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SECOND DIVISION

JUANITO VICTOR C. G.R. No. 218040

REMULLA,
Petitioner, Present:

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

PERALTA,
- versus - MENDOZA,
LEONEN, and
MARTIRES, JJ.

SANDIGANBAYAN (SECOND
DIVISION) and ERINEO S. Promulgated:
MALIKSI, '1 7 APR 2017
)( ------------------------~~~~~~~~n-~s~----------------------~\IJ\.._~~~~)(
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari seeking to annul and set aside the
February 2, 2015 1 and March 20, 2015 2 Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan
Second Division in Criminal Case No. SB-14-CRM-0432, which dismissed
the case filed by Juanita Victor C. Remulla (Remulla) against respondent
Erineo S. Maliksi (Maliksi) for violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

On August 12, 2005, Remulla filed a criminal complaint against

Maliksi before the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsnzan) for violation of
Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019. He alleged that Maliksi, as governor of
Cavite, caused the purchase of certain medical supplies from Allied Medical
Laboratories Corporation in November 2002 without conducting any public
bidding, thereby giving unwarranted benefit or preference to it. On
December 15, 2005, Maliksi filed his counter-affidavit. 3

1
Penned by Associate Justice Teresita V. Diaz-Baldos with Associate Justices Napoleon E. Inoturan and
Maria Cristina J. Cornejo. concurring: rollo. pp. 19-29.
"Id. at 31-35.
; lei. at 24.

\
 G.R. No. 218040
DECISION 2
-
The Ombudsman Ruling

After almost nine (9) years, in a resolution, dated August 27, 2014, the
Ombudsman found probable cause against Maliksi for violation of Section 3
(e) ofR.A. No. 3019. 4

Maliksi filed his motion for reconsideration, arguing that there was no
probable cause and that there was a violation of his right to a speedy
disposition of his case. 5 In its order, dated October 22, 2014, the
Ombudsman denied the said motion for reconsideration. 6

In November 2014, the Ombudsman filed an information for violation

of Section 3 (e) ofR.A. No. 3019 against Maliksi before the Sandiganbayan.
Maliksi then filed his Motion to Dismiss,7 dated November 20, 2014,
alleging that the finding of probable cause against him was null .and v0d,
and that his constitutional right to a speedy disposition of his case ,was
violated. According .to him, the 9-year delay in the proceedings caus{d him
undue prejudice.

The Sandiganbayan Ruling

In its February 2, 2015 Resolution, the Sandiganbayan found that

Maliksi' s right to a speedy disposition of his case was violated. Thus, it
dismissed the case against him. It stated that the explanation provided by the
Ombudsman, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), was
insufficient to justify its 9-year delay in the resolution of Maliksi's case. The
Sandiganbayan noted that the interval was caused by the delay in the routing
or transmission of the records of the case, which was unacceptable. Citing
Coscolluela v: $andiganbayan, 8 (Coscolluela), it wrote that it was
inconsequential to determine whether an accused had followed up on his
case because it was not his duty to do so. The Sandiganbayan opined that it
was t~e Ombudsman's responsibility to expedite the -resolution o"f the case
within a reasonable time.

On February 12, 2015, the OSP filed a Motion for Partial

Reconsideration9 arguing that the delay in the preliminary investigation was
neither whimsical nor capricious,.considering that Maliksi did not complain
on the delay.

4
Id. at 6.
5
Id.
6
" Id.
7
Id. at 52-68.
8
714 Phil. 55 (2013).
9
Rollo, pp. 41-5 l.

1
DECISION 3 G.R. No. 218040

In its assailed resolution, dated March 20, 2015, the Sandiganbayan

denied the motion for partial reconsideration. It reiterated that the fact-
finding of the case, which lasted for three (3) years, and the preliminary
investigation, which lasted for six (6) years, were due to mechanical routing
and avoidable delay. The Sandiganbayan found that such delays were
unnecessary and unacceptable. It also echoed Coscolluela that it was not the
duty of the respondent in a preliminary investigation to follow up on the
prosecution of his case.

Hence, this petition.

Issue

WHETHER THE SANDIGANBA YAN COMMITTED GRAVE

ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION IN DISMISSING THE CRIMINAL CASE
10
AGAINST RESPONDENT.

Remulla argues that the Sandiganbayan should not have dismissed the
case as there was a finding of probable cause; that there was no violation of
Maliksi' s right to a speedy disposition of his case because he did not
promptly assert his right; that mere mathematical reckoning of the time
involved is not sufficient to invoke inordinate delay; that in Tilendo v.
11
Ombudsman (Tilendo), there must be an active asse11ion of the right to a
speedy disposition of cases ~efore the Ombudsman; and that Coscolluela is
inapplicable because the petitioner therein was completely unaware of his
pending case.

12
In his Comment, Maliksi countered that the petition was defective
because it was filed by Remulla, a private party. He underscored that only
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), or, in certain instances, the OSP,
may bring or defend actions for or on behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines. Maliksi also pointed out that the delay of nine (9) years in the
preliminary investigation of his case was clearly an inordinate delay. He
14
cited the cases of Tatad v. Tanodbayan 13 and People v. Sandiganbayan,
where even delays of even shorter period of years were considered violations
of the right to speedy disposition of cases. Finally, Maliksi argued that the
petition was a violation of his constitutional right against double jeopardy
because a dismissal of criminal case due to the right to speedy disposition of
a case is tantamount to an acquittal.

10
Id. at 6.
11
559 Phil. 739 (2007).
12
Id. at 144-152.
13
242 Phil. 563 ( 1988).
14
723 Phil. 444 (2013).

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 .
DECISION 4 G.R. No. 218040

In his Reply, 15 Remulla averred that he had the legal standing to file
this subject petition as a taxpay~r or a citizen because public funds were
illegally disbursed. He contended that the length of delay was riot the only
factor that m.ust be considered in determining inordinate delay. Remulla
invoked the cases of Guerrero v. CA 16 (Guerrero), Bernat v.
Sandiganbayan 17 (Bernat) and Tello v. People 18 {Tello), where the failure of
the accused to assert his right to a speedy disposition of his case was deemed
a waiver for such right. He pointed out that Maliksi knew that there was a
,pending case against him but he never asserted his right to a speedy
disposition of his case during the preliminary investigation. Finally, Remulla
claimed that there was no violation of the right against double jeopardy as
the dismissal of Maliksi' s case was tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

In its Comment, 19 the Ombudsman, through the OSP, argued that

Court must provide a defini.tive ruling on the con~ept of inordinate delay
because the current model was still in a state of peq)etual flux. It opined that
Coscolluela was inapplicable in the present case as Maliksi was aware of the
pending case against him before the Ombudsman. The OSP also emphasized
that the Sandiganbayan merely dismissed the case against Maliksi by
considering the sole factor of length of delay. It cited the case of Barker v.
Wingo, 20 where the defendant's assertion of, or failure to assert, his right to a
speedy trial was one of the factors to be considered in an inquiry whether
there was deprivation of such right. The OSP echoed the argument of
Remulla that an accused who does not take any step whatsoever to
accelerate the disposition of the case was deemed fo have slept on his right
and have given acquiesces to the supervening delays.

The Court's Ruling

.
The petition is bereft of merit.

The petition was filed by a private party

Procedural law mandates that all criminal actions, commenced by a

complaint or. an information, shall be. prosecuted under the direction and
control. of a public prosecutor. In appeals of criminal cases before the Court
of Appeals (CA) and before this Court, the OSG is the appellate counsel of
the People, pursuant to Section -3 5 (1 ), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the
1987 Administrative Code. 21 In certain instances, the OSP represented the
15
Rollo, pp. 177-185.
16
327 Phil. 496 (1996).
17
' 472 Phil. 869 (2004).
18
606 Phil. 514 (2009).
19
Rollo, pp. 245-255.
20
407 U.S. 514.
21
Jimenez v. Sorongon, 700 Phil. 316, 324 (2012).
.

" .
DECISION 5 G.R. No. 218040

People. when it involved criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the

. 22
.Sandiganbayan.

. The present case challenges the dismissal of a criminal case due to the
violation of the right to speedy disposition of cases. The petition filed
before this Court was initiated by Remulla in h1s "capacity as a private
complainant without the intervention of either the OSG or the OSP.
Although he claims that he has legal standing as a tc:ixpayer, the present case
is criminal in nature and the People is the real party in interest. 23 Remulla
captioned his petition as "People of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan
(Second Division) and Erineo S. Maliksi" 24 but it is clear .that he does not
represent the People.

Only on rare occasions when the offended party may be allowed to

pursue the criminal action on his own behalf such as when there is a denial
of due process, 25 or where the dismissal of the case is capricious shall
certiorari lie. 26 As will be discussed later, Remulla failed to qualify in any of
.these exceptional circumstances. Accordingly, he has no legal personality to
assail the dismissal of the criminal case against Maliksi on the ground of
violation of the right to a speedy disposition of his case.

The right to a speedy "

disposition of cases is a
relative concept

The right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to a speedy

27
trial, is deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended by
vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when .unjustified
postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when without cause
or justifiable motive, a long period of time is. allowed to elapse without the
party having his case tried. Equally applicable is the balancing test used to
determine whether a defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial, or
a speedy disposition of a case for that matter, in which the conduct of both
the prosecution and the defendant are weighed. 28

"

Office of the Ombud~man v. Breva, 517 Phil. 396, 405 (2006).

22

23 supra note 2 1. .
24
Roilo, p. 3.
25
Supra note 21.
26
Villareal v. People, 680 Phil. 527, 558(2012).
27
See Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. v. Republic, 679 Phil. 508 (2012), where it was held
that the right to a speedy trial is available oniy to an accused and is a peculiarly criminal law concept, while
the broader right to a speedy disposition of cases may be tapped in any proceedings conducted by state
agencies.
28
Luman/aw y Bulinao v. Peralta, Jr., 517 Phil. 588, 598 (2006).

1
 ,.

DECISION 6 G.R. No. 218040

More than a decade after the 1972 leading U.S. case of Barker v.
Wingo 29 was promulgated, this Court, in Martin v. Ver, 30 began adopting the
"balanGing test" to determine whether a defendant's right to a speedy trial
and a speedy 'disposition of cases has been violated. As this test necessarily
compels the courts to approach such cases on an ad hoc basis, the conduct of
both the . prosecution and defendant are weighed apropos the four-fold
factors, to wit: (1) length of the delay; (2) reason for the delay; (3)
defendant's assertion or non-assertion of his right; and (4) prejudice to
"defendant resulting from the delay. None of these elements, however, is
either a necessary or sufficient condition; they are related and must be
considered together with other relevant circumstances. These factors have no
talismanic qualities31 as courts must still engage in .a ,.difficult and sensitive
balancing process.

In this case, Remulla argues that the cases of Tilendo, Guerrero,

Bernat, and Tello dictate that it is mandatory for a respondent or accused to
actively assert his right to a speedy disposition of his case before it may be
dismissed on the said ground. He. insists that Maliksi failed to follow up on
his case during the preliminary investigation, hence, he cannot invoke his
right to a speedy disposition of his case. Further, he avers that the doctrine in
Coscolluela, where the Court held that there was no need for the respondent
to follow up his case, is not controlling and it is only applicable when the
respondent is completely unaware of the preliminary investigation against
him.

To resolve these issues, the first set of cases cited by Remulla must be
examined
. to .determine whether it is mandatory for a respondent
.
or accused
to assert his right to a speedy disposition of his case. Also, the case of
Coscolluela and its related cases must be evaluated whether the respondent
or accused has the obligation to follow up his case.

Tilendo, Guerrero, Bernat,

and Tello cases

In Tilendo, the petitioner therein invoked his right to a speedy

disposition of his case because the preliminary investigation by the NBI
lasted for three (3) years before it filed a complaint before the Ombudsman.
In denying his petition, the Court held that there was no unreasonable delay
to speak of because the preliminary investigation stage only began after the
NBI filed its complaint against Tilendo. Even assuming there was delay in
the tennination of the preliminary investigation, Tifondo did not do anything
to accelerate the disposition of his case.

29
Supra note 20.
JO 208 Phil. 658 (1983).
31
Spouses Uy v. Adriano, 536 Phil. 475, 498 (:W06).
DECISION 7 G.R. No. 218040

In GuerrerQ, the last pleading before the Court of First Ins~ance was
filed on December 21, 1979. The case was later re-assigned to two other
judges, and on March 14, 1990, the last judge found out that the transcript of
stenographic notes (TSN) was incomplete and ordered'"the parties to have the
same completed. The petitioner therein filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground that his right to a spee9y trial had been violated. The Court ruled that
there was no such violation because it was only after the new judge reset the
retaking of the testimonies that the petitioner asserted his right. It was also
held that a judge could hardly be .faulted for the delay because he could not
have rendered the decision without the TSN. The Court observ'ed that the
condud of th~ case could have a different dimension had the petitioner made
some overt act to assert his right.

Later, in Bernat, the criminal case against the petitioner therein was
submitted for resolution before the Sandiganbayan on August 23, 1994. It
.was reas.signed to Justice Ma. Cristina G. Cortez-Estrada upon her
assumption of. office on November 3, 1998; and sometime in 2002, she
found out that some of the TSN were missing. Thus, the parties were ordered
to attend a conference to discuss the matter. Instead of attending the
conference, the petitioner therein filed a motion asserting his right to a
speedy trial. In dismissing his argument, the Court cited the case of
Guerrero where the TSN \\'.ere also lost and the judge had to retake the
testimonies. It noted that the petitioner failed to assert his r~ghts. The Court
also reiterated the ruling in Guerrero that the case could have taken a
different dimension had the petitioner actively asserted his right to a speedy
trial.

Similarly, Tello echoed the doctrine in Bernat because the petitioner

therein did not take any step to accelerate the disposition of his case. He only
invoked his right to speedy trial after the Sandiganbayan promulgated its
decision convicting him for malversation of public fynds.

Coscolluela and its related cases

. .
In Cosr:olluela, the petitioners therein were investigated for violation
of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. In a resolution, dated March 27, 2003, the
assign~d graft investigator found pr.obable cause against the petitioners. The
Ombudsman, however, only approved the said resolution on May 21, 2009
and filed the information on June 19, 2009. The petitioners sought to dismiss
the case as the delay of six (6) years violated their right to a speedy
disposition of their case. In upholding the position of the petitioners, the
Court ruled that there was unjust~fied delay in the preliminary investigation
of the case. The Ombudsman could not give a sufficient justification why it
took six (6) Y.ears before it approved the resolution of the graft investigator.
The Court also held that it was not the petitioners' duty to follow up on the

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DECISION 8 G.R. No. 218040

prosecution of their case. The petitioners therein were not informed of the
ongoing preliminary investigation against them.

2
Coscolluela relied on the case of Duterte v. Sand(f:?anbaym/'
( Duterte) to justify that there was no requirement to follow up a case. In the
said case, the petitioners were required to file a comment, instead of a
counter-affidavit. The preliminary investigation was delayed for four (4)
years. They could not have urged the speedy resolution of their case because
they were completely unaware that the investigation was still ongoing. The
Court also noted therein that the Ombudsman failed to present any plausible,
special or even novel reason which could justify the 4-year delay in
terminating its investigation and the incident did not involve complicated
factual and legal issues.

33
Earlier, in Cervantes v. Sandiganbayan (Cervantes), a complaint for
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 was filed before the Tanodbayan.
On October 16, 1986, the petitioner therein filed an affidavit to answer the
allegations against him. On May 18, 1992, or after almost six (6) years, an
information was filed by the OSP with the Sandiganbayan. The petitioner
asserted his right to a speedy disposition of his case. The Court upheld his
right because the OSP' s explanation that no political motivation appeared to
have tainted the prosecution of the case was insufficient reason to excuse the
inordinate delay. It was also ruled therein that "[i]t is the duty of the
prosecutor to speedily resolve the complaint, as mandated by the
Constitution, regardless of whether the petitioner did not object to the
delay or that the delay was with his acquiescence provided that it was not
due to causes directly attributable to him." 34

More recently, in People v. Sandiganbayan 35 (People), a complaint

was filed against the private respondents therein on December 28, 1994
before the Ombudsman. The last counter-affidavit was filed by the private
respondents on March 11, 1996. On July 10, 1996, the special prosecution
officer issued a memorandum recommending the filing of violation of
Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019 and was approved by the Deputy Ombudsman.
Instead of filing the information, however, the case was subjected to several
"thorough review and reevaluation." It was only on October 6, 2009 that the
criminal informations were filed before the Sandiganbayan. Eventually, the
private respondents implored their right to speedy disposition of their case.

It was held therein that there was inordinate delay of twelve ( 12) years
from the time that the last counter-affidavit was filed until the informations
were lodged before the court. The explanation of the OSP that the case was

1
" 352 Phil. 557 ( 1998).
11
366 Phil. 602 ( 1999).
1.) lei. at 609.
1
' G.R. Nos. 19915 1-56. July 25. 2016.

'{
DECISION 9 G.R. No. 218040

subjected to a painstaking review and that the Ombudsman had to 'transfer to

its new building were not given credence by the Court. It emphasized that
the Ombudsman simply failed to timely exercise its discretion as to whether
or not to file criminal cases against the private respondents. The Court did
not sustain the OSP's argument that the respondents must be blamed for not
taking any step whatsoever t~ accelerate the disposition of the matter. Citing
Cervantes, the Court reiterated that it was the duty of 11?-e prosecutor to
expedite the prosecution of the case regardless of the fact that the accused
did not object to the delay. .

F'inally, in Inocentes v. People36 (Jnocentes), a complaint for violation

of Section 3 (e) was filed before the Ombudsman against the petitioner
therein. Following the denial of his motion for reconsideration on November
14, 2005, the prosecution filed the informations with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) Tarlac City. On March 14, 2006, however, the Ombudsman
ordered the withdrawal of the informations. From this point, it took almost
six (6) years, or only on May 2, 2012, before the informations were filed
with the Sandigan,bayan. The Court opined that there was inordinate delay in
the disposition of the petitioner's case because it took six (6) years before his
.
case and the records thereof was transferred from the RTC . to the
Sandiganbayan. The argument of the OSP that the petitioner had no right to
complain about the .delay because he failed to seasonably invoke his right
was not upheid by the Court: .It reiterated the doctrine of Coscolluela that it
was not the petitioners' duty to follow up on the prosecution of their case.

Harmonizing the two sets of cases.

The first set of cases shows that the criminal cases were not dismissed
because of the non-assertion of the accused of their right to a speedy
disposition of cases or speedy trial. Other facto~s in the balancing test were
also considered by the Court, particularly, the reason for the delay in the
proceedings and the prejudice caused by the delay ...

In Guerrero and Bernat, it \Vas held that the delay was acceptable
because there was a necessity to retake the testimonies of the witnesses due
to.the lost TSN. The courts could not have adjudicated the case without the
TSN. On the other hand, in Tilendo, the Court accepted the explanation of
the OSP that there was no inordinate delay because the NBI' s inquiry was
not part of the preliminary investigation. Hence, a.s the length of delay in
these cases were properly justified by the prosecution and the accused
therein failed to take steps to accelerate their cases, the Court found that the
there was no prejudice caused, which would warrant the assertion of their
right to a speedy disposition of cases.

36
G.R. Nos. 205963-64, July 7, 2016.

~
 -

DECISION 10 . G.R. No. 218040

I.n the second set of cases, the lengthy delay in the proceeding against
the accused therein was not satisfactorily explained. In Cervantes, the
prosecution provided a lackluster excuse that there was no inordinate delay
because the case was not politically motivated. -In People, the filing of the
case in court was drastically delayed because it was subjected to unnecessary
reviews, and the Ombudsman basically failed to decide whether to file the
case or not. In lnocentes, there was an unwarranted delay in the filing of the
case due to the _lethargic transfer of the records from the R~C to the
Sa,ndiganbayan. Finally, in Coscolluela, the Ombudsman could not give an
explanation why the preliminary investigation was delayed for six years.
-
Essentially, the Court found in those cases that the State miserably
failed to give an acceptable. reason for the extensive delay. Due to the
manifest prejudice caused to the accused therein, the Court no longer gave
weighty consideration to their lack of objection during the period of delay. It
was emphasized in those cases that it was the duty of the prosecutor to
expedite the prosecution of the case regardless if the accused failed to object
to the delay.

Based on the foregoing, there is no conflict between the first and the
second set of cases. In the first set, the Court did not solely rely on the
failure of the accused to assert his right; rather, the proper explanation on the
.delay and the lack of prejudice to the accused were also considered therein.
In the same manner, the Court in the second set of cases took into account
several factors in sustaining the right of the accused to a speedy disposition
of cases, such as the length of delay, the failure of the prosecution to justify
the period of delay, and the prejudice caused to the ac~used. The uHer failure
of the prosecution to explain the delay of the proceedings outweighed the
lack of follow ups from the a~cused.

Accordingly, both sets of cases only show th~t "[a] balancing test of
applying societal interests and the rights of the accused necessarily compels
the court to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis." 37 To reiterate,
none of the factors in the balancing test is either a necessary or sufficient
condition; they are related and must be considered together with other
relevant circumstances. Corpus v. Sandiganbayan38 thoroughly explained
how the factors of the balancing test should be weighed, particularly the
prejudiced caused by the delay, to wit:

37
Corpui v. Sandiganbayan, 484 Phil. 899, 917 (2004).
:is Id.

~
 -

DECISION 11 . G.R. No. 218040

xxx Prejudice should be assessed in the light of the interest of

t!te defendant that the speedy trial was designed to protect, namely: to
prevent .oppressive pre-trial incarceration; to minimize anxiety and
concerns of the accused to trial; and to limit the possibility that his
defens.e will be impaired. Of these, the most serious is the last, because
the .inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the
fairness of the entire system. There is also prejudice if the defense
witnesses are unable to recall accurately the events of the distant
past. Even if the accused is not imprisoned prior to trial, he is .still
disadvantaged. by restraints on his liberty and by living under a
cloud of anxiety, suspicion and often, hostility. His financial
resources may be drained, his association is curtailed~ and he is
subjected to public obloquy.
-
Delay is a two-edge sword. It is the government that bears
the burden of proving its case beyond reasonable doubt. The
passage of time may make it difficult or impossibl~ for the
government to carry its burden. The Constitution and the Rules do
not require impossibilities or extraordinary efforts, diligence or
exertion from courts or the prosecutor, nor contemplate that such
right shall deprive the State of a reasonable opportunity of fairly
prosecuting criminals. As held in Williams v. United States, for the
government to sustain its right to try the accused despite a delay, it
must show two things: (a) that th.e accused suffered no serious
prejudice beyond that which ensued from the ordinary and
inevitable delay; and (b) that there was no more delay than is
r~asonably attributable to the ordinary processes.of justice.

Cl~sely related to the length of delay is the reason or

justification .of the State for such delay. Different weights should be
assigned to different reasons or justifications invoked by the State.
For instance, a deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to
hamper or prejudice the defense should be weightetl heavily against
the State. Also, it is improper for the prosecutor to intentionally
delay to gain some tactical advantage over the defendant or to
harass or prejudice him: .On the other hand, the heavy case load of
the prosecution or a missing witness should be weighted less
heavily against the State. Corollarily, Section 4, Rule 119 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure enumerates the factors for
granting a continuance. 39 [Emphases supplied]

Remulla argues that the assertion or non-assertion of the right to a

speedy disposition of cases determines whether the court must dismiss the
case for .inordinate delay or continue the proceedings. Such argument,
however, fails to persuade. It must be emphasized t~;at the balancing test is a
relative and flexible concept. The factors therein must be weighed according
to the different facts and circumstances of each case. The courts are given
wide judicial discretion in analyzing the context of the case, bearing in mind
the prejudice caused by the delay both to the accused and the State.

-
39
Id. at 918-919.
DECISION 12 G.R. No. 218040

In addition, there is no constitutional or legal provision which states

that it is mandatory for the accused to follow up. his case before his right to
its speedy disposition can be recognized. To rule otherwise would promote
judicial legislation where the Court would provide- a compulsory requisite
.not specified by the constitutional provision. It simply cannot be ~one, thus,
the ad hoc characteristic of the balancing test must be upheld.

Likewise, contrary to the argument of the. O~P, the U.~.. case of

Barker, v. Wingo, 40 from which the balancing test originated, recognizes that
a respondent in a criminal case has no compulsory obligation to follow up on
his case. It was held therein that "[a] defendant has ho duty to bring himself
to trial; the State has that duty as well as the duty of insuring that the trial is
consistent with due process." 41

Einally, Remulla argues that the doctrine in Coscolluela - that the

accused has no duty to follow up on the pro.secution of their case - only
applies to cases where the accused is unaware of the preliminary
investigation. A review of related and subsequent cases, however, validates
the said doctrine that it is applicable even if the accused was fully informed
and had participated in the investigation. In Cervantes, the petitioner filed
his affidavit before the Tanodbayan to answer the allegations against him.
In People, the re~pondents therein were able to file their counte~-affidavit
with the Ombudsman. In lnocentes, the petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration before the Ombudsman. In all these. cases, the accused were
compl~tely informed of the preliminary investigation kgainst them and they
were able to participate in the proceedings before the delays were incurred.
In spite of this, the Court appl.ied the doctrine in Coscolluela because it was
the Ombudsman's responsibility to expedite the proceedings within the
bounds of reasonable timeliness in view of its mandate to promptly act on all
complaints lodged before it.

In fine, it has been settled that the factors in the balancing test must be
given different consideration and weight based on the factual circumstances
of each case. Applying such principle in this case, the Court can now
determine whether or not the Ombudsman committed inordinate delay and
violated Maliksi's right to a speedy disposition of his case.

-
40
Supra note 20.
41
Id. at 527.

~
DECISION 13 G.R. No. 218040

The Ornbudsman failed to

justify the delay in the
proceedings

As indicated in the resolution, dated February 2, 2015, of the

Sandiganbayan, the OSP gave the following explanation regarding the delay
in the proceedings against Maliksi as follows:

In justifying the length of time that it took the OMB to

resolve the case, the prosecution meticulously explains that three
different cases were filed against the accused, two of which were
from the complaint of Juan (sic) Victor C. Remulla for Violation of
the Anti-Graft Law and for Grave Misconduct, which was received
by the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon on August 7,
2005 (Remulla complaints). The third case was through the
Feedback Report of PCSO Fund Allocation Department Manager
Teresita Brazil regarding the "Approved Financial Assistance of
P10M to province of Cavite c/o Gov. Ayong Maliksi," which was
transmitted to the Ombudsman Central Office in 2005 (PCSO
complaint). This was allegedly assigned for fact-finding
investigation in July 3, 2006 under CPL-C-05-0188. Upon
completion of the investigation, the complete record of the third
case was said to have been forwarded to the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon on September 26, 2008 for consolidation
with the two cases initiated by complainant Remulla.

Since the complete records of the Remulla cases, including

the proposed Resolution and Decision, had already been submitted
to the Ombudsman Proper for approval on January 9, 2007,
through the Central Record Division, the Deputy Ombudsman for
Luzon sent a Memorandum dated October 24, 2008 to the
Ombudsman requesting that the third PCSO case be incorporated
with the two Remulla cases already resolved. This Memorandum
Request was allegedly received by the Ombudsman Proper on June
4, 2009 and approved by then Ombudsman Merceditas N. Gutierrez.
On April 6, 2010, the Chief Administrative Officer of the Office of
the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon forwarded the complete record
of the third PCSO case to the Chief of the Central Records Division
for incorporation with the two Remulla cases.

Continuing to the recital of events, the prosecution states

that the cases against the accused were resolved by the Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon as early as 2007 and were
forwarded in the samt; year to the Ombudsman Proper for final
approval. Unfortunately, final action on the Resolution was
allegedly overtaken by disruptive incidents and political events like
the 2010 hostage-taking at the Quirino Grandstand and the
impeachment of Ombudsman Gutierrez that led to her resignation
in April 2011. 42 [Emphases supplied]

42
Rollo. pp. 25-26.

'
DECISION 14 G.R. No. 218040

The length of delay in the proceedings of Maliksi' s case must first be

determined. In People v. Sandiganbayan, 43 it was held that inordinate delay
should be. computed from the time of the fact-finding investigation until the
-completion of the preliminary investigation by the Ombudsman. The Court
expounded that "[t]he guarantee of speedy disposition under Section 16 of
A~icle III of the Constitution applies to all cases pending before all judicial,
quasi-judicial or administrative bodies. The guarantee would be defeated or
rendered inutile if the hair-splitting distinction by the State is accepted.
Whether or not the fact-finding investigation was separate from the
preliminary investigation conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman should
not matter for purposes of determining if the respondents' right to the speedy
disposition of their cases had been violated."44

Applying the foregoing rule, the delay in Maliksi's case started from
the fact-finding investigation of the Ombudsman when he filed his counter-
affidavit in Remulla cases on December 15, 2005 until the completion of the
PCSO case on October 24, 2008, or a span of three (3) years. At that point,
the preliminary investigation began, until it was tenninated on August 27,
2014 and the information was filed before the court)n November 2014, or a
period of six (6) years. Thus, the Sandiganbayan observed that the delay
incurred in the proceedings lasted for a total period of nine (9) yeats. Even if
the Court excludes the fact-finding stage of three (3) years, there was still six
(6) years of inordinate delay.
,.
As to the reason for the delay, the Court is of the view that the
explanation provided by the OSP fails to justify the .delay of six ( 6) years in
the resolution of the case against Maliksi because, first, there was a delay in
the approval of the Remulla complaints by the Ombudsman. These
complaints were filed in 2005 and Maliksi filed his counter-affidavit in the
same year, on December 15, 2005. According to the OSP, the proposed
resoluti.on and decision for the Remulla cases were submitted to the
Ombudsman as early as January 9, 2007 for approval. The resolution and
decision, however, remained unacted by the Ombudsman so much so that it
was only after one (1) year and nine (9) months that the Deputy Ombudsman
for Luzon was able to send a memorandum, dated October 24, 2008, for
their consolidation with the PCSO case. Nd explanation for the
Ombudsman's inaction on the Remulla cases was advanced by the.OSP.
. .
Second, while the memorandum for consolidation of the Remulla and
PCSO cases was dated October 24, 2008, it wa.s only received by the
Ombudsman on June 4, 2009. Evidently, the mere rotiting or transfer of the
memorandum from the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon to the Ombudsman

43
Supra note 14.
44
Id. at 493.

't
 .

DECISION 15 G.R. No. 218040

took almost eight (8) months. Then Ombudsman Gutierrez approved the
memorandumfor consolidation on an unspecified date~

Third, notwithstanding the approval of the consolidation by the

Ombudsman, it was only on April 6, 2010 when the Chief Administrative
Officerofthe Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon forwarded the complete record
'of the third PCSO case to the Chief of the Central Records Division. As the
approval of the. memorandum on consolidation was und~ted, the
Sandiganbayan assumed that the cause of delay was either the
Ombudsman's belated approval or the Chief Adm~nistrative Officer of the
Deputy Ombudsman's delay in the transmittal of the base records: In either
case, a delay of ten .(10) months for the implementation of a memorandum
for consolidation is unacceptable.

Noticeably, the transfer of these memoranda and records are

ministerial in . nature and does not require
. the exercise of discretion. Thus,
the Court is baffled on how these routine acts could take so long to be
accomplished, As properly observed by the Sandiganbayan, routine matters
could have been exercised at a faster pace in order to avoid unnecessary
delay that expectedly bears heavily on litigants. 45 .

FoU:rth, from the time that the consolidation of the Remulla and PCSO
.cases were approved on April 6, 2010, it took four (4) years, or m:itil July 8,
2014, before the joint resolution finding probable cause against Maliksi was
issued by the Ombudsman. There is a void of account as to what exactly
happened to the case during this 4-year period. Even more baffling was that
although the cases were consolidated, the informati~n filed in November
2014 o'nly involved the Remulla case.

Lastly, the OSP sought' the understanding of the Sandiganbayan and

explained that the resolution of the consolidated cases was overtaken by
disruptive events such as the 2010 hostage-taking at the Quirino Grandstand
and the impeachment complaint against the Ombudsman Gutierrez. These
excuseg, however, could hardly be considered as enough reason to warrant
the delay in the proceedings. Obviously, these.events have no direct relation
to the Remulla and PCSO cases to affect their speedy resolution. The
functions. of the Ombudsman under the Constitution are not suspended by
the occurrence of unrelated events to its mandate, .~hether political or not.
Moreover; to sustain the argument of the OSP would set a perilous precedent
'as the delayed cases pending before the Ombudsman from 2010 to 2014 can
simply be overlooked by citing these occasions.

45
Rollo, p. 27.
 "

DECISION 16 G.R. No. 218040

Based on the foregoing, the explanation provided by the OSP falls

short of the reasonable justification to authorize delay in the proceedings. It
was downright unnecessary to prolong the proceedings for a period of nine
(9) years. To summarize, the initial delay began when the Ombudsman did
not act with dispatch on the approval or disapproval of the proposed
resolution and decision in the Remulla. Due to its delay, the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon was able to send a memorandum for consolidation
with the PCSO case. The mere routing or transfer of the memorandum to the
"Ombudsman incurred eight (8) months of delay. Then, when the
memorandum was approved, it took ten (10) months before the records
could be transferred from the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon to the
Ombudsman. Finally, for a period of four (4) years, the consolid~ted cases
sat at ~he Ombudsman. As the OSP did not submit an explanation as to the
status of the. case in that 4-year period, the Court can only conduct
guesswork on the cause of its delay.

Had the Ombudsman immediately approved or disapproved the

proposed reso.lution and decision submitted to its office on January 9, 2007,
then the case would have been promptly acted upon. If filed before the
Sandiganbayan, the prosecution and the defense could have timely presented
their case. Instead, the Ombudsman chose inaction which led to a chain of
delays lasting until July 8, 2014. After the lapse of nine (9) years of being
kept in the dark, Maliksi could not have had the opportunity to timely
present. his case in court due to the extensive delay in the preliminary
.investigation. Certainly, this protraded period of unce1iainty. over his
criminal case caused him prejudice, living under a cloud of anxiety,
su~picion and even, hostility.

Further, in light of the circumstances of this c<tse, the Court does not
give great weight to Maliksi' s lack of objection over the delay because the
OSP miserably failed to defend the Ombudsman's i1;1-action. The prosecution
could not give an acceptable reason to justify the 9-year interval before the
case was filed in court. The proceedings were marred by the delay in the
mechanical transfer of documents and records. No steps were taken by the
Ombudsman to ensure that the preliminary investigation would be resolved
in a tirnely manner. Clearly, the failure of the prosecution to justify the 9-
year interval before the case was filed in court far outweighs Maliksi' s own
inaction over the delay. As articulated in Coscolluela, Duterte, Cervantes,
People, and lnocentes, the Court reiterates that it is the duty of the
prosecutor to expedite the prosecution of the case r.egardless of whether or
not the accused objects to the delay.

Likewise, Reinulla's argument that the Sandiganbayan only. took into

account the length of delay in the proceedings deserves scant consideration.
Aside from the length of delay, the anti-graft court thQroughly discussed the
Ombudsman's failure to give a suitable reason for the delay and the
 .
DECISION 17 G.R. No. 218040

prejudice it had caused to Maliksi. The latter's lack of follow up with his
case was not given much weight because of the . prosecution's manifest
failure to justify the protracted lup in the proceedings. The. Sandiganbayan,
after properly taking into consideration all the relevant factors in the
balancihg tes~ and gave different weight on each factor based on the
particular circumstances of this case, came to a conclusion that the
Ombudsman committed inordinate delay. The case underwent the intricate
and difficult balancing test before Maliksi' s right to a speedy disposition of
his case was sustained. Thus, the Court rules that the Sandiganbayan did not
_commit a grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the criminal case against
Maliksi.

To conclude, the Court finds it proper to reiterate the underlying

principle of the constitutional right to a speedy dispGsition of cases in the
46
landmark case of Tatad v. Sandiganbayan:

xxx Substantial adherence to the requirements of the law

governing the conduct of preliminary investigation, including
substantial compliance with the time limitation prescribed by the
law for the resolution of the _case by the prosecutor, is part of the
procedural due process constitutionally guaranteed by the
fundamental law. Not only under the broad umbrella of the due
process clause, but under the constitutional guarantee of "speedy
disposition" of cases as embodied in Section 16 of the Bill of Right
(both in the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions), the inordinate delay
is violative of the petitioner's constitutional rights. xxx

It has been suggested that the long delay in terminating the

preliminary investigation should not be deemed fatal, for even the
complete ab~ence of a preliminary investigation does not war~ant
dismissal of the information. True - but the ab~ence of a
preliminary investigation can be corrected by giving the accused
such investigation. But an undue delay in the conduct of a
preliminary investigation cannot be corrected for now, until man
has not yet invented a device for setting back time. 47

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Febru.ary 2, 2015 and

March 20, 2015 Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan Second Division in SB-
14-CRM-0432 are AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE CA

46
s"upra note 13.
47
Id. at 575-576.
..
DECISION 18 G.R. No. 218040

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

s UE~TIRES
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court's Division.

ANTONIO T. CA
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

\
DECISION 19 G.R. No. 218040

C E R T I F I C A T I ON

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the

Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the c~nclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES.P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

,.