THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 106087. April 7, 1993.]

ROLITO GO Y TAMBUNTING , petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS,

THE HON. BENJAMIN V. PELAYO, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 168,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, NCJR, PASIG, METRO MANILA and THE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES , respondents.

Law Firm of Raymundo A. Armovit for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for public respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; BAIL; NATURE OF BAIL PROCEEDINGS. —

Respondent judge is correct in appreciating the nature of the bail proceedings. "[T]he
hearing of an application for bail should be summary or otherwise in the discretion of the
court. By 'summary hearing' [is] meant such brief and speedy method of receiving and
considering the evidence of guilt as is practicable and consistent with the purpose of the
hearing which is merely to determine the weight of the evidence for the purpose of bail. In
such a hearing, the court 'does not sit to try the merits or to enter into any nice inquiry as to
the weight that ought to be allowed to the evidence for or against accused, nor will it
speculate on the outcome of the trial or on what further evidence may be therein offered is
admitted.' . . . The course of the inquiry may be left to the discretion of the court which may
con ne itself to receiving such evidence as has reference to substantial matters avoiding
unnecessary thoroughness in the examination and cross-examination of witnesses and
reducing to a reasonable minimum the amount of corroboration particularly on details that
are not essential to the purpose of the hearing."
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; PROCEDURE IN GRANT OF BAIL IS SIMILAR TO PROCEDURE IN
CANCELLATION OF BAIL. — Although the proceedings conducted by respondent judge
were not for an application for bail but to cancel that which was issued to petitioner, the
principles and procedure governing hearings on an application for bail were correctly
applied by respondent judge in the cancellation of bail proceedings since the bail was
issued by this Court in G.R. No. 101837 without prejudice to any lawful order which the trial
court may issue in case the Provincial Prosecutor moves for the cancellation of the bail.
The grant of bail was made without prejudice because where bail is not a matter of right,
as in this case, the prosecution must be given the opportunity to prove that there is a
strong evidence of guilt. In the cancellation of bail proceedings before him, the judge was
confronted with the same issue as in an application for bail, i.e., whether the evidence of
guilt is so strong as to convince the court that the accused is not entitled to bail. Hence,
the similarity of the nature and procedure of the hearings for an application for bail and the
cancellation of the same.
3. LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS; DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES; ESSENCE OF RULE ON
DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES. — The Constitution commands that in all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to have "a speedy, impartial, and public
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 trial." This right is a derivation and elaboration of the more fundamental right to due
process of law. The rule on the disquali cation of judges is a mechanism for enforcing the
requirements of due process.
4. ID.; ID.; REASON FOR REQUIREMENT OF IMPARTIALITY ON PART OF JUDGE. — "It is now
beyond dispute that due process cannot be satis ed in the absence of that degree of
objectivity on the part of a judge suf cient to reassure litigants of his being fair and being
just. Thereby there is the legitimate expectation that the decision arrived at would be the
application of the law to the facts as found by a judge who does not play favorites." The
"cold neutrality of an impartial judge," although required primarily for the bene t of the
litigants, is also designed to preserve the integrity of the judiciary and more fundamentally,
to gain and maintain the people's faith in the institutions they have erected when they
adopted our Constitution. The notion that "justice must satisfy the appearance of justice"
is an imposition by the citizenry, as the nal judge of the conduct of public business,
including trials, upon the courts of a high and uncompromising standard in the proper
dispensation of justice.
5. ID.; ID.; EFFECT OF MOTION FOR INHIBITION, DENIAL OF MOTION FOR INHIBITION,
AND PETITION CHALLENGING DENIAL OF MOTION FOR INHIBITION. — Hence, if the trial
judge decides to deny a motion for inhibition based on Rule 137, Sec. 1, par. 2, he shall
proceed with the trial, unless of course restrained by either the Court of Appeals or by this
Court. The mere ling of a motion for inhibition before the trial court or a petition before
either the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court challenging an order of the trial judge
denying a motion for inhibition will not deprive the judge of authority to proceed with the
case. Otherwise, by the expedient of ling such motion or petition, although the same be
lacking in merit, a party can unduly delay the trial.
6. ID.; ID.; EVIDENCE REQUIRED IN DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGE; BIAS AND PREJUDICE
NOT PRESUMED. — While bias and prejudice, which are relied upon by petitioner, have been
recognized as valid reasons for the voluntary inhibition of the judge under Rule 137, Sec. 1,
par. 2, the established rule is that mere suspicion that a judge is partial is not enough.
There should be clear and convincing evidence to prove the charge. Bare allegations of
partiality and prejudgment will not suf ce. Bias and prejudice cannot be presumed
especially if weighed against a judge's sacred obligation under his oath of of ce to
administer justice without respect to person and do equal right to the poor and the rich.
7. ID.; ID.; IN CASE AT BAR, THE ACT OF RESPONDENT JUDGE OF NOT SUSPENDING
HEARING OF CASE AFTER DENIAL OF PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR RECUSATION AND
DURING PENDENCY OF PETITION CHALLENGING HIS ORDERS DENYING THE MOTION
FOR RECUSATION AND THE MOTION TO SUSPEND PROCEEDINGS AND TRANSFER
VENUE OUTSIDE METRO MANILA NOT PROOF OF PARTIALITY. — In the case at hand,
respondent judge acted in accordance with the Rules and prevailing jurisprudence when he
proceeded with the trial after denying petitioner's Motion for Recusation. Petitioner cannot,
therefore, cite the fact that respondent judge did not suspend hearing the case during the
pendency of this petition as proof of his claim that the judge is partial.
8. ID.; ID.; IN CASE AT BAR, THE ACT OF RESPONDENT JUDGE OF OVERRULING
PETITIONER'S OBJECTION TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF THE EXTRAJUDICIAL STATEMENT
OF A PROSECUTION WITNESS WHO DID NOT TESTIFY THEREON, NOT PROOF OF BIAS;
REASON. — The rst of these allegedly "palpably biased and hostile orders" was that
issued by respondent judge on August 14, 1992 overruling petitioner's objection to the
admissibility of an af davit of Geronimo Gonzaga offered by the prosecution. Petitioner
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 contends that respondent judge should not have admitted the extrajudicial statements of
Gonzaga because the latter did not take the witness stand to af rm the statements
contained in the document presented by the prosecution. Petitioner suspected that
respondent judge was trying to bolster the evidence for the prosecution. This contention is
without merit. The mere fact that the trial judge overruled petitioner's objection to the
admissibility of a particular piece of evidence is not proof of bias. In Jandionco v.
Peñaranda, it was held that "[d]ivergence of opinions between a judge hearing a case and a
party's counsel, as to applicable laws and jurisprudence, is not a suf cient ground to
disqualify the judge from hearing the case on the ground of bias and manifest partiality." If
petitioner disagrees with the judge's ruling, he may still question the admissibility of the
evidence when he les an appeal, in case a judgment of conviction is rendered. To
conclude, however, that respondent judge, by overruling the objection raised by petitioner's
counsel, was trying to strengthen the prosecution's evidence is not only baseless because
there was no evidence given to support this conclusion, but also premature because at
that stage, the judge was not yet appreciating the merits and weight of the particular piece
of evidence in question but was merely ruling on its admissibility. Petitioner's conclusion
that "the offer and admission of Gonzaga's hearsay 'eyewitness' statement suggest a
sinister concert to simulate evidential strength" is, if not suggestive of paranoia, at the very
least, an overreaction.
9. ID.; ID.; IN CASE AT BAR, THE ACT OF RESPONDENT JUDGE OF CONSIDERING THE
CANCELLATION OF BAIL PROCEEDINGS RIPE FOR RESOLUTION AND REFUSING TO
ALLOW PETITIONER'S COUNSEL TO PRESENT ANYMORE WITNESSES, NOT MOTIVATED
BY BIAS; REASON. — The other supervening event allegedly demonstrating the judge's
partiality occurred during one of the hearings concerning the prosecution's motion for the
cancellation of petitioner's bail. On September 28, 1992, after eleven (11) witnesses had
been presented for the prosecution and two (2) for the defense, respondent judge
considered the cancellation of bail proceedings ripe for resolution and refused to allow
petitioner's counsel to present anymore witnesses. The reasons given by respondent
judge for his ruling were: (1) the proceeding in the cancellation of bail is summary and
different from the hearing on the merits; (2) the court need not receive exactly the same
number of witnesses from both the prosecution and the defense; and (3) the counsel for
petitioner previously limited himself to two (2) witnesses as borne out by the record of the
case . . . Having determined that respondent judge made a proper appreciation of the
nature of the bail proceedings before him, we likewise hold that it was within his discretion
to limit the number of witnesses for petitioner. The power of the court in the bail
proceedings to make a determination as to whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong
"implies a full exercise of judicial discretion." If the trial judge believes that the evidence
before him is suf cient for him to rule on the bail issue, after giving both parties their
opportunity to present evidence, it is within his authority to consider the bail proceedings
ripe for resolution. In any case, respondent judge acceded to petitioner's request and
allowed him to present more witnesses in the bail proceedings. In fine, the Court holds that
the respondent judge's ruling on September 28, 1992 considering the prosecution's
motion for cancellation of bail ripe for resolution on the basis of the evidence already
presented was not motivated by bias or prejudice.

10. ID.; ID.; IN CASE AT BAR, RESPONDENT JUDGE'S ORDER ALLOWING PETITIONER'S
ARRAIGNMENT AND TRIAL WITHOUT BENEFIT OF PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION, NOT
NECESSARILY PROOF OF PARTIALITY. — Petitioner, in this Motion for Reconsideration,
restates his argument in the Petition that the respondent judge is biased, as evidenced by
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 his Order dated July 17, 1991 which in effect allowed petitioner's arraignment and trial
without the bene t of a preliminary investigation. It is true that in Go v. Court of Appeals, et
al., G.R. No. 101837, February 11, 1992, a divided Court nulli ed respondent judge's July
17, 1991 Order and ordered that a preliminary investigation be conducted. But the
erroneous Order of respondent judge is not necessarily proof of partiality. In People v.
Lacson, we held that erroneous rulings do not always constitute evidence of bias. In
Luciano v. Mariano, we made the pronouncement that "[t]he mere fact that the judge has
erroneously ruled against the same litigant on two or more occasions does not create in
our minds a decisive pattern of malice on the part of the judge against that particular
litigant. This is not an unusual occurrence on our courts . . ." Moreover, the fact that the
erroneous order issued by a judge can be remedied and was actually corrected, as in this
case, militates against the disqualification of the judge on the ground of bias or partiality.
11. ID.; ID.; IN CASE AT BAR, MOTION FOR RECUSATION IS ANOTHER DILATORY MOVE. —
In the case at hand, the Motion for Recusation led by petitioner must be viewed in the
light of his lawyers' many attempts to suspend the proceedings before the respondent
judge. Before the trial court, petitioner tried at least eight (8) times, not merely to reset the
scheduled hearings, but to suspend the trial of the case itself. The following pleadings filed
by petitioner before respondent judge all prayed either to suspend the proceedings
entirely or for the respondent judge to delay the disposition of a particular issue . . . Before
this Court, petitioner has already led three (3) petitions assailing various orders of
respondent judge in connection with the single murder case pending against him. Apart
from the present petition which is docketed as G.R. No. 106087, petitioner has previously
led two (2) other petitions docketed as G.R. Nos. 101837 and 105424. In all three (3)
petitions, petitioner applied for a temporary restraining order to have the proceedings
before the trial court held in abeyance. The murder case involving only one accused, the
petitioner, has become unnecessarily complicated and the proceedings before the trial
court protracted, as can be gleaned from the fact that between the ling of the information
on July 11, 1991 and the end of last year or December 31, 1992, the records of the case
now consist of four (4) volumes and the transcript of stenographic notes have reached a
total of one thousand ve hundred and twenty three (1523) pages. Hearings are still being
conducted. When taken in the light of petitioner's repeated attempts to have the
proceedings in the murder case suspended and his lawyers' transparent maneuvers for the
needless protraction of the case, the Motion for Recusation can only be viewed as another
dilatory move and the present Motion for Reconsideration a further ploy to stall hearings.
12. ID.; CONDUCT REQUIRED OF A LAWYER BEFORE COURTS AND JUDICIAL OFFICERS. —
The Rules of Court commands members of the bar "[t]o observe and maintain the respect
due to the courts of justice and judicial of cers." Reinforcing this rule of conduct is the
Code of Professional Responsibility which states in Canon 11 the following: "A lawyer shall
observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial of cers and should
insist on similar conduct by others." Rule 11.03 of the Code further states: "A lawyer shall
abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behaviour before the courts."
The next succeeding rule, Rule 11.03 adds: "A lawyer shall not attribute to a judge motives
not supported by the record or having materiality to the case."
13. ID.; ID.; REASON FOR THE REQUIREMENT. — To be sure, the adversarial nature of our
legal system has tempted members of the bar, in pursuing their duty to advance the
interests of their clients, to use strong language. But this privilege is not a license to
malign our courts of justice. Irreverent behavior towards the courts by members of the bar
is proscribed, not so much for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial of ce,
but more importantly, for the maintenance of respect for our judicial system, so necessary
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 for the country's stability. "Time and again, this Court has admonished and punished, in
varying degrees, members of the bar for statements, disrespectful or irreverent,
acrimonious or defamatory, of this Court or the lower courts . . . To be sure, lawyers may
come up with various methods, perhaps more effective, in calling the Court's attention to
the issues involved. The language vehicle does not run short of expressions, emphatic but
respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive."
14. ID.; ID.; AN INSTANCE OF HIGHLY DEROGATORY, OFFENSIVE AND CONTEMPTUOUS
LANGUAGE TOWARD A JUDGE. — Indeed, in the Motion for Reconsideration, counsels for
petitioner describe as "unparalleled for sheer malevolence" respondent judge's allegedly
erroneous assumptions. Petitioner's lawyers further stated: "Petitioner's counsel, citing the
above proceedings, contested the trial judge's baseless, nay despotic attempt to muzzle
his right to be heard in his defense. . ." The trial judge's actions were also branded as an
"obviously unholy rush to do petitioner in . . ." In the Urgent Motion led by petitioner on
December 16, 1992, respondent judge is alleged to have: (a) "generated belief of his being
under contract to do the prosecution's bidding;" (2) "evinced contempt for Supreme Court
case law;" and (3) "dishonored his judicial oath and duty to hear before he condemns,
proceed upon inquiry, and render judgment on a man's liberty only after a full trial of the
facts." . . . In light of the above doctrines and jurisprudence, as well as the inherent power
and authority of this Court to cite members of the Bar in contempt and to discipline them,
we are of the opinion that the language used by petitioner's lawyers is highly derogatory,
offensive and contemptuous.

RESOLUTION

ROMERO , J : p

This is a Motion for Reconsideration of this Court's Resolution dated September 23, 1992
denying petitioner's Petition and af rming the Decision and Resolution promulgated on
March 9, 1992 and June 26, 1992, respectively, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
26305. 1 The CA Decision and Resolution upheld the following: (1) respondent Judge
Benjamin V. Pelayo's Order dated September 4, 1991 which denied petitioner's Motion for
Recusation; and (2) respondent judge's Order dated September 17, 1991 denying
petitioner's Motion to Suspend Proceedings and to Transfer Venue Outside Metro Manila.
A review of the antecedent facts of this case, particularly those wherein respondent Judge
participated, is in order to arrive at a just and correct assessment of his acts vis-a-vis the
petitioner. cdll

On July 2, 1991, Eldon Maguan was shot inside his car along Wilson Street, San Juan,
Metro Manila. After conducting an investigation of the shooting incident, the police
identi ed petitioner Rolito Go as the prime suspect in the commission of the crime. On
July 8, 1991, petitioner, accompanied by two lawyers, presented himself before the San
Juan Police Station. He was arrested and booked for the shooting of Maguan. The police
led a complaint for frustrated homicide with the Of ce of the Provincial Prosecutor of
Rizal.
On July 11, 1991, an information for murder was led against petitioner before the
Regional Trial Court, Pasig, Metro Manila, the victim Eldon Maguan having died on July 9,
1991.
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 On the same day, July 11, 1991, counsel for petitioner led with the Prosecutor an
omnibus motion praying for petitioner's immediate release and for a preliminary
investigation. Provincial Prosecutor Mauro Castro interposed no objection to petitioner's
being granted provisional liberty on a cash bond of P100,000.00.
The case was raf ed to the sala of respondent judge, the Hon. Benjamin V. Pelayo, who, on
July 12, 1991, approved the cash bond posted by petitioner and ordered his release.
On July 16, 1991, respondent judge issued an Order granting leave for the Provincial
Prosecutor of Rizal to conduct a preliminary investigation.
However, on July 17, 1991, respondent judge motu proprio issued an Order 2 which: (a)
recalled the July 12, 1991 Order granting bail; (b) directed petitioner to surrender within 48
hours from notice; (c) cancelled the July 16, 1991 Order granting leave for the Provincial
Prosecutor to conduct a preliminary investigation; (d) treated petitioner's omnibus motion
for immediate release and preliminary investigation dated July 11, 1991 as a petition for
bail.
On July 19, 1991, petitioner led a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
questioning the July 17, 1991 Order of respondent judge. On the same day, petitioner led
before the trial court a motion to suspend all the proceedings pending the resolution of the
petition filed before the Supreme Court. 3 This motion was denied by respondent judge. 4
On July 23, 1991, petitioner voluntarily surrendered to the CAPCOM. Upon motion 5 by
petitioner, the respondent judge issued an Order 6 directing "the accused's continued
detention at the CAPCOM until such time as the Court shall have properly determined the
place where accused should be detained."
On July 29, 1991, the National Bureau of Investigation wrote a letter 7 to the trial court
requesting that custody of petitioner be transferred to the Bureau in view of an
investigation for illegal possession of firearms involving petitioner.

On the same date, July 29, 1991, the trial court issued an Order 8 granting the NBI
temporary custody of petitioner subject to the following conditions: (a) the petitioner is to
be accorded his constitutional rights during the investigation; (b) the NBI investigation is
to be conducted only during of ce hours and petitioner is to be returned to the custody of
the CAPCOM at the end of each day; and (c) the NBI should report to the trial court the
status of the investigation.
On July 30, 1991, petitioner led a motion 9 before the trial court praying that the Order
dated July 29, 1991 be nullified and recalled.
The following day, July 31, 1991, the NBI led a motion 1 0 praying that it be granted full
custody of petitioner pending the investigation of the case involving illegal possession of
firearms.
An Order 1 1 was issued by the trial Court dated August 1, 1991 setting for hearing the
issue concerning the proper venue of petitioner's detention. cdrep

After the hearing on petitioner's custody, the trial court issued an Order 1 2 dated August 2,
1991 ordering the CAPCOM to bring the person of petitioner to the court not later than
August 5, 1991 so that a commitment order for his detention at the Rizal Provincial Jail
could be issued. The Commitment Order 1 3 ordering the Provincial Warden of the
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 Provincial Jail of Pasig to take custody of petitioner was issued on August 5, 1991.
On August 8, 1991, petitioner led a Motion for Recusation 1 4 praying that respondent
judge inhibit himself from hearing the case. The motion was denied by respondent judge in
his Order dated September 4, 1991. 1 5
On August 22, 1991, petitioner led a Motion to Suspend Proceedings and Transfer Venue
Outside Metro Manila which was denied by respondent judge on September 17, 1991. 1 6
Petitioner was arraigned on August 23, 1991. In view of his refusal to enter a plea, a plea of
"Not Guilty" was entered for him by the trial court. 1 7
In the meantime, this Court, by Resolution dated July 24, 1991, remanded to the Court of
Appeals the petition filed by petitioner assailing the July 17, 1991 Order of the trial court.
On August 27, 1991, petitioner led a petition for habeas corpus before the Court of
Appeals.
On September 23, 1991, the Court of Appeals rendered a consolidated decision
dismissing the two petitions. However, upon petition by petitioner, this Court by an 8-6
vote in G.R. No. 101837 issued a decision reversing the, CA decision and ordering (a) the
Provincial Prosecutor to conduct a preliminary investigation; and (b) the release of
petitioner without prejudice to any order that the trial court may issue, should the
Provincial Prosecutor move for cancellation of bail at the conclusion of the preliminary
investigation.
After conducting a preliminary investigation pursuant to this Court's decision in G.R. No.
101837, the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor issued a Resolution dated February 27, 1992
nding probable cause to charge petitioner with the crime of murder. The Resolution was
approved by the Provincial Prosecutor who led with the trial court a motion to cancel the
bail of petitioner and a motion to set the criminal case for resumption of the trial on the
merits.
Petitioner attempted to have the Resolution of the Prosecutor reversed by appealing to the
Department of Justice, and ling petitions with the Court of Appeals (CA, G.R. SP No.
27738) and nally to this Court (G.R. No. 105424), but his efforts did not meet with
success.
On October 1, 1991, petitioner led another petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus before this Court seeking to annul: (1) the Order of the trial court dated
September 4, 1991 denying petitioner's Motion for Recusation; and (2) the Order dated
September 17, 1991 denying petitioner's Motion to Suspend Proceedings and Transfer
Venue Outside Metro Manila. The petition, docketed as G.R. No. 101772, was remanded to
the Court of Appeals.
On March 9, 1992, the Court of Appeals (13th Division) rendered a decision dismissing the
petition. As to the denial of petitioner's Motion for Recusation, the Court of Appeals held in
part:
"On the basis of the allegation of the petition, the Court is not inclined to strike
down the denial of petitioner's motion for recusation as a grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the respondent judge absent any clear showing of such
grave abuse of his discretion. The allegation of petitioner in support of his motion
for recusation are conclusions based on his own fears and are therefore
speculations than anything else.
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 In order to warrant a nding of 'prejudicial' publicity as urged by the petitioner,
there must be allegation and proof that the judge has been unduly in uenced , not
simply that he might be, by the "barrage" of publicity (Martelino vs. Alejandro, 32
SCRA 106; emphasis supplied). While there is such allegation in the petition, the
Court has however found no proof so far adduced suf cient to accept the
petitioner's claim that the respondent judge has been unduly in uenced by the
alleged publicity.

Additionally, We quote hereunder the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the

case of Aparicio vs. Andal, 175 SCRA 569 where, citing the case of Pimentel vs.
Salanga, 21 SCRA 160, it said:
Efforts to attain fair, just and impartial trial and decision, have a
natural and alluring appeal. But, we are not licensed to indulge in
unjusti ed assumptions, or make a speculative approval to this ideal. It ill
behooves this Court to tar and feather a judge as biased or prejudiced,
simply because counsel for a party litigant happens to complain against
him. As applied here, respondent judge has not as yet crossed the line that
divides partiality and impartiality. He has not thus far stepped to one side
of the fulcrum. No act or conduct of his would show arbitrariness or
prejudice. Therefore, we are not to assume what respondent judge, not
otherwise legally disquali ed, will do in a case before him. We have had
occasion to rule in a criminal case that a charge made before trial that a
party 'will not be given a fair, impartial and just hearing' is 'premature.'
Prejudice is not to be presumed. Especially if weighed against a judge's
legal obligation under his oath to administer justice without respect to
person and to equal right to the poor and the rich.' To disqualify or not to
disqualify himself then, as far as respondent judge is concerned, is a
matter of conscience." 1 8

The Court of Appeals also sustained the trial court's denial of petitioner's Motion to
Suspend Proceedings and Transfer Venue Outside Metro Manila with the following
pronouncement: LexLib

"On the question of the denial by the respondent court of petitioner's motion to
suspend proceedings and transfer venue outside of Metro Manila, suf ce it to say
that the respondent court was correct in denying petitioner's motion. For indeed,
the authority to order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of
justice is vested in the Supreme Court by Article VIII, Section 5, paragraph 4 of the
Constitution. Neither the respondent court nor this Court has the authority to grant
petitioner's motion for transfer of venue. The cases cited by petitioner in support
of this issue were all decided by the Supreme Court before the advent of the 1973
Constitution where the provision on transfer of venue was first adopted, hence not
applicable to the instant case." 1 9

Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the CA decision having been denied, 2 0 a

petition under Rule 45 was filed before this Court on July 29, 1992 assailing the decision of
the Court of Appeals. On September 9, 1992, the Of ce of the Solicitor General (OSG),
representing respondent People of the Philippines, filed a Comment on the Petition.
On September 23, 1992, the Court, after considering the allegations contained, issues
raised and the arguments adduced in the Petition, as well as the Comment led by the
OSG, issued a Resolution denying the Petition on the ground that the respondent Court of
Appeals committed no reversible error in its assailed decision.
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 On October 12, 1992, the present Motion for Reconsideration 2 1 was led in which
petitioner reiterates his position that respondent judge should inhibit himself from the
case.
On December 16, 1992, petitioner led a pleading captioned "Urgent Motion (for
preliminary mandatory injunction)." In said Motion, petitioner questioned the Order of the
trial court dated December 9, 1992 denying petitioner's Motion to Reopen Hearing (of the
cancellation of bail proceedings) and to Present Last Witness. It appears that after the
presentation of eleven (11) witnesses by the prosecution and six (6) by the defense, the
trial court considered the question concerning the cancellation of petitioner's bail ripe for
resolution. Thereafter, petitioner filed a Motion to Reopen and Present Last Witness. 2 2 But
the trial court issued an Order 2 3 dated December 9, 1992 which, among other things,
denied the Motion. In the Urgent Motion led with this Court on December 16, 1992,
petitioner prayed "for the issuance forthwith and ex parte of a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction directing respondent judge to allow petitioner to complete his
defense evidence by presenting his last witness on the bail issue . . ." 2 4
On December 29, 1992, the Court passed a Resolution 2 5 issuing a temporary restraining
order (TRO) restraining respondent judge from resolving the bail issue and directing him to
allow petitioner to present his last witness. This Resolution was clari ed and the TRO
confirmed in another Resolution issued by the Court on January 11, 1993. 2 6
On January 8, 1993, the OSG filed a Comment on petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
At the outset, it is noteworthy to observe that petitioner in this Motion for Reconsideration
no longer raises the question of change of venue. Moreover, the Motion for
Reconsideration is predicated on what petitioner alleges are "the supervening events
demonstrating partiality to the prosecution, on one hand, and hostility against petitioner,
on the other." 2 7 Perforce, this Resolution shall only consider the allegations and issues
raised in this Motion for Reconsideration and in the Comment thereon filed by the OSG.

Petitioner's Motion for Recusation led before the trial court is based on Rule 137, sec. 1,
par. 2 of the Rules of Court on disqualification of judges.
The Constitution commands that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to have "a speedy, impartial, and public trial." 2 8 (Emphasis supplied) This right is a
derivation and elaboration of the more fundamental right to due process of law. 2 9 The rule
on the disquali cation of judges is a mechanism for enforcing the requirements of due
process. "It is now beyond dispute that due process cannot be satis ed in the absence of
that degree of objectivity on the part of a judge suf cient to reassure litigants of his being
fair and being just. Thereby there is the legitimate expectation that the decision arrived at
would be the application of the law to the facts as found by a judge who does not play
favorites." 3 0
The "cold neutrality of an impartial judge," 3 1 although required primarily for the bene t of
the litigants, is also designed to preserve the integrity of the judiciary and more
fundamentally, to gain and maintain the people's faith in the institutions they have erected
when they adopted our Constitution. The notion that "justice must satisfy the appearance
of justice" 3 2 is an imposition by the citizenry, as the nal judge of the conduct of public
business, including trials, upon the courts of a high and uncompromising standard in the
proper dispensation of justice.
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 While bias and prejudice, which are relied upon by petitioner, have been recognized as valid
reasons for the voluntary inhibition 3 3 of the judge under Rule 137, sec. 1, par. 2, 3 4 the
established rule is that mere suspicion that a judge is partial is not enough. There should
be clear and convincing evidence to prove the charge. 3 5 Bare allegations of partiality and
prejudgment will not suf ce. 3 6 Bias and prejudice cannot be presumed especially if
weighed against a judge's sacred obligation under his oath of of ce to administer justice
without respect to person and do equal right to the poor and the rich. 3 7
In the Motion for Reconsideration now before the Court, petitioner, to prove his allegation
of bias on the part of respondent judge, takes the latter to task for continuing with the trial
during the pendency of this petition stating that:
"Even as the instant petition for the trial judge's recusation pends, the latter did
not see t to suspend the hearings. Indeed the trial judge has been conducting
marathon hearings which, in the context of his questioned fairness and
impartiality, roars out as a railroad rush to make of cial a pre-determined verdict
of guilt." 3 8

The Court draws the attention of petitioner and his counsels 3 9 to the procedure to be
followed by the judge before whom a motion for disquali cation has been led. Rule 137,
sec. 2 provides: Cdpr

"If it be claimed that an of cial is disquali ed from sitting as above provided, the
party objecting to his competency may, in writing, le with the of cial his
objection, stating the grounds therefor, and the of cial shall thereupon proceed
with the trial, or withdraw therefrom, in accordance with his determination of the
question of his disqualification . . ." (Emphasis supplied)
In People v. Moreno, 4 0 we stated that if a judge denies the motion for disquali cation and
rules favorably on his competency to try the case, it becomes a matter of of cial duty for
him to proceed with the trial and decision of the case. He cannot shirk the responsibility
without the risk of being called upon to account for his dereliction. Although this case was
decided prior to the introduction of par. 2 of Rule 137, sec. 1, there is no reason why the
procedure laid down in Rule 137, sec. 2 and applied in People v. Moreno should not
likewise apply to a motion for inhibition led pursuant to Rule 137, sec. 1, par. 2. 4 1 In fact,
i n Genoblazo v. Court of Appeals , 4 2 the Court applied the procedure prescribed in Rule
137, sec. 2 when the trial judge denied a party's motion for inhibition under Rule 137, sec.
1, par. 2, thus:
"Moreover, the trial judge acted correctly in proceeding with the case by setting it
for pre-trial since it is within her sound discretion, after her decision in favor of her
own competency, to either proceed with the trial or refrain from acting on the case
until determination of the issue of her disquali cation by the appellate court
[Section 2 of Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court; De la Paz v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, supra, at 76]. 4 3

Hence, if the trial judge decides to deny a motion for inhibition based on Rule 137, sec. 1,
par. 2, he shall proceed with the trial, unless of course restrained by either the Court of
Appeals or by this Court. The mere filing of a motion for inhibition before the trial court or a
petition before either the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court challenging an order of
the trial judge denying a motion for inhibition will not deprive the judge of authority to
proceed with the case. Otherwise, by the expedient of ling such motion or petition,
although the same be lacking in merit, a party can unduly delay the trial.

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 In the case at hand, respondent judge acted in accordance with the Rules and prevailing
jurisprudence when he proceeded with the trial after denying petitioner's Motion for
Recusation. Petitioner cannot, therefore, cite the fact that respondent judge did not
suspend hearing the case during the pendency of this petition as proof of his claim that
the judge is partial. This Court has not, in connection with the petition, issued a temporary
restraining order (TRO) enjoining respondent judge from further hearing the case. The TRO
which this Court issued on December 29, 1992 after the petition was denied and pending
this Motion for Reconsideration ordered the judge to desist from resolving the question on
the cancellation of bail until the last witness of petitioner was heard. The TRO did not
restrain the judge from hearing the case. On the contrary, the judge was ordered to hear
petitioner's last witness in the cancellation of bail proceedings. 4 4 Because it was his duty
to continue trying the case and there was no order from this Court not to do so,
respondent judge committed no impropriety evincing partiality when he continued hearing
the case during the pendency of the petition before this Court.
Petitioner, in this Motion for Reconsideration, claims that since the issuance of the Court
Resolution dated September 23, 1992 denying his Petition, there have been "supervening
events demonstrating partiality to the prosecution on one hand, and hostility against
petitioner, on the other hand." 4 5 Petitioner alleges:
"Pursuing his unconstitutional bent rst evinced when, without bene t of
preliminary investigation, petitioner's arraignment and trial, then arrest and
detention for almost a year was peremptorily ordered — which this Court reversed
and rebuked (G.R. no. 101837, promulgated 11 February 1992) — the
unchastened trial judge let out yet with two palpably biased and hostile orders,
infra, clearly and unmistakably demonstrating an unconstitutional prejudgment
of petitioner's culpability." 4 6

The rst of these allegedly "palpably biased and hostile orders" was that issued by
respondent judge on August 14, 1992 overruling petitioner's objection to the admissibility
of an af davit of Geronimo Gonzaga offered by the prosecution. Petitioner contends that
respondent judge should not have admitted the extrajudicial statements of Gonzaga
because the latter did not take the witness stand to af rm the statements contained in the
document presented by the prosecution. Petitioner suspected that respondent judge was
trying to bolster the evidence for the prosecution.
This contention is without merit. The mere fact that the trial judge overruled petitioner's
objection to the admissibility of a particular piece of evidence is not proof of bias. In
Jandionco v. Peñaranda , 4 7 it was held that "[d]ivergence of opinions between a judge
hearing a case and a party's counsel, as to applicable laws and jurisprudence, is not a
suf cient ground to disqualify the judge from hearing the case on the ground of bias and
manifest partiality." 4 8 If petitioner disagrees with the judge's ruling, he may still question
the admissibility of the evidence when he les an appeal, in case a judgment of conviction
is rendered. To conclude, however, that respondent judge, by overruling the objection
raised by petitioner's counsel, was trying to strengthen the prosecution's evidence is not
only baseless because there was no evidence given to support this conclusion, but also
premature because at that stage, the judge was not yet appreciating the merits and weight
of the particular piece of evidence in question but was merely ruling on its admissibility.
Petitioner's conclusion that "the offer and admission of Gonzaga's hearsay 'eyewitness'
statement suggest a sinister concert to simulate evidential strength" 4 9 is, if not
suggestive of paranoia, at the very least, an overreaction.
The other supervening event allegedly demonstrating the judge's partiality occurred during
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 one of the hearings concerning the prosecution's motion for the cancellation of petitioner's
bail. On September 28, 1992, after eleven (11) witnesses had been presented for the
prosecution and two (2) for the defense, respondent judge considered the cancellation of
bail proceedings ripe for resolution and refused to allow petitioner's counsel to present
anymore witnesses. The reasons given by respondent judge for his ruling were: (1) the
proceeding in the cancellation of bail is summary and different from the hearing on the
merits; (2) the court need not receive exactly the same number of witnesses from both the
prosecution and the defense; and (3) the counsel for petitioner previously limited himself
to two (2) witnesses as borne out by the record of the case. 5 0

Respondent judge is correct in appreciating the nature of the bail proceedings. "[T]he
hearing of an application for bail should be summary or otherwise in the discretion of the
court. By 'summary hearing' [is] meant such brief and speedy method of receiving and
considering the evidence of guilt as is practicable and consistent with the purpose of the
hearing which is merely to determine the weight of the evidence for the purpose of bail. In
such a hearing, the court 'does not sit to try the merits or to enter into any nice inquiry as to
the weight that ought to be allowed to the evidence for or against accused, nor will it
speculate on the outcome of the trial or on what further evidence may be therein offered is
admitted.' . . . The course of the inquiry may be left to the discretion of the court which may
con ne itself to receiving such evidence as has reference to substantial matters avoiding
unnecessary thoroughness in the examination and cross-examination of witnesses and
reducing to a reasonable minimum the amount of corroboration particularly on details that
are not essential to the purpose of the hearing." 5 1
Although the proceedings conducted by respondent judge were not for an application for
bail but to cancel that which was issued to petitioner, the principles and procedure
governing hearings on an application for bail were correctly applied by respondent judge in
the cancellation of bail proceedings since the bail was issued by this Court in G.R. No.
101837 without prejudice to any lawful order which the trial court may issue in case the
Provincial Prosecutor moves for the cancellation of the bail. 5 2 The grant of bail was made
without prejudice because where bail is not a matter of right, as in this case, the
prosecution must be given the opportunity to prove that there is a strong evidence of guilt.
5 3 In the cancellation of bail proceedings before him, the judge was confronted with the
same issue as in an application for bail, i.e., whether the evidence of guilt is so strong as to
convince the court that the accused is not entitled to bail. Hence, the similarity of the
nature and procedure of the hearings for an application for bail and the cancellation of the
same. cdrep

Having determined that respondent judge made a proper appreciation of the nature of the
bail proceedings before him, we likewise hold that it was within his discretion to limit the
number of witnesses for petitioner. The power of the court in the bail proceedings to make
a determination as to whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong "implies a full exercise
of judicial discretion." 5 4 If the trial judge believes that the evidence before him is suf cient
for him to rule on the bail issue, after giving both parties their opportunity to present
evidence, it is within his authority to consider the bail proceedings ripe for resolution. In
any case, respondent judge acceded to petitioner's request and allowed him to present
more witnesses in the bail proceedings.
In ne, the Court holds that the respondent judge's ruling on September 28, 1992
considering the prosecution's motion for cancellation of bail ripe for resolution on the
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 basis of the evidence already presented was not motivated by bias or prejudice.
Finally, petitioner, in this Motion for Reconsideration, restates his argument in the Petition
that the respondent judge is biased, as evidenced by his Order dated July 17, 1991 5 5
which in effect allowed petitioner's arraignment and trial without the bene t of a
preliminary investigation.
It is true that in Go v. Court of Appeals, et al. , G.R. No. 101837, February 11, 1992, a divided
Court nulli ed respondent judge's July 17, 1991 Order and ordered that a preliminary
investigation be conducted. But the erroneous Order of respondent judge is not
necessarily proof of partiality. In People v. Lacson, 5 6 we held that erroneous rulings do not
always constitute evidence of bias. 5 7 In Luciano v. Mariano , 5 8 we made the
pronouncement that "[t]he mere fact that the judge has erroneously ruled against the same
litigant on two or more occasions does not create in our minds a decisive pattern of
malice on the part of the judge against that particular litigant. This is not an unusual
occurrence in our courts . . ." Moreover, the fact that the erroneous order issued by a judge
can be remedied and was actually corrected, as in this case, militates against the
disqualification of the judge on the ground of bias or partiality. 5 9
We have earlier underscored the importance of the rule of disquali cation of judges, not
only in safeguarding the rights of litigants to due process of law but also in earning for the
judiciary the people's con dence, an element so essential in the effective administration of
justice. The rule should, therefore, not be used cavalierly to suit a litigant's personal
designs or to defeat the ends of justice. "While We are exacting on the conduct of judges
confronted with motions for disquali cation's, We cannot, however, tolerate acts of
litigants who, for any conceivable reason, seek to disqualify a judge for their own purpose,
under a plea of bias, hostility, prejudice or prejudgment . . . [T]his Court does not approve
the tactic of some litigants of ling of baseless motion for disquali cation of the judge as
a means of delaying the case and/or of forum-shopping for a more friendly judge." 6 0
In the case at hand, the Motion for Recusation led by petitioner must be viewed in the
light of his lawyers' many attempts to suspend the proceedings before the respondent
judge. Before the trial court, petitioner tried at least eight (8) times, not merely to reset the
scheduled hearings, 6 1 but to suspend the trial of the case itself. The following pleadings
led by petitioner before respondent judge all prayed either to suspend the proceedings
entirely or for the respondent judge to delay the disposition of a particular issue:
CAPTION OF PLEADING DATE OF FILING
1. Urgent Ex-Parte Motion July 19, 1991
2. Motion to Hold in Abeyance August 2, 1991
3. Motion for Recusation August 8, 1991
4. Motion to Suspend Proceedings
and Transfer Venue Outside
Metro Manila August 22, 1991
5. Motion to Suspend Proceedings March 4, 1991
6. Second Motion to Inhibit March 2, 1992
7. Motion to Suspend Action on
Formal Offer of Evidence and on
Submission of Memorandum Dec. 21, 1992
8. Motion to Reopen Hearing and
Present Last Witness Dec. 1, 1992

Before this Court, petitioner has already led three (3) petitions assailing various orders of
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 respondent judge in connection with the single murder case pending against him. Apart
from the present petition which is docketed as G.R. No. 106087, petitioner has previously
led two (2) other petitions docketed as G.R. Nos. 101837 and 105424. In all three (3)
petitions, petitioner applied for a temporary restraining order to have the proceedings
before the trial court held in abeyance.
The murder case involving only one accused, the petitioner, has become unnecessarily
complicated and the proceedings before the trial court protracted, as can be gleaned from
the fact that between the ling of the information on July 11, 1991 and the end of last year
or December 31, 1992, the records of the case now consist of four (4) volumes and the
transcript of stenographic notes have reached a total of one thousand ve hundred and
twenty three (1523) pages. Hearings are still being conducted.
When taken in the light of petitioner's repeated attempts to have the proceedings in the
murder case suspended and his lawyers' transparent maneuvers for the needless
protraction of the case, the Motion for Recusation can only be viewed as another dilatory
move and the present Motion for Reconsideration a further ploy to stall hearings.
In sum, after a careful examination of the records of the case, including the transcript of
stenographic notes, and considering the applicable law, the pertinent rules and prevailing
jurisprudence, we reiterate our holding in the Court Resolution dated September 23, 1992
that the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in af rming the respondent
judge's Order which denied petitioner's Motion for Recusation. This extended Resolution
should put an end to petitioner's obvious attempts at deferring the trial of his principal
case by dwelling on incidental matters. The motion for reconsideration must, perforce, be
denied with finality.
In the Comment on the petitioner's Motion for Recusation, the Solicitor General prays that
Attys. Raymundo A. Armovit, Miguel R. Armovit and Rafael R. Armovit, be disciplinarily dealt
with by this Court for allegedly using abusive and intemperate language against
respondent judge which betrays disrespect to the trial court. LLjur

Indeed, in the Motion for Reconsideration, counsels for petitioner describe as "unparalleled
for sheer malevolence" 6 2 respondent judge's allegedly erroneous assumptions.
Petitioner's lawyers further stated: "Petitioner's counsel, citing the above proceedings,
contested the trial judge's baseless, nay despotic attempt to muzzle his right to be heard
in his defense . . ." 6 3 The trial judge's actions were also branded as an "obviously unholy
rush to do petitioner in . . ." 6 4
In the Urgent Motion led by petitioner on December 16, 1992, respondent judge is alleged
to have: (1) "generated belief of his being under contract to do the prosecution's bidding;"
(2) "evinced contempt for Supreme Court case law;" and (3) "dishonored his judicial oath
and duty to hear before he condemns, proceed upon inquiry, and render judgment on a
man's liberty only after a full trial of the facts." 6 5
The Rules of Court commands members of the bar "[t]o observe and maintain the respect
due to the courts of justice and judicial of cers." 6 6 Reinforcing this rule of conduct is the
Code of Professional Responsibility which states in Canon 11 the following: "A lawyer shall
observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial of cers and should
insist on similar conduct by others." Rule 11.03 of the Code further states: "A lawyer shall
abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behaviour before the courts."
The next succeeding rule, Rule 11.03 adds: "A lawyer shall not attribute to a judge motives
not supported by the record or having materiality to the case."
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 To be sure, the adversarial nature of our legal system has tempted members of the bar, in
pursuing their duty to advance the interests of their clients, to use strong language. But
this privilege is not a license to malign our courts of justice. Irreverent behavior towards
the courts by members of the bar is proscribed, not so much for the sake of the temporary
incumbent of the judicial of ce, but more importantly, for the maintenance of respect for
our judicial system, so necessary for the country's stability. "Time and again, this Court has
admonished and punished, in varying degrees, members of the bar for statements,
disrespectful or irreverent, acrimonious or defamatory, of this Court or the lower courts . . .
To be sure, lawyers may come up with various methods, perhaps more effective, in calling
the Court's attention to the issues involved. The language vehicle does not run short of
expressions, emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not
offensive." 67
In light of the above doctrines and jurisprudence, as well as the inherent power and
authority of this Court to cite members of the Bar in contempt and to discipline them, we
are of the opinion that the language used by petitioner's lawyers is highly derogatory,
offensive and contemptuous.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED with
FINALITY. Attys. Raymundo A. Armovit, Miguel R. Armovit and Rafael R. Armovit are hereby
ordered to pay a FINE of P500.00 each with a stern WARNING that a repetition of this or
similar act and language will be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this Resolution be
attached to their records.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, Bidin, Davide, Jr. and Melo, JJ ., concur.

Footnotes

1. Penned by Justice Arturo B. Buena with the concurrence of Justices Minerva P. Gonzaga-
Reyes and Quirino D. Abad Santos Jr.

2. Records, Vol. 1, p. 36.

3. Records, Vol. 1, pp. 103-104.

4. Records, Vol. 1, p. 105.

5. Records, Vol. 1, pp. 113-114.

6. Records, Vol. 1, p. 117.

7. Records, Vol. 1, p. 118.

8. Records, Vol. 1, p. 123.

9. Records, Vol. 1, pp. 125-128.

10. Records, Vol. 1, pp. 136-137.

11. Records, Vol. 1, p. 138.

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 12. Records, Vol. 1, p. 141.
13. Records, Vol. 1, p. 170.

14. Records, Vol. 1, pp. 172-179.

15. Records, Vol. 1, pp. 255-257.

16. Records, Vol. 1, p. 263.

17. Records, Vol. 1, pp. 211-212.

18. CA Decision (CA - G.R. SP No. 26305, March 9, 1992), pp. 7-8; Rollo, pp. 143-144.

19. Id., p. 8; Rollo, p. 144.

20. CA Resolution (CA - G.R. SP No. 26305, June 26, 1992); Rollo, pp. 147-148.
21. The pleading is captioned "Supplemental Petition and/or Motion for Reconsideration (re the
trial judge's inhibition)."

22. Rollo, pp. 227-231.

23. The full text of the Order is as follows:

"ORDER

After hearing the arguments of the defense and that of the prosecution and after taking into
consideration, as pointed out earlier by the Court that it has already heard enough from
the evidence submitted by prosecution and defense, the Court feels that the motion for
cancellation of bail is ripe for resolution, and in view thereof, the instant motion to
reopen proceedings is hereby DENIED.

As far as the motion of prosecution to consider the incident on the cancellation of bail
submitted for resolution on the basis of the evidence thus far presented by the
prosecution and defense, and to consider the defense to have waived its right to le its
formal offer of evidence, in the interest of substantial justice and for humanitarian
reason, the said motion is DENIED and defense is given up to Monday within which to
le its formal offer of evidence, copy furnished the counsel for the prosecution, who
upon receipt is given two days within which to le its comment/opposition thereto, with
or without which, the incident on the formal offer of evidence shall be deemed submitted
for resolution.

The parties are given ve (5) days from receipt of the Court's ruling on the formal offer of
evidence by defense within which to le their simultaneous memoranda, with or without
which, the incident on the cancellation of bail shall be deemed submitted for resolution.
SO ORDERED."

24. Petitioner's Urgent Motion (for preliminary mandatory injunction), p. 1; Rollo, p. 220.

25. Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. was on leave while the ponente dissented. During the
deliberations on petitioner's Urgent Motion (for preliminary mandatory injunction), the
ponente expressed the following reasons for her dissent to the Resolution: (1) the trial
court's Order of December 16, 1992 denying petitioner's Motion to Reopen and Present
Last Witness is not the subject of the present petition and cannot be dealt with here; the
instant petition concerns the Court of Appeals decision upholding the trial court's Order
dated September 4, 1991 denying petitioner's Motion for Recusation and Order dated
September 17, 1991 denying petitioner's Motion to Suspend Proceedings and to Transfer
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 Venue Outside Metro Manila; and (2) petitioner failed to show that his last witness could
not have been presented before the trial court considered the cancellation for bail
proceedings submitted for resolution.

26. Infra, note 44.

27. Supplemental Petition and/or Motion for Reconsideration (re the trial judge's inhibition), p.
3; Rollo, p. 200.

28. Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 14 (2).

29. Constitution, Art. III, sections 1 and 14 (1).

Art. III, sec. 1 provides:

"Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law,
nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws."

Art. III, sec. 14 (1) provides:

"Section 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process
of law."

30. Mateo, Jr. v. Villaluz, G.R. No. L-34756-59, March 31, 1973, 50 SCRA 18, 23.

31. "It has been said, in fact, that due process of law requires a hearing before an impartial and
disinterested tribunal, and that every litigant is entitled to nothing less than the cold
neutrality of an impartial judge." (Gutierrez v. Santos, G.R. No. L-15824, May 30, 1961, 2
SCRA 249, 254).

32. Offutt v. United States, 99 L Ed 11, 16 (1954).

33. The terms inhibition and disquali cation are used interchangeably in this Resolution. See
Del Castillo v. Javelona, supra , note 40, for the view that there is no need to make a ne
distinction between inhibition and disquali cation because they may mean the same
thing and bring about the same result.

34. People v. Tuazon, G.R. No. 74799, March 28, 1988, 159 SCRA 315; People v. Serrano, G.R.
No. 44712, October 28, 1991, 203 SCRA 171.

35. Beltran v. Garcia, G.R. No. L-30868, September 30, 1971, 41 SCRA 158; Aparicio v. Andal,
G.R. Nos. 86587-93, July 25, 1989, 175 SCRA 569.
36. Genoblazo v. Court of Appeals, infra, note 52.

37. Pimentel v. Salanga, G.R. No. L-27934, September 18, 1967, 21 SCRA 161.

38. Supplemental Petition and/or Motion for Reconsideration (re the trial judge's inhibition), p.
2; Rollo, p. 199.
39. The Motion for Recusation was led by the Law Firm of Atty. Raymundo A. Armovit
composed of Attys. Raymundo A. Armovit, Miguel R. Armovit and Rafael R. Armovit, on
behalf of petitioner. On October 3, 1991, the Law Firm of Atty. Raymundo A. Armovit
withdrew its appearance before the trial court as counsel for petitioner. Atty. Carlos Z.
Ambrosio took over for a while but in May 27, 1992, Atty. Prospero A. Cresini substituted
Atty. Ambrosio. In this present Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner is represented by
the Law Firm of Atty. Raymundo A. Armovit again.

40. People v. Moreno, 83 Phil. 286 (1949).

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 41. The Court in an obiter dictum in Geotina v. Gonzales, G.R. No. L-26310, September 30, 1971,
41 SCRA 66, stated that Rule 137, sec. 2 applies to par. 2 of Rule 137, sec. 1.

42. G.R. No. 79303, June 20, 1989, 124 SCRA 124.

43. Id., at 134-135.

44. On January 11, 1993, the Court issued a Resolution con rming and clarifying the TRO
issued on December 29, 1992, thus:

"Acting on the urgent motion for the issuance of a preliminary mandatory injunction led by
counsel for petitioner, this Court, in issuing the temporary restraining order directed the
trial court to allow petitioner to present his last witness provided that he shall be heard in
only one hearing, after which the incident shall be deemed submitted for resolution. The
trial court shall immediately rule thereon without waiting for further instruction from this
Court.

The Court hereby CONFIRMS the temporary restraining order issued on December 29, 1992."
45. Supra, note 27.

46. Supplemental Petition and/or Motion for Reconsideration (re the trial judge's inhibition), p.
2; Rollo, p. 199.
47. G.R. No. 79284, November 27, 1987, 155 SCRA 725.

48. Id, at 731.

49. Supplemental Petition and/or Motion for Reconsideration (re the trial judge's inhibition), p.
3; Rollo, p. 200.

50. TSN, September 28, 1992, pp. 3-4.

51. Ocampo v. Bernabe, 77 Phil. 55, 62 (1946).

52. Go v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 101837, February 11, 1992, 206 SCRA 138, 162.

53. People v. Calo, Jr., G.R. No. 88531, June 18, 1990, 186 SCRA 620.
54. Herras Teehankee v. Director of Prisons, 76 Phil. 756, 770 (1946).

55. Supra, note 2.

56. G.R. No. L-8188, February 13, 1961, 1 SCRA 414.

57. Cf., Heirs of Julio Rosas v. Reyes, G.R. No. 91406, July 31, 1990, 188 SCRA 236.

58. Adm. Case No. 181-J, March 31, 1971, 38 SCRA 176, 183-184.
59. Rosello v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. L-46274, L-46549, December 14, 1988, 168 SCRA 459.

60. People v. Serrano, G.R. No. L-44712, October 28, 1991, 203 SCRA 171, 186-187.

61. As of the writing of this Resolution, petitioner has led ve (5) written motions to reset
hearings dated September 26, 1991, May 13, 1992, June 11, 1992, January 7, 1992 and
February 16, 1993. These do not include petitioners' oral motions for postponement.

62. Rollo, p. 200.

63. Rollo, p. 201.

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 64. Rollo, p. 207.

65. Rollo, p. 221.

66. Rule 138, sec. 20(b).

67. Rheem of the Philippines v. Ferrer, G.R. No. L-22979, June 26, 1967, 20 SCRA 441, 445 citing
Perkins v. Perkins, 57 Phil. 223, 226; Salcedo v. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724; Medina v.
Rivera, 66 Phil. 151, 157; In re Franco, 67 Phil. 312, 316; People v. Carillo, 77 Phil. 572,
579-580, 583; In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595, 601-602; People v. Venturanza, 98 Phil. 211, 217;
De Joya v. Court of First Instance of Rizal, 99 Phil. 907, 915-916; Sison v. Sandejas, L-
9270, April 29, 1959; Paragas v. Cruz (Resolution), L-24433, July 30, 1965.

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