Peloponnesian War

The Peloponnesian War (431–404 BC)[2] was an ancient

Peloponnesian War
Greek war fought by the Delian League led by Athens
against the Peloponnesian League led by Sparta.
Historians have traditionally divided the war into three
phases. In the first phase, the Archidamian War, Sparta
launched repeated invasions of Attica, while Athens took
advantage of its naval supremacy to raid the coast of the
Peloponnese and attempt to suppress signs of unrest in its
empire. This period of the war was concluded in 421 BC,
with the signing of the Peace of Nicias. That treaty,
however, was soon undermined by renewed fighting in
the Peloponnese. In 415 BC, Athens dispatched a massive
expeditionary force to attack Syracuse, Sicily; the attack
failed disastrously, with the destruction of the entire force
in 413 BC. This ushered in the final phase of the war,
generally referred to either as the Decelean War, or the
Ionian War. In this phase, Sparta, now receiving support
from the Achaemenid Empire, supported rebellions in
Athens's subject states in the Aegean Sea and Ionia,
undermining Athens's empire, and, eventually, depriving
the city of naval supremacy. The destruction of Athens's
fleet in the Battle of Aegospotami effectively ended the
war, and Athens surrendered in the following year.
Corinth and Thebes demanded that Athens should be
destroyed and all its citizens should be enslaved, but
Sparta refused.
The Peloponnesian war alliances at 431 BC.
Although the term "Peloponnesian War" was never used
Orange: Athenian Empire and Allies; Green:
by Thucydides, one of the conflict's most important
historians, the fact that the term is all but universally used Spartan Confederacy
today is a reflection of the Athens-centric sympathies of Date 431 – April 25, 404 BC
modern historians. As prominent historian J. B. Bury
Location Mainland Greece, Asia Minor,
remarks, the Peloponnesians would have considered it the
Sicily
"Attic War".[3]
Result
The Peloponnesian War reshaped the ancient Greek Peloponnesian League
world. On the level of international relations, Athens, the victory
strongest city-state in Greece prior to the war's beginning,
was reduced to a state of near-complete subjection, while Thirty Tyrants installed in
Sparta became established as the leading power of Athens
Greece. The economic costs of the war were felt all Spartan hegemony
across Greece; poverty became widespread in the
Peloponnese, while Athens was completely devastated, Territorial Dissolution of the Delian League;
and never regained its pre-war prosperity.[4][5] The war changes Spartan hegemony over Athens
also wrought subtler changes to Greek society; the and its allies;
conflict between democratic Athens and oligarchic Persia regains control over Ionia.
Sparta, each of which supported friendly political factions Belligerents
within other states, made war a common occurrence in Delian League (led by Peloponnesian League
the Greek world.
Athens) (led by Sparta)

Ancient Greek warfare, meanwhile, originally a limited Supported by:

and formalized form of conflict, was transformed into an Achaemenid
all-out struggle between city-states, complete with Empire
atrocities on a large scale. Shattering religious and
Commanders and leaders
cultural taboos, devastating vast swathes of countryside,
and destroying whole cities, the Peloponnesian War Pericles (died in 429 BC) Archidamus II
marked the dramatic end to the fifth century BC and the Cleon † Brasidas †
golden age of Greece.[6] Nicias Lysander
Alcibiades (in exile) Alcibiades
The Peloponnesian War was soon followed by the Demosthenes
Corinthian War (394-386 BC), which, although it ended
inconclusively, helped Athens regain a little of its former Casualties and losses
greatness. At least 18,070 unknown
soldiers[1]
unknown number of
Contents civilian casualties.

Prelude
Breakdown of the peace
The "Archidamian War" (431–421 BC)
Peace of Nicias (421 BC)
Sicilian Expedition (415–413 BC)
The Second War (413–404 BC)
Athens recovers
Achaemenid support for Sparta (414–404 BC)
Lysander triumphs, Athens surrenders
Aftermath
References
Further reading
Classical authors
Modern authors
External links

Prelude
As the preeminent Athenian historian, Thucydides, wrote in his influential History of the Peloponnesian
War, "The growth of the power of Athens, and the alarm which this inspired in Lacedaemon, made war
inevitable."[7] Indeed, the nearly fifty years of Greek history that preceded the outbreak of the
Peloponnesian War had been marked by the development of Athens as a major power in the Mediterranean
world. Its empire began as a small group of city-states, called the Delian League—from the island of Delos,
on which they kept their treasury—that came together to ensure that the Greco-Persian Wars were truly over.
After defeating the Second Persian invasion of Greece in the year 480 BC, Athens led the coalition of Greek
city-states that continued the Greco-Persian Wars with attacks on Persian territories in the Aegean and Ionia.
What then ensued was a period, referred to as the Pentecontaetia (the
name given by Thucydides), in which Athens increasingly became in
fact an empire,[8] carrying out an aggressive war against Persia and
increasingly dominating other city-states. Athens proceeded to bring
under its control all of Greece except for Sparta and its allies,
ushering in a period which is known to history as the Athenian
Empire. By the middle of the century, the Persians had been driven
from the Aegean and forced to cede control of a vast range of
territories to Athens. At the same time, Athens greatly increased its
own power; a number of its formerly independent allies were
reduced, over the course of the century, to the status of tribute-
paying subject states of the Delian League. This tribute was used to
support a powerful fleet and, after the middle of the century, to fund Fragment of the Athenian Tribute
List, 425-424 BC.
massive public works programs in Athens, causing resentment.[9]

Friction between Athens and the Peloponnesian states, including

Sparta, began early in the Pentecontaetia; in the wake of the departure of the Persians from Greece, Sparta
attempted to prevent the reconstruction of the walls of Athens (without the walls, Athens would have been
defenseless against a land attack and subject to Spartan control), but was rebuffed.[10] According to
Thucydides, although the Spartans took no action at this time, they "secretly felt aggrieved".[11] Conflict
between the states flared up again in 465 BC, when a helot revolt broke out in Sparta. The Spartans
summoned forces from all of their allies, including Athens, to help them suppress the revolt. Athens sent out
a sizable contingent (4,000 hoplites), but upon its arrival, this force was dismissed by the Spartans, while
those of all the other allies were permitted to remain. According to Thucydides, the Spartans acted in this
way out of fear that the Athenians would switch sides and support the helots; the offended Athenians
repudiated their alliance with Sparta.[12] When the rebellious helots were finally forced to surrender and
permitted to evacuate the state, the Athenians settled them at the strategic city of Naupaktos on the Gulf of
Corinth.[13]

In 459 BC, Athens took advantage of a war between its neighbors Megara and Corinth, both Spartan allies,
to conclude an alliance with Megara, giving the Athenians a critical foothold on the Isthmus of Corinth. A
fifteen-year conflict, commonly known as the First Peloponnesian War, ensued, in which Athens fought
intermittently against Sparta, Corinth, Aegina, and a number of other states. For a time during this conflict,
Athens controlled not only Megara but also Boeotia; at its end, however, in the face of a massive Spartan
invasion of Attica, the Athenians ceded the lands they had won on the Greek mainland, and Athens and
Sparta recognized each other's right to control their respective alliance systems.[14] The war was officially
ended by the Thirty Years' Peace, signed in the winter of 446/5 BC.[15]

Breakdown of the peace

The Thirty Years' Peace was first tested in 440 BC, when Athens's powerful ally Samos rebelled from its
alliance with Athens. The rebels quickly secured the support of a Persian satrap, and Athens found itself
facing the prospect of revolts throughout the empire. The Spartans, whose intervention would have been the
trigger for a massive war to determine the fate of the empire, called a congress of their allies to discuss the
possibility of war with Athens. Sparta's powerful ally Corinth was notably opposed to intervention, and the
congress voted against war with Athens. The Athenians crushed the revolt, and peace was maintained.[16]

The more immediate events that led to war involved Athens and Corinth. After suffering a defeat at the
hands of their colony of Corcyra, a sea power that was not allied to either Sparta or Athens, Corinth began to
build an allied naval force. Alarmed, Corcyra sought an alliance with Athens, which after debate and input
from both Corcyra and Corinth, decided to swear a defensive alliance with Corcyra. At the Battle of Sybota,
a small contingent of Athenian ships played a
critical role in preventing a Corinthian fleet from
capturing Corcyra. In order to uphold the Thirty
Years' Peace, however, the Athenians were
instructed not to intervene in the battle unless it
was clear that Corinth was going to press onward to
invade Corcyra. However, the Athenian warships
participated in the battle nevertheless, and the
arrival of additional Athenian triremes was enough
to dissuade the Corinthians from exploiting their
victory, thus sparing much of the routed Corcyrean
and Athenian fleet.[17]

Following this, Athens instructed Potidaea in the

peninsula of Chalkidiki, a tributary ally of Athens
but a colony of Corinth, to tear down its walls, send The Delian League in 431 BC
hostages to Athens, dismiss the Corinthian
magistrates from office, and refuse the magistrates
that the city would send in the future.[18] The Corinthians, outraged by these actions, encouraged Potidaea to
revolt and assured them that they would ally with them should they revolt from Athens. During the
subsequent Battle of Potidaea, the Corinthians unofficially aided Potidaea by sneaking contingents of men
into the besieged city to help defend it. This was a direct violation of the Thirty Years' Peace, which had
(among other things) stipulated that the Delian League and the Peloponnesian League would respect each
other's autonomy and internal affairs.

A further source of provocation was an Athenian

decree, issued in 433/2 BC, imposing stringent
trade sanctions on Megarian citizens (once more a
Spartan ally after the conclusion of the First
Peloponnesian War). It was alleged that the
Megarians had desecrated the Hiera Orgas. These
sanctions, known as the Megarian decree, were
largely ignored by Thucydides, but some modern
economic historians have noted that forbidding
Megara to trade with the prosperous Athenian
empire would have been disastrous for the
Megarans, and have accordingly considered the
decree to be a contributing factor in bringing about
the war.[19] Historians that attribute responsibility Battle of Potidaea (432 BC): Athenians against
for the war to Athens cite this event as the main Corinthians. Scene of Socrates saving Alcibiades. 18th
cause for blame.[20] century engraving.

At the request of the Corinthians, the Spartans

summoned members of the Peloponnesian League to Sparta in 432 BC, especially those who had grievances
with Athens to make their complaints to the Spartan assembly. This debate was attended by members of the
league and an uninvited delegation from Athens, which also asked to speak, and became the scene of a
debate between the Athenians and the Corinthians. Thucydides reports that the Corinthians condemned
Sparta's inactivity up to that point, warning the Spartans that if they continued to remain passive while the
Athenians were energetically active, they would soon find themselves outflanked and without allies.[21] The
Athenians, in response, reminded the Spartans of their record of military success and opposition to Persia,
and warned them of the dangers of confronting such a powerful state, ultimately encouraging Sparta to seek
arbitration as provided by the Thirty Years' Peace.[22] Undeterred, a majority of the Spartan assembly voted
to declare that the Athenians had broken the peace, essentially declaring war.[23]

The "Archidamian War" (431–421 BC)

Sparta and its allies, with the exception of
Corinth, were almost exclusively land-
based powers, able to summon large land
armies which were very nearly unbeatable
(thanks to the legendary Spartan forces).
The Athenian Empire, although based in
the peninsula of Attica, spread out across
the islands of the Aegean Sea; Athens
drew its immense wealth from tribute paid
from these islands. Athens maintained its
empire through naval power. Thus, the
two powers were relatively unable to fight
decisive battles.

The Spartan strategy during the first war,

known as the Archidamian War (431–421
The walls surrounding Athens BC) after Sparta's king Archidamus II,
was to invade the land surrounding
Athens. While this invasion deprived
Athenians of the productive land around their city, Athens itself was able to maintain access to the sea, and
did not suffer much. Many of the citizens of Attica abandoned their farms and moved inside the Long Walls,
which connected Athens to its port of Piraeus. At the end of the first year of the war, Pericles gave his
famous Funeral Oration (431 BC).

The Spartans also occupied Attica for periods of only three weeks at a time; in the tradition of earlier hoplite
warfare the soldiers were expected to go home to participate in the harvest. Moreover, Spartan slaves,
known as helots, needed to be kept under control, and could not be left unsupervised for long periods of
time. The longest Spartan invasion, in 430 BC, lasted just forty days.

The Athenian strategy was initially guided by the strategos, or general, Pericles, who advised the Athenians
to avoid open battle with the far more numerous and better trained Spartan hoplites, relying instead on the
fleet. The Athenian fleet, the most dominant in Greece, went on the offensive, winning a victory at
Naupactus. In 430 BC an outbreak of a plague hit Athens. The plague ravaged the densely packed city, and
in the long run, was a significant cause of its final defeat. The plague wiped out over 30,000 citizens, sailors
and soldiers, including Pericles and his sons. Roughly one-third to two-thirds of the Athenian population
died. Athenian manpower was correspondingly drastically reduced and even foreign mercenaries refused to
hire themselves out to a city riddled with plague. The fear of plague was so widespread that the Spartan
invasion of Attica was abandoned, their troops being unwilling to risk contact with the diseased enemy.

After the death of Pericles, the Athenians turned somewhat against his conservative, defensive strategy and
to the more aggressive strategy of bringing the war to Sparta and its allies. Rising to particular importance in
Athenian democracy at this time was Cleon, a leader of the hawkish elements of the Athenian democracy.
Led militarily by a clever new general Demosthenes (not to be confused with the later Athenian orator
Demosthenes), the Athenians managed some successes as they continued their naval raids on the
Peloponnese. Athens stretched their military activities into Boeotia and Aetolia, quelled the Mytilenean
revolt and began fortifying posts around the Peloponnese. One of these posts was near Pylos on a tiny island
called Sphacteria, where the course of the first war turned in
Athens's favour. The post off Pylos struck Sparta where it was
weakest: its dependence on the helots, who tended the fields while
its citizens trained to become soldiers. The helots made the Spartan
system possible, but now the post off Pylos began attracting helot
runaways. In addition, the fear of a general revolt of helots
emboldened by the nearby Athenian presence drove the Spartans to
action. Demosthenes, however, outmanoeuvred the Spartans in the
Battle of Pylos in 425 BC and trapped a group of Spartan soldiers on
Sphacteria as he waited for them to surrender. Weeks later, though,
Demosthenes proved unable to finish off the Spartans. After
boasting that he could put an end to the affair in the Assembly, the
inexperienced Cleon won a great victory at the Battle of Sphacteria.
The Athenians captured 300 Spartan hoplites. The hostages gave the
Athenians a bargaining chip.

After these battles, the Spartan general Brasidas raised an army of

allies and helots and marched the length of Greece to the Athenian
colony of Amphipolis in Thrace, which controlled several nearby
silver mines; their product supplied much of the Athenian war fund.
Thucydides was dispatched with a force which arrived too late to
stop Brasidas capturing Amphipolis; Thucydides was exiled for this,
and, as a result, had the conversations with both sides of the war Bust of Pericles.
which inspired him to record its history. Both Brasidas and Cleon
were killed in Athenian efforts to retake Amphipolis (see Battle of
Amphipolis). The Spartans and Athenians agreed to exchange the hostages for the towns captured by
Brasidas, and signed a truce.

Peace of Nicias (421 BC)

With the death of Cleon and Brasidas, zealous war hawks for both nations, the Peace of Nicias was able to
last for some six years. However, it was a time of constant skirmishing in and around the Peloponnese.
While the Spartans refrained from action themselves, some of their allies began to talk of revolt. They were
supported in this by Argos, a powerful state within the Peloponnese that had remained independent of
Lacedaemon. With the support of the Athenians, the Argives succeeded in forging a coalition of democratic
states within the Peloponnese, including the powerful states of Mantinea and Elis. Early Spartan attempts to
break up the coalition failed, and the leadership of the Spartan king Agis was called into question.
Emboldened, the Argives and their allies, with the support of a small Athenian force under Alcibiades,
moved to seize the city of Tegea, near Sparta.

The Battle of Mantinea was the largest land battle fought within Greece during the Peloponnesian War. The
Lacedaemonians, with their neighbors the Tegeans, faced the combined armies of Argos, Athens, Mantinea,
and Arcadia. In the battle, the allied coalition scored early successes, but failed to capitalize on them, which
allowed the Spartan elite forces to defeat the forces opposite them. The result was a complete victory for the
Spartans, which rescued their city from the brink of strategic defeat. The democratic alliance was broken up,
and most of its members were reincorporated into the Peloponnesian League. With its victory at Mantinea,
Sparta pulled itself back from the brink of utter defeat, and re-established its hegemony throughout the
Peloponnese.

Sicilian Expedition (415–413 BC)

In the 17th year of the war, word came to Athens that one of their
distant allies in Sicily was under attack from Syracuse. The people
of Syracuse were ethnically Dorian (as were the Spartans), while the
Athenians, and their ally in Sicilia, were Ionian. The Athenians felt
obliged to assist their ally.

The Athenians did not act solely from altruism: rallied on by

Alcibiades, the leader of the expedition, they held visions of
conquering all of Sicily. Syracuse, the principal city of Sicily, was
not much smaller than Athens, and conquering all of Sicily would
have brought Athens an immense amount of resources. In the final
stages of the preparations for departure, the hermai (religious
statues) of Athens were mutilated by unknown persons, and
Alcibiades was charged with religious crimes. Alcibiades demanded
that he be put on trial at once, so that he might defend himself before
the expedition. The Athenians however allowed Alcibiades to go on
the expedition without being tried (many believed in order to better
plot against him). After arriving in Sicily, Alcibiades was recalled to
Athens for trial. Fearing that he would be unjustly condemned, Destruction of the Athenian army at
Alcibiades defected to Sparta and Nicias was placed in charge of the Syracuse.
mission. After his defection, Alcibiades claimed to the Spartans that
the Athenians planned to use Sicily as a springboard for the conquest
of all of Italy and Carthage, and to use the resources and soldiers from these new conquests to conquer the
Peloponnese.

The Athenian force consisted of over 100 ships and some 5,000
infantry and light-armored troops. Cavalry was limited to about 30
horses, which proved to be no match for the large and highly trained
Syracusan cavalry. Upon landing in Sicily, several cities
immediately joined the Athenian cause. Instead of attacking at once,
Nicias procrastinated and the campaigning season of 415 BC ended
with Syracuse scarcely damaged. With winter approaching, the
Sicily and the Peloponnesian War Athenians were then forced to withdraw into their quarters, and they
spent the winter gathering allies and preparing to destroy Syracuse.
The delay allowed the Syracusans to send for help from Sparta, who
sent their general Gylippus to Sicily with reinforcements. Upon arriving, he raised up a force from several
Sicilian cities, and went to the relief of Syracuse. He took command of the Syracusan troops, and in a series
of battles defeated the Athenian forces, and prevented them from invading the city.

Nicias then sent word to Athens asking for reinforcements. Demosthenes was chosen and led another fleet to
Sicily, joining his forces with those of Nicias. More battles ensued and again, the Syracusans and their allies
defeated the Athenians. Demosthenes argued for a retreat to Athens, but Nicias at first refused. After
additional setbacks, Nicias seemed to agree to a retreat until a bad omen, in the form of a lunar eclipse,
delayed any withdrawal. The delay was costly and forced the Athenians into a major sea battle in the Great
Harbor of Syracuse. The Athenians were thoroughly defeated. Nicias and Demosthenes marched their
remaining forces inland in search of friendly allies. The Syracusan cavalry rode them down mercilessly,
eventually killing or enslaving all who were left of the mighty Athenian fleet.

The Second War (413–404 BC)

The Lacedaemonians were not content with simply sending aid to
Sicily; they also resolved to take the war to the Athenians. On the
advice of Alcibiades, they fortified Decelea, near Athens, and
prevented the Athenians from making use of their land year round.
The fortification of Decelea prevented the shipment of supplies
overland to Athens, and forced all supplies to be brought in by sea at
increased expense. Perhaps worst of all, the nearby silver mines
were totally disrupted, with as many as 20,000 Athenian slaves freed
by the Spartan hoplites at Decelea. With the treasury and emergency
reserve fund of 1,000 talents dwindling away, the Athenians were
forced to demand even more tribute from her subject allies, further
increasing tensions and the threat of further rebellion within the
Empire.

The Corinthians, the Spartans, and others in the Peloponnesian

League sent more reinforcements to Syracuse, in the hopes of
driving off the Athenians; but instead of withdrawing, the Athenians
sent another hundred ships and another 5,000 troops to Sicily. Under
Gylippus, the Syracusans and their allies were able to decisively
defeat the Athenians on land; and Gylippus encouraged the The key actions of each phase
Syracusans to build a navy, which was able to defeat the Athenian
fleet when they attempted to withdraw. The Athenian army,
attempting to withdraw overland to other, more friendly Sicilian cities, was divided and defeated; the entire
Athenian fleet was destroyed, and virtually the entire Athenian army was sold off into slavery.

Following the defeat of the Athenians in Sicily, it was widely believed that the end of the Athenian Empire
was at hand. Their treasury was nearly empty, its docks were depleted, and many of the Athenian youth were
dead or imprisoned in a foreign land.

Athens recovers

Following the destruction of the Sicilian Expedition, Lacedaemon

encouraged the revolt of Athens's tributary allies, and indeed, much
of Ionia rose in revolt against Athens. The Syracusans sent their fleet
to the Peloponnesians, and the Persians decided to support the
Spartans with money and ships. Revolt and faction threatened in
Athens itself.

The Athenians managed to survive for several reasons. First, their

The triumphal return of Alcibiades to foes were lacking in initiative. Corinth and Syracuse were slow to
Athens in 407 BC. bring their fleets into the Aegean, and Sparta's other allies were also
slow to furnish troops or ships. The Ionian states that rebelled
expected protection, and many rejoined the Athenian side. The
Persians were slow to furnish promised funds and ships, frustrating battle plans.

At the start of the war, the Athenians had prudently put aside some money and 100 ships that were to be
used only as a last resort.

These ships were then released, and served as the core of the Athenians' fleet throughout the rest of the war.
An oligarchical revolution occurred in Athens, in which a group of 400 seized power. A peace with Sparta
might have been possible, but the Athenian fleet, now based on the island of Samos, refused to accept the
change. In 411 BC this fleet engaged the Spartans at the Battle of Syme. The fleet appointed Alcibiades their
leader, and continued the war in Athens's name. Their opposition led to the reinstitution of a democratic
government in Athens within two years.

Alcibiades, while condemned as a traitor, still carried weight

in Athens. He prevented the Athenian fleet from attacking
Athens; instead, he helped restore democracy by more subtle
pressure. He also persuaded the Athenian fleet to attack the
Spartans at the battle of Cyzicus in 410. In the battle, the
Athenians obliterated the Spartan fleet, and succeeded in re-
establishing the financial basis of the Athenian Empire.

Between 410 and 406, Athens won a continuous string of

victories, and eventually recovered large portions of its
empire. All of this was due, in no small part, to Alcibiades.

Achaemenid support for Sparta (414–404 Encounter between Cyrus the Younger
BC) (left), Achaemenid satrap of Asia Minor and
son of Darius II, and Spartan general
From 414 BC, Darius II, ruler of the Achaemenid Empire had Lysander (right), in Sardis. The encounter
started to resent increasing Athenian power in the Aegean and was related by Xenophon.[24] Francesco
had his satrap Tissaphernes enter into an alliance with Sparta Antonio Grue (1618-1673).
against Athens, which in 412 BC led to the Persian reconquest
of the greater part of Ionia.[3] Tissaphernes also helped fund
the Peloponnesian fleet.[25][26]

Facing the resurgence of Athens, from 408 BC, Darius II decided to continue the war against Athens and
give stronger support to the Spartans. He sent his son Cyrus the Younger into Asia Minor as satrap of Lydia,
Phrygia Major and Cappadocia, and general commander (Karanos, κἀρανος) of the Persian troops.[27]
There, Cyrus allied with the Spartan general Lysander. In him, Cyrus found a man who was willing to help
him become king, just as Lysander himself hoped to become absolute ruler of Greece by the aid of the
Persian prince. Thus, Cyrus put all his means at the disposal of Lysander in the Peloponnesian War. When
Cyrus was recalled to Susa by his dying father Darius, he gave Lysander the revenues from all of his cities
of Asia Minor.[28][29][30]

Cyrus the Younger would later obtain the support of the Spartans in return, after having asked them "to show
themselves as good friend to him, as he had been to them during their war against Athens", when he led his
own expedition to Susa in 401 BC in order to topple his brother, Artaxerxes II.[31]

Lysander triumphs, Athens surrenders

The faction hostile to Alcibiades triumphed in Athens following a minor Spartan victory by their skillful
general Lysander at the naval battle of Notium in 406 BC. Alcibiades was not re-elected general by the
Athenians and he exiled himself from the city. He would never again lead Athenians in battle. Athens was
then victorious at the naval battle of Arginusae. The Spartan fleet under Callicratidas lost 70 ships and the
Athenians lost 25 ships. But, due to bad weather, the Athenians were unable to rescue their stranded crews
or to finish off the Spartan fleet. Despite their victory, these failures caused outrage in Athens and led to a
controversial trial. The trial resulted in the execution of six of Athens's top naval commanders. Athens's
naval supremacy would now be challenged without several of its most able military leaders and a
demoralized navy.
Unlike some of his predecessors the new Spartan general, Lysander,
was not a member of the Spartan royal families and was also
formidable in naval strategy; he was an artful diplomat, who had
even cultivated good personal relationships with the Achaemenid
prince Cyrus the Younger, son of Emperor Darius II. Seizing its
opportunity, the Spartan fleet sailed at once to the Dardanelles, the
source of Athens's grain. Threatened with starvation, the Athenian
fleet had no choice but to follow. Through cunning strategy,
Lysander totally defeated the Athenian fleet, in 405 BC, at the Battle
of Aegospotami, destroying 168 ships and capturing some three or
four thousand Athenian sailors. Only twelve Athenian ships escaped,
and several of these sailed to Cyprus, carrying the strategos
(general) Conon, who was anxious not to face the judgment of the
Assembly.

Facing starvation and disease from the prolonged siege, Athens

surrendered in 404 BC,[2] and its allies soon surrendered as well. Lysander outside the walls of Athens.
The democrats at Samos, loyal to the bitter last, held on slightly 19th century lithograph.
longer, and were allowed to flee with their lives. The surrender
stripped Athens of its
walls, its fleet, and all
of its overseas
possessions. Corinth
and Thebes demanded
that Athens should be
destroyed and all its
citizens should be
enslaved. However,
the Spartans
announced their
refusal to destroy a The Spartan general Lysander has
In 404 BC, the Athenian General Alcibiades, city that had done a the walls of Athens demolished in
exiled in the Achaemenid Empire province good service at a time 404 BC, as a result of the Athenian
of Hellespontine Phrygia, was assassinated of greatest danger to defeat in the Peloponnesian War.
by Persian soldiers, who may have been Greece, and took
following the orders of Satrap Pharnabazus Athens into their own
II, at the instigation of Sparta's system. Athens was "to have the same friends and enemies" as
Lysander.[32][33][34] La mort d'Alcibiade. Sparta.[35]
Philippe Chéry, 1791. Musée des Beaux-
Arts, La Rochelle.
Aftermath
The overall effect of the war in Greece proper was to replace the Athenian Empire with a Spartan empire.
After the battle of Aegospotami, Sparta took over the Athenian empire and kept all of its tribute revenues for
itself; Sparta's allies, who had made greater sacrifices for the war effort than had Sparta, got nothing.[3]

For a short period of time, Athens was ruled by the "Thirty Tyrants", and democracy was suspended. This
was a reactionary regime set up by Sparta. In 403 BC, the oligarchs were overthrown and a democracy was
restored by Thrasybulus.

Although the power of Athens was broken, it made something of a recovery as a result of the Corinthian
War and continued to play an active role in Greek politics. Sparta was later humbled by Thebes at the Battle
of Leuctra in 371 BC, but the rivalry between Athens and Sparta was brought to an end a few decades later
when Philip II of Macedon conquered all of Greece except Sparta, which was later subjugated by Philip's
son Alexander in 331 BC.[36]

References
1. Barry Strauss: Athens after the Peloponnesian War. Class, Faction and Policy 403-386 B.C.,
New York 2014, page 80.
2. Salomon, Marilyn J. (1974). Great Cities of the World 3: Next Stop... Athens. The Symphonette
Press. p. 19.
3. Bury, J. B.; Meiggs, Russell (1956). A history of Greece to the death of Alexander the Great.
London: Macmillan. pp. 397, 540.
4. Kagan, The Peloponnesian War, 488.
5. Fine, The Ancient Greeks, 528–33.
6. Kagan, The Peloponnesian War, Introduction xxiii–xxiv.
7. Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War 1.23 (http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgi-bin/ptex
t?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0200&layout=&loc=1.23.1)
8. Fine, The Ancient Greeks, 371
9. Kagan, The Peloponnesian War, 8
10. Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War 1.89–93 (http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgi-bin/ptext?look
up=Thuc.+1.89.1)
11. Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War 1.92.1 (http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgi-bin/ptext?lookup
=Thuc.+1.92.1)
12. Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War 1.102 (http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgi-bin/ptext?lookup
=Thuc.+1.102.1)
13. Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War 1.103 (http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgi-bin/ptext?lookup
=Thuc.+1.103.1)
14. Kagan, The Peloponnesian War, 16–18
15. In the Hellenic calendar, years ended at midsummer; as a result, some events cannot be
dated to a specific year of the modern calendar.
16. Kagan, The Peloponnesian War, 23–24
17. Thucydides, Book I, 49–50
18. Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War 1.56 (http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgi-bin/ptex
t?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0200&layout=&loc=1.56)
19. Fine, The Ancient Greeks, 454–56
20. Buckley Aspects of Greek History, 319–22
21. Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War 1.67–71 (http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgi-bin/ptext?look
up=Thuc.+1.68.1)
22. Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War 1.73–75 (http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgi-bin/ptext?look
up=Thuc.+1.73.1)
23. Kagan, The Peloponnesian War, 45.
24. Rollin, Charles (1851). The Ancient History of the Egyptians, Carthaginians, Assyrians,
Babylonians, Medes and Persians, Grecians, and Macedonians (https://archive.org/details/anc
ienthistorye03rollgoog). W. Tegg and Company. p. 110 (https://archive.org/details/ancienthistor
ye03rollgoog/page/n123).
25. "The winter following Tissaphernes put Iasus in a state of defence, and passing on to Miletus
distributed a month's pay to all the ships as he had promised at Lacedaemon, at the rate of an
Attic drachma a day for each man." in Perseus Under Philologic: Thuc. 8.29.1 (http://perseus.u
chicago.edu/perseus-cgi/citequery3.pl?dbname=GreekFeb2011&getid=1&query=Thuc.%208.2
9.1).
26. Harrison, Cynthia (2002). Numismatic Problems in the Achaemenid West: The Undue Modern
Influence of 'Tissapherness' (https://brill.com/view/book/edcoll/9789004350908/B97890043509
08-s018.xml). pp. 301–319.
27. The Encyclopaedia Britannica: A Dictionary of Arts, Sciences, Literature and General
Information (https://books.google.com/books?id=zpyJG7CiGtkC). University Press. 1910.
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28. "He then assigned to Lysander all the tribute which came in from his cities and belonged to him
personally, and gave him also the balance he had on hand; and, after reminding Lysander how
good a friend he was both to the Lacedaemonian state and to him personally, he set out on the
journey to his father." in Xenophon, Hellenica 2.1.14 (http://perseus.uchicago.edu/perseus-cgi/
citequery3.pl?dbname=GreekFeb2011&getid=1&query=Xen.%20Hell.%202.1.12)
29. Xenophon. Tr. H. G. Dakyns. Anabasis I.I. Project Gutenberg (http://www.gutenberg.org/files/1
170/1170-h/1170-h.htm).
30. Plutarch. Ed. by A.H. Clough. "Lysander," Plutarch's Lives. 1996. Project Gutenberg (http://ww
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31. Brownson, Carlson L. (Carleton Lewis) (1886). Xenophon; (https://archive.org/details/xenopho
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oc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0144&layout=&loc=16.40)
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t?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.04.0062%3Aid%3Dalcibiades) and W. Smith, New Classical
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34. Plutarch, Alcibiades, 39 (http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgi-bin/ptext?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A
1999.01.0182&query=chapter%3D%2339&layout=&loc=Alc.%2038.1).
35. Xenophon, Hellenica, 2.2.20,404/3
36. Roisman, Joseph; Worthington, Ian (2010). A Companion to Ancient Macedonia (https://books.
google.com/books?id=lkYFVJ3U-BIC). John Wiley & Sons. p. 201. ISBN 9781405179362.

Further reading

Classical authors
Aristophanes, Lysistrata
Diodorus Siculus
Herodotus, Histories sets the table of events before Peloponnesian War that deals with Greco-
Persian Wars and the formation of Classical Greece
Plutarch, known primarily for his Parallel Lives and Moralia
Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War
Xenophon, Hellenica

Modern authors
Bagnall, Nigel. The Peloponnesian War: Athens, Sparta, And The Struggle For Greece. New
York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2006 (hardcover, ISBN 0-312-34215-2).
Cawkwell, George. Thucydides and the Peloponnesian War. London: Routledge, 1997
(hardcover, ISBN 0-415-16430-3; paperback, ISBN 0-415-16552-0).
Hanson, Victor Davis. A War Like No Other: How the Athenians and Spartans Fought the
Peloponnesian War. New York: Random House, 2005 (hardcover, ISBN 1-4000-6095-8); New
York: Random House, 2006 (paperback, ISBN 0-8129-6970-7).
 Heftner, Herbert. Der oligarchische Umsturz des Jahres
411 v. Chr. und die Herrschaft der Vierhundert in Athen:
Quellenkritische und historische Untersuchungen.
Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2001 (ISBN 3-631-37970-
6).
Hutchinson, Godfrey. Attrition: Aspects of Command in the
Peloponnesian War. Stroud, Gloucestershire, UK: Tempus
Publishing, 2006 (hardcover, ISBN 1-86227-323-5).
Kagan, Donald:
The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War. Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 1969 (hardcover, ISBN 0-
8014-0501-7); 1989 (paperback, ISBN 0-8014-9556-3).
The Archidamian War. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 1974 (hardcover, ISBN 0-8014-0889-X); 1990
(paperback, ISBN 0-8014-9714-0).
The Peace of Nicias and the Sicilian Expedition.
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1981 (hardcover,
ISBN 0-8014-1367-2); 1991 (paperback, ISBN 0-8014-
9940-2).
Eight bookes of the Peloponnesian
The Fall of the Athenian Empire. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Warre written by Thucydides the
University Press, 1987 (hardcover, ISBN 0-8014-1935- sonne of Olorus. Interpreted with
2); 1991 (paperback, ISBN 0-8014-9984-4). faith and diligence immediately out of
The Peloponnesian War. New York: Viking, 2003 the Greeke by Thomas Hobbes
(hardcover, ISBN 0-670-03211-5); New York: Penguin, secretary to ye late Earle of
2004 (paperback, ISBN 0-14-200437-5); a one-volume Deuonshire. (Houghton Library)
version of his earlier tetralogy.
Kallet, Lisa. Money and the Corrosion of Power in
Thucydides: The Sicilian Expedition and its Aftermath. Berkeley: University of California Press,
2001 (hardcover, ISBN 0-520-22984-3).
Kirshner, Jonathan. 2018. "Handle Him with Care: The Importance of Getting Thucydides
Right." Security Studies.
Krentz, Peter. The Thirty at Athens. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1982 (hardcover,
ISBN 0-8014-1450-4).
The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War, edited by
Robert B. Strassler. New York: The Free Press, 1996 (hardcover, ISBN 0-684-82815-4); 1998
(paperback, ISBN 0-684-82790-5).
Roberts, Jennifer T. The Plague of War: Athens, Sparta, and the Struggle for Ancient Greece.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017 (hardcover, ISBN 9780199996643

External links
"Peloponnesian War" (https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/1911_Encyclop%C3%A6dia_Britannica/P
eloponnesian_War). Encyclopædia Britannica. 21 (11th ed.). 1911.
LibriVox: The History of the Peloponnesian War (http://librivox.org/the-history-of-the-peloponne
sian-war-by-thucydides) (Public Domain Audiobooks in the US – 20:57:23 hours, at least 603.7
MB)
Richard Crawley, The History of the Peloponnesian War (http://www.gutenberg.org/etext/7142)
(Translation of Thukydides's books – in Project Gutenberg (http://www.gutenberg.org))
Peloponnesian war (http://www.laconia.org/gen_info_literature/Peloponnesian_war.htm)
 Peloponnesian war on Lycurgus.org (https://web.archive.org/web/20160829152736/http://lycur
gus.org/)

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