Varieties of Communitarianism
Varieties of Communitarianism
of community in the functioning of political life, in the analysis and evaluation of political
institutions, and in understanding human identity and well-being. It arose in the 1980s as
a critique of two prominent philosophical schools: contemporary liberalism, which seeks to
protect and enhancepersonal autonomy and individual rights in part through the activity of
government, and libertarianism, a form of liberalism (sometimes called “classical liberalism”)
that aims to protect individual rights—especially the rights to liberty and property—through strict
limits on governmental power.
There are strong communitarian elements in many modern and historical political and religious
belief systems—e.g., in the Hebrew Bible(Old Testament) and the Christian New
Testament (Acts 4:32: “Now the whole group of those who believed were of one heart and soul,
and no one claimed private ownership of any possessions, but everything they owned was held
in common”); in the early Islamic concept of shūrā(“consultation”); in Confucianism; in Roman
Catholic social thought (the papal encyclical Rerum Novarum[1891]); in
moderate conservatism (“To be attached to the subdivision, to love the little platoon we belong
to in society, is the first principle…of public affections”—Edmund Burke); and in social
democracy, especially Fabianism. Communitarian ideas have also played a significant role in
public life through their incorporation into the electoral platforms and policies of Western
political leaders of the late 20th and early 21st centuries, including British Prime Minister Tony
Blair, Dutch Prime Minister Jan Peter Balkenende, and U.S. Presidents Bill Clinton and Barack
Obama.
Varieties Of Communitarianism
The term communitarian was coined in 1841 by John Goodwyn Barmby, a leader of the
British Chartistmovement, who used it to refer to utopian socialists and others who
experimented with unusual communal lifestyles. It was rarely used in the generations that
followed.
It was not until the 1980s that the term gained currency through its association with the work of
a small group of mostly American political philosophers who argued for the importance of
the common good in opposition to contemporary liberals and libertarians, who emphasized the
good for individuals, particularly including personal autonomy and individual rights. The
Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor and the American political theorist Michael Sandel were
among the most prominent scholars of this brand of communitarianism. Other political
theorists and philosophers who were often cited as communitarians in this sense, or whose
work exhibited elements of such communitarian thinking, included Shlomo Avineri, Seyla
Benhabib, Avner de-Shalit, Jean Bethke Elshtain, Amitai Etzioni, William A. Galston, Alasdair
MacIntyre, Philip Selznick, and Michael Walzer.
During the same period, students of East Asian politics and society used communitarianism to
describe the social thinking within authoritariansocieties such as China, Singapore, and
Malaysia, which extolled social obligations and the importance of the common good and
accorded much less weight to autonomy and rights. Indeed, these societies viewed individuals
as more or less interchangeable cells who find meaning in their contribution to the social whole
rather than as free agents. Scholars of this kind of communitarianism included the American
political theorist Russell A. Fox and the Singaporean diplomat Bilahari Kausikan.
In 1990 Etzioni and Galston founded a third school, known as “responsive” communitarianism.
Its members formulated a platform based on their shared political principles, and the ideas in it
were eventually elaborated in academic and popular books and periodicals, gaining thereby a
measure of political currency, mainly in the West. The main thesis of responsive
communitarianism is that people face two major sources of normativity, that of the common
good and that of autonomy and rights, neither of which in principle should take precedence over
the other.
The close relation between the individual and the community was discussed on a theoretical
level by Sandel and Taylor, among other academic communitarians, in their criticisms of
philosophical liberalism, including especially the work of the American liberal theorist John
Rawlsand that of the German Enlightenment philosopher Immanuel Kant. They argued that
contemporary liberalism and libertarianism presuppose an incoherent notion of the individual as
existing outside and apart from society rather than embedded within it. To the contrary, they
argued, there are no generic individuals but rather only Germans or Russians, Berliners or
Muscovites, or members of some other particularistic community. Because individual identity is
partly constituted (or “constructed”) by culture and social relations, there is no coherent way of
formulating individual rights or interests in abstraction from social contexts. In particular,
according to these communitarians, there is no point in attempting to found a theory
of justice on principles that individuals would choose in a hypothetical state of ignorance of
their social, economic, and historical circumstances (from behind a Rawlsian “veil of
ignorance”), because such individuals cannot exist, even in principle.
Liberal scholars argued that this line of criticism is overstated or misconceived. Despite its
emphasis on autonomy and rights, they contended, contemporary liberalism is not incompatible
with the notion of a socially embedded self. Indeed, Rawls himself, in his foundational work A
Theory of Justice (1971), recognized the importance of what he called “social unions” and
asserted that “only in a social union is the individual complete.” Thus, according to liberals, the
communitarian critique does not rebut the core of liberal theory but merely serves as a
corrective to “stronger” liberal doctrines such as libertarianism, which does embrace an
atomized notion of individual identity (see below A synthesis: Rights and responsibilities).
In the same vein, responsive communitarians also warned against excessively expansive
definitions of rights and championed modern communities in which people find both a rich web
of social relations and considerable degrees of freedom. In the early 21st century, responsive
communitarians believed that the Scandinavian countries had achieved the best balance,
though even there some individual rights were being curtailed for security reasons and in
response to anti-immigrant sentiment.
Policy Implications
Responsive communitarianism developed criteria for the formulation of policies that would
enable societies to cope with the potential conflicts between the common good and individual
rights, including in areas such as public health versus individual privacy and national security
versus individual liberty. These criteria, which must be applied jointly, included the following:
1. No change is justified in governing public policies and norms unless society encounters
serious challenges, because these kinds of changes exact considerable societal costs. (The
September 11 attacks constituted such a challenge.)
2. Limitations on rights can be considered only if there are significant gains to the common
good—what the U.S. courts refer to as a “compelling interest”—and if the intrusion is as limited
as possible.
3. Adverse side effects that result from policy changes must be treated, above all, by
introducing stronger mechanisms of accountability and oversight.
An example of the application of these criteria can be seen in the debate in the United States
concerning whether to improve public health by testing newborn babies for HIV. According to
communitarians, such tests would be justified if: (1) they saved lives (an infant infected with
HIV has a strong chance of not developing AIDS if it is not breastfed and is treated with the
drug AZT), (2) the intrusion were limited to testing blood that would be collected anyway, and (3)
the adverse side effects could be limited by regulations that ban the disclosure of test results to
nonmedical personnel.
Closely related to the question of the scope of morality is the question of the scope of
community itself. Historically, communities have been local. However, as the reach of economic
and technological forces extended, more-expansive communities became necessary in order to
provide effective normative and political guidance to and control of these forces—hence the rise
of national communities in Europe in the 17th century. Since the late 20th century there has
been a growing recognition that the scope of even these communities is too limited, as many
challenges that people now face, such as the threat of nuclear war and the reality of global
environmental degradation, cannot be handled on a national basis. This has led to the quest for
more-encompassing communities. The most advanced experiment in building a supranational
community is the European Union (EU). However, so far the EU has not developed the kind of
social integration and shared values that a strong community requires.
A similar issue arises with regard to the global community, currently more an ideal than a reality.
Could such a community be constructed top-down, say, through some kind of enhanced United
Nations (UN)? Or will it arise from the bottom up, through societal processes and institutions
such as international nongovernmental organizations(NGOs), the transnational sharing of
norms (e.g., for protecting the environment), a global second language (about one quarter of the
world’s population has at least a functional command of English), and other informal social
networks? The question remains whether, ultimately, world governance can thrive without a
worldwide community.