Austria Vs Reyes

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-23079. February 27, 1970

RUBEN AUSTRIA, et.al., Petitioners,
v.
HON. ANDRES REYES, Judge, CFI Rizal, PERFECTO CRUZ,
et.al., Respondents.
PONENTE: CASTRO, J.
Facts:
In 1956, Basilia Austria vda. de Cruz last will and testament
was admitted to probate in CFI Rizal (SP:2457). The estate
was, under the will, to pass on to the respondents, all of whom
had been declared by her as her own legally adopted children.
In 1959, petitioners filed in the same proceedings a petition in
intervention for partition alleging that they are Basilias
nearest of kin, and that respondents had not in fact been
adopted by decedent in accordance with law. The court
granted the petition.
In February 1963, petitioners moved to set for hearing the

matter of the genuineness of respondents adoption. But
before the hearing, respondent Benita moved to confine the
petitioners intervention to properties not disposed of in the
will. In June 1963, the CFI granted Benitas motion. Petitioners
moved to reconsider, but was denied. Hence, the petition for
certiorari. Petitioners contend that, relying on Article 850 of
NCC, the sole basis of Basilias institution of respondents was
her belief that they were compulsory heirs; hence, had she
known the adoption to be spurious, she would not have
instituted them.
Issue:
Whether or not the institution of heirs would retain validity in
the event there exists proof that the adoption of the same
heirs by the decedent is false. [NO]
Ruling:
Petition is Denied.
Before the institution of heirs may be annulled under article
850 of the Civil Code, the following requisites must concur:
First, the cause for the institution of heirs must be stated in the
will; second, the cause must be shown to be false; and third, it
must appear from the face of the will that the testator would
not have made such institution if he had known the falsity of
the cause.
The petitioners would have us imply, from the use of the terms,
"sapilitang tagapagmana" (compulsory heirs) and "sapilitang
mana" (legitime), that the impelling reason or cause for the
institution of the respondents was the testatrixs belief that
under the law she could not do otherwise. If this were indeed
what prompted the testatrix in instituting the respondents,
she did not make it known in her will. Surely if she was aware
that succession to the legitime takes place by operation of law,
independent of her own wishes, she would not have found it
convenient to name her supposed compulsory heirs to their
legitimes. Her express adoption of the rules on legitimes
should very well indicate her complete agreement with that
statutory scheme. But even this, like the petitioners own
proposition, is highly speculative of what was in the mind of
the testatrix when she executed her will. One fact prevails,
however, and it is that the decedents will does not state in a
specific or unequivocal manner the cause for such institution
of heirs. We cannot annul the same on the basis of guesswork
or uncertain implications.
And even if we should accept the petitioners theory that the

decedent instituted the respondents perfecto Cruz, Et. Al.
solely because she believed that the law commanded her to do
so, on the false assumption that her adoption of these
respondents was valid, still such institution must stand.
Article 850 of the Civil Code, quoted above, is a positive

injunction to ignore whatever false cause the testator may
have written in his will for the institution of heirs. Such
institution may be annulled only when one is satisfied, after an
examination of the will, that the testator clearly would not
have made the institution if he had known the cause for it to be
false. Now, would the late Basilia have caused the revocation
of the institution of heirs if she had known that she was
mistaken in treating these heirs as her legally adopted
children? Or would she have instituted them nonetheless?
The decedents will, which alone should provide the answer, is

mute on this point or at best is vague and uncertain. The
phrases, "mga sapilitang tagapagmana" and "sapilitang
mana," were borrowed from the language of the law on
succession and were used, respectively, to de scribe the class
of heirs instituted and the abstract object of the inheritance.
They offer no absolute indication that the decedent would
have willed her estate other than the way she did if she had
known that she was not bound by law to make allowance for
legitimes. Her disposition of the free portion of her estate
(libre disposicion) which largely favored the respondent
Perfecto Cruz, the latters children, and the children of the
respondent Benita Cruz, shows a perceptible inclination on her
part to give to the respondents more than what she thought
the law enjoined her to give to them. Compare this with the
relatively small devise of land which the decedent had left for
her blood relatives, including the petitioners Consuelo
Austria-Benta and Lauro Mozo and the children of the
petitioner Ruben Austria. Were we to exclude the respondents
Perfecto Cruz, et al, from the inheritance, then the petitioners
and the other nephews and nieces would succeed to the bulk
of the estate by intestacy a result which would subvert the
clear wishes of the decedent.
Whatever doubts one entertains in his mind should be swept

away by these explicit injunctions in the Civil Code: "The
words of a will are to receive an interpretation which will give
to every expression some effect, rather than one which will
render any of the expressions inoperative; and of two modes
of interpreting a will, that is to be preferred which will prevent
intestacy." 1
Testacy is favored and doubts are resolved on its side,
especially where the will evinces an intention on the part of the
testator to dispose of practically his whole estate, 2 as was
done in this case. Moreover, so compelling is the principle that
intestacy should be avoided and the wishes of the testator
allowed to prevail, that we could even vary the language of the
will for the purpose of giving it effect. 3 A probate court has
found, by final judgment, that the late Basilia Austria Vda. de
Cruz was possessed of testamentary capacity and her last will
executed free from falsification, fraud, trickery or undue
influence. In this situation, it becomes our duty to give full
expression to her will. 4
At all events, the legality of the adoption of the respondents by

the testatrix can be assailed only in a separate action brought
for that purpose, and cannot be the subject of a collateral
attack. 5
To the petitioners charge that the lower court had no power to

reverse its order of December 22, 1969, suffice it to state that,
as borne by the records, the subsequent orders complained of
served merely to clarify the first an act which the court
could legally do. Every court has the inherent power to amend
and control its processes and orders so as to make them
conformable to law and justice. 6 That the court a quo has
limited the extent of the petitioners intervention is also within
its powers as articulated by the Rules of Court. 7
- Digested [18 September 2017, 07:50]
***

Austria Vs Reyes

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Austria Vs Reyes

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FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-23079. February 27, 1970

In February 1963, petitioners moved to set for hearing the

And even if we should accept the petitioners theory that the

Article 850 of the Civil Code, quoted above, is a positive

The decedents will, which alone should provide the answer, is

Whatever doubts one entertains in his mind should be swept

At all events, the legality of the adoption of the respondents by

To the petitioners charge that the lower court had no power to

- Digested [18 September 2017, 07:50]

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