RM Inv. Co. v. US Forest Service, 511 F.3d 1103, 10th Cir. (2007)
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United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
December 28, 2007
PUBLISH
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT
R.M. INVESTMENT CO., doing
business as Trappers Lake Lodge and
Resort,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
No. 06-1456
UNITED STATES FOREST
SERVICE; DON G. CARROLL, in his
official capacity as White River
National Forest Supervisor,
Defendant - Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
(D.C. NO. 04-cv-2314-REB)
Submitted on the briefs: *
Tracy A. Oldemeyer, Cline, Williams, Wright, Johnson & Oldfather, L.L.P., Fort
Collins, Colorado, for Plaintiff - Appellant.
Matthew J. McKeown, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Washington, D.C.,
Troy A. Eid, United States Attorney, and Kevin Traskos, Assistant United States
Attorney, Denver, Colorado, Ellen Durkee and M. Alice Thurston, Attorneys,
United States Department of Justice, Environment & Natural Resources Division,
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
and Kenneth Pitt, Office of the General Counsel, Department of Agriculture, and
Kenneth Pitt, Office of the General Counsel, Department of Agriculture,
Washington, D.C., for Defendants - Appellees.
Before HARTZ, Circuit Judge, BRORBY, Senior Circuit Judge, and
TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judge.
HARTZ, Circuit Judge.
R.M. Investment Co., doing business as Trappers Lake Lodge and Resort
(Trappers), appeals a district-court order vacating as moot its prior order setting
aside a decision by the United States Forest Service that had revoked Trappers
permits to operate a lodge and an outfitter-guide service. Trappers also appeals
an order denying its request for attorney fees under the Equal Access to Justice
Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. 2412. We affirm.
I.
BACKGROUND
Trappers operated a lodge and outfitter-guide activities on land in the
White River National Forest in Colorado. The Forest Service granted Trappers
the necessary permits for this use of national-forest land. In June 2003 the Forest
Service issued Trappers a Notice of Noncompliance asserting that it was in
violation of some of the terms and conditions of the permits. Trappers responded
three days later, stating why it believed itself to be in compliance. The Forest
Service neither acknowledged the response nor took any further action for nearly
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a year. On May 26, 2004, it issued a Notice of Immediate Suspension based on
its immediate concern for environmental and public safety. Aplt. App. at 125.
On June 7 it issued a Notice of Noncompliance and Opportunity to Cure, giving
Trappers until August 15 to take corrective action itemized in the notice.
Trappers response of June 16 crossed in the mail with a June 15 Notice of
Revocation, which set forth additional alleged permit violations. The revocation
notice required Trappers to remove its improvements from the forest land.
Trappers pursued an administrative appeal but was unsuccessful. It then
sought review under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) in the United
States District Court for the District of Colorado. See 5 U.S.C. 701-706.
Relief available under the APA does not include damages. See id. 702.
On October 7, 2005, while the case was pending in district court, Trappers
sold its White River assets but did not advise the court. On October 19, 2005, the
court entered an order setting aside the Notice of Revocation because the Forest
Service had violated proper procedure in revoking the permits. The court also
granted Trappers its costs but denied attorney fees to Trappers on the ground that
the Forest Services position was substantially justified. On November 3, 2005,
the Forest Service moved to vacate the judgment, contending that Trappers sale
of its property had mooted the case before the district court issued its order. The
district court granted the motion on September 5, 2006, dismissing the case as
moot and vacating the October 2005 judgment.
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Trappers appeals, arguing that the district court erred in determining that
the case is moot. It also challenges the district courts denial of its request for
attorney fees under the EAJA, asserting that the Forest Services position was not
substantially justified.
II.
DISCUSSION
A.
Mootness
Under Article III of the Constitution, federal courts may adjudicate only
actual, ongoing cases or controversies. Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp.,
494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990). A federal court lacks jurisdiction unless a litigant
[has] suffered, or [is] threatened with, an actual injury traceable to the defendant
and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision. Id. To qualify as a
case fit for federal-court adjudication, an actual controversy must be extant at all
stages of review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed. Arizonans for
Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 67 (1997) (internal quotation marks
omitted). On the other hand,
[w]e will not dismiss [a case] as moot if (1) secondary or collateral
injuries survive after resolution of the primary injury; (2) the issue is
deemed a wrong capable of repetition yet evading review; (3) the
defendant voluntarily ceases an allegedly illegal practice but is free
to resume it at any time; or (4) it is a properly certified class action
suit.
Riley v. INS, 310 F.3d 1253, 1257 (10th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks
omitted). We review de novo the question of whether a case is moot. Unified
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Sch. Dist. No. 259 v. Disability Rights Ctr. of Kan., 491 F.3d 1143, 1147 (10th
Cir. 2007).
Trappers raises several contentions why its district-court action is not moot.
First, it contends that its effort under the APA to vindicate its rights is
functionally the same as a civil-rights suit for nominal damages under 42 U.S.C.
1983. It argues that because such a 1983 suit is justiciable, see OConnor v.
City & County of Denver, 894 F.2d 1210, 121516 (10th Cir. 1990), so should be
the present action. It quotes the following recent statement by this court: It may
seem odd that a complaint for nominal damages could satisfy Article IIIs case or
controversy requirements, when a functionally identical claim for declaratory
relief will not. But this Court has squarely so held. Utah Animal Rights Coal. v.
Salt Lake City Corp., 371 F.3d 1248, 1257 (10th Cir. 2004) (footnote omitted).
That statement, however, does not support, but undermines, Trappers contention.
The issue in Utah Animal Rights Coalition was whether we should continue to
recognize the prospect of nominal damages as sufficient to continue a case or
controversy that would otherwise be moot. We followed our precedent saying
that it would suffice. Rather than saying that nominal damages are irrelevant, we
said that they could be dispositive. Take away the nominal damages in that case
and no case or controversy remained. Because Trappers has no claim for nominal
damages, it cannot rely on nominal-damages cases to overcome mootness.
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Along the same lines, Trappers contends that a judgment against the Forest
Service will serve the public good by proclaiming the Forest Services
misconduct and deterring future such behavior. It quotes this courts statement
that [t]he core question in mootness inquiry is whether granting a present
determination of the issues offered . . . will have some effect in the real world.
Kennecott Utah Copper Corp. v. Becker, 186 F.3d 1261, 1266 (10th Cir. 1999)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Under that standard, it suggests, deterrence is
a real-world effect that makes the case justiciable. The real-world effect,
however, must be on the legal relationship between the parties to the case. The
touchstone of the mootness inquiry is whether the controversy continues to touch
the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests in the outcome of the
case . . . . Wirsching v. Colorado, 360 F.3d 1191, 1196 (10th Cir. 2004)
(internal quotation marks omitted). To be justiciable, a case must seek to redress
a cognizable Article III injury, Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Envt, 523 U.S.
83, 107 (1998), and the injury that others may suffer from future similar
wrongdoing is not such an injury. Article III denies federal courts the power to
decide questions that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case before them.
Lewis, 494 U.S. at 477 (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, in Steel
Co. the Supreme Court rejected the proposition that the prospect of deterring
future harm by the defendant sufficed to overcome mootness. See 523 U.S. at
10607.
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Trappers also contends that it has suffered and will suffer collateral
consequences that preclude mootness. It states that mootness will preclude it
from obtaining reimbursement of its attorney fees under the EAJA. But a claim
of entitlement to attorneys fees does not preserve a moot cause of action,
although the expiration of the underlying cause of action does not moot a
controversy over attorneys fees already incurred, Dahlem ex. rel Dahlem v. Bd.
of Educ. of Denver Pub. Schs., 901 F.2d 1508, 1511 (10th Cir. 1990) (citations
omitted). Trappers further notes that it incurred other expenses in pursuing its
claim; but we fail to see the relevance of that fact, because it has not sought
damages and could not obtain any judicial relief from those expenses.
As an additional collateral consequence, Trappers alleges injury to its
reputation. But the moral stigma of a judgment which no longer affects legal
rights does not present a case or controversy for appellate review, Spencer v.
Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 89 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted); see id. at 16
n.8, although we note, as discussed at length in Spencer, that the impact of this
proposition has been diminished in the criminal context, where the Supreme Court
has presumed that a conviction carries collateral consequences, see id. at 913.
Trappers has failed to show that it has suffered a stigma that will affect its legal
rights. At most, it speculates that the Forest Services ruling may be a factor in
some future adverse decision against it. That possibility does not create a case or
controversy. See id. at 1416.
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Finally, Trappers appears to suggest that its claim should not be deemed
moot because the event that created mootnessits sale of its assetswas forced
upon it by the Forest Service. The Forest Service ruling, however, required
removal, not sale, of the assets. Moreover, the force imposed on Trappers by
the Forest Service was no more than an adverse decision subject to judicial
review, and Trappers could have sought a stay of the agencys directive pending
the district courts ruling. Cf. Am. Book Co. v. Kan. ex rel. Nichols, 193 U.S. 49,
52 (1904) (Compliance with judgment rendered case moot. It makes no
difference that plaintiff in error felt coerced into compliance. A judgment
usually has a coercive effect, and necessarily presents to the party against whom
it is rendered the consideration whether it is better to comply or continue the
litigation.).
B.
Attorney Fees
As we previously noted, the expiration of the underlying cause of action
does not moot a controversy over attorneys fees already incurred. Dahlem, 901
F.2d at 1511; accord Citizens for Responsible Govt State Political Action Comm.
v. Davidson, 236 F.3d 1174, 1183 (10th Cir. 2000). The EAJA requires a court to
award a prevailing party its attorney fees and other expenses incurred in a
proceeding brought by or against the United States in any court having
jurisdiction of that action, unless the court finds that the position of the United
States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award
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unjust. 28 U.S.C. 2412(d)(1)(A). The burden to demonstrate substantial
justification is on the government. Hackett v. Barnhart, 475 F.3d 1166, 1172
(10th Cir. 2007). We review for an abuse of discretion a district courts
determination that the governments position was substantially justified. See id.
In doing so, we evaluate whether its position was reasonable in law and fact. See
id. The governments position can be justified even though it is not correct.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
The district court held that the Forest Services position was substantially
justified. We affirm the district courts denial of an EAJA award.
III.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
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