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c hapter 18

THE THEORY OF “EFFICIENT

BREACH”: A JEWISH LAW
PERSPECTIVE

ronald warburg

Efficient Breach
The Law and Economics school of thought has advanced a number of controversial
claims in the name of economic efficiency—from promoting trading on inside
information to providing markets for the sale of human organs—but none may be
as provocative and challenging as the argument of entitlement and economic
efficiency underlying the theory of “efficient breach.”1 In its view, there is a positive
value in structuring a contractual remedy to permit, if not encourage, contractual
breaches that will lead to the maximization of resources (i.e., economic efficiency).2

1 Its contemporary relevance is signaled by recent English and American case law addressing this matter.
See, for example, Attorney General v. Blake, [2001] 1 A.C. 268, (2000) 4 All E.R. (UKHL); Experience Hendrix LLC
v. PPX Enters. Inc., 1 All E.R. 830 (Ct. App. 2003); U.S. Naval Institute v. Charter Communications, Inc., 936 F. 2d
692 (2d. Cir. 1991); EarthInfo, Inc. v. Hydrosphere Res. Consultants, Inc., 900 P. 2d 113 (Colorado. 1995); SEC v. JT
Wallenbrock & Assoc., 440 F. 3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2006); U.S. v. Snepp, 444 U.S. 507 (1980). For additional case law,
see Melvin Eisenberg, “The Disgorgement Interest in Contract Law,” Michigan Law Rev. 559, 565 (2006): 105.
2 Robert Birmingham, “Breach of Contract, Damage Measures, and Economic Efficiency,” Rutgers
L. Rev. 273 (1970): 24; John Barton, “The Economic Bases of Damages for Breach of Contract,” J. Legal Studies
277 (1972): 1; Richard Posner, Economic Analysis of the Law (1972), 56–72; Charles Goetz and Robert Scott, “Liq-
uidated Damages, Penalties and the Just Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a
Theory of Efficient Breach,” Colum. L. Rev. 554 (1977): 77; E. Allan Farnsworth, “Your Loss or my Gain? The
Dilemma of the Disgorgement Principle in Breach of Contract,” Yale L.J. 1339 (1985): 94. For a recent survey of
the literature, see David Barnes, “The Anatomy of Contract Damages and Efficient Breach Theory,” S. Cal.
Interdisc. L. J. 397 (1997–1998): 6.

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This theory can be illustrated by the oft-cited overbidder paradigm (OP1). In this
paradigm,3
Seller S signs a contract to deliver one hundred thousand custom-ground widgets
at one dollar each to buyer B1 for use in his boiler factory. After S has delivered
the first ten thousand units, buyer B2 comes to S, explains that he desperately
needs twenty-five thousand custom-ground widgets at once since otherwise he
will be forced to close his pianola factory at great cost, and offers to S two dollars
each for twenty-five thousand widgets. S sells to B2 the widgets and therefore does
not complete timely delivery to B1, who sustains one thousand dollars in damages
from S’s breach. Having obtained an additional profit of twenty-five thousand
dollars on the sale to B2 (twenty-five thousand units multiplied by the difference
between two dollars and one dollar), S is fifteen thousand dollars economically
ahead even after reimbursing B1 for his loss (the difference between the additional
profit of twenty-five thousand dollars and one thousand dollars of damages
caused by the breach).
The conventional remedy of damages for breach of contract is the expectation stan-
dard, which places the plaintiff (i.e., the first buyer) in the position in which the
plaintiff would have been had the contract been performed. According to this
theory of efficient breach, the promisor (i.e., the seller) may breach the contract as
long as he is prepared to pay the plaintiff his expectation damages.
Notable American economists, jurists, and philosophers have argued that,
under such circumstances, said breach is economically, legally, philosophically,
or morally uncontestable. Economic proponents of this theory embrace the
Kaldor-Hicks Compensation doctrine, which posits that, if the defendant is
made better off, even if there is a loss to the contracting party, such breach
increases societal gain as long as the benefiting party is able to fully compensate
the losing party.4 In effect, contractual compliance does not necessarily entail
actual performance, for the promisor may opt to breach the contract and pay
damages. Though, as Richard Craswell noted, “this form of enforcement is rarely
considered in the philosophical literature on promising, which usually assumes
that promises must either (1) oblige the promisor to perform the promised
actions, or (2) have no moral force at all,”5 economic breach of contract involves
an intermediate moral obligation to perform or pay damages. The classic formu-
lation in jurisprudential thought of this position is, of course, Oliver Wendell
Holmes’ bad man:
The only universal consequence of a legally binding promise is, that the law
makes the promisor pay damages if the promised event does not happen. In every

3 Posner, supra note 29, at 57.

4 Nicholas Kaldor, “Welfare Propositions of Economics and Inter-Personal Comparisons of Utility,”
Econ. J. 549 (1938): 49; John Hicks, “The Foundations of Welfare Economics,” Econ. J. 696 (1939): 49. For a
discussion of this principle, see Jules Coleman, “Efficiency, Exchange, and Auction: Philosophical Aspects of the
Economic Approach to Law,” Calif. L. Rev. 221 (1980): 68.
5 Richard Craswell, “Two Economic Theories of Enforcing Promises,” in The Theory of Contract Law:
New Essays, 19,27 (Peter Benson ed., Cambridge 2001).

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342 jewish law, ethics, and the modern society

case, it leaves him free from interference until the time for fulfillment has gone
by, and, therefore, free to break his contract if he chooses.6
Put slightly differently in a philosophical vein, the notion of a “promise” is to be
understood in consequential terms. As Frank Menetrez observed:
According to a consequentialist, the promisor ought, as always, to do whatever is
likely to yield the best consequences overall. That is, the promisor ought to
perform if performance is likely to yield better overall consequences, than breach,
and otherwise ought to breach. Thus, when the time for performance arrives, the
promisor is obligated to perform the promise only if an independent assessment
of the consequences recommends performance.7
From this perspective, efficiency theorists would argue that economic efficiency,
which leads to the maximization of resources by encouraging such actions that
benefit some without injuring others, would be the litmus test for determining
whether a contractual breach will yield such consequences. Should it yield such
beneficial outcome, the breach should be executed rather than performance of the
contract.
In effect, adopting this line of argument, one may be accepting a social contract,
which, under certain conditions, individuals have chosen or conceived of the notion
of wealth maximization as a fundamental moral value. And a utilitarian would
advance the claim that a society that aims at wealth maximization will produce an
ethically attractive amalgamation of happiness, of rights (to liberty and property),
and of sharing with the less fortunate members of society.8 Alternatively, the
adoption of the theory of efficient breach eliminates the moral content from the
contractual promise by permitting a breach based on grounds of economic
efficiency.
An alternative approach to the morality of agreement compliance is argued by
Craswell:
[I]f there is a general principle that one ought not cause harm to others, that
might be enough to justify some sort of rule against [agreement breaking].9
For example, promise-keeping may entail benefiting another such as proscribing
the manipulation of another and exercising due diligence in guiding others to form
certain expectations.10 Consequently, promised performance that never transpires

6 Oliver Holmes, The Common Law, ed. by M. deWolfe Howe 236 (Boston, MA: Little, Brown & Co.
1963). Though the legal literature has attributed this statement to Holmes, it has been demonstrated that Holmes
rejected this posture and was “speaking from the bad man’s point of view.” See Joseph Perillo, “Misreading
Oliver Wendell Holmes on Efficient Breach and Tortuous Interference,” Fordham L. Rev. 1085 (2000): 68.
7 Frank Menetrez, “Consequentialism, Promissory Obligation, and the Theory of Efficient Breach,”
UCLA L. Rev. 863, 874 (1999–2000): 47.
8 Richard Posner, “Utilitarianism, Economics and Legal Theory,” J. Legal Stud. 103, (1979): 8. For a
critique, see Jules Coleman, “Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization,” Hofstra L. Rev. 509, 526–539
(1979–1980): 8.
9 Richard Craswell, “Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of Promising,” Michigan L. Rev.
489, 499 (1989): 88.
10 Thomas Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, MA, 1998), 296–302.

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or dashed expectations are “harms” caused to the promisee.11 In this context, the
“harm principle” posits that it is proper for the law to interfere with individual
liberties since the individual has harmed another person.12 In short, noncompliance
with an agreement undermines the “harm principle.” A clear articulation of this
posture in general and the relationship between law and morality in particular
emerges from the thinking of Joseph Raz. He observed:
It follows from the harm principle that enforcing voluntary obligations is not
itself a proper goal for contract law. To enforce voluntary obligations is to
enforce morality through the legal imposition of duties on individuals. In this
respect, it does not differ from the legal proscription of pornography.13

Complying with a promise may be deemed laudable; however, the failure to do so

in and of itself is beyond the province of contract law. The bifurcation of contract
law and morality into two separate domains is either because law should not enforce
morality or because of their differing goals (i.e., law provides rules for an efficient
system of interaction and morality entails the engendering of moral values such as
trust in interpersonal relations).
Last, if the enforcement of a promise qua promise means fulfilling an
obligation (for example, keeping one’s word even when doing so is inefficient or
regardless of whether the promise has been relied upon), it follows that this char-
acterization of the nature of this agreement-keeping is diametrically opposed to
the aforesaid economic, legal, and philosophical rationales as well as the harm
principle underlying the theory of “efficient breach.” A most prominent contem-
porary secular perspective has focused upon the intrinsic value of promises (i.e.,
freestanding obligation of promise-keeping) rather than its instrumental value
such as the avoidance of harm or efficient economic exchange as elaborated upon
by Charles Fried, who observed that through agreement-making obligations
emerge “just because [they have] promised.”14 Adopting such a stance imbues a
promise with moral content and thereby disallows a breach based on grounds of
economic efficiency.

11 For the problematics in grounding the duty to agreement-keeping in such a harm-based account, see
Daniel Markovits, “Making and Keeping Contracts,” Va. L. Rev. 1325, 1352-1366 (2006): 92.
12 See John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (David Spitz ed. 1975), 10–11. More recently, Raz argues, “compensat-
ing individuals for harm resulting from reliance on voluntary obligation is . . . a proper goal for the law.” See
Joseph Raz, “Promises in Morality and Law,” Harvard L. Rev. 916, 937 (1982): 95.
13 Ibid.
14 Charles Fried, Contract as Promise: A Theory of Contractual Obligation (Cambridge, Mass, 1981) 16. See
also, James Gordley, “Contract Law in the Aristotelian Tradition,” in The Theory of Contract Law (Peter Benson
ed., 2001), 265.

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Jewish Law
Halakhah (i.e., Jewish law; halakhot in plural) distinguishes between legal and moral
norms. The distinguishing characteristic between them is enforceability.15 Whereas
a halakhic-legal norm is enforceable by a bet din (i.e., a court of Jewish law), compli-
ance with a halakhic moral norm is dependent upon individual volition.
There are two components required in the undertaking of an obligation:
effectuating a kinyan (i.e., symbolic act of acquisition) and gemirat da’at (i.e., a
concrete articulation of the parties’ firm resolve to undertake the obligation).16
The act of promising reflects the absence of gemirat da’at either because a promise
entails executing an obligation in the future (e.g., a promise to sell goods) or a
promise in respect to transferring title of something that is not yet in existence
(e.g., davar she-lo ba la-’olam) such as an item that has not been produced or not
in his possession (i.e., eno bi-reshuto), and therefore such promises are unenforce-
able in a bet din.17
Our presentation will address the issue of whether Jewish law explains the
halakhic norm of a promissory obligation (i.e., halakhically enforceable agreement)
in instrumental terms for which economic efficiency is its identifying characteristic,
or is it grounded in, and underwritten by, the halakhic morality of promising? Is the
goal of the Jewish law of obligations the enforcement of promises or the righting
for—compensation for—harms? And how does the normative sense of the Jewish
law of obligations impact upon agreement breaches among fellow-Jews18 in general
and “efficient breaches” in particular?
The efficacy of a promise is codified in the following fashion:
When one conducts and concludes commercial transactions using words
only (the negotiation and agreement not being completed by a formal act of
acquisition), that person should stand by his word, even though none of the
purchase price has been taken, nor a buyer’s mark made on the goods, nor a

15 For the distinction between a halakhic-moral promissory obligation and a halakhic-legal promissory
obligation, see Shillem Warhaftig, The Jewish Law of Contract (Hebrew)(Jerusalem: 1974), 16–30; Zorach
Warhaftig, Studies in Jewish Law (Hebrew) (Ramat Gan: 1985), 87–93; R. Zalman Nechemiah Goldberg (Israel,
contemporary), The Halakhic-Legal Validity of a Promise, (Hebrew) 13 Tehumin 371 (5752-5753); Berachyahu
Lifshitz, Why Doesn’t Jewish Law Enforce the Fulfillment of a Promise? (Hebrew) 25 Mishpatim 161 (5755), Itamar
Warhaftig, Undertaking in Jewish Law (Hebrew) 407 (Jerusalem: 2001).
16 There is a scholarly discussion in academic literature regarding the need to avoid presenting invidious
comparisons by utilizing modern legal concepts to elucidate Jewish legal categories. For a bibliographical refer-
ence regarding this methodological issue in analyzing Jewish law, see Shahar Lifshitz, “Oppressive Contracts: A
Jewish Law Perspective,” Journal of Law and Religion 101, 104, n. 8 (2008): 23. Therefore, throughout this presen-
tation we describe agreement making as undertaking obligations (i.e., hithayvut) rather than creating a contract,
which is a modern legal concept.
17 For varying approaches toward defining these concepts, see Shalom Albeck, The Law of Property and
Contract in the Talmud, (Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: 1976); Shillem Warhaftig, n. 15 above; Berachyahu Lifshitz, Promise:
Obligation and Acquisition in Jewish Law, (Hebrew) (Jerusalem: 1988); Itamar Warhaftig, n. 15 above.
18 See B Pesahim 91a; J Pesahim 8:6; Maimonides (Rambam, Egypt, 1135–1204) Responsa 448; R. Jacob
b. Meir Tam (France, 1100–1171) Responsa 37 and 39.

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pledge given (for the price): Whoever withdraws from this type of transaction,
whether buyer or seller, is deemed a faithless person.
GLOSS: Even though in a transaction that is conducted and concluded by
means of words only, where no money is tendered, one can withdraw from such
a transaction. . . in any event, a person should stand by his word even though no
act of acquisition has been performed, only mere words have passed between the
parties. . . .19
Where no payment has been made, and the seller articulates an oral commitment
to sell realty or personalty to a prospective buyer, and should either party renege on
the agreement of sale he is stigmatized as a mehusar amana (lit., lacking faith).
Given that no act of acquisition (i.e., kinyan) has been executed between the parties,
technically either party may withdraw from consummating the sale. The noncom-
pliance with the promise is unenforceable. Enforceability depends upon the execu-
tion of a kinyan.
Because of his reneging on an oral commitment, the community publicly
shames him by proclaiming:
Hear ye, hear ye, this person refuses to keep his word. He has caused displeasure
to the scholars and therefore is no longer included among the community of
Israel. The remnant of Israel shall not commit sin, nor speak lies (Zephaniah
3:13); for this man is a liar and has made himself a reneger.20
In short, the proclamation communicates the Jewish legal position that a promise
is binding because of the halakhic need to keep one’s word, albeit unenforceable by
a bet din. Stripped to their essentials, promises create obligations because they are
conventionally understood in Jewish law to create religious obligations.
Thus interpreted, the halakhic position regarding promise-keeping stands in
bold contrast to the theory of promissory obligation propounded by Charles Fried.
Fried’s posture is articulated in the following fashion:
There exists a convention that defines the practice of promising and its entail-
ments. This convention provides a way that a person may create expectations in
others. By virtue of the basic Kantian principles of trust and respect, it is wrong
to invoke that convention in order to make a promise, then to break it.21
The promissory obligation derives not from a religious and moral norm such as
natural law, nor even from the reliance of what is promised, but from the

19 R. Joseph Caro (Ottoman Palestine, 1488–1575), Shulhan Arukh, Hoshen Mishpat 204:7; R. Moses
b. Israel Isserles (Rema, Poland, 1525/30–1572), Hoshen Mishpat 204:11. All translations of Shulhan Arukh are
culled from Stephen Passamaneck, The Traditional Jewish Law of Sale (Cincinnati, 1983), 120–21.
20 R. Moses b. Isaac Mintz (Germany, fifteenth century), Responsa Maharam Mintz, 1:no.160; R. Shalom
Mordechai Schwadron (Maharsham, Poland, 1835–1911), Mishpat Shalom, Hoshen Mishpat 204.
21 Fried, n.14 above, 17. For antecedent thinking that fidelity to promises depends on the social conven-
tion of keeping agreements, see variant perspectives in David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, L.A. Selby-
Bigge, ed. (Oxford: 1960) at Book III, Pt. II, Ch. V; John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: 1971),
344–50; Neil MacCormick, “Voluntary Obligations and Normative Powers I” Proc. Aristotelian Soc’y (1972) 46
(Supp. Vol.) 59.

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expectation that the promisor will do as he or she promised.22 In the words of

Stephen Smith,
Fried’s argument is that because a promisor has, by intentionally invoking a
convention, created a belief that the promisor is under a moral obligation to do
the promised thing, the promisor is in fact under such an obligation.23
In other words, the social convention of promising would have the effect of creating
the obligation.24 In Searle’s nomenclature, Fried’s argument for promise-keeping is
grounded by deriving “ought” from “is.”25 But whereas Searle concedes that the
derivation of “ought” from “is” belies an institutional ‘“ought,” Fried’s argues that
it is a moral “ought.” In short, such postures differ radically from the halakhic con-
ception of promise-keeping. Avowing a diametrically opposed position, halakhah
views promise-keeping as aligning oneself with the fulfillment of a religious norm
rather than compliance with a norm of natural law, institutional moral norm, or
moral norm established by social convention.
In halakhah, is there an additional ground for promise-keeping based upon the
argument that the promisor caused harm by induced reliance, and that is what cre-
ates the binding nature of the promise? A promissory obligation as conventionally
understood and induced reliance obligation overlap, but they are not identical.
This reliance-based duty is distinguishable from the duty to perform the promise.
This duty comes into play only after the promise is not performed. Accordingly, the
reliance duty is not to be confused with the duty of promise-keeping, but rather a
duty to ensure that one who relies upon another’s promise is compensated for
being harmed. Is the violation of a reliance-based duty actionable in a bet din or is
it similar to the contravention of a promissory obligation, a toothless tiger providing
no judicial redress?
Responding to our question, the Talmud instructs us:

22 The need to protect the promisee’s expectations is a recurring theme in the literature. See Alfred
Corbin, Contracts, Sec. 1, at 2 (1952), Charles Goetz and Robert Scott, “Enforcing Promises: An Examination of
the Basis of Contract,” Yale L.J. 1261, 1265-1271 (1980): 89.
On a rudimentary level, one of the bases of this expectation is that the conventional understanding of
promise-keeping is that promissors remain obligated even if the human calculus determines that “the best over-
all” would dictate otherwise. See Joseph Raz, “Promises and Obligations,” in Law, Morality and Society: Essays in
Honor of H.L.A. Hart (P. M. S. Hacker and J. Raz eds., 1977), 210, 221–22.
23 Stephen Smith, “Towards a Theory of Contract,” in Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence: Fourth Series(Jeremy
Horder, ed., 2000), 107, 113.
24 Admittedly, Scanlon concurs with Fried’s approach that the social practice of agreement making may
create certain expectations. However, the existence of these practices fails to explain why reneging upon
agreement is wrong. See Thomas Scanlon, “Promises and Practices,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 199 (1990): 19.
In fact, Fried concedes that the grounds for being morally obligated to fulfill a promise lie elsewhere. See Fried,
n. 14 above, 14. In Scanlon’s estimation, the moral duty for promise keeping derives from “general principles
arising from the interests that others have in being able to rely on expectations about what we are going to do.”
Thomas M. Scanlon, “Thickness and Theory,” J. Philosophy 275, 283 (2003): 100. For an elucidation of these
moral principles, see Thomas Scanlon, n. 10 above, 295–327.
25 John Searle, “How to Derive ‘Ought’ from ‘Is’,” Philosophical Review 43 (1964): 73. For the classic
critique of Searle’s approach, see R. M. Hare, “The Promising Game,” Rev. Internationale de Phil. 398 (1964): 18.

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If someone gives money to his friend to serve as his agent to go and purchase
wine for him during the season while the price was low. And he was negligent
and failed to buy it the law is that he has to pay him wine according to the low
price. . . .26
Here, a promise was made, the promisee relied upon the promisor, and the prom-
isee incurred pecuniary loss. The Talmud concludes that the promisor is liable to
compensate for the harm suffered. Should we infer from this ruling that induced
reliance affords a judicial remedy in the case of an explicit promise unaccompanied
by the execution of a kinyan?
The dominant approach is that compensation resulting from a breach of an
induced-reliance obligation is because the promisor explicitly agreed at the time the
agreement was executed to reimburse the promisee for such loss resulting from
failure to consummate the wine purchase. In other words, in the absence of said
agreement, any harm suffered from reliance would be unrecoverable. Reliance of
the promisee upon the oral commitment of the promisor does not engender
monetary liability.27
Even pursuant to the minority opinion, however, promissory reliance will only
engender monetary liability if it is a halakhically enforceable promise. As R. Aaron
b. Joseph ha-Levi (Ra’ah, Spain, c. 1235–1300) notes:
Here (Bava Metsi’a 73b), even though the agent did not contractually agree to
assume liability [for failure to fulfill his promise], since the principal gave him
money with which to purchase merchandise, and the principal would have either
purchased it himself or arranged for another to do so had not the agent promised
to do so, and the principal relied upon him and gave him the money based upon
the reliance; for that reason the agent is liable to pay the loss caused by the
reliance on his promise.28
Ra’ah’s position contains four propositions. The first is that one does not require an
agreement that explicitly stipulates that consequential damages are recoverable.
The second proposition is that in the absence of such agreement, by giving money
to the agent to effectuate a wine purchase at a location where the selling price was
lower than others give, the promisee relied upon the promisor’s compliance. The
third proposition is that the words of the promisor serve as the act of inducing

26 B Bava Metsi’a 73b.

27 R. Solomon b. Abraham Aderet (Rashba, Spain, c. 1235–c. 1310), Hiddushe ha-Rashba, B Bava Metsi’a
73b; R. Asher b. Jehiel (Rosh, Germany & Spain, c. 1250–1327), B Bava Metsi’a 5:69; R. Mordecai b. Hillel
(Germany, 1240?–1298) B Bava Kamma 114:115; R. Joseph Habiba (Nimmukei Yosef, Spain, beg. of fifteenth
century) B Bava Metsi’a 44a; R. Jacob b. Jacob Moses Lorbeerbaum of Lissa (Poland, c. 1760–1832), Netivot
ha-Mishpat (Bi’urim), Hoshen Mishpat 176:31, 183:1, 304:2, 306:6, 333:14; R. Avraham Yeshayahu Karelitz (Israel,
1878–1953), Hazon Ish, B Bava Kamma 22:1; Maharsham, Mishpat Shalom, Hoshen Mishpat 176:4.
Cf. R. Moses Sofer (Hatam Sofer, Pressburg, 1762–1839), Responsa Hatam Sofer no. 168 representation of
the dominant position.
28 Though numerous authorities identify the authorship of this view with R. Yom Tov b. Abraham
Ishbili (Ritba, Spain, c. 1250–1330), in fact, Ritba is citing the teaching of Ra’ah, his teacher. The text identifies the
position with “moreh ha-rav” (i.e., his rabbinical teacher). Usage of this appellation refers to Ra’ah. See Issac
Brand, “HaNosei Ve’noten Be’devarim: Between Contractual Obligation and Tortuous Reliance,” (Hebrew)
Mechkarei Mishpat 5, notes 107,122–124 (2008): 24.

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reliance by the promisee. Moreover, and in the context of Ra’ah’s posture more
importantly, it is the be-hahi hana’ah (i.e., because of the benefit created by the
induced reliance that establishes a surety relationship between the two parties)
he undertakes the obligation, and therefore the promise becomes halakhically
binding upon the promisor and enforceable in case of breach.29 Similar to an ’arev
(i.e., one who assumes liability because the creditor parted with monies on the
strength of his assurance) the individual who was hired to transact business is liable
because the investor relied upon him. It is the halakhic-legal norm of suretyship
rather than the halakhic-moral norm (i.e., promissory obligation or induced reli-
ance) that endows halakhic-legal validity to the agreement.30
To summarize: The undertaking of a promise regardless whether it induces
reliance or not mandates the promisor’s compliance, albeit a breach of a promise
will not be actionable. In other words, in reneging of a promise, the promisee is
frequently harmed because he relied on the promise. Concerning compliance with
the promise, however, harm is irrelevant. One is halakhically morally obliged to
fulfill the promise qua promise (i.e., the religious duty of promise-keeping regard-
less of whether the promisee has detrimentally relied on the promise or not).31 In
other words, the binding nature of the promise is independent and free-standing,
separate from induced-reliance obligation.
Having presented the dichotomy between halakhic-legal norms and halakhic-
moral norms in general and a rudimentary definition of a promissory obligation in
particular, now we may begin to explore actual cases of breaches of various

29 See generally Baruch Kahane, Israel: Guarantee (Hebrew) (Jerusalem: 1991), 78–90, who subscribes to
this interpretation of Ra’ah.
30 The underlying premise of Ra’ah’s posture is predicated upon the fact that the context of liability is
within the framework of hithayvut (i.e., undertaking an obligation), rather than being a form of consideration
as a vehicle to execute a kinyan. See Berachyahu Lifshitz, “Consideration in Jewish Law—A Reconsideration,”
The Jewish Law Annual 115, 122-123 (1989): 8; Berachyahu Lifshitz, The Promise (Hebrew) (Jerusalem: 1988), 214.
Cf. Kahane, n. 29 above, 6, n. 8.
Others interpret that Ra’ah’s position is that an induce-reliance obligation is to be assimilated in the hal-
akhic norms of obligations’ natural neighbor—namely, torts. Properly understood, the promisor induces the
promisee’s reliance triggered by “ha’na’a” and, in the wake of a breach, damage ensues and the promisor is obli-
gated to compensate the promisee because of the induced-reliance generated. See Yechiel Kaplan, Elements of
Tort in the Jewish Law of Surety, (Hebrew) 9–10 Shenaton ha-Mishpat ha-’Ivri 359 (5742–5743); Brand, n. 28 above.
A breach of a reliance-induced obligation entails a contravention of “the remnant of Israel shall not commit sins
or lies.” See R. Isaac b. Moses of Vienna (Or Zaru’ah, Germany and France, c. 1180-c. 1250) Responsa Or Zaru’a
1:748; Rosh, B Hullin 3:34, Brand, 28 above, 29, n. 96. In effect, pursuant to Ra’ah’s view, a breach of a promissory
obligation involves the violation of a “the remnant of Israel shall not commit sins or lies” two times (i.e., once for
breach of the promissory obligation and a second time for breach of reliance-induced obligation).
Thus, insofar as the halakhic-moral norm of promissory obligation, promises are given halakhic-moral
effect qua promises. However, according to Ra’ah, as far as the halakhic-legal norm of promissory obligation is
concerned, promises are given effect qua reliance-inducing acts. It follows that a breach of a promissory obliga-
tion occurs when you have induced someone to rely upon you. The person inducing the reliance and subse-
quently causing a breach must be viewed as an individual who is reneging on a commitment or acting tortuously.
Regardless of the halakhic classification of the promisor’s breach, judicial redress is contingent upon the integra-
tion of the halakhot of obligations or torts into the picture.
31 For varying explanations addressing the rationale for nonenforcement of a promissory obligation, see
Zorach Warhaftig, n. 15, above 87; Shalom Albeck, The Nature of Contract in Jewish Law, (Hebrew) 6 Iyyunei
Mishpat 517–518 (1978–1979); Lifshitz, n. 15 above, 178–180; I. Warhaftig, n. 15 above, 468–469.

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agreements for the purpose of understanding how Jewish law addresses the theory
of “efficient breach.”
One of the Jewish legal overbidder paradigms (OP2) is codified in the following
manner:
If one is in the process of negotiating to acquire or lease a thing, whether real
property or moveable property and (during this process) someone else comes
and lawfully acquires it, this latter person is deemed wicked (his transaction,
however, is valid). This same rule applies when one wishes to hire himself out to
an employer (and during the course of negotiations, another person comes and
takes the position). . . .
GLOSS: . . . All the above only treats the case in which a price between
parties (to a sale) has been mutually agreed upon, and only the act of formal
acquisition is lacking (to complete the sale). If, however, no price has yet been
agreed upon, the seller wants so and so much, and the buyer wants to pay less, it
is permissible for another party (to break into those negotiations). . . .32
In rabbinic sources, preempting a sales transaction or an employment agreement is
metaphorically compared to an ’ani ha-mehapekh be-harara (lit., a poor person
preparing a cake and another snatching it from him).33 At what point is an interloper
precluded from interfering with negotiations for a deal? According to one opinion,
the interdict applies as long as a deal is being brokered; whereas, according to
others, a third party may interfere only before the final phase of negotiations prior
to the consummation of a kinyan.34
One who interferes with either the negotiations or the final stage of the brokering
of a deal and purchases the item is labeled a “rasha’” (i.e., a wicked person).35 Though
the designation serves to stigmatize the offender, nevertheless, the purchase is valid
and no formal claim for damages may be leveled against him.
In effect, the interloper’s action is viewed morally objectionable in the eyes of
Jewish law.36 Though morally objectionable, nevertheless, his behavior is not
actionable in a court of Jewish law.37 ’Ani ha-mehapekh ba-harara serves as one of
the numerous illustrations of behavior that is morally inappropriate, albeit beyond
the halakhic-legal realm of the norms of obligations. Moreover, in stark contrast to
OP1, where promoting self-interest and economic welfare is the underlying basis
for legal entitlement by the promisor, here the dynamics of OP2 illustrate the

32 Shulhan Arukh, Hoshen Mishpat 237:1.

33 B Kiddushin 59a.
34 See Aaron Levine, Free Enterprise in Jewish Law, (New York: 1980), 124–26.
35 The interloper interdict applies even if the second bidder is unaware of the first agreement. Under such
circumstances, once aware of the agreement, the second bidder must withdraw his bid. See R. Moses Feinstein
(New York, 1895–1986), Iggerot Moshe, Hoshen Mishpat 1:60.
36 This infraction of a halakhic-moral norm either violates “doing what is proper and good in the eyes
of God,” or entails encroaching upon someone’s livelihood. See R. Moses b. Petahiah Isserlein (Germany,
1390–1460) Terumat ha-Deshen 340; R. Solomon b. Isaac (Rashi, France, 1040–1105), B Bava Metsi’a 71a.
37 However, if the bet din is aware that the interloper is momentarily attempting to snatch away another’s
anticipated gain, a bet din may step in and direct the interloper to withdraw his bid. See R. Samuel b. Moses de
Medina (Maharashdam, Greece, 1506–1589) Responsa Maharashdam, Hoshen Mishpat 259; Maharsham, Mishpat
Shalom, Hoshen Mishpat 237.

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350 jewish law, ethics, and the modern society

working of a halakhic-moral norm of promissory obligation where we are concerned

with the religious propriety, fairness, and appropriateness to hold individuals to
promises that they have voluntarily made. Last, the halakhic interloper interdict is
more solicitous of a promissory obligation and reliance on preagreement represen-
tations than American law traditionally is.38
This halakhic-moral dimension of the promissory obligation continues to
operate in the workings of another overbidder paradigm (OB3) in the following
Talmudic discussion:
A certain individual told his friend: “If I ever sell this field I will sell it to you for
100 zuz.” He subsequently went and sold it to another individual for a 120 zuz.
R. Kahane said: the first one acquired it.
An objection is raised. R. Ya’akov Nehar Pakod objected: “But this
individual did not sell him the field voluntarily. Rather, the additional zuzim
coerced him to sell.” The halakhah is according to Rabbi Yaakov Pakod.39

Similar to other agreements of sales, this one envisions that the parties will comply
with the terms of the agreement and that the transfer of ownership ultimately will
occur.40 This agreement, however, is informed by a tenai (i.e., condition). When
one transfers ownership of either land or moveable goods to another, and either the
transferor or the transferee has placed conditions on the transaction, which
conditions are susceptible of fulfillment: If the conditions are fulfilled, the item,
acquisition of which had been formally effected, is deemed purchased; if the condi-
tions are not fulfilled, no sale has occurred. In our scenario, the seller stipulated that
if he decides to sell it and he will sell it to him (i.e., the first bidder).
Hence, should the seller agree to sell, R. Kahane argues that the seller must
keep his promise and sell it to the first prospective buyer. R. Ya’akov Pakod, how-
ever, demurs and argues that the transfer of the extra profit serves as a means of
coercing the seller to transfer ownership to the second prospective buyer and,
therefore, the sale to him is valid. In these circumstances, the seller was not inter-
ested in selling the field but sold it to the prospective second buyer in order to
capitalize on a windfall profit. In other words, the windfall profits coerced him to
sell to the second person. Given the presence of duress, the fulfillment of the tenai
never materialized and therefore the seller may break his promise and sell the field
to the overbidder.41 The logical inference that can be drawn from this case is that,
had the seller sold it to the second bidder for one hundred zuzim, the first bidder
would have been entitled to specific performance as a remedy enforceable by bet

38 For attempts to reform the state of the law, see Avery Katz, “When Should an Offer Stick? The
Economics of Promissory Estoppel in Preliminary Negotiations,” Yale L. J. 1249 (1996): 105; Richard Craswell,
“Offer, Acceptance and Efficient Reliance,” Stan. L. Rev. 481 (1996): 48; Lucian Arye Bebchuk and Omri
Ben-Shahar, “Precontractual Reliance,” J. Legal Stud. 423, 427 (2001): 30.
39 B Avodah Zara 72a.
40 The implicit assumption is that the transfer was in actually done “me-akhshav,” (i.e., from now when
he decides to sell it). See Itamar Warhaftig, n. 15 above, 184.
41 Rashi, Avodah Zara 72a s.v. zuzei; R. Joseph b. Solomon Colon Trabotto (Maharik, Italy, c. 1420–1480),
Responsa Maharik, Shoresh 20, Anaf 8.

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din.42 Moreover, said conclusion that the default remedy for breach of an agreement
is specific performance rather than expectation damages dovetails with our repre-
sentation that the halakhic-legal norm of promissory obligation mandates the ful-
fillment of a halakhic norm of keeping one’s promise and therefore the promisee is
entitled to actual performance.43 The remedy of specific performance is not limited
to an agreement to sell immediately realty or personalty (i.e., hakna’a—property
conveyance),44 the focal point of this Talmudic discussion, but equally extends to
an agreement that obligates the parties now and the transfer of ownership or other
obligations will occur in the future (i.e., hithayvut).45
What happens, however, if the promisor stipulates in advance a sum payable as
damages (i.e., liquidated damages) upon breach of the agreement. For example, if S
obligates himself to sell the field to B, and a penalty will be imposed upon S for non-
performance, may S breach the agreement and pay the liquidated damages, which will
serve as compensation to B?46 The answer to this question lies with understanding
how halakhah wants to address noncompliance of a promise. If the goal of halakhah
is to compel specific performance, then such a clause ought to be unenforceable.

42 Rosh, ’Avodah Zara 5:23; Shulhan Arukh, Hoshen Mishpat 206:1. Clearly, an agreement for sale must be
accompanied by the requisite kinyan. See Rashi, ’Avodah Zara 72a, s.v. lekha; Rambam, Mishneh Torah, Mekhi-
rah 8:7; R. Jacob b. Asher (Germany and Spain, 1270?–1340), Arba’ah Turim, Hoshen Mishpat 195:11.
43 Interestingly enough, though Fried adopts a teleological approach to promise-keeping, emphasizing
the moral dimension of the promissory obligation, nevertheless, he argues that a breaking of a promise entitles
one to expectation damages rather than specific performance. See Fried, n. 14 above, 16–17. One cannot simul-
taneously advocate promissory morality and the awarding of expectation damages in cases of a breach.
The endorsement of such a view would give an incentive for promissors to break their promises. The cor-
relation between moral duty to keep a promise and that the law should enforce an agreement is noted by legal
scholars. See E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts, Section 12.1 at 755–56 (3rd ed.: 1999).
44 The assumption is that the passage in B ’Avodah Zara 72a is dealing with a sale rather than an agreement
to sell. See R. Aaron Perahiah ha-Kohen (Greece, seventeenth century); Responsa Perah Matteh Aharon 1:7;
R. Sasson, Responsa Torat Emet, 133. Cf. R. Meir Abulafia (Rama, Spain, 1170?–1244), Yad Rama, B Bava Batra,
1:26; R. Shabbetai b. Meir ha-Kohen (Shakh, Lithuania, 1621–1662), Hoshen Mishpat 66:128.
45 Employing a formula of hithayvuth coupled with the use of the term “me-akhshav” (i.e., from now) will
establish the undertaking of an obligation for contemplated actions in the future. See R. Hayyim b. Israel
Benveniste (Turkey, 1603–1673) Kenesset ha-Gedolah, Mahadurah Batra, Hoshen Mishpat 61, Hagaha 10:2. Cf.
Responsa Torat Emet, 133. Furthermore, whether there is an additional requirement that a person’s property
serve as a guarantor by the promisor to create a halakhically legal promissory obligation (i.e., shi’bud nekhasim)
is subject to debate. See Netivot ha-Mishpat, Hoshen Mishpat 39:17, 60:7, 203:6; R. Aryeh Leib b. Joseph ha-Kohen
Heller (Poland, 1745?–1813) Ketsot ha-Hoshen, Hoshen Mishpat 203:2, 206:1. For the grounds for mandating spe-
cific performance in case of a breach of an obligation, see B Bava Batra 2a; Rashi, B Bava Batra 2b, s.v. ve-ta’amo;
Tosafot, (medieval Talmudic glosses, France and Germany, twelfth–fourteenth centuries) B Bava Batra 3a, s.v. ki
ratsu; Rosh, B Bava Batra 1:3; Tosafot, Ketubot 54b s.v. af al pi. For the parameters of specific performance in
acquisitions and undertaking obligations, see S. Warhaftig, n. 15 above, 316–33; I. Warhaftig, n. 15 above, 133, 135,
182–85. Though the halakhic promissory obligation implies that an agreement should not be breached and hence
should be specifically enforced, nevertheless, an agreement for personal services such as a decree ordering an
employee specifically to perform under an employment agreement is construed as involuntary servitude. See
Shillem Warhaftig, Jewish Labor Law (Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: 1969), 122–29. However, there are legists who contend
that a worker or a contractor (i.e., kabbelan) who executes a kinyan prior to commencing employment cannot
rescind his or her agreement for services. See R. Tam cited in Tosafot, B Bava Metsi’a 48a, s.v. ve-hu; Hiddushe
ha-Ritba, B Bava Metsi’a 75b, s.v. ha-sokher; R. Jacob b. Joseph Reischer (Czech Republic, c. 1670–1733); Responsa
Shevut Ya’akov, 2:184; R. Moses b. Joseph Trani (Mabit, Ottoman Palestine, 1500–1580); Responsa Mabit 2:132.
46 This question is similar to the situation of a private equity capital commitment, the agreement of which
stipulates that if the investor fails to meet his or her capital call there is a remedy for default (e.g., losing his or
her entire investment). I thank Leon M. Metzger for this observation.

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352 jewish law, ethics, and the modern society

However, if the telos of the system is to redress the nonperformance by compensating

for promissory noncompliance, then such a clause ought to be enforceable. Under
such an agreement, the liquidated damages serve as a deterrent, an in terrorem effect
to give compensation to the injured party and avoid the expense of litigation in bet
din. In other words, the payment of liquidated damages does not actually preclude the
obligation to perform the agreement. In principle, in cases of promissory noncompli-
ance, a claim for specific performance may be advanced in bet din. To avoid the
expense of litigation in bet din, however, an agreement to pay the liquidated damages
may serve as a deterrent to promissory noncompliance.47 In effect, should the prom-
isor fail to pay liquated damages, the agreement accompanied by a kinyan would
stipulate that specific performance be in place.48 In each case, there must be a factual
determination whether the crafted provision of the agreement providing for penalty
damages is designed to reinforce the act of kinyan or is incorporated as a judicial
remedy for a potential breach. If the purpose is the former, the promisor must keep
his promise; if it is the latter, he may breach his promise and pay damages.49
What happens if the promisor breaches the agreement and in the process
secures profits from his wrongdoing?50 Generally, pursuant to halakhah, the recov-
erable damages are calculated based on the expectancy interest (i.e., the difference
between the position in which the damaged party would have been had the
agreement not been breached and the position in which it is because of the breach).
The plaintiff is entitled to be reimbursed and placed in as good a position as he
would have been had the defendant performed his obligations.51 Is the victim of the

47 Rashba, Responsa Rashba 3:202-203; Shulhan Arukh, Hoshen Mishpat 12:9; R. Elijah b. Solomon Zalman
(Gra, Lithuania, 1720–1797), Bi’ur ha-Gra, Hoshen Mishpat 12:17. Cf. R. Elijah b. Hayyim (Greece, 1530?–1610?);
Responsa Maharanah, 1:66, who challenges this position and in the final analysis endorses this position. The impact
of the issue of “asmakhta” (i.e., the absence of firm resolve of the promissor) is beyond the scope of this presentation.
48 Tosafot B Betsah 20a s.v. nazir; Bi’ur ha-Gra, n. 45 above; R. Moses b. Isaac Judah Lima (Lithuania,
1605?–1658) Helkat Mehokek, Even ha-Ezer 50:22; Netivot Ha-Mishpat, Hoshen Mishpat 12:6 (Bi’urim) and 15
(Hiddushim). R. Samuel b. David Moses ha-Levi (Poland and Germany, 1625?–1681), Nahalat Shiv’ah, 8:10 who
notes that this conclusion is unanimously accepted. Cf. R. Joseph Saul Nathanson (1810–1875), Responsa Sho’el
u-Meshiv, Mahadura Tinyana, 2:81 who argues that the option to choose between performing the agreement or
breaching it and paying damages is limited to marital engagements and judicial compromise and is inapplicable
to commercial transactions. For the problematics of adopting such a posture, see Divrei Geonim 86:1.
49 Responsa Torat Emet 64 (end). However, in the case of a breach should the promisee proceed to request
recovery of the penalty damages without submitting a claim for specific performance, the promisee loses his
right to this remedy. See R. Moses Joshua Judah Leib Diskin (Maharil Diskin, Lithuania and Ottoman Palestine,
1817–1898) Responsa Maharil Diskin, vol. 1 (end), Pesakim 148.
50 Clearly, proponents of the theory of efficient breach would oppose disgorging such gains. See Sidney
DeLong, “The Efficiency of a Disgorgement as a Remedy for Breach of Contract,” Ind. L. Rev. 737, 742–45 (1989):
22; Farnsworth, n. 1 above, 1380–82.
51 For example, if an employee retracts his offer to work for a company, and the employer can only recruit
a replacement at a higher salary and the company incurs additional losses related to the worker’s decision to
leave, so the company is entitled to recover the differential in the worker’s salary from the retracting worker and
possibly all other damages. On a halakhic-moral level, dinei shamayim, the retracting employee is obligated to
compensate for all losses including but not limited to consequential damages. See Shakh, Hoshen Mishpat 333:39;
Ketsot ha-Hoshen, Hoshen Mishpat 333:3; Hazon Ish, Hoshen Mishpat 23:25; Divrei Geonim, 105:1; Piskei Din
Rabbaniyyim 15:237 (hereafter:PDR). In other words, the goal of compensation is to reinstate the employer to his
financial situation that existed prior to hiring the retracting worker. Cf. David Bass, Contracts According to Din
Torah, (Hebrew) 17,118 in Keter, vol. 1. (Shlomo Ishon and Yitzchok Bazak, eds., 1996).

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breach of the agreement entitled to bring an action for tort damages against the
perpetrator of this breach (i.e., the expectancy interest)?
Let’s address the issue of trade secrets, which is based on the breach of relation-
ally specific duties between the employee and the employer.52 Clearly, if an employee
receives on-the-job training, his employer cannot prevent him from working for
himself or a competitor.53 To qualify as a trade secret, the information, commonly
a customer list, business design, or technological process, must confer a competi-
tive edge and it must remain secret.54 To prevent disclosures of technological devel-
opments, business information, and customer-related information, employers may
block public access, using passwords and restricting employee access to sensitive
locations, and execute confidentiality agreements. In the main, trade secret cases
arise when disloyal employees use or disclose their employer’s secrets contravening
a duty of confidentiality grounded in an employer-employee agreement. As a
condition to his employment, the individual had signed a contract in which he
obligated himself to refrain from disclosing certain trade secrets due to their market
value. But the employee chose to breach the agreement. Can the employer sue him
for damages?
In his treatment of the unauthorized opening of a letter and possession of a
letter addressed to another, R. Hayyim Shabbetai (Greece, 1556–1647) argued
that, though it was unclear whether the victim was entitled to damages,
nevertheless, even if the damage was remote (i.e., gerama) the offender should
be chastised.55 Although we know all acts entailing remote damages are not
actionable in a bet din, one remains proscribed from engaging in such tortuous
behavior.56 Should an individual engage in such acts, there are halakhic-moral—to

52 Most agreements will be structured with a provision prohibiting disclosure by an employee who is told
a secret in confidence. In other words, we are dealing with an employee who is undertaking an obligation with
his employer to refrain from acting in a certain fashion (i.e., disclosure of a trade secret). For the sake of this
presentation, we assume that such a construction of an agreement that mandates abstention from an act is valid.
See I. Warhaftig, supra n. 15 above, 201–5. Even according to the legists, who invalidate this type of an agreement,
should the agreement stipulate that a breach will bring attendant damage, or a penalty will be imposed in the
wake of a breach, such an agreement will be valid. See R. Isaac Weiss (Israel, 1902–1989), Responsa Minhat
Yitzhak 6:170:18. Second, given that tangibility is defined as something that possesses height, width, and depth
(see R. Hai Gaon [Babylonia, 939–1038], Sefer Mekah u-Mimkar, Vienna ed., Sha’ar 2) and therefore a trade
secret should be viewed as a “davar sh’ein bo mamash” nevertheless, based upon commercial practice (i.e., min-
hag ha-soharim), rabbinic legislation, or its recognition by civil law, it is deemed as something with tangibility.
See R. Solomon b. Jehiel Luria (Maharshal, 1510?–1574) Responsa Maharshal, siman 36; Responsa Mabit 3:225;
R. Abraham Zevi Hirsch b. Jacob Eisenstadt (Lithuania, 1813–1868) Pithei Teshuva, Hoshen Mishpat 212:1–2;
R. Abraham David b. Asher Anschel Wahrmann (Poland, c. 1771–1840), Kesef ha-Kedoshim, ad loc.; Netivot
ha-Mishpat, Hoshen Mishpat 201:1; R. Joseph ibn Lev (Turkey, 1505–1580) Responsa Mahari ibn Lev 1:46.
53 I. Warhaftig, n. 15 above, 174–77. Additionally, see Responsa Hatam Sofer, Hoshen Mishpat 1:23;
Responsa Minhat Yitzhak, see n. 52 above. However, for the efficacy of a postemployment agreement not to
compete, see Warhaftig, ibid.; Aaron Levine, Moral Issues of the Marketplace in Jewish Law, (NY: 2005), 139–74.
54 Roger Milgrim, Milgrim on Trade Secrets, Section 5.02 [1], (New York: 2007). Trade secrets are to be
distinguished from the information that must be continuously used in the employer’s business. Consequently,
any knowledge and technical information learnt in the workplace can be appropriated by the employee and used
in a future job. See R. Malchiel Tenenbaum (Poland, d. 1910) Responsa Divrei Malkiel 3:151; Rabbi Meir Arik
(Poland: nineteenth century), Responsa Imrei Yosher 3:269.
55 Responsa Torat Hayyim 3:47.
56 B Bava Batra 22b; Shulhan Arukh, Hoshen Mishpat 386:3.

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354 jewish law, ethics, and the modern society

be distinguished from halakhic-legal—consequences to such behavior. A bet din

has three options: it could grant an injunction demanding that an employee
cease and desist from disclosing these documents, regardless whether these are
letters or trade secrets; it could invoke a communal ban for the individual to be
automatically shunned57 until he desists or declares his willingness to compen-
sate for any future damages;58 or actually it can order him he to compensate the
victim for any ensuing damages.59 In short, disclosing professional secrets of
one’s employer serves as grounds for shunning of the employee, or compensa-
tory tort damages assessed to the employee.
On what grounds does halakhah proscribe these nonconsensual takings? A
contemporary rabbinic and legal scholar suggests that the protection of trade secrets
rests on a privacy argument. Since halakhah recognizes some degree of privacy is a
necessary condition for reinforcing one’s own persona and dignity and a condition
for the existence of many of our most meaningful social relationships, people have
a right to be free from personal nonconsensual intrusions into their lives, including
but not limited to trade secrets.60 This scholar’s line of argument has serious diffi-
culties. First, there is no general obligation to refrain from infringing upon anoth-
er’s privacy.61 Though there are situations in which the appropriation of informa-
tion is halakhically improper just because it infringes upon someone else’s privacy,62
the disclosure of trade secrets is not one of them. In other words, privacy is justified

57 Whether the unlawful opening of a letter automatically labels the offender as socially shunned or serves
as grounds for invoking a ban is subject to dispute. See Nahum Rakover, Protection of Privacy in Jewish Law,
(Hebrew) (Jerusalem: 2006), 119–24.
58 Shulhan Arukh, Hoshen Mishpat 55:1, Netivot ha-Mishpat (Hiddushim) ad loc. 3; Rema, Hoshen Mishpat
386:3. And, in fact, decisors have invoked injunctions against individuals attempting to divulge professional
secrets. See Responsa Noda bi-Yehudah, Mahadura Tinyana, Hoshen Mishpat 24; Responsa Divrei Malkiel 3:157.
59 Whether the offender must undertake an obligation to pay for ensuing damages by executing a bona
fide halakhic agreement is subject to debate. See Sha’ar ha-Mishpat, Hoshen Mishpat 26:2.
60 Rakover, n. 57 above, 29–141, 149–52. Prof. Rakover argues that a seventeenth-century legist invokes a
privacy argument as grounds for protection of a trade secret. However, upon review of the responsum, one will
find that the privacy argument is advanced for other reasons. See R. Mordechai Ha-levi (Egypt: seventeenth
century), Responsa Darkhei No’am, Hoshen Mishpat 38; Rakover, ad. locum, 150. For a similar perspective on the
notion of privacy in halakhah, see Emanuel Rackman, “Privacy in Judaism,” Midstream 28 (1982): 31; Norman
Lamm, “The Fourth Amendment and Its Equivalent in Halakha,” Judaism 16 (1967): 53.
61 Whereas a secular legal system offers right-based arguments to legitimate a right to privacy, when we are
dealing with a duty-based system, such as the Jewish legal system, one justifies the duty rather than pointing to the
right. See this writer’s, “May One Destroy a Neighbor’s Property In order to Save One’s Life,” in Turim: Studies in
Jewish History and Literature Presented to Dr. Bernard Lander (Michael Shmidman, ed., 2007), 331–60. Consequently,
we have formulated the privacy argument as a violation of a duty rather than as an assertion of a right.
62 Regarding mandating documentation production in the context of a bet din proceeding, see Rosh,
Responsa Rosh 68:25; R. Joshua b. Alexander ha-Kohen Falk (Poland, c. 1555–1614) Sema, Hoshen Mishpat 17:15;
Netivot ha-Mishpat, (Bi’urim), Hoshen Mishpat 17:6. Here again, the requirement illustrates, not a right to
privacy, but the parameters of the obligation of rendering testimony. The absence of an obligation to submit
documents in a particular case gives rise to a concomitant right of privacy. On one hand, the submission of
documentation as testimony is a fulfillment of “gemilut hesed,” (i.e., an act of kindness). See PDR 5, 132, 139–42;
7:316; Rabbi Zalman Nehemiah Goldberg (Israel, contemporary) Lev ha-Mishpat, vol. 1, 13. On the other hand,
in a situation that such an act will not be beneficial, one has the right to retain a zone of privacy regarding per-
sonal matters. Cf. Itamar Warhaftig, “Clarification of Facts in a Trial by Violating the Privacy of the Individual,”
(Hebrew) Mishpete Eretz 209 (2004): 2 who conceptually follows Rabbis Rackman’s, Lamm’s, and Rakover’s
understanding of the role of privacy in halakhah. See n. 60 above.

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as a means to promote individual autonomy, personhood, and feelings of intimacy.63

The divulging of trade secrets does not involve the violations of intimate relation-
ships and feelings usually associated with privacy.64 A cursory review of the rabbinic
sources indicates that an infraction of privacy is to be subsumed in a specifically
defined halakhic-legal category of trespass and theft, rather than under a general
notion of privacy.65 Therefore, it is not surprising to find that disclosure of trade
secrets entails the violation of a specific duty—namely, theft.66
May a victim of a breach of an agreement pursue a restitutionary claim to
recover profits because of that breach?67 R. Ezekiel b. Judah Landau (Czech Repub-
lic, 1713–1793), author of Noda’ Bi-Yehuda, addressed the following scenario: A
scholar authorized a publisher to print his own commentary at the margin of Mish-
nayot. After completing the printing, the publisher had destroyed the type forms
used in the printing, but retained the typeset characters for a future printing of the
publisher’s own edition of Mishnah. By paying the stipulated amount for the
printing of his commentary, though the actual characters belonged to the publisher,
the scholar understood that any benefit the publisher derived from his work in the
arrangement of the characters accrues to the scholar. On the other hand, the
publisher claimed that, since he owned the selfsame characters, the scholar was not
empowered to dismember the character layout and arrangement.68

63 Charles Fried, “Privacy,” Yale L. J. 475, 477–78 (1968): 77; Richard Wasserstrom, “Privacy: Some
Arguments and Assumptions,” in Philosophical Law: Authority, Equality and Personhood(ed. Richard Bronaugh,
1978), 147, 164.
64 However, in other contexts such as professional responsibility (e.g., rabbinic, mental health, and
medical confidentiality) the notion of halakhically protecting feelings is recognized under the rubric of “evil
speech” (i.e., leshon ha-rah). See J. David Bleich (New York, contemporary), “Survey of Recent Halakhic
Periodic Literature, Rabbinic Confidentiality,” Tradition 33 (Spring 1999), 54; Rakover, n. 57 above, 159–69.
65 J. David Bleich, Contemporary Halakhic Problems (NY: 1995), 307. Though from a dogmatic-conceptual
perspective halakhah differs from American law (see n. 60 above), nonetheless, various eminent commentators
equally contend that American law does not recognize a general right to privacy and argue that privacy rights are
derivative. See H. J. McCloskey, “Privacy and the Right to Privacy,” Philosophy 17, 31 (1980): 55; Judith Thomson,
“The Right to Privacy,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 295, 312 (1975): 4; Richard Epstein, “Privacy, Property
Rights and Misrepresentations,” Ga. L. Rev. 455, 463–65 (1978): 12.
66 R. Chaim Pelagi (Izmir: nineteenth century), Responsa Hikekei Lev, 1, Yoreh De’ah 49; Kesef
ha-Kedoshim, Hoshen Mishpat 183:4; R. Samuel Wosner (Israel, contemporary), Responsa Shevet ha-Levi 4:220;
PDR 14:289, 292; R. Ya’akov Yeshayahu Bloi (Israel, contemporary), Pithei Hoshen, Sekhiruth 7: note 24.
67 In recent years, this issue has been the subject of some discussion regarding insurance law. See Menachem
Slae, Insurance in the Halakha, (Tel Aviv: 1982), 128–34; J. David Bleich, “Survey of Recent Halakhic Literature,”
Tradition 52, 60 (1997): 31; Nahum Rakover, Unjust Enrichment in Jewish Law (Jerusalem: 2000); Itamar Warhaftig,
“Insuring Another’s Property,” (Hebrew) Shaarei Tzedek 7 (5767), 99–106. The theory of efficient breach presumes
unilateral termination by breach. It is within this context that we pose our question whether halakhah protects the
disgorgement interest or not. In contrast, should the promisee respect the right of the promisor’s right to opt for
nonperformance, under such conditions whereby there exists mutual consent for termination there is no halakhic
or moral reason to deny the promisor his gains. Under such an arrangement, the promisor knows the actual value
the promise assigns for the contracted-for commodity and, by disclosure of this information, the parties can
agree on an amount that the promisee will accept in lieu of performance of the agreement. Under such conditions,
there would be no requirement to disgorge gains that were made possible by the breach.
68 Responsa Noda bi-Yehudah, Mahadura Tinyana, Hoshen Mishpat 24. Earlier treatments of this respon-
sum in secondary literature fail to note the publisher’s proprietary right in the typeset. See, for example, Nahum
Rakover, Copyright in Jewish Sources, (Hebrew) (Jerusalem: 1991), 104; Jonathan Blass, Unjust Enrichment
(Hebrew) (Jerusalem: 1991), 92; Aaron Levine, Economic Public Policy and Jewish Law (NY: 1993), 188. Cf.
Responsa Divrei Malkiel 3:157, who equally understood that the publisher owned the type forms.

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356 jewish law, ethics, and the modern society

Invoking the Talmudic principle that, if the defendant derives benefit and the
plaintiff sustained a loss (i.e., zeh nehene ve-zeh haser-hayyav), R. Landau opined
that, because the publisher benefited from the scholar’s work in the character lay-
out, the publisher must compensate the scholar for the value of the benefit.69 There
exists an implied obligation that the beneficiary did not intend to cause loss to an-
other without providing compensation. In other words, deriving benefit from a
person’s work mandates compensation.70 In an employer-employee context, even if
the actual working materials belong to the employer, the employee, by dint of
investing time and energy, is entitled to compensation for his performance. Despite
the publisher’s proprietary right,71 the employer must compensate the employee for
his efforts. Failure to provide compensation entails an act of quasi-theft.72
The question is whether the misappropriation of a trade secret entitles the
employer only to recover the value of the information or additionally requires the
employee to disgorge any profits that were accrued by using this information. As we
already observed, according to R. Landau, the scholar will be compensated for the
value of the layout arrangement of the type forms; the publisher, however, will
retain any accrued profits from using the arrangement. In other words, given that
the scholar may have sold more copies of his work without the presence of compe-
tition by the rival publication, the publisher must compensate him for the loss of
this business. The beneficiary, however, is not obligated to share his profits or dis-
gorge them and give them to the owner (i.e., the scholar).73
Under what circumstances is the promisor who breached his employment
agreement regarding confidentiality of trade secrets obligated to disgorge his
profits? The Mishnah records a controversy between R. Yosi and other Sages about
a person who rents a cow and lends it to a third party. While in the possession of the
third party, it dies naturally. The opinion of the Sages is that the third party, who is
liable for accidents, is obligated to pay the renter, and that, if the renter swears that
it died a natural death, he is not obligated to pay the owner. In effect, the renter
profits from a cow that belongs to someone else. R. Yosi demurs and exclaims,
“How shall one engage in business with another person’s cow? The [value of the
cow] must be returned to its owner.”74

69 Entitlement to the compensation is contingent upon the fact that the scholar lost potential revenue
from his own edition due to the issuance of the publisher’s newer edition.
70 One commentator on the Noda bi-Yehudah argued that Rabbi Landau’s avowed position is compensa-
tion is due from benefiting from the publisher’s property and therefore an untenable view. See Hagahot
ha-Baruch Ta’am, Responsa Noda bi-Yehudah, 2: 35b. However, as indicated, our read of R. Landau’s position is
markedly different.
71 The suggestion has been advanced that compensation is derivative of the fact that the scholar has a
partial proprietary right in the typeset arrangement. See Responsa Divrei Malkiel 3:157. R. Israel Trunk (Poland,
1820–1893), Responsa Yeshu’ot Malko, Hoshen Mishpat 22. Noda bi-Yehudah’s responsum does not belie such an
understanding. Moreover, once the scholar is paid for his work, he relinquishes any ownership right. See Rosh,
B Bava Kamma 9:14.
72 Arba’ah Turim, Hoshen Mishpat 371:10; Bi’ur ha-Gra, Hoshen Mishpat 363:14.
73 See also, Rabbi Abraham Samuel, Responsa Amudei Esh, 66b; Responsa Divrei Malkiel, 3:157.
74 M Bava Metsi’a 3:2; B Bava Metsi’a 35b. We are assuming that the owner did not authorize the lending
of the cow to a third party. See Sema, Hoshen Mishpat 307:5; Shakh, Hoshen Mishpat 307:2

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the theory of “efficient breach”: a jewish law perspective 357

Though the halakhah is in accordance with R. Yosi’s view,75 decisors disagree

whether the invoking of his position allows for profit sharing only for the disgorge-
ment of profits.76 The minority position in this matter is to permit profit sharing.
For example, if a person B builds a house upon his neighbor N’s land and rents it to
a third party T, in addition to B’s paying rent for using the land, any rental income
received from T must be shared with N.77 Invoking R. Yosi’s position, the legist
argues that the profit sharing results from the proprietary right of the landowner
and the contractor. Similarly, if a tenant pays insurance premiums and the property
is subsequently destroyed by fire, a minority of authorities opine that the insurance
compensation is divided between the renter and the property owner.78 The majority
opinion, however, understands that invoking R. Yosi’s view entails disgorgement of
all profits.
In short, the disclosure of a trade secret may entail a breach of an agreement or
the violation of a proprietary right. In other words, the resulting consequences of a
disgorgement of profits is grounded either in a breach of a written agreement or a
violation of a proprietary right. Adopting a property-based conception of trade
secrets may lead to different outcomes than propounding an agreement approach.79
Choosing between a property- and contract-based approach framework would
define what information an employee has learned is protected. Under a contractual
approach, any valuable information learned on the job would receive protection. In
contrast, under a property conception, a trade secret claim will be scrutinized in
light of information known in the industry in question, regardless of whether the
employer believed it to be secret. A second matter where the clashing approaches
could make a difference is regarding the grounds for liability of the former employee.
Under the agreement approach, the former employer need not prove the secrecy of
the information. Even if the information is readily available in the public domain,
it is a breach of an agreement for the former employee to disclose knowledge gained
by him in confidence, which is a violation of his fiduciary obligation not to use such
information. Last, regarding the scope of liability for a disclosure of a trade secret,
under a property-based view, the new employer, which knowingly uses the trade
secret of the former employer, would be liable for use of the secret; under an
agreement approach, however, the new employer, which has no agreement with the
trade secret holder, would not be liable for use of the secret.

75 Arba’ah Turim, Hoshen Mishpat 307:5; Shulhan Arukh, Hoshen Mishpat 307:5.
76 The impression that one may draw from Professor Levine’s presentation of R. Yosi’s position is that in
every situation the remedy is disgorgement of ill-gotten gains. See Aaron Levine, n. 68 above, 136–38. Our review
of the topic suggests otherwise.
77 Rema, Hoshen Mishpat 375:7; Rabbi Akiva Eger (Germany: nineteenth century), Hiddushe Rabbi Akiva
Eger, Hoshen Mishpat 375:7.
See also, Hazon Ish, Hoshen Mishpat, B Bava Kamma 22:5; R. Hanokh Agus, (Poland, 1860–1940), Mar-
heshet 2:35; Jonathan Blass, n. 68 above, 92–93.
78 See Pithei Hoshen, Sekhirut 6:19, n. 44.
79 Conceiving a trade secret as a property right, which includes, most significantly, the right to exclude
parties not in contractual privity, may lead to a different outcome than conceptualizing trade secret law as one
based on a contractual obligation executed between the parties.

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358 jewish law, ethics, and the modern society

Conclusion
More than forty years ago, Moshe Silberg, a former justice of the Israeli Supreme
Court, observed:
Why should a man pay his debt or fulfill an obligation which he has undertaken?
The Roman lawyers, as well as any modern lawyer, would be most surprised by
such a question. It is clear, they would say, that the duty of payment of a debt is
the correlative of the concept of ownership, and one cannot exist without the
other. . . . In Jewish law . . . when a person refuses to pay his debt . . . the concern
of the court is not the creditor’s debt, his damages, but the duty of the debtor, his
religious-moral duty. . . .80
Implicitly relying upon a Hofheldian analysis of rights and duties, Silberg argues
that a statement about a right entails a statement about a duty and a statement
about a duty entails a statement about a right.81 Conceptually speaking, when
dealing with a right-based system, one justifies the duty by pointing to the right; if
one requires justification, it is the right that one must justify. When one is dealing
with a duty-based system, such as the Jewish legal system, however, one must justify
the duty and cannot do so by pointing to the right. Although on a jurisprudential
plane there is a conceptual difference between Jewish and other secular legal
systems, on a halakhic legal plane, there is no substantive legal difference between
Jewish and other legal systems. Clearly, the Jewish legal system, similar to other
legal systems, recognizes the notion of property rights. From a halakhic-conceptual
perspective, however, we are dealing with two different systems. Jewish law
focuses upon duties while others focus upon rights. During the last forty years,
contemporary decisors of Jewish law, Jewish historians, law professors, and philos-
ophers alike, have subscribed either wholeheartedly, or with certain reservations, to
Silberg’s analysis. His conclusion, however, that the Jewish legal system is duty-
based has been affirmed by all.82

80 Moshe Silberg, “Law and Morals in Jewish Jurisprudence,” Harvard Law Review 306, 312–13 (1961): 75,
reprinted in Moshe Silberg, Talmudic Law and The Modern State (New York, 1973), 61, 68–69.
81 For a brief summary of the relevant jurisprudential literature, see Alan White, Rights (New York, 1984),
55–73. Compare Feinberg’s suggestion that rights are logically prior to duties and serve as grounds for obliga-
tions in Joel Feinberg, Social Philosophy (NJ: 1973), 58, 62; see also Phillip Montague, “Two Concepts of Rights,”
Philosophy and Public Affairs 372–73 (1980): 9. Implicit in this understanding of the relationship between rights
and duties is the notion that it makes a difference which derivative is from which. See Ronald Dworkin, Taking
Rights Seriously (London, 1979), 171; Jeremy Waldron, The Right to Private Property (London, 1988), 69–73. In our
presentation, we are focusing upon the jurisprudential, rather than the practical, differences between the two
legal systems regarding duties and rights.
82 J. David Bleich, Contemporary Halakhic Problems (New York, 1995), 307; Michael Broyde, “Human Rights
and Human Duties in the Jewish Tradition” in Human Rights in Judaism: Cultural, Religious and Political Perspec-
tives (Michael Broyde and John Witte eds., 1998), 273–82; Haim Cohn, Human Rights in Jewish Law (New York,
1984); Robert M. Cover, “Obligation—A Jewish Jurisprudence of the Social Order,” Journal of Law and Religion
65-74 (1987): 5; Menachem Elon, Jewish Law (Philadelphia, 1994), 117–19; Martin Golding, “The Primacy of Welfare
Rights,” Social Philosophy and Policy 119 (1984): 1; Isaac Herzog, Main Institutions of Jewish Law, vol. 1, (London,
1936), 46; Aaron Kirschenbaum, “The Good Samaritan and Jewish Law,” Dine Israel 7, 15-18 (1976): 7; Berachyahu
Lifshitz, “Shetar and Arevut, (Hebrew) in Memorial Volume to Gad Tedeschi (Jerusalem, 1995), 35–39; David Novak,

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the theory of “efficient breach”: a jewish law perspective 359

Our study has highlighted the dynamics of the halakhic-moral and halakhic-
legal obligation to keep a promise. To wit, halakhah as a duty-oriented system
mandates that under certain conditions in cases of a breach of an agreement, a
promisor must disgorge all of his ill-gotten gains.

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Birmingham, Robert. “Breach of Contract, Damage Measures, and Economic Efficiency.”

Rutgers L. Rev. 273 (1970): 24.
Craswell, Richard. Two Economic Theories of Enforcing Promises. In Peter Benson, ed.
The Theory of Contract Law: New Essays. Cambridge 2001, 19.
Farnsworth, E. Allan. “Your Loss or my Gain? The Dilemma of the Disgorgement Principle
in Breach of Contract.” Yale L.J. 1339 (1985): 94.
Fried, Charles. Contract As Promise: A Theory of Contractual Obligation. Cambridge, MA:
1981.
Goldberg, Zalman Nechemiah. “The Halakhic-Legal Validity of a Promise” (Hebrew).
Techumin 371 (5752–5753): 13.
Lifshitz, Berachyahu. “Why Doesn’t Jewish Law Enforce the Fulfillment of a Promise?”
(Hebrew). Mishpatim 161 (5755): 25.
Posner, Richard. Economic Analysis of the Law (Boston: Little, Brown 1972).
Rakover, Nahum. Unjust Enrichment in Jewish Law (Jerusalem: The Library of Jewish Law
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Warhaftig, Shillem. The Jewish Law of Contract (Hebrew). (Jerusalem: Harry Fischel
Institute 1974).
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Press 1985).

Covenantal Rights: A Study in Jewish Political Tradition (Princeton, 2000), 3–12; Eliav Shochetman, Ma’asei ha-Ba
ba-Avera (Hebrew) (Jerusalem, 1981), 228–31; Suzanne Last Stone, “In Pursuit of the Counter-Text: The Turn to the
Jewish Legal Model in Contemporary American Legal Theory,” Harvard Law Review 813,865 ff (1990): 59; Ephraim
Urbach, The Sages: Their Concepts and Beliefs (Hebrew) (Jerusalem, 1975), 337–39; Itamar Warhaftig, Undertaking in
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