G.R. No. 179267. June 25, 2013.: - en Banc

7/9/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 699
G.R. No. 179267. June 25, 2013.*
JESUS C. GARCIA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE

RAY ALAN T. DRILON, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court-Branch 41, Bacolod City, and ROSALIE JAYPE-
GARCIA, for herself and in behalf of minor children,
namely: JO-ANN, JOSEPH EDUARD, JESSE ANTHONE,
all surnamed GARCIA, respondents.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Courts; Family Courts;

Family Courts Act of 1997 (R.A. No. 8369); It must be stressed that
Family Courts are special courts, of the same level as Regional
Trial Courts. Under R.A. 8369, otherwise known as the “Family
Courts Act of 1997,” family courts have exclusive original
jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of domestic violence against
women and children.—At the outset, it must be stressed that
Family Courts are special courts, of the same level as Regional
Trial Courts. Under R.A. 8369, otherwise known as the “Family
Courts Act of 1997,” family courts have exclusive original
jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of domestic violence against
women and children. In accordance with said law, the Supreme
Court designated from among the branches of the Regional Trial
Courts at least one Family Court in each of several key cities
identified. To achieve harmony with the first mentioned law,
Section 7 of R.A. 9262 now provides that Regional Trial Courts
designated as Family Courts shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction over cases of VAWC defined under the latter law.
Same; Same; Same; Regional Trial Courts; It is settled that
Regional Trial Courts have jurisdiction to resolve the
constitutionality of a statute, “this authority being embraced in the
general definition of the judicial power to determine what are the
valid and binding laws by the criterion of their conformity to the
fundamental law.”—Inspite of its designation as a family court,
the RTC of Bacolod City remains possessed of authority as a court
of general original jurisdiction to pass upon all kinds of cases
whether civil, criminal, special proceedings, land registration,
guardianship, naturalization, admiralty or insolvency. It is settled
that RTCs have jurisdiction to re-
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* EN BANC.
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solve the constitutionality of a statute, “this authority being

embraced in the general definition of the judicial power to
determine what are the valid and binding laws by the criterion of
their conformity to the fundamental law.” The Constitution vests
the power of judicial review or the power to declare the
constitutionality or validity of a law, treaty, international or
executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation not only in this Court, but in all RTCs.
We said in J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. CA, 3 SCRA 696 (1961),
that, “[p]lainly the Constitution contemplates that the inferior
courts should have jurisdiction in cases involving constitutionality
of any treaty or law, for it speaks of appellate review of final
judgments of inferior courts in cases where such constitutionality
happens to be in issue.”
Same; Violence Against Women and Children; Section 20 of
A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the Rule on Violence Against Women and
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016bd6d9c678a7d18796003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/97
Their Children, lays down a new kind of procedure requiring the
respondent to file an opposition to the petition and not an answer.
—Section 20 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the Rule on Violence
Against Women and Their Children, lays down a new kind of
procedure requiring the respondent to file an opposition to the
petition and not an answer. Thus: SEC. 20. Opposition to petition.
—(a) The respondent may file an opposition to the petition which
he himself shall verify. It must be accompanied by the affidavits
of witnesses and shall show cause why a temporary or permanent
protection order should not be issued; (b) Respondent shall not
include in the opposition any counterclaim, cross-claim or
third-party complaint, but any cause of action which could be
the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action.
Same; Civil Procedure; Cause of Action; The
unconstitutionality of a statute is not a cause of action that could
be the subject of a counterclaim, cross-claim or a third-party
complaint.—We cannot subscribe to the theory espoused by
petitioner that, since a counterclaim, cross-claim and third-party
complaint are to be excluded from the opposition, the issue of
constitutionality cannot likewise be raised therein. A
counterclaim is defined as any claim for money or other relief
which a defending party may have against an opposing party. A
crossclaim, on the other hand, is any claim by one party against
a co-party arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the
subject matter either of the original action or of a counterclaim
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therein. Finally, a third-party complaint is a claim that a

defending party may, with leave of court, file against a person not
a party to the action for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or
any other relief, in respect of his opponent’s claim. As pointed out
by Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, the unconstitutionality
of a statute is not a cause of action that could be the subject of a
counterclaim, cross-claim or a third-party complaint. Therefore, it
is not prohibited from being raised in the opposition in view of the
familiar maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
Same; Evidence; Constitutional Law; The question relative to
the constitutionality of a statute is one of law which does not need
to be supported by evidence.—That the proceedings in Civil Case
No. 06-797 are summary in nature should not have deterred
petitioner from raising the same in his Opposition. The question
relative to the constitutionality of a statute is one of law which
does not need to be supported by evidence.
Same; Temporary Protection Order (TPO); If a temporary
protection order issued is due to expire, the trial court may extend
or renew the said order for a period of thirty (30) days each time
until final judgment is rendered.—To obviate potential dangers
that may arise concomitant to the conduct of a hearing when
necessary, Section 26 (b) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC provides that if
a temporary protection order issued is due to expire, the trial
court may extend or renew the said order for a period of thirty
(30) days each time until final judgment is rendered. It may
likewise modify the extended or renewed temporary protection
order as may be necessary to meet the needs of the parties. With
the private respondent given ample protection, petitioner could
proceed to litigate the constitutional issues, without necessarily
running afoul of the very purpose for the adoption of the rules on
summary procedure.
Same; Provisional Remedies; Injunction; Temporary
Protection Order (TPO); It bears stressing that protection orders
are granted ex parte so as to protect women and their children
from acts of violence. To issue an injunction against such orders
will defeat the very purpose of the law against Violence Against
Women and Children.—As the rules stand, a review of the case by
appeal or certiorari before judgment is prohibited. Moreover, if
the appeal of a judgment granting permanent protection shall not
stay its enforcement, with more
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reason that a TPO, which is valid only for thirty (30) days at a
time, should not be enjoined. The mere fact that a statute is
alleged to be unconstitutional or invalid, does not of itself entitle a
litigant to have the same enjoined. In Younger v. Harris, Jr., 27
L.Ed.2d 669 (1971), the Supreme Court of the United States
declared, thus: Federal injunctions against state criminal
statutes, either in their entirety or with respect to their separate
and distinct prohibitions, are not to be granted as a matter of
course, even if such statutes are unconstitutional. No citizen or
member of the community is immune from prosecution, in good
faith, for his alleged criminal acts. The imminence of such a
prosecution even though alleged to be unauthorized and, hence,
unlawful is not alone ground for relief in equity which exerts its
extraordinary powers only to prevent irreparable injury to the
plaintiff who seeks its aid. (Citations omitted) The sole objective
of injunctions is to preserve the status quo until the trial court
hears fully the merits of the case. It bears stressing, however, that
protection orders are granted ex parte so as to protect women and
their children from acts of violence. To issue an injunction against
such orders will defeat the very purpose of the law against
VAWC.
Constitutional Law; Separation of Powers; Courts are not
concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy, or expediency of a
statute; By the principle of separation of powers, it is the legislative
that determines the necessity, adequacy, wisdom and expediency of
any law.—It is settled that courts are not concerned with the
wisdom, justice, policy, or expediency of a statute. Hence, we dare
not venture into the real motivations and wisdom of the members
of Congress in limiting the protection against violence and abuse
under R.A. 9262 to women and children only. No proper challenge
on said grounds may be entertained in this proceeding. Congress
has made its choice and it is not our prerogative to supplant this
judgment. The choice may be perceived as erroneous but even
then, the remedy against it is to seek its amendment or repeal by
the legislative. By the principle of separation of powers, it is the
legislative that determines the necessity, adequacy, wisdom and
expediency of any law. We only step in when there is a violation of
the Constitution. However, none was sufficiently shown in this
case.
Same; Equal Protection of the Laws; Equal protection simply
requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be
treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities im-
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posed.—Equal protection simply requires that all persons or

things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed. The oft-repeated
disquisition in the early case of Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope
Workers’ Union, 59 SCRA 54 (1974), is instructive: The guaranty
of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the
application of the laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not,
therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional
prohibition against inequality, that every man, woman and child
should be affected alike by a statute. Equality of operation of
statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on persons
merely as such, but on persons according to the circumstances
surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights.
The Constitution does not require that things which are different
in fact be treated in law as though they were the same. The equal
protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that
are different. It does not prohibit legislation which is limited
either in the object to which it is directed or by the territory
within which it is to operate. The equal protection of the laws
clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in
law, as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the
grouping of things in speculation or practice because they agree
with one another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid
because of simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that
of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of
inequality in no manner determines the matter of
constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is
that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should
be based on substantial distinctions which make for real
differences; that it must be germane to the purpose of the
law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only;
and that it must apply equally to each member of the class.
This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the
classification or distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or
rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary.
Same; Same; The unequal power relationship between women
and men; the fact that women are more likely than men to be
victims of violence; and the widespread gender bias and prejudice
against women all make for real differences justifying the
classification under the law.—The unequal power relationship
between women and men; the fact that women are more likely
than men to be victims of violence; and the widespread gender
bias and prejudice against women
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all make for real differences justifying the classification under

the law. As Justice McIntyre succinctly states, “the
accommodation of differences ... is the essence of true equality.”
Same; Same; Gender-Based Violence; According to the
Philippine Commission on Women (the National Machinery for
Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment), violence against
women (VAW) is deemed to be closely linked with the unequal
power relationship between women and men otherwise known as
“gender-based violence.”—According to the Philippine Commission
on Women (the National Machinery for Gender Equality and
Women’s Empowerment), violence against women (VAW) is
deemed to be closely linked with the unequal power
relationship between women and men otherwise known as
“gender-based violence.” Societal norms and traditions dictate
people to think men are the leaders, pursuers, providers, and take
on dominant roles in society while women are nurturers, men’s
companions and supporters, and take on subordinate roles in
society. This perception leads to men gaining more power over
women. With power comes the need to control to retain that
power. And VAW is a form of men’s expression of controlling
women to retain power.
Same; Same; The enactment of R.A. 9262 aims to address the
discrimination brought about by biases and prejudices against
women.—The enactment of R.A. 9262 aims to address the
discrimination brought about by biases and prejudices against
women. As emphasized by the CEDAW Committee on the
Elimination of Discrimination against Women, addressing or
correcting discrimination through specific measures focused on
women does not discriminate against men. Petitioner’s
contention, therefore, that R.A. 9262 is discriminatory and that it
is an “anti-male,” “husband-bashing,” and “hate-men” law
deserves scant consideration. As a State Party to the CEDAW, the
Philippines bound itself to take all appropriate measures “to
modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and
women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and
customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of
the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on
stereotyped roles for men and women.” Justice Puno correctly
pointed out that “(t)he paradigm shift changing the character of
domestic violence from a private affair to a public offense will
require the development
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Garcia vs. Drilon
of a distinct mindset on the part of the police, the prosecution and

the judges.”
Same; Same; The distinction between men and women is
germane to the purpose of R.A. 9262, which is to address violence
committed against women and children, spelled out in its
Declaration of Policy.—The distinction between men and women
is germane to the purpose of R.A. 9262, which is to address
violence committed against women and children, spelled out in its
Declaration of Policy, as follows: SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.—It
is hereby declared that the State values the dignity of women and
children and guarantees full respect for human rights. The State
also recognizes the need to protect the family and its members
particularly women and children, from violence and threats to
their personal safety and security. Towards this end, the State
shall exert efforts to address violence committed against women
and children in keeping with the fundamental freedoms
guaranteed under the Constitution and the provisions of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
Convention on the Rights of the Child and other international
human rights instruments of which the Philippines is a party.
Same; Same; The application of R.A. 9262 is not limited to the
existing conditions when it was promulgated, but to future
conditions as well, for as long as the safety and security of women
and their children are threatened by violence and abuse.—The
application of R.A. 9262 is not limited to the existing conditions
when it was promulgated, but to future conditions as well, for as
long as the safety and security of women and their children are
threatened by violence and abuse. R.A. 9262 applies equally to
all women and children who suffer violence and abuse.
Statutes; An act will not be held invalid merely because it
might have been more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its
provisions.—There is nothing in the definition of VAWC that is
vague and ambiguous that will confuse petitioner in his defense.
The acts enumerated above are easily understood and provide
adequate contrast between the innocent and the prohibited acts.
They are worded with sufficient definiteness that persons of
ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited,
and need not guess at its meaning nor differ in its application.
Yet, petitioner insists that
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phrases like “depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or

her child of a legal right,” “solely controlling the conjugal or
common money or properties,” “marital infidelity,” and “causing
mental or emotional anguish” are so vague that they make every
quarrel a case of spousal abuse. However, we have stressed that
the “vagueness” doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of
certainty for the statute to be upheld — not absolute precision or
mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest.
Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, is permissible as
long as the metes and bounds of the statute are clearly delineated.
An act will not be held invalid merely because it might have been
more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions.
Criminal Law; Violence Against Women and Children;
Conspiracy; While the law provides that the offender be related or
connected to the victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual
or dating relationship, it does not preclude the application of the
principle of conspiracy under the Revised Penal Code (RPC).—
VAWC may likewise be committed “against a woman with whom
the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship.” Clearly,
the use of the gender-neutral word “person” who has or had a
sexual or dating relationship with the woman encompasses even
lesbian relationships. Moreover, while the law provides that the
offender be related or connected to the victim by marriage, former
marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude
the application of the principle of conspiracy under the
Revised Penal Code (RPC). Thus, in the case of Go-Tan v. Spouses
Tan, 567 SCRA 231 (2008), the parents-in-law of Sharica Mari L.
Go-Tan, the victim, were held to be proper respondents in the case
filed by the latter upon the allegation that they and their son (Go-
Tan’s husband) had community of design and purpose in
tormenting her by giving her insufficient financial support;
harassing and pressuring her to be ejected from the family home;
and in repeatedly abusing her verbally, emotionally, mentally and
physically.
Remedial Law; Temporary Protection Order; Words and
Phrases; A protection order is an order issued to prevent further
acts of violence against women and their children, their family or
household members, and to grant other necessary reliefs; The rules
require that petitions for protection order be in writing, signed and
verified by the petitioner thereby undertaking full responsibility,
criminal or
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civil, for every allegation therein.—A protection order is an

order issued to prevent further acts of violence against women
and their children, their family or household members, and to
grant other necessary reliefs. Its purpose is to safeguard the
offended parties from further harm, minimize any disruption in
their daily life and facilitate the opportunity and ability to regain
control of their life. “The scope of reliefs in protection orders is
broadened to ensure that the victim or offended party is afforded
all the remedies necessary to curtail access by a perpetrator to the
victim. This serves to safeguard the victim from greater risk of
violence; to accord the victim and any designated family or
household member safety in the family residence, and to prevent
the perpetrator from committing acts that jeopardize the
employment and support of the victim. It also enables the court to
award temporary custody of minor children to protect the children
from violence, to prevent their abduction by the perpetrator and
to ensure their financial support.” The rules require that petitions
for protection order be in writing, signed and verified by the
petitioner thereby undertaking full responsibility, criminal or
civil, for every allegation therein. Since “time is of the essence in
cases of VAWC if further violence is to be prevented,” the court is
authorized to issue ex parte a TPO after raffle but before notice
and hearing when the life, limb or property of the victim is in
jeopardy and there is reasonable ground to believe that the order
is necessary to protect the victim from the immediate and
imminent danger of VAWC or to prevent such violence, which is
about to recur.
Same; Same; Just like a writ of preliminary attachment which
is issued without notice and hearing because the time in which the
hearing will take could be enough to enable the defendant to
abscond or dispose of his property, in the same way, the victim of
Violence Against Women and Children may already have suffered
harrowing experiences in the hands of her tormentor, and possibly
even death, if notice and hearing were required before such acts
could be prevented.—The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot,
therefore, be challenged as violative of the right to due process.
Just like a writ of preliminary attachment which is issued
without notice and hearing because the time in which the hearing
will take could be enough to enable the defendant to abscond or
dispose of his property, in the same way, the victim of VAWC may
already have suffered harrowing experiences in the hands of her
tormentor, and possibly even death, if notice and hearing were
required before such acts could be pre-
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vented. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary

requirements of procedural due process must yield to the
necessities of protecting vital public interests, among which is
protection of women and children from violence and threats to
their personal safety and security. It should be pointed out that
when the TPO is issued ex parte, the court shall likewise order
that notice be immediately given to the respondent directing him
to file an opposition within five (5) days from service. Moreover,
the court shall order that notice, copies of the petition and TPO be
served immediately on the respondent by the court sheriffs. The
TPOs are initially effective for thirty (30) days from service on the
respondent. Where no TPO is issued ex parte, the court will
nonetheless order the immediate issuance and service of the
notice upon the respondent requiring him to file an opposition to
the petition within five (5) days from service. The date of the
preliminary conference and hearing on the merits shall likewise
be indicated on the notice.
Same; Same; The respondent of a petition for protection order
should be apprised of the charges imputed to him and afforded an
opportunity to present his side; “To be heard” does not only mean
verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also through
pleadings.—It is clear from the foregoing rules that the
respondent of a petition for protection order should be apprised of
the charges imputed to him and afforded an opportunity to
present his side. Thus, the fear of petitioner of being “stripped of
family, property, guns, money, children, job, future employment
and reputation, all in a matter of seconds, without an inkling of
what happened” is a mere product of an overactive imagination.
The essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable
opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in
support of one’s defense. “To be heard” does not only mean verbal
arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings.
Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or
pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due
process.
Same; Same; Indubitably, petitioner may be removed and
excluded from private respondent’s residence, regardless of
ownership, only temporarily for the purpose of protecting the
latter. Such removal and exclusion may be permanent only where
no property rights are violated.—Petitioner next laments that the
removal and exclusion of the respondent in the VAWC case from
the residence of the
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victim, regardless of ownership of the residence, is virtually a

“blank check” issued to the wife to claim any property as her
conjugal home. The wording of the pertinent rule, however, does
not by any stretch of the imagination suggest that this is so. It
states: SEC. 11. Reliefs available to the offended party.—The
protection order shall include any, some or all of the following
reliefs: x x x x (c) Removing and excluding the respondent from
the residence of the offended party, regardless of ownership of the
residence, either temporarily for the purpose of protecting the
offended party, or permanently where no property rights are
violated. If the respondent must remove personal effects from the
residence, the court shall direct a law enforcement agent to
accompany the respondent to the residence, remain there until
the respondent has gathered his things and escort him from the
residence; x x x x Indubitably, petitioner may be removed and
excluded from private respondent’s residence, regardless of
ownership, only temporarily for the purpose of protecting the
latter. Such removal and exclusion may be permanent only where
no property rights are violated. How then can the private
respondent just claim any property and appropriate it for herself,
as petitioner seems to suggest?
Same; Same; Under Section 23(c) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC,
the court shall not refer the Violence Against Women and Children
case or any issue thereof to a mediator.—Under Section 23(c) of
A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the court shall not refer the case or any
issue thereof to a mediator. The reason behind this provision is
well-explained by the Commentary on Section 311 of the Model
Code on Domestic and Family Violence as follows: This section
prohibits a court from ordering or referring parties to mediation
in a proceeding for an order for protection. Mediation is a process
by which parties in equivalent bargaining positions voluntarily
reach consensual agreement about the issue at hand. Violence,
however, is not a subject for compromise. A process which
involves parties mediating the issue of violence implies that the
victim is somehow at fault. In addition, mediation of issues in a
proceeding for an order of protection is problematic because the
petitioner is frequently unable to participate equally with the
person against whom the protection order has been sought.
Same; Same; Barangay Protection Order (BPO); The
Barangay Protection Order issued by the Punong Barangay or, in
his unavail-
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ability, by any available Barangay Kagawad, merely orders the

perpetrator to desist from (a) causing physical harm to the woman
or her child; and (2) threatening to cause the woman or her child
physical harm. Such function of the Punong Barangay is, thus,
purely executive in nature, in pursuance of his duty under the
Local Government Code to “enforce all laws and ordinances,” and
to “maintain public order in the barangay.”—Judicial power
includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government. On the other hand, executive power “is generally
defined as the power to enforce and administer the laws. It is the
power of carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing
their due observance.” As clearly delimited by the aforequoted
provision, the BPO issued by the Punong Barangay or, in his
unavailability, by any available Barangay Kagawad, merely
orders the perpetrator to desist from (a) causing physical harm to
the woman or her child; and (2) threatening to cause the woman
or her child physical harm. Such function of the Punong Barangay
is, thus, purely executive in nature, in pursuance of his duty
under the Local Government Code to “enforce all laws and
ordinances,” and to “maintain public order in the barangay.” We
have held that “(t)he mere fact that an officer is required by law
to inquire into the existence of certain facts and to apply the law
thereto in order to determine what his official conduct shall be
and the fact that these acts may affect private rights do not
constitute an exercise of judicial powers.”
Statutes; Before a statute or its provisions duly challenged are

voided, an unequivocal breach or a clear conflict with the
Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative one, must be
demonstrated in such a manner as to leave no doubt in the mind of
the Court.—Before a statute or its provisions duly challenged are
Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative one, must
be demonstrated in such a manner as to leave no doubt in the
mind of the Court. In other words, the grounds for nullity must be
beyond reasonable doubt. In the instant case, however, no
concrete evidence and convincing arguments were presented by
petitioner to warrant a declaration of the unconstitutionality of
R.A. 9262, which is an act of Congress and signed into law by the
highest officer of the co-equal
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executive department. As we said in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan,

369 SCRA 394 (2001), courts must assume that the legislature is
ever conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary powers, and
passed laws with full knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of
promoting what is right and advancing the welfare of the
majority.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J., Concurring Opinion:
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Courts; Regional Trial
Courts; View that the Regional Trial Court (RTC), designated as a
Family Court, is vested with jurisdiction to decide issues of
constitutionality of a law, and that the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 9262 can be resolved in a summary proceeding,
in accordance with the rule that the question of constitutionality
must be raised at the earliest opportunity, otherwise it may not be
considered on appeal.—I agree with Justice Bernabe that the
RTC, designated as a Family Court, is vested with jurisdiction to
decide issues of constitutionality of a law, and that the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9262 can be resolved in a
summary proceeding, in accordance with the rule that the
question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity, otherwise it may not be considered on appeal.
Section 20 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the Rule on Republic Act No.
9262 provides: Sec. 20. Opposition to Petition.—(a) The
respondent may file an opposition to the petition which he himself
shall verify. It must be accompanied by the affidavits of witnesses
and shall show cause why a temporary or permanent protection
order should not be issued. (b) Respondent shall not include in the
opposition any counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint,
but any cause of action which could be the subject thereof
may be litigated in a separate civil action.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Temporary Protection Order; View
that the alleged unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 9262 is a
matter that would have prevented the trial court from granting the
petition for protection order against the petitioner.—The alleged
unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 9262 is a matter that
would have prevented the trial court from granting the petition
for protection order against the petitioner. Thus, petitioner should
have raised it in his Opposition as a defense against the issuance
of a protection order against him.
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Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; View that an action

questioning the constitutionality of the law cannot be filed
separately even with another branch of the RTC. This is not
technically feasible because there will be no justiciable controversy
or an independent cause of action that can be the subject of such
separate action if it were not for the issuance of the Temporary
Protection Order against the petitioner.—For all intents and
purposes, the Petition for Prohibition filed before the Court of
Appeals was precipitated by and was ultimately directed against
the issuance of the TPO, an interlocutory order, which under
Section 22(j) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC is a prohibited pleading. An
action questioning the constitutionality of the law also cannot be
filed separately even with another branch of the RTC. This is not
technically feasible because there will be no justiciable
controversy or an independent cause of action that can be the
subject of such separate action if it were not for the issuance of
the TPO against the petitioner. Thus, the controversy, subject of a
separate action, whether before the Court of Appeals or the RTC,
would still have to be the issuance of the TPO, which is the
subject of another case in the RTC.
Statutes; View that the challenge to the constitutionality of the
law must be raised at the earliest opportunity.—The challenge to
the constitutionality of the law must be raised at the earliest
opportunity. In Dasmariñas Water District v. Monterey Foods
Corporation, 565 SCRA 624 (2008), we said: A law is deemed valid
unless declared null and void by a competent court; more so when
the issue has not been duly pleaded in the trial court. The
opportunity. x x x. The settled rule is that courts will not
anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the
necessity of deciding it. (Citation omitted.) This Court held that
such opportunity is in the pleadings before a competent court that
can resolve it, such that “if it is not raised in the pleadings, it
cannot be considered at the trial, and, if not considered at the
trial, it cannot be considered on appeal.” The decision upon the
constitutional question is necessary to determine whether the
TPO should be issued against petitioner. Such question should
have been raised at the earliest opportunity as an affirmative
defense in the Opposition filed with the RTC handling the
protection order proceedings, which was the competent court to
pass upon the constitutional issue.
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Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Multiplicity of Suits; View

that the filing of a separate action before the Court of Appeals or
the RTC for the declaration of unconstitutionality of Republic Act
No. 9262 would result to multiplicity of suits. It is clear that the
issues of constitutionality and propriety of issuing a protection
order raised by petitioner are inextricably intertwined.—The filing
of a separate action before the Court of Appeals or the RTC for the
declaration of unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 9262 would
result to multiplicity of suits. It is clear that the issues of
constitutionality and propriety of issuing a protection order raised
by petitioner are inextricably intertwined. Another court, whether
it is an appellate court or a trial court, cannot resolve the
constitutionality question in the separate action without affecting
the petition for the issuance of a TPO. Bringing a separate action
for the resolution of the issue of constitutionality will result in an
unresolved prejudicial question to the validity of issuing a
protection order. If the proceedings for the protection order is not
suspended, it does create the danger of having inconsistent and
conflicting judgments between the two separate courts, whether of
the same or different levels in the judicial hierarchy. These two
judgments would eventually be the subject of separate motions for
reconsideration, separate appeals, and separate petitions for
review before this Court – the exact scenario the policy against
multiplicity of suits is avoiding. As we previously held, “the law
and the courts frown upon split jurisdiction and the resultant
multiplicity of actions.”
Procedural Rules and Technicalities; View that when public

interest requires the resolution of the constitutional issue raised,
and in keeping with the Supreme Court’s duty of determining
whether other agencies or even co-equal branches of government
have remained within the limits of the Constitution and have not
abused the discretion given them, the Court may brush aside
technicalities of procedure and resolve the constitutional issue.—
Notwithstanding my position that the Court of Appeals properly
dismissed the Petition for Prohibition because of petitioner’s
failure to raise the issue of constitutionality of Republic Act No.
9262 at the earliest opportunity, I concur that the Court, in the
exercise of its sound discretion, should still pass upon the said
issue in the present Petition. Notable is the fact that not only the
petitioner, but the private respondent as well, pray that the Court
resolve the constitutional issue considering its novelty and
paramount importance. Indeed, when public interest
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requires the resolution of the constitutional issue raised, and in

keeping with this Court’s duty of determining whether other
agencies or even co-equal branches of government have remained
within the limits of the Constitution and have not abused the
discretion given them, the Court may brush aside technicalities of
procedure and resolve the constitutional issue.
Constitutional Law; Equal Protection of the Law; View that
recent Philippine jurisprudence has recognized the need to apply
different standards of scrutiny in testing the constitutionality of
classifications.—Recent Philippine jurisprudence has recognized
the need to apply different standards of scrutiny in testing the
constitutionality of classifications. In British American Tobacco v.
Camacho, 585 SCRA 36 (2009), this Court held that since the case
therein neither involved a suspect classification nor impinged on a
fundamental right, then “the rational basis test was properly
applied to gauge the constitutionality of the assailed law in the
face of an equal protection challenge.”
Same; Same; View that in the context of the constitutional
policy to “ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women
and men” the level of scrutiny applicable, to test whether or not the
classification in Republic Act No. 9262 violates the equal
protection clause, is the middle-tier scrutiny or the intermediate
standard of judicial review.—Since statutory remedies accorded to
women are not made available to men, when the reality is that
there are men, regardless of their number, who are also suffering
from domestic violence, the rational basis test may be too wide
and liberal to justify the statutory classification which in effect
allows different treatment of men who are similarly situated. In
the context of the constitutional policy to “ensure the fundamental
equality before the law of women and men” the level of scrutiny
applicable, to test whether or not the classification in Republic
Act No. 9262 violates the equal protection clause, is the middle-
tier scrutiny or the intermediate standard of judicial
review. To survive intermediate review, the classification in the
challenged law must (1) serve important governmental objectives,
and (2) be substantially related to the achievement of those
objectives.
Same; Same; View that by constitutional mandate, the
Philippines is committed to ensure that human rights and
fundamental
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freedoms are fully enjoyed by everyone.—By constitutional

mandate, the Philippines is committed to ensure that human
rights and fundamental freedoms are fully enjoyed by everyone. It
was one of the countries that voted in favor of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which was a mere two
years after it gained independence from the United States of
America. In addition, the Philippines is a signatory to many
United Nations human rights treaties such as the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the
Convention Against Torture, and the Convention on the Rights of
the Child, among others.
Same; Same; View that the Declaration of Policy in Republic
Act No. 9262 enunciates the purpose of the said law, which is to
fulfill the government’s obligation to safeguard the dignity and
human rights of women and children by providing effective
remedies against domestic violence or physical, psychological, and
other forms of abuse perpetuated by the husband, partner, or
father of the victim.—The Declaration of Policy in Republic Act
No. 9262 enunciates the purpose of the said law, which is to fulfill
the government’s obligation to safeguard the dignity and human
rights of women and children by providing effective remedies
against domestic violence or physical, psychological, and other
forms of abuse perpetuated by the husband, partner, or father of
the victim. The said law is also viewed within the context of the
constitutional mandate to ensure gender equality, which is quoted
as follows: Section 14. The State recognizes the role of women in
nationbuilding, and shall ensure the fundamental equality before
the law of women and men.
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women (CEDAW); Republic Act No. 9262; View that
Republic Act No. 9262 can be viewed therefore as the Philippines’
compliance with the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), which is committed to
condemn discrimination against women and directs its members
to undertake, without delay, all appropriate means to eliminate
discrimination against women in all forms both in law and in
practice.—It has been acknowledged that “gender-based violence
is a form of discrimination that seriously inhibits women’s ability
to enjoy rights and freedoms on a basis of equality with men.”
Republic
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Act No. 9262 can be viewed therefore as the Philippines’

compliance with the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), which is committed
to condemn discrimination against women and directs its
members to undertake, without delay, all appropriate means to
eliminate discrimination against women in all forms both in law
and in practice. Known as the International Bill of Rights of
Women, the CEDAW is the central and most comprehensive
document for the advancement of the welfare of women. It brings
the women into the focus of human rights concerns, and its spirit
is rooted in the goals of the UN: to reaffirm faith in fundamental
human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in
the equal rights of men and women. The CEDAW, in its preamble,
explicitly acknowledges the existence of extensive
discrimination against women, and emphasized that such
is a violation of the principles of equality of rights and
respect for human dignity.
Constitutional Law; Equal Protection of the Law; Gender-
Based Violence; As one of the country’s pervasive social problems,
violence against women is deemed to be closely linked with the
unequal power relationship between women and men and is
otherwise known as “gender-based violence.”—As one of the
country’s pervasive social problems, violence against women is
deemed to be closely linked with the unequal power relationship
between women and men and is otherwise known as “gender-
based violence.” Violent acts towards women has been the subject
of an examination on a historic world-wide perspective. The
exhaustive study of a foreign history professor noted that “[f]rom
the earliest civilizations on, the subjugation of women, in the form
of violence, were facts of life,” as three great bodies of thought,
namely: Judeo-Christian religious ideas; Greek philosophy; and
the Common Law Legal Code, which have influenced western
society’s views and treatment of women, all “assumed patriarchy
as natural; that is, male domination stemming from the view of
male superiority.” It cited 18th century legal expert William
Blackstone, who explained that the common law doctrine of
coverture reflected the theological assumption that husband and
wife were ‘one body’ before God; thus “they were ‘one person’
under the law, and that one person was the husband,” a concept
that evidently found its way in some of our Civil Code provisions
prior to the enactment of the Family Code.
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Criminal Law; Violence Against Women and Children (R.A.

No. 9262); View that although there exists other laws on violence
against women in the Philippines, Republic Act No. 9262 deals
with the problem of violence within the family and intimate
relationships, which deserves special attention because it occurs in
situations or places where women and children should feel most
safe and secure but are actually not.—Preventing violence against
women and children through their availment of special legal
remedies, serves the governmental objectives of protecting the
dignity and human rights of every person, preserving the sanctity
of family life, and promoting gender equality and empowering
women. Although there exists other laws on violence against
women in the Philippines, Republic Act No. 9262 deals with the
problem of violence within the family and intimate relationships,
which deserves special attention because it occurs in situations or
places where women and children should feel most safe and
secure but are actually not. The law provides the widest range of
reliefs for women and children who are victims of violence, which
are often reported to have been committed not by strangers, but
by a father or a husband or a person with whom the victim has or
had a sexual or dating relationship. Aside from filing a criminal
case in court, the law provides potent legal remedies to the
victims that theretofore were not available. The law recognizes,
with valid factual support based on statistics that women and
children are the most vulnerable victims of violence, and therefore
need legal intervention. On the other hand, there is a dearth of
empirical basis to anchor a conclusion that men need legal
protection from violence perpetuated by women.
Temporary Protection Order (TPO); View that the law permits
the issuance of protection orders and the granting of certain reliefs
to women victims, even without a hearing; Despite the ex parte
issuance of these protection orders, the temporary nature of these
remedies allow them to be availed of by the victim without
violating the offender’s right to due process as it is only when a
full-blown hearing has been done that a permanent protection
order may be issued.—The law takes into account the pervasive
vulnerability of women and children, and the seriousness and
urgency of the situation, which, in the language of the law result
in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or
suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts,
battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of
liberty. Hence, the law permits the issuance of
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protection orders and the granting of certain reliefs to women

victims, even without a hearing. The law has granted authority
for barangay officials to issue a protection order against the
offender, based on the victim’s application. The RTC may likewise
grant an application for a temporary protection order (TPO) and
provide other reliefs, also on the mere basis of the application.
Despite the ex parte issuance of these protection orders, the
temporary nature of these remedies allow them to be availed of by
the victim without violating the offender’s right to due process as
it is only when a full-blown hearing has been done that a
permanent protection order may be issued. Thus, these remedies
are suitable, reasonable, and justified. More importantly, they
serve the objectives of the law by providing the victims necessary
immediate protection from the violence they perceive as threats to
their personal safety and security. This translates to the
fulfillment of other governmental objectives as well. By assuring
the victims instant relief from their situation, they are
consequently empowered and restored to a place of dignity and
equality. Such is embodied in the purpose to be served by a
protection order.
Criminal Law; Violence Against Women and Children (R.A.
No. 9262); View that in furtherance of the governmental objectives,
especially that of protecting human rights, violence against women
and children under this Act has been classified as a public offense,
making its prosecution independent of the victim’s initial
participation.—In furtherance of the governmental objectives,
especially that of protecting human rights, violence against
women and children under this Act has been classified as a public
offense, making its prosecution independent of the victim’s initial
participation. Verily, the classification made in Republic Act
No. 9262 is substantially related to the important
governmental objectives of valuing every person’s dignity,
respecting human rights, safeguarding family life,
protecting children, promoting gender equality, and
empowering women.
the equal protection clause in our Constitution does not guarantee
an absolute prohibition against classification.—The equal
protection clause in our Constitution does not guarantee an
absolute prohibition against classification. The non-identical
treatment of women and men under Republic Act No. 9262 is
justified to put them on
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equal footing and to give substance to the policy and aim of the
state to ensure the equality of women and men in light of the
biological, historical, social, and culturally endowed differences
between men and women. Republic Act No. 9262, by affording
special and exclusive protection to women and children, who are
vulnerable victims of domestic violence, undoubtedly serves the
important governmental objectives of protecting human rights,
insuring gender equality, and empowering women. The gender-
based classification and the special remedies prescribed by said
law in favor of women and children are substantially related, in
fact essentially necessary, to achieve such objectives. Hence, said
Act survives the intermediate review or middle-tier judicial
scrutiny. The gender-based classification therein is therefore not
violative of the equal protection clause embodied in the 1987
Constitution.
Violence Against Women and Children; Temporary Protection
Order; View that a protection order is issued under Republic Act
No. 9262 for the purpose of preventing further acts of violence
against a woman or her child.—A protection order is issued under
Republic Act No. 9262 for the purpose of preventing further acts
of violence against a woman or her child. The circumstances
surrounding the availment thereof are often attended by urgency;
thus, women and child victims must have immediate and
uncomplicated access to the same.
Same; Same; Police Power; View that Republic Act No. 9262
and its implementing regulations were enacted and promulgated
in the exercise of that pervasive, sovereign power of the State to
protect the safety, health, and general welfare and comfort of the
public (in this case, a particular sector thereof), as well as the
protection of human life, commonly designated as the police power.
—The ex parte issuance of the TPO does not make it
unconstitutional. Procedural due process refers to the method or
manner by which the law is enforced. It consists of the two basic
rights of notice and hearing, as well as the guarantee of being
heard by an impartial and competent tribunal. However, it is a
constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of
procedural due process yield to the necessities of protecting vital
public interests like those involved herein. Republic Act No. 9262
and its implementing regulations were enacted and promulgated
in the exercise of that pervasive, sovereign power of the State to
protect the safety, health, and general welfare and comfort
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of the public (in this case, a particular sector thereof), as well as

the protection of human life, commonly designated as the police
power.
Barangay Protection Order (BPO); Words and Phrases; View
that a Barangay Protection Order (BPO) refers to the protection
order issued by the Punong Barangay, or in his absence the
Barangay Kagawad, ordering the perpetrator to desist from
committing acts of violence against the family or household
members particularly women and their children.—A Barangay
Protection Order (BPO) refers to the protection order issued by
the Punong Barangay, or in his absence the Barangay Kagawad,
ordering the perpetrator to desist from committing acts of violence
against the family or household members particularly women and
their children. The authority of barangay officials to issue a BPO
is conferred under Section 14 of Republic Act No. 9262: SEC. 14.
Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs); Who May Issue and How.—
Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs) refer to the protection order
issued by the Punong Barangay ordering the perpetrator to desist
from committing acts under Section 5 (a) and (b) of this Act. A
Punong Barangay who receives applications for a BPO shall issue
the protection order to the applicant on the date of filing after ex
parte determination of the basis of the application. If the Punong
Barangay is unavailable to act on the application for a BPO, the
application shall be acted upon by any available Barangay
Kagawad. If the BPO is issued by a Barangay Kagawad the order
must be accompanied by an attestation by the Barangay
Kagawad that the Punong Barangay was unavailable at the time
for the issuance of the BPO. BPOs shall be effective for fifteen (15)
days. Immediately after the issuance of an ex parte BPO, the
Punong Barangay or Barangay Kagawad shall personally serve a
copy of the same on the respondent, or direct any barangay
official to effect is personal service. The parties may be
accompanied by a non-lawyer advocate in any proceeding before
the Punong Barangay.
Same; View that in the case of a Barangay Protection Order, it
is a mere provisional remedy under Republic Act No. 9262, meant
to address the pressing need of the victims for instant protection;
Under the Implementing Rules of Republic Act No. 9262, the
issuance of a Barangay Protection Order or the pendency of an
application for a Barangay Protection Order shall not preclude the
victim from applying for, or the court from granting, a Temporary
Protection Order or Permanent Protection Order.—While judicial
power rests exclusively
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in the judiciary, it may be conceded that the legislature may

confer on administrative boards or bodies, or even particular
government officials, quasi-judicial power involving the exercise of
judgment and discretion, as incident to the performance of
administrative functions. But in so doing, the legislature must
state its intention in express terms that would leave no doubt, as
even such quasi-judicial prerogatives must be limited, if they are
to be valid, only to those incidental to or in connection with the
performance of administrative duties, which do not amount to
conferment of jurisdiction over a matter exclusively vested in the
courts. In the case of a BPO, it is a mere provisional remedy
under Republic Act No. 9262, meant to address the pressing need
of the victims for instant protection. However, it does not take the
place of appropriate judicial proceedings and remedies that
provide a more effective and comprehensive protection to the
victim. In fact, under the Implementing Rules of Republic Act No.
9262, the issuance of a BPO or the pendency of an application for
a BPO shall not preclude the victim from applying for, or the
court from granting, a TPO or PPO. Where a TPO has already
been granted by any court, the barangay official may no longer
issue a BPO. The same Implementing Rules also require that
within twenty-four (24) hours after the issuance of a BPO, the
barangay official shall assist the victim in filing an application for
a TPO or PPO with the nearest court in the victim’s place of
residence. If there is no Family Court or RTC, the application may
be filed in the Municipal Trial Court, the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court or the Metropolitan Trial Court.
BRION, J., Concurring Opinion:
Criminal Law; Violence Against Women and Children; View
that Congress found that domestic and other forms of violence
against women and children contribute to the failure to unify and
strengthen family ties, thereby impeding the State’s mandate to
actively promote the family’s total development.—From the terms
of the law, I find it plain that Congress enacted R.A. No. 9262 as a
measure intended to strengthen the family. Congress found that
domestic and other forms of violence against women and children
contribute to the failure to unify and strengthen family ties,
thereby impeding the State’s mandate to actively promote the
family’s total development. Congress also found, as a reality, that
women and children are more susceptible to domestic and other
forms of violence due to, among
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others, the pervasive bias and prejudice against women and the
stereotyping of roles within the family environment that
traditionally exist in Philippine society. On this basis, Congress
found it necessary to recognize the substantial distinction within
the family between men, on the one hand, and women and
children, on the other hand. This recognition, incidentally, is
not the first to be made in the laws as our law on persons
and family under the Civil Code also recognize, in various
ways, the distinctions between men and women in the
context of the family.
Constitutional Law; Reasonableness Test; View that the
reasonableness test has been consistently applied to allow the
courts to uphold State action as long as the action is found to be
germane to the purpose of the law, in this case to support the unity
and development of the family.—My serious reservation on the
use of an expanded equal protection clause and in applying a
strict scrutiny standard is, among others, based on lack of
necessity; we do not need these measures when we can fully
examine R.A. No. 9262’s constitutionality using the
reasonableness test. The family is a unit, in fact a very basic one,
and it cannot operate on an uneven standard where measures
beyond what is necessary are extended to women and children as
against the man—the head of the family and the family provider.
The use of an expanded equal protection clause only stresses the
concept of an uneven equality that cannot long stand in a unit
living at close quarters in a situation of mutual dependency on
one another. The reasonableness test, on the other hand, has been
consistently applied to allow the courts to uphold State action as
long as the action is found to be germane to the purpose of the
law, in this case to support the unity and development of the
family. If we are to deviate from or to modify this
established standard of scrutiny, we must do so carefully
and for strong justifiable reasons.
Same; Equal Protection of the Law; Suspect Classification;
Words and Phrases; View that a suspect classification is one where
distinctions are made based on the most invidious bases for
classification that violate the most basic human rights, i.e., on the
basis of race, national origin, alien status, religious affiliation
and, to a certain extent, sex and sexual orientation.—When the
court uses a strict standard for review to evaluate the
constitutionality of a law, it proceeds from the premise that the
law established a “suspect classi-
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fication.” A suspect classification is one where distinctions are

made based on the most invidious bases for classification that
violate the most basic human rights, i.e., on the basis of race,
national origin, alien status, religious affiliation and, to a certain
extent, sex and sexual orientation. With a suspect classification,
the most stringent scrutiny of the classification is applied: the
ordinary presumption of constitutionality is reversed and the
government carries the burden of proving the statute’s
constitutionality. This approach is unlike the lowest level of
scrutiny (reasonableness test) that the Court has applied in the
past where the classification is scrutinized and constitutionally
upheld if found to be germane to the purpose of the law. Under a
reasonableness test, there is a presumption of constitutionality
and that the laws enacted by Congress are presumed to fall
within its constitutional powers.
Same; Same; View that there is no indication that Congress
actually intended to classify women and children as a group
against men, under the terms of R.A. No. 9262. Rather than a
clear intent at classification, the overriding intent of the law is
indisputably to harmonize family relations and protect the family
as a basic social institution.—I do not really see any indication
that Congress actually intended to classify women and children as
a group against men, under the terms of R.A. No. 9262. Rather
than a clear intent at classification, the overriding intent of
the law is indisputably to harmonize family relations and
protect the family as a basic social institution. After sifting
through the comprehensive information gathered, Congress found
that domestic and other forms of violence against women and
children impedes the harmony of the family and the personal
growth and development of family members. In the process,
Congress found that these types of violence must pointedly be
addressed as they are more commonly experienced by women and
children due to the unequal power relations of men and women in
our society; Congress had removed these types of violence as they
are impediments that block the harmonious development that it
envisions for the family, of which men are important component
members.
Same; Same; Suspect Classification; View that a suspect

classification and the accompanying strict scrutiny should depend
on the circumstances of the case, on the impact of the illegal
differential treatment on the group involved, on the needed
protection and the
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impact of recognizing a suspect classification on future

classification.—In my view, a suspect classification and the
accompanying strict scrutiny should depend on the circumstances
of the case, on the impact of the illegal differential treatment on
the group involved, on the needed protection and the impact of
recognizing a suspect classification on future classification. A
suspect classification label cannot solely and automatically be
triggered by the circumstance that women and children are
accorded special protection by the Constitution. In fact, there is no
place for a strict level of scrutiny when the Constitution itself has
recognized the need for special protection; where such recognition
has been made, congressional action should carry the
presumption of validity.
Same; Same; View that the classification in the law was not
immediately brought on by considerations of gender or sex; it was
simply a reality as unavoidable as the reality that in Philippine
society, a marriage is composed of a man, a woman and their
children.—A suspect classification and the accompanying strict
scrutiny standard cannot be solely based on the circumstance that
the law has the effect of being “gender-specific.” I believe that the
classification in the law was not immediately brought on
by considerations of gender or sex; it was simply a reality
as unavoidable as the reality that in Philippine society, a
marriage is composed of a man, a woman and their
children. An obvious reason, of course, why the classification did
not solely depend on gender is because the law also covers
children, without regard to their sex or their sexual orientation.
Same; Same; View that R.A. No. 9262 does not deny, restrict
or curtail civil and human rights of other persons falling outside
the classification, particularly of the men members of the family
who can avail of remedies provided by other laws to ensure the
protection of their own rights and interests.—With the objective of
promoting solidarity and the development of the family, R.A. No.
9262 provides the legal redress for domestic violence that
particularly affects women and their children. Significantly, the
law does not deny, restrict or curtail civil and human
rights of other persons falling outside the classification,
particularly of the men members of the family who can
avail of remedies provided by other laws to ensure the
protection of their own rights and interests. Consequently,
the resulting classification under R.A. No.
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9262 is not wholly intended and does not work an injustice by

removing remedies that are available to men in violence
committed against them. The law furthermore does not target
men against women and children and is there simply to achieve a
legitimate constitutional objective, and it does not achieve this by
a particularly harmful classification that can be labeled “suspect”
in the sense already established by jurisprudence. Under the
circumstances, the use and application of strict scrutiny review,
or even the use of an expanded equal protection perspective,
strike me as both unnecessary and disproportionate.
ABAD, J., Separate Concurring Opinion:

men and women are supposed to be equal yet this particular law
provides immediate relief to complaining women and harsh
consequences to their men even before the matter reaches the
courtroom, a relief not available to the latter.—This separate
concurring opinion will address the issue of equal protection since
it presents the more serious challenge to the constitutionality of
the law. Men and women are supposed to be equal yet this
particular law provides immediate relief to complaining women
and harsh consequences to their men even before the matter
reaches the courtroom, a relief not available to the latter. The
law, Garcia says, violates his right to equal protection because it
is gender-specific, favoring only women when men could also be
victims of domestic violence.
Same; Same; View that the equal protection clause can no
longer be interpreted as only a guarantee of formal equality but of
substantive equality.—Chief Justice Puno’s thesis is that the right
to equal protection casts another shadow when the issue raised
under it involves persons protected by the social justice provision
of the Constitution, specifically, Section 1, Article XIII. The equal
protection clause can no longer be interpreted as only a guarantee
of formal equality but of substantive equality. “It ought to be
construed,” said the Chief Justice, “in consonance with social
justice as ‘the heart’ particularly of the 1987 Constitution — a
transformative covenant in which the Filipino people agreed to
enshrine asymmetrical equality to uplift disadvantaged groups
and build a genuinely egalitarian democracy.” This means that
the weak, including women
379
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Garcia vs. Drilon
in relation to men, can be treated with a measure of bias that they

may cease to be weak.
Same; Same; Expanded Equal Protection Clause; View that
the expanded equal protection clause should be understood as
meant to “reduce social, economic, and political inequalities, and
remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and
political power for the common good.”—Chief Justice Puno goes
on: “The Expanded Equal Protection Clause, anchored on the
human rights rationale, is designed as a weapon against the
indignity of discrimination so that in the patently unequal
Philippine society, each person may be restored to his or her
rightful position as a person with equal moral status.”
Specifically, the expanded equal protection clause should be
understood as meant to “reduce social, economic, and political
inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing
wealth and political power for the common good.” Borrowing the
language of Law v. Canada, 1 S.C.R. 497 (1999), case and adding
his own thoughts, the Chief Justice said: The purpose of the
Expanded Equal Protection Clause is to protect and enhance the
right to dignity by: 1) preventing the imposition, perpetuation and
aggravation “of disadvantage, stereotyping, or political [,economic,
cultural,] or social prejudice”; and 2) promo[ting a Philippine]
society in which all persons enjoy equal recognition at law as
human beings.
Violence Against Women and Children; Equal Protection of
the Law; View that Republic Act No. 9262 is gender-specific as
only they may file the prescribed actions against offenders,
whether men or women, with whom the victims are or were in
lesbian relationships.—What remedies does R.A. 9262 especially
provide women and children? The law is gender-specific as only
they may file the prescribed actions against offenders, whether
men or women, with whom the victims are or were in lesbian
relationships. The definition includes past or present marital,
live-in, sexual or dating relationships. This law also provides for
the remedy of a protection order in a civil action or in a criminal
action, aside from the criminal action for its violation. It makes
the process of securing a restraining order against perpetrators
easier and more immediate by providing for the legal remedy of
protection orders from both the courts and barangay officials.
380
Garcia vs. Drilon
Same; Same; Convention on the Elimination of all forms of

Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW); View that in the context
of women’s rights, substantive equality has been defined by the
Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination
Against Women (CEDAW) as equality which requires that women
be given an equal start and that they be empowered by an enabling
environment to achieve equality of results.—In the context of
women’s rights, substantive equality has been defined by the
Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination
Against Women (CEDAW) as equality which requires that women
be given an equal start and that they be empowered by an
enabling environment to achieve equality of results. It is not
enough to guarantee women treatment that is identical to that of
men. Rather, biological as well as socially and culturally
constructed differences between women and men must be taken
into account. Under certain circumstances, non-identical
treatment of women and men will be required in order to address
such differences.
Same; View that R.A. No. 9262 is based on the experiences of
women who have been victims of domestic violence.—Clearly, the
substantive equality model inspired R.A. 9262. For one thing,
Congress enacted it because of compelling interest in preventing
and addressing the serious problem of violence against women in
the context of intimate relationships — recognized all over the
world as one of the most insidious forms of gender discrimination.
For another, R.A. 9262 is based on the experiences of women who
have been victims of domestic violence. The list of acts regarded
as forms of violence come from true-to-life stories of women who
have suffered abuses from their male partners. Finally, R.A. 9262
seeks women’s full participation in society. Hence, the law grants
them needed relief to ensure equality, protection, and personal
safety, enabling them to enjoy their civil, political, social, and
economic rights. The provision on protection orders, for instance,
precisely aims to safeguard “the victim from further harm,
minimizing any disruption in the victim’s daily life, and
facilitating the opportunity and ability of the victim to
independently regain control over her life.”
LEONEN, J., Concurring Opinion:
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Locus Standi; Words and
Phrases; View that Locus standi is defined as “a right of
appearance
381
VOL. 699, JUNE 25, 2013 381
Garcia vs. Drilon
in a court of justice on a given question.”—Legal standing in cases

that raise constitutional issues is essential. Locus standi is
defined as “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given
question.” The fundamental question is “whether a party alleges
such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure
that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions.
Violence Against Women and Children; View that it may be
said that violence in the context of intimate relationships should
not be seen and encrusted as a gender issue; rather, it is a power
issue.—In this light, it may be said that violence in the context of
intimate relationships should not be seen and encrusted as a
gender issue; rather, it is a power issue. Thus, when laws are not
gender-neutral, male victims of domestic violence may also suffer
from double victimization first by their abusers and second by the
judicial system. Incidentally, focusing on women as the victims
entrenches some level of heteronormativity. It is blind to the
possibility that, whatever moral positions are taken by those who
are dominant, in reality intimate relationships can also happen
between men.
Statutes; View that an unconstitutional act is not a law; it
confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it
creates no office; it is x x x as inoperative as though it had never
been passed.—We have declared that “[a]n unconstitutional act is
not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no
protection; it creates no office; it is x x x as inoperative as though
it had never been passed.” However, the seemingly all-inclusive
statement of absolute retroactive invalidity may not always be
justified. One established exception is the doctrine of operative
fact. The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general
rule, only applies as a matter of equity and fair play. It nullifies
the effects of an unconstitutional law by recognizing that the
existence of a statute prior to a determination of
unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have
consequences which cannot always be ignored. The past cannot
always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The doctrine is
applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose
an undue burden on those who have relied on the invalid Law.
382

Garcia vs. Drilon
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Roland G. Ravina for petitioner.
Ma. Rowena Amelia V. Guanzon for private
respondents.
Mae Niña Reyes-Gallos for private respondents.
Claire Angeline P. Luczon co-counsel for private
respondents.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Hailed as the bastion of Christianity in Asia, the
Philippines boasts of 86.8 million Filipinos — or 93 percent
of a total population of 93.3 million adhering to the
teachings of Jesus Christ.1 Yet, the admonition for
husbands to love their wives as their own bodies just as
Christ loved the church and gave himself up for her2 failed
to prevent, or even to curb, the pervasiveness of violence
against Filipino women. The National Commission on the
Role of Filipino Women (NCRFW) reported that, for the
years 2000-2003, “female violence comprised more than
90% of all forms of abuse and violence and more than 90%
of these reported cases were committed by the women’s
intimate partners such as their husbands and live-in
partners.”3
Thus, on March 8, 2004, after nine (9) years of spirited
advocacy by women’s groups, Congress enacted Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 9262, entitled “An Act Defining Violence
Against
_______________
1 “Philippines still top Christian country in Asia, 5th in world,”
Philippine Daily Inquirer, December 21, 2011.
2 Ephesians 5:25-28.
3 RATIONALE OF THE PROPOSED RULE ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND
THEIR CHILDREN, citing statistics furnished by the National Commission on

the Role of Filipino Women.
383
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Garcia vs. Drilon
Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective

Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and
for Other Purposes.” It took effect on March 27, 2004.4
R.A. 9262 is a landmark legislation that defines and
criminalizes acts of violence against women and their
children (VAWC) perpetrated by women’s intimate
partners, i.e., husband; former husband; or any person who
has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom
the woman has a common child.5 The law provides for
protection orders from the barangay and the courts to
prevent the commission of further acts of VAWC; and
outlines the duties and responsibilities of barangay
officials, law enforcers, prosecutors and court personnel,
social workers, health care providers, and other local
government officials in responding to complaints of VAWC
or requests for assistance.
A husband is now before the Court assailing the
constitutionality of R.A. 9262 as being violative of the equal
protection and due process clauses, and an undue
delegation of judicial power to barangay officials.
The Factual Antecedents
On March 23, 2006, Rosalie Jaype-Garcia (private
respondent) filed, for herself and in behalf of her minor
children, a verified petition6 (Civil Case No. 06-797) before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City for the
issuance of a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) against
her husband, Jesus C. Garcia (petitioner), pursuant to R.A.
9262. She claimed to be a victim of physical abuse;
emotional, psychological, and economic violence as a result
of marital infidelity on the part of petitioner, with threats
of deprivation of custody of her children and of financial
support.7
_______________
4 Id.
5 Section 3(a), R.A. 9262.
6 Rollo, pp. 63-83.
7 Id., at pp. 66-67.
384

Garcia vs. Drilon
Private respondent’s claims

Private respondent married petitioner in 2002 when she
was 34 years old and the former was eleven years her
senior. They have three (3) children, namely: Jo-Ann J.
Garcia, 17 years old, who is the natural child of petitioner
but whom private respondent adopted; Jessie Anthone J.
Garcia, 6 years old; and Joseph Eduard J. Garcia, 3 years
old.8
Private respondent described herself as a dutiful and
faithful wife, whose life revolved around her husband. On
the other hand, petitioner, who is of Filipino-Chinese
descent, is dominant, controlling, and demands absolute
obedience from his wife and children. He forbade private
respondent to pray, and deliberately isolated her from her
friends. When she took up law, and even when she was
already working part time at a law office, petitioner
trivialized her ambitions and prevailed upon her to just
stay at home. He was often jealous of the fact that his
attractive wife still catches the eye of some men, at one
point threatening that he would have any man eyeing her
killed.9
Things turned for the worse when petitioner took up an
affair with a bank manager of Robinson’s Bank, Bacolod
City, who is the godmother of one of their sons. Petitioner
admitted to the affair when private respondent confronted
him about it in 2004. He even boasted to the household
help about his sexual relations with said bank manager.
Petitioner told private respondent, though, that he was just
using the woman because of their accounts with the bank.10
Petitioner’s infidelity spawned a series of fights that left
private respondent physically and emotionally wounded. In
one of their quarrels, petitioner grabbed private respondent
on both arms and shook her with such force that caused
_______________
8 Id., at p. 64.
9 Id., at pp. 67-68.
10 Id., at pp. 68-70.
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Garcia vs. Drilon
bruises and hematoma. At another time, petitioner hit

private respondent forcefully on the lips that caused some
bleeding. Petitioner sometimes turned his ire on their
daughter, Jo-Ann, who had seen the text messages he sent
to his paramour and whom he blamed for squealing on him.
He beat Jo-Ann on the chest and slapped her many times.
When private respondent decided to leave petitioner, Jo-
Ann begged her mother to stay for fear that if the latter
leaves, petitioner would beat her up. Even the small boys
are aware of private respondent’s sufferings. Their 6-year-
old son said that when he grows up, he would beat up his
father because of his cruelty to private respondent.11
All the emotional and psychological turmoil drove
private respondent to the brink of despair. On December
17, 2005, while at home, she attempted suicide by cutting
her wrist. She was found by her son bleeding on the floor.
Petitioner simply fled the house instead of taking her to the
hospital. Private respondent was hospitalized for about
seven (7) days in which time petitioner never bothered to
visit, nor apologized or showed pity on her. Since then,
private respondent has been undergoing therapy almost
every week and is taking anti-depressant medications.12
When private respondent informed the management of
Robinson’s Bank that she intends to file charges against
the bank manager, petitioner got angry with her for
jeopardizing the manager’s job. He then packed his things
and told private respondent that he was leaving her for
good. He even told private respondent’s mother, who lives
with them in the family home, that private respondent
should just accept his extramarital affair since he is not
cohabiting with his paramour and has not sired a child
with her.13
_______________
11 Id., at pp. 70-71.
12 Id., at p. 72.
13 Id., at p. 73.
386

Garcia vs. Drilon
Private respondent is determined to separate from

petitioner but she is afraid that he would take her children
from her and deprive her of financial support. Petitioner
had previously warned her that if she goes on a legal battle
with him, she would not get a single centavo.14
Petitioner controls the family businesses involving
mostly the construction of deep wells. He is the President
of three corporations — 326 Realty Holdings, Inc., Negros
Rotadrill Corporation, and J-Bros Trading Corporation —
of which he and private respondent are both stockholders.
In contrast to the absolute control of petitioner over said
corporations, private respondent merely draws a monthly
salary of P20,000.00 from one corporation only, the Negros
Rotadrill Corporation. Household expenses amounting to
not less than P200,000.00 a month are paid for by private
respondent through the use of credit cards, which, in turn,
are paid by the same corporation together with the bills for
utilities.15
On the other hand, petitioner receives a monthly salary
of P60,000.00 from Negros Rotadrill Corporation, and
enjoys unlimited cash advances and other benefits in
hundreds of thousands of pesos from the corporations.16
After private respondent confronted him about the affair,
petitioner forbade her to hold office at JBTC Building,
Mandalagan, where all the businesses of the corporations
are conducted, thereby depriving her of access to full
information about said businesses. Until the filing of the
petition a quo, petitioner has not given private respondent
an accounting of the businesses the value of which she had
helped raise to millions of pesos.17
_______________
14 Id., at p. 74.
15 Id., at pp. 65-66.
16 Id., at p. 66.
17 Id., at p. 70.
387
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Garcia vs. Drilon
Action of the RTC of Bacolod City

Finding reasonable ground to believe that an imminent
danger of violence against the private respondent and her
children exists or is about to recur, the RTC issued a TPO18
on March 24, 2006 effective for thirty (30) days, which is
quoted hereunder:
Respondent (petitioner herein), Jesus Chua Garcia, is

hereby:
a) Ordered to remove all his personal belongings from the
conjugal dwelling or family home within 24 hours from
receipt of the Temporary Restraining Order and if he
refuses, ordering that he be removed by police officers from
the conjugal dwelling; this order is enforceable
notwithstanding that the house is under the name of 236
Realty Holdings Inc. (Republic Act No. 9262 states
“regardless of ownership”), this is to allow the Petitioner
(private respondent herein) to enter the conjugal dwelling
without any danger from the Respondent.
After the Respondent leaves or is removed from the conjugal
dwelling, or anytime the Petitioner decides to return to the
conjugal dwelling to remove things, the Petitioner shall be
assisted by police officers when re-entering the family
home.
The Chief of Police shall also give the Petitioner police
assistance on Sunday, 26 March 2006 because of the danger
that the Respondent will attempt to take her children from
her when he arrives from Manila and finds out about this
suit.
b) To stay away from the petitioner and her children,
mother and all her household help and driver from a
distance of 1,000 meters, and shall not enter the gate of the
subdivision where the Petitioner may be temporarily
residing.
c) Not to harass, annoy, telephone, contact or otherwise
communicate with the Petitioner, directly or indirectly, or
_______________
18 Id., at pp. 84-87.
388

Garcia vs. Drilon
through other persons, or contact directly or indirectly her

children, mother and household help, nor send gifts, cards,
flowers, letters and the like. Visitation rights to the children
may be subject of a modified TPO in the future.
d) To surrender all his firearms including a .9MM caliber
firearm and a Walther PPK and ordering the Philippine
National Police Firearms and Explosives Unit and the
Provincial Director of the PNP to cancel all the
Respondent’s firearm licenses. He should also be ordered to
surrender any unlicensed firearms in his possession or
control.
e) To pay full financial support for the Petitioner and the
children, including rental of a house for them, and
educational and medical expenses.
f) Not to dissipate the conjugal business.
g) To render an accounting of all advances, benefits,
bonuses and other cash he received from all the
corporations from 1 January 2006 up to 31 March 2006,
which himself and as President of the corporations and his
Comptroller, must submit to the Court not later than 2
April 2006. Thereafter, an accounting of all these funds
shall be reported to the court by the Comptroller, copy
furnished to the Petitioner, every 15 days of the month,
under pain of Indirect Contempt of Court.
h) To ensure compliance especially with the order granting
support pendente lite, and considering the financial
resources of the Respondent and his threat that if the
Petitioner sues she will not get a single centavo, the
Respondent is ordered to put up a BOND TO KEEP THE
PEACE in the amount of FIVE MILLION PESOS, in two
sufficient sureties.
On April 24, 2006, upon motion19 of private respondent,

the trial court issued an amended TPO,20 effective for
thirty (30) days, which included the following additional
provisions:
_______________
19 Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Renewal of Temporary Protection Order
(TPO) or Issuance of Modified TPO. Id., at pp. 90-93.
20 Id., at pp. 94-97.
389
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Garcia vs. Drilon
i) The petitioners (private respondents herein) are given

the continued use of the Nissan Patrol and the Starex Van
which they are using in Negros Occidental.
j) The petitioners are given the continued use and
occupation of the house in Parañaque, the continued use of
the Starex van in Metro Manila, whenever they go to
Manila.
k) Respondent is ordered to immediately post a bond to
keep the peace, in two sufficient sureties.
l) To give monthly support to the petitioner provisionally
fixed in the sum of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php
150,000.00) per month plus rental expenses of Fifty
Thousand Pesos (Php 50,000.00) per month until the matter
of support could be finally resolved.
Two days later, or on April 26, 2006, petitioner filed an
Opposition to the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Renewal of
the TPO21 seeking the denial of the renewal of the TPO on
the grounds that it did not (1) comply with the three-day
notice rule, and (2) contain a notice of hearing. He further
asked that the TPO be modified by (1) removing one vehicle
used by private respondent and returning the same to its
rightful owner, the J-Bros Trading Corporation, and (2)
cancelling or reducing the amount of the bond from
P5,000,000.00 to a more manageable level at
P100,000.00.Subsequently, on May 23, 2006, petitioner
moved22 for the modification of the TPO to allow him
visitation rights to his children.
On May 24, 2006, the TPO was renewed and extended
yet again, but subject only to the following modifications
prayed for by private respondent:
a) That respondent (petitioner herein) return the clothes

and other personal belongings of Rosalie and her
_______________
21 Id., at pp. 98-103.
22 Id., at pp. 138-140.
390

Garcia vs. Drilon
children to Judge Jesus Ramos, co-counsel for Petitioner,

within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection
Order by his counsel, otherwise be declared in Indirect
Contempt of Court;
b) Respondent shall make an accounting or list of
furniture and equipment in the conjugal house in Pitimini
St., Capitolville Subdivision, Bacolod City within 24 hours
from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his
counsel;
c) Ordering the Chief of the Women’s Desk of the Bacolod
City Police Headquarters to remove Respondent from the
conjugal dwelling within eight (8) hours from receipt of the
Temporary Protection Order by his counsel, and that he
cannot return until 48 hours after the petitioners have left,
so that the petitioner Rosalie and her representatives can
remove things from the conjugal home and make an
inventory of the household furniture, equipment and other
things in the conjugal home, which shall be submitted to
the Court.
d) Deliver full financial support of Php200,000.00 and
Php50,000.00 for rental and Php25,000.00 for clothes of the
three petitioners (sic) children within 24 hours from receipt
of the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel, otherwise
be declared in indirect contempt of Court;
e) That respondent surrender his two firearms and all
unlicensed firearms to the Clerk of Court within 24 hours
from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his
counsel;
f) That respondent shall pay petitioner educational
expenses of the children upon presentation of proof of
payment of such expenses.23
Claiming that petitioner continued to deprive them of

financial support; failed to faithfully comply with the TPO;
and committed new acts of harassment against her and
their
_______________
23 Order dated May 24, 2006. Id., at pp. 148-149.
391
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Garcia vs. Drilon
children, private respondent filed another application24 for

the issuance of a TPO ex parte. She alleged inter alia that
petitioner contrived a replevin suit against himself by J-
Bros Trading, Inc., of which the latter was purportedly no
longer president, with the end in view of recovering the
Nissan Patrol and Starex Van used by private respondent
and the children. A writ of replevin was served upon
private respondent by a group of six or seven policemen
with long firearms that scared the two small boys, Jessie
Anthone and Joseph Eduard.25
While Joseph Eduard, then three years old, was driven
to school, two men allegedly attempted to kidnap him,
which incident traumatized the boy resulting in his refusal
to go back to school. On another occasion, petitioner
allegedly grabbed their daughter, Jo-Ann, by the arm and
threatened her.26 The incident was reported to the police,
and Jo-Ann subsequently filed a criminal complaint
against her father for violation of R.A. 7610, also known as
the “Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse,
Exploitation and Discrimination Act.”
Aside from the replevin suit, petitioner’s lawyers
initiated the filing by the housemaids working at the
conjugal home of a complaint for kidnapping and illegal
detention against private respondent. This came about
after private respondent, armed with a TPO, went to said
home to get her and her children’s belongings. Finding
some of her things inside a housemaid’s (Sheryl Jamola)
bag in the maids’ room, private respondent filed a case for
qualified theft against Jamola.27
On August 23, 2006, the RTC issued a TPO,28 effective
for thirty (30) days, which reads as follows:
_______________
24 Id., at pp. 154-166.
25 Id., at p. 156.
26 Id., at p. 157.
27 Id., at pp. 158-159.
28 Id., at pp. 167-174.
392

Garcia vs. Drilon
Respondent (petitioner herein), Jesus Chua Garcia, is

hereby:
1) Prohibited from threatening to commit or committing,

personally or through another, acts of violence against the
offended party;
2) Prohibited from harassing, annoying, telephoning,
contacting or otherwise communicating in any form with
the offended party, either directly or indirectly;
3) Required to stay away, personally or through his
friends, relatives, employees or agents, from all the
Petitioners Rosalie J. Garcia and her children, Rosalie J.
Garcia’s three brothers, her mother Primitiva Jaype, cook
Novelita Caranzo, driver Romeo Hontiveros, laundrywoman
Mercedita Bornales, security guard Darwin Gayona and the
petitioner’s other household helpers from a distance of 1,000
meters, and shall not enter the gate of the subdivision
where the Petitioners are temporarily residing, as well as
from the schools of the three children; Furthermore, that
respondent shall not contact the schools of the children
directly or indirectly in any manner including, ostensibly to
pay for their tuition or other fees directly, otherwise he will
have access to the children through the schools and the TPO
will be rendered nugatory;
4) Directed to surrender all his firearms including .9MM
caliber firearm and a Walther PPK to the Court;
5) Directed to deliver in full financial support of
Php200,000.00 a month and Php50,000.00 for rental for the
period from August 6 to September 6, 2006; and support in
arrears from March 2006 to August 2006 the total amount
of Php1,312,000.00;
6) Directed to deliver educational expenses for 2006-2007
the amount of Php75,000.00 and Php25,000.00;
7) Directed to allow the continued use of a Nissan Patrol
with Plate No. FEW 508 and a Starex van with Plate No.
FFD 991 and should the respondent fail to deliver said
vehicles, respondent is ordered to provide the petitioner
another vehicle which is the one taken by J Bros Tading;
393
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Garcia vs. Drilon
8) Ordered not to dissipate, encumber, alienate, sell, lease

or otherwise dispose of the conjugal assets, or those real
properties in the name of Jesus Chua Garcia only and those
in which the conjugal partnership of gains of the Petitioner
Rosalie J. Garcia and respondent have an interest in,
especially the conjugal home located in No. 14, Pitimini St.,
Capitolville Subdivision, Bacolod City, and other properties
which are conjugal assets or those in which the conjugal
partnership of gains of Petitioner Rosalie J. Garcia and the
respondent have an interest in and listed in Annexes “I,” “I-
1,” and “I-2,” including properties covered by TCT Nos. T-
186325 and T-168814;
9) Ordered that the Register of Deeds of Bacolod City and
E.B. Magalona shall be served a copy of this TEMPORARY
PROTECTION ORDER and are ordered not to allow the
transfer, sale, encumbrance or disposition of these above-
cited properties to any person, entity or corporation without
the personal presence of petitioner Rosalie J. Garcia, who
shall affix her signature in the presence of the Register of
Deeds, due to the fear of petitioner Rosalie that her
signature will be forged in order to effect the encumbrance
or sale of these properties to defraud her or the conjugal
partnership of gains.
In its Order29 dated September 26, 2006, the trial court

extended the aforequoted TPO for another ten (10) days,
and gave petitioner a period of five (5) days within which to
show cause why the TPO should not be renewed, extended,
or modified. Upon petitioner’s manifestation,30 however,
that he has not received a copy of private respondent’s
motion to modify/renew the TPO, the trial court directed in
its Order31 dated October 6, 2006 that petitioner be
furnished a copy of said motion. Nonetheless, an Order32
dated a day earlier, October
_______________
29 Id., at p. 182.
30 Id., at pp. 183-184.
31 Id., at p. 185.
32 Id., at pp. 186-187.
394

Garcia vs. Drilon
5, had already been issued renewing the TPO dated

August 23, 2006. The pertinent portion is quoted
hereunder:
x x x x
x x x it appearing further that the hearing could not yet be
finally terminated, the Temporary Protection Order issued
on August 23, 2006 is hereby renewed and extended for
thirty (30) days and continuously extended and renewed for
thirty (30) days, after each expiration, until further orders,
and subject to such modifications as may be ordered by the
court.
After having received a copy of the foregoing Order,

petitioner no longer submitted the required comment to
private respondent’s motion for renewal of the TPO arguing
that it would only be an “exercise in futility.”33
Proceedings before the CA
During the pendency of Civil Case No. 06-797, petitioner
filed before the Court of Appeals (CA) a petition34 for
prohibition (CA-G.R. CEB-SP. No. 01698), with prayer for
injunction and temporary restraining order, challenging (1)
the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 for being violative of the
due process and the equal protection clauses, and (2) the
validity of the modified TPO issued in the civil case for
being “an unwanted product of an invalid law.”
On May 26, 2006, the appellate court issued a 60-day
Temporary Restraining Order35 (TRO) against the
enforcement of the TPO, the amended TPOs and other
orders pursuant thereto.
_______________
33 See Manifestation dated October 10, 2006. Id., at pp. 188-189.
34 Id., at pp. 104-137.
35 Id., at pp. 151-152.
395
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Subsequently, however, on January 24, 2007, the

appellate court dismissed36 the petition for failure of
petitioner to raise the constitutional issue in his pleadings
before the trial court in the civil case, which is clothed with
jurisdiction to resolve the same. Secondly, the challenge to
the validity of R.A. 9262 through a petition for prohibition
seeking to annul the protection orders issued by the trial
court constituted a collateral attack on said law.
His motion for reconsideration of the foregoing Decision
having been denied in the Resolution37 dated August 14,
2007, petitioner is now before us alleging that—
The Issues
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE
PETITION ON THE THEORY THAT THE ISSUE OF
CONSTITUTIONALITY WAS NOT RAISED AT THE EARLIEST
OPPORTUNITY AND THAT, THE PETITION CONSTITUTES A
COLLATERAL ATTACK ON THE VALIDITY OF THE LAW.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN
FAILING TO CONCLUDE THAT R.A. 9262 IS
DISCRIMINATORY, UNJUST, AND VIOLATIVE OF THE
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE MISTAKE IN
NOT FINDING THAT R.A. 9262 RUNS COUNTER TO THE
DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION.
_______________
36 Decision dated January 24, 2007. Penned by Associate Justice Priscilla
Baltazar-Padilla, with Associate Justices Arsenio J. Magpale and Romeo F. Barza,
concurring. Id., at pp. 47-57.
37 Id., at pp. 60-61.
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Garcia vs. Drilon
IV.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT
THE LAW DOES VIOLENCE TO THE POLICY OF THE STATE
TO PROTECT THE FAMILY AS A BASIC SOCIAL
INSTITUTION.
V.
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT
DECLARING R.A. No. 9262 AS INVALID AND
UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT ALLOWS AN UNDUE
DELEGATION OF JUDICIAL POWER TO THE BARANGAY
OFFICIALS.38
The Ruling of the Court

Before delving into the arguments propounded by
petitioner against the constitutionality of R.A. 9262, we
shall first tackle the propriety of the dismissal by the
appellate court of the petition for prohibition (CA-G.R.
CEB-SP. No. 01698) filed by petitioner.
As a general rule, the question of constitutionality must
be raised at the earliest opportunity so that if not raised in
the pleadings, ordinarily it may not be raised in the trial,
and if not raised in the trial court, it will not be considered
on appeal.39 Courts will not anticipate a question of
constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding
it.40
In defending his failure to attack the constitutionality of
R.A. 9262 before the RTC of Bacolod City, petitioner argues
that the Family Court has limited authority and
jurisdiction that is “inadequate to tackle the complex issue
of constitutionality.”41
_______________
38 Petition, Id., at p. 22.
39 ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. Philippine Multi-Media
System, Inc., G.R. Nos. 175769-70, January 19, 2009, 576 SCRA 262, 289.
40 Philippine National Bank v. Palma, 503 Phil. 917, 932; 466 SCRA
307, 323 (2005).
41 Petition, Rollo, p. 24.
397
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We disagree.
Family Courts have authority
and jurisdiction to consider the
constitutionality of a statute.
At the outset, it must be stressed that Family Courts are
special courts, of the same level as Regional Trial Courts.
Under R.A. 8369, otherwise known as the “Family Courts
Act of 1997,” family courts have exclusive original
jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of domestic violence
against women and children.42 In accordance with said law,
the Supreme Court designated from among the branches of
the Regional Trial Courts at least one Family Court in each
of several key cities identified.43 To achieve harmony with
the first mentioned law, Section 7 of R.A. 9262 now
provides that Regional Trial Courts designated as Family
Courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over
cases of VAWC defined under the latter law, viz.:
_______________
42 SEC. 5. Jurisdiction of Family Courts.—The Family Courts shall
have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases:
x x x x
k) Cases of domestic violence against:
1) Women—which are acts of gender based violence that
results, or are likely to result in physical, sexual or psychological
harm or suffering to women; and other forms of physical abuse such
as battering or threats and coercion which violate a woman’s
personhood, integrity and freedom movement; and
2) Children—which include the commission of all forms of
abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation, violence, and discrimination
and all other conditions prejudicial to their development.
43 Sec. 17, R.A. 8369.
398

Garcia vs. Drilon
SEC. 7. Venue.—The Regional Trial Court designated

as a Family Court shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction over cases of violence against women and their
children under this law. In the absence of such court in the
place where the offense was committed, the case shall be
filed in the Regional Trial Court where the crime or any of
its elements was committed at the option of the
complainant. (Emphasis supplied)
Inspite of its designation as a family court, the RTC of

Bacolod City remains possessed of authority as a court of
general original jurisdiction to pass upon all kinds of cases
whether civil, criminal, special proceedings, land
registration, guardianship, naturalization, admiralty or
insolvency.44 It is settled that RTCs have jurisdiction to
resolve the constitutionality of a statute,45 “this authority
being embraced in the general definition of the judicial
power to determine what are the valid and binding laws by
the criterion of their conformity to the fundamental law.”46
The Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the
power to declare the constitutionality or validity of a law,
treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential
decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation not only
in this Court, but in all RTCs.47 We said in J.M. Tuason
and Co., Inc. v. CA48 that, “[p]lainly the Constitution
contemplates that the inferior courts should have
jurisdiction in cases involving constitutionality of any
treaty or law, for it speaks of appellate review of final
judgments of inferior courts
_______________
44 Manalo v. Mariano, 161 Phil. 108, 120; 69 SCRA 80, 89 (1976).
45 Planters Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation, G.R. No. 166006,
March 14, 2008, 548 SCRA 485, 504.
46 Drilon v. Lim, G.R. No. 112497, August 4, 1994, 235 SCRA 135, 140.
47 Planters Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation, supra note 45, at
505, citing Mirasol v. CA, 403 Phil. 760; 351 SCRA 44 (2001).
48 G.R. Nos. L-18128 & L-18672, December 26, 1961, 3 SCRA 696, 703-
704.
399
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Garcia vs. Drilon
in cases where such constitutionality happens to be in

issue.” Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
reads in part as follows:
SEC. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

x x x
2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or
certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide,
final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of
any treaty, international or executive agreement,
law, presidential decree, proclamation, order,
instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.
x x x x
Thus, contrary to the posturing of petitioner, the issue of

constitutionality of R.A. 9262 could have been raised at the
earliest opportunity in his Opposition to the petition for
protection order before the RTC of Bacolod City, which had
jurisdiction to determine the same, subject to the review of
this Court.
Section 20 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the Rule on Violence
Against Women and Their Children, lays down a new kind
of procedure requiring the respondent to file an opposition
to the petition and not an answer.49 Thus:
SEC. 20. Opposition to petition.—(a) The respondent may

file an opposition to the petition which he himself shall
verify. It must be accompanied by the affidavits of witnesses
and shall show cause why a temporary or permanent
protection order should not be issued.
_______________
49 RATIONALE OF THE PROPOSED RULES ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR
CHILDREN.
400

Garcia vs. Drilon
(b) Respondent shall not include in the opposition any

counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint,
but any cause of action which could be the subject thereof
may be litigated in a separate civil action. (Emphasis
supplied)

We cannot subscribe to the theory espoused by
petitioner that, since a counterclaim, cross-claim and third-
party complaint are to be excluded from the opposition, the
issue of constitutionality cannot likewise be raised therein.
A counterclaim is defined as any claim for money or other
relief which a defending party may have against an
opposing party.50 A crossclaim, on the other hand, is any
claim by one party against a co-party arising out of the
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter either
of the original action or of a counterclaim therein.51 Finally,
a third-party complaint is a claim that a defending party
may, with leave of court, file against a person not a party to
the action for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any
other relief, in respect of his opponent’s claim.52 As pointed
out by Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, the
unconstitutionality of a statute is not a cause of action that
could be the subject of a counterclaim, cross-claim or a
third-party complaint. Therefore, it is not prohibited from
being raised in the opposition in view of the familiar maxim
expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
Moreover, it cannot be denied that this issue affects the
resolution of the case a quo because the right of private
respondent to a protection order is founded solely on the
very
_______________
50 Korea Exchange Bank v. Hon. Rogelio C. Gonzales, 496 Phil. 127,
143-144; 456 SCRA 224, 241 (2005); Spouses Sapugay v. CA, 262 Phil.
506, 513; 183 SCRA 464, 479 (1990).
51 Sec. 8, Rule 6, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
52 Sec. 11, Rule 6, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
401
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Garcia vs. Drilon
statute the validity of which is being attacked53 by

petitioner who has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury
as a result of its enforcement. The alleged
unconstitutionality of R.A. 9262 is, for all intents and
purposes, a valid cause for the non-issuance of a protection
order.That the proceedings in Civil Case No. 06-797 are
summary in nature should not have deterred petitioner
from raising the same in his Opposition. The question
relative to the constitutionality of a statute is one of law
which does not need to be supported by evidence.54 Be that
as it may, Section 25 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC nonetheless
allows the conduct of a hearing to determine legal issues,
among others, viz.:
SEC. 25. Order for further hearing.—In case the court

determines the need for further hearing, it may issue an
order containing the following:
(a) Facts undisputed and admitted;
(b) Factual and legal issues to be resolved;
(c) Evidence, including objects and documents that have
been marked and will be presented;
(d) Names of witnesses who will be ordered to present
their direct testimonies in the form of affidavits; and
(e) Schedule of the presentation of evidence by both
parties which shall be done in one day, to the extent
possible, within the 30-day period of the effectivity of the
temporary protection order issued. (Emphasis supplied)
To obviate potential dangers that may arise concomitant

to the conduct of a hearing when necessary, Section 26 (b)
of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC provides that if a temporary
protection
_______________
53 See People of the Philippine Islands and Hongkong & Shanghai
Banking Corporation v. Vera, 65 Phil. 199 (1937); Philippine Coconut
Producers Federation, Inc. (COCOFED) v. Republic, G.R. Nos. 177857-58,
January 24, 2012, 663 SCRA 514, 594.
54 Recreation and Amusement Association of the Philippines v. City of
Manila, 100 Phil. 950, 956 (1957).
402

Garcia vs. Drilon
order issued is due to expire, the trial court may extend or

renew the said order for a period of thirty (30) days each
time until final judgment is rendered. It may likewise
modify the extended or renewed temporary protection order
as may be necessary to meet the needs of the parties. With
the private respondent given ample protection, petitioner
could proceed to litigate the constitutional issues, without
necessarily running afoul of the very purpose for the
adoption of the rules on summary procedure.
In view of all the foregoing, the appellate court correctly
dismissed the petition for prohibition with prayer for
injunction and temporary restraining order (CA-G.R. CEB -
SP. No. 01698). Petitioner may have proceeded upon an
honest belief that if he finds succor in a superior court, he
could be granted an injunctive relief. However, Section
22(j) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC expressly disallows the filing
of a petition for certiorari, mandamus or prohibition
against any interlocutory order issued by the trial
court. Hence, the 60-day TRO issued by the appellate court
in this case against the enforcement of the TPO, the
amended TPOs and other orders pursuant thereto was
improper, and it effectively hindered the case from taking
its normal course in an expeditious and summary manner.
As the rules stand, a review of the case by appeal or
certiorari before judgment is prohibited. Moreover, if the
appeal of a judgment granting permanent protection shall
not stay its enforcement,55 with more reason that a TPO,
which is valid only for thirty (30) days at a time,56 should
not be enjoined.The mere fact that a statute is alleged to be
unconstitutional or invalid, does not of itself entitle a
57
litigant to have the same enjoined. In Younger v. Harris,
Jr.,58 the Supreme Court of the United States declared,
thus:
_______________
55 Secs. 22 and 31, A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC.
56 Sec. 26 (b), A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC.
57 Sto. Domingo v. De Los Angeles, 185 Phil. 94, 102; 96 SCRA 139, 147
(1980).
403
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Federal injunctions against state criminal statutes,

either in their entirety or with respect to their separate and
distinct prohibitions, are not to be granted as a matter of
course, even if such statutes are unconstitutional. No
citizen or member of the community is immune from
prosecution, in good faith, for his alleged criminal acts. The
imminence of such a prosecution even though alleged to be
unauthorized and, hence, unlawful is not alone ground for
relief in equity which exerts its extraordinary powers only
to prevent irreparable injury to the plaintiff who seeks its
aid. (Citations omitted)
The sole objective of injunctions is to preserve the status

quo until the trial court hears fully the merits of the case.
It bears stressing, however, that protection orders are
granted ex parte so as to protect women and their children
from acts of violence. To issue an injunction against such
orders will defeat the very purpose of the law against
VAWC.
Notwithstanding all these procedural flaws, we shall not
shirk from our obligation to determine novel issues, or
issues of first impression, with far-reaching implications.
We have, time and again, discharged our solemn duty as
final arbiter of constitutional issues, and with more reason
now, in view of private respondent’s plea in her Comment59
to the instant Petition that we should put the challenge to
the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 to rest. And so we shall.
Intent of Congress in
enacting R.A. 9262.
Petitioner claims that since R.A. 9262 is intended to
prevent and criminalize spousal and child abuse, which
could very well be committed by either the husband or the
wife,
_______________
58 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971), cited in The Executive Secretary v. Court of
Appeals, 473 Phil. 27, 56-57; 429 SCRA 81, 102 (2004).
59 Rollo, pp. 214-240, 237.
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Garcia vs. Drilon
gender alone is not enough basis to deprive the

husband/father of the remedies under the law.60
A perusal of the deliberations of Congress on Senate Bill
No. 2723,61 which became R.A. 9262, reveals that while the
sponsor, Senator Luisa Pimentel-Ejercito (better known as
Senator Loi Estrada), had originally proposed what she
called a “synthesized measure”62 — an amalgamation of
two measures, namely, the “Anti-Domestic Violence Act”
and the “AntiAbuse of Women in Intimate Relationships
Act”63 — providing protection to “all family members,
leaving no one in isolation” but at the same time giving
special attention to women as the “usual victims” of
64
violence and abuse, nonetheless, it was eventually agreed
that men be denied protection under the same measure. We
quote pertinent portions of the deliberations:
Wednesday, December 10, 2003

Senator Pangilinan. I just wanted to place this on record, Mr.
President. Some women’s groups have expressed concerns and
relayed these concerns to me that if we are to include domestic
violence apart from against women as well as other members of
the household, including children or the husband, they fear that
this would weaken the efforts to address domestic violence of
which the main victims or the bulk of the victims really are the
wives, the spouses or the female partners in a relationship. We
would like to place that on record. How does the good Senator
respond to this kind of observation?
_______________
60 Petition, Id., at pp. 26-27.
61 An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Members of the
Family, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, Providing for Protective Measures
for Victims and for Other Purposes.
62 Congressional Records, Vol. III, No. 45, December 10, 2003, p. 27.
63 Id., at p. 25.
64 Id., at p. 27.
405
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Garcia vs. Drilon
Senator Estrada. Yes, Mr. President, there is this group of women

who call themselves “WIIR” Women in Intimate Relationship.
They do not want to include men in this domestic violence. But
plenty of men are also being abused by women. I am playing safe
so I placed here members of the family, prescribing penalties
therefor and providing protective measures for victims. This
includes the men, children, live-in, common-law wives, and those
related with the family.65
x x x x
Wednesday, January 14, 2004
x x x x
The President Pro Tempore. x x x
Also, may the Chair remind the group that there was the
discussion whether to limit this to women and not to families
which was the issue of the AWIR group. The understanding that I
have is that we would be having a broader scope rather than just
women, if I remember correctly, Madam sponsor.
Senator Estrada. Yes, Mr. President.
As a matter of fact, that was brought up by Senator Pangilinan
during the interpellation period.
I think Senator Sotto has something to say to that.
Senator Legarda. Mr. President, the reason I am in support of the
measure. Do not get me wrong. However, I believe that there is a
need to protect women’s rights especially in the domestic
environment.
As I said earlier, there are nameless, countless, voiceless women
who have not had the opportunity to file a case against their
spouses, their live-in
_______________
65 Id., at pp. 43-44.
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Garcia vs. Drilon
partners after years, if not decade, of battery and abuse. If

we broaden the scope to include even the men, assuming
they can at all be abused by the women or their spouses,
then it would not equalize the already difficult situation for
women, Mr. President.
I think that the sponsor, based on our earlier conversations,
concurs with this position. I am sure that the men in this
Chamber who love their women in their lives so dearly will agree
with this representation. Whether we like it or not, it is an
unequal world. Whether we like it or not, no matter how
empowered the women are, we are not given equal opportunities
especially in the domestic environment where the macho Filipino
man would always feel that he is stronger, more superior to the
Filipino woman.
x x x x
The President Pro Tempore. What does the sponsor say?
Senator Estrada. Mr. President, before accepting this, the committee
came up with this bill because the family members have been
included in this proposed measure since the other members of the
family other than women are also possible victims of violence.
While women are most likely the intended victims, one reason
incidentally why the measure focuses on women, the fact remains
that in some relatively few cases, men also stand to be victimized
and that children are almost always the helpless victims of
violence. I am worried that there may not be enough protection
extended to other family members particularly children who are
excluded. Although Republic Act No. 7610, for instance, more or
less, addresses the special needs of abused children. The same law
is inadequate. Protection orders for one are not available in said
law.
I am aware that some groups are apprehensive about granting the
same protection to men, fearing that they may use this law to
justify their abusive
407
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Garcia vs. Drilon
behavior against women. However, we should also

recognize that there are established procedures and
standards in our courts which give credence to evidentiary
support and cannot just arbitrarily and whimsically
entertain baseless complaints.
Mr. President, this measure is intended to harmonize family
relations and to protect the family as the basic social institution.
Though I recognize the unequal power relations between men and
women in our society, I believe we have an obligation to uphold
inherent rights and dignity of both husband and wife and their
immediate family members, particularly children.
While I prefer to focus mainly on women, I was compelled to
include other family members as a critical input arrived at after a
series of consultations/meetings with various NGOs, experts,
sports groups and other affected sectors, Mr. President.
Senator Sotto. Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Yes, with the permission of the other
senators.
Senator Sotto. Yes, with the permission of the two ladies on the Floor.
The President Pro Tempore. Yes, Sen. Vicente C. Sotto III is
recognized.
Senator Sotto. I presume that the effect of the proposed amendment of
Senator Legarda would be removing the “men and children” in
this particular bill and focus specifically on women alone. That
will be the net effect of that proposed amendment. Hearing the
rationale mentioned by the distinguished sponsor, Sen. Luisa “Loi”
Ejercito Estrada, I am not sure now whether she is inclined to
accept the proposed amendment of Senator Legarda.
I am willing to wait whether she is accepting this or not because if
she is going to accept this, I will propose an amendment to the
amendment rather than object to the amendment, Mr. President.
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Garcia vs. Drilon
x x x x
Senator Estrada. The amendment is accepted, Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection?
x x x x
Senator Sotto. x x x May I propose an amendment to the amendment.
The President Pro Tempore. Before we act on the amendment?
Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Yes, please proceed.
Senator Sotto. Mr. President, I am inclined to believe the rationale
used by the distinguished proponent of the amendment. As a
matter of fact, I tend to agree. Kung may maaabuso, mas
malamang iyong babae kaysa sa lalake. At saka iyong mga lalake,
puwede na talagang magulpi iyan. Okey lang iyan. But I cannot
agree that we remove the children from this particular measure.
So, if I may propose an amendment—
The President Pro Tempore. To the amendment.
Senator Sotto.—more than the women, the children are very much
abused. As a matter of fact, it is not limited to minors. The abuse
is not limited to seven, six, 5-year-old children. I have seen 14, 15-
year-old children being abused by their fathers, even by their
mothers. And it breaks my heart to find out about these things.
Because of the inadequate existing law on abuse of children, this
particular measure will update that. It will enhance and hopefully
prevent the abuse of children and not only women.
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Garcia vs. Drilon
SOTTO-LEGARDA AMENDMENTS
Therefore, may I propose an amendment that, yes, we remove the
aspect of the men in the bill but not the children.
Senator Legarda. I agree, Mr. President, with the Minority
Leader.
The President Pro Tempore. Effectively then, it will be women
AND CHILDREN.
Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.
Senator Estrada. It is accepted, Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection? [Silence]
There being none, the amendment, as amended, is
approved.66
It is settled that courts are not concerned with the

wisdom, justice, policy, or expediency of a statute.67 Hence,
we dare not venture into the real motivations and wisdom
of the members of Congress in limiting the protection
against violence and abuse under R.A. 9262 to women and
children only. No proper challenge on said grounds may be
entertained in this proceeding. Congress has made its
choice and it is not our prerogative to supplant this
judgment. The choice may be perceived as erroneous but
even then, the remedy against it is to seek its amendment
or repeal by the legislative. By the principle of separation
of powers, it is the legislative that determines the
necessity, adequacy, wisdom and expediency of any law.68
We only step in when there is a violation of the
Constitution. However, none was sufficiently shown in this
case.
_______________
66 Congressional Records, Vol. III, No. 51, January 14, 2004, pp. 141-
147.
67 Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty (LAMP) v. The Secretary of
Budget and Management, G.R. No. 164987, April 24, 2012, 670 SCRA 373,
391.
68 Garcia v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 111511, October 5,
1993, 227 SCRA 100, 113-114.
410

Garcia vs. Drilon
R.A. 9262 does not violate the
guaranty of equal protection
of the laws.
Equal protection simply requires that all persons or
things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to
rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. The oft-
repeated disquisition in the early case of Victoriano v.
Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union69 is instructive:
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a

guaranty of equality in the application of the laws upon all
citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in
order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against
inequality, that every man, woman and child should be
affected alike by a statute. Equality of operation of statutes
does not mean indiscriminate operation on persons merely
as such, but on persons according to the circumstances
surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of
rights. The Constitution does not require that things which
are different in fact be treated in law as though they were
the same. The equal protection clause does not forbid
discrimination as to things that are different. It does not
prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to
which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to
operate.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the
Constitution allows classification. Classification in law, as
in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the
grouping of things in speculation or practice because they
agree with one another in certain particulars. A law is not
invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of
classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without
saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner
determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is
required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable,
which means that the classification should be based on
_______________
69 158 Phil. 60, 86-87; 59 SCRA 54, 77-78 (1974).
411
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Garcia vs. Drilon
substantial distinctions which make for real differences;

that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that
it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
that it must apply equally to each member of the class.
This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the
classification or distinction is based on a reasonable
foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary.
(Emphasis supplied)
Measured against the foregoing jurisprudential

yardstick, we find that R.A. 9262 is based on a valid
classification as shall hereinafter be discussed and, as
such, did not violate the equal protection clause by favoring
women over men as victims of violence and abuse to whom
the State extends its protection.
I. R.A. 9262 rests on substantial distinctions.
The unequal power relationship between women and
men; the fact that women are more likely than men to be
victims of violence; and the widespread gender bias and
prejudice against women all make for real differences
justifying the classification under the law. As Justice
McIntyre succinctly states, “the accommodation of
differences ... is the essence of true equality.”70
A. Unequal power relationship
between men and women
According to the Philippine Commission on Women (the
National Machinery for Gender Equality and Women’s
Empowerment), violence against women (VAW) is deemed
to be closely linked with the unequal power
relationship between women and men otherwise
known as “gender-based violence”. Societal norms and
traditions dictate people to
_______________
70 Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143, p.
169.
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think men are the leaders, pursuers, providers, and take on

dominant roles in society while women are nurturers,
men’s companions and supporters, and take on subordinate
roles in society. This perception leads to men gaining more
power over women. With power comes the need to control
to retain that power. And VAW is a form of men’s
expression of controlling women to retain power.71
The United Nations, which has long recognized VAW as
a human rights issue, passed its Resolution 48/104 on the
Declaration on Elimination of Violence Against Women on
December 20, 1993 stating that “violence against women is
a manifestation of historically unequal power relations
between men and women, which have led to domination
over and discrimination against women by men and to the
prevention of the full advancement of women, and that
violence against women is one of the crucial social
mechanisms by which women are forced into subordinate
positions, compared with men.”72
Then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno traced the historical
and social context of gender-based violence and
developments in advocacies to eradicate VAW, in his
remarks delivered during the Joint Launching of R.A. 9262
and its Implementing Rules last October 27, 2004, the
pertinent portions of which are quoted hereunder:
History reveals that most societies sanctioned the use of

violence against women. The patriarch of a family was
accorded the right to use force on members of the family
under his control. I quote the early studies:
_______________
71 Philippine Commission on Women, National Machinery for Gender Equality
and Women’s Empowerment, “Violence Against Women (VAW),”
<http://www.pcw.gov.ph> (visited November 16, 2012).
72 <http://www.lawphil.net/international/treaties/dec_dec_1993.html> (visited
November 16, 2012).
413
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Traditions subordinating women have a long history

rooted in patriarchy—the institutional rule of men. Women
were seen in virtually all societies to be naturally inferior
both physically and intellectually. In ancient Western
societies, women whether slave, concubine or wife, were
under the authority of men. In law, they were treated as
property.
The Roman concept of patria potestas allowed the
husband to beat, or even kill, his wife if she endangered his
property right over her. Judaism, Christianity and other
religions oriented towards the patriarchal family
strengthened the male dominated structure of society.
English feudal law reinforced the tradition of male
control over women. Even the eminent Blackstone has been
quoted in his commentaries as saying husband and wife
were one and that one was the husband. However, in the
late 1500s and through the entire 1600s, English common
law began to limit the right of husbands to chastise their
wives. Thus, common law developed the rule of thumb,
which allowed husbands to beat their wives with a rod or
stick no thicker than their thumb.
In the later part of the 19th century, legal recognition of
these rights to chastise wives or inflict corporeal
punishment ceased. Even then, the preservation of the
family was given more importance than preventing violence
to women.
The metamorphosis of the law on violence in the United
States followed that of the English common law. In 1871,
the Supreme Court of Alabama became the first appellate
court to strike down the common law right of a husband to
beat his wife:
The privilege, ancient though it may be, to beat one’s
wife with a stick, to pull her hair, choke her, spit in
her face or kick her about the floor, or to inflict upon
her like indignities, is not now acknowledged by our
law... In person, the wife is entitled to the same
protection of the law that the husband can invoke for
himself.
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As time marched on, the women’s advocacy movement

became more organized. The temperance leagues initiated
it. These leagues had a simple focus. They considered the
evils of alcoholism as the root cause of wife abuse. Hence,
they demonstrated and picketed saloons, bars and their
husbands’ other watering holes. Soon, however, their
crusade was joined by suffragette movements, expanding
the liberation movement’s agenda. They fought for women’s
right to vote, to own property, and more. Since then, the
feminist movement was on the roll.
The feminist movement exposed the private invisibility
of the domestic violence to the public gaze. They succeeded
in transforming the issue into an important public concern.
No less than the United States Supreme Court, in 1992 case
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, noted:
In an average 12-month period in this country,
approximately two million women are the victims of
severe assaults by their male partners. In a 1985
survey, women reported that nearly one of every eight
husbands had assaulted their wives during the past
year. The [American Medical Association] views these
figures as “marked underestimates,” because the
nature of these incidents discourages women from
reporting them, and because surveys typically exclude
the very poor, those who do not speak English well,
and women who are homeless or in institutions or
hospitals when the survey is conducted. According to
the AMA, “researchers on family violence agree that
the true incidence of partner violence is probably
double the above estimates; or four million severely
assaulted women per year.”
Studies on prevalence suggest that from one-fifth to
one-third of all women will be physically assaulted by
a partner or ex-partner during their lifetime... Thus
on an average day in the United States, nearly 11,000
women are severely assaulted by their male partners.
Many of these incidents involve sexual assault... In
families where wife beat-
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ing takes place, moreover, child abuse is often present
as well.
Other studies fill in the rest of this troubling picture.
Physical violence is only the most visible form of
abuse. Psychological abuse, particularly forced social
and economic isolation of women, is also common.
Many victims of domestic violence remain with their
abusers, perhaps because they perceive no superior
alternative...Many abused women who find temporary
refuge in shelters return to their husbands, in large
part because they have no other source of income...
Returning to one’s abuser can be dangerous. Recent
Federal Bureau of Investigation statistics disclose
that 8.8 percent of all homicide victims in the United
States are killed by their spouses...Thirty percent of
female homicide victims are killed by their male
partners.
Finally in 1994, the United States Congress enacted the
Violence Against Women Act.
In the International front, the women’s struggle for
equality was no less successful. The United States Charter
and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights affirmed
the equality of all human beings. In 1979, the UN General
Assembly adopted the landmark Convention on the
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW). In 1993, the UN General Assembly also adopted
the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against
Women. World conferences on the role and rights of women
have been regularly held in Mexico City, Copenhagen,
Nairobi and Beijing. The UN itself established a
Commission on the Status of Women.
The Philippines has been in cadence with the half — and
full — steps of all these women’s movements. No less than
Section 14, Article II of our 1987 Constitution mandates the
State to recognize the role of women in nation building and
to ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women
and men. Our Senate has ratified the CEDAW as well as
the Convention on the Rights of
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Garcia vs. Drilon
the Child and its two protocols. To cap it all, Congress, on

March 8, 2004, enacted Rep. Act No. 9262, entitled “An Act
Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children,
Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing
Penalties therefor and for other Purposes.” (Citations
omitted)

B. Women are the “usual” and “most likely”
victims of violence.
At the time of the presentation of Senate Bill No. 2723,
official statistics on violence against women and children
show that —
x x x physical injuries had the highest number of cases at

5,058 in 2002 representing 55.63% of total cases reported
(9,903). And for the first semester of 2003, there were 2,381
reported cases out of 4,354 cases which represent 54.31%.
xxx (T)he total number of women in especially difficult
circumstances served by the Department of Social Welfare
and Development (DSWD) for the year 2002, there are
1,417 physically abused/maltreated cases out of the total of
5,608 cases. xxx (T)here are 1,091 DSWD cases out of a total
number of 3,471 cases for the first semester of 2003. Female
violence comprised more than 90% of all forms of abuse and
violence and more than 90% of these reported cases were
committed by the women’s intimate partners such as their
husbands and live-in partners.73
Recently, the Philippine Commission on Women
presented comparative statistics on violence against
women across an eight-year period from 2004 to August of
2011 with violations
_______________
73 As reported by Senator Loi Estrada in her Sponsorship Speech,
Congressional Records, Vol. III, No. 45, December 10, 2003, p. 22.
417
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under R.A. 9262 ranking first among the different VAW

categories since its implementation in 2004,74 thus:
Table 1. Annual Comparative Statistics on Violence Against Women, 2004 - 2011*
Reported Cases 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Rape 997 927 659 837 811 770 1,042 832
Incestuous Rape 38 46 26 22 28 27 19 23
Attempted Rape 194 148 185 147 204 167 268 201
Acts of Lasci-viousness 580 536 382 358 445 485 745 625
Physical Injuries 3,553 2,335 1,892 1,505 1,307 1,498 2,018 1,588
Sexual Harassment 53 37 38 46 18 54 83 63
RA 9262 218 924 1,269 2,387 3,599 5,285 9,974 9,021
Threats 319 223 199 182 220 208 374 213
Seduction 62 19 29 30 19 19 25 15
Concubinage 121 102 93 109 109 99 158 128
RA 9208 17 11 16 24 34 152 190 62
Abduction / Kidnapping 29 16 34 23 28 18 25 22
Unjust Vexation 90 50 59 59 83 703 183 155
Total 6,271 5,374 4,881 5,729 6,905 9,485 15,104 12,948
*2011 report covers only from January to August

Source: Philippine National Police – Women and Children Protection Center (WCPC)
On the other hand, no reliable estimates may be

obtained on domestic abuse and violence against men in
the Philippines because incidents thereof are relatively low
and, perhaps, because many men will not even attempt to
report the
_______________
74 Philippine Commission on Women, “Statistics on Violence Against
Filipino Women,” <http://pcw.gov.ph/statistics/201210/statistics-violence-
against-filipino-women> (visited October 12, 2012).
418

Garcia vs. Drilon
situation. In the United Kingdom, 32% of women who had

ever experienced domestic violence did so four or five (or
more) times, compared with 11% of the smaller number of
men who had ever experienced domestic violence; and
women constituted 89% of all those who had experienced 4
or more incidents of domestic violence.75 Statistics in
Canada show that spousal violence by a woman against a
man is less likely to cause injury than the other way
around (18 percent versus 44 percent). Men, who
experience violence from their spouses are much less likely
to live in fear of violence at the hands of their spouses, and
much less likely to experience sexual assault. In fact, many
cases of physical violence by a woman against a spouse are
in self-defense or the result of many years of physical or
emotional abuse.76
While there are, indeed, relatively few cases of violence
and abuse perpetrated against men in the Philippines, the
same cannot render R.A. 9262 invalid.
In a 1960 case involving the violation of a city ordinance
requiring drivers of animal-drawn vehicles to pick up,
gather and deposit in receptacles the manure emitted or
discharged by their vehicle-drawing animals in any public
highways, streets, plazas, parks or alleys, said ordinance
was challenged as violative of the guaranty of equal
protection of laws as its application is limited to owners
and drivers of vehicle-drawing animals and not to those
animals, although not utilized, but similarly pass through
the same streets.
The ordinance was upheld as a valid classification for
the reason that, while there may be non-vehicle-drawing
animals
_______________
75 Women’s Aid, “Who are the victims of domestic violence?,” citing
Walby and Allen, 2004, <www.womensaid.org.uk/domestic-violence-
articles.asp?section=00010001002200410001&itemid=1273 (visited
November 16, 2012).
76 Toronto District School Board, Facts and Statistics
<www.tdsb.on.ca/site/viewitem.asp?siteid=15&
menuid=23082&pageid=20007>(visited November 16, 2012).
419
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that also traverse the city roads, “but their number must
be negligible and their appearance therein merely
occasional, compared to the rig-drawing ones, as not to
constitute a menace to the health of the community.”77 The
mere fact that the legislative classification may result in
actual inequality is not violative of the right to equal
protection, for every classification of persons or things for
regulation by law produces inequality in some degree, but
the law is not thereby rendered invalid.78
C. Gender bias and prejudices
From the initial report to the police through prosecution,
trial, and sentencing, crimes against women are often
treated differently and less seriously than other crimes.
This was argued by then United States Senator Joseph R.
Biden, Jr., now Vice President, chief sponsor of the
Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), in defending the
civil rights remedy as a valid exercise of the U.S. Congress’
authority under the Commerce and Equal Protection
Clauses. He stressed that the widespread gender bias in
the U.S. has institutionalized historic prejudices against
victims of rape or domestic violence, subjecting them to
“double victimization”—first at the hands of the offender
and then of the legal system.79
Our own Senator Loi Estrada lamented in her
Sponsorship Speech for Senate Bill No. 2723 that
“(w)henever violence occurs in the family, the police treat it
as a private matter and advise the parties to settle the
conflict themselves. Once the complainant brings the case
to the prosecutor, the latter is hesitant to file the complaint
for fear that it might later be
_______________
77 People v. Solon, 110 Phil. 39, 41 (1960).
78 Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union, supra note 69, p. 90; p.
80.
79 Biden, Jr., Joseph R., “The Civil Rights Remedy of the Violence
Against Women Act: A Defense,” 37 Harvard Journal on Legislation 1
(Winter, 2000).
420

Garcia vs. Drilon
withdrawn. This lack of response or reluctance to be

involved by the police and prosecution reinforces the
escalating, recurring and often serious nature of domestic
violence.”80
Sadly, our own courts, as well, have exhibited prejudices
and biases against our women.
In a recent case resolved on March 9, 2011, we fined
RTC Judge Venancio J. Amila for Conduct Unbecoming of a
Judge. He used derogatory and irreverent language in
reference to the complainant in a petition for TPO and PPO
under R.A. 9262, calling her as “only a live-in partner” and
presenting her as an “opportunist” and a “mistress” in an
“illegitimate relationship.” Judge Amila even called her a
“prostitute,” and accused her of being motivated by
“insatiable greed” and of absconding with the contested
property.81 Such remarks betrayed Judge Amila’s
prejudices and lack of gender sensitivity.
The enactment of R.A. 9262 aims to address the
discrimination brought about by biases and prejudices
against women. As emphasized by the CEDAW Committee
on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women,
addressing or correcting discrimination through specific
measures focused on women does not discriminate against
men.82 Petitioner’s contention,83 therefore, that R.A. 9262
is discriminatory and that it is an “anti-male,” “husband-
bashing,” and “hate-men” law deserves scant consideration.
As a State Party to the CEDAW, the Philippines bound
itself to take all appropriate measures “to modify the social
and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a
view to achieving the elimi-
_______________
80 Congressional Records, Vol. III, No. 45, December 10, 2003, pp. 22-
23.
81 Benancillo v. Amila, A.M. No. RTJ-08-2149, March 9, 2011, 645
SCRA 1, 8.
82 “General recommendation No. 25, on article 4, paragraph 1, of the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women, on temporary special measures” <www.un.org/
womenwatch/.../recommendation> (visited January 4, 2013).
421
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nation of prejudices and customary and all other practices

which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the
superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for
men and women.”84 Justice Puno correctly pointed out that
“(t)he paradigm shift changing the character of domestic
violence from a private affair to a public offense will
require the development of a distinct mindset on the part of
the police, the prosecution and the judges.”85
II. The classification is germane to the purpose of
the law.
The distinction between men and women is germane to
the purpose of R.A. 9262, which is to address violence
committed against women and children, spelled out in its
Declaration of Policy, as follows:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.—It is hereby declared that

the State values the dignity of women and children and
guarantees full respect for human rights. The State also
recognizes the need to protect the family and its members
particularly women and children, from violence and threats
to their personal safety and security.
Towards this end, the State shall exert efforts to address
violence committed against women and children in keeping
with the fundamental freedoms guaranteed under the
Constitution and the provisions of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
Convention on the Rights of the Child and other
international human rights instruments of which the
Philippines is a party.
_______________
84 Article 5(a), CEDAW.
85 “The Rule on Violence Against Women and Their Children,”
Remarks delivered during the Joint Launching of R.A. 9262 and its
Implementing Rules last October 27, 2004 at the Session Hall of the
Supreme Court.
422

Garcia vs. Drilon
In 1979, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the

CEDAW, which the Philippines ratified on August 5, 1981.
Subsequently, the Optional Protocol to the CEDAW was
also ratified by the Philippines on October 6, 2003.86 This
Convention mandates that State parties shall accord to
women equality with men before the law87 and shall take
all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination
against women in all matters relating to marriage and
family relations on the basis of equality of men and
women.88 The Philippines likewise ratified the Convention
on the Rights of the Child and its two protocols.89 It is,
thus, bound by said Conventions and their respective
protocols.
III. The classification is not limited to existing
conditions only, and apply equally to all
members
Moreover, the application of R.A. 9262 is not limited to
the existing conditions when it was promulgated, but to
future conditions as well, for as long as the safety and
security of women and their children are threatened by
violence and abuse.
R.A. 9262 applies equally to all women and children
who suffer violence and abuse. Section 3 thereof defines
VAWC as:
x x x any act or a series of acts committed by any person

against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a
woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating
relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or
against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within
or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to
result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering,
or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery,
assault, coercion, harass-
_______________
86 Supra note 49.
87 Article 15.
88 Article 16.
89 Supra note 49.
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Garcia vs. Drilon
ment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. It includes, but is

not limited to, the following acts:
A. “Physical Violence” refers to acts that include bodily or
physical harm;
B. “Sexual violence” refers to an act which is sexual in
nature, committed against a woman or her child. It
includes, but is not limited to:
a) rape, sexual harassment, acts of lasciviousness,
treating a woman or her child as a sex object, making
demeaning and sexually suggestive remarks,
physically attacking the sexual parts of the victim’s
body, forcing her/him to watch obscene publications
and indecent shows or forcing the woman or her child
to do indecent acts and/or make films thereof, forcing
the wife and mistress/lover to live in the conjugal
home or sleep together in the same room with the
abuser;
b) acts causing or attempting to cause the victim to
engage in any sexual activity by force, threat of force,
physical or other harm or threat of physical or other
harm or coercion;
c) Prostituting the woman or child.
C. “Psychological violence” refers to acts or omissions
causing or likely to cause mental or emotional suffering of
the victim such as but not limited to intimidation,
harassment, stalking, damage to property, public ridicule or
humiliation, repeated verbal abuse and marital infidelity. It
includes causing or allowing the victim to witness the
physical, sexual or psychological abuse of a member of the
family to which the victim belongs, or to witness
pornography in any form or to witness abusive injury to
pets or to unlawful or unwanted deprivation of the right to
custody and/or visitation of common children.
D. “Economic abuse” refers to acts that make or attempt to
make a woman financially dependent which includes, but is
not limited to the following:
1. withdrawal of financial support or preventing the
victim from engaging in any legitimate profes-
424

Garcia vs. Drilon
sion, occupation, business or activity, except in cases

wherein the other spouse/partner objects on valid,
serious and moral grounds as defined in Article 73 of
the Family Code;
2. deprivation or threat of deprivation of financial
resources and the right to the use and enjoyment of
the conjugal, community or property owned in
common;
3. destroying household property;
4. controlling the victims’ own money or properties
or solely controlling the conjugal money or properties.
It should be stressed that the acts enumerated in the

aforequoted provision are attributable to research that has
exposed the dimensions and dynamics of battery. The acts
described here are also found in the U.N. Declaration on
the Elimination of Violence Against Women.90 Hence, the
argument advanced by petitioner that the definition of
what constitutes abuse removes the difference between
violent action and simple marital tiffs is tenuous.
There is nothing in the definition of VAWC that is vague
and ambiguous that will confuse petitioner in his defense.
The acts enumerated above are easily understood and
provide adequate contrast between the innocent and the
prohibited acts. They are worded with sufficient
definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can
understand what conduct is prohibited, and need not guess
at its meaning nor differ in its application.91 Yet, petitioner
insists92 that phrases like “depriving or threatening to
deprive the woman or her child of a legal right,” “solely
controlling the conjugal or common money or properties,”
“marital infidelity,” and “causing mental or
_______________
90 Supra note 49.
91 Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 421 Phil. 290, 351-352; 369 SCRA 394,
439 (2001).
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Garcia vs. Drilon
emotional anguish” are so vague that they make every

quarrel a case of spousal abuse. However, we have stressed
that the “vagueness” doctrine merely requires a reasonable
degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld — not
absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as
petitioner seems to suggest. Flexibility, rather than
meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the metes
and bounds of the statute are clearly delineated. An act
will not be held invalid merely because it might have been
more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions.93
There is likewise no merit to the contention that R.A.
9262 singles out the husband or father as the culprit. As
defined above, VAWC may likewise be committed “against
a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or
dating relationship.” Clearly, the use of the gender-neutral
word “person” who has or had a sexual or dating
relationship with the woman encompasses even lesbian
relationships. Moreover, while the law provides that the
offender be related or connected to the victim by marriage,
former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does
not preclude the application of the principle of
conspiracy under the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Thus, in
the case of Go-Tan v. Spouses Tan,94 the parents-in-law of
Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan, the victim, were held to be proper
respondents in the case filed by the latter upon the
allegation that they and their son (Go-Tan’s husband) had
community of design and purpose in tormenting her by
giving her insufficient financial support; harassing and
pressuring her to be ejected from the family home; and in
repeatedly abusing her verbally, emotionally, mentally and
physically.
_______________
93 Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 91, at pp. 352-353; p. 440.
94 G.R. No. 168852, September 30, 2008, 567 SCRA 231.
426

Garcia vs. Drilon
R.A. 9262 is not violative of the due

process clause of the Constitution.
Petitioner bewails the disregard of R.A. 9262,
specifically in the issuance of POs, of all protections
afforded by the due process clause of the Constitution. Says
he: “On the basis of unsubstantiated allegations, and
practically no opportunity to respond, the husband is
stripped of family, property, guns, money, children, job,
future employment and reputation, all in a matter of
seconds, without an inkling of what happened.”95
A protection order is an order issued to prevent
further acts of violence against women and their children,
their family or household members, and to grant other
necessary reliefs. Its purpose is to safeguard the offended
parties from further harm, minimize any disruption in
their daily life and facilitate the opportunity and ability to
regain control of their life.96“The scope of reliefs in
protection orders is broadened to ensure that the victim or
offended party is afforded all the remedies necessary to
curtail access by a perpetrator to the victim. This serves to
safeguard the victim from greater risk of violence; to accord
the victim and any designated family or household member
safety in the family residence, and to prevent the
perpetrator from committing acts that jeopardize the
employment and support of the victim. It also enables the
court to award temporary custody of minor children to
protect the children from violence, to prevent their
abduction by the perpetrator and to ensure their financial
support.”97
The rules require that petitions for protection order be
in writing, signed and verified by the petitioner98 thereby
under-
_______________
96 Sec. 4 (o), A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC.
97 Supra note 49.
98 Sec. 7, A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC.
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Garcia vs. Drilon
taking full responsibility, criminal or civil, for every

allegation therein. Since “time is of the essence in cases of
VAWC if further violence is to be prevented,”99 the court is
authorized to issue ex parte a TPO after raffle but before
notice and hearing when the life, limb or property of the
victim is in jeopardy and there is reasonable ground to
believe that the order is necessary to protect the victim
from the immediate and imminent danger of VAWC or to
prevent such violence, which is about to recur.100
There need not be any fear that the judge may have no
rational basis to issue an ex parte order. The victim is
required not only to verify the allegations in the petition,
but also to attach her witnesses’ affidavits to the
petition.101
The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be
challenged as violative of the right to due process. Just like
a writ of preliminary attachment which is issued without
notice and hearing because the time in which the hearing
will take could be enough to enable the defendant to
abscond or dispose of his property,102 in the same way, the
victim of VAWC may already have suffered harrowing
experiences in the hands of her tormentor, and possibly
even death, if notice and hearing were required before such
acts could be prevented. It is a constitutional commonplace
that the ordinary requirements of procedural due process
must yield to the necessities of protecting vital public
interests,103 among which is protection of women and
children from violence and threats to their personal safety
and security.
_______________
99 Supra note 49.
100 Id.
101 Supra note 85.
102 Cuartero v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 102448, August 5, 1992, 212
SCRA 260, 265.
103 Laguna Lake Development Authority v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
110120, March 16, 1994, 231 SCRA 292, 307, citing Pollution Adjudication
Board v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 93891, March 11, 1991, 195 SCRA
112.
428

Garcia vs. Drilon
It should be pointed out that when the TPO is issued ex

parte, the court shall likewise order that notice be
immediately given to the respondent directing him to file
an opposition within five (5) days from service. Moreover,
the court shall order that notice, copies of the petition and
TPO be served immediately on the respondent by the court
sheriffs. The TPOs are initially effective for thirty (30) days
from service on the respondent.104
Where no TPO is issued ex parte, the court will
nonetheless order the immediate issuance and service of
the notice upon the respondent requiring him to file an
opposition to the petition within five (5) days from service.
The date of the preliminary conference and hearing on the
merits shall likewise be indicated on the notice.105
The opposition to the petition which the respondent
himself shall verify, must be accompanied by the affidavits
of witnesses and shall show cause why a temporary or
permanent protection order should not be issued.106
It is clear from the foregoing rules that the respondent
of a petition for protection order should be apprised of the
charges imputed to him and afforded an opportunity to
present his side. Thus, the fear of petitioner of being
“stripped of family, property, guns, money, children, job,
future employment and reputation, all in a matter of
seconds, without an inkling of what happened” is a mere
product of an overactive imagination. The essence of due
process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be
heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of
one’s defense. “To be heard” does not only mean verbal
arguments in court; one may be heard also through
pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either
_______________
104 Sec. 15, A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC.
105 Sec. 16, A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC.
106 Sec. 20, A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC.
429
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Garcia vs. Drilon
through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is

no denial of procedural due process.107
It should be recalled that petitioner filed on April 26,
2006 an Opposition to the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for
Renewal of the TPO that was granted only two days earlier
on April 24, 2006. Likewise, on May 23, 2006, petitioner
filed a motion for the modification of the TPO to allow him
visitation rights to his children. Still, the trial court in its
Order dated September 26, 2006, gave him five days (5)
within which to show cause why the TPO should not be
renewed or extended. Yet, he chose not to file the required
comment arguing that it would just be an “exercise in
futility,” conveniently forgetting that the renewal of the
questioned TPO was only for a limited period (30 days)
each time, and that he could prevent the continued renewal
of said order if he can show sufficient cause therefor.
Having failed to do so, petitioner may not now be heard to
complain that he was denied due process of law.
Petitioner next laments that the removal and exclusion
of the respondent in the VAWC case from the residence of
the victim, regardless of ownership of the residence, is
virtually a “blank check” issued to the wife to claim any
property as her conjugal home.108
The wording of the pertinent rule, however, does not by
any stretch of the imagination suggest that this is so. It
states:
SEC. 11. Reliefs available to the offended party.—The

protection order shall include any, some or all of the
following reliefs:
x x x x
(c) Removing and excluding the respondent from the
residence of the offended party, regardless of owner-
_______________
107 Esperida v. Jurado, Jr., G.R. No. 172538, April 25, 2012, 671 SCRA 66, 74.
108 Petition, Rollo, pp. 30-31.
430

Garcia vs. Drilon
ship of the residence, either temporarily for the purpose of

protecting the offended party, or permanently where no
property rights are violated. If the respondent must remove
personal effects from the residence, the court shall direct a
law enforcement agent to accompany the respondent to the
residence, remain there until the respondent has gathered
his things and escort him from the residence;
x x x x
Indubitably, petitioner may be removed and excluded

from private respondent’s residence, regardless of
ownership, only temporarily for the purpose of protecting
the latter. Such removal and exclusion may be permanent
only where no property rights are violated. How then can
the private respondent just claim any property and
appropriate it for herself, as petitioner seems to suggest?
The non-referral of a VAWC case
to a mediator is justified.
Petitioner argues that “by criminalizing run-of-the-mill
arguments, instead of encouraging mediation and
counseling, the law has done violence to the avowed policy
of the State to “protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution.”109
Under Section 23(c) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the court
shall not refer the case or any issue thereof to a mediator.
The reason behind this provision is well-explained by the
Commentary on Section 311 of the Model Code on Domestic
and Family Violence as follows:110
This section prohibits a court from ordering or referring

parties to mediation in a proceeding for an order for pro-
_______________
109 Id., at p. 36.
110 Supra note 49.
431
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Garcia vs. Drilon
tection. Mediation is a process by which parties in

equivalent bargaining positions voluntarily reach
consensual agreement about the issue at hand. Violence,
however, is not a subject for compromise. A process
which involves parties mediating the issue of violence
implies that the victim is somehow at fault. In addition,
mediation of issues in a proceeding for an order of
protection is problematic because the petitioner is
frequently unable to participate equally with the person
against whom the protection order has been sought.
(Emphasis supplied)
There is no undue delegation of

judicial power to barangay officials.
Petitioner contends that protection orders involve the
exercise of judicial power which, under the Constitution, is
placed upon the “Supreme Court and such other lower
courts as may be established by law” and, thus, protests
the delegation of power to barangay officials to issue
protection orders.111 The pertinent provision reads, as
follows:
SEC. 14. Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs); Who May

Issue and How.—Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs) refer
to the protection order issued by the Punong Barangay
ordering the perpetrator to desist from committing acts
under Section 5 (a) and (b) of this Act. A Punong Barangay
who receives applications for a BPO shall issue the
protection order to the applicant on the date of filing after
ex parte determination of the basis of the application. If the
Punong Barangay is unavailable to act on the application
for a BPO, the application shall be acted upon by any
available Barangay Kagawad. If the BPO is issued by a
Barangay Kagawad, the order must be accompanied by an
attestation by the Barangay Kagawad that the Punong
Barangay was unavailable at the time of the issuance of the
BPO. BPOs shall be effective for fifteen
_______________
111 Petition, Rollo, pp. 130-131.
432

Garcia vs. Drilon
(15) days. Immediately after the issuance of an ex parte

BPO, the Punong Barangay or Barangay Kagawad shall
personally serve a copy of the same on the respondent, or
direct any barangay official to effect its personal service.
The parties may be accompanied by a non-lawyer advocate
in any proceeding before the Punong Barangay.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice
to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government.112 On
the other hand, executive power “is generally defined as the
power to enforce and administer the laws. It is the power of
carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing
their due observance.”113
As clearly delimited by the aforequoted provision, the
BPO issued by the Punong Barangay or, in his
unavailability, by any available Barangay Kagawad,
merely orders the perpetrator to desist from (a) causing
physical harm to the woman or her child; and (2)
threatening to cause the woman or her child physical harm.
Such function of the Punong Barangay is, thus, purely
executive in nature, in pursuance of his duty under the
Local Government Code to “enforce all laws and
ordinances,” and to “maintain public order in the
barangay.”114
We have held that “(t)he mere fact that an officer is
required by law to inquire into the existence of certain facts
and to apply the law thereto in order to determine what his
official conduct shall be and the fact that these acts may
affect
_______________
112 Sec. 1, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution.
113 Laurel v. Desierto, 430 Phil. 658; 381 SCRA 48 (2002).
114 People v. Tomaquin, 478 Phil. 885, 899; 435 SCRA 23, 36 (2004),
citing Section 389, Chapter 3, Title One, Book III, Local Government Code
of 1991, as amended.
433
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Garcia vs. Drilon
private rights do not constitute an exercise of judicial

powers.”115
In the same manner as the public prosecutor ascertains
through a preliminary inquiry or proceeding “whether
there is reasonable ground to believe that an offense has
been committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof,”
the Punong Barangay must determine reasonable ground
to believe that an imminent danger of violence against the
woman and her children exists or is about to recur that
would necessitate the issuance of a BPO. The preliminary
investigation conducted by the prosecutor is, concededly, an
executive, not a judicial, function. The same holds true
with the issuance of a BPO.
We need not even belabor the issue raised by petitioner
that since barangay officials and other law enforcement
agencies are required to extend assistance to victims of
violence and abuse, it would be very unlikely that they
would remain objective and impartial, and that the chances
of acquittal are nil. As already stated, assistance by
barangay officials and other law enforcement agencies is
consistent with their duty to enforce the law and to
maintain peace and order.
Conclusion
Before a statute or its provisions duly challenged are
Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative one,
must be demonstrated in such a manner as to leave no
doubt in the mind of the Court. In other words, the grounds
for nullity must be beyond reasonable doubt.116 In the
instant case, however, no concrete evidence and convincing
arguments were presented by petitioner to warrant a
declaration
_______________
115 Lovina and Montilla v. Moreno and Yonzon, 118 Phil 1401, 1406; 9
SCRA 557, 561 (1963).
116 Hacienda Luisita, Incorporated v. Presidential Agrarian Reform
Council, G.R. No. 171101, July 5, 2011, 653 SCRA 154, 258.
434

Garcia vs. Drilon
of the unconstitutionality of R.A. 9262, which is an act of

Congress and signed into law by the highest officer of the
co-equal executive department. As we said in Estrada v.
Sandiganbayan,117 courts must assume that the legislature
is ever conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary
powers, and passed laws with full knowledge of the facts
and for the purpose of promoting what is right and
advancing the welfare of the majority.
We reiterate here Justice Puno’s observation that “the
history of the women’s movement against domestic violence
shows that one of its most difficult struggles was the fight
against the violence of law itself. If we keep that in mind,
law will not again be a hindrance to the struggle of women
for equality but will be its fulfillment.”118 Accordingly, the
constitutionality of R.A. 9262 is, as it should be, sustained.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on
certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno (CJ.), Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Bersamin, Del

Castillo, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza and Reyes, JJ.,
concur.
Leonardo-De Castro, Abad and Leonen JJ., See
Separate Concurring Opinion.
Brion, J., See: Concurring Opinion.
Peralta, J., On official leave.
_______________
117 Supra note 91.
118 Supra note 85.
435
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Garcia vs. Drilon
CONCURRING OPINION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

I concur with the conclusion reached in the ponencia
ably written by the Honorable Estela Perlas-Bernabe. With
due respect, however, I submit that the test to determine
an equal protection challenge against the law, denying
statutory remedies to men who are similarly situated as
the women who are given differential treatment in the law,
on the basis of sex or gender, should be at the level of
intermediate scrutiny or middle-tier judicial
scrutiny rather than the rational basis test used in the
ponencia of Justice Bernabe.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails: (1) the
Decision dated January 24, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 01698 dismissing the Petition for
Prohibition with Injunction and Temporary Restraining
Order (Petition for Prohibition) which questioned the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9262, otherwise
known as the “Anti-Violence Against Women and Their
Children Act of 2004,” and sought a temporary restraining
order and/or injunction to prevent the implementation of
the Temporary Protection Order (TPO) and criminal
prosecution of herein petitioner Jesus A. Garcia under the
law; and (2) the Resolution dated August 14, 2007, denying
petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration of the said Decision.
At the outset, it should be stressed that the Court of
Appeals, in its assailed Decision and Resolution, did not
pass upon the issue of constitutionality of Republic Act No.
9262 and instead dismissed the Petition for Prohibition on
technical grounds, as follows:
1. The constitutional issue was raised for the first time on
appeal before the Court of Appeals by petitioner and not at
the earliest opportunity, which should be before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 41, Bacolod City,
acting as a Family Court, where private respondent Rosalie
Garcia, wife of
436

Garcia vs. Drilon
petitioner, instituted a Petition for Temporary and

Permanent Protection Order[s]1 under Republic Act No.
9262, against her husband, petitioner Jesus C. Garcia; and
2. The constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9262 can
only be questioned in a direct action and it cannot be the
subject of a collateral attack in a petition for prohibition, as
the inferior court having jurisdiction on the action may
itself determine the constitutionality of the statute, and the
latter’s decision on the matter may be reviewed on appeal
and not by a writ of prohibition, as it was held in People v.
Vera.2
Hence, the Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution
denied due course to the Petition for Prohibition “for being
fraught with fatal technical infirmities” and for not being
ripe for judicial review. Nevertheless, four out of the five
issues raised by the petitioner here dealt with the alleged
unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 9262. More
accurately put, however, the Court of Appeals refrained
from touching at all those four substantive issues of
constitutionality. The Court of Appeals cannot therefore be
faulted for any erroneous ruling on the aforesaid
substantive constitutional issues.
In this instant Petition for Review, the only issue
directly in point that can be raised against the Court of
Appeals Decision and Resolution is the first one cited as a
ground for the appeal, which I quote:
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE
PETITION ON THE THEORY THAT THE ISSUE OF
CONSTITUTIONALITY WAS NOT RAISED AT THE FIRST
OPPORTUNITY AND THAT, THE PETITION WAS A
COLLATERAL ATTACK ON THE VALIDITY OF THE LAW.3
Under the circumstances, whether this Court should

consider this Petition for Review as a proper occasion to
pass
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 63-83.
2 65 Phil. 56 (1937).
3 Rollo, p. 22.
437
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Garcia vs. Drilon
upon the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9262 shall be

a separate subject matter that is tackled below after the
above-quoted first issue is disposed of.
On the Propriety of Raising the
Issue of Constitutionality in a
Summary Proceeding Before the
RTC Designated as a Family Court
Petitioner assails the Court of Appeals ruling that he
should have raised the issue of constitutionality in his
Opposition4 to private respondent’s petition for protective
orders pending before the RTC for the following reasons:
1. The Rules on Violence Against Women and Children
(A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC), particularly Section 20 thereof,
expressly prohibit him from alleging any counterclaim,
cross-claim or third party claim, all of which are personal
to him and therefore with more reason, he cannot impugn
the constitutionality of the law by way of affirmative
defense.5
2. Since the proceedings before the Family Court are
summary in nature, its limited jurisdiction is inadequate to
tackle the complex issue of constitutionality.6
I agree with Justice Bernabe that the RTC, designated
as a Family Court, is vested with jurisdiction to decide
issues of constitutionality of a law, and that the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9262 can be resolved
in a summary proceeding, in accordance with the rule that
the question of constitutionality must be raised at the
earliest opportunity, otherwise it may not be considered on
appeal.
Section 20 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the Rule on
Republic Act No. 9262 provides:
_______________
4 Id., at pp. 98-103.
5 Id., at p. 23.
6 Id., at p. 24.
438

Garcia vs. Drilon
Sec. 20. Opposition to Petition.—(a) The respondent

may file an opposition to the petition which he himself shall
verify. It must be accompanied by the affidavits of witnesses
and shall show cause why a temporary or permanent
protection order should not be issued.
(b) Respondent shall not include in the opposition any
counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint, but any
cause of action which could be the subject thereof
may be litigated in a separate civil action. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Petitioner cites the above provision, particularly

paragraph (b) thereof, as one of his grounds for not
challenging the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9262
in his Opposition. The error of such reasoning is that it
treats “any cause of action” mentioned in Section 20(b) as
distinct from the “counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party
complaint” referred to in the said Section 20(b). On the
contrary, the language of said section clearly refers to a
cause of action that is the “subject” of the counterclaim,
cross-claim, or third-party complaint, which is barred
and which may be litigated in a separate civil action. The
issue of constitutionality is not a “cause of action” that is a
subject of the aforementioned prohibited pleadings. In fact,
petitioner admitted that such prohibited pleadings would
allege “claims which are personal to him.”7 Hence, Section
20(b) cannot even be invoked as a basis for filing the
separate special civil action of Petition for Prohibition
before the Court of Appeals to question the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9262.
What obviously escapes petitioner’s understanding is
that the contents of the Opposition are not limited to mere
refutations of the allegations in the petition for temporary
and permanent protection order. While it is true that A.M.
No. 04-10-11-SC requires the respondent to file an
Opposition and not
_______________
7 Id., at p. 309, Petitioner’s Memorandum.
439
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Garcia vs. Drilon
an Answer,8 it does not prevent petitioner from challenging

the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9262 in such
Opposition. In fact, Section 20(a) directs petitioner to state
in his Opposition why a temporary or permanent protection
order should not be issued against him. This means that
petitioner should have raised in his Opposition all defenses
available to him, which may be either negative or
affirmative. Section 5(b), Rule 6 of the Rules of Court
define negative and affirmative defenses as follows:
(a) A negative defense is the specific denial of the

material fact or facts alleged in the pleading of the claimant
essential to his cause or causes of action.
(b) An affirmative defense is an allegation of a new
matter which, while hypothetically admitting the material
allegations in the pleading of the claimant, would
nevertheless prevent or bar recovery by him. The
affirmative defenses include fraud, statute of limitations,
release, payment, illegality, statute of frauds, estoppel,
former recovery, discharge in bankruptcy, and any other
matter by way of confession and avoidance.
In Bayog v. Hon. Natino,9 the respondent, in a complaint

for ejectment before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
(MCTC), raised as one of his defenses, the MCTC’s lack of
jurisdiction over the case in light of the agricultural
tenancy relationship between him and the petitioner. The
MCTC applied the Rule on Summary Procedure and issued
an Order stating that it could not take cognizance of the
Answer, for being filed belatedly. This Court ruled that
while the MCTC was correct in applying the Rule on
Summary Procedure as the complaint was one for
ejectment, it should have met and ruled squarely on the
issue of jurisdiction, as there was nothing in the rules that
barred it from admitting the Answer.
_______________
8 Rationale of the Proposed Rule on Violence Against Women and their
Children, 15th Salient Feature.
9 327 Phil. 1019; 258 SCRA 378 (1996).
440

Garcia vs. Drilon
Hence, the MCTC should have heard and received evidence

for the precise purpose of determining whether or not it
possessed jurisdiction over the case.10
Similarly, the alleged unconstitutionality of Republic
Act No. 9262 is a matter that would have prevented the
trial court from granting the petition for protection order
against the petitioner. Thus, petitioner should have raised
it in his Opposition as a defense against the issuance of a
protection order against him.
For all intents and purposes, the Petition for Prohibition
filed before the Court of Appeals was precipitated by and
was ultimately directed against the issuance of the TPO,
an interlocutory order, which under Section 22(j) of A.M.
No. 04-10-11-SC is a prohibited pleading. An action
questioning the constitutionality of the law also cannot be
filed separately even with another branch of the RTC. This
is not technically feasible because there will be no
justiciable controversy or an independent cause of action
that can be the subject of such separate action if it were not
for the issuance of the TPO against the petitioner. Thus,
the controversy, subject of a separate action, whether
before the Court of Appeals or the RTC, would still have to
be the issuance of the TPO, which is the subject of another
case in the RTC.
Moreover, the challenge to the constitutionality of the
law must be raised at the earliest opportunity. In
Dasmariñas Water District v. Monterey Foods
Corporation,11 we said:
A law is deemed valid unless declared null and void by a

competent court; more so when the issue has not been duly
pleaded in the trial court. The question of constitutionality
must be raised at the earliest opportunity. x x x. The settled
rule is that courts will not anticipate a question of
constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it.
(Citation omitted.)
_______________
10 Id., at pp. 1036-1037; p. 394.
11 G.R. No. 175550, September 17, 2008, 565 SCRA 624, 637.
441
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Garcia vs. Drilon
This Court held that such opportunity is in the

pleadings before a competent court that can resolve it, such
that “if it is not raised in the pleadings, it cannot be
considered at the trial, and, if not considered at the trial, it
cannot be considered on appeal.”12 The decision upon the
constitutional question is necessary to determine whether
the TPO should be issued against petitioner. Such question
should have been raised at the earliest opportunity as an
affirmative defense in the Opposition filed with the RTC
handling the protection order proceedings, which was the
competent court to pass upon the constitutional issue. This
Court, in Drilon v. Lim,13 held:
We stress at the outset that the lower court had

jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of
Section 187, this authority being embraced in the
general definition of the judicial power to determine
what are the valid and binding laws by the criterion
of their conformity to the fundamental law.
Specifically, BP 129 vests in the regional trial courts
jurisdiction over all civil cases in which the subject of the
litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation, even as the
accused in a criminal action has the right to question
in his defense the constitutionality of a law he is
charged with violating and of the proceedings taken
against him, particularly as they contravene the Bill
of Rights. Moreover, Article X, Section 5(2), of the
Constitution vests in the Supreme Court appellate
jurisdiction over final judgments and orders of lower courts
in all cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any
treaty, international or executive agreement, law,
presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation is in question. (Citation omitted,
emphases ours.)
_______________
12 Matibag v. Benipayo, 429 Phil. 554, 578; 380 SCRA 49, 65 (2002).
13 G.R. No. 112497, August 4, 1994, 235 SCRA 135, 139-140.
442

Garcia vs. Drilon
Furthermore, the filing of a separate action before the

Court of Appeals or the RTC for the declaration of
unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 9262 would result
to multiplicity of suits. It is clear that the issues of
constitutionality and propriety of issuing a protection order
raised by petitioner are inextricably intertwined. Another
court, whether it is an appellate court or a trial court,
cannot resolve the constitutionality question in the
separate action without affecting the petition for the
issuance of a TPO. Bringing a separate action for the
resolution of the issue of constitutionality will result in an
unresolved prejudicial question to the validity of issuing a
protection order. If the proceedings for the protection order
is not suspended, it does create the danger of having
inconsistent and conflicting judgments between the two
separate courts, whether of the same or different levels in
the judicial hierarchy. These two judgments would
eventually be the subject of separate motions for
reconsideration, separate appeals, and separate petitions
for review before this Court — the exact scenario the policy
against multiplicity of suits is avoiding. As we previously
held, “the law and the courts frown upon split jurisdiction
and the resultant multiplicity of actions.”14
It must be remembered that aside from the “earliest
opportunity” requirement, the court’s power of judicial
review is subject to other limitations. Two of which are the
existence of an actual case or controversy and standing. An
aspect of the actual case or controversy requirement is the
requisite of “ripeness.” This is generally treated in terms of
actual injury to the plaintiff. Thus, a question is ripe for
adjudication when the act being challenged had a direct
adverse effect on the individual challenging it. This direct
adverse effect on the individual will also be the basis of his
standing as it is necessary that the person challenging the
law must have a personal and substantial interest in the
case such that he has
_______________
14 Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Peña, 243 Phil. 93,
106; 159 SCRA 556, 565 (1988).
443
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Garcia vs. Drilon
sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result of its

enforcement.15
In this case, the petitioner’s challenge on the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9262 was on the basis
of the protection order issued against him. Verily, the
controversy became ripe only when he was in danger of or
was directly adversely affected by the statute mandating
the issuance of a protection order against him. He derives
his standing to challenge the statute from the direct injury
he would sustain if and when the law is enforced against
him. Therefore, it is clear that the proper forum to
challenge the constitutionality of the law was before the
RTC handling the protection order proceedings. The filing
of a separate action to question the constitutionality of the
law amounts to splitting a cause of action that runs counter
to the policy against multiplicity of suits.
Moreover, the filing of the Petition for Prohibition with
the Court of Appeals countenanced the evil that the law
and the rules sought to avoid. It caused the delay in the
proceedings and inconvenience, hardship and expense on
the part of the parties due to the multiplicity of suits
between them at different court levels. The RTC where the
petition for protection orders is filed should be trusted,
instead of being doubted, to be able to exercise its
jurisdiction to pass upon the issue of constitutionality
within the mandatory period set by the rules.
In gist, there is no statutory, reglementary, or practical
basis to disallow the constitutional challenge to a law,
which is sought to be enforced, in a summary proceeding.
This is particularly true considering that the issue of a
statute’s constitutionality is a question of law which may
be resolved without the reception of evidence or a full-
blown trial. Hence, said issue should have been raised at
the earliest opportunity in
_______________
15 Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty (LAMP) v. The Secretary of
Budget and Management, G.R. No. 164987, April 24, 2012, 670 SCRA 373,
383-384.
444

Garcia vs. Drilon
the proceedings before the RTC, Bacolod City and for

failure of the petitioner to do so, it cannot be raised in the
separate Petition for Prohibition before the Court of
Appeals, as correctly ruled by the latter, nor in a separate
action before the RTC.
On the Court Resolving the
Issue of Constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 9262
Notwithstanding my position that the Court of Appeals
properly dismissed the Petition for Prohibition because of
petitioner’s failure to raise the issue of constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 9262 at the earliest opportunity, I concur
that the Court, in the exercise of its sound discretion,16
should still pass upon the said issue in the present
Petition. Notable is the fact that not only the petitioner,
but the private respondent as well,17 pray that the Court
resolve the constitutional issue considering its novelty and
paramount importance. Indeed, when public interest
requires the resolution of the constitutional issue raised,
and in keeping with this Court’s duty of determining
whether other agencies or even co-equal branches of
government have remained within the limits of the
Constitution and have not abused the discretion given
them, the Court may brush aside technicalities of
procedure and resolve the constitutional issue.18
Aside from the technical ground raised by petitioner in
his first assignment of error, petitioner questions the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9262 on the following
grounds:
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS

ERROR IN FAILING TO CONCLUDE THAT R.A. NO. 9262
IS DIS-
_______________
16 People v. Vera, supra note 2.
17 Rollo, p. 237, Private Respondents’ Comment.
18 Matibag v. Benipayo, supra note 12 at p. 579; p. 66.
445
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Garcia vs. Drilon
CRIMINATORY, UNJUST, AND VIOLATIVE OF THE

EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE
MISTAKE IN NOT FINDING THAT R.A. NO. 9262 RUNS
COUNTER TO THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE
CONSTITUTION.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING
THAT THE LAW DOES VIOLENCE TO THE POLICY OF
THE STATE TO PROTECT THE FAMILY AS A BASIC
SOCIAL INSTITUTION.
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT
DECLARING R.A. NO. 9262 AS INVALID AND
UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT ALLOWS AN UNDUE
DELEGATION OF JUDICIAL POWER TO THE BARANGAY
OFFICIALS.19
On the Constitutional Right to Equal

Protection of the Laws
Petitioner challenges the constitutionality of Republic
Act No. 9262 for making a gender-based classification,
thus, providing remedies only to wives/women and not to
husbands/men. He claims that even the title of the law, “An
Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children”
is already pejorative and sex-discriminatory because it
means violence by men against women.20 The law also does
not include violence committed by women against children
and other women. He adds that gender alone is not enough
basis to deprive the husband/father of the remedies under
it because its avowed purpose is to curb and punish spousal
violence. The said remedies are discriminatory against the
husband/male gender. There being no reasonable difference
between an abused husband and an abused wife, the equal
protection guarantee is violated.
_______________
19 Rollo, p. 22.
20 Id., at p. 26.
446

Garcia vs. Drilon
Pertinently, Section 1, Article III of the 1987

Constitution states:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property

without due process of law, nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the laws. (Emphasis
supplied.)
The above provision was lifted verbatim from the 1935
and 1973 Constitutions, which in turn was a slightly
modified version of the equal protection clause in Section 1,
Amendment 1421 of the United States Constitution.
In 1937, the Court established in People v. Vera22 the
four-fold test to measure the reasonableness of a
classification under the equal protection clause, to wit:
This basic individual right sheltered by the Constitution

is a restraint on all the three grand departments of our
government and on the subordinate instrumentalities and
subdivisions thereof, and on many constitutional powers,
like the police power, taxation and eminent domain. The
equal protection of the laws, sententiously observes the
Supreme Court of the United States, “is a pledge of the
protection of equal laws.” Of course, what may be regarded
as a denial of the equal protection of the laws is a question
not always easily determined. No rule that will cover every
case can be formulated. Class legislation discriminating
against some and favoring others is prohibited. But
classification on a reasonable basis,
_______________
21 All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
22 Supra note 2 at pp. 125-126.
447
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Garcia vs. Drilon
and not made arbitrarily or capriciously, is

permitted. The classification, however, to be
reasonable must be based on substantial distinctions
which make real differences; it must be germane to
the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to
existing conditions only, and must apply equally to
each member of the class. (Citations omitted, emphasis
supplied.)
In our jurisdiction, the standard and analysis of equal

protection challenges in the main have followed the
foregoing “rational basis” test, coupled with a deferential
attitude to legislative classifications and a reluctance to
invalidate a law unless there is a showing of a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution.23
However, over time, three levels of tests were developed,
which are to be applied in equal protection cases,
depending on the subject matter24 involved:
1. Rational Basis Scrutiny — the traditional test, which requires
“only that government must not impose differences in treatment
except upon some reasonable differentiation fairly related to the
object of regulation.” Simply put, it merely demands that the
classification in the statute reasonably relates to the legislative
purpose.25
2. Intermediate Scrutiny — requires that the classification (means)
must serve an important governmental objective (ends) and is
substantially related to the achievement of such objective. A
_______________
23 Central Bank (now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas) Employees Association, Inc. v. Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas, 487 Phil. 531, 583-584; 446 SCRA 299, 370 (2004).
24 Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 190582, April 8, 2010, 618
SCRA 32, citing BERNAS, THE 1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES: A COMMENTARY, pp.
139-140 (2009).
25 Central Bank (now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas) Employees Association, Inc. v. Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas, supra note 23.
448

Garcia vs. Drilon
classification based on sex is the best-established example of an

intermediate level of review.26
3. Strict Scrutiny — requires that the classification serve a
compelling state interest and is necessary to achieve such
interest. This level is used when suspect classifications or
fundamental rights are involved.27
Recent Philippine jurisprudence has recognized the need

to apply different standards of scrutiny in testing the
constitutionality of classifications. In British American
Tobacco v. Camacho,28 this Court held that since the case
therein neither involved a suspect classification nor
impinged on a fundamental right, then “the rational basis
test was properly applied to gauge the constitutionality of
the assailed law in the face of an equal protection
challenge.”29 We added:
It has been held that “in the areas of social and economic
policy, a statutory classification that neither proceeds along
suspect lines nor infringes constitutional rights must be
upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any
reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a
rational basis for the classification.” Under the rational
basis test, it is sufficient that the legislative classification is
rationally related to achieving some legitimate State
interest. x x x.30 (Citations omitted.)
Echoing the same principle, this Court, speaking

through then Chief Justice Puno in Central Bank (now
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas) Employees Association, Inc. v.
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas,31 stated:
_______________
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 G.R. No. 163583, April 15, 2009, 585 SCRA 36.
29 Id., at p. 40.
30 Id., at pp. 40-41.
31 Supra note 23 at pp. 597-600.
449
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Garcia vs. Drilon
Congress retains its wide discretion in providing for a

valid classification, and its policies should be accorded
recognition and respect by the courts of justice except when
they run afoul of the Constitution. The deference stops
where the classification violates a fundamental right,
or prejudices persons accorded special protection by
the Constitution. When these violations arise, this Court
must discharge its primary role as the vanguard of
constitutional guaranties, and require a stricter and
more exacting adherence to constitutional
limitations. Rational basis should not suffice.
x x x x
Under most circumstances, the Court will exercise
judicial restraint in deciding questions of constitutionality,
recognizing the broad discretion given to Congress in
exercising its legislative power. Judicial scrutiny would be
based on the “rational basis” test, and the legislative
discretion would be given deferential treatment.
But if the challenge to the statute is premised on
the denial of a fundamental right, or the
perpetuation of prejudice against persons favored by
the Constitution with special protection, judicial
scrutiny ought to be more strict. A weak and watered
down view would call for the abdication of this Court’s
solemn duty to strike down any law repugnant to the
Constitution and the rights it enshrines. This is true
whether the actor committing the unconstitutional act is a
private person or the government itself or one of its
instrumentalities. Oppressive acts will be struck down
regardless of the character or nature of the actor. (Citations
omitted.)
This was reiterated in League of Cities of the Philippines

v. Commission on Elections,32 and Ang Ladlad LGBT Party
v. Commission on Elections,33 wherein the Court, although
ap-
_______________
32 G.R. Nos. 176951, 177499, and 178056, November 18, 2008, 571
SCRA 263.
33 Supra note 24.
450

Garcia vs. Drilon
plying the rational basis test, noted that there are tests,
which are more appropriate in other cases, especially those
involving suspect classes and fundamental rights. In fact,
Chief Justice Puno expounded on this in his Separate
Concurring Opinion in the Ang Ladlad case. He said that
although the assailed resolutions therein were correctly
struck down, since the classification was based on
gender or sexual orientation, a quasi-suspect
classification, a heightened level of review should
have been applied and not just the rational basis
test, which is the most liberal basis of judicial
scrutiny. Citing American authority, Chief Justice Puno
continued to elucidate on the three levels of scrutiny and
the classes falling within each level, to wit:
If a legislative classification disadvantages a “suspect

class” or impinges upon the exercise of a “fundamental
right,” then the courts will employ strict scrutiny and the
statute must fall unless the government can demonstrate
that the classification has been precisely tailored to serve a
compelling governmental interest. Over the years, the
United States Supreme Court has determined that suspect
classes for equal protection purposes include classifications
based on race, religion, alienage, national origin, and
ancestry. The underlying rationale of this theory is that
where legislation affects discrete and insular minorities, the
presumption of constitutionality fades because traditional
political processes may have broken down. In such a case,
the State bears a heavy burden of justification, and the
government action will be closely scrutinized in light of its
asserted purpose.
On the other hand, if the classification, while not
facially invidious, nonetheless gives rise to recurring
constitutional difficulties, or if a classification
disadvantages a “quasi-suspect class,” it will be
treated under intermediate or heightened review. To
survive intermediate scrutiny, the law must not only
further an important governmental interest and be
substantially related to that interest, but the justification
for the classification must be genuine and must not de-
451
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Garcia vs. Drilon
pend on broad generalizations. Noteworthy, and of special

interest to us in this case, quasi-suspect classes include
classifications based on gender or illegitimacy.
If neither strict nor intermediate scrutiny is appropriate,
then the statute will be tested for mere rationality. This is
a relatively relaxed standard reflecting the Court’s
awareness that the drawing of lines which creates
distinctions is peculiarly a legislative task and an
unavoidable one. The presumption is in favor of the
classification, of the reasonableness and fairness of state
action, and of legitimate grounds of distinction, if any such
grounds exist, on which the State acted.34 (Citations
omitted, emphases supplied.)
This case presents us with the most opportune time to

adopt the appropriate scrutiny in deciding cases where the
issue of discrimination based on sex or gender is raised.
The assailed Section 3, among other provisions, of Republic
Act No. 9262 provides:
SEC. 3. Definition of Terms.—As used in this Act:

(a) “Violence against women and their children” refers
to any act or a series of acts committed by any person
against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against
a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or
dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child,
or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate,
within or without the family abode, which result in or is
likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or
battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary
deprivation of liberty. x x x. (Emphases supplied.)
The aforesaid law also institutionalized remedies such

as the issuance of protection orders in favor of women and
chil-
_______________
34 Id., at pp. 93-95.
452

Garcia vs. Drilon
dren who are victims of violence and prescribed public

penalties for violation of the said law.
Petitioner questions the constitutionality of Republic Act
No. 9262 which denies the same protection orders to
husbands who are victims of wife-abuse. It should be
stressed that under aforecited section of said law violence
may not only be physical or sexual but also psychological
and economic in nature.
The Honorable Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen in
his concurring opinion notes that “Husband abuse maybe
an under reported form of family violence.” While
concurring with the majority opinion, he opines as follows:
Nevertheless, in a future case more deserving of our

attention, we should be open to realities which may
challenge the dominant conception that violence in intimate
relationships only happens to women and children. This
may be predominantly true, but even those in marginal
cases deserve fundamental constitutional and statutory
protection. We should be careful that in correcting historical
and cultural injustices, we may typecast all women as
victims, stereotype all men as tormentors or make invisible
the possibility that in some intimate relationships, men
may also want to seek succor against acts defined in Section
5 of Republic Act No. 9262 in an expeditious manner.
Since statutory remedies accorded to women are not

made available to men, when the reality is that there are
men, regardless of their number, who are also suffering
from domestic violence, the rational basis test may be too
wide and liberal to justify the statutory classification which
in effect allows different treatment of men who are
similarly situated. In the context of the constitutional
policy to “ensure the fundamental equality before the law
of women and men”35 the level of scrutiny applicable, to
test whether or not the classifi-
_______________
35 1987 Constitution, Article II, Section 14.
453
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Garcia vs. Drilon
cation in Republic Act No. 9262 violates the equal

protection clause, is the middle-tier scrutiny or the
intermediate standard of judicial review.
To survive intermediate review, the classification in the
challenged law must (1) serve important governmental
objectives, and (2) be substantially related to the
achievement of those objectives.36
Important and Essential
Governmental Objectives: Safeguard
Human Rights, Ensure Gender
Equality and Empower Women
Republic Act No. 9262 is a legislation that furthers
important, in fact essential, governmental objectives as
enunciated in the law’s Declaration of Policy, as quoted
below:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.—It is hereby declared

that the State values the dignity of women and children and
guarantees full respect for human rights. The State also
recognizes the need to protect the family and its members
particularly women and children, from violence and threats
to their personal safety and security.
Towards this end, the State shall exert efforts to address
violence committed against women and children in keeping
with the fundamental freedoms guaranteed under the
Constitution and the Provisions of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on the
Elimination of all forms of discrimination Against Women,
Convention on the Rights of the Child and other
international human rights instruments of which the
Philippines is a party.
_______________
36 Central Bank (now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas) Employees
Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, supra note 23 at 586; p.
373, citing Justice Marshall’s dissent in San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
454

Garcia vs. Drilon
This policy is in consonance with the constitutional

provisions,37 which state:
SEC. 11. The State values the dignity of every human

person and guarantees full respect for human rights.
SEC. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family
life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution. x x x.
By constitutional mandate, the Philippines is committed

to ensure that human rights and fundamental freedoms are
fully enjoyed by everyone. It was one of the countries that
voted in favor of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR), which was a mere two years after it gained
independence from the United States of America. In
addition, the Philippines is a signatory to many United
Nations human rights treaties such as the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, the Convention Against Torture, and the
Convention on the Rights of the Child, among others.
As a signatory to the UDHR, the Philippines pledged
itself to achieve the promotion of universal respect for and
observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms,38
keeping in mind the standards under the Declaration.
Among the standards under the UDHR are the following:
Article 1. All human beings are born free and equal in

dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and
conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of
brotherhood.
x x x x
_______________
37 1987 Constitution, Article II.
38 Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
455
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Garcia vs. Drilon
Article 7. All are equal before the law and are

entitled without any discrimination to equal
protection of the law. All are entitled to equal protection
against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration
and against any incitement to such discrimination.
Article 8. Everyone has the right to an effective
remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts
violating the fundamental rights granted him by the
constitution or by law. (Emphasis ours.)
The Declaration of Policy in Republic Act No. 9262

enunciates the purpose of the said law, which is to fulfill
the government’s obligation to safeguard the dignity and
human rights of women and children by providing effective
remedies against domestic violence or physical,
psychological, and other forms of abuse perpetuated by the
husband, partner, or father of the victim. The said law is
also viewed within the context of the constitutional
mandate to ensure gender equality, which is quoted as
follows:
Section 14. The State recognizes the role of women in

nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental equality
before the law of women and men.39
It has been acknowledged that “gender-based violence is

a form of discrimination that seriously inhibits women’s
ability to enjoy rights and freedoms on a basis of equality
with men.”40 Republic Act No. 9262 can be viewed therefore
as the Philippines’ compliance with the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
(CEDAW), which is committed to condemn discrimination
against women and directs its members to undertake,
without delay, all appropriate means to eliminate
discrimination against women in all forms both in law and
in practice.41 Known as
_______________
39 1987 Constitution, Article II.
40 General Recommendation No. 19, CEDAW/par. 1 (1992).
41 CEDAW, Article 2.
456
Garcia vs. Drilon
the International Bill of Rights of Women,42 the CEDAW is

the central and most comprehensive document for the
advancement of the welfare of women.43 It brings the
women into the focus of human rights concerns, and its
spirit is rooted in the goals of the UN: to reaffirm faith in
fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the
human person, in the equal rights of men and women.44
The CEDAW, in its preamble, explicitly acknowledges the
existence of extensive discrimination against
women, and emphasized that such is a violation of
the principles of equality of rights and respect for
human dignity.
In addition, as a state party to the CEDAW, the
Philippines is under legal obligation to to ensure their
development and advancement for the improvement of
their position from one of de jure as well as de facto
equality with men.45 The CEDAW, going beyond the
concept of discrimination used in many legal standards and
norms, focuses on discrimination against women, with the
emphasis that women have suffered and are continuing to
suffer from various forms of discrimination on account of
their biological sex.46
The Philippines’ accession to various international
instruments requires it to promote and ensure the
observance of human rights and “continually affirm its
commitment to ensure that it pursues gender equality in
all aspects of the development process to eventually make
real, a genderresponsive society.”47 Thus, the governmental
objectives of protecting human rights and
fundamental freedoms, which includes promoting
gender equality and empowering
_______________
42 http://pcw.gov.ph/international-commitments/cedaw last visited on
April 9, 2013.
43 CEDAW, Introduction.
44 Id.
45 General Recommendation No. 25, CEDAW/par. 4 (2004).
46 Id., par. 5 (2004).
47 http://pcw.gov.ph/international-commitments last visited on April 9,
2013.
457
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Garcia vs. Drilon
women, as mandated not only by our Constitution, but

also by commitments we have made in the international
sphere, are undeniably important and essential.
The Gender-Based Classification
in Republic Act No. 9262 is Sub-
stantially Related to the Achieve-
ment of Governmental Objectives
As one of the country’s pervasive social problems,
violence against women is deemed to be closely linked with
the unequal power relationship between women and men
and is otherwise known as “gender-based violence.”48
Violent acts towards women has been the subject of an
examination on a historic world-wide perspective.49 The
exhaustive study of a foreign history professor noted that
“[f]rom the earliest civilizations on, the subjugation of
women, in the form of violence, were facts of life,”50 as
three great bodies of thought, namely: Judeo-Christian
religious ideas; Greek philosophy; and the Common Law
Legal Code, which have influenced western society’s views
and treatment of women, all “assumed patriarchy as
natural; that is, male domination stemming from the view
51
of male superiority.” It cited 18th century legal expert
William Blackstone, who explained that the common law
doctrine of coverture reflected the theological assumption
that husband and wife were ‘one body’ before God; thus
“they were ‘one person’ under the law, and that one person
was the husband,”52 a concept that evidently found its way
in some of our
_______________
48 http://pcw.gov.ph/focus-areas/violence-against-women last visited on
April 10, 2013.
49 Historical Perspectives on Violence Against Women. November
2002.
50 Vivian C. Fox, Ph.D. Journal of International Women’s Studies Vol.
4 #1, Historical Perspectives on Violence Against Women. November 2002,
p. 20.
51 Id., at p. 15.
52 Id., at p. 19.
458

Garcia vs. Drilon
Civil Code provisions prior to the enactment of the Family

Code.
Society and tradition dictate that the culture of
patriarchy continue. Men are expected to take on the
dominant roles both in the community and in the family.
This perception naturally leads to men gaining more power
over women —power, which must necessarily be controlled
and maintained. Violence against women is one of the ways
men control women to retain such power.53
The enactment of Republic Act No. 9262 was in response
to the undeniable numerous cases involving violence
committed against women in the Philippines. In 2012, the
Philippine National Police (PNP) reported54 that 65% or
11,531 out of 15,969 cases involving violence against
women were filed under Republic Act No. 9262. From 2004
to 2012, violations of Republic Act No. 9262 ranked first
among the different categories of violence committed
against women. The number of reported cases showed an
increasing trend from 2004 to 2012, although the numbers
might not exactly represent the real incidence of violence
against women in the country, as the data is based only on
what was reported to the PNP. Moreover, the increasing
trend may have been caused by the continuous information
campaign on the law and its strict implementation.55
Nonetheless, statistics show that cases involving violence
against women are prevalent, while there is a dearth of
reported cases involving violence committed by women
against men, that will require legislature intervention or
solicitous treatment of men.
Preventing violence against women and children
through their availment of special legal remedies, serves
the govern-
_______________
53 http://pcw.gov.ph/focus-areas/violence-against-women last visited on
April 10, 2013.
54 As Submitted by the Philippine Commission on Women.
55 http://pcw.gov.ph/statistics/201210/statistics-violence-against-
filipino-women, last visited on March 18, 2013.
459
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Garcia vs. Drilon
mental objectives of protecting the dignity and human

rights of every person, preserving the sanctity of family
life, and promoting gender equality and empowering
women. Although there exists other laws on violence
against women56 in the Philippines, Republic Act No. 9262
deals with the problem of violence within the family and
intimate relationships, which deserves special attention
because it occurs in situations or places where women and
children should feel most safe and secure but are actually
not. The law provides the widest range of reliefs for women
and children who are victims of violence, which are often
reported to have been committed not by strangers, but by a
father or a husband or a person with whom the victim has
or had a sexual or dating relationship. Aside from filing a
criminal case in court, the law provides potent legal
remedies to the victims that theretofore were not available.
The law recognizes, with valid factual support based on
statistics that women and children are the most vulnerable
victims of violence, and therefore need legal intervention.
On the other hand, there is a dearth of empirical basis to
anchor a conclusion that men need legal protection from
violence perpetuated by women.
The law takes into account the pervasive vulnerability of
women and children, and the seriousness and urgency of
the situation, which, in the language of the law result in or
is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or
battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary
deprivation of liberty.57 Hence, the law permits the
issuance of protec-
_______________
56 Republic Act No. 3815, The Revised Penal Code; Republic Act No.
7877, The Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995; Republic Act No. 8353,
The Anti-Rape Law of 1997; Republic Act No. 8505, The Rape Victims
Assistance Act of 1998; Republic Act No. 6955; Republic Act No. 9208, The
Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003; Republic Act No. 8369, The
Family Courts Act of 1997; and Republic Act No. 9710, The Magna Carta
of Women of 2009.
57 Republic Act No. 9262, Section 3.
460

Garcia vs. Drilon
tion orders and the granting of certain reliefs to women

victims, even without a hearing. The law has granted
authority for barangay officials to issue a protection order
against the offender, based on the victim’s application. The
RTC may likewise grant an application for a temporary
protection order (TPO) and provide other reliefs, also on
the mere basis of the application. Despite the ex parte
issuance of these protection orders, the temporary nature
of these remedies allow them to be availed of by the victim
without violating the offender’s right to due process as it is
only when a full-blown hearing has been done that a
permanent protection order may be issued. Thus, these
remedies are suitable, reasonable, and justified. More
importantly, they serve the objectives of the law by
providing the victims necessary immediate protection from
the violence they perceive as threats to their personal
safety and security. This translates to the fulfillment of
other governmental objectives as well. By assuring the
victims instant relief from their situation, they are
consequently empowered and restored to a place of dignity
and equality. Such is embodied in the purpose to be served
by a protection order, to wit:
SEC. 8. Protection Orders.—A protection order is an

order issued under this act for the purpose of preventing
further acts of violence against a woman or her child
specified in Section 5 of this Act and granting other
necessary relief. The relief granted under a protection
order serve the purpose of safeguarding the victim
from further harm, minimizing any disruption in the
victim’s daily life, and facilitating the opportunity
and ability of the victim to independently regain
control over her life. x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)
In furtherance of the governmental objectives, especially

that of protecting human rights, violence against women
and children under this Act has been classified as a public
of-
461
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Garcia vs. Drilon
fense,58 making its prosecution independent of the victim’s

initial participation.
Verily, the classification made in Republic Act No.
9262 is substantially related to the important
governmental objectives of valuing every person’s
dignity, respecting human rights, safeguarding
family life, protecting children, promoting gender
equality, and empowering women.
The persistent and existing biological, social, and
cultural differences between women and men prescribe
that they be treated differently under particular conditions
in order to achieve substantive equality for women.
Thus, the disadvantaged position of a woman as compared
to a man requires the special protection of the law, as
gleaned from the following recommendations of the
CEDAW Committee:
8. [T]he Convention requires that women be given an

equal start and that they be empowered by an enabling
environment to achieve equality of results. It is not enough
to guarantee women treatment that is identical to that of
men. Rather, biological as well as socially and
culturally constructed differences between women
and men must be taken into account. Under certain
circumstances, non-identical treatment of women
and men will be required in order to address such
differences. Pursuit of the goal of substantive equality also
calls for an effective strategy aimed at overcoming
underrepresentation of women and a redistribution of
resources and power between men and women.
9. Equality of results is the logical corollary of de
facto or substantive equality. These results may be
quantitative and/or qualitative in nature; that is, women
enjoying their rights in various fields in fairly equal
numbers with men, enjoying the same income levels,
equality in decision-making and political influence,
_______________
58 Id., Section 25.
462

Garcia vs. Drilon
and women enjoying freedom from violence.59

(Emphases supplied.)
The government’s commitment to ensure that the status

of a woman in all spheres of her life are parallel to that of a
man, requires the adoption and implementation of
ameliorative measures, such as Republic Act No. 9262.
Unless the woman is guaranteed that the violence that she
endures in her private affairs will not be ignored by the
government, which is committed to uplift her to her
rightful place as a human being, then she can neither
achieve substantive equality nor be empowered.
The equal protection clause in our Constitution does not
guarantee an absolute prohibition against classification.
The non-identical treatment of women and men under
Republic Act No. 9262 is justified to put them on equal
footing and to give substance to the policy and aim of the
state to ensure the equality of women and men in light of
the biological, historical, social, and culturally endowed
differences between men and women.
Republic Act No. 9262, by affording special and
exclusive protection to women and children, who are
vulnerable victims of domestic violence, undoubtedly serves
the important governmental objectives of protecting human
rights, insuring gender equality, and empowering women.
The gender-based classification and the special remedies
prescribed by said law in favor of women and children are
substantially related, in fact essentially necessary, to
achieve such objectives. Hence, said Act survives the
intermediate review or middle-tier judicial scrutiny.
The gender-based classification therein is therefore not
violative of the equal protection clause embodied in the
1987 Constitution.
_______________
59 General Recommendation No. 25, CEDAW/pars. 8-9 (2004).
463
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Garcia vs. Drilon
The Issuance of the TPO did not

Violate Petitioner’s Right to Due
Process
A protection order is issued under Republic Act No. 9262
for the purpose of preventing further acts of violence
against a woman or her child.60 The circumstances
surrounding the availment thereof are often attended by
urgency; thus, women and child victims must have
immediate and uncomplicated access to the same. Hence,
Republic Act No. 9262 provides for the issuance of a TPO:
SEC. 15. Temporary Protection Orders.—Temporary

Protection Orders (TPOs) refers to the protection order
issued by the court on the date of filing of the application
after ex parte determination that such order should be
issued. A court may grant in a TPO any, some or all of the
reliefs mentioned in this Act and shall be effective for thirty
(30) days. The court shall schedule a hearing on the
issuance of a PPO prior to or on the date of the expiration of
the TPO. The court shall order the immediate personal
service of the TPO on the respondent by the court sheriff
who may obtain the assistance of law enforcement agents
for the service. The TPO shall include notice of the date of
the hearing on the merits of the issuance of a PPO.
The ex parte issuance of the TPO does not make it

unconstitutional. Procedural due process refers to the
method or manner by which the law is enforced. It consists
of the two basic rights of notice and hearing, as well as the
guarantee of being heard by an impartial and competent
tribunal.61 However, it is a constitutional commonplace
that the ordinary requirements of procedural due process
yield to the necessi-
_______________
60 Section 8.
61 China Banking Corporation v. Lozada, G.R. No. 164919, July 4,
2008, 557 SCRA 177, 193.
464
Garcia vs. Drilon
ties of protecting vital public interests like those involved

herein. Republic Act No. 9262 and its implementing
regulations were enacted and promulgated in the exercise
of that pervasive, sovereign power of the State to protect
the safety, health, and general welfare and comfort of the
public (in this case, a particular sector thereof), as well as
the protection of human life, commonly designated as the
police power.62
In Secretary of Justice v. Lantion,63 the Court
enumerated three instances when notice and/or hearing
may be dispensed with in administrative proceedings:
These twin rights may, however, be considered dispensable in

certain instances, such as:
1. In proceedings where there is an urgent need for
immediate action, like the summary abatement of a
nuisance per se (Article 704, Civil Code), the preventive
suspension of a public servant facing administrative
charges (Section 63, Local Government Code, B.P. Blg. 337),
the padlocking of filthy restaurants or theaters showing
obscene movies or like establishments which are immediate
threats to public health and decency, and the cancellation of
a passport of a person sought for criminal prosecution;
2. Where there is tentativeness of administrative action, that
is, where the respondent is not precluded from enjoying the
right to notice and hearing at a later time without prejudice
to the person affected, such as the summary distraint and
levy of the property of a delinquent taxpayer, and the
replacement of a temporary appointee; and
3. Where the twin rights have previously been offered but the
right to exercise them had not been claimed.
_______________
62 Pollution Adjudication Board v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 93891,
March 11, 1991, 195 SCRA 112, 123.
63 379 Phil. 165, 203-204; 322 SCRA 160, 187-188 (2000).
465
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Garcia vs. Drilon
The principles behind the aforementioned exceptions

may also apply in the case of the ex parte issuance of the
TPO, although it is a judicial proceeding. As mentioned
previously, the urgent need for a TPO is inherent in its
nature and purpose, which is to immediately provide
protection to the woman and/or child victim/s against
further violent acts. Any delay in the issuance of a
protective order may possibly result in loss of life and limb
of the victim. The issuing judge does not arbitrarily issue
the TPO as he can only do so if there is reasonable ground
to believe that an imminent danger of violence against
women and their children exists or is about to recur based
on the verified allegations in the petition of the victim/s.64
Since the TPO is effective for only thirty (30) days,65 any
inconvenience, deprivation, or prejudice the person
enjoined — such as the petitioner herein — may suffer, is
generally limited and temporary. Petitioner is also not
completely precluded from enjoying the right to notice and
hearing at a later time. Following the issuance of the TPO,
the law and rules require that petitioner be personally
served with notice of the preliminary conference and
hearing on private respondent’s petition for a Permanent
Protection Order (PPO)66 and that petitioner submit his
opposition to private respondent’s petition for protections
orders.67 In fact, it was petitioner’s choice not to file an
opposition, averring that it would only be an “exercise in
futility.” Thus, the twin rights of notice and hearing were
subsequently afforded to petitioner but he chose not to take
advantage of them. Petitioner cannot now claim that the ex
parte issuance of the TPO was in violation of his right to
due process.
_______________
64 A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, Section 15(a).
65 Id.
66 Id., Section 15(b).
67 Id., Section 15(c).
466

Garcia vs. Drilon
There is No Undue Delegation of

Judicial Power to Barangay Officials
A Barangay Protection Order (BPO) refers to the
protection order issued by the Punong Barangay, or in his
absence the Barangay Kagawad, ordering the perpetrator
to desist from committing acts of violence against the
family or household members particularly women and their
children.68 The authority of barangay officials to issue a
BPO is conferred under Section 14 of Republic Act No.
9262:
SEC. 14. Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs); Who May

Issue and How.—Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs) refer
to the protection order issued by the Punong Barangay
ordering the perpetrator to desist from committing acts
under Section 5 (a) and (b) of this Act. A Punong Barangay
who receives applications for a BPO shall issue the
protection order to the applicant on the date of filing after
ex parte determination of the basis of the application. If the
Punong Barangay is unavailable to act on the application
for a BPO, the application shall be acted upon by any
available Barangay Kagawad. If the BPO is issued by a
Barangay Kagawad the order must be accompanied by an
attestation by the Barangay Kagawad that the Punong
Barangay was unavailable at the time for the issuance of
the BPO. BPOs shall be effective for fifteen (15) days.
Immediately after the issuance of an ex parte BPO, the
Punong Barangay or Barangay Kagawad shall personally
serve a copy of the same on the respondent, or direct any
barangay official to effect is personal service.
The parties may be accompanied by a non-lawyer
advocate in any proceeding before the Punong Barangay.
Once more, the urgency of the purpose for which

protection orders under Republic Act No. 9262 are issued
justifies the grant of authority to barangay officials to issue
BPOs. Baran-
_______________
68 Id., Section 4(p).
467
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Garcia vs. Drilon
gay officials live and interact closely with their constituents

and are presumably easier to approach and more readily
available than any other government official. Their
issuance of the BPO is but part of their official executive
function of enforcing all laws and ordinances within their
barangay69 and maintaining public order in the
barangay.70 It is true that the barangay officials’ issuance
of a BPO under Republic Act No. 9262 necessarily involves
the determination of some questions of fact, but this
function, whether judicial or quasi-judicial, are merely
incidental to the exercise of the power granted by law.71
The Court has clarified that:
“The mere fact that an officer is required by law to

inquire the existence of certain facts and to apply the law
thereto in order to determine what his official conduct shall
be and the fact that these acts may affect private rights do
not constitute an exercise of judicial powers. Accordingly, a
statute may give to non-judicial officers the power to declare
the existence of facts which call into operation its
provisions, and similarly may grant to commissioners and
other subordinate officers power to ascertain and determine
appropriate facts as a basis for procedure in the
enforcement of particular laws.” (11 Am. Jur., Const. Law,
p. 950, sec. 235)72
Furthermore, while judicial power rests exclusively in

the judiciary, it may be conceded that the legislature may
confer on administrative boards or bodies, or even
particular government officials, quasi-judicial power
involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, as
incident to the performance of
_______________
69 Section 389(b)(1), Chapter III, Title I, Book III of Republic Act No.
7160, otherwise known as The Local Government Code of 1991.
70 Section 389(b)(3), Chapter III, Title I, Book III of The Local
Government Code of 1991.
71 Lovina v. Moreno, 118 Phil. 1401, 1405; 9 SCRA 557, 561 (1963).
72 Id., at p. 1406; pp. 561-562.
468

Garcia vs. Drilon
administrative functions. But in so doing, the legislature

must state its intention in express terms that would leave
no doubt, as even such quasi-judicial prerogatives must be
limited, if they are to be valid, only to those incidental to or
in connection with the performance of administrative
duties, which do not amount to conferment of jurisdiction
over a matter exclusively vested in the courts.73 In the case
of a BPO, it is a mere provisional remedy under Republic
Act No. 9262, meant to address the pressing need of the
victims for instant protection. However, it does not take the
place of appropriate judicial proceedings and remedies that
provide a more effective and comprehensive protection to
the victim. In fact, under the Implementing Rules of
Republic Act No. 9262, the issuance of a BPO or the
pendency of an application for a BPO shall not preclude the
victim from applying for, or the court from granting, a TPO
or PPO. Where a TPO has already been granted by any
court, the barangay official may no longer issue a BPO.74
The same Implementing Rules also require that within
twenty-four (24) hours after the issuance of a BPO, the
barangay official shall assist the victim in filing an
application for a TPO or PPO with the nearest court in the
victim’s place of residence. If there is no Family Court or
RTC, the application may be filed in the Municipal Trial
Court, the Municipal Circuit Trial Court or the
Metropolitan Trial Court.75
All things considered, there is no ground to declare
Republic Act No. 9262 constitutionally infirm.
_______________
73 Miller v. Mardo, 112 Phil. 792, 802; 2 SCRA 898, 907 (1961).
74 Section 14(g).
75 Section 14(d).
469
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Garcia vs. Drilon
CONCURRING OPINION
BRION, J.:
I concur with the ponencia’s conclusion that Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 9262 (An Act Defining Violence Against
Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective
Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefore and
for Other Purposes) is constitutional and does not
violate the equal protection clause. As traditionally
viewed, the constitutional provision of equal protection
simply requires that similarly situated persons be treated
in the same way. It does not connote identity of rights
among individuals, nor does it require that every person is
treated identically in all circumstances. It acts as a
safeguard to ensure that State-drawn distinctions among
persons are based on reasonable classifications and made
pursuant to a proper governmental purpose. In short,
statutory classifications are not unconstitutional when
shown to be reasonable and made pursuant to a legitimate
government objective.
In my view, Congress has presented a reasonable
classification that focuses on women and children based on
protective provisions that the Constitution itself provides.
Section 11, Article II of the Constitution declares it a state
policy to value the dignity of every human person and
guarantees full respect for human rights. Further, under
Section 14, Article II of the Constitution, the State
recognizes the role of women in nation-building and
ensures fundamental equality before the law of women and
men. These policies are given purposeful meaning under
Article XV of the Constitution on family, which states:
Section 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as

the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall
strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total
development.
470

Garcia vs. Drilon
Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution,

is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the
State.
Section 3. The State shall defend:
(1) The right of spouses to found a family in accordance
with their religious convictions and the demands of
responsible parenthood;
(2) The right of children to assistance, including proper
care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms of
neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation and other conditions
prejudicial to their development[.]
From the terms of the law, I find it plain that Congress

enacted R.A. No. 9262 as a measure intended to strengthen
the family. Congress found that domestic and other forms
of violence against women and children contribute to the
failure to unify and strengthen family ties, thereby
impeding the State’s mandate to actively promote the
family’s total development. Congress also found, as a
reality, that women and children are more susceptible to
domestic and other forms of violence due to, among others,
the pervasive bias and prejudice against women and the
stereotyping of roles within the family environment that
traditionally exist in Philippine society. On this basis,
Congress found it necessary to recognize the substantial
distinction within the family between men, on the one
hand, and women and children, on the other hand. This
recognition, incidentally, is not the first to be made in
the laws as our law on persons and family under the
Civil Code also recognize, in various ways, the
distinctions between men and women in the context of
the family.1
_______________
1 Examples of this distinction are found in the following provisions of
the Family Code, as amended:
On the Ownership, Administrative, Enjoyment and Disposition of the
Community Property:
471
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Garcia vs. Drilon
To be sure, Congress has not been alone in addressing

violence committed against women and children as this
move is
_______________
“Art. 96. The administration and enjoyment of the community
property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the
husband’s decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by
the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years
from the date of the contract implementing such decision.”
On the Liquidation of the Absolute Community Assets and Liabilities:
“Art. 102. Upon dissolution of the absolute community regime, the
following procedure shall apply:
x x x x
(6) Unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, in the partition of
the properties, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated
shall be adjudicated to the spouse with whom the majority of the common
children choose to remain. Children below the age of seven years
are deemed to have chosen the mother, unless the court has decided
otherwise. In case there in no such majority, the court shall decide, taking
into consideration the best interests of said children.” (emphases ours)
On the Administration of the Conjugal Partnership Property:
“Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal
partnership shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement,
the husband’s decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court
by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years
from the date of the contract implementing such decision.” (emphasis
ours)
On the Liquidation of the Conjugal Partnership Assets and
Liabilities:
“Art. 129. Upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime,
the following procedure shall apply:
x x x x
(9) In the partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and
the lot on which it is situated shall, unless otherwise agreed upon
by the parties, be adjudicated to the spouse with whom the
majority of the common children choose to remain. Children
below the age of seven years are deemed to have chosen the
mother, unless the court has decided otherwise. In case there is no
such majority, the court shall decide, taking into consideration the
best interests of said children.” (emphases ours)
472

Garcia vs. Drilon
“in keeping with the fundamental freedoms guaranteed

under the Constitution and the Provisions of the Universal
Declara-
_______________
On Parental Authority:
“Art. 209. Pursuant to the natural right and duty of parents over the
person and property of their unemancipated children, parental authority
and responsibility shall include the caring for and rearing them for civic
consciousness and efficiency and the development of their moral, mental
and physical character and well-being.
x x x x
Art. 211. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental
authority over the persons of their common children. In case of
disagreement, the father’s decision shall prevail, unless there is a
judicial order to the contrary.” (emphasis ours)
On the Effect of Parental Authority Upon the Persons of the Children:
“Art. 220 The parents and those exercising parental authority
shall have with the respect to their unemancipated children on
wards the following rights and duties:
(1) To keep them in their company, to support, educate and
instruct them by right precept and good example, and to provide for
their upbringing in keeping with their means;
(2) To give them love and affection, advice and counsel,
companionship and understanding;
(3) To provide them with moral and spiritual guidance, inculcate
in them honesty, integrity, selfdiscipline, self-reliance, industry and
thrift, stimulate their interest in civic affairs, and inspire in them
compliance with the duties of citizenship;
(4) To furnish them with good and wholesome educational
materials, supervise their activities, recreation and association
with others, protect them from bad company, and prevent them
from acquiring habits detrimental to their health, studies and
morals;
(5) To represent them in all matters affecting their interests;
(6) To demand from them respect and obedience;
(7) To impose discipline on them as may be required under the
circumstances; and
(8) To perform such other duties as are imposed by law upon
parents and guardians.
On the Effect of Parental Authority Upon the Property of the Children:
473
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Garcia vs. Drilon
tion of Human Rights, the convention on the Elimination of

all forms of discrimination Against Women, Convention on
the Rights of the Child and other international human
rights instruments of which the Philippines is a party.”2
The only question perhaps is whether the considerations
made in these international instruments have reason or
basis for recognition and active application in the
Philippines.
I believe that the policy consideration Congress made in
this regard is not without basis in history and in
contemporary Philippine society so that Congress was
acting well within its prerogative when it enacted R.A. No.
9262 “to protect the family and its members particularly
women and children, from violence and threats to their
personal safety and security.”3
I consider, too, the statutory classification under R.A.
No. 9262 to be valid, and that the lowest level of scrutiny
of review should be applied in determining if the law has
established a valid classification germane to the
Constitution’s objective to protect the family by protecting
its women and children members. In my view, no need
exists to further test the law’s validity from the perspective
of an expanded equal protection based on social
justice. The Constitution itself has made special mention
of women and their role in society (Article II) and the
assistance and protection that must be given to children
irrespective of sex. It appears highly inconsistent to me
under this situation if the Court would impose a strict level
of scrutiny on government — the primary implementor of
constitutional policies — and lay on it the burden of
_______________
Art. 225. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise legal
guardianship over the property of the unemancipated common child
without the necessity of a court appointment. In case of disagreement, the
father’s decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the
contrary.”
2 R.A. No. 9262, Section 2.
3 Ibid.; italics ours.
474

Garcia vs. Drilon
establishing the validity of an Act directly addressing

violence against women and children.
My serious reservation on the use of an expanded equal
protection clause and in applying a strict scrutiny standard
is, among others, based on lack of necessity; we do not need
these measures when we can fully examine R.A. No. 9262’s
constitutionality using the reasonableness test. The family
is a unit, in fact a very basic one, and it cannot operate on
an uneven standard where measures beyond what is
necessary are extended to women and children as against
the man — the head of the family and the family provider.
The use of an expanded equal protection clause only
stresses the concept of an uneven equality that cannot long
stand in a unit living at close quarters in a situation of
mutual dependency on one another. The reasonableness
test, on the other hand, has been consistently applied to
allow the courts to uphold State action as long as the action
is found to be germane to the purpose of the law, in this
case to support the unity and development of the family. If
we are to deviate from or to modify this established
standard of scrutiny, we must do so carefully and for
strong justifiable reasons.
If we are to use a strict level of scrutiny of government
action, we must be aware of the risks that this system of
review may open. A very real risk is to open the
possibility that our social legislations will always be
subject to heightened scrutiny. Are we sure of what this
approach entails for the government and for our society in
the long run? How will this approach affect the social
legislation that our society, particularly the most
vulnerable members, need? What other effects will a
system of review — that regards governmental action as
illegal unless the government can actively justify the
classifications it has made in the course of pursuing its
actions — have? These are the questions that, in the
long run, we have to contend with, and I hate to
provide an answer through a case that is not, on its
face and even
475
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Garcia vs. Drilon
in deeper reality, representative of the questions we

are asking or need to ask.
The cases of Central Bank Employees Assoc., Inc. v.
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas4 and Serrano v. Gallant
Maritime Services, Inc.5 demonstrate the Court’s
application of a heightened sense of scrutiny on social
legislations. In Central Bank and Serrano, we held that
classifications in the law that result in prejudice to persons
accorded special protection by the Constitution require a
stricter judicial scrutiny.6 In both cases, the question may
well be asked: was there an absolute necessity for a strict
scrutiny approach when, as in Serrano, the same result
emerges when using the lowest level of scrutiny? In short, I
ask if a strict scrutiny is needed under the circumstances of
the present case as the Concurring Opinion of J. Roberto
Abad suggests.
Not to be forgotten or glossed over in answering this
question is the need to consider what a strict scrutiny
requires, as well as the consequences of an expanded
concept of equal protection clause and the accompanying
use of a strict scrutiny standard. Among others, this
approach affects the application of constitutional principles
that we vigilantly adhere to in this jurisdiction.
I outline below what a strict scrutiny approach entails.
First, the use of strict scrutiny only applies when the
challenged law or clause results in a “suspect
classification”;
Second, the use of a strict scrutiny standard of review
creates a reverse onus: the ordinary presumption of
constitution-
_______________
4 487 Phil. 531; 446 SCRA 299 (2004).
5 G.R. No. 167614, March 24, 2009, 582 SCRA 254.
6 See note 4. In Central Bank, the classification was based on salary
grade or officer-employee status. In the words of the decision, “It is akin to
a distinction based on economic class and status, with higher grades as
recipients of a benefit specifically withheld from the lower grades” (p.
391).
476

Garcia vs. Drilon
ality is reversed and the government carries the burden of

proving that the challenged law or clause is constitutional;
And third, the reverse onus in a strict scrutiny
standard of review directly strikes, in the most glaring
manner, at the regularity of the performance of functions of
a co-equal branch of government.
When the court uses a strict standard for review to
evaluate the constitutionality of a law, it proceeds from the
premise that the law established a “suspect classification.”
A suspect classification is one where distinctions are made
based on the most invidious bases for classification that
violate the most basic human rights, i.e., on the basis of
race, national origin, alien status, religious affiliation and,
to a certain extent, sex and sexual orientation.7 With a
suspect classification, the most stringent scrutiny of the
classification is applied: the ordinary presumption of
constitutionality is reversed and the government carries
the burden of proving the statute’s constitutionality. This
approach is unlike the lowest level of scrutiny
(reasonableness test) that the Court has applied in the past
where the classification is scrutinized and constitutionally
upheld if found to be germane to the purpose of the law.
Under a reasonableness test, there is a presumption of
constitutionality and that the laws enacted by Congress are
presumed to fall within its constitutional powers.
To pass strict scrutiny, the government must actively
show that the classification established in the law is
justified by a compelling governmental interest and the
means chosen by the State to effectuate its purpose must
be narrowly tailored to the achievement of that goal.8 In
the context of the present
_______________
7 See note 5, at p. 321. Citing City of Cleburn, Texas v. Cleburne Living
Center, 413 U.S. 432 (1985); Loving v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 388
U.S. 1 (1967).
8 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). See Pamore v. Sidoti, 466
U.S. 429, 432 (1984); Loving v. Commonwealth of Virginia, supra note 7;
and Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 375 (1971).
477
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Garcia vs. Drilon
case, is the resulting classification in the present law so

outstandingly harmful to men in general so that a strict
scrutiny is called for?I
do not really see any indication that Congress actually
intended to classify women and children as a group against
men, under the terms of R.A. No. 9262. Rather than a clear
intent at classification, the overriding intent of the law
is indisputably to harmonize family relations and
protect the family as a basic social institution.9 After
sifting through the comprehensive information gathered,
Congress found that domestic and other forms of violence
against women and children impedes the harmony of the
family and the personal growth and development of family
members. In the process, Congress found that these types
of violence must pointedly be addressed as they are more
commonly experienced by women and children due to the
unequal power relations of men and women in our society;
Congress had removed these types of violence as they are
impediments that block the harmonious development that
it envisions for the family, of which men are important
component members.
Even granting that a classification resulted in the law, I
do not consider the classification of women and children to
be within the “suspect classification” that jurisprudence
has established. As I mentioned earlier, suspect
classifications are distinctions based on the most invidious
bases for classification that violate the most basic human
rights. Some criteria used in determining suspect
classifications are: (1) the group possesses an immutable
and/or highly visible trait;10 and (2) they are powerless to
protect themselves via the political process.11 The group is
a “discrete” and “insular” minority.12
_______________
9 Congressional Records, Vol. III, No. 51, January 14, 2004, pp. 141-
147. See p. 25 of the ponencia.
10 477 U.S. 635 (1986).
11 United States v. Carolene Products Company, 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
12 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
478

Garcia vs. Drilon
Women and children, to my mind, simply do not fall within

these criteria.
In my view, a suspect classification and the
accompanying strict scrutiny should depend on the
circumstances of the case, on the impact of the illegal
differential treatment on the group involved, on the needed
protection and the impact of recognizing a suspect
classification on future classification.13 A suspect
classification label cannot solely and automatically be
triggered by the circumstance that women and children are
accorded special protection by the Constitution. In fact,
there is no place for a strict level of scrutiny when the
Constitution itself has recognized the need for special
protection; where such recognition has been made,
congressional action should carry the presumption of
validity.
Similarly, a suspect classification and the accompanying
strict scrutiny standard cannot be solely based on the
circumstance that the law has the effect of being “gender-
specific.” I believe that the classification in the law was
not immediately brought on by considerations of
gender or sex; it was simply a reality as unavoidable
as the reality that in Philippine society, a marriage
is composed of a man, a woman and their children.
An obvious reason, of course, why the classification did not
solely depend on gender is because the law also covers
children, without regard to their sex or their sexual
orientation.
Congress was sensitive to these realities and had to
address the problem as it existed in order to pinpoint and
remove the obstacles that lay along the way. With this
appreciation of reality, Congress had no recourse but to
identify domestic and other forms of violence committed on
women and their children as among the obstacles that
intrude on the development, peace and harmony of the
family. From this perspective, the objective of the law —
the productive devel-
_______________
13 Concurring Opinion in Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc.,
supra note 5, at p. 322.
479
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Garcia vs. Drilon
opment of the family as a whole and the Congress’ view of

what may be done in the area of violence — stand out.
Thus, with the objective of promoting solidarity and the
development of the family, R.A. No. 9262 provides the legal
redress for domestic violence that particularly affects
women and their children. Significantly, the law does
not deny, restrict or curtail civil and human rights of
other persons falling outside the classification,
particularly of the men members of the family who
can avail of remedies provided by other laws to
ensure the protection of their own rights and
interests. Consequently, the resulting classification under
R.A. No. 9262 is not wholly intended and does not work an
injustice by removing remedies that are available to men in
violence committed against them. The law furthermore
does not target men against women and children and is
there simply to achieve a legitimate constitutional
objective, and it does not achieve this by a particularly
harmful classification that can be labeled “suspect” in the
sense already established by jurisprudence. Under the
circumstances, the use and application of strict scrutiny
review, or even the use of an expanded equal protection
perspective, strike me as both unnecessary and
disproportionate.
As my final point, the level of review that the Court
chooses to apply is crucial as it determines both the process
and the outcome of a given case. The reverse onus that a
strict scrutiny brings ignores the most basic presumption of
constitutionality that the courts consistently adhere to
when resolving issues of constitutionality. It also infringes
on the regularity of performance of functions of co-equal
branches of government. As the Court pronounced in
Drilon v. Lim:14
In the exercise of this jurisdiction, lower courts are

advised to act with the utmost circumspection, bearing in
_______________
14 G.R. No. 112497, August 4, 1994, 235 SCRA 135, 140; citation omitted.
480

Garcia vs. Drilon
mind the consequences of a declaration of
unconstitutionality upon the stability of laws, no less than
on the doctrine of separation of powers. As the questioned
act is usually the handiwork of the legislative or the
executive departments, or both, it will be prudent for such
courts, if only out of a becoming modesty, to defer to the
higher judgment of this Court in the consideration of its
validity, which is better determined after a thorough
deliberation by a collegiate body and with the concurrence
of the majority of those who participated in its discussion.
It is also emphasized that every court, including this
Court, is charged with the duty of a purposeful hesitation
before declaring a law unconstitutional, on the theory that
the measure was first carefully studied by the executive and
the legislative departments and determined by them to be
in accordance with the fundamental law before it was
finally approved. To doubt is to sustain. The presumption of
constitutionality can be overcome only by the clearest
showing that there was indeed an infraction of the
Constitution, and only when such a conclusion is reached by
the required majority may the Court pronounce, in the
discharge of the duty it cannot escape, that the challenged
act must be struck down.
Inter-government harmony and courtesy demand that

we reserve the strict scrutiny standard of review to the
worst possible cases of unacceptable classification, abject
forms of discrimination, and the worst violations of the
Constitution.15 R.A. No. 9262 does not present such a case.
In these lights, I conclude that a valid classification
exists to justify whatever differential treatment may exist
in the law. I vote to deny the petition and uphold the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 9262 using the lowest
level of scrutiny under the reasonableness test.
_______________
15 Concurring Opinion in Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc.,
supra note 5, at p. 322.
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Garcia vs. Drilon
SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION

ABAD, J.:
Republic Act 9262 (R.A. 9262) or the Anti-Violence
against Women and their Children Act is a historic step in
the Filipino women’s long struggle to be freed from a long-
held belief that men are entitled, when displeased or
minded, to hit their wives or partners and their children.
This law institutionalizes prompt community response to
this violent behavior through barangay officials who can
command the man to immediately desist from harming his
home partner and their children. It also establishes
domestic violence as a crime, not only against its victims
but against society as well. No longer
is domestic violence lightly dismissed as a case of marital
dispute that law enforcers ought not to get into.1
Almost eight years after the passage of this landmark
legislation, petitioner Jesus C. Garcia, a husband charged
with the offense, claims before the Court that R.A. 9262
violates his constitutional rights to due process and equal
protection and that it constitutes an undue delegation of
judicial power to barangay officials with respect to the
Temporary Protection Order (TPO) that the latter could
issue against him for his alleged maltreatment of his wife
and children.
This separate concurring opinion will address the issue
of equal protection since it presents the more serious
challenge to the constitutionality of the law. Men and
women are supposed to be equal yet this particular law
provides immediate relief to complaining women and harsh
consequences to their men even before the matter reaches
the courtroom, a relief not available to the latter. The law,
Garcia says, violates his right to equal protection because it
is gender-specific, favoring
_______________
1 SALIGAN Women’s Unit, “Strengthening Responses to Violence
against Women: Overcoming Legal Challenges in the Anti-Violence
Against Women and their Children Act” (March 2008), Ateneo Law
Journal.
482

Garcia vs. Drilon
only women when men could also be victims of domestic

violence.
Justice Estela Perlas-Bernabe ran the issue of equal
protection in her ponencia through the litmus test for
holding a law valid even when it affects only a particular
class, a test that the Court laid down in People v. Vera.2 A
legislative classification, according to Vera, is reasonable as
long as: 1) it rests on substantial distinctions which make
real differences; 2) it is germane to the purpose of the law;
3) it is not limited to existing conditions but applies as well
to future identical conditions; and 4) it applies equally to
all members of the same class.3 I dare not improve on
Justice Bernabe’s persuasive reasoning and conclusions.
I agree with her but would like to hinge my separate
concurring opinion on the concept of an Expanded Equal
Protection Clause that former Chief Justice Reynato S.
Puno espouses in his book: Equal Dignity and Respect: The
Substance of Equal Protection and Social Justice.
Chief Justice Puno’s thesis is that the right to equal
protection casts another shadow when the issue raised
under it involves persons protected by the social justice
provision of the Constitution, specifically, Section 1, Article
XIII. The equal protection clause can no longer be
interpreted as only a guarantee of formal equality4 but of
substantive equality. “It ought to be construed,” said the
Chief Justice, “in consonance with social justice as ‘the
heart’ particularly of the 1987 Constitution — a
transformative covenant in which the Filipino people
agreed to enshrine asymmetrical equality to uplift
_______________
2 65 Phil. 56 (1937).
3 Id., at p. 126.
4 It holds that two persons with equal status in at least one
normatively relevant respect must be treated equally with regard to this
respect.
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Garcia vs. Drilon
disadvantaged groups and build a genuinely egalitarian

democracy.”5
This means that the weak, including women in relation
to men, can be treated with a measure of bias that they
may cease to be weak.
Chief Justice Puno goes on: “The Expanded Equal
Protection Clause, anchored on the human rights rationale,
is designed as a weapon against the indignity of
discrimination so that in the patently unequal Philippine
society, each person may be restored to his or her rightful
position as a person with equal moral status.”6 Specifically,
the expanded equal protection clause should be understood
as meant to “reduce social, economic, and political
inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably
diffusing wealth and political power for the common good.”7
Borrowing the language of Law v. Canada8 case and
adding his own thoughts, the Chief Justice said:
The purpose of the Expanded Equal Protection Clause is

to protect and enhance the right to dignity by: 1) preventing
the imposition, perpetuation and aggravation “of
disadvantage, stereotyping, or political [,economic,
cultural,] or social prejudice;” and 2) promo[ting a
Philippine] society in which all persons enjoy equal
recognition at law as human beings.9
Chief Justice Puno points out that the equal protection

clause must be interpreted in connection with the social
justice provisions of the Constitution “so as not to frustrate
or
_______________
5 Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno (ret.), “Equal Dignity and Respect: The
Substance of Equal Protection and Social Justice,” (2012), p. 546.
6 Id., at p. 523.
7 1987 Philippine Constitution, Art. XIII, Section 1.
8 1 S.C.R. 497 (1999).
9 Supra note 5, at pp. 512-513.
484

Garcia vs. Drilon
water down the constitutional commitment to promote

substantive equality and build the genuinely “just and
humane society” that Filipinos aspire for, as stated in the
Preamble of the 1987 Constitution.”
But the expanded concept of equal protection, said Chief
Justice Puno, only applies to the government’s ameliorative
action or discriminatory actions intended to improve the lot
of the disadvantaged. Laws challenged for invalid
classification because of being unreasonable or arbitrary,
but not discriminatory, are outside the scope of the
expanded equal protection clause. Such cases fall under the
traditional equal protection clause which protects the right
to formal equality and determines the validity of
classifications through the well established reasonableness
test.10
Here, petitioner Garcia argues that R.A. 9262 violates
the guarantee of equal protection because the remedies
against personal violence that it provides may be invoked
only by the wives or women partners but not by the
husbands or male partners even if the latter could possibly
be victims of violence by their women partners. Women, he
claims, are also capable of committing physical,
psychological, emotional, and even sexual abuse against
their husbands and children.
Garcia further assails the title of the law — “An Act
Defining Violence against Women and Their Children,
Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing
Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes” — as
pejorative and sex-discriminatory. R.A. 9262 is an “anti-
male,” “husbandbashing,” and “hate-men” law. It
establishes a special category of domestic violence offenses
which is akin to legislating hate crimes and imposes
penalties based solely on gender; it singles out the husband
or father as the culprit, a clear form of “class legislation.”
_______________
10 Id., at pp. 543-544.
485
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Garcia vs. Drilon
But the Constitution requires the State to “ensure the

fundamental equality before the law of men and women.”
Further, it commands Congress to “give highest priority to
the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the
rights of all the people to human dignity x x x.” and this
includes women. In his speech during the joint launching
on October 27, 2004 of R.A. 9262 and its Implementing
Rules, Chief Justice Puno recalled the historical and social
context of gender-based violence that underpin its
enactment. Thus:
History reveals that most societies sanctioned the use of

violence against women. The patriarch of a family was
accorded the right to use force on members of the family
under his control. I quote the early studies:
Traditions subordinating women have a long
history rooted in patriarchy—the institutional rule of
men. Women were seen in virtually all societies to be
naturally inferior both physically and intellectually.
In ancient western societies, women whether slave,
concubine or wife, were under the authority of men.
In law, they were treated as property.
The Roman concept of patria potestas allowed the
husband to beat, or even kill, his wife if she endangered his
property right over her. Judaism, Christianity and other
religions oriented towards the patriarchal family
strengthened the male dominated structure of society.
English feudal law reinforced the tradition of male
control over women. Even the eminent Blackstone has been
quoted in his commentaries as saying husband and wife
were one and that one was the husband. However, in the
late 1500s and through the entire 1600s, English common
law began to limit the right of husbands to chastise their
wives. Thus, common law developed the rule of thumb,
which allowed husbands to beat their wives with a rod or
stick no thicker than their thumb.
Article II, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution states:
486

Garcia vs. Drilon
The State recognizes the role of women in nation-

building, and shall ensure the fundamental equality before
the law of women and men.
Also, Article XIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution

further states:
The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment

of measures that protect and enhance the rights of all the
people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and
political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by
equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the
common good.
x x x x

The above provisions of the Constitution abundantly
authorize Congress or the government to actively
undertake ameliorative action that would remedy existing
inequalities and inequities experienced by women and
children brought about by years of discrimination. The
equal protection clause when juxtaposed to this provision
provides a stronger mandate for the government to combat
such discrimination. Indeed, these provisions order
Congress to “give highest priority to the enactment of
measures that protect and enhance the right of all the
people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and
political inequalities and remove cultural inequities.”
No doubt, historically, the Philippine tribal and family
model hews close to patriarchy, a pattern that is deeply
embedded in the society’s subconscious. Consequently, it
can be said that in enacting R.A. 9262, Congress has taken
an ameliorative action that would address the evil effects of
such social model on Filipino women and children and
elevate their status as human beings on the same level as
the father or the husband.
What remedies does R.A. 9262 especially provide
women and children? The law is gender-specific as only
they may file the prescribed actions against offenders,
whether men or women, with whom the victims are or were
in lesbian rela-
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Garcia vs. Drilon
tionships.11 The definition includes past or present marital,

live-in, sexual or dating relationships.
This law also provides for the remedy of a protection
order in a civil action or in a criminal action, aside from the
criminal action for its violation. It makes the process of
securing a restraining order against perpetrators easier
and more immediate by providing for the legal remedy of
protection orders from both the courts and barangay
officials.
R.A. 9262 aims to put a stop to the cycle of male abuses
borne of discrimination against women. It is an
ameliorative measure, not a form of “reverse
discrimination” against men as Garcia would have it.
Ameliorative action “is not, as Hogg remarked, an exception
to equality, but an expression and attainment of de facto
equality, the genuine and substantive equality which the
Filipino people themselves enshrined as a goal of the 1987
Constitution.”12 Ameliorative measures are necessary as a
redistributive mechanism in an unequal society to achieve
substantive equality.13
In the context of women’s rights, substantive equality
has been defined by the Convention on the Elimination of
all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) as
equality which requires that women be given an equal start
and that they be empowered by an enabling environment to
achieve equality of results. It is not enough to guarantee
women treatment that is identical to that of men. Rather,
biological as well as socially and culturally constructed
differences between women and men must be taken into
account. Under certain circumstances, non-identical
treatment of women and men will be required in order to
address such differences.
_______________
11 Maria Rowena Amelia V. Guanzon, “The Anti-Violence Against
Women and Their Children Act of 2004 (Republic Act No. 9262),” 2009.
12 Supra note 5 at p. 527.
13 Id., at p. 497.
488

Garcia vs. Drilon
Women’s struggle for equality with men has evolved

under three models:
1. Formal equality — women and men are to be
regarded and treated as the same. But this model does not
take into account biological and socially constructed
differences between women and men.14 It uses male
standards and assumes that women have equal access to
such standards.15 By failing to take into account these
differences, a formal equality approach may in fact
perpetuate discrimination and disadvantage.16
2. Protectionist model — this recognizes differences
between women and men but considers women’s weakness
as the rationale for different treatment.17 This approach
reinforces the inferior status of women and does not
address the issue of discrimination of women on account of
their gender.18
3. Substantive equality model — this assumes that
women are “not vulnerable by nature, but suffer from
imposed disadvantage” and that “if these imposed
disadvantages were eliminated, there was no further need
for protection.”19 Thus, the substantive equality model
gives prime importance to women’s contexts, realities, and
experiences, and the outcomes or results of acts and
measures directed, at or affecting them, with a view to
eliminating the disadvantages they experience as women.20
_______________
14 IWRAW Asia Pacific Manual on CEDAW: Building Capacity for
Change
15 Id.
16 Supra note 11, at p. 42, citing Fredman, S. and Spencer, S., “Beyond
Discrimination: It’s Time for Enforceable Duties on Public Bodies to
promote Equality of Outcomes,” E.H.R.L.R. Issue 6, 601 (2006)”
17 Supra note 14.
18 Supra note 11, at p. 43.
19 Id., at pp. 43-44, citing Goonesekere.
20 Id., at p. 44.
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Garcia vs. Drilon
Clearly, the substantive equality model inspired R.A.

9262. For one thing, Congress enacted it because of
compelling interest in preventing and addressing the
serious problem of violence against women in the context of
intimate relationships — recognized all over the world as
one of the most insidious forms of gender discrimination.21
For another, R.A. 9262 is based on the experiences of
women who have been victims of domestic violence. The list
of acts regarded as forms of violence22 come from true-to-
life stories of women who have suffered abuses from their
male partners. Finally, R.A. 9262 seeks women’s full
participation in society. Hence, the law grants them needed
relief to ensure equality, protection, and personal safety,
enabling them to enjoy their civil, political, social, and
economic rights. The provision on protection orders, for
instance, precisely aims to safeguard “the victim from
further harm, minimizing any disruption in the victim’s
daily life, and facilitating the opportunity and ability of the
victim to independently regain control over her life.”23
For the above reasons, I vote to dismiss the petition for
lack of merit.
_______________
21 Id., at p. 45.
22 SEC. 3. Definition of Terms.—As used in this Act.
(a) “Violence against women and their children” refers to any
act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is
his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or
had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child,
or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without
the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual,
psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including
threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or
arbitrary deprivation of liberty. (Emphasis supplied)
23 REPUBLIC ACT 9262, Sec. 8.
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Garcia vs. Drilon
CONCURRING OPINION
LEONEN, J.:
I join the ponencia in denying the challenge to the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9262 otherwise known
as the “Anti-Violence against Women and their Children
Act of 2004” at least for this case. I write separately to
clarify the basis of my agreement.
The petitioner is not the victim in this case. He does not
have legal standing to raise the constitutional issue.
He appears to have inflicted violence against private
respondents. Petitioner admitted having an affair with a
bank manager. He callously boasted about their sexual
relations to the household help. His infidelity emotionally
wounded private respondent. Their quarrels left her with
bruises and hematoma. Petitioner also unconscionably beat
up their daughter, Joann, whom he blamed for squealing
on him.
All these drove respondent to despair causing her to
attempt suicide on December 17, 2005 by slitting her wrist.
Instead of taking her to the hospital, petitioner left the
house. He never visited her when she was confined for
seven (7) days. He even told his mother-in-law that
respondent should just accept his extramarital affair since
he is not cohabiting with his paramour and has not sired a
child with her.
The private respondent was determined to separate
from petitioner. But she was afraid he would take away
their children and deprive her of financial support. He
warned her that if she pursued legal battle, she would not
get a single centavo from him. After she confronted him of
his affair, he forbade her to hold office at JBTC Building.
This deprived her of access to full information about their
businesses.
Thus, the Regional Trial Court found reasonable ground
to believe there was imminent danger of violence against
respondent and her children and issued a series of
Temporary
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Garcia vs. Drilon
Protection Orders (TPO) ordering petitioner, among other

things, to surrender all his firearms including a .9MM
caliber firearm and a Walther PPK.
This is the quintessential case where the full effects of
Republic Act No. 9262 or the “VAWC” should take effect.
Seen in this light, petitioner’s belated challenge to the
law is nothing but a cheap attempt to raise cherished
fundamental constitutional principles to escape legal
responsibility for causing indignities in another human
being. There is enough in our legal order to prevent the
abuse of legal principles to condone immoral acts.
For us to proceed to rule on Constitutional issues, we
have required that: (1) there must be an actual case or
controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the
person challenging the act must have “standing” to
challenge; he must have a personal and substantial
interest in the case, such that he has sustained or will
sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the
possible opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality
must be the very lis mota of the case.1
Legal standing in cases that raise constitutional issues
is essential. Locus standi is defined as “a right of
appearance in a court of justice on a given question.”2 The
fundamental question is “whether a party alleges such
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon
_______________
1 Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 158 (1936), People v.
Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1937). See also Mariano Jr. v. Commission on Elections,
312 Phil. 259, 270; 242 SCRA 211, 220-221 (1995); Funa v. Executive
Secretary Ermita, G.R. No. 184740, February 11, 2010, 612 SCRA 308,
317.
2 David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 522 Phil. 705, 755; 489 SCRA 160, 216
(2006) citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 941 (Sixth Edition, 1991).
492

Garcia vs. Drilon
which the court depends for illumination of difficult

constitutional questions.3
In private suits, standing is governed by the “real-
parties-in-interest” rule under Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure in that “every action must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-
interest.”4 “Interest” means material interest or an interest
in issue to be affected by the judgment of the case, as
distinguished from mere curiosity about the question
involved.5
Thus, there must be a present substantial interest as
distinguished from a mere inchoate expectancy or a future,
contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest.6
Standing is based on one’s own right to the relief sought.
The doctrine of locus standi in cases raising
constitutional issues frames the power of judicial review
that we wield. This is the power “to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable” as well as “to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government.”7
The presence of an “actual case” prevents this Court
from providing advisory opinions or using its immense
power of judicial review absent the presence of a party with
real and substantial interests to clarify the issues based
upon his/her experience and standpoint. It prevents this
Court from speculating and rendering rulings on the basis
of pure theory. Our
_______________
3 Galicto v. Aquino III, G.R. No. 193978, February 28, 2012, 667 SCRA
150, 170.
4 Baltazar v. Ombudsman, 539 Phil. 131, 139; 510 SCRA 74, 83 (2006).
5 Goco, et al. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 157449, April 6, 2010, 617
SCRA 397, 405. See also IBP v. Zamora, 392 Phil. 618, 633; 338 SCRA 81,
100 (2000).
6 Galicto v. Aquino III, supra.
7 CONSTITUTION, Art. VIII, Sec. 1, par. (2).
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Garcia vs. Drilon
doctrines on justiciability are self-imposed applications of a

fundamental view that we accord a presumption of
constitutionality to acts done by the other constitutional
organs and departments of government. Generally, we do
not strike down acts done by co-equal departments until
their repugnancy to the Constitution can be shown clearly
and materially.
I am aware of our precedents where this Court has
waived questions relating to the justiciability of the
constitutional issues raised when they have
“transcendental importance” to the public.8 In my view,
this accommodates our power to promulgate guidance
“concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights”.9 We choose to rule squarely on the
constitutional issues in a petition wanting all or some of
the technical requisites to meet our general doctrines on
justiciability but raising clear conditions showing imminent
threat to fundamental rights. The imminence and clarity of
the threat to fundamental constitutional rights outweigh
the necessity for prudence. In a sense, our exceptional
doctrine relating to constitutional issues of “transcendental
importance” prevents courts from the paralysis of
procedural niceties when clearly faced with the need for
substantial protection.
That necessity is wanting in this case.
The extraordinary discretion to move beyond the well
established doctrines on justiciability must be carefully
exercised in cases involving social legislation that seeks to
rectify historical and cultural injustices present in our
communities
_______________
8 Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Guingona, G.R. No. 113375, May 5, 1994,
232 SCRA 110, 139. See also Francisco v. House of Representatives, 460
Phil. 830, 899; 415 SCRA 44, 113 (2003), Funa v. Villar, G.R. No. 192791,
April 24, 2012, 670 SCRA 579, 595.
9 CONSTITUTION, Art. VIII, Sec. 5, par. (5) relates to the power of the
Court to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights. It was introduced only in the 1987 Constitution
borne of historical experiences where judicial succor was wanting.
494

Garcia vs. Drilon
and societies. As carefully pointed out in the erudite

ponencia of Justice Perlas-Bernabe, Republic Act No. 9262
was borne out of the struggles of countless women who
suffered indignities. It cannot be undone by a petition filed
by someone who cannot, by any stretch of the most fertile
imagination, be considered the victim.
Nevertheless, in a future case more deserving of our
attention, we should be open to realities which may
challenge the dominant conception that violence in
intimate relationships only happens to women and
children. This may be predominantly true, but even those
in marginal cases deserve fundamental constitutional and
statutory protection. We should be careful that in
correcting historical and cultural injustices, we may
typecast all women as victims, stereotype all men as
tormentors or make invisible the possibility that in some
intimate relationships, men may also want to seek succor
against acts defined in Section 5 of Republic Act No. 926210
in an expeditious manner.
_______________
10 Section 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children.—
The crime of violence against women and their children is committed
through any of the following acts:
(a) Causing physical harm to the woman or her child;
(b) Threatening to cause the woman or her child physical harm;
(c) Attempting to cause the woman or her child physical harm;
(d) Placing the woman or her child in fear of imminent physical
harm;
(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to
engage in conduct which the woman or her child has the right to
desist from or desist from conduct which the woman or her child
has the right to engage in, or attempting to restrict or restricting
the woman’s or her child’s freedom of movement or conduct by force
or threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or
other harm, or intimidation directed against the woman or child.
This shall include, but not limited to, the following acts committed
with the purpose or effect of controlling or restricting the woman’s
or her child’s movement or conduct:
(1) Threatening to deprive or actually depriving the woman
or her child of custody to her/his family;
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Garcia vs. Drilon
Husband abuse may be an underreported form of family

violence.11 According to a Quezon City Police District
Crime
_______________
(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her
children of financial support legally due her or her family, or
deliberately providing the woman’s children insufficient
financial support;
(3) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her
child of a legal right;
(4) Preventing the woman in engaging in any legitimate
profession, occupation, business or activity or controlling the
victim’s own money or properties, or solely controlling the
conjugal or common money, or properties
(f) Inflicting or threatening to inflict physical harm on oneself for
the purpose of controlling her actions or decisions;
(g) Causing or attempting to cause the woman or her child to
engage in any sexual activity which does not constitute rape, by
force or threat of force, physical harm, or through intimidation
directed against the woman or her child or her/his immediate
family;
(h) Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct,
personally or through another, that alarms or causes substantial
emotional or psychological distress to the woman or her child. This
shall include, but not be limited to, the following acts:
(1) Stalking or following the woman or her child in public
or private places;
(2) Peering in the window or lingering outside the
residence of the woman or her child;
(3) Entering or remaining in the dwelling or on the
property of the woman or her child against her/his will;
(4) Destroying the property and personal belongings or
inflicting harm to animals or pets of the woman or her child;
and
(5) Engaging in any form of harassment or violence
(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or
humiliation to the woman or her child, including, but not limited to,
repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial
support or custody of minor children of access to the woman’s
child/children.
11 T. Lewin, Battered Men Sounding Equal-Rights Battle Cry, THE NEW
YORK TIMES NATIONAL (April 20, 1992)
<http://www.nytimes.com/1992/04/20/us/battered-men-sounding-equal-
rights-battlecry.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm> (visited May 27, 2013).
See also C. M.
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Garcia vs. Drilon
Laboratory chief, in his 10 years as medico-legal officer,
he had only received three cases of men complaining of
spousal abuse.12
Another recent study found the same underreporting
but explored the experiences of abuse in intimate
relationships of six Filipino husbands.13 Their experiences
were described as follows:
All the participants acknowledged that they experienced

abuse, but the forms differed from one husband to another.
Four out of the six participants admitted that their spouses’
abusive behavior would initially start with verbal attacks
and put-downs then would shift to physical abuse as their
verbal tussle intensified. Most of the abuses cited by the
participants happened in the confines of their home, but
could also happen in public places.
The constant threats, in the long term, affected the
emotional and psychological well being of the participants.
Four of the husbands felt that their spouses were capable of
carrying out their threats. The frequent and long fights
could be emotionally draining. Throughout the duration of
marriage, EC suffered emotionally from
_______________
RENZETTI AND D. J. CURRAN, WOMEN, MEN AND SOCIETY 164 (Second Edition, 1992)
citing Steinmetz, 1978.
12 C. Delfin, Ever Heard of Battered Husbands? GMA News Online (February
13, 2008) <http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/
story/80412/lifestyle/ever-heard-of-battered-husbands> (visited May 27, 2013). See
also ATTY. A. Ordoñez Sison, Abused and the Battered Man (2009).
13 J. J. Jurisprudencia, Coming out of the Shadows: Husbands Speak About
Their Experience of Abuse in Intimate Relationships, 40 PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF
PSYCHOLOGY No. 2 (2007). In the study, JL was a teacher in one of the schools in
Metro Manila. RE was a university teacher. HM is a medical doctor. DL was a
Physics and Engineering graduate. EC was a teacher. TG finished his MBA as
well as his Bachelor of Laws at a reputable institution but did not take the bar.
497
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the “weird” marital set-up. For TG, emotional abuse was

associated with shattered trust.
The physical abuse for some participants became life-
threatening to the extent that the injury incurred needed
medical attention. Their spouses could use weapons against
them. Four participants described the incidents that led to
their injuries. Coming home one night, RE saw “this mono
block chair flying…hit me…right on the nose.” DL narrated
“…pumunta ako ng doctor on my own para ipalinis yung
sugat ko.” According to HM, his wound from a knife attack
was wide and deep and needed “…some stiches.” JL had to
contend with the long scratches in his chest and back. RE
almost lost an eye when he was hit with a straight punch of
the spouse. JL, RE, and DL would lie to colleagues to avoid
being laughed at. DL had to be absent from his work after
being hit by a flying de lata (canned good) thrown at him
during a fight.
Emotional abuse co-existed with verbal and/or physical
abuse. The participants who were recipients of physical
abuse were also emotionally abused when they became
susceptible to stress and threats of the abuser. JL felt guilty
when the spouse carried out her threat of killing herself by
intentionally taking an overdose of pills in the middle of an
intense disagreement.
Emotional abuse could occur without physical abuse and
yet its effects were still devastating. For instance, EC and
TG were devastated by the lies and deceit of their spouses.
The spouse’s threats of suicide (JL), abandonment (RE), or
taking their children away after a fight (DL) were as
distressing as the other forms of abuse experienced by the
participants.14
Social and cultural expectations on masculinity and
male dominance urge men to keep quiet about being a
victim, adding to the unique experience of male victims of
domestic
_______________
14 Id., at pp. 41-42.
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Garcia vs. Drilon
abuse.15 This leads to latent depression among boys and

men.16 In a sense, patriarchy while privileging men also
victimizes them.
It is true that numerous literature relate violence
against women with the historically unequal power
relations between men and women, leading to domination
over and discrimination against the latter.17 Sociologists
cite the 18th-century
_______________
15 K. F. Hogan, J. R. Hegarty, T. Ward, and L. J. Dodd, Counsellors’
Experiences of Working with Male Victims of Female-Perpetrated Domestic
Abuse, COUNSELLING AND PSYCHOTHERAPY RESEARCH (2011).
16 See S. V. Cochran and F. E. Rabinowitz, Men and Depression:
Clinical and Empirical Perspectives (2000).<http://books.google.
com.ph/books?
id=bOVTz8HgDoC&pg=PR12&lpg=PR12&dq=Early+workers+in+the+field+including+Pleck+and+Sawyer&source=bl&ots=G8bTheyAtB&sig=86_y6WVG_36VuTj3Lh6w
Early%20workers%20in%20the%20field%20including%20
Pleck%20and%20Sawyer&f=false > (visited March 7, 2013).
Early workers in the field including Pleck and Sawyer (1974),
Farrell (1975), Fasteau (1974) and Goldberg (1976) took up the
challenge to traditional masculine values that feminists had made
and began to examine the negative and oppressive aspects of
traditionally constructed gender roles. These efforts included an
examination of the psychologically restrictive nature of most of the
cultural conditioning little boys and men experience. Pleck (1981),
in his seminal critique of male gender identity ideology, introduced
the concept of male gender role strain and conflict.
See also J. H. Pleck, The Gender Role Strain: An Update and S. J.
Bergman, Men’s Psychological Development: A Relational Perspective, in
R.F. LEVANT AND W.S. POLLACK, A NEW PSYCHOLOGY OF MEN 11-32 AND 68-90
(1995). ALSO T. REAL, I DON’T WANT TO TALK ABOUT IT: OVERCOMING THE
SECRET LEGACY OF MALE DEPRESSION (1997) AND HOW CAN I GET THROUGH TO
YOU? CLOSING THE INTIMACY GAP BETWEEN MEN AND WOMEN (2002).
17 Domestic Violence Against Women and Girls, No. 6, UNICEF
Innocenti Digest (2000).
499
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English legal tradition on the “rule of thumb” giving

husbands the right to beat their wives with a stick no
thicker than a thumb.18 In America, women were regarded
as property until the latter half of the 19th century with
marital violence considered a husband’s privilege and men,
as of right, exercised physical domination over women.19
The perspective portraying women as victims with a
heritage of victimization20 results in the unintended
consequence of permanently perceiving all women as weak.
This has not always been accepted by many other strands
in the Feminist Movement.
As early as the 70s, the nationalist movement raised
questions on the wisdom of a women’s movement and its
possible divisive effects, as “class problems deserve unified
and concentrated attention [while] the women question is
vague, abstract, and does not have material base.”21
In the early 80s, self-identifying feminist groups were
formed.22 The “emancipation theory” posits that female
crime
_______________
18 S.D. Amussen, Being Stirred to Much Unquietness: Violence and
Domestic Violence in Early Modern England, Vol. 6 No. 2 JOURNAL OF
WOMEN’S HISTORY, 70-89 (1994).

19 P. M. Jablow, Victims of Abuse and Discrimination: Protecting
Battered Homosexuals Under Domestic Violence Legislation, 28 Hofstra L
Rev 1096-1097 (2000).
20 C. Sorisio, A Tale of Two Feminism: Power and Victimization in
Contemporary Feminist Debate, 137 in THIRD WAVE AGENDA: BEING
FEMINIST, DOING FEMINISM, edited by L. Heywood and J. Drake (1997).
21 See C. I. Sobritchea, The Second Wave of the Women’s Movement in
the Philippines and the Evolution of Feminist Politics, 47, quoting A. F.
Santos from The Philippine Women’s Movement: Problems of Perception,
GENDER CULTURE AND SOCIETY: SELECTED READINGS IN WOMEN STUDIES IN THE
PHILIPPINES (2004).
22 Id., at p. 44.
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Garcia vs. Drilon
has increased and has become more masculine in character

as a result of the women’s liberation movement.23
Feminism also has its variants among Muslims. In 2009,
Musawah (“equality” in Arabic) was launched as a global
movement for equity and justice in the Muslim family. It
brought together activists, scholars, legal practitioners,
policy makers, and grassroots women and men from all
over the world.34 Their belief is that there cannot be justice
without equality, and its holistic framework integrates
Islamic teachings, universal human rights, national
constitutional guarantees of equality, and the lived
realities of women and men.25
There is now more space to believe that portraying only
women as victims will not always promote gender equality
before the law. It sometimes aggravates the gap by
conceding that women have always been dominated by
men. In doing so, it renders empowered women invisible;
or, in some cases, that men as human beings can also
become victims.
In this light, it may be said that violence in the context
of intimate relationships should not be seen and encrusted
as a gender issue; rather, it is a power issue.26 Thus, when
laws are not gender-neutral, male victims of domestic
violence may also suffer from double victimization first by
their abusers and second by the judicial system.27
Incidentally, focusing on women as the victims entrenches
some level of heteronorma-
_______________
23 See C. M. Renzetti and D. J. Curran, Chapter 9 on Gender, Crime
and Justice, WOMEN, MEN AND SOCIETY 220-249 (Second Edition, 1992).
24 See <http://www.musawah.org/> (visited February 26, 2013).
MUSAWAH is considered a movement rather than an organization.
25 Id. Musawa is represented in the Philippines by Nisa Ul Haqq Fi
Bangsamoro or “Women for Justice in the Bangsamoro.”
26 A. Detschelt, Recognizing Domestic Violence Directed Towards Men:
Overcoming Societal Perceptions, Conducting Accurate Studies, and
Enacting Responsible Legislation, 12 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 249 (2003).
27 Id.
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28
tivity. It is blind to the possibility that, whatever moral
positions are taken by those who are dominant, in reality
intimate relationships can also happen between men.29
I accept that for purposes of advocacy and for a given
historical period, it may be important to highlight abuse of
women qua women.30 This strategy was useful in the
passing of Republic Act No. 9262. It was a strategy that
assured that the problem of battered women and children
in the context of various intimate relationships becomes
publicly visible. However, unlike advocacy, laws have the
tendency to be resilient and permanent. Its existence may
transcend historical per-
_______________
28 “[H]eteronormativity is defined as the predominance and privileging
of a definitively heterosexualbased ideology and social structure that acts
as the exclusive interpreter of itself and of all other sexualities in relation
to it.” Definition found in A. Ponce, Shoring up Judicial Awareness: LGBT
Refugees and the Recognition of Social Categories, 18 NEW ENG. J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 185 (2012) citing M. Warner, FEAR OF A QUEER PLANET: QUEER
POLITICS AND SOCIAL THEORY (1993).
29 For a comparative analysis of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender
(LGBT) issues and strategies, see M. P. Ofreneo and T. Casal de Vela,
Spheres of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Struggles: A
Comparative Feminist Analysis, 14 GENDER TECHNOLOGY AND DEVELOPMENT
No. 2, 197-215 (July 2010). For an understanding, see B. Fone,
HOMOPHOBIA: A HISTORY (2000).
30 x x x essentialism is, among other things, a tool for redressing power
imbalances, as when the group under study is seen by the dominant group
as illegitimate or trivial, or when a stigmatized group forms an
oppositional identity to counter such negative ideologies. Essentialism
may therefore be a deliberate move to enable scholarly activity, to forge a
political alliance through the creation of a common identity, or to
otherwise provide a temporarily stable ground for further social action.
Such uses of essentialism have been termed strategic essentialism (Spivak
1988) as discussed in M. BUCHOTZ, SOCIOLINGUISTIC NOSTALGIA AND THE
AUTHENTICATION OF IDENTITY, 401 (2003). See also M. Lloyd, BEYOND IDENTITY

POLITICS: FEMINISM, POWER AND POLITICS, 64-67 (2005). Similarly, D. Fuss,
ESSENTIALLY SPEAKING: FEMINISM, NATURE AND DIFFERENCE (1989).
502

Garcia vs. Drilon
iods that dictate effective advocacy. Laws also have a

constitutive function — the tendency to create false
consciousness when the labels and categories it mandates
succeed in reducing past evils but turn a blind eye to other
issues.
For instance, one of the first cases that laid down the
requisites for determining whether there was a violation of
the equal protection of the law clause of the Constitution
was the 1939 case of People v. Cayat.31 It laid down the
requirements of reasonable classification which requires
that it (a) must rest on substantial distinctions, (b) must be
germane to the purposes of the law, (c) must not be limited
to existing conditions only, and (d) must apply equally to
all members of the same class.32 Even
as early as 1919, the Court in Rubi v. Provincial Board of
Mindoro33 recognized the concept of reasonable
classification holding that “[t]he pledge that no person shall
be denied the equal protection of the laws is not infringed
by a statute which is applicable to all of a class. The
classification must have a reasonable basis and cannot be
purely arbitrary in nature.”34
Yet, it is in these two cases that the Court concluded the
following:
As authority of a judicial nature is the decision of the

Supreme Court in the case of United States vs. Tubban
[Kalinga] ([1915], 29, Phil., 434). The question here arose as
to the effect of a tribal marriage in connection with article
423 of the Penal Code concerning the husband who
surprises his wife in the act of adultery. In discussing the
point, the court makes use of the following language:
x x x we are not advised of any provision of law
which recognizes as legal a tribal marriage of so-
called non-Christians or members of uncivilized
_______________
31 68 Phil. 12 (1939).
32 Id., at p. 18.
33 39 Phil. 660 (1919).
34 Id., at p. 707.
503
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tribes, celebrated within that province without

compliance with the requisites prescribed by General
Orders No. 68 x x x. We hold also that the fact that
the accused is shown to be a member of an uncivilized
tribe, of a low order of intelligence, uncultured and
uneducated, should be taken into consideration as a
second marked extenuating circumstance...35
(Emphasis supplied)
The description of the label and the stereotype of “non-

Christian tribe” would later on be corrected by the
Constitution,36 law,37and jurisprudence.38
The description of the label and the stereotype that only
women can be considered victims may also evolve in the
same way. We should hope that the situation of patriarchy
will not be permanent. Better cultural structures more
affirming of human dignity should evolve.39
In a future case, the fact that there may be battered men
should not cause the nullification of protections given to
women and children.
The Constitution states that: “[t]he State values the
dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect
for human rights.”40 The guarantee of full respect should
not mean that
_______________
35 Id., at p. 686.
36 Indigenous Cultural Communities, See Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 22;
Art. XII, Sec. 5; Art. XIII, Sec. 1.
37 Republic Act No. 8371; see also the Manahan amendments in Com.
Act No. 141, Sec. 48 (c).
38 See for instance Pit-og v. People of the Philippines, 268 Phil. 413; 190
SCRA 386 (1990) and Cruz v. DENR Secretary, et al., 400 Phil. 904; 347
SCRA 128 (2000).
39 See S. Walby, The ‘Declining Significance’ or the ‘Changing Forms’ of
Patriarchy? in PATRIARCHY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: WOMEN’S POSITIONS
AT THE END OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1996).
40 CONSTITUTION, Art. II, Sec.11. See also the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights which similarly provides that “all human beings are born
free and equal in dignity and rights” (Art. 1, UDHR)
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Garcia vs. Drilon
protections already given to those who suffer historical or

cultural prejudices should be automatically rescinded if
only the scope of the law is found wanting.
Our Constitution also mandates that the State “shall
ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women
and men.”41 This is similar to the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
42
(CEDAW) which requires that the Philippines as state
party take all appropriate measures “[to] modify the social
and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a
view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and
customary and all other practices which are based on the
idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the
sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women.”43 The
use of affirmative language should imply that in the proper
suit, a declaration of unconstitutionality on the ground of
the equal protection should not automatically mean that
the entire social legislation that provides effective and
efficient protection of women be set aside.
We have declared that “[a]n unconstitutional act is not a
law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no
protection; it creates no office; it is x x x as inoperative as
though it had never been passed.”44 However, the
seemingly
_______________
and “Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this
Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
property, birth or other status.” (Art. 2, UDHR)
41 CONSTITUTION, Art. II, Sec. 14.
42 The Philippines signed the CEDAW on July 15, 1980 and ratified
the same on August 5, 1981. Available at <http://treaties.un.
org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV 8&chapter
=4&lang=en>
43 Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination
against Women, Article 5(a).
44 Municipality of Malabang, Lanao Del Sur v. Benito, et al., 137 Phil.
358, 364; 27 SCRA 533, 539 (1969) citing Norton v. Shelby County, 118
U.S. 425, 442 (1886).
505
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all-inclusive statement of absolute retroactive invalidity

may not always be justified.45 One established exception is
the doctrine of operative fact.
The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the

general rule, only applies as a matter of equity and fair
play. It nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law by
recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a
determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact
and may have consequences which cannot always be
ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial
declaration.
The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of
unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those
who have relied on the invalid Law.46
The possibility that the constitutionality of Republic Act

No. 9262 may be challenged by male victims of abuse in
intimate relationships ventures to carve another exception
if this court is to ensure the guarantee of fundamental
equality before the law of women and men47 as well as
value the dignity of every human person.48 Applying the
general rule or the existing doctrine of operative facts
would mean removing the protection afforded to women. It
will thus contradict the very reason it is being assailed and
result to an even worse state of laws where none is
protected from intimate violence.
But again, it is not in this case that we consider these
possibilities.
_______________
45 Id.
46 Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012,
676 SCRA 579, 608 citing Planter’s Products Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation,
G.R. No. 166006, March 14, 2008, 548 SCRA 485, 516-517.
506

Garcia vs. Drilon
By concurring with these statements I express a hope:

that the normative constitutional requirements of human
dignity and fundamental equality can become descriptive
reality. The socially constructed distinctions between
women and men that have afflicted us and spawned
discrimination and violence should be eradicated sooner.
Power and intimacy should not co-exist.
The intimate spaces created by our human relationships
are our safe havens from the helter skelter of this world. It
is in that space where we grow in the safety of the special
other who we hope will be there for our entire lifetime. If
that is not possible, then for such time as will be sufficient
to create cherished memories enough to last for eternity.
I concur in the ponencia. Against abominable acts, let
this law take its full course.
Petition denied.
Note.—Judge Arcaya-Chua is guilty of gross ignorance

of the law for issuing a Temporary Protection Order (TPO)
in favor of petitioner Albert Chang Tan, since a TPO
cannot be issued in favor of a man against his wife under
R.A. No. 9292, known as the Anti-Violence Against Women
and Their Children Act of 2004. (Ocampo vs. Arcaya-Chua,
619 SCRA 59 [2010])
——o0o——
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G.R. No. 179267. June 25, 2013.: - en Banc

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G.R. No. 179267. June 25, 2013.: - en Banc

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7/9/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 699

G.R. No. 179267. June 25, 2013.*

JESUS C. GARCIA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Courts; Family Courts;

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solve the constitutionality of a statute, “this authority being

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therein. Finally, a third-party complaint is a claim that a

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posed.—Equal protection simply requires that all persons or

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all make for real differences justifying the classification under

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of a distinct mindset on the part of the police, the prosecution and

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phrases like “depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or

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civil, for every allegation therein.—A protection order is an

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vented. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary

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victim, regardless of ownership of the residence, is virtually a

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ability, by any available Barangay Kagawad, merely orders the

Statutes; Before a statute or its provisions duly challenged are

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executive department. As we said in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan,

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Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; View that an action

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Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Multiplicity of Suits; View

Procedural Rules and Technicalities; View that when public

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requires the resolution of the constitutional issue raised, and in

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freedoms are fully enjoyed by everyone.—By constitutional

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Act No. 9262 can be viewed therefore as the Philippines’

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Criminal Law; Violence Against Women and Children (R.A.

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protection orders and the granting of certain reliefs to women

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of the public (in this case, a particular sector thereof), as well as

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in the judiciary, it may be conceded that the legislature may

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Garcia vs. Drilon

fication.” A suspect classification is one where distinctions are

Same; Same; Suspect Classification; View that a suspect