LTD QUIZ NO.

GROUP 5

HALOG, Shien M.
SINGSON, Jean Ben G.
MALICDEM, Ralph M.

1. Although the property was purchased during the marriage, upon Gertrude’s death, the
conjugal property regime ceased, and gave Adriano an equal portion of Gertrude’s half of the
property to be divided among his legitimes. Co-ownership of the property then began.

However, upon failure of Adriano’s heirs to exercise the right to repurchase, the ownership
of the property transferred to Alexander. Despite the TCT being void for non-compliance with
the provisions of Article 1607 of the Civil Code, the ownership did not transfer back to the
heirs, for compliance with the requirements of the right to repurchase is merely for purposes
of registering the title in the Torrens System.

2. A. Alleged invalidity of the titles of the plaintiff

The certificates of title issued in the name of the plaintiff in accordance with the Land
Registration Act is indefeasible after the expiration of one year from the entry of the decree of
registration. Under section 38 of the Land Registration Act, a petition for review of the decree
must be presented within one year after its entry. After the lapse of one year, the decree becomes
incontrovertible and is binding upon and conclusive against all persons whether or not they were
notified of or participated in the registration proceedings.

Even assuming that said titles may still be challenged, under the provisions of section 48 of
the Property Registration Decree, a certificate of title cannot be subject to collateral attack and
can be altered, modified or cancelled only in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.

B. Defendant’s supposed acquisition of the properties by adverse possession

The defendant’s claim of acquisitive prescription is baseless. Under Article 1126 of the Civil
Code, prescription of ownership of lands registered under the Land Registration Act shall be
governed by special laws. Act no. 496 also provides that no title to registered land in derogation
of that of the registered owner shall be acquired by adverse possession.

3. The simple possession of a certificate of title under the Torrens System does not necessarily
make the possessor a true owner of all the property described therein. If a person obtains a
title under the Torrens System, which include by mistake or oversight land which cannot be
registered under the Torrens System, he does not, by virtue of said certificate alone, become
the owner of the lands illegally included.

The inclusion of public highways in a certificate of title does not, thereby, necessarily give
to the holder of such certificate said public highways. Therefore, the holder of such certificate
 did not become the owner of said lots and is not entitled to recover their value from the city
government.

4. It was erroneous for petitioner Ruben to question the deed of sale executed by the City of
Manila and TCT No. 12345. Such a defense partakes of the nature of a collateral attack against
a certificate of title brought under the operation of the Torrens system of registration pursuant
to Section 122 of the Land Registration Act, now Section 103 of P.D. 1259. The case law on
the matter does not allow a collateral attack on the Torrens certificate of title on the ground of
actual fraud. The rule now finds expression in Section 48 of P.D. 1529 otherwise known as the
Property Registration Decree.

The certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible title to the property in favor of the
person whose name appears therein. After the expiration of the one (1) year period from the
issuance of the decree of registration upon which it is based, it becomes incontrovertible. The
settled rule is that a decree of registration and the certificate of title issued pursuant thereto may
be attacked on the ground of actual fraud within one (1) year from the date of its entry and such
an attack must be direct and not by a collateral proceeding. The validity of the certificate of title
in this regard can be threshed out only in an action expressly filed for the purpose.

It must be emphasized that a certificate of title issued under an administrative proceeding

pursuant to a homestead patent, as in the instant case, is as indefeasible as a certificate of title
issued under a judicial registration proceeding, provided the land covered by said certificate is a
disposable public land within the contemplation of the Public Land Law.

5. The answer must be in the negative. In as much as B did not, during the pendency of the
application for registration, assert a claim to the buildings and improvements in order that the
same may be noted in the certificate of title to be issued to A, he thereby lost his right thereto.

If a person, during the pendency of the registration proceedings, remain silent as to certain
rights, interests, or claims existing in or upon the land, and then later, by a separate action, have
such interests litigated, then the purpose of the Torrens system will be defeated.

6. B. That the instrument evidencing the transaction be presented to the court for appropriate
consideration.

7. YES. Although generally, a forged or fraudulent deed is a nullity and conveys no title, a
fraudulent document may become the root of a valid title where the certificate of title was
already transferred from the name of the true owner to the true owner and the land was
subsequently sold to an innocent purchaser.

8. Under sections 44 and 46, the following are the specific limitations on ownership of land:

Section 44

a. Liens, claims or rights arising or existing under the laws and Constitution of the
Philippines which are not by law required to appear of record in the Registry of Deeds in
order to be valid against subsequent purchasers or encumbrancers of record.
b. Unpaid real estate taxes levied and assessed within two years immediately preceding
the acquisition of any right over the land by an innocent purchaser for value, without
 prejudice to the right of the government to collect taxes payable before that period from
the delinquent taxpayer alone.
c. Any public highway or private way established or recognized by law, or any government
irrigation canal or lateral thereof, if the certificate of title does not state that the
boundaries of such highway or irrigation canal or lateral thereof have been determined.
d. Any disposition of the property or limitation in the use thereof by virtue of, or pursuant
to, PD No. 27 or any other law or regulations on agrarian reform.

Section 46

a. Rights incident to husband and wife

b. Rights incident to landlord and tenant
c. Liability to attachment and execution
d. Liability to any lien of any description established by law on land and buildings thereon
or on the interest of the owner on such lands and buildings
e. Rights incident to the laws on descent
f. Rights incident to the laws on partition between co-owners
g. Taking of the property through eminent domain
h. Right to relieve such land from liability to be recovered by an assignee in insolvency of
trustee in bankruptcy under the laws relative to preferences
i. Rights or liabilities created by law and applicable to unregistered land

9. PD 1529 did not preclude application for registration of alienable lands of the public domain,
possession over which commenced only after June 12, 1945, considering Section 14 (2) which
governs and authorizes the application of those who have acquired ownership of private lands
by prescription under the provisions of existing laws.

While as a rule, prescription does not run against the State, the exception is when the law
expressly provides for it. Properties classified as public land maybe converted into private property
by ordinary prescription of 10 years, or extraordinary prescription of 30 years, without need of
title or good faith. With such conversion, such property may now fall within the contemplation of
private lands and may be registered even if the possession commenced after June 12, 1945.

10. A certificate of tile, once registered, cannot be impugned, altered, changed, modified,
enlarged or diminished except in a direct proceeding permitted by law. The validity of the
certificate of tile can be threshed out only in a direct proceeding filed for the purpose. A Torrens
title cannot be attacked collaterally. The efficacy and integrity of the Torrens system must be
protected.

“Moreover, it is a well-known doctrine that the issue as to whether title was procured by
falsification or fraud as advanced by petitioner can only be raised in an action expressly instituted
for the purpose. Torrens title can be attacked only for fraud, within one year after the date of the
issuance of the decree of registration. Such attack must be direct, and not by a collateral
proceeding. The title represented by the certificate cannot be changed, altered, modified,
enlarged, or diminished in a collateral proceeding.” (Lagrosa v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 115981,
August 12, 1999)

The certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible title to the property in favor of
the person whose name appears therein. After the expiration of the one (1) year period from the
issuance of the decree of registration upon which it is based, it becomes incontrovertible. A decree
of registration and the certificate of tile issued pursuant thereto may be attacked only on the
ground of actual fraud within one (1) year from the date of its entry and such attack must be
direct and not by a collateral proceeding. The validity of the certificate of title can be threshed out
only in an action expressly filed for the purpose.

In Catores v. Afidchao (GR No. 151240, March 31, 2009), an action for recovery of
property filed by respondent, petitioner alleged that the area which she occupied is not within
the titled property of respondent and that respondent’s title is replete with errors in the technical
description of the property. These allegations, according to the Court, constitute a collateral
attack against respondent’s title because petitioner ascribes errors in respondent’s title that
would require a review of the decree of registration which cannot be allowed in an accion
publiciana.

In Caraan v. Court of Appeals (GR No. 140752, Nov. 11, 2005), petitioners’ claim that
subject property could not have been titled in favor of private respondents because the same
had not yet been classified as alienable and disposable was not given consideration because,
“the issue of the validity of the title of respondents can only be assailed in an action expressly
instituted for that purpose.”
Halog, Shien
Malicdem, Ralph
Singson, Jean Ben

1.)

a.) PETITION TO REVIEW OR REOPEN A DECREE OF REGISTRATION

The decree of registration shall not be reopened or revised by reason of absence, minority, or
other disability of any person adversely affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for
reversing judgments, subject, however, to the right of any person, including the government and
the branches thereof, deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by such adjudication or
confirmation of title obtained by actual fraud, to file in the proper Court of First Instance a petition
for reopening and review of the decree of registration not later than one year from and after the
date of the entry of such decree of registration, but in no case shall such petition be entertained
by the court where an innocent purchaser for value has acquired the land or an interest therein,
whose rights may be prejudiced.

b.) ACTION FOR DAMAGES

Upon the expiration of said period of one year, the decree of registration and the certificate of title
issued shall become incontrovertible. Any person aggrieved by such decree of registration in any
case may pursue his remedy by action for damages against the applicant or any other persons
responsible for the fraud.

c.) ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE

An action for reconveyance is a legal and equitable remedy granted to the rightful owner of land
whichc has been wrongfully registered in the name of another for the prupose of compelling the
later to transfer or reconvey the land. Such action must be file within one year from the date of
such decree.

d.) Appeal from judgment

The judgment and orders of the court hearing the land registration case are appealable to the
Court of Appeals or to the Supreme Court in the same manner as in ordinary actions. He may avail
himself of the remedy of new trial, reconsideration, relief from judgment or appeal under the Rules
of Court.

The appellant shall file a notice of the appeal and a record on appeal within 30 days after notice
of the judgment or final order. In case of ordinary appeal, the appeal shall be taken within 15 days
from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from.

Relief from Judgment on the other hand should be filed within 60 days after the petitioner learns
of the judgment, final order or other proceedings to be set aside, and not more than six months
after such judgment was takn.

e.) Claim against the Assurance Fund

f.) Reversion (under CA 141)

g.) Cancellation of title

h.) Annulment of Judgment

i.) Criminal prosecution under the Revised Penal Code

2.)

No the allegation does not constitute extrinsic fraud. The ground relied upon to annul the
1958 decision based on a compromise agreement being intrinsic and not extrinsic fraud, there is
unanimity in the view entertained by the Court that petitioners' stand must be sustained.

Extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the prevailing party in litigation committed
outside of the trial of the case, whereby the defeated party is prevented from fully exhibiting his
side of the case by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent, such as by keeping him
away from court, by giving him a false promise of a compromise, or where the defendant never
had the knowledge of the suit, being kept in ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff, or where an
attorney fraudulently or without authority connives at his defeat.

3.

The petition for a review under section 38 is a remedy separate and distinct from a motion
for a new trial under section 145 of the Code of Civil Procedure and in our opinion the right to the
remedy is not affected by the denial of such a motion irrespective of the grounds upon which it
may have been presented.

4.

It is conceded that no decree of registration has been entered and section 38 of the Land
Registration Act provides that a petition for review of such a decree on the grounds of fraud must
be filed "within one year after entry of the decree." Giving this provision a literal interpretation it
may at first blush seen that the petition for review cannot be presented until the final decree has
been entered. But on further reflection it is obvious that such could not have been the intention
of the Legislature and that what it meant would have been better expressed by stating that such
petitions must be presented before the expiration of one year from the entry of the decree.
Statutes must be given a reasonable construction and there can be no possible reason for requiring
the complaining party to wait until the final decree is entered before arguing his claim for fraud.
We therefore hold that a petition for review under section 38, supra, may be filed at any time after
the rendition of the court's decision and before the expiration of one year from the entry of the
final decree of registration.

5.

The contention that the petitioners must be regarded as innocent purchasers for value
within the meaning of the section 38 cannot be sustained. They acquired their interest in the land
before any final decree had been entered; the litigation was therefore in effect still pending and
to appear that they were aware of the fact. In these circumstances they can hardly be considered
innocent purchasers in good faith.

6.
Only actual or extrinsic fraud would justify the review of a decree of registration.

The right of a person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by adjudication or
confirmation of title obtained by actual fraud is recognized by law as a valid and legal basis for
reopening and revising a decree of registration.

To avail a petition for review, the following requisites must be satisfied:

a. The petitioner must have an estate or interest in the land;

b. He must show actual fraud in the procurement of the decree of registration;
c. The petition must be file within one year from the issuance of the decree by the Land
Registration Authority; and
d. The property has not yet passed to an innocent purchaser.

The action to annul a judgment, upon the ground of fraud, would be unavailing unless the
fraud be extrinsic or collateral and the facts upon which it is based have not been controverted or
resolved in the case where the judgment sought to be annulled was rendered. Extrinsic or collateral
fraud, as distinguished from intrinsic fraud, connotes any fraudulent scheme executed by a
prevailing litigant "outside the trial of a case against the defeated party, or his agents, attorneys
or witnesses, whereby said defeated party is prevented from presenting fully and fairly his side of
the case." But intrinsic fraud takes the form of "acts of a party in a litigation during the trial, such
as the use of forged instruments or perjured testimony, which did not affect the presentation of
the case, but did prevent a fair and just determination of the case“ (Garingan v. Garingan, GR No.
144095, 12 April 2005).

7.

a. ) That the applicant surreptitiously procured its survey of the land in his own name does not
constitute extrinsic fraud.

b. That at the trial, the applicant and his successor-in-interest, submitted a fabricated new tax
declaration showing a greater area and improvement than that shown in the original tax
declaration does not constitute extrinsic fraud.

c. Allegation that neither the applicant nor his alleged successor-in-interest has ever been in actual
possession of the property in question since time immemorial does not constitute extrinsic fraud.

d. That the substituted applicants represented themselves as the true heirs of the applicant when
in fact they are not does not constitute extrinsic fraud.

e. That at the trial, the applicant represented forged document, or a false and perjured testimony
does not constitute extrinsic fraud. It did not affect the presentation of the case, but did prevent
a fair and just determination of the case."

All these go into the merits of the case.

Extrinsic or collateral fraud, as distinguished from intrinsic fraud, connotes any fraudulent
scheme executed by a prevailing litigant "outside the trial of a case against the defeated party, or
his agents, attorneys or witnesses, whereby said defeated party is prevented from presenting fully
and fairly his side of the case.
 The above-mentioned fraudulent schemes of the prevailing litigant do not prevent a party
from having his day in court or from presenting his case. Relief on the ground of fraud will not be
granted where the alleged fraud goes into the merits of the case, is intrinsic and not collateral, and
has been controverted and decided.

8-10.

A. False
B. False
C. False
D. True
E. False
F. False
G. False
H. False
I. True
J. True
JD GROUP 5

HALOG, Shien M.
MALICDEM, Ralph M.
SINGSON, Jean Ben G.

QUIZ NO. 7

Part I
1.

A. The sale to Juan is not valid, as it was contrary to law. As such, there was no transfer of
ownership from Maria to him. The Original Certificate of Title (OCT) obtained by Maria
through free patent grant is valid. However, because of her delinquency, said title is subject
to the right of the local government to sell the land at a public auction. The issuance of the
OCT did not exempt the land from tax sales. Section 44 of P.D.1529 provides that every
registered owner receiving a Certificate of Title shall hold the same free from any
encumbrance, subject to certain exemptions.

B. Juan may recover the P10,000.00 he paid because he was not a party to the violation of
the law.
C. No, the sale did not divest Maria of her title because the sale is void. It is as if no sale ever
took place. In tax sales, the owner is divested of his land initially upon award and issuance
of a Certificate of Sale, and finally after the lapse of the one-year period from date of
registration, to redeem, upon execution by the treasurer of an instrument sufficient in form
and effects to convey the property. Maria remained owner of the land until another tax sale
is to be performed in favor of a qualified buyer.

2.

In voluntary registration, an innocent purchaser for value of registered land becomes the
registered owner, and, in contemplation of law, the holder of a certificate of title, the moment he
presents and files a duly notarized and valid deed of sale and the same is entered in the day book;
and at the same time, he surrenders or presents the owner’s duplicate certificate of title covering
the land sold and pays the registration fees, because what needs to be done lies not within his
power to perform. If the owner's duplicate certificate be not surrendered and presented or if no
payment of registration fees be made within 15 days, entry in the day book of the deed of sale
does not operate to convey and affect the land sold.

On the other hand, in voluntary registration, an entry thereof in the day book is a sufficient notice
to all persons even if the owner's duplicate certificate of title is not presented to the register of
deeds.

Voluntary registration includes sale, mortgage, and lease; while involuntary registration includes
attachment, levy upon, execution, and lis pendens.

3.

There is effective registration once the registrant has fulfilled all that is needed of him for purposes
of entry and annotation, so that what is left to be accomplished lies solely on the register of deeds.
Stated differently, entry alone produces the effect of registration, whether the transaction entered
is a voluntary or an involuntary one, so long as the registrant has complied with all that is required
of him for purposes of entry and annotation, and nothing more remains to be done but a duty
incumbent exclusively on the register of deeds.

In the case of NHA v. Basa (2010), the Court of Appeals ruled that entry of a document, such as
sale of real property, in the entry book is insufficient to treat such document as registered, unless
the same had been annotated on the certificate of title. It went on to say that the entry of the
certificate of sale in the owners duplicate of the titles could not have been sufficient to register the
same since anyone who would wish to check with the Register of Deeds would not see any
annotation. Thus, entry made on the owners duplicate of the titles cannot be considered notice
that would bind the whole world. In this case, the certificate of sale had not been registered or
annotated in the original copies of the titles supposedly kept with the Register of Deeds since said
titles were earlier razed by fire.

However, the Supreme Court held that there already was effective registration. NHA presented
the sheriffs certificate of sale to the Register of Deeds and the same was entered as Entry No.
2873 and said entry was further annotated in the owners transfer certificate of title. A year later
and after the mortgagors did not redeem the said properties, respondents filed with the Register
of Deeds an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership after which the same instrument was
presumably entered into in the day book as the same was annotated in the owners duplicate copy.
It was not NHA’s fault that the certificate of sale was not annotated on the transfer certificates of
title, which were supposed to be in the custody of the Registrar, since the same were burned.
Neither could NHA be blamed for the fact that there were no reconstituted titles available during
the time of inscription as it had taken the necessary steps in having the same reconstituted. NHA
did everything within its power to assert its right.

4.

According to Cornell Law, constructive notice is the legal fiction that someone actually received
notice (being informed of a case that could affect their interest ) whether or not they truly did
receive this. If certain procedures have been followed, the law will consider a person to legally
have received notice, even if in fact they did not.

Section 52 of P.D. 1529 states the following:

SEC. 52. Constructive notice upon registration. Every conveyance, mortgage, lease, lien,
attachment, order, judgment, instrument or entry affecting registered land shall, if
registered, filed or entered in the office of the Register of Deeds for the province or city
where the land to which it relates lies, be constructive notice to all persons from the time
of such registering, filing or entering.

Section 51 likewise states, “The act of registration is the operative act to convey or affect
the land insofar as third persons are concerned.”

As such, it is important to determine when registration took place as it signifies the creation
of a constructive notice. Again, the act of registration is the operative act to convey or affect
the land insofar as third persons are concerned.

In the case of AFP-MBA Inc. v. Santiago (2008), the respondent-purchaser cannot be

considered as an innocent purchaser for value when she bought a parcel of land, which was
 subject of a levy with a notice duly entered in the Registry of Deeds. Under the rule of
notice, it is presumed that the purchaser has examined every instrument of record affecting
the title. Such presumption is irrefutable. He is charged with notice of every fact shown by
the record and is presumed to know every fact shown by the record and to know every fact
which an examination of the record would have disclosed. This presumption cannot be
overcome by proof of innocence or good faith. Otherwise, the very purpose and object of
the law requiring a record would be destroyed.

The fact that the notice of levy on attachment was not annotated on the original title on file
in the Registry of Deeds, which resulted in its non-annotation on the TCT, should not
prejudice petitioner. As long as the requisites required by law in order to effect attachment
are complied with and the appropriate fees duly paid, attachment is duly perfected. The
attachment already binds the land.

5.

The formal requisites for registration in general, as stated in Sec. 55 of PD 1529, are the
following:

Every deed or other voluntary instrument presented for registration shall contain or have
endorsed upon it the full name, nationality, residence and postal address of the grantee or
other person acquiring or claiming an interest under such instrument, and every deed
shall also state whether the grantee is married or unmarried, and if married, the name in
full of the husband or wife. If the grantee is a corporation or association, the instrument
must contain a recital to show that such corporation or association is legally qualified to
acquire private lands. Any change in the residence or postal address of such person shall
be endorsed by the Register of Deeds on the original copy of the corresponding certificate
of title, upon receiving a sworn statement of such change. All names and addresses shall
also be entered on all certificates.

Additional requirements also apply in cases stated in Sec. 56 and 53 of the said decree where;

Sec. 56. Primary Entry Book; fees; certified copies. …All deeds and voluntary instruments
shall be presented with their respective copies and shall be attested and sealed by the
Register of Deeds, endorsed with the file number, and copies may be delivered to the
person presenting them.

Sec. 53. Presentation of owner's duplicate upon entry of new certificate. No voluntary
instrument shall be registered by the Register of Deeds, unless the owner's duplicate
certificate is presented with such instrument, except in cases expressly provided for in this
Decree or upon order of the court, for cause shown.

The production of the owner's duplicate certificate, whenever any voluntary instrument is
presented for registration, shall be conclusive authority from the registered owner to the
Register of Deeds to enter a new certificate or to make a memorandum of registration in
accordance with such instrument, and the new certificate or memorandum shall be
binding upon the registered owner and upon all persons claiming under him, in favor of
every purchaser for value and in good faith.

Part II
1. B
2. B
3. C
4. B
5. D
6. C

Part III

1. FALSE
2. FALSE
3. FALSE
1. Latest bar question (November 13, 2016) in civil law #11…. Enjoy answering.

2.

No, the transfer of the properties in the name of X was without cause or consideration and it was
made for the purpose of holding these properties in trust for the siblings of X. If the transfer was
by virtue of a sale, the same is void for lack of cause or consideration. Hence, the action to declare
the sale void is imprescriptible. ( Heirs of Ureta vs. Ureta September 14, 2011- G.R. No.
165748 September 14, 2011)

3.

In G.R. No. 168523 (March 9, 2011)

Spouses FERNANDO and ANGELINA EDRALIN, Petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE VETERANS
BANK, Respondent;
Does the right to a writ of possession prescribe?
“Petitioners assail the CA’s ruling that the issuance of a writ of possession does not
prescribe.48 They maintain that Articles 1139, 1149, and 1150 of the Civil Code regarding
prescriptive periods cover all kinds of action, which necessarily include the issuance of a writ of
possession. Petitioners posit that, for purposes of the latter, it is the five-year prescriptive period
provided in Article 1149 of the Civil Code which applies because Act No. 3135 itself did not provide
for its prescriptive period. Thus, Veterans Bank had only five years from September 12, 1983, the
date when the Certificate of Sale was issued in its favor, to move for the issuance of a writ of
possession.
Respondent argues that jurisprudence has consistently held that a registered owner of the
land, such as the buyer in an auction sale, is entitled to a writ of possession at any time after the
consolidation of ownership.
We cannot accept petitioners’ contention. We have held before that the purchaser’s right
"to request for the issuance of the writ of possession of the land never prescribes." "The right to
possess a property merely follows the right of ownership," and it would be illogical to hold that a
person having ownership of a parcel of land is barred from seeking possession thereof. In Calacala
v. Republic of the Philippines, the Republic was the highest bidder in the public auction but
failed for a long period of time to execute an Affidavit of Consolidation and to seek a writ of
possession. Calacala insisted that, by such inaction, the Republic’s right over the land had
prescribed, been abandoned or waived. The Court’s language in rejecting Calacala’s theory is
illuminating:
[T]he Republic’s failure to execute the acts referred to by the petitioners within ten (10)
years from the registration of the Certificate of Sale cannot, in any way, operate to restore
whatever rights petitioners’ predecessors-in-interest had over the same. For sure, petitioners have
yet to cite any provision of law or rule of jurisprudence, and we are not aware of any, to the effect
that the failure of a buyer in a foreclosure sale to secure a Certificate of Final Sale, execute an
Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership and obtain a writ of possession over the property thus
acquired, within ten (10) years from the registration of the Certificate of Sale will operate to bring
ownership back to him whose property has been previously foreclosed and sold.

Moreover, with the rule that the expiration of the 1-year redemption period forecloses the obligors’
right to redeem and that the sale thereby becomes absolute, the issuance thereafter of a final
deed of sale is at best a mere formality and mere confirmation of the title that is already vested
in the purchaser.
4.

The complaint for the annulment of Catalino's Title will prosper. In the first place, the second
owner's copy of the title secured by him from the Land Registration Court is void ab initio, the
owner's copy thereof having never been lost, let alone the fact that said second owner's copy of
the title was fraudulently procured and improvidently issued by the Court. In the second place,
the Transfer Certificate of Title procured by Catalino is equally null and void, it having been issued
on the basis of a simulated or forged Deed of Sale. A forged deed is an absolute nullity and conveys
no title. The mortgage in favor of Desiderio is likewise null and void because the mortgagor is not
the owner of the mortgaged property. While it may be true that under the "Mirror Principle" of the
Torrens System of Land Registration, a buyer or mortgagee has the right to rely on what appears
on the Certificate of Title, and in the absence of anything to excite suspicion, is under no obligation
to look beyond the certificate and investigate the mortgagor's title, this rule does not find
application in the case at hand because here. Catalino's title suffers from two fatal infirmities,
namely:
a) The fact that it emanated from a forged deed of a simulated sale;
b) The fact that it was derived from a fraudulently procured or improvidently issued second owner's
copy, the real owner's copy being still intact and in the possession of the true owner, Bruce.
*The mortgage to Desiderio should be cancelled without prejudice to his right to go after Catalino
and/or the government for compensation from the assurance fund.

5.

(A) The appeal is not meritorious. The trial court ruled correctly in granting defendant's motion
to dismiss for the following reasons:
1. While there is the possibility that F, a former lessee of the land was aware of the fact that C
was the bona fide occupant thereof and for this reason his transfer certificate of title may be
vulnerable, the transfer of the same land and the issuance of new TCTs to X and Y who are innocent
purchasers for value render the latter's titles indefeasible. A person dealing with registered land
may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title and the law will not in any way oblige
him to go behind the certificate to determine the condition of the property in search for any hidden
defect or inchoate right which may later invalidate or diminish the right to the land. This is the
mirror principle of the Torrens System of land registration.
(2) The action to annul the sale was instituted in 1977 or more than (10) years from the date of
execution thereof in 1957, hence, it has long prescribed.
Under Sec 45 of Act 496, “the entry of a certificate of title shall be regarded as an agreement
running with the land, and binding upon the applicant and all his successors in title that the land
shall be and always remain registered land. A title under Act 496 is indefeasible and to preserve
that character, the title is cleansed anew with every transfer for value (De Jesus v City of Manila;
29 Phil. 73; Laperal v City of Manila, 62 Phil 313; Penullar v PNB 120 S 111).
(B) Even if the government joins C, this will not alter the outcome of the case so much because
of estoppel as an express provision in Sec 45 of Act 496 and Sec 31 of PD 1529 that a decree of
registration and the certificate of title issued in pursuance thereof “shall be conclusive upon and
against all persons, including the national government and all branches thereof, whether
mentioned by name in the application or not.”

6.
The action of X and Y against B for reconveyance of the land will not prosper because B has
acquired a clean title to the property being an innocent purchaser for value.
A forged deed is an absolute nullity and conveys no title. The fact that the forged deed was
registered and a certificate of title was issued in his name, did not operate to vest upon an
ownership over the property of X and Y. The registration of the forged deed will not cure the
infirmity. However, once the title to the land is registered in the name of the forger and title to
the land thereafter falls into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value, the latter acquires a
clean title thereto. A buyer of a registered land is not required to explore beyond what the record
in the registry indicates on its face in quest for any hidden defect or inchoate right which may
subsequently defeat his right thereto. This is the "mirror principle' of the Torrens system
which makes it possible for a forged deed to be the root of a good title.
Besides, it appears that spouses X and Y are guilty of contributory negligence when they delivered
this OCT to the mortgagee without annotating the mortgage thereon. Between them and the
innocent purchaser for value, they should bear the loss.

7. (A) Under Art. 173 of the Civil Code, the action is barred by prescription because the wife had
only ten (10) years from the transaction and during the marriage to file a suit for the annulment
of the mortgage deed.
The mortgage contract executed by O, if at all, is only a voidable contract since it involves a
conjugal partnership property. The action to annul the same instituted in 1977, or eleven years
after the execution of the sheriff's final sale, has obviously prescribed because: An action to
annul a contract on the ground of fraud must be brought within four (4) years from the date of
discovery of the fraud. Since this is in essence an action to recover ownership, it must be
reckoned from the date of execution of the contract or from the registration of the alleged
fraudulent document with the assessor's office for the purpose of transferring the tax
declaration, this being unregistered land, (Bael u. Intermediate Appellate Court G. R. L-
74423 Jan.30, 1989 169 SCRA 617)

(B) *If the action is to be treated as an action to recover ownership of land, it would have
prescribed just the same because more than 10 years have already elapsed since the date of the
execution of the sale.
*If M had secured a Torrens Title to the land, all the more S and P could not recover because if
at all their remedies would be:
1. A Petition to Review the Decree of Registration. This can be availed of within one (1) year from-
the entry thereof, but only upon the basis of "actual fraud." There is no showing that M committed
actual fraud in securing his title to the land; or
2. An action in personam against M for the reconveyance of the title in their favor. Again, this
remedy is available within four years from the date of the discovery of the fraud but not later than
ten (10) years from the date of registration of the title in the name of M.

8. Forgery; Innocent Purchaser; Holder in Bad Faith

A) Did Rod acquire title to the land? Explain.
No, Rod did not acquire title to the land. The inscription in the registry, to be effective, must be
made in good faith. The defense of indefeasibility of a Torrens Title does not extend to a transferee
who takes the certificate of title with notice of a flaw. A holder in bad faith of a certificate of title
is not entitled to the protection of the law, for the law cannot be used as a shield for frauds.
(Samonte v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104223, July 12, 2001)
In the case at bar, Rod only forged Cesar's signature on the -Deed of Sale. It is very apparent that
there was bad faith on the part of Rod from the very beginning. As such, he is not entitled to the
protection of the Land Registration Act.
B) Discuss the rights of Don, if any, over the property.
It is a well-known rule in this jurisdiction that persons dealing with registered land have the legal
right to rely on the face of the Torrens Certificate of Title and to dispense with the need to inquire
further, except when the party concerned has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that
would impel a reasonably cautious man to make such inquiry. (Naawan Community Rural Bank
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128573, January 13, 2003)
In the given problem, the property was already registered in the name of Rod when he bought the
same from the latter. Thus, Don could be considered as a buyer in good faith and for value.
However, since Rod did not actually sell any property to him, Don has no right to retain ownership
over the property. He has only the right to recover the purchase price plus damages.

9. (A). Principle illustrated in Jurisprudence

In the case of G.R. No. 213286, August 26, 2015 - MAMERTA LOPEZ CLAUDIO, EDUARDO
L. CLAUDIO, ASUNCION CLAUDIO-CONTEGINO, ANA CLAUDIO-ISULAT, DOLORES CLAUDIO-
MABINI, AND FERMIN L. CLAUDIO, Petitioners, v. SPOUSES FEDERICO AND NORMA SARAZA,
Respondent; The doctrine of mortgagee in good faith only applies when the mortgagor has already
obtained a certificate of title in his or her name at the time of the mortgage. Accordingly, an
innocent mortgagee for value is one who entered into a mortgage contract with a mortgagor
bearing a certificate of title in his name over the mortgaged property. Such was not the situation
of Spouses Saraza. They cannot claim the protection accorded by law to innocent mortgagees for
value considering that there was no certificate of title yet in the name of Florentino to rely on
when the mortgaged contract was executed.

Good faith connotes an honest intention to abstain from taking unconscientious advantage
of another. Spouses Saraza could not be deemed to have acted in good faith because they knew
that they were not dealing with the registered owner of the property when it was mortgaged and
that the subject land had yet to be titled in the name of mortgagor Florentino.

(B). Procedure for the Registration of Real Estate Mortgages.

1. Execute the document of mortgage.

2. There must be two witnesses present.

An affidavit of good faith is also necessary, which shall state that
“We (the parties) severally swear that the foregoing mortgage is made for the purpose of
securing the obligation specified in the conditions thereof, and for no other purpose, and
that the same is a just and valid obligation, and one not entered into for the purpose of
fraud.” (Sec. 5)
3. Go to a notary public, who will notarize the document.

4. Pay the documentary stamp tax within the first five days of the succeeding month. The
documentary stamp tax is a percentage of the value of the property mortgaged.

5. Go to the Office of the Register of Deeds (of the place where the property is located)
and pay the registration fees. Before you pay the registration fees, the
government will require you to update payment of realty
taxes on the property.
The Registration process in turn is as follows:

a. Present deed of mortgage together with

b. Owner’s Duplicate and affidavit of good faith

 c. Payment of fees

6. After payment of the registration fees, the mortgage will be annotated on the title.
This shall be done as follows:
a. ROD shall enter upon original certificate of title and upon duplicate a memorandum
(date, time of filing, signature, file number assigned to deed)

b. ROD to note on the deed the date and time of filing, and reference to volume and page
of the registration book in which it was registered.

Procedure for the Registration of CHATTEL MORTGAGE

1. Execution of document of mortgage (This must conform to the form specifically provided in
Section 5 of Act No. 1508).
2. Present the document together with affidavit of good faith
3. Payment of fees
4. Register of Deeds enters in the Day Book in strict order of their presentation chattel
mortgages and other instruments relating thereto (known as the ‘primary process’)

5. ROD thereafter enters in a more detailed form the essential content of the instrument in the
Chattel Mortgage Register (known as the ‘complimentary process’)

Some special rules on where a Chattel Mortgage should be registered.

General Rule is: Registration shall be done in the Register of Deeds where the mortgagor resides
If, however, the property is situated somewhere else, it needs to be registered also in the
Register of Deeds of the area where the property is located.
Exceptions:
Motor vehicles: shall be registered in the Land Transportation Office (LTO) where vehicle is
registered
Shares of stock: Register of Deeds where the corporation has its principal office.
Vessels: Register at the Philippine Coastguard.

10. Will the subsequent nullification of the mortgagor’s title nullify the mortgage?

* Persons dealing with a registered land have a right to rely upon the face of the Torrens certificate
of title and to dispense with the need of inquiring further, except when the party concerned has
actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious man to make
such inquiry.
* Any subsequent lien or encumbrance annotated at the back of certificate of title cannot prejudice
the mortgage previously registered
* An innocent mortgagee with a superior lien has a reserved right to a foreclosure of property

In GONZALES V. IAC (157 SCRA 187)

“Where the Torrens title of the land was in the name of the mortgagor and later given as security
for a bank loan, the subsequent declaration of said title as null and void is not a ground for
nullifying the mortgage right of the bank, which had acted in good faith. Being thus an innocent
mortgagee for value, its right or lien upon the land mortgaged must be respected and protected,
even if the mortgagors obtained their title thereto thru fraud.”
Halog, Shien LTD: Quiz 9 November 23, 2016
Malicdem, Ralph
Singson, Jean Ben Group # 9

1. Macario has the superior and better right to possess. This is because a notice of levy cannot
prevail over the existing adverse claim inscribed in the certificate of title. Section 16 of PD 1529
states that the “levy on execution shall create a lien in favor of the judgment creditor over the
right, title, and interest of the judgment debtor in such property at the time of the levy subject
to liens or encumbrances then existing.”

Hence, even though Alex was able to acquire a notice of levy on attachment and execution it
is still subject to any liens and encumbrances upon the land. Alex’s contention that the adverse
claim is effective only for 30 days cannot stand. In a case decided by the Supreme Court, they
held that the provision regarding adverse claim should not be treated separately but should be
read in relation to the sentence following that “after the lapse of said period, the annotation of
adverse claim may be cancelled upon filing a verified petition therefor by the party in interest.”
The law simply means that the cancellation of the adverse claim is still necessary to render it
ineffective, otherwise, the inscription will remain annotated and shall continue as a lien upon
the property.

2. A notice of Lis Pendens is a warning to everyone who deals with the land, which is the subject
of such notice, is doing so at their own risk. This is because a notice of lis pendens indicates
that such land is still subject to the outcome of an action filed in court. The purpose of a notice
of lis pendens is summarized by the Supreme Court in the case of Heirs of Marasigan v. IAC,
152 SCRA 253 (1987), to wit:
“The purpose of the notice of lis pendens is to constructively advise, or warn
all people who deal with the property that they so deal with it at their own risk, and
whatever rights they may acquire in the property in any voluntary transaction are
subject to the results of the action, and may well be inferior and subordinate to those
which may be finally determined and laid down therein.”

If I were the judge, I would decide in favour of Shirley because, clearly, Jason was in bad faith
in subsequently selling the land to Franz. Notwithstanding that he previously sold the land to
Shirley which he recognized by the act of filing a suit for collection of unpaid balance, placing the
ownership of the land in litigation.

An annotation of a notice of lis pendens on the title would only be proper in the following:
1. To recover possession of real estate
2. To quiet title thereto
3. To remove clouds upon the title thereof
4. For partition, and
5. Any other proceeding of any kind in court directly affecting the title to the land or the
occupation thereof or the building thereon.
Hence, we would grant Shirley’s prayer that a notice of lis pendens be annotated in the title of
the lot, on the ground of a proceeding which directly affects the title to the land, so as to warn
third parties that such land is under litigation.

Franz on the other hand, could be considered a purchaser in good faith because he was able
to do the necessary inquiry to the status of the land before he purchased it, and in the absence of
the registration of the first sale he was led to believe that the land was free from any liens and
encumbrances.
3. The suit will prosper. While an adverse claim duly annotated at the back of a title under Section
7O of P.D. 1529 is good only for 30 days, cancellation thereof is still necessary to render it
ineffective; otherwise, the inscription thereof will remain annotated as a lien on the property.
While the life of adverse claim is 3O days under P.D. 1529, it continuous to be effective until it
is cancelled by formal petition filed with the Register of Deeds.

The cancellation of the notice of levy is justified under Section 108 of P.D. 1529 considering
that the levy on execution cannot be enforced against the buyer whose adverse claim against the
registered owner was recorded ahead of the notice of levy on execution.

4. The notice of lis pendens is not proper because the case filed by Mario against Carmen is only
for collection, damages, and attorney's fees.

Annotation of a lis pendens can only be done in cases involving recovery of possession of real
property, or to quiet title or to remove cloud thereon, or for partition or any other proceeding
affecting title to the land or the use or occupation thereof. The action filed by Mario does not fall
on anyone of these.

5. A. Carlos is a buyer in bad faith. The notice of lis pendens was still annotated at the back of
the title at the time he bought the land from Bart. The uncancelled notice of lis pendens
operates as constructive notice of its contents as well as interests, legal or equitable, included
therein. All persons are charged with the knowledge of what it contains. In an earlier case, it
was held that a notice of an adverse claim remains effective and binding notwithstanding the
lapse of the 30 days from its inscription in the registry. This ruling is even more applicable in
a lis pendens.

Carlos is a transferee pendente lite insofar as Sancho’s share in the co-ownership in the land
is concerned because the land was transferred to him during the pendency of the appeal.

B. Pacifico can protect his right as a co-owner by pursuing his appeal; asking the Court of Appeals
to order the re-annotation of the lis pendens on the title of Carlos; and by invoking his right of
redemption of Bart’s share under Articles 1620 of the New Civil Code.

6. Ordinarily a notice which has been filed in a proper case cannot be cancelled while the action
is pending and undetermined, except in cases expressly provided for by statute.

As held by the Court in St. Mary of the Woods School Inc vs Office of the Registry of Deeds of
Makati City (2009) and as provided in Section 77 of PD 1529, before final judgment, a notice of
lis pendens may be cancelled upon order of the court, after proper showing that the notice is:

(1) for the purpose of molesting the title of the adverse party; or
(2) not necessary to protect the title of the party who caused it to be recorded.

In the case at bar, there is no showing that Rachelle caused the annotation of the notice of
lis pendens to molest the title of an adverse party since what she sought was reconveyance of her
property fraudulently registered by Rommel, nor was the notice not necessary to protect the title
of the adverse party (Rommel) who caused it to be recorded since an adverse right may succeed
or fail during the litigation such that the lis pendens will either be in full force and effect if the
adverse right is valid, or lose its efficacy if the adverse right fails. Thus, the notice of lis pendens
must not be cancelled before final judgment is rendered in the litigation.

7. In Santos and Camus vs Aquino Jr et al. (1992), the Court held that an “attachment is a
proceeding in rem against particular property/properties, the attaching creditor acquires a
specific lien upon the attached properties which ripens into a judgment against the res when
the order of sale is made. Such a proceeding is in effect a finding that the properties attached
are indebted things considered as virtual condemnation to pay the owner’s debt.”

The effect of an attachment is that the lien obtained by attachment stands upon as high
equitable ground as a mortgage lien, a fixed and positive security which must necessarily continue
until the debt is paid. It necessarily follows that the attached properties cannot be interfered with
until sold to satisfy the judgment, or discharged in the manner provided by the Rules of Court,
requiring the conduct of a proper hearing by the court.

8. In Arrazola vs Bernas (1978), the Court held that the following are registerable adverse claim:
a. An interest as an adverse claim if no other provision is made in Act No. 496 for its
registration (section 110).
b. A lease over a parcel of land for a ten-year period, which could not be registered because
the owner's duplicate of the title was not surrendered, could be registered as an adverse
claim and the owner could be compelled to surrender the owner's duplicate of the title so
that the adverse claim could be annotated thereon. If the adverse claim turns out to be
invalid, the owner could ask for its cancellation and, if found to be frivolous or vexatious,
then double or treble costs may be adjudged against the adverse claimant. (Register of
Deeds of Manila vs. Tinoco Vda. de Cruz, 95 Phil. 818)\
c. the claim of a person that she has hereditary rights in the land fraudulently registered in
her sister's name, because the land belonged to their mother, whose estate is pending
settlement in a special proceeding (Gabriel vs. Register of Deeds of Rizal, 118 Phil. 980).

On the other, the following are not registerable adverse claims:

a. a claim based on occurrences prior to the original (De los Reyes vs. De los Reyes, 91 Phil.
528);
b. where the vendee of a parcel of land may register the deed of sale in his favor, as provided
for in section 57 of Act No. 496, he is not entitled to cause that sale to be annotated as an
adverse claim on the vendor's title (Register of Deeds of Quezon City vs. Nicandro, 111 Phil.
989, 997)
c. when the possessor of land already registered in the name of another person claims the
land on the basis of prescription and adverse possession (Estella vs. Register of Deeds of
Rizal, 106 Phil. 911).

9. Yes, a notice of lis pendens may serve the purposes of an adverse claim.

The purposes of an adverse claim is to apprise third persons that there is a controversy over
the ownership of the land and to preserve and protect the right of the adverse claimant during the
pendency of the controversy. While the purposes of a notice of lis pendens are (1) to protect the
rights of the party causing the registration of the lis pendens; and (2) to advise third persons who
purchase or contract on the subject property that they do so at their peril and subject to the result
of the pending litigation.

In Villaflor vs Juezan (1990), the Court held that an adverse claim and a notice of lis pendens
have the same purpose of serving as a warning to third parties dealing with said property that
someone is claiming an interest or the same or a better right than the registered owner thereof,
thus, there would be no need of maintaining the adverse claim.

10. No, notice of lis pendens is not applicable in the following cases as these are not among
those enumerated in Section 24, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court and Section 76 of Presidential
Decree No. 1529 :
a. Preliminary attachments;
b. Proceedings for the probates of wills;
c. Levies on execution;
d. Proceedings for the administration of estate of deceased persons; or
e. Proceedings in which the only subject is the recovery of a money judgment.

In the case of Magdalena Homeowner’s Association vs CA (1990), the Court said that
according to Section 24, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, and Section 76 of Presidential Decree No.
1529, a notice of lis pendens is proper in the following cases, viz.:
a. An action to recover possession of real estate;
b. An action to quiet title thereto;
c. An action to remove clouds thereon;
d. An action for partition and
e. Any other proceedings of any kind in Court directly affecting the title to the land or the use
or occupation thereof or the buildings thereon.
 Land Titles and Deeds
Quiz No. 10

JD Group 5
HALOG, Shien M.
MALICDEM, Ralph M.
SINGSON, Jean Ben G.

PART 1
1.

The motion of Nestor to dismiss the complaint for annulment of O.C.T. No. 375 and
T.C.T. No. 4576 should be denied for the following reasons:

1) Eddie cannot claim protection as an innocent purchaser for value nor can he
interpose the defense of indefeasibility of his title, because his TCT is rooted on
a void title. Under Section 91 of CA No. 141, as amended, otherwise known as
the Public Land Act, statements of material facts in the applications for public
land must be under oath. Section 91 of the same act provides that such
statements shall be considered as essential conditions and parts of the
concession, title, or permit issued, any false statement therein, or omission of
facts shall ipso facto produce the cancellation of the concession. The patent
issued to Nestor in this case is void ab initio not only because it was obtained by
fraud but also because it covers 30 hectares which is far beyond the maximum
of 24 hectares provided by the free patent law.

2) The government can seek annulment of the original and transfer certificates of
title and the reversion of the land to the state. Eddie's defense is untenable. The
protection afforded by the Torrens System to an innocent purchaser for value
can be availed of only if the land has been titled thru judicial proceedings where
the issue of fraud becomes academic after the lapse of one (1) year from the
issuance of the decree of registration. In public land grants, the action of the
government to annul a title fraudulently obtained does not prescribe such action
and will not be barred by the transfer of the title to an innocent purchaser for
value.

2.

The sale of the land by A to B 3 years after issuance of the homestead patent, being in
violation of Section 118 of the Public Land Act, is void from its inception.

The action filed by the heirs of B to declare the nullity or inexistence of the contract and to
recover the land should be given due course. B's defense of prescription is untenable because an
action which seeks to declare the nullity or inexistence of A contract does not prescribe.

On the other hand, B's defense of pari delicto is equally untenable. While as a rule, parties
who are in pari delicto have no recourse against each other on the principle that a transgressor
cannot profit from his own wrongdoing, such rule does not apply to violations of Section 118 of
the Public Land Act because of the underlying public policy in the said Act "to conserve the land
which a homesteader has acquired by gratuitous grant from the government for himself and his
family"
In keeping with this policy, it has been held that one who purchases a homestead within
the five-year prohibitory period can only recover the price which he has paid by filing a claim
against the estate of the deceased seller under the principle that no one shall enrich himself at
the expense of another. Applying the pari delicto rule to violation of Section 118 of the Public
Land Act, the Court of Appeals has ruled that "the homesteader suffers the loss of the fruits
realized by the vendee who in turn forfeits the
improvement that he has introduced into the land."

3.

Patent Who may Limitations Purpose/N Effect of Prohibitio

apply ature of land ns on
(Qualification the Patent erroneo alienatio
s) usly ns
included
in the
patent
Homestea Any citizen of The applicant Benevolent must be
prohibited
d the Philippines must cultivate intention of returned to the
from being
Patents over the age of and improve government
State
alienated,
18, or the head the land to distribute except if in
of a family. continuously favor of
disposable
since the the
agricultural
approval of governme
the land to nt, 5 years
application destitute from and
and resided citizens for after the
for at least 1 their home issuance
year in the and of the
municipality in cultivation patent or
which the land grant.
is located, or
in a
municipality
adjacent to
the same.
Free Any natural who is the Preserve Must be prohibited
Patent born citizen of owner of more and keep in returned from being
the Philippines. than 12 the family of to the alienated,
hectares and the grantee State except if in
who, for at that portion favor of
least 30 years of land the
prior to the which the governme
effectivity of State has nt, 5 years
PD 1529, has given to so from and
continuously he may after the
occupied and have a place issuance
cultivated to live with of the
either by his family patent or
himself or and become grant.
through his a happy
predecessors citizen and a
in interest useful
tract/s of member of
agricultural the family.
public land
subject to
disposition
Sales Citizens of the To have at intended for Shall period of
Patents Philippines of least 1/5 of residential, revert to ten years
lawful age or the land commercial, the State from such
such citizens broken and or industrial cultivation
not of lawful cultivated purposes or grant,
age who is within 5 years convey or
from the date
head of a encumber
of award.
family or dispose
Shall have said lands
established
actual
occupancy,
cultivation
and
improvement
of at least 1/5
of the land
until the date
of such final
payment.
Emancipa tenant farmers primarily for purpose Shall Not
tion of private devoted to of revert to transferabl
Patents agricultural rice and corn ameliorating the State e except
lands under a sad plight of thru
system of hereditary
tenant-
sharecrop or succession
farmers; not
lease-
tenancy, transferable
whether except by
classified as hereditary
landed estate succession
or not

Special -To Non-

Patents Christian -Secretary of cede, and shall -Can be
Filipinos under the DILG shall convey full revert to transferre
Sec. 84 of the certify that ownership the State d among
Public land act the majority of alienable members
of the non- and of the
-any province, Christian disposable same
municipality, or inhabitants of lands ICCs/IPs,
other branch or any given formerly subject to
subdivision of reservation covered by the
the have a customary
Government
advanced reservation laws and
sufficiently in or lands of traditions
civilization the public of the
domain communit
y
-portion of the
land of the
public domain -land so
open to granted
concession for shall in no
educational, case be
charitable or encumber
other similar ed or
purposes, alienated,
except
when the
public
service
requires
their being
leased or
 exchanged
, with the
approval
of the
President

4.

Pertinent provisions of the Act Authorizing the Issuance of Free Patents to Residential
Lands

As to qualifications:

Any Filipino citizen who is an actual occupant of a residential land may apply for a Free
Patent Title provided;

a. That in highly urbanized cities, the land should not exceed two hundred (200) square
meters; in other cities, it should not exceed five hundred (500) square meters; in first class and
second class municipalities, it should not exceed seven hundred fifty (750) square meters;

b. In all other municipalities, it should not exceed one thousand (1,000) square meters;

c. That the land applied for is not needed for public service and/or public use.

As to Coverage:

It shall cover all lands that are:

 a. Zoned as residential areas, including town sites as defined under the Public Land Act
provided that none of the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 705 shall be violated;

b. Zoned residential areas located inside a delisted military reservation or abandoned

military camp, and those of local government units (LGUs) or town sites which
preceded Republic Act No. 7586 or the National Integrated Protected Areas System
(NIPAS) law, shall also be covered.

As to application:

The application on the land applied for shall be supported by a map based on an actual
survey conducted by a licensed geodetic engineer and approved by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and a technical description of the land applied for
together with supporting affidavit of two (2) disinterested persons who are residing in the
barangay of the city or municipality where the land is located, attesting to the truth of the facts
contained in the application to the effect that the applicant thereof has, either by himself or
through his predecessor-in-interest, actually resided on and continuously possessed and
occupied, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, the land applied for at least ten
(10) years and has complied with the requirements prescribed in Section 1.

As to Special Patents:

Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary and subject to private rights, if any,
public land actually occupied and used for public schools, municipal halls, public plazas or parks
and other government institutions for public use or purpose may be issued special patents under
the name of the national agency or LGU concerned provided that all lands titled under this
section shall not be disposed of unless sanctioned by Congress if owned by the national agency
or sanctioned by the sanggunian concerned through an approved ordinance if owned by the LGU.

As to period for application:

All applications shall be filed immediately after the effectivity of this Act before the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the DENR. The CENRO is
mandated to process the application within one hundred and twenty (120) days to include
compliance with the required notices and other legal requirements, and forward this
recommendation to the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO), who shall
have five (5) days to approve or disapprove the patent. In case of approval, patent shall be
issued; in case of conflicting claims among different claimants, the parties may seek the proper
judicial remedies.1avvphi1

5.
The Solicitor General is correct. The authority of the City of Cavite under RA 1899 to reclaim
land is limited to foreshore lands. The Act did not authorize it to reclaim land from the sea. "The
reclamation being unauthorized, the City of Cavite did not acquire ownership over the reclaimed
land. Not being the owner, it could not have conveyed any portion thereof to the contractor.

PART 2
True or False
1. False
2. True
3. True
4. False
5. True
6. True
7. True
8. False
9. False
10.False
 Land Titles and Deeds
Quiz No. 11

JD Group 5
HALOG, Shien M.
MALICDEM, Ralph M.
SINGSON, Jean Ben G.

Part I

1.
Homestead laws were designed to distribute disposable agricultural lots of the State to land-
destitute citizens for their home and cultivation. The prohibition under Section 118 aims to
preserve and keep in the family of the homesteader that portion of public land which the State
had gratuitously given to him. (PNB v Banatao, GR No. 149221. 7 April 2009)

In PNB v. Banatao, the grantees mortgaged the patented land in favor of PNB only months
after the date of issuance of the homestead patents. On the faces of all the OCTs secured through
homestead patents were inscriptions reproducing the inscription provided for under Section 118.

The Court held that the mortgages were void ab initio. The proscription against alienation
or encumbrance is unmistakable even on cursory reading of the OCTs. Thus, one who contracts
with a homestead patentee is charged with knowledge of the law’s proscriptive provision that must
necessarily be read into the terms of any agreement involving homestead. Under the
circumstances, the PNB simply failed to observe the diligence required in the handling of its
transaction and thus made the fatal error of approving the loans secured by mortgages of
properties that cannot, in the first place, be mortgaged.

2.

a.
YES. Notwithstanding the absence of any stipulation in the deed of sale of the vendor’s right
to repurchase the land, such right is granted by operation of law. Section 119 of the Public Land
Act states that every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent or homestead provisions,
when proper, shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant, his widow or legal heirs, for a period
of 5 years from the date of conveyance (Vallangca v. CA, GR No. 55336, 4 May 1989).

b.
NO. Such right cannot be waived since the law is designed to distribute disposable
agricultural lots of the State to land-destitute citizens for their home and cultivation. In line with
the primordial purpose to favor the grantee and his family, the law provides that the sale be
subject to the right of repurchase by him, his widow, or heirs within 5 years from conveyance. The
right to repurchase cannot be waived. It is not within the competence of any citizen to barter away
what public policy by law seeks to preserve (Santos v. Roman Catholic Church of Midsayap, GR
No. L-6088, 25 February 1954).

OR

NO. The right to repurchase under Section 119 of the Public Land Act cannot be waived
because of the underlying policy and reason of the law. The conservation of a family home is the
purpose of homestead laws. The policy of the State is to foster families as the factors of society,
and thus promote general welfare. The sentiment of patriotism and independence, the spirit of
free citizenship, the feeling of interest in public affairs, are cultivated and fostered more readily
when the citizen lives permanently in his own home, with a sense of its protection and durability
(Rural Bank of Davao City, Inc. v. CA, GR No. 83992, 27 January 1993).
 c.
Under Section 119 of the Public Land Act, the 5-year period for legal redemption starts from
the date of the execution of the deed of sale, and not from the date of registration in the office of
the Register of Deeds. This is true even if full payment of the purchase price is not made on said
date, unless there is a stipulation in the deed that ownership shall not vest in the vendee until full
payment of the price (Sucaldito v. Montejo, GR No. 75080, 6 February 1991).

d.
The Court ruled that, where the vendor is still living, it is he alone who has the right of
redemption (Enervida v. de la Torre, GR No. L-38037, 28 January 1974),

e.
YES. The Court held in Ferrer v. Mangente (GR No. L-36410, 13 April 1973) that a land
acquired by homestead patent inures to the benefit, not only of the applicant, but of his family.

The Public Land Act intends to promote the spread of small land ownership and the
preservation of public land grants in the hands of the underprivileged for whose benefit they are
specially intended and whose welfare is a special concern of the State. The law grants the vendor-
grantee’s widow and heirs the right to repurchase because the purpose of the law is to enable the
family of the applicant or grantee to keep their homestead.

The policy of the law is not difficult to understand. The incentive for a pioneer to venture
into developing virgin land becomes more attractive if he is assured that his effort will not go for
naught should perchance his life be cut short. This is merely a recognition of how closely bound
parents and children are in a Filipino family. Logic, the sense of fitness and of right, as well as
pragmatic considerations thus call for a continued adherence to the policy that, not the individual
applicant alone, but those so closely related to him as are entitled to legal succession may take
full advantage of the benefits the law confers.

f.
In case of mortgaged lands, a homesteader, or his widow or heirs, may repurchase or
redeem a homestead sold at a public auction or foreclosure sale (under Act No. 3135) within five
years from the date of conveyance. The 5-year period of redemption fixed in Section 119 of the
Public Land Law of homestead sold at extrajudicial foreclosure begins to run from the day after
the expiration of the 1-year period of repurchase allowed in an extrajudicial foreclosure.

The redemption period, for purposes of determining the time when a formal Deed of Sale
may be executed or issued and the ownership of the registered land consolidated in the purchaser
at an extrajudicial foreclosure sale under Act 3135, should be reckoned from the date of the
registration of the Certificate of Sale in the Office of the Register of Deeds concerned and not from
the date of public auction (Belisario v. IAC, GR No. L-73503, 30 August 1988).

g.
Yes. The filing of an action to redeem within that period is equivalent to a formal offer to
redeem. It is not even necessary for the preservation of such right of redemption to make an offer
to redeem or tender of payment of purchase price within five years. There is not even a need for
consignation of the redemption price. (Rosales vs. Reyes, et al., 25 Phil. 495 (1913); Gonzaga vs.
Go, 69 Phil. 678 (1940); Torio vs, Rosario, 93 Phil. 801 (1953; ( Atong Vda. De Panaligan v CA
GR 112611)

3.

The procedure of consulta when an instrument is denied registration:

1. The Register of Deeds shall notify the interested party in writing, setting forth the defects
of the instrument or the legal ground relied upon for denying the registration, and advising
that if he is not agreeable to such ruling, he may, without withdrawing the documents from
the Registry, elevate the matter by Consulta to the Administrator of the Land Registration
Authority (LRA).

2. Within five (5) days from receipt of notice of denial, the party-in-interest shall file his
Consulta with the Register of Deeds concerned and pay the consulta fee.

3. After receipt of the Consulta and payment of the corresponding fee the Register of Deeds
makes an annotation of the pending consulta at the back of the certificate of title.

4. The Register of Deeds then elevates the case to the LRA Administrator with certified records
thereof and a summary of the facts and issues involved.

5. The LRA Administrator then conducts hearings after due notice or may just require parties
to submit their memoranda.

6. After hearing, the LRA Administrator issues an order prescribing the step to be taken or the
memorandum to be made. His resolution in consulta shall be conclusive and binding upon
all Registers of Deeds unless reversed on appeal by the Court of Appeals or by the Supreme
Court. (Section 117, P.D. 1529)

4.

Yes, Rachelle's suit will prosper because all elements for an action for reconveyance are
present, namely:

a. Rachelle is claiming dominical rights over the same land.

b. Rommel procured his title to the land by fraud.
c. The action was brought within the statutory period of 4 years from discovery of the fraud
and not later than 10 years from the date of registration of Rommel's title.
d. Title to the land has not passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value.

Rommel can invoke the indefeasibility of his title if Rachelle had filed a petition to reopen
or review the decree of registration. But Rachelle instead filed an ordinary action in personam for
reconveyance. In the latter action, indefeasibility is not a valid defense because, in filing such
action, Rachelle is not seeking to nullify nor to impugn the indefeasibility of Rommel's title. She is
only asking the court to compel Rommel to reconvey the title to her as the legitimate owner of the
land.

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:

Yes. The property registered is deemed to be held in trust for the real owner by the person
in whose name it is registered. The Torrens system was not designed to shield one who had
committed fraud or misrepresentation and thus holds the title in bad faith. [(Walstrom v. Mapa
Jr., (GR No. 38387, 29 Jan. 1990) as cited in Martinez, D., Summary of SC Decisions, January to
June, 1990, p. 359]

5.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
 If fraud be discovered in the application which led to the issuance of the patent and
Certificate of Title, this Title becomes ipso facto null and void. Thus, in a case where a person who
obtained a free patent, knowingly made a false statement of material and essential facts in his
application for the same, by stating therein that the lot in question was part of the public domain
not occupied or claimed by any other person, his title becomes ipso facto canceled and
consequently rendered null and void."

"It is to the public interest that one who succeeds in fraudulently acquiring title to public
land should not be allowed to benefit therefrom and the State, through the Solicitor General, may
file the corresponding action for annulment of the patent and the reversion of the land involved
to the public domain" (Dinero us. Director of Lands; Kayaban vs. Republic L-33307,8-20-73;
Director of Lands us. Hon. Pedro Samson Animas, L-37682, 3-29-74).

This action does not prescribe. With respect to Percival’s action for reconveyance, it would
have prescribed, having been filed more than 10 years after registration and issuance of an O.C.T.
in the name of Melvin, were it not for the inherent infirmity of the latter’s title. Under the facts,
the statute of limitations will not apply to Percival because Melvin knew that a part of the land
covered by his title actually belonged to Percival. So, instead of nullifying in toto the title of Melvin,
the court, in the exercise of equity and jurisdiction, may grant prayer for the reconveyance of Lot
B to Percival who has actually possessed the land under a claim of ownership since 1947. After
all, if Melvin's title is declared void ab initio and the land is reverted to the public domain, Percival
would just the same be entitled to preference right to acquire the land from the government.

Besides, well settled is the rule that once public land has been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership for the
period prescribed by Section 48 of the Public Land Act, the same ipso jure ceases to be public and
in contemplation of law acquired the character of private land. Thus, reconveyance of the land
from Melvin to Percival would be the better procedure, (Vitale vs. Anore, 90 Phil. 855; Pena, Land
Titles and Deeds, 1982, Page 427)

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:

The action of the Solicitor General should prosper, considering that the doctrine of
indefeasibility of title does not apply to free patent secured through fraud. A certificate of title
cannot be used as shield to perpetuate fraud. The State is not bound by the period of
prescription stated in Sec. 38 of Act 496. (Director of Lands vs. Abanilla, 124 SCRA 358)

The action for reconveyance filed by Percival may still prosper provided that: (1) the
property has not passed to an innocent third party for value (Dablo us. Court of Appeals, 226
SCRA 618); and (2) the action is filed within the prescriptive period of 10 years (Tale vs. Court of
Appeals, 208 SCRA 266). Since the action was filed by Percival 19 years after the issuance of
Melvin's title, it is submitted that the same is already barred by prescription.

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER (to second part of question):

The action for reconveyance filed by Percival will prosper, because the land has ceased to
be public land and has become private land by open, continuous, public, exclusive possession
under a bona fide claim of ownership for more than 30 years, and Percival is still in possession of
the property at present. His action for reconveyance can be considered as an action to quiet title,
which does not prescribe if the plaintiff is in possession of the property. (Olviga v. CA, GR 1048013,
October 21, 1993)

Part II
True or False
1. TRUE Sec 103, PD 1529:

“…The deed, grant, patent or instrument of conveyance from the

Government to the grantee shall not take effect as a conveyance
or bind the land but shall operate only as a contract between the
Government and the grantee and as evidence of authority to the
Register of Deeds to make registration…”

2. TRUE Sec. 107, CA 141 and Sec 103, PD 1529:

“…Such patents or certificates shall be effective only for the

purposes defined in Section one hundred and twenty-two of the
land Registration Act (now Sec. 103 of PD 1529), and actual
conveyance of the land shall be effected only as provided in said
section…”

“…It is the act of registration that shall be the operative act to

affect and convey the land, and in all cases under this Decree,
registration shall be made in the office of the Register of Deeds of
the province or city where the land lies…”

3. TRUE Sec. 3, Article XII, Constitution:

“…Citizens of the Philippines may lease not more than five hundred
hectares, or acquire not more than twelve hectares thereof, by
purchase, homestead, or grant…”

4. TRUE

5. TRUE Gomez v. CA, GR No. L-77770, 15 December 1988:

“It is a settled rule that a homestead patent, once registered under

the Land Registration Act, becomes indefeasible and
incontrovertible as a Torrens title, and may no longer be the
subject of an investigation for determination or judgment in
cadastral proceeding.”

6. TRUE Sec 118, CA 141:

“Except in favor of the Government or any of its branches, units,

or institutions, lands acquired under free patent or homestead
provisions shall not be subject to encumbrance or alienation from
the date of the approval of the application and for a term of five
years from and after the date of issuance of the patent or grant…”

7. TRUE Sec 119, CA 141:

“Every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent or

homestead provisions, when proper, shall be subject to
repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or legal heirs, within a
period of five years from the date of the conveyance.”
8. TRUE Sec 121, CA 141:

“Except with the consent of the grantee and the approval of the
Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, and solely for
commercial, industrial, educational, religious or charitable
purposes or for a right of way, no corporation, association, or
partnership may acquire or have any right, title, interest, or
property right whatsoever to any land granted under the free
patent, homestead or individual sale provisions of this Act or to
any permanent improvement on such land.

9. FALSE PRDRL Agcaoili p. 670, par. 1 citing Republic v. Garcia, GR No. L-

11597 and Francisco v. Rodriguez, GR No. L-31083:

“The sale was, therefore, null and void and without effect. The
nullity of the sale of only a portion of the land extended to the
entire property…”

10. FALSE Republic v. Mina, GR No. 60685, 29 June 1982:

“…a title will be considered void if it is procured through fraud, as

when a person applies for registration of the land on the claim that
he has been occupying and cultivating it. In the case of disposable
public lands, failure on the part of the grantee to comply with the
conditions imposed by law is a ground for holding such title void.

To hold that a title may become indefeasible by registration

upon the lapse of the 1- year period within which a decree of title
may be reopened for fraud, even if such title had been secured
through fraud or in violation of the law would be the height of
absurdity. Registration should not be a shield of fraud in securing
title.”

Republic v. Heirs of Alejaga, GR No. 146030, 3 December 2002:

“…the indefeasibility of a title does not attach to titles secured by

fraud and misrepresentation…It cannot be a bar to an
investigation by the State as to how the title has been acquired, if
the purpose of the investigation is to determine whether fraud has
in fact been committed in securing the title.

Thus, prescription and laches will not bar actions filed by the
State to recover its own property acquired through fraud by
private individuals. This is settled law.”

11. FALSE PRDRL Agcaoili p. 653-654; Sec. 35, Chapter XII, Title III of EO
No. 292; and Sec. 101 of CA No. 141:

“Under Section 35, Chapter XII, Title III of EO No. 292, the
Administrative Code of 1987, the Office of the Solicitor General
shall…represent the government in all land registration and
related proceedings and institute actions for the reversion to the
 State of lands of the public domain and improvements thereon and
all lands held in violation of the Constitution.

Section 101 of the Public Land Act (CA No. 141, as amended)
provides that “all actions for the reversion to the government of
lands of the public domain, or improvements thereon shall be
instituted by the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead,
in the proper courts, in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines.”

12. FALSE

13. FALSE Sec 105, par. 5, PD 1529:

“In case of subsequent transfer of property covered by an

Emancipation Patent or a Certificate of Title emanating from an
Emancipation Patent, the Register of Deeds shall affect the
transfer only upon receipt of the supporting papers from the
Department of Agrarian Reform.”

14. FALSE Sec 106, par. 1, PD 1529:

“No voluntary deed or instrument purporting to be a subdivision,

mortgage, lease, sale or any other mode of encumbrance or
conveyance of private agricultural land principally devoted to rice
or corn or any portion thereof shall be registered unless
accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor or executor stating that
the land involved is not tenanted, or if tenanted, the same is not
primarily devoted to the production of rice and/or corn.”

15. TRUE on the ground that the cause of action is barred by a prior
judgment or by the statute of limitations?

16. FALSE LBP v. Republic, GR No. 150824, 4 February 2008:

“It is, of course, a well-recognized principle that the Director of

Lands (now Land Management Bureau) is bereft of any jurisdiction
over public forest or any lands not capable of registration. It is the
Bureau of Forestry that has jurisdiction and authority over the
demarcation, protection, management, reproduction, occupancy
and use of all public forests and forest reservations and over the
granting of licenses for the taking of products therefrom. And
where the land applied for is part of the public forest, the land
registration court acquires no jurisdiction over the land, which is
not yet alienable and disposable.”

PRDRL Agcaoili p. 353, par. 1:

“Where the land covered by the homestead application of

petitioner was still within the forest zone or under the jurisdiction
of the Bureau of Forestry, the Director of Lands had no jurisdiction
to dispose of said land under the provisions of the Public Land Act,
and the petitioner acquired no right to the land.”
17. TRUE Sec 119, CA 141:

“Every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent or

homestead provisions, when proper, shall be subject to
repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or legal heirs, within a
period of five years from the date of the conveyance.”

18. FALSE Sec. 119, CA 141; PRDRL Agcaoili p. 671:

“…the five-year period for legal redemption starts from the date
of the execution of the deed of sale, and not from the date of
registration in the office of the Register of Deeds.”

19. FALSE Sec. 1, RA No. 730; PRDRL Agcaoili p. 632, par. 3:

“RA No. 730 merely provides an exception to Sections 61 and 67of

CA No. 141. In short, the law authorizes a sale by private sale, as
an exception to the general rule that it should be by bidding,
provided the area applied for does not exceed 1,000 square
meters, and the applicant has in his favor the conditions specified
for in Section 1 thereof...”

20. TRUE Menil v. CA, GR No. L-43668-69, 31 July 1978:

“As to the execution of the confirmatory deed of sale, by proper

analogy, the Supreme Court in the said case said:

The law prohibiting any transfer or alienation of homestead

land within five years from the issuance of the patent does not
distinguish between executory and consummated sales; and it
would hardly be in keeping with the primordial aim of this
prohibition to preserve and keep in the family of the homesteader
the piece of land that the state had gratuitously given to them, to
hold valid a homestead sale actually perfected during the period
of prohibition but with the execution of the formal deed of
conveyance and the delivery of possession of the land sold to the
buyer deferred until after the expiration of the prohibitory period,
purposely to circumvent the very law that prohibits and declares
invalid such transaction to protect the homesteader and his family.
To hold valid such arrangements would be to throw the door wide
open to an possible fraudulent subterfuges and schemes that
persons interested in land given to homesteaders may devise to
circumvent and defeat the legal provision prohibiting their
alienation within five years from the issuance of the homestead's
patent.

xxx xxx xxx

It cannot be claimed that there are two contracts: one which

is undisputably null and void, and another, having been executed
after the lapse of the 5-year prohibitory period, which is valid. The
second contract of sale executed on March 3, 1964 is admittedly
a confirmatory deed of sale… Inasmuch as the contract of sale
executed on May 7, 1960 is void for it is expressly prohibited or
declared void by law [CA- 141, Section 118], it therefore cannot
be confirmed nor ratified [Article 1409 of the New Civil Code]….”
 Land Titles and Deeds
Quiz No. 12

JD Group 5
HALOG, Shien M.
MALICDEM, Ralph M.
SINGSON, Jean Ben G.
1.
a.

As a general rule, Baldomero cannot demand the return of the property, his remedy being
an ordinary action for recovery of just compensation. By way of exception, Baldomero may
demand so only if the government fails to pay within a reasonable period of time. Such is a
question of fact and requires judicial discretion.

b.
The taking of private property, consequent to the Governments exercise of its power of
eminent domain, is always subject to the condition that the property be devoted to the specific
public purpose for which it was taken. Corollarily, if this particular purpose or intent is not initiated
or not at all pursued, and is peremptorily abandoned, then the former owners, if they so desire,
may seek the reversion of the property, subject to the return of the amount of just compensation
received. In such a case, the exercise of the power of eminent domain has become improper for
lack of the required factual justification.
(MACTAN-CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY & AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE vs.
BERNARDO L. LOZADA, SR., et al. G.R. No. 176625, February 25, 2010)

2.

Discuss the:

a. Meaning;
b. Nature; and
c. Basis of Just Compensation Reform

a. Meaning of Just Compensation

Constitutionally, just compensation is the sum equivalent to the market value of the
property, broadly described as the price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and
ordinary course of legal action and competition or the fair value of the property as between the
one who receives and the one who desires to sell, it being fixed at the time of actual taking by
the one who desires to sell, it being fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government. It
has been repeatedly stressed by the court that the true measure is not the taker’s gain but the
owner’s loss. The word, “just” is used to modify the meaning of the word, “compensation” to
convey the idea that the equivalent to be given for the land property to be taken shall be real,
substantial, full and simple.

The concept of just compensation embraces not only the correct determination of the
amount to be paid to the owners of the land, but also payment within a reasonable time
from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered just
inasmuch as the property owner is made to suffer the consequences of being immediately
deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving
the amount necessary to cope with his loss. (LBP vs Orilla)

Put differently, while prompt payment of just compensation requires the immediate deposit
and release to the landowner of the provisional compensation as determined by the DAR, it does
not end there. Verily, it also encompasses the payment in full of the just compensation to the
landholders as finally determined by the courts. Thus, it cannot be said that there is already
prompt payment of just compensation when there is only a partial payment thereof.

The Court held that the determination of just compensation in accordance with RA 6657,
and not PD 27 and EO 228, is especially imperative considering that just compensation
 should be the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the
expropriator, the equivalent being real, substantial, full and ample. (LBP VS Heirs of
Domingo)

b. Nature of just compensation

Section 17 of RA 6657 which is particularly relevant, providing as it does the

guideposts for the determination of just compensation, reads as follows:

Sec. 17. Determination of Just Compensation. In determining just

compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land, the current value of
the like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn
valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the assessment made
by government assessors shall be considered. The social and economic
benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers and by the
Government to the property as well as the non-payment of taxes or
loans secured from any government financing institution on the said
land shall be considered as additional factors to determine its valuation.

Section 6 of RA No. 6657 provides that the following shall be considered as additional
factors in determining just compensation:
(a) cost of acquisition of the land;
(b) current value of the like properties;
(c) nature, actual use and income of the land;
(d) sworn valuation by the owner;
(e) tax declarations and the assessment made by government assessors;
(f) social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farm workers and by the
government to the property; and
(g) non-payment of taxes or loans sec

Compensation in agrarian reform cases

The traditional medium for the payment of just compensation is money and no other. And so,
conformably, has just compensation been paid in the past solely in that medium. However, under
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of the government, the taking of private
property does not deal with the traditional exercise of the power of eminent domain where only a
specific property of relatively limited area is sought to be taken by the State.

c. Basis of Just Compensation

When to determine value of compensation:

It is now settled that to determine due compensation for lands appropriated by the
Government, the basis should be the price or value at the time it was taken from the owner and
appropriated by the Government. But when the taking of the property coincides with the
commencement of the expropriation proceedings, or takes place
subsequent to the filing of the complaint for eminent domain, the just compensation should be
determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint.

1. Determination of Just Compensation

This formula has to be considered by the SAC in tandem with all the factors referred to in
Section 17 of the law. The administrative order provides:

A. There shall be one basic formula for the valuation of lands covered by
VOS or CA:
LV = (CNI x 0.6) + (CS x 0.3) + (MV x 0.1)

Where:
LV = Land Value
CNI = Capitalized Net Income
 CS = Comparable Sales
MV = Market Value per Tax Declaration

The above formula shall be used if all three factors are present, relevant, and
applicable.

A1. When the CS factor is not present and CNI and MV are applicable, the
formula shall be:
LV = (CNI x 0.9) + (MV x 0.1)

A2. When the CNI factor is not present, and CS and MV are applicable, the
formula shall be:
LV = (CS x 0.9) + (MV x 0.1)

A3. When both the CS and CNI are not present and only MV is applicable,
the formula shall be:
LV = MV x 2

In no case shall the value of idle land using the formula MV x 2 exceed the
lowest value of land within the same estate under consideration or within the same
barangay or municipality (in that order) approved by LBP within one (1) year from
receipt of claimfolder.

---

Where:

CNI= (AGPxSP) - CO
.12
AGP= Average Gross Production corresponding to the latest available 12
months gross production immediately preceding the date of FI (field investigation)

SP= Selling Price (the average of the latest available 12 months selling prices
prior to the date of receipt of the CF (claim folder) by LBP for processing, such prices
to be secured from the Department of Agriculture (DA) and other appropriate
regulatory bodies or, in their absence, from the Bureau of Agricultural Statistics. If
possible, SP data shall be gathered for the barangay or municipality where the
property is located. In the absence thereof, SP may be secured within the province or
region.

CO = Cost of Operations

Whenever the cost of operations could not be obtained or verified, an assumed

net income rate (NIR) of 20% shall be used. Landholdings planted to coconut which
are productive at the time of FI shall continue to use the assumed NIR of 70 %. DAR
and LBP shall continue to conduct joint industry studies to establish the applicable NIR
for each crop covered under CARP.

0.12 = Capitalization rate

2. The guidelines for payment of just compensation under PD 27 and EO No. 228 are no
longer applicable to the delayed payment of lands acquired under PD 27.
Reasons: it would be inequitable to determine just compensation based on the guideline
provided by PD No. 27 and EO 228 considering the DAR’s failure to determine just
compensation for a considerable length of time. That just compensation should be the full
and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator, the
equivalent being real, substantial, full and ample.

In Land Bank v. Natividad, the Court held that the determination of just compensation in
accordance with RA 6657, and not PD 27 and EO 228, is especially imperative considering that
just compensation should be the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by
the expropriator, the equivalent being real, substantial, full and ample.
Number 3. May interest be imposed in the grant of just compensation? How much?

Imposition of interest on just compensation.

The Supreme Court Land Bank to pay petitioners Apo Fruits Corporation (AFC) and Hijo
Plantation, Inc. (HPI) 12% interest per annum on the unpaid balance of the just
compensation due them computed from the date Government took their landholdings on
December 9, 1996 for agrarian reform purposes until Land Bank paid on May 9, 2008 the
balance on the principal amount.
It explained that the rationale for imposing the 12% interest is in order to compensate the
petitioner for the income they would have had they been properly compensated for their
properties at the time of the taking.

Just compensation from the prism of the element of taking. Apart from the requirement
that compensation for expropriated land must be fair and reasonable, compensation, to be just,
must also be made without delay. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be
considered "just" if the property is immediately taken as the property owner suffers the immediate
deprivation of both his land and its fruits or income.

This is the principle at the core of the AFC and HPI vs LBP where the petitioners were made
to wait for more than a decade after the taking of their property before they actually received the
full amount of the principal of the just compensation due them. What they have not received to
date is the income of their landholdings corresponding to what they would have received had no
uncompensated taking of these lands been immediately made. This income, in terms of the
interest on the unpaid principal.

“…Thus, if property is taken for public use before compensation is deposited

with the court having jurisdiction over the case, the final compensation must include
interest[s] on its just value to be computed from the time the property is taken to
the time when compensation is actually paid or deposited with the court. In fine,
between the taking of the property and the actual payment, legal interest[s] accrue
in order to place the owner in a position as good as (but not better than) the position
he was in before the taking occurred”

The Court fixed the applicable interest rate at 12% per annum, computed from the time the
property was taken until the full amount of just compensation was paid, in order to eliminate the
issue of the constant fluctuation and inflation of the value of the currency over time.

4.

It is clear that recovery of possession of the property by the landowner can no longer be
allowed on the grounds of estoppel and, more importantly, of public policy which imposes upon
the public utility the obligation to continue its services to the public. The non-filing of the case for
expropriation will not necessarily lead to the return of the property to the landowner. What is left
to the landowner is the right of compensation. (FORFOM Development Corporation vs PNR Gr no.
170422)

5.

The primary entry book shall contain, among other particulars, the entry number, names of
the parties, nature of the document, and the date, hour and minute it was presented. The
recording shall be effected by an annotation on the registration book after the same shall have
been entered in the primary entry book. (PD 1529 sec113, Par. a)

Registration Books. — The original copy of the original certificate of title shall be filed in the
Registry of Deeds.
The same shall be bound in consecutive order together with similar certificates of title and
shall constitute the registration book for titled properties. (PD 1529 sec 42)
 The primary entry book or day book is a record of all instruments, including copies of writs
and processes, affecting registered lands, which are entered by the RD in the order of their filing,
upon payment of the proper fees
 Land Titles and Deeds
Quiz No. 13

JD Group 5
HALOG, Shien M.
MALICDEM, Ralph M.
SINGSON, Jean Ben G.

1.

Personal property, by a chattel mortgage, is recorded in the Chattel Mortgage Register as

a security for the performance of an obligation. If the movable, instead of being recorded, is
delivered to the creditor or a third person, the contract is a pledge and not a chattel mortgage.
The provisions of the Civil Code on pledge, insofar as they are not in conflict with the Chattel
Mortgage Law, shall be applicable to chattel mortgages.

2.

Section 114 provides that a chattel mortgage shall be recorded in the office of the Register
of Deeds of the province or city where the mortgagor resides as well as where the property is
situated or ordinarily kept.

The sole purpose and object of the chattel mortgage registry is to provide for the registry
of “chattel mortgages,” and transfers thereof, that is to say, mortgages of personal property
executed in the manner and form prescribed in the statute. A factory building is real property, and
the mere fact that it is mortgaged and sold, separate and apart from the land on which it stands,
in no wise changes its character as real property. Hence, neither the original registry in a chattel
mortgage registry of an instrument purporting to be a chattel mortgage of a building and the
machinery installed therein, nor the annotation in that registry of the sale of the mortgaged
property, has any effect whatever insofar as the building is concerned.

3.

The mortgage of any motor vehicle in order to affect third persons should not only be
registered in the Chattel Mortgage Registry, but the same should also be recorded in the Motor
Vehicles Office as required by Section 5(e) of the Revised Motor Vehicles Law.

The failure of the mortgagee to report the mortgage executed in his favor has the effect of
making said mortgage ineffective against a purchaser in good faith who registers his purchase in
the Motor Vehicles Office. The recording provisions of the Revised Motor Vehicles Law are merely
complementary to those of the Chattel Mortgage Law. Thus, as between a chattel mortgagee,
whose mortgage is not recorded in the Motor Vehicles Office, and an innocent purchaser for value
of a car who registers the car in his name, the latter is entitled to preference.

The Revised Motor Vehicles Law is a special legislation enacted to “amend and compile the
laws relative to motor vehicles,” whereas the Chattel Mortgage Law is a general law covering
mortgages of all kinds of personal property. The former is the latest attempt to assemble and
compile the motor vehicle laws of the Philippines, all the earlier laws on the subject having been
found to be very deficient in form as well as in substance. It had been designed primarily to control
the registration and operation of motor vehicles.
 4.

Under Section 108, all petitions or motions after original registration shall be filed and
entitled in the original case in which the decree of registration was entered.6 Said section does
not require that the petition or the answer or opposition thereto be under oath.

Land registration proceedings are as separate and distinct from ordinary civil actions as are
the latter from criminal actions. The rule that “all petitions or motions” filed under Section 108 as
well as under any other provision of the Property Registration Decree after original registration
shall be filed and entitled in the original registration case was adopted with an intelligent purpose
in view — to allow such petitions and motions to be filed and disposed of elsewhere would
eventually lead to confusion and render it difficult to trace the origin of the entries in the registry.

Under Act No. 496 (Land Registration Act), case law stressed the summary character of the
proceedings for the amendment or alteration of certificates of title. Thus, it was held in Fojas v.
Grey that proceedings under Section 112 of the Land registration Act (now Section 108 of the
Property Registration Decree) are summary in nature, and relief can only be granted if there is
unanimity among the parties, or there is no adverse claim or serious objection on the part of any
party in interest; otherwise, the case becomes contentious and controversial which should be
threshed out in an ordinary action or in any case where the incident properly belongs. Similarly,
in Bareng v. Shintoist Shrine & Japanese Charity Bureau, the Supreme Court held that the
proceedings under Sections 111 and 112 of the Land Registration Act (Sections 107 and 108,
Property Registration Decree), being summary in nature, are inadequate for the litigation of
controversial issues, and it was the duty of the land court where controversial issues are raised to
dismiss the petition so that said issues may be threshed out in an ordinary case before a regular
court.

It was also held in Abella v. Rodriguez that under Section 112 of the Land Registration Act,
any registered owner of land or other person in interest may, on certain grounds, apply by petition
to the cadastral court for a new certificate or the entry or cancellation of a memorandum thereon,
but such relief can only be granted if there is no adverse claim or serious objection on the part of
any party in interest; otherwise, the case becomes controversial and should be threshed out in an
ordinary case or in the case where the incident properly belongs. In other words, relief under said
section can only be granted if there is unanimity among the parties, which means the absence of
serious controversy between the parties in interest as to the title of the party seeking relief under
said section.

Although there have been instances wherein the Supreme Court sanctioned deviations from
the otherwise rigid rule that the jurisdiction of a land registration court, being special and limited
in character, and proceedings therein being summary in nature, does not extend to cases involving
issues properly litigable in other independent suits or ordinary civil actions, the peculiarity of the
exceptions is based not alone on the fact that land registration courts are likewise the same Courts
of First Instance (Regional Trial Courts), but also on the following premises: (1) mutual consent
of the parties or their acquiescence in submitting the issues for determination by the court in the
registration proceedings; (2) full opportunity given to the parties in the presentation of their
respective sides of the issues and the evidence in support thereto; and (3) consideration by the
court that the evidence already of record is sufficient and adequate for rendering a decision upon
those issues. The latter condition is a matter that largely lies within the sound discretion of the
trial judge.

Furthermore, no alteration or amendment of decree is permitted except upon order of the

court. Otherwise, a decree of registration cannot be permanent if, for instance, the limits of the
land therein registered may be changed or the amount of land so registered altered by a
subsequent adjudication of said court based upon new evidence tending to show that the evidence
introduced on the former hearing was incorrect. The law also provides that there is no time limit
to file the petition. No limitation or period is fixed for filing a petition to annotate a deed of sale at
the back of a certificate of title. If any person claims that a person registered a deed of sale can
no longer do so, because the deed was executed more than 10 years before, such objection must
be raised in an ordinary civil action. Where there is no question as to the existence and validity of
the deed of sale, the registration of the sale and issuance of a TCT are ministerial duties of the RD

The following are the grounds for the alteration or amendment of a certificate of title:

1. Whether vested, contingent, expectant or inchoate appearing on the certificate, have

terminated and ceased; or

2. That new interest not appearing upon the certificate have arisen or been created; or

3. That an omission or error was made in entering a certificate or any memorandum

thereon, or, on any duplicate certificate; or

4. That the same or any person on the certificate has been changed;

or

5. That the registered owner has married, or,

6. If registered as married, that the marriage has been terminated

and no right or interests of heirs or creditors will thereby be affected; or

7. That a corporation which owned registered land and has been dissolved has not convened
the same within three years after its dissolution; or upon any other reasonable ground;

5.

Section 109 governs the replacement of lost duplicate certificates.

It is the applicable law in petitions for the issuance of new owner’s duplicate certificate which are
lost or stolen or destroyed. Republic Act 26 applies only in cases of reconstitution of lost or
destroyed original certificates of title on file with the Register of Deeds.

The requirements for the replacement of a lost duplicate certificate are:

1. The registered owner or other person in interest shall send notice of the loss or
destruction of the owner’s duplicate certificate of title to the register of deeds of the province
or city where the land lies as soon as the loss or destruction is discovered

2. The corresponding petition for the replacement of the loss or destroyed owner’s duplicate
certificate shall then be filed in court and entitled in the original case in which the decree of
registration was entered

3. The petition shall state under oath the facts and circumstances surrounding such loss or
destruction

4. The court may set the petition for hearing, after due notice to the register of deeds and
other interested parties as shown in the memorandum of encumbrances noted in the OCT
or TCT on file in the office of the register of deeds.

5. After due notice and hearing, the court may direct the issuance of a new duplicate
certificate which shall contain a memorandum of the fact that it is issued in place of the lost
or destroyed certificate and shall in all respects be entitled to the same faith and credit as
the original duplicate

A petition for replacement shall be filed with the RTC of the place where the land lies and
this is true even if the title was issued pursuant to a public land patent registered in accordance
with Section 103 of this decree.
 6.

If I were the judge, I will give due course to the petition of the heirs of Gavino despite the
opposition of Marilou for the following reasons:

a) Judicial reconstitution of a certificate of title under RA. No. 26

partakes of a land registration proceeding and is perforce a proceeding in rem. It denotes

restoration of an existing instrument which has been lost or destroyed in its original form and
condition. The purpose of reconstitution of title or any document is to have the same
reproduced, after proceedings. In the same form, they were when the loss or destruction
occurred.

b) If the Court goes beyond that purpose, it acts without or in excess of jurisdiction. Thus, where
the Torrens Title sought to be reconstituted is in

the name of Gavino, the court cannot receive evidence proving that Marilou is the owner of the
land. Marilou's dominical claim to the land should be ventilated in a separate civil action before
the Regional Trial Court in its capacity as a court of general jurisdiction.

REFERENCES: Heirs of Pedro Pinate vs. Dulay. 187 SCRA 12-20 (1990); Bunagan vs. CF1 Cebu
Branch VI.

97 SCRA 72 (1980); Republic vs. IAC. 157 SCRA 62,66 (1988); Margolles vs. CA, 230 SCRA
709; Republic

us, Feliciano, 148 SCRA 924.

7.

No. For Judicial Reconstitution to be sufficient would require the following to fulfill the
requirements of notice and publication:

1. To be published twice, at the expense of the petitioner, in successive issues of the Official
Gazette

2. To be posted on the main entrance of the provincial building and of the municipal building of
the municipality or city in which the land is situated

3. Copy of the notice to be sent by registered mail or otherwise, at the expense of the petitioner,
to every person named therein whose address is known, within 30 days prior the date of hearing

8.

Procedure: RA 26 Section 19:

If the certificate of title considered lost or destroyed, and subsequently found or

recovered, is not in the name of the same person in whose favor the reconstituted certificate of
title has been issued, the register of deeds should bring the matter to the attention of the proper
Court of First Instance, which, after due notice and hearing, shall order the cancellation of the
reconstituted certificate of title and render, with respect to the memoranda of new liens or
encumbrances, if any, made in the reconstituted certificate of title, after its reconstitution, such
judgment as justice and equity may require: Provided, however, That, if the reconstituted
certificate of title has been cancelled by virtue of any deed or instrument, whether voluntary or
involuntary, or by an order of the court, and a new certificate of title has been issued, the
procedure prescribed above, with respect to memoranda of new liens or encumbrances made on
the reconstituted certificate of title, after its reconstitution, shall be followed with respect to the
new certificate of title, and to such new liens or encumbrances, if any, as may have been made
on the latter after the issuance thereof.

9.

The difference in law between judicial and administrative reconstitution under Republic Act
No. 26. The authority granted by said law to the Register of Deeds to make an administrative
reconstitution of a lost or destroyed transfer certificate of title is limited by Sec. 5 to only two
kinds of source documents: (a) the owners duplicate of the certificate of title and (b) the co-
owners mortgagees, or lessees duplicate of the certificate of title.

These two kinds are mentioned in pars. (a) and (b) of Sec. 3, Rep. Act No. 26. On the
other hand, the power of a court to effect a judicial reconstitution of a lost or destroyed transfer
certificate of title encompasses all the six (6) kinds of source documents enumerated by Sec. 3.
(Alonso v. Cebu Country Club, dissenting opinion Sandoval-Gutierrez)

10.

No. Regional Trial Courts have exclusive jurisdiction over land registration cases involving:

1. Matters related to the registration of land and lands registered under the Torrens System
conferred by Section 2, PD 1529;

2. Matters related involving petitions for amendment of certificate of title provided by Section
108, PD 1529, which provides:

No erasure, alteration, or amendment shall be made upon the registration book after the
entry of a certificate of title or of a memorandum thereon and the attestation of the same be
Register of Deeds, except by order of the proper Court of First Instance. A registered owner of
other person having an interest in registered property, or, in proper cases, the Register of Deeds
with the approval of the Commissioner of Land Registration, may apply by petition to the court
upon the ground that the registered interests of any description, whether vested, contingent,
expectant or inchoate appearing on the certificate, have terminated and ceased; or that new
interest not appearing upon the certificate have arisen or been created; or that an omission or
error was made in entering a certificate or any memorandum thereon, or, on any duplicate
certificate; or that the same or any person on the certificate has been changed; or that the
registered owner has married, or, if registered as married, that the marriage has been
terminated and no right or interests of heirs or creditors will thereby be affected; or that a
corporation which owned registered land and has been dissolved has not convened the same
within three years after its dissolution; or upon any other reasonable ground; and the court may
hear and determine the petition after notice to all parties in interest, and may order the entry or
cancellation of a new certificate, the entry or cancellation of a memorandum upon a certificate,
or grant any other relief upon such terms and conditions, requiring security or bond if necessary,
as it may consider proper; Provided, however, That this section shall not be construed to give
the court authority to reopen the judgment or decree of registration, and that nothing shall be
done or ordered by the court which shall impair the title or other interest of a purchaser holding
a certificate for value and in good faith, or his heirs and assigns, without his or their written
consent. Where the owner's duplicate certificate is not presented, a similar petition may be filed
as provided in the preceding section.
 All petitions or motions filed under this Section as well as under any other provision of this
Decree after original registration shall be filed and entitled in the original case in which the
decree or registration was entered.

3. Section 2 provides that RTC has exclusive jurisdiction for original registration of titles to lands,
including improvements and interest therein, and over all petitions filed after original registration
of title, with power to hear and determine all questions arising upon such applications or
petitions