G.R. No.

196853

ROBERT CHUA, Petitioner,

The prosecution failed to prove all the

In order to successfully hold an accused liable for violation of BP 22, the following essential
elements must be present: "(1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account
or for value; (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not
have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its
presentment; and (3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of
funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered
the bank to stop payment."33 "Of the three (3) elements, the second element is the hardest to prove
as it involves a state of mind. Thus, Section 2 of BP 22 creates a presumption of knowledge of
insufficiency of funds, which, however, arises only after it is proved that the issuer had received a
written notice of dishonor and that within five days from receipt thereof, he failed to pay the amount
of the check or to make arrangements for its payment.34

In the instant case, what is in dispute is the existence of the second element. Chua asserts that the
absence of the date of his actual receipt on the face of the demand letter dated November 30, 1993
prevented the legal presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds from arising. On the other
hand, the MeTC opined that while the date of Chua’s actual receipt of the subject demand letter is
not affixed thereon, it is presumed that he received the same on the date of the demand letter
(November 30, 1993). Moreover, the lower courts banked on the stipulation entered into by Chua’s
counsel as to the existence of the demand letter and of Chua’s signature thereon. By reason of such
stipulation, they all held that Chua could no longer impugn the said demand letter.

In Danao v. Court of Appeals,35 the Court discussed the importance of proving the date of actual
receipt of the notice of dishonor, viz.:

In King vs. People, this Court, through Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, held: "To hold a person liable
under B.P. Blg. 22, it is not enough to establish that a check issued was subsequently dishonored. It
must be shown further that the person who issued the check knew ‘at the time of issue that he does
not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon
its presentment.’ Because this element involves a state of mind which is difficult to establish, Section
2 of the law creates a prima facie presumption of such knowledge, as follows:

‘SEC 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds – The making, drawing and issuance of a check
payment of which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank,
when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of
knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder
thereof the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such
check within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the
drawee.

Thus, this Court further ruled in King, "in order to create the prima facie presumption that the issuer
knew of the insufficiency of funds, it must be shown that he or she received a notice of dishonor and,
within five banking days thereafter, failed to satisfy the amount of the check or make arrangement for
its payment."
Indeed, the prima facie presumption in Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 "gives the accused an opportunity to
satisfy the amount indicated in the check and thus avert prosecution. This opportunity, as this Court
stated in Lozano vs. Martinez, serves to mitigate the harshness of the law in its application.

In other words, if such notice of non-payment by the drawee bank is not sent to the maker or drawer
of the bum check, or if there is no proof as to when such notice was received by the drawer,
then the presumption or prima facie evidence as provided in Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 cannot
arise, since there would simply be no way of reckoning the crucial 5-day period."36 (Italics in
the original, emphasis supplied)

Similarly in the present case, there is no way to ascertain when the five-day period under Section 22
of BP 22 would start and end since there is no showing when Chua actually received the demand
letter dated November 30, 1993. The MeTC cannot simply presume that the date of the demand
letter was likewise the date of Chua’s receipt thereof. There is simply no such presumption provided
in our rules on evidence. In addition, from the inception of this case Chua has consistently denied
having received subject demand letter. He maintains that the paper used for the purported demand
letter was still blank when presented to him for signature and that he signed the same for another
purpose. Given Chua’s denial, it behooved upon the prosecution to present proof of his actual
receipt of the November 30, 1993 demand letter. However, all that the prosecution did was to
present it without, however, adducing any evidence as to the date of Chua’s actual receipt thereof. It
must be stressed that ‘[t]he prosecution must also prove actual receipt of [the notice of dishonor]
because the fact of service provided for in the law is reckoned from receipt of such notice of
dishonor by the accused."37 "The burden of proving notice rests upon the party asserting its
existence. Ordinarily, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to prove notice. In criminal cases,
however, the quantum of proof required is proof beyond reasonable doubt. Hence, for B.P. Blg. 22
cases, there should be clear proof of notice"38 which the Court finds wanting in this case.

Anent the stipulation entered into by Chua’s counsel, the MeTC stated:

In the course of the said proceedings, the defense counsel manifested that he is willing to stipulate
as to the existence of the demand letter and the signature of the accused as reflected on the face of
the demand letter. x x x

xxxx

The prosecution had proved also that private complainant personally sent a written notice of
dishonor of the subject checks to the accused and that the latter personally received the same. In
fact, the defense stipulated in open court the existence of the said demand letter and the signature
of the accused as reflected in the face of the demand letter. x x x In view of that stipulation, the
defense is now estopped in denying its receipt thereof.39

As earlier mentioned, this ruling of the MeTC was affirmed by both the RTC and the CA.

The Court, however, disagrees with the lower courts. It is plain that the stipulation only refers to the
existence of the demand letter and of Chua’s signature thereon. In no way can an admission of
Chua’s receipt of the demand letter be inferred therefrom. Hence, Chua cannot be considered
estopped from claiming non-receipt. Also, the Court observes that Chua’s admission with respect to
his signature on the demand letter is consistent with his claim that See made him sign blank papers
where the contents of the demand letter dated November 30, 1993 were later intercalated.
G.R. No. 187401 September 17, 2014

MA. ROSARIO P. CAMPOS, Petitioner,

The petition lacks merit.

To be liable for violation of B.P. 22, the following essential elements must be present: (1) the
making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value; (2) the knowledge of
the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit
with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the
subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or creditor dishonor
for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop
payment.11

The presence of the first and third elements is undisputed. An issue being advanced by Campos
through the present petition concerns her alleged failure to receive a written demand letter from
FWCC, the entity in whose favor the dishonored checks were issued. In a line of cases, the Court
has emphasized the importance of proof of receipt of such notice of dishonor,12 although not as an
element of the offense,but as a means to establish that the issuer of a check was aware of
insufficiency of funds when he issued the check and the bank dishonored it, in relation to the second
element of the offense and Section 2 of B.P. 22. Considering that the second element involves a
state of mind which is difficult to establish, Section 2 of B.P. 22 creates a presumption of knowledge
of insufficiency of funds,13 as it reads:

Sec. 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. – The making, drawing, and issuance of a check
payment of which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank,
when presented within ninety days fromthe date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of
knowledge of such insufficiency of fundsor credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder
thereof the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such
check within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the
drawee.

In the instant case, both the RTC and the CA affirmed the MeTC’s finding that the required notice of
dishonor from FWCC was received by Campos. Campos, nonetheless, still maintains that her
personal receipt of the notice was not sufficiently established, considering that only a written copy of
the letter and the registry return receipt covering it were presented by the prosecution. The Court
has in truth repeatedly held that the mere presentation of registry return receipts that cover
registered mail was not sufficient to establish that written notices of dishonor had been sent to or
served on issuers of checks. The authentication by affidavit of the mailers was necessary in order
1âwphi 1

for service by registered mail to be regarded as clear proof of the giving of notices of dishonor and to
predicate the existence of the second element of the offense.14

In still finding no merit in the present petition, the Court, however, considers Campos' defense that
she exerted efforts to reach an amicable settlement with her creditor after the checks which she
issued were dishonored by the drawee bank, BPI Family Bank. Campos categorically declared in her
petition that, "[she] has in her favor evidence to show that she was in good faith and indeed made
arrangements for the payment of her obligations subsequently after the dishonor of the
checks."15 Clearly, this statement was a confirmation that she actually received the required notice of
dishonor from FWCC. The evidence referred to in her statement were receipts16 dated January 13,
1996, February 29, 1996, April 22, 1998 and May 26, 1998 issued by FWCC to Campos for
payments in various amounts ranging from ₱2,500.00 to ₱15,700.00. Campos would not have
entered into the alleged arrangements beginning January 1996 until May 1998 if she had. not
received a notice of dishonor from her creditor, and had no knowledge of the insufficiency of her
funds with the bank and the dishonor of her checks.

Campos could have avoided prosecution by paying the amounts due on the checks or making
arrangements for payment in full within five ( 5) days after receiving notice. Unfortunately for
Campos, these circumstances were not established in the instant case. She failed to sufficiently
disclose the terms of her alleged arrangement with FWCC, and to establish that the same had been
fully complied with so as to completely satisfy the amounts covered by the subject checks.
Moreover, documents to prove such fact should have been presented before the MeTC during the
trial, yet Campos opted to be tried in absentia, and thus waived her right to present evidence. While
Campos blamed her former counsel for alleged negligence that led to her failure to be present during
the trial,17 it is settled that the negligence of counsel binds his or her client. Given the circumstances,
the Court finds no cogent reason to reverse the ruling of the CA which affirmed the conviction of
Campos.