Evidence Case Digests 1 70

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y.
2018-2019
1) Armed Forces of the Philippines vs Republic of the failed to show that the witness it presented was duly
Philippines authorized to appear for and in its behalf.
KEYWORD: On February 17, 2009, the court a quo issued an Order

granting the Motion for Reconsideration of the OSG on the
AFP Land Registration; Authority of Witness ground that the petitioner failed to prosecute its case.
DOCTRINE: ISSUE:
There is no substantive or procedural rule which requires a Whether the court a quo acted contrary to law and
witness for a party to present some form of authorization to jurisprudence when it dismissed petitioner’s application for
testify as a witness for the party presenting him or her. All that land registration on the ground that petitioner failed to
the Rules require of a witness is that the witness possesses all prosecute the subject case.
the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided
therein.
RULING:
FACTS: YES. Section 3, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,

as amended, provides only three instances wherein the Court
Petitioner filed an Application for Registration of Title over may dismiss a case for failure to prosecute.
three parcels of land located in West Bicutan, Taguig City,
before the RTC of Pasig City. The said application was later An action may be dismissed for failure to prosecute in any of
docketed and raffled to Branch 68 of the court a quo. the following instances: (1) if the plaintiff fails to appear at
the time of trial; or (2) if he fails to prosecute the action for
These three parcels of land constitute a land grant by virtue of an unreasonable length of time; or (3) if he fails to comply
Presidential Proclamation No. 1218, issued by former with the Rules of Court or any order of the court. Once a
President Fidel V. Ramos on May 8, 1998. case is dismissed for failure to prosecute, this has the effect
The application was filed by Mr. Honorio S. Azcueta (Mr. of an adjudication on the merits and is understood to be with
Azcueta), the then Executive Vice President and Chief prejudice to the filing of another action unless otherwise
Operating Officer of the petitioner, who was duly authorized provided in the order of dismissal. In other words, unless
to do so by the Board of Trustees of the petitioner, as there be a qualification in the order of dismissal that it is
evidenced by a notarized Secretary’s Certificate dated August without prejudice, the dismissal should be regarded as an
18, 2003. adjudication on the merits and is with prejudice.
After due posting and publication of the requisite notices, and First, the petitioner did not fail to appear at the time of the
since no oppositor registered any oppositions after the trial. In fact, the Decision of the RTC dated April 21, 2008
petitioner met the jurisdictional requirements, the court a quo ordering the registration of petitioner’s title to the subject
issued an order of general default against the whole world, lots shows that the petitioner appeared before the Court and
and the petitioner was allowed to present evidence ex-parte. was represented by counsel. Records would also reveal that
the petitioner was able to present its evidence, and as a
The petitioner then presented as its witness, Ms. Alma P. result, the RTC rendered judgment in its favor.
Aban (Ms. Aban), its Vice President and Head of its Asset
Enhancement Office. She testified, inter alia, that: among her Second, the petitioner did not fail to prosecute the subject
main duties is to ensure that the properties and assets of case considering that it appeared during trial, presented Ms.
petitioner, especially real property, are legally titled and freed Aban, who gave competent testimony as regards the titling of
of liens and encumbrances; the subject properties were the subject lots, and the court a quo never held petitioner
acquired by the petitioner through a land grant under liable for any delay in prosecuting the subject case.
Presidential Proclamation No. 1218; prior to Presidential Third, a perusal of the records would demonstrate that the
Proclamation No. 1218, the Republic of the Philippines was in petitioner did not fail to comply with the Rules or any order
open, continuous, exclusive, notorious, and peaceful of the court a quo, as there is no ruling on the part of the
possession and occupation of the subject properties in the latter to this effect.
concept of an owner to the exclusion of the world since time
immemorial; petitioner, after the Republic of the Philippines Indeed, there was no basis for the court a quo’s ruling that
transferred ownership of the subject properties to it, assumed the petitioner failed to prosecute the subject case, because
open, continuous, exclusive, notorious, and peaceful none of the grounds provided in the Rules for dismissing a
possession and occupation, and exercised control over them in case due to failure to prosecute is present.
the concept of owner, and likewise assumed the obligations of
an owner; petitioner has been paying the real estate taxes on On the alleged lack of authority of the witness, Ms. Aban, to
the subject properties; and the subject properties are not testify on behalf of the petitioner. (Related to Evidence Class)
mortgaged, encumbered, or tenanted. Subsequently, The SC ruled that there is no substantive or procedural rule
petitioner submitted its Formal Offer of Evidence, following which requires a witness for a party to present some form
which, the court a quo granted the application in a Decision of authorization to testify as a witness for the party
dated April 21, 2008. presenting him or her. No law or jurisprudence would
In response, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a support the conclusion that such omission can be considered
Motion for Reconsideration dated May 12, 2008, wherein it as a failure to prosecute on the part of the party presenting
argued that the petitioner failed to prove that it has such witness. All that the Rules require of a witness is that
personality to own property in its name and the petitioner
1| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019
the witness possesses all the qualifications and none of the Note (sa later part sa case nani gi discuss): Maximo Alvarez
disqualifications provided therein. set Susan Ramirez’ house knowing fully well that his wife,
Esperanza was there. Their relationship was already strained
Sections 19 and 20 of Rule 130 provide for specific and that they already separated de facto six months prior to
disqualifications. Section 19 disqualifies those who are the incident.
mentally incapacitated and children whose tender age or
immaturity renders them incapable of being witnesses.
Section 20 provides for disqualification based on conflicts of
interest or on relationship. Section 21 provides for ISSUE:
disqualifications based on privileged communications. Section WON Esperanza Alvarez can testify against her husband in
15 of Rule 132 may not be a rule on disqualification of the case for Arson
witnesses but it states the grounds when a witness may be
impeached by the party against whom he was called.
The specific enumeration of disqualified witnesses excludes RULING:

the operation of causes of disability other than those
mentioned in the Rules. As a general rule, where there are Yes. The marital disqualification rule has its own exceptions.
express exceptions these comprise the only limitations on the As a general rule, Section 22, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of
operation of a statute and no other exception will be implied. Court provides:
The Rules should not be interpreted to include an exception
not embodied therein. "Sec. 22. Disqualification by reason of marriage. —
During their marriage, neither the husband nor the
Hence, Ms. Aban is qualified to testify as a witness for the wife may testify for or against the other without the
petitioner since she possesses the qualifications of being able consent of the affected spouse, except in a civil case
to perceive and being able to make her perceptions known to by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a
others. Furthermore, she possesses none of the crime committed by one against the other or the
disqualifications described above. latter's direct descendants or ascendants."
The OSG and the court a quo did not question the The reasons given for the rule are:
Verification/Certification of the application, and neither did 1. There is identity of interests between husband and
they question the authority of Mr. Azcueta to file the subject wife;
application on behalf of the petitioner. Case records would 2. If one were to testify for or against the other, there
reveal that the application was signed and filed by Mr. is consequent danger of perjury;
Azcueta in his capacity as the Executive Vice President and 3. The policy of the law is to guard the security and
Chief Operating Officer of the petitioner, as authorized by confidences of private life, even at the risk of an
petitioner’s Board of Trustees. The authority of Mr. Azcueta to occasional failure of justice, and to prevent
file the subject application was established by a Secretary’s domestic disunion and unhappiness; and
Certificate attached to the said application. The asseveration 4. Where there is want of domestic tranquility there is
that the subject case was not prosecuted by a duly danger of punishing one spouse through the hostile
authorized representative of the petitioner is thus testimony of the other.
unfounded.
But like all other general rules, the marital disqualification
rule has its own exceptions, both in civil actions between the
spouses and in criminal cases for offenses committed by one
against the other. Like the rule itself, the exceptions are
2) Alvarez vs Ramirez backed by sound reasons which, in the excepted cases,
outweigh those in support of the general rule.
KEYWORD:
For instance, where the marital and domestic relations are
Arson by hubby so strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved
nor peace and tranquility which may be disturbed, the
reason based upon such harmony and tranquility fails. In
DOCTRINE: such a case, identity of interests disappears and the
consequent danger of perjury based on that identity is non-
The martial disqualification rule is not absolute and admits of existent. Likewise, in such a situation, the security and
exceptions such as when the relationship of the husband and confidences of private life, which the law aims at protecting,
wife is already strained that the preservation of the marriage will be nothing but ideals, which through their absence,
the two is no longer an interest the State aims to protect. merely leave a void in the unhappy home.
FACTS: Obviously, the offense of arson attributed to petitioner,
Susan Ramirez, herein respondent, is the complaining witness directly impairs the conjugal relation between him and his
in Criminal Case No. 19933-MN for arson pending before the wife Esperanza. His act, as embodied in the Information for
Regional Trial Court, Branch 72, Malabon City. The accused is arson filed against him, eradicates all the major aspects of
Maximo Alvarez, herein petitioner. He is the husband of marital life such as trust, confidence, respect and love by
Esperanza G. Alvarez, sister of respondent. which virtues the conjugal relationship survives and
flourishes. |
The private prosecutor called Esperanza Alvarez to the witness
stand as the first witness against petitioner, her husband. It should be stressed that as shown by the records, prior to
Petitioner and his counsel raised no objection. the commission of the offense, the relationship between
petitioner and his wife was already strained. In fact, they

were separated de facto almost six months before the On November 16, 1973, the trial court granted the motion
incident. Indeed, the evidence and facts presented reveal that and declared that Laura Cervantes, Jose Cervantes as well as
the preservation of the marriage between petitioner and other witnesses similarly situated, are disqualified to testify
Esperanza is no longer an interest the State aims to protect. in the case.
At this point, it bears emphasis that the State, being interested

in laying the truth before the courts so that the guilty may be
punished and the innocent exonerated, must have the right to ISSUE:
offer the direct testimony of Esperanza, even against the Whether or not the witnesses Laura Cervantes and Jose
objection of the accused, because (as stated by this Court in Cervantes were correctly disqualified from testifying in the
Francisco), "it was the latter himself who gave rise to its case and their testimonies excluded on the basis of Section
necessity." 20(a), Rule 130, of the Rules of Court.
3) Guerrero vs St. Claire’s Realty and Co. RULING:

KEYWORD: Upon the facts and under the law, this Court is fully
St. Claire persuaded that the affirmative rulings of both the trial court
and the Court of Appeals were made in error.
The plain truth is that Laura Cervantes and Jose Cervantes are
DOCTRINE: not parties in the present case, and neither are they
assignors of the parties nor "persons in whose behalf a case
Dead man’s statute applies only if the defending party is sued is prosecuted." They are mere witnesses by whose
in his representative capacity. testimonies the plaintiffs aimed to establish that it was not
Cristina Guerrero, but Andres Guerrero, who owned the
disputed land at the time of its alleged sale to Manuel
FACTS: Guerrero; that Cristina Guerrero did not really sell but merely
mortgaged the property to Manuel Guerrero.
Petitioners’ original and amended complaints alleged that
during their lifetime the spouses Isidoro Guerrero and Panay "Following this rule of construction, it may be said that
Ramos were the absolute owners of the disputed property, incompetency to testify established in the provision above
which is a parcel of land located at San Dionisio, Parañaque, quoted, affects only the persons therein mentioned, and no
Rizal. During their lifetime the land were conveyed to Andres others, that is, only parties’ plaintiff or their assignors,
Guerrero, one of their sons and took possession over the persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted. Mere
property. Shortly after the beginning of the Japanese witnesses who are neither parties’ plaintiff, nor their
occupation, Andres Guerrero entrusted the land to his sister, assignors, nor persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted,
Cristina Guerrero, and allowed her to have the property are not included in the prohibition.”
cultivated and to retain the owner’s share in the harvests.
Moreover, the present case is not a claim or demand against
Subsequently, Andres died, and his surviving heir succeeded the estate of the deceased Manuel Guerrero. The
but, it was around this time that a relative named Manuel defendants Guerreros are not the executors or administrators
Guerrero came forward and told them the property they were or representatives of such deceased. They are being sued as
supposed to inherit from their father, Andres, was already claimants of ownership in their individual capacities of the
owned by Manuel Guerrero. disputed lot. The lot is not a part of the estate of Manuel
Guerrero. Hence, the inapplicability of the dead man’s rule.
It was discovered by the heirs of Andres that Manuel Guerrero
supposedly bought the property from their aunt Christina. So, "It has been held that statutes providing that a party in
the heirs of Andres went to court and filed an action to interest is incompetent to testify where the adverse party is
recover the property. dead or insane, must be applied strictly in accordance with
their express wording, irrespective of their spirit.
At this time, the property was already owned by St. Claire,
who bought it from the relatives of Manuel Guerrero, who in The law uses the word ‘against an executor or administrator
turn bought the property from Manuel Guerrero himself. or other representative of a deceased person.’ It should be
There were already series of transfers, from Manuel Guerrero noted that after the mention of an executor or administrator
to St. Claire. the words or other representative follows, which means that
the word ‘representative’ includes only those who, like the
During trial, they presented witnesses (Laura and Jose executor or administrator, are sued in their representative,
Cervantes) to prove that Manuel Guerrero did not acquire not personal, capacity.
ownership over the property, because, Christina who
purportedly executed a deed of sale in favor of Manuel
Guerrero, was not the real owner as the real owner was
Andres Guerrero. Also, they tried to prove that the actual
transaction entered into was not a sale but a mortgage to
guarantee the loan obligation of Christina
Defendants Guerreros filed a written motion to disqualify

Laura Cervantes as a witness on the basis of Section 20(a),
Rule 130, of the New Rules of Court.

4) Goni vs CA The trial court rendered a decision ordering therein

defendants-heirs to deliver to Gaspar Vicente field no 3, to
KEYWORD: execute a formal deed of sale covering fields nos. 3, 4 and 13
Sale of Hacienda; Recovery of Property and Damages in favor of Vicente. CA affirmed lower Court.
DOCTRINE: ISSUE:
The adverse party is competent to testify to transactions or 1. May Gaspar Vicente testify on matters of fact
communications with the deceased or incompetent person occurring before the death of Praxedes T. Villanueva,
which were made with an agent of such person in cases in which constitutes a claim or demand upon his estate,
which the agent is still alive and competent to testify. But the in violation of Rule 130, sec. 20 par. (a)?
testimony of the adverse party must be confined to those 2. May not a written promise to sell dated October 24
transactions or communications which were had with the 1949 be novated into a verbal agreement of lease
agent. during the lifetime of the promisor, whose death
occurred on November 12, 1951, by facts and
circumstances substantiated by competent oral
FACTS: evidence in this case?
The Compañia General de Tabacos de Filipinas [TABACALERA]
owned the three (3) haciendas known as San Sebastian, Sarria
and Dulce Nombre de Maria situated in the Municipality of RULING:
Bais, Negros Oriental. Sometime in 1949, the late Praxedes T. 1. YES. Gaspar Vicente is qualified to testify on matters of
Villanueva negotiated with TABACALERA for the purchase of fact occurring before the death of Praxedes Villanueva. Under
said haciendas. As he did not have sufficient funds to pay the ordinary circumstances, private respondent Vicente would be
price, Villanueva with the consent of TABACALERA, offered to disqualified by reason of interest from testifying as to any
sell Hacienda Sarria to one Santiago Villegas, who was later matter of fact occurring before the death of Praxedes T.
substituted by Joaquin Villegas. Private respondent Gaspar Villanueva, such disqualification being anchored on Section
Vicente stood as guarantor for Villegas in favor of 20(a) of Rule 130, commonly known as the Survivorship
TABACALERA. Villanueva further contracted or promised to Disqualification Rule or Dead Man Statute. The object and
sell to the latter (Vicente) fields nos. 3, 4 and 13 of Hacienda purpose of Rule 130, Sec. 20 par. (a) is to guard against the
Dulce Nombre de Maria for the sum of P13,807.00. temptation to give false testimony in regard to the
Vicente thereafter advised TABACALERA to debit from his transaction in question on the part of the surviving party and
account the amount of P13,807.00 as payment for the balance further to put the two parties to a suit upon terms of equality
of the purchase price. However, as only the amount of in regard to the opportunity of giving testimony. It is
P12,460.24 was actually needed to complete the purchase designed to close the lips of the party plaintiff when death
price, only the latter amount was debited from private has closed the lips of the party defendant, in order to remove
respondent’s account. The difference was supposedly paid by from the surviving party, the temptation to falsehood and the
private respondent Vicente to Villanueva, but as no receipt possibility of fictitious claims against the deceased.
evidencing such payment was presented. The case at bar, although instituted against the heirs of
Subsequent to the execution of the contract/promise to sell, Praxedes Villanueva after the estate of the latter had been
Villanueva was able to raise funds by selling a property in distributed to them, remains within the ambit of the
Ayungon, Negros Oriental. He thus went to private respondent protection. The reason is that the defendants-heirs are
Vicente for the purpose of rescinding the contract/promise to properly the "representatives" of the deceased, not only
sell. However, as the amount of P12,460.24 had already been because they succeeded to the decedent’s right by descent
debited from private respondent's account, it was agreed that or operation of law, but more importantly because they are
lots 4 and 13 of the Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria would so placed in litigation that they are called on to defend which
merely be leased to private respondent Vicente for a period of they have obtained from the deceased and make the defense
five (5) years. which the deceased might have made if living, or to establish
a claim which deceased might have been interested to
On December 10, 1949, TABACALERA executed a formal deed establish, if living.
of sale covering the three haciendas in favor of Villanueva.
Fields Nos. 3, 4 and 13 of the Hacienda Dulce Nombre de HOWEVER, the protection under the Rules, was effectively
Maria were thereafter registered in the name of Villanueva. waived when counsel for petitioners cross-examined private
Meanwhile, Fields nos. 4 and 13 were delivered to private respondent Vicente. "A waiver occurs when plaintiff’s
respondent Vicente. deposition is taken by the representatives of the estate or
when counsel for the representative cross-examined the
On November 12, 1951, Villanueva died. Intestate proceedings plaintiff as to matters occurring during deceased’s lifetime." It
were instituted, among the properties included in the must further be observed that petitioners presented a
inventory submitted to the court were fields nos. 3, 4 and 13 counterclaim against private respondent Vicente. When
of Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria. Vicente thus took the witness stand, it was in a dual capacity
as plaintiff in the action for recovery of property and as
Private respondent Vicente instituted an action for recovery of defendant in the counterclaim for accounting and surrender
property and damages. He sought to recover field no. 3 of the of fields nos. 13 and 14. Evidently, as defendant in the
Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria, basing his entitlement counterclaim, he was not disqualified from testifying as to
thereto on the contract/promise to sell executed by the late matters of fact occurring before the death of Praxedes
Praxedes Villanueva in his favor on October 24, 1949. Villanueva, said action not having been brought against, but
by the estate of representatives of the estate/deceased asked for titles to certain properties in the name of the
person. conjugal partnership. Corresponding decrees for these lots
were issued in the name of the conjugal partnership.
Under the great majority of statutes, the adverse party is
competent to testify to transactions or communications with After the death of Marcelino, the Judge of First Instance in a
the deceased or incompetent person which were made with cadastral case rendered a decision annulling decrees Nos.
an agent of such person in cases in which the agent is still alive 191390, 191504, and 190925, as well as the original
and competent to testify. But the testimony of the adverse certificates of title Nos. 3247, 3298, and 3297 and ordering
party must be confined to those transactions or that in lieu thereof new decrees and certificates of title be
communications which were had with the agent. The issued as the exclusive property of Anastacia. A motion for
inequality or injustice sought to be avoided by Section 20 (a) new trial by counsel for the losing party was denied.
of Rule 130, where one of the parties no longer has the
opportunity to either confirm or rebut the testimony of the In an action for recovery of specified property filed by the
other because death has permanently sealed the former’s lips, administratrix of the estate against Anastacia on July 19,
does not actually exist in the case at bar, for the reason that 1926, a judgment was rendered by Judge Rovira couched in
petitioner Goni could and did not negate the binding effect of the following language: "Therefore, the court renders
the contract/promise to sell. Thus, while admitting the judgment absolving the defendant from the complaint in this
existence of the said contract/promise to sell, petitioner Goni case, and only declares that one-half of the value of the
testified that the same was subsequently novated into a verbal shares in the Sociedad Cooperativa de Credito Rural de Orani,
contract of lease over fields nos. 4 and 13 of the Hacienda to the amount of ten pesos (P10), belong to the intestate
Dulce Nombre de Maria. estate of Marcelino Tongco, which one-half interest must
appear in the inventory of the property of the estate of the
2. YES. The contract was validly novated. Novation takes place deceased Marcelino Tongco." The motion for new trial was
when the object or principal condition of an obligation is denied.
changed or altered. In order, however, that an obligation may
be extinguished by another which substitutes the same, it is From both of the judgment, the administratrix of the estate
imperative that it be so declared in unequivocal terms, or that of Marcelino Tongco has appealed. As pursuant to the
the old and the new obligations be on every point agreement of the parties the two cases were tried together.
incompatible with each other.
The novation of the written contract/promise to sell into a ISSUE:

verbal agreement of lease was clearly and convincingly proven
not only by the testimony of petitioner Goñi, but likewise by Whether the property in dispute should be assigned to the
the acts and conduct of the parties subsequent to the estate of Marcelino Tongco, or whether it should be set aside
execution of the contract/promise to sell. Thus, after the as belonging exclusively to the widow.
milling season of crop year 1949-50, only fields nos. 4 and 13
were delivered to private respondent Vicente. Fields nos. 3, 4 (This was not state in the case but to answer Atty Torreg’s
and 13 were subsequently registered in Villanueva's name. question, “so tell me, why should we be interested in this
Villanueva likewise executed a deed of sale covering Hacienda case?” the evidence related issue I think is: WON the widow’s
Sarria in favor of Joaquin Villegas. All these were known to testimony should be disqualified pursuant dead man’s
private respondent Vicente, yet he did not take any steps statute)
toward asserting and/or protecting his claim over fields nos. 3,
4 and 13 either by demanding during the lifetime of
Villanueva that the latter execute a similar document in his RULING:
favor, or causing notice of his adverse claim to be annotated
SC ruled in favor of Vianzon and affirmed the judgment of the
on the certificate of title of said lots.
trial court.
It is true that by reason of the provisions of article 1407 of

5) Tongco vs Vianzon the Civil Code the presumption is that all the property of the
spouses is partnership property in the absence of proof that
KEYWORD: it belongs exclusively to the husband or to the wife. But even
“Widow asked for annulment of decrees of lots issued in the proceeding on this assumption, we still think that the widow
name of the conjugal partnership after husband’s death” has proved in a decisive and conclusive manner that the
property in question belonged exclusively to her, that is, it
would, unless we are forced to disregard her testimony.
DOCTRINE: The administratrix of the estate attack the ruling of the trial
judge to the effect that the widow was competent to testify.
Dead Man’s Statute; the suit must involve a claim against the Counsel relies on that portion of section 383 of the Code of
estate of the deceased; the law was designed to aid in arriving Civil Procedure as provides that "Parties or assignors of
at the truth and was not designed to suppress the truth. parties to an action or proceeding, or persons in whose
behalf an action or proceeding is prosecuted, against an
executor or administrator or other representative of a
FACTS: deceased person, . . ., upon a claim or demand against the
estate of such deceased person . . ., cannot testify as to any
Marcelino Tongco and Anastacia Vianzon contracted marriage matter of fact occurring before the death of such deceased
on July 5, 1984. Marcelino died on July 8, 1925, leaving person . . ." Counsel is eminently correct in emphasizing that
Anastacia as his widow. Shortly before the death of Marcelino, the object and purpose of this statute is to guard against the
he had presented claims in a cadastral case in which he had temptation to give false testimony in regard to the
transaction in question on the part of the surviving party. He president-treasurer of the claimant corporation. Respondent
has, however, neglected the equally important rule that the also argues that the Exhibit 1 is not self-serving
law was designed to aid in arriving at the truth and was not
designed to suppress the truth. The law twice makes use of
the word "against." The actions were not brought "against" ISSUES:
the administratrix of the estate, nor were they brought upon
claims "against" the estate. 1. Whether the vice-president-treasurer and president of
the corporation which are a party to an action against
In the first case at bar, the action is one by the administratrix the executor or administrator are disqualified from
to enforce a demand "by" the estate. In the second case at testifying under the Rule 123, section 26 (c) of the rules
bar, the same analogy holds true for the claim was presented of court?
in cadastral proceedings where in one sense there is no
plaintiff and there is no defendant. Moreover, a waiver was 2. Whether the Exhibit 1 is be admitted as evidence?
accomplished when the adverse party undertook to cross-
examination the interested person with respect to the
prohibited matter. HELD:
1. NO. We are constrained to hold that the officers and/or

6) Lichauco vs Atlantic Gulf stockholders of a corporation are not disqualified from
testifying, for or against the corporation which is a party
KEYWORD: to an action upon a claim or demand against the estate
of a deceased person, as to any matter of fact occurring
Pacific war, settlement of estate, claim against the estate, self- before the death of such deceased person.
serving statement
2. YES. A self-serving declaration is a statement favorable to
the interest of the defendant. It is inadmissible. The vital
DOCTRINE: objection to the admission of this kind of evidence is its
hearsay character. On the other hand, a declaration
A self-serving declaration is a statement favorable to the against interest of the person making it is admissible in
interest of the defendant. It is inadmissible. evidence notwithstanding its hearsay character, if the
declaration is relevant and the declarant has died,
A declaration against interest of the person making it is become insane, or for some other reason is not available
admissible in evidence notwithstanding its hearsay character, as a witness. “The true test in reference to the reliability
if the declaration is relevant and the declarant has died, of the declaration is not whether it was made ante litem
become insane, or for some other reason is not available as a motam, as is the case with reference to some classes of
witness. hearsay evidence, but whether the declaration was
uttered under circumstances justifying the conclusion
that there was no probable motive to falsify.
FACTS:
In this case, there was no probable motive on the part of
Fitzsimmons was a president of a corporation. He held 1000 Fitzsimmons to falsify his inventory Exhibit 1 by not
shares of stock in a corporation, 545 shares of which were not including therein the claim of the corporation to be
fully paid which was evidenced by a promissory note in favor deducted from the assets of the conjugal partnership. On
of the corporation. Soon after the Japanese invasion, the other hand, if Mr. Fitzsimmons, who was the
Fitzsimmons died in an internment camp in Santo Tomas. A president and one of the largest stockholders of the
special proceeding was for the settlement of the estate was claimant corporation, really owed the latter around
instituted. The corporation of Fitzsimmons filed a claim of P63,000, and had not paid it before he liquidated his
63,000 pesos of which Fitzsimmons owed to the corporation. conjugal partnership as a consequence of the decree of
The claim was evidenced by the testimony of the chief divorce he obtained against his wife, we see no reason
accountant and assistant accountant of the corporation. Aside why he did not include such obligation in said
from the accountant, it also presented the vice-president- liquidation.
treasurer and the president but was objected to by the
administrator of the estate for being violative of the Rule 123. Judging from the high opinion which the officers and
stockholders of the corporation entertained of
The administrator of Fitzsimmons denied the claim and Fitzsimmons as shown by their resolution hereinafter
presented the Exhibit 1 which was an inventory made by Atty. quoted, they cannot impute bad faith to him in not
Linchauco in the settlement of the conjugal partnership acknowledging the claim in question. We find, therefore,
brought about by the divorce of Fitzsimmons and his wife. In that Exhibit 1, insofar as the omission therefrom of the
the inventory there was no mention of any liabilities claims in question was concerned, far from being self-
pertaining to the corporation. serving to, was a declaration against the interest of, the
defendant Fitzsimmons. He having died and therefore
Complainant Contention: The testimony of the vice-president cannot be made as a witness, said document was
and president are not violative of the Rule 123. Plaintiff also correctly admitted by the trial court in evidence.
argues that the Exhibit 1 is self-serving.
Respondent Contention: That the vice-president and treasurer

of the corporation were incompetent under Section 26 (c) of
the Rule 123, they being not only large stockholders and
members of the board of directors but they are also vice-

7) Razon vs IAC Appeals, the Supreme Court held that, to be effective, the
transfer of shares of stock must follow the mode and
KEYWORD: manner prescribed by law. Razon must show that the
Dead Man’s Statute rule does NOT apply in a case filed by the transfer satisfied all the requirements under the
administrator. corporation's by-laws. Since he failed to present any by-
laws, the provisions of the Corporation Code apply.
Under the Corporation Code, a stock certificate must be

DOCTRINE: properly indorsed. The title to such certificate of stock is
vested in the transferee by the delivery of the duly
Failure to object timely to oral testimony on the basis of DMS indorsed certificate of stock. Since the stock certificate
rule is a WAIVER. was no indorsed, the inevitable conclusion is that the
Mere oral testimony is NOT enough to prove valid transfer of shares of stock belong to Chuidian. Furthermore,
shares of stocks. preponderance of evidence shows that the stocks were
given to Chuidian for value, since he was the legal counsel
who handled the legal affairs of the corporation.
FACTS: The decision of the IAC is AFFIRMED. All cash and stock
dividends as, well as all pre-emptive rights that have
In 1962, Enrique Razon organized the E. Razon, Inc. for the
accrued and attached to the 1,500 shares in E. Razon, Inc.,
purpose of bidding for the arrastre services in South Harbor,
since 1966 are declared to belong to the estate of Juan T.
Manila. On April 23, 1966, stock certificate No. 003 for 1,500
Chuidian.
shares of stock was issued in the name of Juan T. Chuidian.
This was registered under his name in the books of the
corporation. No one questioned his ownership of the stocks.
He was even elected as a director. When he died intestate, his 8) Mendezona vs Viuda de Goitia
estate was administered by his son Vicente. Razon refused to DOCTRINE:
deliver the stock certificate to Vicente, prompting the latter to
file this case. Dead Man's Statute does not apply if what is being testified
against the executor is a denial of something that happen
Alleging that Chuidian is a mere nominal investor, Razon before the deceased passed away.
asserts that he himself paid for the stocks, making him the
true owner thereof. He claims that he and the late Chuidian
had an understanding that Razon would possess the stock
certificate until and if Chuidian will pay for the same. The CFI FACTS:
(now RTC) of Manila ruled in favor of Razon. However, this was Defendant Encarnacion C. Vda, de Goitia has been duly
reversed by the IAC (now CA), which applied the Dead Man’s appointed judicial administratrix of the estate of her
Statute rule under Section 20(a) Rule 130 of the Rules of deceased husband Benigno Goitia in special proceeding No.
Court. Razon argues that the rule does not apply because 30273 of this court.
Vicente did not object to his oral testimony regarding the oral
agreement between him and Chuidian. Benigno Goitia was the representative and attorney-in-fact of
the plaintiffs in the joint-account partnership known as the
"Tren de Aguadas" and located in the City of Manila, of which
ISSUE: the plaintiff Leonor Mendezona, widow of Juan Bautista
Goitia, owns 180 shares worth P18,000, and the plaintiff
1. W/N the Dead Man’s Statute rule applies in this case. Valentina Izaguirre y Nazabal owns 72 shares worth P7,200.
Prior to 1915, Benigno Goitia, at that time the manager of
2. W/N Razon’s oral testimony is enough to prove that he the aforesaid co-partnership, collected the dividends for the
owns the stocks plaintiffs, which he remitted to them every year.
RULING: Prior to 1915, the usual dividends which Benigno Goitia
1. NO, the Dead Man’s Statute rule does not apply. Razon’s forwarded to plaintiff Leonor Mendezona each year were
testimony is admissible. P540, and to plaintiff Valentina Izaguirre y Nazabal, P216,
that from 1915 until his death in August, 1926, Benigno
The DMS rule applies only to a case filed AGAINST the Goitia failed to remit to the dividends upon their shares in
administrator of an estate upon a claim against the estate. the "Tren de Aguadas".
This case was not filed against the administrator of the
estate, nor was it filed upon claims against the estate. That sometime before his death, more particularly, in July,
Rather, it is the administrator Vicente who is filing this 1926, Benigno Goitia, who was no longer the manager of the
case. Furthermore, he did not object to the oral testimony. said business, receive as attorney-in-fact of both plaintiff, the
A failure to make a timely objection is deemed to be a amount of P90 as dividend upon plaintiff Leonor
waiver the rule. Mendezona's shares, and P36 upon Valentina Izaguirre y
Nazabal's stock, that from 1915 to 1926, the "Tren de
2. NO, mere oral testimony is insufficient to prove ownership Aguadas" paid dividends to the share-holders, one of them,
over stocks. Ramon Salinas, having received the total amount of P1,155 as
ordinary and special dividends upon his 15 shares that
Several evidences show that Chuidian was considered a
calculating the dividends due from 1915 to 1926 upon
valid stockholder of the corporation: the stocks were
Leonor Mendezona's 180 shares at P540 per annum, and at
registered under his name in the books, he was elected as
P216 yearly upon the 72 shares held by Valentina Izaguirre y
a director. In the case of Embassy Farms, Inc. v. Court of
Nazabal.
Counsel for both plaintiffs filed their claims with the liquidation had not really been received, and that therefore
committee of claims and appraisal of the estate of Benigno instead of P312.37, Mexican currency, that liquidation should
Goitia, and, upon their disallowance, appealed from the have shown a balance of P1,062.37 in favor of Maxilom. It is
committee's decision by means of the complaints in these two evident that in view of the prohibition of section 383,
cases. paragraph 7, of the Code of Civil Procedure, Maxilom could
not testify in his own behalf against Tabotabo's estate, so as
One of the assignment of errors raised by defendant relates to to alter the balance of the liquidation made by and between
Exhibits A and B, being the appellees' depositions made before himself and the decedent. But in the case before us there has
the American consul at Bilbao, Spain, in accordance with been no such liquidation between the plaintiffs and the
section 356 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Counsel for the deceased Goitia. They testify, denying any such liquidation.
appellant was notified of the taking of these depositions, and To apply to them the rule that "if death has sealed the lips of
he did not suggest any other interrogatory in addition to the one of the parties, the law seals those of the other," would
questions of the committee. When these depositions were be to exclude all possibility of a claim against the
read in court, the defendant objected to their admission, testamentary estate. We do not believe that this was the
invoking section 383, No. 7, of the Code of Civil Procedure. Her legislator's intention.
objection referred mainly to the following questions:
The plaintiffs-appellees did not testify to a fact which took
1. Did Mr. Benigno Goitia render you an account of your place before their representative's death, but on the contrary
partnership in the "Tren de Aguadas?" — Yes, until the year denied that it had taken place at all, i.e. they denied that a
1914. liquidation had been made or any money remitted on
account of their shares in the "Tren de Aguadas" which is the
2. From the year 1915, did Mr. Benigno Goitia send you any ground of their claim. It was incumbent upon the appellant
report or money on account of profits upon your shares? — to prove by proper evidence that the affirmative proposition
He sent me nothing, nor did he answer, my letters. was true, either by bringing into court the books which the
attorney-in-fact was in duty bound to keep, or by introducing
3. did you ever ask him to send you a statement of your copies of the drafts kept by the banks which drew them, as
account — Yes, several times by letter, but I never received an was the decedents's usual practice according to Exhibit I, or
answer. by other similar evidence.
The first of these questions tends to show the relationship The appellant admits having found a book of accounts kept
between the principals and their attorney-in-fact Benigno by the decedent showing an item of P90 for the account of
Goitia up to 1914. Supposing it was error to permit such a Leonor Mendezona and another of P36 for the account of
question, it would not be reversible error, for that very Valentina Izaguirre, which agrees with the statement of
relationship is proved by Exhibits C to F, and H to I. As to the Ruperto Santos, who succeeded Benigno Goitia in the
other two questions, it is to be noted that the deponents deny administration of said partnership, to the effect that the
having received from the deceased Benigno Goitia any money deceased attorney-in-fact had collected the amounts due the
on account of profits on their shares, since 1915. plaintiffs as dividends on their shares for the months of May
and June, 1926, or P90 for Leonor Mendezona, and P36 for
Valentina Izaguirre, amounts which had not been remitted by
ISSUE: the deceased to the plaintiffs.
WON the deposition violates Dead Man's Statute
9) Garcia vs Dominga Robles

RULING: KEYWORD: Leasehold Agreement which excluded 2 heirs.
No.
We are of opinion that the claimants' denial that a certain fact DOCTRINE: The Dead Man’s Statute provides that "if one
occurred before the death of their attorney-in-fact Benigno party to the alleged transaction is precluded from testifying
Agoitia does not come within the legal prohibitions (section by death, insanity, or other mental disabilities, the other
383, No. 7, Code of Civil Procedure). The law prohibits a party is not entitled to the undue advantage of giving his own
witness directly interested in a claim against the estate of a uncontradicted and unexplained account of the transaction."
decedent from testifying upon a matter of fact which took
place before the death of the deceased. The underlying
principle of this prohibition is to protect the intestate estate FACTS: Makapugay is the owner of a 2.5-hectare farm being
from fictitious claims. But this protection should not be tilled by Eugenio as agricultural lessee under a leasehold
treated as an absolute bar or prohibition from the filing of just agreement. Makapugay passed away and was succeeded by
claims against the decedent's estate her nephews and niece, namely Amanda, Justo and Augusto.
The facts in the case of Maxilom vs. Tabotabo (9 Phil., 390), On the other hand, Eugenio’s children – Garcia, Salamat and
differ from those in the case at bar. In that case, the plaintiff Pedro – succeeded him.
Maxilom liquidated his accounts with the deceased Tabotabo Before she passed away, Makapugay appointed Amanda as
during his lifetime, with the result that there was a balance in her attorney-in-fact. After Eugenio died, Amanda and Pedro
his favor and against Tabotabo of P312.37, Mexican currency. entered into a leasehold agreement, “Kasunduan sa
The liquidation was signed by both Maxilom and Tabotabo. In Buwisan”, which installed and recognized Pedro as the lone
spite of this, some years later, or in 1906, Maxilom filed a agricultural lessee and cultivator of the land.
claim against the estate of Tabotabo for P1,062.37, Mexican
currency, alleging that P750 which included the 1899
Pedro passed away in 1984, and his wife, Dominga, took over ISSUE: WON Amanda’s Affidavit stating that “(the late) Pedro
as agricultural lessee. assured her (Amanda) that he would not deprive Garcia and
Salamat of their "cultivatory rights” is admissible.
Learning that the “Kasunduan sa Buwisan” excluded Pedro’s
heirs - Amanda, Justo and Augusto, and Pedro’s sisters Garcia
and Salamat, entered into a "Kasunduan sa Buwisan ng Lupa"
whereby Garcia and Salamat were acknowledged as co-lessees RULING:
of Pedro. No. Violation of the Dead Man’s Statute.
Thereafter, petitioners Garcia and Salamat filed a Complaint Amanda’s declaration in her Affidavit covering Pedro’s alleged
for nullification of the first leasehold agreement. admission and recognition of the alternate farming scheme is
Garcia and Salamat claimed that: inadmissible for being a violation of the Dead Man’s Statute,
which provides that "if one party to the alleged transaction is
1) they entered into an agreement with their brother precluded from testifying by death, insanity, or other mental
Pedro to farm the land on a "per-season basis"; disabilities, the other party is not entitled to the undue
advantage of giving his own uncontradicted and unexplained
2) that Pedro reneged on this agreement and cultivated account of the transaction." Thus, since Pedro is deceased,
the land all by himself; and Amanda’s declaration which pertains to the leasehold
3) that as a result, Amanda was deceived into installing agreement affects the 1996 "Kasunduan sa Buwisan ng Lupa"
him as sole agricultural lessee; which she as assignor entered into with petitioners, and
which is now the subject matter of the present case and
4) that when Amanda learned of Pedro’s claim against Pedro’s surviving spouse and lawful successor-
misrepresentations, she executed an Affidavit stating in-interest Dominga, such declaration cannot be admitted
among others that Pedro assured her that he would and used against the latter, who is placed in an unfair
not deprive Garcia and Salamat of their "cultivatory situation by reason of her being unable to contradict or
rights"; and disprove such declaration as a result of her husband-
declarant Pedro’s prior death.
5) that in order to correct matters, Amanda, Justo and
Augusto executed in their favor the "Kasunduan sa If petitioners earnestly believed that they had a right, under
Buwisan ng Lupa", recognizing them as Pedro’s co- their supposed mutual agreement with Pedro, to cultivate
lessees. the land under an alternate farming scheme, then they
should have confronted Pedro or sought an audience with
In her Answer, herein respondent Dominga claimed that: Amanda to discuss the possibility of their institution as co-
1) that Amanda’s July 10, 1996 Affidavit and lessees of the land; and they should have done so soon after
"Kasunduan sa Buwisan ng Lupa" of even date the passing away of their father Eugenio. However, it was
between her and the petitioners are self-serving and only in 1996, or 17 years after Pedro was installed as tenant
violate the existing 1979 Agricultural Leasehold in 1979 and long after his death in 1984, that they came
Contract; forward to question Pedro’s succession to the leasehold. As
correctly held by the PARAD, petitioners slept on their rights,
2) Dominga further claimed that Pedro has been in and are thus precluded from questioning Pedro’s 1979
possession of the land even while Eugenio lived; agricultural leasehold contract.
3) that petitioners have never cultivated nor possessed Amanda, on the other hand, cannot claim that Pedro
the land even for a single cropping; that Pedro has deceived her into believing that he is the sole successor to
been the one paying the lease rentals as evidenced the leasehold. Part of her duties as the landowner’s
by receipts; representative or administrator was to know the personal
circumstances of the lessee Eugenio; more especially so,
4) that when Pedro died in 1984, she succeeded in his
when Eugenio died. She was duty-bound to make an inquiry
rights as lessee by operation of law, and that she had
as to who survived Eugenio, in order that the landowner – or
been remitting lease rentals to the landowners since
she as representative – could choose from among them who
1985; and
would succeed to the leasehold. Under Section 9 of RA 3844,
5) that petitioners had no right to institute themselves Makapugay, or Amanda – as Makapugay’s duly appointed
as her co-lessees. representative or administrator – was required to make a
choice, within one month from Eugenio’s death, who would
Ruling of the PARAD succeed as agricultural lessee.
The PARAD held that Amanda’s act of executing the July 10, There is no other logical conclusion than that the "Kasunduan
1996 Affidavit and "Kasunduan sa Buwisan ng Lupa" amounted sa Buwisan ng Lupa" between Amanda and petitioners,
to dispossession of Pedro’s landholding and rights without which is grounded on Pedro’s inadmissible verbal admission,
cause and which agreement was entered into without obtaining
Dominga’s consent, constitutes an undue infringement of
Ruling of the DARAB
Dominga’s rights as Pedro’s successor-in-interest under
Amanda’s Affidavit and the 1996 "Kasunduan sa Buwisan ng Section 9, and operates to deprive her of such rights and
Lupa" between the landowners and petitioners cannot defeat dispossess her of the leasehold against her will. Under
Pedro’s 1979 Agricultural Leasehold Contract and his rights as Section 732 of RA 3844, Dominga is entitled to security of
the sole tenant over the land; that for sleeping on their rights, tenure; and under Section 16, any modification of the lease
petitioners are now barred by laches from claiming that they agreement must be done with the consent of both parties
are co-lessees and without prejudicing Dominga's security of tenure.

10) People v. Carlos obtain, analogous to that already indicated for a client's
communications (ante, par. 2325, 2326); i. e., if they
PRINCIPLE: If documents were obtained from the addressee were obtained from the addressee by voluntary delivery,
by voluntary delivery, they are privileged; but if they were they should still be privileged (for otherwise the
obtained surreptitiously or otherwise without the consent, privilege could by collusion be practically nullified for
the privilege should cease. written communications); but if they were obtained
surreptitiously or otherwise without the addressee's
consent, the privilege should cease.”
FACTS:
However, if the letter was obtained through a search with no
Dr. Pablo Sityar was a victom of an alleged murder. He warrant, the documents are considered as obtained through
performed surgery on defendant Carlos’ wife for appendicitis. illegal search and thus inadmissible as evidence in a criminal
Thereafter, the wife was required to go to the Doctor’s clinic case. The letter must be excluded for reasons not discussed
several times to dress the wounds. Carlos had always in the briefs. The letter was written by the wife of the
accompanied his wife. On one visit, Dr. Sityar asked Carlos to defendant and if she had testified at the trial the letter might
do an errand and buy medicine. While he was away, the have been admissible to impeach her testimony, but she was
not put on the witness-stand and the letter was therefore
Doctor outraged his wife. Nevertheless, Carlos went a week
not offered for that purpose. If the defendant either by
after to his clinic to consult his lung problem. Several months
answer or otherwise had indicated his assent to the
after, he was admitted to PGH where he remained under the statements contained in the letter it might also have been
care of two other Physicians. While he was there, Dr. Sityar admissible, but such is not the case; the fact that he had the
billed him for professional services he had rendered for his letter in his possession is no indication of acquiescence or
wife. A few days later, Carlos went to the clinic of Dr. Sityar, assent on his part.
found him there alone, and without any preliminary quarrel,
attacked the Doctor and stabbed him twice. The letter is nothing but pure hearsay and its admission in
evidence violates the constitutional right of the defendant in
Carlos surrendered himself to police, admits he killed the a criminal case to be confronted with the witnesses for the
deceased but argues that it was in self-defense. He says that prosecution and have the opportunity to cross-examine
he went over the clinic to protest the charges of the doctor them.
and asked for an extension. He was allegedly insulted by the
doctor, and a quarrel ensued. The deceased took a pocket The question is radically different from that of the
knife from his desk, attached Carlos, but Carlos was able to admissibility of testimony of a third party as to a
take away the knife from him, and stabbed him. conversation between a husband and wife overheard by the
witness. Testimony of that character is admissible on the
The defendant's testimony as to the struggle described is in ground that it relates to a conversation in which both
conflict with the evidence presented by the prosecution. But spouses took part and on the further ground that where the
assuming that it is true, it is very evident that it fails to defendant has the opportunity to answer a statement made
establish a case of self-defense and that, in reality, the only to him by his spouse and fails to do so, his silence implies
question here to be determined is whether the defendant is assent. That cannot apply where the statement is contained
guilty of murder or of simple homicide. in an unanswered letter.
The court found that there was premeditation that Defendant is only guilty of homicide and not murder.
constituted murder. A letter written to Carlos made by the
wife was presented where the wife feared that Carlos would
result to physical violence with the Doctor. Carlos argued that 11) Uy Chico v. Union Life
such letter was a privileged communication and not KEYWORD: Attorney compromised
admissible as evidence.
ISSUE: Whether or not the letter was admissible as evidence FACTS:
The father of the plaintiff Uy Chico died in 1897, at which

time he was conducting a business under his own name, Uy
RULING: Layco. The plaintiff and his brother took over the business
The Supreme Court ruled that it was not. and continued it under the same name, "Uy Layco." The
plaintiff purchased his brother's interest in the business and
The letter was a privileged communication and not continued to carry on the business under the father's name.
admissible. Where a privileged communication from one A fire engulfed the business premises. At the time of the fire
spouse to another comes into the hands of a third party, "Uy Layco" was heavily indebted and subsequent to the fire,
whether legally or not, without collusion and voluntary the creditors of the estate of the plaintiff's father.
disclosure on the part of either of the spouses, the privilege is
extinguished and the communication, if otherwise competent, During the course of these proceedings, the plaintiff's
becomes admissible. attorney surrendered the policies of insurance to the
administrator of the estate, who compromised with the
Professor Wigmore states the rule as follows: insurance company for one-half their face value, or P6,000.
This money was paid into court and is now being held by the
For documents of communication coming into sheriff. The plaintiff now brings this action, maintaining that
the possession of a third person, a distinction should the policies and goods insured belonged to him and not to

the estate of his deceased father and alleges that he is not only link that would form the chain of testimony necessary to
bound by the compromise effected by the administrator of his convict an individual and as such, refuse to give the client’s
father's estate. identity in invoking the privilege.
Defendant showed that plaintiff had agreed to the FACTS:

compromise and his had surrendered the policy to the A complaint was filed by PCGG before the Sandiganbayan for
administrator. To prove this, the defendant introduced the recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth, among the
evidence showing that the plaintiff's attorney had surrendered defendants named in the case are herein petitioners
the policies to the administrator with the understanding that Teodoro Regala, Edgardo J. Angara, Avelino V. Cruz, Jose C.
such a compromise was to be effected. Concepcion, Rogelio A. Vinluan, Victor P. Lazatin, Eduardo U.
The plaintiff was asked, while on the witness stand, if he had Escueta and Paraja G. Hayudini, and herein private
any objection to his attorney's testifying concerning the respondent Raul S. Roco, who all were then partners of the
surrender of the policies, to which he replied in the negative. law firm Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz Law
The attorney was then called for that purpose. Whereupon, Offices (hereinafter referred to as the ACCRA Law Firm).
counsel for the plaintiff formally withdrew the waiver
previously given by the plaintiff and objected to the testimony As members of the ACCRA Law Firm, petitioners and private
of the attorney on the ground that it was privileged. respondent Raul Roco admit that they assisted in the
organization and acquisition of the companies included in
Civil Case No. 0033**, and in keeping with the office
practice, ACCRA lawyers acted as nominees-stockholders of
ISSUE: Was the testimony privileged? the said corporations involved in sequestration proceedings.
Respondent PCGG then filed a "Motion to Admit Third
Amended Complaint" and "Third Amended Complaint" which
RULING: The communication was not privileged. excluded respondent Raul S. Roco from the complaint in
PCGG Case No. 33 as party-defendant, he in turn undertaking
The evidence in question concerned the dealings of the
that he will reveal the identity of the principal/s for whom he
plaintiff's attorney with a third person. The very essence of the
acted as nominee/stockholder in the companies involved in
veil of secrecy which surrounds communications made
PCGG Case No. 33.
between attorney and client is that such communications are
not intended for the information of third persons or to be
Petitioners ACCRA lawyers subsequently filed their
acted upon by them, put of the purpose of advising the client
"COMMENT AND/OR OPPOSITION" with Counter-Motion
as to his rights.
that respondent PCGG similarly grant the same treatment to
It is evident that a communication made by a client to his them (exclusion as parties-defendants) as accorded private
attorney for the express purpose of its being communicated to respondent Roco.
a third person is essentially inconsistent with the confidential
relation. When the attorney has faithfully carried out his In its "Comment," respondent PCGG set the following
instructions be delivering the communication to the third conditions precedent for the exclusion of petitioners,
person for whom it was intended and the latter acts upon it, it namely: (a) the disclosure of the identity of its clients; (b)
cannot, by any reasoning whatever, be classified in a legal submission of documents substantiating the lawyer-client
sense as a privileged communication between the attorney relationship; and (c) the submission of the deeds of
and his client. It is plain that such a communication, after assignments petitioners executed in favor of its clients
reaching the party for whom it was intended at least, is a covering their respective shareholdings.
communication between the client and a third person, and
that the attorney simply occupies the role of intermediary or Sandiganbayan promulgated the Resolution, herein
agent. questioned, denying the exclusion of petitioners in PCGG
Case No. 33, for their refusal to comply with the conditions
The testimony was to the effect that when the attorney required by respondent PCGG
delivered the policies to the administrator, he understood that
there was a compromise to be effected, and that when he ISSUE:
informed the plaintiff of the surrender of the policies for that W/N the revelation of the client’s identity is within the ambit
purpose the plaintiff made no objection whatever. The of the attorney-client privilege
evidence is sufficient to show that the plaintiff acquiesced in
the compromise settlement of the policies. Having agreed to HELD:
the compromise, he cannot now disavow it and maintain an Under the circumstances of this case, yes.
action for the recovery of their face value.
The general rule in our jurisdiction as well as in the United
States is that a lawyer may not invoke the privilege and
12) Regala v Sandiganbayan refuse to divulge the name or identity of his client. The
KEYWORD: Who’s your client? reasons advanced for the general rule are well established.
PRINCIPLE: First, the court has a right to know that the client whose
As a general rule, a lawyer may not invoke the attorney-client privileged information is sought to be protected is flesh and
privilege and refuse to identify the identity of his client. blood; Second, the privilege begins to exist only after the
However, such rule is qualified if revealing the client’s identity attorney-client relationship has been established, privilege
would implicate the client in the very activity for which he does not attach until there is a client; Third, the privilege
sought legal advice for, if disclosure would open client to civil generally pertains to the subject matter of the relationship.
liability or if revealing the client’s name would establish the

Finally, due process considerations require that the opposing in accumulating ill-gotten wealth through government
party should, as a general rule, know his adversary. concessions, etc., which acts constitute gross abuse of official
position and authority, 􏰾flagrant breach of public trust.
The general rule is however qualified by some important
exceptions.
1. Client identity is privileged where a strong probability
exists that revealing the client's name would implicate 13) Barton v Leyte Asphalt
that client in the very activity for which he sought the PRINCIPLE:
lawyer's advice.
2. Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability, The privilege which protects communications between
his identity is privileged attorney and client does not extend to a copy of a letter
3. Where the government's lawyers have no case against an written by the client to his attorney which comes to the
attorney's client unless, by revealing the client's name, hands of the adverse party. Where the authenticity of such a
the said name would furnish the only link that would document is admitted, the court will take no notice of the
form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an manner in which it was obtained.
individual of a crime, the client's name is privileged.
Summarizing these exceptions, information relating to the FACTS:

identity of a client may fall within the ambit of the privilege James Barton, a US citizen residing in Manila sough to
when the client's name itself has an independent recover $318,563.30 in damages for breach of contract from
significance, such that disclosure would then reveal client Leyte Asphalt, a Philippine company with principal office in
confidences. Cebu. Leyte Asphalt is the owner of Lucio mine in Leyte, a
valuable deposit of bituminous limestone and other asphalt
The circumstances in this case would reveal that the instant products.
case falls under at least 2 exceptions to the general rule. First,
disclosure of the alleged client's name would lead to establish William Anderson, president and general manager of Leyte
said client's connection with the very fact in issue of the case, Asphalt, wrote a letter to Barton authorizing him to sell the
which is privileged information, because the privilege, as products in the Commonwealth of Australia and New
stated earlier, protects the subject matter or the substance. Zealand. Barton also eventually entered into sub-agency
Furthermore, under the third main exception, revelation of agreement in San Francisco and Australia.
the client's name would obviously provide the necessary link
There was a large order from Ludvigsen and McCurdy for
for the prosecution to build its case, where none otherwise
6,000 ton of bituminous limestone. However, Anderson told
exists.
Barton that the company was behind construction so it could
not make big contracts at the moment. Despite Anderson’s
Compelling disclosure of the client's name in circumstances
response, Barton wrote a notification to Leyte Asphalt for the
such as the one which exists in the case at bench amounts to
company to be prepared to ship 5,000 tons.
sanctioning 􏰾fishing expeditions by lazy prosecutors and
litigants which we cannot and will not countenance. The There were six causes of actions for various agreements that
logical nexus between name and nature of transaction is so Barton filed with the CFI. However, CFI only allowed Barton
intimate in this case that it would be difficult to simply to recover from two.
dissociate one from the other. In this sense, the name is as
much "communication" as information revealed directly Among the evidences present in the case was a carbon copy
about the transaction in question itself, a communication of a letter written by Barton to his lawyer, Atty. Ingersoll. He
which is clearly and distinctly privileged. wrote that his profit from the San Francisco contract would
have been at the rate of 85 cents per ton. When the letter
Moreover, the PCGG's demand not only touches upon the was offered in evidence by Leyte Asphalt, Barton’s lawyer
question of the identity of their clients but also on documents announced that he had no objection to the introduction of
related to the suspected transactions, not only in violation of the letter evidence if counsel for the company would explain
the attorney-client privilege but also of the constitutional right where the letter was secured. Upon this the attorney for the
against self-incrimination. defendant informed the court that he received the letter
from the former attorneys of the defendant without
(back story) explanation of the manner in which the document had come
**In Civil Case No. 0033, defendants therein, including herein into their possession.
petitioners and Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. conspired with each
Upon this Barton’s lawyer made this announcement: "We
other in setting up through the use of coconut levy funds the
hereby give notice at this time that unless such an
financial and corporate framework and structures that led to
explanation is made, explaining fully how this carbon copy
the establishment of UCPB, UNICOM and others and that
came into the possession of the defendant company, or any
through insidious means and machinations, ACCRA, using its
one representing it, we propose to object to its admission on
wholly-owned investment arm, ACCRA Investments
the ground that it is a confidential communication between
Corporation, became the holder of approximately fifteen
client and lawyer."
million shares.
No further information was then given by the attorney for
The PCGG wanted to establish through the ACCRA lawyers the defendant as to the manner in which the letter had come
that Mr. Cojuangco is their client and it was Cojuangco who to his hands.
furnished all the monies to the subscription payment; hence,
petitioners acted as dummies, nominees and/or agents by Trial judge thereupon excluded the document, on the ground
allowing themselves, among others, to be used as instrument that it was a privileged communication between client and
attorney.
not having heard anything about it, he received a letter on

July 13 from our attorneys urging me to file these cases.
RULING:
CFI ruling was erroneous; for even supposing that the letter When asked by the counsel for Orient to produce the letter,
was within the privilege which protects communications Bachrach only offered in evidence part of the letter
between attorney and client, this privilege was lost when the supporting his testimony (relating to the urging of the filing
letter came to the hands of the adverse party. And it makes no of complaints) but refused to reveal the other part as it
difference how the adversary acquired possession. The law contained private matter privileged in nature between the
protects the client from the effect of disclosures made by him attorneys and TMC (relating to contract of fees, retaining of
to his attorney in the confidence of the legal relation, but counsel’s services in connection with the cases, alleged to be
when such a document, containing admissions of the client,
matters entirely distinct from the issue).
comes to the hand of a third party, and reaches the adversary,
it is admissible in evidence.
Orient demanded for the production of “the best evidence,”
Since the means of preserving secrecy of communication are it being well-known a rule of law that a witness cannot be
entirely in the client's hands, and since the privilege is permitted to give oral testimony as to the contents of a paper
derogation from the general testimonial duty and should be writing which can be produced in court. In response, only a
strictly construed, it would be improper to extend its portion of the letter referred to by the witness was read into
prohibition to third persons who obtain knowledge of the the record. Orient now insists that inasmuch as all the letters
communications. One who overhears the communications,
refers to the case then in court, the entire document should
whether with or without the client's knowledge, is not within
be exhibited pursuant to the rule that when part of a
the protection of the privilege. The same rule ought to apply
to one who surreptitiously reads or obtains possession of a document is offered in evidence, the entire document must
document in original or copy. be presented.
14) Orient Insurance Company vs. E. P. Revilla ISSUE: Does presentation of part of the letter constitute
waiver to present the whole document? Yes.
ONE LINER: Insurance Company only read the part of the
letter which is advantageous to it. Deemed waiver of Is a contract for fees and other terms of employment
privileged communication. between attorney and client privileged in nature? No.
FACTS: RULING:
The object of Orient Insurance Co.’s (Orient) petition for writs The excerpt in question must be considered as proof
of certiorari and mandamus is to require respondent judge to submitted by TMC, and there can be no question that, part of
permit Orient’s counsel to examine a letter, part of which has the letter having been introduced in behalf of the plaintiff,
already been read into the record in the course of the the whole of the letter could properly be examined by Orient,
examination of one of the witnesses testifying for private in accordance with the express provision of section 283, Code
respondent Teal Motor Co., Inc. (TMC). of Civil Procedure.
As to the alleged privileged nature of the terms of
TMC, as plaintiff, filed a civil action against Orient for the employment between attorney and client as contained in
purpose of recovering upon 2 fire insurance policies issued by other portions of the letter, the court found it difficult to
the latter over TMC’s stock merchandise. The policy contained consider a contract for fees as privileged. However irrelevant
a clause stipulating to the effect that all benefits would be under the circumstances, it cannot be privileged in nature.
forfeited if, in case of loss, the claim should be rejected by the Contracts between attorneys and clients are inherently
insurer and action is not commenced within 3 months after personal and considered as private matters, but they are a
such rejection. Orient’s defense alleges that the claim was constant subject of litigation, and contracts relating to fees
rejected on April 15, 1929, and that notice of such rejection are essentially not of privileged nature.
was given to plaintiff by letter on the same day. However, suit
was not instituted by TMC until August 3, more than 3 months Nevertheless, assuming arguendo that the letter contained
after rejection of the claim. privileged matters, such was waived by the introduction in
evidence of part of the letter. Section 238 of the Code of Civil
According to TMC, on the day they were notified of the Procedure, making the whole of a declaration, conversation,
rejection, Orient representative E. E. Elser expressly requested or writing admissible when part has been given in evidence
TMC to defer judicial action until after July 31 for possibilities by one party, makes no exception as to privileged matter; and
of compromise between the parties. TMC relied on the neither do jurisprudence on the subject recognize any
request and delayed institution of action. exception. Hence, Orient was entitled to examine the whole
of the letter, with a view to the introduction in evidence of
However, during the trial of the civil case, witness TMC such parts thereof as may be relevant to the case on trial,
president E. M. Bachrach made an oral statement as to the and the respondent judge was in error in refusing to permit
substance of part of a letter received by TMC from its the inspection by Orient.
attorneys, saying that he waited for about a week longer and
But even supposing that the matter contained in the letter
and withheld from the inspection of the adversary was
originally of a privileged nature, the privilege was waived by by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal in connection with that
the introduction in evidence of part of the letter. The provision perjury case; and a certification of the Presiding Judge that
in section 283 of the Code of Civil Procedure making the said perjury case in his court did not reach the arraignment
whole of a declaration, conversation, or writing admissible stage since action thereon was suspended pending the
when part has been given in evidence by one party, makes no review of the case by the Department of Justice.
exception as to privileged matter; and the jurisprudence on To avoid responsibility, Sansaet revealed in an Affidavit of
the subject does not recognize any exception. Explanations and Rectifications, that Paredes contrived to
have the graft case dismissed on the ground of double
jeopardy by making it appear that the perjury case had been
15) People v Sandiganbayan
dismissed by the trial court after he had been arraigned. He
KEYWORDS: Congressman falsified his arraignment; Counsel further revealed that the documents were prepared and
testified against him; Privileged communication does not apply falsified by his co-respondents in this case in the house of
Paredes. He claimed that he participated in the scheme upon
the instigation and inducement of Paredes. This was to pave
the way for Sansaet’s discharge as state witness.
FACTS:
The proposal for Sansaet to be a state witness was rejected
Respondent Paredes was successively the Provincial Attorney
by the Ombudsman since it was difficult to believe that a
of Agusan del Sur, then Governor of the same province, and
lawyer of his stature, in the absence of deliberate intent to
then the Congressman. Respondent Sansaet was the counsel
conspire, would be unwittingly induced by another to
for Paredes in several instances pertinent to the criminal
commit a crime.
charges involved in the present case.
Sandiganbayan ruled that a lawyer-client relationship existed
Paredes applied for a free patent over a land which was
between Paredes and Sansaet during the relevant periods so
approved and was granted an original certificate of title in his
the facts and other confidential matters involved in this case
favor. However, the Director of Lands filed an action for the
must have been disclosed by Paredes, as client, to
cancellation of respondent Paredes patent and certificate of
respondent Sansaet, as his lawyer. Because of this, Sansaet
title since the land had been designated and reserved as a
cannot be presented as a witness against accused Paredes
school site. The trial court rendered judgment nullifying said
without the latter’s consent.
patent and title after finding that Paredes had obtained the
same through fraudulent misrepresentations in his
application. Sansaet served as counsel of Paredes in that civil
case. ISSUE:
An information for perjury was then filed against respondent W/N the projected testimony of respondent Sansaet, as
Paredes in the MCTC. However, the proceedings were proposed state witness, is barred by the attorney-client
terminated on the ground of prescription. In this criminal case, privilege.
Paredes was likewise represented by Sansaet as counsel.
After that, the Tanodbayan recommended the filing of a

RULING:
criminal case against Paredes for violation of the provisions of
the Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act. It was alleged that by No, the projected testimony of respondent Sansaet is not
using his former position as Provincial Attorney to influence barred by the attorney-client privilege.
and induce the Bureau of Lands officials to favorably act on his
application for free patent, he had violated Section 3(a) of The facts of the case constitute an exception to the rule on
Republic Act No. 3019, as amended. Sansaet was Paredes’ privileged communication made during lawyer-client
counsel of record therein. relationship.
By way of defense, Paredes alleged that double jeopardy has In the American jurisdiction from which our present
already attached since the second complaint filed in court evidential rule was taken, the privilege is not confined to
arose from the same set of facts and same evidence of the verbal or written communications made by the client to his
earlier perjury case which, after its arraignment, was ordered attorney but extends as well to information communicated
dismissed by the court upon recommendation of the by the client to the attorney by other means.
Department of Justice. To support such defense the accused
In the present case, it may correctly be assumed that there
presented court records and transcripts as proof that he was
was a confidential communication made by Paredes to
arraigned in the perjury case.
Sansaet in connection with falsification, and this may
Gelacio, a taxpayer who had initiated the perjury and graft reasonably be expected since Paredes was the accused and
charges against respondent Paredes, sent a letter to the Sansaet his counsel therein. The clincher for this conclusion is
Ombudsman seeking the investigation of the 3 respondents the undisputed fact that said documents were filed by
herein for falsification of public documents. He claimed that Sansaet in behalf of Paredes as annexes to the motion for
respondent Honrada, the Clerk of Court of the MCTC, in reconsideration in the preliminary investigation of the graft
conspiracy with his herein co-respondents, simulated and case before the Tanodbayan. Also, the acts and words of the
certified as true copies certain documents purporting to be a parties during the period when the documents were being
notice of arraignment, and transcripts of stenographic notes falsified were necessarily confidential since Paredes would
supposedly taken during the arraignment of Paredes on the not have invited Sansaet to his house and allowed him to
perjury charge. witness the same except under conditions of secrecy and
confidence.
In support of his claim, Gelacio attached to his letter a
certification that no notice of arraignment was ever received
However, a distinction must be made between confidential PRINCIPLE: A communication divulged to "strangers" or
communications relating to past crimes already committed, outsiders can scarcely be considered a confidential
and future crimes intended to be committed, by the client. communication between attorney and client.
Corollarily, it is admitted that the announced intention of a
client to commit a crime is not included within the The attorney-client privilege does not extend to
confidences which his attorney is bound to respect. communications regarding an intended crime.
For the application of the attorney-client privilege, the period

to be considered is the date when the privileged FACTS:
communication was made by the client to the attorney in
relation to either a crime committed in the past or with Appellant Gordon-Nikkar was convicted after trial by jury of
respect to a crime intended to be committed in the future. In the crime of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute
other words, if the client seeks his lawyer’s advice with approximately four kilograms of cocaine, and the possession
respect to a crime that the former has committed, he is given with intent to distribute and distribution of cocaine. On
the protection of a virtual confessional seal which the appeal, she contends her conviction should be reversed
attorney-client privilege declares cannot be broken by the because the district court permitted a Government witness,
attorney without the client’s consent. The same privileged Brenda Marchand, to give testimony regarding allegedly
confidentiality, however, does not attach with regard to a privileged conversations between appellant's attorney and
crime which a client intends to commit thereafter or in the his clients
future and for purposes of which he seeks the lawyer’s
advice. Brenda Marchand was charged as a co-defendant with the
crimes for which appellant was convicted. Marchand
In the present case, the testimony sought to be elicited from subsequently pled guilty and testified at trial for the
Sansaet as state witness are the communications made to Government. Prior to entering her plea, Marchand had two
him by physical acts and/or accompanying words of Paredes meetings in the office of appellant's attorney, Mr. Estrumsa.
at the time he and Honrada, either with the active or passive Marchand, however, was not a client of Estrumsa, and it is
participation of Sansaet, were about to falsify, or in the unclear whether all the other persons in these meetings were
process of falsifying, the documents which were later filed in Estrumsa's clients.
the Tanodbayan by Sansaet and culminated in the criminal
charges now pending in respondent Sandiganbayan. Clearly, Of the two conversations related by Marchand, the second
therefore, the confidential communications thus made by was the subject of thorough cross-examination by Estrumsa.
Paredes to Sansaet were for purposes of and in reference to The second conversation involved Estrumsa's alleged
the crime of falsification which had not yet been committed recommendation that Marchand leave the country and go to
in the past by Paredes but which he, in confederacy with his Venezuela. On redirect, the Government inquired, over
present co-respondents, later committed. Having been made defense objection, into the substance of the conversation
for purposes of a future offense, those communications are during the first meeting. Marchand testified that at this
outside the pale of the attorney-client privilege. meeting the participants, at Mr. Estrumsa's suggestion,
agreed to give perjured cover-up testimony at trial to the
Furthermore, Sansaet was himself a conspirator in the effect that none of them had possessed the cocaine, but
commission of that crime of falsification which he, Paredes instead merely happened to be at a party where the cocaine
and Honrada concocted and foisted upon the authorities. It is was discovered.
well settled that in order that a communication between a
lawyer and his client may be privileged, it must be for a lawful
purpose or in furtherance of a lawful end. The existence of an ISSUE:
unlawful purpose prevents the privilege from attaching. In
fact, it has also been pointed out to the Court that the Whether the statements in Attorney Estrumsa's office were
prosecution of the honorable relation of attorney and client protected by the attorney-client privilege.
will not be permitted under the guise of privilege, and every
communication made to an attorney by a client for a criminal
purpose is a conspiracy or attempt at a conspiracy which is not HELD:
only lawful to divulge, but which the attorney under certain
circumstances may be bound to disclose at once in the interest No.
of justice.
There were at least five persons present at Estrumsa's office
To prevent a conniving counsel from revealing the genesis of a on this occasion; at least one of the persons, Brenda
crime which was later committed pursuant to a conspiracy, Marchand, and perhaps others, were not clients of Mr.
because of the objection thereto of his conspiring client, Estrumsa. A communication divulged to "strangers" or
would be one of the worst travesties in the rules of evidence outsiders can scarcely be considered a confidential
and practice in the noble profession of law. communication between attorney and client. Therefore, this
communication is not protected by the attorney-client
privilege.
16) US v. GORDON-NIKKAR But even if it appeared that the communication in question
were otherwise privileged (i.e., that the communication was
KEYWORD: lawyer’s advice to commit perjury; not protected
considered confidential despite the presence of a stranger),
by the attorney-client privilege)
the testimony was nonetheless admissible. The conversations
in question dealt with plans to commit perjury so as to hide
the criminal activity of appellant and others. It is beyond
dispute that the attorney-client privilege does not extend to

communications regarding an intended crime. The policy Evidence showed that Benton, acting with the knowledge
underlying the attorney-client privilege is to promote the and complicity of Frederick Ingram and through
administration of justice. It would be a perversion of the intermediaries Bull and Weber, bribed McPartlin and Janicki
privilege to extend it so as to protect communications to cause the sludge-hauling contract to be awarded to
designed to frustrate justice by committing other crimes to Ingram Corporation and one of its subsidiaries, and later
conceal past misdeeds. bribed the same officials to secure favorable treatment under
the contract and modifications of the contract.
At trial, Ingram contended that he did not learn until the

17) US v. MCPARTLIN February, 1972 meeting with Benton that his company had
KEY WORDS: bribery, sludge-hauling contract, attorney-client- secured a multi-million-dollar contract by paying more than
privilege $300,000 to Chicago officials. Ingram testified that he
protested against paying the bribes, but reluctantly agreed
PRINCIPLE: Communications by a client to his own lawyer when Benton informed him that if he refused to pay, the
remain privileged when the lawyer subsequently shares them Sanitary District would not pay the additional $2,100,000 for
with co-defendants for purposes of a common defense. Waiver the pipeline and would use the liquidated damages clause to
is not to be inferred from the disclosure in confidence to a co- penalize Ingram Corporation.
party's attorney for a common purpose.
Throughout the period covered by the indictment, Benton
The privilege protects communications to the attorney's … kept diaries, or appointment calendars, in which he made
agents... for rendering his services. notes concerning meetings and telephone conversations,
naming the persons involved and often recording the
substance of the conversations.
FACTS: The defendants were convicted of numerous violations of the
The Sanitary District is a municipal corporation with primary Travel Act,18 U.S.C. § 1952, and the Wire, Radio, Television
responsibility for disposing of sewage from Chicago and Fraud Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1343, and of conspiring to violate those
surrounding areas. The Sanitary District operates a sewage acts in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371.
treatment plant in Stickney, Illinois. The District announced Destroying Benton's credibility was important to Ingram, as
plans to have the sludge from its treatment plant be it was to the other defendants, even though Ingram's
transported to Fulton County, Illinois, and solicited bids on the defense was based, in part, on the argument that he had
project. made the payments in response to the threats Benton had
During the week before the bids were to be submitted, Bull reported to him, because Ingram's account of events in issue
(president of a towing company, and of the alleged differed materially from Benton's, and because the
intermediaries through whom many of the bribe payments government's case hinged largely on Benton's testimony.
were made) visited Robert Howson (vice president of Ingram Since Benton's diaries corroborated so much of his
Contractors, Inc.), and told Howson that if Ingram testimony, it was imperative from the standpoint of all
Corporation expected to secure the contract, it would have defendants that an effort be made to discredit them.
to make a "political contribution." Howson responded that he Such an effort was made, and Frederick Ingram and McPartlin
was not in that sort of business, but then took Bull to meet cooperated in that effort.
William J. Benton (vice president of Ingram Corporation and
president of Ingram Contractors, Inc.) Benton then telephoned An investigator acting for Frederick Ingram's counsel twice
defendant Frederick Ingram (chairman of the board of Ingram interviewed McPartlin with the consent of the latter's
Corporation) to inform him of Weber's "political contribution" counsel for the purpose of determining whether there was
proposal. Ingram agreed, provided that the contribution a basis for challenging the truth of some of the diary
could be added to the cost of the contract. These was the entries. In the second of these interviews McPartlin made
beginning of a series of transactions between the defendants certain statements, which Ingram argues tend to support his
which are the basis of the charges in this case. defense. At trial, when Ingram offered evidence of these
statements, McPartlin's counsel objected on the ground of
The indictment charged that defendant Frederick B. the attorney-client privilege, and the court, after an in-
Ingram, had paid defendant Robert F. McPartlin, an Illinois camera hearing, sustained the objection on this ground.
legislator (introduced by Weber to Benton as the man who
handled all political contributions for the Democratic Party in ISSUES:
Illinois), defendant Valentine Janicki, a trustee for the
Metropolitan Sanitary District, and others more than $900,000 1. Whether statements made by McPartlin are covered
to secure for the Ingram Corporation a multi-million-dollar under the lawyer-client privilege communication.
sludge-hauling contract with the District. Defendants Franklin 2. Whether the statement was covered by the privilege
H. Weber, a businessman, and Edwin T. Bull, were alleged to since it was made to an investigator rather than an
be intermediaries through whom many of the payments were attorney.
made. William J. Benton (vice president of Ingram HELD:
Corporation) was an unindicted co-conspirator who played a
major role in the conspiracy and testified as a witness for the 1. YES, the statements made by McPartlin cannot be
prosecution. disclosed because they remain protected by the attorney-
client privilege.
Sometime later, a federal grand jury commenced an
investigation of the events surrounding the sludge-hauling McPartlin was entitled to the protection of the attorney-
contract. Later, the government granted immunity to Benton client privilege, because his statements were made in
(vice president of the Ingram Corp). confidence to an attorney for a co-defendant for a common

purpose related to both defenses. They were made in defendant for a limited purpose becomes the co-defendant's
connection with the project of attempting to discredit Benton, attorney for that purpose.
a project in which Ingram and McPartlin and their attorneys
were jointly engaged for the benefit of both defendants.
Ingram acknowledges that communications by a client to his 18) Lim v. Court of Appeals
own lawyer remain privileged when the lawyer subsequently KEYWORD: Annulment of Marriage; physician-patient
shares them with co-defendants for purposes of a common relationship; wife is allegedly schizophrenic
defense. This is known as the common-defense rule which has
been recognized in cases. Uninhibited communication among PRINCIPLE: The physician may be considered to be acting in
joint parties and their counsel about matters of common his professional capacity when he attends to the patient for
concern is often important to the protection of their interests. curative, preventive, or palliative treatment. Thus, only
In criminal cases it can be necessary to a fair opportunity to disclosures which would have been made to the physician to
defend. Therefore, waiver is not to be inferred from the enable him "safely and efficaciously to treat his patient" are
disclosure in confidence to a co-party's attorney for a covered by the privilege. It is to be emphasized that "it is the
common purpose. tenor only of the communication that is privileged. The mere
fact of making a communication, as well as the date of a
In the case at bar, the judge found, as a preliminary question consultation and the number of consultations, are therefore
of fact, that McPartlin had made the statements to the not privileged from disclosure, so long as the subject
investigator in confidence. That finding is not clearly communicated is not stated."
erroneous.
Ingram even argued that the co-defendants' defenses must be Facts:

in all respects compatible if the joint-defense privilege is to be Nelly and Juan Lim are lawfully married to each other. Juan
applicable. The cases do not establish such a limitation, and filed a petition for annulment of marriage on the ground that
there is no reason to impose it. Rule 503(b)(3) of the Nelly has been allegedly suffering from a mental illness called
proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, as approved by the schizophrenia "before, during and after the marriage and
Supreme Court, stated that the privilege applies to until the present."
communications by a client "to a lawyer representing
another in a matter of common interest." The Advisory Juan’s counsel announced that he would present as his next
Committee's Note to proposed Rule 503(b) makes it clear that witness the Chief of the Female Services of the National
the joint-interest privilege is not limited to situations in which Mental Hospital, Dr. Lydia Acampado, a Doctor of Medicine
the positions of the parties are compatible in all respects. who specializes in Psychiatry. Said counsel orally applied for
In this instance the US SC followed such recommendation. The the issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum requiring Dr.
privilege protects pooling of information for any defense Acampado to testify. Nelly's counsel opposed the motion on
purpose common to the participating defendants. the ground that the testimony sought to be elicited from the
Cooperation between defendants in such circumstances is witness is privileged since Dr. Acampado had examined Nelly
often not only in their own best interests but serves to in a professional capacity and had diagnosed her to be
expedite the trial or, as in the case at bar, the trial preparation. suffering from schizophrenia. Over such opposition,
the subpoena was issued.
NOTE: The exclusion of the McPartlin statements would not be
reversible error even if he had not been entitled to claim the Nelly's counsel filed an urgent omnibus motion to quash
privilege. The Court was satisfied from their examination that the subpoena and suspend the proceedings pending
the statements merely corroborated facts which were resolution of the motion.
admitted in evidence and which the jury obviously found to be
true. The Court did not disclose the contents of the statements
Before Dr. Acampado took the witness stand, the court heard
because they remain protected by the attorney-client privilege,
this urgent motion. Nelly’s counsel argued that having seen
on which they alternatively based their ruling on this point.
and examined Nelly in a professional capacity, Dr. Acampado
2. The argument of Ingram that the communication was not is barred from testifying under the rule on the confidentiality
privileged because it was made to an investigator rather than of a physician-patient relationship. Juan’s counsel contended,
an attorney will not prevail. The investigator was an agent for however, that Dr. Acampado would be presented as an
Ingram's attorney, however, so it is as if the communication expert witness and would not testify on any information
was to the attorney himself. It has never been questioned that acquired while attending to Nelly in a professional capacity.
the privilege protects communications to the attorney's The trial court denied the motion and allowed the witness to
agents for rendering his services. testify. Dr. Acampado thus took the witness stand, was
qualified by Juan’s counsel as an expert witness and was
It was also not fatal to the privilege that McPartlin made the asked hypothetical questions related to her field of expertise.
statement to Ingram's attorney rather than his own. When the She neither revealed the illness she examined and treated
Ingram and McPartlin camps decided to join in an attempt to Nelly for nor disclosed the results of her examination and the
discredit Benton, the attorney for each represented both for medicines she had prescribed.
purposes of that joint effort. The relationship was no different
than it would have been if during the trial the Ingram and
Nelly filed with CA a petition for certiorari and prohibition to
McPartlin attorneys had decided that Ingram's attorney would
annul the order of respondent Judge allowing Dr. Acampado
cross-examine Benton on behalf of both, and during cross-
to testify on the ground that the same was issued with grave
examination McPartlin passed Ingram's attorney a note
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, and to
containing information for use in the cross-examination. The
prohibit him from proceeding with the reception of Dr.
attorney who thus undertakes to serve his client's co-
Acampado's testimony.

3. The relation must be one which in the opinion of the

CA denied the petition ruling that Nelly failed in establishing community ought to be sedulously fostered
the confidential nature of the testimony given by or obtained 4. The injury that would inure to the relation by the
from Dr. Acampado when she testified. Hence, the respondent disclosure of the communications must be greater
Judge committed no grave abuse of discretion. than the benefit thereby gained for the correct
disposal of litigation."
ISSUE:
W/N the information given by the physician (Dr. Acampado) in The physician may be considered to be acting in his
her testimony in open court a privileged communication? NO. professional capacity when he attends to the patient for
curative, preventive, or palliative treatment. Thus, only
HELD: disclosures which would have been made to the physician to
enable him "safely and efficaciously to treat his patient" are
Paragraph (c), Section 24 of the Revised Rules on Evidence
covered by the privilege. It is to be emphasized that "it is
which reads:
the tenor only of the communication that is privileged.
"SECTION 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged The mere fact of making a communication, as well as
communication. — The following persons cannot the date of a consultation and the number of
testify as to matters learned in confidence in the consultations, are therefore not privileged from disclosure,
following cases: so long as the subject communicated is not stated." One
xxx xxx xxx who claims this privilege must prove the presence of these
(c) A person authorized to practice medicine, surgery aforementioned requisites.
or obstetrics cannot in a civil case, without the
consent of the patient, be examined as to any advice In this case, Nelly failed to establish the presence of the
or treatment given by him or any information which requisites.
he may have acquired in attending such patient in a
professional capacity, which information was
necessary to enable him to act in that capacity, and Dr. Acampado was presented and qualified as an expert
which would blacken the reputation of the patient." witness. She did not disclose anything obtained in the course
of her examination, interview and treatment of the
petitioner. The facts and conditions alleged in the
This rule on the physician-patient privilege is intended to hypothetical problem did not refer to and had no bearing on
facilitate and make safe full and confidential disclosure by the whatever information or findings the doctor obtained while
patient to the physician of all facts, circumstances and attending to the patient. There is, as well, no showing that Dr.
symptoms, untrammeled by apprehension of their subsequent Acampado's answers to the questions propounded to her
and enforced disclosure and publication on the witness stand, relating to the hypothetical problem were influenced by the
to the end that the physician may form a correct opinion, and information obtained from the petitioner. Otherwise stated,
be enabled safely and efficaciously to treat his patient. It rests her expert opinion excluded whatever information or
in public policy and is for the general interest of the knowledge she had about the petitioner which was
community. acquired by reason of the physician-patient relationship
existing between them. As an expert witness, her testimony
Since the object of the privilege is to protect the patient, it before the trial court cannot then be excluded.
may be waived if no timely objection is made to the
physician's testimony. While it may be true that Nelly’s counsel opposed the oral
request for the issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum to
In order that the privilege may be successfully claimed, the Dr. Acampado and filed a formal motion for the quashal of
following requisites must concur: the said subpoena a day before the witness was to testify,
1. the privilege is claimed in a civil case; Nelly makes no claim in any of her pleadings that her counsel
2. the person against whom the privilege is claimed is had objected to any question asked of the witness on the
one duly authorized to practice medicine, surgery or ground that it elicited an answer that would violate the
obstetrics; privilege, despite the trial court's advice that said counsel
3. such person acquired the information while he was may interpose his objection to the testimony "once it
attending to the patient in his professional capacity; becomes apparent that the testimony, sought to be elicited is
4. the information was necessary to enable him to act in covered by the privileged communication rule." The
that capacity; and particular portions of the stenographic notes of the
testimony of Dr. Acampado quoted in Nelly's Petition and
5. the information was confidential, and, if disclosed,
Memorandum, and in Juan's Memorandum, do not at all
would blacken the reputation (formerly character) of
show that any objections were interposed. Even granting ex
the patient."
gratia that the testimony of Dr. Acampado could be covered
by the privilege, the failure to seasonably object thereto
These requisites conform with the four (4) fundamental amounted to a waiver thereof.
conditions necessary for the establishment of a privilege
against the disclosure of certain communications, to wit:
1. the communications must originate in 19) Krohn vs CA
a confidence that they will not be disclosed. KEY WORDS: annulment, psychiatric evaluation report
2. This element of confidentiality must be essential to
the full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation
between the parties.

PRINCIPLE: The person against whom the privilege (physician- at the earliest opportunity to the evidence presented on
patient) is claimed is must be one duly authorized to practice privileged matters may be construed as an implied waiver.
medicine, surgery or obstetrics.
FACTS:
ISSUE: WoN the psychiatric evaluation report is admissible.
Edgar Krohn, Jr. and Ma. Paz Fernandez were married in
Manila on June 14, 1964 and had three children. Their RULING: YES.
blessings notwithstanding, the relationship between the
Statutes making communications between physician and
couple developed into a stormy one. Ma. Paz underwent
patient privileged are intended to inspire confidence in the
psychological testing purportedly in an effort to ease the
patient and encourage him to make a full disclosure to his
marital strain. The effort however proved futile. Later, they
physician of his symptoms and condition. Consequently, this
finally separated in fact.
prevents the physician from making public information that
In 1975, Edgar was able to secure a copy of the confidential will result in humiliation, embarrassment, or disgrace to the
psychiatric report on Ma. Paz. Presenting the report among patient. For the patient should rest assured with the
others, he obtained a decree from the Tribunal knowledge that the law recognizes the communication as
Metropolitanum Matrimoniale in Manila nullifying his church confidential, and guards against the possibility of his feelings
marriage with Ma. Paz on the ground of "incapacitas being shocked or his reputation tarnished by their
assumendi onera conjugalia due to lack of due discretion subsequent disclosure. The physician-patient privilege
existent at the time of the wedding and thereafter." This creates a zone of privacy, intended to preclude the
decree was eventually confirmed and pronounced “Final and humiliation of the patient that may follow the disclosure of
Definite”. his ailments. Indeed, certain types of information
communicated in the context of the physician-patient
On 1993, Edgar filed a petition for annulment of his marriage
relationship fall within the constitutionally protected zone of
with the RTC. In his petition, he cited the Confidential
privacy, including a patient's interest in keeping his mental
Psychiatric Evaluation Report which Ma. Paz merely denied in
health records confidential. Thus, it has been observed that
her Answer as “either unfounded or irrelevant”.
the psychotherapist-patient privilege is founded upon the
Petitioner’s arguments: She argues that since Sec. 24, par. (c), notion that certain forms of antisocial behavior may be
Rule 130, of the Rules of Court prohibits a physician from prevented by encouraging those in need of treatment for
testifying on matters which he may have acquired in attending emotional problems to secure the services of a
to a patient in professional capacity, with more reason should psychotherapist.
a third person (like respondent-husband) be PROHIBITED from Petitioner's discourse while exhaustive is however
testifying on privileged matters between a physician and misplaced. Lim v. Court of Appeals clearly lays down the
patient or from submitting any medical report, findings or requisites in order that the privilege may be successfully
evaluation prepared by a physician which the latter has invoked: (a) the privilege is claimed in a civil case; (b) the
acquired as a result of his confidential and privileged relation person against whom the privilege is claimed is one duly
with a patient. authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics; (c)
such person acquired the information while he was
She further argues that to allow her husband to testify on the
contents of the psychiatric evaluation report will set a very attending to the patient in his professional capacity; (d) the
information was necessary to enable him to act in that
bad and dangerous precedent because it abets circumvention
capacity; and, (e) the information was confidential and, if
of the rule's intent in preserving the sanctity, security and
confidence to the relation of physician and his patient. Her disclosed, would blacken the reputation
thesis is that what cannot be done directly should not be (formerly character) of the patient.
allowed to be done indirectly. In the instant case, the person against whom the privilege is
claimed is not one duly authorized to practice medicine,
Respondent’s arguments: Edgar Krohn, Jr., however contends surgery or obstetrics. He is simply the patient's husband who
that the rules are very explicit: the prohibition applies only to wishes to testify on a document executed by medical
a physician. Thus, the legal prohibition to testify is not practitioners. Plainly and clearly, this does not fall within the
applicable to the case at bar where the person sought to be claimed prohibition. Neither can his testimony be considered
barred from testifying on the privileged communication is the a circumvention of the prohibition because his testimony
husband and not the physician of the petitioner. In fact, cannot have the force and effect of the testimony of the
according to him, the Rules sanction his testimony considering physician who examined the patient and executed the report.
that a husband may testify against his wife in a civil case filed
by one against the other. Counsel for petitioner indulged heavily in objecting to the
testimony of private respondent on the ground that it was
Besides, private respondent submits that privileged privileged. In his Manifestation before the trial court dated
communication may be waived by the person entitled thereto, 10 May 1991, he invoked the rule on privileged
and this petitioner expressly did when she gave her communications but never questioned the testimony as
unconditional consent to the use of the psychiatric evaluation hearsay. It was a fatal mistake. For, in failing to object to the
report when it was presented to the Tribunal Metropolitanum testimony on the ground that it was hearsay, counsel
Matrimoniale which took it into account among others in waived his right to make such objection and, consequently,
deciding the case and declaring their marriage null and void. the evidence offered may be admitted.
Private respondent further argues that petitioner also gave
her implied consent when she failed to specifically object to 20) Blue Cross Health v. Olivares Gr. No. 169737
the admissibility of the report in her Answer where she merely
described the evaluation report as "either unfounded or PRINCIPLES: Presumption; more specifically Disputable
irrelevant." At any rate, failure to interpose a timely objection presumption; presumptions are satisfactory if

uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by They should have made an independent assessment of
other evidence. However, there are exceptions, one of which Neomi’s condition when it failed to obtain the report. They
when “suppression is an exercise of a privilege.” As such, the shouldn’t have waited for the attending physician’s report to
presumption that an evidence willfully suppressed is adverse come out.
when produce does not apply.
Under Section 3 (e), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court states:
Disputable presumptions. ― The following presumptions are

FACTS: satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and
overcome by other evidence:
Neomi Olivares applied for a health care program with Blue
Cross for the amount of 12,000 pesos. 38 days after she (e) That evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse
applied, she suffered from a stroke. Ailments due to “pre- if produced.
existing conditions” were excluded from the coverage. She
was confined in Medical City and discharged with a bill of Php The exception on presenting evidence applies when the
34,000. Blue Cross refused to pay unless she had her suppression is an exercise of a privilege.
physician’s certification that she was suffering from a pre- Hence, Neomi had the privilege not to present the Doctor’s
existing condition. When Blue Cross still refused to pay, she report under the doctor-client privilege.
filed suit in the MTC. The health care company rebutted by
saying that the physician didn’t disclose the condition due to
the patient’s invocation of the doctor-client privilege. The MTC
dismissed for a lack of cause of action because the physician 21) Chan vs. Chan
didn’t disclose the condition. In the RTC, the spouses were KEYWORDS: Nullity of Marriage Case; Wife requested
awarded the amount of the hospital bills plus 60,000 in subpoena duces tecum for the medical records of husband
damages. This was under the ratio that the burden to prove before trial, latter objected under Privileged Communication
that Neomi had a pre-existing condition was under Blue Cross. Rule
The CA denied the motion for reconsideration of the
health care company.
PRINCIPLES:
ISSUE:  Objections to evidence must be made after the offer

of such evidence for admission in court.
1. Whether petitioner was able to prove that respondent  Physician-Patient Privileged Communication does
Neomi's stroke was caused by a pre-existing condition and not only cover the hospital records, but also the
therefore was excluded from the coverage of the examination of the physician at the trial. Physician
health care agreement. memorializes all this information in the patient's
records. Disclosing them would be equivalent to
compelling the physician to testify on privileged
RULING: No. Petition dismissed. matters he gained while dealing with the patient,
without the latter's prior consent.
The contract of insurance as in this case is a contract
of adhesion. If there is ambiguity in the terms must be
interpreted and enforced stringently against the insurer which
prepared the contract. FACTS: Josielene Chan filed with the RTC a Petition for the
Declaration of Nullity of her marriage to Johnny Chan, the
The agreement defined a pre-existing condition as: dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains, and the
award of custody of their children to her. She claimed that
“A disability which existed before the commencement Johnny failed to care for and support his family and that a
date of membership whose natural history can be psychiatrist diagnosed him as mentally deficient due to
clinically determined, whether or not the Member was incessant drinking and excessive use of prohibited drugs. She
aware of such illness or condition. Such conditions also had convinced him to undergo hospital confinement for
include disabilities existing prior to reinstatement date in detoxification and rehabilitation.
the case of lapse of an Agreement.”
Johnny claimed that it was Josielene who failed in her wifely
“Under this provision, disabilities which existed before the duties. To save their marriage, he agreed to marriage
commencement of the agreement are excluded from its counseling but when he and Josielene got to the hospital,
coverage if they become manifest within one year from its two men forcibly held him by both arms while another gave
effectivity.” him an injection. The marriage relations got worse when the
Petitioners averred that the non-disclosure of the pre-existing police temporarily detained Josielene for an unrelated crime
condition made a presumption in its favor. and released her only after the case against her ended. By
then, their marriage relationship could no longer be repaired.
Respondents maintained that the petitioner had the duty to
prove its accusation. During the pre-trial conference, Josielene pre-marked the
Philhealth Claim Form that Johnny attached to his answer as
(This is the one relevant in the subject of evidence) proof that he was forcibly confined at the rehabilitation unit
of a hospital. The form carried a physician's handwritten
Petitioner never presented evidence to prove its presumption
note that Johnny suffered from "methamphetamine and
that the Doctor’s report would work against Neomi. They only
alcohol abuse."
perceived that the invocation of the privilege made the report
adverse to Neomi and such was a disreputable presumption.

Josielene filed with the RTC a request for the issuance of a To allow, however, the disclosure during discovery
subpoena duces tecum addressed to Medical City, covering procedure of the hospital records — the results of tests that
Johnny's medical records when he was there confined. The the physician ordered, the diagnosis of the patient's illness,
request was accompanied by a motion to "be allowed to and the advice or treatment he gave him — would be to
submit in evidence" the records sought by subpoena duces allow access to evidence that is inadmissible without the
tecum. patient's consent. Physician memorializes all this
information in the patient's records. Disclosing them would
Johnny opposed the motion, arguing that the medical records be the equivalent of compelling the physician to testify on
were covered by physician-patient privilege. privileged matters he gained while dealing with the patient,
RTC: sustained the opposition. without the latter's prior consent.
CA: denied Josielene's petition. If courts were to allow the Josielene argues that since Johnny admitted in his answer to
production of medical records, then patients would be left the petition before the RTC that he had been confined in a
with no assurance that whatever relevant disclosures they hospital against his will and in fact attached to his answer a
may have made to their physicians would be kept confidential. Philhealth claim form covering that confinement, he should
The prohibition covers not only testimonies, but also be deemed to have waived the privileged character of its
affidavits, certificates, and pertinent hospital records. records.
Although Johnny can waive the privilege, he did not do so in But, trial in the case had not yet begun. Consequently, it
this case. He attached the Philhealth form to his answer for cannot be said that Johnny had already presented the
the limited purpose of showing his alleged forcible Philhealth claim form in evidence, the act contemplated
confinement. above which would justify Josielene into requesting an
inquiry into the details of his hospital confinement. Johnny
was not yet bound to adduce evidence in the case when he
ISSUE: filed his answer. Any request for disclosure of his hospital
records would again be premature.
WON the denial of the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum
covering Johnny's hospital records on the ground that these
are covered by the privileged character of the physician-
patient communication is correct 22) NERI V SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF
PUBLIC OFFICERS
DOCTRINE:
RULING:
The confidentiality of the President’s conversations and
Yes. correspondence is not unique. It is akin to the confidentiality
of judicial deliberations. It possesses the same value as the
The time to object to the admission of evidence, such as the right to privacy of all citizens and more, because it is dictated
hospital records, would be at the time they are offered. The by public interest and the constitutionally ordained
offer could be made part of the physician's testimony or as separation of governmental powers.
independent evidence that he had made entries in those
records that concern the patient's health problems.
Section 36, Rule 132, states that objections to evidence must FACTS:
be made after the offer of such evidence for admission in
court. The Senate issued various Senate Resolutions directing
Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and
Since the offer of evidence is made at the trial, Josielene's Investigations of the Senate (popularly known as the Senate
request for subpoena duces tecum is premature. She will Blue Ribbon Committee), among others, to conduct an
have to wait for trial to begin before making a request for the investigation regarding the NBN-ZTE deal. Neri, the head of
issuance of a subpoena duces tecum covering Johnny's NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue
hospital records. It is when those records are produced for Ribbon. Petitioner appeared before respondent Committees
examination at the trial, that Johnny may opt to object, not and testified for about eleven (11) hours on matters
just to their admission in evidence, but more so to their concerning the National Broadband Project (the "NBN
disclosure. Project"), a project awarded by the Department of
Transportation and Communications ("DOTC") to Zhong Xing
It is possible to treat Josielene's motion for the issuance of a Telecommunications Equipment ("ZTE"). He disclosed that
subpoena duces tecum covering the hospital records as a the COMELEC Chairman Abalos offered him P200M in
motion for production of documents, a discovery procedure exchange for his approval of the NBN Project, that he
available to a litigant prior to trial. But the right to compel the informed PGMA about the bribery and that she instructed
production of documents has a limitation: the documents to him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further
be disclosed are "not privileged." on what they discussed about the NBN Project, he refused to
Josielene claims that the hospital records subject of this case answer, invoking “executive privilege”. In particular, he
is not privileged since it is the "testimonial" evidence of the refused to answer the questions on:
physician that may be regarded as privileged. Section 24 (c) of (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN
Rule 130 states that the physician "cannot in a civil case, Project,
without the consent of the patient, be examined" regarding
their professional conversation. The privilege, says Josielene, (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and
does not cover the hospital records, but only the examination
of the physician at the trial. (c) whether or not she directed him to approve.

On November 20, 2007, petitioner did not appear before B. The "doctrine of operational proximity" was laid down
respondent Committees upon orders of the President invoking precisely to limit the scope of the presidential
executive privilege. On November 22, 2007, the respondent communications privilege but, in any case, it is not
Committees issued the show-cause letter requiring him to conclusive.
explain why he should not be cited in contempt.
In the case at bar, the danger of expanding the privilege "to a
Respondent Committees found petitioner’s explanations large swath of the executive branch" is absent because the
unsatisfactory, citing petitioner in contempt of respondent official involved here is a member of the Cabinet, thus,
Committees and ordering his arrest and detention at the properly within the term "advisor" of the President; in fact,
Office of the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms until such time that he her alter ego and a member of her official family.
would appear and give his testimony.
C. The President’s claim of executive privilege is not merely
based on a generalized interest; and in balancing respondent
Committees’ and the President’s clashing interests, the Court
ISSUES: did not disregard the 1987 Constitutional provisions on
(1) Whether or not there is a recognized presumptive government transparency, accountability and disclosure of
presidential communications privilege in our legal system; information.
(2) Whether or not there is factual or legal basis to hold that The Letter dated November 15, 2007 of Executive Secretary
the communications elicited by the three (3) questions are Ermita specified presidential communications privilege in
covered by executive privilege; relation to diplomatic and economic relations with another
sovereign nation as the bases for the claim. It is easy to
(3) Whether or not respondent Committees have shown that discern the danger that goes with the disclosure of the
the communications elicited by the three (3) questions are President’s communication with her advisor. The NBN Project
critical to the exercise of their functions; involves a foreign country as a party to the agreement. It was
actually a product of the meeting of minds between officials
of the Philippines and China. Whatever the President says
RULING: about the agreement - particularly while official negotiations
are ongoing - are matters which China will surely view with
(1) There Is a Recognized Presumptive Presidential particular interest.
Communications Privilege
Privileged character of diplomatic negotiations
The Court, in the earlier case of Almonte v. Vasquez, affirmed
that the presidential communications privilege is fundamental In PMPF v. Manglapus, the therein petitioners were seeking
to the operation of government and inextricably rooted in the information from the President’s representatives on the state
separation of powers under the Constitution. of the then on-going negotiations of the RP-US Military Bases
Agreement. The Court denied the petition, stressing that
“There are certain types of information which the government "secrecy of negotiations with foreign countries is not
may withhold from the public". There is a "governmental violative of the constitutional provisions of freedom of
privilege against public disclosure with respect to state secrets speech or of the press nor of the freedom of access to
regarding military, diplomatic and other national security information."
matters". "The right to information does not extend to matters
recognized as ‘privileged information’ under the separation of No Executive can effectively discharge constitutional
powers, by which the Court meant Presidential conversations, functions in the face of intense and unchecked legislative
correspondences, and discussions in closed-door Cabinet incursion into the core of the President’s decision-making
meetings. process, which inevitably would involve her conversations
with a member of her Cabinet.
In light of this highly exceptional nature of the privilege, the
Court finds it essential to limit to the President the power to For clarity, it must be emphasized that the assailed Decision
invoke the privilege. She may of course authorize the did not enjoin respondent Committees from inquiring into
Executive Secretary to invoke the privilege on her behalf, in the NBN Project. All that is expected from them is to respect
which case the Executive Secretary must state that the matters that are covered by executive privilege.
authority is "By order of the President", which means that he (3) Respondent Committees Failed to Show that the
personally consulted with her. President may not authorize her Communications Elicited by the Three Questions Are Critical
subordinates to exercise such power. to the Exercise of their Functions
In this case, it was the President herself, through Executive In U.S. v. Nixon, Court ruled that the President's generalized
Secretary Ermita, who invoked executive privilege on a specific assertion of privilege must yield to the demonstrated,
matter involving an executive agreement between the specific need for evidence in a pending criminal trial.
Philippines and China, which was the subject of the three (3)
questions. In this case we must weigh the importance of the general
privilege of confidentiality of Presidential
(2) There Are Factual and Legal Bases to Hold that the communications in performance of the President's
Communications Elicited by the Three (3) Questions Are responsibilities against the inroads of such a privilege on
Covered by Executive Privilege the fair administration of criminal justice. (emphasis
A. The power to enter into an executive agreement is a supplied)
"quintessential and non-delegable presidential power." xxx xxx xxx
...the allowance of the privilege to withhold evidence
that is demonstrably relevant in a criminal trial would

cut deeply into the guarantee of due process of law and Spouses Lee Tek Sheng (Lee) and Keh Shiok Cheng (Keh) came
gravely impair the basic function of the to the Philippines as immigrants from China. They have 11
courts. A President's acknowledged need for children (Lee-Keh children).
confidentiality in the communications of his office
is general in nature, whereas the constitutional need for Lee then brought from China Tiu Chuan (Tiu), a young
production of relevant evidence in a criminal proceeding Chinese woman to serve as housemaid. The respondent Leh-
is specific and central to the fair adjudication of a Keh children believes that Tiu left the Leh-Keh household and
particular criminal case in the administration of move into another property of Lee and had an illicit relation
justice. Without access to specific facts a criminal and made 8 children
prosecution may be totally frustrated. The President's After Keh died, the Lee-Keh children learned that Tiu’s
broad interest in confidentiality of children with Lee (Lee’s other children) claimed that they
communication will not be vitiated by disclosure of a were too children of Lee and Keh. Leh-Keh children then
limited number of conversations preliminarily shown to requested the NBI to investigate.
have some bearing on the pending criminal cases.
NBI’s Findings
We conclude that when the ground for asserting privilege
NBI concluded that the mother of the 8 children is obviously
as to subpoenaed materials sought for use in a criminal
not Keh, but most probably Tiu. Upon further evaluation, this
trial is based only on the generalized interest in
could be Lee’s grand design in order to elevate the status of
confidentiality, it cannot prevail over the fundamental
his 8 children as legitimate children and secure their future.
demands of due process of law in the fair administration
NBI also found out from the hospital records that the eldest
of criminal justice. The generalized assertion of privilege
among the Lee’s other children (who was recorded as the
must yield to the demonstrated, specific need for
12th child of Lee and Keh), was born of a 17 yo mother, when
evidence in a pending criminal trial. (emphasis supplied)
Keh was already 38 years old at the time and so forth. IOW,
In the case at bar, we are not confronted with a court’s need by the hospital records of the Lee’s other children, Keh’s
for facts in order to adjudge liability in a criminal case but declared age did not coincide with her actual age when she
rather with the Senate’s need for information in relation to its supposedly gave birth to such other children, numbering 8.
legislative functions. This leads us to consider once again just
how critical is the subject information in the discharge of On the basis of this report, the respondent Leh-Keh children
respondent Committees’ functions. The burden to show this is file two separate petitions for the deletion from the
on the respondent Committees, since they seek to intrude into certificate of live birth of Petitioner Emma Lee, one of Lee’s
the sphere of competence of the President in order to gather other children, the name Keh and replace the same with Tiu
information which, according to said respondents, would "aid" to indicate her true mother’s name.
them in crafting legislation. Lee-Keh children then filed a request for the issuance of a
Interestingly, during the Oral Argument before this Court, the subpoena ad testificandum to compel Tiu, petitioner’s
counsel for respondent Committees impliedly admitted that presumed mother, to testify in the case. RTC granted it. Tiu
the Senate could still come up with legislations even without moved to quash the same.
petitioner answering the three (3) questions. In other words,
the information being elicited is not so critical after all. Tiu’s contention
The subpoena issued on Tiu are:
Legislative inquiries, unlike court proceedings, are not subject
to the exacting standards of evidence essential to arrive at 1. Oppressive considering her advanced age; and
accurate factual findings to which to apply the law. Hence, 2. It violates Section 25, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,
Section 10 of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing the rule parental privilege, compelling her to testify
Inquiries in Aid of Legislation provides that "technical rules of against her stepdaughter
evidence applicable to judicial proceedings which do not affect
substantive rights need not be observed by the Committee."
Court rules which prohibit leading, hypothetical, or repetitive RTC – granted the quashal for being oppressive considering
questions or questions calling for a hearsay answer, to name a Tiu’s old age and the purpose of the subpoena is to badger
few, do not apply to a legislative inquiry. Every person, from her to admit the she was petitioner’s mother.
the highest public official to the most ordinary citizen, has the
right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty in proper CA - set aside the order of the RTC.
proceedings by a competent court or body.
ISSUE: WON TIU MAY BE COMPELLED TO TESTIFY IN THE

CORRECTION OF ENTRY CASE TO SHOW THAT PETITIONER
23) Lee vs. CA EMMA LEE IS NOT KEH’S DAUGHTER
KEY WORDS: cheater Chinese husband; 1st family (KEH) vs 2nd
family (Tiu) RULING:
YES, TIU MAY BE COMPELLED TO TESTIFY.

ONE LINER/PRINCIPLE: The parental and filial privilege rule
applies only to “direct” ascendants/descendants, a family tie Sec. 25. Parental and filial privilege. - No person may be
connected by a common ancestry. It has no application to a compelled to testify against his parents, other direct
stepdaughter who has no common ancestry to her ascendants, children or other direct descendants.
stepmother.
The privilege cannot apply to them because the rule applies
only to “direct” ascendants and descendants, a family tie
FACTS:
connected by a common ancestry. A stepdaughter has no allegedly contained evidence showing that the petitioner
common ancestry by her stepmother. held a 3.3 billion secret bank account under the name Jose
Velarde. The prosecutors walked out in protest. This led to
Consequently, Tiu can be compelled to testify against protests all over Metro Manila demanding petitioner to
petitioner resign.
On January 19, the fall of petitioner seemed inevitable. At

24) ESTRADA v. DESIERTO 2:30pm petitioner agreed to the holding of a snap election
for President where he would not be a candidate. It did not
FACTS: diffuse the growing crisis. At 3pm, the AFP withdrew their
support for the government. A little later, PNP Chief Panfilo
In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Estrada (Erap) Lacson and the major service commanders gave a similar
was elected president while Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) announcement. Rallies for resignation exploded around the
was elected as his VP. 10 million Filipinos voted for petitioner nation. To stem the tide of rage, petitioner announced that
believing he would rescue them from lifes adversity. They he was ordering his lawyers to agree to the opening of the
were both to serve a 6-year term commencing June 30, 1998. highly controversial second envelope.
From the beginning of his term, however, petitioner was January 20 was the day of surrender. At 12 noon, Chief
plagued by a plethora of problems that slowly but surely Justice Davide, after negotiations in the Malacañang,
eroded his popularity. His sharp descent from power started administered the oath to respondent GMA as President of
on October 4, 2000. Chavit Singson, a longtime friend of the Philippines. At 2:30 pm, petitioner and his family
petitioner, went on air and accused the petitioner, his family hurriedly left the Palace. He then issued a press statement
and friends, of receiving millions of pesos from juteng lords. stating that:
The next day, Senator Teofisto Guingona then took the floor
and delivered a fiery privilege speech entitled “I Accuse”. He At twelve o'clock noon today, Vice President Gloria
accused the petitioner of receiving P220 million in jueteng Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath as President of the
money from Governor Singson from 1998-2000. He also Republic of the Philippines. While along with many other
charged that the petitioner took from Governor Singson 70 legal minds of our country, I have strong and serious
million on excise tax on cigarettes intended for Ilocos Sur. The doubts about the legality and constitutionality of her
privilege speech was referred by then Senate President proclamation as President, I do not wish to be a factor
Franklin Drilon, to the Blue-Ribbon Committee and the that will prevent the restoration of unity and order in our
Committee on Justice for joint investigation. civil society.
The HREP did no less. The House Committee on Public Order It is for this reason that I now leave Malacañang Palace,
and Security decided to investigate the expose of Governor the seat of the presidency of this country, for the sake of
Singson. On the other hand, Representatives Alvarez, Herrera, peace and in order to begin the healing process of our
and Defensor spearheaded the move to impeach the nation. I leave the Palace of our people with gratitude
petitioner. for the opportunities given to me for service to our
people. I will not shirk from any future challenges that
Calls for the resignation of the petitioner filled the air. The may come ahead in the same service of our country.
church and former Presidents Cory Aquino and Fidel Ramos
joined the cry for resignation. Respondent Arroyo resigned as I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in the
Secretary of the Department of Social Welfare and Services promotion of a constructive national spirit of
and later asked for the petitioner’s resignation. However, reconciliation and solidarity.
petitioner held on to his office and refused to sign. 4 economic
May the Almighty bless our country and beloved people.
advisers resigned, as well as Secretary Mar Roxas II of DTI.
MABUHAY!
The month of November ended with a big bang. In a
tumultuous session on November 13, House Speaker Villar
transmitted the Articles of Impeachment signed by 115
representatives, or more than 1/3 of all the members of the ISSUE:
HREP to the Senate. This caused political convulsions in both
(daghan nig issue but I’ll just include the ones related to
house of the Congress. Senator Drilon was replaced by
evidence)
Senator Pimentel as Senate President. Speaker Villar was
unseated by Fuentebella. On November 20, the Senate WON the use of the Angara Diary as evidence was proper -
formally opened the impeachment trial of the petitioner. 21 YES
senators took their oath as judges with SC CJ Justice Hilario
Davide presiding. WON the use of the Angara Diary to determine the state of
mind of petitioner violates the rule against the admission of
In December, the impeachment trial started. They day to day hearsay evidence – NO it does not violate hearsay evidence
trial was covered by live TV and during its course enjoyed the rule
highest viewing rating. The dramatic point of the hearings was
the testimony of Clarissa Ocampo, senior VP of Equitable-PCI
Bank. She testified that she was one foot away from petitioner RULING:
Estrada when he affixed the signature “Jose Velarde” on
documents involving a P500 million investment agreement To begin with, the Angara diary is NOT an out of court
with their bank. statement. The Angara Diary is part of the pleadings in the
cases at bar. Petitioner cannot complain he was not furnished
On January 16, when by a vote of 11-10 the senator-judges a copy of the Angara Diary. The said diary was frequently
ruled against the opening of the second envelope which referred to by the parties in their pleadings. The three parts
of the diary were attached as Annexes A-C of the Angara Diary, the petitioner told Secretary Angara: “Since the
Memorandum of private respondents. In fact, petitioner even start of the campaign, Ed, you have been the only one I’ve
cited in his Second Supplemental Reply Memorandum both listened to. And now, at the end, you still are.” True to this
the second part of the diary, and the third part. It was also trust, petitioner has to ask Secretary Angara if he already had
extensively used by the Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez in to leave the Palace after their final lunch. Angara told him to
his oral arguments. Thus, petitioner had all the opportunity to go and he did. Petitioner cannot deny that Angara headed his
contest to the use of the Diary but unfortunately failed to do team of negotiators that met with the team of respondent
so. Arroyo to discuss the peaceful and orderly transfer of power
after his relinquishment. The Diary shows that petitioner was
Even assuming arguendo that the Angara Diary was an out of always briefed by Secretary Angara on the progress of their
court statement, still its use is not covered by the hearsay rule. negotiations. Secretary Angara acted for and in behalf of the
Evidence is called hearsay when its probative force depends petitioner in the crucial days before respondent Arroyo took
on the competency and credibility of some persons other than her oath as President. Consequently, petitioner is bound by
the witness. There are 3 reasons for excluding hearsay the acts and declarations of Secretary Angara.
evidence, namely: (1) absence of cross-examination; (2)
absence of demeanor evidence; and (3) absence of oath. Not Under our rules of evidence, the ban on hearsay evidence
all hearsay evidence however is inadmissible as evidence. Over does not cover independently relevant statements. These
the years, a huge body of hearsay evidence has been admitted are statements which are relevant independently of
by the courts due to their relevance, trustworthiness, and whether they are true or not. They belong to 2 classes: (1)
necessity. those statements which are the very facts in issue, and (2)
those statements which are circumstantial evidence of the
A complete analysis of any hearsay problem requires that we facts in issue. The second class includes the following:
further determine whether the hearsay evidence is one
exempted from the rules of exclusion. A more circumspect (a) Statements of a person showing his state of mind,
examination of our rules of exclusion will show that they do that is his mental condition, knowledge, belief, intention,
not cover admissions of a party and the Angara Diary belongs ill will and other emotions;
to this class. xxx
The Angara Diary contains direct statements of petitioner As afore-discussed, the Angara Diary contains statements of
which can be categorized as admissions of a party: his the petitioner which reflect his state of mind and are
proposal for a snap presidential election where he would not circumstantial evidence of his intent to resign. It also
be a candidate, his statement that he would leave by Monday contains statements of Secretary Angara from which we can
if the second envelope would be opened by Monday and reasonably deduce petitioner’s intent to resign. They are
“pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko na, masyado nang masakit. admissible and they are not covered by the rules on hearsay.
Pagod na ako sa red tape, bureaucracy, intriga. I just want to
clear my name then I will go”. The reason for the meltdown is Petitioner also contends that the rules on authentication of
obvious – his will not to resign has wilted. private writings and best evidence were violated. It is true
that the Court relied not upon the original but only a copy of
It is, however, argued that the Diary is not the diary of the the Angara Diary. In doing so, the Court did NOT, however,
petitioner, hence, not binding on him. The argument overlooks violate the best evidence rule.
the doctrine of Adoptive Admission. An adoptive admission is
a party’s reaction to a statement or action by another person The Court held that with regard to the Best Evidence Rule,
when it is reasonable to treat the party’s reaction as an the production of the original may be dispensed with
admission of something stated or implied by the other whenever in the case in hand the opponent does not bona
person. In the Angara Diary, the options of the petitioner fide dispute the contents of the document and no other
started to dwindle when the armed forces withdrew its useful purpose will be served by requiring production.
support from him as President and commander-in-chief. Thus, Secondary evidence of the content of the writing will be
Executive Secretary Angara had to ask Senate President received in evidence if no objection is made to its reception.
Pimentel to advise petitioner to consider the option of a With regard to the authentication, it is no longer required
dignified exit or resignation. Petitioner did not object to the because the genuineness of such was not denied.
suggested option but simply said he could never leave the
country. Petitioner’s silence on this and other related
suggestions can be taken as an admission by him. 25) PEOPLE v GODOY (Teacher falsely prosecuted for rape)
Petitioner further contends that the use of the Angara Diary PRINCIPLE: No implied admission can be drawn from the
against him violated the rule on res inter alios acta. The rule is efforts to arrive at a settlement outside the court, where the
expressed in Section 28 of the Rule 130 of the Rules of Court: accused did not take part in any of the negotiations
The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act,
declaration, or omission of another, except as herein
otherwise provided. FACTS:
Petitioner errs in his contention. The res inter alios acta rule Accused-appellant Danny Godoy was charged in two separate
has several exceptions. One of them is provided in Section 29 informations filed before the RTC of Palawan with rape and
of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court with respect to admissions kidnapping with serious illegal detention.
by a co-partner or agent.
According to complainant Mia Taha, at around 7:00 P.M. of
Executive Secretary Angara as such was an alter ego of the January 21, 1994, she went to the boarding house of her
petitioner. He was the little president. Indeed, he was cousin, Merlylyn Casantosan, at Pulot Center, Brooke's Point
authorized by the petitioner to act for him in the critical hours which is near the Palawan National School (PNS), Pulot
and days before he left the Palace. Thus, according to the Branch, where she was studying. When she saw that the
house was dark, she decided to pass through the kitchen door informed her that Mia was at Brooke's Point. He further
at the back because she knew that there was nobody inside. conveyed appellant's willingness to become a Muslim so he
As soon as she opened the door, somebody suddenly grabbed could marry Mia and thus settle the case. Helen Taha readily
her, poked a knife on her neck, dragged her by the hand and acceded because she wanted to see her daughter.
told her not to shout. She was then forced to lie down on the
floor. Although it was dark, complainant was able to recognize In the morning of January 27, 1994, she went to the house of
her assailant, by the light coming from the moon and through Naem who sent somebody to fetch complainant. She testified
his voice, as accused-appellant Danny Godoy who was her that when Mia arrived, she was crying as she reported that
Physics teacher at PNS. she was raped by appellant, and that the latter threatened to
kill her if she did not return within an hour. Because of this,
When she was already on the floor, appellant removed her she immediately brought Mia to the hospital where the latter
panty with one hand while holding the knife with the other was examined and then they proceeded to the municipal hall
hand, opened the zipper of his pants, and then inserted his to file a complaint for rape and kidnapping. Both Mia and
private organ inside her private parts against her will. She felt Helen Taha executed separate sworn statements before the
pain because it was her first experience and she cried. PNP at Brooke's Point.
Throughout her ordeal, she could not utter a word. She was
very frightened because a knife was continually pointed at her. Later, Fruit Godoy, the wife of appellant, went to their house
She also could not fight back nor plead with appellant not to and offered P50,000.00 for the settlement of the case. On
rape her because he was her teacher and she was afraid of their part, her husband insisted that they just settle, hence all
him. She was threatened not to report the incident to anyone three of them, Adjeril(father), Helen and Mia Taha, went to
or else she and her family would be killed. the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor where they met with
the mother of appellant who gave them P30,000.00. Adjeril
Thereafter, while she was putting on her panty, she noticed and Helen Taha subsequently executed an affidavit of
that her skirt was stained with blood. Appellant walked with desistance for the case of kidnapping pending in the
her to the gate of the house and she then proceeded alone to prosecutor's office.
the boarding house where she lived. She did not see where
appellant went after she left him at the gate. When she The defense presented a different version of what actually
arrived at her boarding house, she saw her landlady but she transpired.
did not mention anything about the incident. According to appellant, he first met Mia Taha sometime in
The following morning, January 22, 1994, complainant went August, 1993 at the PNS. Although he did not court her, he
home to her parents' house at Ipilan, Brooke's Point. She fell in love with her because she often told him " Sir, I love
likewise did not tell her parents about the incident for fear you". What started as a joke later developed into a serious
that appellant might make good his threat. At around 3:00 relationship which was kept a secret from everybody else.
P.M. of that same day, appellant arrived at the house of her He stated that there was no rape and kidnapping that was
parents and asked permission from the latter if complainant done as they were in a serious relationship. The defense
could accompany him to solicit funds because she was a presented witnesses that corroborated their alleged
candidate for "Miss PNS Pulot." When her parents agreed, she relationship (will be discussed in the ruling). The appellant
was constrained to go with appellant because she did not also said that whenever she wanted to leave the
want her parents to get into trouble. complainant, she threatened to commit suicide.
She was forced to ride the jeep because appellant threatened While appellant was already on his way out of Edward's
to kill her if she would not board the vehicle. The jeep Subdivision, he was met by Chief of Police Eliseo Crespo who
proceeded to the Sunset Garden at the poblacion, Brooke's invited him to the police station. Appellant waited at the
Point where they alighted. police station the whole afternoon but when complainant,
At the Sunset Garden, appellant checked in and brought her to her parents and relatives arrived at around 5:00 P.M., he was
a room where they stayed for three days. During the entire not given the chance to talk to any one of them. That
duration of their stay at the Sunset Garden, complainant was afternoon of January 2 7, 1994, appellant was no longer
not allowed to leave the room which was always kept locked. allowed to leave and he was detained at the police station
She was continuously guarded and constantly raped by after Mia and her parents lodged a complaint for rape and
appellant. She was, however, never drunk or unconscious. kidnapping against him.
Nonetheless, she was forced to have sex with appellant During his detention, Mia's cousin, Lorna Casantosan,
because the latter was always carrying a knife with him. delivered to appellant on different occasions two letters from
In the early morning of January 25, 1994, appellant brought complainant. As Mia's teacher, appellant is familiar with and
her to the house of his friend at Edward's Subdivision where was, therefore, able to identify the handwriting in said letters
she was raped by him three times. She was likewise detained as that of Mia Taha. After a time, he came to know, through
and locked inside the room and tightly guarded by appellant. his mother, that an affidavit of desistance was reportedly
After two days, or on January 27, 1994, they left the place executed by complainants. However, he claims that he never
because appellant came to know that complainant had been knew and it was never mentioned to him, not until the day
reported and indicated as a missing person in the police he testified in court, that his mother paid P30,000.00 to Mia's
blotter. They went to see a certain Naem from whom father because, although he did not dissuade them, neither
appellant sought help. On that same day, she was released but did he request his mother to talk to complainants in order to
only after her parents agreed to settle the case with appellant. settle the case. However, pursuant to a joint resolution issued
on March 11, 1994 by the Prosecutor, two separate
Early the next morning, Helen (mother of Mia) and her informations for rape and for kidnapping with serious illegal
husband went to the PNP station at Pulot, Brooke's Point and detention were nevertheless filed against appellant
had the incident recorded in the police blotter. When she Danny Godoy with no bail recommended in both charges.
returned home, a certain Naem was waiting there and he

ISSUE: Whether the offer of compromise is an admission of Divinagracia. Upon closer scrutiny, however, we find that said
guilt of the appellant findings neither support nor confirm the charge that rape
was so committed through forcible means by appellant
against complainant on January 21, 1994.
In rape of the nature alleged in this case, we repeat, the
RULING: NO. testimony of the complainant must be corroborated by
physical evidence showing use of force.
In the case at bar, several circumstances exist which amply
demonstrate and ineluctably convince this Court that there There is likewise no evidence on record that she put up a
was no rape committed on the alleged date and place, and struggle when appellant forced her to lie on the floor,
that the charge of rape was the contrivance of an removed her panty, opened the zipper of his trousers, and
afterthought, rather than a truthful plaint for redress of an inserted his organ inside her genitals. Neither did she
actual wrong. demonstrate that appellant, in committing the heinous act,
subjected her to any force of whatever nature or form.
The prosecution has palpably failed to prove beyond
peradventure of doubt that appellant had sexual congress Complainant's enigmatic behavior after her alleged
with complainant against her will. According to complainant, ravishment can only be described as paradoxical: it was so
when she entered the kitchen of the boarding house, strangely normal as to be abnormal. It seems odd, if not
appellant was already inside apparently waiting for her. If so, it incredible, that upon seeing allegedly raped her only the day
is quite perplexing how appellant could have known that she before, she did not accuse, revile or denounce him, or show
was going there on that particular day and at that time, rage, revulsion, and disgust. Instead, she meekly went with
considering that she does not even live there, unless of course appellant despite the presence of her parents and the
it was appellant's intention to satisfy his lustful desires on proximity of neighbors which, if only for such facts, would
anybody who happened to come along. But then this would naturally have deterred appellant from pursuing any evil
be stretching the imagination too far aside from the fact that design.
such a generic intent with an indeterminate victim was never The main defense proffered by appellant is that he and
established nor even intimated by the prosecution. complainant were sweethearts. While the "sweetheart
Appellant, on the other hand, testified that on that fateful day, theory" does not often gain favor with this Court, such is not
he went to the boarding house upon the invitation of always the case if the hard fact is that the accused and the
complainant because the latter requested him to help her with supposed victim are, in truth, intimately related except that,
her monologue for the Miss PNS contest. However, they were as is usual in most cases, either the relationship is illicit or the
not able to go inside the house because it was locked and victim's parents are against it. It is not improbable that in
there was no light, so they just sat on a bench outside the some instances, when the relationship is uncovered, the
house and talked. This testimony of appellant was alleged victim or her parents for that matter would rather
substantially corroborated by defense witness Filomena take the risk of instituting a criminal action in the hope that
Pielago. She affirmed that in the evening of January 21, 1994, the court would take the cudgels for them than for the
she saw both appellant and complainant seated on a bench woman to admit to her own acts of indiscretion. And this, as
outside the boarding house. the records reveal, is precisely what happened to appellant.
It was further alleged by complainant that after her alleged Appellant's claim that he and complainant were lovers is
ravishment, she put on her panty and then appellant openly fortified by the highly credible testimonies of several
accompanied her all the way to the gate of the house where witnesses for the defense, viz.: (daghan ni pero ang
they eventually parted ways. This is inconceivable. It is not the significant ra ako gi-include para di na kaayo taas)
natural tendency of a man to remain for long by the side of 1. Filomena Pielago testified that on the night of
the woman he had raped, and in public in a highly populated January 21, 1994, she saw appellant and
area at that. Given the stealth that accompanies it and the complainant sitting on a bench in front of the house
anxiety to end further exposure at the scene, the logical post- where the sexual attack allegedly took place, and
incident impulse of the felon is to distance himself from his the couple were talking intimately. She had warned
victim as far and as soon as practicable, to avoid discovery and Mia about the latter's illicit affair with appellant.
apprehension.
2. Fernando Rubio, an acquaintance of appellant
Complainant's professed reason for going to the boarding and owner of the house at Edward's Subdivision,
house is vague and tenuous. At first, she asserted that she was testified that he asked Mia why she decided to have
at the boarding house talking with a friend and then, later, she an affair with appellant who is a married man. Mia
said it was her cousin. Subsequently, she again wavered and answered that she really loves him. He heard her call
said that she was not able to talk to her cousin. Furthermore, appellant "Papa". The couple looked happy and
she initially stated that on January 21, 1994 at around 7:00 were sweet to each other.
P.M., she was at the boarding house conversing with her
cousin. Then in the course of her narration, she gave another 3. Erna Baradero, a co-teacher of appellant, saw the
version and said that when she reached the boarding house it couple the day before the alleged rape incident,
was dark and there was nobody inside. inside one of the classrooms and they were holding
hands, and she heard Mia tell appellant "Mahal na
Complainant testified that appellant raped her through the mahal kita Sir, iwanan mo ang iyong asawa at
use of force and intimidation, specifically by holding a knife to tatakas tayo." She tried to dissuade complainant
her neck. However, the element of force was not sufficiently from continuing with her relationship with
established. The physical facts adverted to by the lower court appellant.
as corroborative of the prosecution's theory on the use of
force are undoubtedly the medico-legal findings of Dr. Rogelio
The positive allegations of appellant that he was having an (Re: Kidnapping) When they left the house, appellant walked
intimate relationship with complainant, which were ahead of her, obviously with her parents and their neighbors
substantially corroborated by several witnesses, were never witnessing their departure. It is difficult to comprehend how
successfully confuted. The rebuttal testimony of complainant one could deduce from these normal and innocuous
merely consisted of bare, unexplained denials of the positive, arrangement any felonious intent of appellant to deprive
definite, consistent and detailed assertions of appellant. Mere complainant of her liberty. One will look in vain for a case
denials are self-serving negative evidence. They cannot obtain where a kidnapping was committed under such inauspicious
evidentiary weight greater than the declarations of credible circumstances as described by complainant.
disinterested witnesses.
Appellant declared that when they left the house of the Taha
(TOPIC) The prosecution insists that the offer of compromise family, complainant was bringing with her a plastic bag which
made by appellant is deemed to be an admission of guilt. This later turned out to contain her clothes. This bag was left
inference in the instant case. In criminal cases, an offer of behind by Mia at Edward's Subdivision, as hereinbefore
compromise is generally admissible as evidence against the noted, and was later delivered to appellant by Benedicto
party making it. It is a legal maxim, which assuredly Rubio. Again, we cannot conceive of a ridiculous situation
constitutes one of the bases of the right to penalize, that in where the kidnap victim was first allowed to prepare and
the matter of public crimes which directly affect the public pack her clothes, as if she was merely leaving for a pleasant
interest, no compromise whatever may be entered into as sojourn with the criminal, all these with the knowledge and
regards the penal action. It has long been held, however, that consent of her parents who passively looked on without
in such cases the accused is permitted to show that the offer comment.
was not made under a consciousness of guilt, but merely to
avoid the inconvenience of imprisonment or for some other
reason which would justify a claim by the accused that the 26) People vs Gener de Guzman
offer to compromise was not in truth an admission of his guilt
or an attempt to avoid the legal consequences which would FACTS:
ordinarily ensue therefrom.
Gilda Ambray filed with the MTC of Bacoor, Cavite, a
A primary consideration here is that the evidence for the complaint charging accused Gener de Guzman with the crime
defense overwhelmingly proves appellant's innocence of the of rape. On even date, de Guzman was arrested and detained
offense charged. Further, the supposed offer of marriage did but was later released upon the filing and approval of his bail
not come from appellant but was actually suggested by a bond.
certain Naem, who is an imam or Muslim leader and who
likewise informed appellant that he could be converted into a Finding a prima facie case against him on the basis of the
Muslim so he could marry complainant. As a matter of fact, evidence for the prosecution, the MTC forwarded the record
when said offer was first made to appellant, he declined of the case to the Provincial Prosecutor for the filing of the
because of the fact that he was already married. On top of necessary information with the appropriate court. A case for
these, appellant did not know, not until the trial proper, that rape was then filed. Trial followed.
his mother actually paid P30,000.00 for the settlement of Testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution established
these cases. Complainant's own mother, Helen Taha, testified the following facts:
that present during the negotiations were herself, her
husband, Mia, and appellant's mother. Appellant himself was Homeward bound from a Department Store where she
never present in any of said meetings. worked as a sales clerk, complainant Gilda Ambray was at the
gate of Meadow Wood Subdivision waiting for a tricycle ride
It has been held that where the accused was not present at toward her residence. She waited for about ten minutes.
the time the offer for monetary consideration was made, such When she noticed the accused, sitting at the guardhouse, she
offer of compromise would not save the day for the approached him and asked him some questions. He
prosecution. In another case, this Court ruled that no implied answered in a stammering manner. The complainant
admission can be drawn from the efforts to arrive at a recognized the accused very well because it was summertime
settlement outside the court, where the accused did not take and the gate of the subdivision was well-lit.
part in any of the negotiations and the effort to settle the case
was in accordance with the established tribal customs, that is, After Gilda started to walk, the accused mounted his tricycle,
Muslim practices and traditions, in an effort to prevent further followed her and offered her a ride, to which she agreed.
deterioration of the relations between the parties. While on board the tricycle, Gilda noticed that the accused
took a different route. The accused would once in a while
In the cases at bar, the letters written by complainant to stop the tricycle and tell her that it was not in good
appellant are very revealing. Most probably written out of condition.
desperation and exasperation with the way she was being
treated by her parents, complainant threw all caution to the When they reached Phase II of the same subdivision near an
winds when she wrote. Oo aaminin ko nagkasala ako sa iyo unfinished house, the accused stopped and told Gilda to
pinabilanggo kita dahil nagpanig ako sa mga magulang ko push the tricycle. She alighted from the tricycle and paid him,
nadala nila ako sa sulsul nila hindi ko naipaglaban ang dapat which he did not accept. Gilda then walked away, but after
kong ipaglaban obviously referring to her ineptitude and she had taken about ten steps, the accused embraced her
impotence in helping appellant out of his predicament. It from behind, covered her mouth and held her neck tightly.
could, therefore, be safely presumed that the rape charge was The accused then dragged her to a vacant lot 10 meters away
merely an offshoot of the discovery by her parents of the from the unfinished house. Afterwards, the motherfucker
intimate relationship between her and appellant. In order to consummated his ill intention. The accused then warned
avoid retribution from her parents, together with the moral Gilda not to tell anybody, otherwise, he would kill her and all
pressure exerted upon her by her mother, she was forced to members of her family. Gilda picked up her pants and
concoct her account of the alleged rape.

underwear and hurriedly ran toward her home, without deserves scant consideration. In the first place, Gilda
looking back. explained in her re-direct examination that the three hours
mentioned in her cross-examination referred to the time
When Gilda arrived home, she told her mother and her which elapsed from the moment she was at the gate of
husband, Aquilino Ambray, that she was raped by the accused. Meadow Wood Subdivision and until she reported the
Aquilino got angry and wanted to retaliate but was prevailed incident to the President of the Homeowners' Association.
upon not to by Gilda's mother.
The principal object of re-direct examination is to prevent
Gilda and her mother reported the incident to one Tony injustice to the witness and the party who has called him by
Antonio, the President of the Homeowners' Association. The affording an opportunity to the witness to explain the
accused was then brought to the municipal jail which testimony given on cross-examination, and to explain any
ultimately resulted to the filing of the instant case. apparent contradiction or inconsistency in his statements, an
Gener de Guzman interposed the defense of alibi. According opportunity which is ordinarily afforded to him during cross-
to him, he had a drinking session with his friends. In its examination. The re-direct examination serves the purpose
decision, the trial court found the accused guilty beyond of completing the answer of a witness, or of adding a new
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. The accused appealed matter which has been omitted, or of correcting a possible
hence the case at bar. misinterpretation of testimony.
The upshot of the accused's stance in the errors assigned is In the second place, on direct examination, Gilda
that he was not positively identified and that neither force nor categorically declared that the accused tried to thrice insert
intimidation was proven his penis into her vagina. He failed in the first and second
attempts because she struggled, but succeeded on the third
because she was already weak. While it may be true that on
cross-examination, she testified that she was raped once, yet
ISSUE: WON accused is guilty of rape – YES oy on re-direct examination she said that she was raped three
times, no inconsistency at all may be deduced therefrom.
There was merely confusion as to the legal qualifications of
RULING: the three separate acts, i.e., Gilda's answers were
conclusions of law. A witness is not permitted to testify as to
Rape is essentially an offense of secrecy, not generally
a conclusion of law, among which, legal responsibility is one
attempted except in dark or deserted and secluded places
of the most conspicuous. A witness, no matter how skillful,
away from prying eyes, and the crime usually commences
is not to be asked or permitted to testify as to whether or
solely upon the word of the offended woman herself and
not a party is responsible to the law. The accused is guilty of
conviction invariably turns upon her credibility, as the People's
rape.
single witness of the actual occurrence.
The determination of the guilt of the accused depends

primarily on the credibility of the complainant Gilda Ambray, 27) San Miguel vs Kalalo
since only she and the accused witnessed the incident when
it happened. Her testimony alone, if credible, would render KEYWORD: Inumin ng Tagumpay, San Miguel Beer
the accused's conviction inevitable.
A meticulous assessment of Gilda's testimony demonstrates FACTS:

beyond doubt the truthfulness of her story, which she
narrated in a categorical, straightforward and candid manner. Kalalo was a dealer of San Miguel Corp. In the course of the
Further strengthening her credibility in recounting her ordeal dealings of Kalalo, an agent of SMC requested her to issue
at the hands of the accused was her conduct immediately several postdated checks to secure her credit overdraft for
after the sexual assault. She ran home without looking back, the delivery of SMC beer products over the Christmas season.
and upon her arrival she reported the rape to her husband After making several cash payments and returning a number
and her mother. Immediately thereafter, she reported it to the of empty beer bottles and cases, she noticed she still owed
President of the Homeowners' Association who then sought SMC a substantial amount. She insisted a detailed statement
police assistance. of account but SMC failed to do so. To protect her rights, she
ordered her bank to stop payment on the last seven checks
All the foregoing acts of Gilda were done within 24 hours after she had issued to SMC totaling 921,215. SMC sent demand
the commission of the crime. The quickness and spontaneity letters. Kalalo’s counsel made in return an Offer of
of these deeds manifested the natural reactions of a virtuous Compromise which SMC did not accept but instead, it filed a
woman who had just undergone sexual molestation against case for violation of the Bouncing Check Law. During trial and
herself. after the prosecution rested its case, SMC now complied with
We likewise agree with the trial court that the accused used the statement of account showing that she owed SMC
force and intimidation upon Gilda. 71,009. Kalalo recanted her Offer of Compromise stating that
at the time she prepared the letter, she was threatened by
In this case, the accused embraced Gilda from behind, held SMC for imprisonment and that she does not know how
her neck tightly, and covered her mouth. As she struggled to much she owed. She was acquitted by the MeTC. The appeal
free herself, she sustained her injuries. Moreover, the accused before the RTC by SMC on the issue of civil liability (arguing
also threatened Gilda with death if she would not yield to his that SMC is entitled 921,215) and a subsequent Petition for
bestial desires. The threat certainly constituted intimidation. Review before the CA was likewise dismissed. Hence this
petition.
The accused's contention that it was highly incredible that
there was force or intimidation since the assailant committed
three acts of sexual intercourse with Gilda in three hours,
ISSUE: porridge for the Yparraguirres, appellant arrived from work.

Finding out that the children were sleeping, he gave Rosita a
WON the Offer of Compromise may be considered in evidence white envelope with 15 tablets inside, allegedly for the skin
against Kalalo? disease of Rosita’s thigh. The latter took all the tablets as
SMC argues that her Offer of Compromise unequivocally instructed. However, she became weak and fell down. She
admitted her liability while being assister by her counsel. later on found herself on the bed of the appellant who
pointed a hunting knife at her neck and succeeded carnal
knowledge against her will. She was later on punched on the
stomach and lost consciousness. She was threatened by the
RULING: No appellant should she report the incident. After one month,
Contrary to SMCs contention, the aforequoted letter does not she went home to her mother where her mother found her
contain an express acknowledgment of liability. At most, what helpless, not being able to talk and eat, which resulted to her
respondent acknowledged was the receipt of the statement of confinement in a mental hospital in Davao. When Rosita
account, not the existence of her liability to SMC. finally revealed to her mother the incident, a case of rape
Furthermore, the fact that Kalalo made a compromise offer to was filed against appellant who pleaded not guilty. He was
SMC cannot be considered as an admission of liability. In later on convicted.
Pentagon Steel vs CA, the reason why compromise offer may Note: Prior to the filing of the case, the wife of the appellant
not be considered as evidence against the offerror: went to the house of Rosita and offered compromise with her
1. Indeed, if every offer to buy peace could be used as mother so as to drop the case. Not discussed in the facts.
evidence against a person who presents it, many
settlements would be prevented and unnecessary
litigation would result, since no prudent person would ISSUE:
dare offer or entertain a compromise if his or her
compromise position could be exploited as a WON the offer of compromise made before filing of a
confession of weakness. criminal complaint should be admitted as evidence.
2. A true offer of compromise does not, in legal RULING:

contemplation, involve an admission on the part of a There is evidence that after Rosita revealed the rape to her
defendant that he or she is legally liable, or on the mother, appellant's wife, Mary Ann, offered the mother,
part of a plaintiff, that his or her claim is groundless Merlyn P15,000.00 to dissuade her from filing the complaint.
or even doubtful, since it is made with a view to avoid When Merlyn refused, Mary Ann increased the offer to
controversy and save the expense of litigation. P25,000.00. Still Merlyn refused to accept it. As pointed out
SMC argues that Kalalo’s Offer of Compromise may be received by appellant, no criminal complaint had been filed at the
in evidence as an implied admission of guilt pursuant to Sec. time the compromise offer was made. Nevertheless, the rape
27 Rule 130 ROC. incident was already known to appellant's wife. Wife herself
testified that Merlyn told her about it on the day when wife
RULING: No first offered the money. An offer to compromise does not
require that a criminal complaint be first filed before the
The Offer of Compromise was made prior to the filing of the offer can be received in evidence against the offeror. What is
criminal complaint against her for a violation of the Bouncing required is that after committing the crime, the accused or
Checks Law. The Offer of Compromise was clearly not made in his representative makes an offer to compromise and such
the context of a criminal proceeding and, therefore, cannot be offer is proved.
considered as an implied admission of guilt. Finally, during the
testimony of Kalalo and after her receipt of the Statement of The prosecution’s evidence, which rests mainly on the
Account from SMC, she recanted the contents of the Offer of testimony of Rosita, is credible, reliable and trustworthy.
Compromise. She explained that, at the time she had the Rosita testified in a straightforward, spontaneous and candid
letter prepared, the final amount owed to SMC was yet manner and never wavered even on cross-examination and
undetermined; and that she was constantly facing threats of rebuttal. The inconsistencies in her testimony are minor
imprisonment from SMCs agents. which tend to buttress, rather than weaken, the conclusion
that her testimony was not contrived. Appellant's allegation
that Rosita should have fallen asleep for hours after ingesting
28) PEOPLE v YPARRAGUIRRE the tablets is speculative. There is no evidence that the
tablets were sleeping tablets. They, however, weakened
PRINCIPLE: Rosita and prevented her from making any resistance to
appellant's lewd acts. The delay in filing the complaint does
An offer to compromise does not require that a criminal
not in any way affect Rosita's credibility. She was afraid of
complaint be first filed before the offer can be received in
appellant's threat to her life.
evidence against the offeror. What is required is that after
committing the crime, the accused or his representative Rosita was a seventeen-year old barrio lass and a high school
makes an offer to compromise and such offer is proved. dropout. She was also the breadwinner of the family. It is
hard to believe that Rosita would fabricate a story of
defloration, open herself to public trial and place her family,
FACTS: who depended on her, in a very humiliating and
compromising situation for no reason at all. She had been
Rosita Bacaling, a 17-year-old barrio lass, who was not yet working for the Yparraguirres for two months and the
deflorated, was working as a housemaid with accused- spouses actually found her to be a good worker. Rosita's
appellant Yparraguirre and his wife. While she was cooking

psychological condition could not have been the product of ill- demanded that he remove the same, on the ground, among
motive and fabrication. others, that the sidewalk was not part of the land which he
had purchased on installment basis from XEI.
The positive identification of accused-appellant as the rapist
prevails over his defense of alibi. It was not physically Subsequently, XEI turned over its selling operations to OBM.
impossible for appellant to have been at the scene of the OBM warned Manalo, Jr., that "putting up of a business sign
crime. The public market was merely a ten-minute walk from is specifically prohibited by their contract of conditional sale"
their rented room and during work breaks, appellant would and that his failure to comply with its demand would impel it
sometimes go home to bring food to his children. to avail of the remedies as provided in their contract of
conditional sale.
The Commercial Bank of Manila (CBM) subsequently

29) Bank of Commerce v Manalo acquired the Xavierville Estate from OBM. CBM requested
KEYWORD: (Spouses purchased Lot 1 & 2, Block 2 in Perla Manalo to stop any on-going construction on the
installments) property since it (CBM) was the owner of the lot and she had
no permission for such construction. Perla informed them
that her husband had a contract with OBM, through XEI, to
purchase the property. She promised to send CBM the
PRINCIPLE: Under Section 34, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of documents. However, she failed to do so. Thus, CBM filed a
Court, evidence that one did a certain thing at one time is not complaint for unlawful detainer against the spouses. But
admissible to prove that he did the same or similar thing at later on, CBM moved to withdraw its complaint because of
another time, although such evidence may be received to the issues raised. In the meantime, CBM was renamed the
prove habit, usage, pattern of conduct or the intent of the Boston Bank of the Philippines.
parties.
Respondent Spouses then filed a complaint for specific
FACTS: performance and damages against the bank. alleged therein
In 1967, Xavierville Estate, Inc. (XEI) sold to The Overseas Bank that they had always been ready, able and willing to pay the
of Manila (OBM) through a "Deed of Sale of Real Estate" Lot 1, installments on the lots sold to them but no contract was
Block 2 and Lot 2, Block 2 in Xavierville subdivision. forthcoming; they constructed their house worth
Nevertheless, XEI continued selling the residential lots in the ₱2,000,000.00 on the property in good faith; Manalo
subdivision as agent of OBM. informed the defendant that he would abide by the terms
and conditions of his original agreement with the OBM;
In 1972, then XEI president Emerito Ramos contracted the during the hearing of the ejectment case, they offered to pay
services of Engr. Manalo who works for Hurricane Commercial ₱313,172.34 representing the balance on the purchase price
for the installation of a water pump at the former's residence of said lots; such tender of payment was rejected, so that the
for P34,887.66. Engr. Manalo proposed to XEI, through Ramos, subject lots could be sold at considerably higher prices to
to purchase a lot in the Xavierville subdivision, and offered as third parties.
part of the down payment the ₱34,887.66 Ramos owed him.
XEI, through Ramos, agreed. The Manalo spouses chose both Both RTC and CA upheld the respondent spouses.
abovementioned lots for reservation which was later on
confirmed by Ramos. Eventually, the respondent spouses took
possession of the lots and constructed a house thereon. ISSUE: W/N XEI impliedly granted the respondent spouses
the option to pay in 120 or 180 monthly installments when it
In the meantime, many of the lot buyers refused to pay their did so for the other lot buyers.
monthly installments until they were assured that they would
be issued Torrens titles over the lots they had purchased. The
spouses were notified of XEI’s resumption of selling
operations. However, they did not pay the balance of the RULING:
down payment because XEI failed to prepare a contract of We agree with petitioner’s contention that, for a perfected
conditional sale and transmit the same to them for their contract of sale or contract to sell to exist in law, there must
signature. XEI furnished Manalo spouses with a statement of be an agreement of the parties, not only on the price of the
their account showing that they had a balance of ₱34,724.34 property sold, but also on the manner the price is to be paid
on the down payment of the two lots after deducting the by the vendee. Under Article 1458 of the New Civil Code. In a
account of Ramos plus interests. contract to sell property by installments, it is not enough that
The spouses Manalo received another statement of account the parties agree on the price as well as the amount of down
from XEI, inclusive of interests on the purchase price of the payment. The parties must, likewise, agree on the manner of
lots. In reply, Manalo Jr. stated they had not yet received the payment of the balance of the purchase price and on the
notice of resumption of XEI's selling operations, and that there other terms and conditions relative to the sale. Even if the
had been no arrangement on the payment of interests; hence, buyer makes a down payment or portion thereof, such
they should not be charged with interest on the balance of the payment cannot be considered as sufficient proof of the
down payment on the property. Further, they demanded that perfection of any purchase and sale between the parties.
a deed of conditional sale over the two lots be transmitted to We reject the submission of respondents that they and
them for their signatures. However, XEI ignored the demands. Ramos had intended to incorporate the terms of payment
Consequently, the spouses refused to pay the balance of the contained in the three contracts of conditional sale executed
down payment of the purchase price. by XEI and other lot buyers in the "corresponding contract of
Sometime in June 1976, Manalo constructed a business sign in conditional sale," which would later be signed by them. We
the sidewalk near his house. XEI informed Manalo that have meticulously reviewed the respondents’ complaint and
business signs were not allowed along the sidewalk. It find no such allegation therein. Indeed, respondents merely
alleged in their complaint that they were bound to pay the Habit, custom, usage or pattern of conduct must be proved
balance of the purchase price of the property "in like any other facts. Courts must contend with the caveat
installments." When respondent Manalo, Jr. testified, he was that, before they admit evidence of usage, of habit or pattern
never asked, on direct examination or even on cross- of conduct, the offering party must establish the degree of
examination, whether the terms of payment of the balance of specificity and frequency of uniform response that ensures
the purchase price of the lots under the contracts of more than a mere tendency to act in a given manner but
conditional sale executed by XEI and other lot buyers would rather, conduct that is semi-automatic in nature. The
form part of the "corresponding contract of conditional sale" offering party must allege and prove specific, repetitive
to be signed by them simultaneously with the payment of the conduct that might constitute evidence of habit. The
balance of the down payment on the purchase price. examples offered in evidence to prove habit, or pattern of
evidence must be numerous enough to base on inference of
We note that, in its letter to the respondents which was sent systematic conduct. Mere similarity of contracts does not
to them almost three years from the execution by the parties present the kind of sufficiently similar circumstances to
of their August 22, 1972 letter agreement, XEI stated, in part, outweigh the danger of prejudice and confusion.
that respondents had purchased the property "on installment
basis." However, in the said letter, XEI failed to state a specific In determining whether the examples are numerous enough,
amount for each installment, and whether such payments and sufficiently regular, the key criteria are adequacy of
were to be made monthly, semi-annually, or annually. Also, sampling and uniformity of response. After all, habit means
respondents, as plaintiffs below, failed to adduce a shred of a course of behavior of a person regularly represented in like
evidence to prove that they were obliged to pay the circumstances. It is only when examples offered to establish
₱278,448.00 monthly, semi-annually or annually. The pattern of conduct or habit are numerous enough to lose an
allegation that the payment of the ₱278,448.00 was to be paid inference of systematic conduct that examples are
in installments is, thus, vague and indefinite. Case law is that, admissible. The key criteria are adequacy of sampling and
for a contract to be enforceable, its terms must be certain and uniformity of response or ratio of reaction to situations.
explicit, not vague or indefinite.
There are cases where the course of dealings to be followed
Respondents, as plaintiffs below, failed to allege in their is defined by the usage of a particular trade or market or
complaint that the terms of payment of the ₱278,448.00 to be profession. As expostulated by Justice Benjamin Cardozo of
incorporated in the "corresponding contract of conditional the United States Supreme Court: "Life casts the moulds of
sale" were those contained in the contracts of conditional sale conduct, which will someday become fixed as law. Law
executed by XEI and Soller, Aguila and Roque. They likewise preserves the moulds which have taken form and shape from
failed to prove such allegation in this Court. life." Usage furnishes a standard for the measurement of
many of the rights and acts of men. It is also well-settled that
The bare fact that other lot buyers were allowed to pay the parties who contract on a subject matter concerning which
balance of the purchase price of lots purchased by them in known usage prevail, incorporate such usage by implication
120 or 180 monthly installments does not constitute into their agreement, if nothing is said to be contrary.
evidence that XEI also agreed to give the respondents the
same mode and timeline of payment of the ₱278,448.00. However, the respondents inexplicably failed to adduce
sufficient competent evidence to prove usage, habit or
Under Section 34, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court, pattern of conduct of XEI to justify the use of the terms of
evidence that one did a certain thing at one time is not payment in the contracts of the other lot buyers, and thus
admissible to prove that he did the same or similar thing at grant respondents the right to pay the ₱278,448.00 in 120
another time, although such evidence may be received to months, presumably because of respondents’ belief that the
prove habit, usage, pattern of conduct or the intent of the manner of payment of the said amount is not an essential
parties. element of a contract to sell. There is no evidence that XEI or
Similar acts as evidence. – Evidence that one did or did not OBM and all the lot buyers in the subdivision, including lot
do a certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that buyers who pay part of the down payment of the property
he did or did not do the same or a similar thing at another purchased by them in the form of service, had executed
time; but it may be received to prove a specific intent or contracts of conditional sale containing uniform terms and
knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or conditions. Moreover, under the terms of the contracts of
usage, and the like. conditional sale executed by XEI and three lot buyers in the
subdivision, XEI agreed to grant 120 months within which to
However, respondents failed to allege and prove, in the trial pay the balance of the purchase price to two of them, but
court, that, as a matter of business usage, habit or pattern of granted one 180 months to do so. There is no evidence on
conduct, XEI granted all lot buyers the right to pay the record that XEI granted the same right to buyers of two or
balance of the purchase price in installments of 120 months more lots.
of fixed amounts with pre-computed interests, and that XEI
and the respondents had intended to adopt such terms of
payment relative to the sale of the two lots in question. 30) The Learning Child v Ayala Alabang
Indeed, respondents adduced in evidence the three contracts
of conditional sale executed by XEI and other lot buyers (TAKE NOTE: 3 CONSOLIDATED CASES)
merely to prove that XEI continued to sell lots in the
subdivision as sales agent of OBM after it acquired said lots, FACTS:
not to prove usage, habit or pattern of conduct on the part of Ayala Land, Inc. (herein known as “ALI”) sold a parcel of land
XEI to require all lot buyers in the subdivision to pay the to Spouses Yuson. Spouses Yuson in turn sold it to spouses
balance of the purchase price of said lots in 120 months. It ALFONSO. In the TCT, there was a “Deed of Restrictions”
further failed to prove that the trial court admitted the said which stated that the lot shall be used exclusively for the
deeds as part of the testimony of respondent Manalo, Jr. establishment and maintenance of a preparatory school

(KINDERGARTEN and NURSERY) with playground and garage. which may include such installations as an office for school
ALI turned over the right and power to enforce the restrictions administration, playground and garage school vehicles. The
to Ayala Alabang Village Association (AAVA). deed did not limit the number of buildings or rooms. The
construction of more rooms and building extensions is
The spouses Alfonso opened a preparatory school named The contrary to the ORDINANCE, but NOT to the Deed of
Learning Child, Inc. However, subsequently the spouses Restrictions.
decided to include a GRADE SCHOOL program in violation of
the Deed of Restrictions, and did not hear the cries of AVAA to ACT#3 and # 4
cease from such. Hence, AAVA filed a case for injunction in the
RTC against the school and the spouses. Numbers 3 and 4 are acts allegedly performed by ALI. AAVA
claims that these acts cannot be considered in the case at bar
AAVA reasoned before the RTC that the construction of grade under the res inter alios acta rule, as ALI is not a party to the
school rooms is contrary to (1) the Deed of Restrictions and case. Section 28, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court embodies
also contrary to the (2) Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance of said rule:
NCR and its related Barangay ordinance. The ordinance stated
that Block 3 (where the school is located) is a “residential Sec. 28. Admission by third party. The rights of a party cannot
area” and the ordinance allows only preparatory schools with be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another,
TWO classrooms. Hence, RTC ruled in favour of AAVA. except as hereinafter provided.
However, when the spouses filed a motion for We have to clarify that ALIs statements, IF DAMAGING to
reconsideration, the Municipality of Muntinlupa corrected the AAVA, would be binding on the latter. The terms attached to
ordinance and stated that Block 3 is an “institutional area” the Deed of Restrictions on the title of the subject property,
and no longer a “residential area” (hence NO MORE limit as to expressly state that “compliance with the said restrictions….
classrooms). This was because of a typographical error since and conditions maybe enjoined and/or enforced by Court
what should’ve been residential was Block 1 and NOT Block 3 action by Ayala Corporation and/or the Ayala Alabang
(where school was located). Because of this, RTC granted the Village Association, their respective successors and assigns”.
MR and ruled in favour of spouses. CA however reinstated the [52] As such, it appears that Ayala Corporation is JOINTLY
earlier decision of RTC. Hence, this petition was filed. INTERESTED with AAVA in an action to enforce the Deed of
Restrictions, and is therefore covered under the following
Before the Supreme Court, the spouses alleged that AAVA exception to the res inter alios acta rule:
should be now estopped since it seems to have abrogated the
agreed Deed of Restrictions due to the ff. acts: Sec. 29. Admission by copartner or agent. The act or
declaration of a partner or agent of the party within the
1. AAVA Manager admitted that the construction of a scope of his authority and during the existence of the
school building with 24 rooms was approved in a partnership or agency, may be given in evidence against such
“Site Development Plan” with his signature party after the partnership or agency is shown by evidence
2. AAVA President authorized via letter the construction other than such act or declaration. The same rule applies to
of a “new school building extension” the act or declaration of a joint owner, joint debtor, or OTHER
3. ALI (NOT AAVA) impliedly requested the PERSON JOINTLY INTERESTED with the party. (Emphasis
reclassification of the property as “institutional”, and supplied.)
4. ALI subsequently assented to the reclassification of
the property via letter However, the acts of ALI are not at all damaging to the
position of AAVA. Since although ALI indeed “assented” to
the reclassification and expansion, the assent stated that:
“we interpose no objection as long as the conditions are
ISSUE: met” which are (1) the approval of the Board and (2) the
1. WON acts 1 & 2 constitute estoppel by deed? approval of the residents. None of these were met based on
2. WON acts 3 & 4 comes under the rule of res inter the records. Hence, in other words, the conditions for the
alios acta, it being done by a third party? assent were NOT met.
IN OTHER WORDS (author’s own understanding), although

Ayala Land Inc. (AYALA) is a party jointly interested in the case
RULING: and falls under the exception to res inter alios acta rule, the
required conditions to its assent to the changing/alteration of
AAVA is not estopped, and the acts do NOT come under the the terms of the Deed of Restrictions were not met.
rule of res inter alios acta.
Hence, the acts enumerated above cannot prejudice AAVA. In
Estoppel by deed is a bar which precludes one party from fact, records show that AAVA has consistently insisted upon
asserting as against the other party and his privies any right or the compliance with the Deed of Restrictions by: consistently
title in derogation of the deed, or from denying the truth of denying the requests and letters of the spouses, and by
any material facts asserted in it. We have previously cautioned immediately asking the spouses to cease and desist. Hence,
against the perils of the misapplication of the doctrine of AAVA is not estopped.
estoppel.
SC ruled in favor of AAVA in upholding the Deed of
ACT#1 and #2 Restrictions since such Deed may be harmonized with the
The alleged assent of AAVA to the construction of additional ordinance in this way: there could be construction of MORE
classrooms is not at all inconsistent with the provisions of the rooms provided it is used for preparatory schools. However,
Deed of Restrictions, which merely limit the use of the subject since this will prejudice the grade school students already
property exclusively for the establishment and maintenance enrolled, they were allowed to graduate elementary.
thereon of a preparatory (nursery and kindergarten) school However, the school was not anymore allowed to accept
grade school enrollees.
OTHER TOPICS NOT RELATED TO EVIDENCE: corporations. It held that the filing of the conversion to FTAA
by petitioners while the case was still pending is indicative of
I. Intervention: their lack of qualification.
Motion for Intervention was denied since intervention was
done during appeal and not before judgment as required by Hence, the present petition assailing the orders of
the rules. the OP and CA.
II. The spouses cited Ortigas case ISSUES:

1) WON CA erred in not dismissing the case on the
Ortigas case ruled that the ordinance could change the ground of mootness coz the MPSAs were already
contract owing to police power. However, the Ortigas case converted to FTAAs
does not apply here since 1.) the factual antecedents are not
the same and 2.) harmonization with the law can still be done. 2) WON petitioners are Foreign corps
3) WON CA correctly applied the exceptions to res

31) Narra Nickel v. Redmont Consolidated inter alios acta rule (RELEVANT TO EVIDENCE)
KEYWORD: Admission by Co-partner or agent as exception to 4) WON POA had jurisdiction

Res Inter Alios Acta Rule
RULING: PETITION WITHOUT MERIT
FACTS:
Respondent Redmont, domestic corp organized under Phil 1. NOT MOOT
Laws, took interest in mining certain areas of Palawan. After
inquiring with DENR, it learned that said areas were already  Exception to Mootness principle (all must concur)
covered by Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) a. grave violation of the Constitution – misrepresented that
applications of petitioners. Later, Redmont filed before the they are Filipino corporations
Panel of Arbitrators (POA) of DENR 3 petitions for the denials
of the said applications. It argued that at least 60% of the b. exceptional character and paramount public interest
capital stocks of petitioners are owned and controlled by involved – the intricate corporate layering made by MBMI
MBMI Resources, a Canadian corp, hence disqualified since greatly affects the exploitation of our resources
mining activities are reserved only for corporations deemed
Filipino Citizens. In their Answer, petitioners averred that 60% c. to guide the bench, bar, and the public – a ruling on this
of the capital stocks are owned by Filpinos, POA has no case will guide the bbp
jurisdiction, and Redmont has no standing to sue since it has
no present application over the areas. d. capable of repetition yet evading review – MBMI can keep
utilizing dummy Filipino corporations
POA issued a resolution disqualifying petitioners,
since they are not qualified being foreign corporations All requisites are present.
effectively controlled by MBMI. Aggrieved, appealed to the
Mines Adjudication Board (MAB), again stressing that they are  Conversion of MPSA applications to FTAA
qualified and that they had their MPSAs converted to applications
Financial or Technical Assistance Agreements (FTAAs).
Pending resolution, Redmont filed a complaint before the SEC The CA’s analysis of the actions of petitioners after
for the revocation of the petitioners’ respective certificates the case was filed against them by respondent is on point.
for registration. Later, Redmont filed with the RTC a complaint The changing of applications by petitioners from one type to
praying for the deferral of the MAB proceedings pending another just because a case was filed against them, in truth,
resolution by the SEC. Before the RTC can decide, MAB issued would raise not a few sceptics’ eyebrows. What is the reason
a resolution finding the appeals meritorious. for such conversion?
` Later, RTC issued an order granting the injunction The filing of the Financial or Technical Assistance
prayed for by Redmont for MAB to defer ruling. Nevertheless, Agreement application is a clear admission that the
MAB, ruling on the reconsideration of Redmont, denied such. respondents are not capable of conducting a large scale
mining operation and that they need the financial and
So, Redmont went to the CA assailing the MAB technical assistance of a foreign entity in their operation
orders. It reversed the MAB orders and upheld the POA that is why they sought the participation of MBMI
decision that petitioners are disqualified. Reconsideration was Resources, Inc. The participation of MBMI in the corporation
likewise denied. The decision is premised on the doubt as to only proves the fact that it is the Canadian company that
the nationality of petitioners because they had a common will provide the finances and the resources to operate the
major investor, MBMI. Also, the conversion of their MPSAs to mining areas for the greater benefit and interest of the
FTAAs were suspicious. Moreover, POA was declared to have same and not the Filipino stockholders who only have a less
jurisdiction over petitioners, with the capacity to ascertain substantial financial stake in the corporation.
their nationality.
In their last attempt to prove that they are Filipino
Prior resolution by the CA, Redmont also filed with corporations, they alleged before the Court that they have
the Office of the President a petition for the cancellation of already sold/assigned their shares and interest to DMCI
petitioners’ FTAAs. The OP canceled and revoked the same Mining Corp, a Filpino Corp. This only proves that they were
because they misrepresented that they are Filipino in fact not Filipino corporations from the start.

agreements that it entered into with the "Olympic" and

"Alpha" groups––involves SMMI, Tesoro, PLMDC and Narra.
2. GRANDFATHER TEST APPLIES SINCE THE 60-40 FILIPINO- Noticeably, the ownership of the "layered" corporations boils
FOREIGN OWNERSHIP OF PETITIONERS ARE IN DOUBT down to MBMI, Olympic or corporations under the "Alpha"
(NOT FILIPINO NATIONALS) group wherein MBMI has joint venture agreements with,
practically exercising majority control over the corporations
2 Acknowledged Tests in determining the Nationality of a mentioned. In effect, whether looking at the capital structure
Corporations: NATIONALITY TEST and GRANDFATHER TEST or the underlying relationships between and among the
corporations, petitioners are NOT Filipino nationals and must
CONTROL TEST (LIBERAL RULE): be considered foreign since 60% or more of their capital
shares belonging to corporations or partnerships at stocks or equity interests are owned by MBMI.
least 60% of the capital of which is owned by Filipino citizens
shall be considered as of Philippine nationality, (1 st par. DOJ 3. EXCEPTION TO RES INTER ALIOS ACTA RULE APPLIES –
Opinion 020) Sec. 29 Rule 130 ROC – ADMISSION BY CO-PARTNER OR
AGENT and ADMISSION BY PRIVIES
GRANDFATHER TEST (STRINGENT RULE):
If the percentage of the Filipino ownership in the Contention of Petitioners vis-à-vis the application of Sec. 29
corporation or partnership is less than 60%, only the number Rule 130:
of shares corresponding to such percentage shall be counted
as Philippine nationality (2ND par. DOJ Opinion 020). Under Petitioners claim that the CA erred in applying Sec.
this rule, the combined totals in the Investing Corporation and 29, Rule 130 of the Rules by stating that "by entering into a
the Investee Corporation must be traced (i.e., joint venture, MBMI have a joint interest" with Narra, Tesoro
"grandfathered") to determine the total percentage of Filipino and McArthur. They challenged the conclusion of the CA
ownership. which pertains to the close characteristics of "partnerships"
and "joint venture agreements." Further, they asserted that
In other words, this rule applies ONLY when the 60- before this particular partnership can be formed, it should
40 Filipino-foreign equity ownership is in doubt (i.e., in cases have been formally reduced into writing since the capital
where the joint venture corporation with Filipino and foreign involved is more than three thousand pesos
stockholders with less than 60% Filipino stockholdings [or (PhP3,000).Being that there is no evidence of written
59%] invests in other joint venture corporation which is either agreement to form a partnership between petitioners and
60-40% Filipino-alien or the 59% less Filipino). Stated MBMI, no partnership was created.
differently, where the 60-40 Filipino- foreign equity ownership A partnership is defined as two or more persons
is not in doubt, the Grandfather Rule will not apply. who bind themselves to contribute money, property, or
industry to a common fund with the intention of dividing the
profits among themselves. On the other hand, joint ventures
While corporate layering is allowed under FIA, if it is have been deemed to be "akin" to partnerships since it is
used to circumvent the Constitution and pertinent laws, then difficult to distinguish between joint ventures and
it becomes illegal. Further, the pronouncement of petitioners partnerships.
that the grandfather rule has already been abandoned must
be discredited for lack of basis. The relations of the parties to a joint venture and
the nature of their association are so similar and closely akin
Revisiting the intent behind Art. XII of the to a partnership that it is ordinarily held that their rights,
Constitution on National Economy and Patrimony, vis-à-vis duties, and liabilities are to be tested by rules which are
corporate layering , it was the intention of the framers to closely analogous to and substantially the same, if not
apply the grandfather rule in cases of corporate layering. exactly the same, as those which govern partnership. In fact,
Applying the statutory construction, when there is a conflict it has been said that the trend in the law has been to blur the
between the Constitution and a statute (FIA), the former distinctions between a partnership and a joint venture, very
prevails. little law being found applicable to one that does not apply
to the other.
Moreover, as mentioned earlier, Grandfather rule
applies when the 60-40 Filipino-foreign ownership is in doubt. Though some claim that partnerships and joint
In this case, this rule should be applied based on the rulings of ventures are totally different animals, there are very few
the POA and affirmed by the OP, doubt prevails and persists rules that differentiate one from the other; thus, joint
in the corporate ownership of petitioners. Also, as found by ventures are deemed "akin" or similar to a partnership. In
the CA, doubt is present in the 60-40 Filipino equity fact, in joint venture agreements, rules and legal incidents
ownership of petitioners Narra, McArthur and Tesoro, since governing partnerships are applied.
their common investor, the 100% Canadian corporation––
MBMI, funded them. Accordingly, culled from the incidents and records
of this case, it can be assumed that the relationships entered
IN THIS CASE, grandfathering” the petitioners, it was between and among petitioners and MBMI are no simple
established that petitioners McArthur, Tesoro and Narra are "joint venture agreements." As a rule, corporations are
not Filipino since MBMI, a 100% Canadian corporation, owns prohibited from entering into partnership agreements;
60% or more of their equity interests. Such conclusion is consequently, corporations enter into joint venture
derived from grandfathering petitioners’ corporate owners, agreements with other corporations or partnerships for
namely: MMI, SMMI and PLMDC. Going further and adding to certain transactions in order to form "pseudo partnerships."
the picture, MBMI’s Summary of Significant Accounting Obviously, as the intricate web of "ventures" entered into by
Policies statement– –regarding the "joint venture" and among petitioners and MBMI was executed to

circumvent the legal prohibition against corporations entering xxx xxx xxx
into partnerships, then the relationship created should be
deemed as "partnerships," and the laws on partnership (3) Any confession or admission obtained in
should be applied. Thus, a joint venture agreement between violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall
and among corporations may be seen as similar to be inadmissible in evidence against him.
partnerships since the elements of partnership are present. In People v. Sunga, we held that "the right
to counsel applies in certain pretrial proceedings
Considering that the relationships found between that can be deemed 'critical stages' in the criminal
petitioners and MBMI are considered to be partnerships, process. The preliminary investigation can be no
then the CA is justified in applying Sec. 29, Rule 130 of the different from the in-custody interrogations by the
Rules by stating that "by entering into a joint venture, MBMI police, for a suspect who takes part in a preliminary
have a joint interest" with Narra, Tesoro and McArthur. investigation will be subjected to no less than the
State's processes, oftentimes intimidating and
4. POA HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE PETITIONS relentless, of pursuing those who might be liable for
criminal prosecution." In said case, Sunga made an
The POA has jurisdiction to settle disputes over rights uncounselled admission before the police. He later
to mining areas. This refers to any adverse claim, protest, or acknowledged the same admission before the judge
opposition to an application for mineral agreement. The POA in a preliminary investigation. Sunga was thrust into
therefore has the jurisdiction to resolve any adverse claim, the preliminary investigation and while he did have
protest, or opposition to a pending application for a mineral a counsel, for the latter's lack of vigilance and
agreement filed with the concerned Regional Office of the commitment to Sunga's rights, he was virtually
MGB. denied his right to counsel. Thus, the uncounselled
admission was held inadmissible. In the instant case,
the extrajudicial confession is inadmissible against
DENIED Bokingco because he was not assisted at all by
counsel during the time his confession was taken
before a judge.
32) People V. Bokingo & Col MAIN TOPIC (CONFESSION OF A CONSPIRATOR AS
TO THE CONSPIRACY)
Since the extrajudicial confession is inadmissible
KEYWORD: Res inter acta alio; Construction workers killed
against the confessor Bokingo, the same may not be
boss; Conspiracy; Confession of one of the accused
used against accused Pol.
Under Section 28, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,
FACTS: the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act,
declaration or omission of another. Res inter alios
The victim, Noli Paison, was the owner of several apartment acta alteri nocere non debet.Consequently, an
units which were being constructed by the accused. extrajudicial confession is binding only on the
Prosecution’s witness who was the victim’s brother in law confessant, is not admissible against his or her co-
testified that he saw the accused (Bokingo) mauled and killed accused, and is considered as hearsay against
the victim. On the other hand, the victim’s wife saw the other them. An exception to the res inter alios acta rule is
accused(Pol) who sprayed tear gas to her and hit her with a an admission made by a conspirator. Section 30,
sharp object. Upon hearing Bokingo shouting “Tara, patay na Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that the act
sya”, Pol fled the scene with him. Subsequently the accused or declaration of the conspirator relating to the
were caught and during the Preliminary Investigation, accused conspiracy and during its existence may be given in
Bokingo admitted to the crime and that they planned the evidence against the co-conspirator provided that
killing days ahead. On such extrajudicial admission, an the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than by
information was filed against the accused for murder. In such act or declaration. In order that the admission
addition, on the basis of the statement of Paison’s wife, of a conspirator may be received against his or her
conspiracy was alleged to be present in the commission of the co-conspirators, it is necessary that first, the
crime. conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than
the admission itself; second, the admission relates
to the common object; and third, it has been made
ISSUE: WON the extrajudicial confession is admissible? while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the
conspiracy. As we have previously discussed, we did
not find any sufficient evidence to establish the
existence of conspiracy. Therefore, the extrajudicial
RULING: No. The extra judicial confession is
confession has no probative value and is
inadmissible for it violated his constitutional rights.
inadmissible in evidence against Col.
Section 12. (1)Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to be Since no sufficient evidence was given to show col’s
informed of his right to remain silent and to have guilt and conspiracy was not established, Col is
competent and independent counsel preferably of his acquitted.
own choice. If the person cannot afford the services
of counsel, he must be provided with one. These
rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the 33) City of Manila vs. Del Rosario
presence of counsel.
ISSUE: WON the court was correct in overruling the motion

of defendant.
KEYWORDS: “City of Manila seeking recovery of a parcel of
Land” HELD: No, the court was wrong in overruling the motion.
The case was remanded to the Trial court for further
proceedings.
FACTS:
As to the testimony of the third witness.
Petitioner(plaintiff) sought the recovery of a parcel of land in
Calles Clavel and Barcelona, district of Tondo. This parcel of Villega's [third witness] testimony was merely
land was registered in the name of and was in possession of hearsay. It consisted of what he had learned from some of
respondent(defendant) Jacinto Del Rosario. the oldest residents in that section of the city. His testimony
Jacinto Del Rosario alleged that he bought the land was introduced by the plaintiff apparently for the purpose of
from his brother Lorenzo Del Rosario. Lorenzo Del Rosario in proving that the city was generally considered the owner of
turn bought the land from a certain Cipriano Roco. the land, drawing from this fact the presumption of actual
ownership under paragraph 11, section 334, of the Code of
Petitioner alleged that it was the owner of such land, Civil Procedure. Such testimony, however, does not
and to prove his claim, he presented documentary evidence constitute the "common reputation" referred to in the
consisting of a document containing an offer by the City of section mentioned. "common reputation," as used in that
Manila to purchase the land and another document section, is equivalent to universal reputation. The testimony
establishing the transfer of such land to respondent Jacinto. of this witness is not sufficient to establish the presumption
A map was also presented as evidence. referred to.
1st document – offer to purchase by City of Manila
As to the testimony of Lorenzo
nd
2 document – evidence of the transfer of the land
to respondent Jacinto We accordingly hold that the provisions of section
346 of the Code of Civil Procedure are applicable to the case
It was however established that Lorenzo del Rosario at bar in so far as they declare that an offer of compromise is
signed the first document (the offer by the city of manila to not admissible in evidence.
purchase the land) before he acquired from Cipriano Roco y Again, Lorenzo del Rosario signed the first document
Vera the ownership of the land referred to therein, the second before he acquired from Cipriano Roco y Vera the ownership
document being signed after he had transferred the land to of the land referred to therein, the second document being
the defendant Jacinto del Rosario, who took possession of the signed after he had transferred the land to the defendant
same and had it registered. Jacinto del Rosario, who took possession of the same and had
it registered, as the plaintiff admits (par. 2 of the complaint),
Further, petitioner offered the testimonies of several
on the 23d of February, 1893. If this is so, whatever
witnesses including the ones who vouched for the authenticity
statements Lorenzo del Rosario might have made in the
of the documentary evidence presented by the petitioner:
documents mentioned, they are not binding upon the
1st witness - testified that he did not know of his own defendant, because, under section 278 of the Code of Civil
knowledge if the land in question belonged to the city. Procedure, "where one derives title to real property from
another, the declaration, act, or omission of the latter, in
2nd witness - testified that the land included in Calles Clavel relation to the property, is evidence against the former only
and Barcelona was formerly part of Plaza Divisoria, which when made while the latter holds the title."
belonged to the Central Government (not the city), and that
he did not know to whom it now belongs.
The plaintiff also introduced in evidence a map of the city of
rd
3 witness - testified that the land in question was formerly Manila. This map is not before us. It is sufficient to say, in
included in the Gran Divisoria, and that all the land included in order to show that it has no value as evidence, that the
it belonged to the city. reliability of the map was not proven at the trial. The map
identified by the witness John R. Wilson was introduced by
4th witness - testified merely that Lorenzo del Rosario had paid the plaintiff for the sole purpose of showing the location of
100 pesos to her brother Cipriano Roco for the purpose of the land in question. It has, therefore, no value in
instituting a possessory information as to the property establishing the right of possession claimed by the plaintiff.
abutting on Calle Clavel.
In view of the foregoing, we hold that the defendant had a
Lorenzo Del Rosario – testified as to the authenticity of the perfect right to ask for the dismissal of the case on the
documents but he made a statement that the President of the ground that the plaintiff had failed to establish the
Municipal Board, Señor Herrera, advised him to do so in order allegations in the complaint, and the court erred in overruling
to avoid litigation with the city, and such was not contradicted. his motion to dismiss.
(it was thus akin to a compromise agreement)
34) GEVERO VS IAC
At the trial, after the plaintiff rested, the defendant
moved for the dismissal of the case upon the ground that the
plaintiff had failed to establish the allegations in the
complaint. This motion was overruled by the court. FACTS:
The parcel of land under litigation is Lot No. 2476 of the

Subdivision Plan Psd-37365 containing an area of 20,119
square meters and situated at Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City. Said property from another, the act, declaration, or omission of
Lot was acquired by purchase from Luis Lancero in Sept. 15 the latter, while holding the title, in relation to the property is
1964 whom in turn issued TCT 4320 to plaintiff (DELCOR). Luis evidence against the former." It is however stressed that the
Lancero acquired such parcel of land from Ricardo Gevero on admission of the former owner of a property must have
Feb 1952 per deed of sale executed by Ricardo Gevero which been made while he was the owner thereof in order that
was duly annotated as entry No. 1128 at the back of Original such admission may be binding upon the present owner.
Certificate of Title No. 7610 covering the mother lot identified Hence, Lanceros' declaration or acts of executing the 1968
as Lot No. 2476 in the names of Teodorica Babangha — 1/2 document have no binding effect on DELCOR, the ownership
share and her children the other undivided share of the whole of the land having passed to DELCOR in 1964.
area. Teodorica Ddief long before WW2 and was survived by 6
children namely Maria, Restituto, Elena, Ricardo, Eustaquiop Lastly, Petitioners claim that DELCOR's action is barred by
and Ursula all surnamed Gevero. laches considering that the petitioners have remained in the
actual, open, uninterrupted and adverse possession thereof
The heirs of Teodorica Babangha on October 17,1966 executed until at present. ). The execution of a public instrument is
an Extra-Judicial Settlement and Partition of the estate of equivalent to the delivery of the thing and is deemed legal
Teodorica Babangha, consisting of two lots, among them was delivery. Hence, its execution was considered a sufficient
lot 2476. By virtue of the extra-judicial settlement and delivery of the property. Besides, the property sold is a
partition executed by the said heirs of Teodorica Babangha, registered land. It is the act of registration that transfers the
Lot 2476-A to Lot 2476-I, inclusive, under subdivision plan ownership of the land sold. If the property is a registered
(LRC) Psd-80450 duly approved by the Land Registration land, the purchaser in good, faith has a right to rely on the
Commission, Lot 2476-D, among others, was adjudicated to certificate of title and is under no duty to go behind it to look
Ricardo Gevero who was then alive at the time of extra-judicial for flaws.
settlement and partition in 1966.
The Court of Appeals found that it had first investigated and
Plaintiff (private respondent herein) filed an action with the checked the title in the name of Luis Lancero. It likewise
CFI (now RTC) of Misamis Oriental to quiet title and/or annul inquired into the Subdivision Plan, the corresponding
the partition made by the heirs of Teodorica Babangha insofar technical description and the deed of sale executed by
as the same prejudices the land which it acquired a portion of Ricardo Gevero in favor of Luis Lancero and found everything
lot 2476. in order. It even went to the premises and found Luis Lancero
to be in possession of the land to the exclusion of any other
RTC rendered judgement declaring the plaintiff corporation as person. DELCOR had therefore acted in good faith in
the true and absolute owner of that portion of Lot. 2476. From purchasing the land in question.
said decision, defendant heirs of Ricardo Gevero (petitioners
herein) appealed to the IAC (now Court of Appeals) which
subsequently, on March 20, 1986, affirmed the decision
appealed from. 35) US v. Pineda
KEYWORD: Barium Chlorate instead of Potassium Chlorate
ISSUE: 1.)WON the deed of sale executed by Ricardo Gevero to PRINCIPLE: Evidence is admissible in a criminal action which
Lancer is valid, 2.) WON the ½ interests of Teodorica Babangha tends to show motive, although it tends to prove the
in one of the lots under Lot 2476 is included in the deed of commission of another offense by the defendant."
sale and 3.) WON the respondents action is barred by Laches
FACTS:
Santiago Pineda was a registered pharmacist and was an
RULING: owner of a drug store. Feliciano Santos, having some sick
horses, presented a copy of a prescription (obtained from Dr.
Petitioners maintain that the deed of sale is entirely invalid Richardson) to Pineda to buy medicine for his sick horses. The
citing alleged flaws thereto, such as that the signature of prescription specifically read “POTASSIUM CHLORATE”. After
Ricardo was forged without his knowledge of such fact and it was prepared he used it on 2 horses which were sick.
that Lancero had recognized the fatal defect of the 1952 deed Shortly thereafter they died. When he had the medicine
of sale when he signed the document in 1968 entitled checked with the Bureau of Science, they found out that the
"Settlement to Avoid the Litigation. However, it will be medicine contained “BARIUM CHLORATE”. At the instance of
observed that the deed of sale in question was executed with Santos, two chemists also went to the drug store and and the
all the legal formalities of a public document. The 1952 deed same happened. Dr. Buencamino, a veterinarian, performed
was duly acknowledged by both parties before the notary an autopsy on the horses, and found that death was the
public, yet petitioners did not bother to rebut the legal result of poisoning. They were given Barium Chlorate.
presumption of the regularity of the notarized document. It (Barium chlorate is a poison, potassium chlorate is not.)
has the presumption of regularity and to contradict all these,
evidence must be clear, convincing and more than merely ISSUE:
preponderant. Whether the court may admit the testimony of Drs. Pena and
Darjuan as to their purchase of potassium chlorate which
As to petitioners' contention that Lancero had recognized the turned out to be poison. (Four issues here as this is for the
fatal defect of the 1952 deed when he signed the document in most part a torts case, but this is the issue relevant to
1968 entitled "Settlement to Avoid Litigation", it is a basic rule evidence)
of evidence that the right of a party cannot be prejudiced by
an act, declaration, or omission of another (Sec. 28. Rule 130, HELD:
Rules of Court). This particular rule is embodied in the maxim The lower court in admitting the testimony of the chemist
"res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet." Under Section Peña and Darjuan as to their purchase of potassium chlorate
31, Rule 130, Rules of Court "where one derives title to
at the drug store of the accused, which substance proved on

analysis to be barium chlorate. What appellant is here relying PRINCIPLE: Res inter alios acta rule, second batch.
on is the maxim res inter alois acta. As a general rule, the
evidence of other offenses committed by a defendant is FACTS:
inadmissible. But appellant has confused this maxim and this The accused is charged with robbery with homicide.
rule with certain exceptions thereto. The effort is not to
convict the accused of a second offense. Nor is there an On the night of November 9, 1935, 7 armed individuals with
attempt to draw the mind away from the point at issue and white stripes on their faces went to the house of spouses
thus to prejudice defendant's case. The purpose is to ascertain Perfecto Melocotones and Maximiniana Vicente. Some went
defendant's knowledge and intent, and to fix his negligence is upstairs, ordered Perfecto to bring out his money, and was
intensified, and fraudulent intent may even be evidence of attacked with bolos and fell to the floor. Some also went up,
negligence than the frequency of accidents. approached Maximinia, struck her in the face with the butt of
the gun, and lost consciousness.
The United States Supreme Court has held that: When she regained consciousness she saw her husband
already dead. Maximinia turned over to the man who had
"On the trial of a criminal case where the question struck her with the butt of his gun P70 and jewelry valued at
relates to the tendency of certain testimony to throw P200. She looked at the man's face and saw that he had
light upon a particular fact, or to explain the conduct pockmarks and a scar on his left eyelid.
of a particular person, there is a certain discretion on
the part of the trial judge which a court of errors will That same night the house of Juana de la Cruz was assualted
not interfere with, unless it manifestly appear that by malefactors. All of them had white stripes upon their
the testimony has no legitimate bearing upon the faces. Juana de la Cruz noticed that one of them had
question at issue, and is calculated to prejudice the pockmarks and a scar on the left eyelid and was dressed in a
accused. maong-colored suit.
"Whenever the necessity arises for a resort to Maxima Vicente informed Lieutenant Roman Alejandre of
circumstancial evidence, either from the nature of the Constabulary that a person who struck her with the butt
the inquiry or the failure of direct proof, objections of his gun and taker her money and jewelry was a man of
to the testimony on the ground of irrelevancy are regular stature, with a lead body and pockmarked face.
not favored.
Having arrested a group of persons, he brought them to
"Evidence is admissible in a criminal action which Maximiniana Vicente's house so that the latter might
tends to show motive, although it tends to prove identify. She identified the herein accused-appellant
the commission of another offense by the Benjamin Irang as the one who had struck her with the butt
defendant." of his gun and demanded delivery of her money and jewelry.
Juana de la Cruz also recognized Benjamin Irang, through his
As a pharmacist, he is made responsible for the quality of all pockmarks and scar on his left eyelid, as one of the men who
drugs and poisons which he sells. And finally it is provided that had gone up her house that same nght.
it shall be unlawful for him to sell any drug or poison under
any "fraudulent name." ISSUE:
Whether or not the testimony of Juana de la Cruz may me
Where a customer calls upon a druggist for a harmless admitted as evidence to prove the identity of Benjamin Irang
remedy, delivery of a poisonous drug by mistake by the as the perpetrator of the crime charged.
druggist is prima facie negligence, placing the burden on him
to show that the mistake was under the circumstances HELD:
consistent with the exercise of due care. The druggist cannot, Yes, the testimony of Juana de la Cruz may me admitted as
for example in filling a prescription calling for potassium evidence to prove the identity of Benjamin Irang as the
chlorate give instead to the customer barium chlorate, a perpetrator of the crime charged.
poison, place this poison in a package labeled "potassium
chlorate", and expect to escape responsibility on a plea of While evidence of another crime is, as a rule, not admissible
mistake. His mistake, under the most favorable aspect for in a prosecution for robbery, it is admissible when it is
himself, was negligence. otherwise relevant, as where it tends to identify defendant as
the perpetrator of the robbery charged, or tends to show his
A plea of accident and mistake cannot excuse for they cannot presence at the scene or in the vicinity of the crime at the
take place unless there be wanton and criminal carelessness time charged, or when it is evidence of a circumstance
and neglect. How the misfortune occurs in unimportant, if connected with the crime.
under all the circumstances the fact of occurrence is
attributable to the druggist as a legal fault. Rather considering The testimony of Juana de la Cruz to the effect that her
the responsibility for the quality of drugs which the law house, situated only about one hundred meters from that of
imposes on druggist and the position of the made unlawful is Perfecto Melocotones, was assaulted that same night by
the giving of a false name to the drug asked for. some malefactors with white stripes upon their faces, and
that one of them, with pockmarks on his face and a scar on
36) People vs Irang his left eyelid and dressed in a maong colored suit, who later
turned out to be the herein accused-appellant, opened her
box, indirectly corroborates Maximiniana Vicente's testimony
KEYWORD: The pockmark on his face that the man of the same description was the one who went
to her house and demanded delivery of her money and

jewelry, having recognized him later to be the herein accused- of a quarrelsome disposition, provoking, irascible, and fond
appellant. of starting quarrels in the municipality.
The RTC adjudged Clemente Babiera, Justo Babiera, and

Dominga Bores guilty of the crime of murder, the first as
37) PEOPLE v. BABIERA principal, and the last two as accomplices.
ISSUE:
KEYWORD: Doctrine of Ratification Whether the ante mortem declaration of the deceased is
admissible in evidence.
PRINCIPLE: A statement made under circumstances which RULING:

would not render it admissible as a dying declaration becomes YES. while the first affidavit could not be admissible, the
admissible as such, it is held, if approved or repeated by the second affidavit which confirms the first is now admissible.
declarant after he had abandoned all hope of recovery. When a witness made a certain statement unconscious of
impeding death and reiterates at the time he is already
conscious, is deemed to have ratified the earlier statement.
FACTS:
Justo Babiera sold two parcels of land to Basilio Copreros with Although said statement in itself is inadmissible as an ante-
the right of repurchase, but having failed to repurchase them mortem declaration, inasmuch as there is nothing to show
within the period stipulated, the title thereto was that at the time he made it Severino Haro knew or firmly
consolidated in the purchaser, who leased them to Severino believed that he was at the point of death, nevertheless,
Haro. Justo Babiera resorted to every lawful means to regain having ratified its contents a week later when he was near
possession of said two parcels of land, but he failed. death as a result of his wounds, said declaration is admissible
as a part of that which he made ante-mortem. “A statement
The prosecution’s version: made under circumstances which would not render it
On the day of the incident, Severino visited his land with three admissible as a dying declaration becomes admissible as
companions. When he arrived, he was told by Fermin Bruces, such, it is held, if approved or repeated by the declarant after
Severino’s copartner, that he had found Clemente Babiera’s, he had abandoned all hope of recovery.”
son of Justo Babiera, cow grazing on the land. Severino
informed Clemente of what his cow had done and told him to
take better care of his animal and not to let it run loose. 38) US vs Mercado
Severino then ordered Fermin to take the cow where the
Babiera family lived. Severino and his companions made use
of a torch when they were making their way back to town
because it was already dark. When they were on the road KEYWORD: “He has a Pugnacious Disposition”
near Rosendo Paycol’s house, Clemente suddenly sprang from
the cogon grass, went after Severino and struck him with his
bolo in the back. When Severino turned to see who attacked PRINCIPLE:
him, Severino received another bolo blow in the forehead.
A witness cannot be impeached by the party against whom
Then, Dominga Bores, Clemente’s partner, and Justo he has been called, except by showing
appeared, and pinned down Severino. Severino’s companions (a) that he has made contradictory statements; or
were not able to help him because of the threat from (b) by showing that his general reputation for truth,
Clemente. When the assailants already departed, Severino’s honesty, or integrity is bad. (Sec. 342, Act No. 190.)
companions were directed to bring him to town. They were
able to bring Severino to the hospital. Severino made a sworn FACTS:
statement before the deputy fiscal about the incident. This The defendants in this case were charged with the crime of
sworn statement was ratified by him before the same deputy coaccion (translates to coercion):
fiscal when he was near death.
The defense’s version: That the said accused on December 22, 1911, in the
Clemente was in the house of one Oper, when Justo arrived, municipality of Baliuag, Province of Bulacan, P. I., did
and later on, Severino, who at once said to him, “Clemente, willfully and criminally, without legitimate authority
why do you leave your cow loose?” Clemente denied the therefor, and by means of violence or force
imputation, but Severino insisted and the latter added that employed upon the person of Claro Mercado,
the cow had damaged his plantation. Severino charged him of prevent the latter from rendering aid to Maria R.
2 pesos for the damage, however Clemente told him that he Mateo in order that Santiago Mercado might at his
had no money. Clemente told Severino that he will pay on the pleasure maltreat the said Maria R. Mateo, in
following day. At about 7pm, Clemente saw Buenaventura violation of law."
Cabalfin leading his cow, and Severino and his companions
followed. Clemente asked them why they are taking the cow They were then found guilty of the crime charged. During
away when they already have an agreement with regards the trial, Mr. Ricardo Gonzalez Lloret, attorney for the private
payment of the damaged plantation. A commotion then prosecutor, asked the witness for the defense, the said
happened wherein Clemente was allegedly struck by one Santiago Mercado, who is mentioned in the complaint
Margarito Mediavilla, and Severino was hit in the back by a presented in said cause, the following question:
bolo blow. The defense attempted to prove that Severino was

"How many times have you been convicted of assault statements nor that his general reputation for truth, honesty,
upon other persons?" or integrity was bad. While you cannot impeach the
credibility of a witness, except by showing that he has made
To this question, the defendant Tomas Mercado objected on contradictory statements or that his general reputation for
the ground that the question was impertinent. Mr. Lloret truth, honesty, or integrity is bad, yet, nevertheless, you may
explained the purpose of his question by saying: show by an examination of the witness himself or from the
"I wish to demonstrate that he has a pugnacious record of the judgment, that he has been convicted of a high
disposition. I have had occasion to defend him in crime. (Sec. 342, Act No. 190.)
various causes for assault." In the present case, the other offense to which the question
The defendants contended that the character of the witness, above related was not a high crime, as that term is generally
Santiago Mercado, has an intimate relation or may have a used, and we assume that the phrase "high crime," as used in
strong relation with the facts being investigated in the present section 342, is used in its ordinary signification. High crimes
cause,” but this objection was overruled. are generally defined as such immoral and unlawful acts as
are nearly allied and equal in guilt to felonies.
The only argument which the appellant presents in support of
his assignment of error is that the question had no relation to We believe that the objection to the above question was
the question which was being discussed by the court and did properly interposed and should have been sustained. If there
not tend to show that the defendants were either guilty or not was proof enough adduced during the trial of the cause,
guilty of the crime charged; that questions tending to disclose excluding the particular proof brought out by this question to
the character of a witness are immaterial. show that the defendants are guilty of the crime, then the
question and answer and the ruling of the court upon the
In reply to the argument of the appellant, the Attorney- same did not affect prejudicially the interests of the
General contends that the question was a proper question, defendants. Errors committed by the trial court, which are
because it tended to impugn the credibility of the witness and not prejudicial to the rights of the parties, should be
that such questions were for that purpose material and disregarded by the court. In our opinion the evidence clearly
pertinent. It will be remembered that the complaint charged shows that the witness committed the assault to which
that on the occasion when the alleged crime was committed reference is made in the complaint in the present cause.
Santiago Mercado was attempting to and did assault and Whether he had committed other assaults or not was a
illtreat one Maria R. Mateo. In answer to said question, the matter of no importance in the present action. The admission
witness admitted that complaint had been presented against or rejection, therefore, of the proof to which such question
him for the offense of assault and battery. related could in no way prejudice the rights of the
defendants.
After a careful examination of the record, we are persuaded

ISSUE: Whether the witness should be impeached due to the that the same shows, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
character of the witness. defendants were guilty of the crime charged and that the
sentence of the lower court should be affirmed, with costs.
So ordered.
HELD:
The prosecution, to show the circumstances under which the

crime charged here was actually committed, showed that this 39) Gonzales v. People
witness, Santiago Mercado, had assaulted and illtreated Maria
R. Mateo, under the circumstances described in the complaint.
That was an important fact. If the said assault did not actually FACTS:
take place, then the theory of the prosecution must fail. If
there was no assault or attempted assault, there was no Gonzales was charged with arson for allegedly burning two-
occasion for the alleged interference on the part of the said storey residential building to which he pleaded not guilty.
Claro Mercado to prevent it, and the probability of the guilt of
the defendants is greatly lessened.
The prosecution presented eyewitness Carlos C. Canlas,
If the witness who had committed the alleged assault, had owner of the two-storey building testifying that at about 9:30
assaulted other persons and had been prosecuted therefor, p.m. he was watching television in his room when his
may that fact be considered by the court in weighing the proof daughter called his attention to check the commotion in an
and in testing the credibility of the witness? It was an adjacent room. On his way to the room rented by Gonzales,
important fact to prove that Santiago Mercado, at the time he smelled gas. He saw Gonzales ignite a flame and throw it
and place mentioned in the complaint, had assaulted or on a pile of clothes in the middle of the living room where
attempted to assault or illtreat Maria R. Mateo, to show that Gonzales had also placed an LPG tank. Fire quickly spread to
there was occasion for the interference of Claro Mercado. the other parts of the building.
A witness cannot be impeached by the party against whom he
has been called, except by showing
The prosecution also presented two tenants, Villaflor and
(a) that he has made contradictory statements; or Simpao, as witnesses. Villaflor testified that he heard
(b) by showing that his general reputation for truth, Gonzales and his aunt quarreling before the fire. He said he
honesty, or integrity is bad. (Sec. 342, Act No. 190.) heard Gonzales yell "Susunugin ko itong bahay na ito!"
Alarmed, he went to the Barangay Hall to report the incident
The question to which the defendant objected neither but immediately went back to his place when someone
attempted to show that the witness had made contradictory informed him his house was on fire. Simpao testified that he
saw the fire coming from Gonzales's room. He added that ISSUE:
Gonzales was laughing while the building was burning.
Whether the discrepancies in the affidavit and the court
testimonies of a witness are sufficient to exculpate Gonzales
of the crime of arson.
The testimonies were corroborated by P01 Mendoza, who
testified that when he and his fellow officer arrived at the
crime scene, Gonzales admitted responsibility for the fire.
HELD:
NO. In the prosecution for arson, proof of the crime charged

On the other hand, Gonzales averred that the fire was caused is complete where the evidence establishes the corpus delicti
by faulty electrical wiring. He testified that he was napping and the identity of the defendant as the one responsible for
inside his room when he was awakened by heat beside his the crime. In arson, the corpus delicti rule is satisfied by
bed. The room was on fire. He shouted for help and Canlas proof of the bare fact of the fire and of it having been
tried to help him but they failed to extinguish it. Gonzales intentionally caused. Even the uncorroborated testimony of a
denied he and his aunt were quarreling that evening before single eyewitness, if credible, is enough to prove the corpus
the fire started. As his aunt was partly deaf, he said he had to delicti and to warrant conviction. When these are present,
speak in a loud voice. He averred that he merely asked his the only issue is the credibility of the witness. Whenever
aunt to buy food because they ran out of LPG. Gonzales said there is inconsistency between the affidavit and the
that when he met PO1 Mendoza, he explained that he noticed testimony of a witness in court, the testimony commands
the fire had started in his room. He sought police protection greater weight considering that affidavits taken ex parte are
from his neighbors who accused him of starting it. inferior to testimony in court, the former being almost
invariably incomplete and oftentimes inaccurate, sometimes
from partial suggestions and sometimes from want of
The defense presented a Physical Science Report prepared by suggestions and inquiries, without the aid of which the
a Police Inspector showing that the ashes obtained from the witness may be unable to recall the connected circumstances
burnt premises were negative of any flammable substance. necessary for his accurate recollection of the subject.
RTC convicted petitioner. The CA sustained the conviction The eyewitness positively identified Gonzales as the culprit
holding that the denial of Gonzales cannot prevail over the who caused the fire. Both the trial and appellate courts found
positive identification of a witness, that the prosecution the testimony of eyewitness Canlas credible. As a general
established circumstantial evidence sufficient to support the rule, when the findings of both courts are in agreement, this
conviction of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, and that Court will not reverse their findings of fact.
although there were discrepancies in the testimony of Canlas
and his affidavits, the discrepancies did not necessarily
discredit him because affidavits taken ex parte are generally The findings of the Physical Science Report is a negative
considered to be inferior to the testimony given in open court. evidence and taken together with the bare denial of
Moreover, the Court of Appeals held that the alleged petitioner, supported only with testimonies of relatives,
discrepancies pertain to minor matters negated any suspicion constitute inferior evidence as against the circumstantial
that the testimony was perjured and rehearsed. evidence coupled with the positive identification of the
accused as the perpetrator of the offense by a credible
witness..
In this petition for review, petitioner argues that the trial court
and the appellate court erred in giving credence to the
testimony of prosecution witness Canlas. He claims that the 40) Republic v Kenrick Developent
sworn statements of Canlas before the investigating officer of
the fire department and before the city prosecutor were KEYWORD: Unsigned Pleading = Mere scrap of paper;
inconsistent. Adoptive admission constituting judicial admission
PRINCIPLES:
Petitioner cites People v. Salik Magonawal, where the material  By adoptive admission, a third person's statement
discrepancies between the court testimony and prior becomes the admission of the party embracing or
statements of a witness at a preliminary investigation made espousing it.
the testimony incredible.  Only the signature of either the party himself or his
counsel operates to validly convert a pleading from one
that is unsigned to one that is signed.
The OSG contends that the discrepancies in the testimonies of
the witnesses and their sworn statements were not substantial FACTS:
to warrant a review of the findings of fact of the trial court. Kenrick built a concrete perimeter fence around parcels of
The OSG asserts that the testimony of Canlas in court clarified, land behind the Civil Aviation Traininger Center of the Air
corroborated and complemented his affidavit. Likewise, the Transportation Office. As a result of this, ATO was
testimony of the other prosecution witnesses corroborated dispossessed of huge tracts of land. Kenrick, on the other
Canlas's testimony hand, claimed that the land was theirs, showing a TCT issued
in its name which was sold to it by Alfonso Concepcion.

The Registrar of Deeds had no record of such TCT nor of its By adoptive admission, a third person's statement becomes
ascendant TCT. ATO verified the authenticity of Kenrick's titles the admission of the party embracing or espousing it. This
with the Land Registration Authority. LRA submitted its report. may occur when a party:
Registrar of Deeds of Pasay City had no record of the TCT and a) Expressly agrees to or concurs in an oral statement made
its ascendant title. The land allegedly covered by Kenrick's by another
titles was also found to be within Villamor Air Base b) Hears a statement and later on essentially repeats it
(headquarters of the Philippine Air Force) in Pasay City. c) Utters an acceptance or builds upon the assertions of
another
By virtue of a report, OSG filed a complaint for revocation, d) Replies by way of rebuttal to some specific points raised
annulment and cancellation of certificates of title against by another but ignores further points which he or she
Kenrick and an Answer was filed by the latter which was has heard the other maker
purportedly signed by Atty. Onofre Garlitos, Jr. as counsel for e) Reads and signs a written statement made by another
respondent.
During the pendency of the case, the Senate Blue Ribbon Kenrick accepted the pronouncements of Atty. Garlitos and
Committee conducted a hearing in aid of legislation on the built itscase on them. At no instance did it ever deny or
matter of land registration and titling. During the hearing, contradict its former counsel's statements. It went to great
Atty. Garlitos (former counsel of Kenrick) testified that he lengths to explain Atty. Garlitos' testimony as well as its
prepared Kenrick’s answer and transmitted an unsigned draft implications, as follows:
to Victor Ong (Kenrick’s President). He further stated that the 1) While Atty. Garlitos denied signing the answer, the fact
signature in the answer was not his and he authorized no one was that the answer was signed. Hence, the pleading
to sign in his behalf and he did not know who signed the could not be considered invalid for being an unsigned
answer. pleading. The fact that the person who signed it was
neither known to Atty. Garlitos nor specifically
When the Republic found out about this, they promptly filed authorized by him was immaterial. The important thing
an urgent motion to declare Kenrick in default for failure to was that the answer bore a signature.
file a valid answer since it was an unsigned pleading which in 2) While the Rules of Court requires that a pleading must
effect is a mere scrap of paper and produced no legal effect be signed by the party or his counsel, it does not prohibit
pursuant to Sec. 3 Rule 7 of the Rules of Court. a counsel from giving a general authority for any person
to sign the answer for him which was what Atty. Garlitos
Trial court: granted Republic's motion. It found Kenrick's did. The person who actually signed the pleading was of
answer to be sham, false and intended to defeat the purpose no moment as long as counsel knew that it would be
of the rules. It ordered the answer stricken from the records, signed by another, similar to addressing an authorization
respondent in default and allowed the Republic to present its letter "to whom it may concern" such that any person
evidence ex parte. could act on it even if he or she was not known
beforehand.
CA: Granted respondent’s petition for certiorari and directed 3) Atty. Garlitos testified that he prepared the answer; he
the lifting of the order of default against respondent and never disowned its contents and he resumed acting as
ordered the trial court to proceed to trial with dispatch. It counsel for respondent subsequent to its filing. These
found that Atty. Garlitos' statements in the legislative hearing circumstances show that Atty. Garlitos conformed to or
were unreliable since they were not subjected to cross- ratified the signing of the answer by another. Kenrick
examination. It also scrutinized Atty. Garlitos' acts after the completely adopted Garlitos’ statements as its own.
filing of the answer and concluded that he assented to the
signing of the answer by somebody in his stead which
supposedly cured whatever defect the answer may have had. The adoptive admission constituted a judicial admission
which was conclusive on it.
ISSUE:
Whether Kenrick should be declared in default Contrary to respondent's position, a signed pleading is one
that is signed either by the party himself or his counsel.
RULING: YES (Section 3, Rule 7)
Trial court correctly ruled that respondent's answer was
invalid and of no legal effect as it was an unsigned pleading. Only the signature of either the party himself or his counsel
Respondent was properly declared in default and the Republic operates to validly convert a pleading from one that is
was rightly allowed to present evidence ex parte. unsigned to one that is signed. Counsel's authority and duty
to sign a pleading are personal to him. He may not delegate it
A party may, by his words or conduct, voluntarily adopt or to just any person. The signature of counsel constitutes an
ratify another's statement. Where it appears that a party assurance by him that he has read the pleading; that, to the
clearly and unambiguously assented to or adopted the best of his knowledge, information and belief, there is a good
statements of another, evidence of those statements is ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay.
admissible against him. This is the essence of the principle of
adoptive admission. Under the Rules of Court, it is counsel alone, by affixing his
signature, who can certify to these matters. The preparation
An adoptive admission is a party's reaction to a statement or and. signing of a pleading constitute legal work involving
action by another person when it is reasonable to treat the practice of law which is reserved exclusively for the members
party's reaction as an admission of something stated or of the legal profession. Counsel may delegate the signing of a
implied by the other person. pleading to another lawyer but cannot do so in favor of one
who is not.

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides: Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS), all from
Rule 9.01 — A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified Baguio City. Magdalena charged respondent with sexual
person the performance of any task which by law may only be indignities and harassment, while Ligaya accused him of
performed by a member of the Bar in good standing. sexual harassment and various malfeasances
Moreover, a signature by agents of a lawyer amounts to
signing by unqualified persons something the law strongly
proscribes. MAGDALENA:
The blanket authority respondent claims Atty. Garlitos Magdalena Gapuz filed an application with DECS Office in
entrusted to just anyone was void. Any act taken pursuant to Baguio City for permit to operate a pre-school. One of the
that authority was likewise void. There was no way it could requisites for the issuance of the permit was the inspection
have been cured or ratified by Atty. Garlitos' subsequent acts. of the school premises by the DECS Division Office.
Respondent and complainant visited the school. In the course
Moreover, the transcript of the November 26, 1998 Senate of inspection, while both descending the stairs, respondent
hearing shows that Atty. Garlitos consented to the signing of suddenly placed his arms around complainant's shoulders
the answer by another "as long as it conformed to his draft." and kissed her cheek.
We give no value whatsoever to such self-serving statement.
No doubt, Atty. Garlitos could not have validly given blanket Fearful that her application might be jeopardized
authority for just anyone to sign and that her husband might harm respondent, Magdalena
the answer. just kept quiet.
Several days later, Magdalena went to the DECS

Division Office and asked respondent about the status of her
Respondent insists on the liberal application of the rules. It permit. His reply was "Mag-date muna tayo." She declined,
maintains that even if it were true that its answer was explaining that she is married. She then left and reported the
supposedly an unsigned pleading, the defect was a mere matter to DECS Assistant Superintendent Peter Ngabit.
technicality that could
be set aside. Sometime in September 1994, Magdalena read from
a local newspaper that certain female employees of the DECS
Procedural requirements which have often been disparagingly in Baguio City were charging a high-ranking DECS official with
labeled as mere technicalities have their own valid raison d' sexual harassment. Upon inquiry, she learned that the official
etre in the orderly administration of justice. To summarily being complained of was respondent. She then wrote a
brush them aside may result in arbitrariness and injustice. letter-complaint for sexual indignities and harassment to
former DECS Secretary Ricardo Gloria.
Like all rules, procedural rules should be followed except only On October 4, 1994, respondent was placed under
when, for the most persuasive of reasons, they may be relaxed suspension.
to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the
degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the
prescribed procedure. Respondent failed to show any
persuasive reason why it should be exempted from strictly LIGAYAN:
abiding by the rules.
On 4 separate occasions, Belagan touched her
breasts, kissed her cheek, touched her groins, embraced her
The Court cannot close its eyes to the acts committed by Atty.
from behind, pulled her close to him with his organ pressing
Garlitos in violation of the ethics of the legal profession. Thus,
against her. Aside from this, Ligaya charged him with delaying
he should be made to account for his possible misconduct.
teachers' salaries, failing to release differentials to
Decision is furnished the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
substitutes, refusing to release teachers' uniforms and
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for the commencement of
allowances, and failing to constitute the Selection and
disbarment proceedings against Atty. Garlitos, Jr. for his
Promotion Board, as required by the DECS rules and
possible unprofessional
regulations.
41) Civil Service Commission vs. Allyson Belagan

DECS Secretary: Belagan guilty of sexual indignities and
PRINCIPLE: When the credibility of a witness is sought to be ordered dismissed. He was absolved of charges of
impeached by proof of his reputation, it is necessary that the administrative malfeasance or dereliction of duty
reputation shown should be that which existed before the
CSC: Guilty of grave misconduct. His position is that which
occurrence of the circumstances out of which the litigation
requires a high degree of moral uprightness
arose, or at the time of the trial and prior thereto, but not at a
period remote from the commencement of the suit. This is Respondent filed a MR, contending that he has never been
because a person of derogatory character or reputation can charged of any offense in his thirty-seven years of service.
still change or reform himself. By contrast, Magdalena was charged with several offenses
before the MTC of Baguio City. (Respondent listed all the
FACTS: cases; there were A LOT)
The instant case stemmed from two (2) separate complaints
Respondent claimed that the numerous cases filed against
filed respectively by Magdalena Gapuz, founder/directress of
Magdalena cast doubt on her character, integrity, and
the "Mother and Child Learning Center," and Ligaya Annawi, a
credibility, MR was denied
public school teacher at Fort Del Pilar Elementary School,
against respondent Dr. Allyson Belagan, Superintendent of the
CA: reversed the CSC and held that Magdalena is an unreliable or the record of the judgment, that he
witness, her character being questionable has been convicted of an offense."
ISSUE: W/N the complaining witness, Magdalena , is Credible With the foregoing disquisition, the Court of Appeals is
correct in holding that the character or reputation of a
complaining witness in a sexual charge is a proper subject of
RULING: inquiry. This leads us to the ultimate question — is
Magdalena's derogatory record sufficient to discredit her
Generally, the character of a party is regarded as legally credibility?
irrelevant in determining a controversy. 15 One statutory
exception is that relied upon by respondent, i.e.,Section 51 (a) A careful review of the record yields a negative answer.
3, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, which we quote
1) Magdalena's derogatory record is NOT sufficient to
here:
discredit her credibility. Evidence of one's character or
"SEC. 51. Character evidence not generally admissible; reputation must be confined to a time not too remote
exceptions. — from the time in question. What is to be determined is
the character or reputation of the person at the time of
(a) In Criminal Cases: the trial and prior thereto, but not at a period remote
from the commencement of the suit. Most of the
xxx xxx xxx
twenty-two (22) cases filed with the MTC of Baguio City
(3) The good or bad moral character of the offended relate to acts committed in the 70s and 80s and one
party may be proved if it tends to establish in any was in 1994. Surely, those cases and complaints are no
reasonable degree the probability or longer reliable proofs of Magdalenas character or
improbability of the offense charged." reputation. Every person can change
2) Belagan also failed to prove that Magdalena was
It will be readily observed that the above provision pertains convicted of any of the criminal cases. It is not
only to criminal cases, not to administrative offenses. And permissible to show that a witness has been arrested or
even assuming that this technical rule of evidence can be that he has been charged with or prosecuted for a
applied here, still, we cannot sustain respondent's posture. criminal offense, or confined in jail for the purpose of
impairing his credibility
Not every good or bad moral character of the offended party
may be proved under this provision. Only those which would
establish the probability or improbability of the offense
charged. This means that the character evidence must be 42) People vs Noel Lee
limited to the traits and characteristics involved in the type of
offense charged. Thus, on a charge of rape — character for
FACTS:
chastity, on a charge of assault — character for peaceableness
or violence, and on a charge of embezzlement — character for Herminia Marquez and her son, Joseph, were in the
honesty. In one rape case, where it was established that the living room of their house. They were watching a basketball
alleged victim was morally loose and apparently uncaring game on television. Herminia was seated across, Joseph, who
about her chastity, we found the conviction of the accused sat on a sofa against the wall and window of their
doubtful. hous. When Herminia casually glanced at her son, she saw a
hand holding a gun coming out of the open window behind
In the present administrative case for sexual harassment,
Joseph. She looked up and saw accused-appellant Noel Lee
respondent did not offer evidence that has a bearing on
peering through the window and holding the gun aimed at
Magdalena's chastity. What he presented are charges for grave
Joseph. Before she could warn him, Joseph turned his body
oral defamation, grave threats, unjust vexation, physical
towards the window, and simultaneously, appellant fired his
injuries, malicious mischief, etc. filed against her. Certainly,
gun hitting Joseph’s head. Joseph slumped on the sofa.
these pieces of evidence are inadmissible under the above
Herminia stood up but could not move as accused-appellant
provision because they do not establish the probability or
fired a second shot at Joseph and three shots more, two hit
improbability of the offense charged.
the sofa and one hit the cement floor. When no more shots
Credibility means the disposition and intention to tell the were fired, Herminia ran to the window and saw accused-
truth in the testimony given. It refers to a person's integrity, appellant, in a blue sando, flee towards the direction of his
and to the fact that he is worthy of belief. 19A witness may be house. Joseph was then brought to the MCU Hospital where
discredited by evidence attacking his general reputation for he later died.
truth, 20 honesty 21 or integrity. 22 Section 11, Rule 132 of
Herminia filed a complaint for murder against
the same Revised Rules on Evidence reads:
accused-appellant. The trial court ruled against accused-
"SEC. 11. Impeachment of adverse party's witness. — appellant and sentenced him with the penalty of death.
A witness may be impeached by the party against Hence, the automatic review by the Supreme Court.
whom he was called, by contradictory evidence, by
Accused-appellant points out inconsistencies in the
evidence that his general reputation for truth,
eyewitness testimony. In her affidavit before the police
honesty, or integrity is bad, or by evidence that he
officers, Herminia declared that the hand holding a gun
has made at other times statements inconsistent with
pointed at her son came out of a hole in the window,
his present testimony, but not by evidence of
i.e., butas ng bintana. On cross-examination, Herminia stated
particular wrongful acts, except that it may be shown
that she saw a hand holding a gun in the open window,
by the examination of the witness,

i.e., bukas na bintana. According to accused-appellant, this Moreover, proof of the victim’s bad moral character
inconsistency is a serious flaw which cannot be repaired by is not necessary in cases of murder committed with treachery
her statement on the witness stand. and premeditation. In People v. Soliman, a murder case, the
Supreme Court held: “While good or bad moral character
Accused-appellant makes capital of Joseph’s bad may be availed of as an aid to determine the probability or
reputation in their community. He alleges that the victim’s improbability of the commission of an offense, such is not
drug habit led him to commit other crimes and he may have necessary in the crime of murder where the killing is
been shot by any of the persons from whom he had stolen. As committed through treachery or premeditation. The proof of
proof of Joseph’s bad character, appellant presented such character may only be allowed in homicide cases to
Herminia’s letter to the mayor of Caloocan City seeking his show that it has produced a reasonable belief of imminent
assistance for Joseph’s rehabilitation from drugs. danger in the mind of the accused and a justifiable conviction
that a prompt defensive action was necessary.”
ISSUES: In the case at bar, accused-appellant is charged with

murder committed through treachery and evident
1) Whether or not the trial court should not have accepted premeditation. The evidence shows that there was
Herminia’s testimony because it is inconsistent. treachery. There was no opportunity at all for the victim to
defend himself or retaliate against his attacker. The
2) Whether or not the character evidence is admissible in this suddenness and unexpectedness of the attack ensured his
case. death without risk to the assailant. Following the ruling
in People v. Soliman, where the killing of the victim was
attended by treachery, proof of the victim’s bad character is
RULING: not necessary. The presence of this aggravating circumstance
negates the necessity of proving the victims bad character to
1) Herminia corrected her affidavit by saying in open
establish the probability or improbability of the offense
court that she saw the hand and the gun coming out of the
charged and, at the same time, qualifies the killing of Joseph
open window, not from a hole in the window. Between
Marquez to murder.
Herminia’s testimony in open court and her sworn statement,
any inconsistency therein does not necessarily discredit the Supreme Court affirmed but reduced the penalty
witness. Affidavits are generally considered inferior to open from death to reclusion perpetua.
court declarations because affidavits are taken ex-parte and
are almost always incomplete and inaccurate.
2) Character is defined to be the possession by a person

of certain qualities of mind and morals, distinguishing him
from others; his reputation. Good moral character includes all
the elements essential to make up such a character; among
these are common honesty and veracity. The rule is that the
character or reputation of a party is regarded as legally 43) Primo Miro v Porferio Mendoza
irrelevant in determining a controversy, so that evidence
relating thereto is not admissible.
FACTS:
In criminal cases, sub-paragraph 1 of Section 51 of Mendoza is the Director of LTO Cebu, Erederos is his niece
Rule 130 provides that the accused may prove his good moral and secretary, Alingasa was an LTO Clerk and Peque is the OIC
character which is pertinent to the moral trait involved in the of the Operation Division of LTO.
offense charged. Sub-paragraph 2 provides that the
prosecution may not prove the bad moral character of the They were administratively charged with Grave Misconduct
accused except only in rebuttal and when such evidence is for the alleged selling of confirmation certificates supposed
pertinent to the moral trait involved in the offense charged. to be issued by the LTO for free.
Both sub-paragraphs (1) and (2) of Section 51 of Rule 130 refer
to character evidence of the accused. And this evidence must The affidavits of the respondents read:
be pertinent to the moral trait involved in the offense charged,
meaning, that the character evidence must be relevant and “3. That in doing my job, I have noticed and
germane to the kind of the act charged. witnessed the following anomalies concerning the
Sub-paragraph (3) of Section 51 of the said Rule processing of vehicle registration, . . ., as follows:
refers to the character of the offended party. Character a. That in order to secure the forms of
evidence, whether good or bad, of the offended party may be Confirmation of Certificates, you have to buy
proved if it tends to establish in any reasonable degree the the same at the present price of P2,500.00 per
probability or improbability of the offense charged. pad from Catalina Alingasa, an LTO personnel,
who will remit her collections to a certain
In the instant case, proof of the bad moral character
Marilyn Mendoza Vda. [de] Erederos, a niece
of the victim is irrelevant to determine the probability or
and the Secretary of the Regional Director,
improbability of his killing. Accused-appellant has not alleged
Porferio Mendoza; EACIcH
that the victim was the aggressor or that the killing was made
in self-defense. There is no connection between the b. That Confirmation Certificates processed
deceased’s drug addiction and thievery with his violent death during previous administration would not be
in the hands of accused-appellant. honored and under such situations, they would
require that the same be reprocessed which

means that we have to buy and use the new Substantial evidence is defined as such amount of relevant
forms supplied by the present administration[.]” evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.
The NBI/Progress report submitted to the LTO Manila also
revealed that the confirmation certificates were given to the The only pieces of evidence presented by the complainants
representatives of car dealers, who were authorized to supply to establish the respondents' guilt of the act charged are: (1)
the needed data therein. Pertinent provision of said report their complaint-affidavits and the (2) NBI/Progress
reads: report. As correctly found by the CA, these pieces of
evidence do not meet the quantum of proof required in
“06. Submitted Affidavits of Ms. MARICAR G. administrative cases.
HUETE, a resident of Lahug, Cebu City and liaison
Officer of GCY Parts, Kabancalan Mandaue City and
Mr. ERNESTO R. CARTILLAS a resident of Basak,
Mandaue City and liaison Officer of Isuzu Cebu, Inc. in i. Private complainants' affidavits
Jagobiao, Mandaue City stated among others and These affidavits indicate that the complainants have
both attested that: Annexes "E-E-1." commonly "noticed and witnessed" the anomalous sale
In order to secure the forms of Confirmation of transaction concerning the confirmation certificates.
Certificates, you have to buy the same at the present While the payment to Alingasa might be considered based on
cost of P2,500.00 per pad from CATALINA ALINGASA, personal knowledge, the alleged remittance to Erederos and
an LTO Personnel, who will remit her collections to a Mendoza — on its face — is hearsay.
certain MARILYN MENDOZA Vda. De EREDEROS, a
niece and secretary of the Regional Director, Hearsay evidence is evidence, not of what the witness knows
PORFERIO MENDOZA.” himself but, of what he has heard from others; it is not only
limited to oral testimony or statements but likewise applies
Deputy Ombudsman’s Ruling: to written statements, such as affidavits.
Found Mendoza, Erederos, and Alingasa guilty of grave The records show that not one of the complainants actually
misconduct, and found Peque guilty of simple misconduct, witnessed the transfer of money from Alingasa to Erederos
relying largely on the NBI/ Progress Report. and Mendoza. Further, There is no averment relating to any
CA: Reversed the Deputy Ombudsman’s decision, ruling that "personal demand" for the amount of P2,500.00.
the finding of grave misconduct was not supported by That the complainants alleged in the preface of their
substantial evidence. affidavits that they "noticed and witnessed" the anomalous
Found that affiants failed to categorically specify that the act complained of does not take their statements out of the
respondent’s personally demanded from them the payment of coverage of the hearsay evidence rule.
P2,500.00 — an allegation that the appellate court deemed Non-hearsay v. legal hearsay, distinction
material in establishing their personal knowledge.
Non-hearsay Legal hearsay
Held that the statements in the affidavits were hearsay.
fact that utterances or consists of the truth of
statements were made the facts asserted in
the statement
ISSUE:
is offered as an are offered as evidence
whether the CA committed a reversible error in dismissing the
assertion to prove the of the truth of the fact
administrative charge against the respondents
the fact of the asserted
utterance made
RULING: NO. Not covered by the Covered by hearsay

hearsay rule rule
Doctrine of conclusiveness of administrative findings of fact
is not absolute.
Findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman are Failure to identify the affidavits renders them inadmissible
conclusive except when not supported by substantial under the hearsay evidence rule
evidence.
For the affiants' failure to identify their sworn statements,
In the present case, the CA found no substantial evidence to and considering the seriousness of the charges filed, their
support the conclusion that the respondents are guilty of the affidavits must not be accepted at face value and should be
administrative charges against them. Mere allegation and treated as inadmissible under the hearsay evidence rule.
speculation is not evidence, and is not equivalent to
proof. 15 Since the Deputy Ombudsman's findings were found ii. NBI/Progress report
wanting by the CA of substantial evidence, the same shall not
-should not be given any weight
bind this Court.
It was based on complainant Huete's and Cantillas'
affidavits. It constitutes double hearsay because the
Substantial evidence, quantum of proof in administrative material facts recited were not within the personal
cases knowledge of the officers who conducted the investigation.
Reports of investigations made by law enforcement officers
or other public officials are hearsay unless the three

requisites for admissibility under the rule just mentioned: (a) Whether or not the trial court and the Court of
that the entry was made by a public officer, or by another appeals erred in relying on the dying declaration of the victim
person specially enjoined by law to do so; (b) that it was as recounted by Mirasol and corroborated by Arnel.
made by the public officer in the performance of his duties,
or by such other person in the performance of a duty
specially enjoined by law; and (c) that the public officer or RULING:
other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him
stated, which must have been acquired by him personally or The Supreme Court ruled on the negative.
through official information.
A dying declaration is admissible as evidence if the
Conclusion following circumstances are present: (a) it concerns the
cause and the surrounding circumstances of the declarant's
Based on these rulings, the Deputy Ombudsman failed to death; (b) it is made when death appears to be imminent
establish the elements of grave misconduct. and the declarant is under a consciousness of impending
Their involvement or complicity in the allegedly anomalous death; (c) the declarant would have been competent to
scheme cannot be justified under the affidavits of the testify had he or she survived; and (d) the dying declaration
complainants and the NBI/Progress report, which are both is offered in a case in which the subject of inquiry involves
hearsay. the declarant's death.
There is no dispute that the victim's utterance to his

children related to the identities of his assailants. As for the
victim's consciousness of impending death, it is not necessary
44) GERALDO & ARIATE vs. PEOPLE to prove that he stated that he was at the brink of death; it
suffices that, judging from the nature and extent of his
FACTS: injuries, the seriousness of his condition was so apparent to
him that it may safely be inferred that such ante mortem
At 3:00 a.m. of July 1, 2002, his wife, daughter declaration was made under consciousness of an impending
Mirasol, and son Arnel, among other persons, on being death. The location of the victim's two gunshot wounds, his
informed of the shooting of Arthur Ronquillo (the victim), gasping for breath, and his eventual death before arriving at
repaired to where he was, not far from his residence, and the hospital meet this requirement.
found him lying on his side and wounded. Although gasping
for breath, he was able to utter to Mirasol, within the hearing It has not been established, however, that the victim
distance of Arnel, that he was shot by Badjing and Amado. would have been competent to testify had he survived the
attack. There is no showing that he had the opportunity to
Petitioners who were suspected to be the "Badjing" see his assailant. Among other things, there is no indication
and "Amado" responsible for the shooting of the victim were whether he was shot in front, the post-mortem examination
subjected to paraffin tests at the Philippine National Police report having merely stated that the points of entry of the
(PNP) Crime Laboratory in Butuan City. However, the wounds were at the "right lumbar area" and the "right iliac
qualitative examination conducted gave NEGATIVE results for area".
powder residue.
(RULING NOT RELATED TO THE TOPIC)
In documents denominated as affidavits, Arnel and
Mirasol separately gave a statement that the petitioners were At all events, even if the victim's dying declaration
the one who shot his father. At the witness stand, Mirasol were admissible in evidence, it must identify the assailant
echoed her father's declaration that "Badjing" and "Amado" with certainty; otherwise it loses its significance. In convicting
shot him. Arnel substantially corroborated Mirasol's petitioners, the trial court, as stated earlier, relied on the
statement. testimony of the victim's daughter Mirasol, which was
corroborated by her brother Arnel, that the "Badjing" and
Petitioner Ariate, a barangay tanod, raised as a "Amado" mentioned by the victim as his assailants are herein
defense that at 3 am of July 1, 2002, a barangay kagawad petitioners whom they claimed to know because they live in
woke him up and informed him that the victim was shot. He the same barangay. The Court of Appeals believed too the
and the barangay kagawad proceeded to the crime scene and siblings' testimonies.
brought the victim to the hospital where he was pronounced
dead on arrival. Petitioner Geraldo declared that he slept in Contrary, however, to the immediately-quoted ruling
his house and at 6:30 am he saw many people in the vicinity of the appellate court, it is the prosecution, not petitioners,
where the victim’s body was found and learned that the victim which had the burden of proving that petitioners were, at the
was shot. Policemen subsequently went to his house and material time, the only ones in the barangay who bore such
advised him to take a paraffin test. nicknames or aliases. This, the prosecution failed to
discharge.
The Trial Court ruled against the petitioners. It was
convinced of Mirasol’s testimony which was corroborated by When there is doubt on the identity of the
her brother Arnel Ronquillo and it gave weight to the dying malefactors, motive is essential for their conviction.The Court
declaration of the victim. The Court of Appeals affirmed with notes that in their affidavits supporting the criminal
modification the trial court's decision. It found that the trial complaint, the victim's wife and children Mirasol and Arnel
court erred in appreciating nocturnity as an aggravating proffered not knowing any possible motive for petitioners to
circumstance. shoot the victim. 34 At the trial, no evidence of any motive
was presented by the prosecution. Petitioners' defense of
denial and alibi thus assumes importance
ISSUE:

full expression of all that he intended to say as converying his

meaning in respect of such fact.
45) PEOPLE VS DE JOYA

The reason upon which incomplete declarations are generally
excluded, or if admitted, accorded little or no weight, is that
FACTS:
since the declarant was prevented (by death or other
A case regarding the crime of robbery and homicide circumstance) from saying all that he wished to say what he
committed by a stabbing of an 88 year old woman in Bulacan did say might be qualified by the statements which he was
and the taking of her jewelries and other. Accused Paquito De prevented from making. Such incomplete statement is thus
Joya allegedly committed the crime, when the other not entitled to the presumption of truthfulness, which
companions – her daughter, her son in law, both school constitutes the basis upon which dying declarations are
teachers, and their child - were away from the house. The RTC received.
ruled the accused guilty of reasonable doubt but sentenced
him only to life imprisonment because he was already 72 years
old. Basically the SC held here that the RTC assumed that the
uttered words pointed out the accused as the one who
The conviction of the accused was based on the ff. evidence:
committed the crime but the deceased never said such and
1) The testimony of Alvin, the grandson of the deceased, so the SC said that such should not be speculated.
that the latter was still able to utter “si paqui” to him
2) The quarrel is insufficient to prove a credible motive for
when he found her bloodied and asked her what
the commission of such a violent and gory death especially
happened.
with the failure of the prosecution to properly identify the
2) A quarrel that ensued earlier between the accused
perpetrator.
and the deceased regarding the former taking a bike
without the latter’s permission. 3) The slipper even if proven to belong to accused wife has
3) A step in sandal found inside the house that was no relevant connection to the commission of the crime.
alleged to belong to the wife of the accused and
sister of the deceased. 4) Failure to attend to the wake is not enough indication of
4) The accused’s evasive nature during the wake, which guilt as the accused was able to explain that he was busy in
was evidenced by his attending only once. his profession as a tailor and that he had already viewed the
5) A neighbor saw the accused looking at the house a body at the night the murder took place. Such behavior is not
few moments before the event took place. contrary to the common experience of man despite the fact
that respect for the dead is common cultural trait for
Filipinos.
6) Attempt of the accused to settle amicably the 5) Mere sighting by her neighbor of the accused in the yard
criminal charge. of the house of the deceased, in itself, is not proof of any act
or circumstance that the accused, a 72 year old man,
The accused questioned the ruling of the RTC finding him
committed such act.
guilty beyond reasonable doubt based on the evidence
adduced against him. 6) In regards to the attempt to compromise the SC ruled that
such fact was not considered by the RTC and so it inferred
that the RTC either did not believe of such fact and that a
ISSUE: WoN the RTC’s ruling was correct finding accused guilty greater degree of explicitness and detail that the accused
beyond reasonable doubt? impliedly admitted his guilt to a crime as serious as Robbery
with Homicide.
Thus the SC concluded: That the totality of the case made

RULING: against the accused consisted of an aborted, incomplete
dying declaration, and a number of circumstances that does
NO. The SC ruled that the RTC erred on convicting the accused
not necessarily give rise to a compelling inference that the
guilty beyond reasonable doubt based on the evidence
accused indeed committed the crime. The sum total of all the
adduced.
evidence was insufficient to induce that moral certainty of
1) The dying statement “si paqui” while referring to the guilt that characterizes proof beyond reasonable doubt.
accused is not a sensible sentence in itself. It can either be: a)
a subject of a sentence or (b) an object of a verb; if it was a
subject then there was no predicate uttered by the deceased 46) Fuentes vs. CA
and if it was an object of a verb then there was also no verb
uttered by the deceased. Aside from that the statement must
FACTS:
be related to the question asked by the child which was: “Apo,
Apo what happened?” instead of “Apo, Apo who did this to Alejandro Fuentes has been convicted for murder by the RTC.
you?” On appeal, he argued that he is innocent and only a victim of
mistaken identity.
It has been held that a dying declaration to be admissible must
be complete in itself. It does not mean that the declarant must
At four o'clock in the morning of 24 June 1989 Julieto
recite everything that constituted the res gestae of his
Malaspina together with Godofredo Llames, Honorio Osok
statement, but that his statement of any given fact should be a
and Alberto Toling, was at a benefit dance at Dump Site,

Tudela, Trento, Agusan del Sur. Fuentes, the petitioner, called against the interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted in
Malaspina and placed his right arm on the shoulder of the the declaration was at the time it was made so far contrary to
latter saying, "Before, I saw you with a long hair but now you declarant's own interest, that a reasonable man in his
have a short hair." Suddenly petitioner stabbed Malaspina in position would not have made the declaration unless he
the abdomen with a hunting knife. Malaspina fell to the believed it to be true, may be received in evidence against
ground and his companions rushed to his side. Petitioner fled. himself or his successors in interest and against third
Before the victim succumbed to the gaping wound on his persons." The admissibility in evidence of such declaration is
abdomen he muttered that Alejandro Fuentes, Jr., stabbed grounded on necessity and trustworthiness.
him.
There are three (3) essential requisites for the admissibility of
Dr. Porfirio L. Salubre, the Rural Health Physician who a declaration against interest: (a) the declarant must not be
autopsied the cadaver of Julieto Malaspina on 24 July 1989, available to testify; (b) the declaration must concern a fact
reported that death was due to "stab wound at left lumbar cognizable by the declarant; and (c) the circumstances must
region 1-1⁄2 in. in length with extracavitation of the small and render it improbable that a motive to falsify existed.
large intestines."
In this case, DECLARANT IS NOT “UNABLE TO TESTIFY”. There
Petitioner claims on the other hand that it was his cousin Zoilo is no showing that Zoilo is either dead, mentally
Fuentes, Jr., alias "Jonie" who knifed Malaspina. Zoilo allegedly incapacitated or physically incompetent which Sec. 38
confessed to petitioner and Felicisimo Fuentes, the uncle of obviously contemplates. His mere absence from the
petitioner and Zoilo, who in turn relayed the matter to P/Sgt. jurisdiction does not make him ipso facto unavailable under
Benjamin Conde, Jr., that he (Zoilo) killed Malaspina. this rule. For it is incumbent upon the defense to produce
each and every piece of evidence that can break the
Felicisimo testified that on 24 June 1989 while he was at prosecution and assure the acquittal of the accused.
Barangay San Isidro, Zoilo Fuentes, Jr., confessed that he killed
Malaspina in "retaliation"; that he even showed him the knife Other than the gratuitous statements of accused-appellant
he used and asked his help in finding a lawyer, in securing bail and his uncle to the effect that Zoilo admitted having killed
and, if possible, in working out a settlement with the relatives Malaspina, the records show that the defense did not exert
of the deceased. The following day however he learned that any serious effort to produce Zoilo as a witness. Lest we be
the self-confessed killer was gone and that petitioner had misunderstood, the Court is always for the admission of
been arrested for a crime he did not commit. evidence that would let an innocent declaration of guilt by
the real culprit. But this can be open to abuse, as when the
RTC found Fuentes guilty of Murdering Malaspina. CA also extrajudicial statement is not even authenticated thus
affirmed RTC’s decision. increasing the probability of its fabrication; it is made to
persons who have every reason to lie and falsify; and it is not
On appeal to the SC, petitioner argued the following altogether clear that the declarant himself is unable to
contentions: testify.
1. Appellate court erred when it held that petitioner Furthermore, even petitioner’s own witness, Nerio Biscocho,
was positively and categorically identified as the killer who claimed he also saw the killing, testified that Alejandro
of Malaspina. Fuentes, Jr., the petitioner, and "Jonie" Fuentes are one and
2. That there is an inconsistency between testimonies of the same person.
prosecution witnesses Alberto Toling and Honorio
Osok to the effect that they saw petitioner stab 2. No. The discrepancy in inconsequential.
Malaspina on the right lumbar region, and the
testimony of the attending physician that the victim Petitioner points to an alleged inconsistency between the
was stabbed on the left lumbar region. testimonies of prosecution witnesses Alberto Toling and
Honorio Osok to the effect that they saw petitioner stab
ISSUE: Malaspina on the right lumbar region, and the testimony of
the attending physician that the victim was stabbed on the
1. Whether the alleged declaration of Zoilo against his left lumbar region.
penal interest, (that he killed Malaspina and not
petitioner) can be accepted by the court. This discrepancy is inconsequential. What is material is that
2. Whether or not the argument of petitioner of alleged Malaspina was stabbed to death and that three (3)
inconsistency of the witnesses can be given credence. prosecution witnesses positively identified petitioner as the
knife wielder. It must be stressed that these witnesses had
RULING: known petitioner for quite some time and never had any
personal misunderstanding nor altercation with the latter as
1. No. Zoilo was not presented in court to testify and to create any suspicion that they were impelled by ill motives
they were not able to prove that Zoilo is “UNABLE to falsely implicate him.
TO TESTIFY”.
Here, petitioner is claiming that Zoilo killed Malaspina based

on the alleged confession Zoilo made to him and to Felicisimo. 47) DANILO L. PAREL vs. SIMEON B. PRUDENCIO
But this is only hearsay as when Zoilo is not presented in KEYWORD: two-storey residential house
court. One of the recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule is
that pertaining to declarations made against interest. Sec. 38 FACTS:
of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that "(t)he On February 27, 1992, Simeon Prudencio (respondent) filed a
declaration made by a person deceased, or unable to testify, complaint for recovery of possession and damages against
petitioner with the RTC Baguio alleging that: he is the owner of the subject house as conclusive proof that respondent is
of a two-storey residential house located at No. 61 Forbes Park the true and only owner of the house since the affidavit
National Reservation near Department of Public Service (DPS) should be read in its entirety to determine the purpose for
compound, Baguio City; such property was constructed solely which it was executed.
from his own funds and declared in his name under Tax
Declaration No. 47048; he commenced the construction of Petitioner further contends that since he had
said house in 1972 until its completion three years later; when established his father’s co-ownership of the subject house,
the second floor of said house became habitable in 1973, he respondent has no legal right to eject him from the property;
allowed petitioner’s parents, Florentino (now deceased) and that he could not be compelled to pay rentals for residing in
Susan Parel, to move therein and occupy the second floor the ground floor of the subject house; that respondent
while the construction of the ground floor was on-going to should bear his own expenses and be adjudged liable for
supervise the construction and to safeguard the materials; damages which petitioner sustained for being constrained to
when the construction of the second floor was finished in litigate.
1975, respondent allowed petitioner’s parents and children to
transfer and temporarily reside thereat; it was done out of ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner was able to prove by
sheer magnanimity as petitioner’s parents have no house of preponderance of evidence that his father was a co-owner of
their own and since respondent’s wife is the older sister of the subject two-storey residential house.
Florentino, petitioner’s father; in November 1985, respondent
RULING:
wrote Florentino a notice for them to vacate the said house as
NO. The respondent had shown sufficient evidence to
the former was due for retirement and he needed the place to support his complaint for recovery of possession of the
which petitioner’s parents heeded when they migrated to U.S.
ground floor of the subject house as the exclusive owner
in 1986; however, without respondent’s knowledge, petitioner
thereof. Section 38 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
and his family unlawfully entered and took possession of the
provides: SEC. 38. Declaration against interest. – The
ground floor of respondent’s house; petitioner’s refusal to declaration made by a person deceased, or unable to testify,
vacate the house despite repeated demands prompted
against the interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted in
respondent to file the instant action for recovery of
the declaration was at the time it was made so far contrary to
possession. Respondent also asked petitioner for a monthly the declarant's own interest, that a reasonable man in his
rental of P3,000.00 from April 1988 and every month position would not have made the declaration unless he
thereafter until the latter vacates the said premises and
believed it to be true, may be received in evidence against
surrender possession thereof; and for moral and exemplary
himself or his successors-in-interest and against third
damages, attorney’s fees and cost of suit. persons.
Petitioner filed his Answer with Counterclaim alleging
The theory under which declarations against
that: his parents are the co-owners of the said residential interest are received in evidence notwithstanding they are
house, i.e., the upper story belongs to respondent while the hearsay is that the necessity of the occasion renders the
ground floor pertains to petitioner’s parents; he is occupying
reception of such evidence advisable and, further that the
the ground floor upon the instruction of his father, Florentino,
reliability of such declaration asserts facts which are against
with respondent’s full knowledge; his parents spent their own his own pecuniary or moral interest.
resources in improving and constructing the said two-storey
house as co-owners thereof; the late Florentino was an The affiant, Florentino, who died in 1989 was
awardee of the land on which the house stands and as a co- petitioner’s father and had adequate knowledge with respect
owner of the house, he occupied the ground floor thereof; the to the subject covered by his statement. In said affidavit,
demand to vacate was respondent’s attempt to deprive Florentino categorically declared that while he is the
petitioner’s parents of their rights as co-owner of the said occupant of the residential building, he is not the owner of
house; that respondent had filed ejectment case as well as the same as it is owned by respondent who is residing in
criminal cases against them involving the subject house which Quezon City. It is safe to presume that he would not have
were all dismissed. Petitioner asked for the dismissal of the made such declaration unless he believed it to be true, as it is
complaint and prayed for damages and attorney’s fees. prejudicial to himself as well as to his children’s interests as
his heirs.
Petitioner concedes that while his former counsel
failed to make a formal offer of his documentary evidence We agree with the CA that while tax receipts and
before the trial court and that the court shall consider no declarations are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership,
evidence which has not been formally offered, he maintains they constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of
that the said rule is not absolute, citing the case of Bravo, Jr. v. title over the property. The house which petitioner claims to
Borja; that his documentary evidence which were not formally be co-owned by his late father had been consistently
offered in evidence were marked during the presentation of declared for taxation purposes in the name of respondent,
the testimony of petitioner’s witnesses and were part of their and this fact, taken with the other circumstances above-
testimonies; that these evidence were part of the mentioned, inexorably lead to the conclusion that
memorandum filed by him before the trial court on July 12, respondent is the sole owner of the house subject matter of
1993. the litigation.
Petitioner insists that even in the absence of the documentary
evidence, his testimony as well as that of his witnesses In this case, the records show that although
substantiated his claim of co-ownership of the subject house petitioner’s counsel asked that he be allowed to offer his
between his late father and respondent as found by the trial documentary evidence in writing, he, however, did not file
court. the same. Thus, the CA did not consider the documentary
evidence presented by petitioner. Section 34 of Rule 132 of
Petitioner argues that the CA erred in finding the the Rules of Court provides:
affidavit of petitioner’s father declaring respondent as owner
Section 34. Offer of evidence. – The court shall consider no penis into her vagina but it did not penetrate fully
evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose before he ejaculated.
for which the evidence is offered must be specified. Thereafter, appellant gave complainant P2.00 and
A formal offer is necessary because it is the duty of a judge to left. Complainant stood up and went down the
rest his findings of facts and his judgment only and strictly building but never told anybody about it because
upon the evidence offered by the parties to the suit. It is a she was afraid appellant would kill her.
settled rule that the mere fact that a particular document is 2. On April 20, 1988, at about 7:00 o'clock in the
identified and marked as an exhibit does not mean that it has evening complainant was sitting at the Freedom
thereby already been offered as part of the evidence of a Square when appellant approached her and told her
party. to go with him upstairs. Complainant refused but
appellant shoved her towards the stairs, held her by
Petitioner insists that although his documentary the left arm, and brought her to the upper floor.
evidence were not formally offered, the same were marked Appellant inserted his penis into complainant's
during the presentation of the testimonial evidence, thus it vagina but it took sometime before his organ could
can properly be taken cognizance of relying in Bravo, Jr. v. penetrate the girl. When it did, complainant felt
Borja. excruciating pain and begged appellant to stop.
Appellant just ignored her and continued on without
Such reliance is misplaced. In Bravo Jr., we allowed saying anything. And after appellant had withdrawn
evidence on minority by admitting the certified true copy of his sex organ, complainant discovered that her
the birth certificate attached to a motion for bail even if it was vagina was bleeding. Appellant then stood up and
not formally offered in evidence. This was due to the fact that told her not to tell anybody about it. Then appellant
the birth certificate was properly filed in support of a motion gave her P 2.00 and left.
for bail to prove petitioner’s minority which was never
challenged by the prosecution and it already formed part of
the records of the case. The rule referred to in the Bravo case As appellant was going downstairs, he was seen by
was Section 7 of Rule 133 of the Rules of Court which Patrolwoman Evangeline Alfaro, a member of the San Carlos
provides: Section 7. Evidence on motion.- When a motion is City INP assigned at Precinct No. 1, a police outpost near the
based on facts not appearing of record, the court may hear the main entrance of the public market. Pat. Alfaro knew
matter on affidavits or depositions presented by the appellant well because he was the public market watchman
respective parties, but the court may direct that the matter be at the time. A minute later, Pat. Alfaro saw complainant
heard wholly or partly on oral testimony or depositions; and coming down the same stairs. Pat. Alfaro noticed that
not Section 34 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court which is the complainant was pale, with blood flowing to her thighs and
one applicable to the present case. legs, and was reeling as if feeling dizzy.
Even assuming arguendo that the documentary Pat. Alfaro approached complainant and asked what
evidence of petitioner should be considered in his favor, the happened to her. Complainant answered that she was taken
evidence showing that respondent had filed civil and criminal upstairs and raped by appellant. Immediately, Pat. Alfaro
cases against petitioner which were dismissed as well as the brought complainant to the city hospital where she was
alleged Special Power of Attorney of petitioner’s parents examined by Dr. Oscar Jagdon Thereafter, Pat. Alfaro reported
whereby they authorized petitioner to stay in the ground floor the incident to the Station Guard by phone then took
of the house, did not establish co-ownership of Florentino and complainant to the police station after the medical
respondent of the subject house. The testimonies of petitioner examination. When they reached the station, appellant who
and his witnesses failed to show that the subject house is co- had already been taken into custody was readily identified by
owned by petitioner’s father and respondent. complainant as the rapist. Complainant was then investigated
and she rendered her statement to the police.
48) People v. Alfredo Alegado y Delima

RTC: Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape
KEYWORD: Pedigree testimony is an exception to Hearsay punished under Article 335 paragraph 3 of the Revised
Rule; Statutory Rape Penal Code. (Statutory Rape)
FACT: Complainant’s Contention: CRISTINA DEANG y VILLAROSA
The accused-appellant stands charged and convicted of two alleged that the accused raped her twice “against her will and
counts of rape, narrated as follows: without her consent”, and that she was below twelve (12)
1. On April 14, 1988, at about 6:00 o'clock in the years of age on both rape instances.
afternoon, complainant was playing at the Freedom
Square inside the public market of San Carlos City Accused’s Contention: The accused-appellant contends that
when appellant, a 170-pound, 53-year old, market the offended party's actual age at the time of the alleged
watchman at the time, held her by the hand and took incidents of rape was not established with certainty, hence, it
her upstairs to the second floor of the public market was error on the part of the trial court to convict the him of
building which houses some government offices and Statutory Rape as defined and penalized under paragraph 3,
which at the time was expectedly deserted. When Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. The testimonies of
they reached the upper floor of the building, complainant and complainant’s grandfather do not come
appellant ordered complainant to hold his penis and from their personal knowledge of the fact of birth of the
masturbate it. After, appellant ordered complainant complainant. Hence, their testimony to that fact constitutes
to lie down, and when she refused he pushed her Hearsay. Also, the accused-appellant contends that the RTC
down on the floor. Appellant then tried to insert his erroneously found that the rapes were committed with force

and intimidation, as the victim even accepted payment of and that the witness testifying to the said tradition is the
P2.00 each time. maternal grandfather of the rape victim.
ISSUES: Pertinent part of the transcript:

Q The complainant in this case is a certain Cristina
1. Do the testimonies of complainant and complainant’s Deang. Do you know her? A: Yes, sir. She is my
grandfather constitute Hearsay?
granddaughter. 
2. Was there force and intimidation in both rape
Q Who is the mother of Cristina Deang? A: My
instances?
daughter, Angelita Villarosa. 
3. Did the acceptance of the victim of P2.00 on both
Q Is she here?  A: No, she is not here. 
instances amount to tacit consent on her part?
Q Where is she now?  A: I don't know where she
works now, because she did not send a letter to
RULING: me.  My last knowledge about her whereabouts was
that she was in Manila.
1. No. Their testimonies do not constitute hearsay, as Q With whom is this Cristina Deang living now?  A: In
they are exceptions to the hearsay rule as provided our residence. 
under sections 39 and 40 of Rule 130 of the Revised Q How did it happen that Cristina Deang has been
Rules on Evidence. living with you?  A: The mother left her to me. 
Q When was it that the mother left her to you?  A: In
The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses: (1) the offended 1983. 
party herself and (2) her maternal grandfather, Cornelio Q How old was Cristina Deang at the time her
Villarosa, as to the fact that the victim was born on mother left her to you?  A: The mother of Cristina
September 5, 1976 do not constitute hearsay evidence as Deang told me that she was born in 1976 and please
claimed by the accused-appellant but rather fall under the let her go to school. 
exceptions to the hearsay rule as provided under sections 39 ATTY. BRIONES:  I would like to make it of record that
and 40 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. Under the information gathered by the mother, Angelita, is
Section 40 of the said Rule, it is provided, in part, that: a hearsay your Honor. PROSECUTOR FABROZ:  I would
SEC. 40. — Family reputation or tradition regarding like to prove the fact about the birth of the child.. 
pedigree. — The reputation or tradition existing in a COURT: Let it stay in record.
family previous to the controversy, in respect to the PROSECUTOR FABROZ:  Q By the way, did you have a
pedigree of any of its members, may be received in talk or conversation with your daughter, Angelita,
evidence if the witness testifying thereon be also a the mother of the complainant Cristina Deang,
member of the family, either by consanguinity or about when Cristina Deang was born?  A: We did not
affinity. ... talk about the birth of Cristina, but she told me to
let her daughter Cristina go to school because she is
The word “pedigree” under Section 39 of the same Rule already 7 years old. 
includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, Q Did you ask her about the birth of Cristina Deang?
the dates when and the places where these facts occurred and ATTY. BRIONES:  I think that is misleading your Honor. 
the names of the relatives. COURT:  Witness may answer. 
WITNESS: That is what she told me, she was born
In the case of Lazatin v. Campos, 92 SCRA 250, 261 [1979], we on September 5, 1976. 
stated that:
…Declarations in regard to pedigree, although hearsay, are Moreover, the offended party herself categorically stated in
admitted on the principle that they are natural expressions of open court that she was born on September 5, 1976. It is
persons who must know the truth (See Sec. 39, Rule 130 long-settled, as early as in the cases of U.S. v. Bergantino, that
under the new Rules). Pedigree testimony is admitted because the testimony of a person as to his age is admissible,
it is the best that the nature of the case admits and because although hearsay, and though a person can have no personal
greater evil might arise from the rejection of such proof than knowledge of the date of his birth as all the knowledge a
from its admission. person has of his age is acquired from what he is told by his
parents– he may testify as to his age as he had learned it
In the present case, the applicability of Rule 130, Section 39 of from his parents and relatives and his testimony in such case
the Revised Rules on Evidence to prove the victim's age is is an assertion of family tradition.
beyond question. The said provision contains three requisites
for its admissibility, namely: Hence, inasmuch as the accused-appellant failed to present
(1) that there is controversy in respect to the contrary evidence to dispute the prosecution's claim that the
pedigree of any of the members of a family; victim in this case was below twelve (12) years old at the
(2) that the reputation or tradition of the pedigree of time of the rape incidents under consideration, the SC
the person concerned existed previous to the affirmed the trial court's finding that the victim in these rape
controversy; and cases was under twelve years of age.
(3) that the witness testifying to the reputation or
tradition regarding the pedigree of the person must
be a member of the family of said person. 2. Yes, there was force and intimidation found by the
All these preconditions are obtaining in the case at bar Trial Court, although for conviction under Article 335
considering that the date of birth of the rape victim is being paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code, such finding
put in issue; that the declaration of the victim's grandfather is no longer necessary.
relating to tradition (sending a child to school upon reaching
the age of seven) existed long before the rape case was filed;
Time and again we have held that the gravamen of the offense FACTS:
of statutory rape as provided under Article 335, paragraph 3 of
the Revised Penal Code is the carnal knowledge of a woman The petitioners Corazon Tison and Rene Dezoller are niece
below twelve years old. It is not necessary to prove that the and nephew of the deceased Tedora Dezoller Guerrero, who
victim was intimidated or that force was used against her appears to be the sister of their father Hermogenes Dezoller.
because in statutory rape the law presumes that the victim on Teodora Dezoller Guerrero died on March 5, 1983 without
account of her tender age, does not and cannot have a will of any ascendant or descendant, and was survived only by her
her own. Hence, the only elements of statutory rape are: (1) husband, Martin Guerrero, and herein petitioners.
that the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) Petitioners' father, Hermogenes, died on October 3, 1973,
that such woman is under twelve (12) years of age. hence they seek to inherit from Teodora Dezoller Guerrero by
right of representation.
Considering that in the instant case there is clear and The records reveal that upon the death of Teodora Dezoller
competent evidence that the victim was under twelve (12) Guerrero, her surviving spouse executed an Affidavit of
years old at the time of the rape incidents complained of, the Extrajudicial Settlement adjudicating unto himself, allegedly
second argument purported by the accused-appellant that the as sole heir, the land in dispute. Martin sold the lot to herein
alleged rapes were not attended by any force or intimidation private respondent Teodora Domingo and thereafter, a TCT
must also fail. Proof of carnal knowledge of the victim in this was issued in the latter’s name.
case who was only eleven (11) years old on the two separate
occasions reported (April 14 and 20, 1988) is overwhelming Martin Guerrero died. Subsequently, herein petitioners filed
while unnecessary force and intimidation also appear in the an action for reconveyance claiming that they are entitled to
records. The offended party’s testimony regarding the inherit one-half of the property in question by right of
abominable and wicked acts of the accused-appellant against representation. Tedoro Domingo however, attacks the
her chastity on the two occasions indicated in the separate legitimacy of Hermogenes.
informations filed by the victim herself was given in a
straightforward manner without any indication that the same During the hearing, petitioner Corazon Dezoller Tison was
was motivated by any ill-feeling toward the pinpointed presented as the lone witness, with documentary evidences
perpetrator. The fact of rape on the said occasions related by offered to prove petitioners’ filiation to their father and their
the offended party was corroborated by the examining aunt. Petitioners thereafter rested their case and submitted a
physician whose medical finding revealed the presence of written offer of the exhibits.
sperm cells inside the victim's sexual organ due to partial Subsequently, private respondent filed a Demurrer to
penetration of the male organ into it. It is axiomatic in rape Plaintiff’s Evidence on the ground that petitioners failed to
cases that the slightest penetration of the female's private prove their legitimate filiation with the deceased Teodora
organ is sufficient to consummate the crime. Guerrero.
There is no merit in the accused-appellant's contention that The trial court dismissed the complaint for reconveyance.
the trial court abused its discretion in concluding that there Respondent Court of Appeals upheld the dismissal, declaring
was force and intimidation since the information did not that the documentary evidence presented by herein
contain any allegation to that effect simply because the phrase petitioners, such as the baptismal certificates, family picture,
"against her will and without her consent" contained in both and joint affidavits are all inadmissible and insufficient to
informations charging the accused-appellant of rape connotes prove and establish filiation. Hence, this appeal.
the attendance of force and intimidation.
ISSUES:
3. No. It did not amount to tacit consent.
1. Whether or not a third person (private respondent), not
The accused-appellant's act of giving the offended party the
the father nor an heir, may attack the legitimacy of the
sum of P2.00 after each instance of "forcible copulation"
petitioners.
apparently as "full atonement for his dastardly act" smacks of
"insult a hundred times compounded." The accused-appellant, 2. Whether or not petitioners failed to meet the quantum
despite the trial court's strong words, even had the gall to of proof required by Article 172 of the Family Code to
reiterate before us his claim that the acceptance of the said establish legitimacy and filiation
measly amount of P2.00 was tantamount to a tacit consent on 3. Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to inherit
the part of his victim. We deplore such a highly offensive and one-half of the property in question by right of
depraved argument for we cannot allow the innocent and
representation.
helpless victims of unsolicited and forcible defloration to be
brutally insulted while yet nursing their irreparably wounded
sexual purity. RULING:
1. The private respondent is not the proper party to

impugn the legitimacy of herein petitioners.
Fallo: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appealed
decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the amount of NO. Only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a
civil indemnity which the accused shall pay to the offended child born to his wife. He is the one directly confronted
party in each of the two rape cases is hereby increased to with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his
P50,000.00.  wife produces; and he should decide whether to conceal
that infidelity or expose it, in view of the moral
and economic interest involved. It is only in exceptional
49) Tison vs CA cases that his heirs are allowed to contest such
legitimacy. Outside of these cases, none — even his heirs
— can impugn legitimacy; that would amount to an insult prejudice to the rights of brothers and sisters, nephews
to his memory. and nieces, should there be any, under Article 1001.”
2. YES. With regard to legitimacy, both the trial court and CA “Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children
overlooked the universally recognized presumption on survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be
legitimacy. Well settled is the rule that the issue of entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers
legitimacy cannot be attacked collaterally. Only the and sisters or their children to the other half.”
husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to his
wife. Even assuming that the issue is allowed to be Upon the death of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero, one-half
resolved in this case, the burden of proof rests not on of the subject property was automatically reserved to
herein petitioners who have the benefit of the the surviving spouse, Martin Guerrero, as his share in
presumption in their favor, but on private respondent the conjugal partnership. Applying the aforequoted
who is disputing the same. The presumption of legitimacy statutory provisions, the remaining half shall be equally
is so strong that it is clear that its effect is to shift the divided between the widower and herein petitioners
burden of persuasion to the party claiming illegitimacy. who are entitled to jointly inherit in their own
And in order to destroy the presumption, the party right. Hence, Martin Guerrero could only validly alienate
against whom it operates must adduce substantial and his total undivided three-fourths (3/4) share in the entire
credible evidence to the contrary. Where there is an property to herein private respondent. Resultantly,
entire lack of competent evidence to the contrary, and petitioners and private respondent are deemed co-
unless or until it is rebutted, it has been held that a owners of the property covered by the Transfer
presumption may stand in lieu of evidence and support a Certificate of Title in the proportion of an undivided one-
finding or decision. When private respondent opted not fourth (1/4) and three-fourths (3/4) share thereof,
to present countervailing evidence to overcome the respectively.
presumption, by merely filing a demurrer to evidence
instead, she in effect impliedly admitted the truth of such
fact. 50) Mendoza vs. CA
FACTS: The complaint was filed on August 21, 1981, in the
With regard to their filiation to Teodora Guerrero, the Regional Trial Court in Cebu City. Teopista Toring Tufiacao, the
primary proof to be considered in ascertaining the herein private respondent, alleged that she was born on
relationship between the parties concerned is the August 20, 1930, to Brigida Toring, who was then single, and
testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison to the effect that defendant Casimiro Mendoza, married at that time to
Teodora Dezoller Guerrero in her lifetime, or sometime in Emiliana Barrientos. She averred that Mendoza recognized
1946, categorically declared that the former is Teodora’s her as an illegitimate child by treating her as such and
niece. Such a statement is considered a declaration about according her the rights and privileges of a recognized
pedigree which is admissible, as an exception to the illegitimate child.
hearsay rule, under Section 39, Rule 130 of the ROC,
Casimiro Mendoza, then already 91 years old, specifically
subject to the following conditions: (1) that the declarant
denied the plaintiffs allegations and set up a counterclaim for
is dead or unable to testify; (2) that the declarant be
damages and attorney's fees.
related to the person whose pedigree is the subject of
inquiry; (3) that such relationship be shown by evidence Amplifying on her complaint, Teopista testified that it was her
other than the declaration; and (4) that the declaration mother who told her that her father was Casimiro. She called
was made ante litem motam, that is, not only before the him Papa Miroy. She lived with her mother because Casimiro
commencement of the suit involving the subject matter of was married but she used to visit him at his house. When she
the declaration, but before any controversy has arisen married Valentin Tufiacao, Casimiro bought a passenger truck
thereon. Of the four, only (3) remains disputable, so the and engaged him to drive it so he could have a livelihood.
question remains if the evidence was enough to Casimiro later sold the truck but gave the proceeds of the
corroborate w/ each other. Court holds that all the sale to her and her husband. In 1977, Casimiro allowed her
evidence presented, can be deemed to have sufficiently son, Lolito Tufiacao, to build a house on his lot and later he
established the relationship between the declarant and gave her money to buy her own lot from her brother, Vicente
herein petitioners. This is in consonance with the rule that Toring. On February 14, 1977, Casimiro opened a joint savings
a prima facie showing is sufficient and that only slight account with her as a co-depositor at the Mandaue City
proof of the relationship is required. branch of the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank.
Two years later, Margarita Bate, Casimiro's adopted daughter,
(SUCCESSION TOPIC BUT JUST IN CASE) took the passbook from her, but Casimiro ordered it returned
3. The following provisions of the Civil Code provide for the to her after admonishing Margarita.1
manner by which the estate of the decedent shall be Lolito Tufiacao corroborated his mother and said he
divided in this case, to wit: considered Casimiro his grandfather because Teopista said so.
“Art. 975. When children of one or more brothers or He would kiss his hand whenever they saw each other and
sisters of the deceased survive, they shall inherit from Casimiro would give him money. Casimiro used to invite him
the latter by representation, if they survive with their to his house and give him jackfruits. when his grandfather
uncles or aunts. But if they alone survive, they shall learned that he was living on a rented lot, the old man
inherit in equal portions.” allowed him to build a house on the former's land.2
Two other witnesses testified for Teopista, namely,
“Art. 995. In the absence of legitimate descendants and Gaudencio Mendoza and Isaac Mendoza, both relatives of
ascendants, and illegitimate children and their Casimiro.
descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, the
surviving spouse shall inherit the entire estate, without

Gaudencio said he was a cousin of Casimiro and knew Brigida continuous possession of such status. Although the
Toring because she used to work with him in a saltbed in court a quo did not pass on the credibility of the
Opao. Casimiro himself told him she was his sweetheart. Later, various witnesses presented, We consider the
Gaudencio acted as a go-between for their liaison, which witnesses for the plaintiff as credible and unbiased.
eventually resulted in Brigida becoming pregnant in 1930 and No proof was shown to render them otherwise.
giving birth to Teopista. Casimiro handed him P20.00 to be There is no showing that Isaac and Gaudencio
given to Brigida at Teopista's baptism. Casimiro also gave him testified falsely. They were disinterested parties with
P5.00 every so often to be delivered to Brigida.3 no axe to grind against the appellee or the people
Isaac testified that his uncle Casimiro was the father of actively acting in his behalf. In fact even the court a
quo conceded to the truthfulness of some of their
Teopista because his father Hipolito, Casimiro's brother, and
testimonies.
his grandmother, Brigida Mendoza, so informed him. He
worked on Casimiro's boat and whenever Casimiro paid him By contrast, it continued, Vicente Toring was an interested
his salary, he would also give him various amounts from P2.00 party who was claiming to be the sole recognized natural
to P10.00 to be delivered to Teopista. Isaac also declared that child of Casimiro and stood to lose much inheritance if
Casimiro intended to give certain properties to Teopista. 4 Teopista's claim were recognized. He had earlier filed theft
charges against his own sister and libel charges against her
Casimiro himself did not testify because of his advanced age,
husband. As for Julieta Ouano, the respondent court found it
but Vicente Toring took the stand to resist Teopista's claim.
difficult to believe that she had never met Teopista although
The rules on compulsory recognition are embodied in Article both of them have been living in the same barangay since
283 of the Civil Code, which has been held to be applicable birth.
not only to natural children but also to spurious children. 7 The
said article provides: The decision of the Court of Appeals was promulgated on
August 11, 1988. A motion for reconsideration was filed, and
Art. 283. In any of the following cases, the father is it was only from the opposition thereto of the private
obliged to recognize the child as his natural child: respondent that Casimiro's counsel learned that his client
(1) In cases of rape, abduction or seduction, when the had died on May 1986. He immediately informed the
period of the offense coincides more or less with that respondent court build the motion for reconsideration was
of the conception; denied without any substitution of parties having been
effected. The said counsel, now acting for Vicente Toring,
(2) When the child is in continuous possession of then asked this Court to substitute the latter for the deceased
status of a child of the alleged father by the direct Casimiro Mendoza in the present petition.
acts of the latter or of his family;
We hereby allow the substitution of Casimiro Mendoza pro
(3) when the child was conceived during the time haec vice and nunc pro tunc by Vicente Toring, who appears
when the mother cohabited with the supposed to be the former's illegitimate son, pursuant to Sections 16
father. and 17 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. This disposes of the
(4) When the child has in his favor any evidence or private respondent's contention that the lawyer-client
proof that the defendant is his father. relationship terminated with Casimiro's death and that
Vicente has no personality now to substitute him.
This article has been substantially reproduced in the Family
Code as follows: Now to the merits.
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is To establish "the open and continuous possession of the
established by any of the following: status of an illegitimate child," it is necessary to comply with
certain jurisprudential requirements. "Continuous" does not
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register
mean that the concession of status shall continue forever but
or a final judgment; or
only that it shall not be of an intermittent character while it
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public continues.10 The possession of such status means that the
document or a private handwritten instrument and father has treated the child as his own, directly and not
signed by the parent concerned. through others, spontaneously and without concealment
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate though without publicity (since the relation is
filiation shall be proved by:l illegitimate).11 There must be a showing of the permanent
intention of the supposed father to consider the child as his
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status own, by continuous and clear manifestation of paternal
of a legitimate child; or affection and care.12
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court With these guidelines in mind, we agree with the trial court
and special laws. that Teopista has not been in continuous possession of the
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their status of a recognized illegitimate child of Casimiro Mendoza,
illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same under both Article 283 of the Civil Code and Article 172 of
evidence as legitimate children. the Family Code.
In his remarkably well-written decision, Judge Leoncio P. The plaintiff lived with her mother and not with the
Abarquez rejected the plaintiff' s claim that she was in defendant although they were both residents of Omapad,
continuous possession of the status of a child of the alleged Mandaue City. It is true, as the respondent court observed,
father by the direct acts of the latter or of his family. that this could have been because defendant had a legitimate
wife. However, it is not unusual for a father to take his
On appeal, however, the respondent courts8 disagreed and
illegitimate child into his house to live with him and his
arrived at its own conclusion as follows:
legitimate wife, especially if the couple is childless, as in this
Contrary to the conclusion of the court a quo, We case. In fact, Vicente Toring, who also claimed to be an
find that appellant has sufficiently proven her illegitimate child of Casimiro, lived with the latter and his
wife, apparently without objection from the latter. We also 5. The relationship between the declarant and the
note that Teopista did not use the surname of Casimiro person whose pedigree is in question must be
although this is, of course, not decisive of one's status. No less shown by evidence other than such declaration.17
significantly, the regularity of defendant's act of giving money
All the above requisites are present in the case at bar. The
to the plaintiff through Gaudencio Mendoza and Isaac persons who made the declarations about the pedigree of
Mendoza has not been sufficiently established. The trial court Teopista, namely, the mother of Casimiro, Brigida Mendoza,
correctly concluded that such instances were "off-and-on," not
and his brother, Hipolito, were both dead at the time of
continuous and intermittent. Indeed, the plaintiff s testimony
Isaac's testimony. The declarations referred to the filiation of
on this point is tenuous as in one breath she said that her Teopista and the paternity of Casimiro, which were the very
mother solely spent for her education and in another that
issues involved in the complaint for compulsory recognition.
Casimiro helped in supporting her.13
The declarations were made before the complaint was filed
But although Teopista has failed to show that she was in open by Teopista or before the controversy arose between her and
and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child Casimiro. Finally, the relationship between the declarants
of Casimiro, we find that she has nevertheless established that and Casimiro has been established by evidence other than
status by another method. such declaration, consisting of the extrajudicial partition of
the estate of Florencio Mendoza, in which Casimiro was
What both the trial court and the respondent court did not
mentioned as one of his heirs.18 The said declarations have
take into account is that an illegitimate child is allowed to
not been refuted. Casimiro could have done this by
establish his claimed filiation by "any other means allowed by
the Rules of Court and special laws," according to the Civil deposition if he was too old and weak to testify at the trial of
the case.
Code, or "by evidence or proof in his favor that the defendant
is her father," according to the Family Code. Such evidence If we consider the other circumstances narrated under oath
may consist of his baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a by the private respondent and her witnesses, we can
family Bible in which his name has been entered, common reasonably conclude that Teopista was the illegitimate
reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the daughter of Casimiro Mendoza.
testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Judgment is hereby
under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.14
rendered DECLARING Teopista Toring Tuñacao to be the
The trial court conceded that "the defendant's parents, as well illegitimate child of the late Casimiro Mendoza and entitled
as the plaintiff himself, told Gaudencio Mendoza and Isaac to all the rights appurtenant to such status. Costs against the
Mendoza, that Teopista was the daughter of the defendant." It petitioner.
should have probed this matter further in light of Rule 130,
Section 39, of the Rules of Court, providing as follows:
51) Solinap v Locsin
Sec. 39. — Act or declarations about pedigree. — The
act or declaration of a person deceased, or unable to
testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person PRINCIPLE: Birth certificate offers only prima facie evidence
related to him by birth or marriage, may be received of filiation and may be refuted by contrary evidence. Its
in evidence where it occurred before the controversy, evidentiary worth cannot be sustained where there exists
and the relationship between the two persons is strong, complete and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity.
shown by evidence other than such act or FACTS:
declaration. The word "pedigree" includes
relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, Juan "Jhonny" Locsin, Sr. died intestate on December 11,
the dates when and the places where these facts 1990, pursuant to this, respondent Juan E. Locsin, Jr. filed
occurred, and the names of the relatives. It embraces with the RTC of Iloilo, a Petition for Letters of Administration
also facts of family history intimately connected with praying that he be appointed Administrator of the Intestate
pedigree. Estate of the deceased. He alleged, among others, (a) that he
is an acknowledged natural child of the late Juan C. Locsin;
It was only Isaac Mendoza who testified on this question of
(b) that during his; and (c) that he is the only surviving legal
pedigree, and he did not cite Casimiro's father. His testimony
heir of the decedent.
was that he was informed by his father Hipolito, who was
Casimiro's brother, and Brigida Mendoza, Casimiro's own Petitioners in this case which are the nephews and nieces of
mother, that Teopista was Casimiro's illegitimate daughter.15 Juan Sr. claims to be the lawful heirs of the deceased. They
Such acts or declarations may be received in evidence as an averred that respondent is not a child or an acknowledged
exception to the hearsay rule because "it is the best the nature natural child of the late Juan C. Locsin, who during his
of the case admits and because greater evils are apprehended lifetime, never affixed "Sr." in his name.
from the rejection of such proof than from its admission.16 Evidence of Respondent, Juan Jr.:
Commenting on this provision, Francisco enumerates the
following requisites that have to be complied with before the 1. Machine copy (marked as Exhibit "D") of his
act or declaration regarding pedigree may be admitted in Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 found in the bound
evidence: volume of birth records in the Office of the Local
Civil Registrar of Iloilo City.
1. The declarant is dead or unable to testify. 2. Presented as witness: Rosita J. Vencer, the Local Civil
2. The pedigree must be in issue. Registrar of Iloilo City to prove the existence and
authenticity of Certificate of Live Birth No. 477.
3. The declarant must be a relative of the person
3. Photograph (Exhibit C”) showing him and his
whose pedigree is in issue.
mother, Amparo Escamilla, in front of a coffin
4. The declaration must be made before the bearing Juan C. Locsin's dead body. TN: Respondent
controversy arose. claims that such shows that he and his mother have

been recognized as family members of the deceased. a. The testimony of Rosita Vencer, Local Civil Registrar
of Iloilo City - She testified about an event which
Evidence of Petitioners: took place 37 or 38 years ago which made
1. Certified true copy of Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 knowledge of respondent’s birth record based
found in the Civil Registrar General, Metro Manila, merely on her general impressions of the existing
marked as Exhibit "8", indicating that the birth of records in that Office.
respondent was reported by his motherand does not TN: (Exhibit "D") was recorded in a December 1, 1958
contain the signature of the late Juan Sr.
revised form. When Vencer was asked how a 1958
TN: While respondent was born on October 22, 1956 and form could be used in 1957 when respondent's birth was
his birth was recorded on January 30, 1957his Certificate recorded, Vencer answered that maybe the forms in 1956
of Live Birth No. 447 (Exhibit "D") was recorded on were already exhausted so the former Civil Registrar had
a December 1, 1958 revised form. Upon the other hand, requested for a new form and they sent us the 1958 Revised
Exhibit "8" appears on a July, 1956 form, already used Form.
before respondent's birth. b. The back cover of the 1957 bound volume in the
2. Presented as witness: Col. Pedro L. Elvas, a handwriting Local Civil Registry of Iloilo is torn. Exhibit "D" is
expert. He testified that the signatures of Juan C. Locsin merely pasted with the bound volume, not sewn like
and Emilio G. Tomesa (then Civil Registrar of Iloilo City) the other entries.
appearing in (Exhibit "D") are forgeries
c. Exhibit "D" is a typewritten carbon copy of the
TC Decision: Granted Petition of Juan E. Locsin, Jr as alleged original while the records of all other
administrator fidning Exhibit "D" and “C” as sufficient proofs certificates are handwritten.
of respondent's illegitimate filiation with the deceased.
Court of Appeals: affirmed in toto the order of the trial court d. Exhibit "D" does not indicate important particulars,
such as the alleged father's religion, race,
Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari. occupation, address and business. The space which
calls for an entry of the legitimacy of the child is
ISSUES: WON Respondent presented sufficient evidence that
blank. On the back page of Exhibit "D", there is a
he is an acknowledged natural son of the deceased thus
purported signature of the alleged father, but the
entitling him for the issuance of letters of administration?
blanks calling for the date and other details of his
RULING: Residence Certificate were not filled up.
NO. Section 6(a), Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court states SC As to Exhibit 8:
that if no executor is named in the will, or are incompetent,
a. Found in the Civil Registrar General in Metro Manila
refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate,
on Municipal Form No. 102, revised in July, 1956.
administration shall be granted:
TN: It is logical to assume that the 1956 forms would
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be,
continue to be used several years thereafter. But for a
or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to
1958 form to be used in 1957 is unlikely.
such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin,
requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve; b. Shows that respondent's record of birth was made
by his mother.
Undisputed is the fact that the deceased, Juan C. Locsin, was
c. Does not show signature and name of Juan C. Locsin
not survived by a spouse. In his petition for issuance of letters
listed as respondent's father and the entry that he
of administration, respondent alleged that he is
and respondent’s mother were married in Oton,
an acknowledged natural son of the deceased, implying that
Iloilo.
he is an interested person in the estate and is considered
as next of kin. A copy of the document sent by the Local Civil Registrar to the
Civil Registrar General should be identical in form and in
SC held that:
substance with the copy being kept by the latter. In this case,
The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is Exhibit "8", as transmitted to the Civil Registrar General is not
established by (1) the record of birth appearing in the civil identical with Exhibit "D" as appearing in the records of the
register or a final judgement; or (2) an admission of legitimate Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City.
filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
Also as to Exhibit “C” of respondent, such cannot and will not
instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
constitute proof of filiation. Anybody can have a picture
In the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by (1) the taken while standing before a coffin with others and
open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate thereafter utilize it in claiming the estate of the deceased.
child; or (2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court
and special laws. A birth certificate is a formidable piece of evidence
prescribed by both the Civil Code and Article 172 of the
Pursuant to Section 12 of Act 3753 (An Act to Establish a Civil Family Code for purposes of recognition and
Register), the records of births from all cities and filiation. However, birth certificate offers only prima
municipalities in the Philippines are officially and regularly facie evidence of filiation and may be refuted by contrary
forwarded to the Civil Registrar General in Metro Manila by evidence. Its evidentiary worth cannot be sustained where
the Local Civil Registrars. there exist strong, complete and conclusive proof of its falsity
or nullity. In this case, respondent's Certificate of Live Birth
Facts which made SC decide that Exhibit D was a spurious
No. 477 entered in the records of the Local Civil Registry has
document thus making Juan Jr. not illegible as administrator:
all the badges of nullity. Without doubt, the authentic copy

on file in that office was removed and substituted with a presented from witnesses to documents like school records,
falsified Certificate of Live Birth. birth and baptismal certificates) Respondent’s reliance on
the certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar
It also bears stressing the provision of Section 23, Rule 132 of
concerning her birth is clearly misplaced. It is settled that a
the Revised Rules of Court that "(d)ocuments consisting of
certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative
entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by
father is not competent evidence as to the issue of paternity,
a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein when there is no showing that the putative father had a
stated." In this case, the glaring discrepancies between the two
hand in the preparation of said certificates, and the Local
Certificates of Live have overturned the genuineness of Exhibit
Civil Registrar is devoid of authority to record the paternity
"D" entered in the Local Civil Registry. Thus, what is authentic of an illegitimate child upon the information of a third
is Exhibit "8" recorded in the Civil Registry General.
person. Simply put, if the alleged father did not intervene in
the birth certificate, e.g., supplying the information himself,
the inscription of his name by the mother or doctor or
registrar is null and void; the mere certificate by the registrar
52) Jison v CA  without the signature of the father is not proof of voluntary
KEYWORD: Proof of paternity filiation, wala gi angkon ni acknowledgment on the latter's part. In like manner,
Daddy Francisco Francisco’s lack of participation in the preparation of the
baptismal certificates and school records renders the
PRINCIPLE: Circumstantial Evidence & Hearsay exception Rule documents incompetent to prove paternity, the former being
competent merely to prove the administration of the
sacrament of baptism on the date so specified.
Note: This case was really loaded and had several issues
related to evidence, I just followed the notes to guide me in Furthermore, the certificates issued by the Local Civil
pinpointing which issues to include. Registrar and the baptismal certificates cannot be taken as
circumstantial evidence to prove respondent’s filiation.
FACTS: Since they are per se inadmissible in evidence as proof of
Monina Jison (respondent) alleges that she is the daughter of such filiation, they cannot be admitted indirectly as
Francisco (petitioner) who had been married to a certain Lilia circumstantial evidence to prove the same.
Lopez Jison since 1940. She further alleges that her mother
Esperanza F. Amolar (who was then employed as the nanny of 2. As to the various notes and letters written by FRANCISCO's
Francisco's daughter, Lourdes), was impregnated by petitioner relatives, allegedly attesting to MONINA's liation, while their
At the end of 1945 or the start of 1946, however, FRANCISCO due execution and authenticity are not in issue, as MONINA
impregnated Esperanza F. Amolar and that since childhood witnessed the authors signing the documents, nevertheless,
she had enjoyed the continuous, implied recognition as an under Rule 130, Section 39, the contents of these
illegitimate child of Francisco by his acts and that of his family. documents may not be admitted, there being no showing
MONINA further alleged that Francisco gave her support and that the declarants-authors were dead or unable to testify,
spent for her education, such that she obtained a Master's neither was the relationship between the declarants and
degree, became a certified public accountant (CPA) and MONINA shown by evidence other than the documents in
eventually, a Central Bank examiner. Monina filed for a question. As to the admissibility of these documents under
judicial declaration of her illegitimate status and that Rule 130, Section 40, however, this requires further
Francisco support and treat her as such. elaboration. We hold that the scope of the enumeration
contained in the second portion of this provision, in light of
Francisco alleged that he could not have had sexual relations the rule of ejusdem generis, is limited to objects which are
with Esperanza Amolar during the period specified in the commonly known as "family possessions," or those articles
complaint as she had ceased to be in his employ as early as which represent, in effect, a family's joint statement of its
1944, and did not know of her whereabouts since then; belief as to the pedigree of a person. These have been
further, he never recognized Monina, expressly or impliedly, described as objects "openly exhibited and well known to the
as his illegitimate child. family," or those "which, if preserved in a family, may be
At trial on the merits, MONINA presented a total of eleven regarded as giving a family tradition." Other examples of
(11) witnesses: herself, Ruben Castellanes, Sr., Adela these objects which are regarded as reflective of a family's
Casabuena, Arsenio Duatin, Zafiro Ledesma, Danthea Lopez, reputation or tradition regarding pedigree are inscriptions on
Romeo Bilbao, Rudy Tingson, Alfredo Baylosis, Dominador tombstones, monuments or coffin plates.
Zavariz and Lope Amolar.
Plainly then, the various letter as private documents not
CA ruled in favor of respondent. constituting "family possessions" as discussed above, may
not be admitted on the basis of Rule 130, Section 40.
ISSUES: Neither may these exhibits be admitted on the basis of Rule
1.Whether or not the Certificate issued by the Local Civil 130, Section 41 regarding common reputation.
Registrar & baptismal certificate to prove filiation is
admissible. Their inadmissibility not withstanding, the various letters of
2. Whether or not various notes and letter written by Francisco’s relatives inclusive, may, in like manner as
Francisco’s relatives attesting to Monina’s filiation is MONINA's school records, properly be admitted as part of
admissible. her testimony to strengthen her claim that, indeed,
relatives of FRANCISCO recognized her as his daughter.
RULING:
1. Court ruled in favor of respondent but disagreed with
respondent regarding this issue: (Note: Several evidence were

EXTRA INFO: Ratio for why the court ruled in favor of PRINCIPLE: Evidence may be given upon trial of monuments
respondent: and inscriptions in public places as evidence of common
Under Family Code provides the various forms of evidence by reputation; and entries in family Bibles or other family books
which legitimate filiation is established: or charts; engravings on rings, family portraits and the like,
as evidence of pedigree.
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by The law does not require that the entries in the said
any of the following: booklet be made at the same time as the occurrence of those
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register events.
or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public FACT:
document or a private handwritten instrument This is an action by the third generation parties
signed by the parent concerned. traced from their alleged common ancestors filed on 1916 on
the accounts of events that transpired somewhere in the
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate 1800s.
filiation shall be proved by:
Plaintiffs allege that they are the children of a
(1) The open and continuous possession of the certain Rosa Matilde Viademonte y Gonzales (Rosa) – the
status of a legitimate child; or alleged daughter of a certain Isabel. They filed the complaint
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court to recover the share of their mother in the estate of Isabel at
and special laws. the rate of 1/5. (the whole estate to be shared with the other
4 siblings of Rosa allegedly)
To prove open and continuous possession of the status of an They further alleged that Isabel Gonzales had a first
illegitimate child, there must be evidence of the manifestation marriage with a Ramon Viademonte, Sr. who had two
of the permanent intention of the supposed father to consider children, one Ramon, Jr., the other is their mother. Ramon,
the child as his, by continuous and clear manifestations of Sr. died and Isabel contracted another marriage with Don
parental affection and care, which cannot be attributed to Jose Joaquin de Inchausti who, then, had three children who
pure charity. Such acts must be of such a nature that they are the respondents in this case. Thus, according to the
reveal not only the conviction of paternity, but also the plaintiffs, there are five (5) siblings in total. They claimed that
apparent desire to have and treat the child as such in all Rosa’s siblings called her as sister and them as
relations in society and in life, not accidentally, but brothers/sisters. (mostly in the school)
continuously. Upon death of Isabel, Don Jose executed an
While it has been observed that unlawful intercourse will not extrajudicial partition dividing the estate of Isabel with the
be presumed merely from proof of an opportunity for such four (4) siblings giving them ¼ of the estate to the exclusion
indulgence, this does not favor Francisco. Akin to the crime of of Rosa.
rape where, in most instances, the only witnesses to the
felony are the participants in the sexual act themselves, in The common defenses of the respondents are as
deciding paternity suits, the issue of whether sexual follows:
intercourse actually occurred inevitably redounds to the 1. Rosa was not married to the father of the
victim's or mother's word, as against the accused's or putative plaintiffs (making them illegitimate);
father's protestations. In the instant case, Monina's mother 2. Rosa’s surname is not Viademonte y Gonzales;
could no longer testify as to the fact of intercourse, as she 3. Rosa is not a daughter of Isabel;
had, unfortunately, passed away long before the institution of 4. As per Rafael (who is now dead), Rosa is not
the complaint for recognition. But this did not mean that their sister but a protégé of her mother Isabel;
Monina could no longer prove her filiation. The fact of her 5. That the action has prescribed.
birth and her parentage may be established by evidence other
than the testimony of her mother. The paramount question ISSUES:
then is whether Monina's evidence is coherent, logical and 1. WON the plaintiffs are legitimate children of
natural. Rosa?
2. WON Rosa is a legitimate daughter of Isabel?
The complaint stated that Francisco had carnal knowledge of 3. WON testimony of Joaquin Jose as to the
respondent’s mom "by about the end of 1945." This was declaration of Rafael is a heresay.
broad enough to cover the fourth quarter of said year, hence 4. WON entries in family books be entered should
her birth on 6 August 1946 could still be attributed to sexual be made at the same time it occurred?
relations between Francisco and Monina’s mother. The 5. WON Rosa can inherit if she will be considered
evidence in this case established that respondent’s mother as natural child of Rosa?
was still in the employ of petitioner at the time respondent
was conceived as determined by the date of her birth, sexual
contact between petitioner and respondent’s mother was not RULING:
at all impossible, especially in light of the overwhelming 1. No. In different proceedings, Rosa made
evidence, that indeed Francisco fathered Monina, has contradicting statements where on some occasions,
recognized her as his daughter and that Monina has been she claimed that she was not married to Ferrer
enjoying the open and continuous possession of the status as (father of plaintiffs) and on some occasions, she is a
Francisco’s illegitimate daughter. widow of Ferrer. it is undeniable that she could not
duly justify the marriage contracted by her with
53) Ferrer, et. al. v. de Inchausti, et. al. Benigno Ferrer.

2. No. From all the evidence adduced, the slightest law in effect at the time of her death (Law of Toro),
indication cannot be inferred that Rosa Matilde was which provides, among other things, that natural
born during the marriage of Ramon Martinez de children have no right to succeed to their natural
Viademonte, Sr., with Isabel Gonzalez or within the mother when, on her death, the latter leaves
300 days after the dissolution of their marriage by legitimate children, as in the present case, and for
the death of the husband, nor has the said Ramon this reason it is useless to inquire as to whether
Martinez de Viademonte, Sr., in his lifetime Rosa Viademonte or Robles was a natural or even
recognized said Rosa Matilde as his daughter. If Rosa an acknowledged natural child of Isabel Gonzalez.
Matilde is a legitimate daughter of Isabel Gonzalez, it
follows that she was also a daughter of Isabel's
husband, Ramon Martinez de Viademonte, under the 6. The action has prescribed. Libog siya coz ang basis is
assumption that she was born in the marriage of the Old Civil Procedure. 10 years prescription from
both or at a time prior or subsequent to that of the the date of enactment of Old Civil Procedure which
celebration of the marriage, as fixed by law. was August 7, 1901, this was filed on 1916.
It was established that Ramon, Sr. died on 1836
(tho death certificate was not presented, conclusion 54) In Re: Florencio Mallare | 1968
was based on consequential evidence). However, it
was established that Rosa was born after such date,
around 1850s. The evidences are as follows: Case: Disbarment on the ground of citizenship
a. Baptismal certificate which provides that on
September 1, 1862, a child three days old, born FACTS:
of unknown parents, was baptized in the
 Florencio Mallare (Florencio) is a practicing lawyer.
Cathedral Church of this city, and given the name
of Rosa Matilde Robles which Rosa (in another  Acting Commissioner of Immigration Martiniano P.
proceeding against Rafael) admitted that such Vivo denounced Florencio as a Chinaman and
might be hers; prayed for his disbarment.
b. On page 9 of the day-book which Ramon
FLORENCIO’S CONTENTIONS
Martinez de Viademonte, Jr., kept during his
lifetime, appears a memorandum which says: (1) His parents are Filipinos.
"On September 1, 1852, at seven o'clock in the  Florencio’s father Estaban is Filipino citizen by choice
evening, a child three days old, named Rosa (election) because Esteban was only an illegitimate
Matilde Robles, according to the baptismal son (as opposed to legitimate) of a Chinese father and
certificate issued by the acting rector Don a Filipina mother named “Ana.”
Ramon Fernandez of the Cathedral Church of  Florencio’s mother, Te Na, a Chinese, followed the
Manila, was delivered to my mother; this child citizenship of her husband Esteban upon their
was baptized by the priest Don Remigio marriage, thereby making her a Filipina.
Rodriguez with the authority of said rector, and (2) Res Judicata.
according to the baptismal certificate, it was a  Florencio, and his siblings, have been declared Filipino
child of unknown parents. citizens in a final judgment in a Civil Case.
c. Joaquin Jose de Inchausti stated that one day he  Florencio’s birth record, wherein he was originally
was assured by his half-brother Ramon Martinez registered as a Chinese, has likewise been ordered
Viademonte that Rosa Matilde was not his sister, corrected to Filipino, by final judgment in a Special
but that she was only a mere protegee and that Proceeding.
her true name was Rosa Matilde Robles, and
that on that occasion the said brother showed
him the certificate of birth of which Exhibit 6 is a ISSUES:
copy, which he took from the parochial church.
I. W/N FLORENCIO IS A FILIPINO CITIZEN.
3. No. In view of the fact that Ramon Martinez HELD: NO. The evidence is clearly preponderant, if not
Viademonte is now dead, the testimony of Joaquin overwhelming that Florencio's father, Esteban, was and
Jose de Inchausti referring to the said deceased is remained a Chinese until he died; consequently, Florencio's
admissible, for they are members of the same family, mother, admittedly a Chinese, retained her original
in accordance with the provisions of section 281 of citizenship, and their offspring are likewise Chinese.
Act No. 190 (now Rulem 130, Section 39, The
declaration, act, or omission of a member of a family EVIDENCE THAT FLORENCIO IS A FILIPINO CITIZEN
who is not living, or is outside the jurisdiction of the
(1) Testimonial Evidence
Philippine Islands, is admissible as evidence of
(a) Testimony of Catarroja, an ex-municipal president
pedigree or relationship, or family genealogy in cases
o Catarroja met Florencio’s grandmother Ana and
where pedigree, relationship, or family genealogy are
her son Esteban (Florencio’s father) when the
questions at issue.)
latter was 8 years old in 1902, but he had not
seen her actually deliver or give birth to the baby
4. No. The law does not require that the entries in the
boy Esteban.
said booklet be made at the same time as the
o HELD: There was no evidence that Ana was an
occurrence of those events.
"inhabitant of the Philippine Islands continuing
to reside therein who was a Spanish subject on
5. No. The hereditary rights of the successors of the
the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and
Isabel should be determined in accordance with the
ninety-nine" as required by the Philippine Bill of
July 1, 1902 (en masse Filipinization) and she stating therein that he is a Chinese; that he belongs to
cannot, therefore, be considered a Filipina. the yellow race and that he had used these other names:
(b) Testimonies of the Mallare children "Tan Jua Gae", "Enciong" and "Jua Gac."
o The Mallare children testified that their  His explanation that it was his mother who registered
grandmother Ana had NOT actually married her him as an alien is flimsy; and, as stated hereinbefore,
Chinese husband, therefore she remained a he did not present his mother as a witness.
Filipina.
o HELD: Insufficient to overcome the presumption II. W/N THE JUDGMENT IN THE CIVIL CASE AND THE SPECIAL
that persons living together as husband and wife PROCEEDING CONSTITUTED RES JUDICATA.
are married to each other.
HELD: NO. The Civil Case and Special Proceeding are not
(2) Documentary Evidence
modes of acquiring Philippine citizenship; neither is the
(a) Landing Certificate of Residence
Chinese citizenship of Florencio converted to Filipino because
 Te Na, Florencio’s Chinese mother, was described in
certain government agencies recognized him as such. He
a landing certificate of residence issued to her as
remains, by jus sanguinis, a Chinese until he is naturalized.
"wife of P.I. (Philippine Islands) citizen" and as wife
of Esteban, P.I. citizen". (a) The civil case was instituted by the vendor of a certain
 HELD: A landing certificate of residence issued parcel of land to rescind the sale and recover the land
under Section 7, Act 702 by the Collector of sold from the the Mallari siblings on the ground that
Customs is based upon an administrative ex they are Chinese. Thus, their citizenship was not the
parte determination of the evidence presented and thing adjudicated in the judgment and the declaration
the facts as stated by the applicant and, therefore, that they are Filipinos was but a necessary premise for
carries little evidentiary weight as to citizenship. the court to arrive at a conclusion that the sale of the
The truth of Te Na's declarations when she applied realty was valid. Not being the thing directly
for the landing certificate could have been inquired adjudicated, their declared citizenship is not res
into had she been presented as a witness in these judicata, and cannot become conclusive.
proceedings, but this was not done. (b) Florencio’s claim for citizenship was never given
(b) Affidavit of Election of Citizenship adequate publication so as to apprise all concerned and
 Esteban executed an affidavit stating therein that give them opportunity to contest it. Hence, neither
when he reached the age of majority he had decision constitutes res judicata on the issue of
"definitely elected to be a Filipino citizen following respondent's alleged Filipino nationality.
the citizenship of my mother." (c) The Supreme Court, acting pursuant to its inherent and
 HELD: Self-serving and not a substitute for a duly constitutional authority, may not be precluded from
recorded election of Philippine citizenship. When inquiring into the citizenship of persons admitted to the
Esteban executed it, he was already thirty-six (36) practice of law, independently of any other court's
years old and he executed it for the purpose of findings in the cases or proceedings brought or
making a change in a miscellaneous lease instituted therein.
application wherein he had previously stated that
he is a citizen of China.
(c) Voter’s registration
55) DBP Pool of Accredited Insurance Companies v Radio
 Esteban was a registered voter in Macalelon,
Mindanao Network, Inc
Quezon.
 HELD: Esteban’s registration as a voter indicates his FACTS: Radio Mindanao Network Inc owns several
desire to exercise a right appertaining exclusively to broadcasting stations in the country. It contracted a fire
Filipino citizens but this does not alter his real insurance policy with Provident Insurance Corporation
citizenship, which, in this jurisdiction, is covering its various equipment while Petitioner covered its
determinable by his blood ( jus sanguinis). other equipment under another fire insurance policy.
On July 27, 1988, Radio Mindanao’s radio station in Bacolod

EVIDENCE THAT FLORENCIO IS A CHINESE CITIZEN
was razed by fire so it sought recovery under the two
(1) All children of Esteban and Te Na were registered at birth insurance policies. The insurance companies denied its claim
as children of a Chinese father and a Chinese mother and on the ground that the cause of loss was an excepted risk
with the added detail that their parents were born in under their contract (loss caused by war, invasion, hostilities,
China. military or popular uprising, insurrection, rebellion, mutiny
(2) The birth certificate of one of the Mallari children bears and the like). It maintained that the evidence showed that
the Esteban’s own signature as the father. If Esteban was the fire was caused by NPA members. So, Radio Mindanao
indeed a Filipino by choice, then he should have so stated sued petitioner and Provident.
in this birth certificate, instead, he admits, against his own
RTC and CA ruled in favor of Radio Mindanao since it found
interest, that he is a Chinese.
the insurance companies’ evidence were insufficient to prove
(3) Esteban’s own death certificate, signed by his son, shows
that the cause of the loss was due to such excepted risk. The
that Esteban was a Chinese, born in Fookiang, China.
testimony of its witnesses, Lt. Col. Torres and SPO3 Rochar
 The affidavit of said son denying that the signature is
was only based on the bystanders’ statements during their
his is inadmissible as it was offered in evidence for the
investigation that heavily armed men entered and started the
first time after trial was closed.
fire shouting, “Mabuhay ang NPA!” since both were
(4) The entire family, consisting of the father, mother and
admittedly not present when the fire occurred. The persons
their children were registered as aliens in the then
who were investigated and actually saw the burning were not
Division of Alien Statistics.
presented as witnesses. Also, the documentary evidence
(5) Florencio himself was again registered as an alien in 1950,
presented consisting of the police blotter, certification from
his application thereto bearing his thumbprints and
the Bacolod Police Station and Fire Investigation report also stated that the perpetrators were members of the NPA.
did not categorically state that the 20 armed men were They were merely believed to be members or suspected
members of the NPA. Petitioner argues that the testimonies of to be members.
Torres and Rochar be admitted as an exception to the hearsay
rule as part of res gestae
ISSUE: 56) TALIDANO VS. FALCON MARITIME
(1) WON testimonies are considered res gestae FACTS:

(2) WON petitioner’s documentary evidence was sufficient to Petitioner was employed as a second marine officer by
Falcon Maritime and Allied Services, Inc. (private
prove the cause of the fire was due to an excepted risk
respondent) and was assigned to M/V Phoenix Seven, a
vessel owned and operated by Hansu Corporation (Hansu)
which is based in Korea. His one (1)-year contract of
RULING: employment commenced on 15 October 1996 and stipulated
(1) NO, not considered as res gestae. A witness can testify the monthly wage at $900.00 with a fixed overtime pay of
only to those facts which he knows of his personal $270.00 and leave pay of $75.00.
knowledge (derived from his perception). A witness may
not testify as to what he merely learned from others Petitioner claimed that his chief officer, a Korean, always
because he was told or read or heard the same. Such discriminated against and maltreated the vessel’s Filipino
testimony is considered hearsay and may not be received crew. This prompted him to send a letter-complaint to the
as proof of the truth. The problem with hearsay evidence officer-in-charge of the International Transport Federation
is its trustworthiness and reliability due to its lack of oath (ITF) in London, a measure that allegedly was resented by the
or affirmation and cross-examination by the adverse party chief officer. Consequently, petitioner was dismissed on 21
(to test the perception, memory, veracity and January 1997. He filed a complaint for illegal dismissal on 27
articulateness of the out-of-court declarant or actor). October 1999.
Res gestae, as an exception to the hearsay rule, refers to Private respondent countered that petitioner had voluntarily
those exclamations and statements made by either the disembarked the vessel after having been warned several
participants, victims, or spectators to a crime immediately times of dismissal from service for his incompetence,
before, during, or after the commission of the crime, insubordination, disrespect and insulting attitude toward his
when the circumstances are such that the statements superiors. It cited an incident involving petitioner’s
were made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance incompetence wherein the vessel invaded a different route
inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there was at the Osaka Port in Japan due to the absence of petitioner
no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to who was then supposed to be on watch duty. As proof, it
fabricate a false statement. The rule in res gestae applies presented a copy of a fax message, sent to it on the date of
when the declarant himself did not testify and provided incident, reporting the vessel’s deviation from its course due
that the testimony of the witness who heard the to petitioner’s neglect of duty at the bridge, as well as a copy
declarant complies with the following requisites: (1) that of the report of crew discharge issued by the master of M/V
the principal act, the res gestae, be a startling occurrence; Phoenix Seven two days after the incident.
(2) the statements were made before the declarant had
the time to contrive or devise a falsehood; and (3) that Petitioner submits that the Court of Appeals erred in relying
the statements must concern the occurrence in question merely on fax messages to support the validity of his
and its immediate attending circumstances. dismissal from employment. He maintains that the first fax
message containing the information that the vessel
encroached on a different route was a mere personal
observation of the ship master and should have thus been
The Court is not convinced to accept the declarations as corroborated by evidence, and that these fax messages
part of res gestae for lack of requisite #2. Both Rochar and cannot be considered as res gestae because the statement of
Torres received the bystanders' statements while they the ship master embodied therein is just a report. He also
were making their investigations and it can be reasonably contends that he has not caused any immediate danger to
assumed that the bystanders already had enough time the vessel and that if he did commit any wrongdoing, the
and opportunity to mill around, talk to one another and incident would have been recorded in the logbook. Thus, he
exchange information, not to mention theories and posits that the failure to produce the logbook reinforces the
speculations. It cannot therefore be ascertained whether theory that the fax messages have been concocted to justify
these utterances were the products of truth. his unceremonious dismissal from employment. Hence, he
At best, these testimonies may be considered as believes that his dismissal from employment stemmed from
independently relevant statements and are admissible not his filing of the complaint with the ITF which his superiors
as to the veracity thereof but to the fact that they had resented.
been thus uttered. However, even if admitted, it would
not be sufficient proof. The declarations should be Private respondent insists that the appellate court is correct
considered alongside other evidence on record. in considering the fax messages as res gestae statements. It
likewise emphasizes that non-presentment of the logbook is
(2) While the documentary evidence presented may be justified as the same could no longer be retrieved because
considered as exceptions to the hearsay rule being entries Hansu has already ceased to be its principal. Furthermore, it
in official records, none of these documents categorically refutes the allegation of petitioner that he was dismissed

because he filed a complaint with the ITF in behalf of his be material to the issue; (3) the statement must accompany
fellow crew members. It claims that petitioner’s allegation is a the equivocal act; and (4) the statements give a legal
hoax because there is no showing that the alleged complaint significance to the equivocal act.
has been received by the ITF and that no action thereon was
ever taken by the ITF. Petitioner’s alleged absence from watch duty is simply an
innocuous act or at least proved to be one. Assuming
Private respondent also asserts that petitioner was not arguendo that such absence was the equivocal act, it is
dismissed but that he voluntarily asked for his repatriation. nevertheless not accompanied by any statement more so
This assertion, however, deserves scant consideration. It is by the fax statements adverted to as parts of the res
highly illogical for an employee to voluntarily request for gestae. No date or time has been mentioned to determine
repatriation and then file a suit for illegal dismissal. As whether the fax messages were made simultaneously with
voluntary repatriation is synonymous to resignation, it is the purported equivocal act.
proper to conclude that repatriation is inconsistent with the
filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal. Furthermore, the material contents of the fax messages are
unclear. The matter of route encroachment or invasion is
ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal was valid. questionable. The ship master, who is the author of the fax
messages, did not witness the incident. He obtained such
RULING: information only from the Japanese port authorities. Verily,
The validity of an employee's dismissal hinges on the the messages can be characterized as double hearsay.
satisfaction of two substantive requirements, to wit: (1) the
dismissal must be for any of the causes provided for in Article Private respondent’s sole reliance on the fax messages in
282 of the Labor Code; and (2) the employee was accorded dismissing petitioner is clearly insufficient as these messages
due process, basic of which is the opportunity to be heard and were addressed only to itself. No notice was ever given to
to defend himself. petitioner apprising him in writing of the particular acts
showing neglect of duty. Neither was he informed of his
The Labor Arbiter held that petitioner’s absence during his dismissal from employment. Petitioner was never given an
watch duty when an emergency call was received from the opportunity to present his side. The failure to comply with
Japanese port authority that M/V Phoenix Seven was the two-notice rule only aggravated respondent’s liability on
"invading other route" constituted neglect of duty, a just top of dismissing petitioner without a valid cause.
cause for terminating an employee. Records reveal that this
information was related to private respondent via two fax IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The
messages sent by the captain of M/V Phoenix Seven. Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Decision of the NLRC is REINSTATED with the
The second fax message dated 20 January 1997 pertained to a MODIFICATION that in addition to the payment of the sum
report of crew discharge essentially containing the same equivalent to petitioner’s three (3) months’ salary, the full
information as the first fax message. The Court of Appeals amount of placement fee with 12% legal interest must be
treated these fax messages as part of the res gestae proving refunded.
neglect of duty on the part of petitioner.
Section 42 of Rule 13040 of the Rules of Court mentions two

acts which form part of the res gestae, namely: spontaneous
statements and verbal acts. In spontaneous exclamations, the
res gestae is the startling occurrence, whereas in verbal acts, 57) Canque VS. CA
the res gestae are the statements accompanying the
equivocal act. We find that the fax messages cannot be FACTS:
deemed part of the res gestae. Petitioner Rosella D. Canque is a contractor doing business
under the name and style RDC Construction. At the time
To be admissible under the first class of res gestae, it is material to this case, she had contracts with the government
required that: (1) the principal act be a startling occurrence; for
(2) the statements were made before the declarant had the the restoration of Cebu-Toledo wharf road;
time to contrive or devise a falsehood; and (3) that the (b) the asphalting of Lutopan access road; and
statements must concern the occurrence in question and its (c) the asphalting of Babag road in Lapulapu City.
immediate attending circumstances. In connection with these projects, petitioner entered into
two contracts with private respondent Socor Construction
Assuming that petitioner’s negligence—which allegedly Corporation.
caused the ship to deviate from its course—is the startling
occurrence, there is no showing that the statements On May 28, 1986, private respondent sent petitioner a bill
contained in the fax messages were made immediately after (Exh. C), containing a revised computation, for P299,717.75,
the alleged incident. In addition, no dates have been plus interest at rate of 3% a month, representing the balance
mentioned to determine if these utterances were made of petitioner's total account of P2,098,400.25 for materials
spontaneously or with careful deliberation. Absent the delivered and services rendered by private respondent under
critical element of spontaneity, the fax messages cannot be the two contracts. However, petitioner refused to pay the
admitted as part of the res gestae of the first kind. amount, claiming that private respondent failed to submit
the delivery receipts showing the actual weight in metric
Neither will the second kind of res gestae apply. The requisites tons of the items delivered and the acceptance thereof by
for its admissibility are: (1) the principal act to be the government.
characterized must be equivocal; (2) the equivocal act must

Hence, on September 22, 1986, private respondent brought fact, by anything written by himself or under his direction at
suit in the Regional Trial Court of Cebu to recover from the time when the fact occurred, or immediately thereafter,
petitioner the sum of P299,717.75, plus interest at the rate of or at any other time when the fact was fresh in his memory
3% a month. and he knew that the same was correctly stated in the
writing; but in such case the writing must be produced and
On June 22, 1988, the trial court rendered its decision may be inspected by the adverse party, who may, if he
ordering petitioner to pay private respondent the sum of chooses, cross-examine the witness upon it, and may read it
P299,717.75 plus interest at 12% per annum, and costs. It in evidence. So, also, a witness may testify from such a
held: writing, though he retain no recollection of the particular
. . . . [B]y analyzing the plaintiff's Book of Collectible Accounts facts, if he is able to swear that the writing correctly stated
particularly page 17 thereof (Exh. "K") this Court is convinced the transaction when made; but such evidence must be
that the entries (both payments and billings) recorded thereat received with caution.
are credible. Undeniably, the book contains a detailed account
of SOCOR's commercial transactions with RDC which were Thus, the memorandum used to refresh the memory of the
entered therein in the course of business. We cannot witness does not constitute evidence, and may not be
therefore disregard the entries recorded under Exhibit "K" admitted as such, for the simple reason that the witness has
because the fact of their having been made in the course of just the same to testify on the basis of refreshed memory. In
business carries with it some degree of trustworthiness. other words, where the witness has testified independently
Besides, no proof was ever offered to demonstrate the of or after his testimony has been refreshed by a
irregularity of the said entries thus, there is then no cogent memorandum of the events in dispute, such memorandum is
reason for us to doubt their authenticity. not admissible as corroborative evidence. It is self-evident
that a witness may not be corroborated by any written
ISSUES: statement prepared wholly by him.
1. Whether the entries in the Book of Collectible Accounts
constitute competent evidence? However, the entries recorded under Exhibit “K” were
2. May the entries be admitted under Rule 132, 10 of the supported by Socor's Billings under the account of RDC
Rules of Court? Construction. These billings were presented and duly
received by the authorized representatives. The
RULING: NO. circumstances obtaining in the case at bar clearly show that
for a long period of time after receipt thereof, RDC never
Rule 130, 37 of the Rules of Court - Entries in the course of manifested its dissatisfaction or objection to the aforestated
business. Entries made at, or near the time of the transactions billings submitted by plaintiff. Neither did defendant
to which they refer, by a person deceased, outside of the immediately protest to plaintiff’s alleged incomplete or
Philippines or unable to testify, who was in a position to know irregular performance.
the facts therein stated, may be received as prima facie
evidence, if such person made the entries in his professional
capacity or in the performance of duty and in the ordinary or 58) Wallem Maritime Services, Inc. vs. NLRC & Macatuno
regular course of business or duty.
The admission in evidence of entries in corporate books FACTS:

requires the satisfaction of the following conditions: Private respondent Joselito V. Macatuno was hired by
1. The person who made the entry must be dead, outside Wallem Shipmanagement Limited thru its local manning
the country or unable to testify; agent, Wallem Maritime Services, Inc., as an able-bodied
2. The entries were made at or near the time of the seaman on board the M/T Fortuna,. Under the employment
transactions to which they refer; contract, Macatuno was employed for ten (10) months, with
3. The entrant was in a position to know the facts stated in a monthly salary of two hundred seventy-six US dollars (US
the entries; $276)
4. The entries were made in his professional capacity or in
the performance of a duty, whether legal, contractual, On June 24, 1989, while the vessel was berthed at the port of
moral or religious; and Kawasaki, Japan, an altercation took place as with private
5. The entries were made in the ordinary or regular course respondent and fellow Filipino crew member, Julius
of business or duty. Gurimbao, on one hand, and Mr V.S. SASON, a
cadet/apprentice officer (of the same nationality as the
First, Dolores Aday, who made the entries, was presented by captain of the vessel), on the other. The master entered the
private respondent to testify on the account. There was, incident in the tanker's logbook.
therefore, neither justification nor necessity for the
presentation of the entries as the person who made them was As a consequence, private respondent and Gurimbao were
available to testify in court. repatriated to the Philippines where they lost no time in
lodging separate complaints for illegal dismissal with the
Moreover, Aday admitted that she had no personal POEA. The pertinent facts are as follows:
knowledge of the facts constituting the entry. She said she
made the entries based on the bills given to her. But she has
no knowledge of the truth or falsity of the facts stated in the At the wee hours of June 24, 1989, private respondent was
bills. on duty along with Gurimbao, checking the manifold of the
vessel and looking for oil leakages, when a cadet/apprentice
Sec. 10. When witness may refer to memorandum. — A (Mr. Sason) approached them. Sason ordered Gurimbao to
witness may be allowed to refresh his memory respecting a use a shovel in draining the water which was mixed with oil

and dirt. Gurimbao explained to the cadet/apprentice that blind adoption of such contents which merely serve as prima
the throwing of such at sea was prohibited by the laws of facie evidence of the incident in question.
Japan; Hearing this, the cadet/apprentice got mad and
shouted at Gurimbao, which the latter took offense to, but to Moreover, what was presented in the Haverton Shipping
avoid trouble, did as he was ordered. case was a copy of the official entry from the logbook itself.
Gurimbao then complained to private respondent about the In this case, petitioners did not submit as evidence to the
incident. The two then went to the cadet/apprentice and POEA the logbook itself, or even authenticated copies of
reminded him that as a mere apprentice and not an officer of pertinent pages thereof, which could have been easily
the vessel, he had no right to order them around. However, xeroxed or photocopied considering the present technology
the cadet/apprentice reacted violently, as if challenging the on reproduction of documents. What was offered in
two to a fight. Private respondent pushed twice the evidence was merely a typewritten collation of excerpts from
cadet/apprentice's chest while Gurimbao "mildly hit" his arm. what could be the logbook because by their format, they
Frantic and shouting, being not so tough after all, the could have been lifted from other records kept in the vessel
cadet/apprentice cried daddy to the captain who in accordance with Article 612 of the Code of Commerce.
coincidentally happened to witness the incident.
Moreover, the aforequoted entry in the logbook is so sketchy
As a result, the captain told them to pack up their things as that, unsupported by other evidence, it leaves so many
their services were being terminated. The two attempted to questions unanswered. Although private respondent
explain their side of the incident but the captain ignored them candidly admitted in his affidavit having hit Sason on the
and firmly told them to go home. chest twice, he did not admit using a spanner. The conflicting
To make matters worse, they were made to pay their own versions of the incident rendered it impossible to determine
way back to the Philippines. whether it was private respondent or Gurimbao who wielded
said tool. In the absence of a more detailed narration in the
Upon arriving in the Philippines, private respondent took no logbook entry of the circumstances surrounding the alleged
time in filing a case for illegal dismissal with POEA. assault, the same cannot constitute a valid justification to
terminate private respondent's employment. 19
In their defense, petitioners alleged that the incident was not
the first infraction committed by the two, and to prove that Hence, as the typewritten excerpts from the "logbook" were
the dismissal of the respondent was in fact not illegal, it the only pieces of evidence presented by petitioners to
presented copies of the entries of captain’s the log book support the dismissal of private respondent, have no
stating the facts of the alleged incident which occurred in probative value at all, petitioners' cause must fail. Their
Japan. failure to discharge the onus probandi properly may have no
other result than a finding that the dismissal of private
The POEA Deputy Administrator ruled in favor of the Private respondent is unjustified.
Respondent, not giving credence to the evidence submitted,
the same appearing to be dubious. The CA likewise affirmed Thus, the petition at bar is DISMISSED.
the decision of the POEA.
ISSUE:
WON, the copies of the entries of the captain’s logbook was 59) Northwest Airlines, Inc vs. Steven P. Chiong
sufficient to warrant the dismissal of herein private
respondent. FACTS:
On March 14, 1989, Philimare Shipping and Seagull Maritime
RULING: Corporation (Philimare), as the authorized Philippine agent
No. The respondent was illegally dismissed by the petitioner. of TransOcean Lines (TransOcean), hired respondent Steven
Chiong as Third Engineer of TransOcean's vessel M/V Elbia
It is undisputed that the ship captain's logbook is a vital bound for San Diego, California.
evidence as Article 612 of the Code of Commerce, as the same
requires him to keep a record of the decisions he had adopted For this purpose, Philimare purchased for Chiong a
as the vessel's head. Northwest plane ticket for San Diego, California with a
In fact, in Haverton Shipping Ltd. v. NLRC, the Court held that departure date of April 1, 1989 from Manila. So the time had
a copy of an official entry in the logbook is legally binding and come for Chiong to head off to the U.S. Arriving 3hrs ahead
serves as an exception to the hearsay rule. of his scheduled flight and with his family to see him off, he
pro was met by Marilyn Calvo, Philimare's Liaison Officer,
However, the Haverton Shipping ruling does not find met Chiong at the departure gate, and the two proceeded to
unqualified application in the case at bar. In that case, an the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) Counter to present Chiong's
investigation of the incident which led to the seaman's seaman service record book for clearance. Chiong's passport
dismissal was conducted before he was dismissed. was duly stamped, after complying with government
Consequently, the facts appearing in the logbook were requirements for departing seafarers.
supported by the facts gathered at the investigation.
However, when Chiong's proceeded to check-in, the
However, in this case, because no investigation was Northwest personnel informed him that his name did not
conducted by the ship captain before repatriating private appear in the computer's list of confirmed departing
respondent, the contents of the logbook has to be duly passengers. Chiong was then directed to speak to a "man in
identified and authenticated lest an injustice result from a barong" standing outside Northwest's counters from whom
Chiong could allegedly obtain a boarding pass. To his

surprise, the "man in barong" demanded US$100.00 in evidence was presented to prove that the employee who
exchange therefor. made the entries was dead nor did the defendant-appellant
set forth the circumstances that would show the employee's
Having failed to pay such an amount and as a result, Chiong inability to testify. 38
was not allowed to board Northwest Flight No. 24 bound for
San Diego that day and, consequently, was unable to work at WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby
the M/V Elbia by April 1, 1989 (California, U.S.A. time). DENIED.
It was later on found out that Chiong's name was crossed out
and substituted with "W. Costine" in Northwest's Air 60) Patula v. People
Passenger Manifest. 6 KEYWORD: Estafa, ledgers and receipts
Thus, on May 24, 1989, Chiong filed a Complaint for breach of FACTS:
contract of carriage before the RTC. The RTC ruled that the The petitioner in this case was charged with estafa filed in
evidence adduced by the parties supported the conclusion RTC Dumaguete City to which she pleaded not guilty. Upon
that Chiong was deliberately prevented from checking-in and trial, the prosecution presented two witnesses.
his boarding pass unjustifiably withheld to accommodate an
American passenger by the name of W. Costine. The first witness was Lambert Go who was the branch
manager of Footlucker’s Chain of Stores where petitioner
On appeal, the CA affirmed in toto the ruling of the RTC. works. He alleges that petitioner was a sales representative
Hence, this recourse. who was authorized to take orders from customers, collect
payments and issue and sign official receipts for them. It
ISSUE: WON, Northwest’s Exhibits "2" and "3," the Flight came to a point that he noticed a drop of volume in sales but
Manifest and the Passenger Name Record, respectively, were petitioner merely says the business was slow. Eventually, it
hearsay evidence and ought to be excluded from the records. prompted him to summon an accounting clerk to verify the
sales. The accounting clerk found out that there were some
RULING: erasures on the collection receipts. Go also asked an audit
The petition must fail. from the company auditor Karen Guivencan. At that time, he
learned some other discrepancies such as the fact that a
Exception to Hearsay Evidence: Entries Made in the Official customer had already paid his outstanding balance but it
Course of Business appeared unpaid in the records of Footlucker’s.
Finally, the issue of the exclusion of Northwest's Exhibits "2" The other witness of the prosecution was Karen Guivencan
and "3" need not detain us long. Suffice it to state that the who was asked by Go to audit petitioner based on what he
RTC and CA correctly excluded these documents as hearsay learned from the customers of balances being recorded as
evidence. We quote with favor the CA's holding thereon, thus: unpaid in the office ledgers. She discovered in her audit that
the amounts appearing on the original copies of the receipts
As a rule, "entries made at, or near the time of the in the possession of around 50 customers varied from the
transactions to which they refer, by a person deceased, or amounts written on the duplicate copies of the receipts
unable to testify, who was in a position to know the facts petitioner submitted to the office. For this information, she
therein stated, may be received as prima facie evidence, if submitted a written report to Go marked as Exhibit A.
such person made the entries in his professional capacity or in
the performance of a duty and in the ordinary or regular As to the other evidence presented by the prosecution, the
course of business or duty". [Rule 130, Section 43, Revised ledgers of the petitioner’s various customers allegedly with
Rules of Court] discrepancies were marked as Exhibits B to YY and their
derivaties inclusive.
Otherwise stated, in order to be admissible as entries in the
course of business, it is necessary that: (a) the person who During Guivencan’s direct examination, petitioner’s counsel
made the entry must be dead or unable to testify; (b) the objected that the Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives
entries were made at or near the time of the transactions to inclusive were hearsay because the persons who made the
which they refer; (c) the entrant was in a position to know the entries were not presented in court.
facts stated in the entries; (d) the entries were made in his
professional capacity or in the performance of a duty; and (e) On January 28, 2004, RTC rendered a decision finding
the entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt and denied
business or duty. petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
Tested by these requirements, we find the manifest and ISSUES:

passenger name record to be mere hearsay evidence. While Petitioner now comes to the Court with the following issues:
there is no necessity to bring into court all the employees who
individually made the entries, it is sufficient that the person 1. WON the failure of the information for estafa to allege
who supervised them while they were making the entries the falsification of the duplicate receipts issued by
testify that the account was prepared under his supervision petitioner to her customers violated petitioner’s right ro
and that the entries were regularly entered in the ordinary be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
course of business. In the case at bench, while MENDOZA was - (Petitioner, in the main attacks RTC’s adverse
the supervisor on-duty on April 1, 1989, he has no personal decision because the prosecution’s charge was
knowledge of the entries in the manifest since he did not estafa but her conviction was based on evidence
supervise the preparation thereof. More importantly, no

for falsification without it being alleged in the The prosecution attempted to have Go authenticate
information) petitioner’s signature in various receipts. One of them was a
2. WON the ledgers and receipts (Exhibits B to YY and their machine copy of a receipt used for purposes of the
derivatives inclusive) were admissible as evidence despite testimony, the original was promised to be presented on a
not being authenticated later date. As matters turned out in the end, the effort to
3. WON the testimony of Karen Guivencan on the ledgers have Go authenticate both the machine copy of the receipt
and receipts were inadmissible as hearsay to prove with serial number FLDT96 No. 20441 and the signature of
petitioner’s guilt petitioner on that receipt was wasteful because the machine
copy was inexplicably forgotten and was no longer even
RULING: included in the Prosecution's Offer of Documentary
I. As to the first issue Evidence.
There was no need to allege the act of falsification by As to Guivencan, she could not honestly identify petitioner's
petitioner in the information because falsification is not an signature on the receipts either because she lacked
element of estafa. Further, the theory of the prosecution familiarity with such signature, or because she had not seen
hinges on conversion of petitioner of sums paid by customers petitioner affix her signature on the receipts. Guivencan
and later the duplicates of the receipts were falsified, then exclusively relied on the entries of the unauthenticated
prosecution can prove her acts of falsification as a means of ledgers to support her audit report on petitioner's supposed
establishing her misappropriation and conversion. Thus, her misappropriation or conversion, revealing her lack of
right to be informed of the nature of the accusation was not independent knowledge of the veracity of the entries,
violated.
If it is already clear that Go and Guivencan had not
II. As to the second issue themselves seen the execution or signing of the documents,
the Prosecution surely did not authenticate Exhibits B to YY
The nature of documents as either public or private and their derivatives conformably with the rules. Hence,
determines how the documents may be presented as Exhibits B to YY, and their derivatives, inclusive, were
evidence in court. A public document, by virtue of its o cial or inescapably bereft of probative value as evidence.
sovereign character, or because it has been acknowledged
before a notary public (except a notarial will) or a competent
public o cial with the formalities required by law, or because it III. As to the third issue
is a public record of a private writing authorized by law, is self-
authenticating and requires no further authentication in order Section 36 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states that a
to be presented as evidence in court. Lacking the official or witness can testify only to those facts that she knows of her
sovereign character of a public document, or the solemnities personal, that is which are derived from her own perception.
prescribed by law, a private document requires authentication The personal knowledge of a witness is a substantive
in the manner allowed by law or the Rules of Court before its prerequisite for accepting testimonial evidence that
acceptance as evidence in court. The requirement of establishes the truth of a disputed fact. A witness bereft of
authentication of a private document is excused only in four personal knowledge of the disputed fact cannot be called
instances, specifically: (a) when the document is an ancient upon for that purpose because her testimony derives its
one within the context of Section 21,Rule 132 of the Rules of value not from the credit accorded to her as a witness
Court; (b) when the genuineness and authenticity of an presently testifying but from the veracity and competency of
actionable document have not been speci cally denied under the extrajudicial source of her information. In case a witness
oath by the adverse party; (c) when the genuineness and is permitted to testify based on what she has heard another
authenticity of the document have been admitted; or (d) person say about the facts in dispute, the person from whom
when the document is not being offered as genuine. the witness derived the information on the facts in dispute is
not in court and under oath to be examined and cross-
Section 20 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court governs examined. The weight of such testimony then depends not
authentication of private documents: upon the veracity of the witness but upon the veracity of the
other person giving the information to the witness without
Section 20. Proof of private documents. —Before any oath. The information cannot be tested because the
private document offered as authenticis received in declarant is not standing in court as a witness and cannot,
evidence, itsdue execution and authenticity must be therefore, be cross-examined.
proved either:
The prosecution presented two witnesses - Go and
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or Guivencan. Go, on his part described the various duties of
written; or petitioner. Guivencan on the other hand, admits that she has
(b) B y evidence of the genuineness of the signature no personal knowledge of tha amounts actually received by
or handwriting of the maker. petitioner from customers. She based her testimony on the
entries found in the receipts issued by petitioner to various
Any other private document need only be identi ed as customers, the ledgers held by Footluckers and the unsworn
that which it is claimed to be. statements from customer, with her being the only witness
who can testify on the entries. Her being the only witness
Exhibits B to YY and their derivates were private documents deprive RTC to test and validate the veracity of the entries as
because private individuals executed or generated them for evidence of petitioner’s guilt and thus rendered her
private or business purposes or uses. testimony hearsay. Moreover, Exhibits B to YY and their
derivates inclusive were also rejected as proof by the Court.

61) Africa v Caltex The three requisites for admissibility under Section 35, Rule
123:
FACTS: A fire broke out at a Caltex service station. The fire 1. That entry was made by a public officer, or by
spread to and burned several neighboring houses including another person specially enjoined by law to do so
the house of petitioners. The fire started while gasoline was 2. That it was made by the public officer in the
being hosed from a tank truck into the underground storage, performance of his duty, or by such other person in
right at the opening of the receiving tank where the nozzle of the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law
the hose was inserted. 3. That the public officer or other person had sufficient
knowledge of the facts by him stated which must
There were reports presented for evidence; Police Department have been acquired by him personally or through
Report, the Fire Department Report and by a certain Capt. official information
Tinio of the AFP. According to the Police Department Report,
an unknown Filipino lighted a cigarette and threw the burning The third requisite is not present in the case. The material
match stick near the main valve of the said underground tank. facts recited in the reports as to the cause and circumstances
According to the Police department Report, that in the of the fire were not within the personal knowledge of the
premises there was a coca-cola cooler and a rack which officers who conducted the investigation. The sources of
contained cigarettes and matches, installed between the some facts were not identified while some facts were
gasoline pumps and the underground tanks. attributed an employee of Caltex, the driver of the tank
truck, and respondent. To qualify their statements as “official
The report of Capt. Tinio reproduced the information given by information acquired by the officers who prepared the
a certain Benito Morales regarding the history of the gasoline reports”, the persons who made the statements not only
station and what the chief of the Fire Department had told must have personal knowledge of the facts but must have the
him. duty to give such statements for record. THE REPORTS DO
Court of Appeals: NOT CONSTITUE AN EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE. The
facts stated in the reports were not given by informants
The reports were ruled as double hearsay, hence inadmissible. pursuant to any duty to do so.
Petitioner’s Contention: (under Torts, Res Ipsa Loquitor, just in case sir asks)
1. The reports were admitted by the trial court without Where the thing which caused the injury complained of is
objection on the part of Caltex. shown to be under the management defendant or his
2. The police report which was signed by detective servants and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of
Zapanta allegedly “for Salvador Capacillo”, Capacillo things does not happen if those who have its management or
was presented as witness but respondent waived control use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in
their right to cross examination. absence of explanation by defendant, that the accident arose
3. The reports are admissible as an exception to the form want of care.
hearsay rule under Section 35 of Rule 123 now Rule
130. The report without further testimonial evidence The gasoline station, with all its appliances, equipment and
on their contents, fall within the scope of Section 35 employees, was under the control of respondent. A fire
of rule 123. occurred therein and spread. The persons who knew or could
have known how the fire started were respondents and their
ISSUE: Whether the reports are admissible as an exception to employees but can give no explanation. It is a fir inference
the hearsay rule that the incident happened because of want of care.
RULING: 62) People v San Gabriel
1. The reports in question when offered were objected FACTS:

on the ground that they were hearsay and that they
are “immaterial, irrelevant and impertinent”. RICARDO O. SAN GABRIEL was charged with murder in an
Information alleging that on 26 November 1989, armed with
2. Detective Capacillo did take the witness stand but he a bladed weapon, in conspiracy with "Ramon Doe," with
was not examined and he did not testify as to the treachery, evident premeditation and intent to kill, he
facts mentioned in his alleged report. All he said was assaulted and stabbed to death Jaime A. Tonog. The
that he was one of those who investigated the prosecution witness positively identified the suspects, thus
location of the fire gather witnesses. Therefore there the conviction.
was no need to a cross examination and the contents
of the report in which he did not testify did not Accused only used alibi as his defense. Tried to prove that it
become a competent evidence. Even if he testified, was Ramon Doe, and some person named “Mando” who
the information gather by him from third persons is killed the victim.
still objectionable. The accused also leans his defense heavily on the Advance
Information Sheet (blotter) prepared by police office
3. Section 35, Rule 123, provides that “entries in official Casimiro. The accused contends that entries in the Advance
records made in the performance of his duty by a Information Sheet did not mention him at all and named only
public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the Ramon Doe as the principal suspect. Such blotter however
performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are contains information acquired by said police officer only after
prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.” his interview of Camba, an alleged eyewitness of the crime.

by a Formal Assessment Notice dated 1 February 1991,

which, respondent alleges, was sent to petitioner through
ISSUE: Whether or not the Advance Information Sheet falls registered mail on 6 February 1991. However, petitioner
under the Hearsay Rule Exception, for being an ‘Entry In denies receiving such. Petitioner alleges that it only knew
Official Records’. about it when it was served with the Warrant of Distraint and
Levy on 17 March 1992. The respondent presented the BIR
record book where the name of the taxpayer, the kind of tax
RULING: The Advance Information Sheet does not constitute assessed, the registry receipt number and the date of mailing
an exception to the hearsay rule, hence, inadmissible. were noted. Respondent offered (1) the entry in the BIR
record book and (2) the testimony of its record custodian as
Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty entries in official records in accordance with Section 44, Rule
by a public officer or by a person in the performance of a duty 130 of the Rules of Court, 24 which states that:
specially enjoined by law are prima facie evidence of the facts
therein stated. But to be admissible in evidence three (3) Section 44. Entries in official records. — Entries in official
requisites must concur: (a) The entry was made by a police records made in the performance of his duty by a public
officer or by another person specially enjoined by law to do officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of
so; (b) It was made by the public officer in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of
his duties or by such other person in the performance of a the facts therein stated.
duty specially enjoined by law; and, (c) The public officer or
other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him
stated, which must have been acquired by him personally or CTA: unnecessary to decide the issues on the validity and
through official information. propriety of the assessment since the right of the BIR to
The public officer who prepared the document had no assess petitioner has already prescribed.
sufficient and personal knowledge of the stabbing incident. CA: reversed the CTA decision;
Any information possessed by him was acquired from Camba
which therefore could not be categorized as official
information because in order to be classified as such the
persons who made the statements not only must have ISSUE:
personal knowledge of the facts stated but must have the duty WON the evidence offered by respondent, Versola’s
to give such statements for the record. In the case of Camba, testimony, qualifies as an exception to the rule against
he was not legally so obliged to give such statements. hearsay evidence? NO
Supreme Court sustained findings of Trial Court. WON the right of the BIR to assess petitioner has already
prescribed? YES
63) Barcelon v. CIR

RULING:
PRINCIPLE: Under Section 203, NIRC, respondent is given 3 years from
the last day prescribed by law for the filing of the return, or
Section 44. Entries in official records. — Entries in official from the day of actual filing, whichever is later. An
records made in the performance of his duty by a public
assessment is made within the prescriptive period if notice to
officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of
this effect is released, mailed or sent by the CIR to the
a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of taxpayer within said period. Receipt thereof by the taxpayer
the facts therein stated. For this presumption to apply, the
within the prescriptive period is not necessary. But the rule
following must be present:
does not dispense with the requirement that the taxpayer
a) that the entry was made by a public officer, or by should actually receive, even beyond the prescriptive period,
another person specially enjoined by law to do so; the assessment notice which was timely released, mailed and
b) that it was made by the public officer in the sent.
performance of his duties, or by such other person in While a mailed letter is deemed received by the addressee in
the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law;
the ordinary course of mail, this is still merely a disputable
and
presumption subject to controversion, and a direct denial of
c) that the public officer or other person had sufficient
the receipt thereof, as what happened in this case, shifts the
knowledge of the facts by him stated, which must have burden upon the party favored (CIR) by the presumption to
been acquired by him personally or through official
prove that the mailed letter was indeed received by the
information
addressee (Barcelon). In this case, CIR intended to show that
all assessments made are entered into a record book in
chronological order outlining the details of the assessment
FACTS: and the taxpayer liable thereon. However, all entries thereon
appear to be immaterial and impertinent in proving that the
Barcelon, Roxas Securities Inc. (now known as UBP Securities,
assessment notice was mailed and duly received by Barcelon.
Inc.) is a corporation engaged in the trading of securities. On
What is essential to prove the fact of mailing is the registry
14 April 1988, petitioner filed its Annual ITR for taxable year
receipt issued by the Bureau of Posts or the Registry return
1987. After an audit investigation conducted by the BIR, CIR
card which would have been signed by the Petitioner or its
issued an assessment for deficiency income tax since
authorized representative. And if said documents cannot be
petitioner failed to subject the salaries, bonuses and
located, Respondent at the very least, should have submitted
allowances to withholding taxes. This assessment was covered
to the Court a certification issued by the Bureau of Posts and
any other pertinent document which is executed with the The labor arbiter held that petitioner was validly dismissed
intervention of the Bureau of Posts. for gross negligence of duty.
The Labor Arbiter relied on the fax messages presented by
Furthermore, presenting as witness their records custodian private respondent to prove petitioner's neglect of his duties,
still proved to be insufficient. There are three requisites for thus:
admissibility under the rule mentioned in Section 44, Rule 130
of the Rules of Court: (a) that the entry was made by a public . . . The fax message said that the Master of M/V Phoenix
officer, or by another person specially enjoined by law to do Seven received an emergency warning call from Japan Sisan
so; (b) that it was made by the public officer in the Sebo Naika Radio Authority calling attention to the Master of
performance of his duties, or by such other person in the the vessel M/V Phoenix Seven that his vessel is invading
performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and (c) that other route [sic]. When the Master checked the Bridge, he
the public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of found out that the Second Officer (complainant) did not
the facts by him stated, which must have been acquired by carry out his duty watch. There was a confrontation between
him personally or through official information . . . . the Master and the Complainant but the latter insisted that
In this case, the entries made by Versola were not based on he was right. The argument of the Complainant asserting
her personal knowledge as she did not attest to the fact that that he was right cannot be sustained by this Arbitration
she personally prepared and mailed the assessment notice. Branch. The fact that there was an emergency call from the
Nor was it stated in the transcript of stenographic notes how Japanese port authority that M/V Phoenix Seven was
and from whom she obtained the pertinent information. invading other route simply means that Complainant
Moreover, she did not attest to the fact that she acquired the neglected his duty. The fax message stating that Complainant
reports from persons under a legal duty to submit the same. was not at the bridge at the time of the emergency call was
Hence, Rule 130, Section 44 finds no application in the present likewise not denied nor refuted by the Complainant. Under
case. Thus, the evidence offered by respondent does not our jurisprudence, any material allegation and/or document
qualify as an exception to the rule against hearsay evidence. which is not denied specifically is deemed admitted. If not of
the timely call [sic] from the port authority that M/V Phoenix
Since the evidence offered by the respondent fails to convince Seven invaded other route, the safety of the vessel, her crew
that FAN was released, mailed, or sent before 15 April 1991, it and cargo may be endangered. She could have collided with
is insufficient to give rise to the presumption that the other vessels because of complainant's failure to render
assessment notice was received in the regular course of mail. watch duty.
Consequently, the right of the government to assess and
collect the alleged deficiency tax is barred by prescription. The NLRC reversed the ruling of the labor arbiter.
The NLRC held that the fax messages in support of the
alleged misbehavior and neglect of duty by petitioner have
64) Juanito Talidano vs. Falcon Maritime & Allied Services, no probative value and are self-serving. It added that the
Inc. ship's logbook should have been submitted in evidence as it
is the repository of all the activities on board the vessel,
FACTS: Petitioner was employed as a second marine officer by
especially those affecting the performance or
Falcon Maritime and Allied Services, Inc. (private respondent)
attitude of the officers and crew members, and, more
and was assigned to M/V Phoenix Seven, a vessel owned and
importantly, the procedures
operated by Hansu Corporation (Hansu) which is based in
preparatory to the discharge of a crew member.
Korea. His one (1)-year contract of employment commenced
on 15 October 1996 and stipulated the monthly wage at
The CA reinstated the decision of the Labor Arbiter. The
$900.00 with a fi􏰾xed overtime pay of $270.00 and leave pay
appellate court relied on the fax messages issued by the ship
of $75.00.
master shortly after petitioner had committed a serious
neglect of his duties. It noted that the said fax messages
Petitioner claimed that his chief officer, a Korean, always
constitute the res gestae.
discriminated against and maltreated the vessel's Filipino
crew. This prompted him to send a letter-complaint to the
Petitioner submits that the Court of Appeals erred in relying
officer-in-charge of the International Transport Federation
merely on fax messages to support the validity of his
(ITF) in London, a measure that allegedly was resented by the
dismissal from employment. He maintains that the 􏰾fax
Korean chief officer. Consequently, petitioner was dismissed
message containing the information that the vessel
on 21 January 1997. He filed a complaint for illegal dismissal
encroached on a different route was a mere personal
on 27 October 1999.
observation of the ship master and should have thus been
corroborated by evidence, and that these fax messages
Private respondent countered that petitioner had voluntarily
cannot be considered as res gestae because the statement of
disembarked the vessel after having been warned several
the ship master embodied therein is just a report. He also
times of dismissal from service for his incompetence,
contends that he has not caused any immediate danger to
insubordination, disrespect and insulting attitude toward his
the vessel and that if he did commit any wrongdoing, the
superiors. It cited an incident involving petitioner's
incident would have been recorded in the logbook. Thus, he
incompetence wherein the vessel invaded a different route at
posits that the failure to produce the logbook reinforces the
the Osaka Port in Japan due to the absence of petitioner who
theory that the fax messages have been concocted to justify
was then supposed to be on watch duty. As proof, it
his unceremonious dismissal from employment.
presented a copy of a fax message, sent to it on the date of
Private respondent insists that the appellate court is correct
incident, reporting the vessel's deviation from its course due
in considering the fax messages as res gestae statements. It
to petitioner's neglect of duty at the bridge, as well as a copy
likewise emphasizes that non-presentment of the logbook is
of the report of crew discharge issued by the master of M/V
justified as the same could no longer be retrieved because
Phoenix Seven two days after the incident.
Hansu has already ceased to be its principal. Furthermore, it

refutes the allegation of petitioner that he was dismissed element of spontaneity, the fax messages cannot be
because he 􏰾led a complaint with the ITF in behalf of his admitted as part of the res gestae of the 􏰾first kind.
fellow crew members. It claims that petitioner's allegation is a
hoax because there is no showing that the alleged complaint Neither will the second kind of res gestae apply. The
has been received by the ITF and that no action thereon was requisites for its admissibility are:
ever taken by the ITF. (1) the principal act to be characterized must be
equivocal;
Records reveal that this information was related to private (2) the equivocal act must be material to the issue;
respondent via two fax messages sent by the captain of M/V (3) the statement must accompany the equivocal
Phoenix Seven. The fax message dated 18 January 1997 is act; and
reproduced below: (4) the statements give a legal significance to the
JUST RECEIVED PHONE CALL FROM MASTER N C/OFFICER equivocal act.
THAT THEY DECIDED TO DISCHARGE 2/OFFICER AT OSAKA
PORT. Petitioner's alleged absence from watch duty is simply an
DUE TO MIS-BEHAVIOUR N RESEST [SIC] TO OFFICIAL ORDER. innocuous act or at least proved to be one. Assuming
CAPT. HAD RECEIVED EMERGENCY WARNING CALL FROM arguendo that such absence was the equivocal act, it is
JAPAN BISAN SETO NAIKAI RADIO AUTHORITY THAT SHIP IS nevertheless not accompanied by any statement more so by
INVADING OTHER ROUTE. the fax statements adverted to as parts of the res gestae. No
SO, HE WAS SURPRISED N CAME TO BRIDGE N FOUND 2/O date or time has been mentioned to determine whether the
NOT CARRY OUT HIS WATCH DUTY. fax messages were made simultaneously with the purported
MASTER SCOLD HIM ABOUT THIS N CORRECT HIS ERROR BUT equivocal act.
HE RESIST [SIC] THAT HE IS RIGHT AND THEN SAID THAT HE
WILL COME BACK HOME. Furthermore, the material contents of the fax messages are
ACTESI unclear. The matter of route encroachment or invasion is
FURTHER MORE HE ASKED MASTER TO PAY HIM I.T.F. WAGE questionable. The ship master, who is the author of the fax
SCALE. MASTER N/CIO STRONGLY ASKED US HIS messages, did not witness the incident. He obtained such
REPATRIATION WITH I.E.U. information only from the Japanese port authorities. Verily,
PLS. CONFIRM YOUR OPINION ON THIS HAPPENING. the messages can be characterized as double hearsay.
The second fax message dated 20 January 1997 pertained to a Private respondent's sole reliance on the fax messages in
report of crew discharge essentially containing the same dismissing petitioner is clearly insufficient as these messages
information as the fax message. The Court of Appeals treated were addressed only to itself.
these fax messages as part of the res gestae proving neglect of
duty on the part of petitioner. Talidano is illegally terminated.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the fax messages constitute the res gestae? 65) Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. vs Alberto & Alberto Reyes,
RULING: PRINCIPLE: Exception to the hearsay rule are the entries in

No. official records made in the performance of his duty by a
Section 42 of Rule 130 40 of the Rules of Court mentions two public officer of the Philippines. Failure to make a timely
acts which form part of the res gestae, namely: spontaneous objection to the police report’s presentation in evidence is a
statements and verbal acts. In spontaneous exclamations, the waiver of right.
res gestae is the startling occurrence, whereas in verbal acts,
the res gestae are the statements accompanying the
equivocal act. 41
FACTS: At around 5 o’clock in the morning, an accident
occurred at the corner of EDSA and Ayala Avenue involving
The SC ruled that the fax messages cannot be deemed part of
four (4) vehicles: (1) a Nissan Bus, (2) an Isuzu Tanker, (3) a
the res gestae.
Fuzo Cargo Truck, and (4) a Mitsubishi Galant. Based on the
Police Report issued by the on-the-spot investigator SPO1
To be admissible under res gestae of the first kind it is
Alfredo Dungga, the Isuzu Tanker was in front of the
required that:
Mitsubishi Galant with the Nissan Bus on their right side
(1) the principal act be a startling occurrence;
shortly before the incident. All three (3) vehicles were at halt
(2) the statements were made before the declarant
when the Fuzo Cargo Truck simultaneously bumped the rear
had the time to contrive or devise a falsehood; and
portion of the Galant and the rear left portion of the Bus.
(3) that the statements must concern the
Due to the strong impact, these two vehicles were shoved
occurrence in question and its immediate attending
forward and the Galant rammed into the Tanker.
circumstances.
Previously, Malayan Insurance issued a car insurance policy
Assuming that petitioner's negligence — which allegedly insuring the Mitsubishi Galant against third party liability,
caused the ship to deviate from its course — is the startling own damage and theft, among others. Malayan paid the
occurrence, there is no showing that the statements damages and maintaining that it has been subrogated to the
contained in the fax messages were made immediately after rights of the assured, it sent several demand letters to
the alleged incident. In addition, no dates have been respondents, the registered owner and the driver,
mentioned to determine if these utterances were made respectively of the Cargo Truck. Respondents refused forcing
spontaneously or with careful deliberation. Absent the critical petitioner to file a complaint for damages for gross
negligence against respondents.

Respondents asserted that the proximate cause of the a person in the performance of a duty specially
accident was the reckless driving of the Nissan Bus driver enjoined by law are prima facie evidence of the facts
alleging that that the speeding bus, coming from the service therein stated.”
road of EDSA, maneuvered its way towards the middle lane
without due regard to Reyes' right of way. When the Nissan In Alvarez v PICOP Resources, this Court reiterated the
Bus abruptly stopped, Reyes stepped hard on the brakes but requisites for the admissibility in evidence, as an exception to
the braking action could not cope with the inertia and failed to the hearsay rule of entries in official records, thus:
gain sufficient traction. As a consequence, the Fuzo Cargo (a) that the entry was made by a public officer or by
Truck hit the rear end of the Mitsubishi Galant, which, in turn, another person specially enjoined by law to do so;
hit the rear end of the vehicle in front of it. The Nissan Bus, on
the other hand, sideswiped the Fuzo Cargo Truck, causing (b) that it was made by the public officer in the
damage to the latter. They also controverted the result of the performance of his or her duties, or by such other
Police Report, asserting that it was based solely on the biased person in the performance of a duty specially
narration of the Bus driver. enjoined by law; and
At the trial, Malayan Insurance presented the testimony of it (c) that the public officer or other person had
lone witness, motor car claim adjuster, who attested that he sufficient knowledge of the facts by him or her
processed the insurance claim of the assured and verified the stated, which must have been acquired by the public
documents submitted to him. Respondents, on the other officer or other person personally or through official
hand, failed to present any evidence. information.
The trial court ruled in favor of petitioner and declared Notably, the presentation of the police report itself is
respondents liable for damages. CA reversed and set aside the admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule even if the
decision. It noted that the police report was not properly police investigator who prepared it was not presented in
identified by the police who conducted the on-the-spot court, as long as the above requisites could be adequately
investigation of the subject collision. It thus, held that an proved. Here, there is no dispute that SPO1 Dungga, the on-
appellate court cannot rightly appreciate firsthand the-spot investigator, prepared the report, and he did so in
genuineness of an unverified and unidentified document, the performance of his duty. However, what is not clear is
much less accord it evidentiary value. whether SPO1 Dungga had sufficient personal knowledge of
the facts contained in his report. Thus, the third requisite is
Malayan Insurance contends that, even without the lacking.
presentation of the police investigator who prepared the
police report, said report is still admissible in evidence, Respondents failed to make a timely objection to the police
especially since respondents failed to make a timely objection report's presentation in evidence; thus, they are deemed to
to its presentation in evidence. Respondents counter that have waived their right to do so. As a result, the police report
since the police report was never confirmed by the is still admissible in evidence.
investigating police officer, it cannot be considered as part of
the evidence on record. 2) Even if we consider the inadmissibility of the police report
in evidence, still, respondents cannot evade liability by virtue
of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine.
ISSUES: To reiterate, res ipsa loquitor is a rule of necessity which

applies where evidence is absent or not readily available. The
1) Whether or not the police report is admissible requisites are the ff.:
2) Whether or not there was sufficient evidence to support
the claim for gross negligence (a) the accident was of a kind which does not
3) Whether or not subrogation is valid in the instant case ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent;
(b) the instrumentality or agency which caused the
RULING: injury was under the exclusive control of the
person charged with negligence; and
1) Under the rules of evidence, a witness can testify only to (c) the injury suffered must not have been due to
those facts which the witness knows of his or her personal any voluntary action or contribution on the part
knowledge, that is, which are derived from the witness' own of the person injured
perception. Concomitantly, a witness may not testify on
matters which he or she merely learned from others either In the instant case, the Fuzo Cargo Truck would not have had
because said witness was told or read or heard those matters. hit the rear end of the Mitsubishi Galant unless someone is
Such testimony is considered hearsay and may not be received negligent. Also, the Fuzo Cargo Truck was under the exclusive
as proof of the truth of what the witness has learned. This is control of its driver, Reyes. Even if respondents avert liability
known as the hearsay rule. by putting the blame on the Nissan Bus driver, still, this
allegation was self-serving and totally unfounded. Finally, no
As discussed in D.M. Consunji, Inc. v. CA, 21 "Hearsay is not contributory negligence was attributed to the driver of the
limited to oral testimony or statements; the general rule that Mitsubishi Galant. Consequently, all the requisites for the
excludes hearsay as evidence applies to written, as well as oral application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur are present,
statements." thereby creating a reasonable presumption of negligence on
There are several exceptions to the hearsay rule under the the part of respondents.
Rules of Court, among which are entries in official records. Just like any other disputable presumptions or inferences, the
Section 44, Rule 130 provides: presumption of negligence may be rebutted or overcome by
“Entries in official records made in the performance other evidence to the contrary. It is unfortunate, however,
of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by
that respondents failed to present any evidence before the PR later sought for the amendment of its complaint on the
trial court. Thus, the presumption of negligence remains. following grounds:
3) Malayan Insurance contends that there was a valid 1. Original complaint failed to plead for the recovery of
subrogation in the instant case, as evidenced by the claim the value of the lost hull;
check voucher and the Release of Claim and Subrogation 2. Vessel had an actual value of P800,000.00 and that,
Receipt presented by it before the trial court. Respondents, after deducting the insurance payment of
however, claim that the documents presented by Malayan P200,000.00, the amount of P600,000.00 should
Insurance do not indicate certain important details that would likewise be claimed;
show proper subrogation. 3. Inflation resulted to the devaluation of Philippine
peso and had affected the value of replacements,
As noted by Malayan Insurance, respondents had all the thus there should be a reasonable determination
opportunity, but failed to object to the presentation of its thereof; and
evidence. Thus, and as We have mentioned earlier, 4. Due to the sinking of the vessel, PR incurred
respondents are deemed to have waived their right to make unrealized profits and lost business opportunities
an objection.
The rule is that failure to object to the offered

evidence renders it admissible, and the court cannot, Subsequently, the complaint was further amended to include
on its own, disregard such evidence. petitioner as a defendant which the lower court.
XXX During trial, PR presented evidences: (1) testimony of its

general manager and sole witness, Edilberto del Rosario, and
Note also that when a party desires the court to (2) documentary evidence to prove actual damages:
reject the evidence offered, it must so state in the
form of a timely objection and it cannot raise the (you can just skip this part…)
objection to the evidence for the first time on appeal.
Because of a party's failure to timely object, the Exhibit B — a document titled "Marine Protest"
evidence becomes part of the evidence in the case. executed by Delfin Villarosa, Jr. on September 22,
Thereafter, all the parties are considered bound by 1977 stating that as a result of the collision, the M/V
any outcome arising from the offer of evidence Maria Efigenia XV sustained a hole at its left side
properly presented (ACDC v COMFAC Corp). that caused it to sink with its cargo of 1,050 bañeras
valued at P170,000 00;
Bearing in mind that the claim check voucher and the Release
of Claim and Subrogation Receipt presented by Malayan Exhibit C — a quotation for the construction of a 95-
Insurance are already part of the evidence on record, and footer trawler issued by Isidoro A. Magalong of I. A.
since it is not disputed that the insurance company, indeed, Magalong Engineering and Construction on January
paid PhP700,000 to the assured, then there is a valid 26, 1987 to Del Rosario showing that construction of
subrogation in the case at bar. such trawler would cost P2,250,000.00;
Exhibit D — pro forma invoice issued by E.D. Daclan

of Power Systems, Incorporated on January 20, 1987
66) PNOC Shipping and Transport Corp. vs. CA & Maria to Del Rosario showing that two (2) units of
Efigenia Fishing Corp. CUMMINS Marine Engine model would cost
KEYWORDS: collision of vessels; price quotations P1,160,000.00;
PRINCIPLES: The price quotations presented as exhibits Exhibit E — quotation of prices issued by Scan
partake of the nature of hearsay evidence considering that the Marine Inc. on January 20, 1987 to Del Rosario
persons who issued them were not presented as witnesses. showing that a unit of Furuno Compact Daylight
Radar, Model FR-604D, would cost P100,000.00
while a unit of Furuno Color Video Sounder, Model
FCV-501 would cost P45,000.00 so that the two
FACTS:
units would cost P145,000.00;
In the early morning of September 21, 1977, the M/V Maria
Exhibit F — quotation of prices issued by Seafgear
Efigenia XV, owned by private respondent Maria Efigenia
Sales, Inc. on January 21, 1987 to Del Rosario
Fishing Corporation, was navigating the waters near Fortune
showing that two (2) rolls of nylon rope would cost
Island in Nasugbu, Batangas on its way to Navotas, Metro
P140,000.00; two (2) rolls of nylon rope, P42,750.00;
Manila when it collided with the vessel Petroparcel, which at
one (1) binocular, P1,400.00, one (1) compass,
the time was owned by the Luzon Stevedoring Corporation
P4,000.00 and 50 pcs. of floats, P9,000.00 or a total
(LSC).
of P197,150.00;
The Board of Marine Inquiry conducted an investigation and
Exhibit H — price quotation issued by Seafgear
rendered a decision finding the Petroparcel at fault. Based on
Sales, Inc. dated April 10, 1987 to Del Rosario
this finding by the Board and after unsuccessful demands on
showing the cost of poly nettings as: 50 rolls of
petitioner, private respondent sued the LSC and the
400/18 3kts. 100md x 100mtrs., P70,000.00; 50 rolls
Petroparcel captain, Edgardo Doruelo, before the then Court
of 400/18 5kts 100md x 100mtrs., P81,500.00; 50
of First Instance of Caloocan City. Meanwhile, during the
rolls of 400/18 8kts. 100md x 100mtrs., P116,000.00,
pendency of the case, petitioner PNOC Shipping and Transport
and 50 rolls of 400/18 10kts. 100md x 100mtrs.,
Corporation sought to be substituted in place of LSC as it had
P146,500 and bañera (tub) at P65.00 per piece or a
already acquired ownership of the Petroparcel.
total of P414,065.00.

Except for Exhibit B where the value of the 1,050 bañeras of examine the documentary evidence presented to support Del
fish were pegged at their September 1977 value when the Rosario's claim as regards the amount of losses.
collision happened, the pieces of documentary evidence
proffered by private respondent with respect to items and The price quotations presented as exhibits partake of the
equipment lost show similar items and equipment with nature of hearsay evidence considering that the persons
corresponding prices in early 1987 or approximately ten (10) who issued them were not presented as witnesses. Any
years after the collision. evidence, whether oral or documentary, is hearsay if its
probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of
Petitioner only presented Lorenzo Lazaro, senior estimator at the witness but on the knowledge of another person who is
PNOC Dockyard & Engineering Corporation, who testified that not on the witness stand. Hearsay evidence, whether
the price quotations submitted by private respondent were objected to or not, has no probative value unless the
"excessive" and not proved by competent and admissible proponent can show that the evidence falls within the
evidence, and that as an expert witness, he used the exceptions to the hearsay evidence rule. On this point, we
quotations of his suppliers in making his estimates. However, believe that the exhibits do not fall under any of the
he failed to present such quotations of prices from his exceptions provided under Sections 37 to 47 of Rule 130.
suppliers, saying that he could not produce a breakdown of
the costs of his estimates as it was "a sort of secret scheme." It is true that one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule
pertains to "commercial lists and the like" under Section 45,
CFI – rendered its decision in favor of the PR and against the Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. Under Section 45
defendant PNOC. of the aforesaid Rule, a document is a commercial list if:
CA – affirmed decision of CFI in toto. It further ruled that it (1) it is a statement of matters of interest to persons
was not necessary to qualify Del Rosario as an expert witness engaged in an occupation;
because as the owner of the lost vessel, "it was well within his
knowledge and competency to identify and determine the (2) such statement is contained in a list, register,
equipment installed and the cargoes loaded" on the vessel periodical or other published compilation;
(3) said compilation is published for the use of persons

engaged in that occupation, and
ISSUE: Whether the price quotation exhibits presented should
be admitted as evidence to prove actual damages (4) it is generally used and relied upon by persons in the
same occupation.
Based on the above requisites, Exhibits B, C, D, E, F and H

RULING: are not "commercial lists" for these do not belong to the
category of "other published compilations" under Section
NO. As stated at the outset, to enable an injured party to 45. Under the principle of ejusdem generis, "(w)here general
recover actual or compensatory damages, he is required to words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words
prove the actual amount of loss with reasonable degree of of a particular and specific meaning, such general words are
certainty premised upon competent proof and on the best not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held
evidence available. as applying only to persons or things of the same kind or
The exhibits were presented ostensibly in the course of Del class as those specifically mentioned." The exhibits
Rosario's testimony. Private respondent did not present any mentioned are mere price quotations issued personally to
other witnesses especially those whose signatures appear in Del Rosario who requested for them from dealers of
the price quotations that became the bases of the award. We equipment similar to the ones lost at the collision of the two
hold, however, that the price quotations are ordinary private vessels. These are not published in any list, register,
writings which under the Revised Rules of Court should have periodical or other compilation on the relevant subject
been proffered along with the testimony of the authors matter. Neither are these "market reports or quotations"
thereof. Del Rosario could not have testified on the veracity of within the purview of "commercial lists" as these are not
the contents of the writings even though he was the seasoned "standard handbooks or periodicals, containing data of
owner of a fishing fleet because he was not the one who everyday professional need and relied upon in the work of
issued the price quotations. Section 36, Rule 130 of the the occupation." These are simply letters responding to the
Revised Rules of Court provides that a witness can testify only queries of Del Rosario.
to those facts that he knows of his personal knowledge.
For this reason, Del Rosario's claim that private respondent To be sure, letters and telegrams are admissible in evidence
incurred losses in the total amount of P6,438,048.00 should be but these are, however, subject to the general principles of
admitted with extreme caution considering that, because it evidence and to various rules relating to documentary
was a bare assertion, it should be supported by independent evidence. Thus, a letter may be offered in evidence and
evidence. Moreover, because he was the owner of private admitted as such but its evidentiary weight depends upon
respondent corporation, whatever testimony he would give the observance of the rules on evidence. Accordingly, the
with regard to the value of the lost vessel, its equipment and author of the letter should be presented as witness to
cargoes should be viewed in the light of his self-interest provide the other party to the litigation the opportunity to
therein. We agree with the Court of Appeals that his testimony question him on the contents of the letter. Being mere
as to the equipment installed and the cargoes loaded on the hearsay evidence, failure to present the author of the letter
vessel should be given credence considering his familiarity renders its contents suspect. Accordingly, as stated at the
thereto. However, we do not subscribe to the conclusion that outset, damages may not be awarded on the basis of hearsay
his valuation of such equipment, cargo and the vessel itself evidence.
should be accepted as gospel truth. We must, therefore,

Nonetheless, the non-admissibility of said exhibits does not

mean that it totally deprives private respondent of any redress
for the loss of its vessel. Nominal damages are awarded in The plaintiffs presented evidence, among others,
every obligation arising from law, contracts, quasi-contracts, “EXHIBIT H and I,” testimonies of plaintiffs’ witnesses in
acts or omissions punished by law, and quasi-delicts, or in the former case (basically, testimonies of witnesses from
every case where property right has been invaded. Under Civil Case 26909 was exhibited as evidence in the present
Article 2223 of the Civil Code, "the adjudication of nominal action, Civil Case 00855).
damages shall preclude further contest upon the right
involved and all accessory questions, as between the parties to
the suit, or their respective heirs and assigns." Considering the  The Court of First Instance in Manila DISMISSED the
fact, however, that (1) technically petitioner sustained injury present case on the ground of res judicata.
but which, unfortunately, was not adequately and properly  Upon a motion for reconsideration, the decision was
proved, and (2) this case has dragged on for almost two REVERSED and a decision against respondent Francisco
decades, an award of P2,000.000.00 in favor of private Tan.
respondent as and for nominal damages is in order.  On appeal, the Court of Appeals REVERSED the lower
court’s decision and DISMISSED the complaint.
67) Tan v CA
KEYWORD: “Unable to testify” – what does it mean? ISSUE: Whether or not EXHIBITS H and I (testimonies of
plaintiffs’ witnesses from the past case) is admissible in the
present case?
PRINCIPLES: The testimony of a witness, given in a former case
between the same parties, the same matter, the adverse party
having had an opportunity to cross-examine him, may be RULING:
given in evidence, when said witness is: (a) deceased; (b) out
of the Philippines; or (c) unable to testify [such inability No. The controlling statute is Section 41, Rule 130 of the
proceeding from a grave cause, almost amounting to death, as Rules of Court, viz:
when the witness is old and has lost the power of speech].
“SECTION 41. Testimony at a former trial. – The

FACTS: testimony of a witness deceased or out of the Philippines, or
unable to testify, given in a former case between the same
 July 22, 1955 – petitioner, through their mother Celestina parties, relating to the same matter, the adverse party having
Daldo as guardian ad litem, sued respondent Francisco had an opportunity to cross-examine him, may be given in
Tan in the Court of First Instance of Manila for evidence.”
acknowledgement and support, alleging respondent to be
the illegitimate father of the minors Carmelita and The aforesaid rule allows testimony from a former trial to be
Rodolfo [Civil Case 26909]. admissible in evidence. In the present case, however, the
 March 26, 1956 – after petitioners had presented oral and witnesses whose testimonies (from the former trial) were
documentary evidence and were about to rest their case, offered into evidence, were neither dead, nor were they
they moved to dismiss the foregoing civil case upon the outside of the Philippines. Can they then be categorized as
ground that the parties had come to an amicable witnesses of the class ‘unable to testify’? The Court, in
settlement. construing this term held it to mean: “subsequent failure or
refusal to appear thereat [second trial] or hostility since
On the same day, Celestina Daldo subscribed before the testifying at the first does not amount to inability to testify,
clerk of court an affidavit categorically stating that but such inability proceeding from a grave cause, almost
respondent Francisco Tan “is not the father of my said amounting to death, as when the witness is old and has lost
minor children named Carmelita and Rodolfo, but another the power of speech.”
person whose name I cannot divulge”
Here, the witnesses in question were available. Only they
refused to testify – they do not come within the legal
purview of those ‘unable to testify.’ In the situation here
As prayed for by plaintiffs, on the ground of amicable presented, petitioners are not bereft of remedy. They could
settlement between the parties, the aforementioned civil case have urged the court to have said witnesses arrested,
was dismissed by the court with prejudice. punished for contempt – petitioners however failed to avail
of said remedies, went ahead and submitted their case.
 November 25, 1957 – one year and eight months after Civil
Case 26909 was dismissed, petitioners, this time through EXHIBITS H and I thus being inadmissible, the instant case
their maternal grandfather Servillano Daldo as guardian must fail. The evidence for the plaintiffs fall short of the
ad litem, commenced the present action (Civil Case requirement of strong and convincing evidence – such
00855) for acknowledgement and support, involving the evidence is necessary whether to prove legitimate or
same parties, causes of action, and subject matter. illegitimate paternity and filiation, considering the
seriousness of the relationship and its far-reaching
consequences.
Concededly, the witnesses at the former trial were
subpoenaed by the Court a number of times – these
witnesses, however, never appeared to testify.

68) Manliclic vs. Calaunan involved in the present case; and (e) the adverse party had an
opportunity to cross-examine the witness in the former case.
PRINCIPLE: Hearsay evidence alone may be insufficient to
establish a fact in a suit but, when no objection is made Admittedly, respondent failed to show the concurrence of all
thereto, it is, like any other evidence, to be considered and the requisites set forth by the Rules for a testimony given in
given the importance it deserves. a former case or proceeding to be admissible as an exception
to the hearsay rule. Petitioner PRBLI, not being a party in
FACTS: Criminal Case, had no opportunity to cross-examine the 3
witnesses in said case. The criminal case was filed exclusively
At around 6-7am, respondent Calaunan, together with
against petitioner Manliclic, petitioner PRBLI’s employee.
Mendoza, was on his way to Manila from Pangasinan on
board his jeep. The Bus was likewise bound for Manila from
Concepcion, Tarlac. The two vehicles collided. Respondent Second, Petitioners contend that the documents in the
suffered minor injuries while his driver was unhurt. By reason criminal case should not have been admitted in the instant
of such collision, a criminal case was filed charging petitioner civil case because Section 47 of Rule 130 refers only to
Manliclic with Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to "testimony or deposition.”
Property with Physical Injuries. Subsequently, respondent
filed a complaint for damages against petitioners Manliclic Lastly, petitioners contend that the version of petitioner
and Philippine Rabbit Bus Line (PRBL). Manliclic as to how the accident occurred is more credible
than respondent’s version. They anchor their contention on
The criminal case was tried ahead of the civil case. Among the fact that petitioner Manliclic was acquitted of the charge
those who testified in the criminal case were respondent of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property
Calaunan, Mendoza and Ramos. with Physical Injuries.
When the civil case was heard, counsel for respondent prayed ISSUES:
that the transcripts of stenographic notes (TSNs) of the
testimonies of respondent Calaunan, Mendoza and Ramos in 1. WON the TSNs containing the testimonies of
the criminal case be received in evidence in the civil case in as respondent Calaunan, Mendoza and Ramos in the
much as these witnesses are not available to testify in the civil Criminal Case should be admitted in evidence in the
case. Then, the trial court subpoenaed the Clerk of Court of Civil Case
the RTC-Bulacan, the court where Criminal Case was tried, to 2. WON the documents in the criminal case
bring the TSNs of the testimonies of respondent should be admitted in the instant civil case because
Calaunan, Mendoza and Ramos in said case, together with Section 47 of Rule 130 refers only to "testimony or
other documentary evidence marked therein. deposition.”
3. Can Manliclic still be held liable for the
Tuliao testified that his brother-in-law, respondent Calaunan, collision and be found negligent notwithstanding the
left for abroad and has not returned since then. Rogelio took declaration of the Court of Appeals that there was an
the stand and said that his brother, Ramos, left for Amman, absence of negligence on his part?
Jordan, to work. Rosalia testified that her husband, Mendoza,
left their residence to look for a job but has not returned RULING:
home yet.
1. Yes. An objection shall be made at the time when an
Counsel for respondent wanted to mark other TSNs and alleged inadmissible document is offered in evidence;
documents from the said criminal case to be adopted in the otherwise, the objection shall be treated as waived, since the
instant case, but since the same were not brought to the trial right to object is merely a privilege which the party may
court, counsel for petitioners compromised that said TSNs and waive.
documents could be offered by counsel for respondent as
rebuttal evidence.
Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that these documents are
inadmissible for being hearsay, but on account of failure to
Respondent further marked, among other documents, as object thereto, the same may be admitted and considered as
rebuttal evidence, the TSNs of the testimonies of Ganiban, sufficient to prove the facts therein asserted. Hearsay
Buan and petitioner Manliclic in Criminal Case. evidence alone may be insufficient to establish a fact in a suit
but, when no objection is made thereto, it is, like any other
Petitioners argue that the TSNs containing the testimonies of evidence, to be considered and given the importance it
respondent Calaunan, Mendoza and Ramos should not be deserves.
admitted in evidence for failure of respondent to comply with
the requisites of Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. In the case at bar, it is too late for petitioner PRBLI to raise
denial of due process in relation to Section 47, Rule 130 as a
For Section 47, Rule 130 to apply, the following requisites must ground for objecting to the admissibility of the TSNs. And the
be satisfied: (a) the witness is dead or unable to testify; (b) his fact that petitioner PRBLI was not a party in said criminal
testimony or deposition was given in a former case or case, the testimonies of the 3 witnesses are still admissible
proceeding, judicial or administrative, between the same on the ground that petitioner PRBLI failed to object on their
parties or those representing the same interests; (c) the admissibility.
former case involved the same subject as that in the present
case, although on different causes of action; (d) the issue And if petitioner PRBLI argues that the TSNs of the
testified to by the witness in the former trial is the same issue testimonies of plaintiff’s witnesses in the criminal case
should not be admitted in the instant case, why then did it WON there is sufficient evidence for the accused to be liable
offer the TSN of the testimony of Ganiban in the civil case under PD 1612.
which was given in the criminal case? It appears that
petitioner PRBLI wants to have its cake and eat it too. To
disallow admission in evidence of the TSNs of the testimonies RULING:
of Calaunan, Mendoza and Ramos in the criminal case and to
admit the TSN of the testimony of Ganiban would be unfair. No, there is no sufficient evidence to hold the accused liable
under PD 1612.
2. Yes. Though said section speaks only of testimony and The essential elements of the crime of fencing are as follows:
deposition, it does not mean that documents from a former
case or proceeding cannot be admitted. Said documents can 1. a crime of robbery or theft has been committed;
be admitted they being part of the testimonies of witnesses 2. the accused, who is not a principal or accomplice in
that have been admitted. Accordingly, they shall be given the the commission of the crime of robbery or theft,
same weight as that to which the testimony may be entitled. buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals,
sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner
3. Yes. Petitioner Manliclic was acquitted not on reasonable deals in any article, item, object or anything of
doubt, but on the ground that he is not the author of the act value, which has been derived from the proceeds of
complained of. But the extinction of civil liability referred to the crime of robbery or theft;
refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the 3. the accused knew or should have shown that the
Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act said article, item, object or anything of value has
considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not been derived from the proceeds of the crime of
extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that robbery or theft; and,
the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been 4. there is, on the part of the accused, intent to gain
committed by the accused. for himself or for another.
In this civil case, it was petitioner Manliclic’s negligence that Fencing is malum prohibitum, and P.D. No. 1612 creates a
caused the smash up and so there arises the juris tantum prima facie presumption of fencing from evidence of
presumption that the employer is negligent, rebuttable only possession by the accused of any good, article, item, object
by proof of observance of the diligence of a good father of a or anything of value which has been the subject of robbery
family. But due to lack of supervision of its employees, or theft, and prescribes a higher penalty based on the value
petitioner PRBLI is held solidarily responsible for the damages of the property. The stolen property subject of the charge is
caused by petitioner Manliclic’s negligence. not indispensable to prove fencing. It is merely
corroborative of the testimonies and other evidence
adduced by the prosecution to prove the crime of fencing.
69) Ernesto Francisco vs. People With respect to the first element of the crime: The
court ruled that the conviction of Pacita of theft does not
constitute proof against him. There is no showing that the
FACTS: said decision was already final and executory when the trial
court rendered its decision in the instant case.
Jovita Rodriguez (Jovita for brevity) and her husband acquired
several pieces of jewelry which were placed inside a locked Anent the second element, the Court find and hold the
cabinet in a locked room in their main house. Jovita hid the following:
key to the cabinet inside the room. They hired Pacita Linghon First. Jovita’s testimony in the criminal cases against
(Pacita for brevity), as one of their household helpers Pacita, that Pacita had confessed to her that she had sold four
sometime in February 1989. Pacita swept and cleaned the pieces of jewelry to the petitioner, is inadmissible in
room periodically. In May 1991, she left the employ of the evidence against the latter to prove the truth of the said
Rodriguez family. admission. It bears stressing that the petitioner was not a
Sometime in October, Pacita contacted his brother, Macario, party in the said criminal cases. The well-entrenched rule is
and asked him to sell some jewelries (two rings, one bracelet, that only parties to a case are bound by a judgment of the
and a pair of earrings). She told Macario that a friend of hers trial court. Strangers to a case are not bound by the
owned the jewelry. Macario obliged and sold them to Ernesto judgment of said case. Furthermore, the prosecution did not
Francisco (Ernesto for brevity). present Pacita as witness; hence, the petitioner was not able
to cross-examine Pacita. The rule is that the acts or
After sometime Jovita found out that her jewelries were gone declarations of a person are not admissible in evidence
and accused Pacita for stealing the same, which was then against a third party.
proved by the court. Later on, Jovita filed against Ernesto
Second. The testimony of Pacita during the preliminary
Francisco for violation of PD 1612 or Anti-Fencing Law.
investigation in the criminal case filed against Ernesto, as well
RTC ruled against him which was affirmed by the CA. Accused as her supplemental affidavit, is, likewise, inadmissible
then petitioned that the court erred in proving him guilty against the petitioner since Pacita did not testify in the
beyond reasonable doubt and that there was no sufficient court a quo. The petitioner was, thus, deprived of his right of
evidence to prove that he was liable for PD 1612. cross-examination.
Third. The testimony of PO1 Roldan, Jr., that Pacita
pointed to the petitioner as the person who bought the
ISSUE: subject jewelry from her, is indeed admissible in evidence

against the petitioner. However, such testimony is admissible burdened to prove facts and circumstances from which it
only to prove such fact - that Pacita pointed to the petitioner can be concluded that the accused should have known that
as the person to whom she sold the subject jewelry; it is the property sold to him were stolen; which in this case, the
inadmissible to prove the truth of Pacitas declaration to the prosecution failed to establish. Hence, petitioner is
policemen, that the petitioner was the one who purchased ACQUITTED of the crime of violating P.D. No. 1612 for the
the jewelry from her. It must be stressed that the policemen prosecution’s failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
had no personal knowledge of the said sale, and, more doubt.
importantly, Pacita did not testify in the court a quo.
Fourth. The testimony of Macario during the preliminary
investigation of this criminal case is admissible in evidence 70) Gen. Avelino Razon v. Tagitis, et. al
against the petitioner since he testified for the prosecution
and was cross-examined on his testimony during the
KEYWORD: KASIM EVIDENCE (hearsay; based on an
preliminary investigation.
informant) Writ of Amparo
In fine, the only evidence of the prosecution to prove
that the petitioner purchased the jewelry from Macario and Flexibility is necessary under the unique circumstances that
Pacita are the following: the testimony and affidavit of PO1 enforced disappearance cases pose to the courts; to have
Roldan, Jr.; and, the testimony of Macario during the an effective remedy, the standard of evidence must be
preliminary investigation and trial in the court a quo, which is responsive to the evidentiary difficulties faced.||| The
found by the court as dubious. court reduce its rules to the most basic test of reason —
During the preliminary investigation in this criminal case, i.e., to the relevance of the evidence to the issue at hand
Macario admitted that on October 10, 1991, he and his sister and its consistency with all other pieces of adduced
Pacita sold two rings and one bracelet to the petitioner, while evidence. Thus, even hearsay evidence can be admitted if
in November 1991, he and Pacita sold a pair of earrings to the it satisfies this basic minimum test.||
petitioner. On direct examination in the court a quo, Macario
testified that he and Pacita sold the earrings to the petitioner FACTS: Engineer Morced N. Tagitis, a consultant for the
in May 1992. On cross-examination, Macario testified that he World Bank and the Senior Honorary Counselor for the
and his sister Pacita went to the petitioners shop and sold the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) Scholarship Programme,
subject jewelry on both occasions. On further cross- together with his student Kunnong, an IDB scholar,arrived
examination, Macario changed his testimony anew. Further, in Jolo by boat from a seminar in Zamboanga City. They
Macario testified during the preliminary investigation that immediately checked-in at ASY Pension House. Tagitis
when he transacted with the petitioner for the second time, asked Kunnong to buy him a boat ticket for his return trip
he was with a friend, and not with his sister Pacita. On redirect the following day to Zamboanga. When Kunnong returned
examination, Macario declared that in October 1991, he and from this errand, Tagitis was no longer around. The
Pacita sold four (4) pieces of jewelry contrary to his testimony receptionist related that Tagitis went out to buy food at
on direct examination. Such inconsistencies pertained to around 12:30 in the afternoon and even left his room key
material points and not merely to minor matters. with the desk. Kunnong looked for Tagitis and even sent a
Assuming that the petitioner purchased the said jewelry text message to the latter's secretary who did not know of
from Macario, there is no evidence on record that the Tagitis' whereabouts and activities either. He then reported
petitioner knew that they were stolen. Even Macario did not Tagitis disappearance to the Jolo Police Station.
know that the jewelry was stolen. He testified that Pacita told
him before he sold the jewelry to the petitioner that they More than a month later the respondent, Tagitis wife filed
belonged to a friend of hers. Macario only learned, after the a Petition for the Writ of Amparo with the CA. The petition
case against Pacita had already been filed in court, that the was directed against Lt. Gen. Alexander Yano, Commanding
jewelry was owned by Jovita. However, he failed to inform General, Philippine Army; Gen. Avelino I. Razon, Chief,
the petitioner that the said jewelry was stolen. Philippine National Police (PNP);Gen. Edgardo M. Doromal,
Chief, Criminal Investigation and Detention Group
The prosecution cannot even validly argue that the
(CIDG);Sr. Supt. Leonardo A. Espina, Chief, Police Anti-
petitioner should have known which pieces of jewelry were
Crime and Emergency Response; Gen. Joel Goltiao,
stolen. This is so because the prosecution failed to adduce
Regional Director, ARMM-PNP; and Gen. Ruben Rafael,
sufficient competent evidence to prove the value of the said
Chief, Anti-Terror Task Force Comet.
stolen articles. The prosecution relied solely on the bare and
uncorroborated testimony of Jovita, that they were
worth P655,000. It is a well-entrenched rule that an ordinary The petition alleged that Engr. Tagitis went out of the pension
witness cannot establish the value of jewelry, nor may the house to take his early lunch but while out on the street, a
courts take judicial notice of the value of the same. The trial couple of burly men believed to be police intelligence
court can only take judicial notice of the value of goods operatives, forcibly took him and boarded the latter on a
which are matters of public knowledge or are capable of motor vehicle then sped away. That when Kunnong reported
unquestionable demonstration. The value of jewelry is not a the matter to the police authorities in Jolo, he was
matter of public knowledge nor is it capable of immediately given a ready answer that Engr. Tagitis could
unquestionable demonstration and in the absence of receipts have been abducted by the Abu Sayyaf group and other
or any other competent evidence besides the self-serving groups known to be fighting against the government. And
valuation made by the prosecution, we cannot award the when the wife filed a complaint with the PNP in the ARMM,
reparation for the stolen jewelry. she was told of an intriguing tale by the police that her
husband was not missing but was with another woman
In the absence of direct evidence that the accused had
having good time somewhere, which is a clear indication of
knowledge that the jewelry was stolen, the prosecution is
the refusal of the PNP to help and provide police assistance in ISSUE: Whether hearsay evidence is admissible in a petition
locating her missing husband. for writ of Amparo.{evidence whose probative value is not
based on the personal knowledge of the witnesses (the
respondent, Mrs. Talbin and Col. Kasim himself) but on the
In their verified Return filed, the petitioners denied any
knowledge of some other person not on the witness stand
involvement in or knowledge of Tagitis' alleged abduction.
(the informant)}
They argued that the allegations of the petition were
incomplete and did not constitute a cause of action against
them; were baseless, or at best speculative; and were merely RULING:
based on hearsay evidence.
YES. Based on these considerations and the unique
CA directed Gen. Goltiao as the officer in command of the evidentiary situation in enforced disappearance cases, we
area of disappearance to form TASK FORCE TAGITIS. On hold it duly established that Col. Kasim informed the
February 4, 2008, the CA issued an ALARM WARNING that respondent and her friends, based on the informant's letter,
Task Force Tagitis did not appear to be exerting extraordinary that Tagitis, reputedly a liaison for the JI and who had been
efforts in resolving Tagitis' disappearance. under surveillance since January 2007, was "in good hands"
and under custodial investigation for complicity with the JI
after he was seen talking to one Omar Patik and a certain
(relevant to the topic on hearsay evidence): In her direct
"Santos" of Bulacan, a "Balik Islam" charged with
testimony, respondent pointed to two sources of
terrorism. The respondent's and Mrs. Talbin's testimonies
information as her bases for her allegation that Tagistis had
cannot simply be defeated by Col. Kasim's plain denial and his
been placed under government custody. The first was a
claim that he had destroyed his informant's letter, the critical
friend in Zamboanga Col. Ancanan, who occupied a high
piece of evidence that supports or negates the parties'
position in the military and who allegedly mentioned
conflicting claims. Col. Kasim's admitted destruction of this
that Tagitis was in good hands. (Nothing came out of this
letter — effectively, a suppression of this evidence — raises
claim, as both the respondent herself and her witness, Mrs.
the presumption that the letter, if produced, would be proof
Talbin, failed to establish that Col. Ancanan gave them any
of what the respondent claimed. For brevity, we shall call the
information that Tagitis was in government custody.)
evidence of what Col. Kasim reported to the respondent to
be the "Kasim evidence".
The second, more specific and productive source of
information was Col. Kasim, (high ranking PNP, mistaken to
Given this evidence, our next step is to decide
be a military man) whom the respondent, together with her
whether we can accept this evidence, in lieu of direct
witness Mrs. Talbin, met in Camp Katitipan in Davao
evidence, as proof that the disappearance of Tagitis was
City. ||The respondent and Talbin testified that Kasim
due to action with government participation, knowledge
(Kasim Evidence) read to them a "highly confidential report"
or consent and that he was held for custodial
that contained the "alleged activities of Engineer Tagitis"
investigation. We note in this regard that Col. Kasim was
and informed her that her husband was abducted because
never quoted to have said that the custodial
"he is under custodial investigation" for being a liaison for
investigation was by the CIDG Zamboanga. The Kasim
"J.I. or Jema'ah Islamiah". The report indicated that her
evidence only implies government intervention through
husband met with people belonging to a terrorist group.
the use of the term "custodial investigation", and does
She then told Col. Kasim that her husband was a diabetic
not at all point to CIDG Zamboanga as Tagitis' custodian.
taking maintenance medication, and asked that the Colonel
relay to the persons holding him the need to give him his Strictly speaking, we are faced here with a
medication. classic case of hearsay evidence — i.e., evidence whose
probative value is not based on the personal knowledge
of the witnesses (the respondent, Mrs. Talbin and Col.
Kasim never denied that he met with the respondent and
Kasim himself) but on the knowledge of some other
her friends, and that he provided them information based
person not on the witness stand (the informant).
on the input of an unnamed asset. He simply claimed in his
testimony that the "informal letter" he received from his To say that this piece of evidence is
informant in Sulu did not indicate that Tagitis was in the incompetent and inadmissible evidence of what it
custody of the CIDG. He also stressed that the information substantively states is to acknowledge — as the
he provided the respondent was merely a "raw report" from petitioners effectively suggest — that in the absence of
"barangay intelligence" that still needed confirmation and any direct evidence, we should simply dismiss the
"follow up" as to its veracity. petition. To our mind, an immediate dismissal for this
reason is no different from a statement that
the Amparo Rule — despite its terms — is ineffective, as
CA: confirmed that the disappearance of Tagitis was an
it cannot allow for the special evidentiary difficulties that
"enforced disappearance" under the UN Declaration on the
are unavoidably present inAmparo situations,
Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances.
particularly in extrajudicial killings and enforced
The conclusion that the CIDG was involved was based on the
disappearances. The Amparo Rule was not promulgated
respondent's testimony, corroborated by her companion,
with this intent or with the intent to make it a token
Mrs. Talbin. The CA thus greatly relied on the "raw report"
gesture of concern for constitutional rights. It was
from Col. Kasim's asset, pointing to the CIDG's involvement
promulgated to provide effective and timely
in Tagitis' abduction. The CA held that "raw reports" from an
remedies, using and profiting from local and
"asset" carried "great weight" in the intelligence world. It
international experiences in extrajudicial killings and
also labeled as "suspect" Col. Kasim's subsequent and
enforced disappearances, as the situation may require.
belated retraction of his statement that the military, the
Consequently, we have no choice but to meet the
police, or the CIDG was involved in the abduction of Tagitis.
evidentiary difficulties inherent in enforced Col. Kasim that yielded positive results. Col. Kasim's
disappearances with the flexibility that these difficulties story, however, confirmed only the fact of his custodial
demand. investigation (and, impliedly, his arrest or abduction),
without identifying his abductor/s or the party holding
To give full meaning to our Constitution and the
him in custody. The more significant part of Col. Kasim's
rights it protects, we hold that, as in Velasquez, we should
story is that the abduction came after Tagitis was seen
at least take a close look at the available evidence to
talking with Omar Patik and a certain Santos of Bulacan,
determine the correct import of every piece of evidence
a "Balik Islam" charged with terrorism. Mrs. Talbin
— even of those usually considered inadmissible under
mentioned, too, that Tagitis was being held at Talipapao,
the general rules of evidence — taking into account the
Sulu. None of the police agencies participating in the
surrounding circumstances and the test of reason that we
investigation ever pursued these leads. Notably, Task
can use as basic minimum admissibility requirement. In
Force Tagitis to which this information was relayed did
the present case, we should at least determine whether
not appear to have lifted a finger to pursue these aspects
the Kasim evidence before us is relevant and meaningful
of the case. DICSaH
to the disappearance of Tagistis and reasonably consistent
with other evidence in the case. More denials were manifested in the Returns on
the writ to the CA made by the petitioners. Then PNP
The evidence about Tagitis' personal
Chief Gen. Avelino I. Razon merely reported the
circumstances surrounded him with an air of mystery. He
directives he sent to the ARMM Regional Director and
was reputedly a consultant of the World Bank and a
the Regional Chief of the CIDG on Tagitis, and these
Senior Honorary Counselor for the IDB who attended a
reports merely reiterated the open-ended initial report
seminar in Zamboanga and thereafter proceded to Jolo
of the disappearance. The CIDG directed a search in all of
for an overnight stay, indicated by his request to Kunnong
its divisions with negative results. These, to the PNP
for the purchase of a return ticket to Zamboanga the day
Chief, constituted the exhaustion "of all possible efforts".
after he arrived in Jolo. Nothing in the records indicates
PNP-CIDG Chief General Edgardo M. Doromal, for his
the purpose of his overnight sojourn in Jolo. A colleague in
part, also reported negative results after searching "all
the IDB, Prof. Matli, early on informed the Jolo police
divisions and departments [of the CIDG] for a person
that Tagitis may have taken funds given to him in trust for
named Engr. Morced N. Tagitis . . . and after a diligent
IDB scholars. Prof. Matli later on stated that he never
and thorough research, records show that no such
accused Tagitis of taking away money held in trust,
person is being detained in the CIDG or any of its
although he confirmed that the IDB was seeking
department or divisions." PNP-PACER Chief PS Supt.
assistance in locating funds of IDB scholars deposited
Leonardo A. Espina and PNP PRO ARMM Regional
in Tagitis' personal account. Other than these pieces of
Director PC Superintendent Joel R. Goltiao did no better
evidence, no other information exists in the records
in their affidavits-returns, as they essentially reported
relating to the personal circumstances ofTagitis.
the results of their directives to their units to search
The actual disappearance of Tagitis is as murky as for Tagitis.
his personal circumstances. While the Amparo petition
The extent to which the police authorities acted
recited that he was taken away by "burly men believed to
was fully tested when the CA constituted Task
be police intelligence operatives", no evidence
Force Tagitis, with specific directives on what to do. The
whatsoever was introduced to support this allegation.
negative results reflected in the Returns on the writ were
Thus, the available direct evidence is that Tagitis was last
again replicated during the three hearings the CA
seen at 12.30 p.m. of October 30, 2007 — the day he
scheduled. Aside from the previously mentioned
arrived in Jolo — and was never seen again.
"retraction" that Prof. Matli made to correct his
The Kasim evidence assumes critical materiality accusation that Tagitis took money held in trust for
given the dearth of direct evidence on the above aspects students, PS Supt. Ajirim reiterated in his testimony that
of the case, as it supplies the gaps that were never looked the CIDG consistently denied any knowledge or
into and clarified by police investigation. It is the complicity in any abduction and said that there was no
evidence, too, that colors a simple missing person report basis to conclude that the CIDG or any police unit had
into an enforced disappearance case, as it injects the anything to do with the disappearance of Tagitis; he
element of participation by agents of the State and thus likewise considered it premature to conclude
brings into question how the State reacted to the that Tagitis simply ran away with the money in his
disappearance. custody. As already noted above, the Task Force notably
did not pursue any investigation about the personal
Denials on the part of the police authorities, and
circumstances of Tagitis, his background in relation to
frustration on the part of the respondent, characterize the
the IDB and the background and activities of this Bank
attempts to locate Tagitis. Initially in Jolo, the police
itself, and the reported sighting of Tagistis with terrorists
informed Kunnong that Tagitis could have been taken by
and his alleged custody in Talipapao, Sulu. No attempt
the Abu Sayyaf or other groups fighting the
appears to have ever been made to look into the alleged
government. No evidence was ever offered on whether
IDB funds that Tagitis held in trust, or to tap any of the
there was active Jolo police investigation and how and
"assets" who are indispensable in investigations of this
why the Jolo police arrived at this conclusion. The
nature. These omissions and negative results were
respondent's own inquiry in Jolo yielded the answer that
aggravated by the CA findings that it was only as late as
he was not missing but was with another woman
January 28, 2008 or three months after the
somewhere. Again, no evidence exists that this
disappearance that the police authorities requested for
explanation was arrived at based on an investigation. As
clear pictures of Tagitis. Col. Kasim could not attend the
already related above, the inquiry with Col. Ancanan in
trial because his subpoena was not served, despite the
Zamboanga yielded ambivalent results not useful for
fact that he was designated as Ajirim's replacement in
evidentiary purposes. Thus, it was only the inquiry from

the latter's last post. Thus, Col. Kasim was not then of Amparo petition, as discussed above, and prove the
questioned. No investigation — even an internal one — allegations by substantial evidence. Once a rebuttable
appeared to have been made to inquire into the identity case has been proven, the respondents must then
of Col. Kasim's "asset" and what he indeed wrote. respond and prove their defenses based on the standard
of diligence required. The rebuttable case, of course,
We glean from all these pieces of evidence and
must show that an enforced disappearance took place
developments a consistency in the government's denial
under circumstances showing a violation of the victim's
of any complicity in the disappearance ofTagitis,
constitutional rights to life, liberty or security, and the
disrupted only by the report made by Col. Kasim to the
failure on the part of the investigating authorities to
respondent at Camp Katitipan. Even Col. Kasim, however,
appropriately respond.
eventually denied that he ever made the disclosure
that Tagitis was under custodial investigation for
complicity in terrorism. Another distinctive trait that runs In the seminal case of Velasquez Rodriguez, the
through these developments is the government's IACHR — faced with a lack of direct evidence that the
dismissive approach to the disappearance, starting from government of Honduras was involved in Velasquez
the initial response by the Jolo police to Kunnong's initial Rodriguez' disappearance — adopted a relaxed and
reports of the disappearance, to the responses made to informal evidentiary standard, and established the rule
the respondent when she herself reported and inquired that presumes governmental responsibility for a
about her husband's disappearance, and even at Task disappearance if it can be proven that the government
Force Tagitis itself. carries out a general practice of enforced disappearances
and the specific case can be linked to that practice. The
Based on these considerations, we conclude that
IACHR took note of the realistic fact that enforced
Col. Kasim's disclosure, made in an unguarded moment,
disappearances could be proven only through
unequivocally point to some government complicity in the
circumstantial or indirect evidence or by logical
disappearance. The consistent but unfounded denials and
inference; otherwise, it was impossible to prove that an
the haphazard investigations cannot but point to this
individual had been made to disappear. It held:
conclusion. For why would the government and its
officials engage in their chorus of concealment if the
intent had not been to deny what they already knew of 130. The practice of international and
the disappearance? Would not an in-depth and thorough domestic courts shows that direct
investigation that at least credibly determined the fate evidence, whether testimonial or
of Tagitis be a feather in the government's cap under the documentary, is not the only type of
circumstances of the disappearance? From this evidence that may be legitimately
perspective, the evidence and developments, particularly considered in reaching a
the Kasim evidence, already establish a concrete case of decision. Circumstantial evidence,
enforced disappearance that the Amparo Rule covers. indicia, and presumptions may be
From the prism of the UN Declaration, heretofore cited considered, so long as they lead to
and quoted, the evidence at hand and the developments conclusions consistent with the facts.
in this case confirm the fact of the enforced
disappearance and government complicity, under a
131. Circumstantial or presumptive
background of consistent and unfounded government
evidence is especially important in
denials and haphazard handling. The disappearance as
allegations of disappearances, because
well effectively placed Tagitis outside the protection of
this type of repression is characterized
the law — a situation that will subsist unless this Court
by an attempt to suppress all
acts.
information about the kidnapping or the
whereabouts and fate of the
Disappearances Cases victim. [Emphasis supplied]
These characteristics — namely, of being summary In concluding that the disappearance of

and the use of substantial evidence as the required Manfredo Velasquez (Manfredo) was carried out by
level of proof (in contrast to the usual preponderance agents who acted under cover of public authority, the
of evidence or proof beyond reasonable doubt in IACHR relied on circumstantial evidence including the
court proceedings) — reveal the clear intent of the hearsay testimony of Zenaida Velasquez, the victim's
framers of the Amparo Rule to have the equivalent of sister, who described Manfredo's kidnapping on the
an administrative proceeding, albeit judicially basis of conversations she had with witnesses who saw
conducted, in addressing Amparo situations. The Manfredo kidnapped by men in civilian clothes in broad
standard of diligence required — the duty of public daylight. She also told the Court that a former Honduran
officials and employees to observe extraordinary military official had announced that Manfredo was
diligence — point, too, to the extraordinary measures kidnapped by a special military squadron acting under
expected in the protection of constitutional rights orders of the Chief of the Armed Forces. The IACHR
and in the consequent handling and investigation of likewise considered the hearsay testimony of a second
extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearance witness who asserted that he had been told by a
cases. Honduran military officer about the disappearance, and
a third witness who testified that he had spoken in
prison to a man who identified himself as Manfredo.
Thus, in these proceedings,
the Amparo petitioner needs only to properly comply
with the substance and form requirements of a Writ

Velasquez stresses the lesson that flexibility is

necessary under the unique circumstances that enforced
disappearance cases pose to the courts; to have an
effective remedy, the standard of evidence must be
responsive to the evidentiary difficulties faced. On the
one hand, we cannot be arbitrary in the admission and
appreciation of evidence, as arbitrariness entails violation
of rights and cannot be used as an effective counter-
measure; we only compound the problem if a wrong is
addressed by the commission of another wrong. On the
other hand, we cannot be very strict in our evidentiary
rules and cannot consider evidence the way we do in the
usual criminal and civil cases; precisely, the proceedings
before us are administrative in nature where, as a rule,
technical rules of evidence are not strictly observed.
Thus, while we must follow the substantial evidence
rule, we must observe flexibility in considering the
evidence we shall take into account.
The fair and proper rule, to our mind, is to

consider all the pieces of evidence adduced in their
totality, and to consider any evidence otherwise
inadmissible under our usual rules to be admissible if it is
consistent with the admissible evidence adduced. In other
words, we reduce our rules to the most basic test of
reason — i.e.,to the relevance of the evidence to the issue
at hand and its consistency with all other pieces of
adduced evidence. Thus, even hearsay evidence can be
admitted if it satisfies this basic minimum test.

Evidence Case Digests 1 70

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Evidence Case Digests 1 70

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EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y.

KEYWORD: On February 17, 2009, the court a quo issued an Order

FACTS: YES. Section 3, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,

1| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

The specific enumeration of disqualified witnesses excludes RULING:

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At this point, it bears emphasis that the State, being interested

3) Guerrero vs St. Claire’s Realty and Co. RULING:

Defendants Guerreros filed a written motion to disqualify

3| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

4) Goni vs CA The trial court rendered a decision ordering therein

The novation of the written contract/promise to sell into a ISSUE:

It is true that by reason of the provisions of article 1407 of

1. NO. We are constrained to hold that the officers and/or

Respondent Contention: That the vice-president and treasurer

6| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

Under the Corporation Code, a stock certificate must be

9) Garcia vs Dominga Robles

9| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

ISSUE: Whether or not the letter was admissible as evidence FACTS:

The father of the plaintiff Uy Chico died in 1897, at which

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Defendant showed that plaintiff had agreed to the FACTS:

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Summarizing these exceptions, information relating to the FACTS:

not having heard anything about it, he received a letter on

After that, the Tanodbayan recommended the filing of a

For the application of the attorney-client privilege, the period

15| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

At trial, Ingram contended that he did not learn until the

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Ingram even argued that the co-defendants' defenses must be Facts:

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3. The relation must be one which in the opinion of the

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Disputable presumptions. ― The following presumptions are

ISSUE:  Objections to evidence must be made after the offer

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ISSUE: WON TIU MAY BE COMPELLED TO TESTIFY IN THE

YES, TIU MAY BE COMPELLED TO TESTIFY.

On January 19, the fall of petitioner seemed inevitable. At

26| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

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The determination of the guilt of the accused depends

A meticulous assessment of Gilda's testimony demonstrates FACTS:

ISSUE: porridge for the Yparraguirres, appellant arrived from work.

2. A true offer of compromise does not, in legal RULING:

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The Commercial Bank of Manila (CBM) subsequently

32| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

IN OTHER WORDS (author’s own understanding), although

II. The spouses cited Ortigas case ISSUES:

3) WON CA correctly applied the exceptions to res

KEYWORD: Admission by Co-partner or agent as exception to 4) WON POA had jurisdiction

34| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

agreements that it entered into with the "Olympic" and

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ISSUE: WON the court was correct in overruling the motion

The parcel of land under litigation is Lot No. 2476 of the

KEYWORD: Barium Chlorate instead of Potassium Chlorate

at the drug store of the accused, which substance proved on

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The RTC adjudged Clemente Babiera, Justo Babiera, and

PRINCIPLE: A statement made under circumstances which RULING:

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After a careful examination of the record, we are persuaded

The prosecution, to show the circumstances under which the

NO. In the prosecution for arson, proof of the crime charged

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Several days later, Magdalena went to the DECS

41) Civil Service Commission vs. Allyson Belagan

45| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS