A. No Fixed Standard Reaction for a Witness of a Startling Occurrence pp. 348.

Rule 132 Sec. 6-7, 11, 13

i. Rationale
ii. Where found in the Rules of Court or in Jurisprudence
iii. Requisites of any
iv. Jurisprudence

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. NO. 189297, June 03, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GUILLERMO

LOMAQUE, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

For review is the July 30, 2009 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-
H.C. No. 03163 affirming the Judgment2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 94,
Quezon City, finding accused-appellant Guillermo Lomaque (appellant) guilty of seven
counts of Rape by Sexual Intercourse, one count of Rape by Sexual Assault, and one
count of Acts of Lasciviousness. cralaw lawlibrary

Factual Antecedents

Appellant was charged under separate Informations for 13 counts of Rape by Sexual
Intercourse allegedly committed against his stepdaughter "AAA"3 on June 5, 1999
(Criminal Case No. Q-00-96389), February 11, 1999 (Criminal Case No. Q-00-96390),
second week of January 1999 (Criminal Case No. Q-00-96391), last week of December
1998 (Criminal Case No. Q-00-96392), November 2, 1998 (Criminal Case No. Q-00-
96393), October 24, 1998 (Criminal Case No. Q-00-96394), September 13, 1998
(Criminal Case No. Q-00-96395), April 27, 1998 (Criminal Case No. Q-00-96396), April
17, 1998 (Criminal Case No. Q-00-96397), January 2, 1998 (Criminal Case No. Q-00-
96398), September 20, 1996 (Criminal Case No. Q-00-96399), March 17, 1999
(Criminal Case No. Q-00-96400), and September 16, 1996 (Criminal Case No. Q-00-
96401).4 Except as to the aforementioned dates of occurrence and the age of “AAA” at
the time of the commission of the crimes, the accusatory portions in the Informations
are similarly worded as the Information in Criminal Case No. Q-00-96389 which
reads:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The undersigned, upon prior sworn complaint of “AAA” accuses GUILLERMO LOMAQUE
of the crime of RAPE (Paragraph 1 of Article 266- A of the Revised Penal Code as
amended by RA 8353 in relation to Section 5 of RA 7610) committed as follows: chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

That on or about the 5th day of June 1999 in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named
accused with force and intimidation did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously commit acts of sexual assault upon the person of one “AAA” his own
stepdaughter a minor 14 years of age by then and there removing her shorts and
inserting his penis inside her vagina and thereafter had carnal knowledge of her against
her will and without her consent.

CONTRARY TO LAW.5

In addition, appellant was also charged with Acts of Lasciviousness in relation to

Section 5 of Republic Act (RA) No. 7610,6 as amended, in Criminal Case No. Q-00-
96402, the accusatory portion of which reads:

The undersigned, upon prior sworn complaint of “AAA” accuses GUILLERMO LOMAQUE
of the crime of ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS IN RELATION TO SECTION 5 OF R.A. 7610,
committed as follows: chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

That on or about the 8th da[y] of May 1993 in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-
named accused with force and intimidation did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously commit acts of lewdness upon the person of one “AAA” his own
stepdaughter a minor 8 years of age by then and there caress[ing] her breast, and her
vagina, smell[ing] her private parts and insert[ing] his finger inside her vagina, which
are acts prejudicial to the child’s psychological and emotional development, debase,
demean and degrade the intrinsic worth and dignity of said “AAA” as a human being.

CONTRARY TO LAW.7

At arraignment, appellant entered a plea of not guilty to all the Informations. Soon the
cases were set for Pre-Trial where only the minority of “AAA” was stipulated upon.
Accordingly, the joint trial on the merits ensued.

Version of the Prosecution

The CA summarized the evidence for the prosecution based on the Decision of the RTC
and the records of the case as follows: chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

AAA was born on September 15, 1985 to BBB by her first husband. She was about
eight (8) years old at the time Lomaque started abusing/molesting her.

The first act of molestation happened on May 8, 1993 when Lomaque asked AAA to
remove his growing mustache and take out white hair from his head. Lomaque, while
lying on AAA’s lap, started to smell and sniff her private parts, and thereafter inserted
his finger inside her vagina.

At that time, she did not understand what Lomaque did to her. But to avert any further
incident, she decided to sleep more often in the house of her aunt DDD. When her
mother, BBB, inquired why she often slept in her Aunt’s house, AAA told her mother
that accused-appellant touched her private parts. BBB confronted Lomaque and they
quarreled. For a while, Lomaque stopped molesting her so AAA returned to their house
to sleep there again.  In the evening of September 16, 1996, while almost everybody
was asleep, AAA was awakened by Lomaque who embraced her and slowly removed
her shorts, and immediately inserted his penis into her vagina. She was then only [11]
years old.

On September 20, 1996, when everybody in the room was already asleep, Lomaque
again embraced AAA, slowly removed her shorts, and against her will, inserted his
penis into AAA’s vagina while her back was against him.

On January 2, 1998, when BBB was in the hospital, Lomaque again sexually abused
AAA, this time removing all the clothes of AAA, and thereafter inserting his penis into
her vagina. AAA could not shout as Lomaque, with a gun, threatened to kill her and her
mother if she reported the incident.

Again, on April 17, 1998, while everyone was watching the television, Lomaque
positioned himself at the back of AAA, and pinned AAA’s thigh with his own legs.
Lomaque slowly removed AAA’s shorts and inserted his penis into her vagina. AAA could
not do anything as she recalled Lomaque’s threat to kill her and her mother if she
reported the matter to BBB.

On April 27, 1998, while they were watching TV in their house, Lomaque touched and
held AAA’s vagina. Again, she could not do anything as she was scared.

In the evening of September 13, 1998, accused-appellant again sexually abused AAA,
while everyone was asleep. He laid beside AAA, embraced her, lowered her shorts, and
then inserted his penis into her vagina.

Another incident happened on October 24, 1998. This time, while AAA was embracing
her mother BBB apologizing for something she did earlier, Lomaque positioned himself
at the back of AAA, and initially held BBB’s breasts, he then lowered his hand towards
AAA’s waist, and slowly removed AAA’s shorts. Lomaque then inserted his penis into
AAA’s vagina.

During the last week of December 1998, Lomaque, while clad only with towel,
summoned AAA to go upstairs. He asked AAA to hold his penis, had it inserted into
AAA’s mouth, and also rubbed his penis against her lips.

On February 11, 1999, while AAA was about to sleep, Lomaque went on top of her, and
inserted his penis into her vagina while kissing her.

AAA’s harrowing experience with Lomaque continued and she eventually became
pregnant. It was during the last week of November 1999, when Lomaque asked BBB to
bring AAA to the doctor for medical check-up, that BBB discovered that AAA was
pregnant.

BBB inquired who the father was and AAA told her that it was Lomaque, a matter which
Lomaque admitted. However, when BBB became hysterical, Lomaque retracted and
concocted a story that somebody else caused the pregnancy of AAA.

After giving birth, AAA returned to their house.  There she saw Lomaque kissing her
younger sister, CCC. Afraid that CCC might suffer the same fate she had, she decided
to file a complaint against Lomaque with the help of Bantay-Bata 163.

On June 19, 2000, AAA with her aunt DDD went to Bantay-Bata 163 to seek assistance.
There, AAA disclosed to social worker Liwayway Ilao, what Lomaque did to her. Ilao
conducted further interview and counseling on AAA and her sister CCC; submitted AAA
for medico-legal examination; and assisted AAA in filing a complaint before the Women
and Children Concern Office at Camp Crame, among others.

Dr. Jaime Rodrigo Leal (“Dr. Leal”), the medico-legal officer who conducted the physical
examination on AAA, testified that AAA had an attenuated hymen and deep healed
lacerations, indicating chronic penetration. While the same was consistent with vaginal
delivery, Dr. Leal however explained that his findings validate the fact that AAA was
indeed sexually abused several times, and that she gave birth on April 1, 2000.8

Version of the Defense

Appellant denied his complicity in the crimes charged by alleging alibi. His testimony
was synthesized by the CA in this wise: chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Lomaque testified that he started to live with BBB in 1993, bringing with him his own
set of children by his first marriage.

He denied that he sexually abused AAA, claiming that he could not have committed the
crimes charged because as a bio-medical technician, he was deployed all over the
country to repair hospital equipment. He offered several plane tickets in support of this
allegation. These place tickets were dated: June 2, 1992; February 21, 1994; March 5,
1994; August 14, 1994; August 25, 1994; November 9, 1994; November 27 (year
illegible); and January 7, 1997.  He likewise testified that his parents-in-law and sister-
in-law were living with them.9

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

After trial, the RTC found “AAA” to be a credible witness and rejected the defense of
denial and alibi proffered by the appellant. Consequently, it rendered a Decision10 dated
October 23, 2007 which declared appellant guilty of seven counts of rape by sexual
intercourse (Criminal Case Nos. Q-00-96390, Q-00-96394, Q-00-96395, Q-00-96397,
Q-00-96398, Q-00-96399 and Q-00-96401), one count of rape by sexual assault
(Criminal Case No. Q-00-96392) and one count of Acts of Lasciviousness (Criminal Case
No. Q-00-96402). Accordingly, the RTC sentenced appellant to imprisonment and
ordered him to pay damages, viz: chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused

Guillermo Lomaque: chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

1) In Crim. Case No. Q-00-96389, NOT GUILTY on ground of reasonable doubt with

costs de-officio.
2) In Crim. Case No. Q-00-96390, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Rape and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua; to
indemnify the offended party “AAA” the sum of P75,000; moral damages in the sum
of P50,000 and to pay the costs.
3) In Crim. Case No. Q-00-96391, NOT GUILTY of the crime of Rape on ground of
reasonable doubt.
4) In Crim. Case No. Q-00-96392, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt and sentences
accused with the indeterminate penalty ranging from FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO (2)
MONTHS of prision correccional in its medium period as minimum to TEN (10)
YEARS of prision mayor in its medium period as maximum.
5) In Crim. Case No. Q-00-96393, NOT GUILTY on ground of reasonable doubt with
costs de-officio.
6) In Crim. Case No. Q-00-96394, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt and sentences
accused to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua; to indemnify the offended party
(“AAA”) the sum of P75,000; to pay moral damages in the sum of P50,000 and to pay
the costs.
7) In Crim. Case No. Q-00-96395, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Rape and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua; to
indemnify the offended party (“AAA”) the sum of P75,000; to pay moral damages in
the sum of P50,000; and to pay the costs.
8) In Crim. Case No. Q-00-96396, NOT GUILTY on ground of reasonable doubt with
costs de-officio.
9) In Crim. Case No. Q-00-96397, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt and hereby
sentences him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua; to indemnity the offended
party (“AAA”) the sum of P75,000; to pay moral damages in the sum of P50,000; and
to pay the costs.
10) In Crim. Case No. Q-00-96398, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Rape and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua; to
indemnify the offended party (“AAA”) the sum of P75,000; to pay moral damages in
the sum of P50,000; and to pay the costs.
11) In Crim. Case No. Q-00-96399, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Rape and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua; to
indemnity the offended party (“AAA”) the sum of P75,000; to pay moral damages in
the sum of P50,000; and to pay the costs.
12) In Crim. Case No. Q-00-96400, NOT GUILTY on ground of reasonable doubt with
costs de-officio.
13) In Crim. Case No. Q-00-96401, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Rape and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua; to
indemnity the offended party (“AAA”) the sum of P75,000; to pay moral damages in
the sum of P50,000; and to pay the costs.
14) In Crim. Case No. Q-00-[96402], GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Acts of Lasciviousness in relation to Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7610 and hereby
sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty ranging from EIGHT (8) YEARS and
ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor in its medium period as minimum to FOURTEEN (14)
YEARS and EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of Reclusion Temporal in its
medium period as maximum; to indemnify the offended party (“AAA”) the sum of
 P50,000; to pay moral damages in the sum of P50,000; and to pay the costs.

To credit the accused the full period of his detention in accordance with law.

SO ORDERED.11

Appellant thus assailed his conviction before the CA.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In his Brief,12 appellant faulted the trial court in giving full weight and credence to
“AAA’s” testimony and in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes
charged. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), for the plaintiff-appellee People of
the Philippines, on the other hand prayed for the affirmance of the assailed Judgment
contending that “AAA’s” testimony is clear, candid and straightforward.  It contended
that appellant’s culpability was established beyond reasonable doubt.

The CA, however, was not impressed with the arguments of the appellant, and hence
rendered the questioned Decision13 dated July 30, 2009 affirming the Decision of the
RTC.

Still not satisfied, appellant is now before us insisting on his innocence.

In the Resolution14 dated February 8, 2010, we required the parties to file their

respective supplemental briefs if they so desire.15  Appellant manifested that he was no
longer filing a supplemental brief and was instead adopting the Appellant’s Brief filed
before the CA.16 The OSG took the same recourse by praying that its Appellee’s Brief be
considered as its supplemental brief.17  Thus, the case was deemed submitted for
decision on the basis of the parties’ respective briefs filed with the CA. cralaw lawlibrary

Issue

Simply stated, the principal issue for resolution is whether the prosecution has proven
beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of appellant for the crimes of rape and acts of
lasciviousness. Basically, appellant assails the credibility of “AAA.” Thus, the resolution
of the issue rests upon the credibility of the testimony of the offended party. cralaw lawlibrary

Our Ruling

We affirm.

The RTC and the CA’s finding of

appellant’s guilt must be sustained. 

It is now too well-settled to require extensive documentation that where the issue is the
extent of credence to be properly given to the declaration made by witnesses, the
findings of the trial court are accorded great weight and respect. Such findings can only
be discarded or disturbed when it appears in the records that the trial court overlooked,
ignored or disregarded some facts or circumstances of weight or significance which if
considered would have altered the result.18 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Here, we find no plausible ground to disturb the findings of the trial court, as sustained
by the CA, respecting the credibility of “AAA.” Her testimony indeed bears the earmarks
of truth and sincerity which contains details only a real victim could remember and
reveal. “AAA” was really positive and firm in pointing an accusing finger on appellant as
the very person who sexually assaulted her on different dates.

In his attempt to discredit “AAA,” appellant contends that “AAA’s” silence and failure to
divulge her alleged horrifying ordeal to immediate relatives despite the claim that it
happened for several times run counter to the natural reaction of an outraged maiden
despoiled of her honor.

We are not persuaded. “AAA’s” momentary inaction will neither diminish nor affect her
credibility. “The filing of complaints of rape months, even years, after their commission
may or may not dent the credibility of witness and of testimony, depending on the
circumstances attendant thereto.”19 “It does not diminish the complainant’s credibility
or undermine the charges of rape when the delay can be attributed to the pattern of
fear instilled by the threats of bodily harm, specially by one who exercises moral
ascendancy over the victim.”20 In this case, not long after the initial rape, appellant
threatened “AAA” that he would kill her and her mother if ever she would tell anyone
about what happened. At that time, “AAA” was only 11 years old and was living under
the same roof with the latter whom she treated as a father. Obviously, the threat “AAA”
received from appellant, coupled with his moral ascendancy, is enough to cow and
intimidate “AAA.” Being young and inexperienced, it instilled tremendous fear in her
mind. In People v. Domingo,21 we ruled that the effect of fear and intimidation instilled
in the victim’s mind cannot be measured against any given hard-and-fast rule such that
it is viewed in the context of the victim’s perception and judgment not only at the time
of the commission of the crime but also at the time immediately thereafter. In any
event, “the failure of the victim to immediately report the rape is not necessarily an
indication of a fabricated charge.”22
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Neither the failure of “AAA” to struggle nor at least offer resistance during the rape
incidents would tarnish her credibility. “Physical resistance need not be established
when intimidation is brought to bear on the victim and the latter submits herself out of
fear. As has been held, the failure to shout or offer tenuous resistance does not make
voluntary the victim’s submission to the criminal acts of the accused.”23  Rape is
subjective and not everyone responds in the same way to an attack by a sexual fiend.
Although an older person may have shouted for help under similar circumstances, a
young victim such as “AAA” is easily overcome by fear and may not be able to cry for
help.

Also, the fact that “AAA” resumed her normal life after the commission of the alleged
rapes cannot be taken against her. We have consistently ruled that “no standard form
of behavior can be anticipated of a rape victim following her defilement, particularly a
child who could not be expected to fully comprehend the ways of an adult. People react
differently to emotional stress and rape victims are no different from them.”24 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Moreover, appellant contends that it challenges human credulity that he was able to
sexually abuse “AAA” despite the many people around them. Such contention deserves
scant consideration. This is not the first time that our attention was called upon to rule
on this matter. As has been repeatedly ruled, rape can be committed even when the
rapist and the victim are not alone.  “[L]ust is no respecter of time and
place.”25 “[R]ape is not impossible even if committed in the same room while the
rapist’s spouse is sleeping or in a small room where other family members also
sleep.”26 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

“AAA” having positively identified the assailant to be the appellant and no other, the
latter’s proffered defense of denial must fail. “Denial could not prevail over the victim’s
direct, positive and categorical assertion.”27  As to his alibi, appellant failed to
substantiate the same with clear and convincing evidence. The plane tickets he
submitted in evidence to show that he was in other places during the incidents are
irrelevant. As correctly observed by the RTC, the tickets were all issued in 1994 while
the incidents subject of the Informations charging appellant with rape transpired from
1996 to 1999.  Thus, appellant’s alibi being uncorroborated and unsubstantiated by
clear and convincing evidence, is self- serving and deserves no weight in law.

In fine, “AAA’s” woeful tale of her harrowing experience in the hands of the appellant is
impressively clear, definite and convincing. Her detailed narration of the incidents,
given in a spontaneous and frank manner and without any fanfare, were beyond cavil
well-founded. We therefore sustain the RTC’s and the CA’s findings of appellant’s guilt.

However, the rapes committed in

Criminal Case Nos. Q-00-96390, Q-
00-96394, Q-00-96395, Q-00-96397,
Q-00-96398, Q-00-96399 and Q-00-
 
96401 are simple and not qualified
since the relationship between
appellant and the victim was not
proven.

The guilt of appellant having been established and following the settled rule that in a
criminal case an appeal throws the whole case open for review,28 we will now determine
the sufficiency of evidence respecting the presence of the qualifying circumstances of
minority and relationship. This is considering that it was under this context that the CA
based its affirmance of appellant’s guilt for qualified rape as shown by its declaration
that the proper imposable penalty for the seven counts of rape at that time is
death.29chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), rape is qualified and the penalty
of death is imposed when the victim is below 18 years of age and the offender is a
parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within
the third civil degree or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim. To justify
the imposition of the death penalty, however, it is required that the special qualifying
circumstances of minority of the victim and her relationship to the appellant be properly
alleged in the Information and duly proved during the trial. Needless to say, these two
circumstances must concur.

Based on our meticulous review, we find that the courts below erred in finding appellant
guilty of rape in its qualified form.  Indeed, the subject Informations clearly aver the
special qualifying circumstances of minority of “AAA” and her filiation (stepdaughter) to
the appellant. While the prosecution was able to sufficiently prove “AAA’s” minority
through the latter’s testimony during the trial and by the presentation of her Certificate
of Live Birth30 showing that she was born on September 15, 1985, it however, failed to
prove the fact of relationship between her and the appellant (stepfather-stepdaughter).
Notably, said alleged relationship was not even made the subject of stipulation of facts
during the pre-trial.31  As held in People v. Hermocilla,32 “[a] stepdaughter is a daughter
of one’s spouse by previous marriage, while a stepfather is the husband of one’s
mother by virtue of a marriage subsequent to that of which the person spoken is the
offspring.”  The allegation that “AAA” is the stepdaughter of appellant requires
competent proof and should not be easily accepted as factually true. The bare
testimony of appellant that he was married to “BBB” (“AAA’s” mother) is not enough.
Neither does “AAA’s” reference to appellant as her stepfather during her testimony
would suffice. As ruled in People v. Agustin,33 “the relationship of the accused to the
victim cannot be established by mere testimony or even by the accused’s very own
admission of such relationship.” In this case, save for the testimony of appellant that he
was married to “BBB,” the record is bereft of any evidence to show that appellant and
“BBB” were indeed legally married. The prosecution could have presented the marriage
contract, the best evidence to prove the fact of marriage but it did not. As aptly
observed in People v. Abello:34 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

This modifying circumstance, however, was not duly proven in the present case due to
the prosecution’s failure to present the marriage contract between Abello and AAA’s
mother. If the fact of marriage came out in the evidence at all, it was via an admission
by Abello of his marriage to AAA’s mother.  This admission, however, is inconclusive
evidence to prove the marriage to AAA’s mother, as the marriage contract still remains
the best evidence to prove the fact of marriage. This stricter requirement is only proper
as relationship is an aggravating circumstance that increases the imposable penalty and
hence must be proven by competent evidence.

Following Abello, “AAA” cannot be considered as appellant’s stepdaughter and

conversely, appellant as “AAA’s” stepfather.  Appellant, therefore, should only be
convicted of simple rape in Criminal Case Nos. Q-00-96390, Q-00-96394, Q-00-96395,
Q-00-96397, Q-00-96398, Q-00-96399 and Q-00-96401 where the proper penalty for
the same under Article 266-B35 of the RPC is reclusion perpetua. Incidentally, the
penalty of reclusion perpetua is the same penalty which would have been imposable
even if he were guilty of qualified rape pursuant to RA 9346.36 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

There is variance in the mode of the

commission of the crime of rape in
Criminal Case No. Q-00-96392 as
alleged in the Information and as  
proven during trial. Nevertheless,
appellant’s conviction for rape by
sexual assault stands.

However, in Criminal Case No. Q-00-96392, we observe that the courts below
overlooked a glaring variance between what was alleged in the Information and what
was proven during trial respecting the mode of committing the offense. While the
Information in this case clearly states that the crime was committed by appellant’s
insertion of his penis inside “AAA’s” vagina, the latter solemnly testified on the witness
stand that appellant merely put his penis in her mouth.37  Nevertheless, appellant failed
to register any objection that the Information alleged a different mode of the
commission of the crime of rape. As ruled in  People v. Abello38 and People v.
Corpuz,39 a variance in the mode of commission of the offense is binding upon the
accused if he fails to object to evidence showing that the crime was committed in a
different manner than what was alleged. Thus, appellant’s conviction for rape by sexual
assault must be sustained, the variance notwithstanding.

Appellant’s conviction for Acts of

Lasciviousness is likewise sustained.

In Criminal Case No. Q-00-96402, appellant was charged with having inserted his finger
inside “AAA’s” vagina under Article 336 (Acts of Lasciviousness) of the RPC in relation to
Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610. The elements of Acts of Lasciviousness under
Article 336 are: chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

1. That the offender commits any acts of lasciviousness or lewdness; nadcralavvonlinelawlibrary

2. That it is done under any of the following circumstances: chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

a) By using force or intimidation; nadcralavvonlinelawlibrary

b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or

c) When the offended party is under 12 years of age; and

3. That the offended party is another person of either sex.

To obtain conviction for the same, the prosecution is also bound to establish the
elements of sexual abuse under Section 5, Article III of RA 7610, to wit: chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct.

2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other
sexual abuse.
3. The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.

Lascivious conduct is defined under Section 2(H) of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of RA 7610 as “a crime committed through the intentional touching, either
directly or through the clothing of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh or
buttocks with the intention to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade or arouse or gratify the
sexual desire of any person, among others.”40  In this case, it is undisputed that
appellant committed lascivious conduct when he smelled “AAA’s” genital area and
inserted his finger inside her vagina to gratify or arouse his sexual desire. At the time
this happened on May 8, 1993, “AAA” was barely eight years old as established through
her birth certificate. Without a doubt, all the afore-stated elements are obtaining in this
case.  We thus likewise sustain the finding that appellant is guilty of Acts of
Lasciviousness as defined and penalized under Article 336 of the RPC in relation to
Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610.

The Penalty and Proper Indemnity

Having declared appellant guilty of simple rape only in Criminal Case Nos. Q-00-96390,
Q-00-96394, Q-00-96395, Q-00-96397, Q-00-96398, Q-00-96399 and Q-000-96401,
the appropriate penalty is reclusion perpetua under Article 266- B of the RPC. We,
therefore, sustain the penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed on the appellant not by
reason of RA 9346 but because that is the penalty provided for by the law for simple
rape.

With regard to civil indemnity, we uphold the award of the same in line with prevailing
jurisprudence that “civil indemnification is mandatory upon the finding of
rape.”41 However, since the proper imposable penalty for simple rape is  reclusion
perpetua, the amount of civil indemnity awarded to the private complainant should
correspondingly be reduced from P75,000.00 to P50,000.00 for each count, in line with
current jurisprudence.

In like manner, case law requires automatic award of moral damages to a rape victim
without need of proof because from the nature of the crime, it can be assumed that she
has suffered moral injuries entitling her to such award. Thus, we find the award of
moral damages by the CA in the amount of P50,000.00 for each count of rape proper. 
In addition, exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00 should be awarded in
view of the proven circumstance of minority.

In Criminal Case No. Q-00-96392, rape by sexual assault in Article 266- A(2) of the
RPC is punishable under Article 266-B by prision mayor, the duration of which is from
six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. The latter article also provides that
if the rape is committed with any of the 10 aggravating/qualifying circumstances
therein enumerated, the penalty shall be reclusion temporal  which has a range of
twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years.

As ruled by the Court in previous cases, the 10 attendant circumstances partake the
nature of special qualifying circumstances.  Under the first circumstance,42 the minority
of the victim and the relationship of the offender to the victim must both be alleged in
the Information and duly proved clearly and indubitably as the crime itself.  They must
be lumped together and their concurrence constitutes only one special qualifying
circumstance. However, in this particular case, while the special qualifying circumstance
of minority was alleged and proved, the circumstance of relationship of “AAA” was not
clearly

established. Accordingly, appellant should be meted the penalty of prision mayor.

Nonetheless, in People v. Bayya,43People v. Esperanza,44People v. Hermocilla,45 and the
recent case of People v. Soria,46 the Court held that when one of the qualifying
circumstances of relationship and minority is omitted or lacking, that which is pleaded
in the Information and proved by the evidence may be considered as an aggravating
circumstance. Conformably with such ruling, “AAA’s” minority may be appreciated as an
aggravating circumstance. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of
the indeterminate penalty shall be within the full range of the penalty that is one
degree lower than prision mayor, that is prision correccional, the range of which shall
be from six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. The maximum of the
indeterminate penalty however shall be within the maximum period of prision mayor in
view of the proven aggravating circumstance of minority. Thus, an indeterminate
penalty of six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to twelve (12) years
of prision mayor, as maximum, is imposed upon appellant.
“AAA” is likewise entitled to P30,000.00 as civil indemnity and P30,000.00 as moral
damages for rape through sexual assault.  Exemplary damages in the amount of
P30,000.00 is also awarded pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence.

In Criminal Case No. Q-00-96402, appellant is found guilty of Acts of Lasciviousness in

relation to Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610. The imposable penalty is reclusion
temporal in its medium period since the victim was under 12 years of age at the time
the crime was committed. Since the minority of the victim is considered an aggravating
circumstance,47 the penalty shall be applied in its maximum period that ranges from
sixteen (16) years, five (5) months and ten (10) days to seventeen (17) years and four
(4) months. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty next lower in
degree is reclusion temporal in its minimum period with a range of twelve (12) years
and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months.  Hence, the proper
indeterminate penalty is fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months of reclusion temporal as
minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as
maximum. “AAA’ is entitled to P20,000.00 as civil indemnity and P15,000.00 as moral
damages.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the July 30, 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 03163 is AFFIRMED with the following
MODIFICATIONS: chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

1. In Criminal Case Nos. Q-00-96390, Q-00-96394, Q-00-96395, Q-00-96397, Q-00-

96398, Q-00-96399 and Q-00-96401, appellant is hereby found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Simple Rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and ORDERED to pay “AAA” the reduced amount of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and an additional amount of P30,000.00 as
exemplary damages for each count.

2. In Criminal Case No. Q-00-96392, appellant is found GUILTY of Rape by Sexual

Assault under Article 266-A(2) and is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to twelve (12) years
of prision mayor, as maximum. He is likewise ORDERED to pay “AAA” the amount of
P30,000.00 as civil indemnity, P30,000.00 as moral damages and P30,000.00 as
exemplary damages.

3. In Criminal Case No. Q-00-96402, appellant is found GUILTY of Acts of

Lasciviousness in relation to Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610 and is meted to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months
of reclusion temporal as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months
of reclusion temporal as maximum. He is ORDERED to pay "AAA" the amounts of
P20,000.00 as civil indemnity and P15,000.00 as moral damages.

SO ORDERED
 THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 215198, November 09, 2016

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JHUN VILLALON Y

ORDONO, Accused-Appellants.

DECISION

PERALTA,***J.:

This case seeks to reverse and set aside the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision1 dated June
30, 2014 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 05471. The CA upheld the Decision2 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Agoo, La Union, Branch 32, dated February 29, 2012 in Family
Court Case No. A-1021, which found accused-appellant Jhun Villalon y Ordono guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape.

An Information was filed charging Villalon of raping AAA,3 which reads: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

That on or about the 17th day of April 2010, in the Municipality of Aringay, Province of
La Union, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, by means of force, coercion and intimidation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with his cousin AAA, a minor
child 14 years of age, against her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Upon arraignment on June 14, 2011, Villalon pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.
Thus, trial on the merits ensued.

The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:

Jhun Villalon was charged with raping his cousin, AAA. AAA testified that she was
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

born on February 2, 1996 and that her cousin (their mothers are sisters) raped her on
April 17, 2010 when she was merely 14 years old. At 7:30 a.m. of that date, Villalon
went to AAA's house in San Benito Norte, Aringay, La Union. He invited AAA to gather
mangoes in the mountain, which was 2-3 kilometers away. AAA then left with Villalon
with her mother's knowledge. After harvesting mangoes, Villalon asked AAA to go to
the higher part of the mountain. Thereafter, Villalon invited his cousin to have sexual
intercourse with him so she could experience it. AAA then felt like ciying because she
could not understand why her cousin would say that. She became nervous and wanted
to leave but Villalon held her hands and removed her lower garments. She struggled to
free herself, but Villalon overpowered her. He laid her down on the ground and started
kissing her. AAA tried to avoid Villalon's kisses and to wriggle out of his embrace, but
he placed himself on top of her and was able to fulfill his bestial desires. He then
threatened AAA not to tell anybody.

AAA tried to hide the incident but after a month, she could no longer contain the
nightmares caused by the abuse so she told her mother, BBB. Hence, BBB accompanied
her daughter to the barangay captain to report the incident. When confronted, Villalon
became angry and refused to cooperate,so BBB and AAA went to the police station. The
physician who examined the victim found multiple healed hymenal lacerations and an
infection which could have been caused by sexual intercourse.

When the case was already in court, Villalon's mother and wife allegedly brought AAA
and BBB to the office of the defense counsel to sign an affidavit of desistance. AAA
refused to sign the affidavit so she ran and hid at the market. When their relatives
found her, they brought her back to the office to sign the affidavit. After signing, BBB
was instructed to submit it to the Prosecutor's office, where she learned that the
consequence of the affidavit would be the dismissal of the case. BBB then changed her
mind and left with the affidavit.

For his part, Villalon asserted that it was on April 10, 2010 that he invited AAA's brother
to gather mangoes in the mountain but AAA volunteered to go with him. When they
finished at 9:00 a.m., they immediately proceeded to Caba to sell the fruits. On April
17, 2010, however, when the rape was supposedly committed, he just stayed at home
all day with his wife. He was shocked when three (3) weeks later, he learned that he
was being charged with rape. He, likewise, refused to settle at the barangay because he
did nothing wrong.

On February 29, 2012, the RTC convicted Villalon in Family Court Case No. A-1021 and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and to pay AAA P75,000.00
as civil indemnity and P75,000.00 as moral damages, thus: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Jhun Villalon y Ordono GUILTY beyond

reasonable doubt of the crime of rape, and hereby [sentences] him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and to pay [AAA] the amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity
and P75,000.00 as moral damages.

SO ORDERED.5 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Therefore, Villalon elevated the case to the CA. On June 30, 2014, the CA affirmed the
RTC Decision, to wit: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.6 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Villalon now comes before the Court, insisting that the prosecution failed to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He presents the following errors: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

I.

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT

DESPITE THE PROSECUTION'S FAILURE TO ESTABLISH FORCE, VIOLENCE, THREAT
AND INTIMIDATION AS ELEMENTS OF RAPE.

II.
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
DESPITE THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT'S LACK OF CREDIBILITY.
The appeal is devoid of merit.

The Court finds that the prosecution has successfully proved Villalon's guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. Even if AAA did not shout for help, such could not and would not
diminish her credibility. It must be emphasized that there is no standard form of
reaction for a woman, much more a minor, when confronted with a horrifying
experience such as sexual assault. The actions of children who have undergone
traumatic experience should not be judged by the norms of behavior expected from
adults when placed under similar circumstances. People react differently to emotional
stress and rape victims are no different from them.7 chanrobleslaw

Also, Villalon's alibi must necessarily fall. Physical impossibility pertains to the distance
between the place where the accused was during the commission of the crime and the
place where the crime was actually committed, as well as the facility of access between
the two places.8 Here, Villalon resided some twenty (20) meters away from AAA's
house, which was about two to three (2-3) kilometers away from the place where the
incident transpired. Thus, there was no physical impossibility for Villalon's presence at
the scene of the crime. His allegation that he was just at home on April 17, 2010 with
his wife is, likewise, self-serving and remains uncorroborated by any evidence. His wife
did not even testify to support said claim.

Regarding the affidavit of desistance, it must be stressed that, as a rule, it is viewed

with suspicion and reservation. It has been regarded as exceedingly unreliable, because
it can easily be secured from a poor and ignorant witness, usually through intimidation
or for monetary consideration, and attains no probative value in light of the alleged
affiant's testimony to the contrary. Moreover, there is always the probability that it
would later on be repudiated, and criminal prosecution would thus be
interminable.9 BBB has explained that they were merely forced by their relatives into
signing the affidavit and that she had not fully understood the effects of signing said
affidavit, until the secretary of the prosecutor finally explained to her its contents,
which were all written in English. Thus, they chose to leave and decided to pursue the
case.

Indeed, AAA testified in a candid, vivid, and straightforward manner, and remained firm
and unswerving even on cross-examination. It has been consistently held that when it
comes to credibility of witnesses, the findings of a trial court on such matter will not be
disturbed unless the lower court had clearly misinterpreted certain facts. The credibility
of the witnesses is best addressed by the trial court, it being in a better position to
decide such question, having heard them and observed their demeanor, conduct, and
attitude under grueling examination. These are the most significant factors in
evaluating the sincerity of witnesses and in unearthing the truth, especially in the face
of conflicting testimonies. Through its observations during the entire proceedings, the
trial court can be expected to determine, with reasonable discretion, whose testimony
to accept and which witness to believe. Verily, findings of the trial court on such
matters will not be disturbed on appeal unless some facts or circumstances of weight
have been overlooked, misapprehended, or misinterpreted so as to materially affect the
disposition of the case. Also, where there is no evidence that the witnesses of the
prosecution were influenced by ill motive, as in this case, it is presumed that they were
not so actuated and their testimony is entitled to full faith and credit.10 As to the
amount of damages, however, the accused should be ordered to pay another
P75,000.00 as exemplary damages based on recent jurisprudence.11 chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court DENIES the petition

and AFFIRMS with MODIFICATION the Decision dated June 30, 2014 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 05471 finding accused-appellant Jhun Villalon y Ordono
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape. The Court sentences Villalon to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay AAA the amount of P75,000.00 as
civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and another P75,000.00 as exemplary
damages, all with interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of
this judgment until fully paid.

SO ORDERED. chanRobl

B. Discrepancies/Inconsistencies in Witness’s Testimony

C.
v. The witness of a particular crime may not remember in everything
that has happened upon its occurrence or that his memory may be
tampered or altered from time to time in relation to the point of view
of persons who had his own narration of events or may be due to the
trauma he has suffered for witnessing such. Additionally, a human
memory is frail as it can only remember clips of details of what has
happened at a certain point in time.
vi. It can be found on Rule 132 Sections 6, 7, 11, and 13, to wit:

Section 6. Cross-examination; its purpose and extent. — Upon the termination of the direct
examination, the witness may be cross-examined by the adverse party as to many matters
stated in the direct examination, or connected therewith, with sufficient fullness and freedom
to test his accuracy and truthfulness and freedom from interest or bias, or the reverse, and to
elicit all important facts bearing upon the issue. (8a)

Section 7. Re-direct examination; its purpose and extent. —  After the cross-examination of
the witness has been concluded, he may be re-examined by the party calling him, to explain
or supplement his answers given during the cross-examination. On re-direct-examination,
questions on matters not dealt with during the cross-examination, may be allowed by the
court in its discretion. (12)

Section 11. Impeachment of adverse party's witness. — A witness may be impeached by the

party against whom he was called, by contradictory evidence, by evidence that his general
reputation for truth, honestly, or integrity is bad, or by evidence that he has made at other
times statements inconsistent with his present, testimony, but not by evidence of particular
wrongful acts, except that it may be shown by the examination of the witness, or the record of
the judgment, that he has been convicted of an offense. (15)
 Section 13. How witness impeached by evidence of inconsistent statements. — Before a
witness can be impeached by evidence that he has made at other times statements inconsistent
with his present testimony, the statements must be related to him, with the circumstances of
the times and places and the persons present, and he must be asked whether he made such
statements, and if so, allowed to explain them. If the statements be in writing they must be
shown to the witness before any question is put to him concerning them. (16)

vii. Requisites of any

viii. Jurisprudence

FIRST DIVISION

July 19, 2017

G.R. No. 217973

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

vs.
FEDERICO GEROLA y AMAR alias "FIDEL", Accused-Appellant

DECISION

CAGUIOA, J.:

This is an Appeal  filed under Section 13(c), Rule 124 of the Rules of Court from the
1

Decision  dated September 25, 2014 (questioned Decision) of the Court of Appeals,
2

Special Eighteenth Division (CA), in CA-G.R. CR. HC. No. 01277, which affirmed the
Decision  dated January 28, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court of Himamaylan City,
3

Negros Occidental, Branch 55 (RTC) in Criminal Case Nos. 1213, 1214, and 1215,
convicting accusedappellant Federico A. Gerola (Federico) for the crimes charged
therein.

The Facts

Three (3) separate Informations for Rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 1  of the
4

Revised Penal Code were filed in the RTC against Federico, as follows:

[CRIMINAL CASE NO. 1213]

That sometime in July of 1999, in the Municipality of Himamaylan, Province of Negros

Occidental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, by means of force and intimidation, taking advantage of his moral
ascendancy being the step-father of herein victim AAA,  a minor, 11 years old, did then
5

and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the latter, against
her will.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 6
[CRIMINAL CASE NO. 1214]

That sometime in the year 1998, in the Municipality of Himamaylan, Province of Negros
Occidental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, by means of force and intimidation, taking advantage of his moral
ascendancy being the step-father of herein victim AAA, a minor, 10 years old, did then
and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the latter, against
her will.

CONTRARY TO LA W. 7

{CRIMINAL CASE NO. 1215]

That on or about the 9th day of January, 2000, in the Municipality of Himamaylan,

Province of Negros Occidental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, by means of force and intimidation, taking advantage
of his moral ascendancy being the step-father of herein victim AAA, a minor, 12 years
old, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the
latter, against her will.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 8

As culled from the questioned Decision, the antecedent facts are as follows:

Version of the Prosecution

Private complainant AAA was born on July 5, 1987. She was a minor when all three (3)
acts of rape were committed. She was 11 years old when the first act of rape occurred
sometime in the year 1998. The second act of rape happened sometime in the year 1999
when she was 12 years old and the third time was in January 2000 when she was 12
years and 6 months of age. At the time all three (3) acts of rape occurred, she was living
in the same house in Barangay Libacao, City of Himamaylan in San Jose with her full-
blood sister, her half-siblings (children of her mother and step-father), her mother MMM
and AAA's step-father, accused-appellant Federico Gerola.

Sometime in 1998 at around 8:30 in the evening, AAA and her sisters were sleeping. Her
mother was in the hospital tending to her aunt who had just delivered a baby. At that
time, appellant crawled towards AAA. Accused-appellant told AAA to keep quiet, lie
down and remove her underwear. AAA tried to resist but appellant gestured to box her.
AAA tried to shout but he covered her mouth. After removing her underwear, accused
also removed his brief and laid on top of AAA. Appellant inserted his penis into her
vagina. AAA bled and felt pain. AAA did not tell her mother about the incident because
appellant threatened her of maltreating them if she did so.

In July 1999 at around 9:30 in the evening, AAA was raped for the second time. While
she was sleeping in bed, appellant sat beside her and removed her underwear. He then
inserted his penis into her vagina. The victim felt pain and bled. At that time, AAA's
mother was in the Himamaylan hospital tending to her grandmother. Again, she did not
tell her mother due to appellant's threat to maltreat her mother.
In January of the year 2000, appellant did the same act of having carnal knowledge with
AAA for the third time. This was done at around 2:30 in the morning and lasted for about
thirty (30) minutes while everyone else in the house was sleeping. AAA's mother was
away from home to tend to the latter's younger sister who gave birth. Like the other
incidents, AAA did not tell her mother. Instead, AAA told her friend who advised her to
tell their teacher. AAA then narrated the incident to her teacher, Mrs. Rafil, who
summoned her mother and told her what happened. When her mother learned of her
daughter's ordeal, she cried. AAA's aunt El en accompanied the victim to the Barangay
Captain and reported the rape incidents. Appellant was then fetched by the Barangay
Captain and thereafter brought to the police station where the appellant was detained.

On February 7, 2000, AAA was examined by Dr. Medardo Estanda who made a written
case report and anatomical sketch of the victim pursuant to the incidents that occurred.
The report indicated that there were penetrations on the organ of the victim which had
hymenal lacerations at 5, 6 and 12 o'clock positions.

Version of the Appellant

Accused-appellant Federico Gerola y Amar alias Fidel testified that he was married to
MMM, the private complainant's mother, in the year 1996 and they begot four (4)
children. The family which was composed of his wife and himself, their four children and
a child of MMM by her first marriage were living in San Jose Valing, Barangay Libacao,
Himamaylan City. The other child of MMM by her first husband, AAA, lived with her aunt
Erlita Aguirre.

As a cane laborer, accused-appellant worked in the sugarcane field and sometimes in

the rice field. Since 1998 up to 2000, AAA was living with the latter's aunt Erlita Aguirre in
a separate house because she was going to school in San Jose.

Accused-appellant testified that he was not in good terms with Dodoy Puertas, the
brother-in-law of his wife MMM, because Puertas was not in favor of their marriage.
Accused-appellant recalled that when he and MMM asked permission from Dodoy
Puertas about their plan to get married, Puertas did not give consent and merely said "I
don't know". Appellant further testified that MMM and Dodoy Puertas initiated the filing of
the criminal cases against him because MMM and Puertas have an illicit affair and both
live together in Mirasol.
9

Ruling of the RTC

After trial, the RTC rendered the Decision dated January 28, 2010, finding accused-
appellant guilty of all charges filed against him and imposing the penalty of reclusion
perpetua for each charge, without eligibility of parole. The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court finds the accused Federico Gerola
y Amar alias "Fidel" "GUILTY" beyond a (sic) reasonable doubt on the three counts of
Rape as charged against him. Since the death penalty is suspended, the Court hereby
sentences the accused to three (3) penalties of Reclusion Perpetua, without eligibility of
parole.

The accused is further ordered to pay the private complainant, [AAA], moral damages in
the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php50,000.00) for each case; civil indemnity in the
amount of Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (Php75,000.00) for each case; and exemplary
damages in the amount of Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos (Php25,000.00) for each case.

SO ORDERED. 10

Pleading his innocence, Federico filed a Notice of Appeal on April 28, 2010.  Briefs were
11

then respectively filed by Federico and plaintiff-appellee on August 15, 2011 and May 28,
2012, pursuant to the Notice to File Brief dated January 14, 2011 issued by the CA. 12

On appeal before the CA, Gerola assailed the RTC's appreciation of the testimonies of
prosecution witnesses, which he claimed to be replete with inconsistencies and
contradictions.  Gerola anchored his claim on the fact that AAA had difficulty recalling
13

the specific dates when the incidents occurred and that she failed to promptly report the
same to the proper authorities. 14

Ruling of the CA

On September 25, 2014, the CA rendered the questioned Decision, affirming the
judgment of the RTC in toto:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court

of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental Branch 55 in Criminal Case Nos. 1213, 1214
and 1215 dated January 28, 2010 is hereby AFFIRMED in its entirety.

SO ORDERED. 15

Federico then elevated the case before the Court via Notice of Appeal  dated October
16

22, 2014. In lieu of supplemental briefs, plaintiff-appellee filed a Manifestation and Motion
(in Lieu of Supplemental Brief)  dated September 1, 2015, while Federico filed a
17

Manifestation (in Lieu of Supplemental Brief)  dated September 23, 2015.

18

Issue

The sole issue for resolution is whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC's conviction of
Federico for three (3) counts of Rape.

The Court's Ruling

The Appeal is dismissed.

Federico's lone assignment of error rests on his claim that AAA "could not exactly
determine what year x x x the first rape incident occurred," which purportedly creates
doubt on the credibility of AAA.  Federico draws the same conclusion from AAA's failure
19

to promptly disclose her repeated defilement to the proper authorities.  Such

20

circumstances, Federico asserts, were not properly appreciated by the RTC when it
handed out his conviction. The Court is not impressed.

The assessment of the credibility of witnesses is a task most properly within the domain
of trial courts. In People v. Gahi, the Court stressed that the findings of the trial court
21

carry great weight and respect due to the unique opportunity afforded them to observe
the witnesses when placed on the stand.  Consequently, appellate courts will not
22
overturn the factual findings of the trial court in the absence of facts or circumstances of
weight and substance that would affect the result of the case.  Said rule finds an even
23

more stringent application where the said findings are sustained by the CA,  as in the
24

case at hand:

Time and again, we have held that when it comes to the issue of credibility of the victim
or the prosecution witnesses, the findings of the trial courts carry great weight and
respect and, generally, the appellate courts will not overturn the said findings unless the
trial court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of
weight and substance which will alter the assailed decision or affect the result of the
case. This is so because trial courts are in the best position to ascertain and measure the
sincerity and spontaneity of witnesses through their actual observation of the witnesses'
manner of testifying, their demeanor and behavior in court. Trial judges enjoy the
advantage of observing the witness' deportment and manner of testifying, her "furtive
glance, blush of conscious shame, hesitation, flippant or sneering tone, calmness, sigh,
or the scant or full realization of an oath" - all of which are useful aids for an accurate
determination of a witness' honesty and sincerity. Trial judges, therefore, can better
determine if such witnesses are telling the truth, being in the ideal position to weigh
conflicting testimonies. Again, unless certain facts of substance and value were
overlooked which, if considered, might affect the result of the case, its assessment must
be respected, for it had the opportunity to observe the conduct and demeanor of the
witnesses while testifying and detect if they were lying. The rule finds an even more
stringent application where the said findings are sustained by the Court of Appeals. 25

As well, that a witness' testimony contains inconsistencies or discrepancies does not, by

such fact alone, diminish the credibility of such testimony. In People v. Esquila,  the
26

accused therein similarly cited contradictions and discrepancies in the victim's testimony
in questioning his conviction for rape.  Notably, as in the present Appeal, the purported
27

discrepancies consisted of statements relating to date of the commission of the

crime.  In affirming the findings of the lower courts, the Court brushed aside such
28

inconsistencies and gave full weight and credit to the testimony of the victim, who was
likewise a minor :
29

Thus, accused-appellant avers that the trial court erred in convicting him because the
testimony of the victim, Maribeth, is uncertain, contradictory, and filled with
inconsistencies and material discrepancies sufficient to destroy her credibility. He argues
that in her direct testimony, Maribeth declared that the crime happened on October 15,
1991 at 12 o'clock midnight x x x while under cross-examination on August 3, 1992, she
stated that she left accused-appellant's house on October 11, 1991 for Poblacion,
Bansalan to look for work and stayed thereat for 1-112 months, from October 11, 1991 x
x x. Thereafter she returned to Pananag, Managa, Bansalan but she did not go to
accused-appellant's house. Instead she proceeded to her cousin's house x x x.

Indeed, the statements are contradictory. However, it should be remembered that the
victim, Maribeth, was only 14 years old at the time she testified and, therefore, it is not
unnatural should inconsistencies crop into her testimony as she is more prone to error
than an adult person. In fact, minor inconsistencies may be expected of persons of such
tender years.

The minor inconsistencies in Gloria's testimonies are to be expected. Protracted cross-

examination of a 16- year old girl not accustomed to public trial would produce
contradictions which nevertheless would not destroy her credibility. x x x
We will not deviate from the rule that "testimonies of rape victims who are young and
immature are credible; the revelation of an innocent child whose chastity was abused
demands full credence." x x x

Too, the inconsistent statements Maribeth made as to the date and place of the
commission of the crime are collateral or minor matters which do not at all touch upon
the commission of the crime itself x x x nor affect Maribeth's credibility.

This Court has time and again held that inconsistencies in the testimony of witnesses
with respect to minor details and collateral matters do not affect either the substance of
their declaration, their veracity, or the weight of their testimony x x x.  (Citations omitted;
30

emphasis supplied)

Time and again, the Court has held that the date or time of the commission of rape is not
a material ingredient of the crime and need not be stated with absolute accuracy; where
the time of commission is not an essential element of the crime charged, conviction may
be had on proof of the commission of the crime, even if it appears that the crime was not
committed at the precise time alleged.  It is well to stress that variance in minor details
31

has the net effect of bolstering instead of diminishing the witness' credibility because
they discount the possibility of a rehearsed testimony.  Instead, what remains paramount
32

is the witness' consistency in relating the principal elements of the crime and the positive
and categorical identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the same. 33

Bearing the foregoing in mind, the Court finds that Federico's guilt was proven beyond
reasonable doubt by the evidence of the prosecution.

In criminal cases, "[p]roof beyond reasonable doubt" does not mean such degree of
proof, excluding possibility of error, that produces absolute certainty; only "moral
certainty" is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an
unprejudiced mind. 34

In the instant case, aside from harping on the alleged inconsistencies of AAA's
testimony, Federico relies on his bare and uncorroborated refutations and nothing
more.  No other testimonial or documentary evidence was offered by Federico during the
35

course of the trial. Such counter evidence, when weighed against the positive
identification and straightforward testimony of AAA, do little to affect the issue of
Federico's carnal knowledge of AAA, the elements of which have been consistently
narrated by the latter. Following established jurisprudence, denials, being self-serving
negative evidence, cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the positive
declaration of a credible witness.  All told, considering that the prosecution produced
36

various testimonial and documentary evidence  on record, the Court is led to the
37

unquestionable conclusion that Federico is indeed guilty of the crimes charged.

Anent the issue of delay, the Court agrees with the ruling of the CA that delay in the
prosecution of an offense is not an indicium of a fabricated charge.  Such fact of delay
38

was satisfactorily explained during trial, where it was revealed that the same was brought
about by AAA's fear of Federico, who was her step-father.  In the same manner, the
39

Court brushes aside Federico's desperate attribution of ill-motive against AAA and her
mother for being self-serving and unsupported by the evidence on record. 40

Finally, in light of prevailing jurisprudence, the Court modifies the award for
damages.  As charged in the three (3) Informations, the crimes of rape are punishable by
1âwphi1
 death under Section 11  of Republic Act (RA) No. 7659,  given the confluence of the
41 42

following elements: (i) that the victim was below eighteen (18) years of age at the time all
three rape incidents occurred, and (ii) that the offender is the step-parent of the victim.

In People v. Jugueta, the Court held that for those crimes where the penalty imposed is
43

death but reduced to reclusion perpetua because of RA No. 9346,  the civil indemnity as
44

well as the award for moral and exemplary damages shall each be set at One Hundred
Thousand Pesos (₱l00,000.00).

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit and
the Decision dated September 25, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR. HC. No.
01277 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant Federico Gerola y Amar
is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of three (3) counts of Rape as defined
under Article 266-A, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code· and is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count.

The amount of damages awarded is likewise increased, ordering accused-appellant to

pay the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱l00,000.00) as civil indemnity, One
Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱l00,000.00) as moral damages, and One Hundred
Thousand Pesos (₱l00,000.00) as exemplary damages for each count of Rape. All
monetary awards shall earn interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from
the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION

January 16, 2017

G.R. No. 213224

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
ROQUE DAYADAY y DAGOOC , Accused-Appellant.
1

DECISION

CAGUIOA, J.:

On appeal is the May 26, 2014 Decision  of the Court of Appeals (CA), Special Twenty-Third Division
2

in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00887-MIN, which affirmed the Decision  dated September 27, 2010 of the
3

Regional Trial Court (R TC) of Surallah, South Cotabato, Branch 26, in Criminal Case No. 4005-N.
 The Facts

In an Information  filed with the RTC, accused-appellant Roque Dayaday y Dagooc (Roque) was
4

charged with the crime of Murder, the accusatory portion of which reads:

"That on or about the 27th day of October 2005 at around 10:00 o'clock in the evening thereof, at
Barangay Esperanza, Municipality of Norala, Province of South Cotabato, Philippines, within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, while armed with a handgun and a
knife, with intent to kill, attended by treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot for several times and stab one BASILIO
GALLENERO, hitting and inflicting upon the latter several mortal gunshot wounds on the different
parts of his body, and stab wound at the epigastric area of the victim's abdomen, which caused his
death shortly thereafter."

CONTRARY TO LAW, attended by aggravating circumstance of Illegal Possession of Firearms. 5

Upon arraignment, Roque pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. Thereafter, trial on the merits
ensued. The prosecution presented Alex Gallenero (Alex), the son of the victim, and Dr. Lanelita
Lanaria-Amido (Dr. Amido ), the Municipal Health Officer of Norala, South Cotabato, as witnesses
who testified to the following facts, to wit:

On the evening of October 27, 2005 at about 10 o'clock, Alex and his father, Basilio Gallenero
(Basilio), were walking home along the road in Barrio 3, Norala, South Cotabato  after attending a
6

wedding celebration at the house of Rodolfo Dayaday,  when suddenly, Roque shot the victim in the
7

back four (4) times, successively. Alex easily recognized Roque as the assailant because the place
was well lit and he was just about ten (10) meters away from Roque when the latter fired his
gun.   For fear of his life, Alex an away from the place of incident.   He reported the incident to his
8 9

uncle Petring Pinuela and to the police officers of Norala. 10

The postmortem report of Dr. Amido showed that the victim suffered four (4) gunshot wounds and
one (1) stab wound  and died due to cardiopulmonary arrest, probably secondary to multiple injuries
11

caused by the gunshot and stab wounds.  12

Roque, on the other hand, through the testimonies of Reynald Dayaday (Reynald) and Dennis
Blancada (Dennis), denied the accusation and interposed the defense of alibi.

Reynald, accused-appellant's brother, testified that on October 27, 2005, the night before the
wedding of his niece, he was at the house of his older Brother, Teodolfo Dayaday, at Barangay
Esperanza (Barrio 3), Norala, South Cotabato.  He was with Roque and seven (7) other people, who
13

were tasked to prepare the food for the wedding celebration. They were all together in the kitchen
from 5 o'clock in the evening to 3 o'clock in the morning.  14

Dennis testified that he was at Barangay Esperanza, Norala, South Cotabato on October 27, 2005
because he was invited to cook in the house of Teodolfo Dayaday.   He arrived there at 12 o'clock
15

noon but his duty started at 5 o'clock in the evening and ended at 3 o'clock in the morning the
following day.   He recalled that during those times that he was cooking, Roque never left the
16

kitchen. 17

Ruling of the RTC

Finding the positive testimony of Alex credible as against Roque's defense of alibi, the RTC
convicted Roque of the crime of murder and sentenced him accordingly. The dispositive portion of
the Decision  dated September 27, 2010 reads as follows:
18

WHEREFORE, premises all considered, the court finds the evidence of the prosecution sufficient to
sustain it in finding the accused criminally responsible of the crime charged.

Consequently, accused Roque Dayaday y Dago-oc is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Murder as he is charged in this case.

He is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of reclusion perpetua.

He is further ordered to pay the heirs of his deceased victim, Basilio Gallenero, the amount of
P75,000.00 as indemnity for his death; the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages; the amount of
P30,000.00 as exemplary damages and the amount of P30,000.00 as reasonable actual expenses
for his wake and burial and the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED. 19

Aggrieved, Roque appealed to the CA by a Notice of Appeal dated October 28, 2010.  Both parties
20

accordingly filed their respective Briefs dated April 26, 2011  and November 22, 2011.
21 22

Ruling of the CA

The CA concurred with the RTC's finding on Alex's credibility and dismissed the alleged
inconsistencies in his testimony.   Moreover, the CA found Roque's defense of alibi very flimsy.
23

According to the CA, while the defense witnesses claimed that Roque was cooking at the time of the
commission, it was not physically impossible for Roque to be at the scene of the crime because the
place where he was allegedly cooking was in the same vicinity where the crime was committed.  24

The CA further ruled that while the prosecution failed to prove the aggravating circumstance of
evident premeditation, treachery was very patent in the instant case, which is sufficient to qualify the
crime to murder. Records showed that the victim was shot several times in the back while he was
walking, which means that he was defenseless at the time of the attack; and the fact that the stab
wound was located on the victim's abdomen would not preclude treachery because the victim was
already vulnerable due to the gunshot wounds. 25

Thus, on May 26, 2014, the CA rendered the assailed Decision  affirming Rogue's conviction, the
26

decretal portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated September 27, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
26, Surallah, South Cotabato finding accused-appellant Roque Dayaday y Dagooc guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder in Criminal Case No. 4005-N is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED. 27

Hence, this appeal.  28

In the Resolution dated January 28, 2015,  this Court required the parties to file their supplemental
29

briefs; but both parties manifested  that they would no longer file the pleadings and opted to replead
30

and adopt the arguments submitted before the CA.

Issue

Consequently, the only issue for the Court's consideration is whether the CA erred in affirming
Roque's conviction for the crime of murder.

The Court's Ruling

In the instant appeal, Roque essentially questions the credibility of Alex and the veracity of his
accusations. Roque insists that Alex is a biased witness considering his relationship with the victim.
He further avers that Alex exhibited a propensity to lie when he stated in his affidavit that there were
other witnesses who saw the commission of the crime, and later admitted in open court that he was
the sole witness to the crime. Roque also claims that the testimony of Alex that his father had been
shot four (4) times runs counter to the postmortem report of Dr. Amido, which indicates that there
were seven (7) gunshot wounds.

The appeal fails.

Time and again, the Court has held that when the issues involve matters of credibility of witnesses,
the findings of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies, and its assessment of the probative
weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings, are accorded high respect, if not
conclusive effect. This is so because the trial court has the unique opportunity to observe the
demeanor of witnesses and is in the best position to discern whether they are telling the
truth.   Hence, it is a settled rule that appellate courts will not overturn the factual findings of the trial
31

court unless there is a showing that the latter overlooked facts or circumstances of weight and
substance that would affect the result of the case.   The foregoing rule finds an even more stringent
32

application where the findings of the RTC are sustained by the CA.  33

In the present case, both the RTC and CA found the testimony of Alex straightforward and worthy of
belief. Alex identified Roque as the one who shot his father at the back and his positive declaration
was never destroyed even after cross-examination in court.  34

For his part, Roque failed to identify any significant factor circumstance which would justify the
reversal of the RTC's and CA's findings on Alex's credibility.

The imputation of bias to Alex because of his relationship with the victim must necessarily fail.
In People v. Montemayor, the Court ruled that relationship by itself does not give rise to any
35

presumption of bias or ulterior motive, nor does it impair the credibility of witnesses or tarnish their
testimonies.   The relationship of a witness to the victim would even make his testimony more
36

credible, as it would be unnatural for a relative who is interested in vindicating the crime to charge
and prosecute another person other than the real culprit.   Relatives of victims of crimes have a
37

natural knack for remembering the faces of the attacker and they, more than anybody else, would be
concerned with obtaining justice for the victim by having the felon brought to justice and meted the
proper penalty.  Where there is no showing of an improper motive on the part of the prosecution's
38

witnesses for testifying against the appellant, their relationship to the victim does not render their
testimony less credible.   In this case, since there is no showing of any ill or improper motive on the
39

part of Alex to testify against the accused, his relationship with the victim even made his testimony
more credible and truthful.

Furthermore, the alleged discrepancy between Alex's testimony and the postmortem report of Dr.
Amido as to the number of gunshot wounds is more imagined than real. As correctly pointed out by
the CA, the postmortem report showing that there are four (4) entry gunshot wounds and three (3)
exit wounds, which means that there are three (3) perforating gunshots and one (1) penetrating
gunshot, coincides with Alex's declaration that his father was shot four (4) times.39-a

The Court also agrees with the CA that the inconsistency between Alex's affidavit and his testimony
in open court as to whether there are other witnesses to the crime is immaterial to affect his
credibility, because it does not detract from the fact that Alex saw and identified Roque as the
assailant of his father.  In People v. Yanson,  the Court held:
40 41

x x x [T]his Court had consistently ruled that the alleged inconsistencies between the testimony
of a witness in open court and his sworn statement before the investigators are not fatal
defects to justify a reversal of judgment. Such discrepancies do not necessarily discredit the witness
since ex parte affidavits are almost always incomplete. A sworn statement or an affidavit does not
purport to contain a complete compendium of the details of the event narrated by the affiant. Sworn
statements taken ex parte are generally considered to be inferior to the testimony given in open
court.

xxxx

The discrepancies in [the witness]'s testimony do not damage the essential integrity of the
prosecution's evidence in its material whole. Instead, the discrepancies only erase suspicion that
the testimony was rehearsed or concocted. These honest inconsistencies serve to
strengthen rather than destroy [the witness]'s credibility. 42

Under Article 248  of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), murder is committed when: (1) a person was
43

killed; (2) the accused killed him; (3) the killing was with the attendance of any of the qualifying
circumstances enumerated in Article 248; and (4) the killing neither constitutes parricide nor
infanticide.
44

All elements of the crime of murder have been established in this case beyond reasonable doubt.

Through the testimony of Alex, the eyewitness to the crime, it was established that Basilio was killed
and it was Roque who had killed him. As to the presence of qualifying circumstances, the Court
sustains the CA's finding that treachery attended the killing of Basilio. There is treachery when a
victim is set upon by the accused without warning, as when the accused attacks the victim from
behind, or when the attack is sudden and unexpected and without the slightest provocation on the
part of the victim, or is, in any event, so sudden and unexpected that the victim is unable to defend
himself, thus insuring the execution of the criminal act without risk to the assailant.  45

Here, the evidence unequivocally shows that the attack against Basilio, which came from behind,
was sudden, deliberate and unexpected. The victim was completely unaware of any threat to his life
as he was merely walking home with his son. The use of a firearm showed deliberate intent to kill
Basilio and the location and number of gunshot wounds rendered him defenseless and incapable of
retaliation. Hence, treachery was evident in the case at bar, sufficient to qualify the crime to Murder.

Penalty, Civil Indemnity and Damages

Under Article 248 of the RPC, the penalty for murder qualified by treachery is reclusion perpetua to
death. Considering that, apart from treachery, the aggravating circumstances of evident
premeditation and illegal possession of firearms, as alleged in the Information, were not duly proven,
the RTC correctly held that the proper imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua.
As to the award of damages, the Court deems it proper to modify the CA's award pursuant to the
Court's recent ruling in People v. Jugueta. Therefore, in addition to the amount of ₱30,000.00 as
46

reasonable actual expenses for the wake and burial and the costs of suit, the victim's heirs are
entitled to ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity; ₱75,000.00 as moral damages; and ₱75,000.00 as
exemplary damages. All damages awarded shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from
date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Appeal is

DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Decision dated May 26, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR-HC No. 00887-MIN, finding accused-appellant Roque Dayaday y Dagooc GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS in that the
award of civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages are each increased to Seventy-
Five Thousand Pesos (₱75,000.00) and all monetary awards shall earn interest at the legal rate of
six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

D. Equipoise Rule
ix. Rationale
x. Where found in the Rules of Court or in Jurisprudence

xi. RULE 115

xii. Rights of Accused

Section 1. Rights of accused at the trial. — In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall be entitled to the following rights:

(a) To be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved beyond reasonable doubt.

Section 2. Proof beyond reasonable doubt. — In a criminal case, the accused is entitled to an
acquittal, unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does
not mean such a degree of proof, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainly. Moral
certainly only is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.
(2a) Rule 133

RULE 131

Burden of Proof and Presumptions

Section 1. Burden of proof. — Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts
in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law. (1a,
2a)
Section 3. Disputable presumptions. — The following presumptions are satisfactory if
uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:

(a) That a person is innocent of crime or wrong;

Section 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due
process of law.

(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved,

Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

xiii. Requisites of any

xiv. Jurisprudence

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 208067, September 14, 2016

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. RONNIE R. LIBRIAS, Appellant.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We resolve the appeal of accused-appellant Ronnie R. Librias (Librias) assailing the May
22, 2013 decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB-CR-H.C. No. 01130. The
assailed decision affirmed the ruling of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 28,
Mandaue City, Cebu, finding Librias guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
forcible abduction with rape.

THE FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS

Librias was charged with Forcible Abduction with Rape in relation to R.A. No. 7610 in an
information that reads: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
That sometime on the 14th day of September 2003, in Mandaue City, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with lewd designs, abduct one, AAA,2 who is a
17-yr. old minor, against her will, taking and carrying her to a place somewhere in
Colon Street, Cebu City, and away from her residence, and by means of force and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge of her against her will.

CONTRARY TO LAW.3 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

He pleaded not guilty to the charge during his arraignment.4 chanrobleslaw

When AAA was presented by the prosecution, she testified that on September 14, 2003,
at around 9:00 P.M., she was at the Mandaue Plaza while waiting for her cousin, who
did not show up.5 While waiting, AAA was approached by Librias who threatened to kill
her if she would not go with him.6 Librias and AAA thereafter left the plaza and boarded
a taxi.7
chanrobleslaw

While they were inside the taxi, Librias instructed the driver to bring them to Colon
Street in Cebu City.8 AAA, on the other hand, was trying to open the door of the taxi
but Librias held her hands down.9 chanrobleslaw

Upon reaching Colon Street, Librias and AAA walked towards a house where they were
given their own private room with its own bed.10 When they were already inside, Librias
slowly started taking off AAA's clothes.11 AAA struggled but was overpowered as Librias
held her hands and pinned her down with his legs.12 After taking off his pants, Librias
inserted his penis into AAA's vagina while on top of her.13 Although AAA was not able to
see how Librias was able to insert his penis, she said that it went into her vagina
because she felt pain inside and outside her private parts.14 chanrobleslaw

Shortly after his sexual advances, Librias fell asleep which gave AAA an opportunity to
get dressed and to escape.15 AAA then flagged down a taxi and proceeded to the
Barangay Hall of Ibabao and reported the matter to the barangay officials.16 Noticing
that Librias had followed her and was sitting at a bar nearby, AAA requested the
barangay tanods to arrest him.17 Librias was thereafter brought to the nearest police
station.18 chanrobleslaw

In his defense, Librias insisted that he did not force or threaten AAA to have sexual
intercourse with him; much less did he hold her against her will when he brought her to
the Hidden Lounge in Cebu City.

Librias testified that after lighting a candle at the nearby church, he proceeded to
Mandaue Plaza anticipating his ex-girlfriend to arrive and hoping that they would
talk.19 While he was seated in the park, Librias noticed a woman - who was also seated
alone right across him - smiling at him.20 After a while, Librias stood up and decided to
leave, passing by the woman who smiled at him again.21 This time, Librias smiled back
and asked her why she was smiling at him.22 The woman replied and said that he
looked familiar, and so Librias asked for her name;23 the woman was AAA.

After introducing themselves to one another, Librias and AAA started flirting and
strolled around the plaza for a good hour and a half. AAA thereafter invited Librias if he
wanted to join her in meeting her friend at a disco.24 At first, Librias declined as he had
to work that night, but he eventually decided not to go to work and invited AAA to go
with him to a videoke bar instead.25  AAA acceded; so they boarded a taxi and
cralawred

proceeded to Colon Street in Cebu City.26 chanrobleslaw

When they alighted from the taxi, Librias took AAA to his cousin's store.27 However,
since his cousin was not there, Librias offered to take AAA home and said that he would
just sleep somewhere nearby.28 AAA refused and insisted that she would just stay with
him.29 Thus, the two walked to Hidden Lounge where they checked in for two (2)
hours.30chanrobleslaw

After getting settled the room, AAA approached Librias who said, "Whatever will happen
to us now, don't worry because I will be responsible for it."31 In response, AAA
embraced Librias.32 chanrobleslaw

Librias, then, narrated that they indulged in foreplay before having sexual
intercourse.33 He alleged that he did not force himself upon AAA, much less threaten to
kill her to have sex with him.34 chanrobleslaw

After their intimate act, Librias and AAA fell asleep, but were shortly woken up by the
roomboy.35 They left the room together and went downstairs. To Librias' surprise, AAA
asked him for money so that she could go home.36 Librias told her to wait as he had to
go to the comfort room and that he was going to bring her home.37 chanrobleslaw

When Librias came out of the comfort room, he saw AAA leave the motel and board a
taxi.38 Recalling where AAA said she lived, he proceeded to her residence.39 While
waiting for AAA to possibly come outside of her house, Librias waited in a nearby
bar.40 Minutes later, AAA came out and instructed the barangay tanods to arrest
Librias.41 chanrobleslaw

In its September 25, 2009 judgment,42 after careful consideration of the evidence of

both parties, the RTC found that Librias, with the use of force and intimidation, had
taken away AAA from Mandaue Plaza to a house on Colon Street, Cebu City, where they
had sexual intercourse. The trial court did not give much credence to his denial in the
light of AAA's positive declaration that Librias had held her against her will and raped
her. Accordingly, applying Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the RTC imposed the
more serious penalty for rape, which is reclusion perpetua, and ordered him to pay AAA
P50,000.00 for civil indemnity and P15,000.00 for moral damages.

On appeal, the CA affirmed Librias' conviction in toto after finding no compelling reason

to depart from the factual findings of the trial court. Simply, it held that AAA's version
of what transpired was more credible and believable. The appellate court was likewise
not persuaded by Librias' assertion that AAA could have easily shouted for help because
her reaction to the force and intimidation could have varied and that she could have
been paralyzed with fear. Like the trial court, the CA found Librias' denial unacceptable
considering that denial is an inherently weak defense, and that it was not buttressed by
strong evidence of non-culpability.

OUR RULING
We hold that the accused should be acquitted.

By their very nature, crimes against chastity, as well as the crime of rape, usually
involve only two persons: the victim-complainant and the alleged offender. As a
consequence, the conviction or acquittal of the accused depends almost entirely on the
credibility of the complainant's testimony as seldom is there an eyewitness, other than
those involved, to the commission of the offense. It is for this reason that we should
examine with greatest care the complainant's story and subject it to a thorough
scrutiny to determine its veracity in the light of human nature and experience.43 chanrobleslaw

In People v. Aballe44 we said:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

It is the peculiarity of rape cases that conviction or acquittal of the accused depends
almost entirely on the credibility of the complaining witness. It may well then be that
the testimony of the victim, to bear upon its face the brand of moral certainty
demanded by the due process clause, must involve a narrative that is
plausible under the circumstances as recounted before the court. The mere fact
that there are contradictions and inconsistencies in her testimony will not in itself acquit
an accused as long as the story of the complaining witness is not inherently impossible
or suspect of prejudice and ill motive. Still and all, credence should only be given to
trustworthy testimonies capable of supporting a guilty verdict.45 [emphasis and
underscoring ours]
We likewise emphasized in People v. Fabito46 that in reviewing rape cases on appeal, we
consider the reality that rape is a very serious accusation and, at the same time, a
charge is not that hard to lay against another, to wit: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The review of a criminal case opens up the case in its entirety. The totality of the
evidence presented by both the prosecution and the defense are weighed, thus,
avoiding general conclusions based on isolated pieces of evidence. In the case of rape,
a review begins with the reality that rape is a very serious accusation that is painful to
make; at the same time, it is a charge that is not hard to lay against another by one
with malice in her mind. Because of the private nature of the crime that justifies the
acceptance of the lone testimony of a credible victim to convict, it is not easy for the
accused, although innocent, to disprove his guilt. These realities compel us to approach
with great caution and to scrutinize the statements of a victim on whose sole testimony
conviction or acquittal depends.47 [citations omitted; italics ours]
Contrary to the findings of the lower courts, we find AAA's testimony - which the
prosecution heavily relied on - that raise serious doubts in the truthfulness of her
statements.

We are reminded that the quantum of proof required in criminal cases is proof beyond
reasonable doubt in order to convict the accused.48 Because of the constitutional
presumption of innocence, the burden, therefore, lies with the prosecution to meet this
quantum of proof.49 In the case at bar, the prosecution failed to discharge this burden
since AAA's testimony was not credible enough to establish with moral certainty that
Librias abducted AAA and raped her.

First, AAA's narration that Librias forcibly took her from Mandaue Plaza to a house on
Colon Street, Cebu City, is very unlikely considering that AAA could have easily escaped
or, at least, have called for help. After reviewing the records of the case, we discovered
that Librias did not have a weapon nor did he threaten to use one should AAA not
accede to his demands. Without a weapon of any sort, AAA could have broken free and
run away - without any risk to her life - as the plaza was an open space where she
could have run in any direction.

Admittedly, the plaza was not completely deserted as AAA testified that there were a
few people around, thus: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Q. You said that on September 14, 2003, you went to the plaza here in Mandaue City?
A. Yes.
Q. What time was that?
A. 8:00 [P.M.]
xxxx
Q. So, what were,you doing when you arrived at the Mandaue Plaza?
A. I was roaming around.
Q. You were alone?
A. Yes.
Q. You would agree with me that there were many others who were also doing the same thing as
you were walking around the plaza at that time?
A. There were only few.
Q. When you arrived at around 8:00 [P.M.] there were still many people at that time?
A. Yes.
Q. Where exactly at the plaza did you go?
A. Near city hall.
Q. You walked around for about how many minutes?
A. Around two hours.50 [emphases ours]
From her testimony, we gather that AAA could have called for help and anyone around
the vicinity would have noticed. In fact, any person at the plaza could have easily
noticed that she was in some kind of danger had she tried to struggle to break free.
Hence, the foregoing statements would suggest that AAA was not really held against
her will.

The lower courts' conclusion that AAA could think of a way to escape because she was
afraid is a mere conjecture that cannot support a conviction. As a general rule, we are
bound by the trial court's findings of fact and evaluation of the credibility of witnesses,
especially when affirmed by the appellate court. However, this time-honored doctrine
admits exceptions, such as when the trial court overlooked, misunderstood, or
misapplied facts or circumstances of weight and substance that would affect the result
of the case.

Faced with two conflicting versions, we are guided by the equipoise rule: where the
evidence in a criminal case is evenly balanced, the constitutional presumption of
innocence tilts the scale in favor of the accused.51 Thus, where the inculpatory facts and
circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with
the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence
does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a
conviction.52 Applying this rule in the present case would properly lead us to conclude
that AAA did not try to escape or call for help because she wanted to go to wherever
Librias was planning to bring her.

Second, AAA gave different statements as to how she was held back by Librias during
the taxi ride going to Colon Street, Cebu City. In her direct testimony, she said that
Librias was holding her hands the whole time while he was flagging down a taxi cab and
when he pushed her inside it, viz:
Q. In the last hearing you testified that while you were at the Mandaue City plaza somebody
held your hand and said, "kuyog ka nako."53
Was this correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Is that all he said?
A. Yes.
Q. So, what happened after that?
A. He flagged down a taxi.
Q. While he flagged down a taxi what did he do to you?
A. He was holding on me.
Q. Was he able to flag down a taxi?
A. Yes.
Q. Then what happened after that?
A. He opened the door of the taxi and pushed me inside.
Q. So, what happened after you were pushed inside the taxi?
A. I told the driver of the taxi to go back to Ibabao.
Q. So the taxi then moved on?
A. A. Yes.
Q. And you told the driver of the taxi to return to Ibabao?
A. Yes.
Q. Then what happened after that?
A. He brought me to Colon St.
Q. Have you gone to this place, Colon St.?
A. No.
Q. How did you know it was Colon?
A. Because he said Colon.
Q. To whom was the word directed?
A. The taxi driver.54
However, upon further cross examination, she stated that Librias tied her hands with a
towel to restrict her movement, to wit: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Q. You said you were able to flag down a taxi which you rode, who flagged down the taxi?
A. He did.
Q. And how didjhe flag down the taxi if he was holding both your hands?
A. He was bringing a towel and he tied my hands with the towel.
Q. He tied both your hands with the towel while you were walking?
A. When he was already about to flag down a taxi.
Q. So, you had to stop because he had to tie your hands with the towel?
A. Yes, at the side of the road.
AAA's statements as to how Librias brought her to the taxicab buttress our conclusion
that she voluntarily went with him. Holding her arms and tying them are completely
different ways of restricting a person's movements. Thus, for AAA to narrate that
Librias was simply holding her, then later say that her arms were tied with a towel is
very unusual for a person who is supposed to be telling the truth. While rape victims
are not required or expected to remember all the details of their harrowing experience,
this inconsistency drawn from AAA's contradicting testimonies cannot be considered as
minor that would not affect her credibility.55 chanrobleslaw

Also, AAA again could have easily asked help from the taxi driver if she was really being
held against her will. We find it strange that AAA asked the taxi driver to take her to a
specific place when she could have simply said she was being taken away by Librias.
The close proximity of the taxi driver should have already triggered AAA's instinct to
call for help.

Third, AAA's version on how she was raped likewise raises doubt as to whether the
sexual intercourse initiated by Librias was against her will. Allegedly, Librias was able to
insert his penis inside AAA's vagina at the same time he was using his hands to restrain
her hands and his legs to hold her down. This means that AAA's legs were pinned
underneath the legs of Librias. To our mind, this position would make it very difficult to
insert a man's penis inside a woman's vagina when the entry to the latter would be
closed with her legs supposedly pinned and thus restrained from opening.

While we generally do not disturb the factual findings of the lower courts, we cannot
help but examine AAA's testimony critically and, based on this examination, conclude
that what she had declared was not the entire and actual truth.

What we have in this case is a double plus in favor of the defense.56 The first plus factor
is the weakening of the prosecution's case for almost solely relying on the testimony of
AAA which, as discussed above, has raised serious doubts that would not support a
conviction. The second plus for the defense is Librias' denial, which was straightforward
and needed no elaborate analysis to understand. He was walking around Mandaue Plaza
where he met this girl who caught his attention. They were initially attracted to each
other; hence, they started flirting. Not long after, they did not want the night to end so
soon and wanted to take their newly found attraction further. This is simply a case of a
one-night stand that went bad. Given these facts and the shaky evidence presented by
the prosecution, Librias' denial is all that is needed to acquit him.

All told, we conclude that the evidence for the prosecution does not prove beyond
reasonable doubt that Librias is guilty of the crime charged. On the other hand, Librias'
evidence for his defense - i.e., his testimony which, to our mind, is more sensible and
real — raises serious questions as to the credibility of AAA's allegations. Given that the
prosecution failed to meet the degree of moral certainty required, acquittal becomes
our constitutional duty, for fear that we be tortured with the thought that we could
possibly imprison an innocent man.57 chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we REVERSE and SET ASIDE the May 22, 2013

decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-CR-H.C. No. 01130. Accused-appellant
Ronnie R. Librias is hereby ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. He is ordered IMMEDIATELY RELEASED from detention
unless he is otherwise legally confined for another cause.

Let a copy of this Decision be sent to the Director, Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa
City, for immediate implementation. Said director is directed to report the action he has
taken to this Court within five (5) days from receipt of this Decision.

SO ORDERED. chanRobl

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 207662, April 13, 2016

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. FABIAN URZAIS Y

LANURIAS, ALEX BAUTISTA, AND RICKY BAUTISTA, Accused.

FABIAN URZAIS Y LANURIAS, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION
 PEREZ, J.:

Before us for review is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A. G.R. CR.-H.C.
No. 04812 dated 19 November 2012 which dismissed the appeal of accused-appellant
Fabian Urzais y Lanurias and affirmed with modification the Judgment2 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Cabanatuan City, Branch 27, in Criminal Case No. 13155 finding
accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of carnapping with
homicide through the use of unlicensed firearm.

Accused-appellant, together with co-accused Alex Bautista and Ricky Bautista, was
charged with Violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6539, otherwise known as the Anti-
Carnapping Act of 1972, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, with homicide through the use
of an unlicensed firearm. The accusatory portion of the Information reads as follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

That on or about the 13th day of November, 2002, or prior thereto, in the City of
Cabanatuan, Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating with and abetting one
another, with intent to gain and by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then
and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away, a Isuzu
Highlander car, colored Forest Green, with Plate No. UUT-838 of one MARIO MAGDATO,
valued at FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00) Philippine Currency, owned
by and belonging to said MARIO MAGDATO, against his will and consent and to his
damage and prejudice in the aforestated amount of P500,000.00, and on the occasion
of the carnapping, did assault and use personal violence upon the person of one MARIO
MAGDATO, that is, by shooting the latter with an unlicensed firearm, a Norinco cal.
9mm Pistol with Serial No. 508432, thereby inflicting upon him gunshot wound on the
head which caused his death.3 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

At his arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty. The trial proceeded against
him. His two co-accused remain at large.

The prosecution presented as witnesses Shirley Magdato (Shirley), Senior Police Officer
2 Fernando Figueroa (SPO2 Figueroa) and Dr. Jun Concepcion (Dr. Concepcion).

Shirley, the widow of the victim, testified mainly regarding her husband's
disappearance and discovery of his death. She narrated that her husband used to drive
for hire their Isuzu Highlander with plate number UUT-838 from Pulilan, Bulacan to the
LRT Terminal in Metro Manila. On 12 November 2002, around four o'clock in the
morning, her husband left their house in Pulilan and headed for the terminal at the
Pulilan Public Market to ply his usual route. When her husband did not return home that
day, Shirley inquired of his whereabouts from his friends to no avail. Shirley went to the
terminal the following day and the barker there told her that a person had hired their
vehicle to go to Manila. Shirley then asked her neighbors to call her husband's mobile
phone but no one answered. At around 10 o'clock in the morning of 13 November 2002,
her husband's co-members in the drivers' association arrived at their house and
thereafter accompanied Shirley to her husband's supposed location. At the Sta.Rosa
police station in Nueva Ecija, Shirley was informed that her husband had passed away.
She then took her husband's body home.4 Shirley retrieved their vehicle on 21
November 2002 from the Cabanatuan City Police Station. She then had it cleaned as it
had blood stains and reeked of a foul odor.5
SPO2 Figueroa of the Philippine National Police (PNP), Cabanatuan City, testified
concerning the circumstances surrounding accused-appellant's arrest. He stated that in
November 2002, their office received a "flash alarm" from the Bulacan PNP about an
alleged carnapped Isuzu Highlander in forest green color. Thereafter, their office was
informed that the subject vehicle had been seen in the AGL Subdivision, Cabanatuan
City. Thus, a team conducted surveillance there and a checkpoint had been set up
outside its gate. Around three o'clock in the afternoon of 20 November 2002, a vehicle
that fit the description of the carnapped vehicle appeared. The officers apprehended the
vehicle and asked the driver, accused-appellant, who had been alone, to alight
therefrom. When the officers noticed the accused-appellant's waist to be bulging of
something, he was ordered to raise his shirt and a gun was discovered tucked there.
The officers confiscated the unlicensed 9mm Norinco, with magazine and twelve (12)
live ammunitions. The officers confirmed that the engine of the vehicle matched that of
the victim's. Found inside the vehicle were two (2) plates with the marking "UUT-838"
and a passport. Said vehicle contained traces of blood on the car seats at the back and
on its flooring. The officers detained accused-appellant and filed a case for illegal
possession of firearm against him. The subject firearm was identified in open court.6

Dr. Concepcion testified about the wounds the victim sustained and the cause of his
death. He stated that the victim sustained one (1) gunshot wound in the head, the
entrance of which is at the right temporal area exiting at the opposite side. The victim
also had several abrasions on the right upper eyelid, the tip of the nose and around the
right eye. He also had blisters on his cheek area which could have been caused by a
lighted cigarette.7

Accused-appellant testified in his defense and interposed the defense of denial.

Accused-appellant testified that he had ordered in October 2002 from brothers Alex and
Ricky Bautista, an owner-type jeepney worth P60,000.00 for use in his business. The
brothers, however, allegedly delivered instead a green Isuzu Highlander around half
past three o'clock in the afternoon of 13 November 2002. The brothers told accused-
appellant that his P60,000.00 would serve as initial payment with the remaining
undetermined amount to be paid a week after. Accused-appellant agreed to this,
amazed that he had been given a new vehicle at such low price. Accused-appellant then
borrowed money from someone to pay the balance but the brothers never replied to his
text messages. On 16 November 2002, his friend Oscar Angeles advised him to
surrender the vehicle as it could be a "hot car." Accused-appellant was initially hesitant
to this idea as he wanted to recover the amount he had paid but he eventually decided
to sell the vehicle. He removed its plate number and placed a "for sale" sign at the
back. On 18 November 2002, he allegedly decided to surrender the vehicle upon advice
by a certain Angie. But when he arrived home in the afternoon of that day, he alleged
that he was arrested by Alex Villareal, a member of the Criminal Investigation and
Detection Group (CIDG) of Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija.8 Accused-appellant also testified that
he found out in jail the owner of the vehicle and his unfortunate demise.9 On cross-
examination, accused-appellant admitted that his real name is "Michael Tapayan y
Baguio" and that he used the name Fabian Urzais to secure a second passport in 2001
to be able to return to Taiwan.10

The other defense witness, Oscar Angeles (Angeles), testified that he had known the
accused-appellant as Michael Tapayan when they became neighbors in the AGL
subdivision. Accused-appellant also served as his computer technician. Angeles testified
that accused-appellant previously did not own any vehicle until the latter purchased the
Isuzu Highlander for P30,000.00 from the latter's friends in Bulacan. Angeles advised
accused-appellant that the vehicle might have been carnapped due to its very low
selling price. Angeles corroborated accused-appellant's testimony that he did not want
to surrender the car at first as he wanted to recover his payment for it.11

On 18 October 2010, the RTC rendered judgment finding accused-appellant guilty of

the crime charged. The RTC anchored its ruling on the disputable presumption that a
person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the
taker and the doer of the whole act.12 It held that the elements of carnapping were
proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt through the recovery of the
purportedly carnapped vehicle from the accused-appellant's possession and by his
continued possession thereof even after the lapse of one week from the commission of
the crime.13 The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court finds accused Fabian Urzais alias
Michael Tapayan y Lanurias GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
carnapping as defined and penalized by Republic Act 6539 (Anti-Carnapping Act of
1972) as amended by R.A. 7659 with homicide thru the use of unlicensed firearm.
Accordingly, he is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of forty (40) years
of reclusion perpetua.

In the service of the sentence, accused shall be credited with the full time of his
preventive detention if he agreed voluntarily and in writing to abide by the disciplinary
rules imposed upon convicted prisoners pursuant to Article 29 of the Revised Penal
Code.

Accused is further sentenced to indemnify the heirs of Mario Magdato the sum of
Php50,000.00 as death indemnity, Php50,000.00 as moral damages, and
Php672,000.00 as loss of earning capacity.14 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Accused-appellant filed a Notice of Appeal on 22 December 2010.15

On 19 November 2012, the CA rendered the assailed judgment affirming with

modification the trial court's decision. The CA noted the absence of eyewitnesses to the
crime yet ruled that sufficient circumstantial evidence was presented to prove accused-
appellant's guilt, solely, accused-appellant's possession of the allegedly carnapped
vehicle.

Accused-appellant appealed his conviction before this Court. In a Resolution16 dated 12

August 2013, accused-appellant and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) were
asked to file their respective supplemental briefs if they so desired. Accused-appellant
filed a Supplemental Brief17 while the OSG manifested18 that it adopts its Brief19 filed
before the CA for the purpose of the instant appeal.

Before the Court, accused-appellant vehemently maintains that there is no direct

evidence that he robbed and murdered the victim; and that the lower courts erred in
convicting him based on circumstantial evidence consisting only of the fact of his
possession of the allegedly carnapped vehicle. Accused-appellant decries the appellate
court's error in relying on the disputable presumption created by law under Section 3
(j), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court to conclude that by virtue of his possession of the
vehicle, he is considered the author of both the carnapping of the vehicle and the killing
of its owner. Accused-appellant asserts that such presumption does not hold in the case
at bar.

The Court agrees.

Every criminal conviction requires the prosecution to prove two (2) things: 1. The fact
of the crime, i.e. the presence of all the elements of the crime for which the accused
stands charged; and (2) the fact that the accused is the perpetrator of the crime. The
Court finds the prosecution unable to prove both aspects, thus, it is left with no option
but to acquit on reasonable doubt.

R.A. No. 6539, or the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, as amended, defines carnapping as
the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the
latter's consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation against persons, or by
using force upon things.20 By the amendment in Section 20 of R.A. No. 7659, Section
14 of the Anti-Carnapping Act now reads:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

SEC. 14. Penally for Carnapping. Any person who is found guilty of carnapping, as this
term is defined in Section two of this Act, shall, irrespective of the value of the motor
vehicle taken, be punished by imprisonment for not less than fourteen years and eight
months and not more than seventeen years and four months, when the carnapping is
committed without violence or intimidation of persons, or force upon things, and by
imprisonment for not less than seventeen years and four months and not more than
thirty years, when the carnapping is committed by means of violence or intimidation of
any person, or force upon things; and the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall
be imposed when the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed
or raped in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof.
(Emphasis supplied)
Three amendments have been made to the original Section 14 of the Anti-Carnapping
Act: (1) the penalty of life imprisonment was changed to reclusion perpetua, (2) the
inclusion of rape, and (3) the change of the phrase "in the commission of the
carnapping" to "in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion
thereof." This third amendment clarifies the law's intent to make the offense a special
complex crime, by way of analogy vis-a-vis paragraphs 1 to 4 of the Revised Penal
Code on robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons. Thus, under the last
clause of Section 14 of the Anti-Carnapping Act, the prosecution has to prove the
essential requisites of carnapping and of the homicide or murder of the victim, and
more importantly, it must show that the original criminal design of the culprit was
carnapping and that the killing was perpetrated "in the course of the commission of the
carnapping or on the occasion thereof." Consequently, where the elements of
carnapping are not proved, the provisions of the Anti-Carnapping Act would cease to be
applicable and the homicide or murder (if proven) would be punishable under the
Revised Penal Code.21

In the instant case, the Court finds the charge of carnapping unsubstantiated for failure
of the prosecution to prove all its elements. For one, the trial court's decision itself
makes no mention of any direct evidence indicating the guilt of accused-appellant.
Indeed, the CA confirmed the lack of such direct evidence.22 Both lower courts solely
based accused-appellant's conviction of the special complex crime
on one circumstantial evidence and that is, the fact of his possession of the allegedly
carnapped vehicle.

The Court notes that the prosecution's evidence only consists of the fact of the victim's
disappearance, the discovery of his death and the details surrounding accused-
appellant's arrest on rumors that the vehicle he possessed had been carnapped. Theres
is absolutely no evidence supporting the prosecution's theory that the victim's vehicle
had been carnapped, much less that the accused-appellant is the author of the same.

Certainly, it is not only by direct evidence that an accused may be convicted, but for
circumstantial evidence to sustain a conviction, following are the guidelines: (1) there is
more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is as such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.23 Decided cases expound that the circumstantial
evidence presented and proved must constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one
fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as
the guilty person. All the circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent
with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and at the same time inconsistent with
the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rationale except that of guilt.24

In the case at bar, notably there is only one circumstantial evidence. And this sole
circumstantial evidence of possession of the vehicle does not lead to an inference
exclusively consistent with guilt. Fundamentally, prosecution did not offer any iota of
evidence detailing the seizure of the vehicle, much less with accused-appellant's
participation. In fact, there is even a variance concerning how accused-appellant was
discovered to be in possession of the vehicle. The prosecution's uncorroborated
evidence says accused-appellant was apprehended while driving the vehicle at a
checkpoint, although the vehicle did not bear any license plates, while the latter
testified he was arrested at home. The following testimony of prosecution witness SPO2
Figueroa on cross-examination raises even more questions:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Q: You mentioned the car napping incident, when was that, Mr. witness?
ATTY. GONZALES:
Your Honor, I noticed that every time the witness gave his answer, he is looking at a
piece of paper and he is not testifying on his personal knowledge.
xx
xx
COURT:
The witness is looking at the record for about 5 min. now. Fiscal, here is another
witness who has lapses on the mind.
FISCAL MACARAIG:
I am speechless, Your Honor.
WITNESS:
It was not stated in my affidavit, sir the time of the carnapping incident.
ATTY. GONZALES:
 Your Honor, if he can no longer remember even the simple matter when this car
napping incident happened then he is an incompetent witness and we are deprive (sic)
of the right to cross examine him. I move that his testimony would be stricken off from
the record.
xx
xx
Q: Mr. Witness, what is the date when you arrested the accused Fabian Urzais?
A: It was November 20, 2002 at around 3 o'clock in the afternoon, sir.
Q: You said earlier that on November 3, 2002 that you met the accused is that correct, Mr.
Witness?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Why did you see the accused on November 3, 2002, Mr. Witness?
A: During that time, we conducted a check point at AGL were (sic) the Highlander was often
seen, sir.
Q: So, since on November 3, 2002, you were conducting this check point at AGL, it is safe to
assume that the carnapping incident happened earlier than November 3, 2002?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Were you present when this vehicle was car napped, Mr. Witness?
A: No, sir.
Q: Since you were not present, you have no personal knowledge about this car napping
incident, right, Mr. Witness?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: No further question, Your Honor.25
Considering the dearth of evidence, the subject vehicle is at best classified as "missing"
since the non-return of the victim and his vehicle on 12 November 2002. Why the
check-point had begun before then, as early 3 November 2002, as stated by the
prosecution witness raises doubts about the prosecution's version of the case. Perhaps,
the check-point had been set up for another vehicle which had gone missing earlier. In
any event, accused-appellant's crime, if at all, was being in possession of a missing
vehicle whose owner had been found dead. There is perhaps guilt in the acquisition of
the vehicle priced so suspiciously below standard. But how this alone should lead to a
conviction for the special complex crime of carnapping with homicide/murder, affirmed
by the appellate court is downright disturbing.

The application of disputable presumption found in Section 3 (j), Rule 131 of the Rules
of Court, that a person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent
wrongful act is the taker and doer of the whole act, in this case the alleged carnapping
and the homicide/murder of its owner, is limited to cases where such possession is
either unexplained or that the proffered explanation is rendered implausible in view of
independent evidence inconsistent thereto.26 In the instant case, accused-appellant set-
up a defense of denial of the charges and adhered to his unrebutted version of the story
that the vehicle had been sold to him by the brothers Alex and Ricky Bautista. Though
the explanation is not seamless, once the explanation is made for the possession, the
presumption arising from the unexplained possession may not anymore be invoked and
the burden shifts once more to the prosecution to produce evidence that would render
the defense of the accused improbable. And this burden, the prosecution was unable to
discharge. In contrast to prosecution witness SPO2 Figueroa's confused, apprehensive
and uncorroborated testimony accused-appellant unflinchingly testified as follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Q: Will you please tell us how you came into possession of this Isuzu Highlander with plate
number UTT 838?
A: That vehicle was brought by Ricky Bautista and Alex Bautista, sir.
xx
xx
Q: Do you know why Alex and Ricky Bautista gave you that Isuzu Highlander?
A: Actually that was not the vehicle I ordered form (sic) them, I ordered an owner type jeep
worth Php60,000 but on November 13, 2002 they brought that Isuzu Highlander, sir.
Q: Why did you order an owner type jeep from them?
A: Because I planned to install a trolley, cause I have a videoke for rent business, sir.
xx
xx
Q: What happened upon the arrival of this Alex and Ricky Bautista on that date and time?
A: I was a little bit surprise (sic) because Alex alighted from an Isuzu Highlander colored
green, sir.
Q: What happened after that?
A: I told them that it was not I ordered from you and my money is only Php60,000, sir.
Q: What did he told (sic) you?
A: He told me to give them the Php60,000 and they will leave the vehicle and when I have the
money next week I will send text message to them, sir.
Q: What was your reaction?
A: I was amazed because the vehicle is brand new and the price is low, sir.
xx
xx
Q: Did you find out anything about the Isuzu highlander that they left to you?
A: When I could not contact them I went to my friend Oscar Angeles and told him about the
vehicle then he told me that you better surrender the vehicle because maybe it is a hot car,
sir. "Nung hindi ko na po sila makontak ay nagpunta ako sa kaibigan kong si Oscar Angeles
at sinabi ko po yung problema tungkol sa sasakyan at sinabi nya sa akin na isurrender na
 lang at baka hot car yan"27
xx
xx
Q: Mr. Witness, granting for the sake that what you are saying is true, immediately on the 16th,
according to your testimony, and upon confirming it to your friend, you then decided to
surrender the vehicle, why did you not do it on the 16th, why did you still have to wait until
you get arrested?
A: Because I was thinking of my Sixty Thousand Pesos (Php60,000.00) at that time, and on
how I can take it back, sir. ("Kasi nanghinayang po ako sa Sixty Thousand (Php60,000.00)
ko nung oras na un ... pano ko po yun mabawi sabi ko".)
xx
xx
Q: So Mr. Witness, let us simplify this, you have purchased a carnapped vehicle, your intention
is to surrender it but you never did that until you get caught in possession of the same, so in
other words, that is all that have actually xxx vehicle was found dead, the body was dumped
somewhere within the vicinity of Sta. Rosa, those are the facts in this case?
A: I only came to know that there was a dead person when I was already in jail, sir.
Q: What about the other facts that I have mentioned, are they correct or not?
A: When I gave the downpayment, I do not know yet that it was a hot car and I came to know it
only on the 16th, sir.28
Significantly, accused-appellant's testimony was corroborated by defense witness
Angeles who had known accused-appellant by his real name "Michael Tapayan y
Baguio," to wit:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Q: Do you know if this Michael Tapayan owns any vehicle sometime in 2002?
A: At first none, sir, he has no vehicle.
Q: What do you mean when you say at first he has no vehicle?
A: Later, sir, I saw him riding in a vehicle.
xxx
x
Q: Did Michael Tapayan tell you how much he bought that vehicle?
A: I remember he told me that he bought that vehicle for Thirty Thousand (Php30,000.00)
Pesos, sir.
Q: What was your reaction when you were told that the vehicle was purchased for only Thirty
Thousand Pesos (Php30,000.00)?
A: I told him that it's very cheap and also told him that it might be a carnap (sic) vehicle.
Q: What was the reaction of Michael Tapayan when you told him that?
A: He thought about it and he is of the belief that the person who sold the vehicle to him will
come back and will get the additional payment, sir.
Q: Aside from this conversation about that vehicle, did you have any other conversation with
Michael Tapayan concerning that vehicle?
A: After a few days, sir, I told him to surrender the said vehicle to the authorities because the
persons who sold it to him did not come back for additional payment.
Q: What was the reaction of Michael Tapayan to this suggestion?
A: He told me that he will think about it because he was thinking about the money that he
already gave to them.29
Evidently, the disputable presumption cannot prevail over accused-appellant's
explanation for his possession of the missing vehicle. The possession having been
explained, the legal presumption is disputed and thus, cannot find application in the
instant case. To hold otherwise would be a miscarriage of justice as criminal convictions
necessarily require proof of guilt of the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt and in
the absence of such proof, should not be solely based on legal disputable presumptions.

The carnapping not being duly proved, the killing of the victim may not be treated as an
incident of carnapping. Nonetheless, even under the provisions of homicide and murder
under the Revised Penal Code, the Court finds the guilt of accused-appellant was not
established beyond reasonable doubt.

There were no eyewitnesses to the killing of the victim, Mario Magdato. Again, both
courts relied only on the circumstantial evidence of accused-appellant's possession of
the missing vehicle for the latter's conviction. Shirley, the widow, testified that her
husband and their vehicle went missing on 12 November 2002. Dr. Concepcion gave
testimony on the cause of death of Mario Magdato and the injuries he had sustained.
Most glaringly, no connection had been established between the victim's gunshot
wound which caused his death and the firearm found in the person of accused-
appellant. Only SPO2 Figueroa's testimony gave light on how allegedly accused-
appellant was found to have been in possession of the missing vehicle of the victim. But
even if this uncorroborated testimony was true, it does not link accused-appellant to
the carnapping, much less, the murder or homicide of the victim. And it does not
preclude the probability of accused-appellant's story that he had merely bought the
vehicle from the Bautista brothers who have themselves since gone missing.

The equipoise rule states that where the inculpatory facts and circumstances are
capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of
the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfil the
test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction. The equipoise rule
provides that where the evidence in a criminal case is evenly balanced, the
constitutional, presumption of innocence tilts the scales in favor of the accused.30

The basis of the acquittal is reasonable doubt, which simply means that the evidence of
the prosecution was not sufficient to sustain the guilt of accused-appellant beyond the
point of moral certainty. Proof beyond reasonable doubt, however, is a burden
particular to the prosecution and does not apply to exculpatory facts as may be raised
by the defense; the accused is not required to establish matters in mitigation or
defense beyond a reasonable doubt, nor is he required to establish the truth of such
matters by a preponderance of the evidence, or even to a reasonable probability.31

It is the primordial duty of the prosecution to present its side with clarity and
persuasion, so that conviction becomes the only logical and inevitable conclusion. What
is required of it is to justify the conviction of the accused with moral certainty. Upon the
prosecution's failure to meet this test, acquittal becomes the constitutional duty of the
Court, lest its mind be tortured with the thought that it has imprisoned an innocent
man for the rest of his life.32 The constitutional right to be presumed innocent until
proven guilty can be overthrown only by proof beyond reasonable doubt.33

In the final analysis, the circumstances narrated by the prosecution engender doubt
rather than moral certainty on the guilt of accused-appellant. chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 19
November 2012 in C.A. G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04812 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
FABIAN URZAIS Y LANURIAS alias Michael Tapayan y Baguio is ACQUITTED on
reasonable doubt of the crime of carnapping with homicide, without prejudice to
investigation for the crime of fencing penalized under Presidential Decree 1612. His
immediate release from confinement is hereby ordered, unless he is being held for
some other lawful cause.

SO ORDERED. cralawlawlibrary