THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 80264. May 31, 1989.]

SAN MIGUEL VILLAGE SCHOOL , petitioner, vs. HONORABLE AMIR

PUKUNUM D. PUNDOGAR and CHRISTINA TRIÑO , respondents.

Estelito R. Alvia for petitioner.

Macalalag Law Office & Associates for private respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; P.D. 1508; NON-COMPLIANCE WITH REQUIREMENTS DOES NOT

AFFECT JURISDICTION. — It is, firmly settled that failure of a plaintiff to comply with the
requirements of P.D. No. 1508 does not affect the jurisdiction of the court that tried the
action. In, e,g., Millare v. Hernando, the Court stressed that "the conciliation procedure
required under P.D. No. 1508 is not a jurisdictional requirement in the sense that failure to
have prior recourse to such procedure would not deprive a court of its jurisdiction either
over the subject matter or over the person of the defendant." Failure of a plaintiff to go
through the conciliation procedure established by P.D. No. 1508 merely affects the
sufficiency, or the maturity or ripeness of the plaintiff s cause of action and the complaint
becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss, not on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, but
rather for want of cause of action or for prematurity. Respondent Judge was thus in
palpable error in holding his predecessor without jurisdiction to render the assailed
decision.
2. ID.; ID.; REQUIREMENT SATISFIED WHERE DEFENDANT FAILS TO RESPOND TO A
NOTICE TO APPEAR BEFORE THE LUPON. — There is no question that the "confrontation"
or conciliation proceedings did not materialize here, since private respondent did not
appear before the Lupon. Where, however, the defendant in an action fails for one reason
or another to respond to a notice to appear before the Lupon, the requirement of P.D. No.
1508 must be regarded as having been satisfied by the plaintiff. A defendant cannot be
allowed to frustrate the requirements of the statute by her own refusal or failure to appear
before the Lupon and then later to assail a judgment rendered in such action by setting up
the very ground of non-compliance with P.D. No. 1508. In simplest terms, a defendant
cannot be allowed to profit by her own default.
3. ID.; ID.; NON-COMPLIANCE WITH PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENT MUST BE RAISED IN
A MOTION TO DISMISS OR IN THE ANSWER OTHERWISE DEFENSE IS DEEMED WAIVED. —
The alleged failure on the part of a plaintiff to comply with the procedural requirement
established by P.D. No. 1508 must be raised in a timely manner, that is, at the first
available opportunity, if such alleged failure is to provide legal basis for dismissal of the
complaint. Such failure must be pleaded, in other words, in a timely motion to dismiss or in
the answer. Failure to so set up that defense produces the effect of waiver of such
defense.
4. ID.; DEFAULT; RESPONDENT CONSIDERED TO HAVE WAIVED DEFENSE UNDER P.D.
1508 AND RIGHT TO APPEAR AND ANSWER; CASE AT BAR. — In the instant case, private
respondent was declared in default and that default order was never set aside.
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 Accordingly, private respondent must be held to have waived whatever right she may have
had to raise the defense of failure to comply with the compulsory conciliation procedure
under P.D. No. 1508. Indeed, that was not the only thing she waived; she also waived the
right to appear and to file an answer and there to set up that and other defenses that she
might have had. It is simply too late to demand conciliation under P.D. No. 1508 after a
judgment on the merits (albeit by default) has been rendered and become final and
executory.

DECISION

FELICIANO , J : p

On 2 October 1985, petitioner San Miguel Village School filed a complaint for breach of
contract with damages against respondent Christina Triño, before the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 3, Lanao del Norte, the complaint being docketed as Civil Case No. L-111-577. A
Certificate to File Action, signed by the Barangay Captain of Barangay Palao, Iligan City,
dated 17 September 1985, bearing the notation that the "respondent cannot be
contacted," was filed along with the complaint.
Summons was served upon the private respondent through her husband. On 22 November
1985, private respondent having failed to file an answer within the reglementary period, the
petitioner School moved to declare her in default. The trial court granted the motion,
declared private respondent in default and designated the Branch Clerk of Court to receive
the evidence of the petitioner and thereafter to report back to the court.
From the evidence received by the Branch Clerk of Court from the petitioner, the following
facts emerged:
On 9 May 1985, petitioner, a duly accredited private school located at Barangay Palao,
Iligan City, entered into a contract of services with private respondent Christina Triño.
Under that contract, Christina Triño would teach at the petitioner School during the school
year 1985-1986, which would commence in June 1985 and end in March 1986. She was
assigned to take charge of Grade VI, Intermediate Department. The contract also provided
that any party desiring to terminate the contract before its scheduled expiration, would
give the other party at least one month notice of termination in writing. Sometime in
August 1985, while the contract was in full force and effect, and during a final examination
period, private respondent suddenly stopped teaching at the petitioner School, without
giving notice of termination and thereby causing not inconsiderable difficulties for the
School. Petitioner School immediately sought the assistance of the Barangay Captain of
Palao and the commencement of conciliation proceedings. This attempt failed because
private respondent could not be contacted, she having left Iligan City and having secured a
better paying job at the Philippine Refugee Center based in Manila.
On 26 January 1986, the trial court then presided over by Judge Magadapa Rasuman
rendered a decision against private respondent, the dispositive portion of which read as
follows:
"WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing consideration, judgment is hereby rendered
in favor of the plaintiff, San Miguel Village School and against defendant,
Christina Triño, as follows:
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 1. Ordering defendant to pay all compensatory damages to the plaintiff, the
amount of P8,400.00;
2. To pay plaintiff, the amount of P5,000.00, as moral damages;

3. To pay attorney's fees of P5,000.00, and

4. To pay the costs of this suit.

SO ORDERED."

Four (4) months later, on 15 May 1986, private respondent filed a Petition for Relief from
Judgment with the trial court, alleging that the court had no jurisdiction to render its
decision dated 26 January 1986 for failure of petitioner to go through the mandatory
conciliation procedure prescribed by Sections 2 and 6 of P.D. No. 1508. Private
respondent argued that the certification of the Barangay Captain of Palao dated 17
September 1985 was inadequate compliance with P.D. No. 1508, private respondent being
a resident, not of Barangay Palao, Iligan City, but rather of Barangay Tomas Cabili, Iligan
City.
Almost a year later, on 6 April 1987, the trial court, this time presided over by respondent
Judge Amir Pukunum D. Pundogar, issued an order upholding private respondent's
contentions and setting aside the assailed decision of 26 January 1986. In his order, while
Judge Pundogar acknowledged the impropriety of the Petition for Relief from Judgment,
he nonetheless in effect granted the relief sought, holding that the Regional Trial Court in
rendering the decision dated 26 January 1986, acted without jurisdiction "over the parties
and the subject matter of the action" 1 for failure of petitioner to comply with the
requirements of P.D. No. 1508. A Motion for Reconsideration by petitioner was denied by
the respondent Judge.
In the instant Petition, it is vigorously contended by petitioner that the trial court had
jurisdiction to render its decision of 26 January 1986.
The Court notes, at the outset, that respondent Judge in fact granted the Petition for Relief
from Judgment not because he found one or more of the grounds specified in Section 2 of
Rule 38 of the Revised Rules of Court (fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence)
but rather because respondent Judge found his predecessor in the same court to have
acted without jurisdiction. prLL

It is, however, firmly settled 2 that failure of a plaintiff to comply with the requirements of
P.D. No. 1508 does not affect the jurisdiction of the court that tried the action. In, e,g.,
Millare v. Hernando, the Court stressed that "the conciliation procedure required under P.D.
No. 1508 is not a jurisdictional requirement in the sense that failure to have prior recourse
to such procedure would not deprive a court of its jurisdiction either over the subject
matter or over the person of the defendant." 3 Failure of a plaintiff to go through the
conciliation procedure established by P.D. No. 1508 merely affects the sufficiency, or the
maturity or ripeness of the plaintiff s cause of action and the complaint becomes
vulnerable to a motion to dismiss, not on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, but rather for
want of cause of action or for prematurity. 4 Respondent Judge was thus in palpable error
in holding his predecessor without jurisdiction to render the assailed decision.
Respondent Judge was equally in error when he either disregarded or misconstrued the
Certificate to File Action, dated 17 September 1985, which had been issued by the
Barangay Captain of Barangay Palao.
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 Respondent Judge simply said apropos this Certificate to File Action, that no
"confrontation" had taken place between petitioner and private respondent before the
Barangay authorities and immediately concluded that the requirements of P.D. No. 1508
had been violated. There is no question that the "confrontation" or conciliation proceedings
did not materialize here, since private respondent did not appear before the Lupon. Where,
however, the defendant in an action fails for one reason or another to respond to a notice
to appear before the Lupon, the requirement of P.D. No. 1508 must be regarded as having
been satisfied by the plaintiff. A defendant cannot be allowed to frustrate the requirements
of the statute by her own refusal or failure to appear before the Lupon and then later to
assail a judgment rendered in such action by setting up the very ground of non-compliance
with P.D. No. 1508. In simplest terms, a defendant cannot be allowed to profit by her own
default. cdrep

In the instant case, private respondent, as noted earlier, had stated in her subsequent
Petition for Relief from Judgment that she resided not in Barangay Palao but in Barangay
Cabili, in effect suggesting that she had not received notice to appear before the Lupon of
Barangay Palao. We do not believe that the statement and suggestion of private
respondent should be given much credence. In the first place, the Barangay authorities of
Barangay Palao must be presumed to have performed their official duties and to have
acted regularly in issuing the Certificate to File Action. They must be presumed to have
sent a notice to Christina Triño to appear before the Lupon; otherwise, they could not
reasonably have stated that Christina "could not be contacted." Secondly, petitioner School
had already presented evidence during the hearing before the Commissioner appointed by
Judge Rasuman that both petitioner and private respondent were residents of Palao, Iligan
City.
Finally, and in any event, the alleged failure on the part of a plaintiff to comply with the
procedural requirement established by P.D. No. 1508 must be raised in a timely manner,
that is, at the first available opportunity, if such alleged failure is to provide legal basis for
dismissal of the complaint. Such failure must be pleaded, in other words, in a timely
motion to dismiss or in the answer. Failure to so set up that defense produces the effect
of waiver of such defense. In the instant case, private respondent was declared in default
and that default order was never set aside. Accordingly, private respondent must be held
to have waived whatever right she may have had to raise the defense of failure to comply
with the compulsory conciliation procedure under P.D. No. 1508. Indeed, that was not the
only thing she waived; she also waived the right to appear and to file an answer and there
to set up that and other defenses that she might have had. It is simply too late to demand
conciliation under P.D. No. 1508 after a judgment on the merits (albeit by default) has been
rendered and become final and executory.
ACCORDINGLY, the Orders of respondent Judge Amir Pukunum D. Pundogar dated 6 April
1987 and 15 June 1987 in Civil Case No. L-111-577 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE
and the Decision dated 26 January 1986 of Judge Magadapa Rasuman is hereby
REINSTATED. Costs against private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan (C.J.), Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Footnotes

1. Rollo, p. 17.
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 2. Royales v. IAC, 127 SCRA 470 (1984); Peregrina v. Panis, 133 SCRA 72 (1984); Gonzales
v. Court of Appeals, 151 SCRA 289 (1987); Ebol v. Amin, 135 SCRA 438 (1985); Millare v.
Hernando, 151 SCRA 484 (1987); Fernandez v. Militante, G.R. No. 59801, 31 May 1988;
Spouses Bejer v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 79404 and 80045, 27 January 1989.
3. 151 SCRA at 489.

4. Fernandez v. Militante, G.R. No. 59801, 31 May 1988 at p. 3.

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