THIRD DIVISION

JOANIE SURPOSA UY, G.R. No. 183965

Petitioner,
Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
- versus - VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.

Promulgated:
JOSE NGO CHUA,
Respondent. September 18, 2009
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
-x

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court

assailing the Resolution dated 25 June 2008 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 24, which granted the demurrer to evidence
of respondent Jose Ngo Chua, resulting in the dismissal of Special
Proceeding No. 12562-CEB.

Petitioner Joanie Surposa Uy filed on 27 October 2003 before the

RTC a Petition[1] for the issuance of a decree of illegitimate filiation
against respondent. The Complaint was docketed as Special Proceeding
No. 12562-CEB, assigned to RTC-Branch 24.
 Petitioner alleged in her Complaint that respondent, who was then
married, had an illicit relationship with Irene Surposa (Irene). Respondent
and Irene had two children, namely, petitioner and her brother,
Allan. Respondent attended to Irene when the latter was giving birth to
petitioner on 27 April 1959, and instructed that petitioners birth
certificate be filled out with the following names: ALFREDO F.
SURPOSA as father and IRENE DUCAY as mother. Actually, Alfredo F.
Surposa was the name of Irenes father, and Ducay was the maiden
surname of Irenes mother. Respondent financially supported petitioner
and Allan. Respondent had consistently and regularly given petitioner
allowances before she got married. He also provided her with
employment. When petitioner was still in high school, respondent
required her to work at the Cebu Liberty Lumber, a firm owned by his
family. She was later on able to work at the Gaisano- Borromeo Branch
through respondents efforts. Petitioner and Allan were introduced to each
other and became known in the Chinese community as respondents
illegitimate children. During petitioners wedding, respondent sent his
brother Catalino Chua (Catalino) as his representative, and it was the
latter who acted as father of the bride. Respondents relatives even
attended the baptism of petitioners daughter.[2]

In his Answer[3] to the Complaint, filed on 9 December 2003,

respondent denied that he had an illicit relationship with Irene, and that
petitioner was his daughter.[4]Hearings then ensued during which
petitioner testified that respondent was the only father she knew; that he
took care of all her needs until she finished her college education; and
that he came to visit her on special family occasions. She also presented
documentary evidence to prove her claim of illegitimate
filiation. Subsequently, on 27 March 2008, respondent filed a Demurrer
to Evidence[5] on the ground that the Decision dated 21 February 2000 of
RTC-Branch 9 in Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB had already been
barred by res judicata in Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB before
RTC-Branch 24.

It turned out that prior to instituting Special Proceeding No.

12562-CEB on 27 October 2003, petitioner had already filed a similar
Petition for the issuance of a decree of illegitimate affiliation against
respondent. It was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB,
assigned to RTC-Branch 9. Petitioner and respondent eventually entered
into a Compromise Agreement in Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB,
which was approved by RTC-Branch 9 in a Decision[6] dated 21 February
2000. The full contents of said Decision reads:

Under consideration is a Compromise Agreement filed by the

parties on February 18, 2000, praying that judgment be rendered in
accordance therewith, the terms and conditions of which follows:

1. Petitioner JOANIE SURPOSA UY declares,

admits and acknowledges that there is no blood
relationship or filiation between petitioner and her
brother Allan on one hand and [herein respondent]
JOSE NGO CHUA on the other. This declaration,
admission or acknowledgement is concurred with
petitioners brother Allan, who although not a party to
the case, hereby affixes his signature to this pleading
and also abides by the declaration herein.

2. As a gesture of goodwill and by way of

settling petitioner and her brothers (Allan) civil,
monetary and similar claims but without admitting any
liability, [respondent] JOSE NGO CHUA hereby binds
himself to pay the petitioner the sum of TWO
MILLION PESOS (P2,000,000.00) and another TWO
MILLION PESOS (P2,000,000.00) to her brother,
ALLAN SURPOSA. Petitioner and her brother hereby
acknowledge to have received in full the said
compromise amount.

3. Petitioner and her brother (Allan) hereby

declare that they have absolutely no more claims,
causes of action or demands against [respondent] JOSE
NGO CHUA, his heirs, successors and assigns and/or
against the estate of Catalino Chua, his heirs, successors
and assigns and/or against all corporations, companies
or business enterprises including Cebu Liberty Lumber
and Joe Lino Realty Investment and Development
Corporation where defendant JOSE NGO CHUA or
CATALINO NGO CHUA may have interest or
participation.

4. [Respondent] JOSE NGO CHUA hereby

waives all counterclaim or counter-demand with respect
to the subject matter of the present petition.

5. Pursuant to the foregoing, petitioner hereby

asks for a judgment for the permanent dismissal with
prejudice of the captioned petition. [Respondent] also
 asks for a judgment permanently dismissing with
prejudice his counterclaim.

Finding the said compromise agreement to be in order, the

Court hereby approves the same. Judgment is rendered in accordance
with the provisions of the compromise agreement. The parties are
enjoined to comply with their respective undertakings embodied in the
agreement.[7]

With no appeal having been filed therefrom, the 21 February

2000 Decision of RTC-Branch 9 in Special Proceeding 8830-CEB was
declared final and executory.

Petitioner filed on 15 April 2008 her Opposition[8] to respondents

Demurrer to Evidence in Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB. Thereafter,
RTC-Branch 24 issued its now assailed Resolution dated 25 June 2008 in
Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB, granting respondents Demurrer.

RTC-Branch 24 summarized the arguments of respondent and

petitioner in the Demurrer and Opposition, respectively, as follows:
This is to resolve the issues put across in the Demurrer to the
Evidence submitted to this Court; the Opposition thereto; the Comment
on the Opposition and the Rejoinder to the Comment.

xxxx

1. The instant case is barred by the principle of res judicata because

there was a judgment entered based on the Compromise
Agreement approved by this multiple-sala Court, branch 09, on
the same issues and between the same parties.

2. That such decision of Branch 09, having attained finality, is beyond

review, reversal or alteration by another Regional Trial Court
and not even the Supreme Court, no matter how erroneous.

3. Judicial Admissions or admission in petitioners pleadings to the

effect that there is no blood relationship between petitioner and
respondent, which is a declaration against interest, are
conclusive on her and she should not be permitted to falsify.

4. That the Certificate of Live Birth showing that petitioners father is

Alfredo Surposa is a public document which is the evidence of
the facts therein stated, unless corrected by judicial order.
 5. After receiving the benefits and concessions pursuant to their
compromise agreement, she is estopped from refuting on the
effects thereof to the prejudice of the [herein respondent].

The summary of the Opposition is in this wise:

1. That the illegitimate filiation of petitioner to respondent is

established by the open, and continuous possession of the status
of an illegitimate child.

2. The Demurrer to the evidence cannot set up the affirmative grounds

for a Motion to Dismiss.

3. The question on the civil status, future support and future legitime
can not be subject to compromise.

4. The decision in the first case does not bar the filing of another action
asking for the same relief against the same defendant.[9]

Taking into consideration the aforementioned positions of the

parties, RTC-Branch 24 held that:

Looking at the issues from the viewpoint of a judge, this Court

believes that its hands are tied. Unless the Court of Appeals strikes
down the Compromise Judgment rendered by Branch 09 of
the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, this Court will not attempt to
vacate, much more annul, that Judgment issued by a co-equal court,
which had long become final and executory, and in fact executed.

This court upholds the Policy of Judicial Stability since to do otherwise

would result in patent abuse of judicial discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. The defense of lack of jurisdiction cannot be waived. At
any rate, such is brought forth in the Affirmative Defenses of the
Answer.

This Court, saddled with many cases, suffers the brunt of allowing
herein case involving same parties to re-litigate on the same issues
already closed.[10]

In the end, RTC-Branch 24 decreed:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Demurrer to the Evidence

is hereby given due course, as the herein case is hereby ordered
DISMISSED.[11]
 RTC-Branch 24 denied petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration[12] in a Resolution[13] dated 29 July 2008.

Petitioner then filed the instant Petition raising the following issues
for resolution of this Court:

Whether or not the principle of res judicata is applicable to

judgments predicated upon a compromise agreement on cases
enumerated in Article 2035 of the Civil Code of the Philippines;

II

Whether or not the compromise agreement entered into by the parties

herein before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 09 of Cebu City
effectively bars the filing of the present case.[14]

At the outset, the Court notes that from the RTC Resolution
granting respondents Demurrer to Evidence, petitioner went directly to
this Court for relief. This is only proper, given that petitioner is raising
pure questions of law in her instant Petition.

Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. A party

desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or
resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional
Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file with
the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The
petition shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set
forth.

Clearly, a party may directly appeal to this Court from a decision

or final order or resolution of the trial court on pure questions of law. A
question of law lies, on one hand, when the doubt or difference arises as
to what the law is on a certain set of facts; a question of fact exists, on the
other hand, when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or
falsehood of the alleged facts. Here, the facts are not disputed; the
controversy merely relates to the correct application of the law or
jurisprudence to the undisputed facts.[15]

The central issue in this case is whether the Compromise

Agreement entered into between petitioner and respondent, duly
approved by RTC-Branch 9 in its Decision dated 21 February 2000 in
Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, constitutes res judicata in Special
Proceeding No. 12562-CEB still pending before RTC-Branch 24.

The doctrine of res judicata is a rule that pervades every well-

regulated system of jurisprudence and is founded upon two grounds
embodied in various maxims of the common law, namely: (1) public
policy and necessity, which makes it in the interest of the State that there
should be an end to litigation, interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium, and
(2) the hardship of the individual that he should be vexed twice for the
same cause, nemo debet bis vexari pro eadem causa.[16]

For res judicata, to serve as an absolute bar to a subsequent action,

the following requisites must concur: (1) there must be a final judgment
or order; (2) the court rendering it must have jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties; (3) it must be a judgment or order on the merits;
and (4) there must be, between the two cases, identity of parties, subject
matter, and causes of action.[17]

It is undeniable that Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, previously

before RTC-Branch 9, and Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB, presently
before RTC-Branch 24, were both actions for the issuance of a decree of
illegitimate filiation filed by petitioner against respondent. Hence, there is
apparent identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action between
the two cases. However, the question arises as to whether the other
elements of res judicata exist in this case.

The court rules in the negative.

A compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by making

reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already
commenced.[18] In Estate of the late Jesus S. Yujuico v. Republic,[19] the
Court pronounced that a judicial compromise has the effect of res
judicata. A judgment based on a compromise agreement is a judgment on
the merits.

It must be emphasized, though, that like any other contract, a

compromise agreement must comply with the requisites in Article 1318
of the Civil Code, to wit: (a) consent of the contracting parties; (b) object
certain that is the subject matter of the contract; and (c) cause of the
obligation that is established. And, like any other contract, the terms and
conditions of a compromise agreement must not be contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public policy and public order. Any compromise
agreement that is contrary to law or public policy is null and void, and
vests no rights in and holds no obligation for any party. It produces no
legal effect at all.[20]

In connection with the foregoing, the Court calls attention to

Article 2035 of the Civil Code, which states:

ART. 2035. No compromise upon the following questions shall be

valid:

(1) The civil status of persons;

(2) The validity of a marriage or a legal separation;

(3) Any ground for legal separation;

(4) Future support;

(5) The jurisdiction of courts;

(6) Future legitime. (Emphases ours.)

The Compromise Agreement between petitioner and respondent,

executed on 18 February 2000 and approved by RTC-Branch 9 in its
Decision dated 21 February 2000 in Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB,
obviously intended to settle the question of petitioners status and
filiation, i.e., whether she is an illegitimate child of respondent. In
exchange for petitioner and her brother Allan acknowledging that they
are not the children of respondent, respondent would pay petitioner and
Allan P2,000,000.00 each. Although unmentioned, it was a necessary
consequence of said Compromise Agreement that petitioner also waived
away her rights to future support and future legitime as an illegitimate
child of respondent. Evidently, the Compromise Agreement dated 18
February 2000 between petitioner and respondent is covered by the
prohibition under Article 2035 of the Civil Code.

Advincula v. Advincula[21] has a factual background closely similar

to the one at bar. Manuela Advincula (Manuela) filed, before the Court of
First Instance (CFI) of Iloilo, Civil Case No. 3553 for acknowledgment
and support, against Manuel Advincula (Manuel). On motion of both
parties, said case was dismissed. Not very long after, Manuela again
instituted, before the same court, Civil Case No. 5659 for
acknowledgment and support, against Manuel. This Court declared that
although Civil Case No. 3553 ended in a compromise, it did not bar the
subsequent filing by Manuela of Civil Case No. 5659, asking for the same
relief from Manuel. Civil Case No. 3553 was an action for
acknowledgement, affecting a persons civil status, which cannot be the
subject of compromise.

It is settled, then, in law and jurisprudence, that the status and

filiation of a child cannot be compromised. Public policy demands that
there be no compromise on the status and filiation of a child.[22] Paternity
and filiation or the lack of the same, is a relationship that must be
judicially established, and it is for the Court to declare its existence or
absence. It cannot be left to the will or agreement of the parties.[23]

Being contrary to law and public policy, the Compromise

Agreement dated 18 February 2000 between petitioner and respondent is
void ab initio and vests no rights and creates no obligations. It produces
no legal effect at all. The void agreement cannot be rendered operative
even by the parties' alleged performance (partial or full) of their
respective prestations.[24]

Neither can it be said that RTC-Branch 9, by approving the

Compromise Agreement, in its Decision dated 21 February 2000 in
Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, already made said contract valid and
legal. Obviously, it would already be beyond the jurisdiction of
RTC-Branch 9 to legalize what is illegal. RTC-Branch 9 had no authority
to approve and give effect to a Compromise Agreement that was contrary
to law and public policy, even if said contract was executed and
submitted for approval by both parties. RTC-Branch 9 would not be
competent, under any circumstances, to grant the approval of the said
Compromise Agreement. No court can allow itself to be used as a tool to
circumvent the explicit prohibition under Article 2035 of the Civil
Code. The following quote in Francisco v. Zandueta[25] is relevant herein:

It is a universal rule of law that parties cannot, by consent, give

a court, as such, jurisdiction in a matter which is excluded by the laws
of the land. In such a case the question is not whether a competent
court has obtained jurisdiction of a party triable before it, but whether
the court itself is competent under any circumstances to adjudicate a
claim against the defendant. And where there is want of jurisdiction of
the subject-matter, a judgment is void as to all persons, and consent of
parties can never impart to it the vitality which a valid judgment
derives from the sovereign state, the court being constituted, by
express provision of law, as its agent to pronounce its decrees in
controversies between its people. (7 R. C. L., 1039.)

A judgment void for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It

cannot be the source of any right or the creator of any obligation. All acts
performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal
effect. Hence, it can never become final, and any writ of execution based
on it is void. It may be said to be a lawless thing that can be treated as an
outlaw and slain on sight, or ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits
its head.[26]

In sum, Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB before RTC-Branch

24 is not barred by res judicata, since RTC-Branch 9 had no jurisdiction
to approve, in its Decision dated 21 February 2000 in Special Proceeding
No. 8830-CEB, petitioner and respondents Compromise Agreement,
which was contrary to law and public policy; and, consequently, the
Decision dated 21 February 2000 in Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB,
being null and void for having been rendered by RTC-Branch 9 without
jurisdiction, could not have attained finality or been considered a
judgment on the merits.

Nevertheless, the Court must clarify that even though the

Compromise Agreement between petitioner and respondent is void for
being contrary to law and public policy, the admission petitioner made
therein may still be appreciated against her in Special Proceeding No.
12562-CEB. RTC-Branch 24 is only reminded that while petitioners
admission may have evidentiary value, it does not, by itself, conclusively
establish the lack of filiation.[27]

Proceeding from its foregoing findings, the Court is remanding this

case to the RTC-Branch 24 for the continuation of hearing on Special
Proceedings No. 12562-CEB, more particularly, for respondents
presentation of evidence.

Although respondents pleading was captioned a Demurrer to

Evidence, it was more appropriately a Motion to Dismiss on the ground
of res judicata.

Demurrer to Evidence is governed by Rule 33 of the Rules of

Court, Section 1 of which is reproduced in full below:
SECTION 1. Demurrer to evidence. After the plaintiff has
completed the presentation of his evidence, the defendant may move
for dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff
has shown no right to relief. If his motion is denied, he shall have the
right to present evidence. If the motion is granted but on appeal the
order of dismissal is reversed he shall be deemed to have waived the
right to present evidence.

Demurrer to evidence authorizes a judgment on the merits of the

case without the defendant having to submit evidence on his part, as he
would ordinarily have to do, if plaintiff's evidence shows that he is not
entitled to the relief sought. Demurrer, therefore, is an aid or instrument
for the expeditious termination of an action, similar to a motion to
dismiss, which the court or tribunal may either grant or deny.[28]

The Court has recently established some guidelines on when a

demurrer to evidence should be granted, thus:

A demurrer to evidence may be issued when, upon the facts and

the law, the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. Where the plaintiff's
evidence together with such inferences and conclusions as may
reasonably be drawn therefrom does not warrant recovery against the
defendant, a demurrer to evidence should be sustained. A demurrer to
evidence is likewise sustainable when, admitting every proven fact
 favorable to the plaintiff and indulging in his favor all conclusions
fairly and reasonably inferable therefrom, the plaintiff has failed to
make out one or more of the material elements of his case, or when
there is no evidence to support an allegation necessary to his claim. It
should be sustained where the plaintiff's evidence is prima facie
insufficient for a recovery.[29]

The essential question to be resolved in a demurrer to evidence is

whether petitioner has been able to show that she is entitled to her claim,
and it is incumbent upon RTC-Branch 24 to make such a
determination. A perusal of the Resolution dated 25 June 2008 of
RTC-Branch 24 in Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB shows that it is
barren of any discussion on this matter. It did not take into consideration
any of the evidence presented by petitioner. RTC-Branch 24 dismissed
Special Proceedings No. 12562-CEB on the sole basis of res
judicata, given the Decision dated 21 February 2000 of RTC-Branch 9 in
Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, approving the Compromise
Agreement between petitioner and respondent. Hence, the Resolution
dated 25 June 2008 of RTC-Branch 24 should be deemed as having
dismissed Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB on the ground of res
judicata rather than an adjudication on the merits of respondents
demurrer to evidence. Necessarily, the last line of Section 1, Rule 33 of
the Rules of Court should not apply herein and respondent should still be
allowed to present evidence before RTC-Branch 24 in Special
Proceedings No. 12562-CEB.
It must be kept in mind that substantial justice must prevail. When
there is a strong showing that grave miscarriage of justice would result
from the strict application of the Rules, this Court will not hesitate to
relax the same in the interest of substantial justice. The Rules of Court
were conceived and promulgated to set forth guidelines in the
dispensation of justice but not to bind and chain the hand that dispenses it,
for otherwise, courts will be mere slaves to or robots of technical rules,
shorn of judicial discretion.That is precisely why courts in rendering real
justice have always been, as they in fact ought to be, conscientiously
guided by the norm that when on the balance, technicalities take backseat
against substantive rights, and not the other way around.[30]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Resolution dated 25

June 2008 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 24, in
Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. This case is ordered REMANDED to the said trial court for
further proceedings in accordance with the ruling of the Court herein. No
costs.

SO ORDERED.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
 ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in

consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Courts Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the
above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S.
PUNO
Chief Justice

[1]
Records, pp. 1-7.
[2]
Id. at 1-6.
[3]
Id. at 19-32.
[4]
Id. at 19.
[5]
Rollo, p. 53.
[6]
Copy of the Petition and the RTC decision in Special Proceeding 8830-CEB not attached to the
records of the petition before this Court.
[7]
Records, pp. 210-211.
[8]
Id. at 237.
[9]
Id. at 304.
[10]
Id. at 304-305.
[11]
Id. at 305.
[12]
Id. at 308.
[13]
Id. at 315.
[14]
Rollo, p. 7.
[15]
Philippine Veterans Bank v. Monillas, G.R. No. 167098, 28 March 2008, 550 SCRA 251, 257.
[16]
Arenas v. Court of Appeals, 399 Phil. 372, 385 (2000).
[17] Estate of the late Jesus S. Yujuico v. Republic, G.R. No. 168661, 26 October 2007, 537 SCRA 513,
537.
[18]
Civil Code, Article 2028.
[19]
Supra note 17, citing Romero v. Tan, 468 Phil. 224, 239 (2004).
[20]
Rivero v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141273, 17 May 2005, 458 SCRA 714, 735.
[21]
119 Phil. 448 (1964).
[22]
Concepcion v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123450, 31 August 2005, 468 SCRA 438, 447-448,
citing Baluyut v. Baluyut, G.R. No. 33659, 14 June 1990, 186 SCRA 506, 511.
[23]
De Asis v. Court of Appeals, 362 Phil. 515, 522 (1999).
[24]
See Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, 366 Phil. 863, 871 (1999).
[25]
61 Phil. 752, 757-758 (1935).
[26]
Galicia v. Manliquez Vda. de Mindo, G.R. No. 155785, 13 April 2007, 521 SCRA 85, 97.
[27]
See De Asis v. Court of Appeals, supra note 23.
[28]
Condes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 161304, 27 July 2007, 528 SCRA 339, 352.
[29]
Id. at 352-353.
[30]
See People v. Flores, 336 Phil. 58, 64 (1997), citing De Guzman v. Sandiganbayan, 326 Phil. 182,
188 (1996).

DENR v. United Planners

DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES (DENR) v. UNITED
PLANNERS CONSULTANTS , INC.,
G.R. No. 212081, February 23, 2015

FACTS:
 July 26, 1993 - Petitioner, through the Land Management Bureau (LMB), entered into
an Agreement for Consultancy Services (Consultancy Agreement) with respondent United
Planners Consultants, Inc. in connection with the LMB’s Land Resource Management Master
Plan Project (LRMMP). Under the Consultancy Agreement, petitioner committed to pay a total
contract price of P4,337,141.00, based on a predetermined percentage corresponding to the
particular stage of work accomplished.
 December 1994 - Respondent completed the work required, which petitioner formally
accepted on December 27, 1994. However, petitioner was able to pay only 47% of the total
contract price in the amount of P2,038,456.30.
 October 25, 1994 - The Commission on Audit (COA) released the Technical Services
Office Report (TSO) finding the contract price of the Agreement to be 84.14% excessive. This
notwithstanding, petitioner, in a letter dated December 10, 1998, acknowledged its liability to
respondent in the amount of P2,239,479.60 and assured payment at the soonest possible
time.
 For failure to pay its obligation under the Consultancy Agreement despite repeated
demands, respondent instituted a Complaint against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City. Due to the existence of Arbitration clause, the respondent moved for the issue
to be tried through arbitration. The Arbitral Tribunal rendered its Award dated May 7, 2010
(Arbitral Award) in favor of respondent
 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. Arbitral Tribunal claimed that it had
already lost jurisdiction over the case after it had submitted to the RTC its Report together with
a copy of the Arbitral Award
 March 30, 2011, the RTC merely noted petitioner’s aforesaid motions, finding that
copies of the Arbitral Award appear to have been sent to the parties by the Arbitral Tribunal,
including the OSG, contrary to petitioner’s claim. On the other hand, the RTC confirmed the
Arbitral Award pursuant to Rule 11.2 (A)36 of the Special ADR Rules and ordered petitioner to
pay respondent the costs of confirming the award, as prayed for, in the total amount of
P50,000.00. From this order, petitioner did not file a motion for reconsideration.
 June 15, 2011 - Respondent moved for the issuance of a writ of execution, to which no
comment/opposition was filed by petitioner despite the RTC’s directive therefor. In an Order
dated September 12, 2011, the RTC granted respondent’s motion. Petitioner moved to quash
the writ of execution, positing that respondent was not entitled to its monetary claims. It also
claimed that the issuance of said writ was premature since the RTC should have first resolved
its May 19, 2010 Motion for Reconsideration and June 1, 2010 Manifestation and Motion, and
not merely noted them, thereby violating its right to due process.
 In an Order dated July 9, 2012, the RTC denied petitioner’s motion to quash.
 July 12, 2012 - Petitioner received the RTC’s Order dated July 9, 2012 denying its
motion to quash. Dissatisfied, it filed on September 10, 2012 a petition for certiorari before the
CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 126458, averring in the main that the RTC acted with grave
abuse of discretion in confirming and ordering the execution of the Arbitral Award.
 March 26, 2014 - The CA dismissed the certiorari petition on two (2) grounds, namely:
(a) the petition essentially assailed the merits of the Arbitral Award which is prohibited under
Rule 19 of the Special ADR Rules and (b) the petition was filed out of time, having been filed
way beyond 15 days from notice of the RTC’s July 9, 2012 Order, in violation of Rule 19.2852
in relation to Rule 19.853 of said Rules which provide that a special civil action for certiorari
must be filed before the CA within 15 days from notice of the judgment, order, or resolution
sought to be annulled or set aside (or until July 27, 2012). Aggrieved, petitioner filed the instant
petition.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not the CA erred in applying the provisions of the Special ADR Rules,
resulting in the dismissal of petitioner’s special civil action for certiorari.

HELD:
 The petition is DENIED, Republic Act No. (RA) 9285, otherwise known as the
Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004,” institutionalized the use of an Alternative Dispute
Resolution System (ADR System) in the Philippines. The Act, however, was without prejudice
to the adoption by the Supreme Court of any ADR system as a means of achieving speedy
and efficient means of resolving cases pending before all courts in the Philippines.
 May 7, 2010, the Arbitral Tribunal rendered the Arbitral Award in favor of respondent.
Under Section 17.2, Rule 17 of the CIAC Rules, no motion for reconsideration or new trial may
be sought, but any of the parties may file a motion for correction of the final award, which shall
interrupt the running of the period for appeal, Moreover, the parties may appeal the final award
to the CA through a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.