CHAPTER THREE: Aids to Construction • That title written in capital letters by Congress itself;

such kind of title then is not to be classed with words or

Generally titles used by compilers of statues because it is the
• Where the meaning of a statue is ambiguous, the court legislature speaking.
is warranted in availing itself of all illegitimate aids to • Words by virtue of judicial decisions rendered in the
construction in order that it can ascertain the true intent title of the law stand in equal importance to the phrase in
of the statute. Sections 1 thereof by virtue of judicial proceedings
• The aids to construction are those found in the printed instituted.
page of the statute itself; known as the intrinsic aids, and • The court ruled that examining Act no. 2874 in detail
those extraneous facts and circumstances outside the was intended to apply to public lands only for the title of
printed page, called extrinsic aids. the act, always indicative of legislative intent.
Title • No bill shall embrace more than one subject, which
• It is used as an aid, in case of doubt in its language to subject shall be expressed in the title of the bill, the
its construction and to ascertaining legislative will. words and for other purposes’ when found in the title
have been held to be without force or effect whatsoever
• If the meaning of the statute is obscure, courts may and have been altogether discarded in construing the
resort to the title to clear the obscurity. Act.
• The title may indicate the legislative intent to extend or Ebarle v. Sucaldito
restrict the scope of law, and a statute couched in a
language of doubtful import will be constructed to • The issue is raised whether Executive order no. 264
conform to the legislative intent as disclosed in its title. entitled “Outlining the procedure by which complaints
charging government officials and employees with
• Resorted as an aid where there is doubt as to the commission of irregularities should be guided” applies to
meaning of the law or as to the intention of the criminal actions, to the end that no preliminary
legislature in enacting it, and not otherwise. investigation thereof can be undertaken or information
file in court unless there is previous compliance with the
• Serve as a guide to ascertaining legislative intent
executive order.
carries more weight in this jurisdiction because of the
constitutional requirement that “every bill shall embrace • EO only applies to administrative and not to criminal
only one subject who shall be expressed in the title complaints.
thereof.
• The very title speaks of commission of irregularities.
• The constitutional injunction makes the title an
indispensable part of a statute. When resort to title not authorized

Baguio v. Marcos • The text of the statute is clear and free from doubt, it is
improper to resort to its title to make it obscure.
• The question raised is when to count the 40 year
period to file a petition for reopening of cadastral • The title may be resorted to in order to remove, but not
proceedings (to settle and adjudicate the titles to the to create doubt.
various lots embraced in the survey) as authorized by Preamble
RA 931 covering the lands that have been or about to be
declared land of public domain, by virtue of judicial • It is a part of the statute written immediately after its
proceedings instituted w/in the 40 years next preceding title, which states the purpose, reason for the enactment
the approval of this act. of the law.

• The question is asked if the proceeding be reopened • Usually express in whereas clauses.
originally instituted in court April 12, 1912 or November
25, 1922, the counted date form which the decision • Generally omitted in statutes passed by:
therein rendered became final. o Phil. Commission
o Phil. Legislature
• Petition was filed on July 25, 1961, beyond the 40-year o National Assembly
period if the period was to be computed from the date o Congress of the Phil
the petition was originally filed, and not if it was to be o Batasang Pambansa
counted from the date the decision became final.
• These legislative bodies used the explanatory note to
• Title of the Law “An Act to authorize the filing in the explain the reasons for the enactment of statutes.
proper court under certain conditions of certain claims of
title to parcels of land that have been declared public • Extensively used if Presidential decrees issued by the
land, by virtue of the approval of this act.” President in the exercise of his legislative power.

• There was an apparent inconsistency between the title • When the meaning of a statute is clear and
and body of the law. unambiguous, the preamble can neither expand nor
restrict its operation, much less prevail over its text. Nor
• It ruled that the starting date to count the period is the can be used as basis for giving a statute a meaning.
date the final decision was rendered.
• When the statute is ambiguous, the preamble can be
• It recites that it authorizes court proceedings of claims resorted to clarify the ambiguity.
to parcels of land declared public by virtue of judicial
decisions rendered within forty years next preceding the • Preamble is the key of the statute, to open the minds of
approval of this act. the lawmakers as to the purpose is achieved, the
mischief to be remedied, and the object to be • Every section, provision, or clause of the statute must
accomplished, by the provisions of the legislature. be expounded by reference to each other in order to
arrive at the effect contemplated by the legislature.
• May decide the proper construction to be given to the
statute. Punctuation marks

• May restrict to what otherwise appears to be a broad • Semi- colon – used to indicate a separation in the
scope of law. relation of the thought, what follows must have a relation
to the same matter it precedes it.
• It may express the legislative intent to make the law
apply retroactively in which case the law has to be given • Comma and semi- colon are used for the same
retroactive effect. purpose to divide sentences, but the semi – colon makes
the division a little more pronounce. Both are not used to
Illustration of rule introduce a new idea.
People v. Purisima • Rule of legal hermeneutics, Punctuation marks are aids
• A person was charged w/ violation of PD 9 which of low degree and can never control against the
penalizes, among others, the carrying outside of one’s intelligible meaning of written words. Because neither
residence any bladed, blunt or pointed weapon not used are not part of a statute nor part of the English language.
as a necessary tool or implement for livelihood, with • An ambiguity of a statute which may be partially or
imprisonment ranging from five to ten years. wholly solved by a punctuation mark may be considered
• Question rose whether the carrying of such weapon in the construction of a statute.
should be in relation to subversion, rebellion, • The qualifying effect of a word or phrase may be
insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos or confined to its last antecedent if the latter is separated
public disorder as a necessary element of the crime. by a comma from the other antecedents.
• The mere carrying of such weapon outside one’s • An argument based on punctuation is not persuasive.
residence is sufficient to constitute a violation of the law
Illustrative examples
• Pursuant to the preamble which spelled out the events
that led to the enactment of the decree the clear intent Florentino v. PNB
and spirit of the decree is to require the motivation
mentioned in the preamble as in indispensable element • “who may be willing to accept the same for such
of the crime. settlement” – this implies discretion

• The severity of the penalty for the violation of the • SC held: only the last antecedent – “any citizen of the
decree suggests that it is a serious offense, which may Philippines or any association or corporation organized
only be justified by associating the carrying out of such under the laws of the Philippines”
bladed of blunt weapon with any of the purposes stated • xxx pursuant to which backpay certificate-holders can
in its preamble. compel government-owned banks to accept said
Peo v. Echavez certificates for payment of their obligations subsisting at
the time of the amendatory act was approved
• Issue: whether a person who squatted on a pastoral
land could be held criminally liable for the violation of PD Nera v. Garcia
772 “any person who, with the use of force, intimidation • “if the charge against such subordinate or employee
or threat, or taking advantage of the absence or involves dishonesty, oppression, or grave misconduct or
tolerance of the land owner, succeeds in occupying or neglect in the performance of his duty”
possessing the property of the latter against his will for
residential, commercial or any other purposes. • “dishonesty” and “oppression” – need not be committed
in the course of the performance of duty by the person
• The decree was promulgated to solve the squatting charges
problem which according to its preamble is still a major
problem in urban communities all over the country and Peo. v. Subido
because many persons and entities found to have been
• Subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency qualifies
unlawfully occupying public and private lands belong to
both non-payment of indemnity and non-payment of fine
the affluent class.
Capitalization of letters
• The court said that crime may only be committed in
urban communities and not in agricultural and pastural • An aid of low degree in the construction of statute.
lands because the preamble of the decree shows that it
was intended to apply for squatting in urban lands, more Headnotes or epigraphs
particularly to illegal constructions.
• Secondary aids
Context of whole text
• They are prefixed to sections, or chapters of a statute
• To ascertain legislative intent is the statute itself taken for ready reference or classification.
as a whole (words, phrases, sentences, sections,
• Not entitled too much weight, and inferences drawn
clauses, provisions) and in relation to one another
there from are of little value and they can never control
considering the whole context of the statute and not from
the plain terms of the enacting clauses, for they are not
an isolated part of the provision.
part of the law.
• The meaning dictated by the context prevails.
• The provisions of each article are controlling upon the • Intended to be removed or suppressed and the causes
subject thereof and operate as a general rule for settling which induced the enactment of the law are important
such questions as are embraced therein. factors to be considered in this construction.

• When the text of a statute is clear and unambiguous, » Purpose or object of the law
there is neither necessity nor propriety to resort to the » Mischief intended to be removed
headings or epigraphs of a section for interpretation of » Causes which induced the enactment of the law
the text, especially when they are mere reference aids
indicating the general nature of the text that follows. • Must be read in such a way as to give effect to the
purpose projected in the statute.
Lingual text
• The purpose of the general rule is not determinative of
• Rule is that, unless provided, where a statute is the proper construction to be given to the exceptions.
promulgated in English and Spanish, English shall
govern but in case of ambiguity, Spanish may be • Purpose of statute is more important than the rules of
consulted to explain the English text. grammar and logic in ascertaining the meaning

• A statute is officially promulgated in Spanish or in Dictionaries

English, or in Filipino • A statute does not define word or phrases used.
• “In the interpretation of a law or administrative issuance • Generally define words in their natural plain and
promulgated in all the official languages, the English text ordinary acceptance and significance.
shall control, unless otherwise provided.
Consequences of various constructions
Intent or spirit of law
• Inquired as an additional aid to interpretation.
• It is the law itself.
• A construction of a statute should be rejected that will
• Controlling factor, leading star and guiding light in the
cause injustice and hardship, result in absurdity, defeat
application and interpretation of a statute.
legislative intent or spirit, preclude accomplishment of
• A statute must be according to its spirit or intent. legislative purpose or object, render certain words or
phrases a surplusage (not necessary), nullify the statute
• The courts cannot assume an intent in no way or make any of its provisions nugatory (inoperative).
expressed and then construe the statute to accomplish
the supposed intention; otherwise they would pass Presumptions
beyond the bounds of judicial power to usurp legislative
• Based on logic, experience, and common sense, and in
power.
the absence of compelling reasons to the contrary,
Policy of law doubts as to the proper and correct construction of a
statute will be resolved in favor of that construction
• Should be given effect by the judiciary. which is in accord with the presumption on the matter.
• One way to accomplish this mandate is to give a » Constitutionality of a statute
statute of doubtful meaning, a construction that will » Completeness
promote public policy. » Prospective operation
Tinio v. Francis » Right and justice
» Effective, sensible, beneficial and reasonable
• Policy of the law – to conserve the land of the operation as a whole
homesteader » Against inconsistency and implied repeal
 unnecessary changes in law
• xxx not be subject to encumbrance/ alienation from the  impossibility
date of the approval of the application and for a term of 5  absurdity
years from and after the date of the issuance of the  injustice and hardship
patent or grant  inconvenience
» from the ORDER for the issuance of patent  Ineffectiveness.
» if literal interpretation is to be used, policy will be LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
defeated Generally
Cajiuat v. Mathay • A statute is susceptible of several interpretations or
where there is ambiguity in the language, there is no
• policy – against double pensions for the same services better means of ascertaining the will and intention of the
legislature than that which is afforded by the history of
• a law which grants retirable employees certain gratuity
the statute.
“in addition to other benefits which they are entitled
under existing laws” CANNOT be construed as to What constitutes legislative history?
authorize the grant of double gratuity
• History of a statute refers to all its antecedents from its
• “other benefits” may be: inception until its enactment into law.
» Refund of contributions
» Payment of the money value of accumulated • Its history proper covers the period and the steps done
vacation and sick leaves from the time the bill is introduced until it is finally passed
by the legislature.
Purpose of law or mischief to be suppressed
• What it includes:
» President’s message if the bill is enacted in legislator was not a member of the assembly that
response thereto, enacted the said laws.
» The explanatory note accompanying the bill
» Committee reports of legislative investigations • When a statute is clear and free from ambiguity, courts
» Public hearings on the subject of the bill will not inquire into the motives which influence the
» Sponsorship speech legislature or individual members, in voting for its
» Debates and deliberations concerning the bill passage; no indeed as to the intention of the draftsman,
» Amendments and changes in phraseology in which it or the legislators, so far as it has not been expressed
undergoes before final approval thereof. into the act.
» If the statute is based from a revision, a prior statute, Reports of commissions
the latter’s practical application and judicial
construction, • Commissions are usually formed to compile and collate
» Various amendments it underwent all laws on a particular subject and to prepare the draft of
» Contemporary events at the President’s message to the proposed code.
legislature
Prior laws from which statute is based
President’s message to the legislature
• Courts are permitted to prior laws on the same subject
• The president shall address the congress at the and to investigate the antecedents of the statute
opening of its regular session or appear before it at any involved.
other time.
• This is applicable in the interpretation of codes, revised
• Usually contains proposed legal measures. or compiled statutes, for the prior law which have been
codified, compiled or revised will show the legislative
• Indicates his thinking on the proposed legislation, when history that will clarify the intent of the law or shed light
enacted into law, follows his line of thinking on the on the meaning and scope of the codified or revised
matter. statute.
Explanatory note Peo. v. Manantan
• A short exposition of explanation accompanying a • Issue: whether or not justice of peace is included
proposed legislation by its author or proponent.
• Contention of Manantan, who is a justice of peace, is
• Where there is ambiguity in a statute or where a statute that the omission of “justice of peace” revealed the
is susceptible of more than one interpretation, courts intention of the legislature to exclude such from its
may resort to the explanatory note to clarify the operation
ambiguity and ascertain the purpose or intent of the
statute. • Held: contention denied. In holding that the word
“judge” includes “justice of peace”, the Court said that “a
• Used to give effect to the purpose or intent as review of the history of the Revised Election Code will
disclosed in its explanatory note. help justify and clarify the above conclusion”
• A statute affected or changed an existing law and the Director of Lands v. Abaya
explanatory note to the bill which has eventually enacted
into a law states that the purpose is too simply to secure • When to count the 10-year period, either from the date
the prompt action on a certain matter by the officer the decision was rendered or from the date judicial
concerned and not to change the existing law; the proceedings instituted in cadastral cases
statute should be construed to carry out such purpose.
• Held: court resolved the issue by referring to 4 older
• It may be used as a basis for giving a statute a laws which have in common that counting of the period
meaning that is inconsistent with what is expressed in starts from the date of the institution of the judicial
the text of the statute. proceeding and not from the date the judgment is
rendered
Legislative debates, views and deliberations
Salaysay v. Castro
• Courts may avail to themselves the actual proceedings
of the legislative body to assist in determining the • “Actually holding” ~ “lastly elected”
construction of a statute of doubtful meaning.
• Thus, a vice mayor acting as mayor is not included in
• There is doubt to what a provision of a statute means, the provision
that meaning which was put to the provision during the
Change in phraseology by amendments
legislative deliberation or discussion on the bill may be
adopted. • Indicates a legislative intent to change the meaning of
the provision.
• Views expressed are as to the bill’s purpose, meaning
or effect are not controlling in the interpretation of the • in construing, courts may investigate the history of the
law. provision to ascertain legislative intent as to the meaning
or scope of the amended law.
• It is impossible to determine with authority what
construction was put upon an act by the members of the • A statute has undergone several amendments, each
legislative body that passed the bill. amendment using different phraseology, the deliberate
selection of language differing from that of the earlier act
• The opinions expressed by legislators in the course of
on the subject indicates that a change in meaning of the
debates concerning the application of existing laws are
not also given decisive weight, especially where the
law was intended and courts should so construe that • Foreign statutes are adopted in this country or from
statute as to reflect such change in meaning. local laws are patterned form parts of the legislative
history of the latter.
Commissioner of Customs v. CTA
• Local statutes are patterned after or copied from those
• issue raised is whether a vessel, which berths at a of another country, the decision of the courts in such
privately owned wharf or pier, is liable for payment of the country construing those laws are entitled to great
berthing charge under Sec. 2901 of the Tariff and weight in the interpretation of such local statutes.
Customs Code which was amended by P.D. No 34,
states that a vessel berthing “at any national port” shall Limitations of rule
pay berthing fees.
• A statute which has been adopted from that of a foreign
• Prior to amendment, law provided that such fees be country should be construed in accordance with the
collected from any vessel berthing “at any port”. construction given it in the country of origin is not without
limitations.
•The Court ruled that the word “national” before the word
“port” was inserted in the amendment – such change in Principles of common law
the phraseology by the amendment of the provision
indicates a legislative intent to change the meaning of • Known as Anglo-American jurisprudence which is no in
the provision from that it originally had. force in this country, save only insofar as it is founded on
sound principles applicable to local conditions and is not
• “national port” (new law) not the same as “any port” in conflict with existing law, nevertheless, many of the
(old law); otherwise, “national” will be a surplusage principles of the common law have been imported into
this jurisdiction as a result of the enactment of laws and
Amendment by deletion establishment of institutions similar to those of the US.
• As a rule, deletion of certain words or phrases in a Conditions at time of enactment
statute indicates that the legislature intended to change
the meaning of the statute, for the presumption is that • In enacting a statute, the legislature is presumed to
the legislation would not have made the deletion had the have taken into account the existing conditions of things
intention been not effect a change in its meaning. at the time of its enactment.

• A statute containing a provision prohibiting the doing of • In the interpretations of a statute, consider the physical
a certain thing is amended by deleting such provision. conditions of the country and the circumstances then
obtain understanding as to the intent of the legislature or
Gloria v. CA as to the meaning of the statute.
• Issue: whether a public officer or employee, who has History of the times
been preventively suspended pending investigation of
the administrative charges against him, is entitled to his • A court may look to the history of the times, examining
salary and other benefits during such preventive the state of things existing when the statute was
suspension enacted.

• Held: Court answered in the negative because such • A statute should not be construed in a spirit as if it were
provision with regard to payment of salaries during a protoplasm floating around in space.
suspension was deleted in the new law
• In determining the meaning, intent, and purpose of a
Buenaseda v. Flavier law or constitutional provision, the history of the times of
which I grew and to which it may be rationally supposed
• Ombudsman and his deputy can only preventively to bear some direct relationship, the evils intended to be
suspend respondents in administrative cases who are remedied and the good to be accomplished are proper
employed in his office, and not those who are employees subjects of inquiry.
in other department or offices of the government
• Law being a manifestation of social culture and
Exceptions to the rule (of amendment by deletion) progress must be interpreted taking into consideration
• An amendment of the statue indicates a change in the stage of such culture and progress including all the
meaning from that which the statute originally had concomitant circumstances.
applies only when the intention is clear to change the • Law is not a watertight compartment sealed or shut off
previous meaning of the old law. from the contact with the drama of life which unfolds
• Rules don’t apply when the intent is clear that the before our eyes.
amendment is precisely to plainly express the CONTEMPORARY CONSTRUCTION
construction of the act prior to its amendment because
its language is not sufficiently expressive of such Generally
construction.
• Are the constructions placed upon statutes at the time
• Frequently, words do not materially affect the sense will of, or after their enactment by the executive, legislative
be omitted from the statute as incorporated in the code or judicial authorities, as well as by those who involve in
or revised statute, or that some general idea will be the process of legislation are knowledgeable of the intent
expressed in brief phrases. and purpose of the law.

Adopted statutes • Contemporary construction is strongest in law.

Executive construction, generally; kinds of

• Generally, executive and administrative officers are the receive the money in question, even though the sugar
very first officials to interpret the law, preparatory to its was shipped from a private wharf
enforcement. These interpretations are in the form of
rules and regulations, circulars, directives, opinions and Weight accorded to usage and practice
rulings. • Common usage and practice under the statute, or a
• Three types of executive interpretation course of conduct indicating a particular undertaking of
» Construction by an executive or administrative it, especially where the usage has been acquiesced in
officer directly called to implement the law. by all the parties concerned and has extended over a
o Expressed (embodied in circular, directive or long period of time.
regulation) or implied (practice or mode of • Optimus interpres rerum usus – the best interpretation
enforcement of not applying the statute to of the law is usage.
certain situations or applying the statute to
certain situations or of applying it in a Construction of rules and regulations
particular manner)
• This rule-making power, authorities sustain the
o Interpretation by usage or practice
principle that the interpretation by those charged with
» Construction by the secretary of justice in his
their enforcement is entitled to great weight by the court
capacity as the chief legal adviser of the
in the latter’s construction of such rules and regulations.
government.
o Opinions issued upon request of Reasons why contemporaneous construction is given
administrative or executive officials who much weight
enforce the law
o In absence of judicial ruling and unless • It is entitled to great weight because it comes from the
reprobated by the President, opinions of the particular branch of government called upon to
Sec Justice are generally controlling among implement the law thus construed.
administrative and executive officials of the
• Are presumed to have familiarized themselves with all
gov’t
the considerations pertinent to the meaning and purpose
o President of Executive Secretary, by
of the law, and to have formed an independent,
authority of the President, has the power to
conscientious and competent expert opinion thereon
modify, alter or reverse the construction
given by dept. secretary When contemporaneous construction disregarded
» Handed down in an adversary proceeding in the
form of a ruling by an executive officer exercising • When there is no ambiguity in the law.
quasi-judicial power.
• If it is clearly erroneous, the same must be declared
Weight accorded to contemporaneous construction null and void.

• Where there is doubt as to the proper interpretation of Erroneous contemporaneous construction does not
a statute, the uniform construction placed upon it by the preclude correction nor create rights; exceptions
executive or administrative officer charged with its
• The doctrine of estoppel does not preclude correction
enforcement will be adopted if necessary to resolve the
of the erroneous construction by the officer himself by
doubt.
his successor or by the court in an appropriate case.
• True expression of the legislative purpose, especially if
• An erroneous contemporeaneous construction creates
the construction is followed for a considerable period of
no vested right on the part of those relied upon, and
time.
followed such construction.
Nestle Philippines, Inc. v. CA
Legislative interpretation
• Reasons for why interpretation of an administrative
• Legislative may provide in the statute itself an
agency is generally accorded great respect
interpretative or declaratory clause prescribing rules of
» Emergence of multifarious needs of a modernizing construction or indicating how its provisions should be
society construed
» Also relates to experience and growth of specialized
• define he terms used in a statute, enect a declaratory
capabilities by the administrative agency
act construing a previous law or pass a resolution
» They have the competence, expertness, experience
indicating its sense or intentions as to a given statute.
and informed judgment, and the fact that they
frequently are the drafters of the law they interpret • Take form of an implied acquiescence to, or approval
of, an executive or judicial construction of a statute.
Philippine Sugar Central v. Collector of Customs
• The legislature, in indicating its construction laws,
• Issue: whether the government can legally collect
cannot limit or restrict the power granted to the courts by
duties “as a charge for wharfage” required by a statute
the constitution.
upon all articles exported through privately-owned
wharves o May not, by defining a term, make the
definition conclusive not only as regards
• Held: the court reasoned in the affirmative by saying
other statutes or as used elsewhere.
“the language of the Act could have been made more
o Cannot validate a law which violates a
specific and certain, but in view of its history, its long
constitutional provision as to prevent an
continuous construction, and what has been done and
attack in the courts by declaration that it
accomplished by and under it, we are clearly of the
shall be construed as not to contravene the
opinion that the government is entitled to have and
 constitutional limitation. To do so would be • The rule of stare decisis is not absolute. It does not
to usurp judicial prerogative apply when there is a conflict between the precedent
and the law.
Legislative approval
• The duty of the court is to forsake and abandon any
• Legislative is presumed to have full knowledge of a doctrine or rule found to be in violation of law in force
contemporaneous or practical construction of a statute
by an administrative or executive officer charged with its • Inferior courts as well as the legislature cannot
enforcement. abandon a precedent enunciated by the SC except by
way of repeal or amendment of the law itself
• The legislature may, by action or inaction, approve or
ratify such contemporaneous construction.

• may manifest when: (1) re-enacts a statute previously

given a contemporaneous construction, (2) uses words
similar in their import to the language of an earlier law
that received practical interpretation, (3) or amends a
prior statute w/o, in the amending act, providing
anything which would restrict, change or nullify the
previous contemporaneous construction.

• May also be shown by the legislature appropriating

money for the officer designated to perform a task
pursuant to interpretation of a statute.

• Legislative ratification is equivalent to a mandate.

Re-enactment

• Most common act of approval.

• The re-enactment of a statute, previously given a

contemporaneous construction is persuasive indication
of the adoption by the legislature of the prior
construction.

• Re-enactment if accorded greater weight and respect

than the contemporaneous construction of the statute
before its ratification.

Stare decisis

• Judicial interpretation of a statute and is of greater

weight than that of an executive or administrative officer
in the construction of other statutes of similar import.

• It is an invaluable aid in the construction or

interpretation of statutes of doubtful meaning.

• Stare decisis et non quieta movere – one should follow

past precedents and should not disturb what has been
settled.

• Supreme Court has the constitutional duty not only of

interpreting and applying the law in accordance with
prior doctrines but also of protecting society from the
improvidence and wantonness wrought by needless
upheavals in such interpretations and applications

• In order that it will come within the doctrine of stare

decisis, must be categorically stated on an issue
expressly raised by the parties; it must be a direct ruling,
not merely an obiter dictum

• Obiter dictum – does not fall within the doctrine.

Defined as opinion expressed by a court upon some
question of law which is not necessary to the decision of
the case before it; not binding as a precedent

• The principle presupposes that the facts of the

precedent and the case to which it is applied are
substantially the same.

• Where the facts are dissimilar, then the principle of

stare decisis does not apply.
CASE DIGEST

City of Baguio, ET AL. vs. PIO R. MARCOS, ET AL.

Statutory construction; Object of interpretation.—the true object of all interpretation is to ascertain the meaning and
will of the law-making body, to the end that it may be enforced. In varying language, “the purpose of all rules or maxims” in
interpretation “is to discover the true intention of the law.” (82 C.J.S. 526) They are only valuable when they sub serve this
purpose.” In fact, “the spirit or intention of a statute prevails over the letter thereof”. A statute “should be construed
according to its spirit and reason, disregard. As far as necessary, the letter of the law.” By this, the Supreme Court does
not “correct the act of the Legislature, but rather x x x carry out and give due course to” its true in-tent.

Title of act may be resorted in the ascertainment of congressional will. — When engaged the task of construing an
obscure expression the law (82 C.J.S. 731) or where exact or literal rendering of the words would not carry out the
legislative intent, the title thereof may be resorted to in the ascertainment of congressional will. Reason therefor is that the
title of the law may properly be regarded as an index of or clue or guide to legislative intention. (82 C.J.S. 734) This is
especially true in this jurisdiction. For the reason that by specific constitutional precept, “no bill which may be enacted into
law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill.” (Sec. 21 [1], Art. VI, Const.) In
such case, courts “are compelled by the Constitution to consider both the body and the title in order to arrive at the
legislative intention.” (37 A.L.R. 952)

FACTS:
On April 12, 1912, the Director of Lands in the Court of First Instance of Baguio instituted the reopening of cadastral
proceedings (a land registration/ titling proceeding) Civil Case No.1. A decision on November 13, 1922 was rendered; the
land involved (Baguio Townsite) was among those declared public lands.

On July 25, 1961, Belong Lutes petitioned cadastral court to reopen said civil case. He claims that the land (Baguio
Townsite) be registered in his name upon the grounds that:
1.) he and his predecessors have been in continuous possession and cultivation of the landsince Spanish times
2.) his predecessors were illiterate Igorots, thus were not able to file their claim to the land in question.

On the other hand, Francisco G. Joaquin Sr., Francisco G. Joaquin, Jr. and Teresita J. Buchholz, as tree farm lessees of
the land in question, opposed the reopening. Their contentions are as follows:
1.) The reopening petition was filed outside the 40-year period provided by R.A. 931
2.) Petition to reopen the case was not published
3.) As lessees of the land, they have a standing to appear in the reopening proceedings.

ISSUE/S:
Statcon issue here is whether the reopening petition was filed outside the 40-year period provided by R.A. 931 (enacted
June 20, 1953). Joaquin’s group contests that the title of the said act is in conflict with section 1 of the same act, thus
invalidating the petition of Lutes to reopen the civil case.

Title of the act reads:

AN ACT TO AUTHORIZE THE FILING IN THE PROPER COURT, UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS, OF CERTAIN
CLAIMS OF TITLE TO PARCELS OF LAND THAT HAVE BEEN DECLARED PUBLIC LAND, BY VIRTUE OF JUDICIAL
DECISIONS RENDERED WITHIN THE FORTY YEARS NEXT PRECEDING THE APPROVAL OF THIS ACT.

Section 1 of the act provides: …in case such parcels of land, on account of their failure to file such claims, have been, or
are about to be declared land of the public domain by virtue of judicial proceedings instituted within the forty years next
preceding the approval of this Act, are hereby granted…

HELD:

The court allowed the reopening of the case since the case was filed within the 40-year period imposed by the act.

Joaquin’s group believes that the difference between the title (BY VIRTUE OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS RENDERED and in
section 1 (by virtue of judicial proceedings instituted), is material. If the title is to be followed, the date November 13, 1922
should be the date used in reckoning the period (which is still within the 40-year period; counted from the date of the
enactment of R.A. 931 which is June 20, 1953). But if the wordings of the title are to be followed, the date April 12, 1912,
which is the date the Director of lands instituted the reopening of the case, would render the petition invalid since it is
already outside the 40-year period.
The rule on statutory construction provides that laws should be construed liberally (see page 12 of statcon book). The
spirit or the intent of the law should be looked upon and should prevail over its letter. In this case, R.A. 931 clearly gives
an opportunity to any person who has any interest in any parcel of land which has been declared as public land to present
his claim within the time prescribed. This act is a piece of remedial legislation; its intent provides a mode of relief to
landowners who, before the act had no legal means of perfecting titles. Therefore, the court cannot see an inconsistency
between the title and its section.

The title of the act is indisputably clear, as it expresses the very substance of the law itself. The constitutional jurisdiction
that the subject of the statute must be expressed in the title, breathes the spirit of command because the constitution does
not exact of Congress the obligation to read during its deliberations the entire text of the bill.

Therefore, by the statute, the petition of Lutes to reopen the case, decision on which was rendered on Nov. 13, 1922,
comes within the 40-year period.

Case: People vs. Purisima, G.R. No. L-42050-66

Facts: This case actually involves 17 petitions, in which informations in each petition were filed against the respective
accused with “illegal possession of deadly weapon” in violation of Presidential Decree No. 9, paragraph 3. The accused in
each petition filed a motion to quash, and the judge concurred with the motions filed, filing an order to quash or dismiss
the said informations on the ground that that the information in each petition did not assert facts which constitute the
offense penalized by P.D. No. 9, paragraph 3 because it failed to state one essential element of the crime. In one case,
the information contended that the accused carried a 6 inches long carving knife, which the accused carried outside of his
residence, not being used as a tool or something for him to earn his livelihood, nor being used in an activity that has
connection therewith, which the information concluded as contrary to law. The judge who handled the case, Amante
Purisima, ruled that the information should have shown that the possession of the bladed weapon was for the purpose of
carrying out or worsening of criminality, organized lawlessness, public disorder, etc. in accordance to what is being
mentioned in Proclamation 1081. The information filed didn’t have the requirement, since the accused didn’t have the
motivation to carry out lawlessness as was in Proclamation 1081, since the bladed weapon is concealed. Hence, it
doesn’t establish the facts to constitute an offense against P.D. 9(3). The petitioner argues that P.D. 9(3) punishes mala
prohibita acts, hence for public policy.

Furthermore, the presidential decree here doesn’t only condemn carrying a bladed weapon in connection with the
commission of the crime, but in relation to criminality as a whole which characterized the pre-martial law era. The
petitioner further said that the preamble of a statute, usually introduced by the word “whereas”, is not an essential part of
an act and cannot enlarge or confer powers, or cure inherent defects in the statute, and that the explanatory note or
enacting clause of the decree, if it provides limits to the violation of the decree, cannot prevail over the text itself because
the explanatory note merely states or explains the reason which prompted the issuance of the decree.

Issue: Whether the informations filed by the prosecutors in each petition are sufficient in form and substance to constitute
the offense of “illegal possession of deadly weapon” punishable under P.D. No. 9(3).

Ruling: The Court disagreed with the contention of the petitioner. First, the Court said that the preamble or the explanatory
note of a statute contains the legislative intent and spirit of the decree if there will be problems as to how we should
construe a statute. The Court then stated that the results of implementing P.D. No. 9 (3) should be within its legislative
intent. The Court accorded with Judge Purisima’s ruling, saying that it is only the act of carrying a blunt or bladed weapon
with an intention or motivation connected with or in relation with desired result of Proclamation 1081 that is within the
intent of P.D. No. 9(3), and nothing else. Furthermore, in construing this presidential degree, there should be an inquiry
concerning the consequences of a word-for-word implementation of which, and it is a presumption that in any statute,
maladaptive consequences where never intended by the legislator, and this is a characteristic of P.D. No. 9(3), and the
way the petitioner claimed the presidential decree is to provide hardships for the citizens. The Court also found, as did
Purisima, that the elements [1] to constitute the violation of P.D. 9(3) were not mentioned in the informations, the second
element being absent, hence upheld the decision of Purisima. The petition therefore was denied.

Statutory Construction Issue: 1) pursuit of legislative intent; 2) preamble and explanatory note as construction aids; 3)
construing visà-vis the consequences of the statute

[1] The first element is the carrying outside one’s residence of any bladed, blunt, or pointed weapon, etc. not used as a
necessary tool or implement for a livelihood; and second, that the act of carrying the weapon was either in furtherance of,
or to abet, or in connection with subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos, or public disorder.

PEOPLE VS MANANTAN
Electioneering; Officers prohibited from engaging in politics; Justices of the peace. — A justice of the peace is included
among the officers enjoined from active political participation by Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. There was no
need of including justices of the peace in the enumeration in said Section 54 because the Legislature had availed itself of
the more generic and broader term "judge".

"Judge" construed. —The term "judge" not modified by any word or phrase, is intended to comprehend all kinds of judges,
like judges of the courts of first instance, judges of the Courts of Agrarian Relations, and justices of the peace.

Statutory Construction; Rule of "casus omisus" when applicable.—The rule of "casus omisus pro omisso habendus est"
can operate and apply only if and when the omission has been clearly established. In the case at bar, the Legislature did
not exclude or omit justices of the peace from the enumeration of officers precluded from engaging in partisan political
activities. Rather, they were merely called by another term —"judges." The rule, therefore, has no applicability to the
instant case.

Penal Statutes; Rule of Strict Construction. — The rule that penal statutes are given a strict construction is not the only
factor controlling the interpretation of such laws; instead, the rule merely serves as an additional, single factor to be
considered as an aid in determining the meaning of penal laws. (3 Sutherland, Statutory Construction, p. 56). The court
may consider the spirit and reason of a statute, as in this particular instance, where a literal meaning would lead to
absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would feat the clear purpose of the lawmakers (Crawford, Interpretation of Laws, Sec.
78, p. 294).

Rule of Exclusion.—Where a statute appears on its face to limit the operation of its provisions to particular persons or
things by enumerating them, but no reason exists why other persons or things not so enumerated should not have been
included, and manifest injustice will follow by not so including them, the maxim expresio unius est exclusio alterius, should
not be invoked. (Blevins vs. Mullally,135 P. 307, 22 Cal. App. 519).

FACTS:

• This is an appeal of the Solicitor General from the order of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan dismissing the
information against the defendant.

• The defendant was charged with the violation of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. A preliminary investigation
conducted by said court resulted in the finding of a probable cause that the crime charged was committed by the
defendant.

• Both parties were submitting this case upon the determination of this single question of law: Is a justice of the peace
included in the prohibition of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code?

Section 54 of the Revised Election Code, provides:

“ No justice, fiscal, treasurer, assessor of any province, no officer or employee of the Army, no member of the national,
provincial, city, municipal or rural police force, and no classified civil service officer or employee shall aid any candidate, or
exert any influence in any manner in any election or take part therein, if he is a peace officer,”

• The defendant argued that the justice of the peace was not comprehended among the officers enumerated in Section 54
of the Revised Election Code. That the word “justice of peace “was omitted, and the omission revealed the intention of the
legislature to exclude justice of the peace from its operation. Invoking the rule of “casus omisus pro omisso habendus
est,” under the said rule, a person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted
intentionally.

Section 449 of the Revised Administrative Code, which provided the following:

“Sec. 449- Persons prohibited from influencing elections. - No judge of the First Instance, justice of the peace, or
treasurer, fiscal or assessor of any province and no officer of employee of the Philippine Constabulary, or any Bureau or
employee of the classified civil service, shall aid any candidate or exert influence in any manner in any election or take
part therein otherwise than exercising the right to vote.”

• The court of appeals and the trial court applied the rule of “expression unius est exclusion alterius,” which means, the
express mention of one person, thing or consequence implies the exclusion of all the others, in arriving at the conclusion
that the justices of the peace was covered by Section 54.

Issue:
Whether or not the justice of peace was excluded in the provision of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code, thereby, the
law was construed in the rule of casus omisus pro omisso habendus est?

Decision:

The order of dismissal entered by the trial court should be set aside and the case was remanded for trial on the merits.

Reason for the decision:

The rule has no applicability to the case at bar. The maxim “casus omisus” can operate and apply only if and when the
omission has been clearly established. In the case under consideration, it has already been shown that the legislature did
not exclude or omit justices of the peace from the enumeration of officers precluded from engaging in partisan political
activities, in the new law, or Section 54 or the Revised Election Code, justices of the peace were just called “judge”.

COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS VS CTA

Facts:

Petitioner contends that the importation of the foodstuff in question is prohibited and the articles thus imported may be
subject to forfeiture under Sec. 2530 (f) and 102 (k) of the Tariff and Customs Code. The foodstuff may be released under
bond as provided in sec 2301 of the same code.

Issue:

WoN the imported foodstuff in question are not contraband, and are not as stated by Respondent Court, among the
prohibited importations enumerated in Sec. 102 of the Tariff and Customs Code therefore these foodstuff may be released
under bond as provided in sec 2301 of the same code.

Held:

Yes. The imported foodstuff are considered prohibited importation under sec. 102 of the Tariff and Customs Code.

Sec. 102 – Prohibited Importations – The following importations into the Philippines of the following articles is prohibited:
(k) All other articles the importation of which is prohibited by law.

Sec. 2530 – Property Subject to Forfeiture Under Tariff and Customs Laws – Any vessel or aircraft cargo, articles and
other objects shall, under the following conditions, be subject to forfeiture: (f) Any article of prohibited importation or I
effected or attempted contrary to law, and all other articles which, in the opinion of the Collector, have been used, are or
were intended to be used as instrument in the importation or exportation of the former.

GLORIA VS COURT OF APPEALS

Statutory Construction; the amendment by deletion of certain words or phrases in a statute indicates that the legislature
intended to change the meaning of the statute.—The Civil Service Act of 1959 (R.A. No. 2260) provided for the payment
of such salaries in case of exoneration. However, the law was revised in 1975 and the provision on the payment of
salaries during suspension was deleted. Sec. 42 of the Civil Service Decree (P.D. 807) read: * * * this provision was
reproduced in §52 of the present Civil Service Law. It is noteworthy that the Ombudsman Act of 1989 (R.A. No. 6770)
categorically provides that preventive suspension shall be “without pay.” It is clear that the purpose of the amendment is
to disallow the payment of salaries for the period of suspension. This conclusion is in accord with the rule of statutory
construction that—As a rule, the amendment by deletion of certain words or phrases in a statute indicates that the
legislature intended to change the meaning of the statute, for the presumption is that the legislature would not have made
the deletion had the intention been not in effect a change in its meaning. The amended statute should accordingly be
given a construction different from that previous to its amendment.

Statutory Construction; The legislative purpose of the present Civil Service Law, which is found in Executive Order No.
292 issued by then President Corazon Aquino in the exercise of her legislative powers under the Freedom Constitution,
cannot be clearly established because it has no recorded deliberations from which to verify such intent.—Significantly, the
Civil Service Law does not state that exonerated employees are not entitled to back salaries corresponding to the
preventive suspension period. Such silence of the law should not ipso facto be interpreted as a denial of the right,
pursuant to rules on statutory construction. In any event, the rules on the interpretation of laws are mere tools used to
ascertain legislative intent. They are not necessarily applicable at all times, particularly when the intention to change the
meaning of the previous law is not clear. In the case of the present Civil Service Law, which is found in Executive Order
No. 292 issued by then President Corazon Aquino in the exercise of her legislative powers under the Freedom
Constitution, its legislative purpose cannot be clearly established, because it has no recorded deliberations from which to
verify such intent. Consequently, we should not completely rely on the general rule on amendment by deletion. We should
not hold the omission of words in the later statute as necessarily altering the construction of the earlier one, for we may do
so only “where the intent of the legislature to make such change is clear of construction.”

Facts:

Abad, Bandigas, Somebang and Margallo, private respondents, are public school teachers. Sometime in September and
October 1990, during the teacher’s strikes, they did not report for work. For this reason they were administratively charged
with 1) grave misconduct; 2) gross violation of Civil Service Rules; 3) gross neglect of duty; 4) refusal to perform official
duty; 5) gross insubordination; 6) conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service and; 7) AWOL. They were placed
under preventive suspension. Investigation ended before the lapse of the 90 day period.

Margallo was dismissed from the service. The three others were suspended for 6 months. On appeal to the CA, the court
mitigated the punishment to reprimand only. Hence their reinstatement. Now the reinstated teachers are asking for back
wages during the period of their suspension and pending appeal (before the CA exonerated them).

Issue:

Whether the teachers are entitled to back wages for the period pending their appeal if they are subsequently exonerated.

Held:

YES, they are entitled to full pay pending their appeal. To justify the award of back wages, the respondent must be
exonerated from the charges and his suspension be unjust. Preventive suspension pending appeal is actually punitive,
and it is actually considered illegal if the respondent is exonerated and the administrative decision finding him guilty is
reversed.

Hence he should be reinstated with full pay for the period of the suspension. Section 47 (4) of the Civil Service Decree
states that the respondent “shall be considered as under preventive suspension during the pendency of the appeal in the
event he wins.” On the other hand if his conviction is affirmed the period of his suspension becomes part of the final
penalty of suspension or dismissal. In the case at bar the respondents won in their appeal, therefore the period of
suspension pending their appeal would be considered as part of the preventive suspension, entitling them to full pay
because they were eventually exonerated and their suspension was unjustified.

They are still entitled to back salaries even if they were still reprimanded.

PHILIPPINE SUGAR CENTRALS AGENCY VS. INSULAR COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS

Facts:

The Philippine Sugar Centrals Agency at all times, acted as a representative of the Ma-ao Sugar Central Company. The
Plaintiff shipped 5, 124, 416 gross kilograms of centrifugal sugar consigned to the US that the said sugar was laden
through wharf built, owned and maintained solely by Ma-ao Sugar Central Company, leased to it by the Government of
Philippine Islands. Insular Collector of Customs assessed and collected wharfage dues on sugar at 2 pesos per thousand
gross kilograms with total amount of 10, 248.84 pesos. The plaintiff paid, under protest, the said amount but overruled by
the Insular Collector of Customs.

Issue:

WoN, the Government of the Philippine Islands can legally collect the duty of 1 dollar per gross ton of 1,000 kilograms as
charged per wharfage.

Held:

August 5, 1909, the Congress of the US passed what is known as the “Philippine Tariff Act of 1909,” entitled “An Act to
raise revenue for the Philippine Islands, and for the purposes,” section 14 of which, under the head of “Wharfage,” states
that there shall be levied and collected upon all articles, goods, wares, or merchandise, except coal, timber and cement,
the product of the Philippine Islands, exported through ports of entry of the Philippine Islands, or shipped therefrom to the
US or any of its possessions, a duty of one dollar per gross ton of 1,000 kilos, as charge for wharfage, whatever be the
port of destination or nationality of the exporting vessel: Provided, that articles, goods, wares, or merchandise imported,
exported, or shipped in transit for the use of the Government of the US, or of that of that of the Philippine Islands, shall be
exempted from the charges prescribed in this section. The Government of the Philippine Islands can legally collect the
duty of 1 dollar per gross ton of 1,000 kilograms as a charged for wharfage.
CHAPTER FOUR: Adherence to, or departure from, language of statute • Where the law is clear, appeals to justice and equity as justification to construe
it differently are unavailing – Philippines is governed by CIVIL LAW or POSITIVE
LITERAL INTERPRETATION LAW, not common law

Literal meaning or plain-meaning rule • Equity is available only in the absence of law and not its replacement – (so, pag
may law, walang equity equity! Pero pag walang law, pwedeng mag-equity,
• General rule: if statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given gets?!?... important to!)
its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation
• Aequitas nunquam contravenit legis – equity never acts in contravention of the
o Verba legis law

o Index animi sermo – speech is the index of intention DEPARTURE FROM LITERAL INTERPRETATION

o Words employed by the legislature in a statute correctly express its intent or Statute must be capable of interpretation, otherwise inoperative
will
• If no judicial certainty can be had as to its meaning, the court is not at liberty to
o Verba legis non est recedendum – from the words of a statute there should be supply nor to make one
no departure
Santiago v. COMELEC
o Thus, what is not clearly provided in the law cannot be extended to those
matters outside its scope • In this case, the Court adopted a literal meaning thus, concluded that RA 6735
is inadequate to implement the power of the people to amend the Constitution
• Judicial legislation – an encroachment upon legislative prerogative to define the (initiative on amendments) for the following reasons:
wisdom of the law
o Does not suggest an initiative on amendments on to the Constitution because it
o Courts must administer the law as they find it without regard to consequences is silent as to amendments on the Constitution and the word “Constitution” is
neither germane nor relevant to said section
National Federation of Labor v. NLRC
o Does not provide for the contents of a petition for initiative on the Constitution
• Employees were claiming separation pay on the basis of Art. 283 Labor Code
which states that “employer MAY also terminate the employment of an employee” o Does not provide for subtitles for initiative on the Constitution
for reasons therein by serving notice thereof and paying separation pay to
affected employees o RA is incomplete and does not provide a sufficient standard

• There was compulsory acquisition by the government of the employer’s land • Justice Puno dissents:
(Patalon Coconut Estate) for purposes of agrarian reform which forced the
employer to cease his operation o Legislative intent is also shown by the deliberations on the bill that became RA
6735… (There are 4 more reasons – see page 130-131)
• Issue: whether or not employer is liable for separation pay?
• Interpretation of RA 6735 was not in keeping with the maxim interpretation
• Held: NO, employer is not liable for separation pay! fienda est ut res magis valeat quam pereat – that interpretation as will give the
thing efficacy is to be adopted
o It is a unilateral and voluntary act by the employer if he wants to give
separation pay What is within the spirit is within the law

o This is gleaned from the wording “MAY” in the statute • Don’t literally construe the law if it will render it meaningless, lead to ambiguity,
injustice or contradiction
o “MAY” denotes that it is directory in nature and generally permissive only
• The spirit of the law controls its letter
o Plain-meaning rule is applicable
• Ratio legis – interpretation according to the spirit or reason of the law
o Ano yun, ipapasara ng government tapos magbabayad pa ang employer ng
separation pay?!? Ang daya-daya! Lugi na nga si employer, kikita pa si • Spirit or intention of a statute prevails over the letter
employee?!? Unfair! Cannot be! No! No!
• A law should accordingly be so construed as to be in accordance with, and not
o To depart from the meaning expressed by the words is to alter the statute, to repugnant to, the spirit of the law
legislate and not interpret
• Presumption: undesirable consequences were never intended by a legislative
o Maledicta est exposition quae corrumpit textum – dangerous construction measure
which is against the text
Literal import must yield to intent
Dura lex sed lex
• Verba intentioni, non e contra, debent inservire – words ought to be more
• Dura lex sed lex – the law may be harsh but it is still the law subservient to the intent and not the intent to the words

• Absoluta sentential expositore non indigent – when the language of the law is • Guide in ascertaining intent – conscience and equity
clear, no explanation of it is required
• So it is possible that a statute may be extended to cases not within the literal
• When the law is clear, it is not susceptible of interpretation. It must be applied meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent
regardless of who may be affected, even if it may be harsh or onerous
Limitation of rule
• Hoc quidem perquam durum est, sed ital ex scripta est – it is exceedingly hard
but so the law is written • Construe (intent over letter) only if there is ambiguity!

• A decent regard to the legislative will should inhibit the court from engaging in Construction to accomplish purpose
judicial legislation to change what it thinks are unrealistic statutes that do not
conform with ordinary experience or • PURPOSE or REASON which induced the enactment of the statute – key to
open the brain of the legislature/ legislative intent!
• If there is a need to change the law, amend or repeal it, remedy may be done
through a legislative process, not by judicial decree • Statutes should be construed in the light of the object to be achieved and the
evil or mischief to be suppressed
• As between two statutory interpretations, that which better serves the purpose • Purpose or object of the law – to protect large cattle against theft and to make
of the law should prevail easy recovery and return of such cattle to their owners, when lost, strayed or
stolen
Sarcos v. Castillo
• Issue: whether the slaughter of large cattle outside the municipal
• This case explains why legislative purpose to determine legislative intent slaughterhouse without a permit by the municipal treasurer is prohibited?

• Frankfurter • Held: YES! Outside or inside without permit is prohibited

o Legislative words are not inert but derived vitality from the obvious purposes at Bocobo v. Estanislao
which they are aimed
• Issue: whether the CFI and a municipal court in the capital of a province have
o Legislation – working instrument of government and not merely as a collection concurrent jurisdiction over the crime of libel
of
• RPC – grants jurisdiction with CFI
English words
• Judiciary Act grants jurisdiction with the municipal court in the capital of a
• Benjamin Natham Cardozo province in offenses where the penalty is not more than prission correctional or
fine not exceeding 6,000Php (penalty for libel)
o Legislation is more than a composition
Godines v. CA
o It is an active instrument of government which means that laws have ends to be
achieved • Patent Law – grants the patentee the exclusive right to make, use, and sell his
patented machine, article or product xxx
• Holmes
• Doctrine of equivalents – when a device appropriates a prior invention by
o Words are flexible incorporating its innovative concept, and albeit with some modification and
change, performs substantially the same function in substantially the same way
o The general purpose is a more important aid to the meaning than any rule to achieve substantially the same result
which grammar or formal logic may lay down
Planters Association of Southern Negros, Inc. v. Ponferrada
o Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of law where those
words import a policy that goes beyond them • 2 apparently conflicting provisions should be construed as to realize the
purpose of the law
Soriano v. Offshore Shipping and Manning Corp
• The purpose of the law is to INCREASE the worker’s benefits
• A literal interpretation is to be rejected if it would be unjust or lead to absurd
results • Benefits under RA 6982 shall be IN ADDITION to the benefits under RA 809
and PD 621
Illustration of rule
• “Substituted” cannot be given literal interpretation
King v. Hernandez
When reason of law ceases, law itself ceases
• Issue: whether or not a Chinese may be employed in a non-control position in a
retail establishment, a wholly nationalized business under RA 1180 Retail Trade • The reason which induced the legislature to enact a law is the heart of the law
Law (It has been repealed by the Retail Trade Liberalization Act)
• Cessante ratione legis, cessat et ipsa lex – when the reason of the law ceases,
• Held: No. the law has to be construed with the Anti- the law itself ceases

Dummy Law – prohibiting an alien from intervening in the management, • Ratio legis est anima – reason of the law is its soul
operation, administration or control thereof
Peo v. Almuete
• When the law says you cannot employ such alien, you cannot employ an alien!
The unscrupulous alien may resort to flout the law or defeat its purpose! • Agricultural Tenancy Act is repealed by the Agricultural Land Reform Code

• It is imperative that the law be interpreted in a manner that would stave off any • Agricultural Tenancy Act – punishes pre-reaping or pre-threshing of palay on a
attempt at circumvention of the legislative purpose date other than that previously set without the mutual consent of the landlord and
tenant
Bustamante v. NLRC
o Share tenancy relationship
• Issue: how to compute for back wages to which an illegally dismissed employee
would be entitled until his actual reinstatement (take note of this case... it’s a • Agricultural Land Reform Code – abolished share tenancy relationship, thus
labor case) does not punish prereaping or prethreshing of palay on a date other than that
previously set without the mutual consent of the landlord and tenant anymore
• 3 ways:
o Leasehold system
o 1st – before Labor Code – to be deducted from the amount of backwages is the
earnings elsewhere during the period of illegal dismissal Commendador v. De Villa

o 2nd – Labor Code Art. 279 – the amount of backwages is fixed without • Issue: whether PD 39, which withdrew the right to peremptorily challenge
deductions or qualifications but limited to not more than 3 years members of a military tribunal, had been rendered inoperative by PD 2045
proclaiming the termination of a state of martial law
o 3rd – amended Art. 279 – full backwages or without deductions from the time
the laborer’s compensation was withheld until his actual reinstatement • Held: YES! The termination of the martial law and the dissolution of military
tribunals created thereunder, the reason for the existence of PD 39 ceased
• The clear legislative intent of the amendment in RA 6715 (Labor Code) is to automatically and the decree itself ceased
give more benefits to workers than was previously given them under the Mercury
Drug rule or the 1st way Vasquez v. Giap

US v. Toribio • Where the mischief sought to be remedied by a statute has already been
removed in a given situation, the statute may no longer apply in such case
• The prohibition of the slaughter of carabaos for human consumption so long as
these animals are fit for agricultural work/ draft purposes was a “reasonable • The law bans aliens from acquiring and owning lands, the purpose is to
necessary limitation” on private ownership preserve the nation’s lands for future generations of Filipinos
• A sale of land in favor of an alien, in violation of the said law, no longer be o Prescription shall begin to run from
questioned after the alien becomes a Filipino citizen
 The day of the commission of the violation
Supplying legislative omission  From the time of discovery AND institution of judicial proceedings for
investigation and punishment
• xxx if it is clearly ascertainable from the CONTEXT!
• But the prevailing rule is that prescriptive period is tolled upon the institution of
• May supply legislative omission to make the statute conform to obvious intent of judicial proceedings – an act of grace by the State
the legislature or to prevent the act from being absurd
• Court held that the phrase “institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation
• Note: differentiate from judicial legislation and punishment” may be either disregarded as surplusage or should be deemed
preceded by the word “until”
Correcting clerical errors
Oliveros v. Villaluz
• As long as the meaning intended is apparent on the face of the whole
enactment and no specific provision is abrogated • Issue: whether or not the suspension order against an elective official following
an information for violation of the Anti-Graft law filed against him, applies not only
• This is not judicial legislation to the current term of office but also to another term if the accused run for
reelection and won
Illustration rule
• Sec 13 of the Anti-Graft Law – suspension unless acquitted, reinstated!
Rufino Lopez & Sons, Inc. v. CTA
• Held: only refers to the current term of the suspended officer (and not to a future
• Court change the phrase “collector of customs” to “commissioner of customs” to unknown and uncertain new term unless supplemented by a new suspension
correct an obvious mistake in law order in the event of reelection) for if his term shall have expired at the time of
acquittal, he would obviously be no longer entitled to reinstatement; otherwise it
• Sec 7 – “commissioner of customs” – grants the CTA jurisdiction to review will lead to absurdities
decisions of the Commissioner of Customs
Peo v. Yu Hai
• Sec 11 – “collector of customs” – refers to the decision of the Collector of
Customs that may be appealed to the tax court • Issue: when does a crime punishable by arresto menor prescribe?

• “Commissioner” prevails – Commissioner of Customs has supervision and • State says 10 years as provided for in Art 90 RPC
control over Collectors of Customs and the decisions of the latter are reviewable
by the Commissioner of Customs o Art. 26 (correctional offenses) – max fine of 200Php – correctional penalty –
prescribes in 10 years (Art. 90)
Lamp v. Phipps
• Court held that this is not right!!!! It is wrong!
• “Ordinary COURTS of law” to “Ordinary COURSE of law”
o Art. 9 (light offenses) – not more than 200Php – light felonies – 2 months
Farinas v. Barba
o 1Php makes a difference of 9 years and 10 months!
• Issue: who is the appointing power to fill a vacancy created by the sanggunian
member who did not belong to any political party, under the provision of the Local o Arresto mayor (correctional penalty) prescribes in 5 years
Government Code
o Less grave – prescribe even shorter
• “local chief executive” – a misnomer
o Also, prescriptive period cannot be ascertained not until the court decides
• It should be “authorities concerned” which of the alternative penalties should be imposed

• Because the President is not a “local chief executive” but under Sec. 50 of the Peo v. Reyes
Local Government Code, the “President, Governor, Mayor have the executive
power to appoint in order to fill vacancies in local councils or to suspend local • Dangerous Drugs Act
officials
• RA 7659
Qualification of rule (of correcting clerical errors)
o X < 200 grams – max penalty is reclusion perpetua
• Only those which are clearly clerical errors or obvious mistakes, omissions, and
misprints; otherwise, is to rewrite the law and invade the domain of the o X > 200 grams – min penalty is reclusion perpetua
legislature, it is judicial legislation in the guise of interpretation
• Court ruled that:
Construction to avoid absurdity
o X < 200 grams – penalty ranging from prision correctional to reclusion temporal
• Reason: it is always presumed that the legislature intended exceptions to its
language which would avoid consequences of this character  134-199grams – reclusion temporal
 66-133 – prison mayor
• Thus, statutes may be extended to cover cases not within the literal meaning of  Less than 66 grams – prision correcional
the terms if their exact and literal import would lead to absurd or mischievous
results • StatCon – duty of the court to harmonize conflicting provisions to give effect to
the whole law; to effectuate the intention of legislature
• Interpretation talis in ambiguis simper fienda est ut evitetur inconveniens et
absurdum – where there is ambiguity, such interpretation as will avoid Malonzo v. Zamora
inconvenience and absurdity is to be adopted
• Contention: the City Counsel of Caloocan cannot validly pass an ordinance
• Courts test the law by its results – if law appears to be arbitrary, courts are not appropriating a supplemental budget for the purpose of expropriating a certain
bound to apply it in slavish disobedience to its language parcel of land, without first adopting or updating its house rules of procedure
within the first 90 days following the election of its members, as required by Secs.
• Courts should construe a statute to effectuate, and not to defeat, its provisions; 50 and 52 of the LGC
nor render compliance with its provisions impossible to perform
• Court said this is absurd!!!! Contention is rejected!
Peo v. Duque
o Adoption or updating of house rules would necessarily entail work… local
• Surplusage!!! council’s hands were tied and could not act on any other matter if we hold the
absurd contention!
• Sec. 2 of Act No. 3326 – prescription of offenses
Construction to avoid injustice • BSP rejected the writ of attachment alleging Sec 113 of the Central Bank
Circular No. 960 (applicable to transient foreigners)
• Presumption – legislature did not intend to work a hardship or an oppressive
result, a possible abuse of authority or act of oppression, arming one person with • Issue: whether the dollar bank deposit in a Philippine bank of a foreign tourist
a weapon to impose hardship on the other can be attached to satisfy the moral damages awarded in favor of the latter’s 12-
year-old rape victim
• Ea est accipienda interpretation quae vitio caret – that interpretation is to be
adopted which is free from evil or injustice • BSP did not honor the writ of attachment pursuant to RA6426 Sec 8 – “foreign
currency deposits shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other
Amatan v. Aujero order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any
administrative body whatsoever”
• Rodrigo Umpad was charged with homicide
o Court applied the principles of right and justice to prevail over the strict and
• Pursuant to some provision in criminal procedure, he entered into a plea literal words of the statute
bargaining agreement, which the judge approved of, downgrading the offense
charge of homicide to attempted homicide to which Umpad pleaded guilty o The purpose of RA 6426 to exempt such assets from attachment: at the time
thereto. the said law was enacted, the country’s economy was in a shambles. But in the
present time it is still in shambles but in the present time, the country has
• Fiat justicia, ruat coelum – let the right be done, though the heavens fall recovered economically. No reason why such assets cannot be attached
especially if it would satisfy a judgment to award moral damages to a 12-year-old
• Stated differently, when a provision of the law is silent or ambiguous, judges rape victim!
ought to invoke a solution responsive to the vehement urge of conscience
Surplusage and superfluity disregarded
Peo v. Purisima
• Where a word, phrase or clause in a statute is devoid of meaning in relation to
• It was contended that PD 9(3) – is a malum prohibitum; thus intent to use such the context or intent of the statute, or where it suggests a meaning that nullifies
prohibited weapons is immaterial by reason of public policy the statute or renders it without sense, the word, phrase or clause may be
rejected as surplusage and entirely ignored
• Court said that use the preamble to construe such act whether penalized or not
• Surplusagium non noceat – surplusage does not vitiate a statute
• Moreover the court said that legislature did not intend injustice, absurdity and
contradiction • Utile per inutile non vitiatur – nor is the useful vitated by the non-useful

• Court gave an example… Demafiles v. COMELEC

o So if I borrowed a bolo then I return this to my lender, then in the course or my • Issue: whether a pre-proclamation election case has become moot because the
journey I’m caught, I’m penalized under the Decree for 5-10 years imprisonment! proclaimed winner had immediately taken his oath pursuant to Sec 2 RA 4870
which provides that the “first mayor, vice-mayor and councilors of the municipality
Ursua v. CA of Sebaste shall be elected in the next general elections for local officials and
shall have qualified”
• Issue: whether or not the isolated use, at one instance, of a name other than a
person’s true name to secure a copy of a document from a government agency, • It was contended that “shall have qualified” begins immediately after their
constitutes violation of CA 142 – Anti-alias Law proclamation!

• Held: NO! • Court held that this is wrong!

o The purpose of the Anti-alias Law is to prevent confusion and fraud in business o The said phrase is a jargon and does not warrant the respondent’s reading that
transactions the term of office of the first municipal officials of Sebaste begins immediately
after their proclamation
o Such isolated use of a different name is not prohibited by the law; otherwise,
injustice, absurdity and contradiction will result o The King in ‘Alice in Wonderland’: if there is no meaning in it, that saves a
world of trouble, you know, as we need not try to find any
Construction to avoid danger to public interest
o Apply the general rule when such term begin – the term of municipal officials
Co Kim Cham v. Valdez Tan Keh shall begin on the 1st day of January following their election
• “processes” in the proclamation that “all laws regulations and processes” of the Redundant words may be rejected
so-called RP during the Japanese occupation of the country “are null and void
and without legal effect” MAY NOT be construed to embrace JUDICIAL • Obscure or missing word or false description may not preclude construction
PROCESSES as this would lead to great inconvenience and public hardship and
public interest would be endangered • Falsa demonstration non nocet, cum de corpore constat – false description
does not preclude construction nor vitiate the meaning of the statute which is
o Criminals freed otherwise clear

o Vested right, impaired Exemption from rigid application of law

Construction in favor of right and justice • Ibi quid generaliter conceditur – every rule is not without an exception
• Art. 10 CC: In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is • Inest haec exception, si non aliquid sit contras jus basque – where anything is
presumed that the law-making body intended right and justice to prevail granted generally, this exception is implied

• Art. 9 CC: The fact that a statute is silent, obscure, or insufficient with respect to • Compelling reasons may justify reading an exception to a rule even where the
a question before the court will not justify the latter from declining to render latter does not provide any; otherwise the rigor of the law would become the
judgment thereon highest injustice – summum jus, summa injuria

• In balancing conflicting solutions, that one is perceived to tip the scales which Law does not require the impossible
the court believes will best promote the public welfare is its probable operation as
a general rule or principle • Nemo tenetur ad impossible – the law obliges no one to perform an impossibility

Salvacion v. BSP • Impossibilium nulla obligation est – no obligation to do an impossible thing

• Greg Bartelli raped his alleged niece 10 times and detained her in his apartment • Impossible compliance versus Substantial compliance (as required by law)
for 4 days
Lim co Chui v Posadas
• Court gave a favorable judgment of more than 1MPhp
• Publication in the Official Gazette weekly, for three times and consecutively, to o A coterminous employee is no different from a casual or temporary employee,
acquire jurisdiction over naturalization case and by necessary implication, the inclusion of the latter in the class of
government employees entitled to the benefits of the law necessarily implies that
• It was an impossibility to fulfill such requirement as the OG was not, at the time, the former should also be entitled to such benefits
published weekly
o Wrong application of the maxim “expresio uniusest exclusion alterius”
• Thus, Court held that compliance with the other 2 requirements would be
deemed sufficient to acquire jurisdiction over the naturalization case Remedy implied from a right

Akbayan v. COMELEC • Ubi jus, ibi remedium - where there is a right, there is a remedy for violation
thereof
• This case is about the statutory grant of stand-by power to the COMELEC as
provided for in Sec. 28 RA 8436 • Right -> Obligation -> Remedy

• Petitioners were asking the respondent to exercise such power so as to • The fact that the statute is silent as to the remedy does not preclude him from
accommodate potential voters who were not able to register for the upcoming vindicating his right, for such remedy is implied from such right
election
• Once a right is established, the way must be cleared for its enforcement, and
• COMELEC denied the petition alleging the impossibility of late registration to technicalities in procedure, judicial as well as administrative, must give way
accommodate potential voters
• Where there is “wrong,” (deprivation or violation of a right) there is a remedy
• Court ruled that the provision must be given such interpretation that is in
accordance with logic, common sense, reasonableness and practicality • If there’s no right, principle does not apply

• Where time constraint and the surrounding circumstances make it impossible or Batungbakal v National Development Co
the COMELEC to conduct special registration of voters, the COMELEC cannot
be faulted for refusing to do so, for the law does not require the impossible to be • Petitioner was suspended and removed from office which proved to be illegal
done; there is no obligation to hope the impossible thing and violative not only of the Administrative Code but of the Constitution itself

• COMELEC’s decision is sustained • Court ruled that to remedy the evil and wrong committed, there should be
reinstatement and payment of backwages, among other things
Number and gender of words
• However, there was a legal problem as to his reinstatement, for when he was
• When the context of a statute so indicates, words in plural include the singular, suspended and eventually dismissed, somebody was appointed to his position
and vice versa.
• Issue: whether remedy is denied petitioner
• A plural word in a statute may thus apply to a singular person or thing, just as a
singular word may embrace two or more persons or things • Held: position was never “vacant”. Since there is no vacancy, the present
incumbent cannot be appointed permanently. The incumbent is only holding a
• Art. 996 CC – (law on succession) such article also applies to a situation where temporary position. Moreover, the incumbent’s being made to leave the post to
there is only one child because “children” includes “child” give way to the employee’s superior right may be considered as removal for
cause
• Election Code – “candidate” comprehends “some candidates” or “all candidates”
Grant of jurisdiction
• On gender – the masculine, but not the feminine, includes all genders, unless
the context in which the word is used in the statute indicates otherwise • Conferred only by the Constitution or by statute

IMPLICATIONS • Cannot be conferred by the Rules of Court

Doctrine of necessary implication • Cannot be implied from the language of a statute, in the absence of clear
legislative intent to that effect
• So-called gaps in the law develop as the law is enforced
Pimentel v. COMELEC
• StatCon rule: to fill in the gap is the doctrine of necessary implication
• COMELEC has appellate jurisdiction over election cases filed with and decided
• Doctrine states that what is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that by the RTC involving municipal elective officials DOES NOT IMPLY the grant of
which is expressed authority upon the COMELEC to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition or
mandamus concerning said election cases
• Ex necessitate legis – from the necessity of the law
Peo v. Palana
• Every statutory grant of power, right or privilege is deemed to include all
incidental power, right or privilege • Statute grants a special court jurisdiction over criminal cases involving offenders
under 16 at the time of the filing of the action, a subsequent statute defining a
• In eo quod plus sit, simper inest et minus – greater includes the lesser youthful offender as one who is over 9 but below 21 years of age may not be so
construed as to confer by implication upon said special court the authority to try
• Necessity – cases involving offenders 16 but below 21 years of age

o includes such inferences as may be logically be drawn from the purpose or What may be implied from grant of jurisdiction?
object of the statute, from what the legislature must be presumed to have
intended, and from the necessity of making the statute effective and operative • The grant of jurisdiction to try actions carries with it all necessary and incidental
powers to employ all writs, processes and other means essential to make its
o excludes what is merely plausible, beneficial, or desirable jurisdiction effective

• must be consistent with the Constitution or to existing laws • Where a court has jurisdiction over the main cause of action, it can grant reliefs
incidental thereto, even if they would otherwise be outside its jurisdiction
• An implication which is violative of the law is unjustified or unwarranted
o E.g. forcible entry and detainer is cognizable in MTC… MTC can order
Chua v. Civil Service Commission payment of rentals even though the amount exceeds the jurisdictional amount
cognizable by them, the same merely incidental to the principal action
• Issue: whether a coterminous employee, or one whose appointment is co-
existent with the duration of a government project, who has been employed as • Statutes conferring jurisdiction to an administrative agency must be liberally
such for more than 2 years, is entitled to early retirement benefits under Sec 2 construed to enable the agency to discharge its assigned duties in accordance
RA 6683 with the legislative purpose

• Court held that YES, Chua is entitled!

o E.g. the power granted the NHA to hear and decide claims involving refund and • Public policy requires that parties to an act prohibited by statute be left where
any other claims filed xxx, include attorney’s fees and other damages they are, to make the statute effective and to accomplish its object

Grant of power includes incidental power o Party to an illegal contract cannot come to court of law and ask that his illegal
object be carried out
• Where a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power
necessary for the exercise of one or the performance of the other is also o A citizen who sold his land to an alien in violation of the constitutional restriction
conferred cannot annul the same and recover the land, for both seller and buyer are guilty
of having violated the Constitution
• The incidental powers are those which are necessarily included in, and are
therefore of lesser degree than the power granted Two (2) Exceptions to the rule

o Examples • Pari delicto doctrine will not apply when its enforcement or application will
violate an avowed fundamental policy or public interest
 Power to establish an office includes authority to abolish it, unless xxx
 Warrant issued shall be made upon probable cause determined by the Delos Santos v. Roman Catholic Church
judge xxx implies the grant of power to the judge to conduct preliminary
investigations • Homestead Law – to give and preserve in the homesteader and his family a
 Power to approve a license includes by implication the power to revoke it piece of land for his house and cultivation

• Power to revoke is limited by the authority to grant license, from which it is • The law prohibits the alienation of a homestead within 5 years following the
derived issuance of the patent and provides that any contract of a conveyance in
contravention thereof shall be null and void
 Power to deport includes the power to arrest undesirable aliens after
investigation • The seller or his heirs, although in pari delicto, may recover the land subject of
 Power to appoint vested in the President includes the power to make such illegal sale
temporary appointments, unless xxx
 Power to appropriate money includes power to withdraw unexpended Barsobia v. Cuenco
money already appropriated
 Etc… see page 171-172 • Another exception is that when the transaction is not illegal per se but merely
prohibited and the prohibition by law is designed for protection of one party, the
Grant of power excludes greater power court may grant relief in favor of the latter

• The principle that the grant of power includes all incidental powers necessary to What cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly
make the exercise thereof effective implies the exclusion of those which are
greater than that conferred • Quando aliquid prohibetur ex directo, prohibetur et per obliquum – what cannot,
by law, be done directly cannot be done indirectly
o Power of supervision DOES NOT INCLUDE power to suspend or removal
Peo v. Concepcion
o Power to reorganize DOES NOT INCLUDE the authority to deprive the courts
certain jurisdiction and to transfer it to a quasi-judicial tribunal • Where a corporation is forbidden from doing an act, the prohibition extends to
the board of directors and to each director separately and individually
o Power to regulate business DOES NOT INCLUDE power to prohibit
• Where the board of directors is prohibited from granting loans to its director, a
What is implied should not be against the law loan to a partnership of which the wife of a director is a partner falls within the
prohibition
• Power to appoint includes power to suspend or remove – Constitutional
restriction of CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES, that it must be a cause provided for Peoples Bank and Trust Co. v. PNB
by law precludes such implication (unless the appointment was made outside the
civil service law • Where a statute prohibits the payment of the principal obligation during a fixed
period, the interest thereon during the existence of the restriction is not
• Power to appoint a public officer by the President includes power to remove demandable

o Provided that such removal is made with just cause Cruz v. Tantuico

o Except is such statute provides that term of office to be at the pleasure of the • Law exempts retirement benefits of a public officer or employee from
appointing officer, power to appoint carries with it power to remove anytime attachment, garnishment etc

• Power to investigate officials DOES NOT INCLUDE the power to delegate the • Earlier law authorizes the government to withhold an amount due such officer or
authority to take testimony of witnesses whose appearance may be required by employee to pay his indebtedness to the government SHOULD NOT BE
the compulsory process of subpoena. Nor does such power to investigate include CONSTRUED to withhold so much of his retirement benefits as this amount to
the power to delegate the authority to administer oath attachment garnishment etc.

Authority to charge against public funds may not be implied Tantuico, Jr. v Domingo

• It is well-settled that unless a statute expressly so authorizes, no claim against • Law exempts retirement benefits of a public officer or employee from
public funds may be allowed attachment, garnishment etc

o Statute grants leave privileges to APPOINTIVE officials, this cannot be • Government cannot withhold payment of retirement benefits of a public officer
construed to include ELECTIVE officials until his accountabilities with the government shall have been cleared, as such
action is doing indirectly what the government is prohibited from doing directly
o “employer” to pay 13th month pay, does not imply that it includes “government
There should be no penalty from compliance with law
Illegality of act implied from prohibition
• A person who complies with what a statute requires cannot, by implication, be
• In pari delicto potior est conditio defendentis - where a statute prohibits the penalized thereby
doing of an act, the act done in violation thereof is by implication null and void
• For “simple logic and fairness and reason cannot countenance an exaction or a
• Prohibited act cannot serve as foundation of a cause of action for relief penalty for an act faithfully done in compliance with the law”

• Ex dolo malo non oritur actio – no man can be allowed to found a claim upon
his own wrongdoing or inequity

• Nullus coomodum capere potest de injuria sua propria – no man should be

allowed to take advantage of his own wrong