CRESPO VS MOGUL CASE DIGEST

FACTS:

Petitioner Mario Crespo was accused for Estafa in the Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena City.
When the case was set for arraignment, the accused filed a motion for defer arraignment on the
ground that there was a pending petition for review filed with the Secretary of Justice. However,
Justice Mogul denied the motion, but the arraignment was deferred in a much later date to
afford time for the petitioner to elevate the mater to the appellate court.

The accused filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a preliminary writ of
injunction to the CA. The CA ordered the trial court to refrain from proceeding with the
arraignment until further orders of the Court. Undersecretary of Justice, Hon. Catalino Macaraig
Jr., resolved the petition for review reversed the resolution of the office of the Provincial Fiscal
and directed the Fiscal to move for immediate dismissal of the information filed against the
accused. Judge Mogul denied the motion for dismissal of the case ad set the arraignment. The
accused then filed a petition for Certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with petition for the
issuance of preliminary writ of prohibition and/or temporary restraining order in the CA. The CA
dismissed the order and lifted the restraining order.

Issue: Whether the trial court may refuse to grant a motion to dismiss filed by the Fiscal under
orders fro, the Secretary of Justice and insists on arraignment and trial on the merits.

HELD:
It is a cardinal principle that all criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by
information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. 17 The institution of
a criminal action depends upon the sound discretion of the fiscal. The reason for placing the
criminal prosecution under the direction and control of the fiscal is to prevent malicious or
unfounded prosecution by private persons. 19 It cannot be controlled by the complainant.

However, the action of the fiscal or prosecutor is not without any limitation or control. The same
is subject to the approval of the provincial or city fiscal or the chief state prosecutor as the case
maybe and it maybe elevated for review to the Secretary of Justice who has the power to affirm,
modify or reverse the action or opinion of the fiscal. Consequently the Secretary of Justice may
direct that a motion to dismiss the case be filed in Court or otherwise, that an information be
filed in Court.

The filing of a complaint or information in Court initiates a criminal action. The Court thereby
acquires jurisdiction over the case, which is the authority to hear and determine the case. The
preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining whether a prima
facie case exists warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the filing of the
information in the proper court.
1. On April 18, 1977 Assistant Fiscal Proceso K. de Gala with the approval of the Provincial
Fiscal filed an information for estafa against Mario Fl. Crespo in the Circuit Criminal Court of
Lucena City.

2. When the case was set for arraignment the accused filed a motion to defer arraignment on
the ground that there was a pending petition for review filed with the Secretary of Justice of the
resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal for the filing of the information.

3. In an order of August 1, 1977, the presiding judge, His Honor, Leodegario L. Mogul, denied
the motion. A motion for reconsideration of the order was denied in the order of August 5, 1977
but the arraignment was deferred to August 18, 1977 to afford time for petitioner to elevate the
matter to the appellate court.

4. A petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a preliminary writ of injunction was filed
by the accused in the Court of Appeals. In an order of August 17, 1977 the Court of Appeals
restrained Judge Mogul from proceeding with the arraignment of the accused until further orders
of the Court.

5. In a comment that was filed by the Solicitor General he recommended that the petition be
given due course.

6. On May 15, 1978 a decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals granting the writ and
perpetually restraining the judge from enforcing his threat to compel the arraignment of the
accused in the case until the Department of Justice shall have finally resolved the petition for
review.

7. On March 22, 1978 then Undersecretary of Justice, Hon. Catalino Macaraig, Jr., resolving the
petition for review reversed the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and directed the
fiscal to move for immediate dismissal of the information filed against the accused.

8. A motion to dismiss for insufficiency of evidence was filed by the Provincial Fiscal dated April
10, 1978 with the trial court, attaching thereto a copy of the letter of Undersecretary Macaraig,
Jr. In an order of August 2, 1978 the private prosecutor was given time to file an opposition
thereto.

9. On November 24, 1978 the Judge denied the motion and set the arraignment, stating that
“the motion’s trust being to induce this Court to resolve the innocence of the accused on
evidence not before it but on that adduced before the Undersecretary of Justice, a matter that
not only disregards the requirements of due process but also erodes the Court’s independence
and integrity.”
10. The accused then filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with petition for
the issuance of preliminary writ of prohibition and/or temporary restraining order in the Court of
Appeals.

11. On January 23, 1979 a restraining order was issued by the Court of Appeals against the
threatened act of arraignment of the accused until further orders from the Court. In a decision of
October 25, 1979 the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and lifted the restraining order of
January 23, 1979.

12. A motion for reconsideration of said decision filed by the accused was denied in a resolution
of February 19, 1980.

13. Hence this petition for review of said decision. Petitioner and private respondent filed their
respective briefs while the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation in lieu of brief reiterating that
the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals be reversed and that respondent Judge be
ordered to dismiss the information.

ISSUE: Whether the trial court, acting on a motion to dismiss a criminal case filed by the
Provincial Fiscal upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice to whom the case was elevated for
review, may refuse to grant the motion and insist on the arraignment and trial on the merits?

RULING: YES.

The rule in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition
of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound
discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of
criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial
court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The
determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to
dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant
or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the
accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary
of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation.

In order therefor to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of the Secretary of Justice who
reviewed the action of the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary of Justice
should, as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the
action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been filed in Court. The
matter should be left entirely for the determination of the Court.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
MANUEL P. MARTINEZ, ​petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, and SALVADOR H. LAUREL, ​respondent.
Eriberto Ignacio for petitioner.
Laurel Law Offices for private respondent.

Criminal Law; Constitutional Law; Double Jeopardy; Requisites before legal jeopardy
attaches.—Appeal against the order of dismissal of February 18, 1992 was not foreclosed by the
rule of double jeopardy, said order having issued before arraignment. Legal jeopardy attaches only
(a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea
having been entered, and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express
consent of the accused.
Same; Same; Same; Appeals; Words and Phrases; “Party,” Defined; The offended party may appeal
from a final judgment or order in a criminal case except when the accused is placed thereby in
double jeopardy.—Under Section 2, Rule 122 of the 1988 Rules of Criminal Procedure, the right to
appeal from a final judgment or order in a criminal case is granted to “any party,” except when the
accused is placed thereby in double jeopardy. In People vs. Guido, this Court ruled that the word
“party” must be understood to mean not only the government and the accused, but also other
persons who may be affected by the judgment rendered in the criminal proceeding. Thus, the party
injured by the crime has been held to have the right to appeal from a resolution of the court which is
derogatory to his right to demand civil liability arising from the offense. The right of the offended
party to file a special civil action of prohibition and certiorari from an order rendered in a criminal
case was likewise recognized in the cases of Paredes vs. Gopengco and People vs. Calo, Jr., which
held that “of-fended parties in criminal cases have sufficient interest and personality as `person(s)
aggrieved’ to file the special civil action of prohibition and certiorari under Sections 1 and 2 of Rule
65 in line with the underlying spirit of the liberal construction of the Rules of Court in order to
promote their object * * *.”
Same; Solicitor General; It is not unusual for the Solicitor General to take a position adverse to the
People or the prosecution.—It is not unusual for the Solicitor General to take a position adverse to
the People or the prosecution. The reason, as explained by the Court in [Martinez vs. Court of
Appeals, 237 SCRA 575(1994)]
Orbos vs. Civil Service Commission, is that as the lawyer of the government, its agencies and
instrumentalities, the Solicitor General has the duty to “see to it that the best interest of the
government is upheld within the limits set by law. * * * It is incumbent upon him to present to the
court what he considers would legally uphold the best interest of the government although it may run
counter to a client’s position.” When that happens, as the Court observed in Orbos: “*** the Solicitor
General nevertheless manifests his opinion and recom-mendation to the Court which is an
invaluable aid in the disposition of the case. On some occasions he begs leave to be excused from
intervening in the case, more so, when the client had already filed its own comment different from
the stand of the Solicitor General or in a situation when he finds the contention of a private party
tenable as against that of the government or any of its agencies. The Solicitor General has
recommended the acquittal of the accused in appealed criminal cases.”
Same; Appeals; Certiorari; The remedy from an order of dismissal is appeal, not the special civil
action of certiorari.—The procedural recourse of appeal taken by private complainant Laurel is
correct because the order of dismissal was a final order. It finally disposed of the pending action so
that nothing more could be done with it in the lower court. In Bell Carpets International Trading Corp.
vs. Court of Appeals, this Court held that “(t)he remedy against such a judgment is an appeal,
regardless of the questions sought to be raised on appeal, whether of fact, or of law, whether
involving jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion of the Trial Court. * * * (T)he party aggrieved * * *
did not have the option to substitute the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 for the remedy
of appeal provided for in Rule 41. Indeed, the existence and availability of the right of appeal are
antithetical to the availment of the special civil action of certiorari.”
Same; Courts; Motions to Dismiss; The rule in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information
is filed in Court any disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the
accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court.—The rule with respect to the disposition of
motions to dismiss filed by the fiscal was laid down by the Court in Crespo vs. Mogul, where it was
held that: “The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in
Court any disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in
the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the
prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion
on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The
determination of the
577

VOL. 237, OCTOBER 13, 1994

577
Martinez vs. Court of Appeals
case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the
fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not
matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after
a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the
investigation.”
Same; Same; Same; Due Process; The complainant was deprived of his day in court when the judge
granted the motion to dismiss without the prosecution having furnished him a copy of the
motion.—The fault of error tainting the order of dismissal of the lower court consists in its failure to
observe procedural due process and to exercise its discretion properly and judiciously. The trial
judge granted the motion to dismiss without the prosecution having furnished private complainant a
copy of the motion despite having been ordered to do so, thereby effectively depriving private
complainant of his day in court.
Same; Same; Same; Libel; It was error for the judge to grant a motion to dismiss based merely on
the findings of the Acting Secretary of Justice that no crime was committed.—Secondly, the
dismissal was based merely on the findings of the Acting Secretary of Justice that no libel was
committed. The trial judge did not make an independent evaluation or assessment of the merits of
the case. Reliance was placed solely on the conclusion of the prosecution that “there is no sufficient
evidence against the said accused to sustain the allegation in the information” and on the supposed
lack of objection to the motion to dismiss, this last premise being, however, questionable, the
prosecution having failed, as observed, to give private complainant a copy of the motion to dismiss.
In other words, the grant of the motion to dismiss was based upon considerations other than the
judge’s own personal individual conviction that there was no case against the accused. Whether to
approve or disapprove the stand taken by the prosecution is not the exercise of discretion required in
cases like this. The trial judge must himself be convinced that there was indeed no sufficient
evidence against the accused, and this conclusion can be arrived at only after an assessment of the
evidence in the possession of the prosecution. What was imperatively required was the trial judge’s
own assessment of such evidence, it not being sufficient for the valid and proper exercise of judicial
discretion merely to accept the prosecution’s word for its supposed insufficiency.
Same; Same; Same; In failing to make an independent finding of the merits of the case and merely
anchoring the dismissal on the revised position of the prosecution, the trial judge relinquished the
discretion he was duty bound to exercise.—As aptly observed by the Office of the
Solicitor General, in failing to make an independent finding of the merits of the case and merely
anchoring the dismissal on the revised position of the prosecution, the trial judge relinquished the
discretion he was duty bound to exercise. In effect, it was the prosecution, through the Department
of Justice which decided what to do and not the court which was reduced to a mere rubber stamp in
violation of the ruling in Crespo v. Mogul. [Martinez vs. Court of Appeals, 237 SCRA 575(1994)]

NARVASA, ​C.J.:
This petition for review prays for the reversal of the resolutions of
the Court of Appeals dated July 16, 1993 and October 25, 1993 in CA-G.R. No. 13429, entitled "The
People of the Philippines, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus Manuel P. Martinez, Accused-Appellee, and
Salvador H. Laurel, Private Complainant and Appellant." What petitioner Manuel P. Martinez actually
seeks is the dismissal of the information for libel filed against him in the Trial Court. On the basis of
the facts hereunder set forth, the Court denies his plea.
On complaint of then Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel, 1 an Information dated March 23, 1990 2 ​was
filed before the Regional Trial Court [RTC] of Manila by Assistant Prosecutor Antonio J. Ballena, charging
Manuel F. Martinez with libel arising from the allegedly derogatory and scurrilous imputations and
insinuations against Laurel contained in Martinez' article entitled "The Sorrows of Laurel" published on
January 8, 1990 in his Manila Times column ​Narrow Gate.​ The Information was docketed as Criminal
Case No. 90-82891 and assigned to Branch XI.
Martinez filed a "Motion for Reinvestigation" 3 ​which, was denied by Judge Manuel E. Yuzon in an
4
Order dated June 21, 1990. ​The case was set for arraignment and pre-trial conference on July 31,
1990, but this setting was cancelled in view of Judge Yuzon's retirement.
On October 8, 1990, complainant Laurel filed a motion to set the case for arraignment and pre-trial.
Action on the motion was held in abeyance by the pairing judge, Hon. Gerardo Pepito, pending
assumption of duty of Judge Yuzon's successor.
In the meantime, Martinez filed a petition with the Department of Justice (DOJ) seeking review of the
resolution of the City Prosecutor finding a prima facie c​ ase of libel against him. Accordingly, 3rd
Asst. City Prosecutor Lourdes C. Tabanag filed before the trial court on October 26, 1990, a motion
to suspend proceedings pending resolution by the DOJ of Martinez' petition for review, which was
granted by Judge Pepito on November 6, 1990.
On February 6, 1991, complainant Laurel attempted once more to have the case set for arraignment
and trial. No action was taken on his said motion, and a subsequent motion dated July 16, 1991
praying for the resolution of the February 6, 1991 motion met the same fate.
By letter dated August 16, 1991 addressed to the City Prosecutor of Manila, 5 ​then Acting Justice
Secretary Silvestre H. Bello III declared inter alia t​ hat while the language used in the article may be
unsavory and unpleasant to complainant, the same was not actionable as libel, as if embodied merely an
opinion protected as a privileged communication under Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code. The
appealed resolution was therefore set aside and the City Prosecutor was directed to cause the dismissal
of the information filed against Manuel F. Martinez. Consequently, a motion to dismiss Criminal
Case No. 90-82891 was filed on August 26, 1991 and set for hearing on December 17, 1991. At the
hearing, upon manifestation of complainant's counsel, as private prosecutor, that he had received no
copy of the motion to dismiss, the trial court directed the case prosecutor to furnish said counsel the
desired copy, giving the latter ten (10) days to respond thereto.
It does not appear that the case prosecutor complied with the trial court's order; this notwithstanding,
said court, through Presiding Judge Roberto A. Barrios, issued on February 18, 1992 and Order 6
reading:
Before arraignment was had, the Department of Justice conducted & since concluded review and
reinvestigation of the charges, the Resolution of which is Annex "A" of the prosecution's motion to
dismiss. The prosecution's fresh stand is that "there is no sufficient evidence against the said
accused to sustain the allegation in the information." Coming as it does from the officials having
control of the prosecution and at this stage of the proceedings, and there being no objection, the
motion to dismiss is granted.
WHEREFORE, the case is dismissed. The office/officer having custody of it is directed to forthwith
release to the accused his cash bond submitted under O.R. NO. 46865.
SO ORDERED.
Complainant Laurel having sought and been denied a reconsideration of said Order, he went to the
Court of Appeals, ascribing error to the lower court in (a) recognizing the regularity and validity of the
petition for review filed by Martinez with the DOJ and the DOJ's giving due course thereto, and (b)
granting the motion to dismiss despite absence of notice thereof to complainant Laurel, and basing
said dismissal not on evidence on record but on the opinion of the Secretary of Justice, to whom the
judge completely subordinated his judgment and whose opinion, on its face, was clearly puerile and
flimsy and violated or disregarded numerous Supreme Court decisions.
Martinez, on his part, moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that no appeal lies from the
dismissal of a criminal case, and certainly not by the private complainant, particularly where
dismissal was at the instance of the City Prosecutor upon orders of the Department of Justice. He
contended that if any remedy was available to private complainant, it was a petition for ​certiorari​, not
an appeal. Said motion notwithstanding, the Court of Appeals ordered complainant to file his brief.
For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation in Lieu of Appellee's Brief
recommending that the Order dated February 18, 1992 of the lower court granting the prosecution's
motion to dismiss, be set aside and the case remanded to the court ​a quo f​ or further proceedings.
On July 16, 1993, the Court of Appeals, Sixth Division, issued a Resolution 7 ​granting the appeal and
remanding the case for arraignment of the accused and trial on the merits. The Appellate Court ruled that
private complainant had "sufficient personality and a valid grievance against the order of dismissal before
arraignment" and that the remedy of appeal was properly available because the order of dismissal was a
final order which terminated all proceedings in the case. Quoting extensively from the People's
Manifestation, the Court found the review by then Acting Justice Secretary Bello to run counter to
prevailing jurisprudence and DOJ Circulars. It further ruled that the trial court completely abdicated its
jurisdiction in favor of the Justice Department when it dismissed the case on the mere say-so of the
prosecutor, without requiring the latter to present evidence to enable the court to arrive at its own
judgment.
Martinez sought, but failed to obtain, a reconsideration of the above Resolution. 8 ​Hence, the present
recourse. His arguments in support thereof do no warrant reversal of the challenged judgment of the
Court of Appeals.
Appeal against the order of dismissal of February 18, 1992 was not foreclosed by the rule of double
jeopardy, said order having issued before arraignment. Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid
indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered,
and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused.
9

Under Section 2, Rule 122 of the 1988 Rules of Criminal Procedure, the right to appeal from a final
judgment or order in a criminal case is granted to "any party", except when the accused is placed
thereby in double jeopardy.​10
In ​People vs. Nano 16​, the Court, while declaring the petition filed before it by the private counsel for the
offended parties to be defective in form, nevertheless took cognizance thereof in view of the gravity of
error allegedly committed by the respondent judge against the prosecution — denial of due process — as
well as the manifestation and motion filed by the Office of the Solicitor General praying that the petition be
treated as if filed by the said office. The same exceptional circumstances obtaining in the ​Nano​, case
justified the Court of Appeals' taking cognizance of the appeal filed by private complainant Laurel, i.e.:
denial of due process consisting in the failure of the prosecution to furnish counsel for private complainant
a copy of the motion to dismiss despite being ordered to do so, as well as of the Manifestation in Lieu of
17​
Appellee's Brief ​ ​filed by the Solicitor General in the appellate
court, recommending the setting aside of the Order of the lower court dated February 18, 1992 and the
remand of the case to the court ​a quo f​ or further proceedings.
It is not unusual for the Solicitor General to take a position adverse to the People or the prosecution.
The reason, as explained by the Court in ​Orbos vs. Civil Service Commission​, 18 is that as the lawyer
of the government, its agencies and instrumentalities, the Solicitor General has the duty to "see to it that
the best interest of the government is upheld within the limits set by
law. . . . It is incumbent upon him to present to the court what he considers would legally uphold the best
interest of the government although it may run counter to a client's position." When that happens, as the
Court observed in ​Orbos:​
. . . the Solicitor General nevertheless manifests his opinion and recommendation to the Court which
is an invaluable aid in the disposition of the case. On some occasions he begs leave to be excused
from intervening in the case, more so, when the client had already filed its own comment different
from the stand of the Solicitor General or in a situation when he finds the contention of a private
party tenable as against that of the government or any of its agencies. The Solicitor General has
recommended the acquittal of the accused in appealed criminal cases.
The procedural recourse of appeal taken by private complainant Laurel is correct because the order
of dismissal was a final order. It finally disposed
of the pending action so that nothing more could be done with it in the lower court. 19
​ ​In ​Bell Carpets
20
International Trading Corp. vs. Court Appeals​, ​ ​this Court held that "(t)he remedy against such a
judgment is an ​appeal​, regardless of the questions sought to be raised on appeal, whether of fact, or of
law, whether involving jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion of the Trial Court. . . . (T)he party
​ nder Rule 65 for
aggrieved . . . did not have the option to substitute the special civil action of ​certiorari u
the remedy of appeal provided for in Rule 41. Indeed, the existence and availability of the right of appeal
are antithetical to the availment of the special civil action of​certiorari.​ "
The rule with respect to the disposition of motions to dismiss filed by the fiscal was laid down by the
Court in​Crespo vs. Mogul,​ 21​
​ ​where it was held that:
The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complainant or information is filed in Court any
disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the
sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution
of criminal even cases while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial
court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The determination
of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by
the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does
not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed
after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of
the investigation.
Petitioner maintains that it is precisely in recognition of the above-cited rule that the prosecutor left
the disposition of the case to the discretion of the lower court by filing the appropriate motion to
dismiss; and that it was neither the Justice Secretary nor the fiscal who dismissed the information,
but the trial judge himself, who exercised his discretion by approving the stand taken by the
prosecution.
The fault or error tainting the order of dismissal of the lower court consists in its failure to observe
procedural due process and to exercise its discretion properly and judiciously. Other procedural
lapses that must be pointed out are attributable to petitioner Martinez, who filed a petition for review
with the Department of Justice despite the denial by Judge Yuzon of his motion for reinvestigation,
and to the Justice Secretary, who took cognizance of the petition for review despite the fact that an
information had been filed in court. But that is water under the bridge.
What now concerns the Court here with is how the trial judge acted in relation to the motion to
dismiss. First, he granted the same without the prosecution having furnished private complainant a
copy of the motion despite having been ordered to do so, thereby effectively depriving private
complainant of his day in court.
Secondly, the dismissal was based merely on the findings of the Acting Secretary of Justice that no
libel was committed. The trial judge did not make an independent evaluation or assessment of the
merits of the case. Reliance was placed solely on the conclusion of the prosecution that "there is no
sufficient evidence against the said accused to sustain the allegation in the information" and on the
supposed lack of objection to the motion to dismiss, this last premise being, however, questionable,
the prosecution having failed, as observed, to give private complainant a copy of the motion to
dismiss.
In other words, the grant of the motion to dismiss was based upon considerations other than the
judge's own personal individual conviction that there was no case against the accused. Whether to
approve or disapprove the stand taken by the prosecution is not the exercise of discretion required in
cases like this. The trial judge must himself be convinced that there was indeed no sufficient
evidence against the accused, and this conclusion can be arrived at only after an assessment of the
evidence in the possession of the prosecution. What was imperatively required ws the trial judge's
own assessment of such evidence, it not being sufficient for the valid and proper exercise of judicial
discretion merely to accept the prosecution's word for its supposed insufficiency.
As aptly observed by the Office of the Solicitor General, in failing to make an independent finding of
the merits of the case and merely anchoring the dismissal on the revised position of the prosecution,
the trial judge relinquished the discretion he was duty bound to exercise. In effect, it was the
prosecution, through the Department of Justice which decided what to do and not the court which
was reduced to a mere rubber stamp in violation of the ruling in​Crespo v. Mogul.​ 22
​
The dismissal order having been issued in violation of private complainant's right to due process as
well as upon an erroneous exercise of judicial discretion, the Court of Appeals did not err in setting
aside said dismissal order and remanding the case to the trial court for arraignment of petitioner as
accused therein and for further proceedings.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed resolutions of the Court of Appeals are
affirmed. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
11
In ​People vs. Guido,​ ​this Court ruled that the word "party" must be understood to mean not only the
government and the accused, but also other persons who may be affected by the judgment rendered in
the criminal proceeding. Thus, the party injured by the crime has been held to have the right to appeal
from a resolution of the court which is derogatory to his right to demand civil liability arising from the
12
offense. ​ ​The right of the offended party to file a special civil action of prohibition and​certiorari ​from an
13
order rendered in a criminal case was likewise recognized in the cases of ​Paredes vs. Gopengco ​
14
and​People vs. Calo, Jr​., which held that "offended parties in criminal cases have sufficient interest and
​ nder
personality as 'person(s) aggrieved' to file the special civil action of prohibition and ​certiorari u
Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 65 in line with the underlying spirit of the liberal construction of the Rules of
15
Court in order to promote their object . . . ." ​

Larranaga vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 130644. March 13, 1998.*
THE MINOR FRANCISCO JUAN LARRANAGA, Represented in this Suit by his mother,
MARGARITA G. LARRANAGA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Criminal Procedure; Arrests; Section 7 of Rule 112 applies only to persons lawfully arrested
without a warrant.—The prosecutors’ argument is bereft of merit. Section 7 of Rule 112 applies
only to persons lawfully arrested without a warrant. Petitioner in this case was, in the first place,
not arrested either by a peace officer or a private person.
_______________

72 That is, “she is still entitled to separation pay in lieu of reinstatement, due to strained
relationship.” See par. b of the NLRC’s disposition, footnote 4.
* SECOND DIVISION.
582

582
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Larranaga vs. Court of Appeals
Same; Same; Prosecutors’ argument that petitioner was actually committing a crime at the time
of the arrest since kidnapping with serious illegal detention is a continuing crime rejected.—We
reject the prosecutors’ argument that petitioner was actually committing a crime at the time of
the arrest since kidnapping with serious illegal detention is a continuing crime. In the case of
Parulan v. Director of Prisons cited by the prosecutors, kidnapping with illegal detention is
considered a continuing crime where the deprivation of liberty is persistent and continuing from
one place to another. The facts show that the alleged kidnapping was committed on July 16,
1997. One of the victims, Marijoy Chiong, was found dead in Sitio Tanawan, Barangay
Guadalupe, Carcar, Cebu on July 18, 1997, while the other victim, Jacqueline Chiong, remains
missing to date. There is no showing that at the time of the arrest on September 15, 1997,
Jacqueline Chiong was being detained by petitioner who was then residing in Quezon City.
Hence, petitioner may not be considered as continually committing the crime of kidnapping with
serious illegal detention at the time of the arrest.
Same; Same; Preliminary Investigations; Waiver; A waiver, whether express or implied, must be
made in clear and unequivocal manner.—A waiver, whether express or implied, must be made
in clear and unequivocal manner. Mere failure of petitioner and his counsel to appear before the
City Prosecutor in the afternoon of September 17, 1997 cannot be construed as a waiver of his
right to preliminary investigation, considering that petitioner has been vigorously invoking his
right to a regular preliminary investigation since the start of the proceedings before the City
Prosecutor.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The filing of charges and the issuance of the warrant of arrest
against a person invalidly detained will cure the defect of that detention or at least deny him the
right to be released because of such defect.—The records show that on September 17, 1997,
two informations were filed against petitioner for kidnapping and serious illegal detention.
Executive Judge Priscila Agana issued a warrant of arrest on September 19, 1997. Petitioner
was arrested on September 22, 1997 by virtue of said warrant. We held in Sanchez v.
Demetriou that the filing of charges and the issuance of the warrant of arrest against a person
invalidly detained will cure the defect of that detention or at least deny him the right to be
released because of such defect.
583

VOL. 287, MARCH 13, 1998

583
Larranaga vs. Court of Appeals
Same; Same; Same; The absence of a preliminary investigation will not justify petitioner’s
release because such defect did not nullify the information and the warrant of arrest against
him.—We hold, therefore, that petitioner’s detention at the Bagong Buhay Rehabilitation Center
is legal in view of the information and the warrant of arrest against him. The absence of a
preliminary investigation will not justify petitioner’s release because such defect did not nullify
the information and the warrant of arrest against him.
Same; Same; Same; The holding of a preliminary investigation is a function of the Executive
Department and not of the Judiciary.— As regards petitioner’s motion to change the venue and
the authority to conduct the preliminary investigation, we are constrained to dismiss the same
for lack of jurisdiction. The holding of a preliminary investigation is a function of the Executive
Department and not of the Judiciary. Petitioner should therefore address their plea to the
Department of Justice that has control and supervision over the conduct of preliminary
investigations. [Larranaga vs. Court of Appeals, 287 SCRA 581(1998)]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOSELITO DEL ROSARIO y PASCUAL,

accused-appellant.
Criminal Law; Exempting Circumstances; A person who acts under the compulsion of an
irresistible force, like one who acts under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of equal or
greater injury is exempt from criminal liability because he does not act with freedom.—A person
who acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force, like one who acts under the impulse of an
uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury, is exempt from criminal liability because he does
not act with freedom. Actus me invito factus non est meus actus. An act done by me against my
will is not my act. The force contemplated must be so formidable as to reduce the actor to a
mere instrument who acts not only without will but against his will. The duress, force, fear or
intimidation must be present, imminent and impending, and of such nature as to induce a
well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act be done. A threat of
future injury is not enough. The compulsion must be of such a
_________________

* EN BANC.
741

VOL. 305, APRIL 14, 1999

741
People vs. Del Rosario
character as to leave no opportunity for the accused for escape or self-defense in equal combat.
Same; Same; It is natural for people to be seized by fear when threatened with weapons, even
those less powerful than a gun, such as knives and clubs.—As a rule, it is natural for people to
be seized by fear when threatened with weapons, even those less powerful than a gun, such as
knives and clubs. People will normally, usually and probably do what an armed man asks them
to do, nothing more, nothing less. In the instant case, del Rosario was threatened with a gun.
He could not therefore be expected to flee nor risk his life to help a stranger. A person under the
same circumstances would be more concerned with his personal welfare and security rather
than the safety of a person whom he only saw for the first time that day.
Same; Evidence; Conspiracy; In conspiracy, there is need for concurrence of wills or unity of
action and purpose or for common and joint purpose and design.—A conspiracy in the statutory
language exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission
of a felony and decide to commit it. The objective of the conspirators is to perform an act or
omission punishable by law. That must be their intent. There is need for “concurrence of wills” or
“unity of action and purpose” or for “common and joint purpose and design.” Its manifestation
could be shown by “united and concerted action.”
Same; Same; Same; Mere knowledge, acquiescence or approval of the act, without the
cooperation or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one a party to a conspiracy,
but there must be intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the
common design and purpose.—Admittedly, direct proof is not essential to establish conspiracy.
Since by its nature conspiracy is planned in utmost secrecy, it can rarely be proved by direct
evidence. Consequently, the presence of the concurrence of minds which is involved in
conspiracy may be inferred from proof of facts and circumstances which, taken together,
apparently indicate that they are merely parts of some complete whole. If it is proved that two or
more persons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object,
each doing a part so that their combined acts, though apparently independent, were in fact
connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of
sentiment, a conspiracy may be inferred
742

742
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Del Rosario
though no actual meeting among them to concert is proved. That would be termed an implied
conspiracy. Nevertheless, mere knowledge, acquiescence or approval of the act, without the
cooperation or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one a party to a conspiracy,
but that there must be intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of
the common design and purpose. Conspiracy must be established, not by conjectures, but by
positive and conclusive evidence. In fact, the same degree of proof necessary to establish the
crime is required to support a finding of the presence of a criminal conspiracy, which is, proof
beyond reasonable doubt.
Same; Same; Same; Mere companionship does not establish conspiracy.—In this case, the trial
court stated that “there is no evidence that the accused came to an agreement concerning the
commission of the felony and decided to commit the same.” Therefore, in order to convict the
accused, the presence of an implied conspiracy is required to be proved beyond reasonable
doubt. However, the fact that del Rosario was with the other accused when the crime was
committed is insufficient proof to show cabal. Mere companionship does not establish
conspiracy. The only incriminating evidence against del Rosario is that he was at the scene of
the crime but he has amply explained the reason for his presence and the same has not been
successfully refuted by the prosecution. As stated earlier, he feared for his safety and security
because of the threat made by his co-accused that he would be killed should he shout for help.
No complicity can be deduced where there is absolutely no showing that the accused directly
participated in the overt act of robbing and shooting although he was with the persons who
robbed and killed the victim.
Same; Constitutional Law; Investigations; Custodial investigation includes the practice of issuing
an invitation to a person who is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to
have committed.—Custodial investigation is the stage where the police investigation is no
longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect
taken into custody by the police who carry out a process of interrogation that lends itself to elicit
incriminating statements. It is well-settled that it encompasses any question initiated by law
enforcers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of
action in any significant way. This concept of custodial investigation has been
743

VOL. 305, APRIL 14, 1999

743
People vs. Del Rosario
broadened by RA 7438 to include “the practice of issuing an ‘invitation’ to a person who is
investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed.”
Same; Criminal Procedure; Arrests; In essence, Sec. 5, par. (a), Rule 113, requires that the
accused be caught in flagrante delicto or caught immediately after the consummation of the
act.—It must be recalled that del Rosario was arrested by SPO4 De Leon during the police raid
at the place of “Jun” Marquez at Brgy. Dicarma on 14 May 1996. In People vs. Sucro we held
that when a police officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or hears the disturbances
created thereby, and proceeds at once to the scene thereof, he may effect an arrest without a
warrant on the basis of Sec. 5, par. (a), Rule 113, since the offense is deemed committed in his
presence or within his view. In essence, Sec. 5, par. (a), Rule 113, requires that the accused be
caught in flagrante delicto or caught immediately after the consummation of the act. The arrest
of del Rosario is obviously outside the purview of the aforequoted rule since he was arrested on
the day following the commission of the robbery with homicide.
Same; Same; Same; Requisites before a warrantless arrest can be effected.—On the other
hand, Sec. 5, par. (b), Rule 113, necessitates two (2) stringent requirements before a
warrantless arrest can be effected: (1) an offense has just been committed; and, (2) the person
making the arrest has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested had
committed it.
Same; Same; Same; Even in instances not allowed by law, a warrantless arrest is not a
jurisdictional defect and any objection thereto is waived when the person arrested submits to
arraignment without any objection.—However, the conspicuous illegality of del Rosario’s arrest
cannot affect the jurisdiction of the court a quo because even in instances not allowed by law, a
warrantless arrest is not a jurisdictional defect and any objection thereto is waived when the
person arrested submits to arraignment without any objection, as in this case. [People vs. Del
Rosario, 305 SCRA 740(1999)]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RAFAEL OLIVAREZ, JR. and DANILO
ARELLANO, accused-appellants.
Criminal Law; Complex Crimes; The categorization by the prosecution of the crime of robbery
with double homicide is erroneous; Essential elements of robbery with homicide.—The
categorization by the prosecution of the crime of robbery with double homicide is erroneous
because the word “homicide” in Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) should be taken in
its generic sense, absorbing not only acts which results in death (such as murder) but also all
other acts producing anything short of death (such as physical injuries) committed during the
robbery, and regardless of the multiplicity of the victims which is only considered as an
aggravating circumstance. The indictable offense is still the complex crime of robbery with
homicide (which is its proper nomenclature), the essential elements of which are: a.) the taking
of personal property with the
__________________

* SECOND DIVISION.
636

636
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Olivarez, Jr.
use of violence or intimidation against a person; b.) the property thus taken belongs to another;
c.) the taking is characterized by intent to gain or animus lucrandi; d.) on the occasion of the
robbery or by reason thereof, the crime of homicide which is therein used in a generic sense,
was committed.
Criminal Procedure; Evidence; The evidence adduced against appellants are inadmissible to
sustain a criminal conviction.—In this case, there were no eyewitnesses to the killing and
robbery and thus, no direct evidence points to appellants’ criminal liability. The prosecution’s
principal evidence against them is based solely on the testimony of the police officers who
arrested, investigated and subsequently took their confession. Such evidence when juxtaposed
with appellants’ constitutional rights concerning arrests and the taking of confessions leads to a
conclusion that they cannot be held liable for the offense charged despite the inherent
weakness of their defenses of denial and alibi, not because they are not guilty but because the
evidence adduced against them are inadmissible to sustain a criminal conviction.
Same; Same; Constitutional Law; Confessions; Mere invitation is covered by the proscription on
a warrantless arrest because it is intended for no other reason than to conduct an
investigation.—Probably aware of the illegality of the arrest they made, the arresting officers
testified that appellants were merely invited to the police precinct. Such invitation, however,
when construed in the light of the circumstances is actually in the nature of an arrest designed
for the purpose of conducting an interrogation. Mere invitation is covered by the proscription on
a warrantless arrest because it is intended for no other reason than to conduct an investigation.
Thus, pursuant to Section 4(2), Article IV of the 1973 Constitution which was in effect at that
time, “any evidence” obtained in violation of their right under Section 3, Article IV (pertaining to
invalid warrantless arrests) “shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; The constitutional protection on the inadmissibility of evidence
known as the exclusionary rule, applies not only to criminal cases but even extends to civil,
administrative and any other form of proceedings.—In the same manner, all the products of
those illegal arrests cannot be utilized to sustain any civil liability that they may have incurred by
reason of their acts.
637

VOL. 299, DECEMBER 4, 1998

637
People vs. Olivarez, Jr.
This is the clear mandate of the Constitution when it provides that those illegally obtained
evidence being “the fruits of the poisonous tree” are “inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.” The foregoing constitutional protection on the inadmissibility of evidence (which
are the product of an illegal search and arrest) known as the exclusionary rule, applies not only
to criminal cases but even extends to civil, administrative and any other form of proceedings. No
distinction is made by the Constitution; this Court ought not to distinguish.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The invalid waiver of the right to counsel during custodial
investigation makes the uncounselled confession, whether verbal or non-verbal, obtained in
violation thereof as also “inadmissible in evidence.”—Under the Constitution, any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right, among others, to have a
counsel, which right can be validly waived. In this case, the said confession was obtained during
custodial investigation but the confessant was not assisted by counsel. His manifestation to the
investigating officer that he did not need the assistance of counsel does not constitute a valid
waiver of his right within the contemplation of our criminal justice system, this notwithstanding
the fact that the 1973 Constitution does not state that a waiver of the right to counsel to be valid
must be made with the assistance or in the presence of counsel. Although this requisite
concerning the presence of counsel before a waiver of the right to counsel can be validly made
is enshrined only in the 1987 Constitution, which further requires that the waiver must also be in
writing, yet jurisprudence is replete even during the time of appellants’ arrest where it has been
categorically ruled that a waiver of the constitutional right to counsel shall not be valid when the
same is made without the presence or assistance of counsel. Consequently, the invalid waiver
of the right to counsel during custodial investigation makes the uncounselled confession,
whether verbal or non-verbal, obtained in violation thereof as also “inadmissible in evidence”
under Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Requisites in order for a confession to be admissible.—Under the
present laws, a confession to be admissible must be: 1.) express and categorical; 2.) given
voluntarily, and intelligently where the accused realizes the legal significance of his act; 3.) with
assistance of competent and independent counsel; 4.) in writing, and in the language known to
and understood by the con-
638

638
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Olivarez, Jr.
fessant; and 5.) signed, or if the confessant does not know how to read and write, thumbmarked
by him.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The purpose of providing counsel to a person under custodial
investigation is to curb the uncivilized practice of extracting confession even by the slightest
coercion as would lead the accused to admit something false; Extrajudicial confession of one
accused may not be utilized against a co-accused unless they are repeated in open court or
unless there is an opportunity to cross-examine the other on his extrajudicial statements.—The
purpose of providing counsel to a person under custodial investigation is to curb the uncivilized
practice of extracting confession even by the slightest coercion as would lead the accused to
admit something false. What is sought to be avoided is the “evil of extorting from the very mouth
of the person undergoing interrogation for the commission of an offense, the very evidence with
which to prosecute and thereafter convict him.” These constitutional guarantees have been
made available to protect him from the inherently coercive psychological, if not physical,
atmosphere of such investigation. In any case, said extra-judicial confession of one accused
may not be utilized against a coaccused unless they are repeated in open court or when there is
an opportunity to cross-examine the other on his extrajudicial statements. It is considered
hearsay as against said accused under the rule on res inter alios acta, which ordains that the
rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another.
Same; Same; Essential elements to sustain a conviction based on circumstantial evidence.—In
order to sustain a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, it is necessary that the same
satisfies the following elements: 1. there is more than one circumstance; 2. the facts from which
the inferences are derived are proven; and 3. the combination of all the circumstances is such
as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. [People vs. Olivarez, Jr., 299 SCRA
635(1998)]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. WENCESLAO JAYSON,

accused-appellant.
Criminal Law; Constitutional Law; Arrest and Seizures; Court holds that the warrantless arrest
and search were valid.—With respect to the arrest, SPO1 Loreto Tenebro testified that at
around 10:00 in the evening of March 16, 1991, while he and Patrolmen Camotes and Reinerio
Racolas were patrolling in their car, they received a radio message from their camp directing
them to proceed to the “Ihaw-Ihaw” on Bonifacio Street where there had been a shooting.
Accordingly, they proceeded to the place and there saw the victim, Nelson Jordan. Bystanders
pointed to accused-appellant as the one who had shot Jordan. They then arrested
accused-appellant. Seized from him was a .38 caliber revolver with serial number 91955. The
firearm was covered by a mission order and memorandum receipt. Considering these facts, we
hold that the warrantless arrest and search were valid.
Same; Same; Same; The arresting officers thus acted on the basis of personal knowledge of the
death of the victim and of facts indicating that accused-appellant was the assailant.—In the case
at bar there was a shooting. The policemen summoned to the scene of the crime found the
victim. Accused-appellant was pointed to them as the assailant only moments after the
shooting. In fact accused-appellant had not gone very far (only ten meters away from the
“Ihaw-Ihaw”), although he was then fleeing. The arresting officers thus acted on the basis of
personal knowledge of the death of the victim and of facts indicating that accused-appellant was
the assailant.
Same; Same; Same; The subsequent search of accused-appellant’s person and the seizure
from him of the firearm was likewise lawful.—The subsequent search of accused-appellant’s
person and the seizure from him of the firearm was likewise lawful. Rule 126, §12 states: Sec.
12. Search incident to lawful arrest.—A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous
weapons or any-
__________________

* SECOND DIVISION.
167

VOL. 282, NOVEMBER 18, 1997

167
People vs. Jayson
thing which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant.
Same; Illegal Possession of Firearms; Considering the invalidity of the mission order and
memorandum receipt, both the Regional Trial Court and Court of Appeals correctly held
accused-appellant liable under P.D. No. 1866.—In any event, accused-appellant does not claim
to be the holder of a regular license but only of a mission order and memorandum receipt.
Considering the invalidity of these documents, both the Regional Trial Court and Court of
Appeals correctly held accused-appellant liable under P.D. No. 1866.
Same; Same; Evidence; Good faith and absence of criminal intent are not valid defenses
because the offense committed is malum prohibitum punishable by special law.—Nor can
accused-appellant claim to have acted in the good faith belief that the documents issued to him
sufficed as legal authority for him to carry the firearm. As the Court of Appeals pointed out, good
faith and absence of criminal intent are not valid defenses because the offense committed is
malum prohibitum punishable by special law. [People vs. Jayson, 282 SCRA 166(1997)]
ATTY. EDGAR H. TALINGDAN, complainant, vs. JUDGE HENEDINO P. EDUARTE, RTC-Br.
20, Cauayan, Isabela, respondent.
Judges; Searches and Seizures; Warrants of Arrest; Words and Phrases; The words “personal
determination” of probable cause by the judge in Section 2, Article III of the Constitution does
not mean that judges are obliged to conduct the personal examination of the complainant and
his witnesses themselves, rather what is emphasized merely is the exclusive
_______________

* SECOND DIVISION.
560

560
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Talingdan vs. Eduarte
and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself as to the existence of probable
cause—he is never allowed to follow blindly the prosecutor’s bare certification as to the
existence of probable cause.—Enshrined in our Constitution is the rule that “[n]o x x x warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing x x x the persons x x x to be seized.” Interpreting the words “personal
determination” we said that it does not thereby mean that judges are obliged to conduct the
personal examination of the complainant and his witnesses themselves. To require thus would
be to unduly laden them with preliminary examinations and investigations of criminal complaints
instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before them. Rather what is
emphasized merely is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy
himself as to the existence of probable cause. To this end he may: (a) personally evaluate the
report and the supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor regarding the existence of
probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (b) if on the basis thereof
he finds no probable cause, disregard the prosecutor’s report and require the submission of
supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in determining its existence. What he is never
allowed to do is follow blindly the prosecutor’s bare certification as to the existence of probable
cause. Much more is required by the constitutional provision. Judges have to go over the report,
the affidavits, the transcript of stenographic notes if any, and other documents supporting the
prosecutor’s certification. Although the extent of the judge’s personal examination depends on
the circumstances of each case, to be sure, he cannot just rely on the bare certification alone
but must go beyond it. This is because the warrant of arrest issues not on the strength of the
certification standing alone but because of the records which sustain it. He should even call for
the complainant and the witnesses to answer the court’s probing questions when the
circumstances warrant.
Same; Same; Same; There is total and unwarranted abdication of a judicial function where a
Judge signs a Warrant of Arrest simply because it is presented to him for signature by the
Criminal Docket Clerk.—In the case at bench respondent Judge not only failed to follow the
required procedure but worse, was negligent enough not to have noticed that there was not
even a prosecutor’s certification to rely upon since no information had even been filed yet in
court, and that Crim. Case No. Br. 20-1373 was merely docketed as such on the strength of a
mere complaint filed by the private complainant Leoncio Dalin, Sr. himself. Respondent Judge
admitted that he signed the Warrant of Arrest against complainant and the latter’s client simply
because it was presented to him for signature by the
561

VOL. 366, OCTOBER 5, 2001

561
Talingdan vs. Eduarte
Criminal Docket Clerk. There was thus a total and unwarranted abdication of a judicial function.
Respondent cannot exculpate himself from administrative liability by contending that the mistake
was entirely attributable to the Criminal Docket Clerk who failed to faithfully comply with her
“duty” of going over the records of criminal cases and ensuring first that an information had
already been filed in court before preparing the warrant of arrest. As we have already repeatedly
said, a judge cannot take refuge behind the inefficiency of his court personnel for they are not
guardians of his responsibilities.
Same; Same; Same; A judge cannot without abandoning his judicial obligation, just instruct the
Criminal Docket Clerk through a much vaunted Check List for Criminal Cases that he has
prepared for her to follow, to automatically prepare warrants of arrest simply because
informations have been filed.—More importantly the responsibility delegated by respondent was
clearly unauthorized and unwarranted, as already explained above. He cannot without
abandoning his judicial obligation just instruct the Criminal Docket Clerk, through the much
vaunted Check List for Criminal Cases that he had prepared for her to follow, to automatically
prepare warrants of arrest simply because informations have been filed against the accused.
Although respondent’s purpose in preparing the Check List, i.e., to help him comply with RA
8493 otherwise known as the Speedy Trial Act of 1998, may be considered laudable, we have
already said that shortcuts in judicial processes are to be avoided when they impede rather than
promote a judicious dispensation of justice. Much more when, as in the instant case, the
shortcut amounted to a violation of a constitutional provision.
Same; Same; Same; A judge fails in his bounden duty if he relies merely on the certification of
the investigating officer as to the existence of probable cause making him administratively
liable.—A judge fails in his bounden duty if he relies merely on the certification of the
investigating officer as to the existence of probable cause making him administratively liable.
We can do no less in the case of herein respondent who issued the subject warrant of arrest
without even such certification to rely upon, and worse, merely at the instance of the Criminal
Docket Clerk who mechanically typed the Warrant of Arrest for his signature. [Talingdan vs.
Eduarte, 366 SCRA 559(2001)]
STATE PROSECUTOR AND SPECIAL PROSECUTOR ON SSS CASES IN REGION V,
ROMULO SJ. TOLENTINO, AND REGIONAL STATE PROSECUTOR SANTIAGO M.
TURINGAN, as alter ego of the Secretary of Justice in Region V, in their official capacities, and,
for and in representation of the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and MARITES C. DE LA
TORRE, in her official capacity as counsel for the Complainant, SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM
(SSS) Bicol Cluster, petitioners, vs. HON. PABLO M. PAQUEO, JR., in his capacity as Presiding
Judge of RTC, Branch 23, of the City of Naga, and Accused BENEDICT DY TECKLO,
respondents.
Criminal Procedure; State Prosecutors; An examination of the functions of the Regional State
Prosecutor under Sec. 8 of Presidential Decree No. 1275 showed that they do not include that
of approving the Information filed or dismissed by the investigating prosecutor.—While the old
1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, stated that “[no] complaint or information may
be filed or dismissed by an investigating fiscal without the prior written authority or approval of
the provincial or city fiscal of chief state prosecutor,” the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure states that “[n]o complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an
investigating prosecutor without the prior written authority or approval of the provincial or city
prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy.” Since the provision is
couched in negative terms importing that the act shall not be done otherwise than designated, it
is mandatory. An examination of the functions of the Regional State Prosecutor under Sec. 8 of
Presidential Decree No. 1275 showed that they do not include that of approving the Information
filed or dismissed by the investigating prosecutor.
Same; Same; Statutory Construction; Since the Regional State Prosecutor is not included
among the law officers authorized to approve the filing or dismissal of the Information of the
investigating
_______________

* FIRST DIVISION.
378

378
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tolentino vs. Paqueo, Jr.
prosecutor, the Information filed by such State Prosecutor did not comply with the requirement
of Sec. 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure; It is a rule of statutory
construction that the express mention of one person, thing, or consequence implies the
exclusion of all others, expressio unius est exclusio alterius.—It is a rule of statutory
construction that the express mention of one person, thing, or consequence implies the
exclusion of all others, expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Since the Regional State
Prosecutor is not included among the law officers authorized to approve the filing or dismissal of
the Information of the investigating prosecutor, the Information filed by petitioner State
Prosecutor Tolentino did not comply with the requirement of Sec. 4, Rule 112 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure. Consequently, the non-compliance was a ground to quash the
Information under Sec. 3 (d), Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Same; Same; Certiorari; Words and Phrases; Certiorari implies an indifferent disregard of the
law, arbitrariness and caprice, an omission to weigh pertinent considerations, a decision arrived
at without rational deliberation.—Certiorari implies an indifferent disregard of the law,
arbitrariness and caprice, an omission to weigh pertinent considerations, a decision arrived at
without rational deliberation. In this petition for certiorari, the Court finds that respondent judge
did not gravely abuse his discretion in dismissing the Information filed by petitioner State
Prosecutor Romulo SJ. Tolentino for failure to comply with the third paragraph of Sec. 4, Rule
112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Same; Same; For the orderly administration of justice, the provisions contained in the Rules of
Court should be followed by all litigants, but especially by the prosecution arm of the
Government.— The Rules of Court governs the pleading, practice and procedure in all courts of
the Philippines. For the orderly administration of justice, the provisions contained therein should
be followed by all litigants, but especially by the prosecution arm of the Government. [Tolentino
vs. Paqueo, Jr., 523 SCRA 377(2007)]

OFFICE OF THE PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR OF ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE, petitioner, vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, ATICO ABORDO, JUDY CATUBIG, PETER MOLATO, and
FLORENCIO CANDIA, respondents.
Criminal Procedure; Informations; A municipal judge has no legal authority to determine the
character of the crime but only to determine whether or not the evidence presented supported
prima facie the allegation of facts contained in the complaint.—To sustain the procedure
followed by the Court of Appeals of considering evidence dehors the record of the trial court
would be to set a bad precedent whereby the accused in any case can demand, upon the filing
of the information, a review of the evidence presented during the preliminary investigation for
the purpose of compelling the trial court to change the charge to a lesser offense. Such a ruling
would undermine the authority of the prosecutor and impose an intolerable burden on the trial
court. As held in Depamaylo v. Brotarlo: . . . The Court in a number of cases has declared that a
municipal judge has no legal authority to determine the character of the crime but only to
determine whether or not the evidence presented supported prima facie the allegation of facts
contained in the complaint. He has no legal authority to determine the character of the crime
and his declaration upon that point can only be regarded as an expression of opinion in no wise
binding on the court.
Same; Same; The public prosecutors should have the option to ascertain which prosecutions
should be initiated on the basis of the evidence at hand.—The political motivation for the crime
must be shown in order to justify finding the crime committed to be rebellion. Otherwise, as in
People v. Ompad, although it was shown that the accused was an NPA commander, he was
nonetheless convicted of murder for the killing of a person suspected of being a government
informer. At all events, as this Court said in Baylosis v. Chavez: . . . . Certainly, the public
prosecutors should have the option to ascertain which prosecutions should be initiated on the
basis of the evidence at hand. That a criminal act may have elements common to more than
one offense does not rob the prosecutor of that option (or discretion) and mandatorily require
him to charge the lesser offense although the evidence before him may warrant prosecution of
the more serious one. [Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Zamboanga del Norte vs. Court of
Appeals, 348 SCRA 714(2000)]