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Spring 3-1-2013
Recommended Citation
John P. Gross, Too Poor to Hire a Lawyer but Not Indigent: How States Use the Federal Poverty
Guidelines to Deprive Defendants of their Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel, 70 Wash. & Lee L. Rev.
1173 (2013), https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol70/iss2/11
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Too Poor to Hire a Lawyer but Not
Indigent: How States Use the Federal
Poverty Guidelines to Deprive
Defendants of their Sixth Amendment
Right to Counsel
John P. Gross∗
Table of Contents
1173
1174 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1173 (2013)
I. Introduction
The Supreme Court has devoted very little time to the issue
of who is indigent, although it should be noted that the term
indigent is itself a misnomer. While those defendants who are too
poor to hire a lawyer are typically referred to as indigent,10 courts
have never required that defendants be wholly without means
before they are eligible for assigned counsel.11 In his letter of
concurring) (arguing that the government should provide free trial transcripts to
those defendants “who cannot afford to purchase one,” rather than only those
defendants who are wholly without means); Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours
& Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339 (1948) (“We cannot agree with the court below that one
must be absolutely destitute to enjoy the benefit of the statute.”).
12. H.R. REP NO. 88-864, at 7 (1963), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2990,
2995 (referring to 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)).
13. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344.
14. Adkins, 335 U.S. 331.
15. Id. at 333.
16. Id. at 339.
17. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
TO POOR TO HIRE A LAWYER 1177
last dollar they have or can get, and thus make themselves
and their dependents wholly destitute, would be to construe
the statute in a way that would throw its beneficiaries into the
category of public charges. The public would not be profited if
relieved of paying costs of a particular litigation only to have
imposed on it the expense of supporting the person thereby
made an object of public support.18
It makes little sense to insist on the collection of court costs from
a litigant who, once those costs have been paid, will then have to
seek financial assistance from the state for the necessities of life.
Two additional cases that were decided in the decade before
Gideon and that focus on the legal rights of the indigent are
Griffin v. Illinois19 and Burns v. Ohio.20 In Griffin, the Court
found that the state must provide a trial transcript to an indigent
appellant if the transcript is necessary for determining the merits
of the appeal.21 The Court compared the requirement that an
appellant pay for the cost of a transcript to a requirement that a
defendant pay costs in advance of a trial and concluded that such
a law “would make the constitutional promise of a fair trial a
worthless thing.”22 Under such circumstances the right to be
heard and the right to counsel would be “meaningless promises to
the poor.”23 The Court ruled that “[i]n criminal trials a State can
no more discriminate on account of poverty than on account of
religion, race, or color.”24 The effective denial of a right to appeal
a criminal conviction to someone who was too poor to afford the
costs of a trial transcript was seen by the Court as “a misfit in a
country dedicated to affording equal justice to all and special
privileges to none in the administration of its criminal law.”25 The
Court clearly stated that “[t]here can be no equal justice where
the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he
has.”26
18. Id.
19. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
20. Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959).
21. Griffin, 351 U.S. at 19–20.
22. Id. at 17.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 19.
26. Id.
1178 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1173 (2013)
38. Id. at 289 n.7 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (citations omitted) (quoting
ATT’Y GEN.’S COMM. ON POVERTY & THE ADMIN. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, REPORT ON
POVERTY AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 8 (1963)).
39. Id.
40. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
41. See id. at 84 (“[W]here the consequence of error is so great, the
relevance of responsive psychiatric testimony so evident, and the burden on the
State so slim, due process requires access to a psychiatric examination on
relevant issues, to the testimony of the psychiatrist, and to assistance in
preparation at the sentencing phase.”).
42. Id. at 76.
43. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
44. Ake, 470 U.S. at 76.
45. Id. at 77. The Court also mentioned that these same principles have
been extended to “quasi-criminal” proceedings such as paternity actions. Id. at
TO POOR TO HIRE A LAWYER 1181
treatment under the law.”55 The Court did not rule that any
attempt to recoup defense costs by a state would be held to be
unconstitutional but found that the statute in James violated the
Equal Protection Clause because it denied the criminal defendant
the protections available to civil debtors.56
Two years later, the Court upheld a recoupment statute in
Fuller v. Oregon.57 Unlike the statute at issue in James, the
recoupment statute in Fuller afforded the defendant all the
protections of civil judgment debtors.58 In upholding the statute,
the Court observed that the dividing line between those able to
afford representation and those deemed to be indigent created a
system in which a defendant who was barely able to afford
counsel would be at a disadvantage. The Court noted in Fuller
that
[w]e live in a society where the distribution of legal assistance,
like the distribution of all goods and services, is generally
regulated by the dynamics of private enterprise. A defendant
in a criminal case who is just above the poverty line separating
the indigent from the nonindigent must borrow money, sell off
his meager assets, or call upon his family or friends in order to
hire a lawyer. We cannot say that the Constitution requires
that those only slightly poorer must remain forever immune
from any obligation to shoulder the expenses of their legal
defense, even when they are able to pay without hardship.59
The Court was resigned to the fact that “the dynamics of
private enterprise” will impact the “distribution of legal
assistance.”60 Unless the Court were to adopt a rule that all
defendants are entitled to publicly funded defense counsel, there
will inevitably be a group of defendants who are not considered
indigent, but who have such limited financial resources that they
will have difficulty retaining counsel. The Court was willing to
65. See infra notes 67–69 and accompanying text (explaining the process by
which states began to establish standards for indigency).
66. See supra note 50 and accompanying text (explaining how the Court in
Griffin, Burns, Douglas, and Ake never attempted to define indigent).
67. See ROBERT L. SPANGENBERG ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CONTAINING
THE COSTS OF INDIGENT DEFENSE PROGRAMS: ELIGIBILITY SCREENING AND COST
RECOVERY PROCEDURES 9 (1986) (“In the past, in many jurisdictions, counsel was
appointed simply on the request of the defendant. Some judges asserted that the
time and effort necessary for eligibility screening was unwarranted, since only a
few defendants would be excluded.”).
1186 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1173 (2013)
person charged with a misdemeanor who earns less than 100% of the federal
poverty guidelines and a person charged with a felony who earns less than 150%
of the federal poverty guidelines are considered “indigent” unless they can show
“undue hardship”).
80. See Lamonte v. State, 839 N.E.2d 172, 176 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (“If a
defendant ‘legitimately lacks financial resources to employ an attorney, without
imposing substantial hardship on himself or his family, the court must appoint
counsel to defend him.’” (quoting Hall v. State, 826 N.E.2d 99, 104 (Ind. Ct. App.
2005))).
81. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 815.9(1)(b) (West 2012) (providing that a person
with an income between 125% and 200% “of the most recently revised poverty
income guidelines . . . shall not be entitled to an attorney . . . , unless the court
makes a written finding that not appointing counsel on the pending case would
cause the person substantial hardship”).
82. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:175(A)(1)(b) (2013) (“A person will be
deemed ‘indigent’ who is unable, without substantial financial hardship to
himself or to his dependents, to obtain competent, qualified legal representation
on his own.”).
83. See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM PROC. §16-210(a) (West 2012) (“An individual
may apply for services of the Office as an indigent individual, if the individual
states in writing under oath or affirmation that the individual, without undue
financial hardship, cannot provide the full payment of an attorney and all other
necessary expenses of representation . . . .”).
84. See MICH. CT. R. 6.005(B), available at http://courts.mi.gov/Courts/
MichiganSupremeCourt/CurrentCourtRules/1Chapter6CriminalProcedure.pdf
(“The determination of indigency must be guided by the . . . availability and
convertibility, without undue financial hardship to the defendant and the
defendant’s dependents, of any personal or real property owned . . . .”).
85. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 47-1-111(3) (2012) (providing that a defendant
is entitled to court-appointed counsel if his income is less than 133% of the
federal poverty guidelines or “the disposable income and assets of the applicant
and the members of the applicant’s household are insufficient to retain
competent private counsel without substantial hardship”).
86. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-16-2 (West 2013) (defining a “needy person”
as one “who, at the time his need is determined by the court, is unable, without
undue hardship, to provide for all or a part of the expenses of legal
representation from available present income and assets”).
87. See OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 151.485(1) (West 2013) (“[A] person is
financially eligible for appointed counsel if the person is determined to be
financially unable to retain adequate counsel without substantial hardship in
providing basic economic necessities to the person or the person’s dependent
family.”).
88. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 5201(3) (2013) (“‘Needy person’ means a
person who at the time his or her need is determined is financially unable,
without undue hardship, to provide for the full payment of an attorney and all
other necessary expenses of representation or who is otherwise unable to employ
TO POOR TO HIRE A LAWYER 1189
an attorney.”).
89. See VA. CODE. ANN. § 19.2-159(B) (2012) (providing that if the accused
is not a recipient of a state or federally funded welfare program, the court may
appoint counsel after considering, among other factors, “[a]ll assets of the
accused which are convertible into cash within a reasonable period of time
without causing substantial hardship”).
90. ALASKA STAT. § 18.85.170(4) (2013).
91. Potter v. State, 547 A.2d 595, 599 (Del. 1988).
92. State v. Mickle, 525 P.2d 1108, 1111 (Haw. 1974).
93. NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-3901(3) (LexisNexis 2012).
94. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 151.485(1) (West 2013).
95. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-15-8 (2012).
96. UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-32-202(3)(a)(i) (West 2013).
1190 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1173 (2013)
107. See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-6-106(c) (2012) (providing that the court must
determine whether the defendant can pay for necessary expenses, and if so,
allowing the court to compel such payment).
108. Nikander v. Dist. Court, 711 P.2d 1260, 1262 (Colo. 1986).
109. See id. (“Factors to be considered include whether the defendant has
any dependents, whether he is employed, income from all sources, real and
personal property owned, extent of any indebtedness, necessary living expenses,
and the Eligibility Income Guidelines which reflect the current Federal Poverty
Guidelines.”).
110. ME. R. CRIM. P. 44(b).
111. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 604-A:2-c (2013).
112. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 977.02(3)(a) (West 2013).
113. UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-32-202(3)(b)(v) (West 2013).
114. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:158-14(g) (West 2013).
115. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 29-21-16(e)(6) (West 2013).
1192 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1173 (2013)
116. See Adam M. Gershowitz, The Invisible Pillar of Gideon, 80 IND. L.J.
571, 588 (2005)
[W]hile some attorneys may trust their clients to pay the bill, the
overwhelming majority of criminal defense lawyers—whether
practical or jaded—will adopt a more pessimistic view. Accordingly, it
is the practice of criminal defense attorneys to charge an up-front
retainer before agreeing to represent a criminal defendant.
117. See State v. Mickle, 525 P.2d 1108, 1111 (Haw. 1974)
Obviously, no simple formula can be devised that will dispose of every
case where court-appointed counsel is sought by the accused.
However, in determining eligibility based on indigency, the trial court
should take into consideration the . . . applicant’s borrowing capacity
and the extent to which such borrowing will affect his fixed monthly
obligations . . . .
(emphasis omitted).
118. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 604-A:2-c (2013)
In determining a defendant’s financial ability to obtain counsel, the
rules adopted by the commissioner . . . shall contain a method for
considering the defendant’s ability to borrow some or all of the
necessary funds. The rules shall also consider the possibility of the
defendant paying his counsel fees in periodic installments.
119. See State v. Dale, 439 N.W.2d 112, 116 (S.D. 1989) (“The type and
nature of information which should be furnished is as follows: . . . income from
whatever source and ability to borrow money.”).
120. See WYO. R. CRIM. P. 44(d) (“In making a determination of eligibility,
the judicial officer shall consider . . . the defendant’s capacity to borrow
money.”).
TO POOR TO HIRE A LAWYER 1193
121. See ME. R. CRIM. P. 44(b) (“In making its determination the court shall
consider . . . the defendant’s credit standing . . . .”); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, ch. 18
app. § I, r. 1.14(A)(1) (2012) (“The qualifications for a defendant to have court-
appointed counsel . . . include, but are not limited to . . . the accused’s credit
standing in the community.”).
122. See Hardy v. United States, 375 U.S. 277, 289 n.7 (1964) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring) (“[T]he fact that a defendant may be able to muster enough
resources, of his own or of a friend or relative, to obtain bail does not in itself
establish his nonindigence for the purpose of purchasing a complete trial
transcript or retaining a lawyer.”).
123. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 27.52(4)(a)(1)–(2) (West 2013).
124. MO. ANN. STAT. § 600.086(1) (West 2013).
125. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:158A-14(d) (West 2013).
126. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 29-21-16(e)(8) (West 2013).
1194 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1173 (2013)
167. TEX. TASK FORCE ON INDIGENT DEF., THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF AN
INDIGENT DEFENDANT VERIFICATION STUDY 3 (2007), http://www.txcourts.
gov/tidc/pdf/Supplement%20to%20Verification%20Study-%20FINAL.pdf.
168. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.8317 (West 2012) (“The district court
and the several judges thereof may . . . appoint attorneys to represent indigent
persons accused of misdemeanors or ordinance violations . . . .”).
169. Michigan Trial Courts, MICH. CTS. ONE CT. OF JUSTICE, http://www.
courts.michigan.gov/courts/trialcourts/pages/default.aspx (last visited Apr. 2,
2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
170. See MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 775.16 (West 2012) (“Upon proper
showing, the chief judge shall appoint or direct the magistrate to appoint an
attorney to conduct the accused’s examination and to conduct the accused’s
defense.”).
171. Michigan Trial Courts, supra note 169.
172. See Determination of Indigence and Substantial Hardship Guidelines,
STATE OF MISS. JUDICIARY (2012), https://www.3rdcc.org/Documents%5CAdminis
tration%5CBudgetFinance%5CCollections%5C2012%20Poverty%20Level%20
Guidelines%5E%5E%5E.pdf (“A party may be deemed ‘indigent’ if the person
has a gross income level at or below one hundred and thirty-three percent
(133%) of the United States poverty level . . . .”).
173. See id. (defining a person who is not indigent but allowing for
mitigating circumstances).
174. See id. (defining the circumstances in which an otherwise ineligible
TO POOR TO HIRE A LAWYER 1203
181. See, e.g., Tinsley v. Commonwealth, 185 S.W.3d 668, 672 (Ky. Ct. App.
2006) (“The exact point on the economic scale at which a defendant becomes
indigent and therefore entitled to have counsel furnished is not subject to
precise measurement . . . .” (citation omitted)); Lamonte v. State, 839 N.E.2d
172, 176 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (“It is not possible to set specific financial
guidelines for the determination of indigency.”); State v. Vincent, 883 P.2d 278,
282 (Utah 1994) (“We think it best to loosely define indigency at the present
time, creating . . . a rather broad pasture for trial judges applying the law of
indigency to the facts before them.”); People v. Gillespie, 201 N.W.2d 104, 106
(Mich. Ct. App. 1972) (“It is impossible to lay down absolute standards as to
what constitutes indigency.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); State v. Dale,
439 N.W.2d 112, 115 (S.D. 1989) (“Indigence should be considered without resort
to artificially pre-determined fiscal standards or guidelines . . . .”).
182. See Fischer, supra note 8, at 2 (“The poverty thresholds were developed
in 1963−64 by Mollie Orshansky . . . .”).
183. See id. (stating that Orshansky’s original purpose for the thresholds
was not to measure poverty).
184. See id. (stating that Orshansky’s intent for the poverty thresholds was
to “develop a measure to access the relative risks of low economic status . . .
among different demographic groups of families with children”).
185. CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT, BERNADETTE D. PROCTOR & CHERYL HILL LEE,
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN
THE UNITED STATES: 2004, at 45 (2005), http://www.census.gov/prod/2005
pubs/p60-229.pdf.
186. See Fischer, supra note 8, at 4 (describing how Orshansky developed
the poverty thresholds using food plans prepared by the Department of
Agriculture).
TO POOR TO HIRE A LAWYER 1205
187. See id. (stating that the data underlying Orshansky’s plan came from
the Agriculture Department’s 1955 Household Food Consumption Survey).
188. See id. at 5 (articulating Orshansky’s “‘multiplier’ methodology” for
deriving the poverty thresholds).
189. See id. at 4 (“[E]xcept for the area of food, no definitive and accepted
standards of minimum need for major consumption items existed either then or
today.”).
190. See id. at 5.
191. See id. at 8 (stating that the Consumer Price Index is the basis for any
annual changes to the poverty threshold).
192. Consumer Expenditures—2011, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, 2 (Sept. 25, 2012),
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/cesan.pdf (illustrating the shares of average
annual expenditures on food by income quintiles, the average of which is 13.7%).
193. See Fischer, supra note 8, at 4 (“Orshansky did not develop the poverty
thresholds as a standard budget—that is, a list of goods and services that a
family of a specified size and composition would need to live at a designated
level of well-being . . . .”).
194. See id. at 10 (stating that the 1970 revisions to the poverty threshold
eliminated the distinction between “farm” and “nonfarm” families).
1206 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1173 (2013)
VI. Eligible for Food Stamps but Ineligible for Assigned Counsel
195. See WIC Income Eligibility Guidelines 2012−2013, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC
(July 13, 2012), http://www.fns.usda.gov/WIC/howtoapply/incomeguidelines.htm
(last visited Apr. 2, 2013) (stating the program’s eligibility requirements on the
basis of income) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
196. Supplemental Nutritional Assistance Program, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC.
(Oct. 4, 2012), http://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/applicant_recipients/eligibility.htm
#income (last visited Apr. 2, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
197. National School Lunch Program, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., 2 (Aug. 2012),
http://www.fns.usda.gov/cnd/lunch/AboutLunch/NSLPFactSheet.pdf.
198. Id.
199. LIHEAP Eligibility Criteria, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.
(May 8, 2012), http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ocs/resource/liheap-eligibility-
criteria (last visited Apr. 2, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
TO POOR TO HIRE A LAWYER 1207
200. See CHIPS Eligibility Standards, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., http://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-Topic
s/Childrens-Health-Insurance-Program-CHIP/CHIP-Eligibility-Standards-.html
(last visited Apr. 2, 2013) (stating the purpose of CHIPS) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
201. Id.
202. See Low Income Taxpayer Clinics, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.,
http://www.irs.gov/uac/Low-Income-Taxpayer-Clinics (last visited Apr. 2, 2013)
(describing the funding that the IRS offers to Low Income Taxpayer Clinics) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
203. Low Income Taxpayer Clinic Income Eligibility Guidelines, LEGAL
SERVS. CORP. (Aug. 4, 2012), http://www.irs.gov/uac/Low-Income-Taxpayer-
Clinic-Income-Eligibility-Guidelines (last visited Apr. 2, 2013) (on file with the
Washington and Lee law Review).
204. 45 C.F.R. § 1611.3(c) (2005).
205. Fact Sheet on the Legal Services Corporation, LEGAL SERVS. CORP.
(2012), http://www.lsc.gov/about/what-is-lsc [hereinafter Fact Sheet] (last visited
Apr. 2, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
1208 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1173 (2013)
211. See 42 U.S.C. § 2996f(b) (2010) (“No funds made available by the
Corporation . . . may be used . . . to provide legal assistance with respect to any
criminal proceeding . . . .”).
212. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 27.52(2)(a) (West 2013).
213. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:175 (2013).
214. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 261, § 27A(a) (2013).
215. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611.17(a)(1) (West 2013).
216. See N.D. Comm’n on Legal Counsel for Indigents, supra note 153, at
7−8 (describing automatic qualification for assigned counsel).
1210 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1173 (2013)
meet basic needs, are viewed as income that can be used to retain
counsel by state courts.
230. Me. Comm’n on Indigent Legal Servs., supra note 142, § (1)(2)(E)
(establishing a process for determining whether a defendant is able to reimburse
the state for the expense of assigned counsel).
231. MASS. R. SUP. JUD. CT. 3:10(g).
232. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611.20(2) (West 2013).
233. MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 18, § 10-3.010(4)(A) (2013).
234. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-455(a) (2012). See also State v. Boyd, 418 S.E.2d
471, 475−76 (N.C. 1992) (emphasizing that North Carolina law requires
defendants to “contribute whatever they can to the cost of their representation”
and that the state must fund “the remaining necessary expenses of
representation”); State v. Hoffman, 190 S.E.2d 842, 850 (N.C. 1972) (noting that
Section 7A-455(a) demonstrates the “legislative intent that every defendant in a
criminal case, to the limit of his ability to do so, shall pay the cost of his
defense”).
235. ME. R. CRIM. P. 44(b).
236. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 16-210(c)(3)(i) (West 2012).
237. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:158A-14(c) (West 2013).
238. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-159(B)(2) (2012).
239. See Commonwealth v. Mortimer, 971 N.E.2d 283, 290 (Mass. 2012)
TO POOR TO HIRE A LAWYER 1213
241. Id.
242. See The Self-Sufficiency Standard, CTR. FOR WOMEN’S WELFARE,
http://www.selfsufficiencystandard.org/standard.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2013)
(describing the Self-Sufficiency Standard) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
243. See id. (defining the Standard).
244. See id. (explaining how the Self-Sufficiency Standard is calculated).
245. See id.
TO POOR TO HIRE A LAWYER 1215
246. See id. (comparing the Standard to the Federal Poverty Guidelines and
illustrating how the Standard has been used in some states).
247. Find the Self-Sufficiency Standard for Your State, CTR. FOR WOMEN’S
WELFARE, http://www.selfsufficiencystandard.org/pubs.html (last visited Apr. 2,
2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
248. C.J. Directive 04-04: Appointment of State Funded Counsel in Criminal
and Juvenile Delinquency Cases and for Contempt of Court, SUP. CT. OF CO.,
OFFICE OF THE C.J., attachments A, B, & C (July 2011),
http://www.courts.state.co.us/Courts/Supreme_Court/Directives/04-04amended06-
11withAttachmentB revised3-1-12.pdf.
249. See Annual Update of HHS Poverty Guidelines, 76 Fed. Reg. 3637-02
(Jan. 20, 2011) [hereinafter Update of HHS Poverty Guidelines] (placing the
poverty guideline for a three-person household at $18,530). A defendant living
in a three-person household is ineligible for assigned counsel in Colorado if he
makes more than 175% of $18,530, i.e., $32,427.
250. Diana M. Pierce, The Self-Sufficiency Standard for Colorado 2011,
COLO. CTR. ON LAW & POLICY, 11 (Oct. 2011), http://www.selfsufficiencystandard.
1216 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1173 (2013)
org/docs/Colorado2011.pdf.
251. See Update of HHS Poverty Guidelines, supra note 249 (placing the
poverty guideline for a one-person household at $10,890). A defendant living
alone with no dependents is ineligible for assigned counsel in Colorado if he
makes more than 175% of $10,890, i.e., $19,057.
252. Pierce, supra note 250, at 66.
253. See Update of HHS Poverty Guidelines, supra note 249 (placing the
poverty guideline for a two-person household at $14,710). A defendant living in
a two-person household is ineligible for assigned counsel in Colorado if he makes
more than 175% of $14,710, i.e., $25,742.
254. Pierce, supra note 250, at 66.
255. See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 16-210(b) (West 2012) (“For an
individual whose assets and net annual income are less than 100 percent of the
federal poverty guidelines, eligibility for services of the Office may be
determined without an assessment regarding the need of the applicant.”);
id. § 16-210(c) (“For an individual whose assets and net annual income equal or
exceed 100 percent of the federal poverty guidelines, eligibility for the services of
the Office shall be determined by the need of the applicant.”); see also Office of
the Pub. Defender v. State, 993 A.2d. 55, 69 (Md. 2010) (holding that it was
reversible error to only consider the Federal Poverty Guidelines when
determining eligibility).
[W]here the local OPD declines representation to a defendant
erroneously, because of the local OPD’s failure to consider properly
the statutorily-mandated criteria for determining indigency, and
where a court finds, upon its subsequent mandatory independent
TO POOR TO HIRE A LAWYER 1217
X. Conclusion
prosecutions will turn the working poor into the unemployed and
destitute. Until states adopt realistic guidelines for determining
eligibility for assigned counsel, justice will come with a price tag
attached to it.