G.R. No.

104813 October 21, 1993

HEIRS OF JOSE OLVIGA, NAMELY: PLACIDA S. OLVIGA,

VIRGILIO OLVIGA, LOLITA OLVIGA, CARMENCITA O.
ALPUERTO and JEANETTE OLILA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ANGELITA R. GLOR,

SERILINA G. JAMON, EMELITA G. MADELA, EMAN G. MANALO,

MYRNA GLOR, FELIPE GLOR, GAUDENCIO GLOR and
CORNELIO GLOR, respondents.
Natalio T. Paril, Jr. for petitioners.
Leovigildo L. Cerilla for private respondents.

GRIO-AQUINO, J.:
This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 30542, affirming in toto the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Calauag, Quezon ordering the defendants, heirs of Jose Olviga
(petitioners herein), to reconvey the land in dispute to the plaintiffs, heirs
of Cornelia Glor (now private respondents),and to pay attorney's fees and
the costs of suit.
This case started as an action (Civil Case No. C-883) filed in the Regional
Trial Court of Calauag, Quezon by Angelita Glor and her children against
the heirs of Jose Olviga for reconveyance of a parcel of land, measuring
54,406 square meters (5.44 has), more or less, known as Lot 13, Pls-84 of
the Guinayangan Public Land Subdivision.
The court, after due trial, rendered judgment in favor of the private
respondents, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, and considering the foregoing judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of the PLAINTIFFS and against the defendants as heirs
of Jose Olviga to reconvey the land in dispute to the plaintiffs as heirs of
Cornelio Glor Sr.; condemning the defendants jointly and severally to pay
the plaintiffs attorneys fees of P5,000.00 plus the costs of the suit. The
counterclaim interposed by defendants is dismissed. ( p. 12, Rollo.)
The judgment was appealed to the Court of Appeals by the defendants
who raised several factual issues regarding possession and fraud, as well
as legal issues involving prescription and purchaser in good faith, but the
appellate court dismissed the appeal and affirmed in toto the decision of

the trial court.

It was established by the evidence on record that the land in question
was, in 1950, still forest land when Eutiquio Pureza, then only twelve
years old, and his father cleared and cultivated it. In 1954, they
introduced improvements such as, coconut trees, jackfruit, mangoes,
avocado and bananas. When the area was released for disposition, the
Bureau of Lands surveyed the same in 1956 in the name of Eutiquio
Pureza. Since then, the land has been known as Lot 13, Pls-84 of the
Guinayangan Public Land Subdivision. Godofredo Olviga, a son of Jose
Olviga then living with the latter, protested the survey but without
respect to a one-half-hectare portion "sa dakong panulukan ng
Amihanan-Silanganan." This protest or "tutol" (Exh. B) of Godofredo
Olviga, brother of petitioners Virgilio Olviga and Lolita Olviga Olila, is of
public record in the Bureau of Lands (Exh. B). In said document,
Godofredo Olviga expressly admitted that the lot belonged to Eutiquio
Pureza, except the 1/2 hectare portion claimed by him (Godofredo) which
was included in the survey of Pureza's Lot 13.
In 1960, Eutiquio Pureza filed a homestead application over Lot 13.
Without his application having been acted upon, he transferred his rights
in said lot to Cornelia Glor in 1961. Neither the homestead application of
Eutiquio nor the proposed transfer of his rights to Cornelio Glor was
acted upon by the Director of Lands for reasons that the records of the
Bureau of Lands do not disclose.
In 1967, Jose Olviga obtained a registered title for said lot in a cadastral
proceeding, in fraud of the rights of Pureza and his transferee, Cornelio
Glor and his family who were the real and actual occupants of the land.
What must have happened as found by the Court of Appeals, is that since
Cornelio Glor, Sr. was sickly, and his wife (now widowed) Angelita Glor,
was unschooled, they failed to follow up Pureza's homestead application
over Lot 13 in the cadastral proceedings in the Municipal Court of
Guinayangan Public Land Subdivision, Pls-84, Case 1 (Philcusa-Foa). In
fact, they were not aware of the proceedings. Angelita Glor testified that
no notice was ever posted on Lot 13 about the proceedings nor did the
barangay captain, tell her about them. Neither did she receive any notice
from the court sheriff or any court employee. This non-posting of the
hearing of the cadastral hearing on the land, or in the barangay hall, was

confirmed by petitioner Virgilio Olviga himself who testified that he did

not notice any papers posted on the property in question (tsn, October 18,
1990, pp. 83-84). On the other hand, petitioner's father Jose Olviga,
claimed both Lots 12 and 13, which are adjoining lots, in the same
cadastral proceedings. He falsely omitted in his answer mention of the
fact that other persons were in possession of, and claiming adverse
interest in, Lot 13 and that the land had been surveyed for Eutiquio
Pureza, the former occupant who sold his interests to private
respondents' parent. Cornelio Glor, in 1961. Glor was Olviga's neighbor.
As a result, both Lots 12 and 13 were declared as uncontested in the name
of Jose Olviga (Exh. 7), and were registered in his name in 1967 in
Original Certificate of Title, No. 0-12713 (Exh. 5). In 1971, Olviga
requested that OCT No. 0-12713 be split into two (2) TCT's, one each for
the two (2) lots. TCT Nos. T-103823 and T-103824 were issued for lots 12
and 13, respectively. Jose Olviga later transferred Lot 13 to his son-inlaw, Jaime Olila and daughter, Lolita Olviga resulting in the cancellation
of TCT. No. 241314 in the names of the spouses (Exh. 3).
It was also established that the spouses Jaime Olila and Lolita Olviga
Olila, were not innocent purchasers for value of the land from their father,
and have never been in the possession. The Glors and their predecessorin-interest (Cornelio Glor Sr., and Eutiquio Pureza) were the ones found
to be in possession of the property.
From said finding, and conclusions, the appellate court in its decision
dated January 13, 1992, resolved the issues presented, thus:
. . ., whether or not plaintiffs' action is really one for quieting of title that
does not prescribe; or assuming that their demand for reconveyance of the
lot in question prescribes in ten years, being based on an implied trust,
whether their cause of action should be counted from the date of the
issuance of the late Jose Olviga's title over said lot in 1967 and has,
therefore, already prescribed, or whether the prescriptive period should
be counted from the date plaintiffs acquired knowledge of said title
sometime in 1988.
The first question should be answered in the affirmative. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
But even assuming that plaintiffs' action for reconveyance, being based on
an implied or constructive trust, prescribes in ten years, the lower court

again correctly ruled that their cause of action should be considered to

have accrued not from the date of registration of the title of Jose Olviga,
defendants' predecessor-in-interest, over the lot in question in 1967, but
only from the time the plaintiffs learned of such title in 1988. . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
All in all, therefore, the court a quo did not err in holding that plaintiffs'
action against defendants-appellants for the reconveyance of the lot in
question filed on April 10, 1989, or in less than a year after they learned
of the issuance of a title over said lot to Jose Olviga, predecessor-ininterest of defendants, has not yet prescribed.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from herein is AFFIRMED in toto,
with costs against defendants-appellants. (pp. 48-51, Rollo.)
Petitioners now seek a review of the above decision. They allege that the
present action has already prescribed; (2) the Court of Appeals erred
when it ruled that the private respondents' cause of action accrued not in
1967 but in 1988; (3) that the Court of Appeals erred when it failed to
consider that private respondents as mere homestead transferees cannot
maintain an action for reconveyance; (4) that the Faja and Caragay-Layno
cases have no bearing and direct application to the case at bar; and (5)
that private respondents have not proven by preponderance of evidence
their ownership and possession of the disputed land.
With regard to the issue of prescription, this Court has ruled a number of
times before an action for reconveyance of a parcel of land based on
implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years, the point of
reference being the date of registration of the deed of the date of the
issuance of the certificate of title over the property (Vda. de Portugal vs.
IAC, 159 SCRA 178). But this rule applies only when the plaintiff is not
in possession of the property, since if a person claiming to be the owner
thereof is in actual possession of the property, the right to seek
reconveyance, which in effect seeks to quiet title to the property, does not
prescribe.
In Sapto vs. Fabiana, 103 Phil. 683, 686-687, appellants' predecessors sold
to appellees in 1931 a parcel of land. The sale was approved by the
Provincial Governor of Davao but was never registered. Possession of the
land was, however, transferred to Fabiana and the latter has been in
possession thereof from 1931 up to the present. The widow and children

of Samuel Sapto filed an action to recover the land. This Court in

affirming the validity of the sale in favor of appellee (Fabiana) held:
No enforcement of the contract is in fact needed, since the delivery of
possession of the land sold had consummated, the sale and transferred
title to the purchaser, registration of the contract not being indispensable
as between the parties. Actually the action for conveyance was one to
quiet title, i.e., to remove the cloud cast upon appellee's ownership by the
refusal of the appellants to recognize the sale made by their predecessors.
This action accrued only when appellants initiated their suit to recover
the land in 1954. Furthermore, it is an established rule of American
jurisprudence (made applicable in this jurisdiction by Art. 480 of the New
Civil Code) that actions to quiet title to property in the possession of the
plaintiff are imprescriptible (44 Am. Jur. p. 47; Cooper vs. Rhea, 39 L.R.A.
930; Inland Empire Land Co. vs. Grant County, 138 Wash. 439 245 Pac.
14).
In Faja vs. Court of Appeals, 75 SCRA 441, 446, this Court likewise
reiterated the ruling that:
. . . There is settled jurisprudence that one who is in actual possession of
a piece of land claiming to be owner thereof may wait until his possession
is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his
right, the reason for the rule being, that his undisturbed possession gives
him a continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and
determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect
on his own title, which right can be claimed only by one who is in
possession. No better situation can be conceived at the moment for Us to
apply this rule on equity than that of herein petitioners whose mother,
Felipa Faja, was in possession of the litigated property for no less than 30
years and was suddenly confronted with a claim that the land she had
been occupying and cultivating all these years, was titled in the name of a
third person. We hold that in such situation the right to quiet title to the
property, to seek its reconveyance and annul any certificate of title
covering it, accrued only from the time in possession was made aware of a
claim adverse to his own, and it is only then that the statutory period of
prescription commences to run against possessor.
In the case at bar, private respondents and their predecessors-in-interest
were in actual possession of the property since 1950. Their undisturbed

possession gave them the continuing right to seek the aid of a court of
equity to determine the nature of the adverse claim of petitioners, who in
198 disturbed their possession.
The other issues raised in the petition are factual.
The Court of Appeals and the trial court correctly based their findings of
tact on the testimonies of the parties and their witnessess. It can be said
therefore that those conclusions are based on substantial evidence. No
cogent reason exists to disturb them. As reiterated in a long line of
decisions, it is beyond the province of this Court to make its own findings
of facts different from those of the trial court as affirmed by the Court of
Appeals (Vda. de Cailles vs. Mayuga 170 SCRA 347; New
Owners/Management of TML Garments, Inc. vs. Zaragosa, 170 SCRA
563). In petitions for review of decisions of the Court of Appeals, the
jurisdiction of this Court is confined to a review of questions of law, except
when the findings of fact are not supported by the records or are so
glaringly erroneous as to constitute a serious abuse of discretion (Lim vs.
Court of Appeals, 158 SCRA 307; Samson vs. CA, 141 SCRA 194;
Republic vs. IAC, 144 SCRA 705). The case at bar does not fall under the
exceptions.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision of the Court of
Appeals, the petition for review is DENIED, with costs against the
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo and Quiason, JJ., concur.