G.R. No.

L-8936             October 2, 1915 for an adjustment and correction of the error

committed by including said wall in the registered title
CONSUELO LEGARDA, with her husband MAURO of each of said parties. The lower court however,
PRIETO, plaintiffs-appellants,  without notice to the defendant, denied said petition
vs. upon the theory that, during the pendency of the
N.M. SALEEBY, defendant-appellee. petition for the registration of the defendant's land,
they failed to make any objection to the registration of
Singson, Ledesma and Lim for appellants. said lot, including the wall, in the name of the
D.R. Williams for appellee. defendant.

Sixth. That the land occupied by t he wall is registered

in the name of each of the owners of the adjoining
lots. The wall is not a joint wall.
JOHNSON, J.:
Under these facts, who is the owner of the wall and
From the record the following facts appear: the land occupied by it?

First. That the plaintiffs and the defendant occupy, as The decision of the lower court is based upon the
owners, adjoining lots in the district of Ermita in the theory that the action for the registration of the lot of
city of Manila. the defendant was a judicial proceeding and that the
judgment or decree was binding upon all parties who
did not appear and oppose it. In other words, by
Second. That there exists and has existed a number
reason of the fact that the plaintiffs had not opposed
of years a stone wall between the said lots. Said wall
the registration of that part of the lot on which the wall
is located on the lot of the plaintiffs.
was situate they had lost it, even though it had been
theretofore registered in their name. Granting that
Third. That the plaintiffs, on the 2d day of March, theory to be correct one, and granting even that the
1906, presented a petition in the Court of Land wall and the land occupied by it, in fact, belonged to
Registration for the registration of their lot. After a the defendant and his predecessors, then the same
consideration of said petition the court, on the 25th theory should be applied to the defendant himself.
day of October, 1906, decreed that the title of the Applying that theory to him, he had already lost
plaintiffs should be registered and issued to them the whatever right he had therein, by permitting the
original certificate provided for under the torrens plaintiffs to have the same registered in their name,
system. Said registration and certificate included the more than six years before. Having thus lost hid right,
wall. may he be permitted to regain it by simply including it
in a petition for registration? The plaintiffs having
Fourth. Later the predecessor of the defendant secured the registration of their lot, including the wall,
presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration were they obliged to constantly be on the alert and to
for the registration of the lot now occupied by him. On watch all the proceedings in the land court to see that
the 25th day of March, 1912, the court decreed the some one else was not having all, or a portion of the
registration of said title and issued the original same, registered? If that question is to be answered
certificate provided for under the torrens system. The in the affirmative, then the whole scheme and
description of the lot given in the petition of the purpose of the torrens system of land registration
defendant also included said wall. must fail. The real purpose of that system is to quiet
title to land; to put a stop forever to any question of
Fifth. Several months later (the 13th day of the legality of the title, except claims which were
December, 1912) the plaintiffs discovered that the noted at the time of registration, in the certificate, or
wall which had been included in the certificate granted which may arise subsequent thereto. That being the
to them had also been included in the certificate purpose of the law, it would seem that once a title is
granted to the defendant .They immediately registered the owner may rest secure, without the
presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration
necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or which indicates who should be the owner of land
sitting in the "mirador de su casa," to avoid the which has been registered in the name of two
possibility of losing his land. Of course, it can not be different persons.
denied that the proceeding for the registration of land
under the torrens system is judicial The rule, we think, is well settled that the decree
(Escueta vs.  .Director of Lands, 16 Phil. Rep., 482). It ordering the registration of a particular parcel of land
is clothed with all the forms of an action and the result is a bar to future litigation over the same between the
is final and binding upon all the world. It is an same parties .In view of the fact that all the world are
action in rem. (Escueta vs. Director of Lands (supra); parties, it must follow that future litigation over the title
Grey Alba vs. De la Cruz, 17 Phil. rep., 49 is forever barred; there can be no persons who are
Roxas vs. Enriquez, 29 Phil. Rep., 31; not parties to the action. This, we think, is the rule,
Tyler vs. Judges, 175 Mass., 51 American Land except as to rights which are noted in the certificate or
Co. vs. Zeiss, 219 U.S., 47.) which arise subsequently, and with certain other
exceptions which need not be dismissed at present. A
While the proceeding is judicial, it involves more in its title once registered can not be defeated, even by an
consequences than does an ordinary action. All the adverse, open, and notorious possession. Registered
world are parties, including the government. After the title under the torrens system can not be defeated by
registration is complete and final and there exists no prescription (section 46, Act No. 496). The title, once
fraud, there are no innocent third parties who may registered, is notice to the world. All persons must
claim an interest. The rights of all the world are take notice. No one can plead ignorance of the
foreclosed by the decree of registration. The registration.
government itself assumes the burden of giving notice
to all parties. To permit persons who are parties in the The question, who is the owner of land registered in
registration proceeding (and they are all the world) to the name of two different persons, has been
again litigate the same questions, and to again cast presented to the courts in other jurisdictions. In some
doubt upon the validity of the registered title, would jurisdictions, where the "torrens" system has been
destroy the very purpose and intent of the law. The adopted, the difficulty has been settled by express
registration, under the torrens system, does not give statutory provision. In others it has been settled by the
the owner any better title than he had. If he does not courts. Hogg, in his excellent discussion of the
already have a perfect title, he can not have it "Australian Torrens System," at page 823, says: "The
registered. Fee simple titles only may be registered. general rule is that in the case of two certificates of
The certificate of registration accumulates in open title, purporting to include the same land, the earlier in
document a precise and correct statement of the date prevails, whether the land comprised in the latter
exact status of the fee held by its owner. The certificate be wholly, or only in part, comprised in the
certificate, in the absence of fraud, is the evidence of earlier certificate. (Oelkers vs. Merry, 2 Q.S.C.R., 193;
title and shows exactly the real interest of its owner. Miller vs. Davy, 7 N.Z.R., 155; Lloyd vs. Myfield, 7
The title  once registered, with very few exceptions, A.L.T. (V.) 48; Stevens vs. Williams, 12 V.L. R., 152;
should not thereafter be impugned, altered, changed, Register of Titles, vs. Esperance Land Co., 1 W.A.R.,
modified, enlarged, or diminished, except in some 118.)" Hogg adds however that, "if it can be very
direct proceeding permitted by law. Otherwise all clearly ascertained by the ordinary rules of
security in registered titles would be lost. A registered construction relating to written documents, that the
title can not be altered, modified, enlarged, or inclusion of the land in the certificate of title of prior
diminished in a collateral  proceeding and not even by date is a mistake, the mistake may be rectified by
a direct proceeding, after the lapse of the period holding the latter of the two certificates of title to be
prescribed by law. conclusive." (See Hogg on the "Australian torrens
System," supra, and cases cited. See also the
For the difficulty involved in the present case the Act excellent work of Niblack in his "Analysis of the
(No. 496) providing for the registration of titles under Torrens System," page 99.) Niblack, in discussing the
the torrens system affords us no remedy. There is no general question, said: "Where two certificates purport
provision in said Act giving the parties relief under to include the same land the earlier in date prevails. ...
conditions like the present. There is nothing in the Act In successive registrations, where more than one
certificate is issued in respect of a particular estate or when one piece of real property had been sold to two
interest in land, the person claiming under the prior different persons it shall belong to the person
certificates is entitled to the estate or interest; and that acquiring it, who first inscribes it in the registry. This
person is deemed to hold under the prior certificate rule, of course, presupposes that each of the vendees
who is the holder of, or whose claim is derived directly or purchasers has acquired title to the land. The real
or indirectly from the person who was the holder of ownership in such a case depends upon priority of
the earliest certificate issued in respect thereof. While registration. While we do not now decide that the
the acts in this country do not expressly cover the general provisions of the Civil Code are applicable to
case of the issue of two certificates for the same land, the Land Registration Act, even though we see no
they provide that a registered owner shall hold the objection thereto, yet we think, in the absence of other
title, and the effect of this undoubtedly is that where express provisions, they should have a persuasive
two certificates purport to include the same registered influence in adopting a rule for governing the effect of
land, the holder of the earlier one continues to hold a double registration under said Act. Adopting the rule
the title" (p. 237). which we believe to be more in consonance with the
purposes and the real intent of the torrens system, we
Section 38 of Act No. 496, provides that; "It (the are of the opinion and so decree that in case land has
decree of registration) shall be conclusive upon and been registered under the Land Registration Act in
against all persons, including the Insular Government the name of two different persons, the earlier in date
and all the branches thereof, whether mentioned by shall prevail.
name in the application, notice, or citation, or included
in the general description "To all whom it may In reaching the above conclusion, we have not
concern." Such decree shall not be opened by reason overlooked the forceful argument of the appellee. He
of the absence, infancy, or other disability of any says, among other things; "When Prieto et al. were
person affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any served with notice of the application of Teus (the
court for reversing judgments or decrees; subject, predecessor of the defendant) they became
however, to the right of any person deprived of land or defendants in a proceeding wherein he, Teus, was
of any estate or interest therein by decree of seeking to foreclose their right, and that of orders, to
registration obtained by fraud  to file in the Court of the parcel of land described in his application.
Land Registration a petition for review within one Through their failure to appear and contest his right
year  after entry of the decree (of registration), thereto, and the subsequent entry of a default
provided no innocent purchaser for value has judgment against them, they became irrevocably
acquired an interest. bound by the decree adjudicating such land to Teus.
They had their day in court and can not set up their
It will be noted, from said section, that the "decree of own omission as ground for impugning the validity of
registration" shall not be opened, for any reason, in a judgment duly entered by a court of competent
any court, except for fraud, and not even for fraud, jurisdiction. To decide otherwise would be to hold that
after the lapse of one year. If then the decree of lands with torrens titles are above the law and beyond
registration can not be opened for any reason, except the jurisdiction of the courts".
for fraud, in a direct proceeding for that purpose, may
such decree be opened or set aside in a collateral As was said above, the primary and fundamental
proceeding by including a portion of the land in a purpose of the torrens system is to quiet title. If the
subsequent certificate or decree of registration? We holder of a certificate cannot rest secure in this
do not believe the law contemplated that a person registered title then the purpose of the law is
could be deprived of his registered title in that way. defeated. If those dealing with registered land cannot
rely upon the certificate, then nothing has been
We have in this jurisdiction a general statutory gained by the registration and the expense incurred
provision which governs the right of the ownership of thereby has been in vain. If the holder may lose a
land when the same is registered in the ordinary strip of his registered land by the method adopted in
registry in the name of two persons. Article 1473 of the present case, he may lose it all. Suppose within
the Civil Code provides, among other things, that the six years which elapsed after the plaintiff had
secured their title, they had mortgaged or sold their
right, what would be the position or right of the against defenses which the vendor would not. Said
mortgagee or vendee? That mistakes are bound to sections speak of available rights in favor of third
occur cannot be denied, and sometimes the damage parties which are cut off by virtue of the sale of the
done thereby is irreparable. It is the duty of the courts land to an "innocent purchaser." That is to say,
to adjust the rights of the parties under such persons who had had a right or interest in land
circumstances so as to minimize such damages, wrongfully included in an original certificate would be
taking into consideration al of the conditions and the unable to enforce such rights against an "innocent
diligence of the respective parties to avoid them. In purchaser," by virtue of the provisions of said
the present case, the appellee was the first negligent sections. In the present case Teus had his land,
(granting that he was the real owner, and if he was including the wall, registered in his name. He
not the real owner he can not complain) in not subsequently sold the same to the appellee. Is the
opposing the registration in the name of the appellee an "innocent purchaser," as that phrase is
appellants. He was a party-defendant in an action for used in said sections? May those who have been
the registration of the lot in question, in the name of deprived of their land by reason of a mistake in the
the appellants, in 1906. "Through his failure to appear original certificate in favor of Teus be deprived of their
and to oppose such registration, and the subsequent right to the same, by virtue of the sale by him to the
entry of a default judgment against him, he became appellee? Suppose the appellants had sold their lot,
irrevocably bound by the decree adjudicating such including the wall, to an "innocent purchaser," would
land to the appellants. He had his day in court and such purchaser be included in the phrase "innocent
should not be permitted to set up his own omissions purchaser," as the same is used in said sections?
as the ground for impugning the validity of a judgment Under these examples there would be two innocent
duly entered by a court of competent jurisdiction." purchasers of the same land, is said sections are to
Granting that he was the owner of the land upon be applied .Which of the two innocent purchasers, if
which the wall is located, his failure to oppose the they are both to be regarded as innocent purchasers,
registration of the same in the name of the appellants, should be protected under the provisions of said
in the absence of fraud, forever closes his mouth sections? These questions indicate the difficulty with
against impugning the validity of that judgment. There which we are met in giving meaning and effect to the
is no more reason why the doctrine invoked by the phrase "innocent purchaser," in said sections.
appellee should be applied to the appellants than to
him. May the purchaser of land which has been included in
a "second original certificate" ever be regarded as an
We have decided, in case of double registration under "innocent purchaser," as against the rights or interest
the Land Registration Act, that the owner of the of the owner of the first original certificate, his heirs,
earliest certificate is the owner of the land. That is the assigns, or vendee? The first original certificate is
rule between original parties. May this rule be applied recorded in the public registry. It is never issued until
to successive vendees of the owners of such it is recorded. The record notice to all the world. All
certificates? Suppose that one or the other of the persons are charged with the knowledge of what it
parties, before the error is discovered, transfers his contains. All persons dealing with the land so
original certificate to an "innocent purchaser." The recorded, or any portion of it, must be charged with
general rule is that the vendee of land has no greater notice of whatever it contains. The purchaser is
right, title, or interest than his vendor; that he acquires charged with notice of every fact shown by the record
the right which his vendor had, only. Under that rule and is presumed to know every fact which the record
the vendee of the earlier certificate would be the discloses .This rule is so well established that it is
owner as against the vendee of the owner of the later scarcely necessary to cite authorities in its support
certificate. (Northwestern National Bank vs. Freeman, 171 U.S.,
620, 629; Delvin on Real Estate, sections 710, 710
We find statutory provisions which, upon first reading, [a]).
seem to cast some doubt upon the rule that the
vendee acquires the interest of the vendor only. When a conveyance has been properly recorded such
Sections 38, 55, and 112 of Act No. 496 indicate that record is constructive notice of its contents and all
the vendee may acquire rights and be protected interests, legal and equitable, included therein.
(Grandin vs.  Anderson, 15 Ohio State, 286, 289; obligatory, notwithstanding. It would be just as logical
Orvis vs. Newell, 17 Conn., 97; to allow the defense of ignorance of the existence and
Buchanan vs. Intentional Bank, 78 Ill., 500; contents of a public record.
Youngs vs. Wilson, 27 N.Y., 351; McCabe vs. Grey,
20 Cal., 509; Montefiore vs. Browne, 7 House of In view, therefore, of the foregoing rules of law, may
Lords Cases, 341.) the purchaser of land from the owner of the second
original certificate be an "innocent purchaser," when a
Under the rule of notice, it is presumed that the part or all of such land had theretofore been
purchaser has examined every instrument of record registered in the name of another, not the vendor?
affecting the title. Such presumption is irrebutable. He We are of the opinion that said sections 38, 55, and
is charged with notice of every fact shown by the 112 should not be applied to such purchasers. We do
record and is presumed to know every fact which an not believe that the phrase "innocent purchaser
examination of the record would have disclosed. This should be applied to such a purchaser. He cannot be
presumption cannot be overcome by proof of regarded as an "innocent purchaser" because of the
innocence or good faith. Otherwise the very purpose facts contained in the record of the first original
and object of the law requiring a record would be certificate. The rule should not be applied to the
destroyed. Such presumption cannot be defeated by purchaser of a parcel of land the vendor of which is
proof of want of knowledge of what the record not the owner of the original certificate, or his
contains any more than one may be permitted to successors. He, in nonsense, can be an "innocent
show that he was ignorant of the provisions of the purchaser" of the portion of the land included in
law. The rule that all persons must take notice of the another earlier original certificate. The rule of notice of
facts which the public record contains is a rule of law. what the record contains precludes the idea of
The rule must be absolute. Any variation would lead innocence. By reason of the prior registry there
to endless confusion and useless litigation. cannot be an innocent purchaser of land included in a
prior original certificate and in a name other than that
While there is no statutory provision in force here of the vendor, or his successors. In order to minimize
requiring that original deeds of conveyance of real the difficulties we think this is the safe rule to
property be recorded, yet there is a rule requiring establish. We believe the phrase "innocent
mortgages to be recorded. (Arts. 1875 and 606 of the purchaser," used in said sections, should be limited
Civil Code.) The record of a mortgage is only to cases where unregistered land has been
indispensable to its validity. (Art .1875.) In the face of wrongfully included in a certificate under the torrens
that statute would the courts allow a mortgage to be system. When land is once brought under the torrens
valid which had not been recorded, upon the plea of system, the record of the original certificate and all
ignorance of the statutory provision, when third subsequent transfers thereof is notice to all the world.
parties were interested? May a purchaser of land, That being the rule, could Teus even regarded as the
subsequent to the recorded mortgage, plead holder in good fifth of that part of the land included in
ignorance of its existence, and by reason of such his certificate of the appellants? We think not.
ignorance have the land released from such lien? Suppose, for example, that Teus had never had his
Could a purchaser of land, after the recorded lot registered under the torrens system. Suppose he
mortgage, be relieved from the mortgage lien by the had sold his lot to the appellee and had included in
plea that he was a bona fide purchaser? May there be his deed of transfer the very strip of land now in
a bona fide purchaser of said land, bona fide in the question. Could his vendee be regarded as an
sense that he had no knowledge of the existence of "innocent purchaser" of said strip? Would his vendee
the mortgage? We believe the rule that all persons be an "innocent purchaser" of said strip? Certainly
must take notice of what the public record contains in not. The record of the original certificate of the
just as obligatory upon all persons as the rule that all appellants precludes the possibility. Has the appellee
men must know the law; that no one can plead gained any right by reason of the registration of the
ignorance of the law. The fact that all men know the strip of land in the name of his vendor? Applying the
law is contrary to the presumption. The conduct of rule of notice resulting from the record of the title of
men, at times, shows clearly that they do not know the appellants, the question must be answered in the
the law. The rule, however, is mandatory and negative. We are of the opinion that these rules are
more in harmony with the purpose of Act No. 496 than predecessor of the appellee, as well as in all other
the rule contended for by the appellee. We believe duplicate certificates issued.
that the purchaser from the owner of the later
certificate, and his successors, should be required to Without any findings as to costs, it is so ordered.
resort to his vendor for damages, in case of a mistake
like the present, rather than to molest the holder of
the first certificate who has been guilty of no
negligence. The holder of the first original certificate
and his successors should be permitted to rest secure
in their title, against one who had acquired rights in
conflict therewith and who had full and complete
knowledge of their rights. The purchaser of land
included in the second original certificate, by reason
of the facts contained in the public record and the
knowledge with which he is charged and by reason of
his negligence, should suffer the loss, if any, resulting
from such purchase, rather than he who has obtained
the first certificate and who was innocent of any act of
negligence.

The foregoing decision does not solve, nor pretend to

solve, all the difficulties resulting from double
registration under the torrens system and the
subsequent transfer of the land. Neither do we now
attempt to decide the effect of the former registration
in the ordinary registry upon the registration under the
torrens system. We are inclined to the view, without
deciding it, that the record under the torrens system,
supersede all other registries. If that view is correct
then it will be sufficient, in dealing with land registered
and recorded alone. Once land is registered and
recorded under the torrens system, that record alone
can be examined for the purpose of ascertaining the
real status of the title to the land.

It would be seen to a just and equitable rule, when

two persons have acquired equal rights in the same
thing, to hold that the one who acquired it first and
who has complied with all the requirements of the law
should be protected.

In view of our conclusions, above stated, the

judgment of the lower court should be and is hereby
revoked. The record is hereby returned to the court
now having and exercising the jurisdiction heretofore
exercised by the land court, with direction to make
such orders and decrees in the premises as may
correct the error heretofore made in including the land
in the second original certificate issued in favor of the
 administrative reconstitution of a nonexistent original
title covering the same parcel of land; that by reason
G.R. No. 83383 May 6, 1991 of the said reconstitution and subsequent issuance of
TCT No. T-11520 RT 1660, there now exists a cloud
on the title of petitioner.
SOLID STATE MULTI-PRODUCTS CORPORATION,
petitioner,
As gathered by the respondent appellate court and
vs. trial court, the evidence for the petitioner consists of
THE COURT OF APPEALS (Former Sixth Division) the following:
and THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF ANTENOR S.
VIRATA and the DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents. Pursuant to the provisions of Act No. 32, as amended,
Julian Peñaranda submitted with the Bureau of
Lands, thru its District Land Office at Rosario, Cavite
Antonio M. Chavez for petitioner. an application dated November 22, 1968, in a verified
Indorsement dated November 25, 1968, to purchase
Rodolfo M. Dela Rosa for respondent Intestate Estate a friar land which was subscribed and sworn to before
of Antenor S. Virata. Manuel Cupino, Acting District Land Officer (Exh.
"D"). The application covers Lot No. 7449 of the Imus
Friar Lands Estate, situated at Barrio Molino, Bacoor,
Cavite, containing an area of 4 hectares, 81 ares and
82 centares. Said application was accompanied by a
"SALAYSAY" (Exhibit "A") signed and sworn to by
MEDIALDEA, J.:
one Mabini Legaspi before said District Land Officer
Cupino, purporting to transfer to, and to waive in favor
of, Julian Peñaranda, all the rights of executor to Lot
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the No. 7449.
decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the
decision of the trial court dismissing the complaint
filed by petitioner for quieting of title and declaring
Following the routine in cases of this nature, District
Antenor Virata as the true and lawful owner of the
Land Officer Cupino referred to Land Investigator
disputed property.
Alberto Buhain for investigation and in a verified
Indorsement dated November 25, 1968, said
investigator made a Report (Exh. "B") on the result of
The antecedent facts are as follows: his investigation, to District Land Officer Cupino,
District Land Office No. III-8 Bureau of Lands,
Rosario, Cavite, certifying that applicant Julian
Peñaranda is the actual occupant of Lot No. 7449,
On September 28, 1982, petitioner, a domestic has introduced improvements consisting of upland
corporation, filed an action for quieting of title against rice and other seasonal crops; that Peñaranda's
the respondent estate of Virata alleging that it is the occupation of the land is derived through a voluntary
registered owner of a parcel of land located at Imus, assignment of right of the former occupant, Mabini
Cavite, with an area of 48,182 sq. meters, covered by Legaspi, and that the same is free from claims and
Certificate of Title No. T-80889 of the Register of conflicts and that the said applicant has established
Deeds of Cavite, which was issued on February 24, his rights over the subject land, in view of which, said
1976; that Virata, during his lifetime thru the use of investigator recommended that said lot be awarded to
fraud, caused the issuance of Certificate of Title No. applicant Julian Peñaranda according to law.
T-11520 RT 1660 on September 1, 1959 thru an
 technical description of the lot in question (See Exh.
"S-l").
Thereafter, the Report having been submitted to
Cupino, the latter directed investigator Buhain to
prepare an Information Sheet (Exh. "G" up to "G-3")
and Cupino made the Appraisal Report (Exh. "E-2"). xxx xxx xxx
The above requirements having been accomplished,
District Land Officer Cupino forwarded Peñaranda's
application to the Director of Lands, thru the Chief, On the basis of said Deed of Conveyance No. 10431,
Land Management Division, recommending the Register of Deeds of Cavite issued on November
disposition of Lot No. 7449 be made in accordance 14, 1969 in favor of Julian Peñaranda TCT No. T-
with the findings of his office, to Julian Peñaranda, 39631 (Exh. "Z-6") which on its face shows it to have
pursuant to the provisions of C.A. of No. 32, as come from a direct transfer from OCT no. 1002, and
amended. on February 17, 1976, the plaintiff, by way of a Deed
of Absolute Sale (Exh. "Z") bought said Lot No. 7449
as a consequence of which, TCT No. T-39631 was
By second Indorsement dated December 16, 1968, cancelled and new TCT No. T-80889 was issued on
Higinio P. Sunico, Chief, Land Management Division, February 24, 1976 to the plaintiff, Solid State Multi
acting for and in behalf of the Director of Lands, Products Corporation.
forwarded to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, the application of Julian Peñaranda,
recommending that Lot No. 7449 be sold to said Plaintiff Solid State Multi-Products Corporation
applicant without public auction for a sum of enrolled Lot No. 7449 with the issuance of Tax
P1,198.00 (Exh. "I") and by a 3rd Indorsement dated Declaration No. 20893 which was superseded by Tax
December 16, 1969, the application of Julian Declaration No. 10973 and continued to religiously
Peñaranda was returned by the Secretary of pay the realty taxes as covered by receipts of tax
Agriculture and Natural Resources, to the Director of payments (Exh. for 1977 and Exh. "7-19" for 1984)
Lands, Manila, approving that sale without auction, to and the subject property is in its actual possession
Julian Peñaranda, of lot No. 7449. Pursuant to this since its acquisition from Peñaranda up to the
approval, the Director of Lands authorized the District present. (pp. 109-112, Rollo (Emphasis Ours)
Land Officer, Rosario, Cavite, to sell without auction
to Julian Peñaranda, and directing that the sales
contract should be executed soonest (Exh- "I"). The
Director of Lands and Julian Peñaranda executed, On the other hand, respondent Virata denied the
therefore, Sales Contract No. V-447 (Exh. "K"), on allegations in the complaint and presented evidence
February 28, 1969, for a consideration of P1,198.00, to prove his claim over the land. The appellate court
to be paid in ten (10) monthly installments, the first and trial court made the following findings:
installment of P290.00 having been paid upon
execution of the sales contract and the payment of
the P1,198.00 was fully paid on August 6, 1969 (Exh.
. . . on March 20, 1943, the Director of Lands, Mr.
"O").
Jose F. Dans, gave authority to sell at public auction
Lot No. 7449 of the Imus Estate, containing an area of
4.8182 hectares at the price of not less than its
The contract price of the land having been paid by appraised value of P290.00 (Exh. X-33). Accordingly
Peñaranda, Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural on April 20, 1943, the Bureau of Friar Lands Agent
Resources Isoceles Pascual, on August 13, 1969, Severo Rivera issued a Notice fixing the public
issued the final deed of conveyance of lot No. 7449 auction of Lot No. 7449, among others, on May 5,
(Exh. "8") in favor of Julian Peñaranda and the said 1943 at 10:00 a.m. (Exh. 1). On said date, Mabini
deed of conveyance contains the physical and Legaspi (appellee Virata's predecessor-in-interest)
submitted a winning bid of P290.00 and paid P29.00
(10% of the purchase price) and even issued Bureau received a subpoena from the National Bureau of
of Lands Official Receipt No. 77735 dated May 5, Investigation (NBI) in connection with its investigation
1943 (Exh. 7). The subsequent installments were paid of the conflicting land titles on Lot No. 7449. Virata
on January 14, 1944, April 24, 1944, August 17, 1944, presented Mabini Legaspi as his witness. NBI Agent
and September 20, 1944 in the amounts of P29.00, Manuel C. Dionisio took the sworn testimony of
P29.00, 87.00 and P116.00, respectively. The Mabini Legaspi on August 27, 1978 (Exh. 10) and
payments were evidenced by Official Receipts Nos. submitted a written report (Exhs. 9 to 9-H) of his
78396, 783392, 784704 and 78466 (Exhs. 7-A, 7-B, investigation on October 27, 1978. Mabini Legaspi in
7-C and V) her sworn testimony (Exh. 10) declared that she
acquired Lot 7449 during the Japanese occupation
and in support of her acquisition, she presented to
NBI agent Dionisio the carbon or duplicate original of
On December 12, 1944, the Bureau of Lands, through the notice of public auction and the letters dated
Mr. Vicente Tordesillas, sent a letter to the Register of December 12, 1944 of Vicente Tordesillas of the
Deeds at Imus, Cavite, requesting the issuance of the Bureau of Lands to the Register of Deeds requesting
corresponding certificates of title to eight persons, the issuance of a certificate of title in favor of Mabini
among whom was Mabini Legaspi, specifying with Legaspi, which documents were substituted on the
respect to him Lot No. 7449 with an area of 4.8182 same occasion with xerox copies (Exh. 1 and 2) also
located at Bacoor, Cavite Exh. 2). Accordingly, the marked as Exhibits 10-C and 10-D, respectively, after
Register of Deeds of Cavite issued TCT No. A-2188 a comparison with the duplicate originals. Legaspi
to Mabini Legaspi who held ownership of the property also presented the originals of the receipts of
up to December 6, 1957 when he executed a Deed of payment she made to the Bureau of Lands, which
Sale transferring it to Antenor S. Virata (Exh. 6). The were substituted with xerox copies (Exhs. 7, 7-A, 7-B
deed was registered with the Registry of Deeds on and 7-C, also marked as Exhibit 10-E, 10-F 10-G and
December 10, 1957 . . . . On the same day, 10-H) after comparison with the original. She (Mabini)
December 10, 1957, the Register of Deeds issued also testified on the sale of the lot in favor of Antenor
TCT No. 11520 (Exh. 12) to Antenor Virata . . . Virata on December 6, 1957, presenting as proof
thereof, the duplicate or carbon original of the
Absolute Deed of Sale of Agricultural Land, which
However, on June 7, 1959, the Provincial Capitol was likewise, substituted with xerox copies (Exhs. 6 to
building of Cavite which housed the Registry of Deeds 6-F, inclusive, also marked Exh. 11).
was burned, destroying land records and titles in d
registry among which were the records relating to Lot
No. 7449. Mabini Legaspi testified that the originals of Exhibits 1
and 2 got lost. She said she placed the documents on
the table in her house after returning from the NBI
On September 1, 1959, the Registry of Deeds investigation, thinking "all the while that those
administratively reconstituted the original of TCT No. documents will be useless because I had my property
T-11520 based on owner's duplicate certificate (Exh. sold." (Tsn., p. 17, December 19, 1984). She denied
12) and renumbered the same as TCT No. (T-11520) having sold the land to Julian Peñaranda, nor having
RT-1660. waived her right over the land in his favor (tsn., p. 12,
March 18, 1985). (pp. 113-116, Rollo).

xxx xxx xxx

On June 15, 1985, the trial court rendered its
decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

The sentence of TCT No. 80889 issued in the name

of appellant on February 24, 1976 came to the
knowledge of Antenor Virata in August 1978 when he
WHEREFORE, by preponderance of evidence, THROUGH SALE, WHICH LAW AND SPECIAL
judgment is hereby rendered for defendant Virata and REQUIREMENTS SHOULD SERVE AS THE
against the plaintiff, to wit: MEASURE AGAINST WHICH THE EVIDENCE OF
THE PARTIES TO THIS CASE SHOULD BE
WEIGHED, SUCH GROSS ERROR LEADING THE
APPELLATE COURT TO—
a. Dismissing the complaint which states no
cause of action;

(A) ERRONEOUSLY INFER THE EXISTENCE

AND/OR DUE ISSUANCE OF THE SUPPOSED TCT
b. Recognizing that defendant Virata is the true NO. A-2188 (IN THE NAME OF PRIVATE
and lawful owner of the land covered by Transfer RESPONDENTS PREDECESSOR-IN INTEREST),
Certificate of Title No. (T-11520) RT 1660 of the FROM DOCUMENTS THAT CAME AFTER WERE
Register of Deeds of the Province of Cavite and BASED ON SUCH TCT NO. A-2188, CLEARLY
holding that the same is valid; BEGGING THE ISSUE WHICH IS PRECISELY
WHETHER OR NOT THE TRANSFER
CERTIFICATE OF TITLE WAS IN FACT ISSUED IN
c. Declaring that Transfer Certificate of Title COMPLIANCE WITH THE FRIAR LANDS ACT AND
No. T-80889 in the name of plaintiff, the Solid State CA-32 TO COVER THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION;
Multi Products Corporation is null and void and of no
force and effect and is, therefore, ordered cancelled;
(B) ERRONEOUSLY BASE ITS DECISION IN
FAVOR OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT ON TCTs
d. Sentencing the plaintiff to pay the costs of ISSUED BY THE REGISTER OF DEEDS INSPITE
the proceeding. OF THE FACT THAT IT IS THE BUREAU OF LANDS
UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE SECRETARY OF
AGRICULTURE AND COMMERCE (NATURAL
RESOURCES) WHICH DISPOSES FRIAR LANDS
SO ORDERED. (p. 70, Rollo). AND NOT THE REGISTER OF DEEDS WHOSE
RECORDS CAN BE NO BETTER THAN THE RIGHT
IT HAS REGISTERED;
Not satisfied with the decision of the trial court, the
petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. On July
13, 1987, the respondent appellate court rendered its (C) ERRONEOUSLY DISREGARD THE
decision affirming the decision of the trial court. PATENT INADMISSIBILITY OF THE
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE OFFERED BY THE
PRIVATE RESPONDENT THE ORIGINALS OF
Hence, this petition was filed with the petitioner WHICH WERE NEVER PRESENTED BEFORE THE
assigning the following errors: TRIAL COURT;

THE RESPONDENT COURT GROSSLY ERRED (D) ERRONEOUSLY IGNORE THE LACK OF
WHEN IT IGNORED THE BASIC CONSIDERATION PROBATIVE VALUE OF SUCH DOCUMENTARY
THAT THE CONTESTED PROPERTY CAME FROM EVIDENCE SUCH LACK OF PROBATIVE VALUE
THE FRIAR LANDS ESTATE THE DISPOSITION OF BEING PATENT ON THE FACE OF SUCH
WHICH IS GOVERNED BY SPECIAL LAWS DOCUMENT;
SPECIFYING THE REQUIREMENTS FOR ITS
ACQUISITION FROM THE GOVERNMENT
(E) ERRONEOUSLY IGNORE THE VERITY It also argues that the sale of Lot No. 7449 to
THAT THE DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE COULD respondent's predecessor, Mabini Legaspi, and the
SUPPORT NO MORE THAN THE FACT THAT THE issuance of a certificate of title in her favor was in
RESPONDENTS PREDECESSOR-IN-INTEREST violation of the Friar Lands Act as there was no
HAD MERELY A QUESTIONABLE INCHOATE AND required approval by the Secretary of Agriculture and
INCOMPLETE RIGHT TO ACQUIRE THE Natural Resources.
PROPERTY IN QUESTION, WHICH
QUESTIONABLE INCHOATE AND IN FACT
UNCOMPLETED RIGHT CANNOT PREVAIL OVER
THE TITLE OF PETITIONER'S PREDECESSOR IN There is no dispute here that the land involved in this
INTEREST WHO WAS THE ACTUAL POSSESSOR case is a friar land and that the laws which are
THAT APPLIED FOR THE PURCHASE OF THE applicable are Act No. 1120, know as the Friar Lands
LAND EVERY NEEDED STEP FOR THE Act, providing for the administration and temporary
PURCHASE HAVING BEEN PASSED UPON AND leasing and sale of certain haciendas and parcels of
RECORDED BY THE BUREAU OF LANDS WHOSE land, commonly known as friar lands, and
RECORDS SHOW ONE AND ONLY TITLE ISSUED Commonwealth Act No. 32 dated September 15,
OVER THE LAND, THAT IS, THE TITLE OF THE 1936 as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 316
PETITIONER'S PREDECESSOR-IN-INTEREST (pp. dated June 9, 1938, which provided for the
20, 22, Rollo) subdivision and sale of all the portions of the friar
lands estated remaining undisposed of.

We find the petition impressed with merit.

Sec. 12 of Act No. 1120 provides in part:

Since the assigned errors were interrelated, it would

be well for this Court to discuss them jointly. . . . the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands shall give
the said settler and occupant a certificate which shall
set forth in detail that the Government has agreed to
sell to such settler and occupant the amount of land
Petitioner does not question the factual findings made so held by him at the price so fixed payable as
by the respondent appellate court and supported by provided in this Act at the Office of the Chief of the
the records (p. 22, Rollo). It does not however accept Bureau of Public Lands . . . and that upon the
the legal conclusion made by the appellate court and payment of the final installment together with all
trial court that the registered title of private respondent accrued interest the Government will convey to such
to the land should prevail over its own title. settler and occupant the said land so held by him by
proper instrument of conveyance, which shall be
issued and become effective in the manner provided
in section one hundred and twenty two of the Land
Petitioner contends that Act No. 1120, otherwise Registration Act.
known as the Friar Lands Act provides the procedure
for the sale and disposition of the friar lands to private
persons; that pursuant thereto, the acquisition by
petitioner's predecessor-in-interest Julian Peñaranda Also, Sec. 18 of the same Act provides:
of the disputed Lot 7449, which was formerly part of
the friar lands estate, was in compliance with all legal
requisites laid down in Act No. 1120, for the validity of
the sale by the government in favor of Peñaranda of No lease or sale made by the Chief of the Bureau of
such friar lands. Public Lands under the provisions of this Act shall be
valid until approved by the Secretary of the Interior.
(Emphasis ours)
 as provided in Act No. 1120. Later laws, however,
required that the sale shall be approved by the
Similarly, Sec. 2 of C.A. No. 32, as amended by C.A. Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce. In short, the
No. 316 provides in part: approval by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Commerce is indispensable for the validity of the sale.

. . . The persons who, at the time of the subdivision

survey are actual and bona fide occupants of any It is undisputed that petitioner's predecessor, Julian
portion of the Friar Lands Estates, not exceeding ten Peñaranda was the actual occupant of Lot 7449 when
hectares, shall be given preference to purchase the he filed his application to purchase the said lot on
portion occupied at a private sale and at a price to be November 22, 1968; that on December 16, 1989, the
fixed in such case, by the Director of Lands, subject to Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and approved the sale of the lot without auction to
Commerce, after taking into consideration its location, Peñaranda; that a sales contract was executed
quality, and any other circumstances as may affect its between the Director of Lands and Peñaranda on
value, the provisions of section twelve of Act February 28, 1969 for a consideration of P 1,198.00
Numbered Eleven hundred and twenty, as amended, payable in 10 monthly installments; that upon the full
to the contrary, . . . (Emphasis ours) payment of the price, the Undersecretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources issued the final
deed of conveyance of Lot No. 7449 in favor of
It is clear from the foregoing provisions that the friar Peñaranda. Subsequently, the Register of Deeds of
lands were purchased by the government for sale to Cavite issued TCT No. 39631 in the name of
actual settlers and occupants at the time said lands Peñaranda, and when the latter sold the land to
are acquired by the government. The Bureau of petitioner, TCT No. 39631 was cancelled and TCT
Lands shall first issue a certificate stating therein that No. T-80889 was issued in favor of the latter.
the government has agreed to sell the land to such
settler or occupant. The latter then shall accept the
certificate and agree to pay the purchase price so Clearly, the purchase of the friar land made by
fixed and in the installments and at the interest Peñaranda was in compliance with law. The
specified in the certificate. execution of the sales contract vested the right of
ownership in Peñaranda over the land. There is no
doubt whatsoever that the said sale was valid as it
The conveyance executed in favor of a buyer or was approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and
purchaser, or the so called certificate of sale, is a Natural Resources. Hence, the sale made by
conveyance of the ownership of the property, subject Peñaranda in favor of the petitioner transferred the
only to the resolutory condition that the sale may be ownership of the land in favor of the latter resulting in
cancelled if the price agreed upon is not paid for in the proper issuance of TCT No. T-80889 in its name.
full. The purchaser becomes the owner upon the
issuance of the certificate of sale in his favor subject
only to the cancellation thereof in case the price On the other hand, the antecedents leading to the
agreed upon is not paid (Pugeda vs. Trias, No. L- acquisition of title by respondent Virata are clearly
16925, March 31, 1962, 4 SCRA 849.) shown in the records. The latter's predecessor, Mabini
Legaspi bought Lot 7449 in a sale by public auction
held on May 5, 1943 conducted by the Bureau of
Upon the payment of the final installment together Lands and friar lands agent Severino Rivera, and paid
with all accrued interests, the government shall then the purchase price thereof in installments in 1943;
issue a final deed of conveyance in favor of the that on December 12, 1944, the Bureau of Lands sent
purchaser. However, the sale of such friar lands shall a letter to the Register of Deeds of Cavite requesting
be valid only if approved by the Secretary of Interior the issuance of certificates of title to several persons
including Mabini Legaspi, in whose favor TCT A-2188 the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and
was issued; that subsequently on December 6, 1957, Commerce. The absence of such approval made the
she sold the disputed land to respondent Virata, supposed sale null and void ab initio. Without the
which was evidenced by a deed of sale registered certificate of sale to prove the transfer of the
with the Registry of Deeds of Cavite on December 10, ownership of the land from the government Mabini
1957; that on the same date, TCT No. 11520 was Legaspi and without the required approval of the sale
issued in the name of Virata. Due to the fire which by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, We
gutted the building housing the Registry of Cavite on find that Mabini Legaspi did not in any manner
June 7, 1959, the latter administratively reconstituted acquire ownership over the land in 1943. The
the original of TCT No. 11520 on September 1, 1959, ownership or title over the friar land, specifically Lot
based on the owner's duplicate certificate and No. 7449 remained in the government until
renumbered the same as TCT No. 1120 RT 1660. Peñaranda, petitioners predecessor, lawfully acquired
ownership over the same lot on February 28, 1969 by
virtue of a sales contract executed in his favor.
Apparently, the sale of the lot to Mabini Legaspi
occurred much earlier than the date of acquisition of
same lot by petitioner's predecessor, and the The issuance of a certificate of title in favor of Mabini
evidence presented by respondent Virata indicates Legaspi did not vest ownership upon her over the
that the latter's predecessor paid the purchase price land nor did it validate the alleged purchase of the lot,
of Lot No. 7449 on installments. which is null and void. Time and again, it has been
held that registration does not vest title. It is merely
evidence of such title over a particular property. Our
land registration laws do not give the holder any
Nowhere in the evidence for the respondent or in the better title than that what he actually has (De man et
records of this case however, would show that a al. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. L- 46935 December 21,
certificate of sale was ever issued by the Bureau of 1987, 156 SCRA 701; Cruz vs. Cabana, No. 56232,
Lands, which would vest ownership and title over the June 22, 1984, 129 SCRA 656).
land in favor of Mabini Legaspi. The existence of the
official receipts showing payment of the price of the
land by Legaspi does not prove that the land was
legally conveyed to her without any contract of sale Although a period of one year has already expired
having been executed by the government in her favor. from the time the certificate of title was issued to
Viewed from all angles, the acquisition of the lot by Mabini Legaspi pursuant to the alleged sale from the
Legaspi was highly irregular and void, and not in government, said title does not become
compliance with the procedure mandated by law for incontrovertible but is null and void since the
the sale of friar lands. For one thing, Mabini Legaspi acquisition of the property was in violation of law.
allegedly purchased the land in a sale at public Further, the petitioner herein is in possession of the
auction, which procedure is nowhere provided in Act land in dispute. Hence, its action to quiet title is
No. 1120 or in C.A. 32, as amended by C.A. 316. The imprescriptible (Coronel vs. Intermediate Appellate
laws expressly state that an actual occupant of the Court, No. 70191, October 29, 1987, 155 SCRA
land shall purchase the lot occupied by him at a 270).1âwphi1 In one case, this Court ruled that an
private sale and not in a sale at public auction (Sec. 2, adverse claimant of a registered land who is in
C.A. 32 as amended). Further, neither was there any possession thereof for a long period of time is not
deed of conveyance issued to Legaspi by the barred from bringing an action for reconveyance
government after the full payment of the installments which in effect seeks to quiet title to the property
on the disputed lot. against a registered owner relying upon a Torrens title
which was illegally or wrongfully acquired (Caragay-
Layno vs. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA 718). In
actions for reconveyance of property predicated on
Highly significant at this point is the fact that there the fact that the conveyance complained of was void
was neither allegation nor proof that the sale was with ab initio, a claim of prescription of the action would be
unavailing (Corpus, et al. vs. Beltran, et al., 97 Phil.
722; Agne vs. Director of Lands, G.R. L-40399,
February 6, 1990, 181 SCRA 793). Being null and
void, the sale made to Mabini Legaspi and the
subsequent titles issued pursuant thereto produced
no legal effects whatsoever. Quod nullum est nullum
producit affectum (Agnes vs. Director of Lands,
supra). There being no title to the land that Mabini
Legaspi acquired from the government, it follows that
no title to the same land could be conveyed by the
former to respondent Virata.

Even assuming that respondent Virata was a

purchaser in good faith and for value, the law is, as
between two persons both of whom are in good faith
and both innocent of any negligence, the law must
protect and prefer the lawful holder of registered title
over the transferee of a vendor bereft of any
transmissible rights (Baltazar vs. Court of Appeals,
G.R. 78728, December 8, 1988, 168 SCRA 354,
emphasis ours). Further if a person happened to
obtain property by mistake or to the prejudice of
another with or without bad faith, the certificate of title
which may have been issued to him under the
circumstances may and should be cancelled or
corrected.

Our unavoidable conclusion in this case is that the

title of petitioner under the Torrens land system
should be upheld considering that no previous valid
title to the same land existed.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby GRANTED

and the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals
dated July 13, 1987 is hereby REVERSED. Petitioner
Solid State Multi-Products Corporation is hereby
declared the true owner of the land covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-80889. The Register
of Deeds of Cavite is ordered to cancer transfer
Certificate of Title No. (T-11520) RT 1660 in the name
of respondent Antenor Virata.

SO ORDERED.
 This parcel of agricultural land is used for the raising
of rice and sugar cane and is assessed at $1,000
G.R. No. 5246 September 16, 1910 United States currency. The petition, which was filed
on the 18th of December, 1906, was accompanied by
a plan and technical description of the above-
MANUELA GREY ALBA, ET AL., petitioners- described parcel of land.
appellants,

vs. After hearing the proofs presented, the court entered,

ANACLETO R. DE LA CRUZ, objector-appellee. on the 12th of February, 1908, a decree in
accordance with the provisions of paragraph 6 of
section 54 of Act No. 926, directing that the land
described in the petitioner be registered in the names
Ramon Salinas, for appellants. of the four petitioners, as coowners, subject to the
usufructuary right of Vicente Reyes, widower of
Aniceto G. Reyes, for appellee. Remedios Grey.

TRENT, J.: On the 16th of June, 1908, Anacleto Ratilla de la Cruz

filed a motion in the Court of Land Registration asking
for a revision of the case, including the decision, upon
These petitioners, Manuela, Jose, Juan, and the ground that he is the absolute owner of the two
Francisco, surnamed Grey y Alba, are the only heirs parcels of land which are described in said motion,
of Doña Segunda Alba Clemente and Honorato Grey, and which, according to his allegations, are included
deceased. Remedios Grey y Alba, a sister of the in the lands decreed to the petitioners. He alleged that
petitioners, was married on the 21st day of March, the decree of February 12, 1908, was obtained
1903, to Vicente Reyes and died on the 13th of July, maliciously and fraudulently by the petitioners,
1905, without leaving any heirs except her husband. thereby depriving him of said two parcels of land. He
The four petitioners, as coowners, sought to have further alleged that he was the absolute owner of the
registered the following-described property: two parcels of land, having inherited them from his
father, Baldomero R. de la Cruz, who had a state
grant for the same. He therefore asked, under the
provisions of section 38 of the Land Registration Act
A parcel of land situated in the barrio of Talampas, (No. 496), a revision of the case, and that the said
municipality of Baliuag, Province of Bulacan, upon decree be modified so as to exclude the two parcels
which are situated three houses and one camarin of of land described in said motion. The Land Court
light material, having a superficial area of 52 hectares, upon this motion reopened the case, and after
51 ares, and 22 centares; bounded on the north by hearing the additional evidence presented by both
the highway (calzada) of Talampas and the lands of parties, rendered, on the 23rd of November, 1908, its
Rita Ruiz Mateo; on the east by the lands of the said decision modifying the former decree by excluding
Rita Ruiz Mateo, Hermenegildo Prado, Policarpo de from the same the two parcels of land claimed by
Jesus, and a stream called Sapang Buslut; on the Anacleto Ratilla de la Cruz. From this decision and
south by the same stream and the lands of the judgment the petitioners appealed and now insist,
capellania; and on the west by the stream called first, that the trial court erred in reopening the case
Sapang Buslut, and the lands of Vicente de la Cruz, and modifying its decree dated the 12th of February,
Jose Camacho and Domingo Ruiz Mateo. 1908, for the reason that said decree was not
obtained by means of fraud; and, second, that the
court erred in holding that the two parcels of land
described in the appellee's motion are not their
property.
It was agreed by counsel that the two small parcels The mother of the petitioners died on November 15,
now in dispute forma part of the land described in the 1881; their father died prior to that time. Manuela, the
petition and were included in the decree of February oldest of the petitioners, was about six years of age
12, 1908, and that the petitioners are the owners of when their mother died. So these children were
the remainder of the land described in the said minors when the father of the appellee obtained the
decree. estate grant.

The petitioners inherited this land from their parents, On the 13th of June, 1882, Jose Grey, uncle and
who acquired the same, including the two small representative of the petitioners, who were then
parcels in question, by purchase, as is evidenced by a minors, rented the land owned by the petitioners'
public document dated the 26th of November, 1864, deceased parents to one Irineo Jose for a period of
duly executed before Francisco Iriarte, alcalde mayor three years. On the 23d of March, 1895, the said Jose
and judge of the Court of First Instance of the Grey, as the representative of the petitioners, rented
Province of Bulacan. the same land for a period of six years to Baldomero
R. de la Cruz, father of the appellee. This rental
contract was duly executed in writing. This land was
cultivated during these six years by Baldomero R. de
Baldomero R. de la Cruz, father of the appellee, la Cruz and his children, one of whom is the appellee.
obtained in march, 1895, a state grant for several On the 14th of December, 1905, Jose Grey, for
parcels of land, including the two parcels in question. himself and the other petitioners, rented the same
This grant was duly inscribed in the old register of land to Estanislao R. de la Cruz for a period of two
property in Bulacan on the 6th of April of the same years. Estanislao de la Cruz on entering into this
year. rental contract with Jose Grey did so for himself and
his brothers, one of whom is the appellee. While the
appellee admits that his father and brother entered
It is admitted that at the time the appellants presented into these rental contracts and did, in fact, cultivate
their petition in this case the appellee was occupying the petitioners' land, nevertheless he insists that the
the two parcels of land now in question. It is also two small parcels in question were not included in
admitted that the name of the appellee does not these contracts. In the rental contract between the
appear in the said petition as an occupant of the said uncle of the petitioners and he father of the appellee
two parcels. The petitioners insist that the appellee the land is not described. In the rental contract
was occupying these parcels as their tenant and for between Jose Grey, one of the petitioners, and
this reason they did not include his name in their Estanislao R. de la Cruz, brother of the appellee, the
petition, as an occupant, while the appellee contends two small parcels of land in question are included,
that he was occupying the said parcels as the according to the description given therein. This was
absolute owner under the estate grant by inheritance. found to be true by the court below, but the said court
held that as this contract was made by Estanislao R.
de la Cruz it was not binding upon Anacleto R. de la
Cruz, the appellee.
The court below held that the failure on the part of the
petitioners to include the name of the appellee in their
petition, as an occupant of these two parcels of land,
was a violation of section 21 of Act No. 496, and that The two small parcels of land in question were
this constituted fraud within the meaning of section 38 purchased by the parents of the petitioners in 1864,
of said Land Registration Act. The trial court further as is evidenced by the public document of purchase
held that the grant from the estate should prevail over and sale of that year. The same two parcels of land
the public document of purchase of 1864. are included in the state grant issued in favor of
Baldomero Ratilla de la Cruz in 1895. This grant was
obtained after the death of the petitioners' parents has served the notice as directed by the court by
and while they were minors. So it is clear that the publication or mailing shall be conclusive proof of
petitioners honestly believed that the appellee was such service. Within the time allowed in the notices, if
occupying the said parcels as their lessee at the time no person appears and answers, the court may at
they presented their application for registration. They once, upon motion of the applicant, no reason to the
did not act in bad faith, nor with any fraudulent intent, contrary appearing, order a general default. By the
when they omitted to include in their application the description in the published notice "to all whom it may
name of the appellee as one of the occupants of the concern," and by express provisions of law "all the
land. They believed that it was not necessary nor word are made parties defendant and shall be
required that they include in their application the concluded by the default an order." If the court, after
names of their tenants. Under these circumstances, hearing, finds that the applicant has title, as stated in
did the court below commit an error in reopening this his application, a decree or registration shall be
case in June, 1908, after its decree had been entered entered.
in February of the same year?

Every decree of registration shall bind the land and

The application for the registration is to be in writing, quiet title thereto, subject only to the exceptions
signed and sworn to by the applicant, or by some stated in the following section. It shall be conclusive
person duly authorized in his behalf. It is to contain an upon and against all persons, including the Insular
accurate description of the land. It shall contain the Government, and all the branches thereof, whether
name in full and the address of the applicant, and also mentioned by name in the application, notice, or
the names and addresses of all occupants of land and citation, or included in the general description "to all
of all adjoining owners, if known; and, if not known, it whom it may concern." Such decree shall not be
shall state what search has been made to find them. opened by reason of the absence, infancy, or other
In the form of notice given by statute, which shall be disability of any person affected thereby, nor by any
sworn to, the applicant is required to state and set proceedings in any court for reversing judgments or
forth clearly all mortgages or encumbrances affecting decrees; subject, however, to the right of any person
said land, if any, the rights and interests, legal or deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by
equitable, in the possession, remainder, reversion, or decree of registration obtained by fraud to file in the
expectancy of all persons, with their names in full, Court of Land Registration a petition for review within
together with their place of residence and post office one year. . . . (Sec. 38 of Act No. 496.)
addresses. Upon receipt of the application the clerk
shall cause notice of the filling to be published twice in
the Official Gazette. This published notice shall be
directed to all persons appearing to have an interest The appellee is not included in any of the exceptions
in the land sought to be registered and to the named in section 38 referred to above.
adjoining owners, and also "to all whom it may
concern." In addition to the notice in the Official
Gazette the Land Court shall, within seven days after It will be seen that the applicant is required to mention
said publication, cause a copy of the notice, in not only the outstanding interest which he admits but
Spanish, to be mailed by the clerk to every person also all claims of interest, though denied by him. By
named in the application whose address is known; to express provision of law the world are made parties
cause a duly attested copy of the notice, in Spanish, defendant by the description in the notice "to all whom
to be posted in a conspicuous place on every parcel it may concern."
of land included in the application, and in a
conspicuous place on the chief municipal building of
the town in which the land is situated. The court may
also cause other or further notice of the application to Although the appellee, occupying the two small
be given in such manner and to such persons as it parcels of land in question under the circumstances
may deem proper. The certificate of the clerk that he as we have set forth, was not served with notice, he
was made a party defendant by publication; and the With regard to decisions on the sections relating to
entering of a decree on the 12th of February, 1908, the conclusive effect of certificates of title, it has been
must be held to be conclusive against all persons, held in some cases that the "fraud" there mentioned
including the appellee, whether his (appellee's) name means actual or moral fraud, not merely constructive
is mentioned in the application, notice, or citation. or legal fraud. In other cases "fraud" has been said to
include constructive, legal, and every kind of fraud. In
other cases, against, knowledge of other persons'
right, and the deliberate acquisition of registered title
The said decree of February 12, 1908, should not in the face of such knowledge, has been held to be
have been opened on account of the absence, "fraud" which rendered voidable the certificates of title
infancy, or other disability of any person affected so obtained; and voluntary ignorance is, for this
thereby, and could have been opened only on the purpose, the same as knowledge. But in none of
ground that the said decree had been obtained by these three classes of cases was there absent the
fraud. That decree was not obtained by fraud on the element of intention to deprive another of just rights,
part of the applicants, inasmuch as they honestly which constitutes the essential characteristics of
believed that the appellee was occupying these two actual — as distinguished from legal-fraud. (Id., p.
small parcels of land as their tenant. One of the 835, and cases cited in notes Nos. 85, 86, 87, 88, and
petitioner went upon the premises with the surveyor 89 at bottom of pages 835 and 836.)
when the original plan was made.

By "fraud" is meant actual fraud-dishonesty of some

Proof of constructive fraud is not sufficient to sort. (Judgment of Privy Council in Assets Co. vs.
authorize the Court of Land Registration to reopen a Mere Roihi, and Assets Co. vs. Panapa Waihopi,
case and modify its decree. Specific, intentional acts decided in March, 1905, cited by Hogg in his
to deceive and deprive anther of his right, or in some Supplementary Addendum to his work on Australian
manner injure him, must be alleged and proved; that Torrens System, supra.) The same meaning should
is, there must be actual or positive fraud as be given to the word "fraud" used in section 38 of our
distinguished from constructive fraud. statutes (Act No. 496).

The question as to the meaning of the word "fraud" in The question as to whether any particular transaction
the Australian statutes has been frequently raised. shows fraud, within the meaning of the word as used
Two distinctions have been noted by the Australian in our statutes, will in each case be a question of fact.
courts; the first is the distinction between the meaning We will not attempt to say what acts would constitutes
of the word "fraud" in the sections relating to the this kind of fraud in other cases. This must be
conclusive effect of certificates of title, and its determined from the fact an circumstances in each
meaning in the sections relating to the protection of particular case. The only question we are called upon
bona fide purchasers from registered proprietors. The to determine, and have determined, is whether or not,
second is the distinction between "legal," "equitable," under the facts and circumstances in this case, the
or "constructive" fraud, and "actual" or "moral" fraud. petitioners did obtain the decree of February 12,
In none of the groups of the sections of the Australian 1908, by means of fraud.
statutes relating to the conclusive effect of certificates
of title, and in which fraud is referred to, is there any
express indication of the meaning of "fraud," with the
sole exception of that of the South Australian group. It might be urged that the appellee has been deprived
(Hogg on Australian Torrens System, p. 834.) of his property without due process of law, in violation
of section 5 of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902,
known as the Philippine Bill," which provides "that no
law shall be enacted in the said Islands which shall
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without unknown to him, already sold the and to a third
due process of law." person. . . The registered proprietor may feel himself
protected against any defect in his vendor's title. (Id.,
p. 21.)
The Land Registration Act requires that all occupants
be named in the petition and given notice by
registered mail. This did not do the appellee any The following summary of benefits of the system of
good, as he was not notified; but he was made a party registration of titles, made by Sir Robert Torrens, has
defendant, as we have said, by means of the been fully justified in its use:
publication "to all whom it may concern." If this
section of the Act is to be upheld this must be
declared to be due process of law.
First. It has substituted security for insecurity.

Before examining the validity of this part of the Act it

might be well to note the history and purpose of what Second. It has reduced the costs of conveyances
is known as the "Torrens Land Registration System." from pounds to shillings, and the time occupied from
This system was introduced in South Australia by Sir months to days.
Robert Torrens in 1857 and was there worked out in
its practicable form.
Third. It has exchanged brevity and clearness for
obscurity and verbiage.
The main principle of registration is to make
registered titles indefeasible. As we have said, upon
the presentation in the Court of Land Registration of Fourth. It has so simplified ordinary dealings that he
an application for the registration of the title to lands, who has mastered the "three R's" can transact his
under this system, the theory of the law is that all own conveyancing.
occupants, adjoining owners, adverse claimants, and
other interested persons are notified of the
proceedings, and have have a right to appear in
opposition to such application. In other words, the Fifth. It affords protection against fraud.
proceeding is against the whole word. This system
was evidently considered by the Legislature to be a
public project when it passed Act No. 496. The Sixth. It has restored to their just value many estates
interest of the community at large was considered to held under good holding titles, but depreciated in
be preferred to that of private individuals. consequence of some blur or technical defect, and
has barred the reoccurrence of any similar faults.
(Sheldon on Land Registration, pp. 75, 76.)
At the close of this nineteenth century, all civilized
nations are coming to registration of title to land,
because immovable property is becoming more and The boldest effort to grapple with the problem of
more a matter of commercial dealing, and there can simplification of title to land was made by Mr.
be no trade without security. (Dumas's Lectures, p. (afterwards Sir Robert) Torrens, a layman, in South
23.) Australia in 1857. . . . In the Torrens system title by
registration takes the place of "title by deeds" of the
system under the "general" law. A sale of land, for
The registered proprietor will no longer have reasons example, is effected by a registered transfer, upon
to fear that he may evicted because his vendor had, which a certificate of title is issued. The certificate is
guaranteed by statute, and, with certain exceptions, Act No. 496 of the Philippine Commission, known as
constitutes indefeasible title to the land mentioned the "Land Registration Act," was copied substantially
therein. Under the old system the same sale would be from the Massachussetts law of 1898.
effected by a conveyance, depending for its validity,
apart from intrinsic flaws, on the correctness of a long
series of prior deeds, wills, etc. . . . The object of the
Torrens system, them, is to do away with the delay, The Illinois and Massachusetts statutes were upheld
uncertainty, and expense of the old conveyancing by the supreme courts of those States.
system. (Duffy & Eagleson on The Transfer of Land
Act, 1890, pp. 2, 3, 5, 7.)
It is not enough to show a procedure to be
unconstitutional to say that we never heard of it
By "Torrens" system generally are meant those before. (Tyler vs. Judges, supra; Hurtado vs.
systems of registration of transactions with interest in California, 110 U. S., 516.)
land whose declared object . . . is, under
governmental authority, to establish and certify to the
ownership of an absolute and indefeasible title to Looked at either from the point of view of history or of
realty, and to simplify its transfer. (Hogg on Australian the necessary requirements of justice, a proceeding in
Torrens system, supra, pp. 1, 2.) rem dealing with a tangible res may be instituted and
carried to judgment without personal service upon
claimants within the State or notice by name to those
Compensation for errors from assurance funds is outside of it, and not encounter any provision of either
provided in all countries in which the Torrens system constitution. Jurisdiction is secured by the power of
has been enacted. Cases of error no doubt will the court over the res. As we have said, such a
always occur. The percentage of errors, as compared proceeding would be impossible, were this not so, for
with the number of registered dealings in Australia, is it hardly would do to make a distinction between the
very small. In New South Wales there were, in 1889, constitutional rights of claimants who were known and
209, 894 registered dealings, the average risk of error those who were not known to the plaintiff, when the
being only 2 ½ cents for each dealing. In Queensland proceeding is to bar all. (Tyler vs. Judges, supra.)
the risk of error was only 1 ½ cents, the number of
registered dealings being 233,309. In Tasmania and
in Western Australia not a cent was paid for This same doctrine is annunciated in Pennoyer vs.
compensation for errors during the whole time of Neff (95 U. S., 714); The Mary (9 Cranch, 126);
operation, (Dumas's Lectures, supra, p. 96.) This Mankin vs. Chandler (2 Brock., 125); Brown vs. Levee
system has been adopted in various countries of the Commission (50 Miss., 468); 2 Freeman, Judgments,
civilized world, including some of the States of the 4th ed., secs. 606, 611.
American Union, and practical experience has
demonstrated that it has been successful as a public
project.
If the technical object of the suit is to establish a claim
against some particular person, with a judgment
which generally, in theory at least, binds his body, or
The validity of some of the provisions of the statutes to bar some individual claim or objection, so that only
adopting the Torrens system has been the subject of certain persons are entitled to be heard in defense,
judicial decision in the courts of the United States. the action is in personam, although it may concern the
(People vs. Chase, 165 Ill., 527; State vs. Guilbert, 56 right to or possession of a tangible thing. If, on the
Ohio St., 575; People vs. Simon, 176 Ill., 165; Tyler other hand, the object is to bar indifferently all who
vs. Judges, 175 Mass., 71.) might be minded to make an objection of any sort
against the right sought to be established, and if
anyone in the world has a right to be heard on the
strenght of alleging facts which, if true, show an
inconsistent interest, the proceeding is in rem. (Tyler
vs. Judges, supra.)

In the case of Hamilton vs. Brown (161 U. S., 256) a

judgment of escheat was held conclusive upon
persons notified by advertisement to all persons
interested. In this jurisdiction, by the provisions of the
Code of Civil Procedure, Act No. 190, a decree
allowing or disallowing a will binds everybody,
although the only notice of the proceedings given is
by general notice to all persons interested.

The supreme court Massachusetts, in the case of

Tyler vs. Judges (supra), did not rest its judgment as
to the conclusive effect of the decree upon the ground
that the State has absolute power to determine the
persons to whom a man's property shall go at his
death, but upon the characteristics of a proceeding in
rem. So we conclude that the proceedings had in the
case at bar, under all the facts and circumstances,
especially the absolute lack on the part of the
petitioners of any dishonest intent to deprive the
appellee of any right, or in any way injure him,
constitute due process of law.

As to whether or not the appellee can succesfully

maintain an action under the provisions of sections
101 and 102 of the Land Registration Act (secs. 2365,
2366, Compilation) we do not decide.

For these reasons we are of the opinion, and so hold,

that the judgment appealed from should be, and the
same is hereby reversed and judgment entered in
favor of the petitioners in conformity with the decree
of the lower court of February 12, 1908, without
special ruling as to costs. It is so ordered.
 and Romeo. 2 Pedro, Lorenzo, Antonio, and Sotera
are the private respondents herein while Jose's
widow, Virginia (Jose died on March 8, 1970), and
their children are the petitioners.

G.R. No. 81401 May 18, 1990

It also appears that on October (or September) 27,
1941, the Arceos executed a deed of donation inter
VIRGINIA FRANCO VDA. DE ARCEO, CARMELITA vivos, marked as Exhibit "J", in which the spouses
ARCEO, ZENAIDA ARCEO, ROMEO ARCEO, bestowed the properties in favor of Jose. 3 Since
RODOLFO ARCEO and MANUEL ARCEO, 1942, Jose had been paying taxes thereon. 4 In 1949,
petitioners, he took personal possession thereof, worked thereon,
and claimed them as owner thereof 5
vs.

HON. COURT OF APPEALS (Former 16th Division),

PEDRO M. ARCEO, SOTERA ARCEO, LORENZO It furthermore appears that on August 2, 1950, the
ARCEO, and ANTONIO ARCEO, respondents. spouses executed another deed of donation inter
vivos, marked as exhibit "T" disposing of the
properties further in favor of Jose. 6

Ricardo S. Inton and Jose F. Tiburcio for petitioners.

On October 3 (or 30), 1941, the Arceos supposedly
signed a deed of donation mortis causa, marked as
Hermin E. Arceo for private respondents. exhibit "1" revoking exhibit "J" and giving away the
properties in question in favor of all his grandchildren
including Jose. It seems however that it was notarized
only on November 3, 1944, after Escolastica had
died.
SARMIENTO, J.:

On January 12, 1972, Virginia, together with her

The Court grants this petition on a successful children, filed with the cadastral court 7 an application
demonstration of error committed by the Court of for registration in their names of lots Nos. 2582, 2595,
Appeals.1 3054, and 8131 on the strength of exhibits "J" and
"T". Pedro, Antonio, Lorenzo, and Sotera opposed the
application on the basis of exhibit "1". Pedro and
Lorenzo specifically contested the application on lots
It appears that the spouses Abdon Arceo and Nos. 3054 and 8131 on claims that each of them were
Escolastica Geronimo were the owners of four parcels entitled to one-third thereof. 8
of unregistered land (six were involved but only four
were disputed) located in Pulilan, Bulacan, identified
as lots nos. 2582, 2595, 3054, and 8131. Escolastica
died on September 16, 1942 while Abdon passed The cadastral court rejected all three documents and
away in 1953. They had one son, Esteban, who died distributed the properties according to the law on
on September 2, 1941. Esteban had five children, intestate succession. 9
Jose, Pedro, Lorenzo, Antonio, and Sotera. Jose
married Virginia Franco, with whom he fathered six
children, Carmelita, Zenaida, Rodolfo, Manuel, Cesar,
Virginia and her children shortly went to the Court of Who has the right over lots Nos. 2582, 2595, 3054,
Appeals which affirmed the decision of the cadastral and 8131?
court and dismissed the appeal.

As we indicated, we find merit in this petition.

On February 15, 1988, Virginia, et al. petitioned this
Court.
The first question must, however, be resolved against
the petitioners. We have held that under Section 2 of
The petitioners argue that the cadastral court was the Property Registration Decree, the jurisdiction of
bereft of the power to determine conflicting claims of the Regional Trial Court, sitting as a land registration
ownership, and that its authority was solely to confirm court, is no longer as circumscribed as it was under
an existing title, and that anyway, all the lots should Act No. 496, the former land registration law. 11 We
have been awarded to them by virtue of open, said that the Decree "has eliminated the distinction
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession between the general jurisdiction vested in the regional
since 1941 (1942, when Jose took possession of the trial court and the limited jurisdiction conferred upon it
parcels) or otherwise, by acquisitive prescription. 10 by the former law when acting merely as a cadastral
They also assert that exhibits "J" and "T" had validly court." The amendment was "aimed at avoiding
transferred the subject lands to them. multiplicity of suits, the change has simplified
registration proceedings by conferring upon the
required trial courts the authority to act not only on
applications for 'original registration' 'but also 'over all
In their comment, Pedro, Lorenzo, Antonio, and petitions filed after original registration of title, with
Sotera contend that the cadastral court had the power to hear and determine all questions arising
jurisdiction to decide questions of ownership of from such applications or petitions.'" 12 At any rate,
property; that the issue of prescription was never we have also stated that the limited jurisdiction rule
ventilated below; and that exhibit "J" had been validly governing land registration courts is subject to
rescinded by exhibit "1". recognized exceptions, to wit, (1) where the parties
mutually agreed or have acquiesced in submitting
controversial issues for determination; (2) where they
The parties do not quarrel over the genuineness of all have been given full opportunity to present their
three exhibits but rather, over the dates thereof. evidence; and (3) where the court has considered the
Pedro, et al. alleged that exhibit "J" was executed on evidence already of record and is convinced that the
September 27, 1941, and not October 27, 1941, and same is sufficient for rendering a decision upon such
that exhibit "l", the instrument that revoked it, came controversial issues. 13 By the same token, it has
later, or on October 3, 1941. Virginia et al. maintain been held that the rule is not, in reality, one of
on the other hand that exhibit "J' was actually made jurisdiction, but rather, of mere procedure, which may
on October 27, 1941, twenty-four days after the be waived. 14 It is not amiss to state likewise that
execution of exhibit "1", and that assuming exhibit "1" where the issue, say, of ownership, is ineluctably tied
came earlier, it was notarized, and took effect, only on up with the question of right of registration, the
November 3, 1944, after the death of Escolastica, one cadastral court commits no error in assuming
of the donors. jurisdiction over it, as, for instance, in this case, where
both parties rely on their respective exhibits to defeat
one another's claims over the parcels sought to be
registered, in which case, registration would not be
Although the parties wrangle over dates, the Court possible or would be unduly prolonged unless the
observes that there is no real question of fact to be court first decided it.
resolved in this case. The important question, so we
find, is, based on existing facts, legal in character:
The next question refers to acquisitive prescription. In
support of their claims, Virginia, et al. cite four events:
(1) In 1941, Jose entered upon the properties and Other than the claims by Pedro, et al., that exhibit "J"
until his death in 1970, worked thereon; (2) Upon his had been revoked by exhibit "1", exhibit "J" appears
death, they, Virginia, et al., divided the same by virtue to have been executed in compliance with legal
of an extrajudicial partition; (3) Ever since, Jose had requirements, i.e., as to form and acceptance. 17 It is
paid taxes thereon until he died; (4) Pedro, et al., true that the cadastral court was supposed to have
have not lifted a finger to oust him, Jose, in attributed fraud on the part of Jose in making Abdon
possession, or otherwise, to impugn his right. Virginia, sign the exhibit, 18 (according to Pedro, Abdon
et al. now say that barring the above exhibits, they affixed his signature thereon upon "the belief that it
have anyway acquired the parcels by prescription. was a deed of sale of the land purchased from one
Marciano Santos" 19) but as found by the Court of
Appeals, It is a theory that "must be received with a
'grain of salt', 20 because, for one thing, Jose is dead,
We also regret that one can not agree with this and for another, the petitioners have adduced
proposition. The petitioners suppose that the parcels ' evidence that exhibit "J" was genuine. We are bound
had come under the category of a co-ownership, by the factual finding of the Appellate Court and as we
following the death of their grandparents, but in that averred, we are disposing of this question on pure
case, it has been held that in order for prescription to questions of law.
set in, the following requisites must concur: (1) there
is a clear showing that the claimant has repudiated
the co-ownership; (2) he has made known to the rest
of the co-owners that he is assuming exclusive As to exhibit "T", the finding of the Court of Appeals
ownership over the property; (3) there is clear and that it was defective is just as controlling on this
convincing evidence thereof; and (4) his possession is Court, that is, that "it was signed by Abdon Arceo after
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious. 15 the death of his wife on September 16, 1942 and
does not contain the acceptance ... by Jose Arceo."
21

The evidence for Virginia et al. do not persuade us

that they (through Jose) have acquired the lots by
lapse of time. The fact that in 1941, Jose wrested We can not say that exhibit "1" had validly revoked
possession thereof, so we hold, does not amount to exhibit "J". The weight of authority is that a valid
adverse possession because as a co-owner, he had donation, once accepted, becomes
the right of enjoyment, and his use thereof can not by
itself prejudice the right of his fellow co-owners. The irrevocable, 22 except on account of officiousness, 23
fact that he paid taxes thereon is not controlling either failure by the donee to comply with charges imposed
because payment of real estate taxes does not in the donation, 24 or by reason of ingratitude. 25
necessarily confer title upon a claimant. 16 The fact There is simply no proof that Abdon when he
finally that Virginia, et al. had sought to extrajudicially executed exhibit "1", was in possession of a legal
divide the property is nothing conclusive because ground for annulment.
there is no showing that they, Virginia, et al. had
made this known to Pedro, et al. Under these
circumstances, we can not validly say that the lands We can not thus accept the Court of Appeals' holding
had devolved on Virginia., et al., by way of that exhibit "1" had "neutralized the force and effect"
prescription. 26 of exhibit "J".

We are granting the petition nonetheless on the It is therefore this Court's ruling that the disposition
finding that the lots had been conferred to Jose by a under exhibit "J" in favor of Jose (whose rights were
valid donation inter vivos, that is, exhibit "J". transmitted to Virginia, et al.) should be respected.
We find no need in settling the issue of true dates of
the parties' exhibits, because first, it is an issue of fact
and second, because whatever their true dates, there
is no obstacle to the validity of the claims of Virginia,
et al.

WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is SET

ASIDE. The court a quo is ORDERED to distribute the
properties covered by the donation inter vivos, dated
October (or September) 27, 1941, exhibit "J",
according to the terms and conditions set forth
therein, and in the proportions indicated thereby. No
costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
 AFFIRMING in part and REVERSING in part the
judgment appealed from, as follows:

"1. Declaring [Respondent] Romana de Vera the

rightful owner and with better right to possess the
property in question, being an innocent purchaser for
G.R. No. 154409 June 21, 2004 value therefor;

Spouses NOEL and JULIE ABRIGO, petitioners, "2. Declaring Gloria Villafania [liable] to pay the
vs. following to [Respondent] Romana de Vera and to
[Petitioner-]Spouses [Noel and Julie] Abrigo, to wit:
ROMANA DE VERA, respondent.

As to [Respondent] Romana de Vera:

DECISION

1. ₱300,000.00 plus 6% per annum as actual

PANGANIBAN, J.: damages;

Between two buyers of the same immovable property 2. ₱50,000.00 as moral damages;
registered under the Torrens system, the law gives
ownership priority to (1) the first registrant in good
faith; (2) then, the first possessor in good faith; and 3. ₱50,000.00 as exemplary damages;
(3) finally, the buyer who in good faith presents the
oldest title. This provision, however, does not apply if
the property is not registered under the Torrens
system. 4. ₱30,000.00 as attorney’s fees; and

The Case 5. Cost of suit.

Before us is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of As to [Petitioner-]Spouses [Noel and Julie] Abrigo:
the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the March 21,
2002 Amended Decision2 and the July 22, 2002
Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR
CV No. 62391. The Amended Decision disposed as 1. ₱50,000.00 as moral damages;
follows:

2. ₱50,000.00 as exemplary damages;

"WHEREFORE, the dispositive part of the original D E
C I S I O N of this case, promulgated on November
19, 2001, is SET ASIDE and another one is entered 3. ₱30,000.00 as attorney’s fees;
 free patent was later on cancelled by TCT No. 212598
on April 11, 1996.
4. Cost of suit."4

‘On October 16, 1997, Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and

The assailed Resolution denied reconsideration. Rosita Cave-Go, sold the house and lot to the herein
[Petitioner-Spouses Noel and Julie Abrigo].

The Facts
‘On October 23, 1997, Gloria Villafania sold the same
house and lot to Romana de Vera x x x. Romana de
Quoting the trial court, the CA narrated the facts as Vera registered the sale and as a consequence, TCT
follows: No. 22515 was issued in her name.

"As culled from the records, the following are the ‘On November 12, 1997, Romana de Vera filed an
pertinent antecedents amply summarized by the trial action for Forcible Entry and Damages against
court: [Spouses Noel and Julie Abrigo] before the Municipal
Trial Court of Mangaldan, Pangasinan docketed as
Civil Case No. 1452. On February 25, 1998, the
parties therein submitted a Motion for Dismissal in
‘On May 27, 1993, Gloria Villafania sold a house and view of their agreement in the instant case that
lot located at Banaoang, Mangaldan, Pangasinan and neither of them can physically take possession of the
covered by Tax Declaration No. 1406 to Rosenda property in question until the instant case is
Tigno-Salazar and Rosita Cave-Go. The said sale terminated. Hence the ejectment case was
became a subject of a suit for annulment of dismissed.’5
documents between the vendor and the vendees.

"Thus, on November 21, 1997, [petitioners] filed the

‘On December 7, 1993, the Regional Trial Court, instant case [with the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan
Branch 40 of Dagupan City rendered judgment City] for the annulment of documents, injunction,
approving the Compromise Agreement submitted by preliminary injunction, restraining order and damages
the parties. In the said Decision, Gloria Villafania was [against respondent and Gloria Villafania].
given one year from the date of the Compromise
Agreement to buy back the house and lot, and failure
to do so would mean that the previous sale in favor of
Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and Rosita Cave-Go shall
remain valid and binding and the plaintiff shall "After the trial on the merits, the lower court rendered
voluntarily vacate the premises without need of any the assailed Decision dated January 4, 1999,
demand. Gloria Villafania failed to buy back the house awarding the properties to [petitioners] as well as
and lot, so the [vendees] declared the lot in their damages. Moreover, x x x Gloria Villafania was
name. ordered to pay [petitioners and private respondent]
damages and attorney’s fees.

‘Unknown, however to Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and

Rosita Cave-Go, Gloria Villafania obtained a free "Not contented with the assailed Decision, both
patent over the parcel of land involved [on March 15, parties [appealed to the CA]."6
1988 as evidenced by OCT No. P-30522]. The said
Ruling of the Court of Appeals "3. Who between the petitioners and respondent has
a better title over the property in question."10

In its original Decision promulgated on November 19,

2001, the CA held that a void title could not give rise In the main, the issues boil down to who between
to a valid one and hence dismissed the appeal of petitioner-spouses and respondent has a better right
Private Respondent Romana de Vera.7 Since Gloria to the property.
Villafania had already transferred ownership to
Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and Rosita Cave-Go, the
subsequent sale to De Vera was deemed void.
The Court’s Ruling

The CA also dismissed the appeal of Petitioner-

Spouses Abrigo and found no sufficient basis to The Petition is bereft of merit.
award them moral and exemplary damages and
attorney’s fees.
Main Issue:

On reconsideration, the CA issued its March 21, 2002

Amended Decision, finding Respondent De Vera to Better Right over the Property
be a purchaser in good faith and for value. The
appellate court ruled that she had relied in good faith
on the Torrens title of her vendor and must thus be
protected.8 Petitioners contend that Gloria Villafania could not
have transferred the property to Respondent De Vera
because it no longer belonged to her.11 They further
claim that the sale could not be validated, since
Hence, this Petition.9 respondent was not a purchaser in good faith and for
value.12

Issues
Law on Double Sale

Petitioners raise for our consideration the issues

below: The present case involves what in legal contemplation
was a double sale. On May 27, 1993, Gloria Villafania
first sold the disputed property to Rosenda Tigno-
"1. Whether or not the deed of sale executed by Salazar and Rosita Cave-Go, from whom petitioners,
Gloria Villafania in favor of [R]espondent Romana de in turn, derived their right. Subsequently, on October
Vera is valid. 23, 1997, a second sale was executed by Villafania
with Respondent Romana de Vera.

"2. Whether or not the [R]espondent Romana de Vera

is a purchaser for value in good faith. Article 1544 of the Civil Code states the law on double
sale thus:
 had presented the transfer certificate of title (TCT)
covering the property.19
"Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to
different vendees, the ownership shall be transferred
to the person who may have first taken possession
thereof in good faith, if it should be movable property. Respondent De Vera contends that her registration
under the Torrens system should prevail over that of
petitioners who recorded theirs under Act 3344. De
Vera relies on the following insight of Justice Edgardo
"Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall L. Paras:
belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith first
recorded it in the Registry of Property.

"x x x If the land is registered under the Land

Registration Act (and has therefore a Torrens Title),
"Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall and it is sold but the subsequent sale is registered not
pertain to the person who in good faith was first in the under the Land Registration Act but under Act 3344,
possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the as amended, such sale is not considered
person who presents the oldest title, provided there is REGISTERED, as the term is used under Art. 1544 x
good faith." x x."20

Otherwise stated, the law provides that a double sale We agree with respondent. It is undisputed that
of immovables transfers ownership to (1) the first Villafania had been issued a free patent registered as
registrant in good faith; (2) then, the first possessor in Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-30522.21 The
good faith; and (3) finally, the buyer who in good faith OCT was later cancelled by Transfer Certificate of
presents the oldest title.13 There is no ambiguity in Title (TCT) No. 212598, also in Villafania’s name.22
the application of this law with respect to lands As a consequence of the sale, TCT No. 212598 was
registered under the Torrens system. subsequently cancelled and TCT No. 22515
thereafter issued to respondent.

This principle is in full accord with Section 51 of PD

152914 which provides that no deed, mortgage, lease Soriano v. Heirs of Magali23 held that registration
or other voluntary instrument -- except a will -- must be done in the proper registry in order to bind
purporting to convey or affect registered land shall the land. Since the property in dispute in the present
take effect as a conveyance or bind the land until its case was already registered under the Torrens
registration.15 Thus, if the sale is not registered, it is system, petitioners’ registration of the sale under Act
binding only between the seller and the buyer but it 3344 was not effective for purposes of Article 1544 of
does not affect innocent third persons.16 the Civil Code.

In the instant case, both Petitioners Abrigo and More recently, in Naawan Community Rural Bank v.
respondent registered the sale of the property. Since Court of Appeals,24 the Court upheld the right of a
neither petitioners nor their predecessors (Tigno- party who had registered the sale of land under the
Salazar and Cave-Go) knew that the property was Property Registration Decree, as opposed to another
covered by the Torrens system, they registered their who had registered a deed of final conveyance under
respective sales under Act 3344.17 For her part, Act 3344. In that case, the "priority in time" principle
respondent registered the transaction under the was not applied, because the land was already
Torrens system18 because, during the sale, Villafania covered by the Torrens system at the time the
conveyance was registered under Act 3344. For the
same reason, inasmuch as the registration of the sale because the land no longer belonged to the judgment
to Respondent De Vera under the Torrens system debtor as of the time of the said execution sale."28
was done in good faith, this sale must be upheld over
the sale registered under Act 3344 to Petitioner-
Spouses Abrigo.
Petitioners cannot validly argue that they were
fraudulently misled into believing that the property
was unregistered. A Torrens title, once registered,
Radiowealth Finance Co. v. Palileo25 explained the serves as a notice to the whole world.29 All persons
difference in the rules of registration under Act 3344 must take notice, and no one can plead ignorance of
and those under the Torrens system in this wise: the registration.30

"Under Act No. 3344, registration of instruments Good-Faith Requirement

affecting unregistered lands is ‘without prejudice to a
third party with a better right.’ The aforequoted phrase
has been held by this Court to mean that the mere
registration of a sale in one’s favor does not give him We have consistently held that Article 1544 requires
any right over the land if the vendor was not anymore the second buyer to acquire the immovable in good
the owner of the land having previously sold the same faith and to register it in good faith.31 Mere
to somebody else even if the earlier sale was registration of title is not enough; good faith must
unrecorded. concur with the registration.32 We explained the
rationale in Uraca v. Court of Appeals,33 which we
quote:

"The case of Carumba vs. Court of Appeals26 is a

case in point. It was held therein that Article 1544 of
the Civil Code has no application to land not "Under the foregoing, the prior registration of the
registered under Act No. 496. Like in the case at bar, disputed property by the second buyer does not by
Carumba dealt with a double sale of the same itself confer ownership or a better right over the
unregistered land. The first sale was made by the property. Article 1544 requires that such registration
original owners and was unrecorded while the second must be coupled with good faith. Jurisprudence
was an execution sale that resulted from a complaint teaches us that ‘(t)he governing principle is primus
for a sum of money filed against the said original tempore, potior jure (first in time, stronger in right).
owners. Applying [Section 33], Rule 39 of the Revised Knowledge gained by the first buyer of the second
Rules of Court,27 this Court held that Article 1544 of sale cannot defeat the first buyer’s rights except
the Civil Code cannot be invoked to benefit the where the second buyer registers in good faith the
purchaser at the execution sale though the latter was second sale ahead of the first, as provided by the Civil
a buyer in good faith and even if this second sale was Code. Such knowledge of the first buyer does not bar
registered. It was explained that this is because the her from availing of her rights under the law, among
purchaser of unregistered land at a sheriff’s execution them, to register first her purchase as against the
sale only steps into the shoes of the judgment debtor, second buyer. But in converso, knowledge gained by
and merely acquires the latter’s interest in the the second buyer of the first sale defeats his rights
property sold as of the time the property was levied even if he is first to register the second sale, since
upon. such knowledge taints his prior registration with bad
faith. This is the price exacted by Article 1544 of the
Civil Code for the second buyer being able to displace
the first buyer; that before the second buyer can
"Applying this principle, x x x the execution sale of obtain priority over the first, he must show that he
unregistered land in favor of petitioner is of no effect acted in good faith throughout (i.e. in ignorance of the
first sale and of the first buyer’s rights) ---- from the
time of acquisition until the title is transferred to him
by registration, or failing registration, by delivery of
possession.’"34 (Italics supplied) xxx xxx xxx

Equally important, under Section 44 of PD 1529, "Registration of the second buyer under Act 3344,
every registered owner receiving a certificate of title providing for the registration of all instruments on land
pursuant to a decree of registration, and every neither covered by the Spanish Mortgage Law nor the
subsequent purchaser of registered land taking such Torrens System (Act 496), cannot improve his
certificate for value and in good faith shall hold the standing since Act 3344 itself expresses that
same free from all encumbrances, except those noted registration thereunder would not prejudice prior rights
and enumerated in the certificate.35 Thus, a person in good faith (see Carumba vs. Court of Appeals, 31
dealing with registered land is not required to go SCRA 558). Registration, however, by the first buyer
behind the registry to determine the condition of the under Act 3344 can have the effect of constructive
property, since such condition is noted on the face of notice to the second buyer that can defeat his right as
the register or certificate of title.36 Following this such buyer in good faith (see Arts. 708-709, Civil
principle, this Court has consistently held as regards Code; see also Revilla vs. Galindez, 107 Phil. 480;
registered land that a purchaser in good faith acquires Taguba vs. Peralta, 132 SCRA 700). Art. 1544 has
a good title as against all the transferees thereof been held to be inapplicable to execution sales of
whose rights are not recorded in the Registry of unregistered land, since the purchaser merely steps
Deeds at the time of the sale.37 into the shoes of the debtor and acquires the latter's
interest as of the time the property is sold (Carumba
vs. Court of Appeals, 31 SCRA 558; see also Fabian
vs. Smith, Bell & Co., 8 Phil. 496) or when there is
Citing Santiago v. Court of Appeals,38 petitioners only one sale (Remalante vs. Tibe, 158 SCRA
contend that their prior registration under Act 3344 is 138)."39 (Emphasis supplied)
constructive notice to respondent and negates her
good faith at the time she registered the sale.
Santiago affirmed the following commentary of Justice
Jose C. Vitug: Santiago was subsequently applied in Bayoca v.
Nogales,40 which held:

"The governing principle is prius tempore, potior jure

(first in time, stronger in right). Knowledge by the first "Verily, there is absence of prior registration in good
buyer of the second sale cannot defeat the first faith by petitioners of the second sale in their favor.
buyer's rights except when the second buyer first As stated in the Santiago case, registration by the first
registers in good faith the second sale (Olivares vs. buyer under Act No. 3344 can have the effect of
Gonzales, 159 SCRA 33). Conversely, knowledge constructive notice to the second buyer that can
gained by the second buyer of the first sale defeats defeat his right as such buyer. On account of the
his rights even if he is first to register, since such undisputed fact of registration under Act No. 3344 by
knowledge taints his registration with bad faith (see [the first buyers], necessarily, there is absent good
also Astorga vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No 58530, 26 faith in the registration of the sale by the [second
December 1984) In Cruz vs. Cabana (G.R. No. buyers] for which they had been issued certificates of
56232, 22 June 1984; 129 SCRA 656), it was held title in their names. x x x."41
that it is essential, to merit the protection of Art. 1544,
second paragraph, that the second realty buyer must
act in good faith in registering his deed of sale (citing Santiago and Bayoca are not in point. In Santiago, the
Carbonell vs. Court of Appeals, 69 SCRA 99, first buyers registered the sale under the Torrens
Crisostomo vs. CA, G.R. 95843, 02 September 1992). system, as can be inferred from the issuance of the
TCT in their names.42 There was no registration
under Act 3344. In Bayoca, when the first buyer The Court of Appeals examined the facts to determine
registered the sale under Act 3344, the property was whether respondent was an innocent purchaser for
still unregistered land.43 Such registration was value.47 After its factual findings revealed that
therefore considered effectual. Respondent De Vera was in good faith, it explained
thus:

"x x x. Gloria Villafania, [Respondent] De Vera’s

Furthermore, Revilla and Taguba, which are cited in vendor, appears to be the registered owner. The
Santiago, are not on all fours with the present case. In subject land was, and still is, registered in the name of
Revilla, the first buyer did not register the sale.44 In Gloria Villafania. There is nothing in her certificate of
Taguba, registration was not an issue.45 title and in the circumstances of the transaction or
sale which warrant [Respondent] De Vera in
supposing that she need[ed] to look beyond the title.
As can be gathered from the foregoing, constructive She had no notice of the earlier sale of the land to
notice to the second buyer through registration under [petitioners]. She ascertained and verified that her
Act 3344 does not apply if the property is registered vendor was the sole owner and in possession of the
under the Torrens system, as in this case. subject property by examining her vendor’s title in the
Registry of Deeds and actually going to the premises.
There is no evidence in the record showing that when
she bought the land on October 23, 1997, she knew
We quote below the additional commentary of Justice or had the slightest notice that the same was under
Vitug, which was omitted in Santiago. This omission litigation in Civil Case No. D-10638 of the Regional
was evidently the reason why petitioner Trial Court of Dagupan City, Branch 40, between
misunderstood the context of the citation therein: Gloria Villafania and [Petitioners] Abrigo. She was not
even a party to said case. In sum, she testified clearly
and positively, without any contrary evidence
presented by the [petitioners], that she did not know
"The registration contemplated under Art. 1544 has
anything about the earlier sale and claim of the
been held to refer to registration under Act 496 Land
spouses Abrigo, until after she had bought the same,
Registration Act (now PD 1529) which considers the
and only then when she bought the same, and only
act of registration as the operative act that binds the
then when she brought an ejectment case with the x x
land (see Mediante vs. Rosabal, 1 O.G. [12] 900,
x Municipal Court of Mangaldan, known as Civil Case
Garcia vs. Rosabal, 73 Phil 694). On lands covered
No. 1452. To the [Respondent] De Vera, the only
by the Torrens System, the purchaser acquires such
legal truth upon which she had to rely was that the
rights and interest as they appear in the certificate of
land is registered in the name of Gloria Villafania, her
title, unaffected by any prior lien or encumbrance not
vendor, and that her title under the law, is absolute
noted therein. The purchaser is not required to
and indefeasible. x x x."48
explore farther than what the Torrens title, upon its
face, indicates. The only exception is where the
purchaser has actual knowledge of a flaw or defect in
the title of the seller or of such liens or encumbrances We find no reason to disturb these findings, which
which, as to him, is equivalent to registration (see petitioners have not rebutted. Spouses Abrigo base
Sec. 39, Act 496; Bernales vs. IAC, G.R. 75336, 18 their position only on the general averment that
October 1988; Hernandez vs. Sales, 69 Phil 744; respondent should have been more vigilant prior to
Tajonera vs. Court of Appeals, L-26677, 27 March consummating the sale. They argue that had she
1981),"46 inspected the property, she would have found
petitioners to be in possession.49

Respondent in Good Faith

This argument is contradicted, however, by the
spouses’ own admission that the parents and the
sister of Villafania were still the actual occupants in its assailed Resolution, the appellate court denied
October 1997, when Respondent De Vera purchased herein petitioner Elvira T. Arangote’s Motion for
the property.50 The family members may reasonably Reconsideration.
be assumed to be Villafania’s agents, who had not
been shown to have notified respondent of the first
sale when she conducted an ocular inspection. Thus,
good faith on respondent’s part stands. Elvira T. Arangote, herein petitioner married to Ray
Mars E. Arangote, is the registered owner of the
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the subject property, as evidenced by Original Certificate
assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against of Title (OCT) No. CLOA-1748.6 Respondents Martin
petitioners. (Martin II) and Romeo are first cousins and the
grandnephews of Esperanza Maglunob-Dailisan
SO ORDERED. (Esperanza), from whom petitioner acquired the
subject property.
G.R. No. 178906 February 18, 2009

The Petition stems from a Complaint7 filed by

ELVIRA T. ARANGOTE, petitioner, petitioner and her husband against the respondents
for Quieting of Title, Declaration of Ownership and
vs. Possession, Damages with Preliminary Injunction,
SPS. MARTIN MAGLUNOB and LOURDES S. and Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order before
MAGLUNOB, and ROMEO SALIDO, Respondents. the MCTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 156.

DECISION The Complaint alleged that Esperanza inherited the

subject property from her uncle Victorino Sorrosa by
virtue of a notarized Partition Agreement8 dated 29
April 1985, executed by the latter’s heirs. Thereafter,
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: Esperanza declared the subject property in her name
for real property tax purposes, as evidenced by Tax
Declaration No. 16218 (1985).9
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure seeking to reverse and set aside the The Complaint further stated that on 24 June 1985,
Decision1 dated 27 October 2006 and Resolution2 Esperanza executed a Last Will and Testament10
dated 29 June 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA- bequeathing the subject property to petitioner and her
G.R. SP No. 64970. In its assailed Decision, the husband, but it was never probated. On 9 June 1986,
appellate court affirmed the Decision3 dated 12 Esperanza executed another document, an
September 2000 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Affidavit,11 in which she renounced, relinquished,
6th Judicial Region, Branch 1, Kalibo, Aklan, in Civil waived and quitclaimed all her rights, share, interest
Case No. 5511, which reversed the Decision4 dated 6 and participation whatsoever in the subject property in
April 1998 of the 7th Municipal Circuit Trial Court favor of petitioner and her husband. On the basis
(MCTC) of Ibajay-Nabas, Ibajay, Aklan, in Civil Case thereof, Tax Declaration No. 16218 in the name of
No. 156; and declared5 the herein respondent- Esperanza was cancelled and Tax Declaration No.
Spouses Martin and Lourdes Maglunob (Spouses 1666612 (1987) was issued in the name of the
Maglunob) and respondent Romeo Salido (Romeo) petitioner and her husband.
as the lawful owners and possessors of Lot 12897
with an area of 982 square meters, more or less,
located in Maloco, Ibajay, Aklan (subject property). In
In 1989, petitioner and her husband constructed a and her husband as the true and lawful owners of the
house on the subject property. On 26 March 1993, subject property. The decretal portion of the MCTC
OCT No. CLOA-1748 was issued by the Secretary of Decision reads:
the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) in the
name of petitioner, married to Ray Mars E. Arangote.
However, respondents, together with some hired
persons, entered the subject property on 3 June 1994 WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
and built a hollow block wall behind and in front of
petitioner’s house, which effectively blocked the
entrance to its main door. A. Declaring the [herein petitioner and her husband]
the true, lawful and exclusive owners and entitled to
the possession of the [subject property] described and
As a consequence thereof, petitioner and her referred to under paragraph 2 of the [C]omplaint and
husband were compelled to institute Civil Case No. covered by Tax Declaration No. 16666 in the names
156. of the [petitioner and her husband];

In their Answer with Counterclaim in Civil Case No. B. Ordering the [herein respondents] and anyone
156, respondents averred that they co-owned the hired by, acting or working for them, to cease and
subject property with Esperanza. Esperanza and her desist from asserting or claiming any right or interest
siblings, Tomas and Inocencia, inherited the subject in, or exercising any act of ownership or possession
property, in equal shares, from their father Martin over the [subject property];
Maglunob (Martin I). When Tomas and Inocencia
passed away, their shares passed on by inheritance
to respondents Martin II and Romeo, respectively. C. Ordering the [respondents] to pay the [petitioner
Hence, the subject property was co-owned by and her husband] the amount of ₱10,000.00 as
Esperanza, respondent Martin II (together with his attorney’s fee. With cost against the [respondents].13
wife Lourdes), and respondent Romeo, each holding
a one-third pro-indiviso share therein. Thus,
Esperanza could not validly waive her rights and
interest over the entire subject property in favor of the The respondents appealed the aforesaid MCTC
petitioner. Decision to the RTC. Their appeal was docketed as
Civil Case No. 5511.

Respondents also asserted in their Counterclaim that

petitioner and her husband, by means of fraud, undue Respondents argued in their appeal that the MCTC
influence and deceit were able to make Esperanza, erred in not dismissing the Complaint filed by the
who was already old and illiterate, affix her petitioner and her husband for failure to identify the
thumbmark to the Affidavit dated 9 June 1986, subject property therein. Respondents further faulted
wherein she renounced all her rights and interest over the MCTC for not declaring Esperanza’s Affidavit
the subject property in favor of petitioner and her dated 9 June 1986 -- relinquishing all her rights and
husband. Respondents thus prayed that the OCT interest over the subject property in favor of petitioner
issued in petitioner’s name be declared null and void and her husband -- as null and void insofar as
insofar as their two-thirds shares are concerned. respondents’ two-thirds share in the subject property
is concerned.

After trial, the MCTC rendered its Decision dated 6

April 1998 in Civil Case No. 156, declaring petitioner On 12 September 2000, the RTC rendered its
Decision reversing the MCTC Decision dated 6 April
1998. The RTC adjudged respondents, as well as the of Civil Procedure, before the Court of Appeals, where
other heirs of Martin Maglunob, as the lawful owners the Petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 64970.
and possessors of the entire subject property. The
RTC decreed:
In their Petition before the appellate court, petitioner
and her husband raised the following errors
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as committed by the RTC in its 12 September 2000
follows: Decision:

1) The appealed [D]ecision is REVERSED; I. It erred in reversing the [D]ecision of the [MCTC];

2) [Herein respondents] and the other heirs of Martin II. It erred in declaring the [herein respondents] and
Maglunob are declared the lawful owners and the other heirs of Martin Maglunob as the lawful
possessors of the whole [subject property] as owners and possessors of the whole [subject
described in Paragraph 2 of the [C]omplaint, as property];
against the [herein petitioner and her husband].

III. It erred in declaring [OCT] No. CLOA-1748 in the

3) [Petitioner and her husband] are ordered to name of [herein petitioner] Elvie T. Arangote as null
immediately turn over possession of the [subject and void;
property] to the [respondents] and the other heirs of
Martin Maglunob; and
IV. It erred in denying [petitioner and her husband’s]
[M]otion for [N]ew [T]rial or [R]econsideration dated
4) [Petitioner and her husband] are ordered to pay [26 September 2000; and
[respondents] attorney’s fees of ₱5,000.00, other
litigation expenses of ₱5,000.00, moral damages of
₱10,000.00 and exemplary damages of P5,000.00.14
V. It erred in not declaring the [petitioner and her
husband] as possessors in good faith.20

Petitioner and her husband filed before the RTC, on

26 September 2000, a Motion for New Trial or
Reconsideration15 on the ground of newly discovered On 27 October 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered a
evidence consisting of a Deed of Acceptance16 dated Decision denying the Petition for Review of petitioner
23 September 2000, and notice17 of the same, which and her husband and affirming the RTC Decision
were both made by the petitioner, for herself and in dated 12 September 2000. Petitioner and her
behalf of her husband,18 during the lifetime of husband’s subsequent Motion for Reconsideration
Esperanza. In the RTC Order19 dated 2 May 2001, was similarly denied by the Court of Appeals in its
however, the RTC denied the aforesaid Motion for Resolution dated 29 June 2007.
New Trial or Reconsideration.

Hence, petitioner21 now comes before this Court

The petitioner and her husband then filed a Petition raising in her Petition the following issues:
for Review, under Rule 42 of the 1997 Revised Rules
I. Whether the [RTC] acted with grave abuse of Finally, petitioner argues that, assuming for the sake
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction of argument, that Esperanza’s Affidavit is null and
when it declared the [petitioner and her husband’s title void, petitioner and her husband had no knowledge of
to the subject property] null and void; any flaw in Esperanza’s title when the latter
relinquished her rights to and interest in the subject
property in their favor. Hence, petitioner and her
husband can be considered as possessors in good
II. Whether the [RTC] acted with grave abuse of faith and entitled to the rights provided under Articles
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it 448 and 546 of the Civil Code.
declared the Affidavit of Quitclaim null and void; and

This present Petition is devoid of merit.

III. Whether the [RTC] and the Honorable Court of
Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
rejected petitioner’s claim as possessors (sic) in good It is a hornbook doctrine that the findings of fact of the
faith, hence, entitled to the rights provided in [Article] trial court are entitled to great weight on appeal and
448 and [Article] 546 of the Civil Code.22 should not be disturbed except for strong and valid
reasons, because the trial court is in a better position
to examine the demeanor of the witnesses while
testifying. It is not a function of this Court to analyze
Petitioner contends that the aforesaid OCT No. and weigh evidence by the parties all over again. This
CLOA-1748 was issued in her name on 26 March Court’s jurisdiction is, in principle, limited to reviewing
1993 and was registered in the Registry of Deeds of errors of law that might have been committed by the
Aklan on 20 April 1993. From 20 April 1993 until the Court of Appeals.23 This rule, however, is subject to
institution of Civil Case No. 156 on 10 June 1994 several exceptions,24 one of which is present in this
before the MCTC, more than one year had already case, i.e., when the factual findings of the Court of
elapsed. Considering that a Torrens title can only be Appeals and the trial court are contradictory.
attacked within one year after the date of the issuance
of the decree of registration on the ground of fraud
and that such attack must be through a direct
proceeding, it was an error on the part of the RTC and In this case, the findings of fact of the MCTC as
the Court of Appeals to declare OCT No. CLOA-1748 regards the origin of the subject property are in
null and void. conflict with the findings of fact of both the RTC and
the Court of Appeals. Hence, this Court will have to
examine the records to determine first the true origin
of the subject property and to settle whether the
Petitioner additionally posits that both the RTC and respondents have the right over the same for being
the Court of Appeals committed a mistake in declaring co-heirs and co-owners, together with their grand
null and void the Affidavit dated 9 June 1986 aunt, Esperanza, before this Court can resolve the
executed by Esperanza, waiving all her rights and issues raised by the petitioner in her Petition.
interest over the subject property in favor of petitioner
and her husband. Esperanza’s Affidavit is a valid and
binding proof of the transfer of ownership of the
subject property in petitioner’s name, as it was also After a careful scrutiny of the records, this Court
coupled with actual delivery of possession of the affirms the findings of both the RTC and the Court of
subject property to petitioner and her husband. The Appeals as regards the origin of the subject property
Affidavit is also proof of good faith on the part of and the fact that respondents, with their grand aunt
petitioner and her husband. Esperanza, were co-heirs and co-owners of the
subject property.
The records disclosed that the subject property was however, that the subject property, measuring 982
part of a parcel of land25 situated in Maloco, Ibajay, square meters, allocated to Esperanza under the
Aklan, consisting of 7,176 square meters and Partition Agreement dated 29 April 1985, is already
commonly owned in equal shares by the siblings inclusive of the smaller parcel of 897 square meters
Pantaleon Maglunob (Pantaleon) and Placida assigned to her under the Deed of Extrajudicial
Maglunob-Sorrosa (Placida). Upon the death of Settlement and Partition of Estate dated July 1981. As
Pantaleon and Placida, their surviving and legal heirs explained by the RTC in its 12 September 2000
executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Decision:
Partition of Estate in July 1981,26 however, the Deed
was not notarized. Considering that Pantaleon died
without issue, his one-half share in the parcel of land
he co-owned with Placida passed on to his four The [subject property] which is claimed by the [herein
siblings (or their respective heirs, if already petitioner and her husband] and that which is claimed
deceased), namely: Placida, Luis, Martin I, and by the [herein respondents] are one and the same,
Victoria, in equal shares. the difference in area and technical description being
due to the repartition and re-allocation of the parcel of
land originally co-owned by Pantaleon Maglunob and
his sister Placida Maglunob and subsequently
According to the aforementioned Deed of Extrajudicial declared in the name of [Victorino] under Tax
Settlement and Partition of Estate, the surviving and Declaration No. 5988 of 1949.32
legal heirs of Pantaleon and Placida agreed to have
the parcel of land commonly owned by the siblings
declared for real property tax purposes in the name of
Victorino Sorrosa (Victorino), Placida’s husband. It is clear from the records that the subject property
Thus, Tax Declarations No. 5988 (1942),27 No. 6200 was not Esperanza’s exclusive share, but also that of
(1945)28 and No. 7233 (1953)29 were all issued in the other heirs of her father, Martin I. Esperanza
the name of Victorino. expressly affixed her thumbmark to the Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement of July 1981 not only for
herself, but also on behalf of the other heirs of Martin
I. Though in the Partition Agreement dated 29 April
Since Martin I already passed away when the Deed of 1985 Esperanza affixed her thumbmark without
Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition of Estate was stating that she was doing so not only for herself, but
executed, his heirs30 were represented therein by also on behalf of the other heirs of Martin I, this does
Esperanza. By virtue of the said Deed, Martin I not mean that Esperanza was already the exclusive
received as inheritance a portion of the parcel of land owner thereof. The evidence shows that the subject
measuring 897 square meters. property is the share of the heirs of Martin I. This is
clear from the sketch33 attached to the Partition
Agreement dated 29 April 1985, which reveals the
proportionate areas given to the heirs of the two
After the death of Victorino, his heirs31 executed siblings, Pantaleon and Placida, who were the original
another Partition Agreement on 29 April 1985, which owners of the whole parcel of land34 from which the
was notarized on the same date. The Partition subject property was taken.
Agreement mentioned four parcels of land. The
subject property, consisting of a portion of the
consolidated parcels 1, 2, and 3, and measuring
around 982 square meters, was allocated to Further, it bears emphasis that the Partition
Esperanza. In comparison, the property given to Agreement was executed by and among the son,
Esperanza under the Partition Agreement is bigger grandsons, granddaughters and cousins of Victorino.
than the one originally allocated to her earlier under Esperanza was neither the granddaughter nor the
the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition of cousin of Victorino, as she was only Victorino’s
Estate dated July 1981, which had an area of only grandniece. The cousin of Victorino is Martin I,
897 square meters. It may be reasonably assumed, Esperanza’s father. In effect, therefore, the subject
property allotted to Esperanza in the Partition the said Affidavit was to donate her share in the
Agreement was not her exclusive share, as she holds subject property to petitioner and her husband.
the same for and on behalf of the other heirs of Martin
I, who was already deceased at the time the Partition
Agreement was made.
As no onerous undertaking is required of petitioner
and her husband under the said Affidavit, the
donation is regarded as a pure donation of an interest
To further bolster the truth that the subject property in a real property covered by Article 749 of the Civil
was not exclusively owned by Esperanza, the Affidavit Code.36 Article 749 of the Civil Code provides:
she executed in favor of petitioner and her husband
on 6 June 1985 was worded as follows:

Art. 749. In order that the donation of an immovable

That I hereby renounce, relinquish, waive and may be valid, it must be made in a public document,
quitclaim all my rights, share, interest and specifying therein the property donated and the value
participation whatsoever in the [subject property] unto of the charges which the donee must satisfy.
the said Sps. Ray Mars Arangote and Elvira T.
Arangote, their heirs, successors, and assigns
including the improvement found thereon;35
The acceptance may be made in the same deed of
donation or in a separate public document, but it shall
not take effect unless it is done during the lifetime of
Logically, if Esperanza fully owned the subject the donor.
property, she would have simply waived her rights to
and interest in the subject property, without
mentioning her "share" and "participation" in the
same. By including such words in her Affidavit, If the acceptance is made in a separate instrument,
Esperanza was aware of and was limiting her waiver, the donor shall be notified thereof in an authentic
renunciation, and quitclaim to her one-third share and form, and this step shall be noted in both instruments.
participation in the subject property.

From the aforesaid provision, there are three

Going to the issues raised by the petitioner in this requisites for the validity of a simple donation of a real
Petition, this Court will resolve the same concurrently property, to wit: (1) it must be made in a public
as they are interrelated. instrument; (2) it must be accepted, which acceptance
may be made either in the same Deed of Donation or
in a separate public instrument; and (3) if the
acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the
In this case, the petitioner derived her title to the donor must be notified in an authentic form, and the
subject property from the notarized Affidavit executed same must be noted in both instruments.
by Esperanza, wherein the latter relinquished her
rights, share, interest and participation over the same
in favor of the petitioner and her husband.
This Court agrees with the RTC and the Court of
Appeals that the Affidavit executed by Esperanza
relinquishing her rights, share, interest and
A careful perusal of the said Affidavit reveals that it is participation over the subject property in favor of the
not what it purports to be. Esperanza’s Affidavit is, in petitioner and her husband suffered from legal
fact, a Donation. Esperanza’s real intent in executing infirmities, as it failed to comply with the aforesaid
requisites of the law.
 received by the donor and noted in both the Deed of
Donation and the separate instrument embodying the
In Sumipat v. Banga,37 this Court declared that title to acceptance.41 At the very least, this last legal
immovable property does not pass from the donor to requisite of annotation in both instruments of donation
the donee by virtue of a Deed of Donation until and and acceptance was not fulfilled by the petitioner.
unless it has been accepted in a public instrument Neither the Affidavit nor the Deed of Acceptance
and the donor duly notified thereof. The acceptance bears the fact that Esperanza received notice of the
may be made in the very same instrument of acceptance of the donation by petitioner. For this
donation. If the acceptance does not appear in the reason, even Esperanza’s one-third share in the
same document, it must be made in another. Where subject property cannot be adjudicated to the
the Deed of Donation fails to show the acceptance, or petitioner.
where the formal notice of the acceptance, made in a
separate instrument, is either not given to the donor
or else not noted in the Deed of Donation and in the
separate acceptance, the donation is null and void.38 With the foregoing, this Court holds that the RTC and
the Court of Appeals did not err in declaring null and
void Esperanza’s Affidavit.

In the present case, the said Affidavit, which is

tantamount to a Deed of Donation, met the first
requisite, as it was notarized; thus, it became a public The next issue to be resolved then is whether the
instrument. Nevertheless, it failed to meet the RTC, as well as the Court of Appeals, erred in
aforesaid second and third requisites. The declaring OCT No. CLOA-1748 in the name of
acceptance of the said donation was not made by the petitioner and her husband null and void.
petitioner and her husband either in the same Affidavit
or in a separate public instrument. As there was no
acceptance made of the said donation, there was also Again, this Court answers the said issue in the
no notice of the said acceptance given to the donor, negative.
Esperanza. Therefore, the Affidavit executed by
Esperanza in favor of petitioner and her husband is
null and void.
Section 48 of Presidential decree No. 1529 states:

The subsequent notarized Deed of Acceptance39

dated 23 September 2000, as well as the notice40 of SEC. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. -
such acceptance, executed by the petitioner did not A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral
cure the defect. Moreover, it was only made by the attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled
petitioner several years after the Complaint was filed except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.
in court, or when the RTC had already rendered its
Decision dated 12 September 2000, although it was
still during Esperanza’s lifetime. Evidently, its
Such proscription has long been enshrined in
execution was a mere afterthought, a belated attempt
Philippine jurisprudence. The judicial action required
to cure what was a defective donation.
to challenge the validity of title is a direct attack, not a
collateral attack.42

It is true that the acceptance of a donation may be

made at any time during the lifetime of the donor. And
The attack is considered direct when the object of an
granting arguendo that such acceptance may still be
action is to annul or set aside such proceeding, or
admitted in evidence on appeal, there is still need for
enjoin its enforcement. Conversely, an attack is
proof that a formal notice of such acceptance was
indirect or collateral when, in an action to obtain a
different relief, an attack on the proceeding is Esperanza’s Affidavit, which was the sole basis of
nevertheless made as an incident thereof. Such petitioner’s claim to the subject property, has been
action to attack a certificate of title may be an original declared null and void. Moreover, petitioner and her
action or a counterclaim, in which a certificate of title husband were not tenants of the subject property. In
is assailed as void.43 fact, petitioner herself admitted in her Complaint filed
before the MCTC that her husband is out of the
country, rendering it impossible for him to work on the
subject property as a tenant. Instead of cultivating the
A counterclaim is considered a new suit in which the subject property, petitioner and her husband
defendant is the plaintiff and the plaintiff in the possessed the same by constructing a house thereon.
complaint becomes the defendant. It stands on the Thus, it is highly suspicious how the petitioner was
same footing as, and is to be tested by the same rules able to secure from the DAR a Certificate of Land
as if it were, an independent action.44 Ownership Award (CLOA) over the subject property.
The DAR awards such certificates to the grantees
only if they fulfill the requirements of Republic Act No.
In their Answer to the Complaint for Quieting of Title 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
filed by the petitioner and her husband before the Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).45 Hence, the
MCTC, respondents included therein a Counterclaim RTC and the Court of Appeals did not err in declaring
wherein they repleaded all the material allegations in null and void OCT No. CLOA-1748 in the name of the
their affirmative defenses, the most essential of which petitioner, married to Ray Mars E. Arangote.
was their claim that petitioner and her husband -- by
means of fraud, undue influence and deceit -- were
able to make their grand aunt, Esperanza, who was Considering that Esperanza died without any
already old and illiterate, affix her thumbmark to the compulsory heirs and that the supposed donation of
Affidavit, wherein she renounced, waived, and her one-third share in the subject property per her
quitclaimed all her rights and interest over the subject Affidavit dated 9 June 1985 was already declared null
property in favor of petitioner and her husband. In and void, Esperanza’s one-third share in the subject
addition, respondents maintained in their Answer that property passed on to her legal heirs, the
as petitioner and her husband were not tenants either respondents.
of Esperanza or of the respondents, the DAR could
not have validly issued in favor of petitioner and her
husband OCT No. CLOA-1748. Thus, the
respondents prayed, in their counterclaim in Civil As petitioner’s last-ditch effort, she claims that she is
Case No. 156 before the MCTC, that OCT No. CLOA- a possessor in good faith and, thus, entitled to the
1748 issued in the name of petitioner, married to Ray rights provided for under Articles 448 and 546 of the
Mars E. Arangote, be declared null and void, insofar Civil Code.
as their two-thirds shares in the subject property are
concerned.
This claim is untenable.

It is clear, thus, that respondents’ Answer with

Counterclaim was a direct attack on petitioner’s
certificate of title. Furthermore, since all the essential The Civil Code describes a possessor in good faith as
facts of the case for the determination of the validity of follows:
the title are now before this Court, to require
respondents to institute a separate cancellation
proceeding would be pointlessly circuitous and Art. 526. He is deemed a possessor in good faith who
against the best interest of justice. is not aware that there exists in his title or mode of
acquisition any flaw which invalidates it.
 Moreover, the petitioner cannot be considered a
builder in good faith of the house on the subject
He is deemed a possessor in bad faith who property. In the context that such term is used in
possesses in any case contrary to the foregoing. particular reference to Article 448 of the Civil Code, a
builder in good faith is one who, not being the owner
of the land, builds on that land, believing himself to be
Mistake upon a doubtful or difficult question of law its owner and unaware of any defect in his title or
may be the basis of good faith. mode of acquisition.47

Art. 1127. The good faith of the possessor consists in The various provisions of the Civil Code, pertinent to
the reasonable belief that the person from whom he the subject, read:
received the thing was the owner thereof, and could
transmit his ownership.
Article 448. The owner of the land on which anything
has been built, sown, or planted in good faith, shall
Possession in good faith ceases from the moment have the right to appropriate as his own the works,
defects in the title are made known to the possessor sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity
by extraneous evidence or by a suit for recovery of provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the
the property by the true owner. Every possessor in one who built or planted to pay the price of the land,
good faith becomes a possessor in bad faith from the and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However,
moment he becomes aware that what he believed to the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the
be true is not so.46 land if its value is considerably more than that of the
building or trees. In such a case, he shall pay
reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not
choose to appropriate the building or trees after
In the present case, when respondents came to know proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the
that an OCT over the subject property was issued and terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the
registered in petitioner’s name on 26 March 1993, court shall fix the terms thereof.1avvphi1
respondents brought a Complaint on 7 August 1993
before the Lupon of Barangay Maloco, Ibajay, Aklan,
challenging the title of petitioner to the subject
property on the basis that said property constitutes Article 449. He who builds, plants, or sows in bad faith
the inheritance of respondent, together with their on the land of another, loses what is built, planted or
grandaunt Esperanza, so Esperanza had no authority sown without right to indemnity.
to relinquish the entire subject property to petitioner.
From that moment, the good faith of the petitioner had
ceased. Article 450. The owner of the land on which anything
has been built, planted or sown in bad faith may
demand the demolition of the work, or that the
Petitioner cannot be entitled to the rights under planting or sowing be removed, in order to replace
Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code, because the things in their former condition at the expense of the
rights mentioned therein are applicable only to person who built, planted or sowed; or he may compel
builders in good faith and not to possessors in good the builder or planter to pay the price of the land, and
faith. the sower the proper rent.

Under the foregoing provisions, the builder in good

faith can compel the landowner to make a choice
between appropriating the building by paying the a tax declaration does not prove ownership. It is
proper indemnity or obliging the builder to pay the merely an indicium of a claim of ownership. Payment
price of the land. The choice belongs to the owner of of taxes is not proof of ownership; it is, at best, an
the land, a rule that accords with the principle of indicium of possession in the concept of ownership.
accession, i.e., that the accessory follows the Neither tax receipts nor a declaration of ownership for
principal and not the other way around. Even as the taxation purposes is evidence of ownership or of a
option lies with the landowner, the grant to him, right to possess realty when not supported by other
nevertheless, is preclusive. He must choose one. He effective proofs.50
cannot, for instance, compel the owner of the building
to instead remove it from the land. In order, however,
that the builder can invoke that accruing benefit and
enjoy his corresponding right to demand that a choice With the foregoing, the petitioner is not entitled to the
be made by the landowner, he should be able to rights under Article 448 and 546 as the petitioner is
prove good faith on his part.48 not a builder and possessor in good faith.

Good faith, here understood, is an intangible and WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant
abstract quality with no technical meaning or statutory Petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision and
definition, and it encompasses, among other things, Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
an honest belief, the absence of malice and the 64970, dated 27 October 2006 and 29 June 2007,
absence of design to defraud or to seek an respectively, affirming the RTC Decision dated 12
unconscionable advantage. An individual’s personal September 2000 in Civil Case No. 5511 and declaring
good faith is a concept of his own mind and, the respondents the lawful owners and possessors of
therefore, may not conclusively be determined by his the subject property are hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
protestations alone. It implies honesty of intention,
and freedom from knowledge of circumstances which
ought to put the holder upon inquiry. The essence of SO ORDERED.
good faith lies in an honest belief in the validity of
one’s right, ignorance of a superior claim, and
absence of intention to overreach another. Applied to
possession, one is considered in good faith if he is not
aware that there exists in his title or mode of
acquisition any flaw which invalidates it.49

In this case, the subject property waived and

quitclaimed by Esperanza to the petitioner and her
husband in the Affidavit was only covered by a tax
declaration in the name of Esperanza. Petitioner did
not even bother to look into the origin of the subject
property and to probe into the right of Esperanza to
relinquish the same. Thus, when petitioner and her
husband built a house thereon in 1989 they cannot be
considered to have acted in good faith as they were
fully aware that when Esperanza executed an
Affidavit relinquishing in their favor the subject
property the only proof of Esperanza’s ownership over
the same was a mere tax declaration. This fact or
circumstance alone was enough to put the petitioner
and her husband under inquiry. Settled is the rule that
 Roque Naranja was the registered owner of a parcel
of land, denominated as Lot No. 4 in Consolidation-
Subdivision Plan (LRC) Pcs-886, Bacolod Cadastre,
with an area of 136 square meters and covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-18764.
Roque was also a co-owner of an adjacent lot, Lot
No. 2, of the same subdivision plan, which he co-
owned with his brothers, Gabino and Placido Naranja.
When Placido died, his one-third share was inherited
by his children, Nenita, Nazareto, Nilda, Naida and
Neolanda, all surnamed Naranja, herein petitioners.
Lot No. 2 is covered by TCT No. T-18762 in the
names of Roque, Gabino and the said children of
Placido. TCT No. T-18762 remained even after
Gabino died. The other petitioners — Serafin Naranja,
Raul Naranja, and Amelia Naranja-Rubinos — are the
children of Gabino.3

G.R. No. 160132 April 17, 2009

The two lots were being leased by Esso Standard
Eastern, Inc. for 30 years from 1962-1992. For his
SERAFIN, RAUL, NENITA, NAZARETO, properties, Roque was being paid ₱200.00 per month
NEOLANDA, all surnamed NARANJA, AMELIA by the company.4
NARANJA-RUBINOS, NILDA NARANJA-LIMANA,
and NAIDA NARANJA-GICANO, Petitioners,

vs. In 1976, Roque, who was single and had no children,

lived with his half sister, Lucilia P. Belardo (Belardo),
COURT OF APPEALS, LUCILIA P. BELARDO, in Pontevedra, Negros Occidental. At that time, a
represented by her Attorney-in-Fact, REBECCA catheter was attached to Roque’s body to help him
CORDERO, and THE LOCAL REGISTER OF urinate. But the catheter was subsequently removed
DEEDS, BACOLOD CITY, Respondents. when Roque was already able to urinate normally.
Other than this and the influenza prior to his death,
Roque had been physically sound.5
DECISION

Roque had no other source of income except for the

₱200.00 monthly rental of his two properties. To
NACHURA, J.:
show his gratitude to Belardo, Roque sold Lot No. 4
and his one-third share in Lot No. 2 to Belardo on
August 21, 1981, through a Deed of Sale of Real
This petition seeks a review of the Court of Appeals Property which was duly notarized by Atty. Eugenio
(CA) Decision1 dated September 13, 2002 and Sanicas. The Deed of Sale reads:
Resolution2 dated September 24, 2003 which upheld
the contract of sale executed by petitioners’
predecessor, Roque Naranja, during his lifetime, over
I, ROQUE NARANJA, of legal age, single, Filipino
two real properties.
and a resident of Bacolod City, do hereby declare that
I am the registered owner of Lot No. 4 of the
Cadastral Survey of the City of Bacolod, consisting of
136 square meters, more or less, covered by Transfer reached ₱15,000.00, Dema-ala required a security.
Certificate of Title No. T-18764 and a co-owner of Lot On November 19, 1983, Roque executed a deed of
No. 2, situated at the City of Bacolod, consisting of sale in favor of Dema-ala, covering his two properties
151 square meters, more or less, covered by Transfer in consideration of the ₱15,000.00 outstanding loan
Certificate of Title No. T-18762 and my share in the and an additional ₱15,000.00, for a total of
aforesaid Lot No. 2 is one-third share. ₱30,000.00. Dema-ala explained that she wanted
Roque to execute the deed of sale himself since the
properties were still in his name. Belardo merely
acted as a witness. The titles to the properties were
That for and in consideration of the sum of TEN given to Dema-ala for safekeeping.9
THOUSAND PESOS (₱10,000.00), Philippine
Currency, and other valuable consideration, receipt of
which in full I hereby acknowledge to my entire
satisfaction, by these presents, I hereby transfer and Three days later, or on December 2, 1983, Roque
convey by way of absolute sale the above-mentioned died of influenza. The proceeds of the loan were used
Lot No. 4 consisting of 136 square meters covered by for his treatment while the rest was spent for his
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-18764 and my one- burial.10
third share in Lot No. 2, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-18762, in favor of my sister
LUCILIA P. BELARDO, of legal age, Filipino citizen,
married to Alfonso D. Belardo, and a resident of In 1985, Belardo fully paid the loan secured by the
Pontevedra, Negros Occidental, her heirs, successors second deed of sale. Dema-ala returned the
and assigns. certificates of title to Belardo, who, in turn, gave them
back to Atty. Sanicas.11

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my

hand this 21st day of August, 1981 at Bacolod City, Unknown to Belardo, petitioners, the children of
Philippines. Placido and Gabino Naranja, executed an
Extrajudicial Settlement Among Heirs12 on October
11, 1985, adjudicating among themselves Lot No. 4.
On February 19, 1986, petitioner Amelia Naranja-
(SGD.) Rubinos, accompanied by Belardo, borrowed the two
TCTs, together with the lease agreement with Esso
ROQUE NARANJA6 Standard Eastern, Inc., from Atty. Sanicas on account
of the loan being proposed by Belardo to her.
Thereafter, petitioners had the Extrajudicial
Roque’s copies of TCT No. T-18764 and TCT No. T- Settlement Among Heirs notarized on February 25,
18762 were entrusted to Atty. Sanicas for registration 1986. With Roque’s copy of TCT No. T-18764 in their
of the deed of sale and transfer of the titles to possession, they succeeded in having it cancelled
Belardo. But the deed of sale could not be registered and a new certificate of title, TCT No. T-140184,
because Belardo did not have the money to pay for issued in their names.13
the registration fees.7

In 1987, Belardo decided to register the Deed of Sale

Belardo’s only source of income was her store and dated August 21, 1981. With no title in hand, she was
coffee shop. Sometimes, her children would give her compelled to file a petition with the RTC to direct the
money to help with the household expenses, including Register of Deeds to annotate the deed of sale even
the expenses incurred for Roque’s support. At times, without a copy of the TCTs. In an Order dated June
she would also borrow money from Margarita Dema- 18, 1987, the RTC granted the petition. But she only
ala, a neighbor.8 When the amount of her loan succeeded in registering the deed of sale in TCT No.
T-18762 because TCT No. T-18764 had already been was not a purchaser in good faith since she acted as
cancelled.14 a witness to the second sale of the property knowing
that she had already purchased the property from
Roque. Whatever rights private respondent had over
the properties could not be superior to the rights of
On December 11, 1989, Atty. Sanicas prepared a petitioners, who are now the registered owners of the
certificate of authorization, giving Belardo’s daughter, parcels of land. The RTC disposed, thus:
Jennelyn P. Vargas, the authority to collect the
payments from Esso Standard Eastern, Inc. But it
appeared from the company’s Advice of Fixed
Payment that payment of the lease rental had already IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is
been transferred from Belardo to Amelia Naranja- hereby rendered:
Rubinos because of the Extrajudicial Settlement
Among Heirs.
1. Dismissing Civil Case No. 7144.

On June 23, 1992, Belardo,15 through her daughter

and attorney-in-fact, Rebecca Cordero, instituted a
suit for reconveyance with damages. The complaint 2. Civil Case No. 7214.
prayed that judgment be rendered declaring Belardo
as the sole legal owner of Lot No. 4, declaring null
and void the Extrajudicial Settlement Among Heirs, a) Declaring the Deed of Sale dated August 21, 1981,
and TCT No. T-140184, and ordering petitioners to executed by Roque Naranja, covering his one-third
reconvey to her the subject property and to pay (1/3) share of Lot 2 of the consolidation-subdivision
damages. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. plan (LRC) Pcs-886, being a portion of the
7144. consolidation of Lots 240-A, 240-B, 240-C and 240-D,
described on plan, Psd-33443 (LRC) GLRO Cad.
Rec. No. 55 in favor of Lucilia Belardo, and entered
Subsequently, petitioners also filed a case against as Doc. No. 80, Page 17, Book No. XXXVI, Series of
respondent for annulment of sale and quieting of title 1981 of Notary Public Eugenio Sanicas of Bacolod
with damages, praying, among others, that judgment City, as null and void and of no force and effect;
be rendered nullifying the Deed of Sale, and ordering
the Register of Deeds of Bacolod City to cancel the
annotation of the Deed of Sale on TCT No. T-18762. b) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Bacolod City to
This case was docketed as Civil Case No. 7214. cancel Entry No. 148123 annotate at the back of
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-18762;

On March 5, 1997, the RTC rendered a Decision in

the consolidated cases in favor of petitioners. The trial c) Ordering Lucilia Belardo or her successors-in-
court noted that the Deed of Sale was defective in interest to pay plaintiffs the sum of ₱20,000.00 as
form since it did not contain a technical description of attorney’s fees, the amount of ₱500.00 as
the subject properties but merely indicated that they appearance fees.
were Lot No. 4, covered by TCT No. T-18764
consisting of 136 square meters, and one-third portion
of Lot No. 2 covered by TCT No. T-18762. The trial
court held that, being defective in form, the Deed of Counterclaims in both Civil Cases Nos. 7144 and
Sale did not vest title in private respondent. Full and 7214 are hereby DISMISSED.
absolute ownership did not pass to private respondent
because she failed to register the Deed of Sale. She
SO ORDERED.16 SO ORDERED.17

On September 13, 2002, the CA reversed the RTC The CA denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration
Decision. The CA held that the unregisterability of a on September 24, 2003.18 Petitioners filed this
deed of sale will not undermine its validity and petition for review, raising the following issues:
efficacy in transferring ownership of the properties to
private respondent. The CA noted that the records
were devoid of any proof evidencing the alleged
vitiation of Roque’s consent to the sale; hence, there 1. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE
is no reason to invalidate the sale. Registration is only RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS IS CORRECT
necessary to bind third parties, which petitioners, IN IGNORING THE POINT RAISED BY
being the heirs of Roque Naranja, are not. The trial [PETITIONERS] THAT THE DEED OF SALE WHICH
court erred in applying Article 1544 of the Civil Code DOES NOT COMPL[Y] WITH THE PROVISIONS OF
to the case at bar since petitioners are not purchasers ACT NO. 496 IS [NOT] VALID.
of the said properties. Hence, it is not significant that
private respondent failed to register the deed of sale
before the extrajudicial settlement among the heirs. 2. WHETHER OR NOT THE ALLEGED DEED OF
The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads: SALE [OF REAL PROPERTIES] IS VALID
CONSIDERING THAT THE CONSENT OF THE
LATE ROQUE NARANJA HAD BEEN VITIATED; x x
WHEREFORE, the decision dated March 5, 1997 in x THERE [IS] NO CONCLUSIVE SHOWING THAT
Civil Cases Nos. 7144 and 7214 is hereby THERE WAS CONSIDERATION AND THERE [ARE]
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof, SERIOUS IRREGULARITIES IN THE
judgment is hereby rendered as follows: NOTARIZATION OF THE SAID DOCUMENTS.19

1. Civil Case No. 7214 is hereby ordered DISMISSED In her Comment, private respondent questioned the
for lack of cause of action. Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping
attached to the Petition for Review, which was signed
by a certain Ernesto Villadelgado without a special
power of attorney. In their reply, petitioners remedied
2. In Civil Case No. 7144, the extrajudicial settlement the defect by attaching a Special Power of Attorney
executed by the heirs of Roque Naranja adjudicating signed by them.
among themselves Lot No. 4 of the consolidation-
subdivision plan (LRC) Pcs – 886 of the Bacolod
Cadastre is hereby declared null and void for want of
factual and legal basis. The certificate of title issued to Pursuant to its policy to encourage full adjudication of
the heirs of Roque Naranja (Transfer Certificate of the merits of an appeal, the Court had previously
[T]i[t]le No. T-140184) as a consequence of the void excused the late submission of a special power of
extra-judicial settlement is hereby ordered cancelled attorney to sign a certification against forum-
and the previous title to Lot No. 4, Transfer Certificate shopping.20 But even if we excuse this defect, the
of Title No. T-18764, is hereby ordered reinstated. petition nonetheless fails on the merits.
Lucilia Belardo is hereby declared the sole and legal
owner of said Lot No. 4, and one-third of Lot No. 2 of
the same consolidation-subdivision plan, Bacolod The Court does not agree with petitioners’ contention
Cadastre, by virtue of the deed of sale thereof in her that a deed of sale must contain a technical
favor dated August 21, 1981. description of the subject property in order to be valid.
Petitioners anchor their theory on Section 127 of Act
No. 496,21 which provides a sample form of a deed of must be sustained in full force and effect so long as
sale that includes, in particular, a technical description he who impugns it does not present strong, complete,
of the subject property. and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity on account
of some flaws or defects provided by law.23

To be valid, a contract of sale need not contain a

technical description of the subject property. Petitioners allege that Belardo unduly influenced
Contracts of sale of real property have no prescribed Roque, who was already physically weak and senile
form for their validity; they follow the general rule on at that time, into executing the deed of sale. Belardo
contracts that they may be entered into in whatever allegedly took advantage of the fact that Roque was
form, provided all the essential requisites for their living in her house and was dependent on her for
validity are present.22 The requisites of a valid support.
contract of sale under Article 1458 of the Civil Code
are: (1) consent or meeting of the minds; (2)
determinate subject matter; and (3) price certain in
money or its equivalent. There is undue influence when a person takes
improper advantage of his power over the will of
another, depriving the latter of a reasonable freedom
of choice.24 One who alleges any defect, or the lack
The failure of the parties to specify with absolute of consent to a contract by reason of fraud or undue
clarity the object of a contract by including its influence, must establish by full, clear and convincing
technical description is of no moment. What is evidence, such specific acts that vitiated the party’s
important is that there is, in fact, an object that is consent; otherwise, the latter’s presumed consent to
determinate or at least determinable, as subject of the the contract prevails.25 For undue influence to be
contract of sale. The form of a deed of sale provided present, the influence exerted must have so
in Section 127 of Act No. 496 is only a suggested overpowered or subjugated the mind of a contracting
form. It is not a mandatory form that must be strictly party as to destroy his free agency, making him
followed by the parties to a contract. express the will of another rather than his own.26

In the instant case, the deed of sale clearly identifies Petitioners adduced no proof that Roque had lost
the subject properties by indicating their respective lot control of his mental faculties at the time of the sale.
numbers, lot areas, and the certificate of title covering Undue influence is not to be inferred from age,
them. Resort can always be made to the technical sickness, or debility of body, if sufficient intelligence
description as stated in the certificates of title covering remains.27 The evidence presented pertained more
the two properties. to Roque’s physical condition rather than his mental
condition. On the contrary, Atty. Sanicas, the notary
public, attested that Roque was very healthy and
mentally sound and sharp at the time of the execution
On the alleged nullity of the deed of sale, we hold that of the deed of sale. Atty. Sanicas said that Roque
petitioners failed to submit sufficient proof to show also told him that he was a Law graduate.28
that Roque executed the deed of sale under the
undue influence of Belardo or that the deed of sale
was simulated or without consideration.1avvphi1
Neither was the contract simulated. The late
registration of the Deed of Sale and Roque’s
execution of the second deed of sale in favor of
A notarized document carries the evidentiary weight Dema-ala did not mean that the contract was
conferred upon it with respect to its due execution, simulated. We are convinced with the explanation
and documents acknowledged before a notary public given by respondent’s witnesses that the deed of sale
have in their favor the presumption of regularity. It
was not immediately registered because Belardo did
not have the money to pay for the fees. This
explanation is, in fact, plausible considering that
Belardo could barely support herself and her brother,
Roque. As for the second deed of sale, Dema-ala,
herself, attested before the trial court that she let
Roque sign the second deed of sale because the title
to the properties were still in his name.

Finally, petitioners argue that the Deed of Sale was

not supported by a consideration since no receipt was
shown, and it is incredulous that Roque, who was
already weak, would travel to Bacolod City just to be
able to execute the Deed of Sale.

The Deed of Sale which states "receipt of which in full

I hereby acknowledge to my entire satisfaction" is an
acknowledgment receipt in itself. Moreover, the
presumption that a contract has sufficient G.R. No. 85240 July 12, 1991
consideration cannot be overthrown by a mere
assertion that it has no consideration.29

HEIRS OF CECILIO (also known as BASILIO)

CLAUDEL, namely, MODESTA CLAUDEL, LORETA
Heirs are bound by contracts entered into by their HERRERA, JOSE CLAUDEL, BENJAMIN CLAUDEL,
predecessors-in-interest.30 As heirs of Roque, PACITA CLAUDEL, CARMELITA CLAUDEL, MARIO
petitioners are bound by the contract of sale that CLAUDEL, ROBERTO CLAUDEL, LEONARDO
Roque executed in favor of Belardo. Having been sold CLAUDEL, ARSENIA VILLALON, PERPETUA
already to Belardo, the two properties no longer CLAUDEL and FELISA CLAUDEL, petitioners,
formed part of Roque’s estate which petitioners could
have inherited. The deed of extrajudicial settlement vs.
that petitioners executed over Lot No. 4 is, therefore,
void, since the property subject thereof did not HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF MACARIO,
become part of Roque’s estate. ESPERIDIONA, RAYMUNDA and CELESTINA, all
surnamed CLAUDEL, respondents.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is

DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated Ricardo L. Moldez for petitioners.
September 13, 2002 and Resolution dated September
24, 2003 are AFFIRMED. Juan T. Aquino for private respondents

SO ORDERED.
SARMIENTO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks the reversal TCT No. 395391 1,997 sq. m. –– Jose
of the decision rendered by the Court of Appeals in Claudel
CA-G.R. CV No. 044291 and the reinstatement of the
decision of the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of
Rizal, Branch CXI, in Civil Case No. M-5276-P,
entitled. "Heirs of Macario Claudel, et al. v. Heirs of TCT No. 395392 1,997 sq. m. –– Modesta
Cecilio Claudel, et al.," which dismissed the complaint Claudel and children
of the private respondents against the petitioners for
cancellation of titles and reconveyance with
damages.2 TCT No. 395393 1,997 sq. m. –– Armenia
C. Villalon

As early as December 28, 1922, Basilio also known

as "Cecilio" Claudel, acquired from the Bureau of TCT No. 395394 1,997 sq. m. –– Felisa
Lands, Lot No. 1230 of the Muntinlupa Estate Claudel4
Subdivision, located in the poblacion of Muntinlupa,
Rizal, with an area of 10,107 square meters; he
secured Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 7471
issued by the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Four years later, on December 7, 1976, private
Rizal in 1923; he also declared the lot in his name, respondents SIBLINGS OF CECILIO, filed Civil Case
the latest Tax Declaration being No. 5795. He dutifully No. 5276-P as already adverted to at the outset, with
paid the real estate taxes thereon until his death in the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, a "Complaint
1937.3 Thereafter, his widow "Basilia" and later, her for Cancellation of Titles and Reconveyance with
son Jose, one of the herein petitioners, paid the Damages," alleging that 46 years earlier, or sometime
taxes. in 1930, their parents had purchased from the late
Cecilio Claudel several portions of Lot No. 1230 for
the sum of P30.00. They admitted that the transaction
was verbal. However, as proof of the sale, the
The same piece of land purchased by Cecilio would, SIBLINGS OF CECILIO presented a subdivision plan
however, become the subject of protracted litigation of the said land, dated March 25, 1930, indicating the
thirty-nine years after his death. portions allegedly sold to the SIBLINGS OF CECILIO.

Two branches of Cecilio's family contested the As already mentioned, the then Court of First Instance
ownership over the land-on one hand the children of of Rizal, Branch CXI, dismissed the complaint,
Cecilio, namely, Modesto, Loreta, Jose, Benjamin, disregarding the above sole evidence (subdivision
Pacita, Carmelita, Roberto, Mario, Leonardo, Nenita, plan) presented by the SIBLINGS OF CECILIO, thus:
Arsenia Villalon, and Felisa Claudel, and their children
and descendants, now the herein petitioners
(hereinafter referred to as HEIRS OF CECILIO), and
on the other, the brother and sisters of Cecilio, Examining the pleadings as well as the evidence
namely, Macario, Esperidiona, Raymunda, and presented in this case by the parties, the Court can
Celestina and their children and descendants, now not but notice that the present complaint was filed in
the herein private respondents (hereinafter referred to the name of the Heirs of Macario, Espiridiona,
as SIBLINGS OF CECILIO). In 1972, the HEIRS OF Raymunda and Celestina, all surnamed Claudel,
CECILIO partitioned this lot among themselves and without naming the different heirs particularly
obtained the corresponding Transfer Certificates of involved, and who wish to recover the lots from the
Title on their shares, as follows: defendants. The Court tried to find this out from the
evidence presented by the plaintiffs but to no avail.
On this point alone, the Court would not be able to
apportion the property to the real party in interest if SHOWING THE PORTIONS SOLD TO EACH OF
ever they are entitled to it as the persons indicated THE PLAINTIFFS' PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST.
therein is in generic term (Section 2, Rule 3). The
Court has noticed also that with the exception of
plaintiff Lampitoc and (sic) the heirs of Raymunda
Claudel are no longer residing in the property as they 4. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT
have (sic) left the same in 1967. But most important of DECLARING PLAINTIFFS AS OWNERS OF THE
all the plaintiffs failed to present any document PORTION COVERED BY THE PLAN, EXHIBIT A.
evidencing the alleged sale of the property to their
predecessors in interest by the father of the
defendants. Considering that the subject matter of the 5. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT
supposed sale is a real property the absence of any DECLARING TRANSFER CERTIFICATES OF TITLE
document evidencing the sale would preclude the NOS. 395391, 395392, 395393 AND 395394 OF THE
admission of oral testimony (Statute of Frauds). REGISTER OF DEEDS OF RIZAL AS NULL AND
Moreover, considering also that the alleged sale took VOID.
place in 1930, the action filed by the plaintiffs herein
for the recovery of the same more than thirty years
after the cause of action has accrued has already
prescribed. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial
court on the following grounds:

WHEREFORE, the Court renders judgment

dismissing the complaint, without pronouncement as 1. The failure to bring and prosecute the action
to costs. in the name of the real party in interest, namely the
parties themselves, was not a fatal omission since the
court a quo could have adjudicated the lots to the
SIBLINGS OF CECILIO, the parents of the herein
SO ORDERED.5 respondents, leaving it to them to adjudicate the
property among themselves.

On appeal, the following errors6 were assigned by the

SIBLINGS OF CECILIO: 2. The fact of residence in the disputed
properties by the herein respondents had been made
possible by the toleration of the deceased Cecilio.
1. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT DESPITE
CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE SHOWING THE 3. The Statute of Frauds applies only to
PORTION SOLD TO EACH OF PLAINTIFFS' executory contracts and not to consummated sales as
PREDECESSORS. in the case at bar where oral evidence may be
admitted as cited in Iñigo v. Estate of Magtoto7 and
Diana, et al. v. Macalibo.8
2. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO PROVE ANY
DOCUMENT EVIDENCING THE ALLEGED SALE. In addition,

3. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT . . . Given the nature of their relationship with one
GIVING CREDIT TO THE PLAN, EXHIBIT A, another it is not unusual that no document to
evidence the sale was executed, . . ., in their blind To Macario Claudel, Lot 1230-D, with an area of 596
faith in friends and relatives, in their lack of sq. m.10
experience and foresight, and in their ignorance, men,
in spite of laws, will make and continue to make
verbal contracts. . . .9
The respondent court also enjoined that this
disposition is without prejudice to the private
respondents, as heirs of their deceased parents, the
4. The defense of prescription cannot be set up SIBLINGS OF CECILIO, partitioning among
against the herein petitioners despite the lapse of themselves in accordance with law the respective
over forty years from the time of the alleged sale in portions sold to and herein adjudicated to their
1930 up to the filing of the "Complaint for Cancellation parents.
of Titles and Reconveyance . . ." in 1976.

The rest of the land, lots 1230-E and 1230-F, with an

According to the Court of Appeals, the action was not area of 598 and 6,927 square meters, respectively
for the recovery of possession of real property but for would go to Cecilio or his heirs, the herein petitioners.
the cancellation of titles issued to the HEIRS OF Beyond these apportionments, the HEIRS OF
CECILIO in 1973. Since the SIBLINGS OF CECILIO CECILIO would not receive anything else.
commenced their complaint for cancellation of titles
and reconveyance with damages on December 7,
1976, only four years after the HEIRS OF CECILIO
partitioned this lot among themselves and obtained The crux of the entire litigation is whether or not the
the corresponding Transfer Certificates of Titles, then Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in
there is no prescription of action yet. disposing the question of the true ownership of the
lots.

Thus the respondent court ordered the cancellation of

the Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 395391, And the real issues are:
395392, 395393, and 395394 of the Register of
Deeds of Rizal issued in the names of the HEIRS OF
CECILIO and corollarily ordered the execution of the 1. Whether or not a contract of sale of land may
following deeds of reconveyance: be proven orally:

To Celestina Claudel, Lot 1230-A with an area of 705 2. Whether or not the prescriptive period for
sq. m. filing an action for cancellation of titles and
reconveyance with damages (the action filed by the
SIBLINGS OF CECILIO) should be counted from the
To Raymunda Claudel, Lot 1230-B with an area of alleged sale upon which they claim their ownership
599 sq. m. (1930) or from the date of the issuance of the titles
sought to be cancelled in favor of the HEIRS OF
CECILIO (1976).

To Esperidiona Claudel, Lot 1230-C with an area of

597 sq. m.
The rule of thumb is that a sale of land, once
consummated, is valid regardless of the form it may
have been entered into.11 For nowhere does law or
jurisprudence prescribe that the contract of sale be
put in writing before such contract can validly cede or xxx xxx xxx
transmit rights over a certain real property between
the parties themselves.
(Emphasis supplied.)

However, in the event that a third party, as in this

case, disputes the ownership of the property, the
person against whom that claim is brought can not The purpose of the Statute of Frauds is to prevent
present any proof of such sale and hence has no fraud and perjury in the enforcement of obligations
means to enforce the contract. Thus the Statute of depending for their evidence upon the unassisted
Frauds was precisely devised to protect the parties in memory of witnesses by requiring certain enumerated
a contract of sale of real property so that no such contracts and transactions to be evidenced in
contract is enforceable unless certain requisites, for Writing.12
purposes of proof, are met.

The provisions of the Statute of Frauds originally

The provisions of the Statute of Frauds pertinent to appeared under the old Rules of Evidence. However
the present controversy, state: when the Civil Code was re-written in 1949 (to take
effect in 1950), the provisions of the Statute of Frauds
were taken out of the Rules of Evidence in order to be
included under the title on Unenforceable Contracts in
Art. 1403 (Civil Code). The following contracts are the Civil Code. The transfer was not only a matter of
unenforceable, unless they are ratified: style but to show that the Statute of Frauds is also a
substantive law.

xxx xxx xxx

Therefore, except under the conditions provided by
the Statute of Frauds, the existence of the contract of
sale made by Cecilio with his siblings13 can not be
2) Those that do not comply with the Statute of proved.
Frauds as set forth in this number. In the following
cases, an agreement hereafter made shall be
unenforceable by action unless the same, or some
note or memorandum thereof, be in writing, and On the second issue, the belated claim of the
subscribed by the party charged, or by his agent; SIBLINGS OF CECILIO who filed a complaint in court
evidence, therefore, of the agreement cannot be only in 1976 to enforce a light acquired allegedly as
received without the writing, or a secondary evidence early as 1930, is difficult to comprehend.
of its contents:

The Civil Code states:

xxx xxx xxx

Art. 1145. The following actions must be

e) An agreement for the leasing for a longer commenced within six years:
period than one year, or for the sale of real property
or of an interest therein;
(1) Upon an oral contract . . . (Emphasis
supplied).
 corresponding certificate of title issued on the basis
thereof, with the result that the land covered thereby
If the parties SIBLINGS OF CECILIO had allegedly will again form part of the public domain, as only the
derived their right of action from the oral purchase Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead may
made by their parents in 1930, then the action filed in do so.16
1976 would have clearly prescribed. More than six
years had lapsed.

It is true that in some instances, the Court did away

with the irrevocability of the torrens title, but the
We do not agree with the parties SIBLINGS OF circumstances in the case at bar varied significantly
CECILIO when they reason that an implied trust in from these cases.
favor of the SIBLINGS OF CECILIO was established
in 1972, when the HEIRS OF CECILIO executed a
contract of partition over the said properties.
In Bornales v. IAC, 17 the defense of indefeasibility of
a certificate of title was disregarded when the
transferee who took it had notice of the flaws in the
But as we had pointed out, the law recognizes the transferor's title. No right passed to a transferee from
superiority of the torrens title. a vendor who did not have any in the first place. The
transferees bought the land registered under the
torrens system from vendors who procured title
Above all, the torrens title in the possession of the thereto by means of fraud. With this knowledge, they
HEIRS OF CECILIO carries more weight as proof of can not invoke the indefeasibility of a certificate of title
ownership than the survey or subdivision plan of a against the private respondent to the extent of her
parcel of land in the name of SIBLINGS OF CECILIO. interest. This is because the torrens system of land
registration, though indefeasible, should not be used
as a means to perpetrate fraud against the rightful
owner of real property.
The Court has invariably upheld the indefeasibility of
the torrens title. No possession by any person of any
portion of the land could defeat the title of the
registered owners thereof.14 Mere registration of the sale is not good enough, good
faith must concur with registration. Otherwise
registration becomes an exercise in futility.18

A torrens title, once registered, cannot be defeated,

even by adverse, open and notorious possession. A
registered title under the torrens system cannot be In Amerol v. Bagumbaran,19 we reversed the
defeated by prescription.1âwphi1 The title, once decision of the trial court. In this case, the title was
registered, is notice to the world. All persons must wrongfully registered in another person's name. An
take notice. No one can plead ignorance of the implied trust was therefore created. This trustee was
registration.15 compelled by law to reconvey property fraudulently
acquired notwithstanding the irrevocability of the
torrens title.20

xxx xxx xxx

In the present case, however, the facts belie the claim
of ownership.
Furthermore, a private individual may not bring an
action for reversion or any action which would have
the effect of cancelling a free patent and the
For several years, when the SIBLINGS OF CECILIO, No clear specific contrary evidence was cited by the
namely, Macario, Esperidiona Raymunda, and respondent appellate court to justify the reversal of
Celestina were living on the contested premises, they the lower court's findings. Thus, in this case, between
regularly paid a sum of money, designated as "taxes" the factual findings of the trial court and the appellate
at first, to the widow of Cecilio, and later, to his court, those of the trial court must prevail over that of
heirs.21 Why their payments were never directly the latter.26
made to the Municipal Government of Muntinlupa
when they were intended as payments for "taxes" is
difficult to square with their claim of ownership. We
are rather inclined to consider this fact as an WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED We
admission of non-ownership. And when we consider REVERSE and SET ASIDE the decision rendered in
also that the petitioners HEIRS OF CECILIO had CA-G.R. CV No. 04429, and we hereby REINSTATE
individually paid to the municipal treasury the taxes the decision of the then Court of First Instance of
corresponding to the particular portions they were Rizal (Branch 28, Pasay City) in Civil Case No. M-
occupying,22 we can readily see the superiority of the 5276-P which ruled for the dismissal of the Complaint
petitioners' position. for Cancellation of Titles and Reconveyance with
Damages filed by the Heirs of Macario, Esperidiona
Raymunda, and Celestina, all surnamed CLAUDEL.
Costs against the private respondents.
Renato Solema and Decimina Calvez, two of the
respondents who derive their right from the SIBLINGS
OF CLAUDEL, bought a portion of the lot from Felisa
Claudel, one of the HEIRS OF CLAUDEL.23 The SO ORDERED.
Calvezes should not be paying for a lot that they [G.R. NO. 154953 : June 26, 2008]
already owned and if they did not acknowledge Felisa
as its owner.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v.

T.A.N. PROPERTIES, INC., Respondent.
In addition, before any of the SIBLINGS OF CECILIO
could stay on any of the portions of the property, they
had to ask first the permission of Jose Claudel again,
one of the HEIRS OF CECILIO.24 In fact the only DECISION
reason why any of the heirs of SIBLINGS OF
CECILIO could stay on the lot was because they were
allowed to do so by the HEIRS OF CECILIO.25
CARPIO, J.:

In view of the foregoing, we find that the appellate

The Case
court committed a reversible error in denigrating the
transfer certificates of title of the petitioners to the
survey or subdivision plan proffered by the private
respondents. The Court generally recognizes the Before the Court is a Petition for Review 1 assailing
profundity of conclusions and findings of facts the 21 August 2002 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals
reached by the trial court and hence sustains them on in CA-G.R. CV No. 66658. The Court of Appeals
appeal except for strong and cogent reasons affirmed in toto the 16 December 1999 Decision3 of
inasmuch as the trial court is in a better position to the Regional Trial Court of Tanauan, Batangas,
examine real evidence and observe the demeanor of Branch 6 (trial court) in Land Registration Case No. T-
witnesses in a case. 635.
The Antecedent Facts During the hearings conducted on 13 and 14
December 1999, respondent presented three
witnesses: Anthony Dimayuga Torres (Torres),
respondent's Operations Manager and its authorized
This case originated from an Application for Original representative in the case; Primitivo Evangelista
Registration of Title filed by T.A.N. Properties, Inc. (Evangelista), a 72-year old resident of San
covering Lot 10705-B of the subdivision plan Csd-04- Bartolome, Sto. Tomas, Batangas since birth; and
019741 which is a portion of the consolidated Lot Regalado Marquez, Records Officer II of the Land
10705, Cad-424, Sto. Tomas Cadastre. The land, with Registration Authority (LRA), Quezon City.
an area of 564,007 square meters, or 56.4007
hectares, is located at San Bartolome, Sto. Tomas,
Batangas.
The testimonies of respondent's witnesses showed
that Prospero Dimayuga (Kabesang Puroy) had
peaceful, adverse, open, and continuous possession
On 31 August 1999, the trial court set the case for of the land in the concept of an owner since 1942.
initial hearing at 9:30 a.m. on 11 November 1999. The Upon his death, Kabesang Puroy was succeeded by
Notice of Initial Hearing was published in the Official his son Antonio Dimayuga (Antonio). On 27
Gazette, 20 September 1999 issue, Volume 95, No. September 1960, Antonio executed a Deed of
38, pages 6793 to 6794,4 and in the 18 October 1999 Donation covering the land in favor of one of his
issue of People's Journal Taliba,5 a newspaper of children, Fortunato Dimayuga (Fortunato). Later,
general circulation in the Philippines. The Notice of however, Antonio gave Fortunato another piece of
Initial Hearing was also posted in a conspicuous place land. Hence, on 26 April 1961, Antonio executed a
on the bulletin board of the Municipal Building of Sto. Partial Revocation of Donation, and the land was
Tomas, Batangas, as well as in a conspicuous place adjudicated to one of Antonio's children, Prospero
on the land.6 All adjoining owners and all government Dimayuga (Porting).11 On 8 August 1997, Porting
agencies and offices concerned were notified of the sold the land to Respondent.
initial hearing.7

The Ruling of the Trial Court

On 11 November 1999, when the trial court called the
case for initial hearing, there was no oppositor other
than the Opposition dated 7 October 1999 of the
Republic of the Philippines represented by the In its 16 December 1999 Decision, the trial court
Director of Lands (petitioner). On 15 November 1999, adjudicated the land in favor of respondent.
the trial court issued an Order8 of General Default
against the whole world except as against petitioner.
The trial court ruled that a juridical person or a
corporation could apply for registration of land
During the hearing on 19 November 1999, Ceferino provided such entity and its predecessors-in-interest
Carandang (Carandang) appeared as oppositor. The have possessed the land for 30 years or more. The
trial court gave Carandang until 29 November 1999 trial court ruled that the facts showed that
within which to file his written opposition.9 Carandang respondent's predecessors-in-interest possessed the
failed to file his written opposition and to appear in the land in the concept of an owner prior to 12 June 1945,
succeeding hearings. In an Order10 dated 13 which possession converted the land to private
December 1999, the trial court reinstated the Order of property.
General Default.

The dispositive portion of the trial court's Decision

reads:
 Evangelista's failure to mention the name of his uncle
who continuously worked on the land, the Court of
WHEREFORE, and upon previous confirmation of the Appeals ruled that Evangelista should not be faulted
Order of General Default, the Court hereby as he was not asked to name his uncle when he
adjudicates and decrees Lot 10705-B, identical to Lot testified. The Court of Appeals also ruled that at the
13637, Cad-424, Sto. Tomas Cadastre, on plan Csd- outset, Evangelista disclaimed knowledge of
04-019741, situated in Barangay of San Bartolome, Fortunato's relation to Kabesang Puroy, but this did
Municipality of Sto. Tomas, Province of Batangas, not affect Evangelista's statement that Fortunato took
with an area of 564,007 square meters, in favor of over the possession and cultivation of the land after
and in the name of T.A.N. Properties, Inc., a domestic Kabesang Puroy's death. The Court of Appeals
corporation duly organized and existing under further ruled that the events regarding the acquisition
Philippine laws with principal office at 19th Floor, and disposition of the land became public knowledge
PDCP Bank Building, 8737 Paseo de Roxas, Makati because San Bartolome was a small community. On
City. the matter of additional witnesses, the Court of
Appeals ruled that petitioner failed to cite any law
requiring the corroboration of the sole witness'
Once this Decision shall have become final, let the testimony.
corresponding decree of registration be issued.

The Court of Appeals further ruled that Torres was a

SO ORDERED.12 competent witness since he was only testifying on the
fact that he had caused the filing of the application for
registration and that respondent acquired the land
from Porting.
Petitioner appealed from the trial court's Decision.
Petitioner alleged that the trial court erred in granting
the application for registration absent clear evidence
that the applicant and its predecessors-in-interest Petitioner comes to this Court assailing the Court of
have complied with the period of possession and Appeals' Decision. Petitioner raises the following
occupation as required by law. Petitioner alleged that grounds in its Memorandum:
the testimonies of Evangelista and Torres are general
in nature. Considering the area involved, petitioner
argued that additional witnesses should have been The Court of Appeals erred on a question of law in
presented to corroborate Evangelista's testimony. allowing the grant of title to applicant corporation
despite the following:

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

1. Absence of showing that it or its predecessors-in-
interest had open, continuous, exclusive, and
In its 21 August 2002 Decision, the Court of Appeals notorious possession and occupation in the concept
affirmed in toto the trial court's Decision. of an owner since 12 June 1945 or earlier;
andcralawlibrary

The Court of Appeals ruled that Evangelista's

knowledge of the possession and occupation of the 2. Disqualification of applicant corporation to acquire
land stemmed not only from the fact that he worked the subject tract of land.13
there for three years but also because he and
Kabesang Puroy were practically neighbors. On
The Issues registration is alienable and disposable rests with the
applicant.15

The issues may be summarized as follows:

In this case, respondent submitted two certifications
issued by the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR). The 3 June 1997 Certification by
1. Whether the land is alienable and disposable; the Community Environment and Natural Resources
Offices (CENRO), Batangas City,16 certified that "lot
10705, Cad-424, Sto. Tomas Cadastre situated at
2. Whether respondent or its predecessors-in-interest Barangay San Bartolome, Sto. Tomas, Batangas with
had open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious an area of 596,116 square meters falls within the
possession and occupation of the land in the concept ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE ZONE under Project
of an owner since June 1945 or earlier; No. 30, Land Classification Map No. 582 certified [on]
andcralawlibrary 31 December 1925." The second certification17 in the
form of a memorandum to the trial court, which was
issued by the Regional Technical Director, Forest
Management Services of the DENR (FMS-DENR),
3. Whether respondent is qualified to apply for stated "that the subject area falls within an alienable
registration of the land under the Public Land Act. and disposable land, Project No. 30 of Sto. Tomas,
Batangas certified on Dec. 31, 1925 per LC No. 582."

The Ruling of this Court

The certifications are not sufficient. DENR
Administrative Order (DAO) No. 20,18 dated 30 May
The petition has merit. 1988, delineated the functions and authorities of the
offices within the DENR. Under DAO No. 20, series of
1988, the CENRO issues certificates of land
classification status for areas below 50 hectares. The
Respondent Failed to Prove Provincial Environment and Natural Resources
Offices (PENRO) issues certificate of land
that the Land is Alienable and Disposable classification status for lands covering over 50
hectares. DAO No. 38,19 dated 19 April 1990,
amended DAO No. 20, series of 1988. DAO No. 38,
Petitioner argues that anyone who applies for series of 1990 retained the authority of the CENRO to
registration has the burden of overcoming the issue certificates of land classification status for areas
presumption that the land forms part of the public below 50 hectares, as well as the authority of the
domain. Petitioner insists that respondent failed to PENRO to issue certificates of land classification
prove that the land is no longer part of the public status for lands covering over 50 hectares.20 In this
domain. case, respondent applied for registration of Lot
10705-B. The area covered by Lot 10705-B is over 50
hectares (564,007 square meters). The CENRO
certificate covered the entire Lot 10705 with an area
of 596,116 square meters which, as per DAO No. 38,
The well-entrenched rule is that all lands not series of 1990, is beyond the authority of the CENRO
appearing to be clearly of private dominion to certify as alienable and disposable.
presumably belong to the State.14 The onus to
overturn, by incontrovertible evidence, the
presumption that the land subject of an application for
The Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, has no
authority under DAO Nos. 20 and 38 to issue
certificates of land classification. Under DAO No. 20, Hence, the certification issued by the Regional
the Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR: Technical Director, FMS-DENR, in the form of a
memorandum to the trial court, has no probative
value.

1. Issues original and renewal of ordinary minor

products (OM) permits except rattan;
Further, it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to
certify that a land is alienable and disposable. The
applicant for land registration must prove that the
2. Approves renewal of resaw/mini-sawmill permits; DENR Secretary had approved the land classification
and released the land of the public domain as
alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of
3. Approves renewal of special use permits covering the application for registration falls within the
over five hectares for public infrastructure projects; approved area per verification through survey by the
andcralawlibrary PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land
registration must present a copy of the original
classification approved by the DENR Secretary and
certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the
4. Issues renewal of certificates of registration for official records. These facts must be established to
logs, poles, piles, and lumber dealers. prove that the land is alienable and disposable.
Respondent failed to do so because the certifications
presented by respondent do not, by themselves,
prove that the land is alienable and disposable.
Under DAO No. 38, the Regional Technical Director,
FMS-DENR:

Only Torres, respondent's Operations Manager,

identified the certifications submitted by respondent.
1. Issues original and renewal of ordinary minor
The government officials who issued the certifications
[products] (OM) permits except rattan;
were not presented before the trial court to testify on
their contents. The trial court should not have
accepted the contents of the certifications as proof of
2. Issues renewal of certificate of registration for logs, the facts stated therein. Even if the certifications are
poles, and piles and lumber dealers; presumed duly issued and admissible in evidence,
they have no probative value in establishing that the
land is alienable and disposable.
3. Approves renewal of resaw/mini-sawmill permits;

Public documents are defined under Section 19, Rule

132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence as follows:
4. Issues public gratuitous permits for 20 to 50 cubic
meters within calamity declared areas for public
infrastructure projects; andcralawlibrary
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official
acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and
tribunals, and public officers, whether of the
5. Approves original and renewal of special use Philippines, or of a foreign country;
permits covering over five hectares for public
infrastructure projects.
(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public probative value.25 Certainly, the certifications cannot
except last wills and testaments; andcralawlibrary be considered prima facie evidence of the facts stated
therein.

(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private

documents required by law to be entered therein. The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-
DENR, certifications do not prove that Lot 10705-B
falls within the alienable and disposable land as
proclaimed by the DENR Secretary. Such government
Applying Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public certifications do not, by their mere issuance, prove the
documents referred to in Section 19(a), when facts stated therein.26 Such government certifications
admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an may fall under the class of documents contemplated
official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the in the second sentence of Section 23 of Rule 132. As
officer having legal custody of the record, or by his such, the certifications are prima facie evidence of
deputy x x x. The CENRO is not the official repository their due execution and date of issuance but they do
or legal custodian of the issuances of the DENR not constitute prima facie evidence of the facts stated
Secretary declaring public lands as alienable and therein.
disposable. The CENRO should have attached an
official publication21 of the DENR Secretary's
issuance declaring the land alienable and disposable.
The Court has also ruled that a document or writing
admitted as part of the testimony of a witness does
not constitute proof of the facts stated therein.27
Section 23, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Here, Torres, a private individual and respondent's
Evidence provides: representative, identified the certifications but the
government officials who issued the certifications did
not testify on the contents of the certifications. As
Sec. 23. Public documents as evidence. Documents such, the certifications cannot be given probative
consisting of entries in public records made in the value.28 The contents of the certifications are
performance of a duty by a public officer are prima hearsay because Torres was incompetent to testify on
facie evidence of the facts stated therein. All other the veracity of the contents of the certifications.29
public documents are evidence, even against a third Torres did not prepare the certifications, he was not
person, of the fact which gave rise to their execution an officer of CENRO or FMS-DENR, and he did not
and of the date of the latter. conduct any verification survey whether the land falls
within the area classified by the DENR Secretary as
alienable and disposable.

The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-

DENR, certifications do not fall within the class of
public documents contemplated in the first sentence Petitioner also points out the discrepancy as to when
of Section 23 of Rule 132. The certifications do not the land allegedly became alienable and disposable.
reflect "entries in public records made in the The DENR Secretary certified that based on Land
performance of a duty by a public officer," such as Classification Map No. 582, the land became
entries made by the Civil Registrar22 in the books of alienable and disposable on 31 December 1925.
registries, or by a ship captain in the ship's However, the certificate on the blue print plan states
logbook.23 The certifications are not the certified that it became alienable and disposable on 31
copies or authenticated reproductions of original December 1985.
official records in the legal custody of a government
office. The certifications are not even records of public
documents.24 The certifications are conclusions
unsupported by adequate proof, and thus have no
We agree with petitioner that while the certifications We agree with petitioner.
submitted by respondent show that under the Land
Classification Map No. 582, the land became
alienable and disposable on 31 December 1925, the
blue print plan states that it became alienable and Evangelista testified that Kabesang Puroy had been
disposable on 31 December 1985. Respondent in possession of the land before 1945. Yet,
alleged that "the blue print plan merely serves to Evangelista only worked on the land for three years.
prove the precise location and the metes and bounds Evangelista testified that his family owned a lot near
of the land described therein x x x and does not in any Kabesang Puroy's land. The Court of Appeals took
way certify the nature and classification of the land note of this and ruled that Evangelista's knowledge of
involved."30 It is true that the notation by a surveyor- Kabesang Puroy's possession of the land stemmed
geodetic engineer on the survey plan that the land "not only from the fact that he had worked thereat but
formed part of the alienable and disposable land of more so that they were practically neighbors."32 The
the public domain is not sufficient proof of the land's Court of Appeals observed:
classification.31 However, respondent should have at
least presented proof that would explain the
discrepancy in the dates of classification. Marquez, In a small community such as that of San Bartolome,
LRA Records Officer II, testified that the documents Sto. Tomas, Batangas, it is not difficult to understand
submitted to the court consisting of the tracing cloth that people in the said community knows each and
plan, the technical description of Lot 10705-B, the everyone. And, because of such familiarity with each
approved subdivision plan, and the Geodetic other, news or events regarding the acquisition or
Engineer's certification were faithful reproductions of disposition for that matter, of a vast tract of land
the original documents in the LRA office. He did not spreads like wildfire, thus, the reason why such an
explain the discrepancy in the dates. Neither was the event became of public knowledge to them.33
Geodetic Engineer presented to explain why the date
of classification on the blue print plan was different
from the other certifications submitted by Respondent.
Evangelista testified that Kabesang Puroy was
succeeded by Fortunato. However, he admitted that
he did not know the exact relationship between
There was No Open, Continuous, Exclusive, and Kabesang Puroy and Fortunato, which is rather
Notorious unusual for neighbors in a small community. He did
not also know the relationship between Fortunato and
Possession and Occupation in the Concept of an Porting. In fact, Evangelista's testimony is contrary to
Owner the factual finding of the trial court that Kabesang
Puroy was succeeded by his son Antonio, not by
Fortunato who was one of Antonio's children. Antonio
Petitioner alleges that the trial court's reliance on the was not even mentioned in Evangelista's testimony.
testimonies of Evangelista and Torres was misplaced.
Petitioner alleges that Evangelista's statement that
the possession of respondent's predecessors-in- The Court of Appeals ruled that there is no law that
interest was open, public, continuous, peaceful, and requires that the testimony of a single witness needs
adverse to the whole world was a general conclusion corroboration. However, in this case, we find
of law rather than factual evidence of possession of Evangelista's uncorroborated testimony insufficient to
title. Petitioner alleges that respondent failed to prove that respondent's predecessors-in-interest had
establish that its predecessors-in-interest had held the been in possession of the land in the concept of an
land openly, continuously, and exclusively for at least owner for more than 30 years. We cannot consider
30 years after it was declared alienable and the testimony of Torres as sufficient corroboration.
disposable. Torres testified primarily on the fact of respondent's
acquisition of the land. While he claimed to be related
to the Dimayugas, his knowledge of their possession
of the land was hearsay. He did not even tell the trial
court where he obtained his information. Taking into account the requirements of conservation,
ecology, and development, and subject to the
requirements of agrarian reform, the Congress shall
determine, by law, the size of lands of the public
The tax declarations presented were only for the domain which may be acquired, developed, held, or
years starting 1955. While tax declarations are not leased and the conditions therefor.
conclusive evidence of ownership, they constitute
proof of claim of ownership.34 Respondent did not
present any credible explanation why the realty taxes
were only paid starting 1955 considering the claim The 1987 Constitution absolutely prohibits private
that the Dimayugas were allegedly in possession of corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land
the land before 1945. The payment of the realty taxes of the public domain. In Chavez v. Public Estates
starting 1955 gives rise to the presumption that the Authority,35 the Court traced the law on disposition of
Dimayugas claimed ownership or possession of the lands of the public domain. Under the 1935
land only in that year. Constitution, there was no prohibition against private
corporations from acquiring agricultural land. The
1973 Constitution limited the alienation of lands of the
public domain to individuals who were citizens of the
Land Application by a Corporation Philippines. Under the 1973 Constitution, private
corporations, even if wholly owned by Filipino citizens,
were no longer allowed to acquire alienable lands of
Petitioner asserts that respondent, a private the public domain. The present 1987 Constitution
corporation, cannot apply for registration of the land of continues the prohibition against private corporations
the public domain in this case. from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public
domain.36 The Court explained in Chavez:

We agree with petitioner.

The 1987 Constitution continues the State policy in
the 1973 Constitution banning private corporations
from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public
Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution domain. Like the 1973 Constitution, the 1987
provides: Constitution allows private corporations to hold
alienable lands of the public domain only through
lease. x x x x
Sec. 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into
agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and
national parks. Agricultural lands of the public domain [I]f the constitutional intent is to prevent huge
may be further classified by law according to the uses landholdings, the Constitution could have simply
to which they may be devoted. Alienable lands of the limited the size of alienable lands of the public domain
public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. that corporations could acquire. The Constitution
Private corporations or associations may not hold could have followed the limitations on individuals, who
such alienable lands of the public domain except by could acquire not more than 24 hectares of alienable
lease, for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, lands of the public domain under the 1973
renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and Constitution, and not more than 12 hectares under the
not to exceed one thousand hectares in area. Citizens 1987 Constitution.
of the Philippines may lease not more than five
hundred hectares, or acquire not more than twelve
hectares thereof by purchase, homestead or grant.
If the constitutional intent is to encourage economic hectares, which Acme acquired from members of the
family-size farms, placing the land in the name of a Dumagat tribe. The issue in that case was whether
corporation would be more effective in preventing the the title could be confirmed in favor of Acme when the
break-up of farmlands. If the farmland is registered in proceeding was instituted after the effectivity of the
the name of a corporation, upon the death of the 1973 Constitution which prohibited private
owner, his heirs would inherit shares in the corporations or associations from holding alienable
corporation instead of subdivided parcels of the lands of the public domain except by lease not to
farmland. This would prevent the continuing break-up exceed 1,000 hectares. The Court ruled that the land
of farmlands into smaller and smaller plots from one was already private land when Acme acquired it from
generation to the next. its owners in 1962, and thus Acme acquired a
registrable title. Under the 1935 Constitution, private
corporations could acquire public agricultural lands
not exceeding 1,024 hectares while individuals could
In actual practice, the constitutional ban strengthens acquire not more than 144 hectares.39
the constitutional limitation on individuals from
acquiring more than the allowed area of alienable
lands of the public domain. Without the constitutional
ban, individuals who already acquired the maximum In Director of Lands, the Court further ruled that open,
area of alienable lands of the public domain could exclusive, and undisputed possession of alienable
easily set up corporations to acquire more alienable land for the period prescribed by law created the legal
public lands. An individual could own as many fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the
corporations as his means would allow him. An requisite period, ipso jure and without the need of
individual could even hide his ownership of a judicial or other sanction ceases to be public land and
corporation by putting his nominees as stockholders becomes private property. The Court ruled:
of the corporation. The corporation is a convenient
vehicle to circumvent the constitutional limitation on
acquisition by individuals of alienable lands of the
public domain. Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical
inevitability of considering possession of public land
which is of the character and duration prescribed by
statute as the equivalent of an express grant from the
The constitutional intent, under the 1973 and 1987 State than the dictum of the statute itself that the
Constitutions, is to transfer ownership of only a limited possessor(s) "x x x shall be conclusively presumed to
area of alienable land of the public domain to a have performed all the conditions essential to a
qualified individual. This constitutional intent is Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate
safeguarded by the provision prohibiting corporations of title x x x." No proof being admissible to overcome
from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain, a conclusive presumption, confirmation proceedings
since the vehicle to circumvent the constitutional would, in truth be little more than a formality, at the
intent is removed. The available alienable public lands most limited to ascertaining whether the possession
are gradually decreasing in the face of an ever- claimed is of the required character and length of
growing population. The most effective way to insure time; and registration thereunder would not confer
faithful adherence to this constitutional intent is to title, but simply recognize a title already vested. The
grant or sell alienable lands of the public domain only proceedings would not originally convert the land from
to individuals. This, it would seem, is the practical public to private land, but only confirm such a
benefit arising from the constitutional ban.37 conversion already effected by operation of law from
the moment the required period of possession
became complete.
In Director of Lands v. IAC,38 the Court allowed the
land registration proceeding filed by Acme Plywood &
Veneer Co., Inc. (Acme) for five parcels of land with x x x [A]lienable public land held by a possessor,
an area of 481,390 square meters, or 48.139 personally or through his predecessors-in-interest,
openly, continuously and exclusively for the Being already private land when TCMC bought them
prescribed statutory period of (30 years under The in 1979, the prohibition in the 1973 Constitution
Public Land Act, as amended) is converted to private against corporations acquiring alienable lands of the
property by the mere lapse or completion of said public domain except through lease (Article XIV,
period, ipso jure. Following that rule and on the basis Section 11, 1973 Constitution) did not apply to them
of the undisputed facts, the land subject of this appeal for they were no longer alienable lands of the public
was already private property at the time it was domain but private property.
acquired from the Infiels by Acme. Acme thereby
acquired a registrable title, there being at the time no
prohibition against said corporation's holding or
owning private land. x x x.40 (Emphasis What is determinative for the doctrine in Director of
supplied)cralawlibrary Lands to apply is for the corporate applicant for land
registration to establish that when it acquired the land,
the same was already private land by operation of law
because the statutory acquisitive prescriptive period
Director of Lands is not applicable to the present of 30 years had already lapsed. The length of
case. In Director of Lands, the "land x x x was already possession of the land by the corporation cannot be
private property at the time it was acquired x x x by tacked on to complete the statutory 30 years
Acme." In this case, respondent acquired the land on acquisitive prescriptive period. Only an individual can
8 August 1997 from Porting, who, along with his avail of such acquisitive prescription since both the
predecessors-in-interest, has not shown to have 1973 and 1987 Constitutions prohibit corporations
been, as of that date, in open, continuous, and from acquiring lands of the public domain.
adverse possession of the land for 30 years since 12
June 1945. In short, when respondent acquired the
land from Porting, the land was not yet private
property. Admittedly, a corporation can at present still apply for
original registration of land under the doctrine in
Director of Lands. Republic Act No. 917642 (RA
9176) further amended the Public Land Act43 and
For Director of Lands to apply and enable a extended the period for the filing of applications for
corporation to file for registration of alienable and judicial confirmation of imperfect and incomplete titles
disposable land, the corporation must have acquired to alienable and disposable lands of the public
the land when its transferor had already a vested right domain until 31 December 2020. Thus:
to a judicial confirmation of title to the land by virtue of
his open, continuous and adverse possession of the
land in the concept of an owner for at least 30 years
since 12 June 1945. Thus, in Natividad v. Court of Sec. 2. Section 47, Chapter VIII of the same Act, as
Appeals,41 the Court declared: amended, is hereby further amended to read as
follows:

Under the facts of this case and pursuant to the

above rulings, the parcels of land in question had Sec. 47. The persons specified in the next following
already been converted to private ownership through section are hereby granted time, not to extend beyond
acquisitive prescription by the predecessors-in- December 31, 2020 within which to avail of the
interest of TCMC when the latter purchased them in benefits of this Chapter: Provided, That this period
1979. All that was needed was the confirmation of the shall apply only where the area applied for does not
titles of the previous owners or predecessors-in- exceed twelve (12) hectares: Provided, further, That
interest of TCMC. the several periods of time designated by the
President in accordance with Section Forty-five of this
Act shall apply also to the lands comprised in the
provisions of this Chapter, but this Section shall not
be construed as prohibiting any of said persons from
acting under this Chapter at any time prior to the
period fixed by the President.

Sec. 3. All pending applications filed before the

effectivity of this amendatory Act shall be treated as
having been filed in accordance with the provisions of
this Act.

Under RA 9176, the application for judicial

confirmation is limited only to 12 hectares, consistent
with Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution that
a private individual may only acquire not more than 12
hectares of alienable and disposable land. Hence,
respondent, as successor-in-interest of an individual
owner of the land, cannot apply for registration of land
in excess of 12 hectares. Since respondent applied
for 56.4007 hectares, the application for the excess
area of 44.4007 hectares is contrary to law, and thus
void ab initio. In applying for land registration, a
private corporation cannot have any right higher than
its predecessor-in-interest from whom it derived its
right. This assumes, of course, that the corporation
acquired the land, not exceeding 12 hectares, when
the land had already become private land by
operation of law. In the present case, respondent has
failed to prove that any portion of the land was
already private land when respondent acquired it from G.R. No. L-17652 June 30, 1962
Porting in 1997.

IGNACIO GRANDE, ET AL., petitioners,

WHEREFORE, we SET ASIDE the 21 August 2002
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. vs.
66658 and the 16 December 1999 Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Tanauan, Batangas, Branch 6 HON. COURT OF APPEALS, DOMINGO
in Land Registration Case No. T-635. We DENY the CALALUNG, and ESTEBAN CALALUNG,
application for registration filed by T.A.N. Properties, respondents.
Inc.

Bartolome Guirao and Antonio M. Orara for

SO ORDERED. petitioners.

Gonzales and Fernandez for respondents.

BARRERA, J.:
 asserting that they have been in continuous, open,
and undisturbed possession of said portion, since
This is an appeal taken by petitioners Ignacio, prior to the year 1933 to the present.
Eulogia, Alfonso, Eulalia, and Sofia Grande, from the
decision of the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 25169-
R) reversing that of the Court of First Instance of
Isabela (Civil Case No. 1171), and dismissing After trial, the Court of First Instance of Isabela, on
petitioners' action against respondents Domingo and May 4, 1959, rendered a decision adjudging the
Esteban Calalung, to quiet title to and recover ownership of the portion in question to petitioners,
possession of a parcel of land allegedly occupied by and ordering respondents to vacate the premises and
the latter without petitioners' consent. deliver possession thereof to petitioners, and to pay to
the latter P250.00 as damages and costs. Said
decision, in part, reads:

The facts of the case, which are undisputed, briefly

are: Petitioners are the owners of a parcel of land,
with an area of 3.5032 hectares, located at barrio It is admitted by the parties that the land involved in
Ragan, municipality of Magsaysay (formerly this action was formed by the gradual deposit of
Tumauini), province of Isabela, by inheritance from alluvium brought about by the action of the Cagayan
their deceased mother Patricia Angui (who inherited it River, a navigable river. We are inclined to believe
from her parents Isidro Angui and Ana Lopez, in that the accretion was formed on the northeastern
whose name said land appears registered, as shown side of the land covered by Original Certificate of Title
by Original Certificate of Title No. 2982, issued on No. 2982 after the survey of the registered land in
June 9, 1934). Said property is identified as Lot No. 1, 1931, because the surveyors found out that the
Plan PSU-83342. When it was surveyed for purposes northeastern boundary of the land surveyed by them
of registration sometime in 1930, its northeastern was the Cagayan River, and not the land in question.
boundary was the Cagayan River (the same boundary Which is indicative of the fact that the accretion has
stated in the title). Since then, and for many years not yet started or begun in 1931. And, as declared by
thereafter, a gradual accretion on the northeastern Pedro Laman, defendant witness and the boundary
side took place, by action of the current of the owner on the northwest of the registered land of the
Cagayan River, so much so, that by 1958, the bank plaintiffs, the accretion was a little more than one
thereof had receded to a distance of about 105 hectare, including the stony portion, in 1940 or 1941.
meters from its original site, and an alluvial deposit of Therefore, the declarations of the defendant Domingo
19,964 square meters (1.9964 hectares), more or Calalung and his witness, Vicente C. Bacani, to the
less, had been added to the registered area (Exh. C- effect that the land in question was formed by
1). accretion since 1933 do not only contradict the
testimony of defendants' witness Pedro Laman, but
could not overthrow the incontestable fact that the
accretion with an area of 4 hectare more or less, was
On January 25, 1958, petitioners instituted the formed in 1948, reason for which, it was only declared
present action in the Court of First Instance of Isabela in that same year for taxation purposes by the
against respondents, to quiet title to said portion defendants under Tax Dec. No. 257 (Exh. "2") when
(19,964 square meters) formed by accretion, alleging they entered upon the land. We could not give
in their complaint (docketed as Civil Case No. 1171) credence to defendants' assertion that Tax Dec. No.
that they and their predecessors-in-interest, were 257 (Exh. "2") cancelled Tax Dee. No. 28226 (Exh.
formerly in peaceful and continuous possession "1"), because Exh. "2" says that "tax under this
thereof, until September, 1948, when respondents declaration begins with the year 1948. But, the fact
entered upon the land under claim of ownership. that defendants declared the land for taxation
Petitioners also asked for damages corresponding to purposes since 1948, does not mean that they
the value of the fruits of the land as well as attorney's become the owner of the land by mere occupancy, for
fees and costs. In their answer (dated February 18, it is a new provision of the New Civil Code that
1958), respondents claim ownership in themselves, ownership of a piece of land cannot be acquired by
occupation (Art. 714, New Civil Code). The land in which provides that "to the owner of lands adjoining
question being an accretion to the mother or the banks of rivers, belongs the accretion which they
registered land of the plaintiffs, the accretion belongs gradually receive from the effects of the current of the
to the plaintiffs (Art. 457, New Civil Code; Art. 366, waters." The defendants, however, contend that they
Old Civil Code). Assuming arguendo, that the have acquired ownership through prescription. This
accretion has been occupied by the defendants since contention poses the real issue in this case. The
1948, or earlier, is of no moment, because the law Court a quo, has resolved it in favor of the plaintiffs,
does not require any act of possession on the part of on two grounds: First, since by accession, the land in
the owner of the riparian owner, from the moment the question pertains to the original estate, and since in
deposit becomes manifest (Roxas v. Tuason, 9 Phil. this instance the original estate is registered, the
408; Cortez v. City of Manila, 10 Phil. 567). Further, accretion, consequently, falls within the purview of
no act of appropriation on the part of the reparian Section 46 of Act No. 496, which states that "no title
owner is necessary, in order to acquire ownership of to registered land in derogation to that of the
the alluvial formation, as the law does not require the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or
same (3 Manresa, C.C., pp. 321-326). adverse possession"; and, second, the adverse
possession of the defendant began only in the month
of September, 1948, or less than the 10-year period
required for prescription before the present action was
This brings us now to the determination of whether instituted.
the defendants, granting that they have been in
possession of the alluvium since 1948, could have
acquired the property by prescription. Assuming that
they occupied the land in September, 1948, but As a legal proposition, the first ground relied upon by
considering that the action was commenced on the trial court, is not quite correct. An accretion to
January 25, 1958, they have not been in possession registered land, while declared by specific provision of
of the land for ten (10) years; hence, they could not the Civil Code to belong to the owner of the land as a
have acquired the land by ordinary prescription (Arts. natural accession thereof, does not ipso jure become
1134 and 1138, New Civil Code). Moreover, as the entitled to the protection of the rule of imprescriptibility
alluvium is, by law, part and parcel of the registered of title established by the Land Registration Act. Such
property, the same may be considered as registered protection does not extend beyond the area given and
property, within the meaning of Section 46 of Act No. described in the certificate. To hold otherwise, would
496: and, therefore, it could not be acquired by be productive of confusion. It would virtually deprive
prescription or adverse possession by another the title, and the technical description of the land
person. given therein, of their character of conclusiveness as
to the identity and area of the land that is registered.
Just as the Supreme Court, albeit in a negative
manner, has stated that registration does not protect
Unsatisfied, respondents appealed to the Court of the riparian owner against the erosion of the area of
Appeals, which rendered, on September 14, 1960, the his land through gradual changes in the course of the
decision adverted to at the beginning of this opinion, adjoining stream (Payatas Estate Development Co. v.
partly stating: Tuason, 53 Phil. 55), so registration does not entitle
him to all the rights conferred by Land Registration
Act, in so far as the area added by accretion is
That the area in controversy has been formed through concerned. What rights he has, are declared not by
a gradual process of alluvium, which started in the said Act, but by the provisions of the Civil Code on
early thirties, is a fact conclusively established by the accession: and these provisions do not preclude
evidence for both parties. By law, therefore, unless acquisition of the addition area by another person
some superior title has supervened, it should properly through prescription. This Court has held as much in
belong to the riparian owners, specifically in the case of Galindez, et al. v. Baguisa, et al., CA-G.R.
accordance with the rule of natural accession in No. 19249-R, July 17, 1959.
Article 366 of the old Civil Code (now Article 457),
 The oral evidence for the defendants concerning the
period of their possession — from 1933 to 1958 — is
We now proposed to review the second ground relied not only preponderant in itself, but is, moreover,
upon by the trial court, regarding the length of time supported by the fact that it is they and not the
that the defendants have been in possession. plaintiffs who declared the disputed property for
Domingo Calalung testified that he occupied the land taxation, and by the additional circumstance that if the
in question for the first time in 1934, not in 1948 as plaintiff had really been in prior possession and were
claimed by the plaintiffs. The area under occupancy deprived thereof in 1948, they would have
gradually increased as the years went by. In 1946, he immediately taken steps to recover the same. The
declared the land for purposes of taxation (Exhibit 1). excuse they gave for not doing so, namely, that they
This tax declaration was superseded in 1948 by did not receive their copy of the certificate of title to
another (Exhibit 2), after the name of the municipality their property until 1958 for lack of funds to pay the
wherein it is located was changed from Tumauini to fees of the surveyor Domingo Parlan, is too flimsy to
Magsaysay. Calalung's testimony is corroborated by merit any serious consideration. The payment of the
two witnesses, both owners of properties nearby. surveyor's fees had nothing to do with their right to
Pedro Laman, 72 years of age, who was Municipal obtain a copy of the certificate. Besides, it was not
president of Tumauini for three terms, said that the necessary for them to have it in their hands, in order
land in question adjoins his own on the south, and to file an action to recover the land which was legally
that since 1940 or 1951, he has always known it to be theirs by accession and of which, as they allege, they
in the peaceful possession of the defendants. Vicente had been illegally deprived by the defendants. We are
C. Bacani testified to the same effect, although, he convinced, upon consideration of the evidence, that
said that the defendants' possession started the latter, were really in possession since 1934,
sometime in 1933 or 1934. The area thereof, he said, immediately after the process of alluvion started, and
was then less than one hectare. that the plaintiffs woke up to their rights only when
they received their copy of the title in 1958. By then,
however, prescription had already supervened in
We find the testimony of the said witnesses entitled to favor of the defendants.
much greater weight and credence than that of the
plaintiff Pedro Grande and his lone witness, Laureana
Rodriguez. The first stated that the defendants It is this decision of the Court of Appeals which
occupied the land in question only in 1948; that he petitioners seek to be reviewed by us.
called the latter's attention to the fact that the land
was his, but the defendants, in turn, claimed that they
were the owners, that the plaintiffs did not file an
action until 1958, because it was only then that they The sole issue for resolution in this case is whether
were able to obtain the certificate of title from the respondents have acquired the alluvial property in
surveyor, Domingo Parlan; and that they never question through prescription.
declared the land in question for taxation purposes or
paid the taxes thereon. Pedro Grande admitted that
the defendants had the said land surveyed in April, There can be no dispute that both under Article 457 of
1958, and that he tried to stop it, not because he the New Civil Code and Article 366 of the old,
claimed the accretion for himself and his co-plaintiffs, petitioners are the lawful owners of said alluvial
but because the survey included a portion of the property, as they are the registered owners of the
property covered by their title. This last fact is land which it adjoins. The question is whether the
conceded by the defendants who, accordingly, accretion becomes automatically registered land just
relinquished their possession to the part thus because the lot which receives it is covered by a
included, containing an area of some 458 square Torrens title thereby making the alluvial property
meters.1äwphï1.ñët imprescriptible. We agree with the Court of Appeals
that it does not, just as an unregistered land
purchased by the registered owner of the adjoining
land does not, by extension, become ipso facto Appeals that the respondents acquired alluvial lot in
registered land. Ownership of a piece of land is one question by acquisitive prescription is in accordance
thing, and registration under the Torrens system of with law.
that ownership is quite another. Ownership over the
accretion received by the land adjoining a river is
governed by the Civil Code. Imprescriptibility of
registered land is provided in the registration law. The decision of the Court of Appeals under review is
Registration under the Land Registration and hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioners. So
Cadastral Acts does not vest or give title to the land, ordered.
but merely confirms and thereafter protects the title
already possessed by the owner, making it
imprescriptible by occupation of third parties. But to
obtain this protection, the land must be placed under
the operation of the registration laws wherein certain
judicial procedures have been provided. The fact
remain, however, that petitioners never sought
registration of said alluvial property (which was
formed sometime after petitioners' property covered
by Original Certificate of Title No. 2982 was registered
on June 9, 1934) up to the time they instituted the
present action in the Court of First Instance of Isabela
in 1958. The increment, therefore, never became
registered property, and hence is not entitled or
subject to the protection of imprescriptibility enjoyed
by registered property under the Torrens system.
Consequently, it was subject to acquisition through
prescription by third persons.

G.R. No. L-40912 September 30, 1976

The next issue is, did respondents acquire said
alluvial property through acquisitive prescription? This
is a question which requires determination of facts:
physical possession and dates or duration of such REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by
possession. The Court of Appeals, after analyzing the the MINDANAO MEDICAL CENTER, petioner,
evidence, found that respondents-appellees were in
possession of the alluvial lot since 1933 or 1934, vs.
openly, continuously and adversely, under a claim of
ownership up to the filing of the action in 1958. This HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ALEJANDRO Y DE
finding of the existence of these facts, arrived at by JESUS, respondents.
the Court of Appeals after an examination of the
evidence presented by the parties, is conclusive as to
them and can not be reviewed by us. Office of the Solicitor for petitioner.

The law on prescription applicable to the case is that Ananias C. Ona for private respondent.
provided in Act 190 and not the provisions of the Civil
Code, since the possession started in 1933 or 1934
when the pertinent articles of the old Civil Code were
not in force and before the effectivity of the new Civil
Code in 1950. Hence, the conclusion of the Court of
MARTIN, J.:têñ.£îhqw⣠Application No. 5436 were in accordance with law and
existing regulations, the land covered thereby is
herebyawarded to the said applicant, Eugenio de
jesus, at P100.50 per hectare or P2,211.00 for the
This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of the whole tract.
Court of Apiwals in its CA-G.R. No. 39577-R, raising
the question of whether or not petitioner Mindanao
Medical Center has registerable title over a full
12.8081-hectare land by virtue of an executive This application should be entered in the records of
proclamation in 1956 reserving the area for medical this office as Sales Application No. 3231, covering the
center site purposes. tract herein awarded, which is more particularly
described as follows:

On January 22, 1921, Eugenio de Jesus, the father of

respondent Alejandro de Jesus, applied with the Location: Central, Davao,ñé+.£ªwph!1
Bureau of Lands for Sales Patent (Sales Application
No. 5436) of a 33-hectare situated in barrio Libaron,
Municipality of Davao (now Davao City). 1 The
property applied for was a portion of what was then Davao
known as Lot 522 of the Davao Cadastre.

Area: 22 hectares
On January 23, 1934, the Bureau of Lands, through
its Davao District Land Officer, accepted sealed bids
for the purchase of the subject land. One Irineo Jose Boundaries:ñé+.£ªwph!1
bidded for P20.00 per hectare, while a certain Dr.
Josc Ebro submitted a bid of P100.50 per hectare The
Director of Lands, however, annulled the auction sale
for the reason that the sales applicant, Eugenio de N—Maria Villa Abrille and Arenio Suazo;
Jesus, failed to participate in the bidding for non-
service of notice on him of the scheduled bidding.
SE—Provincial Road and Mary Gohn;

In lieu of that sale, another bidding was held on

October 4, 1934. Sales applicant Eugenio de Jesus SW—Public Land;
was the lone bidder. He equalled the bid previously
submitted by Dr. Jose Ebro and made a deposit of
P221.00 representing 10% of the price of the land at
P100.50 per hectare. W—Municipal Road;

On November 23, 1934, the Director of Lands issued Because the area conveyed had not been actually
to Eugenio de Jesus an Order of Award, the surveyed at the time Eugenio de Jesus filed his Sales
dispositive portion of which reads: 2ñé+.£ªwph!1 Application, the Bureau of Lands conducted a survey
under Plan Bsd-1514. On July 29, 1936, the plan was
approved and the land awarded to Eugenio de Jesus
was designated as Lot Nos. 1176-A, 1176-B-1-A and
In view of the foregoing, and it appearing that the 1176-B-1-B with an aggregate area of 20.6400
proceedings had in connection with the Sales hectares, Bsd-10153, City of Davao.
 this Proclamation No. 328 and reserved the same Lot
No. 1176-B-2 for medical center site purposes under
On August 28, 1936, the Director of Lands ordered an the administration of the Director of Hospital. 7
amendment of the Sales Application of Eugenio de
Jesus stating that "a portion of the land covered by
Sales Application No. 5436 (E-3231) of Eugenio de
Jesus is needed by the Philippine Army for military Whereupon, on December 6, 1969, petitioner
camp site purposes, the said application is amended Mindanao Medical Center applied for the Torrens
so as to exclude therefrom portion "A" as shown in registration of the 12.8081-hectare Lot 1176-B-2 with
the sketch on the back thereof, and as thus amended, the Court of First Instance of Davao. The Medical
it will continue to be given due course." The area Center claimed "fee simple" title to the land on the
excluded was Identified as Lot 1176-B-2, the very strength of proclamation No. 350 reserving the area
land in question, consisting of 12.8081 hectares. for medical center site purposes.

On September 7, 1936, President Manuel L. Quezon Respondent Alejandro de Jesus, the son and
issued Proclaimation No. 85 withdrawing Lot No. successor-in-interest of sale applicant Eugenio de
1176-B-2 from sale and settlement and reserving the Jesus, opposed the registration oil the ground that his
same for military purposes, under the administration father, Eugenio de Jesus, had aquired a vested right
of the Chief of Staff, Philippine Army. on the subject lot by virtue of the Order of Award
issued to him by the Director of Lands.

On November 29, 1939, Eugenio de Jesus paid

P660.45 covering the 8th and 10th installment for A certain Arsenio Suazo likewise filed his opposition
20.6400 hectares, the remaining area after his Sales to the registration on the claim that the 2-hectare
Application was amended. This payment did not portion on the northeastern part of Lot 1176-B-2
include the military camp site (Lot No. 1176-B-2) as belongs to him.
the same had already been excluded from the Sales
Application at the time the payment was made. 3
Thereafter, or on May 15, 1948, then Director of After due hearing, the Court of First Instance of
Lands Jose P. Dans ordered the issuance of patent to Davao rendered judgment on September 2, 1966,
Eugenio de Jesus, pursuant to his Sales Application directing "the registration of the title to Lot No. 1176-
for "a tract of land having an area of 20.6400 B-2 of Subdivision Plan Bsd-5134, shown on Plan Ap-
hectares, situated in the barrio of Poblacion, City of 6512, situated in the Barrio of Central, City of Davao,
Davao. 4 On the same date, then Secretary of and containing an area of 128,081 square meters in
Agriculture and Natural Resources Mariano the name of the Mindanao Medical Center, Bureau of
Garchitorena granted a Sales Patent to Eugenio de Medical Services, Department of Health.
Jesus for "a tract of agricultural public land situated in
the City of Davao, Island of Mindanao, Philippines,
containing an area of 20 hectares, 64 ares, and 00
centares. 5 The two oppositors, Alejandro de Jesus and Arsenio
Suazo, excepted from this judgment of the trial court
and appealed the case to the respondent Court of
Appeals.
On August 11, 1956, President Ramon Magsaysay
revoked Proclamation No. 85 and declared the
disputed Lot 1176-B-2 open to disposition under the
provisions of the Public land Act for resettlement of On July 2, 1974, the Appellate Court held: ñé+.£ªwph!
the squatters in the Piapi Beach, Davao City. 6 In the 1
following October 9, President Magsaysay revoked
 shall be brought forthwith under the operation of this
Act [Land Registration Act, Act 496] and shall become
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is hereby registered lands." 9 It would be completely absurd to
modified insofar as it denies the claim of appellant rule that, on the basis of Proclamation No. 350, the
Arsenio Suazo, the same is hereby affirmed, in regard Medical Center has registerable title on the portion
the appeal of appellant Alejandro Y. de Jesus, occupied by it, its nervous disease pavilion and the
registration Lot 1176-B-2, situated in Barrio Central, reasonable appurtenances, and not on the full extent
Davao City, and containing an area of 12.8081 square of the reservation, when the proclamation explicitly
meters, is hereby decreed in the name of said reserved the entire Lot 1176-B-2 of 12.8081 hectares
appellants, but said appellant is hereby ordered to to the Center.
relinquish to the appellee that portion of Lot 1176-B-2
which is occupied by the medical center and nervous
disease pavilion and their reasonable appartenances,
no costs. Certainly, proclamation no. 350 is free of any legal
infirmity. It proceeds from the recognized competence
of the president to reserve by executive proclamation
alienable lands of the public domain for a specific
On July 5, 1974, petitioner Mindanao Medical Center public use or service. 10 section 64 (e) of the Revised
moved for reconsideration, maintaining ownership Administrative Code empowers the president "(t)o
over the entire area of 12.8081 hectares, but the reserve from sale oe other disposition and for specific
Appellate Court in a Special Division of Five denied public uses for service, any land belonging to the
the motion on June 17, 1975. 8 private domain of the Government of the Philippines,
the use of which is not otherwise directed by law. the
land reserved "shall be used for the specific purposes
Forthwith, petitioner Mindanao Medical Center directed by such executive order until otherwise
elevated the matter to Us thru the present appeal. provided by law." Similarly, Section 83 of the Public
Land Act (CA 141) authorizes the President to
"designate by proclamation any tract or tracts of land
of the public domain as reservations for the use ofthe
We find petitioner's appeal to b meritorious. commonwealth of the Philippines or of any of its
branches, or of the inhabitants thereof, ... or for quasi-
public uses or purposes when the public interest
requires it, including reservations for ... other
1. Petitioner Mindanao Medical Center has
improvements for the public benefit.
registerable title over the whole contested area of
12.8081 hectares, designated Lot No. 1176-B-2, and
not only on a portion thereof occupied by the Medical
Center, its nervous disease pavilion and their 2. Respondent Appellate Court erroneously
reasonable appurtenances. Proclamation No. 350, ruled that Alejabdro's father, Eugenio de jesus, had
dated October 9, 1956, of President Magsaysay acquired ownership over the whole 12.8081-hectare
legally effected a land grant to the Mindanao Medical Lot 1176-B-2 because the Sales Award issued to him
Center, Bureau of Medical Services, Department of on November 23, 1934 by then Director of Lands
Health, of the whole lot, validity sufficient for initial Simeon Ramos covered the 33 hectares applied for,
registration under the Land Registration Act. Such including the 12.8081 hectares. We fail to see any
land grant is constitutive of a "fee simple" tile or reasonable basis on record for the Appellate Court to
absolute title in favor of petitioner Mindanao Medical draw such conclusion. On the contrary, the very Sales
Center. Thus, Section 122 of the Act, which governs Award describes the tract awarded as located in
the registration of grants or patents involving public Central, Davao, Davao, with an area of 22 hectares,
lands, provides that "Whenever public lands in the and bounded on the north by Maria Villa Abrille and
Philippine Islands belonging to the Government of the Arsenio Suazo; on the southeast by a provincial road
Philippines are alienated, granted, or conveyed to and Mary Gohn; on the southwest by a public land;
persons or to public or private corporations, the same and on the west by a municipal road. 11 This area of
22 hectares was even reduced to 20.6400 hectares Application SA-5436 of Eugenio de Jesus, as ordered
upon actual survey made by the Bureau of Lands. ... by the Director of Lands." 14
The same area was reckoned with by then Lands
Director Jose P. Dans when he directed the issuance
of a patent to Eugenio de Jesus on May 15, 1948 for
his application filed on January 22, 1921 covering "a But, respondent Appellate Court reasons out that if
tract of land having an area of 20.6400 hectares, the area bidden for and awarded in 1934 ws only 22
situated in the barrio of Poblacion, City of Davao." 12 hectares and since two years thereafter the Director
In like manner, the Sales Patent issued to Eugenio de of Lands ordered an amendment excluding the
Jesus on the same date, May 15, 1948, by then military camp site of 12.8081 hectares, then only 10
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources hectares, then would have been left to applicant
Mariano Garchitorena indicated therein the sale to Eugenio de Jesus and not 20.6400 hectares would
Eugenio de Jesus of "a tract of agricultural public land have been left in the Sales Patent. The Appellate
situated in the City of Davao, Island of Mindanao, Court's reasoning is premised on wrong assumption.
Philippines, containing an area of 20 hectares 64, What was ordered amended was the Sales
ares 00 centares." Seen in the light of Patent, and Application for 33 hectares and not the Order of 22
Sales Order for Issuance of Patent, and Sales Patent, hectares or 20.6400 hectares. The Order states:
invariably bearing the area awarded to sales applicant "Order: Amendment of Application." Necessarily so,
Eugenio de Jesusas 20.6400 hectares, it becomes because the amendment was already reflected in the
imperative to conclude that what was really awarded Order of Award, since only an area of 22 hectares
to Eugenio de jesus was only 20.6400 hectares and was awarded.
not 33 hectares as applied for by him.

3. The phrase "whole tract" in the Sales Award 15

However, We observe that in the public bidding of cannot be licitly seized upon as basis for the
october 4, 1934, the succesful bidder, submitted a bid conclusion that the area awarded to applicant
of 100.50 per hectare and made a cash deposit of Eugenio de Jesus was the applied area of 33
only P221.00, which amount represents 10% of the hectares. Such general description of "whole tract"
purchase price of the land. 13 At P100.50 per cannot prevail over the specific description delineating
hectare, the purchase would be P2,221.00 for 22 the area in quantity and in boundaries. Thus, the
hectares, 10% deposit of which amounts to P221.00. Sales Award specifies the area awarded as 22
For 33 hectares, the total purchase price would be hectares, located at Central, Davao, Davao, and
P3,316.50 at P100.50 per hectare and the 10% bounded on the north by the property of Maria Villa
deposit would be P331.65, not P221.00, as what was Abrille and Arsenio Suazo; on the southwest by a
actually deposited by sales applicant Eugenio de provincial road and the property by Mary Gohn on the
Jesus. Withal, if Eugenio de Jesus was really southwest by a public land; and on the west by a
awarded 33 hectares in that public bidding, he should municipal road. 16 Specific description is ordinarily
have made the required 10% deposit of P331.65. preferred to general description, or that which is more
That he merely deposited P221.00 strongly suggests certain to what which is less certain. 17 More so,
that what was bidden for and awarded to him was when it is considered that the series of executive
only 22 hectares and not 33 hectares as applied for. proclamations (Proclamation Nos. 85, 328, 350)
As a matter of fact, his last payment of P660.45 on continuously maintained the intent of the Government
November 29, 1939 for the 8th te 10th installment to reserve the subject land for a specific purpose or
intended only to cover 20.6400 hectares, the service.
remaining area after the amendment of the Sales
Application on August 28, 1936, excluding "the
military camp site [Lot 1176B-2 of 12.8081 hectares] Besides, patents and land grants are construed
for the reason that the said site, at the time of last favorably to the Governement, and most strongly
installment was already excluded from Sale against the grantee. 18 Any doubt as to the intention
or extent of the grant, or the intention of the
Government, is to be resolved in its favor. 19 In was acquired by him or his ancestors either by
general, the quantity of the land granted must be composition title from the Spanish Government or by
ascertained from the description in the patent is possessory information title, or any other means for
exclusive evidence of the land conveyed. 20 And the acquisition of public lands, such as grants or
courts do not usually go beyond a description of a patents, the property must be held to be part of the
tract in a patent and determine the tract and quantity public domain. 26 Nor could respondent Alejandro de
of land apart from the patent itself. 21 Jesus legetimately claim to have obtained title by
prescription over the disputed 12.8081 hectares,
inasmuch as by applying for the sale thereof
(assuming hypothetically that the 12.8081-hectare lot
4. We cannot share the view of respondent was included in the original sales application for 33
Appellate Court that eugenio de jesus's alleged hectares), his father, Eugenio de Jesus, necessarily
occupation, cultivation and improvement of the 33- admits that the portions applied for are part of the
hectare land (including the 12-hectare camp site) public domain, against which no acquisitive
since 1916 vested in him a right of preference or pre- prescription may lie 27 except as provided in Section
empive right in the acquisition of the land, which right 48(b) of C.A. 141, as amended.
was controverted into "a special propriety right" when
the Sales Award was issued to him in 1934. Not only
for the earlier reasons that the Sales Award was only
for 22 hectares (later found to be 20,6400 fectares 5. Respondent Appellate Court mistakenly
upon actual survey) and not for 33 hectares, the sustained Eugenio de Jesus's pretense that the
privilege of occupying public lands a view to military "camp site" (Lot 176-B-2) had been donated
preemption confers np contractual or vested right in by him to the Philippine Army, thru Secretary Serafin
the lands occupied and the authority of the President Marabut of the Department of National Defense,
to withdraw suchlands for sale or acquisition by the sometime in 1936 subject to the condition that it
public, or to reserve them for public use, prior to the would be returned to him when the Philippine Army
divesting by the government of title threof stands, would no longer need it. As found by the trial court in
even though this may defeat the imperfect right of a 1936, the Department of National Defense was not
settler. 22 Lands covered by reservation are not yet in existence, so that no Defense Secretary by the
subject to entry, and no lawful settlement on them can name of Serafin Marabut could have entered into a
be acquired. 23 The claims o0f persons who have deed of donation with Eugenio de Jesus over Lot
settled on occupied, and improved a parcel of public 1176-B-2 consisting of 12.8081 hectares. The
land which is later included in a reservation are Department of National Defense was only organized
considered worthy of protection and are usually in 1939. Nonetheless, respondent Alejandro de
respected, but where the President, as authorized by Jesus, would prove by secondary evidence the
law, issuesa proclamation reserving certain lands and existence of such donation thru the testimony of
warning all persons to depart therefrom, this persons who supposedly saw it. In this regard, the
terminates any rights previously avquired in such Rules provides that before the terms of a transaction
lands by a person who was settled thereon in order to in realty may be established by secondary evidence, it
obtain a preferential right of purchase. 24 And patents is n that the due execution and subsequent loss of the
for lands which have been previously granted, original instrument evidencing the transaction be
reserved from sale, or appropriate, are void. 25 proved. For it is the due execution of the document
and its subsequent loss that would constitute the
foundation for the introduction of secondary evidence
to prove the contents of such document. And the due
It is true that Proclamation No. 350 states that the of the execution of the document would be proved
same is subject to "privilege rights, if any there be," through the testimony of (1) the person or persons
but Eugenio de Jesus or his son Alejandro de Jesus who executed it; (2) the person before whom its
failed to prove any private rights over the property execution was acknowledged, or (3) any who was
reserved. Wee-settled is the rule that unless the present and saw it executed and delivered, or who,
applicant has shown by clear and convincing after its execution and delivery, saw it and recognized
evidence that a certain portion of the public domain
the signatures, or by a person to whom the parties to Natural Resources and the Acting Executive
the instrument had previously confessed the Secretary that the property was "still needed for
execution thereof. 28 None of these modes of proof military purposes" and may not therefore be released
was ever followed by respondent Alejandro de Jesus. from the reservation cannot substitute the proof so
His predecessor- in-interest, Eugenio de Jesus, required. These replies are not confirmatory of the
merely made a broad statement that he executed a existence of such donation much less official
deed f donation in 1936 with Defense Secretary admissions thereof.
Marabut when at hat time the Defense Department
was not yet in existence. The notary public who
presumptively acknowledged the donation or the
witnesses to the instrument were never presented. It Even on the gratuitous assumption that a donation of
has been ruled that the failure of the party to present the military "camp site" was executed between
the notary Public and thore s who must have seen the Eugenior de jesus and Serafin Marabut, such
signing of the document as witnesses to testify on its donation would anyway be void, because Eugenior de
execution interdicts the admission of a secondary jesus held no dominical rights over the site when it
evidence of the terms of the deed. 29 This is was allegedly donated by him in 1936. In that year,
especially true in realty donations where Art. 748 of proclamation No. 85 of President Quezon already
the new Civil Code requires the accomplishment withrew the area from sale or settlement and reserved
thereof in a public document in order to be valid. The it for military purposes. Respondent Appellate Court,
testimony of Marcelo Belendres that Sesinando de however, rationalizes that the subject of the donation
jesus, brother of Eugenio de Jesus showed him a was not the land itself but "the possessory and special
copy of the "paper" signed by Secretary Marabut and proprietary rights" of Eugenio de jesus over it. We
Eugenio de Jesus; of Jose Tinio, Acting Register of disagree. It is true that the gratiuitous disposal in
Deeds of Davao, that in May or June 1937, Col. donation may consist of a thing or right. 31 But the
Simeon de jesus went to his office to register a term "right" must be understood in a "propriety"
document" executed by Eugenio de Jesus and sense, over which the processor has the jus
Secretary Marabut; of former Secretary Brigido disponendi. 32 This is because, in true donations,
Valencia that Col. Simeon de Jesus showed him a there results a consequent impoverishment of the
deed of donation signed by Eugenio de Jesus and donor or diminution of his assets. 33 Eugenio de
Serafin Marabut. hardly suffer to satisfy the requisites Jesus cannot be said to be possessed of that
of the Rules, as to which very strict compliance is "proprietary " right over the whole 33 hectares in 1936
imposed because of the importance of the document including the disputed 12.8081 hectares for at that
involved. 30 First none of these persons was a time this 12.8081-hectare lot had already been
witness to the instrument, nor any of them saw the severed from the mass of disposable public lands by
document after its execution and delivery ind Proclamation No. 85 and excluded in the Sales
recognized the signatures of the parties nor to whom Award. Impoverishment of Eugenio's assets as a
the parties to the instrument had previously confessed consequence of such donation is therefore farfetehed.
the execution; second, the reference to a "paper" or In fact, even if We were to assume in gratia argumenti
"document" ambigous as to be synonymous with a that the 12.8081-hectare lot was included in the Sales
"deed of donation;" and third, the persons who Award, still the same may not be the subject of
showed the deed, Sesinando de Jesus and Col. donation. In Sales Award, what is conferred on the
Simeon de Jesus were not parties to the instrument. applicant is merely the right "to take possession of the
Respondent Alejandro de Jesus's narration of the land so that he could comply with the requirements
existence and loss of the document equally deserves prescribed by law." 34 In other words, the right
no credence. As found by the trial court, he testified granted to the sales awardee is only "possessory
that the copy of the deed which his father kept was right" as distinguished from "proprietary right," for the
sent to him in Manila thru his uncle, Sesinando de fundamental reason that prior to the issuance of the
Jesus in July 1942, while his father himself, Eugenio sales patent and registration thereof, title to the land
de Jesus, declared that his copy of the deed was is retained by the State. 35 Admittedly, the land
burned in Davao during the Japanese occupation. applied for may be considered "disposed of by the
The replies of the Undersecretary of Agriculture and Government" upon the issuance of the Sales Award,
but this has the singular effect of withdrawing the land NARVASA, J.:
from the public domian that is "disposable" by the
Director of Lands under the Public Land Act.
Moreover, the dsiposition is merely provisional
because the applicant has still to comply with the The Director of Lands has brought this appeal by
requirements of the law before any patent is issued. It certiorari from a judgment of the Intermediate
is only after compliance with such requirements to the Appellate Court affirming a decision of the Court of
satisfaction of the Director of Lands, that the patent is First Instance of Isabela, which ordered registration in
issued and the land applied for considered favor of Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc. of five
"permanently disposed of by the Government." This parcels of land measuring 481, 390 square meters,
again is a circumstance that demeans the irrevocable more or less, acquired by it from Mariano and Acer
nature donation, because the mere desistance of the Infiel, members of the Dumagat tribe.
sales applicant to pursue the requirements called for
would cause the virtual revocation of the donation.
The registration proceedings were for confirmation of
title under Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141
ACCORDINGLY, the appealed judgement of the (The Public Land Act). as amended: and the appealed
Court of Appeals, promulgated on July 2, 1974, and judgment sums up the findings of the trial court in said
its resolution of Jane 17, 1975, denying petitioner's proceedings in this wise:
motion for reconsiderations, are hereby reversed and
set aside. The disputed Lot 1176-B-2, Plan Bsd-1514
of Davao Cadastre and containing an area of 12.8081 1. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc.,
hectares, is hereby adjudicated in favor of petitioner represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario is a corporation
Mindanao Medical Center. The urgent motion of the duly organized in accordance with the laws of the
petitioner for leave to construct essential hospitawl Republic of the Philippines and registered with the
buildings, namely: (a) communicable and contagious Securities and Exchange Commission on December
diseas pavilion; (b) hospital motorpool; and (c) 23, 1959;
physician's quarters, is hereby granted. With costs
against private respondent.

2. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc.,

represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario can acquire real
SO ORDERED. properties pursuant to the provisions of the Articles of
Incorporation particularly on the provision of its
G.R. No. 73002 December 29, 1986 secondary purposes (paragraph (9), Exhibit 'M-l');

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner, 3. That the land subject of the Land
vs. Registration proceeding was ancestrally acquired by
Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., on October 29,
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ACME 1962, from Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel, both
PLYWOOD & VENEER CO. INC., ETC., respondents. members of the Dumagat tribe and as such are
cultural minorities;

D. Nacion Law Office for private respondent.

4. That the constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines of 1935 is applicable as the sale took
place on October 29, 1962;
 Maconacon, Isabela (Exh. 'N-l'), during their special
session on November 22, 1979.
5. That the possession of the Infiels over the
land relinquished or sold to Acme Plywood & Veneer
Co., Inc., dates back before the Philippines was
discovered by Magellan as the ancestors of the Infiels The Director of Lands takes no issue with any of
have possessed and occupied the land from these findings except as to the applicability of the
generation to generation until the same came into the 1935 Constitution to the matter at hand. Concerning
possession of Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel; this, he asserts that, the registration proceedings
have been commenced only on July 17, 1981, or long
after the 1973 Constitution had gone into effect, the
latter is the correctly applicable law; and since section
6. That the possession of the applicant Acme 11 of its Article XIV prohibits private corporations or
Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., is continuous, adverse associations from holding alienable lands of the public
and public from 1962 to the present and tacking the domain, except by lease not to exceed 1,000 hectares
possession of the Infiels who were granted from (a prohibition not found in the 1935 Constitution which
whom the applicant bought said land on October 29, was in force in 1962 when Acme purchased the lands
1962, hence the possession is already considered in question from the Infiels), it was reversible error to
from time immemorial. decree registration in favor of Acme Section 48,
paragraphs (b) and (c), of Commonwealth Act No.
141, as amended, reads:
7. That the land sought to be registered is a
private land pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act
No. 3872 granting absolute ownership to members of SEC. 48. The following described citizens of
the non-Christian Tribes on land occupied by them or the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain
their ancestral lands, whether with the alienable or or claiming to own any such lands or an interest
disposable public land or within the public domain; therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of
the province where the land is located for confirmation
8. That applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. of their claims, and the issuance of a certificate of title
Inc., has introduced more than Forty-Five Million therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
(P45,000,000.00) Pesos worth of improvements, said
improvements were seen by the Court during its
ocular investigation of the land sought to be xxx xxx xxx
registered on September 18, 1982;

(b) Those who by themselves or through their

9. That the ownership and possession of the predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
land sought to be registered by the applicant was duly continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
recognized by the government when the Municipal occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain,
Officials of Maconacon, Isabela, have negotiated for under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership,
the donation of the townsite from Acme Plywood & for at least thirty years immediately preceding the
Veneer Co., Inc., and this negotiation came to reality filing of the application for confirmation of title except
when the Board of Directors of the Acme Plywood & when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall
Veneer Co., Inc., had donated a part of the land be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
bought by the Company from the Infiels for the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall
townsite of Maconacon Isabela (Exh. 'N') on be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions
November 15, 1979, and which donation was of this chapter.
accepted by the Municipal Government of
(c) Members of the National Cultural minorities
who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open. continuous, exclusive and In this regard, attention has been invited to Manila
notorious possession and occupation of lands of the Electric Company vs. Castro-Bartolome, et al, 1
public domain suitable to agriculture, whether where a similar set of facts prevailed. In that case,
disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of Manila Electric Company, a domestic corporation
ownership for at least 30 years shall be entitled to the more than 60% of the capital stock of which is
rights granted in subsection (b) hereof. Filipino-owned, had purchased in 1947 two lots in
Tanay, Rizal from the Piguing spouses. The lots had
been possessed by the vendors and, before them, by
their predecessor-in-interest, Olimpia Ramos, since
The Petition for Review does not dispute-indeed, in prior to the outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941. On
view of the quoted findings of the trial court which December 1, 1976, Meralco applied to the Court of
were cited and affirmed by the Intermediate Appellate First Instance of Rizal, Makati Branch, for
Court, it can no longer controvert before this Court-the confirmation of title to said lots. The court, assuming
fact that Mariano and Acer Infiel, from whom Acme that the lots were public land, dismissed the
purchased the lands in question on October 29, 1962, application on the ground that Meralco, a juridical
are members of the national cultural minorities who person, was not qualified to apply for registration
had, by themselves and through their progenitors, under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act which
possessed and occupied those lands since time allows only Filipino citizens or natural persons to
immemorial, or for more than the required 30-year apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect titles to
period and were, by reason thereof, entitled to public land. Meralco appealed, and a majority of this
exercise the right granted in Section 48 of the Public Court upheld the dismissal. It was held that:
Land Act to have their title judicially confirmed. Nor is
there any pretension that Acme, as the successor-in-
interest of the Infiels, is disqualified to acquire and
register ownership of said lands under any provisions ..., the said land is still public land. It would cease to
of the 1973 Constitution other than Section 11 of its be public land only upon the issuance of the
Article XIV already referred to. certificate of title to any Filipino citizen claiming it
under section 48(b). Because it is still public land and
the Meralco, as a juridical person, is disqualified to
apply for its registration under section 48(b),
Given the foregoing, the question before this Court is Meralco's application cannot be given due course or
whether or not the title that the Infiels had transferred has to be dismissed.
to Acme in 1962 could be confirmed in favor of the
latter in proceedings instituted by it in 1981 when the
1973 Constitution was already in effect, having in
mind the prohibition therein against private Finally, it may be observed that the constitutional
corporations holding lands of the public domain prohibition makes no distinction between (on the one
except in lease not exceeding 1,000 hectares. hand) alienable agricultural public lands as to which
no occupant has an imperfect title and (on the other
hand) alienable lands of the public domain as to
which an occupant has on imperfect title subject to
The question turns upon a determination of the judicial confirmation.
character of the lands at the time of institution of the
registration proceedings in 1981. If they were then still
part of the public domain, it must be answered in the
negative. If, on the other hand, they were then already Since section 11 of Article XIV does not distinguish,
private lands, the constitutional prohibition against we should not make any distinction or qualification.
their acquisition by private corporations or The prohibition applies to alienable public lands as to
associations obviously does not apply. which a Torrens title may be secured under section
48(b). The proceeding under section 48(b)
'presupposes that the land is public' (Mindanao vs. That ruling assumed a more doctrinal character
Director of Lands, L-19535, July 30, 1967, 20 SCRA because expressed in more categorical language, in
641, 644). Susi:

The present Chief Justice entered a vigorous dissent, .... In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the
tracing the line of cases beginning with Carino in 1909 presumption juris et de jure established in paragraph
2 thru Susi in 1925 3 down to Herico in 1980, 4 which (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, amending Act No.
developed, affirmed and reaffirmed the doctrine that 926, that all the necessary requirements for a grant by
open, exclusive and undisputed possession of the Government were complied with, for he has been
alienable public land for the period prescribed by law in actual and physical possession, personally and
creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon through his predecessors, of an agricultural land of
completion of the requisite period ipso jure and the public domain openly, continuously, exclusively
without the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases and publicly since July 26, 1984, with a right to a
to be public land and becomes private property. That certificate of title to said land under the provisions of
said dissent expressed what is the better — and, Chapter VIII of said Act. So that when Angela Razon
indeed, the correct, view-becomes evident from a applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had
consideration of some of the principal rulings cited already acquired, by operation of law not only a right
therein, to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not
necessary that a certificate of title should be issued in
order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts,
an application therefore is sufficient, under the
The main theme was given birth, so to speak, in provisions of section 47 of Act No. 2874. If by a legal
Carino involving the Decree/Regulations of June 25, fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in
1880 for adjustment of royal lands wrongfully question by a grant of the State, it had already ceased
occupied by private individuals in the Philippine to be of the public domain and had become private
Islands. It was ruled that: property, at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi,
beyond the control of the Director of Lands.
Consequently, in selling the land in question of
It is true that the language of articles 4 and 5 5 Angela Razon, the Director of Lands disposed of a
attributes title to those 'who may prove' possession for land over which he had no longer any title or control,
the necessary time and we do not overlook the and the sale thus made was void and of no effect, and
argument that this means may prove in registration Angela Razon did not thereby acquire any right. 6
proceedings. It may be that an English conveyancer
would have recommended an application under the
foregoing decree, but certainly it was not calculated to Succeeding cases, of which only some need be
convey to the mind of an Igorot chief the notion that mentioned, likeof Lacaste vs. Director of Lands, 7
ancient family possessions were in danger, if he had Mesina vs. Vda. de Sonza, 8 Manarpac vs.
read every word of it. The words 'may prove' Cabanatuan, 9 Miguel vs. Court of Appeals 10 and
(acrediten) as well or better, in view of the other Herico vs. Dar, supra, by invoking and affirming the
provisions, might be taken to mean when called upon Susi doctrine have firmly rooted it in jurisprudence.
to do so in any litigation. There are indications that
registration was expected from all but none sufficient
to show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained
would be lost. The effect of the proof, wherever made, Herico, in particular, appears to be squarely
was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as affirmative: 11
already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier
law. ...
.... Secondly, under the provisions of Republic Act No. (T)here are indications that registration was expected
1942, which the respondent Court held to be from all, but none sufficient to show that, for want of it,
inapplicable to the petitioner's case, with the latter's ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of
proven occupation and cultivation for more than 30 the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but
years since 1914, by himself and by his simply to establish it, as already conferred by the
predecessors-in-interest, title over the land has decree, if not by earlier law."
vested on petitioner so as to segregate the land from
the mass of public land. Thereafter, it is no longer
disposable under the Public Land Act as by free
patent. .... If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was
already private land to which the Infiels had a legally
sufficient and transferable title on October 29, 1962
when Acme acquired it from said owners, it must also
xxx xxx xxx be conceded that Acme had a perfect right to make
such acquisition, there being nothing in the 1935
Constitution then in force (or, for that matter, in the
1973 Constitution which came into effect later)
As interpreted in several cases, when the conditions prohibiting corporations from acquiring and owning
as specified in the foregoing provision are complied private lands.
with, the possessor is deemed to have acquired, by
operation of law, a right to a grant, a government
grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title
being issued. The land, therefore, ceases to be of the Even on the proposition that the land remained
public domain and beyond the authority of the technically "public" land, despite immemorial
Director of Lands to dispose of. The application for possession of the Infiels and their ancestors, until title
confirmation is mere formality, the lack of which does in their favor was actually confirmed in appropriate
not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would be proceedings under the Public Land Act, there can be
evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be no serious question of Acmes right to acquire the land
issued upon the strength of said patent. 12 at the time it did, there also being nothing in the 1935
Constitution that might be construed to prohibit
corporations from purchasing or acquiring interests in
public land to which the vendor had already acquired
Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical that type of so-called "incomplete" or "imperfect" title.
inevitability of considering possession of public land The only limitation then extant was that corporations
which is of the character and duration prescribed by could not acquire, hold or lease public agricultural
statute as the equivalent of an express grant from the lands in excess of 1,024 hectares. The purely
State than the dictum of the statute itself 13 that the accidental circumstance that confirmation
possessor(s) "... shall be conclusively presumed to proceedings were brought under the aegis of the
have performed all the conditions essential to a 1973 Constitution which forbids corporations from
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate owning lands of the public domain cannot defeat a
of title .... " No proof being admissible to overcome a right already vested before that law came into effect,
conclusive presumption, confirmation proceedings or invalidate transactions then perfectly valid and
would, in truth be little more than a formality, at the proper. This Court has already held, in analogous
most limited to ascertaining whether the possession circumstances, that the Constitution cannot impair
claimed is of the required character and length of vested rights.
time; and registration thereunder would not confer
title, but simply recognize a title already vested. The
proceedings would not originally convert the land from
public to private land, but only confirm such a We hold that the said constitutional prohibition 14 has
conversion already affected by operation of law from no retroactive application to the sales application of
the moment the required period of possession Binan Development Co., Inc. because it had already
became complete. As was so well put in Carino, "...
acquired a vested right to the land applied for at the productive of a defect hardly more than procedural
time the 1973 Constitution took effect. and in nowise affecting the substance and merits of
the right of ownership sought to be confirmed in said
proceedings, there being no doubt of Acme's
entitlement to the land. As it is unquestionable that in
That vested right has to be respected. It could not be the light of the undisputed facts, the Infiels, under
abrogated by the new Constitution. Section 2, Article either the 1935 or the 1973 Constitution, could have
XIII of the 1935 Constitution allows private had title in themselves confirmed and registered, only
corporations to purchase public agricultural lands not a rigid subservience to the letter of the law would
exceeding one thousand and twenty-four hectares. deny the same benefit to their lawful successor-in-
Petitioner' prohibition action is barred by the doctrine interest by valid conveyance which violates no
of vested rights in constitutional law. constitutional mandate.

xxx xxx xxx The Court, in the light of the foregoing, is of the view,
and so holds, that the majority ruling in Meralco must
be reconsidered and no longer deemed to be binding
The due process clause prohibits the annihilation of precedent. The correct rule, as enunciated in the line
vested rights. 'A state may not impair vested rights by of cases already referred to, is that alienable public
legislative enactment, by the enactment or by the land held by a possessor, personally or through his
subsequent repeal of a municipal ordinance, or by a predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and
change in the constitution of the State, except in a exclusively for the prescribed statutory period (30
legitimate exercise of the police power'(16 C.J.S. years under The Public Land Act, as amended) is
1177-78). converted to private property by the mere lapse or
completion of said period, ipso jure. Following that
rule and on the basis of the undisputed facts, the land
subject of this appeal was already private property at
xxx xxx xxx the time it was acquired from the Infiels by Acme.
Acme thereby acquired a registrable title, there being
at the time no prohibition against said corporation's
In the instant case, it is incontestable that prior to the holding or owning private land. The objection that, as
effectivity of the 1973 Constitution the right of the a juridical person, Acme is not qualified to apply for
corporation to purchase the land in question had judicial confirmation of title under section 48(b) of the
become fixed and established and was no longer Public Land Act is technical, rather than substantial
open to doubt or controversy. and, again, finds its answer in the dissent in Meralco:

Its compliance with the requirements of the Public 6. To uphold respondent judge's denial of
Land Law for the issuance of a patent had the effect Meralco's application on the technicality that the
of segregating the said land from the public domain. Public Land Act allows only citizens of the Philippines
The corporation's right to obtain a patent for the land who are natural persons to apply for confirmation of
is protected by law. It cannot be deprived of that right their title would be impractical and would just give rise
without due process (Director of Lands vs. CA, 123 to multiplicity of court actions. Assuming that there
Phil. 919).<äre||anº•1àw> 15 was a technical error not having filed the application
for registration in the name of the Piguing spouses as
the original owners and vendors, still it is conceded
that there is no prohibition against their sale of the
The fact, therefore, that the confirmation proceedings land to the applicant Meralco and neither is there any
were instituted by Acme in its own name must be prohibition against the application being refiled with
regarded as simply another accidental circumstance, retroactive effect in the name of the original owners
and vendors (as such natural persons) with the end confirmation of an imperfect title to public land under
result of their application being granted, because of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. Reference to the
their indisputable acquisition of ownership by 1973 Constitution and its Article XIV, Section 11, was
operation of law and the conclusive presumption only tangential limited to a brief paragraph in the main
therein provided in their favor. It should not be opinion, and may, in that context, be considered as
necessary to go through all the rituals at the great essentially obiter. Meralco, in short, decided no
cost of refiling of all such applications in their names constitutional question.
and adding to the overcrowded court dockets when
the Court can after all these years dispose of it here
and now. (See Francisco vs. City of Davao)
WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error in the
appealed judgment of the Intermediate Appellate
Court, the same is hereby affirmed, without costs in
The ends of justice would best be served, therefore, this instance.
by considering the applications for confirmation as
amended to conform to the evidence, i.e. as filed in
the names of the original persons who as natural
persons are duly qualified to apply for formal SO ORDERED.
confirmation of the title that they had acquired by
conclusive presumption and mandate of the Public
Land Act and who thereafter duly sold to the herein
corporations (both admittedly Filipino corporations
duly qualified to hold and own private lands) and
granting the applications for confirmation of title to the
private lands so acquired and sold or exchanged.

There is also nothing to prevent Acme from

reconveying the lands to the Infiels and the latter from
themselves applying for confirmation of title and, after
issuance of the certificate/s of title in their names,
deeding the lands back to Acme. But this would be
merely indulging in empty charades, whereas the
same result is more efficaciously and speedily
obtained, with no prejudice to anyone, by a liberal
application of the rule on amendment to conform to
the evidence suggested in the dissent in Meralco.
G.R. No. L-46729 November 19, 1982

While this opinion seemingly reverses an earlier ruling LAUSAN AYOG, BENITO AYOG, DAMASO AYOG,
of comparatively recent vintage, in a real sense, it JULIO AYOG, SEGUNDA AYOG, VICENTE
breaks no precedent, but only reaffirms and re- ABAQUETA, BERNARDINO ADORMEO, VIDAL
established, as it were, doctrines the soundness of ALBANO, FELICIANO ARIAS, ANTONIO BALDOS,
which has passed the test of searching examination MAXIMO BALDOS, ROMERO BINGZON, EMILIO
and inquiry in many past cases. Indeed, it is worth CADAYDAY, FRUCTUOSO CHUA, SR., HERACLEO
noting that the majority opinion, as well as the CHUA, GUILLERMO DAGOY, ABDON DEIMOS,
concurring opinions of Chief Justice Fernando and NICASIO DE LEON, JULIANA VDA. DE DIANNA,
Justice Abad Santos, in Meralco rested chiefly on the DEMOCRITO DEVERO, ALFREDO DIVINAGRACIA,
proposition that the petitioner therein, a juridical ESTEBAN DIVINAGRACIA, LEODEGARDIO
person, was disqualified from applying for DIVINAGRACIA, NELLO DIVINAGRACIA,
MERQUIADES EMBERADOR, JESUS EMPERADO, The Director found that the protestants (defendants in
PORFERIO ENOC, SOFRONIO ENOC, RAFAEL the 1961 ejectment suit, some of whom are now
GAETOS, NICOLAS GARLET, TRINIDAD GARLET, petitioners herein) entered the land only after it was
FORTUNATA GEONZON, NICOLADA NAQUILA, awarded to the corporation and, therefore, they could
TORIBIO NAQUILA, EFREN OKAY, ELPIDIO OKAY, not be regarded as bona fide occupants thereof. The
SR., DIEGO ONGRIA, ERNESTO PANARES, Director characterized them as squatters. He found
VICENTE PATULOT, IGNACIA RIBAO, JUANO that some claimants were fictitious persons (p. 30,
RICO, JESUS ROSALITA, ARMANDO TANTE and Rollo of L-43505, Okay vs. CA). He issued a writ of
ANSELMO VALMORES, petitioners, execution but the protestants defied the writ and
refused to vacate the land (p. 28, Rollo of L-43505,
vs. Okay vs. CA). **
JUDGE VICENTE N. CUSI, JR., Court of First
Instance of Davao, Branch I, PROVINCIAL SHERIFF
OF DAVAO, and BINAN DEVELOPMENT CO., INC., Because the alleged occupants refused to vacate the
respondents. MINISTER OF NATURAL land, the corporation filed against them on February
RESOURCES and DIRECTOR OF LANDS, 27, 1961 in the Court of First Instance of Davao, Civil
intervenors. Case No. 3711, an ejectment suit (accion publiciana).
The forty defendants were Identified as follows:

AQUINO, J.:
1. Vicente Abaqueta 21. Eniego Garlic

This case is about the application of section 11,

Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution (disqualifying a 2. Candido Abella 22. Nicolas Garlic
private corporation from purchasing public lands) to a
1953 sales award made by the Bureau of Lands, for
which a sales patent and Torrens title were issued in
1975, and to the 1964 decision of the trial court, 3. Julio Ayog 23. Rufo Garlic
ejecting some of the petitioners from the land
purchased, which decision was affirmed in 1975 by
the Court of Appeals. That legal question arises under 4. Arcadio Ayong 24. Alfonso Ibales
the following facts:

5. Generoso Bangonan 25. Julian Locacia

On January 21, 1953, the Director of Lands, after a
bidding, awarded to Biñan Development Co., Inc. on
the basis of its 1951 Sales Application No. V-6834
Cadastral Lot No. 281 located at Barrio Tamugan, 6. Lomayong Cabao 26. Filomeno Labantaban
Guianga (Baguio District), Davao City with an area of
about two hundred fifty hectares. Some occupants of
the lot protested against the sale. The Director of 7. Jose Catibring 27. Arcadio Lumantas
Lands in his decision of August 30, 1957 dismissed
the protests and ordered the occupants to vacate the
lot and remove their improvements. No appeal was
made from that decision. 8. Teodolfo Chua 28. Santos Militante

9. Guillermo Dagoy 29. Toribio Naquila

 On November 10, 1961, an official of the Bureau of
Lands submitted a final investigation report wherein it
10. Anastacia Vda. de Didal 30. Elpidio Okay was stated that the corporation had complied with the
cultivation and other requirements under the Public
Land Law and had paid the purchase price of the land
11. Alfredo Divinagracia 31. Guillermo Omac (p. 248, Rollo).

12. Silverio Divinagracia 32. Emilio Padayday It was only more than thirteen years later or on
August 14, 1975 when Sales Patent No. 5681 was
issued to the corporation for that lot with a reduced
area of 175.3 hectares. The patent was registered.
13. Galina Edsa 33. Marcosa Vda. de Rejoy Original Certificate of Title No. P-5176 was issued to
the patentee.

14. Jesus Emperado 34. Lorenzo Rutsa

The Director of Lands in his memorandum dated June
29, 1974 for the Secretary of Natural Resources,
recommending approval of the sales patent, pointed
15. Porfirio Enoc 35. Ramon Samsa
out that the purchaser corporation had complied with
the said requirements long before the effectivity of the
Constitution, that the land in question was free from
16. Benito Ente 36. Rebecca Samsa claims and conflicts and that the issuance of the
patent was in conformity with the guidelines
prescribed in Opinion No. 64, series of 1973, of
Secretary of Justice Vicente Abad Santos and was an
17. German Flores 37. Alfeao Sante exception to the prohibition in section 11, Article XIV
of the Constitution (p. 258, Rollo).

18. Ciriaco Fuentes 38. Meliton Sante

Secretary of Natural Resources Jose J. Leido, Jr., in
approving the patent on August 14, 1975, noted that
19. Pulong Gabao 39. Amil Sidaani the applicant had acquired a nested right to its
issuance (p. 259, Rollo).

20. Constancio Garlic 40. Cosme Villegas

Before that patent was issued, there was a trial in the
ejectment suit. Fifteen defendants (out of forty),
namely, Julio Ayog, Guillermo Bagoy, Generoso
That ejectment suit delayed the issuance of the Bangonan, Jose Catibring, Porfirio Enoc, Jose
patent. The trial court found that the protests of twenty Emperado, Arcadio Lomanto, Toribio Naquila, Elpidio
of the abovenamed defendants were among those Okay, Alfeo Sante, Meliton Sante, Ramon Samsa,
that were dismissed by the Director of Lands in his Rebecca Samsa, Arcadio Sarumines and Felix
1957 decision already mentioned. Tahantahan, testified that they entered the disputed
land long before 1951 and that they planted it to
coconuts, coffee, jackfruit and other fruit trees. (p. 28,
Record on Appeal).
On July 18, 1961 the purchase price of ten thousand
pesos was fully paid by Binan Development Co., Inc.
The trial court did not give credence to their acquired a vested right to the land applied for at the
testimonies. It believed the report of an official of the time the 1973 Constitution took effect.
Bureau of Lands that in 1953 the land was free from
private claims and conflicts and it gave much weight
to the decision of the Director of Lands dismissing the
protests of the defendants against the sales award (p. That vested right has to be respected. lt could not be
30, Record on Appeal). abrogated by the new Constitution. Section 2, Article
XIII of the 1935 Constitution allows private
corporations to purchase public agricultural lands not
exceeding one thousand and twenty-four hectares.
Furthermore, the trial court during its ocular inspection Petitioners' prohibition action is barred by the doctrine
of the land on November 8, 1964 found that the of vested rights in constitutional law.
plantings on the land could not be more than ten
years old, meaning that they were not existing in 1953
when the sales award was made. Hence, the trial
court ordered the defendants to vacate the land and "A right is vested when the right to enjoyment has
to restore the possession thereof to tile company. The become the property of some particular person or
Court of Appeals affirmed that judgment on December persons as a present interest" (16 C.J.S. 1173). It is
5, 1975 in its decision in Binan Development Co., Inc. "the privilege to enjoy property legally vested, to
vs, Sante, CA-G.R. No. 37142- R. The review of the enforce contracts, and enjoy the rights of property
decision was denied by this Court on May 17, 1976 in conferred by the existing law" (12 C.J. 955, Note 46,
Elpidio Okay vs. Court of Appeals, L-43505. No. 6) or "some right or interest in property which has
become fixed and established and is no longer open
to doubt or controversy" (Downs vs. Blount 170 Fed.
15, 20, cited in Balboa vs. Farrales, 51 Phil. 498,
After the record was remanded to the trial court, the 502).
corporation filed a motion for execution. The
defendants, some of whom are now petitioners
herein, opposed the motion. They contended that the
adoption of the Constitution, which took effect on The due process clause prohibits the annihilation of
January 17, 1973, was a supervening fact which vested rights. "A state may not impair vested rights by
rendered it legally impossible to execute the lower legislative enactment, by the enactment or by the
court's judgment. They invoked the constitutional subsequent repeal of a municipal ordinance, or by a
prohibition, already mentioned, that "no private change in the constitution of the State, except in a
corporation or association may hold alienable lands of legitimate exercise of the police power" (16 C.J.S.
the public domain except by lease not to exceed one 1177-78).
thousand hectares in area."

It has been observed that, generally, the term "vested

The lower court suspended action on the motion for right" expresses the concept of present fixed interest,
execution because of the manifestation of the which in right reason and natural justice should be
defendants that they would file a petition for protected against arbitrary State action, or an innately
prohibition in this Court. On August 24, 1977, the just and imperative right which an enlightened free
instant prohibition action was filed. Some of the society, sensitive to inherent and irrefragable
petitioners were not defendants in the ejectment case. individual rights, cannot deny (16 C.J.S. 1174, Note
71, No. 5, citing Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc.
vs. Rosenthal, 192 Atl. 2nd 587).

We hold that the said constitutional prohibition has no

retroactive application to the sales application of
Biñan Development Co., Inc. because it had already Secretary of Justice Abad Santos in his 1973 opinion
ruled that where the applicant, before the Constitution
took effect, had fully complied with all his obligations As we cannot review the factual findings of the trial
under the Public Land Act in order to entitle him to a court and the Court of Appeals, we cannot entertain
sales patent, there would seem to be no legal or petitioners' contention that many of them by
equitable justification for refusing to issue or release themselves and through their predecessors-in-interest
the sales patent (p. 254, Rollo). have possessed portions of land even before the war.
They should have filed homestead or free patent
applications.
In Opinion No. 140, series of 1974, he held that as
soon as the applicant had fulfilled the construction or
cultivation requirements and has fully paid the Our jurisdiction is limited to the resolution of the legal
purchase price, he should be deemed to have issue as to whether the 1973 Constitution is an
acquired by purchase the particular tract of land and obstacle to the implementation of the trial court's 1964
to him the area limitation in the new Constitution final and executory judgment ejecting the petitioners.
would not apply. On that issue, we have no choice but to sustain its
enforceability.

In Opinion No. 185, series of 1976, Secretary Abad

Santos held that where the cultivation requirements Nevertheless, in the interest of social justice, to avoid
were fulfilled before the new Constitution took effect agrarian unrest and to dispel the notion that the law
but the full payment of the price was completed after grinds the faces of the poor, the administrative
January 17, 1973, the applicant was, nevertheless, authorities should find ways and means of
entitled to a sales patent (p. 256, Rollo). accommodating some of the petitioners if they are
landless and are really tillers of the soil who in the
words of President Magsaysay deserve a little more
food in their stomachs, a little more shelter over their
Such a contemporaneous construction of the heads and a little more clothing on their backs. The
constitutional prohibition by a high executive official State should endeavor to help the poor who find it
carries great weight and should be accorded much difficult to make both ends meet and who suffer
respect. It is a correct interpretation of section 11 of privations in the universal struggle for existence.
Article XIV.

A tiller of the soil is entitled to enjoy basic human

In the instant case, it is incontestable that prior to the rights, particularly freedom from want. The common
effectivity of the 1973 Constitution the right of the man should be assisted in possessing and cultivating
corporation to purchase the land in question had a piece of land for his sustenance, to give him social
become fixed and established and was no longer security and to enable him to achieve a dignified
open to doubt or controversy. existence and become an independent, self-reliant
and responsible citizen in our democratic society.

Its compliance with the requirements of the Public

Land Law for the issuance of a patent had the effect To guarantee him that right is to discourage him from
of segregating the said land from the public domain. becoming a subversive or from rebelling against a
The corporation's right to obtain a patent for that land social order where, as the architect of the French
is protected by law. It cannot be deprived of that right Revolution observed, the rich are choking with the
without due process (Director of Lands vs. CA, 123 superfluities of life but the famished multitude lack the
Phil. 919). barest necessities.
Indeed, one purpose of the constitutional prohibition Arlegui, L-41360, February 17, 1977, 75 SCRA 234
against purchases of public agricultural lands by and Berses vs. Villanueva, 25 Phil. 473.)
private corporations is to equitably diffuse land
ownership or to encourage "owner-cultivatorship and
the economic family- size farm" and to prevent a
recurrence of cases like the instant case. Huge Contempt incident.-During the pendency of this case,
landholdings by corporations or private persons had or at about four o'clock in the morning of December
owned social unrest. 12, 1978, Ciriaco Tebayan, Domingo Nevasca,
Rogelio Duterte and Sofronio Etac, employees of the
Crown Fruits and Cannery Corporation, plowed or
bulldozed with their tractors a portion of the disputed
Petitioners' counsel claims that Biñan Development land which was occupied by Melquiades Emberador,
Co., Inc. seeks to execute the judgment in Civil Case one of the petitioners herein. The disputed land was
No. 3711, the ejectment suit from which this leased by Biñan Development Co., Inc. to the canning
prohibition case arose, against some of the petitioners corporation.
who were not defendants in that suit (p. 126, Rollo).

The four tractor drivers destroyed the improvements

Those petitioners are not successors-in-interest of the thereon worth about five thousand pesos consisting of
defendants in the ejectment suit. Nor do they derive coffee, coconut and banana plants. Emberador was in
their right of possession from the said defendants. the hospital at the time the alleged destruction of the
Those petitioners occupy portions of the disputed land improvements occurred. However, it should be noted
distinct and separate from the portions occupied by that Emberador was not expressly named as a
the said defendants. defendant in the ejectment suit. Apparently, he is not
included in the trial court's decision although he was
joined as a co-petitioner in this prohibition case.
We hold that judgment cannot be enforced against The petitioners in their motion of January 11, 1979
the said petitioners who were not defendants in that asked that the four tractor drivers and Honesto
litigation or who were not summoned and heard in Garcia, the manager of Biñan Development Co., Inc.,
that case. Generally, "it is an axiom of the law that no be declared in contempt of court for having
man shall be affected by proceedings to which he is a disregarded the restraining order issued by this Court
stranger" (Ed. A. Keller & Co. vs Ellerman & Bucknall on August 29, 1977, enjoining specifically Judge
Steamship Co., 38 Phil. 514, 520). Vicente N. Cusi and the provincial sheriff from
enforcing the decision in the ejectment suit, Civil Case
No. 3711 (pp. 46-47, 138- 141, Rollo).
To enforce the judgment against those who were not Garcia and the four drivers answered the motion. The
parties to the case and who occupy portions of the incident was assigned for hearing to Judge Antonio
disputed land distinct and separate from the portions M. Martinez of the Court of First Instance of Davao.
occupied by the defendants in the ejectment suit, Judge Martinez found that the plowing was made at
would be violative of due process of law, the law the instance of Garcia who told the barrio captain,
which, according to Daniel Webster in his argument in petitioner Lausan Ayog, a Bagobo, that he (Garcia)
the Dartmouth College case, is the law of the land, a could not wait anymore for the termination of this
law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds case.
upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial.
"The meaning is, that every citizen shall hold his life,
liberty, property, and immunities, under the protection
of the general rules which govern society." (Cited in The record shows that on April 30, 1979 or four
Lopez vs. Director of Lands, 47 Phil. 23, 32. See months after the said incident, Emberador, in
Gatchalian vs. Arlegui, L-35615 and Tang Tee vs. consideration of P3,500, as the value of the
improvements on his land, executed a quitclaim in VICENTE V. DE VILLA, JR., and VICENTE S. DE
favor of the Crown Fruits and Cannery Corporation VILLA, SR., private oppositors-appellees.
(Exh. 1, 2 and 3).
MAKALINTAL, J.:

We hold that no contempt was committed. The

temporary restraining order was not directed to Biñan Appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of
Development Co., Inc. its officers, agents or privies. Batangas (Lipa City) dismissing appellants'
Emberador was not named specifically in the trial "application for registration of the parcel of land
court's judgment as one of the occupants to be consisting of 107 hectares, more or less, situated in
ejected. the barrio of Sampiro, Municipality of San Juan,
Province of Batangas, and designated in amended
For the redress of whatever wrong or delict was plan PSU-103696 as Lot A."
committed against Emberador by reason of the
destruction of his improvements, his remedy is not in
a contempt proceeding but in some appropriate civil
and criminal actions against the destroyer of the The proceedings in the court a quo are not disputed.
improvements.

In resume, we find that there is no merit in the instant On August 4, 1960 appellants filed an application for
prohibition action. The constitutional prohibition relied registration of the land above described pursuant to
upon by the petitioners as a ground to stop the the provisions of Act 496. They alleged that the land
execution of the judgment in the ejectment suit has no had been inherited by them from their grandfather,
retroactive application to that case and does not Pelagio Zara, who in turn acquired the same under a
divest the trial court of jurisdiction to enforce that Spanish grant known as "Composicion de Terrenos
judgment. Realengos" issued in 1888. Alternatively, should the
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of provisions of the Land Registration Act be not
merit but with the clarification that the said judgment applicable, applicants invoke the benefits of the
cannot be enforced against those petitioners herein provisions of Chapter VIII, Section 48, subsection (b)
who were not defendants in the ejectment case, Civil of C.A. 141 as amended, on the ground that they and
Case No. 3711, and over whom the lower court did their predecessor-in-interest had been in continuous
not acquire jurisdiction. The contempt proceeding is and adverse possession of the land in concept of
also dismissed. No costs. owner for more than 30 years immediately preceding
the application.
SO ORDERED.

Oppositions were filed by the Director of Lands, the

G.R. No. L-19535 July 10, 1967 Director of Forestry and by Vicente V. de Villa, Jr. The
latter's opposition recites:
HEIRS OF PELAGIO ZARA; PIO, CLEMENTE,
SERAFIA, PORFIRIO and ESTEBAN, all surnamed
MINDANAO; MARIA and GLICERIA, both surnamed
SEDARIA; DULCE CORDERO, VICTORIA DE LOS x x x that the parcel of land sought to be registered by
REYES and JOSE GARCIA, applicants-appellants, the applicants consisting of 107 hectares, more or
less, was included in the area of the parcel of land
vs. applied for registration by Vicente S. de Villa, Sr. in
Civil Case No. 26, L.R. Case No. 601 in this Court,
DIRECTOR OF LANDS, DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, which was decided by this same Court through the
Government oppositor-appellees. then incumbent Judge, the Honorable Juan P.
Enriquez, on September 30, 1949; that the parcel
sought to be registered by the applicants was precludes a subsequent application by an alleged
declared public land in said decision; that they (the possessor for judicial confirmation of title on the basis
oppositors Vicente V. de Villa, Jr. and Vicente S. de of continuous possession for at least thirty years,
Villa, Sr.) have an interest over the land in question pursuant to Section 48, subsection (b) of the Public
because for a period more than sixty (60) years, the Land Law, C.A. 141, as amended. This provision
de Villas have been in possession, and which reads as follows:
possession, according to them, was open continuous,
notorious and under the claim of ownership; that the
proceeding being in rem, the failure of the applicants
to appear at the case No. 26, L.R. Case No. 601 to The following-described citizens of the Philippines,
prove their imperfect and incomplete title over the occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to
property, barred them from raising the same issue in own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose
another case; and that as far as the decision in Civil titles have not been perfected or completed, may
Case No. 26, L.R. Case No. 601 which was affirmed apply to the Court of First Instance of the province
in the appellate court in CA-G.R. No. 5847-R is where the land is located for confirmation of their
concerned, there is already "res-adjudicata" — in claims and the issuance of a certificate of title
other words, the cause of action of the applicant is therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
now barred by prior judgment; and that this Court has
no more jurisdiction over the subject matter, the
decision of the Court in said case having transferred xxx xxx xxx
to the Director of Lands.

(b) Those who by themselves or through their

On November 15, 1960 the De Villas (De Villa, Sr. predecessors in interest have been in open,
was subsequently included as oppositor) filed a continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
motion to dismiss, invoking the same grounds alleged occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain,
in its opposition, but principally the fact that the land under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership,
applied for had already been declared public land by for at least thirty years immediately preceding the
the judgment in the former registration case. filing of the application for confirmation of title, except
when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall
be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
The trial court, over the objection of the applicants, conditions essential to a Government grant and shall
granted the motion to dismiss by order dated January be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions
27, 1961, holding, inter alia, that "once a parcel of of this Chapter.1äwphï1.ñët
land is declared or adjudged public land by the court
having jurisdiction x x x it cannot be the subject
anymore of another land registration proceeding x x x The right to file an application under the foregoing
(that) it is only the Director of Lands who can dispose provision has been extended by Republic Act No.
of the same by sale, by lease, by free patent or by 2061 to December 31, 1968.
homestead."

It should be noted that appellants' application is in the

In the present appeal from the order of dismissal alternative: for registration of their title of ownership
neither the Director of Lands nor the Director of under Act 496 or for judicial confirmation of their
Forestry filed a brief as appellee. The decisive issue "imperfect" title or claim based on adverse and
posed by applicants-appellants is whether the 1949 continuous possession for at least thirty years. It may
judgment in the previous case, denying the be that although they were not actual parties in that
application of Vicente S. de Villa, Sr., and declaring previous case the judgment therein is a bar to their
the 107 hectares in question to be public land, claim as owners under the first alternative, since the
proceeding was in rem, of which they and their
predecessor had constructive notice by publication.
Even so this is a defense that properly pertains to the Solicitor General for petitioner.
Government, in view of the fact that the judgment
declared the land in question to be public land. In any
case, appellants' imperfect possessory title was not Restituto L. Opis for respondents.
disturbed or foreclosed by such declaration, for
precisely the proceeding contemplated in the
aforecited provision of Commonwealth Act 141
presupposes that the land is public. The basis of the
decree of judicial confirmation authorized therein is
not that the land is already privately owned and hence MAKASIAR, C.J.:
no longer part of the public domain, but rather that by
reason of the claimant's possession for thirty years he
is conclusively presumed to have performed all the Petition to review a decision of the Intermediate
conditions essential to a Government grant. Appellate Court which affirmed in toto that of the trial
court.

On the question of whether or not the private

oppositors-appellees have the necessary personality In LRC No. N-173 of the then Court of First Instance
to file an opposition, we find in their favor, considering of Marinduque, Avelino, Leandro, Justina, Zara and
that they also claim to be in possession of the land, Felipa all surnamed LEYCO applied for judicial
and have furthermore applied for its purchase from confirmation of their title to two (2) parcels of land with
the Bureau of Lands.1äwphï1.ñët a combined area of 138.5413 hectares (pp. 1-9,
ROA).

Wherefore, the order appealed from is set aside and

the case is remanded to the Court a quo for trial and The Director of lands for the Republic of the
judgment on the merits, with costs against the private Philippines opposed the petition.
oppositors-appellees.

Respondent applicants' alleged possession of Lots 1

and 2 of Psu-133612 (consisting of 138.5413
hectares) from 1962 up to the filing of their application
for registration in 1976 — about 14 years only — does
G.R. No. L-67399 November 19, 1985 not constitute possession under claim of ownership so
as to entitle them to a State grant under Section 48(b)
of the Public Land Act (Com. Act No. 141), as
amended.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (The Director of
Lands), petitioner,

vs. Respondent applicants failed to establish conclusively

that they and their predecessor-in-interest were in
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and continuous possession and occupancy of the lots in
AVELINO LEYCO, LEANDRO LEYCO, ZARA question under bona fide claim of ownership. Even
LEYCO, JUSTINA LEYCO and FELIPA LEYCO, the alleged long-time possession by respondent
represented by LEANDRO LEYCO, respondents. applicants' mother, Fausta de Jesus, who claimed to
have entered into possession of the land in question
in 1911 until her death in 1962, does not appear to be coconut trees (fruit bearing). Value of land assessed
indubitable. at P 3,500.00 and value of improvements thereon
assessed at P7,500.00 or a total value of P11,900.00.
This declaration cancelled TD No. 2778.
The tax declarations presented as evidence by
respondent applicants are not by themselves
conclusive proof of their alleged possession under Exh. M-6" — Tax Declaration No. 2778 (1955) in the
claim of ownership over the lots in question. The name of Fausta de Jesus. Declared as coconut land
earliest tax declaration is dated 1927 while the others with a total area of 19.4182 has. . Planted to 620
are recent tax declarations. coconut trees fruit bearing. Value of land assessed at
P2,330.00 and value of improvements assessed at
P2,920.00 or a total assessed value of P5,250.00.
This declaration cancelled TD No. 475.
Respondent applicants presented the following
exhibits:

Exh. M-7" — Tax Declaration No. 475 (1949) in the

name of Fausta de Jesus. Declared as coconut
Exh. M-2" — Tax Declaration No. 3431 (1966) in the (6.0000 has.) and cogon (17.0000 has.) lands.
name of Fausta de Jesus. Declared as coconut Planted to 500 coconut trees bearing fruits and 120
(15.4182 has.) and cogon (40000 has.) lands. Planted coconut trees not bearing fruits. Total value of land
to 1512 coconut bearing trees. Value of land assessed at P940.00 and improvements at P1550.00
assessed at P3,590.00 and value of improvements or a total value of P2490.00. This TD cancelled TD
assessed at P9,070.00 or a total value of P12,660.00. No. 5319.
This TD cancelled TD No. 664.

Exh. M-8" — Tax Declaration No. 5319 (1928) in the

Exh. M-3" — Tax Declaration No. 664 (1966) in the name of Fausta de Jesus. Declared as "Cogonalos
name of Fausta de Jesus. Declared as coconut para cocal, cogonalos para paste," with an area of
(15.4182 has.) and cogon (40000 has.) lands. Planted 23.0000 has . . Planted to 150 "ponos de cocos
to 1512 coconut bearing trees. Value of land frutales." Value of land assessed at P690 and
assessed at 114,360 and value of improvements improvements thereon at P300 or a total assessed
assessed at P11,340 or a total value of P15,700. This value of P990.00.
TD cancelled TD No. 4023.

Exh. 0-2" — Tax Declaration No. 3432 (1966) in the

Exh. M-4" — Tax Declaration No. 4023 (1958) in the name of Fausta de Jesus. Declared as coconut
name of Fausta de Jesus. Declared as coconut and (19.1231 has.) and cogon (100.0000 has.) lands, or
cogon lands, with a total area of 19.4182 has. . with a total area of 119.1231. Planted to 1685 coconut
Planted to 1,012 coconut fruit bearing trees. Total trees. Total value of land assessed at P9210.00 while
value of land assessed at P 2,900.00 while value of total value of improvements assessed at P10,110.00
improvements assessed at P 5,570.00 or a total or a total assessed value of P19,320.00. This
assessed value of P 8,470.00. This TD cancelled TD declaration cancelled TD No. 665.
No. 3480.

Exh. 0-3" — Tax Declaration No. 665 (1966) in the

Exh. M-5" — Tax Declaration No. 3480 (1958) in the name of Fausta de Jesus. Declared as coconut
name of Fausta de Jesus. Declared as coconut land (19.1231 has.) and cogon (100.0000 has.) lands.
with a total area of 19.4182 has. . Planted to 1364 Planted to 1,685 coconut fruit bearing trees. Land
assessed at P10,120 while improvements thereon at
P12,640 or a total assessed value of P22,760. This
declaration cancelled TD No. 4022. Likewise, respondent applicants herein presented the
following tax declarations:

Exh. 0-4" — Tax Declaration No. 4022 (1958) in the

name of Fausta de Jesus. Declared as coconut Exh. L" — Tax Declaration No. 2485 (1974) in the
(19.1231 has.) and cogon (P100.00 has.) lands. name of Avelino Leandro, Justina, Zara & Felipe, all
Planted to 1,685 coconut trees bearing fruits. Land surnamed Leyco. Classified as coconut land with an
assessed at P5,840.00 and improvements thereon at area of P5.0000 has. . Planted to 140 coconut bearing
P9,270.00. This declaration cancelled TD No. 3543. trees. Value of land assessed at P5280 and value or
improvements therein at P8020 or a total assessed
value of P13,300.00. This declaration cancelled TD
No. 4166.
Exh. 0-5" — Tax Declaration No. 3543 (1958) in the
name of Fausta de Jesus. Declared as coconut land
with a total area of 119.1231 has. . Planted to 1843
coconut trees fruit bearing. Land assessed at Exh. M" — Tax Declaration No. 4166 (1970) in the
P21,440.00 while improvements thereon at name of Avelino, Leandro, Justina and Felipa Leyco.
P10,140.00 or a total value of P31,580.00. This Declared as coconut (15.4182 has.) and cogon
declaration cancelled TD No. 2779. (4.0000 has,) lands, or with a total area of has. .
Planted to 1512 coconut fruit bearing trees. Value of
land is assessed at P3590 while value of
improvements at P9070 or a total assessed value of
Exh. 0-6" — Tax Declaration No. 2779 (1955) in the P12,660. This declaration cancelled TD No. 3431.
name of Fausta de Jesus. Declared as coconut land
with a total area of 119.1231 has. . Planted to 2,190
coconut trees fruit bearing and 200 coconut trees not
bearing fruit (3 years old). Land assessed at Exh. N" — Tax Declaration No. 2484 (1974) in the
P14,290.00 while improvements thereon at name of Avelino, Leandro, Justina, Zara and Felipa
P10,290.00 or a total value of P24,590.00. This TD Leyco. Classified as coconut (19.0000 has.) and
cancelled TD No. 4476 cogon (50.0000 has.) lands. Planted to 1425 coconut
bearing trees and 550 coconut not bearing fruits.
Land assessed at P13.730 and improvements
thereon assessed at P9,860 or a total assessed value
Exh. 0-7" — Tax Declaration No. 476 (1949) in the of P24,590. This declaration cancelled TD No. 4165.
name of Fausta de Jesus. Declared as coconut
(20.8595 has.) and pasture (642042 has.) lands or a
total area of 85.0637 has. . Planted to 2,190 coconut
trees fruit bearing. Land assessed at P3370.00 while Exh. O" — Tax Declaration No. 4165 (1970) in the
improvements thereon valued at P660.00 or a total name of Avelino Alejandro, Justina, Zara and Felipa
assessed value of P10,030.00. This TD cancelled TD Leyco. Declared as coconut (19.1231 has.) and
No. 5321. cogon (100.0000 has.) lands. Planted to 1685
coconut trees fruit bearing. Value of land assessed at
P9,210 and thereon at P10,111 or a total assessed
value of P19,320. This declaration cancelled TD No.
Exh. 0-8" — Tax Declaration No. 5321 (1941) on the 3432.
name of Fausta de Jesus. Declared as "Llani cocal"
with an area of 88.0637 has. . Planted to "2191 cocos
frutales." Land assessed at P2320 and improvements
there at P4380 or a total assessed value of P6700.00. A cursory look at the exhibits (tax declarations)
This declaration cancelled TD No. 3231. presented by respondent applicants herein reveals a
number of discrepancies that cast serious doubts on This anomaly in the listing of adjoining owners in the
respondents' claim over the lots in question: two aforestated tax declarations over the same parcel
of land only reveals the flaw that apparently attended
the acquisition of the lots in question by respondent
applicants and their predecessor-in-interest.
1. Tax Declaration No. 5319 dated 1928 (Exh.
M-8) declared in the name of Fausta de Jesus with an
area of 23.0000 hectares, specifies its boundaries as
follows: 2. Under Tax Declaration No. 5321 dated 1941 (Exh.
0-8), respondent applicants' predecessor-in-interest,
Fausta de Jesus, declared a parcel of land in her
name with an area of 88.0637 hectares.
North: Sapa

Later, in 1949, Fausta de Jesus filed Tax Declaration

East: Florencio Corral No. 476 (Exh. 0-7) which cancelled Tax Declaration
No. 5321 over the same parcel of land. However,
under Tax Declaration No. 476, the total area of the
South: Fausta de Jesus land declared was only 85.0637 hectares (84.0637 as
erroneously stated in Tax Declaration No. 476).

West: Mar.
Again, the foregoing disparity in the size of the land
as declared in the two tax declarations is a clear
indication that respondent applicants herein and their
In 1949, Fausta de Jesus filed Tax Declaration No. predecessor-in-interest were uncertain and
475 (Exh. M-7) which cancelled Tax Declaration 475 contradictory as to the exact or actual size of the land
(Exh. M-7) which cancelled Tax Declaration No. 5319 they purportedly possessed.
over the same parcel of land. A close examination,
however, of Tax Declaration No. 475 shows that the
listing of the adjoining owners therein was at variance
with what was previously stated in Tax Declaration Likewise, it is noteworthy to mention that six years
No. 5319, thus: after Fausta de Jesus filed Declaration No. 476 in
1949, Tax Declaration No. 2779 was filed —
cancelling Tax Declaration No. 476 — showing this
time a whopping land area of 119.1231 hectares. As
North. Brook to how Fausta de Jesus managed to increase her
landholdings in so short a span of time intrigues one
no end, considering that from 1949 up to her death in
East: Aurelia de Jesus 1962, she listed Manila as her place of residence.

South: Seashore (before Fausta de Jesus) 3. Tax Declaration No. 3432 (1966), 665 (1966), and
4022 (1958) presented as Exhibits 0-2, 0-3, and 0-4,
respectively, show that of the total declared area of
119.1231 hectares, only about 19.1231 hectares were
West: Hrs. of Florencio Corral planted to coconuts and the remaining 100.000,00
hectares were cogonal or uncultivated lands.
The unjustifiable award of this vast tract of land — and fruit trees. Once planted, a coconut is left to grow
which are cogon lands and therefore pasture lands and need not be tended or watched. This is not what
still forming part of the public domain and released by the law considers as possession under claim of
the Bureau of Lands for disposition — to the ownership. On the contrary, it merely showed casual
respondent applicants herein, who are undeserving, is or occasional cultivation of portions of the land in
tantamount to putting a premium on absentee question. In short, possession is not exclusive nor
landlordism. notorious, much less continuous, so as to give rise to
a presumptive grant from the government.

The record shows that even the taxes due o the

litigated lots were not paid regularly. As per Moreover, respondent applicants herein have not
certification of the municipal treasurer of Buenavista, shown nor clearly their right to inherit from their
Marinduque, it was shown that the taxes due on the predecessor-in-interest. The observation of the
land registered in the name of Fausta de Jesus were Solicitor General on this point is thus well taken:
paid only from 1949 until 1957 — an indication that
respondent applicants and their predecessor-in-
interest did not pay taxes to the government from
1928 to 1940, and from 1958 until July 6, 1978 when Even assuming that applicants' deceased mother
the respondent applicants closed their evidence — a acquired registerable title over the parcels in question,
total of 32 years. The respondent applicants applicants cannot be said to have acquired the same
presented their evidence on April 19, 1977, October right proper for registration. They have not presented
12, 1977, March 29, 1978 and July 6, 1978. any evidence of value to prove that they have the
right to inherit whatever portion of the properties left
by Fausta de Jesus. They have first to show their right
to succeed Fausta, testate or intestate; to establish
The testimonies of respondent applicants' alleged who Fausta's legal heirs are or that applicants. and no
overseers and hired tenants should not be accorded other, are Fausta's sole heirs. But all these should be
weight and significance; because it is only natural for threshed out in a proper proceeding, certainly not in a
the overseers and hired tenants to testify as they did land registration case.
in respondent applicants' favor as they stand to
benefit from a decision favorable to their supposed
landlords and benefactors.
Finally, this is a clear case of land-grabbing of over
100 hectares of land, which could be divided among
the landless and the poor to defuse the seething
But even granting that the witnesses presented by unrest among the underprivileged. At this point in time
herein respondent applicants were indeed bona fide in our country's history, land-grabbing by the powerful,
overseers and tenants or workers of the land in moneyed and influential absentee claimants should
question, it appears rather strange why only about not be tolerated nor condoned if only to avoid fanning
3,000 coconut trees and some fruit trees were planted further the fires of discontent, dissidence or
(2,000 coconut trees on Lot 1 which is 119 hectares. subversion which menacingly threaten the very
and 1,000 coconut trees on Lot 2 which is 19 survival of our nation.
hectares) on the vast tract of land subject of the
instant petition. In a practical and scientific way of
planting, a one- hectare land can be planted to about
144 coconut trees. In the instant case, if the hired WHEREFORE, THE PETITION IS HEREBY
tenants and workers of respondent applicants GRANTED. THE DECISION OF THE RESPONDENT
managed to plant only 3,000 coconut trees, it could INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT IS HEREBY
only mean that about only 25 hectares out of the 138 REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. NO COSTS.
hectares claimed by herein respondent applicants
were cleared, cultivated and planted to coconut trees
SO ORDERED.

This is a letter-motion praying for reconsideration (for

the third time) of the June 16, 2008 resolution of this
Court denying the petition for review filed by petitioner
Florencia G. Diaz.

Petitioner’s late mother, Flora Garcia (Garcia), filed an

application for registration of a vast tract of land1
located in Laur, Nueva Ecija and Palayan City in the
then Court of First Instance (CFI), Branch 1, Nueva
Ecija on August 12, 1976.2 She alleged that she
possessed the land as owner and worked, developed
and harvested the agricultural products and benefits
of the same continuously, publicly and adversely for
more or less 26 years.

The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the

Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the
application because the land in question was within
the Fort Magsaysay Military Reservation (FMMR),
established by virtue of Proclamation No. 237
(Proclamation 237)3 in 1955. Thus, it was inalienable
as it formed part of the public domain.

Significantly, on November 28, 1975, this Court

already ruled in Director of Lands v. Reyes4 that the
property subject of Garcia’s application was
inalienable as it formed part of a military reservation.
Moreover, the existence of Possessory Information
Title No. 216 (allegedly registered in the name of a
G.R. No. 181502 February 2, 2010 certain Melecio Padilla on March 5, 1895), on which
therein respondent Parañaque Investment and
Development Corporation anchored its claim on the
land, was not proven. Accordingly, the decree of
FLORENCIA G. DIAZ, Petitioner, registration issued in its favor was declared null and
void.
vs.

REPUBLIC of the PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

Reyes notwithstanding, the CFI ruled in Garcia’s favor
in a decision5 dated July 1, 1981.
RESOLUTION

The Republic eventually appealed the decision of the

CFI to the Court of Appeals (CA). In its decision6
CORONA, J.:
dated February 26, 1992, penned by Justice Vicente On June 30, 1999, the appellate court approved the
V. Mendoza (Mendoza decision),7 the appellate court compromise agreement.11 On January 12, 2000, it
reversed and set aside the decision of the CFI. The directed the Land Registration Administration to issue
CA found that Reyes was applicable to petitioner’s the corresponding decree of registration in petitioner’s
case as it involved the same property. favor.12

The CA observed that Garcia also traced her However, acting on a letter written by a certain Atty.
ownership of the land in question to Possessory Restituto S. Lazaro, the OSG filed a motion for
Information Title No. 216. As Garcia’s right to the reconsideration of the CA resolution ordering the
property was largely dependent on the existence and issuance of the decree of registration. The OSG
validity of the possessory information title the informed the appellate court that the tract of land
probative value of which had already been passed subject of the amicable settlement was still within the
upon by this Court in Reyes, and inasmuch as the military reservation.
land was situated inside a military reservation, the CA
concluded that she did not validly acquire title thereto.
On April 16, 2007, the CA issued an amended
resolution (amended resolution)13 annulling the
During the pendency of the case in the CA, Garcia compromise agreement entered into between the
passed away and was substituted by her heirs, one of parties. The relevant part of the dispositive portion of
whom was petitioner Florencia G. Diaz.81avvphi1 the resolution read:

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolves to:
Mendoza decision. While the motion was pending in
the CA, petitioner also filed a motion for recall of the
records from the former CFI. Without acting on the
motion for reconsideration, the appellate court, with (1) x x x x x x
Justice Mendoza as ponente, issued a resolution9
upholding petitioner’s right to recall the records of the
case. (2) x x x x x x

Subsequently, however, the CA encouraged the (3) x x x x x x

parties to reach an amicable settlement on the matter
and even gave the parties sufficient time to draft and
finalize the same.
(4) x x x x x x

The parties ultimately entered into a compromise

agreement with the Republic withdrawing its claim on (5) x x x x x x
the more or less 4,689 hectares supposedly outside
the FMMR. For her part, petitioner withdrew her
application for the portion of the property inside the (6) REVERSE the Resolution dated June 30, 1999 of
military reservation. They filed a motion for approval this Court approving the Amicable Settlement dated
of the amicable settlement in the CA.10 May 18, 1999 executed between the Office of the
Solicitor General and Florencia Garcia Diaz[;]
(7) ANNUL and SET ASIDE the Amicable Settlement Thereafter, petitioner filed a petition for review on
dated May 18, 1999 executed between the Office of certiorari15 in this Court. It was denied for raising
the Solicitor General and Florencia Garcia Diaz; the factual issues.16 She moved for reconsideration.17
said Amicable Settlement is hereby DECLARED to be This motion was denied with finality on the ground
without force and effect; that there was no substantial argument warranting a
modification of the Court’s resolution. The Court then
ordered that no further pleadings would be
entertained. Accordingly, we ordered entry of
(8) GRANT the Motion for Reconsideration filed by judgment to be made in due course.18
the Office of the Solicitor General and, consequently,
SET ASIDE the Resolution dated January 12, 2000
which ordered, among other matters, that a certificate
of title be issued in the name of plaintiff-appellee Petitioner, however, insisted on filing a motion to lift
Florencia Garcia Diaz over the portion of the subject entry of judgment and motion for leave to file a
property in consonance with the Amicable Settlement second motion for reconsideration and to refer the
dated May 18, 1999 approved by the Court in its case to the Supreme Court en banc.19 The Court
Resolution dated June 30, 1999; denied20 it considering that a second motion for
reconsideration is a prohibited pleading.21
Furthermore, the motion to refer the case to the banc
was likewise denied as the banc is not an appellate
(9) SET ASIDE the Resolution dated June 30, 1999 court to which decisions or resolutions of the divisions
approving the May 18, 1999 Amicable Settlement and may be appealed.22 We reiterated our directive that
the Resolution dated September 20, 1999 amending no further pleadings would be entertained and that
the aforesaid June 30, 1999 Resolution; and entry of judgment be made in due course.

(10) REINSTATE the Decision dated February 26, Not one to be easily deterred, petitioner wrote
1992 dismissing applicant-appellee Diaz’ registration identical letters, first addressed to Justice Leonardo
herein. A. Quisumbing (then Acting Chief Justice) and then to
Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno himself.23 The body of
the letter, undoubtedly in the nature of a third motion
SO ORDERED. for reconsideration, is hereby reproduced in its
entirety:
(Emphasis supplied)

This is in response to your call for "Moral Forces" in

Petitioner moved for reconsideration. For the first order to "redirect the destiny of our country which is
time, she assailed the validity of the Mendoza suffering from moral decadence," that to your mind, is
decision – the February 26, 1992 decision adverted to the problem which confronts us. (Inquirer, January 15,
in the CA’s amended resolution. She alleged that 2009, page 1)[.]
Justice Mendoza was the assistant solicitor general
during the initial stages of the land registration
proceedings in the trial court and therefore should
have inhibited himself when the case reached the CA. I recently lost my case with the Supreme Court, G.R.
His failure to do so, she laments, worked an injustice N[o]. 181502, and my lawyer has done all that is
against her constitutional right to due process. Thus, humanly possible to convince the court to take a
the Mendoza decision should be declared null and second look at the miscarriage of justice that will
void. The motion was denied.14 result from the implementation of the DISMISSAL in a
MINUTE RESOLUTION of our Petition for Review.
 If leaked to the tri-media[,] my case will certainly
evoke even greater spite from the public, and put the
Pending before your Division (First Division) is a last Supreme Court in bad light. I must confess that I was
plea for justice so that the case may be elevated to tempted to pursue such course of action. I however
the Supreme Court en banc. I hope the Court believe that such an action will do more harm than
exercises utmost prudence in resolving the last plea. good, and even destroy the good name of Hon.
For ready reference, a copy of the Motion is hereto Justice Mendoza.
attached as Annex "A".

I fully support your call for "moral force" that will

The issue that was brought before the Honorable slowly and eventually lead our country to redirect its
Supreme Court involves the Decision of then Justice destiny and escape from this moral decadence, in
Vicente Mendoza of the Court of Appeals, which is which we all find ourselves.
NULL and VOID, ab initio.

I am content with the fact that at least, the Chief

It is null and void because destiny placed Hon. Justice Justice continues to fight the dark forces that
Vicente Mendoza in a position in which it became surround us everyday.
possible for him to discharge the minimum
requirement of due process, [i.e.] the ability of the
court to render "impartial justice," because Mr. Justice
Mendoza became the ponente of the Court of I only ask that the Supreme Court endeavor to ensure
Appeals Decision, reversing the findings of the trial that cases such as mine do not happen again, so that
court, notwithstanding the fact that he, as Assistant the next person who seeks justice will not experience
Solicitor General, was the very person who appeared the pain and frustration that I suffered under our
on behalf of the Republic, as the oppositor in the very judicial system.
same land registration proceedings in which he lost.

Thank you, and more power to you, SIR. (Emphasis

In other words, he discharged the duties of prosecutor in the original).
and judge in the very same case.

The language of petitioner’s letter/motion is

In the case of the "Alabang Boys[,]" the public was unmistakable. It is a thinly veiled threat precisely
outraged by the actions of Atty. Verano who admitted worded and calculated to intimidate this Court into
having prepared a simple resolution to be signed by giving in to her demands to honor an otherwise legally
the Secretary of Justice. infirm compromise agreement, at the risk of being
vilified in the media and by the public.

In my case, the act complained of is the worst kind of

violation of my constitutional right. It is simply This Court will not be cowed into submission. We
immoral, illegal and unconstitutional, for the deny petitioner’s letter/third motion for
prosecutor to eventually act as the judge, and reverse reconsideration.
the very decision in which he had lost.

APPLICABILITY OF REYES
The Court agrees with the Republic’s position that therein, thereafter sold the same property to Benigno
Reyes is applicable to this case. S. Aquino. The latter sought to have it registered in
his name. The question in that case, as well as in this
one, was whether our decision in the case in which
another person was the applicant constituted res
To constitute res judicata, the following elements judicata as against his successors-in-interest.
must concur:

We ruled there, and we so rule now, that in

(1) the former judgment or order must be final; registration cases filed under the provisions of the
Public Land Act for the judicial confirmation of an
incomplete and imperfect title, an order dismissing an
(2) the judgment or order must be on the merits; application for registration and declaring the land as
part of the public domain constitutes res judicata, not
only against the adverse claimant, but also against all
persons.27
(3) it must have been rendered by a court having
jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties; and

We also declared in Aquino that:

(4) there must be between the first and second

actions, identity of parties, of subject matter, and of
causes of action. 24 From another point of view, the decision in the first
action has become the "law of the case" or at least
falls within the rule of stare decisis. That adjudication
should be followed unless manifestly erroneous. It
The first three requisites have undoubtedly been was taken and should be taken as the authoritative
complied with. However, petitioner takes exception to view of the highest tribunal in the Philippines. It is
the fourth requisite, particularly on the issue of identity indispensable to the due administration of justice
of parties. In her petition for review filed in this Court, especially by a court of last resort that a question
she contends that since the applicants in the two once deliberately examined and decided should be
cases are different, the merits of the two cases considered as settled and closed to further argument.
should, accordingly, be determined independently of x x x28
each other.25

Be that as it may, the fact is that, even before the CFI

This contention is erroneous. came out with its decision in favor of petitioner on July
1, 1981, this Court, in Reyes, already made an earlier
ruling on November 28, 1975 that the disputed realty
The facts obtaining in this case closely resemble was inalienable as it formed part of a military
those in Aquino v. Director of Lands.26 In that case, reservation. Thus, petitioner’s argument that the
Quintin Tañedo endeavored to secure title to a findings of fact of the trial court on her registrable title
considerable tract of land by virtue of his possession are binding on us – on the principle that findings of
thereof under CA 141. When the case eventually fact of lower courts are accorded great respect and
reached this Court, we affirmed the trial court’s bind even this Court – is untenable. Rather, it was
decision to dismiss the proceedings as the property in incumbent upon the court a quo to respect this
question was part of the public domain. Quintin’s Court’s ruling in Reyes, and not the other way around.
successor-in-interest, Florencia Tañedo, who despite
knowledge of the proceedings did not participate
However, despite having been apprised of the Court's approximately 13,957 hectares of said land consist of
findings in Reyes (which should have been a matter public forest. x x x (Emphasis supplied)32
of judicial notice in the first place), the trial court still
insisted on its divergent finding and disregarded the
Court's decision in Reyes, declaring the subject land
as forming part of a military reservation, and thus Concomitantly, we stated therein, and we remind
outside the commerce of man. petitioner now, that forest lands are not registrable
under CA 141.

By not applying our ruling in Reyes, the trial judge

virtually nullified the decision of this Court and [E]ven more important, Section 48[b] of CA No. 141,
therefore acted with grave abuse of discretion.29 as amended, applies exclusively to public agricultural
Notably, a judgment rendered with grave abuse of land. Forest lands or area covered with forest are
discretion is void and does not exist in legal excluded. It is well-settled that forest land is incapable
contemplation.30 of registration; and its inclusion in a title, whether such
title be one issued using the Spanish sovereignty or
under the present Torrens system of registration,
nullifies the title. (Emphasis supplied).33
All lower courts, especially the trial court concerned in
this case, ought to be reminded that it is their duty to
obey the decisions of the Supreme Court. A conduct
becoming of inferior courts demands a conscious However, it is true that forest lands may be registered
awareness of the position they occupy in the when they have been reclassified as alienable by the
interrelation and operation of our judicial system. As President in a clear and categorical manner (upon the
eloquently declared by Justice J.B. L. Reyes, "There recommendation of the proper department head who
is only one Supreme Court from whose decision all has the authority to classify the lands of the public
other courts should take their bearings."31 domain into alienable or disposable, timber and
mineral lands)34 coupled with possession by the
claimant as well as that of her predecessors-in-
interest. Unfortunately for petitioner, she was not able
ACQUISITION OF PRIVATE RIGHTS to produce such evidence. Accordingly, her
occupation thereof, and that of her predecessors-in-
interest, could not have ripened into ownership of the
subject land. This is because prior to the conversion
Petitioner, however, argues that Proclamation 237 of forest land as alienable land, any occupation or
itself recognizes that its effectivity is "subject to possession thereof cannot be counted in reckoning
private rights, if any there be." compliance with the thirty-year possession
requirement under Commonwealth Act 141 (CA 141)
or the Public Land Act.35 This was our ruling in
By way of a background, we recognized in Reyes that Almeda v. CA.36 The rules on the confirmation of
the property where the military reservation is situated imperfect titles do not apply unless and until the land
is forest land. Thus: classified as forest land is released through an official
proclamation to that effect. Then and only then will it
form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the
public domain.37
Before the military reservation was established, the
evidence is inconclusive as to possession, for it is
shown by the evidence that the land involved is
largely mountainous and forested. As a matter of fact, Coming now to petitioner’s contention that her "private
at the time of the hearing, it was conceded that rights" to the property, meaning her and her
predecessors’ possession thereof prior to the
establishment of the FMMR, must be respected, the xxx
same is untenable. As earlier stated, we had already
recognized the same land to be public forest even
before the FMMR was established. To reiterate:
A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by
the claimant, and the raising thereon of cattle, do not
constitute possession under claim of ownership. In
Before the military reservation was established, the that sense, possession is not exclusive and notorious
evidence is inconclusive as to possession, for it is as to give rise to a presumptive grant from the State.
shown by the evidence that the land involved is While grazing livestock over land is of course to be
largely mountainous and forested. As a matter of fact, considered with other acts of dominion to show
at the time of the hearing, it was conceded that possession, the mere occupancy of land by grazing
approximately 13,957 hectares of said land consist of livestock upon it, without substantial inclosures, or
public forest. x x x other permanent improvements, is not sufficient to
support a claim of title thru acquisitive prescription.
The possession of public land, however long the
period may have extended, never confers title thereto
Therefore, even if possession was for more than 30 upon the possessor because the statute of limitations
years, it could never ripen to ownership. with regard to public land does not operate against
the State unless the occupant can prove possession
and occupation of the same under claim of ownership
But even assuming that the land in question was for the required number of years to constitute a grant
alienable land before it was established as a military from the State.38
reservation, there was nevertheless still a dearth of
evidence with respect to its occupation by petitioner
and her predecessors-in-interest for more than 30 xxx
years. In Reyes, we noted:

Furthermore, the fact that the possessory information

Evidently, Melecio Padilla, having died on February 9, title on which petitioner also bases her claim of
1900, barely five (5) years after the inscription of the ownership was found to be inexistent in Reyes,39
informacion possessoria, could not have converted thus rendering its probative value suspect, further
the same into a record of ownership twenty (20) years militates against granting her application for
after such inscription, pursuant to Article 393 of the registration.
Spanish Mortgage Law.

NULLITY OF COMPROMISE AGREEMENT

xxx

On the compromise agreement between the parties,

During the lifetime of Melecio Padilla, only a small we agree with the CA that the same was null and
portion thereof was cleared and cultivated under the void.
‘kaingin’ system, while some portions were used as
grazing land. After his death, his daughter, Maria
Padilla, caused the planting of vegetables and had
about forty (40) tenants for the purpose. During the An amicable settlement or a compromise agreement
Japanese occupation, Maria Padilla died. x x x is in the nature of a contract and must necessarily
comply with the provisions of Article 1318 of the New
Civil Code which provides:
 or receive anything in discharge of a client’s claim but
the full amount in cash. (Emphasis supplied).
Art. 1318. There is no contract unless the following
requisites concur:

Moreover, the land in question could not have been a

valid subject matter of a contract because, being
(1) Consent of the contracting parties; forest land, it was inalienable. Article 1347 of the Civil
Code provides:

(2) Object certain which is the subject matter of the

contract; Art. 1347. All things which are not outside the
commerce of men, including future things, may be the
object of a contract. All rights which are not
(3) Cause of the obligation which is established. intransmissible may also be the object of contracts.

Petitioner was not able to provide any proof that the No contract may be entered into upon future
consent of the Republic, through the appropriate inheritance except in cases expressly authorized by
government agencies, i.e. the Department of law.
Environment and Natural Resources, Land
Management Bureau, Land Registration Authority,
and the Office of the President, was secured by the All services which are not contrary to law, morals,
OSG when it executed the agreement with her.40 The good customs, public order or public policy may
lack of authority on the part of the OSG rendered the likewise be the object of a contract. (Emphasis
compromise agreement between the parties null and supplied)
void because although it is the duty of the OSG to
represent the State in cases involving land
registration proceedings, it must do so only within the
scope of the authority granted to it by its principal, the Finally, the Court finds the cause or consideration of
Republic of the Philippines.41 the obligation contrary to law and against public
policy. The agreement provided that, in consideration
of petitioner’s withdrawal of her application for
registration of title from that portion of the property
In this case, although the OSG was authorized to located within the military reservation, respondent
appear as counsel for respondent, it was never given was withdrawing its claim on that part of the land
the specific or special authority to enter into a situated outside said reservation. The Republic could
compromise agreement with petitioner. This is in not validly enter into such undertaking as the subject
violation of the provisions of Rule 138 Section 23, of matter of the agreement was outside the commerce of
the Rules of Court which requires "special authority" man.
for attorneys to bind their clients.

PETITIONER’S CONTEMPT OF COURT

Section 23. Authority of attorneys to bind clients. –
Attorneys have authority to bind their clients in any
case by any agreement in relation thereto made in
writing, and in taking appeals, and in all matters of This Court, being the very institution that dispenses
ordinary judicial procedure. But they cannot, without justice, cannot reasonably be expected to just sit by
special authority, compromise their client’s litigation, and do nothing when it comes under attack.
 requirement of due process, [i.e.] the ability of the
court to render "impartial justice," because Mr. Justice
That petitioner’s letter-motion constitutes an attack Mendoza became the ponente of the Court of
against the integrity of this Court cannot be denied. Appeals Decision, reversing the findings of the trial
Petitioner started her letter innocently enough by court, notwithstanding the fact that he, as Assistant
stating: Solicitor General, was the very person who appeared
on behalf of the Republic, as the oppositor in the very
same land registration proceedings in which he lost.
This is in response to your call for "Moral Forces" in (Emphasis supplied).
order to "redirect the destiny of our country which is
suffering from moral decadence," that to your mind, is
the problem which confronts us. (Inquirer, January 15, Petitioner then indirectly hints that, when push comes
2009, page 1)[.] to shove, she has no choice but to expose the
irregularity concerning the Mendoza decision to the
media. This is evident in her arrogant declaration that:
It, however, quickly progressed into a barely
concealed resentment for what she perceived as this
Court’s failure to exercise "utmost prudence" in If leaked to the tri-media[,] my case will certainly
rendering "impartial justice" in deciding her case. evoke even greater spite from the public, and put the
Petitioner recounted: Supreme Court in bad light.

I recently lost my case with the Supreme Court, G.R. But she hastens to add in the same breath that:
N[o]. 181502, and my lawyer has done all that is
humanly possible to convince the court to take a
second look at the miscarriage of justice that will
result from the implementation of the DISMISSAL in a I must confess that I was tempted to pursue such
MINUTE RESOLUTION of our Petition for Review. course of action. I however believe that such an
action will do more harm than good, and even destroy
the good name of Hon. Justice Mendoza.

Pending before your Division (First Division) is a last

plea for justice so that the case may be elevated to
the Supreme Court en banc. I hope the Court Petitioner ends her letter by taking this Court to task:
exercises utmost prudence in resolving the last plea.
For ready reference, a copy of the Motion is hereto
attached as Annex "A". . . . endeavor to ensure that cases such as mine do
not happen again, so that the next person who seeks
justice will not experience the pain and frustration that
The issue that was brought before the Honorable I suffered under our judicial system.
Supreme Court involves the Decision of then Justice
Vicente Mendoza of the Court of Appeals, which is
NULL and VOID, ab initio. When required to show cause why she should not be
cited for contempt for her baseless charges and
veiled threats, petitioner answered:
It is null and void because destiny placed Hon. Justice
Vicente Mendoza in a position in which it became
possible for him to discharge the minimum xxx
 a careful and thorough deliberation of the facts of this
case and all the matters pertaining thereto. The
The Letter of January 26, 2009 is not a "veiled records of the case, in fact, show that all the pertinent
threat[.] It was written in response to the call of the issues raised by petitioner were passed upon and
Chief Justice for a moral revolution. Juxtaposed sufficiently addressed by the appellate court and this
against the factual backdrop of the "Alabang Boys" Court in their respective resolutions.
case and the Meralco [c]ase, involving Mr. Justice
Jose L. Sabio which also enjoyed wide publicity over
the tri-media, petitioner felt that the facts of the said
cases pale in comparison to the facts of her case As to petitioner’s complaint regarding this Court’s
where the lawyer of her opponent eventually became denial of her petition through a mere minute resolution
justice of the appellate court and ended up reversing (which allegedly deprived her of due process as the
the very decision in which he lost, in clear violation of Court did not issue a full-blown decision stating the
her [c]onstitutional [r]ight to fundamental fair play – for facts and applicable jurisprudence), suffice it to say
no contestant in any litigation can ever serve as a that the Court is not duty-bound to issue decisions or
judge without transgression of the due process resolutions signed by the justices all the time. It has
clause. This is basic. ample discretion to formulate ponencias, extended
resolutions or even minute resolutions issued by or
upon its authority, depending on its evaluation of a
case, as long as a legal basis exists. When a minute
Petitioner confesses that she may have been resolution (signed by the Clerk of Court upon orders
emotional in the delivery of her piece, because of the Court) denies or dismisses a petition or motion
correctly or incorrectly[,] she believes they are for reconsideration for lack of merit, it is understood
irrefutable. If in the course of that emotional delivery, that the assailed decision or order, together with all its
she has offended your honors’ sensibilities, she is findings of fact and legal conclusions, are deemed
ready for the punishment, and only prays that his sustained.42
Court temper its strike with compassion – as her letter
to the Chief Justice was never written with a view of
threatening the Court.
Furthermore, petitioner has doggedly pursued her
case in this Court by filing three successive motions
for reconsideration, including the letter-motion subject
xxx of this resolution. This, despite our repeated warnings
that "no further pleadings shall be entertained in this
case." Her unreasonable persistence constitutes utter
Petitioner wrote the Chief Justice in order to obtain defiance of this Court’s orders and an abuse of the
redress and correction of the inequity bestowed upon rules of procedure. This, alongside her thinly veiled
her by destiny. It was never meant as a threat. threats to leak her case to the media to gain public
sympathy – although the tone of petitioner’s
compliance with our show-cause resolution was
decidedly subdued compared to her earlier letters –
The Court now puts an end to petitioner’s constitutes contempt of court.
irresponsible insinuations and threats of "going public"
with this case. We are not blind to petitioner’s clever
and foxy interplay of threats alternating with false
concern for the reputation of this Court. In Republic v. Unimex,43 we held:

It is well to remind petitioner that the Court has A statement of this Court that no further pleadings
consistently rendered justice with neither fear nor would be entertained is a declaration that the Court
favor. The disposition in this case was arrived at after has already considered all issues presented by the
parties and that it has adjudicated the case with reconsideration is a prohibited pleading and the plea
finality. It is a directive to the parties to desist from utterly lacks merit.
filing any further pleadings or motions. Like all orders
of this Court, it must be strictly observed by the
parties. It should not be circumvented by filing
motions ill-disguised as requests for clarification. Petitioner is found GUILTY of contempt of court.
Accordingly, a FINE of Five Thousand Pesos is
hereby imposed on her, payable within ten days from
receipt of this resolution. She is hereby WARNED that
A FEW OBSERVATIONS any repetition hereof shall be dealt with more
severely.

If petitioner was, as she adamantly insists, only

guarding her constitutional right to due process, then Treble costs against petitioner.
why did she question the validity of the Mendoza
decision late in the proceedings, that is, only after her
motion for reconsideration in the CA (for its
subsequent annulment of the compromise SO ORDERED.
agreement) was denied? It is obvious that it was only
when her case became hopeless that her present
counsel frantically searched for some ground, any
ground to resuscitate his client’s lost cause,
subsequently raising the issue. This is evident from a
statement in her petition to this Court that:

It is this fresh discovery by the undersigned counsel

of the nullity of the proceedings of the Court of
Appeals that places in doubt the entire proceedings it
previously conducted, which led to the rendition of the
February 26, 1992 Decision, a fact that escaped the
scrutiny of applicant for registration Flora L. Garcia,
as well as her lawyer, Atty. Cayetano Dante Diaz,
who died in 1993, and the late Justice Fernando A.
Santiago, who stood as counsel for Flora L. Garcia’s
successor-in-interest, herein petitioner, Florencia G.
Garcia.44 (Emphasis supplied).

The above cited statement does not help petitioner’s

cause at all. If anything, it only proves how desperate
the case has become for petitioner and her counsel.

WHEREFORE, the letter-motion dated January 26,

2009 of petitioner is NOTED and is hereby treated as
a third motion for reconsideration. The motion is
DENIED considering that a third motion for