Ayala de Roxas vs City of Manila

Facts: Petitioner applied to the defendant city engineer for a license to construct a terrace over “the strip of
land 3 meters in width between the main wall of her house and the edge of the said canal of Sibacon or San
Jacinto, which strip of land belongs exclusively to her”; but the defendant refused to grant the license or
authorize the plaintiff to build the terrace, because, as the plaintiff has been informed, the sole reason
wherefore the license was denied is because “the said defendants pretend to compel the plaintiff to leave
vacant and without any construction whatever thereon the said strip of 3 meters in width which is a portion
of the ground belonging to her, in order to use the same as the wharf or public way so that the plaintiff will
only be able to use the said strip in the same manner and for the same purposes as the public in general,
thus losing the enjoyment, use, and exclusive possession of the said strip of the property which the plaintiff
and the former owners thereof have enjoyed quietly and peacefully during more than seventy years.
Additionally, it was agreed between both parties thatthe strip above referred to had not been
expropriated in whole or in part by the municipality of Manila, and that neither had the latter
offered any compensation for the same to the owner thereof.

Issue: Whether the non-issuance of a license to the petitioners is tantamount to a taking that requires just
compensation

Held: Yes.

What the defendants have therefore done is to prevent the plaintiffs from continuing to enjoy, use, and
freely dispose of such strip of their ground, as they had been doing up to the time when they applied for a
license to construct a terrace over said strip, and the defendants prevented it with the intention of
establishing a public easement provided for in an ordinance of their own which they consider is pursuant to
the provisions of the Law of Waters and of the Civil Code in force.

In the decision entered by the court on the 5th of May, 1906, regarding the demurrer, the following was set
forth:

The easement of a zone for public use, authorized by article 73 of the Law of Waters of 1866, is developed
in articles 160 and 161, inclusive, of said law; the general interest on behalf of which the easement is
supported is determined, for navigation, by articles 160 and 161; for flotation, by article 162; for salvage,
by article 163; and for fishing, by article 164; in all of them the owner of the riverside property supports the
easement“upon being previously indemnified for loss and damage.” (Folio 41.)

Said zone for public use, the same as a towpath, is solely available for the purposes of navigation, flotation,
fishing, and salvage, being closed to any other use which be attempted; therefore, it is erroneous to pretend
that the right of the owner of the property bordering upon the stream can be reduced to the level of the
public right; on the contrary he should only be called upon to bear those burdens which are in the general
interest, but not without prior, or subsequently indemnity. (Folio 43.)

If as affirmed in statement No. 4, and accepted by the defendants, the Sibacon Creek is a canal — let us
grant that it is navigable, because it has been held by competent authority — and that under the name of a
public wharf, which is the largest in area, it is desired to establish a towpath, which is the smallest, it must
be remembered that the law does not grant it along navigable canals (art. 157), and, at all events, the
establishment thereof must be preceded by the corresponding indemnity. (Arts. 154 and 157.)

Under section 5 of the act of Congress of July 1, 1902, no legislation shall be enacted in the Philippine
Islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; and the due
process of law in order to deprive a person of his property is, according to the Code of Civil Procedure,
reserved to the judicial authority.The refusal to grant a license or the enactment of an ordinance
whereby a person may be deprived of property or rights, or an attempt thereat is made, without
previously indemnifying him therefor, is not, nor can it be, due process of law.

Considering that the easement intended to be established, whatever may be the object thereof, is not merely
a real right that will encumber the property, but is one tending to prevent the exclusive use of one portion of
the same, by expropriating it for a public use which, be it what it may, can not be accomplished unless the
owner of the property condemned or seized be previously and duly indemnified, it is proper to protect the
appellant by means of the remedy employed in such cases, as it is the only adequate remedy when no other
legal action can be resorted to, against an intent which is nothing short of an arbitrary restriction imposed
by the city by virtue of the coercive power with which the same is invested. The question involved here is
not the actual establishment of an easement which might be objected to by an action in court, but a mere act
of obstruction, a refusal which is beyond the powers of the city of Manila, because it is not simply a
measure in connection with building regulations, but is an attempt to suppress, without due process of law,
real rights which are attached to the right of ownership.

The imposition of an easement over a 3-meter strip of the plaintiff’s property could not legally be done
without payment to it of just compensation.

The Court commanded the defendant to issue said license.

Reyes vs. NHA

Facts:
National Housing Authority filed several expropriation complaints on the sugarland owned by the
petitioners Reyes. The land is located in Dasmarinas, Cavite. The purpose of the expropriation is for the
expansion of the Dasmarinas Resettlement Project to accommodate the squatters who were relocated from
Manila. The trial court rendered judgment ordering the expropriation of these lots with payment of just
compensation. It was affirmed by the Supreme Court.

The petitioners Reyes alleged the failure of the respondents to comply with the Supreme Court order, so
they filed a complaint for forfeiture of their rights before the RTC of Quezon City. They also said that NHA
did not relocate squatters from Manila on the expropriated lands which violate the reason for public
purpose. The petitioners prayed that NHA be enjoined from disposing and alienating the expropriated
properties and that judgment be rendered forfeiting all its rights and interests under the expropriation
judgment.

In the answer of NHA, they already paid a substantial amount to the petitioners. Thus, several issues are
already raised in the expropriation court.

The trial court dismissed the case. It held that NHA did not abandon the public purpose because the
relocation of squatters involves a long and tedious process. It also entered into a contract with a developer
for the construction of a low-cost housing to be sold to qualified low income beneficiaries. The payment of
just compensation is independent of the obligation of the petitioners to pay capital gains tax. Lastly, the
payment of just compensation is based on the value at the time the property was taken.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.

Issue:
Whether or not the property expropriated is taking for public purpose.

Held:
The decision appealed is modified.

The 1987 Constitution explicitly provides for the exercise of the power of eminent domain over the private
properties upon payment of just compensation. Sec. 9, Article III states that private property shall not be
taken for public use without just compensation. The constitutional restraints are public use and just
compensation.

The expropriation judgment declared that NHA has a lawful right to take petitioners properties “for the
public use or purpose of expanding the Dasmarinas Resettlement Project”.

The “public use” is synonymous with “public interest”, “public benefit”, “public welfare”, and “public
convenience”. The act of NHA in entering a contract with a real estate developer for the construction of
low cost housing cannot be taken to mean as a deviation from the stated public purpose of their taking.
Expropriation of private lands for slum clearance and urban development is for a public purpose even if the
developed area is later sold to private homeowners, commercial firms, entertainment and service companies
and other private concerns.

The expropriation of private property for the purpose of socialized housing for the marginalized sector is in
furtherance of the social justice provision under Section 1, Article XIII of the Constitution.

When land has been acquired for public use in fee simple unconditionally, either by the exercise of eminent
domain or by purchase, the former owner retains no rights in the land, and the public use may be
abandoned, or the land may be devoted to a different use, without any impairment of the estate or title
acquired, or any reversion to the former owner.

Sumulong vs. Guerrero

Facts: On December 5, 1997 the National Housing Authority (NHA) filed a complaint for expropriation of
parcels of land for the expansion of Bagong Nayon Hosing Project to provide housing facilities to low-
salaried government employees, covering approximately twenty five (25) hectares in Antipolo, Rizal. This
included the lots of petitioners Lorenzo Sumulong (6,667 sq.m.) and Emilia Vidanes-Balaoing (3,333
sq.m.). The land sought to be expropriated were valued by the NHA at one peso (P1.00) per square meter
adopting the market value fixed by the provincial assessor in accordance with presidential decrees
prescribing the valuation of property in expropriation proceedings.

Together with the complaint was a motion for immediate possession of the properties. The NHA deposited
the amount of P158,980.00 with the Phil. Nat’l Bank, representing the “total market value” of the subject
25 ha. of land, pursuant to P.D. No. 1224 which defines “the policy on the expropriation of private property
for socialized housing upon payment of just compensation.”

On January 17, 1978, respondent Judge Buenaventura S. Guerrero issued a writ of possession pertaining to
the subject parcels of land. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that they had been
deprived of the possession of their property without due process of law. This was however, denied. Hence,
this petition challenging the orders of respondent Judge and assailing the constitutionality of P.D. No. 1224,
as amended.

Petitioners contend that the taking of their property subsumed under the topics of public use, just
compensation, and due process.

Issues:
(1) Whether “socialized housing” as defined in P.D. 1224, as amended, for the purpose of condemnation
proceedings is not “public use” since it will benefit only “a handful of people, bereft of public character,”
hence it is not a valid exercise of the State’s power of eminent domain.

(2) Whether NHA has the discretion to determine the size of the property/properties to be expropriated.

(3) Whether P.D. 1224, as amended, allows unjust and unfair valuations arbitrarily fixed by government
assessors.

(4) Whether petitioners were denied due process because their parcels of land were immediately possessed
by the NHA by virtue of the writ of possession ordered by the respondent judge.

Held:
(1) P.D. 1224 defines “socialized housing” as, “the construction of dwelling units for the middle and lower
class members of our society, including the construction of the supporting infrastructure and other
facilities.” The “public use” requirement for a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain is a flexible
and evolving concept influenced by changing conditions. The taking to be valid must be for public use. As
long as the purpose of the taking is public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play. It is accurate
to state then that at present, whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the
requirement of public use. Ergo, “socialized housing” falls within the confines of “public use.”

(2) The State acting through the NHA is vested with broad discretion to designate the particular
property/properties to be taken for socialized housing purposes and how much thereof may be expropriated.
Absent a clear showing of fraud, bad faith, or gross abuse of discretion, which petitioners failed to
demonstrate, the Court will give due weight to and leave undisturbed the NHA’s choice and the size of the
site for the project. The right to use, enjoyment and disposal of private property is tempered by and has to
yield to the demands of the common good.

(3) Yes. The provisions on just compensation found in Presidential Decrees No. 1224, 1259, and 1313 are
the same provisions found in P.D. No.’s 76, 464, 794, and 1533 which were declared unconstitutional for
being encroachments on judicial prerogative. Just compensation means the value of the property at the time
of the taking. It means a fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained. Tax values can serve as guides but
cannot be absolute substitute for just compensation.

(4) Yes. The petitioners were denied of due process. P.D. 1224, as amended, violates procedural due
process as it allows immediate taking of possession, control and disposition of property without giving the
owner his day in court. Respondent Judge ordered the issuance of a writ of possession without notice and
without hearing.

De Knecht v CA
G.R. No. 108015. May 20, 1998

FACTS: Cristina de Knecht and Rene Knecht- owners of a land in

which they constructed 8houses: 7 leased out , 1 occupied by them.
1979 RP initiated a civil case for expropriation of their property for
the purpose of using it to complete the Manila Flood Control and
Drainage Project and the extension of the EDSA towards Roxas
Boulevard. CFI of Pasay issued a writ of possession but was
annulled for an arbitrary choice for EDSA’s extension.
1982 City Treasurer sold the property at public auction for failure of
petitioners to pay real estate taxes on the property from 1980 to
1982. Spouses Babieras and Spouses Sangalangs were the highest
Bidders.

1985 they sold the property to Salem Investment Corporation. The

property was part of those expropriated under B.P. Blg. 340
authorizing the national government to expropriate certain properties
in Pasay City for the EDSA Extension, passed on 1983.

1990 RP filed Civil Case 7327 for determination of just compensation

for expropriated properties. Writ of possession was issued by the trial
court. 7 of the 8 houses built on the property were demolished. The
Knechts refused to leave their house so Salem filed a case against
them for unlawful detainer. Court ordered Knechts’ ejectment.
1991 the Knechts filed for a Motion to Intervene and to Implead
Additional Parties after the trial court issued an order fixing the
compensation of all the lands sought to be expropriated by the govt.
The trial court denied the motion and the Court of Appeals affirmed
the decision after finding that petitioners had no legal interest over
the property.

ISSUE: WON petitioners are entitled to just compensation

HELD: NO. Since B.P. Blg. 340 did not, by itself, lay down the
procedure for expropriation, reference must be made to the
provisions on eminent domain in the Revised Rules of Court.
Section 1. The complaint.-- The right of eminent domain shall be
exercised by the filing of a complaint which shall state with certainty
the right and purpose of condemnation, describe the real or personal
property sought to be condemned, and join as defendants all
persons owning or claiming to own, or occupying, any part thereof or
interest therein, showing, so far as practicable, the interest of each
defendant separately.

The defendants in an expropriation case are not limited to the

owners of the property condemned.

"Owner" when employed in statutes relating to eminent domain to

designate the persons who are to be made parties to the proceeding,
refers, as is the rule in respect of those entitled to compensation,
to all those who have lawful interest in the property to be
condemned. If a person claiming an interest in the land sought to be
condemned is not made a party, he is given the right to intervene and
lay claim to the compensation.

The Knechts insisted that although they were no longer the

registered owners of the property at the time Civil Case No. 7327
was filed, they still occupied the property and therefore should have
been joined as defendants in the expropriation proceedings and
entitled to a share in the just compensation.

4 months prior filing of Civil Case No. 7327, a case for reconveyance
was dismissed with finality which resulted to the Knechts’ loss of
whatever right or colorable title they had to the property. The fact that
the Knechts remained in physical possession was based on their
claim of ownership, not on any juridical title such as a lessee,
mortgagee, or vendee. Since the issue of ownership was put to rest
in the civil case of reconveyance, they had no legal interest in the
property by the time the expropriation proceedings were instituted.
They had no right to intervene and the trial court did not err in
denying their "Motion for Intervention and to Implead Additional
Parties.

SPOUSES ANTONIO and FE YUSAY vs. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS
The petitioners owned a parcel of land with an area of 1,044 square meters situated between Nueve de Febrero Street andFernandez
Street in Barangay Mauway, Mandaluyong City. Half of their land they used as their residence, and the rest they rented out to nine
other families. Allegedly, the land was their only property and only source of income. Sangguniang Panglungsod of Mandaluyong
City adopted Resolution No. 552, Series of 1997, to authorize then City Mayor Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr. to take the necessary legal
steps for the expropriation of the land of the petitioners for the purpose of developing it for low cost housing for the less privileged but
deserving city inhabitants.

ISSUE
Whether or not the Sangguniang Panlungsod abused its discretion in adopting Resolution No. 552.

HELD
No. A resolution is upon a specific matter of a temporary nature while an ordinance is a law that is permanent in character. No rights
can be conferred by and be inferred from a resolution, which is nothing but an embodiment of what the lawmaking body has to say in
the light of attendant circumstances. A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a resolution is
merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter. An ordinance possesses a general and
permanent character, but a resolution is temporary in nature. Additionally, the two are enacted differently -- a third reading is
necessary for an ordinance, but not for a resolution, unless decided otherwise by a majority of all the Sanggunian members.

In simply expressing its sentiment or opinion through the resolution, therefore, the Sangguniang Panglungsod in no way abused its
discretion, least of all gravely, for its expression of sentiment or opinion was a constitutionally protected right.

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs  HEIRS OF MACABANGKIT SANGKAY

G.R. No. 165828 August 24, 2011

BERSAMIN, J.

FACTS:

 Pursuant to its legal mandate under Republic Act No. 6395 (An Act Revising the Charter of the
National Power Corporation), NPC undertook the Agus River Hydroelectric Power Plant Project
in the 1970s to generate electricity for Mindanao. The project included the construction of several
underground tunnels to be used in diverting the water flow from the Agus River to the
hydroelectric plants.[2]§
 1997: Respondents sued NPC in the RTC for the recovery of damages and of the property, with
the alternative prayer for the payment of just compensation
 Allegations: that one of the underground tunnels of NPC that diverted the water flow of
the Agus River for the operation of the Hydroelectric Project in Agus V, Agus VI and
Agus VII traversed their land
 that the underground tunnel had been constructed without their knowledge and consent;
that the presence of the tunnel deprived them of the agricultural, commercial, industrial
and residential value of their land
 NPC’s Answer: the Heirs of Macabangkit had no right to compensation under section 3(f) of
Republic Act No. 6395, under which a mere legal easement on their land was established; that
their cause of action, should they be entitled to compensation, already prescribed due to the tunnel
having been constructed in 1979; and that by reason of the tunnel being an apparent and
continuous easement, any action arising from such easement prescribed in five years
 RTC ruled in favor of the plaintiffs finding that an underground tunnel was constructed therein
 Ordered NPC to pay P113,532,500.00 as actual damages or just compensation
 NPC to pay rental fees
 the RTC issued a supplemental decision stating that respondents’ land or properties are
condemned in favor of defendant National Power Corporation, upon payment of the aforesaid sum
 the Heirs of Macabangkit filed an urgent motion for execution of judgment pending appeal. [9]§ 
 The RTC granted the motion and issued a writ of execution
 NPC assailed such decision by filing a writ by petition for certiorari in the CA
 CA: affirmed the decision of the RTC
Rationale:
 the testimonies of NPCs witness Gregorio Enterone and of the respondents witness Engr.
Pete Sacedon, the topographic survey map, the sketch map, and the ocular inspection
report sufficiently established the existence of the underground tunnel traversing the land
of the Heirs of Macabangkit
 Section 3(i) of R.A. No. 6395, being silent about tunnels, did not apply to the present case
 Contention of NPC: the CA should have applied Section 3(i) of Republic Act No. 6395, which
provided a period of only five years from the date of the construction within which the affected
landowner could bring a claim against it; and that even if Republic Act No. 6395 should be
inapplicable, the action of the Heirs of Macabangkit had already prescribed due to the
underground tunnel being susceptible to acquisitive prescription after the lapse of 10 years
pursuant to Article 620 of the Civil Code due to its being a continuous and apparent legal
easement under Article 634 of the Civil Code.
 National Power Corporation (NPC) seeks the review on certiorari of the decision of the CA

ISSUE: WON NPC is liable for payment of just compensation?

RULING: Yes.
1. Factual findings of the RTC are binding since it was affirmed by the RTC
 the evidence on the tunnel was substantial, for the significance of the topographic survey
map and the sketch map (as indicative of the extent and presence of the tunnel
construction) to the question on the existence of the tunnel was strong
 These two (2) pieces of documentary evidence readily point the extent and presence of
the tunnel construction coming from the power cavern near the small man-made lake
 which is the inlet and approach tunnel, or at a distance of about two (2) kilometers away
from the land of the plaintiffs-appellees, and then traversing the entire and the whole
length of the plaintiffs-appellees property, and the outlet channel of the tunnel is another
small man-made lake
 The ocular inspection done by the RTC actually confirmed the existence of the tunnel
2. Five-year prescriptive period under Section 3(i) of Republic Act No. 6395 does not apply
to claims for just compensation
 prescription did not bar the present action to recover just compensation
 Section 3(i) includes no limitation except those enumerated after the term works.
Accordingly, the term works is considered as embracing all kinds of
constructions, facilities, and other developments that can enable or help NPC to
meet its objectives of developing hydraulic power expressly provided under
paragraph (g) of Section 3.[23]§ The CAs restrictive construal of Section 3(i) as
exclusive of tunnels was obviously unwarranted, for the provision applies not
only to development works easily discoverable or on the surface of the earth but
also to subterranean works like tunnels
 the prescriptive period provided under Section 3(i) of Republic Act No. 6395 is
applicable only to an action for damages, and does not extend to an action to
recover just compensation like this case

JUST COMPENSATION (inverse DAMAGES

condemnation)
has the objective to recover the value of seeks to vindicate a legal wrong
property taken in fact by the through damages, which may be
governmental defendant, even though actual, moral, nominal, temperate,
no formal exercise of the power of liquidated, or exemplary
eminent domain has been attempted by
the taking agency.
Just compensation is the full and fair When a right is exercised in a manner
equivalent of the property taken from not conformable with the norms
its owner by the expropriator. The enshrined in Article 19[28]§ and like
measure is not the takers gain, but the provisions on human relations in
owner’s loss. The word just is used to the Civil Code, and the exercise
intensify the meaning of the results to the damage of another, a
word compensation in order to convey legal wrong is committed and the
the idea that the equivalent to be wrongdoer is held responsible
rendered for the property to be taken
shall be real, substantial, full, and
ample
Basis: Constitution statutory enactments
arises from the exercise by the State of emanates from the transgression of a
its power of eminent domain against right
private property for public use

 Due to the need to construct the underground tunnel, NPC should have first
moved to acquire the land from the Heirs of Macabangkit either by voluntary
tender to purchase or through formal expropriation proceedings. In either case,
NPC would have been liable to pay to the owners the fair market value of the
land, for Section 3(h) of Republic Act No. 6395 expressly requires NPC to pay
the fair market value of such property at the time of the taking
3. The construction constitutes taking of the land as to entitle the owners to just compensation
 there was a full taking on the part of NPC, notwithstanding that the owners were not
completely and actually dispossessed.
 It is settled that the taking of private property for public use, to be compensable, need not
be an actual physical taking or appropriation.[36]§ Indeed, the expropriators action may
 be short of acquisition of title, physical possession, or occupancy but may still amount to
a taking
 As a result, NPC should pay just compensation for the entire land
 Just compensation was based on the valuation of the OIC of the City Assessors Office
who testified that, within that area, that area is classified as industrial and residential.
That plaintiffs land is adjacent to many subdivisions and that is within the industrial
classification. He also issued a certificate stating that the appraised value of plaintiffs
land ranges fromP400.00 to P500.00 per square meter
 the fixing of just compensation must be based on the prevailing market value at the time
of the filing of the complaint, instead of reckoning from the time of the taking pursuant to
Section 3(h) of Republic Act No. 6395
 Compensation that is reckoned on the market value prevailing at the time either
when NPC entered or when it completed the tunnel, as NPC submits, would not
be just, for it would compound the gross unfairness already caused to the owners
by NPCs entering without the intention of formally expropriating the land, and
without the prior knowledge and consent of the Heirs of Macabangkit
 NPCs entry denied elementary due process of law to the owners since then until
the owners commenced the inverse condemnation proceedings

RUBEN DEL CASTILLO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 185128, 30 January 2012, THIRD DIVISION
(Peralta, J.)

Having been established that the assistance of the barangay tanods was sought by the police authorities who effected the searched
warrant, the same barangay tanods therefore acted as agents of persons in authority.

FACTS:
Police Officers headed by SPO3 Bienvenido Masnayon went to serve a search warrant from the Regional Trial Court (RTC) to
Petitioner Ruben Del Castillo in search of illegal drugs. Upon arrival, somebody shouted “raid” which prompted the police officers to
immediately disembark from the jeep they were riding and go directly to Del Castillo’s house and cordoned it off. Police men found
nothing incriminating in Del Castillo’s residence, but one of the barangay tanods was able to confiscate from the hut several articles
including four (4) plastic packs of methamphetamine hydrochloride, or shabu.

An Information was filed before RTC against Del Castillo, charging him with violation of Section 16, Article III of R.A. 6425 (The
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972). During the arraignment, Del Castillo pleaded not guilty. The RTC found Del Castillo guilty beyond
reasonable of the charge against him in the information. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision.

Del Castillo appealed his case to the CA, insisting that there was a violation of his constitutional guaranty against unreasonable
searches and seizure. On the contrary, the Office of the Solicitor General argued that the constitutional guaranty against unreasonable
searches and seizure is applicable only against government authorities. Hence, assuming that the items seized were found in another
place not designated in the search warrant, the same items should still be admissible as evidence because the one who discovered them
was a barangay tanod who is a private individual.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a violation of Del Castillo’s right against unreasonable searches and seizure

HELD:
Petition GRANTED.

It must be remembered that the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized in
order for it to be valid. A designation or description that points out the place to be searched to the exclusion of all others, and on
inquiry unerringly leads the peace officers to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement of definiteness.

In the present case, the search warrant specifically designates or describes the residence of the petitioner as the place to be searched.
Incidentally, the items were seized by a barangay tanod in a nipa hut, 20 meters away from the residence of the Del Castillo. The
confiscated items, having been found in a place other than the one described in the search warrant, can be considered as fruits of an
invalid warrantless search, the presentation of which as an evidence is a violation of Del Castillo’s constitutional guaranty against
unreasonable searches and seizure.

The OSG argued that, assuming that the items seized were found in another place not designated in the search warrant, the same items
should still be admissible as evidence because the one who discovered them was a barangay tanod who is a private individual, the
constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizure being applicable only against government authorities. The
contention is devoid of merit. It was testified to during trial by the police officers who effected the search warrant that they asked the
assistance of the barangay tanods. Having been established that the assistance of the barangay tanods was sought by the police
authorities who effected the search warrant, the same barangay tanods therefore acted as agents of persons in authority. Article 152 of
the Revised Penal Code defines persons in authority and agents of persons in authority as “any person directly vested with jurisdiction,
whether as an individual or as a member of some court or governmental corporation, board or commission, shall be deemed a person
in authority. A barangay captain and a barangay chairman shall also be deemed a person in authority. A person who, by direct
provision of law or by election or by appointment by competent authority, is charged with the maintenance of public order and the
protection and security of life and property, such as barrio councilman, barrio policeman and barangay leader, and any person who
comes to the aid of persons in authority, shall be deemed an agent of a person in authority.”

The Local Government Code also contains a provision which describes the function of a barangay tanod as an agent of persons in
authority. Section 388 of the Local Government Code reads: “For purposes of the Revised Penal Code, the punong barangay,
sangguniang barangay members, and members of the lupong tagapamayapa in each barangay shall be deemed as persons in authority
in their jurisdictions, while other barangay officials and members who may be designated by law or ordinance and charged with the
maintenance of public order, protection and security of life and property, or the maintenance of a desirable and balanced environment,
and any barangay member who comes to the aid of persons in authority, shall be deemed agents of persons in authority.

By virtue of the above provisions, the police officers, as well as the barangay tanods were acting as agents of a person in authority
during the conduct of the search. Thus, the search conducted was unreasonable and the confiscated items are inadmissible in evidence.

People vs. Racho

626 SCRA 633, August 3, 2010
Facts:
On May 19, 2003, a confidential agent of the police transacted through cellular phone with appellant for the purchase of shabu. The
agent reported the transaction to the police authorities who immediately formed a team to apprehend the appellant. The team members
posted themselves along the national highway in Baler, Aurora, and at around 3:00 p.m. of the same day, a Genesis bus arrived in
Baler. When appellant alighted from the bus, the confidential agent pointed to him as the person he transacted with, and when the
latter was about to board a tricycle, the team approached him and invited him to the police station as he was suspected of carrying
shabu. When he pulled out his hands from his pants’ pocket, a white envelope slipped therefrom which, when opened, yielded a small
sachet containing the suspected drug. The team then brought appellant to the police station for investigation and the confiscated
specimen was marked in the presence of appellant. The field test and laboratory examinations on the contents of the confiscated sachet
yielded positive results for methamphetamine hydrochloride.

Appellant was charged in two separate informations, one for violation of Section 5 of R.A. 9165, for transporting or delivering; and
the second, of Section 11 of the same law for possessing, dangerous drugs. During the arraignment, appellant pleaded "Not Guilty" to
both charges. On July 8, 2004, the RTC rendered a Joint Judgment convicting appellant of Violation of Section 5, Article II, R.A.
9165 but acquitted him of the charge of Violation of Section 11, Article II, R.A. 9165. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision.
The appellant brought the case to SC assailing for the first time he legality of his arrest and the validity of the subsequent warrantless
search.

Issue: Whether or not the appellant has a ground to assail the validity of his arrest.

Held: The long standing rule in this jurisdiction is that "reliable information" alone is not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest. The
rule requires, in addition, that the accused perform some overt act that would indicate that he has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense. We find no cogent reason to depart from this well-established doctrine.

Appellant herein was not committing a crime in the presence of the police officers. Neither did the arresting officers have personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested had committed, was committing, or about to commit an offense. At the
time of the arrest, appellant had just alighted from the Gemini bus and was waiting for a tricycle. Appellant was not acting in any
suspicious manner that would engender a reasonable ground for the police officers to suspect and conclude that he was committing or
intending to commit a crime. Were it not for the information given by the informant, appellant would not have been apprehended and
no search would have been made, and consequently, the sachet of shabu would not have been confiscated.

Neither was the arresting officers impelled by any urgency that would allow them to do away with the requisite warrant. As testified to
by Police Officer 1 Aurelio Iniwan, a member of the arresting team, their office received the "tipped information" on May 19, 2003.
They likewise learned from the informant not only the appellant’s physical description but also his name. Although it was not certain
that appellant would arrive on the same day (May 19), there was an assurance that he would be there the following day (May 20).
Clearly, the police had ample opportunity to apply for a warrant.

People v. Doria

FACTS:
Members of the PNP Narcotics Command received information that one “ Jun” [Doria] was engaged in illegal drug activities, so they
decided to entrap and arrest him in a buy-bust operation. He was arrested. They frisked him but did not find the marked bills on him,
and upon inquiry, he revealed that he left it at the house of his associate “ Neneth ” [Gaddao], so he led the police team to her house.
The team found the door open and a woman inside the house. “ Jun” identified her as “Neneth, ” and she was asked by SPO1 Badua
about the marked money as PO3 Manlangit looked over her house [he was still outside the house]. Standing by the door, PO3
Manlangit noticed a carton box under the dining table. One of the box’ s flaps was open, and inside it was something wrapped in
plastic, and it appeared similar to the marijuana earlier sold to him by “ Jun. ” His suspicion aroused, so he entered the house and took
hold of the box. He peeked inside the box and saw 10 bricks of what appeared to be dried marijuana leaves. SPO1 Badua recovered
the marked bills from “ Neneth ” and they arrested her. The bricks were examined and they were found to be dried marijuana leaves.

Florencio Doria and Violeta Gaddao were charged with violation of RA 6425 [Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972], Section 4 [Sale,
Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited Drugs] in relation to Section 21 [Attempt and Conspiracy].
RTC convicted them.

ISSUE AND HOLDING:

WON RTC correctly found that the box of marijuana was in plain view, making its warrantless seizure valid. NO

RATIO:
Re: warrantless arrest
Gaddao ’s warrantless arrest was illegal because she was arrested solely on the basis of the alleged identification made by Doria. Doria
did not point to her as his associate in the drug business, but as the person with whom he left the marked bills. This identification does
not necessarily mean that Gaddao conspired with Doria in pushing drugs. If there is no showing that the person who effected the
warrantless arrest had knowledge of facts implicating the person arrested to the perpetration of the criminal offense, the arrest is
legally objectionable.

Since the warrantless arrest of Gaddao was illegal, the search of her person and home and the subsequent seizure of the marked bills
and marijuana cannot be deemed legal as an incident to her arrest.

Plain view ” issue

Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure even without a
search warrant and may be introduced in evidence.

Requisites
a) The law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he
can view a particular area
b) The discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent
c) It is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject
to seizure

An object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed to sight. The difficulty arises when the object is inside a closed
container. Where the object seized was inside a closed package, the object itself is not in plain view and therefore cannot be seized
without a warrant. If the package is such that an experienced observer could infer from its appearance that it contains the prohibited
article, then the article is deemed in plain view. It must be immediately apparent to the police that the items that they observe may be
evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.

In his direct examination, PO3 Manlangit said that he was sure that the contents of the box were marijuana because he himself
checked and marked the said contents. On cross-examination, however, he admitted that he merely presumed the contents to be
marijuana because it had the same plastic wrapping as the "buy-bust marijuana." Each of the ten bricks of marijuana in the box was
individually wrapped in old newspaper and placed inside plastic bags-- white, pink or blue in color. PO3 Manlangit himself admitted
on cross-examination that the contents of the box could be items other than marijuana. He did not know exactly what the box
contained that he had to ask appellant Gaddao about its contents. It was not immediately apparent to PO3 Manlangit that the content of
the box was marijuana; hence, it was not in plain view and its seizure without the requisite search warrant was in violation of the law
and the Constitution. It was fruit of the poisonous tree and should have been excluded and never considered by the trial court.

The fact that the box containing about 6 kilos of marijuana was found in Gaddao ’s house Gaddao does not justify a finding that she
herself is guilty of the crime charged.

In a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, what is material is the submission of proof that the sale took place between the
poseur-buyer and the seller and the presentation of the drug as evidence in court.
A. Prosecution established the fact that in consideration of the P1,600.00 he received, Doria sold and delivered 970 grams of
marijuana to PO3 Manlangit, the poseur-buyer
B. Prosecution failed to prove that Gaddao conspired with accused-appellant Doria in the sale of said drug

DORIA SENTENCED TO SUFFER RECLUSION PERPETUA + 500K FINE

GADDAO ACQUITTED

Valmonte v. De Villa
I. THE FACTS

On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was activated pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87
of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the mission of conducting security operations within its area of responsibility and
peripheral areas, for the purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace and order, and providing an
atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political development of the National Capital Region. As part of its duty to
maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.

Petitioners Atty. Ricardo Valmonte, who is a resident of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, and the Union of Lawyers and Advocates For
People’s Rights (ULAP) sought the declaration of checkpoints in Valenzuela, Metro Manila and elsewhere as unconstitutional. In the
alternative, they prayed that respondents Renato De Villa and the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) be directed to
formulate guidelines in the implementation of checkpoints for the protection of the people. Petitioners contended that the checkpoints
gave the respondents blanket authority to make searches and seizures without search warrant or court order in violation of the
Constitution.

II. THE ISSUE

Do the military and police checkpoints violate the right of the people against unreasonable search and seizures?

III. THE RULING

[The Court, voting 13-2, DISMISSED the petition.]

NO, military and police checkpoints DO NOT violate the right of the people against unreasonable search and seizures.

xxx. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be
determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case.

Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds, or
simply looks into a vehicle, or flashes a light therein, these do not constitute unreasonable search.

The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably in other areas) may be considered as a security measure to
enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing effective territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of
the public. Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to thwart plots to destabilize the government, in the interest of public
security. In this connection, the Court may take judicial notice of the shift to urban centers and their suburbs of the insurgency
movement, so clearly reflected in the increased killings in cities of police and military men by NPA “sparrow units,” not to mention
the abundance of unlicensed firearms and the alarming rise in lawlessness and violence in such urban centers, not all of which are
reported in media, most likely brought about by deteriorating economic conditions – which all sum up to what one can rightly
consider, at the very least, as abnormal times. Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence and promote public
welfare and an individual's right against a warrantless search which is however reasonably conducted, the former should prevail.

True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform, in the same manner that all
governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the citizen,
the checkpoints during these abnormal times, when conducted within reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for an orderly
society and a peaceful community.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ERNESTO UYBOCO y RAMOS

FACTS:
On 20 December 1993, Nimfa and her wards, siblings Jeson Kevin and Jeson Kirby Dichaves
were abducted and brought to a house in Merville Subdivision, Parañaque. Nimfa was able to recognized
one of the kidnappers as appellant, because she had seen the latter in her employers office.

The kidnappers called Jepson and demanded for ransom of P26 Million. In one of the calls of the kidnappers,
Jepson was able to recognize the voice of appellant because he had several business transactions. After,
numerous times of negotiation, the parties finally agreed to a ransom of P1.5 Million, some in ash and the
balance to be paid in kind, such as jewelry and a pistol. Appellant asked Jepson to bring the ransom
alone at Pancake House in Magallanes Commercial Center and ordered him to put the bag in the trunk,
leave the trunk unlocked, and walk away for ten (10) minutes without turning back. P/Insp. Escandor and
P/Supt. Chan were assigned to proceed to Magallanes Commercial Center and brought a camera to take
photo and video coverage of the supposed pay-off. He identified Macias together with appellant and the
latter as the one who took the ransom. Later, appellant checked on his trunk and the bag was already
gone. Appellant then apprised him that his sons and helper were already at the Shell Gasoline Station
along South Luzon Expressway. He immediately went to the place and found his sons and helper seated
at the corner of the gas station. P/Supt. Cruz and his group was assigned at Fort Bonifacio then heard on
their radio that the suspect’s vehicle, a red Nissan Sentra was heading in their direction. A few minutes
later, they saw the red car and tailed it until it reached Dasmariñas Village in Makati. When said car
slowed down, they blocked it and immediately approached the vehicle.

They introduced themselves aspolice officers and accosted the suspect, who turned out to be appellant. Appellant suddenly pulled a .
38 caliber revolver and a scuffle took place. They managed to subdue appellant and handcuffed him. Appellant was requested to open
the compartment and a gray bag was found inside. P/Supt. Cruz saw
money, jewelry and a gun inside the bag.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid arrest and search without warrant?

DOCTRINE:
The arrest was validly executed pursuant to Section 5, paragraph (b) of Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court, which provides: “A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person: x x x; (b) When an offense has in fact been committed and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and, (c) x x x.” A search incident to a lawful
arrest is also valid under Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court which states: “A person lawfully
arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute
proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant.”

RATIONALE: The instance of lawful warrantless arrest covered by paragraph (b) cited above necessitates
two stringent requirements before a warrantless arrest can be effected: (1) an offense has just been
committed; and (2) the person making the arrest has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed it. Records show that both requirements are present in the instant
case. The police officers present in Magallanes Commercial Center were able to witness the pay-off
which effectively consummates the crime of kidnapping. Such knowledge was then relayed to the other
police officers stationed in Fort Bonifacio where appellant was expected to pass by. Personal knowledge
of facts must be based on probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of
suspicion. Section 5, Rule 113 does not require the arresting officers to personally witness the
commission of the offense with their own eyes. It is sufficient for the arresting team that they were
monitoring the pay-off for a number of hours long enough for them to be informed that it was indeed
appellant, who was the kidnapper. This is equivalent to personal knowledge based on probable cause.
Likewise, the search conducted inside the car of appellant was legal because the latter consented to
such. Even assuming that appellant did not give his consent for the police to search the car, they can still
validly do so by virtue of a search incident to a lawful arrest under Section 13, Rule 126. In lawful arrests,
it becomes both the duty and the right of the apprehending officers to conduct a warrantless search not
only on the person of the suspect, but also in the permissible area within the latter's reach. Therefore, it is
only but expected and legally so for the police to search his car as he was driving it when he was
arrested.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from are AFFIRMED

SUBIDO VS. OZAETA- Registered Land Records

FACTS:
Petitioner was the editor of the Manila Post who sought the inspection of real estates sold to aliens and registered with the Register of
Deeds (RD) who was given the authority thru DOJ Circular to examine all the records in the respondent’s custody relative to the said
transactions.

ISSUE:
What is the extent of the discretion of the Register of Deeds (RD) to regulate the accessibility of records relating to registered lands in
its office.

HELD:
What the law expects and requires from the RD is the exercise of an unbiased and impartial judgment by which all persons resorting to
the office, under the legal authority and conducting themselves with the motives, reasons and objects of the person seeking access to
the records. Except when it is clear that the purpose of the inspection is unlawful, it is not the duty of the registration officers to
concern themselves with the motives, purposes, and objects of the person seeking to inspect the records. It is not their prerogative to
see that the information which the records contain is not flaunted before the public gaze.