THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 108028. July 30, 1996.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES , plaintiff-appellee, vs . CRISTINA M.

HERNANDEZ , accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Teresita J. Herbosa for accused-appellant.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; PRE-TRIAL; STIPULATION OF FACTS;

CONTENTION THAT THE STIPULATION OF FACTS WAS NOT TANTAMOUNT TO AN
ADMISSION BY THE APPELLANT OF THE FACT OF NON-POSSESSION OF THE AUTHORITY
OR LICENSE FROM THE POEA TO RECRUIT WORKERS IS WITHOUT MERIT; REASON. —
Appellant assails as erroneous the reliance placed by the prosecution on the said
stipulation of facts in dispensing with the presentation of evidence to prove the said
element of the crime of illegal recruitment. Appellant posits that the stipulation of facts
did not relieve the prosecution of its duty to present evidence to prove all the elements of
the crime charged to the end that the guilt of the accused may be proven beyond
reasonable doubt. At the outset, it should be said that the above contention and the
arguments are insigni cant in view of the fact that records disclose that the prosecution
had in fact presented evidence to prove the said element of the crime of illegal
recruitment. "EXHIBIT I", a certi cation issued by the Chief Licensing Branch of the POEA,
attesting to the fact that neither appellant nor Philippine-Thai is licensed/authorized to
recruit workers for employment abroad, was offered and admitted in evidence without the
objection of the appellant. In view of the foregoing, the stipulation of facts proposed
during trial by prosecution and admitted by defense counsel is tantamount to a judicial
admission by the appellant of the facts stipulated on. Controlling, therefore, is Section 4,
Rule 129 of the Rules of Court which provides that: "An admission, verbal or written, made
by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The
admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable
mistake or that no such admission was made."
2. ID.; ADMISSION THAT A WITNESS IF PRESENTED IN COURT WOULD TESTIFY
TO CERTAIN FACTS AND AN ADMISSION OF THE FACTS THEMSELVES; DISTINGUISHED.
— Appellant correctly distinguishes between an admission that a particular witness if
presented in court would testify to certain facts, and an admission of the facts
themselves. According to the appellant, what was stipulated on between the prosecution
and defense counsel at the hearing on June 6, 1990 was "merely that the testimony of the
Chief Licensing O cer of the POEA would be to the effect that appellant is not licensed
nor authorized to recruit workers", Thus: "Prosecutor . . . Before we call on our rst witness,
we propose some stipulations regarding the testimony of the Chief Licensing Branch of
the POEA — that Cristina Hernandez is not a (sic) licensed nor authorized by the
Department of Labor to recruit workers abroad. Court: Would you agree? Atty. Ulep
(Counsel for the Accused): Agreed, Your Honor." To buttress her position, the following
was cited to note the distinction:
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 "Suppose a case is set for trial and one of the parties moves for a continuance
because of the absence of W, an important witness. His opponent, who is anxious to go to
trial; asks what are the facts to which W would testify. The other attorney tells him, adding:
'If I consent to the overruling of my motion, will you stipulate that those are the facts?' The
attorney who is pressing for trial says: 'No but I will stipulate that if W were called in this
case as a witness, he would so testify.' What is the difference between the two
stipulations?
In the rst stipulation proposed there is a judicial admission of the facts, and they
cannot be contradicted. But the second stipulation proposed will only have the same
effect as if the witness had testi ed to the facts. Such testimony the party is free to
contradict."
The prosecution and the defense agreed to stipulate/admit that from the record of
the POEA Licensing and Regulation O ce, Dept. of Labor and Employment, accused
Cristina Hernandez/Phil. etc., . . . is neither licensed nor authorized by that o ce to recruit
workers overseas abroad and that if the duly authorized representative from the POEA
Administration is to take the witness stand, he will con rm to this fact . . ." The claim that
the lower court mistakenly interpreted defense counsel's acquiescence to the
prosecution's proposed stipulation as an admission of non-possession of the requisite
POEA license or authority is belied by the fact after the above enunciation by the court, no
objection was interposed by defense counsel.
3. ID.; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; STIPULATION OF FACTS IN CRIMINAL CASES;
PROHIBITION AGAINST A STIPULATION OF FACTS IN CRIMINAL CASES NO LONGER
HOLDS TRUE. — The rule prohibiting the stipulation of facts in criminal cases is grounded
on the fundamental right of the accused to be presumed innocent until proven guilty, and
the corollary duty of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt. It is therefore advanced that the prosecution being duty-bound to prove all the
elements of the crime, may not be relieved of this obligation by the mere expedient of
stipulating with defense on a matter constitutive of an essential element of the crime
charged. The rationale behind the proscription against this class of agreements between
prosecution and defense was enunciated in the case of U.S. vs. Manlimos: "It is not
supposed to be within the knowledge or competence of counsel to predict what a
proposed witness shall say under the sanction of his oath and the test of cross-
examination. A conviction for crime should not rest upon mere conjecture. Nor is it
possible for a trial court to weigh with exact nicety the contradictory declaration of
witnesses not produced so as to be subjected to its observation and its judgment as to
their credibility." However, in the light of recent changes in our rules on criminal procedure,
particularly the pre-trial provisions found in Rule 118, the prohibition against a stipulation
of facts in criminal cases no longer holds true. Rule 118 provides the following: "Section 1.
Pre-trial; when proper — To expedite trial, where the accused and counsel agree, the court
shall conduct a pre-trial conference on the matters enunciated in Section 2 hereof, without
impairing the rights of the accused. Sec. 2 Pre-trial conference; subjects . . . The pre-trial
conference shall consider the following: (a) Plea bargaining; (b) Stipulation of facts; . . ." By
virtue of the foregoing rule, a stipulation of facts in criminal cases is now expressly
sanctioned by law. In further pursuit of the objective of expediting trial by dispensing with
the presentation of evidence on matters that the accused is willing to admit, a stipulation
of facts should be allowed not only during pre-trial but also and with more reason, during
trial proper itself. Parenthetically, although not expressly sanctioned under the old rules of
court, a stipulation of facts by the parties in criminal cases has long been allowed and
recognized as declarations constituting judicial admissions, hence, binding upon the
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 parties. In the case of People vs. Mapa where the accused was charged with illegal
possession of rearms, the prosecution and the defense stipulated on the fact that the
accused was found in possession of a gun without the requisite permit or license. More at
point is the case of People vs. Bocar wherein the scal proposed the admission by the
accused of the a davits and other exhibits already presented by the prosecution to
dispense with oral testimonies on the matter. Holding that the admissions made by the
parties were binding, this Court stated that: ". . . [T]here is nothing unlawful or irregular
about the above procedure. The declarations constitute judicial admissions, which are
binding on the parties, by virtue of which the prosecution dispensed with the introduction
of additional evidence and the defense waived the right to contest or dispute the veracity
of the statements contained in the exhibits."
4. ID.; SECTION 4 OF RULE 118 DOES NOT APPLY TO A STIPULATION OF FACTS
MADE DURING TRIAL. — A stipulation of facts entered into by the prosecution and defense
counsel during trial in open court is automatically reduced into writing and contained in the
o cial transcript of the proceedings had in court. The conformity of the accused in the
form of his signature a xed thereto is unnecessary in view of the fact that: ". . . an attorney
who is employed to manage a party's conduct of a lawsuit . . . has prima facie authority to
make relevant admissions by pleadings, by oral or written stipulation, . . . which unless
allowed to be withdrawn are conclusive." In fact, "judicial admissions are frequently those
of counsel or of the attorney of record, who is, for the purpose of the trial, the agent of his
client. When such admissions are made . . . for the purpose of dispensing with proof of
some fact, . . . they bind the client, whether made during, or even after, the trial."
5. ID.; SECTION 3 OF RULE 129; JUDICIAL NOTICE; GENERAL RULE THAT
COURTS ARE NOT AUTHORIZED TO TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE OF THE CONTENTS OF THE
RECORDS OF OTHER CASES; EXCEPTION. — Appellant makes much ado of the "judicial
notice" taken by the lower court of the fact that appellant had been charged with another
illegal recruitment case, and in considering the pendency thereof as evidence of the
scheme and strategy adopted by the accused. Appellant cites a violation of Section 3 of
Rule 129 of the Rules of Court which provides that before the court may take judicial notice
of any matter, the parties shall be heard thereon if such matter is decisive of a material
issue in the case. It is claimed that the lower court never announced its intention to take
judicial notice of the pendency of the other illegal recruitment case nor did it allow the
accused to be heard thereon. It is true that as a general rule, courts are not authorized to
take judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases, even when such cases
have been tried or are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding the fact that both
cases may have been tried or are actually pending before the same judge. However, this
rule is subject to the exception that: ". . . in the absence of objection and as a matter of
convenience to all parties, a court may properly treat all or any part of the original record of
the case led in its archives as read into the records of a case pending before it, when with
the knowledge of the opposing party, reference is made to it, by name and number or in
some other manner by which it is su ciently designated, . . ." The judicial notice taken by
the lower court of the pendency of another illegal recruitment case against the appellant
falls squarely under the above exception in view of the fact that it was the appellant herself
who introduced evidence on the matter when she testi ed in open court. Even assuming,
however, that the lower court improperly took judicial notice of the pendency of another
illegal recruitment case against the appellant, the error would not be fatal to the
prosecution's case. The judgment of conviction was not based on the existence of another
illegal recruitment case led against appellant by a different group of complainants, but on
the overwhelming evidence against her in the instant case.
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 6. ID.; DENIALS; ARE NEGATIVE AND SELF-SERVING IF UNSUBSTANTIATED BY
CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE; CANNOT PREVAIL OVER TESTIMONY ON
AFFIRMATIVE MATTERS. — Well established is the rule that denials if unsubstantiated by
clear and convincing evidence are negative, self-serving evidence which deserve no weight
in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary weight over the testimony of credible
witnesses who testify on a rmative matters. That she did not merely deny, but likewise
raised as an a rmative defense her appointment as mere nominee-president of
Philippine-Thai is a futile attempt at exculpating herself and is of no consequence
whatsoever when weighed against the positive declarations of witnesses that it was the
appellant who executed the acts of illegal recruitment as complained of.
7. POLITICAL LAW; RIGHTS OF AN ACCUSED; DOCTRINE OF WAIVER; RIGHT TO
CONFRONT AND CROSS-EXAMINE WITNESSES AGAINST THE ACCUSED AND THE RIGHT
TO PRESENT EVIDENCE ARE EXPRESSLY OR IMPLIEDLY WAIVABLE. — It is true that the
rights of an accused during trial are given paramount importance in our laws on criminal
procedure. Among the fundamental rights of the accused is the right to confront and
cross-examine the witnesses against him. But the right of confrontation guaranteed and
secured to the accused is a personal privilege which may be waived. Thus, in the case of
U.S. vs. Anastasio, this Court deemed as a waiver of the right of confrontation, the
admission by the accused that witnesses if present would testify to certain facts stated in
the affidavit of the prosecution. In the same vein, it may be said that such an admission is a
waiver of the right of an accused to present evidence on his behalf. Although the right to
present evidence is guaranteed by no less than the Constitution itself for the protection of
the accused, this right may be waived expressly or impliedly. This is in consonance with the
doctrine of waiver which recognizes that ". . . everyone has a right to waive, and agree to
waive, the advantage of a law or rule made solely for the bene t and protection of the
individual in his private capacity, if it can be dispensed with and relinquished without
infringing on any public right, and without detriment to the community at large."
8. LEGAL ETHICS; GENERAL RULE THAT A CLIENT IS BOUND BY THE ACTS OF
HIS COUNSEL; NO COGENT REASON TO MAKE AN EXCEPTION IN THIS CASE. — The
foregoing nd basis in the general rule that a client bound by the acts of his counsel who
represents him. For all intents and purposes, the acts of a lawyer in the defense of a case
are the acts of his client. The rule extends even to the mistakes and negligence committed
by the lawyer except only when such mistakes would result in serious injustice to the
client. No cogent reason exists to make such exception in this case. It is worth noting that
Atty. Ulep, appellant's counsel in the lower court, agreed to the stipulation of facts
proposed by the prosecution not out of mistake nor inadvertence, but obviously because
the said stipulation of facts was also in conformity to defense's theory of the case. It may
be recalled that throughout the entire duration of the trial, appellant staunchly denied ever
having engaged in the recruitment business either in her personal capacity or through
Philippine-Thai. Therefore, it was but logical to admit that the POEA records show that
neither she nor Philippine-Thai was licensed or authorized to recruit workers.

DECISION

FRANCISCO , J : p

Accused-appellant Cristina Hernandez was charged with the crime of illegal

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 recruitment committed in large scale in violation of Article 38 (a) and (b) in relation to
Article 13 (b) and (c) of the New Labor Code 1 , committed as follows:
"That in or about and during the period comprised between December 14,
1988 to December 24, 1988, inclusive in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused representing herself to have the capacity to contract, enlist and transport
Filipino workers for employment abroad, did then and there willfully and
unlawfully for a fee, recruit and promise employment/job placement abroad to
the following persons to wit: ROGELIO N. LEGASPI, ULDARICO P. LEGASPI,
SONNY P. BERNABE, ARNEL B. MENDOZA, BENITO L. BERNABE, ARNOLD P.
VALENZUELA, ARMANDO P. PAGULAYAN, GREGORIO P. MENDOZA, JR., RONALD
T. CORREA, DANILO PALAD and ROBERT P. VELASQUEZ (hereafter known as
private complainants) without rst having secured the required license or
authority from the POEA." 2 (Emphasis supplied.)
Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty and trial on the merits ensued. Of the
fourteen (14) private complainants, four (4) were presented as witnesses for the
prosecution, namely; Benito L. Bernabe, Robert P. Velasquez, Gregorio P. Mendoza and
Arnel Mendoza. They testi ed to the following essential facts: Private complainants' rst
encounter with the appellant was on December 12, 1988 when one Josefa Cinco
accompanied them to the o ce of the Philippine Thai Association, Inc. (Philippine-Thai) in
Ermita, Manila to meet the appellant. Introducing herself as the general manager of
Philippine-Thai, appellant asserted that her company recruited workers for placement
abroad and asked private complainants if they wanted to work as factory workers in
Taipeh. Enticed by the assurance of immediate employment and an $800 per month salary,
private complainants applied. Appellant required private complainants to pay placement
and passport fees in the total amount of P22,500.00 per applicant, to be paid in three
installments, to wit: P1,500 on December 14, 1988, P10,000.00 on December 16, 1988 and
P11,000.00 on December 22, 1988. When the complainants-witnesses paid the rst two
installments, they were issued receipts by Liza Mendoza, the alleged treasurer of
Philippine-Thai signed by the latter in the presence of the appellant. The receipts for the
last installment paid by them were signed by Liza Mendoza, and the appellant. After having
received the entire amount 3 from the witnesses, appellant assured them that they would
be able to leave for Taipeh sometime before the end of December, 1988. But contrary to
appellant's promise, complainants-witnesses were unable to leave for abroad. They
demanded for the return of their money but to no avail. Appellant's unful lled promise of
employment and her refusal to return the money that had been paid by way of placement
and passport fees, triggered the filing of the complaint.
For its part, the defense presented as its lone witness, the appellant whose
testimony consisted mainly in denying the charges against her. Appellant claimed that she
never met any of the complainants nor did she ever recruit any of them. She likewise
denied having received money from anyone and asserted that she did not know any Liza
Mendoza who is she alleged treasurer of Philippine-Thai. Appellant maintained that
although she had an o ce in Ermita Building located at Arquiza Street, Ermita, Manila, the
said o ce belonged to B.C. Island Wood Products Corporation which was engaged in the
logging business. However, when questioned further, appellant admitted being the
president of Philippine-Thai but only in a nominal capacity, and claimed that as nominee-
president, she did not participate in any of its transactions. Appellant likewise insisted that
Philippine-Thai was engaged solely in the barong tagalog business.
After careful calibration of the evidence presented by the prosecution and the
defense, the court a quo rendered a decision holding that the defense of "denial"
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 interposed by the accused could not prevail over the positive and clear testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses which had established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt 4 the dispositive portion of the decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court hereby nds that the
accused CRISTINA HERNANDEZ, (sic) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of illegal recruitment, committed in large scale, as de ned in Article 38(a) &
(b) of Presidential Decree No. 1412, . . . in relation to Article 13 (b) and (c) . . .,
accordingly, sentences the accused to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment
(RECLUSION PERPETUA) with the accessory penalties provided for by law; to pay
a ne of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P100,000.00) PESOS without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency; to return and pay to BENITO L. BERNABE the
amount of TWENTY EIGHT THOUSAND AND FIVE HUNDRED (P28,500) PESOS; to
ROBERT P. VELASQUEZ the amount of TWENTY TWO THOUSAND AND FIVE
HUNDRED (P22,500.00) PESOS; to GREGORIO P. MENDOZA the amount of
TWENTY TWO THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED (P22,500.00) PESOS; to ARNEL
MENDOZA the amount of TWENTY TWO THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED
(P22,500.00) PESOS also without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency;
and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.
Manila, Philippines, November 29, 1991." 5

Appellant comes to this Court for the reversal of the judgment of conviction the
following errors against the lower court.
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED "LIABLE OF (sic) ILLEGAL
RECRUITMENT COMMITTED IN A LARGE SCALE AND BY A SYNDICATED (sic)"
FOR HAVING "MAINTAINED OFFICE WITHOUT LICENSE OR REGISTRATION
FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, THRU ITS OFFICE, THE PHILIPPINE
OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION (POEA)."
II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN TAKING JUDICIAL NOTICE OF THE "FACT THAT
ACCUSED CRISTINA M. HERNANDEZ HAD BEEN CHARGED . . . OF ANOTHER
ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT . . . DOCKETED AS CRIMINAL CASE NO. 88-62599" AND
IN CONSIDERING THE PENDENCY THEREOF AS EVIDENCE OF THE "SCHEME
AND STRATEGY ADOPTED BY THE ACCUSED . . . AND PRACTICED WITH THE
HELP OF HER AGENTS AND OTHER PERSONS WORKING UNDER THE SHADE OF
HER PROTECTION."
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE OR WEIGHT TO THE
DEFENSE OF THE ACCUSED. 6

The rst assignment of error is anchored on the contention that the prosecution
failed to prove one of the essential elements of the crime of illegal recruitment — that the
offender is a non-licensee or non-holder of authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment
and placement of workers. 7 The aforementioned element, speci cally the fact that neither
appellant nor Philippine-Thai was licensed or authorized to recruit workers as shown by
the records of the POEA, was the subject of a stipulation proposed by the prosecution and
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 admitted by the defense during trial. Appellant assails as erroneous the reliance placed by
the prosecution on the said stipulation of facts in dispensing with the presentation of
evidence to prove the said element of the crime of illegal recruitment. Appellant argues
that: (1) the stipulation of facts was not tantamount to an admission by the appellant of
the fact of non-possession of the requisite authority or license from the POEA, but was
merely an admission that the Chief Licensing O cer of the POEA, if presented in court,
would testify to this fact, and (2) the stipulation of facts is null and void for being contrary
to law and public policy. Appellant posits the foregoing arguments to bolster her
contention that the stipulation of facts did not relieve the prosecution of its duty to
present evidence to prove all the elements of the crime charged to the end that the guilt of
the accused may be proven beyond reasonable doubt.
At the outset, it should be said that the above contention and the arguments are
insigni cant in view of the fact that records disclose that the prosecution had in fact
presented evidence to prove the said element of the crime of illegal recruitment. "EXHIBIT
I", a certi cation issued by the Chief Licensing Branch of the POEA, attesting to the fact
that neither appellant nor Philippine-Thai is licensed/authorized to recruit workers for
employment abroad, was offered and admitted in evidence without the objection of the
appellant. 8
Although appellant's arguments nd no signi cant bearing in the face of the
existence of "EXHIBIT I", they nonetheless require deeper scrutiny and a clear response for
future application. Hence, the following discussion.
Appellant correctly distinguishes between an admission that a particular witness if
presented in court would testify to certain facts, and an admission of the facts
themselves. According to the appellant, what was stipulated on between the prosecution
and defense counsel at the hearing on June 6, 1990 was "merely that the testimony of the
Chief Licensing O cer of the POEA would be to the effect that appellant is not licensed
nor authorized to recruit workers". 9 Thus:
"Prosecutor
. . . Before we call on our rst witness, we propose some stipulations
regarding the testimony of the Chief Licensing Branch of the POEA — that
Cristina Hernandez is not a (sic) licensed nor authorized by the Department
of Labor to recruit workers abroad.
Court

Would you agree?

Atty. Ulep (Counsel for the Accused):
Agreed, Your Honor." 1 0

She claims that the foregoing clearly indicate that there was no judicial admission of
the fact of non-possession of a license/authority but rather a mere admission that the
witness, if presented, would testify to such fact. This being the case, it remained
incumbent upon the prosecution to present evidence of such fact. To buttress her
position, the following was cited to note the distinction:
"Suppose a case is set for trial and one of the parties moves for a
continuance because of the absence of W, an important witness. His opponent,
who is anxious to go to trial; asks what are the facts to which W would testify.
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 The other attorney tells him, adding: 'If I consent to the overruling of my motion,
will you stipulate that those are the facts?' The attorney who is pressing for trial
says: 'No but I will stipulate that if W were called in this case as a witness, he
would so testify.' What is the difference between the two stipulations?
In the rst stipulation proposed there is a judicial admission of the facts,
and they cannot be contradicted. But the second stipulation proposed will only
have the same effect as if the witness had testi ed to the facts. Such testimony
the party is free to contradict." 1 1
The distinction, though cogent, is unfortunately inapplicable to the case at bar.
Conveniently omitted from the appellant's reply brief is the ensuing statement made by the
court after counsel for the accused, Atty. Ulep agreed to the stipulation proposed by the
prosecution, to wit:
Atty. Ulep (counsel for the accused):

Agreed, Your Honor.

Court
The prosecution and the defense agreed to stipulate/admit that from the
record of the POEA Licensing and Regulation O ce, Dept. of Labor and
Employment, accused Cristina Hernandez/Phil. etc., . . . is neither licensed
nor authorized by that o ce to recruit workers overseas abroad and that if
the duly authorized representative from the POEA Administration is to take
the witness stand, he will con rm to this fact as borne by the records. 1 2
(Emphasis supplied.)

From the foregoing, it is evident that the prosecution and the defense counsel
stipulated on two things: that ". . . from the record of the POEA, . . . accused Cristina
Hernandez, Phil. etc. Ass. . . . is neither licensed nor authorized by that o ce to recruit
workers for overseas abroad and that if the duly authorized representative from the POEA
Administration (sic) is to take the witness stand, he will con rm to this fact . . ." 13 The
claim that the lower court mistakenly interpreted defense counsel's acquiescence to the
prosecution's proposed stipulation as an admission of non-possession of the requisite
POEA license or authority is belied by the fact after the above enunciation by the court, no
objection was interposed by defense counsel.
Appellant further contends that granting arguendo that defense counsel had in fact
agreed to the above stipulation of facts, the same is null and void for being contrary to the
well-established rule that a stipulation of facts is not allowed in criminal cases. To bolster
this contention, appellant cited the consistent ruling of this Court on the matter. Thus, as
held in the case of U.S. vs. Donato: 1 4
"Agreements between attorneys for the prosecution and for the defense in
criminal cases, by which it is stipulated that certain witnesses, if present, would
testify to certain facts prevent a review of the evidence by the Supreme Court and
are in violation of the law." 1 5

The above ruling was reiterated in a subsequent case where the accused was
convicted solely on the basis of an agreement between the scal and the counsel for the
accused that certain witnesses would testify con rming the complaint in all its part. In
reversing the judgment of the conviction, this Court held that:
"It is neither proper nor permissible to consider a case closed, or to render
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 judgment therein, by virtue of an agreement entered into between the provincial
scal and the counsel for the accused with reference to facts, some of which are
favorable to the defense, and others related to the prosecution, without any
evidence being adduced or testimony taken from the witnesses mentioned in the
agreement; such practice is not authorized and defeats the purposes of criminal
law; it is an open violation of the rules of criminal procedure . . ." 1 6

The rule prohibiting the stipulation of facts in criminal cases is grounded on the
fundamental right of the accused to be presumed innocent until proven guilty, and the
corollary duty of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt. It is therefore advanced that the prosecution being duty-bound to prove all the
elements of the crime, may not be relieved of this obligation by the mere expedient of
stipulating with defense counsel on a matter constitutive of an essential element of the
crime charged.
The rationale behind the proscription against this class of agreements between
prosecution and defense was enunciated in the case of U.S. vs. Manlimos: 1 7
"It is not supposed to be within the knowledge or competence of counsel to
predict what a proposed witness shall say under the sanction of his oath and the
test of cross-examination. A conviction for crime should not rest upon mere
conjecture. Nor is it possible for a trial court to weigh with exact nicety the
contradictory declaration of witnesses not produced so as to be subjected to its
observation and its judgment as to their credibility." 1 8

However, in the light of recent changes in our rules on criminal procedure,

particularly the pre-trial provisions found in Rule 118, the prohibition against a stipulation
of facts in criminal cases no longer holds true. Rule 118 provides the following:
"Section 1. Pre-trial; when proper — To expedite trial, where the accused
and counsel agree, the court shall conduct a pre-trial conference on the matters
enunciated in Section 2 hereof, without impairing the rights of the accused.
Sec. 2 Pre-trial conference; subjects . . . The pre-trial conference shall
consider the following:
(a) Plea bargaining;
(b) Stipulation of facts;
. . ." (Emphasis supplied)

By virtue of the foregoing rule, a stipulation of facts in criminal cases is now

expressly sanctioned by law. In further pursuit of the objective of expediting trial by
dispensing with the presentation of evidence on matters that the accused is willing to
admit, a stipulation of facts should be allowed not only during pre-trial but also and with
more reason, during trial proper itself. Parenthetically, although not expressly sanctioned
under the old rules of court, a stipulation of facts by the parties in criminal cases has long
been allowed and recognized as declarations constituting judicial admissions, hence,
binding upon the parties. In the case of People vs. Mapa 1 9 where the accused was
charged with illegal possession of rearms, the prosecution and the defense stipulated on
the fact that the accused was found in possession of a gun without the requisite permit or
license. More at point is the case of People vs. Bocar 2 0 wherein the scal proposed the
admission by the accused of the a davits and other exhibits already presented by the
prosecution to dispense with oral testimonies on the matter. Holding that the admissions
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 made by the parties were binding, this Court stated that:
". . . [T]here is nothing unlawful or irregular about the above procedure. The
declarations constitute judicial admissions, which are binding on the parties, by
virtue of which the prosecution dispensed with the introduction of additional
evidence and the defense waived the right to contest or dispute the veracity of the
statements contained in the exhibits." 2 1 (Emphasis supplied.)
American jurisprudence has established the acceptability of the practice of
stipulating during the trial of criminal cases, and categorically stated in People vs. Hare 2 2
that:
"That record discloses that the defense counsel stipulated to what certain
witnesses would testify if they were present in court. . . .
. . . The defendant contends that it was error for his counsel to make these
stipulations. This court has held that an accused may by stipulation waive the
necessity of proof of all or any part of the case which the people have alleged
against him and that having done so, he cannot complain in this Court of
evidence which he has stipulated into the record. 2 3

The corollary issue left for the determination of this Court is whether or not Section
4 of Rule 118 — requiring an agreement or admission made or entered during the pre-trial
conference to be reduced in writing and signed by the accused and his counsel before the
same may be used in evidence against the accused — equally applies to a stipulation of
facts made during trial. We resolved this issue in the negative.
A stipulation of facts entered into by the prosecution and defense counsel during
trial in open court is automatically reduced into writing and contained in the o cial
transcript of the proceedings had in court. The conformity of the accused in the form of
his signature a xed thereto is unnecessary in view of the fact that: ". . . an attorney who is
employed to manage a party's conduct of a lawsuit . . . has prima facie authority to make
relevant admissions by pleadings, by oral or written stipulation, . . . which unless allowed to
be withdrawn are conclusive." 2 4 (Emphasis supplied.) In fact, "judicial admissions are
frequently those of counsel or of the attorney of record, who is, for the purpose of the trial,
the agent of his client. When such admissions are made . . . for the purpose of dispensing
with proof of some fact, . . . they bind the client, whether made during, or even after, the
trial." 2 5
The foregoing nd basis in the general rule that a client bound by the acts of his
counsel who represents him. 2 6 For all intents and purposes, the acts of a lawyer in the
defense of a case are the acts of his client. The rule extends even to the mistakes and
negligence committed by the lawyer except only when such mistakes would result in
serious injustice to the client. 2 7 No cogent reason exists to make such exception in this
case. It is worth noting that Atty. Ulep, appellant's counsel in the lower court, agreed to the
stipulation of facts proposed by the prosecution not out of mistake nor inadvertence, but
obviously because the said stipulation of facts was also in conformity to defense's theory
of the case. It may be recalled that throughout the entire duration of the trial, appellant
staunchly denied ever having engaged in the recruitment business either in her personal
capacity or through Philippine-Thai. Therefore, it was but logical to admit that the POEA
records show that neither she nor Philippine-Thai was licensed or authorized to recruit
workers.
It is true that the rights of an accused during trial are given paramount importance in
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 our laws on criminal procedure. Among the fundamental rights of the accused is the right
to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him. 2 8 But the right of confrontation
guaranteed and secured to the accused is a personal privilege which may be waived. 2 9
Thus, in the case of U.S. vs. Anastasio, 3 0 this Court deemed as a waiver of the right of
confrontation, the admission by the accused that witnesses if present would testify to
certain facts stated in the affidavit of the prosecution. 3 1
In the same vein, it may be said that such an admission is a waiver of the right of an
accused to present evidence on his behalf. Although the right to present evidence is
guaranteed by no less than the Constitution itself for the protection of the accused, this
right may be waived expressly or impliedly. 3 2 This is in consonance with the doctrine of
waiver which recognizes that ". . . everyone has a right to waive, and agree to waive, the
advantage of a law or rule made solely for the bene t and protection of the individual in his
capacity, if it can be dispensed with and relinquished without infringing on any public right,
and without detriment to the community at large." 3 3
The abovementioned doctrine is squarely applicable to the case at bar. Appellant
was never prevented from presenting evidence contrary to the stipulation of facts. If
appellant believed that the testimony of the Chief Licensing O cer of the POEA would be
bene cial to her case, then it is the defense who should have presented him. Her
continuous failure to do so during trial was waiver of her right to present the pertinent
evidence to contradict the stipulation of facts and establish her defense.
In view of the foregoing, the stipulation of facts proposed during trial by prosecution
and admitted by defense counsel is tantamount to a judicial admission by the appellant of
the facts stipulated on. Controlling, therefore, is Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court
which provides that:
"An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the
proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be
contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that
no such admission was made."

We now go to appellant's second and third assignment of errors. In her second

assignment of error, appellant makes much ado of the "judicial notice" taken by the lower
court of the fact that appellant had been charged with another illegal recruitment case, 3 4
and in considering the pendency thereof as evidence of the scheme and strategy adopted
by the accused. Appellant cites a violation of Section 3 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court
which provides that before the court may take judicial notice of any matter, the parties
shall be heard thereon if such matter is decisive of a material issue in the case. It is
claimed that the lower court never announced its intention to take judicial notice of the
pendency of the other illegal recruitment case nor did it allow the accused to be heard
thereon.
It is true that as a general rule, courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the
contents of the records of other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are
pending in the same court, and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been
tried or are actually pending before the same judge. 3 5 However, this rule is subject to the
exception that:
". . . in the absence of objection and as a matter of convenience to all
parties, a court may properly treat all or any part of the original record of the case
led in its archives as read into the records of a case pending before it, when with
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 the knowledge of the opposing party, reference is made to it, by name and
number or in some other manner by which it is su ciently designated, . . ." 3 6
(emphasis supplied.)

The judicial notice taken by the lower court of the pendency of another illegal
recruitment case against the appellant falls squarely under the above exception in view of
the fact that it was the appellant herself who introduced evidence on the matter when she
testified in open court as follows:
"Q: You mean to say . . . by the way, where (sic) were you at the NBI when
Mrs. Cinco inquired from you about placement abroad?

A: I was just invited by the personnel of the NBI and I was not allowed to go
home.
Q: Why were you invited by the NBI?

A: They told me that there was a complaint against me.

Q: Complaint about what?

A: The same case.

Q: You mean illegal recruitment also?

A: Yes, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: You made mention than an illegal recruitment case which was supposed
to be the cause of your detention at the NBI. . . .

I am not referring to this case, Mrs. Hernandez — what happened to that

case, what is the status of the case?
A: It is also in this sala.

COURT:

It is already submitted for decision. 3 7

Even assuming, however, that the lower court improperly took judicial notice of the
pendency of another illegal recruitment case against the appellant, the error would not be
fatal to the prosecution's case. The judgment of conviction was not based on the
existence of another illegal recruitment case led against appellant by a different group of
complainants, but on the overwhelming evidence against her in the instant case.
Anent the last assignment of error, su ce it to say that we do not nd any
compelling reason to reverse the ndings of the lower court that appellant's bare denials
cannot overthrow the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses against her.
Well established is the rule that denials if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing
evidence are negative, self-serving evidence which deserve no weight in law and cannot be
given greater evidentiary weight over the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on
a rmative matters. 3 8 That she did not merely deny, but likewise raised as an a rmative
defense her appointment as mere nominee-president of Philippine-Thai is a futile attempt
at exculpating herself and is of no consequence whatsoever when weighed against the
positive declarations of witnesses that it was the appellant who executed the acts of
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 illegal recruitment as complained of.
Finally, under Article 39 of the New Labor Code, the penalty for illegal recruitment
committed in large scale is life imprisonment and a ne of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND
PESOS (P100,000.00). As previously held by this Court, life imprisonment is not
synonymous with reclusion perpetua. 3 9 The lower court erred in imposing "the penalty of
life imprisonment (reclusion perpetua) with the accessory penalties provided for by law; . .
." 4 0 (Emphasis supplied)
WHEREFORE, appellant's conviction of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale
is hereby AFFIRMED, and the penalty imposed MODIFIED as follows: the court sentences
the accused to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a ne of ONE HUNDRED
THOUSAND (P100,000.00) PESOS without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency;
to return and pay to BENITO L. BERNABE the amount of TWENTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIVE
HUNDRED (P28,500.00) PESOS; to ROBERT P. VELASQUEZ the amount of TWENTY TWO
THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED (P22,500.00) PESOS; to GREGORIO P. MENDOZA the amount
of TWENTY TWO THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED (P22,500.00) PESOS; to ARNEL MENDOZA
the amount of TWENTY TWO THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED (P22,500.00) PESOS also
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa C . J ., Davide, Jr., Melo, and Panganiban, JJ ., concur.

Footnotes
1. "Art. 38. Illegal Recruitment. (a) Any recruitment activities, including the
prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of this Code, to be undertaken by non-
licenses or non-holders of authority shall be deemed illegal and punishable under Article
39 of this Code. The Ministry of Labor and Employment or any law enforcement officers
may initiate complaints under this article.
(b) Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be
considered an offense involving economic sabotage and shall be penalized in
accordance with Article 39 hereof.

Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by group of

three (3) or more persons conspiring and/or confederating with one another in carrying
out any unlawful or illegal transaction, enterprise or scheme, defined under the first
paragraph hereof. Illegal recruitment is deemed committed against three (3) or more
persons individually or as a group. . . ."

2. Decision dated November 29, 1991, p. 1; Rollo, p. 14.

3. Witnesses paid a total of P22, 500.00 each with the exception of BENITO BERNABE who
paid P28,500.00.

4. Supra note 2, pp. 5-6; Rollo, pp. 18-19.

5. Id. at pp. 7-8; Rollo, pp. 20-21.
6. Appellant's Brief, p. 9.
7. People vs. Bodozo, 215 SCRA 33, 40.
8. Records, pp. 77-B and 79.
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 9. Appellant's Reply Brief, March 30, 1995, p. 3.

10. TSN, Hearing on June 6, 1990, pp. 1-2.

11. Supra, Note 9, p. 4. Francisco, The Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines (1990), Vol.
VII, p. 101 citing Tracy, Handbook on Evidence, pp. 16-17.

12. TSN, Supra, Note 10.

13. Id.
14. 9 Phil. 701.
15. Id. at p. 101.
16. U.S. vs. Pobre, 11 Phil. 51, 51-52.
17. 11 Phil. 547.
18. Id. at p. 548.
19. People vs. Mapa, 20 SCRA 1164, 1165.
20. People vs. Bocar, 27 SCRA 512.
21. Id., at p. 518.
22. People vs. Hare, 185 N.E. 2d 178.
23. Id., at p. 179. Also People vs. Hawkins, 189 N.E. 2d 252.
24. McCormick on Evidence 2nd Ed. p. 641.

25. 31 C.J.S. 537

26. People vs. Ravelo, 202 SCRA 655; Ayllon vs. Sevilla, 156 SCRA 257.
27. Villa Rhecar Bus vs. De la Cruz, 157 SCRA 13; De La Cruz vs. C.A., June 29, 1989.
28. Section 1(f) Rule 115 of the Rules of Court.

29. U.S. vs. Anastasio, 6 Phil. 413.

30. Id.
31. Id. citing United States vs. Sacramento, 2 Mont. 239; 25 Am. Rep. 742.
32. People vs. Dichoso, 96 SCRA 957; People vs. Angco, 103 Phil. 33.
33. People vs. Donato, 198 SCRA 130, 154.
34. Criminal Case No. 88-625 99 pending in the same court.

35. Tabuena vs. CA, 196 SCRA 650.

36. Id., at p. 656, citing U.S. vs. Claveria, 29 Phil. 527.
37. TSN, Hearing on August 22, 1990, p. 5.
38. People vs. Guibao, 217 SCRA 64; People vs. Marti, 193 SCRA 57; People vs. Song, et al.,
204 SCRA 135.

39. People vs. Alvero, 224 SCRA 16; People vs. Avendana, 216 SCRA 187.
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 40. Supra, note 2, p. 8, Rollo, p. 21.

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