The Grammatical and Ordinary Sense of The Words May Be Modified, So As To Avoid Absurdity and Inconsistency, But No Further"
The Grammatical and Ordinary Sense of The Words May Be Modified, So As To Avoid Absurdity and Inconsistency, But No Further"
1
This became known as "Lord Wensleydale's golden rule". It only applies where the
words are ambiguous. An interpretation that is not absurd is to be preferred to one that
is.
In River Wear Commissioners v Adamson [1876-77] LR 2 App Cas 743.
HELD - ‘we are to take the whole statute together, and construe it all together, giving
the words their ordinary signification, unless when so applied they produce an
inconsistency, or an absurdity or inconvenience so great as to convince the Court that
the intention could not have been to use them in their ordinary signification, and to
justify the Court in putting on them some other signification, which, though less
proper, is one which the Court thinks the words will bear.’
The rule is thus stated by the Irish Judge, Burton, J., in Warburton v. Loveland,
(1828) 1 Hud and Bro pp.632 in terms quoted and approved by Lord Fitzgerald
in Bradlaugh v. Clarke, (1883) 8 AC at p. 384.
“I apprehend it is a rule in the construction of statutes that in the first instance the
grammatical sense of the words is to be adhered to. If that is contrary to, or
inconsistent with, any expressed intention or declared purpose of the statute, or if it
would involve any absurdity, repugnancy or inconsistency, the grammatical sense
must then be modified, extended or abridged, so far as to avoid such an
inconvenience, but no further.”
ILLUSTRATIVE CASES
R v Allen [1872] LR 1 CCR 367.
Offences Against the Person Act 1861 - Section 57 - offence to ‘marry’ whilst the
original spouse was still alive. The Defendant who charged with bigamy argued that
he did not marry as he could not ‘legally marry’ as he was not divorced. The court
held the word ‘marry’ means ‘to go through a ceremony of marriage’.
Re Sigsworth (1935).
A son had murdered his mother and as the mother had not made a will the estate was
to be distributed to her nearest next of kin under the Administration of Estates Act
1925.
This meant that her son would have inherited as her ‘issue’. The court had a problem
with this on public policy grounds, in that it was repugnant for a murderer to benefit
from the killing. The court applied the golden rule in preference to the literal rule and
interpreted the word ‘issue’ so as to exclude someone who had killed the deceased.
2
Adler v George: QBD 7, [1964] 1 All ER 628
Under section 3 of the Official Secrets Act 1920, it was an offence to obstruct HM
Forces in the vicinity of a prohibited place. Mr Frank Adler had in fact been arrested
whilst obstructing such forces within such a prohibited place (Markham Royal Air
Force Station, Norfolk).
He argued that he was not in the vicinity of a prohibited place.
Held - Applying the golden rule of statutory interpretation, he was guilty. ‘In the
vicinity of’ should be interpreted to mean in or near the prohibited place.
If the literal rule had been applied, it would have produced absurdity, as someone
protesting near the base would be committing an offence whilst someone protesting in
it would not.
In Kehar Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.),AIR 1988 SC 1883 -
the Supreme Court has observed that there is a change in the approach of the Courts
in the interpretation of the Statute and what was considered as the golden rule
previously laying emphasis on “grammatical meaning” is now changed over to
“intention of legislature” or “purpose of Statute”.
M. Pentiah Vs Veeramallappa, 1961 SCR (2) 295: -
The respondent were elected member of municipal committee under Hyderabad
municipal and town committee act 1951 which was repealed by the Hyderabad
District Municipality Act 1956.
The act of 1956, however provided that the committee constituted under the act of
1951 would continue till the first meeting of the committee elected under the act of
1956 was called. Since no elections were held the old committee continue in office for
more than three years, the maximum period provided for a committee to hold office
under the Act of 1951. The appellant prayed for a writ of quo warranto.
The SC held - if more than one construction were possible the one which was
narrower and failed to achieve the object of the Act should fail. The Act should be so
interpreted as to avoid absurdity.
In the present case since the Act of 1956 continue with the committee constituted
under the Act of 1951 till election took place and the first meeting of new elected
members held, it is reasonable to hold the provision of maximum period of tenure of
the committee under old Act should also stand under new Act. Therefore, if no
elections are held, the members of the committee automatically ceased to be member
after the expiry of three year period.
3
Lee v. Knapp, (1966) 3 AH ER 961.
Section 77(1) of the Road Traffic Act, 1960, provided that “a driver causing accident
shall stop after the accident”,
the interpretation of the word “stop” was in question.
In this case, the driver of the motor vehicle stopped for a moment after causing an
accident and then ran away.
Applying the golden rule the court held that the driver had not fulfilled the
requirement of the section, as he had not stopped for a reasonable period so as to
enable interested persons to make necessary inquiries from him about the accident at
the spot of the accident.
PROBLEMS WITH THE GOLDEN RULE
a) Judges are able to add or change the meaning of statutes and thereby become law
makers infringing the separation of powers.
b) Judges have no power to intervene for pure injustice where there is no absurdity.
ADVANTAGES OF THE GOLDEN RULE
i. Errors in drafting can be corrected immediately
ii. Decisions are generally more in line with Parliament's intention
iii. Closes loopholes
iv. Often gives a more just result
v. Brings common sense to the law
CONCLUSION
Unless the words are without meaning or absurd, it would be safe to give words their
natural meaning because the framer is presumed to use the language which conveys
the intention and it would not be in accord with any sound principle of construction to
refuse to give effect to the provisions of a statute on the very elusive ground that to
give them their ordinary meaning leads to consequences which are not in accord with
the notions justice entertained by the Court.