2004 Huber y Solt Neoliberalismo

Successes and Failures of Neoliberalism
Author(s): Evelyne Huber and Fred Solt

Source: Latin American Research Review, Vol. 39, No. 3 (2004), pp. 150-164
Published by: The Latin American Studies Association
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/1555472
Accessed: 05-05-2019 01:15 UTC
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
https://about.jstor.org/terms
The Latin American Studies Association is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve
and extend access to Latin American Research Review
This content downloaded from 129.81.56.15 on Sun, 05 May 2019 01:15:05 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
SUCCESSES AND FAILURES OF
NEOLIBERALISM
Evelyne Huber, University of North Carolina, C

Fred Solt, Rice University
As Kurt Weyland points out in his introduction, we h

arly literature on the causes and processes of neoliberal
America and elsewhere.* In contrast, much of the d
fects of neoliberal reforms in Latin America has been carried out at a
political and ideological level. The image of an overblown and ineffi-
cient state that stifles market forces and private initiative has been con-
trasted with the model of a lean and efficient state that relies on the
market to set free productive energies and thus stimulates growth and
solves social problems (e.g., Larroulet 1993). With this research note, we
aim to make a contribution to the emerging empirically based scholarly
literature that investigates the effects of neoliberal policy reforms (e.g.,
Stallings and Peres 2000).
It may be useful to start by clarifying how we are approaching the
assessment of the successes or failures of neoliberal reforms. Any such
assessment is in some sense relative and depends heavily on one's
counterfactual. If the counterfactual is no reforms at all, i.e., a continua-
tion of the ISI model as it was pursued from the 1950s to the 1970s, in-
cluding what Michael Walton calls the "old-style populist redistributive
agenda" (see Walton in this volume, 178), then the assessment of suc-
cesses looks more favorable. The old model was clearly not sustainable
and was kept afloat by easy borrowing during the 1970s, and thus had
to be changed. It also had serious regressive components in social policy
that needed to be changed. If, however, the counterfactual is a different
sort of change from neoliberal change, let us call it for convenience's
sake a social democratic model, then the failures of neoliberalism seem
to weigh more heavily than the successes.
We are using the term "social democratic" in the sense of its vener-
able history in Northern Europe, to denote a policy orientation guided
*The authors would like to thank Bill Smith, John Stephens, and Kurt Weyland for
comments on earlier drafts and Tom Mustillo and Jenny Pribble for research assistance.
Latin American Research Review, Vol. 39, No. 3, October 2004

? 2004 by the University of Texas Press, P.O. Box 7819, Austin, TX 78713-7819
SUCCESSES AND FAILURES OF NEOLIBERALISM 151
by the values of solidarity and equity, and by the recognition that sus-
tainable growth strategies are a precondition for improvements in hu-
man welfare. In Northern Europe's small and open economies, this has
always meant that a country has to be competitive in export markets,
and the democratic state has a crucial role in cooperation with orga-
nized labor and employers in promoting competitiveness and pursuing
social solidarity and equity. Thus, the social democratic model is by no
means tied to protected economies but remains relevant in a globalizing
world. Our usage, then, is consistent with the one that was introduced
into the debate about economic reform in developing countries by Bresser
et al. (1993) to denote an orientation that emphasizes the importance of
social safety nets as part of economic reforms, and the importance of
democratic mechanisms in shaping reforms in economic and social policy.
What are the criteria, then, or indicators by which to assess progress
or lack thereof towards a development model that combines growth,
equity, and democracy (the latter not just in the form of periodic elec-
tions but in the form of protection of civil and political rights and the
rule of law and governmental accountability)? To what extent can we
link progress or lack thereof to neoliberal reforms and to the nature of
the reform process? Can we identify alternative reforms that would have
brought more progress towards these goals?
We can look at five indicators to assess progress towards such a de-
velopment model: growth, economic stability/predictability/absence of vola-
tility, poverty, inequality, and quality of democracy.
REFORMS AND PERFORMANCE ON GROWTH AND EQUITY
Since all Latin American and Caribbean countries embarked on some

kind of neoliberal reform course in the 1980s and/or 1990s, we can be-
gin by looking at the overall trajectory of our indicators in Latin America,
assuming that overall performance was shaped by the thrust of the re-
forms. Growth performance has been mixed; after the lost decade of the
1980s, we saw good average growth rates in the first half of the 1990s,
but lower ones in the second half. Arguably, lower average rates in the
second half were due to the effects of various financial crises, starting
with the Tequila crisis in the mid-1990s, continuing with the repercus-
sions of the Asian crisis in 1997 and 1998, and culminating in the Argen-
tine collapse in 2001 and 2002.
With regard to stability versus volatility, it is clear that stability has
increased in one respect, in that Latin American countries had clearly
lower rates of inflation in the 1990s than before. However, in other
respects volatility dominated. As a result, a whole issue of the Inter-
American Development Bank's annual report on Economic and Social
Progress in Latin America was devoted to the topic of "Overcoming
152 Latin American Research Review
Volatility" (1995). The periodic financial crises generated the need for
economic stabilization and resulted in a decline in growth rates in the
short run. This volatility also kept investment rates low and thus re-
duced the growth potential in the longer run.
If we look at poverty, we see an improvement in the 1990s; poverty
fell from 48.3 percent of the population in 1990 to 43.8 percent in 1999,
but still remained above the level of 40.5 percent in 1980 (estimate for
nineteen countries; ECLAC 2002,14). Arguably, this is a result of a com-
bination of the changing class structure in Latin America and the failure
of governments to include in their reforms the construction of solid so-
cial safety nets. The growing informalization and decline of formal sec-
tor employment, together with other reforms, have led to growing
income concentration, as outlined by Portes and Hoffman (2003).
Finally, the quality of democracy in Latin America has not improved
since roughly the mid-1980s, as Larry Diamond et al. (1999, 62) have
shown. According to the Freedom House scores, there were seven lib-
eral democracies among twenty-two Latin American and Caribbean
countries in 1980, as indicated by a score of 2-5 for political rights and
civil liberties; by 1987 the number had increased to thirteen, but dropped
again to eleven by 1997. The number of outright authoritarian regimes
decreased from eight to one over this period, and the number of elec-
toral or pseudodemocracies increased from seven to ten.
Overall, the picture of progress in the areas of growth, stability, pov-
erty, and democracy is not particularly encouraging. Proponents of
neoliberal reforms are quick to argue that the problem has been insuffi-
cient commitment to reforms. If governments had been less cautious,
less intimidated by political opposition, and instead more aggressive in
pushing through a broad reform program, the outcomes would have
been better. In their view, bold actions by politically insulated techno-
crats, including shock therapies, are indicated to overcome resistance.
In order to subject these claims to empirical scrutiny, we perform some
simple comparisons. We compare countries that ranked higher on
neoliberal reforms in the mid-1990s to those that ranked lower, and we
compare more radical to more cautious reformers over the period of 1982
to 1995. We are using the best available data on neoliberal reform in Latin
America, the General Reform Index (GRI) constructed by Morley et al.
(1999). Unfortunately, the data for this index that are in the public do-
main only cover the years up to 1995. The GRI has five components: com-
mercial, financial, capital account, privatization, and tax reform.
The index confirms that all of the countries underwent neoliberal re-
forms in the years after the onset of the debt crisis; in fact the 1995 GRI
scores for all countries, except Jamaica (.767) and Venezuela (.667), ex-
ceeded that of the most neoliberal country of 1982, Uruguay (.776). We
Table 1 Neoliberal Reforms in Seventeen Latin American Countries

Countries Above Median Countries Below Median
General Reform Index, 1995

Uruguay Venezuela
Argentina Jamaica
El Salvador Honduras
Dominican Republic Colom
Costa Rica Ecuador
Peru Brazil
Chile Mexico
Guatemala Bolivia
Paraguay
Change in GRI, 1982-1995

Dominican Republic Chile
Peru Uruguay
El Salvador Honduras
Paraguay Colombia
Jamaica Argentina
Guatemala Venezuela
Costa Rica Ecuador
Brazil Bolivia
Mexico
Drastic Reform Episodes, 1982-1995

Peru Uruguay
Brazil Chile
Costa Rica Venezuela
Paraguay Argentina
Ecuador Honduras
Dominican Republic Co
Bolivia Mexico
El Salvador Jamaica
Guatemala
Source: Morley, Machado, and Pettinato (1999).
first divide the countries into two groups, those above the median value
of the GRI in 1995, and those below.
In order to better gauge the successes and failures of radical, that is,
fast and extensive, neoliberal reform processes, we then classify the coun-
tries on the basis of the extent of these reforms from 1982 to 1995, mea-
sured as the change in GRI scores. We further include a measure of the
magnitude of any drastic reform episodes their governments may have
imposed during that period. We calculated the magnitude of drastic
reform episodes for each country as its largest one-year change on the
GRI. Again, both classifications are simple dichotomies, above and be-
low the median of the measure in question. The three classifications
overlap considerably. Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Peru, and Paraguay are above the median in all three classi-
fications; Colombia, Honduras, Mexico, and Venezuela are consistently
below the median. Despite these similarities, the three classifications
yield different results that are useful for evaluating the claims made on
behalf of neoliberal reform against its actual record in Latin America.
Results for our first two indicators, growth and volatility, are shown
in table 2. We divide the period into two sub-periods, 1982-89 and 1990-
98. We do this in order to deal with the argument that an analysis of the
whole period would lump together the economic crises that preceded
the reforms with the reform period itself and its aftermath. It could be
the case that the countries that suffered the worst crises then engaged in
the most radical reforms, and a bad economic performance over the en-
tire period could be interpreted as a cause rather than an effect of radi-
cal neoliberal reforms. Table 2 shows that countries that had more
liberalized economies in 1995 suffered a somewhat bigger decline in GDP
per capita between 1982 and 1989 but experienced clearly higher aver-
age annual growth in GDP per capita between 1990 and 1998 (in con-
stant dollars, adjusted for purchasing power parity). However, just as
clearly, countries that pursued more radical reform approaches suffered
actually a somewhat lower decline between 1982 and 1989 but then ex-
perienced six times lower average annual growth rates between 1990
and 1998 than countries that proceeded more cautiously. Countries that
imposed drastic reform episodes suffered a steeper decline in between
1982 and 1989, and between 1990 and 1998 grew by less than a quarter
of the rate of countries that avoided them. This last result could poten-
tially be interpreted as lending some support to the alternative interpre-
tation that deeper economic crises were the causes of more radical
reforms. However, one can just as well argue that the drastic reform
episodes aggravated the economic recessions. An examination of growth
rates in the period between 1973 and 1981 does not support the argu-
ment that economies with historically lower growth rates were forced
into more radical reforms in the 1980s. Radical reformers grew at an
average of 1.15 percent in the period between 1973 and 1981, whereas
the more moderate reformers grew at an average annual rate of 1.51
percent-not a difference that would lead to risky experiments. More-
over, between 1973 and 1981 countries that imposed radical reform epi-
sodes in the 1980s grew at 1.77 percent per year, whereas countries that
avoided such episodes grew at 0.86 percent per year. These results sug-
gest very strongly that more liberalized economies did provide better
conditions for economic growth between 1990 and 1998, but that radical
Table 2 Economic Growth and Stability

Gross Domestic Product Per Capita
(1995 PPP U.S. Dollars)
Standard
Average Average Deviation
Annual Annual of Annual
Growth, Growth, Growth,
1982-1989 1990-1998 1990-1998
(%) (%) (%)

Above Median -0.74 1.35 5.7
Below Median -0.43 -0.37 3.6

Below Median -0.76 0.88 4.1

Below Median -0.43 0.90 4.2
Source: World Bank (2000).
approaches to liberalization
pressed growth rates.
When we turn to volatility,
ization is associated with gre
Development Bank (1995), w
ing the standard deviation of
alized economies as of 1995
growth was 5.7 percent in th
3.6 percent for countries wit
The more radical reformers
cent, and the more cautious r
nally, countries that impo
between 1982 and 1998 had
1998, and countries that av
Our results, then, indicate th
a higher achieved level of ref
tility. Arguably, this is a res
capital markets and trade,
1. For this analysis, we had to co

World Bank's World Developmen
ity. We thank Kurt Weyland for p
Our attempt to gauge the performance of more and less liberalized

economies and of more and less radical reformers in the areas of pov-
erty and inequality is somewhat hampered by the availability of data
that are comparable over time and across countries. Income inequality
data for Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay, and Uruguay are un-
available; for the remaining countries, data for the closest available year
was used. Poverty data at the national level for Bolivia and Uruguay are
unavailable. Ideally, one would want poverty data for the period before
the onset of the reforms, to measure change, but problems of compara-
bility are serious. Nevertheless, even with restricted data availability,
the picture emerging from table 3 is clear and consistent.
Higher levels of liberalization and more radical processes of liberal-
ization are associated with higher levels of inequality and poverty. The
changes in inequality are impressive: The countries with the more liber-
alized economies as of 1995 started out around 1982 with lower levels of
inequality than the countries with the less liberalized economies as of
1995, but the two sets of countries switched position, with the more lib-
eralized economies ending up with higher levels of inequality around
1995 than the less liberalized economies. Looking at the process of re-
form, we see that the more radical reformers started out and ended up
with lower levels of inequality than the more moderate reformers, as
both sets of countries saw an increase in inequality. However, the gap
between the two sets of countries narrowed considerably, as the more
radical reformers increased their Gini index twice as much as the more
moderate reformers. The greatest costs in terms of inequality were in-
curred by drastic reform episodes; countries that had more drastic re-
form episodes increased their Gini index nine times more than countries
that avoided them. There is no doubt, then, that higher levels of
neoliberalism and more aggressive tactics of liberalization are associ-
ated with rising inequality.
The picture on poverty is equally consistent. More liberalized econo-
mies and more radical reform approaches are associated with higher
levels of poverty. Since we do not have comparable data for the period
before the onset of reforms, proponents of neoliberalism will argue that
this must be a result of initially higher levels of poverty in the radical
reformers. However, we need to remember that the more liberalized
economies started out with a higher level of GDP per capita in 1982, had
higher economic growth in the period between 1982 and 1998, and ended
up with a level of GDP per capita in 1998 roughly a third higher than the
less liberalized economies. So, the very least we can say is that economic
growth certainly did not trickle down and did nothing to relieve the
higher levels of poverty in the more liberalized economies. If we con-
sider the poverty data in conjunction with the inequality data, this seems
to be a great understatement.
Table 3 Income Inequality and Poverty

Gini Index of Poverty,
Income Inequality 1987-2000
-1982 -1995 Change
Above Median 47.2 51.9 4.7 32.3
Below Median 49.7 50.4 0.7 26.2

Above Median 46.8 50.6 3.8 32.0
Below Median 50.7 52.6 1.9 26.6
Drastic Reform Episodes 1982-1995

Above Median 47.4 52.8 5.4 34.0
Below Median 49.5 50.1 0.6 24.2
Sources: Londofo and Szekely (1997);
Finally, we look at the perform

the area of quality of democrac
House scores, because they allow
ferences than dichotomous mea
both the Polity IV and Freedom
as measures of the quality of de
cross-national work (see Munck
2001). We recoded Freedom Hou
higher quality democracies, to
rable to the Polity IV scores. W
neoliberal reforms and democr
story (table 4).
Countries with more liberalize
improvements in the two measu
riod between 1982 and 2000 (8.9
alized economies (2.1 and -0.8)
democracy in 1982 and caught u
tries with less liberalized econo
surpassed the latter's level on t
that more liberalized economies
for democracy than more regul
When we look at the reform
The more radical reformers imp
extent than the more cautious
radical reformers started out h
tious reformers, and on the Fr
virtually the same level and fel
Table 4 Democracy
Polity IV
Score Freedom House
(-10 to 10) (2 to 14)
1982 2000 Change 1982 2000 C
Above Median -1.3 7.6 8.9 7.8 11.0 3.2
Below Median 5.5 7.6 2.1 10.9 10.1 -0.8

Above Median 2.1 7.3 5.1 9.3 10.3 1.0
Below Median 1.7 7.9 6.2 9.2 10.9 1.7

Above Median 2.7 7.1 4.4 9.6 10.4 0.7
Below Median 1.0 8.1 7.1 8.9 11.0 2.1
Sources: Marshall and Jaggers (2002); Fre
even more pronounced if we comp

drastic reform episodes. Those tha
creased their democracy scores con
posed them: 7.1 points compared t
and 2.1 points compared to 0.7 poin
differences demonstrate that aggres
nificant costs in the quality of de
course, with the prescription for
technocrats politically insulated a
correct solutions without distract
So, what is the bottom line on th
liberalized economies and radical versus cautious reformers? In the Latin
American context of the last two decades of the twentieth century, more
liberalized economies performed better in economic growth and in im-
provements in the quality of democracy than less liberalized economies.
However, they suffered higher volatility, saw greater increases in in-
equality, and experienced higher levels of poverty. The higher levels of
volatility clearly raise the question of whether the growth performance
can be maintained in the future. The increases in inequality and the higher
levels of poverty highlight the failures in linking economic neoliberalism
to the construction of strong social safety nets. So, we are clearly far
from a ringing endorsement of liberalized economies, even before tak-
ing into account the Argentine crisis. Given the few countries we are
dealing with, the deterioration in Argentina would clearly affect the pic-
ture in growth and poverty for the worse as far as the performance of
the liberalized economies is concerned.
The starkest lessons from our comparisons, though, are the costs of
radical reform approaches, and particularly of the imposition of drastic
reform episodes. Countries undertaking radical reforms and imposing
drastic reform episodes performed worse on all but one of our indica-
tors than countries pursuing a more cautious reform course and avoid-
ing such episodes. They had lower growth rates, more volatility, greater
increases in inequality, higher levels of poverty, and less improvements
in the quality of democracy. These results leave no doubt that govern-
ments are well advised to resist internal and external pressures to em-
brace aggressive reform. There are not only political costs associated
with radical reform courses, but also economic and human costs.
PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE
To counter our assessment of the extremely limited suc

neoliberalism and the high costs of radical neoliberal reform p
the proponents of neoliberalism might argue that these two de
just too short a time span to assess the effects of the reforms,
larly, since in some countries far-reaching reforms were onl
mented in the 1990s. To respond to this argument we need to ask w
the neoliberal reforms that have been implemented have put i
policies that will have beneficial effects in the long run on gro
bility, poverty, inequality, and quality of democracy. In this co
need to look beyond economic liberalization to accompanying
of tax systems and of social policies. Here, the picture appear
unfavorable.
We have shown that higher levels of economic liberalization are as-
sociated with higher volatility, and we have commented on the periodic
financial crises. These crises disrupt stability and are bad for growth in
the long run, because they reduce predictability and thus investment.
Arguably, these financial crises are a result of the excessive deregulation
of financial markets in combination with trade liberalization. Specula-
tive inflows of foreign capital are followed by the overvaluation of the
exchange rate and increases in imports and the current account deficit,
which, in turn, encourage foreign borrowing. A high foreign-debt bur-
den makes countries vulnerable to rapid outflows of capital. Once such
a rapid outflow occurs, countries find themselves in balance of payments
crises and are required to impose tough austerity and stabilization pro-
grams. These programs depress growth in the short run via compres-
sion of demand and in the long run via reduced investments.
Poverty has increased in many cases over the past two decades and
inequality has increased in almost every Latin American and Caribbean
country. One sure way to counteract both would be through tax reforms
to raise revenue to pay for increased spending on basic social safety nets
16o Latin American Research Review
and human capital formation, i.e., food and shelter, health care, educa-
tion, and job training. The dominant pattern of tax reforms, though, has
reduced marginal tax rates and not increased income tax collection. It
has shifted more weight to value-added taxes, which tax lower-income
earners also. In general, Latin American populations remain undertaxed,
with an average tax burden of 14 percent of GDP in the first half of the
1990s, compared to 17 percent of GDP in a group of East and Southeast
Asian countries (IDB 1996,128). Direct taxes amount to about 25 percent
of tax revenue only, and of this amount 60 to 80 percent come from cor-
porate tax payments, and only 10 to 15 percent come from private indi-
viduals (ECLAC 1998, 72). Interestingly, the situation in the
English-speaking Caribbean is very different, with an average tax bur-
den in the first half of the 1990s of 27-28 percent of GDP, essentially
double the rate of Latin America, and direct taxation accounting for 40
percent of tax revenue (ECLAC 1998, 66-72). This contrast suggests that
the fundamental reasons for the poor tax collection performance in Latin
America are poor policy choices, rather than low levels of economic
development and technological capacity.
Neoliberal reforms of social policy have done little to rectify the lack
of a safety net for the working-age population and less to stem the de-
cline of the value of the safety net for the elderly. Altogether, nine Latin
American countries have implemented and a tenth has legislated full or
partial privatization of their pension system. In five cases, privatization
was total and the public system was closed down; in the other five cases
it was partial and the private system remained a supplementary or a
parallel option (Muller 2003). Now, it is well known that several Latin
American countries had or still have excessively generous pension sys-
tems for privileged categories of workers, which clearly have to be
changed. However, privatization of the public system as a whole is not
the answer. Even in the best-functioning privatized systems, such as
Chile's, there are very serious problems with coverage, contributions,
regressive structures of fees, high administrative costs, and cohort and
individual risk of investments. Maintenance of a basic public pension is
crucial, and given that about half of the workforce is in the informal
sector, it should be a citizenship-based pension, not one based on em-
ployment.2
Reforms in health care have been more heterogeneous, though in gen-
eral, the private sector has expanded its role, sometimes by design as
part of a neoliberal reform project and sometimes by default as a result
of serious underfunding of the public system. Certainly, the increase of
the role of the private sector in health care is most likely to increase the
2. For an elaboration of these issues, see Huber and Stephens (2000).
SUCCESSES AND FAILURES OF NEOLIBERALISM i61
price of health care and inequality of access in the long run. We know
from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) that the countries with the greatest reliance on private insur-
ance and private providers have the most expensive and inegalitarian
health care systems.
In the 1990s most countries raised their social expenditures, so that
they increased from 10.4 percent of GDP to 13.1 percent (ECLAC 2002),
slightly above the level of 1980. Growth in the various categories of so-
cial expenditure, that is, education, health care and nutrition, social se-
curity, and housing and sanitation was roughly similar, with social
security continuing to absorb the bulk of social expenditure, at 4.8 per-
cent of GDP between 1998 and 1999, followed by education with 3.9
percent and health care and nutrition with 2.9 percent (ECLAC 2002,
26). Clearly, these levels of expenditure remain far below what would
be needed for a concerted and successful attack on poverty and improve-
ment of the human capital base. Also, the distribution is not as progres-
sive as it could be. In a study of eight countries, ECLAC (United Nations
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean) found that
on average the lower-income strata receive transfers and free or subsi-
dized services, including social security, equivalent to 43 percent of to-
tal household income, compared to 13 percent and 7 percent for the fourth
and fifth income quintiles. Nevertheless, in some of these countries the
actual amount of the transfers to the richest stratum was twice as much
as that going to the poorest stratum (ECLAC 2002, 28).
One of the main arguments of neoliberal reformers, of course, has
been that social expenditures should be targeted toward the poor and
poorest. In principle, this is reasonable, but it raises at least two funda-
mental problems: (1) how large a group is to be targeted and how? and
(2) what will this do to the political support for these programs? We
know from the experience of advanced industrial countries that pro-
grams targeted toward small groups are politically most vulnerable,
whereas programs that benefit most of the population are very popular.
Given that over 40 percent of the population is poor in Latin America, it
would not be difficult to construct a needy target population that is a
clear majority of the population. A coalition of the poor and the working
class, or the informal and the manual formal proletariat, accounts for
60-70 percent of the population in Latin American countries (Portes and
Hoffman 2003, 52). Basic health care, nutrition, education, and a mini-
mum income in case of illness or old age, targeted toward this popula-
tion, with entitlement based on citizenship and financed out of general
tax revenue, would be an effective and politically sustainable approach.
These are fundamental principles of social-democratic welfare-state
policies adapted for countries at low to medium levels of development.
These principles contain a heavy emphasis on the development of the
human capital base, which, in turn, is crucial for sustainable economic

growth in a globalizing economy.
Improvement of the human capital base requires not only higher in-
vestment in primary health care and education, but also a broader attack
on poverty and inequality. We now have compelling evidence from a study
by the OECD and Statistics Canada that investment in education alone is
an ineffective tool to improve the quality of human capital at the bottom.
Representative samples of the population in OECD countries were given
literacy tests designed to assess to what extent people could understand
documents and directions (OECD/ Statistics Canada 2000). There is no
correlation between the achievements of the bottom quartile of the popu-
lations with overall expenditure on education, public and private, but
there are strong negative correlations with the levels of poverty and in-
equality in the respective societies (Huber and Stephens 2002).
In sum, on average, in the Latin American countries neoliberal reforms
of trade and financial systems, tax systems, pensions, transfers to work-
ing-age families, health care systems, and education, have failed to put
into place policies that firmly advance growth, stability, the reduction of
poverty and inequality, and improvements of the human capital base.
Walton correctly argues that "it is of fundamental importance to link
market and government policies to the institutional context in which it
occurs, in both its political and socio-cultural dimensions" (end of sec-
ond paragraph, 165-166). Indeed, the rich literature on the political
economy of advanced industrial societies has firmly established that the
institutional context in the wider sense, including political parties, con-
stitutional structure, and labor and employer organizations, is the crucial
determinant of economic performance, the welfare state, and poverty and
inequality (e.g., Kitschelt et al. 1999; Scharpf and Schmidt 2000; Hall and
Soskice 2001; Huber and Stephens 2001). These institutions, however, are
generally very weak in Latin America, though there are differences be-
tween countries. What we are arguing against is precisely the pressure to
implement a standard set of neoliberal reforms, regardless of context. In
particular, the imposition of drastic reform episodes can be outright coun-
terproductive because, as we have shown, these episodes tend to have a
negative effect on democratic institutions. Instead, slow and cautious eco-
nomic reforms accompanied by the social policy efforts outlined above
and deliberate institution-building strategies are a more promising alter-
native.
REFERENCES
Bresser Pereira, Luiz Carlos, Jose Maria Maravall, and Adam Przeworski
1993 Economic Reforms in New Democracies: A Social-Democratic Approach. Cambr
Cambridge University Press.
Diamond, Larry, Jonathan Hartlyn, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, eds.
1999 Democracy in Developing Countries: Latin America, 2nd ed. Boulder, CO: Lynne
Rienner Publishers.
Hall, Peter A., and David Soskice, eds.
2001 Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage. New
York: Oxford University Press.
Huber, Evelyne, and John D. Stephens
2000 "The Political Economy of Pension Reform." Geneva: United Nations Research
Institute for Social Development: Occasional Paper 7.
2001 Development and Crisis of the Welfare State: Parties and Policies in Global Markets.
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
2002 "Globalization, Competitiveness, and the Social Democratic Model." Social Policy
and Society 1 (1): 47-57.
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)
1995 Economic and Social Progress in Latin America, 1995 Report: Overcoming Volatility.
Washington, DC: IDB/Johns Hopkins University Press.
1996 Economic and Social Progress in Latin America, 1996 Report. Washington, DC: IDB
Johns Hopkins University Press.
Kitschelt, Herbert, Peter Lange, Gary Marks, and John D. Stephens, eds.
1999 Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press.
Larroulet V., Cristian
1993 "Introduction." In Private Solutions to Public Problems: The Chilean Experience,
edited by Cristian Larroulet V., 7-12. Santiago, Chile: Instituto Libertad y
Desarrollo
Londofio, Juan Luis, and Miguel Szekely
1997 "Persistent Poverty and Excess Inequality: Latin America, 1970-1995." Work-
ing Paper 357, Office of the Chief Economist, Inter-American Development Bank.
Mainwaring, Scott, Daniel Brinks, and Anibal P6rez-Lifinn
2001 "Classifying Political Regimes in Latin America, 1945-1999," Studies in Com-
parative International Development 36 (1): 37-65 (Spring).
Marshall, Monty G., and Keith Jaggers
2002 Polity IV: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2001. Dataset avail-
able for download at http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/index.htm.
Morley, Samuel A., Roberto Machado, and Stefano Pettinato
1999 "Indexes of Structural Reform in Latin America." Serie Reformas Econ6micas
12. Santiago, Chile: United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America
and the Caribbean.
Miiller, Katharina
2003 Privatising Old Age Security: Latin America and Eastern Europe Compared.
Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishers.
Munck, Gerardo L., and Jay Verkuilen
2002 "Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy: Evaluating Alternative Indices."
Comparative Political Studies 35 (1): 5-34 (February).
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)/Statistics Canada
2000 Literacy in the Information Age: Final Report of the International Adult Literacy Sur-
vey. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
Portes, Alejandro, and Kelly Hoffman
2003 "Latin American Class Structures: Their Composition and Change during the
Neoliberal Era." Latin American Research Review 38 (1): 41-82 (February).
Scharpf, Fritz W., and Vivien A. Schmidt
2000 Welfare and Work in the Open Economy: From Vulnerability to Competitiveness. New
York: Oxford University Press.
Stallings, Barbara, and Wilson Peres
2000 Growth, Employment, and Equity: The Impact of the Economic Reforms in Latin America
and the Caribbean. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
2002 Human Development Report 2002: Deepening Democracy in a Fragmented World.
New York: Oxford University Press.
United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)
1998 The Fiscal Covenant. Santiago, Chile: ECLAC.
2002 Social Panorama of Latin America. Santiago, Chile: Freedom House
2002 Freedom in the World: The Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties, 2001-
2002. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
World Bank
2000 World Development Indicators 2000. Washington, DC: World Bank.

2004 Huber y Solt Neoliberalismo

Uploaded by

2004 Huber y Solt Neoliberalismo

Uploaded by

Successes and Failures of Neoliberalism

Author(s): Evelyne Huber and Fred Solt

Evelyne Huber, University of North Carolina, C

As Kurt Weyland points out in his introduction, we h

Latin American Research Review, Vol. 39, No. 3, October 2004

REFORMS AND PERFORMANCE ON GROWTH AND EQUITY

Since all Latin American and Caribbean countries embarked on some

Table 1 Neoliberal Reforms in Seventeen Latin American Countries

General Reform Index, 1995

Change in GRI, 1982-1995

Drastic Reform Episodes, 1982-1995

Source: Morley, Machado, and Pettinato (1999).

Table 2 Economic Growth and Stability

General Reform Index, 1995

Change in GRI, 1982-1995

Drastic Reform Episodes, 1982-1

Source: World Bank (2000).

1. For this analysis, we had to co

Our attempt to gauge the performance of more and less liberalized

Table 3 Income Inequality and Poverty

Change in GRI, 1982-1995

Drastic Reform Episodes 1982-1995

Sources: Londofo and Szekely (1997);

Finally, we look at the perform

Change in GRI, 1982-1995

Drastic Reform Episodes, 1982-1995

Sources: Marshall and Jaggers (2002); Fre

even more pronounced if we comp

PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE

To counter our assessment of the extremely limited suc

2. For an elaboration of these issues, see Huber and Stephens (2000).

human capital base, which, in turn, is crucial for sustainable economic

You might also like