SECOND DIVISION

EDWARD V. LACSON, G.R. No. 150644

Petitioner,
Present:
PUNO, J., Chairperson,
- versus - SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CORONA,
AZCUNA, and
GARCIA, JJ.
MAOWEE DABAN LACSON
and MAONAA DABAN Promulgated:
LACSON, represented by their
mother and guardian ad-litem,
LEA DABAN LACSON, August 28, 2006
Respondents.
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

GARCIA, J.:

Petitioner Edward V. Lacson, father of the respondent sisters Maowee

Daban Lacson and Maonaa Daban Lacson and husband of their mother and
guardian ad-litem, Lea Daban Lacson, has come to this Court via this
petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to seek the reversal
and setting aside of the Decision[1] dated July 13, 2001 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 60203, as reiterated in its Resolution[2] of
October 18, 2001 denying his motion for reconsideration.

From the petition and its annexes, the respondents reply thereto, and
other pleadings, the Court gathers the following facts:

The sisters Maowee Daban Lacson and Maonaa Daban Lacson are
legitimate daughters of petitioner Edward V. Lacson and his wife, Lea
Daban Lacson. Maowee was born on December 4, 1974, while Maonaa, a
little less than a year later. Not long after the birth of Maonaa, petitioner left
the conjugal home in Molo, Iloilo City, virtually forcing mother and children
to seek, apparently for financial reason, shelter somewhere else. For a
month, they stayed with Leas mother-in-law, Alicia Lacson, then with her
(Leas) mother and then with her brother Noel Daban. After some time, they
rented an apartment only to return later to the house of Leas mother. As the
trial court aptly observed, the sisters and their mother, from 1976 to 1994, or
for a period of eighteen (18) years, shuttled from one dwelling place to
another not their own.

It appears that from the start of their estrangement, Lea did not badger
her husband Edward for support, relying initially on his commitment
memorialized in a note dated December 10, 1975 to give support to his
daughters. As things turned out, however, Edward reneged on his promise of
support, despite Leas efforts towards having him fulfill the same. Lea would
admit, though, that Edward occasionally gave their children meager amounts
for school expenses. Through the years and up to the middle part of 1992,
Edwards mother, Alicia Lacson, also gave small amounts to help in the
schooling of Maowee and Maonaa, both of whom
eventually took up nursing at St. Pauls College in Iloilo City. In the early
part of 1995 when Lea, in behalf of her two daughters, filed a complaint
against Edward for support before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City,
Branch 33, Maowee was about to graduate.

In that complaint dated January 30, 1995, as amended,[3] docketed as Civil

Case No. 22185, Maowee and Maonaa, thru their mother, averred that their
father Edward, despite being gainfully employed and owning several pieces
of valuable lands, has not provided them support since 1976. They also
alleged that, owing to years of Edwards failure and neglect, their mother
had, from time to time, borrowed money from her brother Noel Daban. As
she would later testify, Lea had received from Noel, by way of a loan, as
much as P400,000.00 to P600,000.00.

In his Answer, Edward alleged giving to Maowee and Maonaa sufficient

sum to meet their needs. He explained, however, that his lack of regular
income and the unproductivity of the land he inherited, not his neglect,
accounted for his failure at times to give regular support. He also blamed
financial constraint for his inability to provide the P12,000.00 monthly
allowance prayed for in the complaint.

As applied for and after due hearing, the trial court granted the sisters
Maowee and Maonaa support pendente lite at P12,000.00 per month, subject
to the schedule of payment and other conditions set forth in the courts
corresponding order of May 13, 1996.[4]

Following trial, the RTC rendered on June 26, 1997 judgment finding for the
plaintiff sisters, as represented by their mother. In that judgment, the trial
court, following an elaborate formula set forth therein, ordered their
defendant father Edward to pay them a specific sum which represented 216
months, or 18 years, of support in arrears. The fallo of the trial courts
decision[5]reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

1) Ordering defendant to compensate plaintiffs support in

arrears in the amount of TWO MILLION FOUR
HUNDRED NINETY-SIX THOUSAND (P2, 496,000.00)
PESOS from which amount shall be deducted ONE
HUNDRED TWENTY-FOUR (P124,000.00) PESOS that
which they received from defendant for two years and that
which they received by way of support pendent lite;

2) Ordering defendant to pay TWENTY THOUSAND

(P20,000.00) PESOS as attorneys fees; and

3) Pay costs.

SO ORDERED.
Therefrom, Edward appealed to the CA whereat his recourse was docketed
as CA-G.R. CV. No. 60203.

Eventually, the CA, in the herein assailed Decision dated July 13,
2001,[6] dismissed Edwards appeal, disposing as follows;

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is hereby DISMISSED

and the appealed Decision in Civil Case No. 22185 is hereby AFFIRMED.

Double costs against the defendant appellant [Edward Lacson].

SO ORDERED. (Words in bracket added.)

In time, Edward moved for reconsideration, but his motion was denied by
the appellate court in its equally assailed Resolution of October 18, 2001.[7]

Hence, Edwards present recourse on his submission that the CA erred -

I. XXX WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE GRANT OF SUPPORT IN

ARREARS FROM 1976 TO 1994.

II. XXX IN AFFIRMING THE ALLEGED ADVANCES OF SUPPORT

BY RESPONDENTS UNCLE NOEL DABAN.

III. XXX IN AFFIRMING THE AWARD OF SUPPORT EVEN IF

PETITIONER IS NOT FINANCIALLY CAPABLE OF PROVIDING
THE SAME TO RESPONDENTS.

IV. XXX WHEN IT ORDERED PETITIONER TO PROVIDE SUPPORT

TO XXX RESPONDENTS EVEN IF PETITIONERS OBLIGATION TO
PROVIDE SUPPORT HAD ALREADY BEEN COMPLETELY
SATISFIED BY THE PROCEEDS OF THE SALE OF HIS EXCLUSIVE
PROPERTY WHICH WERE ALL APPROPRIATED BY THE
RESPONDENTS.

The petition lacks merit.

Petitioner admits being obliged, as father, to provide support to both
respondents, Maowee and Maonaa. It is his threshold submission, however,
that he should not be made to pay support in arrears, i.e., from 1976 to 1994,
no previous extrajudicial, let alone judicial, demand having been made by
the respondents. He invokes the following provision of the Family Code to
complete his point:

Article 203 The obligation to give support shall be demandable from the
time the person who has a right to receive the same needs it for
maintenance, but it shall not be paid except from the date of judicial or
extrajudicial demand.

To petitioner, his obligation to pay under the aforequoted provision starts

from the filing of Civil Case No. 22185 in 1995, since only from that
moment can it be said that an effective demand for support was made upon
him.

Petitioners above posture has little to commend itself. For one, it

conveniently glossed over the fact that he veritably abandoned the
respondent sisters even before the elder of the two could celebrate her
second birthday. To be sure, petitioner could not plausibly expect any of the
sisters during their tender years to go through the motion of demanding
support from him, what with the fact that even their mother (his wife) found
it difficult during the period material to get in touch with him. For another,
the requisite demand for support appears to have been made sometime in
1975. It may be that Lea made no extrajudicial demand in the sense of a
formal written demand in terms and in the imperious tenor commonly used
by legal advocates in a demand letter. Nonetheless, what would pass as a
demand was, however, definitely made. Asking one to comply with his
obligation to support owing to the urgency of the situation is no less a
demand because it came by way of a request or a plea. As it were, the trial
court found that a demand to sustain an award of support in arrears had been
made in this case and said so in its decision, thus:
 From 1976, [respondents] mother now and then went to their [paternal]
grandmothers house by their father and asked for support; this
notwithstanding their fathers commitment for this purpose which the latter
embodied in a note dated December 10, 1975. For twenty-one years that
they needed support, [petitioner] complied with his obligation for only two
(2) years.

xxx xxx xxx

Last December 10, 1975, [petitioner] committed self for the support of his
children, the [respondents] herein but failing, plaintiffs mother asked
extrajudicially for her childrens support since 1976, when she went to her
mothers house. .[8] (Words in bracket and underscoring added.)
The appellate court made a parallel finding on the demand angle,
formulating the same in the following wise:

We could not confer judicial approval upon [petitioners] posture

of trying to evade his responsibility to give support to his daughters simply
because their mother did not make a formal demand therefor from him.
[Petitioners] insistence on requiring a formal demand from his wife is
truly pointless, in the face of his acknowledgment of and commitment to
comply with such obligation through a note in his own handwriting. Said
note [stating that he will sustain his two daughters Maowee and Maonaa]
also stated as requested by their mother thus practically confirming the
fact of such demand having been made by [respondents] mother. The trial
court thus correctly ruled that [petitioners] obligation to pay support in
arrears should commence from 1976.[9] (Words in bracket added).

The Court finds no adequate reason to disturb the factual determination of

the CA confirmatory of that of the trial court respecting the demand Lea
made on the petitioner to secure support for the respondents. As a matter of
long and sound appellate practice, factual findings of the CA are accorded
respect, if not finality, save for the most compelling and cogent
reasons.[10] Not one of the well-recognized exceptions to this
rule on conclusiveness of factual findings appear to obtain in this case.
Accordingly, the Court cannot grant the petitioners plea for a review of the
CAs findings bearing on the actuality that, as basis for an award of support
in arrears, an extrajudicial demand for support had been made on the
petitioner as evidenced by the December 10, 1975 note adverted to. Lest it
be overlooked, the jurisdiction of the Court in a petition for review, as here,
is generally limited to correction of errors of law. Complementing that
postulate is the rule that the Court is not bound to analyze and weigh all over
again the evidence already considered in the proceedings below, [11] except
when, as earlier indicated, compelling reasons demand a review of the
factual conclusions drawn from such evidence.

Petitioners second specification of error touches on the CAs affirmatory

holding that respondents uncle, Noel Daban, advanced the money for their
support. Again, petitioners lament on the matter is a veritable call for review
of factual determinations of the two courts below. It need not, accordingly,
detain us long. Suffice it to state in that regard that, of their close relatives,
the respondents appeared to have stayed longest with their uncle, Noel
Daban. Noteworthy also is the fact that petitioner, from 1976 to 1994, only
gave Maowee and Maonaa token amounts for schooling when support
comprises everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing,
medical attendance and education,[12] or, in short, whatever is necessary to
keep a person alive. Logically, the sisters would, thru their mother, turn to
their uncle (Noel Daban) for their sustenance and education when petitioner
failed to give the same, a failing which stretched from their pre-schooling
days to their college years. Since such failure has been established, it is not
amiss to deduce, as did the trial court and the CA, that Noel Daban who,
owing to consideration of kinship, had reasons to help, indeed lent his sister
Lea money to support her children.
Pursuant to Article 207 of the Family Code, Noel Daban can rightfully exact
reimbursement from the petitioner. The provision reads:

When the person obliged to support another unjustly refuses or fails to

give support when urgently needed by the latter, any third person may
furnish support to the needy individual, with right of reimbursement from
the person obliged to give support.

Mention may also be made that, contextually, the resulting juridical

relationship between the petitioner and Noel Daban is a quasi-contract,[13] an
equitable principle enjoining one from unjustly enriching himself at the
expense of another.
As for the amount of support in arrears, there is also no reason to disturb the
absolute figures arrived at by the two courts below, appearing as they do to
be reasonable and proper. Arbitrariness respecting the determination of the
final numbers cannot plausibly be laid on the doorsteps of the CA, and the
trial court before it, considering that they fixed such amount based on the
varying needs of the respondents during the years included in the
computation and to the financial resources of the petitioner, as proved by the
evidence adduced below. As a matter of law, the amount of support which
those related by marriage and family relationship is generally obliged to give
each other shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and
to the needs of the recipient.[14]

Petitioner closes his petition by urging the Court, as it did the CA earlier, to
consider a transaction that transpired after the trial court had rendered
judgment. We refer to the sale by Lea of half of what petitioner claims to be
his exclusive or capital property. As the petitioner would have this Court
believe, Lea and the respondent sisters appropriated the P5 Million proceeds
of the sale for themselves. Pressing on, he alleged that the amount thus
received from the sale is more than enough to fully satisfy thus release him
from complying with- the underlying judgment for support, assuming ex
gratia argumenti his obligation to pay support in arrears.

Petitioners above submission is flawed by the premises holding it

together. For firstly, it assumes as a fact that what was sold for P5 Million
was indeed his exclusive property. But, as the CA aptly observed, there is no
showing whether the property subject of the transaction mentioned by [the
petitioner] is a conjugal property or [his] exclusive property, as in fact
[respondents] mother asserts that she and [petitioner] had separately sold
their respective shares on said property.[15]

Secondly, the respondent sisters were not party to the sale aforementioned.
Petitioners suggestion, therefore, that part of the proceeds of the sale went to
them and may be set off for what petitioner owes them by way of support in
arrears is unacceptable, being at best gratuitous and self-serving.

Petitioner, unlike any good father of a family, has been remiss in his duty to
provide respondents with support practically all throughout their growing
years. At bottom, the sisters have been deprived by a neglectful father of the
basic necessities in life as if it is their fault to have been born. This
disposition is thus nothing more than a belated measure to right a wrong
done the herein respondents who are no less petitioners daughters.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the appealed CA

decision and resolution are AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

CANCIO C. GARCIA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ RENATO C. CORONA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
 ATESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in

consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division

Chairperson's Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the
above decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court.

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice

[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr., with Associate Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr.,
and Associate Justice Sergio L. Pestao (ret.) concurring; Rollo, pp. 44-49.
[2]
Id. at 51.
[3]
Id. at 56 et seq.
[4]
Page 2 of CA Decision; Id. at 45.
[5]
Id. at 66-80.
[6]
Supra note 1.
[7]
Supra note 2.
[8]
Page 14 of RTC Decision; Rollo, p. 79
[9]
CA Decision, p. 4; Id. at 47.
[10]
Republic v. CA, G.R. No. 116372, January 18, 2001, 349 SCRA 451.
[11]
Velasquez, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 138480, March 25, 2004, 426 SCRA 309, citing cases.
[12]
Art. 194 of the Family Code.
[13]
Sta. Maria, Persons and Family Relations Law, 3rd [1999] ed., p. 684.
[14]
Art. 201, Family Code; Baltazar v. Serfino, No. L. 17315, July 31, 1965, 10 SCRA 189.
[15]
CA Decision, pp. 5-6; Rollo, pp. 48-49.