DRDC - Defensive Aids Suite Technology

Preliminary study of defensive aids suite
technology for the armour combat vehicle

programme
J.L.Rapanotti
A.Cantin
R.G.Dickinson
DRDCValcartier
Defence R&D Canada Valcartier

Technical Memorandum
DRDC Valcartier TM 2003-274
February 2007
Preliminary study of
defensive aids suite technology for the
armour combat vehicle programme
J.L. Rapanotti
A. Cantin
R. G. Dickinson
DRDC Valcartier
Defence R & D Valcartier

DRDC Valcartier TM 2003274
February 2007
Author
J.L. Rapanotti
Approved by
Philip Twardawa
Head, Electro-Optical Warfare
Approved for release by
Gilles Berube
Chief Scientist
This study is in direct support of the major project FAVS-TD (Future Amoured Vehicle Systems -
Technology Demonstrator) and minor project DAS for LAV as described in work unit 2fi16.

c Her Majesty the Queen as represented by the Minister of National Defence, 2007

c Sa majeste la reine, representee par le ministre de la Defense nationale, 2007
Abstract
On future missions, the Leopard 1 Main Battle Tank (MBT) and Cougar tank trainer will be
replaced by an Armoured Combat Vehicle (ACV) providing direct fire support for Light
Armoured Vehicles (LAVs). These new ACVs will be significantly better than the Cougar but
will lack the survivability of the MBT. To overcome this deficiency, a suite of sensors and
countermeasures will be proposed. This Defensive Aids Suite (DAS) will include sensor data
processing to provide prioritized solutions to threats while interfacing with other vehicle
resources through a data bus. The initial DAS design will detect virtually all laser-based threats
and counter with obscurants, evasive manoeuvres and direct fire. A modular, federated approach
to the design of the DAS, will facilitate upgrades and mission configurability. Future upgrades
recommended are missile launch detection and tracking, directed infrared jamming and laser
dazzling and a hard-kill system based on radar. Related areas of investigation have been
identified including camouflage and signature management to improve vehicle stealth.
Additional areas of development include modelling and simulation to determine the benefit of
new technologies, sensor, countermeasure and algorithm development, scene generation for the
DAS processor and crew training. This will be a preliminary study and will serve as a reference
for future study in this area.

Resum e
Au cours des missions futures, les chars dassaut (CCP) Leopard 1 et le vehicule Cougar,
seront remplaces par un vehicule blinde de combat (VBC) fournissant lappui-feu direct pour les
vehicules blindes legers (VBL). Ces nouveaux VBC seront nettement meilleurs que le Cougar
mais leur surviabilite negalera pas celle du CCP. Afin de pallier ce defaut, une suite de capteurs
et de contre-mesures sera developpee. Cette suite daides a` la defense (SAD) inclura le
traitement de donnees de capteurs pour fournir des solutions prioritaires aux menaces tout en se
connectant par interface a` dautres ressources du vehicule par un bus de donnees. La conception
initiale de la SAD detectera pratiquement toutes les menaces laser et y ragire l'aide d'obscurcissants,
de manoeuvres e vasives et du tir direct. Une approche modulaire et federee a` la conception de la
SAD facilitera la mise a` niveau et la configuration de missions. Les futures mises a` niveau
recommandees sont la detection de lancement de missiles et le brouillage infrarouge dirige et
e blouissant par laser et un système de destruction de la menace basee sur la detection par radar.
Des domaines de recherche connexes comprenant le camouflage et la gestion de la signature pour
ameliorer le furtivite du vehicule ont e te identifies . Les domaines additionnels du
developpement incluent la modelisation et la simulation afin de determiner lavantage des
nouvelles technologies, des capteurs, des contre-mesures et le developpement dalgorithmes, des
modèles de champs de bataille pour lordinateur de la SAD et la formation dequipages. Ce sera
une e tude preliminaire qui servira de reference dans ce domaine.
DRDC Valcartier TM 2003274 i

Executive summary
The Leopard 1 Main Battle Tank (MBT) and Cougar tank trainer will be replaced by an
Armoured Combat Vehicle (ACV) providing direct fire support for Light Armoured Vehicles
(LAVs). Preliminary war-gaming studies have shown that the new vehicle will successfully
replace the Cougar but will have a low survivability from the reduction in passive armour.
Explosive reactive armour is a possible option but it is limited by new missile designs based on
multiple shape-charge warheads. LAV survivability can be improved through:
Detection Avoidance based on advanced camouflage techniques and signature management,

and
Threat Avoidance to compensate for the reduction in passive armour through DAS technology
to defeat or avoid threats.
The Defensive Aids Suite (DAS) will include sensor data processing to provide prioritized
solutions to threats while interfacing with other vehicle resources through a data bus. The initial
DAS design will detect virtually all laser-based threats and counter with obscurants, evasive
manoeuvres and direct fire. A modular, federated DAS design, will facilitate upgrades and
mission configurability. Future upgrades recommended are missile launch detection and tracking
and a radar-based hard-kill system.
A vehicle with suitable camouflage and signature management can engage targets at long range
without being detected and use the DAS to defeat short range threats. Signature management
requires a coordinated approach to reduce to background levels: the vehicle radar cross-section
and signatures in the following regimes: visible, infrared, electronic, acoustic, seismic and
magnetic. Based on more mature technology first, the initial DAS system should counter
laser-based threats with hemispheric coverage and 1 resolution. Presently, the more important
threats to the vehicle use lasers for guidance, ranging or target designating. The countermeasures
would include obscurants, manoeuvres and direct fire. At fixed intervals, typically five years, the
state of sensor and countermeasure technology should be reviewed and assessed for
improvements. At year 5 (2010), missile launch detection and tracking should be available using
infrared staring arrays to provide the same hemispheric coverage and levels of accuracy. With
reliable missile detection available, directional infrared countermeasures can be installed to
counter missiles relying on infrared guidance beacons. The directional platform can also include
dazzling since an operator is generally in the loop and therefore offers a capability to handle
multiple threats. At year 10 (2015), active armour, including radar for accurate targeting
information should be available to counter virtually all projectiles. Additional areas of
development which will be pursued in the future include modelling and simulation to determine
the benefit of new sensors, countermeasures and algorithms.
J.L. Rapanotti, A. Cantin and R.G. Dickinson, 2007 Preliminary study of defensive aids suite
technology for the armour combat vehicle programme, DRDC Valcartier TM 2003274,
Defence R& D Canada.
ii DRDC Valcartier TM 2003274

Sommaire
Le char dassaut principal Leopard 1 (CCP) et le Cougar seront remplaces par un vehicule
blinde de combat (VBC) pouvant fournir un appui-feu direct pour les vehicules blindes legers
(VBL). Des e tudes preliminaires de simulations de guerre ont demontre que le nouveau vehicule
remplacera avec succès le Cougar, mais sa surviabilite sera reduite a` cause de la reduction du
blindage passif. Le blindage reactif est une option possible, mais celle-ci sera limitee par de
nouvelles conceptions de missiles bases sur des ogives a` charges-creuse multiples. La surviabilite
dun VBL peut e tre amelioree par :
Levitement de la detection base sur le camouflage et la gestion de la signature et

Levitement de la menace pour compenser la reduction du blindage passif par la technologie
SAD afin de defaire ou e viter des menaces.
La suite daides a` la defense (SAD) inclura la gestion de donnees du capteur afin de fournir des
solutions prioritaires aux menaces pendant linteraction avec les ressources des autres vehicules
par lintermediaire dun bus de donnees. La conception initiale SAD detectera virtuellement
toutes les menaces basees sur les lasers qui seront contrees avec des obscurcissants, des
manoeuvres e vasives et lattaque directe. Une conception modulaire et federee de la SAD
facilitera la mise a` niveau et la configurabilite des missions. Les mises a` niveau futures
recommandees sont la detection de lancement de missiles ainsi que leur pistage et un système de
destruction base sur le radar.
Un vehicule avec du camouflage et une gestion de la signature peut affronter des cibles a` une
grande distance sans e tre detecte et utiliser la SAD pour vaincre les menaces a` faible distance. La
gestion de la signature exige une approche coordonnee afin de la reduire a` des niveaux
darrière-plan : la section transversale du radar du vehicule et les signatures dans les regimes
suivants : visible, infrarouge, e lectronique, acoustique, sismique et magnetique. Dabord, basee
sur des technologies plus matures, la SAD initiale devrait contrer les menaces laser avec
couverture hemispherique avec 1 de resolution. Presentement, les menaces les plus
importantes utilisent le laser pour le guidage, lestimation de la distance au ciblage. Les
contre-mesures pourraient inclure des obscurcissants, des manoeuvres et lattaque directe. A `
intervalles fixes de cinq ans, letat de la technologie des capteurs et des contre-mesures pourrait
` la cinquième annee (2010), la detection de lancement
e tre revise et e value pour amelioration. A
de missiles et le pistage devrait e tre disponible en utilisant des dispositifs infrarouges pour
fournir la meme couverture hemispherique et les memes niveaux de precision. Avec un système
de detection de missiles, les contre-mesures directionnelles infrarouges pourront e tre installees
afin de contrer les missiles bases sur des balises de guidage infrarouge. La plate-forme
directionnelle pourra aussi inclure leblouissement, puisquun operateur est generalement dans la
boucle, et de ce fait offrir la capacite de prendre en charge plusieurs menaces.
DRDC Valcartier TM 2003274 iii

` la dixième annee (2015), le blindage actif incluant le radar pour un pistage precis devrait e tre
A
disponible pour contrer virtuellement tous les projectiles. Des domaines additionnels de
developpement qui seront entrepris dans le futur incluront la modelisation et la simulation pour
determiner les bienfaits des nouveaux capteurs, contre-mesures et algorithmes.
J.L. Rapanotti, A. Cantin and R.G. Dickinson, 2007 Preliminary study of defensive aids suite
technology for the armour combat vehicle programme, DRDC Valcartier TM 2003274,
Defence R& D Canada.
iv DRDC Valcartier TM 2003274

Table of contents
Abstract . ...............................................................................................i
Resume ................................................................................................ i
Executive summary. ..................................................................................ii
Sommaire ............................................................................................ iii
Table of contents . .....................................................................................v
List of figures........................................................................................vii
List of tables . ....................................................................................... viii
Acknowledgements . ................................................................................. ix
1. Introduction . ................................................................................. 1
2. Threats of operational significance. .........................................................4

2.1 Threat classification. ................................................................5
2.1.1 Threat countermeasures . .................................................. 5
3. Current and near-future DAS technologies . ................................................ 7

3.1 DAS Systems for laser-based threats. ..............................................9
3.2 DAS systems for SACLOS missile threats . ...................................... 10
3.3 Obscurants and launcher systems . ................................................10
3.4 DAS Processors. ...................................................................11
4. Relative maturity of DAS technology ..................................................... 12

4.1 In-production equipment . ......................................................... 12
4.2 Working prototypes. ...............................................................12
4.3 Engineering/advanced development model.......................................12
5. Cost-benefit and sensitivity considerations . ............................................... 15

5.1 Indicative costs . ................................................................... 17
5.2 DAS effectiveness toward ACV survivability . ................................... 17
DRDC Valcartier TM 2003274 v

5.3 Cost versus technical risk . ........................................................ 18
6. DAS development based on operations research . ......................................... 19

6.1 General approach to studying DAS effectiveness . ............................... 20
6.2 DAS system effectiveness study . ................................................. 21
6.2.1 Inputs for system effectiveness study . ................................... 22
6.2.2 Availability of data from trials such as Pronghorn . ..................... 23
6.2.3 Man machine interface . .................................................. 23
6.2.4 Man-in-the loop, hardware-in-the-loop simulation. .....................23
6.2.5 Countermeasure tactics. ..................................................23
6.2.6 Questions for system effectiveness study. ...............................24
6.3 DAS battlefield effectiveness study . ..............................................24
6.3.1 Inputs for war-gaming. ...................................................24
6.3.2 Questions for battlefield effectiveness study . ........................... 26
7. ACV definition and implementation . ...................................................... 27

7.1 Modular DAS development project. ..............................................27
7.2 DAS Development through modelling and simulation. ..........................27
7.3 Missile Launch detection and tracking (MLDT) ................................. 27
7.4 MLDT Development with third parties. ..........................................28
7.5 Platform signature management . ................................................. 28
7.6 Threat Missile signature trials .................................................... 28
7.7 Soft-kill and hard-kill systems . ................................................... 28
7.8 General purpose DAS for LAV variants . ......................................... 29
8. Concluding remarks . ....................................................................... 32
9. References . ................................................................................. 33
List of symbols/abbreviations/acronyms/initialisms . .............................................. 35
Annex A: Detection and tracking avoidance through signature management. ....................37
Distribution list . ..................................................................................... 39
vi DRDC Valcartier TM 2003274

List of figures
Figure 1. Layers of survivability.. ....................................................................3

Figure 2. Incremental evolution of DAS technology.. ...............................................7
Figure 3. The DAS prototype developed for use at the pronghorn trials . ......................... 13
Figure 4. ModSAF development. . .................................................................. 21
Figure 5. A notional event timeline for defence against missile attack. . .......................... 22
Figure 6. A notional defensive probability curve for use in high-level war-gaming . ............. 25
DRDC Valcartier TM 2003274 vii

List of tables
Table 1. threat missiles classified by guidance or communications system.........................4

Table 2. Lockheed Martin MCD SACLOS effectiveness . ......................................... 14
viii DRDC Valcartier TM 2003274

Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank Messrs. Christian Carrier and David Saint for suggesting this
work. The support provided by Majors Mark Espenant, Robert Bouchard and James Atkins is
greatly appreciated.
DRDC Valcartier TM 2003274 ix

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x DRDC Valcartier TM 2003274

1. Introduction
An operational requirement has been identified to acquire an Armoured Combat Vehicle. The
ACV will improve the direct fire support capability arising from the expanding role of the LAVs.
Under current doctrine, Canadian troops must be protected in Armoured Personnel Carriers
(APC). The direct fire support will suppress hostile direct fire including threats from Main Battle
Tanks (MBTs), Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFVs) and strong points. The ACV project, (Ref. [1]),
can be conducted in two phases:
1. Phase One will replace 195 of the Cougar tank trainers. Operationally, the ACV will
provide direct fire in support of some combat operations and in Operations Other Than War
(OOTW);
2. Phase Two will replace the Leopard 1 MBT with a light vehicle similar to the ACV in phase
one but capable of undertaking the most demanding combat operations.
According to the project definition, (Ref. [1]), the phase I ACV will not be able to replace the
MBT in all roles but must be capable of firing kinetic energy rounds, chemical energy rounds and
anti-tank guided missiles. The vehicle will be a LAV and use signature management, a Defensive
Aids Suite (DAS) and local hardening, (Ref. [2]), to maximize crew survivability through
detection and hit avoidance and reduced armour penetration. The various aspects of vehicle
defence are often depicted as layers as shown in Figure 1. Advanced sensor systems and
communications will provide the crew with a high degree of situational awareness and
integration. The unpredictable operational environment, planned longevity of the platform and
rapid advances in technology, will require an ACV with a high degree of growth potential
through modularity and mission configurability.
A war-gaming study, (Ref. [3]), was undertaken to determine the effectiveness of a conceptual
ACV using a 105 mm gun. It was shown that the ACV was likely to suffer half the casualties and
kill twice the number of enemy compared to a Cougar force. The conclusion is that the basic
ACV would be a successful replacement for the Cougar.
In a comparison of the Abrams M1A2 MBT with a T-80, the M1A2 defence is twice as effective
as that of the ACV and the attack is three times more effective. In considering the lethality of the
basic ACV, the ACV can only defeat the T-80 head-on when the MBT is exposed and at close
range. War-gaming results also show that the ACV is very vulnerable when exposed. Equipping
the ACV with a through-the-barrel missile resulted in an increased long-range capability, a
fourfold improvement in the number of head-on engagements and a corresponding increase in
the loss exchange ratio. An up-armoured ACV with 400 mm of additional frontal armour was not
significantly better. In assessing the vulnerability to indirect fire the ACV was shown to suffer
three times the losses of the M1A2.
Vehicle survivability can be represented usefully by a series of layers, as shown in Figure 1. New
vehicles designs emphasize the first two layers, detection and hit avoidance, to survive an attack.
In the first layer, survivability can be improved by reducing the size and silhouette of the vehicle
and through signature management, which is the reduction to background levels of the radar
DRDC Valcartier TM 2003274 1

cross-section and signature in the visible, infrared, electronic, acoustic, seismic and magnetic
domains.
The next layer, the DAS layer, relies on a system of sensors to collect data, which is then
processed to determine the presence of any threats. This system is interfaced to countermeasures
through processors, which will determine a prioritized list of responses. As the challenges of hit
avoidance, including short timelines and numerous threats, are addressed, the solutions will lead
to weapons of greater precision and increased tempo on the battlefield through automation.
In the war-gaming study, (Ref. [3]), a DAS would have decreased vehicle vulnerability and
therefore significantly improved the performance of the basic ACV. However, the ACV was still
highly vulnerable. The high performance of the M1A2, as suggested by the study, justifies the
reluctance demonstrated by the US Army in improving that platform and instead channeling
more resources in developing the Future Combat System (FCS). In general, a MBT will survive
small calibre rounds and debris from indirect fire better than the DAS-equipped LAV. The LAV
however will be better suited to handle single anti-tank threats. These differences will help define
roles for both vehicles in the future armies.
The principal objective of this study is to identify, prioritize and recommend options for the ACV
DAS. The threats to the ACV of operational significance are defined. The following chapters are
included in the report. Chapter 2.0 describes two techniques to reduce threats to the ACV. These
include signature management and DAS technology. Chapter 3.0 explains in more detail current
and near term DAS technologies. Chapter 4.0 ranks the DAS in terms of readiness for use in the
field. In Chapter 5.0 the more promising systems are analyzed for cost versus benefit. The
various aspects of operations research in developing the DAS are outlined in Chapter 6.0. In
Chapter 7.0 the DAS and DAS-related activities, recommended for the ACV definition study are
discussed. Conclusion and concluding remarks are outlined in Chapter 8.0. The reference
materials used in the report are listed in Chapter 9.0. A list of acronyms is also included at the
end of the memorandum.
2 DRDC Valcartier TM 2003274

DAS layer
Don't be Seen
Signature Management Camouflage
Materials Don't be Hit Geometry
Coatings IR Countermeasures Acoustic Sensors
Shape Missile Warning
Active Protection
Don't be Penetrated
Advanced Passive Armour Radar Warning
Laser Warning
Don't be Killed
Laser CM
Compartmentation
Fire Suppression
NBC Filtration
Figure 1. Layers of survivability. With the reduction of passive armour, greater emphasis is placed
on detection avoidance and on hit avoidance, the DAS layer.

2. Threats of operational significance
The ACV must be suited to a wide range of the operations from peacekeeping and OOTW to
high intensity conflicts. The ACV must provide the necessary firepower, survivability, mobility
and reliability to enable the crew to fight, survive and conduct operations independently, as a
troop, or as part of a combined arms team. The ACV will require protection against attack by
medium cannon, artillery fragments, mines, shaped charge attacks, missiles, lasers, and
dismounted personnel. Of special concern is the protection against tank or ACV guns, vehicle
and air-launched guided missiles, guided and unguided anti-tank weapons, plus conventional and
smart artillery-delivered munitions and submunitions. The latest generation of anti-tank missiles,
and in particular top-attack weapons, offer sufficient lethality to render passive or reactive armour
solutions too heavy.
The light armoured ACV will encounter numerous threats, (Ref. [2]), which must be addressed
through improved technology to avoid detection and tracking and avoid being hit if detected.
Detection and tracking avoidance or stealth can be achieved through signature management
(described in more detail in Annex A). Signature management has to be a coordinated effort to
achieve a balanced result to avoid canceling previous solutions. Stealth and the vehicle DAS are
complementary and must be considered together. Signature measurements are fundamental in
identifying the basic DAS requirements and in eliminating any flaws from the vehicle design or
the design of the upgrade kits.
Among the many threats to land vehicles, a list of 89 missiles was compiled by guidance and
communication links used, (Ref. [4]) and presented in Table 1. Based on the total number of
Table 1. threat missiles classified by guidance or communications system
Number Missile Type, (Ref. [4])
41 Semi-Automatic Command to Line of Sight (SACLOS)

16 Laser Beam Rider (LBR)
11 Manual Command to Line of Sight (MCLOS)
8 Fibre-optic guided missiles (FOGM)
7 Imaging Infrared
6 Laser and millimetric wave designation, including Semi-Active Homing
3 Laser based guidance or communications link
2 Automatic Command to Line of Sight (ACLOS)
1 Radio Frequency Homing
89/95 Total missiles/Total configurations
missile configurations, 26% (25 missiles) can be detected and as laser-based threats. Of these
threats, six rely on laser designators, sixteen of the missiles are beam riders and another three use
either a laser based guidance or communications link. A total of 41 (43% of the missiles) are a
SACLOS design and could be defeated by jamming the signal from the IR beacon used to correct

the missile trajectory. Therefore, a countermeasure, such as smoke, designed to counter
laser-based threats and SACLOS missiles can defeat a total of 66 missiles or 69% . Another
eleven are of MCLOS design, the two ACLOS missiles are fired without operator intervention,
eight rely on a fibre-optic link for guidance, and seven are based on imaging infrared seekers.
The last missile in the list relies on RF illumination of the target.
In this list, missiles that rely on lasers are numerically less significant but are the more serious
threats to the vehicle. Virtually all of these missiles have an operator in the loop which can be
defeated by using a combination of dazzling and obscuration to disrupt aiming. An effective
basic DAS could be based on laser threat detection, missile detection and tracking sensors and
countermeasures including: dazzling , obscurants, evasive manoeuvres and counterfire. This
soft-kill solution is independent of any specific missile design. The alternative to this soft-kill
approach is the hard-kill solution where the missile is physically destroyed. A combination of
soft-kill and hard-kill designs will probably provide an optimum performance.
2.1 Threat classification

There is a requirement for a comprehensive, integrated DAS to provide threat warning and threat
assessment systems which are linked to all vehicle countermeasures and other vehicle systems,
so that response can be taken with little or no action by the vehicle crew. Command and control
for the ACV commander is made increasingly difficult by such factors as enlarged areas of
responsibility, expanding amounts of intelligence, greater range, lethality, accuracy and speed of
engagement of weapon systems, and the growing capability to conduct day and night, all weather
operations. The DAS coverage should be hemispheric and sufficiently precise and accurate to
relay adequate information to the vehicle Fire Control System (FCS) and other countermeasures.
In the infrared regime, staring focal plane arrays can be used to detect and track other vehicles,
missiles and submunitions through a contrast with the background clutter. Radar would also
provide useful information about these threats including more precise position, speed and aid in
threat identification. Acoustic sensor systems can also be useful in determining sniper positions.
Combat identification would provide a necessary means of avoiding direct fire from friendly
forces.
2.1.1 Threat countermeasures
Once a threat is detected and identified, countermeasures are required to either avoid or
neutralize it. The possibility of multiple threats must also be considered. System redundancy can
counter multiple threats and provide an alternative when expendables are depleted.
There is a requirement for a local, rapid obscuration system with good spatial coverage that
produces visible and IR screens. Coverage must obscure the vehicle from the threat position
within 2 s of activation and last for at least 30 s. This coverage requirement should be extended
to include selective hemispheric coverage, without blocking driver vision, and include MMW
screening.
There are also advantages to developing a hard-kill system capable of destroying the threat a safe

distance from the vehicle. A hard-kill system will require the additional information possible
with radar that must be balanced by the need to maintain stealth. The advantage would include an
ability to stop supersonic Kinetic Energy (KE) rounds.

3. Current and near-future DAS technologies
The long service life of the vehicle, uncertainty about the types of missions to be encountered
and rapidly evolving sensor technology are a strong influence on DAS technology. The DAS
should be a federated, modular and mission configurable system, interfaced to the vehicle bus for
access to other systems such as the Fire Control System. To keep the cost as low as possible the
DAS based on more mature technology first and because of the rapidly evolving nature of
technology modified through 5-year upgrades. DAS evolution, represented in Figure 2, could be
carried out as described in the chapters below. The 2010 and 2015 vehicles would be designed to
operate in a network.
2015 Vehicle Networks, High-Speed LBR

2010 Staring, Scanning Optics, Vehicle OS Vehicle bus/FCS
2005 Laser detection, Obscurants
COUNTER-
SENSORS PROCESSORS
MEASURES
Figure 2. The rate at which computer and sensor technologies are developed justifies 5 year
upgrade increments. The more mature technology is implemented beginning with laser-aided
threat detection and visible/IR/MMW obscurants. Improved situational awareness, detection and
identification is possible with staring and scanning optics. An operating system is needed to
interface the vehicle bus and fire control system with the DAS for efficient use of LAV resources.
By 2015, improved survivability can be achieved through vehicle networks and increased
operational tempo and firepower with high-speed missiles. The 2010 and 2015 vehicles would
be designed to operate in a network.
Some desirable DAS features include, modularity, mission configurability and eventually a plug
and play capability. Integrated components and sensor fusion may have better performance but
are less desirable than modular, federated systems that are easier and less costly to upgrade and
optimize. With a modular approach, the DAS can be upgraded incrementally as the technology
and funding becomes available. A federated system can rely on the vehicle bus architecture and
computers to connect the components or subsystems together to form a complete system. The
Galix system described above is an example of a system that can be used to configure and
optimize the vehicle for a wide range of missions.
1. Fitted for, but not fitted with, approach providing a quick response at low cost implies
designing the vehicles for equipment upgrades according to the mission requirements
without needing to purchase for the entire fleet,

2. Modularity including minimizing the interference among subsystems, which can
complicate an upgrade and incremental upgrades of best of breed technology of a
federation of modules instead of an integration of fused sensors,
3. Mission configurability relying, for example, on the Galix grenade system that offers a wide
range of capability from CS gas and stun grenades for peacekeeping to obscurants and
fragmentation grenades for higher intensity warfare and a
4. Plug and play capability facilitating fast upgrading and replacement, and
5. General purpose solutions providing acceptable performance for a wide range of
requirements,
6. Robustness avoiding catastrophic failure of the DAS with sensors based on complementary
technologies and data fusion to improve performance and to replace lost sensors.
This level of readiness also facilitates rapid acquisition of up-to-date technology and further
facilitates rapid deployment.
Based on discussions with UK and US researchers and contractors an optimal solution for a DAS
on the ACV should begin with an implementation of the more mature technology first. The
vehicle should be designed and fitted to receive the newer technology, as it becomes available.
Software should be upgraded at regular intervals to implement new equipment on short notice.
Following this approach, the DAS would be initially designed to counter laser based threats
followed by missile approach warning and radar detection. Countermeasures would begin with
obscurants, counterfire and manoeuvres followed by IR jammers and active protection. Combat
identification is also necessary both in protecting the vehicle against friendly fire and in choosing
an appropriate response to a threat. This modular approach is preferable when rapidly evolving
technology has to be adapted to a vehicle with an expected useful life exceeding 25 years.
In this preliminary study, the availability, maturity and ultimately the affordability of technology
will drive the selection of countermeasures to these threats. Based on these criteria, the basic
DAS should consist of laser threat detection with obscurants, evasive manoeuvres and direct fire
as countermeasures. Sensors and algorithms must be developed to reliably detect missiles,
rockets and other threats directed at the vehicle. With reliable missile detection, the first upgrade
can include installation of a DIRCM to jam certain missiles. The directional platform can also
include a laser dazzling for detection and defeating targeting systems. A second upgrade is
envisioned to include radar, providing accurate targeting information, interfaced to a hard-kill
system.
Two active major trends in DAS technologies include detection of laser-based threats and IR
jamming to defeat SACLOS (Semi-Automatic Command to Line of Sight) missiles. Presently
the detection of laser threat detection is limited to visible and near infrared (0.4-1.7 m) and
includes detection of designators, range finders and beam-riding missiles. This range excludes
lasers operating at 10.6 m. Beam-rider detection generally occurs in a characteristic narrow
range of 0.85-0.95 m. SACLOS missiles rely on an infrared beacon located on the rear of the
missile. The beacon signal is received at the launcher and compared with the position of the
crosshair on the target. Based on this comparison, the guidance system corrects the flight path.
Jamming occurs when the IR signal generated at the vehicle is significantly more powerful than

the signal produced by the infrared beacon. The launcher interprets an incorrect missile position
and the flight path information returned to the missile causes the missile to veer off course.
Xenon lamps, lasers or even pyrotechnic flares can be used to produce the jamming signal.
The challenge in defeating the SACLOS missile, as it is for any surface-to-surface missile, is in
detecting and identifying the missile. The missiles use a gas generator to pitch the missile out a
safe distance before the boost motor ignites. After a relatively short boost phase, to increase the
velocity up from about 75 to 300 m/s, a sustain or coast phase is used to maintain missile
velocity. With current UV Missile Approach Warning System (MAWS) technology, missile
detection has to occur during the ignition or boost phase when there is sufficient heat produced
and the temperatures are high enough to result in significant emission in the IR or even UV
regimes. High temperatures, however, are not essential in subsonic missiles aimed at slow
moving targets. Low performance, but clean burning, double-base propellants can be used
instead of metallic composite propellants to generate the necessary thrust and also avoid
obscuring the guidance system. The problem of detection can be further exacerbated by
suppressed plume afterburning to impede the mid-IR radiators and flash-suppressed igniters to
avoid any UV emission. Missile detection and tracking, if presently adequate, will eventually
have to rely active sensors such as radar.
3.1 DAS Systems for laser-based threats

Raytheon Danbury Optical Systems has developed the AN/VVR-1 Laser Warning Receiver
(LWR) based on the AN/AVR-2A(V), (Ref. [5]). The LWR operating from 0.5-1.6 m is a
staring system and provides angle-of-arrival (AOA) information based on detection of range
finders, designators and beam-riders using four sensors to provide a coverage of 360 in azimuth
and 55 in elevation. According to Communications Electronics Command (CECOM) at Fort
Monmouth, laser warning is the most mature of the sensor technologies. The AN/VVR-1 was
scheduled for use with the M2A3 Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV) but has not gone into
production. The 218S LWR is based on the AN/AVR-2A(V) and is installed on Canadian LAVs.
The 218S is a staring system with a total coverage of 360 in azimuth and 110 elevation using
five detector assemblies. With sensor FOV overlap the 218S can provide 22.5 AOA accuracy.
The AOA has been improved to 1 for a newer version, the VVR-1 described above, for all
laser threats but the beam-riders. Future development of LWR technology will focus on detection
of longer wavelengths and threat identification. Threat identification will rely on real-time
parameters such as characteristic modulation, wavelength and pulse rate. A successful
countermeasure used against laser designator systems has been the laser decoy. Laser decoying
occurs when illuminating a spot on the ground generates a second homing signal.
A prototype DAS based on a 2-band HARLIDTM(High Angular Resolution Laser Irradiation
Detector), (Ref. [6]), and the DRDC-Valcartier beam-rider detector (WARNLOC) is being
developed to detect and locate laser-based threats. The spatial coverage will be better than that of
the AN/VVR-1 extending to hemispheric coverage and detecting laser sources with a typical
accuracy of 1 . Similar to the AN/VVR1 the prototype DAS uses staring technology to detect
rapid events. Future improvement should include integrating the HARLID and WARNLOC in a
single module. Four modules will be distributed about the turret for additional reliability. The
contract to build this prototype was awarded to Litton Systems Canada and is therefore

tentatively called the Litton DAS. The ability to rapidly detect all significant laser-based threats
with pinpoint accuracy over a hemisphere is a significant advantage over similar systems.
3.2 DAS systems for SACLOS missile threats

The DAS systems being developed to defeat SACLOS missiles are described in more detail in
Section 4.4 on concept or technology demonstrators.
3.3 Obscurants and launcher systems

The grenade launcher can be used with a wide range of grenade types depending on the threat
encountered. Smoke, CS gas or fragmentation grenades can be chosen.
The Visible IR Smoke Screen (VIRSS) grenade is a Canadian technology, (Ref. [7]), and can be
adapted to the specific requirements of the ACV, (Ref. [8]). The original requirements were for a
grenade capable of providing spectral coverage from 0.3 to 14 m in less than 3.5 s and lasting at
least 20 s. The requirement is attained by eight grenades launched at 45 to provide a coverage of
110 in azimuth, 7 m high 30 m from the vehicle. Presently, the grenade is a 76 mm canister used
with Wegmann launchers. The Light Armoured Vehicle (LAV) Coyote uses two sets of launchers
without overlap to provide 220 coverage.
Lacroix Defense and Giat Industries have developed an interesting system, the Galix, (Ref. [9]).
For a vehicle intended for OOTW, the launchers have the advantage of being mission
configurable and modular. The system is based on 80 mm diameter canisters that can carry a
greater volume but are incompatible with existing 76 mm systems. The following list describes
the various expendables developed for the Galix system:
Galix-4 consists of two spherical fragmenting grenades covering a region from 5 to 60 m from
the vehicle.
Galix-6 is an IR-decoy flare for second generation SACLOS missiles and consists of an IR
pyrotechnic source fixed over the vehicle. The tethered flare provides omnidirectional
coverage and does not need to be pointed like a DIRCM system. When jamming of the
SACLOS missile occurs, the elevated position of the flare will drive the missile into the
ground. This would also be a useful countermeasure against IR seeking missiles that would
be drawn to the much hotter flare.
Galix-7 is a rocket deployed parachute flare to provide night fire support. The flare generates a
minimum of 5 lux in a 300 m diameter, 1000 m from the vehicle for 30 s.
Galix-13 is a multi-band smoke with visible and IR coverage and an effective screening in less
than 2 s and a persistence greater than 30 s at 20 m from the vehicle. It is a two part system
producing ground coverage as well as an air burst. Coverage extending to the MMW
regime is being planned. This would be a significant improvement and the possibility of
exporting this technology to Canada is being investigated.
Galix-15 is a canister system containing seven CS gas loads, for crowd control and dispersal,
launched 200 m ahead of the vehicle.

Galix-19 is a stun grenade system that can be activated in less than 2 s.
Galix also provides various training rounds for ecological and operator safety.
3.4 DAS Processors

A computer system is required to access and coordinate vehicle resources. A DAS processor has
been developed by the US Army TACOM TARDEC through Lockheed Martin (Sanders) called
Commanders Decision Aid (CDA). The CDA is independent from the Suite of Survivability
Enhancement Systems (SSES) being developed by the Program Manager for Ground System
Integration (PM-GSI) for use on the Abrams MBT and the BFV. Since there is no funding for the
SSES, it would appear that the limited resources are not being use to upgrade the existing
vehicles but are instead directed at the new FCS. The CDA, which was originally developed for
the Crusader vehicle, has been offered to Canada and is therefore of interest. The CDA receives
information from a suite of sensors, processes the information with additional information about
available countermeasures and generates a list of prioritized responses. The CDA then
communicates with the countermeasures and the Vehicle Interface System (VIS). Therefore, the
DAS, or the Integrated Defense System (IDS) as commonly referenced by the US Army,
interfaces with the VIS. An automated response system is the only effective way of reacting to
short timeline events. Crews are often hesitant to rely completely on an automatic system, but as
the crew gains experience and confidence in the system performance using such simulators they
will learn when to rely on semi-automatic and automatic mode. Both the US and UK researchers
feel that crews will only feel comfortable with an automatic mode once they have had a chance to
familiarize themselves with the DAS and DAS controller software.

4. Relative maturity of DAS technology
The amount of effort required to modify and improve current technology presents a certain
technological risk in obtaining the required level of performance. The following chapters
describe the available technology ranked according to levels of product development.
4.1 In-production equipment

There are no DAS systems currently in production, but relevant technology exists in the form of
LWRs, discussed above, acquisition and surveillance.
DRS Technologies has acquired Raytheon Ground Electro-Optical Systems, developers of the
Long-Range Advanced Scout Surveillance System (LRAS3), and the Improved Bradley
Acquisition System (IBAS). IBAS is an upgrade for the Bradley vehicle, increasing target
acquisition performance. IBAS allows the gunner to detect, identify and engage targets at longer
ranges for increased self-survivability and lethality. System improvements also provide enhanced
shoot-on-the-move capability for the Bradley 25 mm gun. IBAS incorporates the Horizontal
Technology Insertion (HTI) Second Generation B-Kit Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) Thermal
Imaging System, also produced by DRS, direct view optics, dual automatic target tracking
capability, eye safe laser range finder capability, a daylight television, and a two-axis, stabilized
pointing head mirror assembly. The IBAS is a scanning system and therefore lacks the ability to
detect rapid events available with staring optics.
4.2 Working prototypes

The Litton DAS will be a prototype designed and built to exploit 2-band HARLIDs and
scheduled for demonstration on LAVs during trial PRONGHORN in October 1999 at CFB
Gagetown. This multi-national trial, comprising the US, UK and Canada, will demonstrate the
effectiveness of a DAS system protecting a LAV Coyote against laser range finders, laser
weapons and laser-aided weapons. The prototype will include a laser warning receiver, a DAS
demonstration processor and a DAS display unit. The prototype block diagram is depicted in
Figure 3. The DAS processor will control the deployment of smoke grenades and will provide
the crew with targeting information to align the turret gun on the laser threat for counterfire.
DELCO GM will be responsible for integrating the prototype on the LAV turret. Based on results
of laboratory and field evaluations, a LWR demonstrator based on HARLIDs was capable of
detecting and locating a 1.064 m laser source to within 1 up to a distance of 3 km and
directed as much as 7 m off-axis from the vehicle. This performance was obtained during the
multinational trial SPRINGBOK held at CFB Gagetown on October 1995.
4.3 Engineering/advanced development model

The Israel Military Industries have developed the Pedestal-Operated Multi-Ammunition
Launching System (POMALS). The POMALS, (Ref. [10]), uses the Amcoram LWS-2 laser

warning system to initiate the firing of smoke, flares or decoys from one or more traversing
multiple-tube launchers. Each launcher contains 16 tubes. The ability of this system to move the
launcher independently of the turret can be an advantage for the ACV.
Laser Warning
System
Azimuth Drive
Assembly
DAS Display, Gun Turret

Touch Screen Drive Electronics
DAS
Demonstration Angle
Processor Encoder
Control and
Laptop Display Assembly
Computer
Tone Grenade
Generator Launchers
Commander's
Hand Controller
Communications
System
Figure 3. The DAS prototype developed for use at the pronghorn trials
Lockheed Martin (Sanders) and Northrop Grumman have developed similar systems to counter
SACLOS missiles. During demonstrations at Socorro, NM, (Ref. [11]), the US Army and
Lockheed Martin (Sanders) mounted five missile-warning sensors on a vehicle. The sensors, four
UV and one IR, are based on the UV staring arrays of the AAR-57 and the Sanders ALQ-212
Advanced Threat IR Countermeasures System (ATIRCM) system. Of the five missiles that
engaged the vehicle, all were defeated when the ATIRCM jammed the guidance system.
Lockheed Martin, (Ref. [12]), is developing the AN/VLQ-6 Missile Countermeasure Device
(MCD). The MCD has a beacon mounted at the top and to the left of the turret. When the missile
is detected, the turret is pointed at the threat and a beam 40 in azimuth and 12 in elevation is
emitted. As the missile reaches 50% distance to target, the MCD signal becomes stronger than
the missile beacon signal received at launcher and the guidance system is captured. The missile
course is corrected based on the beacon that is above and to the right of the crosshair. The
correction causes the missile to fly down and to the left eventually hitting the ground. Table 2
illustrates typical MCD performance.
Northrop Grumman Electronics and Systems Sector at Rolling Meadows collaborated with
CECOM to develop a DIRCM, (Ref. [11]), for ground vehicles based on the AAQ-24(V)
Nemesis DIRCM. Low-power diode lasers to generate the false beacon replaced the Xenon lamp
source from the Nemesis. A Northrop Grumman AAR-54 passive missile warning system
detected missile launches. The AAR-54, originally designed for aircraft, uses six staring UV

Table 2. Lockheed Martin MCD SACLOS effectiveness
Missile launched at Missile capture occurs at Missile grounds at
1000 m (from vehicle) 500 m 250 m

2000 m 1000 m 500 m
3000 m 1500 m 750 m
4000 m 2000 m 1000 m
arrays to provide a near-complete spherical coverage. The jammer was successful in live-fire
demonstrations conducted during March 1996 at the Yuma Proving Grounds. Following the tests,
Northrop has refined the system, now known as the Directed Missile Countermeasures Device
(DMCD), with its own funding. Due to the reluctance of the US Army to install expensive
systems to defend a relatively low cost platform, cost been a major consideration in the design.
The price of the DMCD is about 250K US.

5. Cost-benefit and sensitivity considerations
The term cost-benefit analysis can be ambiguous. When examining system options for the
vehicle numerous criteria must be satisfied. Effectiveness is important, but it may not be the only
or even necessarily the most important criteria. A multiple criteria, evaluation, as done by GD
Canada, (Ref. [13]), for concepts, is necessary for specific system options. Their study makes
two observations that are of special note. First, they observe that many concepts designed to
detect and defeat the specific threat within a scenario failed to score well against the[ir]
evaluation criteria. Second, they observe that in the final analysis many of the concepts were
either too expensive, immature or very complex.
Evaluation of specific DAS system options should begin with a multiple criteria evaluation.
There are different models that could be used for bringing out the risks and benefits. First,
however, the evaluation criteria would have to be agreed. This could include a range wide range
of criteria including the following:
Weight Response times Vulnerability

Size Integration issues Government R& D
Cost Detection ranges Industry R& D
Reliability Technology complexity Environmental Requirements
Adaptability Mission-configurable ...
External mounting Power consumption ...
The selected criteria could also include specific aspects of these broader criteria. It would be
necessary to prioritize each criterion. For each criterion an assessment scale would be
established. This could take a variety of forms such as high, medium, low; a scale of 1 to 10; or
statements of conditions to satisfy higher or lower assessment. The assessment may be defined
qualitatively or quantitatively. Each system would then be assessed according to each criterion by
the assessment scale for that criterion. Risks, benefits and uncertainties would be assessed for
each criterion. Processing of these assessments could vary according to the criteria and
assessment scales. The final result would be an identification of the highest risk and benefit
factors for each option and some ranking of the options.
As one of the criteria, effectiveness could be given more attention. and examined at different
levels. Initially it could be determined whether the basic stated requirements can be met
effectively. This requires looking at timelines to ensure threats can be detected in time with high
probability and appropriate actions or decisions can be made in time. This is based on technical
performance probabilities defined as given a threat is in range what is the probability the system
will detect it.
The probabilities in an event tree can be compared to costs to develop a sense of cost
effectiveness trade-off. Thus a system with very expensive active armour which adds a small
overall increase to probability of successful defence would have a high cost to effectiveness ratio.
Another system with inexpensive obscurants that effectively contribute to vehicle defence would
have a lower and more desirable cost to effectiveness ratio. Some sensitivity analysis could be
applied on these systems. The probability estimates (ranges of values would be best) would have
to be supplied by technical experts.

For a DAS system composed of a set of components where the effects are probabilistically
independent, the overall effectiveness is at least as great as for its most effective component.
Thus, for example, if a very close-in defence system was highly effective against all threats, then
it could form a strong basis for any DAS. For the MBT, the armour provided this effective basis
of defence; for the ACV a system like Smart Armour PROtection System (SAProS) could be an
effective basis. If any particular component is to be the solid basis around which a system is built,
then its performance must be well understood and its performance assessment well founded.
In fact, the components for a DAS will probably not have independent effect and indeed a
component like the laser warning receiver will be an important cueing system for all other
sensors and countermeasures. In this case, a particular component can have a much greater
influence over the overall effectiveness of the DAS.
The active armour system, SAProS, could be the most effective contributor that can be used to
illustrate the complexity of the issues in evaluating and selecting components for a DAS. A
close-in defence system, which was highly reliable in defeating any threat in the terminal stages
of attack could provide a good basic survivability. The prominence of SAProS was primarily
because of their assessment of the importance of the very short range RPG threat; no other
system could react quickly enough for a weapon fired at less than 500 m. The weighting given to
the RPG threat should be tempered by the likelihood that it would be employed in any scenario
of interest and by the likelihood that there would be opportunities for engagement with it. There
are many other factors to consider, as well. The foremost factor to consider in recommending a
plan for DAS development, is that SAProS is a developing technology which is not mature
enough to be implemented within the next ten years. This also means that the effectiveness of
such a system is largely conjectural and so the results of the analysis may not be valid.
Furthermore, there are important operational and reliability questions about such a close-in
system. SAProS is an active system and thus must be on, or at a high state of readiness, all the
time to be effective. Does this compromise the operations of the vehicle? Availability and
reliability are the keys to making the system effective, but are not always easy to achieve in
military systems. For example, the naval Close-In Weapon System (CIWS), a weapon of last
resort for defence against anti-ship missiles, has had continual problems achieving and
maintaining a high availability. In short, there are clearly many issues, which must be considered
and balanced as specific DAS system proposals are developed.
A more important level of effectiveness is that in a scenario or battlefield context. If the DAS
concepts, basic timelines and technologies are very similar it is unlikely that there would be any
significant difference of effectiveness on the battlefield. This type of study can require a great
deal of effort to set up and execute properly, often involving seemingly irrelevant factors.
CASTFOREM could be a useful tool for battlefield impact analysis, and US Army TRAC may
be in a position to do something, since they already have the basic models. However, even then,
there would be a good deal of preparation of systems data required. Certainly for us to do it
ourselves on CASTFOREM, the effort required to build databases, to learn the system, to
develop scripts and be comfortable with the results from the data available would demand at least
half a year of effort and probably much more.
Those most prepared to do effectiveness analysis are probably those who would be proposing
systems for consideration. For example, a company like GD Canada would probably be in a

position to quickly run some effectiveness assessments at different levels.
As a first approximation, an effectiveness study would need
timings and the distribution of timings for all engagement events
time for processing
time to pass data
time for decision making
time to effect action
probabilities of engagement events
probability of sensor detection In various scenarios, environments, threats
probability of successful obscuration
probability technology will do what it is supposed to do in given conditions
Another approach to effectiveness that has not been explored is to ask, what are things that would
make a system proposal ineffective? Given the tight time constraints for the study, perhaps it can
only be expected to narrow the field to two or three for closer evaluation.
5.1 Indicative costs

Costs have to be estimated based on contractor suggestion and past experience with similar
systems. The Litton DAS with hemispherical coverage and pinpoint accuracy of virtually all
laser threats, is estimated to cost less than 200K US per vehicle. The US countermeasures to
SACLOS missiles will cost about 250K US as complete turnkey systems. Combining the two
systems will cost less than the total due to the modular design and sharing of components such as
the DAS controller, software and data bus.
The Litton DAS will focus uniquely on laser-based threats, while the two US systems are
virtually equivalent in countering only SACLOS missiles. Competition among the US
contractors will ensure that neither will have a significant advantage over the other. The cost of
either US system is expected to be 250K US.
5.2 DAS effectiveness toward ACV survivability

Obscurants, counter-manoeuvres, counter-fire, dazzling and jamming can be used to defeat most
threats with acceptable levels of success. The most significant challenge, however, is to detect the
missile, rocket or projectile directed at the vehicle. Even with a staring system, detection of the
missile launch and flight requires substantial thermal radiation. It is relatively easy to suppress
radiation and reduce it to insignificant levels. Eventually, the hard-body itself has to be detected
and tracked before the assessment of a threat can be made.

5.3 Cost versus technical risk
In general, the technical risk is low since the systems are based on well-understood technology.
The most cost-effective DAS solution will be the Litton DAS with obscurants from a flexible
system like the Galix. Additional coverage extending to the SACLOS missiles is possible with
the US systems. Presently, only SACLOS missiles that can be readily detected can be effectively
countered. The exact number of missiles that can be detected has not be determined but the
MAWS used in the trials described above were designed to detect the significantly more powerful
motors needed by supersonic anti-aircraft missiles. Future surface-to-surface missiles will be
virtually invisible.

6. DAS development based on operations research
Various DAS system concepts were examined in a comprehensive U.S. study called Guardian,
(Ref. [13]). The study concluded that:
Laser Warning Receiver (LWR) were the most effective against long range ATGM,
Missile Approach Warning System (MAWS) was the most effective in performance but higher
in cost,
Radar Warning Receiver (RWR) were the most effective against radar seeking projectiles,
LWR was the most effective at the lowest cost, and.
LWR and MAWS, combined were the most effective overall.
To cover all the possible missile threats a DAS system should have a LWR, a MAWS and a
RWR, but cost and development status would suggest this is a long term goal. A follow-on study
to Guardian, referred to as IPS, is being undertaken by Aberdeen Proving Grounds, which might
indicate some of the basic assumptions have changed or the results were not fully accepted. In
general, the evidence gathered in preparation of this study supported these results.
The GD Canada DAS Definition Study, (Ref. [13]), which examined system concepts, concluded
that a baseline for a robust modular DAS systems that can be upgraded and expanded as required
comprises:
infrared (IR) missile approach warning system (MAWS),
high accuracy laser warning receiver (LWR),
multi-spectral smoke,
counter-fire, and
evasive manoeuvres.
They further stated that technologies which were not mature enough but which should be
considered as additional components for a future DAS system are:
imaging systems,
MMW radar receivers,
active armour, and
dazzlers and jammers.

The conclusions stated in both the GD Canada report and Project Guardian are useful and similar
to the current beliefs of US, UK and Canadian researchers in this area, except for one important
difference. According to the US Army TACOM TARDEC, an assumption in the Project
Guardian study was that MAWS would be effective against threat missiles. This may be true
when a current technology MAWS is used, as designed, to defend airborne platforms against
high speed missiles. Anti-tank missiles, due to differences in motor design, are much more
difficult to detect and track and determining the missile time of arrival is virtually impossible.
Also, an IR MAWS for land vehicles, as suggested by GD Canada, is not yet practical. The
actual trend is to incorporate the MAWS algorithms with a general purpose thermal sight as
stated elsewhere in this report. From these two studies, it is clear that a combination of a variety
of components is necessary to defeat the range of threats which might be encountered in
warfighting scenarios. It is also clear that the approach for development described in this study,
based largely on technological maturity, is in good agreement with these studies. The overall
effectiveness of DAS system options with specific proposed sets of components will have to be
determined as, and when, reliable information and performance data are available.
6.1 General approach to studying DAS effectiveness

There are two main ways of thinking about DAS system effectiveness: its effectiveness as a
system in defeating threats; and its effectiveness in making a difference on the battlefield. The
approaches required to examine each of these are different and one can learn different things
from each. There is also interaction between these two approaches.
Some simple modelling of effectiveness of DAS systems in defeating threats should be done first,
and should help in understanding the key processes or weakest links in the process. This should
also provide initial performance estimates that could be used in war-gaming. System
effectiveness can be explored more fully with increasing attention to detail using modelling of
components and a man-in-the-loop, hardware-in-the-loop simulator to determine what
developments would be useful to the ACV crew. These simulations are extremely important
when a human is directly involved and they can also be used to refine the tactics of response,
given that a missile has been fired. Once a potential DAS solution is established, war-gaming
using models such as Janus can then be used to develop tactics for employment on the battlefield.
Results from this stage may also indicate vulnerabilities or weaknesses that suggest changes must
be made to the DAS system. More extensive statistics can be generated using scripted models
such as CASTFOREM. The modelling and experimental analysis loop can then be closed by
trials to validate the DAS solution.
As shown in Figure 4, a continuous cycle of model-test-model can be established using field
trials and experimental data to develop models and simulations. Ideally, models should be based
on physical principles but when this is impractical, systems can still be analyzed
phenomenologically. Both approaches can be implemented in ModSAF. ModSAF (Modular
Semi-Automated Forces) was developed for training and doctrine development and provides a
capability to define and control entities, on a simulated battlefield. It is a model of the dynamic
behaviour of simulated units, their component vehicles and weapons systems with sufficient
realism for training and combat development. ModSAF simulates an extensive list of entities
including fixed and rotary wing aircraft, ground vehicles, dismounted infantry, and additional

special models such as howitzers, mortars, minefields, and environmental effects. The behaviour
of the simulated entities can be scripted, so they can move, fire, sense, communicate and react
without operator intervention. The entities can interact with each other as well as manned
simulators over a network supported by Distributed Interactive Simulation. Operating over a
network is also useful in maintaining a necessary level of security.
These basic features in ModSAF are sufficient to define the participation of three group of
workers and implement their requirements free from mutual interference. To gain general
acceptance, ModSAF development must meet the requirements of the scientists and engineers
who develop the technology, the operations research community and the military developing
tactics and doctrine. MATLAB R
, which is designed for quick-prototyping and code generation,
can be used for ModSAF development. MATLAB R
modelling can also be used to share
information with contractors and other researchers As shown in Figure 4, an important
application of ModSAF is the generation of a battlefield environment for the man-in-the-loop
simulators at GD Canada. The MIL simulators are critical in the development of a suitable
man-machine-interface for the DAS.
MMI
MIL
Field trials, simulators
experimental
data
DAS contractors Brigade and
below
simulations
ModSAF/
MATLAB
OneSAF
modelling
development
Operations
research
Figure 4. The four aspects of ModSAF development are shown. MATLAB R

is used as a quick-
prototyping tool generating, transferable models and code usable by ModSAF. There a tight loop
between field evaluations and ModSAF development used to design DAS prototypes and plan
future trials. Larger battles are carried out in simulation labs where new tactics and doctrine are
developed. ModSAF is also used to provide the battlefield around man-in-the-loop simulators.
From the simulators, the man-machine interface and vehicle operating systems are developed.
6.2 DAS system effectiveness study

To study the DAS as a system to defeat threats it is necessary to examine the possible
components, the expected performance characteristics and the relationship between these

components. These can be studied using increasingly detailed techniques.
It is important for this part to understand how threat missiles can be detected and tracked.
Extensive analysis exists for surface-to-air missiles, but there is virtually nothing for
surface-to-surface threats.
A simple event tree and/or timeline using estimated timings and performance can be used for a
first order and sensitivity analysis of the DAS as a system to defeat threats. Some DAS
components, such as the HARLID-based LWR, already exist and performance is well
understood. For other components, such as the MAWS, it would be necessary to make reasonable
estimates from similar systems or physical characteristics. The probabilities of successful
employment of each component against specific threats are then combined according to the
designs of the DAS systems. For example, a simple DAS with a series of events that must happen
sequentially will have a probability of success equal to the product of the probability of success
of each step in the sequence. The sensitivity of success to various components can be determined
firstly, by the marginal improvements overall for small changes in the success of the component
and, secondly, by the magnitude of improvement possible with technological advances.
6.2.1 Inputs for system effectiveness study
Figure 5 shows what a timeline might look like and some of the key events. The order of some
events may change and some events may not occur or may not be strictly necessary, such as
tracking or analyzing the threat situation, or even identification. There also may be several
possible events of each type from different systems, in parallel. The events in italics are those in
which a human might play a role. With each event there is some probability of success which
may be estimated against a given threat in a given environment. The timings are very important
to determining whether a successful defence is even possible, while the component performance
estimates will determine the extent to which the defence might be successful.
Classification
Detection Analyze
Identification
Tracking
Threat Initiate Reaction
Range Recognition Reaction
Decision
Vehicle Impact
Time
Figure 5. A notional event timeline for defence against missile attack.

6.2.2 Availability of data from trials such as Pronghorn
Some of these data will have to come from, or be validated by, trials like SPRINGBOK,
(Ref. [14]), and PRONGHORN. Without these performance benchmarks for DAS components,
which are under consideration, the effectiveness analysis is somewhat conjectural. It is extremely
important in these trials to accurately record the timings and carefully describe situations where
difficulties were encountered.
6.2.3 Man machine interface
Human factors can influence the effectiveness of the system and needs to be closely evaluated.
The effectiveness in alerted and unalerted response should be examined. Trials like the
Pronghorn trials can provide valuable data. The AVTB would be an excellent way to examine the
responsiveness with a man-in-the loop and to explore crew-DAS interaction and interfaces.
6.2.4 Man-in-the loop, hardware-in-the-loop simulation
The more detailed modelling of components and the use of man-in-the-loop or

hardware-in-the-loop simulation will lead to more confidence that the relationships between
components are well understood. They can be used as engineering tools to examine reliability
and process decisions.
Modelling increases in importance, as platforms become more sophisticated and capabilities
increase in complexity. Based on developing trends, an effective approach would include an
initial investigation of technology using a man-in-the-loop, hardware-in-the-loop simulator to
determine what developments would be useful to the ACV crew.
Simulators are also important in developing crew teamwork, in developing and maintaining
acceptable levels of skill, and in using the vehicle proficiently. This should also include crews
that spend long periods of time in the field. DAS systems would likely be designed with
semi-automatic and automatic modes.
6.2.5 Countermeasure tactics
Once the timings and performance can be predicted, tactics for the employment of
countermeasures can be developed. These tactics will depend on the threat, the geometry and the
environmental conditions. Tactics have been well developed for anti-ship missile defence and the
way in which these tactics were developed and the issues raised there are informative. The
defence against missiles in the land battle is quite different from anti-ship missile defence,
however a few points can be noted. The diversity of anti-ship missile threats means that it was
difficult to find robust tactics that would work well for all threats. Thus, classification was very
important to having improved effectiveness. Furthermore, for some missiles the best defence
options can be quite narrow, so that small changes in the situation could mean large differences in

countermeasure effectiveness.
6.2.6 Questions for system effectiveness study
For the kind of studies of the DAS as a system to defeat missile threats, then, one can expect to
answer the following kinds of questions:
1. The ability to counter specific threats under different conditions,

2. The best selection of components,
3. The reliability and redundancy required,
4. Automatic versus semi-automatic,
5. The order of decisions, e.g. classify before deployment of countermeasures, and
6. The tactics of response, i.e. best geometry, countermeasure deployment.
6.3 DAS battlefield effectiveness study

This defeat of the threat missile, of course, occurs within a broader context that is just as
important. Clues, which alert the crew to possible imminent attack, are extremely important.
These may come through situation awareness, detection of enemy communications and various
other indications and warnings. Detection of a threat platform and its activity provide the
opportunity to avoid detection or place you in a safer position. Signature reduction is also a
valuable contribution to DAS effectiveness because it provides for
1. Greater effectiveness of countermeasures,

2. Greater difficulty for the enemy to classify and/or identify your vehicle, and
3. Smaller range of initial detection.
It is equally important to understand the relationship between the use of tactics and the DAS
functioning. For example terrain can be used to advantage, but may lead to initial detection and
engagement ranges within the minimum range of the DAS. This kind of concern can be
addressed in this next stage where battlefield effectiveness is examined.
6.3.1 Inputs for war-gaming
The results of an evaluation of the systems concepts, which explores the likely range of
performance of the system and its components, could be something like a set of curves of the
probability of successful defence against threat firing range shown in Figure 6. These curves
would depend on the type of threat and the situation or environment in which it was encountered.

There would be a minimum range because it takes at least some time to recognize and respond to
a threat, and even a missile could travel a significant distance in even a few seconds. If there is a
counter for the threat, then there could be some reasonable level of success. There would
probably be a fairly steep increase in probability just beyond the minimum range and then a
sustained likelihood of success for ranges out until the limitations of sensors to provide warning
or detection begin to have an effect.
Probability Time Limitations Sensor Limitations

of - reaction Shape depends on - warning
Successful - deployment - threat - detection
- defensive system
Defence components, performance
- human involvement
- situation, environment
0
Threat Firing Range
Figure 6. A notional defensive probability curve for use in high-level war-gaming
The flight time for a high-subsonic missile travelling 1000m is about 4 seconds. This may be a
tactically significant distance. Probably very little can be done to improve geometry. Smoke may
be deployed quickly, but will it be full enough, fast enough. The minimum range can be very
important in considering the tactics of vehicles on the battlefield.
It is the gross features of such curves: a minimum range, the general shape and height of the
curve and a maximum effective range that are important for determining battlefield effectiveness
and examining vehicle tactics.
The approaches used to study the DAS as a factor on the battlefield are usually higher level
modelling and simulation or war-gaming. The war-game context gives the likelihood that the
mission and tactics will produce opportunities for attack.
Different combat models or war-games have different data requirements. CASTFOREM has
environmental models and does calculations for smoke effectiveness within the program. Janus,
on the other hand does not have such calculations within the program, and this would be assumed
in the performance data provided for the DAS. The kind of curve displayed in Figure 6, for
different threats, conditions and response tactics is the kind of input which would be useful for
Janus.
Canada uses a pre-processor for Janus, (Ref. [15]), which calculates the two probability factors,
which together give probability of kill or incapacitation for use in the war-game:
1. Probability of hit as a function of weapon firing range for a given weapon against a given
target; and
2. Probability of target kill (or incapacitation) given a weapon hit.

The pre-processor does not include any defensive counter in its calculations. The second part
essentially calculates the ability of armour to prevent damage. This part could be adapted to
incorporate reactive armour or any other very close in defensive factor that might come into play
given that the weapon will hit the target. The first part, however, could not easily be adapted
since it is viewed from the weapon perspective and not the defensive perspective. The above
curves for successful defence, determined by means other than this pre-processor, would give the
probability that the weapon will not hit the target, and so they would be one minus the probability
of a hit at range of firing. All the other DAS factors, the alert, the timing, the countermeasure, the
manoeuvre, all contribute to providing this probability of hit.
6.3.2 Questions for battlefield effectiveness study
The kinds of questions that can be addressed through these higher level models are:
1. Relationship between tactics, countermeasure deployment and overall system effectiveness,

2. Value of the DAS enabling continuation of a mission,
3. Type and number of countermeasures for mission load-out,
4. Impact on group effectiveness,
5. Trade-off between tactics and time to respond (enemy coming within response range), and
6. Battlefield approach in an environment with difficult threats for any DAS.

7. ACV definition and implementation
The recommended activities to define, develop and implement an ACV DAS are discussed below
7.1 Modular DAS development project

The advantage of a modular, federated system is exploitation of mission configurability and
lower upgrade cost. At fixed intervals, typically five years, the state of sensor and
countermeasure technology should be reviewed and assessed for improvement. Based on the
current state of technology, technology driving factors and vehicle survivability requirements, the
following DAS development project is reasonable. The initial DAS system should consist of the
Litton DAS for hemispheric coverage and pinpoint accuracy in locating laser-based threats. The
countermeasures should include obscurants, counterfire and counter-manoeuvre. At year 5
(2010), missile launch detection and tracking should be available using IR staring arrays to
provide the same hemispheric coverage and levels of accuracy. With reliable missile detection
available a DRICM can be installed to counter SACLOS missiles. The directional platform can
also include a dazzler since an operator is generally in the loop and therefore offer a capability to
handle multiple threats. At year 10 (2015), active armour, including radar for accurate targeting
information should be available.
7.2 DAS Development through modelling and simulation

Once a potential DAS solution is established through the simulator, as described above,
war-gaming using models such as Janus can then be used to develop an optimum set of tactics.
More extensive statistics can then be generated using scripted models such as CASTFOREM.
The modelling and experimental analysis loop can then be closed by trials to validate the DAS
solution.
A second aspect to modelling is the need to gain an understanding of how threat missiles can be
detected and tracked. Extensive analysis exists for surface-to-air missiles, but there is virtually
nothing for surface-to-surface threats. More analysis is needed to develop MAWS for ground
systems. The difference between threats and generally greater cost precludes the use of MAWS
developed for airborne platforms in ground systems.
Physical models are needed to represent a realistic battlefield environment to the DAS controller.
Once implemented warning of atmospheric or background conditions favouring high signature
contrast and estimates of threat missile detection ranges are possible.
7.3 Missile Launch detection and tracking (MLDT)

There is a significant disagreement between contractors, selling MLDT equipment,and
researchers who know that missile detection is very difficult if not impossible with the sensors
used. Modelling or a detailed analysis of the problem can be used to determine the requirements

for MLDT and estimate when the technology will be in place to consider implementation on a
vehicle. Meanwhile the necessary algorithms can be developed for detection and tracking.
Eventually vignettes or image sequences can be developed and used as benchmarks to test the
capabilities of contractor prototypes to detect and track various missiles and under variable
conditions.
7.4 MLDT Development with third parties

The consensus is that a basic DAS should consist of laser threat detection and obscurants with
counter-manoeuvre as a countermeasure. The next step in technology is the development of
sensors and algorithms to detect missiles, rocket and projectiles directed towards the vehicle.
Since this is a major undertaking the technical risk can be reduced to acceptable levels by
collaboration with allies and contractors in developing a common system. Participating in this
endeavour will also give us an opportunity to understand how (and how well) the system works
and how to use it effectively.
7.5 Platform signature management

Vehicle signature management provides the necessary stealth and complements the DAS in
providing a total vehicle protection. The US Army TACOM TARDEC has offered to provide
maps or profiles of the radar, visible, infrared and acoustic signatures. These measurements
would be very useful in identifying and eliminating any flaws during the design phase of the
programme.
7.6 Threat Missile signature trials

Although the SACLOS missile countermeasures perform well during tests, trials carried out by
the US Army and Germany indicate that missile launch detection and tracking cannot be done
reliably. As implied above initial flash of the launch motors and igniter can be suppressed and
rocket propellant designed for low emission. Therefore current UV MAWS technology is
inadequate. The detection and tracking of missiles requires more research including spectral
imaging and modelling to further sensor development. Both the US Army and Georgia Tech are
interested in collaborating in this area. Researchers at Fort Monmouth are interested in
developing a signature database for surface-to-surface missiles.
7.7 Soft-kill and hard-kill systems

The need for active armour arose when the MBT became too heavy for additional passive armour
and explosive reactive armour could no longer stop modern weapons, (Ref. [12]). The objective
of active armour is to destroy the projectile when being hit is inevitable. It is therefore the last
step in protection offered by the DAS. Many countries, including Canada, are developing active
armour or hard-kill systems but only the Russians have succeeded in developing systems for
production. Russian active armour and countermeasure systems include: Drozd, Shtora-1, and

Arena.
Drozd uses MMW radar sensors on each side of the turret to detect incoming projectiles. Filters
are used to ensure that the system responds only to targets flying at typical ATGM speeds. Once
engaged, one or two small rockets with fragmentation warheads are fired at the target. Poor
elevation resolution and a high probability of collateral damage limit Drozd capability. The
system has a cost of 30K US and is reported to be about 80% successful against rocket propelled
grenades.
Shtora-1 is actually a soft-kill system using an electro-optical jammer to defeat IR seeking
missiles, SACLOS missiles, laser rangefinders and laser designators. The system comprises four
components:
a laser warning receiver with a 360 azimuth and -5 to +25 elevation field; and
a bank of forward-firing aerosol-screen grenade launchers mounted on either side of the turret;
the electro-optical interface unit including the jammer, modulator, and control panel;
a control system including the microprocessor.
The screening aerosol can be deployed in less than 3 s at a range of 50-70 m and persists for
about 20 s. In a typical scenario the LWR detects the threat, the turret is oriented in the direction
of the threat and the grenades are launched. The screen is a hot smoke covering the spectral
region from 0.4 to 14.0 m. The heat generated is sufficient to decoy an IR seeking missile. The
jammers emit over the region 0.7 to 2.5 m injecting a coded pulsed IR signal into the SACLOS
guidance system. The jammers provide an effective coverage of 20 in azimuth and 4 in
elevation within 2 s of target identification.
Arena is the latest and most advanced of the Russian systems and is based on a multidirectional
radar fixed to the turret to detect a potential threat within 50 m of the tank. At a distance between
7.8 to 10.06 m from the vehicle, a tethered explosive device, similar to a Claymore mine, is
launched and detonated 1.3 to 3.9 m from the threat. The directed charge of particles destroys the
missile. The Arena is an expensive system costing about 300K US.
The Canadian system SAProS, (Ref. [16, 17]) relies on electro-optical sensors to provide an early
warning. When the projectile is detected the threat is handed over to a radar system for more
precise target location and timing information. At a suitable distance from the vehicle, a shaped
charge explosive is selected and detonated. The rod of liquid metal, typically travelling at
Mach 35, has sufficient time to destroy the projectile.
7.8 General purpose DAS for LAV variants

Based on analysis of the ACV threat environment and typical compatibility requirements for the
CF and ABCA allies, the following general purpose DAS is proposed as a initial step to the
iterative process of configuring an optimum DAS, (Ref. [18]). The general DAS comprises four
subsystems:

Hard-kill systems are designed to either destroy or deflect the threat away from the vehicle.
Active sensors are required to classify the threat and provide ranging data. A system of this
type includes the AWiSS-K, designed by DIEHL Munitionssysteme with:
1. Active staring/scanning sensors

(a) Ka-band search radar providing hemispheric coverage out to 800 m and
(b) Ka-band tracking radar mounted on high-speed grenade launchers.
2. grenades including
(a) blast grenades to deflect kinetic energy projectiles at 50 m and
(b) fragmentation grenades to destroy chemical energy threats 15 m from the vehicle.
The search radars are based on radar elements fixed to each corner of the turret. The normal
configuration consists of two high-speed launchers mounted at the rear of the turret. Each
turret contains 2 grenades and a tracking radar. The launcher slew rate is 90 over 120 ms.
The total system response time is 400 ms. DIEHL Munitionssysteme estimates that this
system can be fielded by 2008.
Soft-kill systems rely on obscurants and countermanoeuvres to avoid threats. Sensors for these
systems detect threats at much longer ranges and are passive to avoid detection. Vehicles
which can not be manoeuvred easily, such as long-range reconnaissance, must rely on
jammers instead. Based technology trends, a 2010 system based largely on off-the-shelf
components could be designed as follows:
1. Passive staring/scanning sensors, include scanning optics assumed to be mounted in a

mini-turret similar to the high-speed launcher above.
(a) mid-infrared staring arrays providing hemispherical coverage, 4096 4096
pixels per corner operating at 60 Hz
(b) mid-IR scanning array, 10241024 pixels with a field of view of 2.5 2.5 at
60 Hz
(c) a laser illuminator and range-gated camera based on a near-IR scanning array,
1024 1024 pixels with a field of view of 0.5 0.5 at 60 Hz
2. Obscuration and countermanoeuvres consisting of:
(a) passive smoke grenades based on metal-flake and chaff providing hemispherical
coverage, laser dazzling can also be used safely against personnel to fill in the
1.5 s gap until full obscuration is achieved,
(b) manoeuvring the vehicle will benefit from various technologies, including
robotics and MEMS gyroscopes to keep track of the threat.
Information on the vehicle status and driver intent is useful in selecting and automatically
maintaining an optimum level of obscuration. The following information can be read from
the vehicle bus:
Vehicle bus variables including vehicle speed to lead the grenade pattern, braking,
transmission forward or reverse position, wheel direction, and accelerator position.
Based on these variables and the threat detected, the following

Grenade variables can be selected including grenade type, the appropriate pattern and
the launch point of each pattern.
Acoustic threat detection will detect muzzle blast and sound waves from a wide range of
projectiles, and contribute to the performance of the vehicle. Only rarely will the acoustic
microphones outperform the hard-kill and soft-kill sensors but the sensors will contribute to
the overall robustness of the DAS by avoiding catastrophic failure from loss of the more
fragile sensors. Acoustic threat detection is useful in detecting small arms fire where flash
and blast has been suppressed and under battlefield conditions where smoke and dust
interfere with other sensors.
Detection of active targeting systems consisting of both LWR and RWR are required for both
DAS and IFF functions. The HARLID-based LWR, with the improved 1 resolution, will
reduce the burden required to detect the platform over the current 22.5 resolution. The
LWR capability should be extended to include detection of beam-rider missile lasers using,
for example, WARNLOC. The RWR will detect the more advanced MMW targeting
systems that are now replacing laser-based targeting.

8. Concluding remarks
The ACV will successfully replace the Cougar tank trainer but will have a low survivability
typical of a LAV. Survivability can be increased by:
1. Reducing detection and tracking through signature management and

2. Reducing hit probability with a DAS to detect and counter threats.
Signature management requires a coordinated approach to reduce to background levels: the

vehicle radar cross-section and signatures in the following regimes: visible, infrared, electronic,
acoustic and magnetic. Expertise in all these areas would require considerable time and resources
to develop but the US Army TACOM TARDEC is willing to collaborate with us on this mutual
problem.
The DAS should be a federated, modular, mission-configurable system based on more mature
technology first. The initial DAS with 5-year upgrades would evolve as follows:
1. Initial DAS including HARLID and WARNLOC technology with hemispheric coverage
and a typical accuracy of 1 . Countermeasures would include obscurants,
countermanoeuvres and direct fire.
2. Year 5 (2010), reliable missile launch detection and tracking should be available using
infrared staring arrays to provide the same hemispheric coverage and levels of accuracy. A
directional platform can also include a dazzler since an operator is generally in the loop and
therefore offer a capability to handle multiple threats.
3. Year 10 (2015), active armour, based on radar for accurate targeting information to counter
virtually all projectile threats and networking to use available resources more effectively.
Based on analysis of the ACV threat environment and typical compatibility requirements for the
CF and ABCA allies, the following general purpose DAS is proposed as a initial step to the
iterative process of configuring an optimum DAS, (Ref. [18]). The general DAS comprises four
subsystems:
1. Hard-kill systems based on radar as active sensors to classifiy and range the threat,
2. Soft-kill systems on the long-range passive infrared sensors available on the vehicle for
manoeuvring and targeting,
3. Acoustic threat detection, complementing the radar and infrared sensors to detect small
arms fire and provide a degree of system reliability
4. Detection of active targeting systems based on LWR and RWR to provide both DAS and
IFF capability.

9. References
1. The Future Army: Armoured Combat Vehicle Concept Paper, Fort Frontenac, Kingston, 19
May 1998.
2. Project L2636 Armour Combat Vehicle Statement of Operational Requirement, Draft no. 3,
July 1997.
3. M. Ormrod, P. Bender, and Maj. N. de Tilly, Quarre de Fer: Analysis of the ACV in
War-Fighting Tasks ORD PR9817, DOR(J& L) , December 1998.
4. R.G. Lee, T.K. Garland-Collins, D.E. Johnson, E. Archer, C. Sparkes, G.M. Moss and A.W.
Mowat, Guided Weapons, Basseys (UK) Ltd., Third Edition 1998.
5. J. Knowles, Covering the Spectrum the Armys EW Triad, Journal of Electronic Defense
October 98, pp 51-81.
6. A. Cantin et al, Miniaturized Digital High Angular Resolution Laser Irradiation Detector
(HARLIDTM ) Technology and its Performance as Integrated in a Laser Warning Receiver
(LWR) Demonstrator (U), October 1998, DREV.
7. G. Roy, P. Brière, D. Sanschagrin and G. Couture, Development of a 76-mm Visual and lR
Smoke Screening (VIRSS) Grenade for the Wegmann Launcher, DREV TR-9605,
December 1996, UNCLASSIFIED.
8. J.L. Rapanotti and M. Palmarini, Dazzle and obscuration strategies for light armoured
vehicles, Ground Target Modeling & Validation Thirteenth Annual Conference, August
2002.
9. Personal communication with Maurice A. Clermark, Clermark Inc.

10. D. Richardson, Steel Alone is no Longer Enough on Tanks, Armada International 3, 1998
pp 34-46.
11. B. Sweetman, A New Approach to Missile Warning, Journal of Electronic Defense

October, pp 41-78.
12. Capt. T. J. Meyer, Active Protective Systems: Impregnable Armor or Simply Enhanced
Survivability? , Armor, May-June 1998, pp 7-11.
13. Defensive Aids Suite - Definition Study (DAS-DS), DAS Final Report, 971483
CDRL:005, Computing Devices Canada Ltd., July 1998.
14. B. Manatt, A. Cantin, C. Brown and K. Burrett, Final Report for the Electro-Optical
Performance and Countermeasure Trials of SPRINGBOK (U), TTCP Subgroup Q, QAG-16
report OTD-TR-8-95, 21 April 1997, SECRET (Releasable to UK/ CAN/ AUS/ NEWZEA).
15. Maj. L. Mader, and P.S. Ladouceur, Current Modelling - Weapons and Targets Used by
DOR(J& L) Ph/Pk Pre-processor, DOR(J& L) Research Note RN 9806, March 1998.

16. Active Armour Concept Demonstration Program, Bendix Avelex Inc., May 1990,
(Confidential), Volumes 1 and 2 and 4 dated May 1990, Volume 3 dated February 1990
17. Enhanced Armour Protection System, Phase 2, Final Report No. AETR 46824,
Allied-Signal Aerospace Canada Inc., August 1992, 3 volumes (Confidential).
18. J.L. Rapanotti and M. Palmarini, Common DAS development for LAV variants, 14th
Annual Ground Target Modeling and Validation Conference, August 2003.

List of
symbols/abbreviations/acronyms/initialisms
ACV Armoured Combat Vehicle

AOA Angle-Of-Arrival
APC Armoured Personnel Carrier
ATIRCM Advanced Threat InfraRed Countermeasures System
BFV Bradley Fighting Vehicle
CDA Commanders Decision Aid
CECOM Communications Electronics COMmand
CITV Commanders Independent Thermal Viewer
DAS Defensive Aids Suite
DIRCM Directional InfraRed CounterMeasure
DLR Director of Land Requirements
DMCD Directed Missile Countermeasures Device
FCS Fire Control System, or Future Combat System
FLIR Forward Looking InfraRed
HARLIDTM High Angular Resolution Laser Irradiation Detector
HTI Horizontal Technology Insertion
IBAS Improved Bradley Acquisition System
IDS Integrated Defense System
IFF Identfication, Friend or Foe
IFV Infantry Fighting Vehicle
IR InfraRed
KE Kinetic Energy
LAV Light Armoured Vehicle
LRAS3 Long Range Advanced Scout Surveillance System
LWR Laser Warning Receiver
MAWS Missile Approach Warning System

MBT Main Battle Tank
MCD Missile Countermeasure Device
MLDT Missile Launch Detection and Tracking
MMI Man-Machine Interface
MMW MilliMetre Wave
OOTW Operations Other Than War
OR Operational Research
SAProS Smart Armour PROtection System
PM-GSI Program Manager for Ground System Integration
POMALS Pedestal Operated Multi-Ammunition Launching System
RWR Radar Warning System
SACLOS Semi-Automatic Command to Line of Sight
SSES Suite of Survivability Enhancement System
VIRSS Visible InfraRed Smoke Screen
VIS Vehicle Interface System
WARNLOC DRDC-V beam-rider detector

Annex A: Detection and tracking avoidance through
signature management
Survivability of a light armoured vehicle can be improved by reducing any contrast between the
vehicle and the sensor background. The signature or cross-section regimes to be considered are
visible, thermal, electronic, acoustic, radar, magnetic and seismic. Unique signatures that
improve detection, recognition and identification of the vehicle have to be avoided. An important
signature reduction technique is to keep the overall size and profile of the ACV as low as
possible. The reduction in size is also important in transportability of the ACV by air.
Visible and infrared signature
The visible regime is one of the more important and can be controlled through traditional
camouflage, paint and coatings or more advanced active camouflage where the infrared contrast
is kept low by cooling or heating surface plates. These phenomena are well understood and can
be analyzed through modelling with the more expensive field trials restricted to validation.
Radar cross-section
The radar cross-section cannot be eliminated but it can be reduced to the background levels.
Similar to IR analysis, radar cross-sections can be determined analytically. Surface properties are
usually not important but certain geometric features such as large flat surfaces and acute-angle
surfaces that can act as corner reflectors can greatly increase radar returns. Reduction of the radar
cross-section is becoming more important. Terminally guided submunitions that normally use IR
contrast to detect the target can be designed to use MMW radar to detect moving targets.
Variations of missiles such as Hellfire, which use laser designation, are being adapted to use
mmW designators.
Electronic signature
All electro-magnetic emission from the ACV should be suppressed to avoid the possibility of
intercept and detection by enemy electronic support measures. The availability of optical fibre
for data transfer is becoming more important as a means of reducing electronic noise.
Acoustic signature
The acoustic frequencies for the ACV range from 50 Hz-20 kHz. Noise reduction techniques
vary from using quieter components to judicious operation of the vehicle. Surface maps of
vehicle vibration can be used to identify and eliminate constructive wave phases leading to
excessive noise.
Magnetic signature
Reduction of magnetic signature is possible through increased use of non-ferrous materials and
will reduce the susceptibility of the ACV to magnetic fuses and sensors typically found in land
mines.

Seismic signature
Future sensor networks are being developed to distinguish between track and wheel-based
vehicles. Wheeled-based LAVs generate the least amount of vibration.

Distribution list
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3 Document Library
1 Dr. J.L. Rapanotti (author)
1 Mr. G. Pelletier
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External
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1 Maj. Les Mader

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13. ABSTRACT (a brief and factual summary of the document. It may also appear elsewhere in the body of the document itself.
It is highly desirable that the abstract of classified documents be unclassified. Each paragraph of the abstract shall begin
with an indication of the security classification of the information in the paragraph (unless the document itself is unclassified)
represented as (S), (C), (R), or (U). It is not necessary to include here abstracts in both official languages unless the text is
bilingual).
On future missions, the Leopard I Main Battle Tank (MBT) and Cougar tank trainer will be replaced by an Armoured Combat
Vehicle (ACV) providing direct fire support for Light Armoured Vehicles (LAVs). These new ACVs will be significantly better than
the Cougar but lack the survivability of the MBT. To overcome this deficiency a suite of sensors and countermeasures will be
proposed. This Defensive Aids Suite (DAS) will include sensor data processing to provide prioritized solutions to threats while
interfacing with other vehicle resources through a data bus. The initial DAS design will detect virtually all laser-based threats and
counter with obscurants, evasive manoeuvres and direct fire. A modular, federated approach to the design of the DAS, will
facilitate upgrades and mission configurability. Future upgrades recommended are missile launch detection and tracking, directed
infrared jamming and laser dazzling and a hard-kill system based on radar. Related areas of investigation have been identified
including camouflage and signature management to improve vehicle stealth. Additional areas of development include modelling
and simulation to determine the benefit of new technologies, sensor, countermeasure and algorithm development, reality models
for the DAS processor and crew training. This will be a preliminary study and will serve as a reference for future study in this
area.
14. KEYWORDS, DESCRIPTORS or IDENTIFIERS (technically meaningful terms or short phrases that characterize a document
and could be helpful in cataloguing the document. They should be selected so that no security classification is required.
Identifiers, such as equipment model designation, trade name, military project code name, geographic location may also be
included. If possible keywords should be selected from a published thesaurus, e.g. Thesaurus of Engineering and Scientific
Terms (TEST) and that thesaurus-identified. If it is not possible to select indexing terms which are Unclassified, the
classification of each should be indicated as with the title.)
DAS
LAV
ACV
land vehicle
survivability
LWR
RWR
UNCLASSIFIED
dcd03e rev.(10-1999)
Defence R&D Canada R & D pour la dfense Canada
Canadas Leader in Defence Chef de file au Canada en matire

and National Security de science et de technologie pour
Science and Technology la dfense et la scurit nationale
WWW.drdc-rddc.gc.ca

DRDC - Defensive Aids Suite Technology

Uploaded by

DRDC - Defensive Aids Suite Technology

Uploaded by

Preliminary study of defensive aids suite

technology for the armour combat vehicle

Defence R&D Canada Valcartier

Defence R & D Valcartier

Approved for release by

DRDC Valcartier TM 2003274 i

Detection Avoidance based on advanced camouflage techniques and signature management,

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Levitement de la detection base sur le camouflage et la gestion de la signature et

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Executive summary. ..................................................................................ii

Sommaire ............................................................................................ iii

Table of contents . .....................................................................................v

List of tables . ....................................................................................... viii

2. Threats of operational significance. .........................................................4

3. Current and near-future DAS technologies . ................................................ 7

4. Relative maturity of DAS technology ..................................................... 12

5. Cost-benefit and sensitivity considerations . ............................................... 15

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6. DAS development based on operations research . ......................................... 19

7. ACV definition and implementation . ...................................................... 27

8. Concluding remarks . ....................................................................... 32

List of symbols/abbreviations/acronyms/initialisms . .............................................. 35

Annex A: Detection and tracking avoidance through signature management. ....................37

Distribution list . ..................................................................................... 39

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Figure 1. Layers of survivability.. ....................................................................3

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Table 1. threat missiles classified by guidance or communications system.........................4

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Table 1. threat missiles classified by guidance or communications system

Number Missile Type, (Ref. [4])

41 Semi-Automatic Command to Line of Sight (SACLOS)

89/95 Total missiles/Total configurations

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2.1 Threat classification

2.1.1 Threat countermeasures

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2015 Vehicle Networks, High-Speed LBR

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3.1 DAS Systems for laser-based threats

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3.2 DAS systems for SACLOS missile threats

3.3 Obscurants and launcher systems

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3.4 DAS Processors

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4.1 In-production equipment

4.2 Working prototypes

4.3 Engineering/advanced development model

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DAS Display, Gun Turret

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Missile launched at Missile capture occurs at Missile grounds at

1000 m (from vehicle) 500 m 250 m

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Weight Response times Vulnerability

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timings and the distribution of timings for all engagement events

time for processing

time to pass data

time for decision making

time to effect action

probabilities of engagement events

probability of sensor detection In various scenarios, environments, threats

probability of successful obscuration

probability technology will do what it is supposed to do in given conditions