The Soviet RDS-202 hydrogen bomb (code name Ivan[3] or Vanya), known by Western nations

as Tsar Bomba (Russian: Царь-бо́мба, tr. Tsar'-bómba, IPA: [t͡sarʲ ˈbombə], lit. 'Tsar bomb'), was the
most powerful nuclear weapon ever created. Tested on 30 October 1961 as an experimental
verification of calculation principles and multi-stage thermonuclear weapon designs, it also remains
the most powerful man-made explosive ever detonated.
The bomb was detonated at the Sukhoy Nos ("Dry Nose") cape of Severny Island, Novaya Zemlya,
15 km (9.3 mi) from Mityushikha Bay, north of Matochkin Strait.[4][5][6] The detonation was secret but
was detected by US Intelligence agencies. The US apparently had an instrumented KC-135R aircraft
(Operation SpeedLight[7]) in the area of the test - close enough to have been scorched by the
blast.[2][8]
The bhangmeter results and other data suggested the bomb yielded about 58 megatons of TNT [Mt]
(240 PJ),[9] and that was the accepted yield in technical literature until 1991 when Soviet scientists
revealed that their instruments indicated a yield of 50 Mt (210 PJ).[2] As they had the instrumental
data and access to the test site, their yield figure has been accepted as more correct.[2][8] In theory,
the bomb would have had a yield in excess of 100 Mt (420 PJ) if it had included a uranium-238
tamper but, because only one bomb was built, that capability has never been demonstrated.
The remaining bomb casings are located at the Russian Atomic Weapon Museum in Sarov and the
Museum of Nuclear Weapons, All-Russian Research Institute of Technical Physics, at Snezhinsk.

Contents

 1Background
o 1.1Name
o 1.2Genesis
 2Test
 3Analysis
 4Films
 5Hoaxes and myths
 6See also
 7References
 8External links

Background[edit]
Name[edit]
Many codenames are attributed to the Tsar Bomba: Project 7000; product code 202 (Izdeliye 202),
"Product V" (izdeliye V); article designations RDS-220 (РДС-220), RDS-202 (РДС-202), RN202
(PH202, incorrect codename as the AN602 is a modification of the RN202), AN602 (AH602);
codename Vanya; nicknames Big Ivan, Kuzkina mat.[10][11] The name "Tsar Bomba" was coined in an
analogy with other large Russian objects: the Tsar Bell and Tsar Cannon.[10] The CIA designated the
test as "JOE 111".[6]
The bomb was also referred to as Kuzma's mother (Russian: Ку́зькина ма́ть, tr. Kúz'kina
mát', IPA: [ˈkusʲkʲɪnə ˈmatʲ]),[12] possibly referring to First secretary Nikita Khrushchev's promise to
"show the United States a Kuzma's mother" (an idiom roughly translating to "We'll show you") at a
1960 session of the United Nations General Assembly.[13][14]

Genesis[edit]
In addition to being created for political, propagandistic use and as a response to the nuclear
deterrence capabilities then possessed by the United States, the Tsar Bomba was created as part of
the strategic nuclear forces concept of the USSR, adopted during the rule of Georgy
Malenkov and Nikita Khrushchev. The aim was to achieve—without pursuing a quantitative parity
with the US in terms of nuclear weapons and means of delivery—sufficient "guaranteed retaliation
with an unacceptable level of damage to the enemy" in the event of a nuclear strike on the USSR via
qualitatively superior nuclear power. The Tsar Bomba was not designed as a weapon, but as a
proof-of-concept that larger warheads were practically possible and to exert psychological pressure
on the United States.[15] Research had also shown that the ammunition size of a thermonuclear
weapon could be increased with minimal cost increases of 60 cents (in 1950s USD) per kiloton of
TNT-equivalent explosive power.[16]
The "Malenkov-Khrushchev nuclear doctrine" involved the adoption of geopolitical and military
challenges to the United States and the participation of the USSR in the nuclear race but "in a
distinctly asymmetrical style". The technical manifestation of this undocumented doctrine was the
research-and-development of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery; the former large enough
to completely (or nearly) wipe out large cities and entire urbanized regions in one strike (i.e. with a
single payload and a single aircraft). An example of this would be the creation of the N-1 orbital
combat rocket (GRAU index 11A52) per the Resolution of the Council of Ministers issued on 23 June
1960. With a starting weight of 2200 tons and a nuclear warhead weighing 75 tons, its estimated
nuclear yield (though unknown exactly) could surpass that of a 150-ton-yield 40-ton warhead
delivered by a UR-500 missile.
The development of such weapons also required mandatory and practical aerial bombardment
methods as, for a high-yield (thermo-)nuclear explosion to reach maximal effect, the payload has to
be detonated at an optimal height for the shock wave to reach the greatest force and range. In
addition, ultra-large-yield thermonuclear bombs were considered by the Long Range Aviation units
of the USSR, as their use fits the "cause the greatest damage to the enemy with a minimal number
of carriers (i.e. bombers)" doctrine, while it was also necessary to consider the practical feasibility of
such heavy thermonuclear weapons with reliably predictable characteristics. Before this, an
underwater "doomsday weapon" considered by Soviet military and technical experts— essentially a
giant torpedo launched by a dedicated nuclear submarine— was planned for development which
would detonate its nuclear warhead near the US coast causing a huge tsunami. This project (known
as the T-15 torpedo) was abandoned after more detailed consideration as its combat effectiveness
was questionable.

A Tsar Bomba-type casing on display at Sarov

Design work on the Tsar Bomba started from autumn 1954[17] to autumn 1961 (with a two-year break
from 1959-1960). A 100-megaton-of-TNT (420 PJ) nuclear bomb was also under development in
NII-1011 at this time. This somehow contradicts partially with the official history of the institute (now
the All-Russian Scientific Research Institute Of Technical Physics); the official history stated that the
Ministry of Medium Engineering of the USSR order concerning the creation of a corresponding
research institute was not signed until 5 April 1955, with design work starting a few months later. But
in any case, there existed a common (but entirely false) myth that the Tsar Bomba was designed per
personal order from Nikita Khrushchev with a total research and development time of only 112 days;
the actual development of the final stage of the Tsar Bomba (then already placed in KB-11, now
the All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Experimental Physics) did indeed take 112 days.
The Tsar Bomba differs from its parent design—the RN202—in several places. The Tsar Bomba
was a three-stage bomb with Trutnev-Babaev[18] second- and third-stage design,[19] with a yield of
50 Mt (210 PJ).[2] This is equivalent to about 1,570 times the combined energy of the bombs
that destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki,[20] 10 times the combined energy of all the conventional
explosives used in World War II,[21] one quarter of the estimated yield of the 1883 eruption of
Krakatoa and 10% of the combined yield of all nuclear tests to date. A three-stage hydrogen bomb
uses a fission bomb primary to compress a thermonuclear secondary, as in most hydrogen bombs,
and then uses energy from the resulting explosion to compress a much larger additional
thermonuclear stage. There is evidence that the Tsar Bomba had several third stages rather than a
single very large one.[22]
The initial three-stage design (coded A620EN, not tested) was capable of yielding approximately
100 Mt (420 PJ) through fast fission, 3,000 times the size of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki
bombs,[23] but it was thought that it would have caused too much nuclear fallout and the aircraft
delivering the bomb would not have had enough time to escape the explosion. To limit the amount of
fallout, the third stage and possibly the second stage had a lead tamper instead of a uranium-
238 fusion tamper (which greatly amplifies the reaction by fissioning uranium atoms with fast
neutrons from the fusion reaction). This eliminated fast fission by the fusion-stage neutrons so that
approximately 97% of the total yield resulted from thermonuclear fusion alone (as such, it was one of
the "cleanest" nuclear bombs ever created, generating a very low amount of fallout relative to its
yield).[24] There was a strong incentive for this modification since most of the fallout from a test of the
bomb would likely have descended on populated Soviet territory.[22][25]
The first studies on "Topic 242" began immediately after Igor Kurchatov talked with Andrei
Tupolev (then held in autumn 1954). Tupolev appointed his deputy for weapon systems, Aleksandr
Nadashkevich, as the head of the Topic. Subsequent analysis indicated that to carry such a heavy,
concentrated load, the Tu-95 bomber carrying the Tsar Bomba needed to have its engines, bomb
bay, suspension and release mechanisms seriously redesigned. The Tsar Bomba's dimensional and
weight drawings were passed in the first half of 1955, together with its placement layout drawing.
The Tsar Bomba's weight accounted for 15% the weight of its Tu-95 carrier as expected. The carrier,
aside from having its fuel tanks and bomb bay doors removed, had its BD-206 bomb-holder replaced
by a new, heavier beam-type BD7-95-242 (or BD-242) holder attached directly to the longitudinal
weight-bearing beams. The problem of how to release the bomb was also solved; the bomb-holder
would release all three of its locks in a synchronous fashion via electro-automatic mechanisms as
required by safety protocols.