Evidence Basic Principles

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Evidence: Basic Principles and

Selected Problems
JUSTICE ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO*
Evidence is the means of proving a fact. It becomes necessary to

present evidence in a case when the pleadings filed present factual issues.
Factual issues arise when a party specifically denies material allegations in
the adverse party's pleading. These are the issues which the judge cannot
resolve without evidence being presented thereon. Thus, whether a
certain thing exists or not, whether a certain act was done or not, whether
a certain statement was uttered or not, are questions of fact that require
evidence for their resolution. Questions of fact exist when the doubt or
difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of alleged facts. 1 Other than
factual issues, the case invariably pres.ents legal issues. On the other
hand, a question of law exists when the doubt or difference arises as to
what the law is on a certain set of facts. Legal issues are resolved by simply
applying the law or rules applicable, or interpreting the law applicable
considering the facts of the case. Generally, no evidence need be
presented on what the applicablelaw is. Everyone, indudingthe judge, is
presumed to know the law.
When the parties' pleadings fail to tender any issue of fact, either
because all the factual allegations have been admitted expressly or
impliedly (as when a denial is a general denial), there is no need of
conducting a trial, since there is no need of presenting evidence anymore.
The case is then ripe for judicial determination, either
* Solicitor General, Professor of Law &. Bar Reviewer in Remedial Law at liST Faculty of Civil
Law.
1 Parafiaque Kings Enterprises v. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 727.
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ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO
94
through a judgment on the pleadings2 or by summary judgment.3
ADMISSIBILI'IY OF EVIDENCE
The study of the law on evidence involves two main problems, viz.: (1)
determining whether a given piece of evidence is admissible; and (2) the
proper presentation of that evidence so that the court will consider it in
resolving the issues and deciding the case. Although evidence may, by itself,
be admissible, the court may not admit or consider it in the resolution of the
case unless the evidence was properly presented.
A. Axiom of Admissibility of Evidence

Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issues and is
competent, i.e., it is not excluded by the law or the Rules of Court.4 Evidence
is relevant if it tends in any reasonable degree to establish the probability or
improbability of a fact in issue.5 It is of a lesser degree of reliability as
evidence than material evidence. Material evidence directly proves a fact in
issue. Thus, the testimony of an eyewitness to the commission of a crime is
material; the evidence of motive or flight of the accused may be relevant.
Evidence that is material or relevant must also be competent to--b-e-
admissible. For example, although the testimony of the eyewitness may be
material, it may be inadmissible if it is excluded by the marital
disqualification rule.
Relevancy or materiality of evidence is a matter of logic, since it is
determined simply by ascertaining its logical connection to a fact in issue in
the case. It is therefore inadvisable for a judge to ask an objecting counsel
why an offered piece of evidence is irrelevant or immaterial. By his inquiry,
he shows his unfamiliarity with the issues in the case. A judge is expected to
be aware of the issues which he was supposed to have defined and limited in
his mandatory pre-trial order.
2 Rule 34, Rules of Court. 3

Rule 35, Ru-Ies of Court.
4 Rule 128, See. 3, Rules of Court. S
Ibid.
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EVIDENCE: BASIC PRINCIPLES ... 95
On the other hand, the grounds for objection to the competency of

evidence must be specifiedG and are determined by the Rules or the law.
The opposites of the three requisites for admissibility of evidence, viz.,
irrelevancy, immateriality or incompetency, are the general grounds for
objection. The first two are valid grounds for objection without need of
specification or explanation. The third ground for objection, incompetency, if
offered without further explanation, is not valid for being unspecific, except
when invoked in reference to the lack of qualification of a witness to answer a
particular question or give a particular evidence.
B. Proper Presentation of Evidence
Every piece of evidence, regardless of its nature, requires certain

processes of presentation for its admissibility and admission:
1. Object evidence must generally be marked (Exhibit A, B, etc. for the
plaintiff; Exhibit I, 2, 3, etc. for the defendant) either during the pre-trial or
during its presentation at the trial. It must also be identified as the object
evidence it is claimed to be. This requires a testimonial sponsor. For example,
a forensic chemist identifies marijuana leaves as those submitted to him in the
case for examination. Further, object evidence must be formally offered after
the presentation of a party's testimonial evidence. 7
2. Oral evidence is presented through the testimony of a witness.
Under the 1989 Rules of Evidence, oral evidence must be formally offered at
the time the witness is called to testify.8 Objections may then be raised against
the testimony of the witness. If the objection is valid, as when the witness'
testimony is'barred by the hearsay rule or the opinion rule, the witness will
not be allowed to testify. If the witness is otherwise allowed to testify, he shall
be sworn in, either by taking an oath or making an affirmation.9 It is essential
that the proper
6 Rule 134, See. 6, Rules of Court. 7

Rule 132, See. 35, Rules of Court. S
Ibid.
9 Rule 13 2, See. 1, Rules of Court.
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96 ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO
foundation for the testimony of a witness must be laid. An ordinary

witness must be shown to h9-ve personal knowledge of the facts he shall
testify to, otherwise his testimony will be hearsay, or he will be
incompetent to answer the questions to be asked of him. An expert
witness must be specifically qualified as such, otherwise he cannot
validly give his opinion on matters for which he may have been
summoned as a witness.
However, the requirement of qualifying an expert witness may be
dispensed with if:
a. the adverse counsel stipulates on the expertfs qualification; or
b. the court takes judicial notice of the witness's expertise, because the judge
happens to be aware thereof on account of the judgefs judicial functions:
3. Documentary evidence is (a) marked; (b) identified as the
document which it is claimed to be (as when the witness asserts that the
document presented to him is the same contract which he claims was
executed between the two parties); (c) authenticated, if a private
document, by proving its due execution and genuineness; and (d) formally
offered after all the proponentis witnesses have testified. 10
Rule 132, See. 34 provides that the court shall consider no evidence
which has not been formally offered, and that the purpose for which the
evidence is offered must be specified. In this connection, it has been asked
whether it would be proper for the judge to disregard a witnessfs direct
testimony given without the prior formal offer thereof which Rule 132,
See. 35 requires, and corollarily, whether the adverse party may be
required to cross-examine that witness. In People vs. Romil Marcos, 11 the
Supreme Court ruled that if a witness has given un offered direct
testimony without objection from the adverse party, the latter is estopped
from raising that objection whkh he is deemed to have waived; hence,
although not formally offered, the testimony may be considered by the
court.

212 SCRA 748, August 21, 1992.
UST LA W REVIEW, Vol. XLVIII, January-December 2004

PEOPLE v. MARCOS
C.R. No. 91646, 21 August 1992, 212 SCRA 748 Appellant was
charged with a violation of the Dangerous
Drugs Act. Relying upon the testimonies of prosecution witnesses
regarding the buy-bust operation, the court found the appellant guilty
and imposed a sentence of imprisonment. On appeaL the appellant
raised in issue, the courtfs alleged reversible error in convicting the
accused based on the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, when
such testimonies were not properly offered in evidence.
Issue: Whether the absence of the formal offer of testimonial
evidence would prevent the court from considering them in its
decision.
Ruling: The testimony of one of the prosecution witnesses was
formally offered by the prosecution, whereas the testimonies of the
other witnesses were not. They were, however, included in the
prosecuting Fiscalis formal offer of documentary evidence. Inasmuch
as the appellant did not object to such offer, nor object to the
unoffered direct testimony of the witnesses, he is now estopped frorp.
questioning their appreciation by the court. The appellant was not
deprived of any of his constitutional rights in the inclusion of the
subject testimonies, nor of his right to cross-examine all the
prosecution witnesses.
The view can be advanced, however, that although the aforesaid
testimony was not expressly formally offered, it was nonetheless formally
offered, albeit impliedly and automatically, the moment each question was
propounded to elicit an answer. This view is premised on two related
provisions in Rule 132, See. 36, i.e., that "Objection to evidence offered orally
must be made immediately after the offer is made, " and that "Objection to a
question propounded in the course of the oral examination of a witness shall be
made as soon as the grounds therefore shall have become reasonably apparent. "
Clearly, the purpose of the express formal offer of oral evidence before the
witness testifies is merely to determine, on the basis of the stated substance of
the testimony and its purpose, whether the witness shall be allowed to testifY.
Once the witness is allowed to testifY, each question propounded to elicit
specific oral evidence may still be objected to as soon as a ground for
objection

98 ALFREDO 1. BENIPAYO
becomes reasonably apparent. But it is fundamental that an objection to

evidence can be validly raised only after an offer is made. Thus, every
question asked of a witness especially on direct examination presupposes a
formal offer of the answer, the oral evidence, sought to be elicited. It would
seem therefore that unlike documentary and object evidence which are
formally offered only after all the witnesses of a party have testified, oral
evidence is offered twice: once, expressly, before the witness testifies, and
again, with each question propounded to the witness.
IMPORTANCE OF THE FORMAL OFFER OF EVIDENCE;

NEED FOR STATEMENT OF THE PURPOSE OF
EVIDENCE
Evidence not formally offered will not be considerea. by the court in

deciding the case.12
A party makes a formal offer of his evidence by stating its substance or
nature and the purpose or purposes for which the evidence is offered. 13
Without a formal offer of evidence, and hence without a disclosure of its
purpose, it cannot be determined whether it is admissible or not. This is so
because it is the intended purpose of a piece of evidence which determines
what rule of evidence will apply for its admissibility. A piece of evidence may
be admissible if offered for one purpose but may be inadmissible if offered for
another. For example, the testimony of a witness, in a libel case, that he heard
the defendant call the plaintiff a liar and a crook is certainly inadmissible for
being hearsay, if offered to prove the truth of the perceived statement.
However, the same testimony is perfectly admissible if offered simply to
prove that the statement was uttered. For that purpose, the witness would be
the only person qualified to testify on, and prove, what he heard defendant say.
Similarly, the declaration of a dying person made without consciousness of
his impending death will not qualify as a dying declaration, although it may
be admissible if offered as part of the res gestae.

Ibid.
UST LAW REVIEW, Vol. XL VIII, January-December 2004

It must be noted that the mere marking, identification, or

authentication of documentary evidence does not mean that it will be, or has
been, offered as part of the evidence of a party. This was the ruling of the
Supreme Court in People v. Santito, Jr.14
PEOPLE v. SANTITO
G.R. No. 91628, 22 August 1991, 201 SCRA 87

Appellant was charged with the crime of robbery with homicide.
Upon arraignment, accused, assisted by counsel, entered pleas of not
guilty. After trial on the merits, the court rendered judgment finding
them guilty. Hence, this appeal.
Issue: Whether the identification of an entry in the police blotter
is equivalent to an offer of evidence ..
Ruling: Entries in official records, as in the case of a police
blotter, are only prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. They
are not conclusive.
The entry in the police blotter was never presented by the
defense during the proceedings. Even assuming that the same had been
identified in court, it would have no evidentiary value. The mere fact
that a particular document is identified and marked as an exhibit does
not mean it will be or has been offered as part of the evidence of the
party. The party may, or may not, decide to formally offer it after all.
In any case, since the defense did not identify or formally offer
the said entry in the blotter, the court still would not consider the same,
identification and marking as an exhibit being necessary for a formal
offer. Under Section 35, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, no evidence
shall be considered without first having been formally offered.
Annexes attached to pleadings, if not offered formally, are mere scraps
of paper and should not be considered by the court,15 unless the truth of their
contents has been judicially admitted.
14
201 SCRA 87.
15 Llaban v. Court of Appeals, December 20, 1991 (Although thedecision in Llaban was
withdrawn by the Supreme Court on March 17, 1993, the withdrawal affected only the validity
of final disposition of that case. This did not wid the soundness of the Court's pronouncement on
the treatment of annexes attached to pleadings.).

To the general rule that the court shall not consider any evidence· not
formally offered, there are certain exceptions:
1. Under the Rule on Summary Procedure, where no full blown trial is
held in the interest of speedy administration of justice;
2. In summary judgments under Rule 35 where the judge bases his
decisions on the pleadings, depositions, admissions, affidavits and
documents filed with the court;
3. Documents whose contents are taken judicial notice of by the court;
4. Documents whose contents are judicially admitted;
5. Object evidence which could not be formally offered because they
have disappeared or have become lost after they have been marked,
identified and testified on and described in the record and became the
subject of cross-examination of the witnesses who testified on them
during the trial, e.g., marijuana involved in a prohibited drugs
prosecution. 16
PEOPLE v. NAPAT-A
C.R. No. 84951, 14 November 1989, 179 SCRA 403
Accused was nabbed in a buy-bust operation and
subsequently convicted of the crime of drug-pushing.
Issue: Whether the failure to present the box and its contents
of marijuana leaves as evidence precludes conviction for
drug-pushing.
Ruling: The forensic chemist of the Philippine Constabulary
Crime Laboratory testified that the box and its contents were
presented, identified, and marked as exhibits in court. The
subsequent loss of these exhibits did not affect the case for the trial
court had described the evidence in the records. In People v. Mate,
the Court ruled that “even without the exhibits which have been
incorporated into the records of the case, the prosecution can still
establish the case because the witnesses properly identified those
exhibits and their testimonies are recorded." Furthermore, in this
case, the appellant's counsel had cross-examined the prosecution
witness who testified on those exhibits.
16 People v. Napat-a, 179 SCRA 403; People v. Tabuena, 196 SCRA 650, May 6, 1991

EVIDENCE: BASIC PRINCIPLES... 101
TABUENA v. COURT OF APPEALS

C.R. No. 85432, 6 May 1991, 196 SCRA 650
Ruling: The mere fact that a particular document is marked as an
exhibit does not mean that it has thereby already been offered as part
of the evidence of a party. In Interpacific Transit v. Aviles, the Court held
that" (a)t the trial on the merits, the party may decide to formally offer
(the exhibits) if it believes that they will advance its cause, and then
again it may decide not to do so at all. In the latter event such
documents cannot be considered evidence, nor can they be given any
evidentiary value. "
MODES OF EXCLUDING INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE
There are two ways of excluding inadmissible evidence. One is by objection

and the other is by a motion to strike out.
A. Evidence is objected to at the time it is offered (not before it is offered):
1. Oral evidence is objected to after its express formal offer before the
witness testifies. 17 When thereafter the witness is allowed to testify,
objection to a question propounded in the course of the oral examination
of a witness shall be made as soon as the grounds therefore shall become
reasonably apparent. IS
2. Documentary and object evidence are objected to upon their formal offer
after the presentation of a party's testimonial evidence.
Failure to seasonably object to offered evidence amounts to a waiver of
the grounds for objection. The rules of exclusion are not self operating.
They must be properly invoked.
The grounds for objection must be specified.19 Grounds not raised are
deemed waived. However, repetition of objection is unnecessary when a
continuing objection is properly made.2o Objection to the purpose for
which evidence is offered is not proper.
17 Rule 13 2, See. 35, Rules of Court. IS

Rule 132, See. 36, Rules of Court. 19
Ibid.
20 Rule 132, See. 37, Rules of Court.

B. A motion to strike out answer or testimony is proper in the

following instances:
1. The witness answers prematurely.21
2. The answer is incompetent, irrelevant, or improper.22
The incompetency referred to here is limited to the incompetency of the
witness to answer the question posed, it does not extent to the general
concept of incompetency of evidence for being excluded by law or the
Rules.
3. The answer given is unresponsive.
4. The ground for objection was not apparent when the question was asked.
5. Uncompleted testimony - e.g., a witness who gave direct testimony
becomes unavailable for cross-examination through no fault of the
cross-exam mer.
6. Unfulfilled condition in conditionally admitted testimony.
OBJECTIONS AND RULING

I. Objections to evidence may be formal or substantive.
A. Formal objections are based on the defective form of the question
asked. Examples:
(1) leading questions, which suggest to the witness the answer desired23
a. If a counsel finds difficulty in avoiding leading questions, the
judge may suggest, to expedite proceedings, that counsel begin his
questions with the proper interrogative pronouns, such as "who," "what,
" "where," "why," "how," etc.
b. Leading questions are allowed of a witness who cannot be
reasonably expected to be led by the examining counsel, as (a) on
cross-examination; 24 (b) when the witness is unwilling or hostile,
after it has been demonstrated that the witness had shown unjustified
reluctance to testify or has an adverse interest or had misled the party
into calling him to the witness stand,

Ibid.
Ibid.

and in either case after having been declared by the court to be indeed
unwilling or hostile;25 or (c) when the witness is an adverse party or
an officer, director, or managing agent of a public or private
corporation or of a partnership or association which is an adverse
party.26
c. Leading questions may also be asked when there is difficulty
in getting direct and intelligible answers from a witness who is
ignorant or a child of tender years, or is feeble minded, or a
deaf-mute.27
d. Leading questions may moreover be asked on preliminary
matters, i.e., on facts not in controversy, and offered only as basis for
more important testimony to follow. For example, "You are Mrs. Maria
Morales, wife of the plaintiff in this case?"
e. Likewise, asking a question which uses as a premise admitted
facts or the witnesses’ previous answer is not for that reason
objectionable as leading.
(2) misleading questions, which assume as true a fact not testified to by the
witness ("question has no basis"), or contrary to that which he has
previously stated;28
(3) double or multiple questions, which are two or more queries in one.
For example, Q: "Did you see the defendant enter the plaintif’s house, and was
the plaintiff there?"
(4) vague; ambiguous; indefinite or uncertain questions - not allowed because
the witness cannot understand from the form of the question just what
facts are sought to be elicited.
(5) Repetitious questions, or those already answered. However, on cross-
examination, the cross-examiner may ask a question already answered to
test the credibility of a witness.
(6) Argumentative questions, which challenge a witness's testimony by
engaging him in an argument, e.g., Q: "Isn't it a fact Mr. Witness that
nobody could possibly see all the circumstances you mentioned in a span
of merely two seconds, and that either your observations are inaccurate or
you are lying?"
25 Rule 132, Sees. 10 & 12, Rules of Court. 26

Ibid.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.

B. Substantive objections ~~ those based on the inadmissibility .'

of the offered evidence, e.g.;
(1) irrelevant; immaterial
(2) best evidence rule
(3) parol evidence rule
( 4) disqualification of witness
(5) privileged communication
(6) res inter alios acta
(7) hearsay
(8) ,opinion
(9) evidence illegally obtained
(10) private document not authenticated
II. The ruling by the court on an objection must be given immediately

after an objection is made, unless the court desires to take a reasonable
time to inform itself on the question presented; but the ruling shall always
be made during the trial and at such time as will give the party against
whom it is made an opportunity to meet the situations presented by the
ruling. 29 Thus, an objection to a question asked of a witness must be at
once resolved by the court by either sustaining or overruling the objection.
It would be incorrect for a judge to consider the objection "submitted" or
"noted." Unless the objection is resolved, the examination of the witness
could not be expected to continue since in all likelihood the next question
would depend on how the objection is resolved. If the issue raised by the
objection is a particularly difficult one, it would not be improper for the
judge to perhaps declare a brief recess to enable him to quickly study the
matter. But certainly, the resolution must be given before the trial
resumes.
The reason for sustaining or overruling an objection need not be
stated. However, if the objection is based on two or more grounds, a
ruling sustaining the objection, on one or some of them, must specify the
ground or grounds relied upon.30

Ibid.

Judges are advised to judiciously consider the validity of the grounds

for objections and carefully rule on them. A ruling that all evidence formally
offered are "admitted for whatever they may be worth" will not reflect well on
the judge, as it implies a hasty and ill-considered resolution of the offer and
the objections. Besides, the phrase "for whatever they may be worth" is
improper since it refers to the weight or credibility of the evidence. At the
formal offer, the only issue presented is the admissibility of evidence; the
weight of the evidence shall be considered only after the evidence shall have
been admitted. Another ruling that is ludicrous and even nonsensical is
"[ e ]vidence admitted subject to the objections." This is a non-ruling.
In case of an honest doubt about the admissibility of evidence, it is
better policy to rule in favor of its admission. An erroneous rejection of
evidence will be unfair to the offeror since the judge cannot validly consider
it even if after the trial the judge realizes his mistake. On the other hand, if the
judge had erred in admitting a piece of evidence, he may simply give it little
or no weight when deciding the case.
LAYING THE- FOUNDATIONS FOR EVIDENCE
In determining the competency of an offered piece of evidence, the

court must examine the requisites provided by the pertinent rule or law for its
admissibility. These requisites must be established as foundations for the
evidence. For example, for a declaration of an agent to be admissible against
his principal, as an exception to the res inter alios acta rule,31 the declaration
must be: (1) within the scope of the agent’s authority; (2) made during the
existence of the agency; and (3) the agency is shown by evidence other than
by such declaration.32 If the agent's declaration is on a matter outside the
scope of his agency, or is made after the agency had ceased, the agent's
declaration cannot be admitted against his principal; the general rule of res
inter alios acta will apply instead.

Rule 130, See. 29, Rules of Court.

Similarly, the foundation required by the Rules for the proper

presentation of evidence must be laid, lest the evidence be rejected. For
example, when the original of a document is unavailable, before
secondary evidence thereof is admitted, the proponent must establish: (1)
the existence or execution of the original document, and (2) the
circumstances of the loss or destruction of the original, or that the original
cannot be produced in court.
JUDICIAL NOTICE
A. Mandatory and Discretionary Judicial Notice
Not everything alleged in a party's pleading is required to be proved.

Certain matters may be so well known to the court that to compel a party
to prove it would be a waste of time and effort.
Under the Rules, it shall be mandatory for the court to take judicial
notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the existence and
territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of government and
symbols of nationalities, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime
courts of the world and their seals, the political Constitution and history
of the Philippines, the official acts of the three departments
of-the-Philippine government, the laws of nature, the measure of time and
the geographical divisions.33 Courts may take judicial notice of matters
which are: (a) of public knowledge, (b) capable of unquestionable
demonstration, or (c) ought to be known to judges because of their official
functions.34
B. Hearing the Parties on Discretionary Judicial Notice
During the trial, when a court is uncertain whether it may, at its

discretion, take judicial notice of a certain fact or not, it may call the
parties to a hearing to give them reasonable opportunity to present
information relevant to the propriety or impropriety of taking judicial
notice of that fact. Certainly the so-called "hearing" is not for the purpose
33 Rule 129, See. L Rules of Court.


of adducing evidence on that fact. Similarly, even after the trial and before
judgment or on appeal, the court may hear the parties on the propriety of
taking judicial notice of a certain matter if such matter is decisive of a
material issue in the case. 35 This procedure will apprise the parties of the
possibility that the judge will or will not take judicial notice of a fact, or of his
resolution either way; it will thus eliminate the element of surprise and
enable the parties to act accordingly.
C. Judicial Notice of Proceedings in Another Case
In the adjudication of a case pending before it, a court is not authorized

to take judicial notice of the contents of another case even if said case was
heard by the same judge. The following are exceptions to this general rule: (1)
when in the absence of any objection, with the knowledge of the opposing
party, the contents of said other case are dearly referred to by title and
number in a pending action and adopted or read into the record of the latter;
or (2) when the original record of the other case or any part of it is actually
withdrawn from the archives at the court's discretion upon the request, or
with the consent, of the parties, and admitted as part of the record of the
pending case.36 Parenthetically, a court will take judicial notice of its own
acts and records in the same case.37
PEOPLE v. MENDOZA
G.R. No. 96397, 21 November 1991, 204 SCRA 288
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the accused, convicted by
the Regional Trial Court of robbery with homicide, contended
that the trial court erred in taking judicial notice of testimonies
in other criminal cases despite their not having been offered or
admitted.
Issue: Whether the testimonies in another case may be
taken judicial notice of despite their not having been offered or
admitted.

36 Tabuena VS. Court of Appeals, 196 SCRA 650; PP VS. Melencio Mendoza, 294 SCRA 288 37
Republic VS. Court of Appeals, 277 SCRA 633

Ruling: It is noted that when a motion to adopt the said

testimonies of witnesses W.a8 made by the prosecution, the
appellant and his counsel did not object but instead gave their
consent. Moreover, when the co-conspirator of the accused was
confronted with portions of his testimonies in the previous cases,
he merely denied them or refused to explain. Said portions, thus,
became part of his testimony which were duly subjected to
cross-examination by defense counsel.
When there is an objection, and the judge therefore cannot take judicial
notice 9f a testimony or deposition given in another case, the interested party
must present the witness to testify anew. However, if the witness is already
dead or unable to testify (due to a grave cause almost amounting .to death, as
when the witness is old and has lost the power of speech), 38 his testimony or
deposition given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative,
involving the same parties and subject matter, may be given in evidence
against the adverse party who had the opportunity to cross-examine him.39
If the testimony or deposition given in another proceeding is 'that of a
party in a case, the other party may simply offer in evidence the record of that
testimony or the deposition without having to call the declarant-party to
testify thereon. Certainly, a party will offer the opposing party's declaration
as evidence only if it is prejudicial to the latter's interest.. Such declaration of
a party against his interest is an extra-judicial admission which may be given
in evidence against him.4o
ADMISSIONS: JUDICIAL AND EXTRA-JUDICIAL

An admission is a party's acknowledgment of a fact which is against
his interest.
A party may make an admission in any of these ways:
1. In written pleadings, motions and other papers, and stipulations
filed in the case.
38 Tan v. CA, 20 SCRA 57.


109
EVIDENCE: BASIC PRINCIPLES
2. In open court, either by his testimony on the stand or by his

statement or that of his counsel.
3. In his statement made outside the proceedings in the same case.
In the first two instances above-mentioned, the admissions made are
regarded as judicial admissions. A judicial admission does not require proof
and may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable
mistake or that no such admission was made. A judicial admission need not
be offered in evidence since it is not evidence. It is superior to evidence and
shall be considered by the court as established.
On the other hand, statements made by a party outside the proceedings
in the same case are extra-judicial admissions which may be an act, declaration
or omission made by a party as to a relevant fact and may be given in
evidence against him.41 This type of admission is regarded as evidence and
must be offered as such, otherwise the court will not consider it in deciding
the case. If the extra-judicial statement of a party is not against his interest but
is in his favor, it becomes a self-serving declaration which is inadmissible for
being hearsay since it will be testified to by one who simply heard the
statement and has no personal knowledge of it. But it will not be incompetent
evidence, nor self-serVing, if testified to by the party himself at the trial.42
TIJASON v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 113779-80, 23 February 1995, 241 SCRA 695
Ruling: Self-serving evidence is not to be literally taken as
evidence that serves one's selfish interest. Under the law on
evidence, self-serving evidence is one made by a party out of
court at one time: it does not include a party's testimony as a
witness in court. It is excluded on the same ground as any
hearsay evidence, that is, the lack of opportunity for cross-
examination by the adverse party, and on the consideration that
its admission would open the door to fraud and fabrication of
testimony.
41 Rule 130, See. 26, Rules of Court. 42 A.

Tuason v. CA, 241 SCRA 695.

On the other hand, a party's testimony in court is sworn

and affords the other party the opportunity for
cross-examination. In this case, it is clear that the petitioners
testimony in court, on how he was identified by the prosecution
witness, cannot be described as self-serving.
By the rule's definition, not all admissions made by a party during a
judicial proceeding are judicial admissions. To qualify, they must be made
and offered in the proceedings in the same case If made in one judicial
proceeding, but offered in another, they become extrajudicial admissions for
purposes of the latter case. Thus, the declaration of a defendant in a case that
the plaintiff therein is his agent is a judicial admission of the agency
relationship between them if that fact is against the defendants interest.
However, that same admission may only be an extrajudicial admission if
considered in another case between the same parties.
With more reason, an admission made in a document drafted for
purposes of filing as a pleading in the case but never filed, another pleading
being filed in its stead, is not a judicial admission, for the unfiled document is
not considered a pleading. Whether it would even be an extrajudicial
admission would depend upon whether the document was signed by the client
or only by his attorney. If signed only by the attorney, it would not be
admissible at all, since an attorney has authority to make statements on behalf
of his client only in open court or in a pleading actually filed.43
In criminal cases, it should be noted that an admission or stipulation
made by the accused during the pre-trial cannot be used in evidence against
him unless reduced to writing and signed by him and his counsel.44 But this
rule does not apply to admissions made in the course of the trial. Thus, an
admission made by an accused or his counsel during the trial may be used
against the accused although not signed by either of them.45
43 Jackson vs. Schine Lexington Corporation, 305 Ky. 823, 205 S.W. 2d 1013.
44 Rule 118, See. 4; Manolo Fule vs. Court of Appeals, 162 SCRA 446, June 22,1988. 45 People vs.
Cristina Hernandez, 260 SCRA 25, 30 July 1996.

FULE v. COURT OF APPEALS

C.R. No. L-79094, 22 June 1988, 162 SCRA 446
Petitioner was convicted of a violation of B.P. 22, the
Bouncing Checks Law, on the basis of an unsigned stipulation
of facts entered into between the prosecution and the defense
during pre-trial. On appeal the respondent appellate court
upheld the stipulation of facts and affirmed the judgment of
conviction.
Issue: Whether the conviction, based solely on a
stipulation of facts which was not signed by either the petitioner
or his counsel, was proper.
Ruling: The omission of the signature of the accused and
his counsel, as mandatorily required by -the Rules, renders the
stipulation of facts inadmissible in evidence. The fact that the
lawyer of the accused, in his memorandum, confirmed the
stipulation of facts does not cure the defect because Rule 118
requires the signature of both the accused and his counsel.
What the prosecution should have done, upon discovering
the lack of the required signatures, was to submit evidence to
establish the elements of the crime, instead of relying solely on
the supposed admission of the accused. Without said evidence
independent of the admission, the guilt of the accused cannot be
deemed established beyond reasonable doubt.
PEOPLE v. HERNANDEZ
C.R. No. 108028, 30 July 1996, 260 SCRA 25
Issue: Whether the stipulation of facts proposed during
trial by the prosecution, and admitted by defense counsel is
admissible.
Ruling: A stipulation of facts in criminal cases is now
expressly sanctioned by law. In further pursuit of the objective
of expediting trial by dispensing with the presentation of
evidence on matters that the accused is willing to admit, a
stipulation of facts should not be allowed only during the pretrial
but also, and with more reason, during trial proper itself.
A stipulation of facts entered into by the prosecution and
defense counsel during trial in open court is automatically
reduced into writing and contained in the official transcript of
the proceedings had in' court. The conformity of the accused in

the form of his signature affIxed th~reto is unnecessary in view
of the fact that: "xxx an attorney who is employed to manage a
party's conduct of a lawsuit xxx has prima facie authority to
make relevant admissions by pleadings, by oral or written
stipulation, xxx which, unless allowed to be withdrawn, are
conclusive." In fact, "judicial admissions are frequently those of
counsel or of the attorney of record who is, for the purpose of the
trial, the agent of his client. When such admissions are made xxx
for the purpose of dispensing with proof of some fact, xxx they
bind the client, whether made during, or even after trial."
In view of the foregoing, the stipulation of facts proposed
during trial by prosecution and admitted by defense counsel is
tantamount to a judicial admission by the appellant of the facts
stipulated on. Controlling, therefore, is Section 4, Rule 129 of
the Rules of Court (Judicial Admissions).
Admissions in a pleading which had been withdrawn or superseded by
an amended pleading, although filed in the same case, are reduced to the
status of extrajudicial admissions and therefore must be proved by the party
who relies thereon46 by formally offering in evidence the original pleading
containing such extrajudicial admission.47 Consistently, the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure provides that IAn amended pleading supersedes the pleading
that it amends. However, admissions in superseded pleadings may be received
in evidence against the pleader ... "48
JAVELLANA v. D.O. PLAZA ENTERPRISES,

INC. G.R. No. L-28297, 30 March 1970, 32
SCRA 261
A complaint for the collection of a sum of money was filed.
After the defendant filed his answer and counter-claim, the
plaintiff filed a motion to admit his amended complaint which
. was granted. After trial, judgment was rendered ordering the'
defendant to pay a sum of money with interest and qamages.
46 Bastida VS. Menzi & Co., 58 Phil. 188:

47 Javellana vs. D.O. Plaza Enterprises, Inc., March 30,1970; Torres vs. Court of Appeals, 31 July 1984,
131 SCRA 24; Director of Lands vs. CA, 196 SCRA 94, April 22, 1991.

On the basis of defendant's motion for reconsideration, the

court modified its previous decision, decreasing the am0unt
of interest and attorney's fees. Hence, this appeal.
Issue: Whether the court may reduce the amount of
interest and attorney's fees on the basis of the amounts
alleged by the plaintiff in the original complaint.
Ruling: The court reduced the interest and attorney's
fees on the basis of estoppel, the ground therefor being that
the reduced amounts were those alleged, hence admitted, by
the plaintiff in his original complaint. This was error. The
original complaint was not formally offered in evidence.
Having been amended, the original complaint lost its
character as a judicial admission, which would have required
no proof, and became merely an extrajudicial admission, the
admissibility of which, as evidence, requires its formal offer.
Since the record does not show that the complaint was
admitted in evidence, there is no proof of estoppel on the part
of the plaintiff on his allegations in the complaint.
Since generally a judicial admission does not require proof and
cannot be contradicted, any attempt made by a party to still prove it may
be objected to as immaterial, i.e., not in issue anymore; and any attempt
to adduce evidence in contradiction of that admission may also be
objected to. In either case, the judge may himself block such attempts as
improper departures from the issues of the case. Unless, of course, it can
be shown that the admission was made through palpable mistake or that
no such admission was made at all. 49
BEST EVIDENCE RULE
The Best Evidence Rule is applicable only to documents. When the

subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be
admissible other than the original writing itself. 50 Not every writing is
considered a document for purposes of the best evidence rule.
Documents as evidence consist of writings or any material containing


letters, words, numbers, figures, symbols or other modes of written

expressions offered as proof of their contents. 51.
If a writing is offered not to prove its contents but to prove some
other fact, e.g., that the writing exists, or that it is done on sheepskin, or
the size of the paper it is written on, it is, for purposes of evidence, only
object evidence. To determine the admissibility of object evidence, the
best evidence rule does not apply. Hence, the original writing need not be
presented. The existence or condition of that writing may be proved, at
once, by any other evidence, like oral testimony. 52
PEOPLE'v. TANDOY
C.R. No. 80505, 4 December 1990, 192 SCRA 28
Accused was convicted of a violation of the Dangerous Drugs
Act. He appealed to the Supreme Court, contending that the trial
court erred, in violation of the Best Evidence Rule, in admitting
a xerox copy of the bill allegedly used as buy-bust money.
Issue: Whether the xerox copy of the marked bill is
admissible in evidence.
Ruling: The Best Evidence Rule applies only when the
contents of the document are the subject of inquiry. Where the
issue is only: as to whether or not such document was actually
expected, or exists, or in the circumstances relevant to or
surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule does not apply
and testimonial evidence is admissible.
Since the photocopy of the marked money was presented
by the prosecution solely for the purpose of establishing its
existence and not its contents, other substitutionary evidence,
like a xerox copy, is therefore admissible without accounting for
the original.
Closely related to the best evidence rule is the rule that ca document
or writing which is merely" collateral" to the issue involved in the case on
trial need not be produced. This is the collateral facts rule. Thus, where the
purpose of presenting a document is not to prove its contents, but merely
to give coherence to, or to make intelligible,

People vs. Tandoy, 192 SCRA 28.
UST LAW REVIEW, Vol. XLVIII January-December 2004

the testimony of a witness regarding a fact contemporaneous to the writing,

the original of the document need not be presented. In this case, the contents
of the document .are not sought to be proven, but are simply incidental to the
fact being testified to. Thus, the best evidence rule cannot apply. 53
AIR FRANCE v. CARRASCOSO
G.R. No. L-21438, September 28, 1966
On a flight from Bangkok to Rome, onboard an Air
France airplane, the plaintiff Carrascoso was forced to give
up his first class seat for another passenger. Apparently,
Carrascoso was made to give up his seat because a "white
man" had a better right to the seat. During the trial,
Carrascoso testified that the purser of the plane had told him
that he - the purser - had made an entry in his notebook,
relating the incident, thus "First class passenger was forced to
go to the tourist class against his will, and that the captain
refused to intervene." The notebook itself was not presented.
The defense moved to strike the testimony on the ground that
the notebook itself would be the best evidence. The trial court
denied the motion to strike.
Issue: Whether the trial court erred in its decision to
allow the testimony without the production of the document
in question.
Ruling:, Petitioner charges that the finding that the
purser made an entry in his notebooks reading "First class
passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will,
and that the captain refused to intervene" is predicated upon
I evidence (Carrascoso's testimony) which is incompetent. The
court disagreed, holding that the subject of inquiry was not
the entry, but the ouster incident. Testimony of the entry does
not come within the proscription of the best evidence rule.
Such testimony is, therefore, admissible.
The original of a document is one the contents of which are the subject
of inquiry. 54 Even a mere photocopy of a document may be an original if it
is the contents of that photocopy that are inquired into.
53 Air France vs. Car1'ascoso, September 28, 1966. 54 Rule

130, See. 4, Rules of Court.

When a document is in two or more copies executed at or about the

same time with identical con~ents, all such copies are equally regarded as
originals. Thus, the first copy and the four ( 4) carbon copies of a contract,
all of which are identical, are all considered originals. Each of them may
be offered as proof of their contents. But if a party has lost his original
document, he must account not only for the unavailability of his copy but
also for the lost, destruction or unavailability of the rest of the original
copies. Otherwise, secondary evidence of his lost original will not be
admitted. Any of the four other extant originals would still be the best
available evidence. 55
DE VERA v. AGUILAR
G.R. No. 83377, 9 February 1988,218 SCRA 602
The property subject of the dispute was mortgaged by
petitioners to another party. Upon maturity of the mortgage, the
private respondents redeemed it and the owner sold the property
to the petitioners. The private respondents registered the deed of
sale and received an Original Certificate of Title. Petitioners
wrote to the respondents claiming that they were co-owners of
the property and demanding partition. They filed a suit for
reconveyance of the lot in the trial court, which ruled in favor of
the petitioners. In doing so, the trial court admitted an exhibit
purporting to be a xeroxed copy of an alleged deed of sale by the
respondents.
The private respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals,
which rendered its decision reversing the trial court. It found
that the loss or destruction of the original deed of sale had not
been duly proven by the petitioners. Hence, secondary evidence,
Lee, presentation of the xeroxed copy of the alleged deed of sale,
is inadmissible.
Issue: Whether the loss of the original deed of sale was
satisfactorily proven so as to allow the presentation of
secondary evidence.
Ruling: Secondary evidence is admissible when the
original documents were actually lost or destroyed. But prior to
the introduction of such secondary evidence, the proponent must
establish the former existence of the instrument. The correct
55 De Vera V5. Aguilar, 218 SCRA 602.

order of proof is as follows: Existence; execution; loss;

contents - although this order may be changed, if necessary,
in the discretion of the court. The sufficiency of proof
offered as a predicate for the admission of an alleged lost
deed lies within the judicial discretion of the trial court
under all the circumstances of the particular case.
A reading of the decision of the trial court shows that it
merely relied on proof of the existence and due execution of
the alleged deed of sale fi the photocopies thereof. It failed to
look into the facts and circumstances surrounding its loss or
destruction.
The due execution of the deed of sale may be
established by the person or persons who executed it, by the
person before whom its execution was acknowledged, or by
any person who was present and saw it executed or who,
after its execution, saw it and recognized the signatures; or
by a person to whom the parties to the instrument had
previously confessed the execution thereof. In this case, the
due execution of the deed of sale was proven through the
testimony of the notary public.
After the due execution of the document has been
established, it must next be proven that said document was
lost or destroyed. The destruction may be proved by any
person knowing the fact. The loss may be shown by any
person who knew the fact of such loss, or by anyone who
had made, in the judgment of the court, a sufficient
examination in the place or places where the documents or
papers of similar character are usually kept by the person in
whose custody the lost document was, and have been unable
to find it; or who has made any other investigation which is
sufficient to satisfy the court that the instrument is indeed
lost.
However, all duplicates or counterparts must accounted
for before using copies. For, since all the duplicates or
multiplicates are parts of the writing to be proved, no excuse
for non-production of the writing itself can be regarded as
established until it appears that all of its parts are
unavailable.
Secondary evidence may also be resorted to, as though the

document had been lost, when the adverse party who has custody of the
original refuses, despite reasonable notice, to produce the

document. 56 In this case, such adverse party should not later be allowed to
introduce the original for the purpose of contradicting the secondary evidence
presented. 57
When the proper foundation for the reception of secondary evidence
has been laid, the best evidence rule insists on a preference in the type of
secondary evidence that will be presented. Thus, the Rule provides:
"When the original document has been lost or destroyed,
or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its
execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability
without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy,
or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by
the testimony of witnesses, in the order stated."
Hence, before a party may offer the testimony of witnesses to prove the
contents of a lost original, he must first show or prove that no copy of the
document exists and, in addition, that there exists no authentic document
reciting the contents of the unavailable original. This second layer of
foundations may of course be established by oral testimony, but it must be
established.
PAROLE EVIDENCE RULE
The Parole Evidence Rule applies only to contractual documents. 58

However, it does not apply where at least one party to the suit is not a party -
nor a privy to a party - to the written instrument and does not base his claim,
nor assert a right arising from the instrument or established therein. Thus, a
total stranger to the writing is not bound by its terms and is allowed to
introduce extrinsic or parol evidence against the efficacy of the writing. 59
In order that parol evidence may be admissible, the exceptional
situation, including the fact of a subsequent agreement, must be put in issue in
the pleading. Otherwise, no parol evidence can be

Wigmore on Evidence, § 1210.
58 Cruz v. Court of Appeals, December 10, 1999.
59 Lechugas v. Court of Appeals, August 6, 1986.
USTLAW REVIEW, Vol. XLVIII, January-December 2004

admissible. When the defendant invokes such exceptional situations in

his answer, such facts are sufficiently put in issue as to allow the
presentation of parol evidence. However, if, when presented, the parol
evidence is not objected to, such objection is deemed waived.
ADMISSIBILI1Y OF EXTRA-JUDICIAL CONFESSIONS

The extra-judicial confession of an accused acknowledging his
guilt of the offense charged, or of any offense necessarily included
therein, may be given in evidence against him.60 Note that if the
confession is judicially given, either by way of a plea of guilty upon
arraignment or made in the course of the trial, it need not be offered in
evidence since it is a judicial admission.61
An extra-judicial confession may be given either before the
custodial investigation stage or during custodial investigation. A person is
placed under custodial investigation when after a crime has been
committed, the authorities' investigation ceases to be a mere general
inquiry into the circumstances and authorship of the crime and begins to
focus on the individual as a suspect. 62 Under R.A. 7438,63 custodial
investigation shall include the practice of issuing an íinvitationî to a
person who is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected
to have committed.
When under custodial investigation, a person shall have the
constitutional right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the
person cannot afford the services of a counsel he must be provided with
one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence
of counsel. 64 It must be noted that neither a lawyer

62 Miranda v. Arizona. 384 U.S. 436; Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478.
63 An Act Defining Certain Rights of Persons Arrested, Detained, or Under Custodial Investigation as
Well as the Duties of the Arresting, Detaining, and Investigating Officers and Providing Penalties for
Violations Thereof.
64 Art. III, See. 12. Constitution.

NBI agent nor the City Legal Officer can be considered an independent
counsel for this purpose. -
If the person under custodial investigation has not been informed
of any of the above-mentioned rights, any confession or declaration
given by him during said investigation shall be inadmissible. 65 To be
valid, the information to be given to the accused regarding his rights must
be more than a perfunctory recitation of such rights; it must be made in
practical terms, in a language or dialect he understands and in a manner
he comprehends, the degree of explanation varying according to the'
person's level of education and intelligence.66 The presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duty does not apply to
in-cus~ody confessions. The prosecution must prove compliance with
the aforementioned constitutional requirements. 67
PEOPLE v. JIMENEZ
G.R. No. L-40677, 31 May 1976, 71 SCRA 186
Ruling: Prior to the police interrogation of the
appellant, he was not warned that he had the right to remain
silent, that any statement he might make could be used as
evidence against him, and that he had the right to an
attorney, either appointed or retained. Without the aforesaid
warnings, the purported extrajudicial confession of the
appellant, which was obtained during custodial
investigation by the police, is inadmissible in evidence.
PEOPLE v. CAMALOG
G.R. No. 77116,31 January 1989, 169 SCRA 816
Ruling: Appellants were not informed of their
constitutional rights and, even assuming tha.t they were so
informed, there is no indication that they understood those
rights. "xxx the right of a person under interrogation 'to be
informed' implies a correlative obligation on the part of the
police investigator to explain, and contemplates an effective
65 People v. Jimenez, 71 SCRA 186. 66

People v. Camalog, 169 SCRA 816. 67
People v. Trinidad, 162 SCRA 714.

communication that results in understanding what is

conveyed. Short of this, there is denial of the right, as it
cannot truly be said that the person has been 'informed' of his
rights. Now, since the right 'to be informed’ implies
comprehension, the degree of explanation required will
necessarily vary, depending upon the education, intelligence,
and other relevant personal circumstances of the person
under investigation. Suffice it to say that a simpler and more
lucid explanation is needed where the subject in unlettered. n
(Reyes v. Quizon, 142 SCRA 362)
PEOPLE v. TRINIDAD
G.R. No. L-38930, 28 June 1988, 162 SCRA 714
Ruling: The rule is that when an accused testifies that he
signed his confession because he was maltreated, the
prosecution must present evidence to rebut his claim,
otherwise, the confession will be considered illegally
procured. The presumption of regularity of performance of
official duty does not apply to in-custody confessions. The
prosecution must prove compliance with the constitutional
requirements.
No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the
presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested, or by any person in
his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either by the detainee
himself or by anyone in his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived
but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of
counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of this procedure, whether
inculpatory or exculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in
evidence. 68
In People v. Policarpio,69 the accused who was arrested in a buy-bust
operation refused to give a statement after having been informed of his
Constitutional rights; but he was made to acknowledge in writing that six
plastic bags of marijuana leaves were confiscated from him, and he was
also made to sign a receipt for P20.00 as the purchase price of the
marijuana. The Supreme Court ruled that said receipts were in effect
extra-judicial confessions given during custodial
68 People v. Galit, 135 SCRA 465; Morales v. Ponce-Emile, 121 SCRA 538. 69 158
SCRA 85.

investigation and were therefore inadmissible for having been given without
the assistance of counsel.
An extra-judicial confession made by an accused shall not be sufficient
for conviction unless corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti (Rule 133,
See. 3). Thus, in People v._Barlis,70 the accused who validly gave a statement
during custodial investigation confessing to the commission of homicide and
robbery was convicted of homicide only and acquitted of the robbery charge
in the absence of evidence establishing the corpus delicti of robbery. ,
"
The rights guaranteed a person under-Art. III, See. 12 of the
Constitution are not available when he is not under custodial investigation.
Thus, a statement or confession voluntarily given by an employee during an
administrative investigation that he had malversed his employer's funds is
admissible although without a prior information of said rights and without the
assistance of counsel.?1
PEOPLE v. AYSON
G.R. No. 85215, 7 July 1989, 175 SCRA 216
Private respondent was charged with having unlawfully
kept for himself the proceeds of the sale of plane tickets.
Management informed him of the investigation to be conducted.
Prior to the investigation, private respondent informed
management in writing of his willingness to settle the
irregularities. At the investigation, private respondents’ answers
in response to questions were taken down in writing. An
information for estafa was filed. During trial, the written offer of
evidence included statement of the accused and his handwritten
admission. Accused objected. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether the statement and admission of the accused
were properly excluded as evidence.
Ruling: Accused was not, in any sense, under custodial
investigation prior to and during the administrative inquiry.
Thus, a statement or confession voluntarily given by an
70
231 SCRA 426.
71 People v. Ayson, 175 SCRA 216.
UST LA W REVIEW, Vol. XL VIII, January~December 2004

employee during an administrative investigation, that he had

malversed his employer's funds is admissible although without a
prior information of his rights under Article III, Section 12 of
the Constitution and without assistance of counsel.
Similarly competent is the admission of adulterous conduct made by a
woman to her husband when the latter confronted her with incriminatory
evidence in their residence. 72
ARROYO, JR. v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 96602, 19 November 1991, 203 SCRA 750
A criminal complaint for adultery was filed by the husband
against his wife and petitioner. After trial, the Regional Trial
Court convicted the petitioner and the wife, based, among others
on the wife's admission to her husband, of her infidelity. This
decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The wife later
filed a motion for reconsideration or new trial contending that a
pardon had been extended by her husband. The husband filed a
manifestation praying for the dismissal of the case as he had
"tacitly consented" to his wife's infidelity.
Issue: Whether the admission of adulterous conduct by the
wife to her husband is admissible in evidence.
Ruling: The husband's testimony relating the admission of
adulterous conduct made by the wife to her husband is
admissible in evidence. The husband was neither a peace officer
nor an investigating officer conducting a custodial investigation;
hence, petitioner cannot now claim that the wife's admission
should have been rejected.
EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES
A. Generally, the testimony of a witness is elicited through questions

propounded by the examining counsel in open court. Unless the witness is
incapacitated to speak, or the question calls for a different mode of answer,
the answers of the witness shall be given orally. 73
72 Arroyo v. Court of Appeals, 203 SCRA 750. 73

Rule 132, See. L Rules of Court.

The main purpose of requiring a witness to appear and testify orally in

open court is to secure to-the adverse party the opportunity to cross-
examine the witness. Another reason for such rule is to enable the judge
to observe the countenance and demeanor of the witness while testifying,
an important factor in determining the credibility of the witness.
Therefore, it would be impermissible and would be a grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the trial judge to accept the affidavit of a witness
in lieu of the latterfs direct testimony subject to cross-examination. 74
'PEOPLE v. ESTENZO
G.R. No. L-41166, 25 August 1976, 72 SCRA 428
After the accused had testified in the criminal case, his
counsel manifested that the subsequent witnesses would no
longer be called to testify. Their affidavits, subject to
cross-examination, would instead be filed in lieu of oral
testimony. Despite the prosecution's objection, the respondent
judge agreed to the defense counsel's idea and issued an Order to
this effect.
Issue: Whether the respondent judge gravely abused his
discretion in accepting the affidavit of a witness in lieu of direct
testimony.
Ruling: The main and essential purpose of requiring a
witness to appear and testify orally at a trial is to secure, for the
adverse party, the opportunity of cross-examination. It is only
when the witness testifies orally that the judge may have a true
idea of his countenance, manner, and expression, which may
confirm or detract from the weight of his testimony.
There is an additional advantage to be obtained in requiring
that the direct testimony of the witness be given orally in court.
Under the rules, only questions directed to the eliciting of
testimony which, under the general rules of evidence, is relevant
to, and competent to prove, the issue of the case, may be
propounded to the witness. A witness may testify only on those
facts which he knows of his own, knowledge. Thus, on direct
examination, leading questions are not allowed, except in such
cases as the court may, conformably with the Rules, determine
to be exceptional.
74 People v. Estenzo, 72 SCRA 428.

It is obvious that the judge's ability to make such

determinations would be subverted, and the orderly dispatch of
the business of the courts thwarted, if trial judges were allowed
to adopt any procedure in the presentation of evidence other
than what is specifically authorized by the Rules.
The aforesaid rule is relaxed under the Rule on Summary Procedure
(RSP) where in criminal cases covered by said Rule, the affidavits and
counter-affidavits of the parties' witnesses constitute their direct testimonies
subject however to cross-examination, re-direct or re-cross examination.75
And in civil actions covered by the RSP, no examination of witnesses is even
required or allowed; the parties simply submit the affidavits of their
witnesses and other evidence on the factual issues defined in the preliminary
conference order prepared by the judge after the termination of said
conference. 76
Another exception is found in the trial of agrarian cases where the
parties submit affidavits of their witnesses subject to cross-examination. 77
B. One question often asked is whether a witness may be allowed to testify by
narration. While the general rule is that material and relevant facts are elicited
from a witness by questions put to him, it still rests within the sound
discretion of the trial judge to determine whether a witness will be required to
testify by question and answer, or will be permitted to testify in narrative
form.78
"There is no legal principle which prevents a witness from
giving his testimony in narrative form if he is requested to do so
by counsel. A witness may be allowed to testify by narration if it
would be the best way of getting at what he knew or could state
concerning the matter at issue. It would expedite the trial and
would perhaps furnish the court a clearer understanding . of the
matters related as they occurred. Moreover, narrative testimony
may be allowed if material parts of his evidence cannot be easily
obtained through piecemeal testimonies. But
7S See. 15, Rules on Summary Procedure. 76 See.

9, Rules on Summary Procedure. 77 P.D. 946,
See. 16.
78
98 C.T-S. See. 325, p. 26.

"~
.
if in giving such testimony, the witness states matters irrelevant

or immaterial or incompetent, it is the right and duty of counsel
objecting to such testimony to interpose and arrest the narration
by calling the attention of the court particularly to the
objectionable matter and, by a motion to strike it out, obtain a
ruling of the court excluding such testimony from the case.79
While a witness may be permitted in the discretion of the court
to narrate his knowledge of material facts bearing upon the case
without specifically being interrogated in detail, it is also within
the discretion of the court to prohibit a witness from
volunteering unsought information in connection with the
case.”80
C. Now, for some jurisprudential rules regarding uncompleted
testimonies:
1. When a witness had testified on direct examination but was not
cross-examined because he dies after numerous postponements of
his cross-examination attributable to the cross-examining party
whereas the witness had all the time been available for
cross-examination, his direct testimony shall be allowed to remain
in the record and cannot be ordered stricken off. The
cross-examiner is deemed to have waived his right to
cross-examine. 81
2. On the contrary, when cross-examination is not and cannot be done
or completed due to causes attributable to the party offering the
witness, the uncompleted testimony is thereby rendered
incompetent. 82
3. The direct testimony of a witness who dies before conclusion of the
cross-examination can be stricken only insofar as not covered by
the cross-examination, and absence of a witness is not enough to
warrant striking his testimony for failure to appear for further
cross-examination where the witness has already been sufficiently
cross-examined, and the matter on which further cross-examination
is sought is not in controversy. 83
79 Ibid.
80 People v. Calixtro, et. al., 193 SCRA 303.
81 Dela Paz, Jr., v.-Intermediate Appellate Court, 154 SCRA 65. 820rtigas,
Jr., v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 64 SCRA 610 .. 83 People v. Hon. Alberto
V. Sefieris, 99 SCRA 92.

D. A judge may intervene in the trial of a case to promote expedition and

avoid unnecessary waste of time or to clear up some ambiguity. A judge is not
a mere referee like that of a boxing bout. He should have as much interest as
counsel in the orderly and expeditious presentation of evidence, calling the
attention of counsel to points at issue that are overlooked, directing them to
ask questions that would elicit the facts on the issues involved, clarifying
ambiguous remarks. The number of time a judge intervenes in the
examination of a witness is not necessarily an indication of bias. It cannot be
taken against a judge if his clarifying questions happen to reveal certain truths
which tend to spoil the theory of one party. 84
E. The court may stop the introduction of further testimony upon any
particular point when the evidence upon it is already so full that more
witnesses to the same point cannot be reasonably expected to be additionally
persuasive. But this power should be exercised with caution.8s
AUTHENTICATION AND PROOF OF DOCUMENTS
For the purpose of their presentation in evidence, documents are either

public or private.
Public documents need not be authenticated; private documents have tn
be authenticated to be admissible in evidence.
There are only three types of public documents, viz.: (1) the written
official acts or records of official acts of the sovereign authority, official
bodies and tribunals and public officers, whether of the Philippines or of a
foreign country, e.g., transfer certificate of title, the Official Gazette, entries
in the book of entries of judgments; (2) documents acknowledged before a
notary public except last wills and testaments; (3) public records, kept in the
Philippines, of private documents required by law to be entered therein, e.g.,
certified true copies of birth certificates or of death certificates issued by the
local civil registrar. 87
84 People v. Glenn Hatton, 210 SCRA 1. 85

87 Ibid.

All other writings are private and thus ought to be authenticated.

Their due execution and genuineness must be proved either (1) by anyone
who saw the document executed or written; or (2) by evidence of the
genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.88 Note that the
opinion of an ordinary witness regarding the handwriting of a person is
admissible under Rule 130, Sec. 50, as an exception to the opinion rule
provided· the witness is shown to have sufficient familiarity with the
handwriting.
The last paragraph of Rule 132, Sec. 20 states that "Any other private
document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be." This provision
should be taken in relation to the first paragraph which reads: "Before any
private document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and
genuineness must be proved ... "If it is offered as a genuine writing, it must be
proved to be genuine. If it is offered as a forgery, it must be proved to be a
forgery. If a private writing is offered not as an authentic document, it need
only be identified as that which the offeror claims it to be. Thus, if an
anonymous letter a party has received is relevant to the issues in a case, he
need not authenticate it since he cannot possibly do that anyway. He. only has
to identify it as the anonymous letter he had received. The authenticity of the
document is immaterial for he is not offering it as authentic. An ancient
document, although private in nature, needs no authentication either;
provided it appears to be more than thirty years old, is produced from a
custody in which it would naturally be found if genuine, and is unblemished
by any alteration or circumstances of suspicion.89 Of course, also, if the
authenticity of a private document is judicially admitted by the other, a party
need not authenticate it.
Not all public documents have the same, probative value. Documents
consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a
public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.9o Hence, the
entries made by 'the clerk of court in the book of entries of judgments are
prima facie evidence of the

Rule 132, See. 22, Rules of Court. 90 Rule
132, See. 23, Rules of Court.
UST ~ W REVIEW, Vol. XLVIII, January-December 2004
-,"
entered facts; the clerk of court need not be called to attest to the truth
thereof. Such evidence of course are only prima facie, i.e., good until
rebutted by reliable contradictory evidence.
But "[a]ll other public documents are evidence, even against a third person,
of the fact which gave rise to their execution and of the date of the latter.”91 Thus, a
certified true copy of a death certificate issued by the local civil registrar -
although a public document - is proof only of the fact which gave rise to
its execution, i.e., the fact of death and the date of that fact. The death
certificate is not evidence of the cause of death, which ought to be proved
by competent evidence.
TENDER OF EXCLUDED EVIDENCE
Evidence formally offered by a party may be admitted or excluded

by the court. If a party's offered documentary or object evidence is
excluded, he may move or request that it be attached to form part of the
record 'of the case. If the excluded evidence is oral, he may state for the
record the name and other personal circumstances of the witness and the
substance of the proposed testimony. If a question asked of a witness by
the 'counsel who presented him is objected to and the objection is
sustained, counsel may manifest for the record what the witness would
have answered if the witness had been allowed to do so. This procedure is
known as offer of proof or tender of excluded evidence92 and is made for
purposes of appeal. If an adverse judgment is eventually rendered against
the offeror, he may in his appeal assign as error the rejection of the
excluded evidence. The appellate court will better understand and
appreciate the assignment of error if the evidence involved is included in
the record of the case. And since the offer of proof is for appellate
purposes, the same cannot be denied by the trial court.
91 Ibid.
UST LA W REVIEW, Vol. XLVIII, January-December 2004

Evidence Basic Principles

Uploaded by

Evidence Basic Principles

Uploaded by

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Evidence: Basic Principles and

JUSTICE ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO*

Evidence is the means of proving a fact. It becomes necessary to

UST LAW REVIEW, Vol. XL VIII, January-December 2004, Pages 93-129.

through a judgment on the pleadings2 or by summary judgment.3

A. Axiom of Admissibility of Evidence

2 Rule 34, Rules of Court. 3

UST LAW REVIEW, Vol. XLVIII, January-December 2004

On the other hand, the grounds for objection to the competency of

B. Proper Presentation of Evidence

Every piece of evidence, regardless of its nature, requires certain

6 Rule 134, See. 6, Rules of Court. 7

UST LA W REVIEW, Vol. XL VIII, January-December 2004

foundation for the testimony of a witness must be laid. An ordinary

10 Rule 132, See. 35, Rules of Court. 11

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UST LAW REVIEW, Vol. XLVIII, January-December 2004

becomes reasonably apparent. But it is fundamental that an objection to

IMPORTANCE OF THE FORMAL OFFER OF EVIDENCE;

Evidence not formally offered will not be considerea. by the court in

12 Rule 130, See. 34, Rules of Court. 13

UST LAW REVIEW, Vol. XL VIII, January-December 2004

It must be noted that the mere marking, identification, or

G.R. No. 91628, 22 August 1991, 201 SCRA 87

UST LAW REVIEW, Vol. XL VIII, January-December 2004

UST LAW REVIEW, Vol. XLVIII, January-December 2004

TABUENA v. COURT OF APPEALS

MODES OF EXCLUDING INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE

There are two ways of excluding inadmissible evidence. One is by objection

17 Rule 13 2, See. 35, Rules of Court. IS

UST LAW REVIEW, Vol. XLVIII, January-December 2004

B. A motion to strike out answer or testimony is proper in the

OBJECTIONS AND RULING

21 Rule 132, See. 39, Rules of Court. 22

UST LAW REVIEW, Vol. XLVIII, January-December 2004

25 Rule 132, Sees. 10 & 12, Rules of Court. 26

UST LAW REVIEW, Vol. XLVIII, January-December 2004

B. Substantive objections ~~ those based on the inadmissibility .'

II. The ruling by the court on an objection must be given immediately

29 Rule 132, See. 38, Rules of Court. 30

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Judges are advised to judiciously consider the validity of the grounds

LAYING THE- FOUNDATIONS FOR EVIDENCE

In determining the competency of an offered piece of evidence, the

31 Rule 130, See. 28, Rules of Court. 32

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Similarly, the foundation required by the Rules for the proper

A. Mandatory and Discretionary Judicial Notice

Not everything alleged in a party's pleading is required to be proved.

B. Hearing the Parties on Discretionary Judicial Notice

During the trial, when a court is uncertain whether it may, at its

33 Rule 129, See. L Rules of Court.

UST LA W REVIEW, Vol. XL VIII, January-December 2004

C. Judicial Notice of Proceedings in Another Case

In the adjudication of a case pending before it, a court is not authorized

35 Rule 129, See. 3, Rules of Court.

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Ruling: It is noted that when a motion to adopt the said

ADMISSIONS: JUDICIAL AND EXTRA-JUDICIAL

38 Tan v. CA, 20 SCRA 57.

UST LAW REVIEW, Vol. XLVIII, January-December 2004

2. In open court, either by his testimony on the stand or by his

41 Rule 130, See. 26, Rules of Court. 42 A.

UST LAW REVIEW, Vol. XLVIII, January-December 2004

On the other hand, a party's testimony in court is sworn

UST LAW REVIEW, Vol. XLVIII, January-December 2004

FULE v. COURT OF APPEALS

the proceedings had in' court. The conformity of the accused in

JAVELLANA v. D.O. PLAZA ENTERPRISES,

46 Bastida VS. Menzi & Co., 58 Phil. 188:

UST LAW REVIEW, Vol. XLVIII, January-December 2004

On the basis of defendant's motion for reconsideration, the

BEST EVIDENCE RULE

The Best Evidence Rule is applicable only to documents. When the

49 Rule 129, See. 4, Rules of Court. 50