Case A.9 Chavez V Nha

8/4/2016 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 530
VOL. 530, AUGUST 15, 2007 235

Chavez vs. National Housing Authority
*
G.R. No. 164527. August 15, 2007.
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL

HOUSING AUTHORITY, RII BUILDERS, INC., RII
HOLDINGS, INC., HARBOUR CENTRE PORT
TERMINAL, INC., and MR. REGHIS ROMERO II,
respondents.
Judicial Review; Locus Standi; Taxpayer’s Suit; In cases

where issues of transcendental public importance are presented,
there is no necessity to show that petitioner has experienced or is in
actual danger of suffering direct and personal injury as the
requisite injury is assumed; Issues averred to be in breach of the
fair diffusion of the country’s natural resources and the
constitutional right of a citizen to information are matters of
transcendental public importance.—Only a person who stands to
be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or entitled to
the avails of the suit can file a complaint or petition. Respondents
claim that petitioner is not a proper partyininterest as he was
unable to show that “he has sustained or is in immediate or
imminent danger of sustaining some direct and personal injury as
a result of the execution and enforcement of the assailed contracts
or agreements.” Moreover, they assert that not all government
contracts can justify a taxpayer’s suit especially when no public
funds were utilized in contravention of the Constitution or a law.
We explicated in Chavez v. PCGG, 299 SCRA 744 (1998), that in
cases where issues of transcendental public importance are
presented, there is no necessity to show that petitioner has
experienced or is in actual danger of suffering direct and personal
injury as the requisite injury is assumed. We find our ruling in
Chavez v. PEA, 384 SCRA 152 (2002), as conclusive authority on
locus standi in the case at bar since the issues raised in this
petition are averred to be in breach of the fair diffusion of the
country’s natural resources and the constitutional right of a
citizen to information which have been declared to be matters of
transcendental public importance. Moreover, the pleadings
especially those of respondents readily reveal that public funds
have been indirectly utilized in the Project by means of Smokey
http://central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/000001565571c13a65a60129003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/104
Mountain Project Participation Certificates (SMPPCs) bought by

some government agencies. Hence, petitioner,
_______________
* EN BANC.
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236 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
as a taxpayer, is a proper party to the instant petition before the

court.
Same; Hierarchy of Courts; While direct recourse to the
Supreme Court is generally frowned upon and discouraged, such
resort may be allowed if the redress desired cannot be obtained in
the appropriate courts or where exceptional compelling
circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and calling for
the exercise of the Supreme Court’s primary jurisdiction; Serious
constitutional challenges allegedly affecting the right of Filipinos
to the distribution of natural resources in the country and the right
to information of a citizen compel the Court to turn a blind eye to
the judicial structure meant to provide an orderly dispensation of
justice and consider the instant petition as a justified deviation
from an established precept.—While direct recourse to this Court
is generally frowned upon and discouraged, we have however
ruled in Santiago v. Vasquez, 217 SCRA 633 (1993), that such
resort to us may be allowed in certain situations, wherein this
Court ruled that petitions for certiorari, prohibition, or
mandamus, though cognizable by other courts, may directly be
filed with us if “the redress desired cannot be obtained in the
appropriate courts or where exceptional compelling circumstances
justify availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of
[this Court’s] primary jurisdiction.” The instant petition
challenges the constitutionality and legality of the SMDRP
involving several hectares of government land and hundreds of
millions of funds of several government agencies. Moreover,
serious constitutional challenges are made on the different
aspects of the Project which allegedly affect the right of Filipinos
to the distribution of natural resources in the country and the
right to information of a citizen—matters which have been
considered to be of extraordinary significance and grave
consequence to the public in general. These concerns in the
instant action compel us to turn a blind eye to the judicial

structure meant to provide an orderly dispensation of justice and
consider the instant petition as a justified deviation from an
established precept.
Natural Resources; Judgments; Stare Decisis; Chavez v.
Public Estates Authority (PEA), 384 SCRA 152 (2002), is not a
binding precedent to the instant petition because the facts in said
case are substantially different from the facts and circumstances
in the case at bar.—The Court finds that PEA is not a binding
precedent to the
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instant petition because the facts in said case are substantially

different from the facts and circumstances in the case at bar,
thus: (1) The reclamation project in PEA was undertaken through
a JVA entered into between PEA and AMARI. The reclamation
project in the instant NHA case was undertaken by the NHA, a
national government agency in consultation with PEA and with
the approval of two Philippine Presidents; (2) In PEA, AMARI
and PEA executed a JVA to develop the Freedom Islands and
reclaim submerged areas without public bidding on April 25,
1995. In the instant NHA case, the NHA and RBI executed a JVA
after RBI was declared the winning bidder on August 31, 1992 as
the JVA partner of the NHA in the SMDRP after compliance with
the requisite public bidding. (3) In PEA, there was no law or
presidential proclamation classifying the lands to be reclaimed as
alienable and disposal lands of public domain. In this RBI case,
MO 415 of former President Aquino and Proclamation No. 39 of
then President Ramos, coupled with Special Patents Nos. 3591,
3592, and 3598, classified the reclaimed lands as alienable and
disposable; (4) In PEA, the Chavez petition was filed before the
amended JVA was executed by PEA and AMARI. In this NHA
case, the JVA and subsequent amendments were already
substantially implemented. Subsequently, the Project was
terminated through a MOA signed on August 27, 2003. Almost
one year later on August 5, 2004, the Chavez petition was filed;
(5) In PEA, AMARI was considered to be in bad faith as it signed
the amended JVA after the Chavez petition was filed with the
Court and after Senate Committee Report No. 560 was issued
finding that the subject lands are inalienable lands of public
domain. In the instant petition, RBI and other respondents are
considered to have signed the agreements in good faith as the
Project was terminated even before the Chavez petition was filed;
(6) The PEAAMARI JVA was executed as a result of direct
negotiation between the parties and not in accordance with the
BOT Law. The NHARBI JVA and subsequent amendments
constitute a BOT contract governed by the BOT Law; and (7) In
PEA, the lands to be reclaimed or already reclaimed were
transferred to PEA, a government entity tasked to dispose of
public lands under Executive Order No. (EO) 525. In the NHA
case, the reclaimed lands were transferred to NHA, a government
entity NOT tasked to dispose of public land and therefore said
alienable lands were converted to patrimonial lands upon their
transfer to NHA. Thus the PEA Decision cannot be considered an
authority or precedent to the
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instant case. The principle of stare decisis has no application to

the different factual setting of the instant case.
Reclamation Projects; Public Estates Authority (PEA);
Requisites for Legal and Valid Reclamation Projects.—EO 525
reads: Section 1. The Public Estates Authority (PEA) shall be
primarily responsible for integrating, directing, and
coordinating all reclamation projects for and on behalf of the
National Government. All reclamation projects shall be approved
by the President upon recommendation of the PEA, and shall be
undertaken by the PEA or through a proper contract executed by
it with any person or entity; Provided, that, reclamation
projects of any national government agency or entity
authorized under its charter shall be undertaken in
consultation with the PEA upon approval of the President.
(Emphasis supplied.) The aforequoted provision points to three (3)
requisites for a legal and valid reclamation project, viz.: (1)
approval by the President; (2) favorable recommendation of PEA;
and (3) undertaken by any of the following: a. by PEA, b. by any
person or entity pursuant to a contract it executed with PEA, and
c. by the National Government agency or entity authorized under
its charter to reclaim lands subject to consultation with PEA.
Same; Same; While Public Estates Authority (PEA) under PD
1084 has the power to reclaim land and under EO 525 is primarily
responsible for integrating, directing and coordinating
reclamation projects, such authority is not exclusive and such
power to reclaim may be granted or delegated to another
government agency or entity or may even be undertaken by the

National Government itself, Public Estates Authority (PEA) being
only an agency and a part of the National Government.—Without
doubt, PEA under EO 525 was designated as the agency primarily
responsible for integrating, directing, and coordinating all
reclamation projects. Primarily means “mainly, principally,
mostly, generally.” Thus, not all reclamation projects fall under
PEA’s authority of supervision, integration, and coordination. The
very charter of PEA, PD 1084, does not mention that PEA has the
exclusive and sole power and authority to reclaim lands of public
domain. EO 525 even reveals the exception—reclamation projects
by a national government agency or entity authorized by its
charter to reclaim land. One example is EO 405 which authorized
the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) to reclaim and develop
submerged areas for port related purposes. Under its charter, PD
857, PPA has the
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power “to reclaim, excavate, enclose or raise any of the lands”

vested in it. Thus, while PEA under PD 1084 has the power to
reclaim land and under EO 525 is primarily responsible for
integrating, directing and coordinating reclamation projects, such
authority is NOT exclusive and such power to reclaim may be
granted or delegated to another government agency or entity or
may even be undertaken by the National Government itself, PEA
being only an agency and a part of the National Government.
Same; National Housing Authority (NHA); Administrative
Law; Basic in administrative law is the doctrine that a
government agency or office has express and implied powers based
on its charter and other pertinent statutes; When a general grant of
power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power
necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other
is also conferred by necessary implication—implied powers are
those that can be inferred or are implicit in the wordings of the law
or conferred by necessary or fair implication in the enabling act;
The power to reclaim on the part of the National Housing
Authority (NHA) is implicit from PD 757, RA 7279, MO 415, RA
6957, and PD 3A.—Basic in administrative law is the doctrine
that a government agency or office has express and implied
powers based on its charter and other pertinent statutes. Express
powers are those powers granted, allocated, and delegated to a
government agency or office by express provisions of law. On the
other hand, implied powers are those that can be inferred or are
implicit in the wordings of the law or conferred by necessary or
fair implication in the enabling act. In Angara v. Electoral
Commission, 63 Phil. 139 (1936), the Court clarified and stressed
that when a general grant of power is conferred or duty enjoined,
every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the
performance of the other is also conferred by necessary
implication. It was also explicated that when the statute does not
specify the particular method to be followed or used by a
government agency in the exercise of the power vested in it by
law, said agency has the authority to adopt any reasonable
method to carry out its functions. The power to reclaim on the
part of the NHA is implicit from PD 757, RA 7279, MO 415, RA
6957, and PD 3A.
Same; Same; Smokey Mountain Development and
Reclamation Project (SMDRP); Even without an implied power to
reclaim lands under National Housing Authority (NHA’s) charter,
we rule that the
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authority granted to National Housing Authority (NHA), a

national government agency, by the President under PD 3A
reinforced by EO 525 is more than sufficient statutory basis for the
reclamation of lands under the Smokey Mountain Development
and Reclamation Project (SMDRP); Under PD 3A, “national
government” can only mean the Executive Branch headed by the
President—it cannot refer to Congress as it was dissolved and
abolished at the time of the issuance of PD 3A.—Even without an
implied power to reclaim lands under NHA’s charter, we rule that
the authority granted to NHA, a national government agency, by
the President under PD 3A reinforced by EO 525 is more than
sufficient statutory basis for the reclamation of lands under the
SMDRP. PD 3A is a law issued by then President Ferdinand E.
Marcos under his martial law powers on September 23, 1972. It
provided that “[t]he provisions of any law to the contrary
notwithstanding, the reclamation of areas, underwater, whether
foreshore or inland, shall be limited to the National Government
or any person authorized by it under the proper contract.” It
repealed, in effect, RA 1899 which previously delegated the right
to reclaim lands to municipalities and chartered cities and
revested it to the National Government. Under PD 3A, “national
government” can only mean the Executive Branch headed by the
President. It cannot refer to Congress as it was dissolved and

abolished at the time of the issuance of PD 3A on September 23,
1972. Moreover, the Executive Branch is the only implementing
arm in the government with the equipment, manpower, expertise,
and capability by the very nature of its assigned powers and
functions to undertake reclamation projects. Thus, under PD 3A,
the Executive Branch through the President can implement
reclamation of lands through any of its departments, agencies, or
offices. Subsequently, on February 4, 1977, President Marcos
issued PD 1084 creating the PEA, which was granted, among
others, the power “to reclaim land, including foreshore and
submerged areas by dredging, filling or other means or to acquire
reclaimed lands.” The PEA’s power to reclaim is not however
exclusive as can be gleaned from its charter, as the President
retained his power under PD 3A to designate another agency to
reclaim lands. On February 14, 1979, EO 525 was issued. It
granted PEA primary responsibility for integrating, directing, and
coordinating reclamation projects for and on behalf of the
National Government although other national government
agencies can be designated by the President to reclaim lands in
coordination with the PEA. Despite the issuance of EO 525, PD 3
A remained
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valid and subsisting. Thus, the National Government through the

President still retained the power and control over all reclamation
projects in the country.
Same; Same; Same; President; Power of Control; Department
of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR); The President
can exercise executive power motu proprio and can supplant the
act or decision of a subordinate with the President’s own; The
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) is a
department in the executive branch under the President, and it is
only an alter ego of the latter; There is nothing infirm or
unconstitutional if the President decides on the implementation of
a certain project or activity and requires said department to
implement it.—Section 17, Art. VII of the Constitution provides
that “the President shall have control of all executive
departments, bureaus and offices.” The President is assigned the
task of seeing to it that all laws are faithfully executed. “Control,”
in administrative law, means “the power of an officer to alter,
modify, nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer has done in
the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of

the former for that of the latter.” As such, the President can
exercise executive power motu proprio and can supplant the act or
decision of a subordinate with the President’s own. The DENR is
a department in the executive branch under the President, and it
is only an alter ego of the latter. Ordinarily the proposed action
and the staff work are initially done by a department like the
DENR and then submitted to the President for approval.
However, there is nothing infirm or unconstitutional if the
President decides on the implementation of a certain project or
activity and requires said department to implement it. Such is a
presidential prerogative as long as it involves the department or
office authorized by law to supervise or execute the Project. Thus,
as in this case, when the President approved and ordered the
development of a housing project with the corresponding
reclamation work, making DENR a member of the committee
tasked to implement the project, the required authorization from
the DENR to reclaim land can be deemed satisfied. It cannot be
disputed that the ultimate power over alienable and disposable
public lands is reposed in the President of the Philippines and not
the DENR Secretary. To still require a DENR authorization on
the Smokey Mountain when the President has already authorized
and ordered the implementation of the Project would be a
derogation of the powers of the President as the head of the
executive branch. Otherwise, any de
242
partment head can defy or oppose the implementation of a project

approved by the head of the executive branch, which is patently
illegal and unconstitutional.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; When a statute
imposes a specific duty on the executive department, the President
may act directly or order the said department to undertake an
activity.—In Chavez v. Romulo, 431 SCRA 534 (2004), we stated
that when a statute imposes a specific duty on the executive
department, the President may act directly or order the said
department to undertake an activity, thus: [A]t the apex of the
entire executive officialdom is the President. Section 17, Article
VII of the Constitution specifies [her] power as Chief executive
departments, bureaus and offices. [She] shall ensure that the laws
be faithfully executed. As Chief Executive, President Arroyo holds
the steering wheel that controls the course of her government.
She lays down policies in the execution of her plans and

programs. Whatever policy she chooses, she has her subordinates
to implement them. In short, she has the power of control.
Whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or
regulation to her subordinate, she may act directly or
merely direct the performance of a duty x x x. Such act is
well within the prerogative of her office (emphasis supplied).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The power to order
the reclamation of lands of public domain is reposed first in the
Philippine President.—The power to order the reclamation of
lands of public domain is reposed first in the Philippine President.
The Revised Administrative Code of 1987 grants authority to the
President to reserve lands of public domain for settlement for any
specific purpose, thus: Section 14. Power to Reserve Lands of the
Public and Private Domain of the Government.—(1) The
President shall have the power to reserve for settlement or
public use, and for specific public purposes, any of the lands
of the public domain, the use of which is not otherwise directed
by law. The reserved land shall thereafter remain subject to the
specific public purpose indicated until otherwise provided by law
or proclamation. (Emphasis supplied.)
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Same; Same; Same; Alienable and Disposable Lands; The

Court finds that the conclusion that the lands to be reclaimed by
National Housing Authority (NHA) are classified as alienable and
disposable is derived and implicit from the authority given to the
National Housing Authority (NHA) to transfer the reclaimed lands
to qualified beneficiaries.—It cannot be said that MO 415,
Proclamations Nos. 39 and 465 are explicit declarations that the
lands to be reclaimed are classified as alienable and disposable.
We find however that such conclusion is derived and implicit from
the authority given to the NHA to transfer the reclaimed lands to
qualified beneficiaries.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The reclaimed lands became
alienable and disposable only after the special patents covering
said areas were issued; MO 415 and Proclamations Nos. 39 and
465 cumulatively and jointly taken together with Special Patent
Nos. 3591, 3592, and 3598 more than satisfy the requirement in
Public Estates Authority (PEA) that “[t]here must be a law or
presidential proclamation officially classifying these reclaimed
lands as alienable or disposable and open to disposition or
concession.”—The query is, when did the declaration take effect?

It did so only after the special patents covering the reclaimed
areas were issued. It is only on such date that the reclaimed lands
became alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. This
is in line with the ruling in PEA where said issue was clarified
and stressed: PD No. 1085, coupled with President Aquino’s
actual issuance of a special patent covering the Freedom
Islands, is equivalent to an official proclamation
classifying the Freedom Islands as alienable or disposable
lands of the public domain. PD No. 1085 and President
Aquino’s issuance of a land patent also constitute a
declaration that the Freedom Islands are no longer needed
for public service. The Freedom Islands are thus alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain, open to disposition or
concession to qualified parties. (Emphasis supplied.) Thus, MO
415 and Proclamations Nos. 39 and 465 cumulatively and jointly
taken together with Special Patent Nos. 3591, 3592, and 3598
more than satisfy the requirement in PEA that “[t]here must be a
law or presidential proclamation officially classifying these
reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable and open to disposition
or concession (emphasis supplied).”
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Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; BuildOperateandTransfer

(BOT) Law (R.A. No. 6957); RA 6957 as amended by RA 7718
provides ample authority for the classification of reclaimed land in
the Smokey Mountain Development and Reclamation Project
(SMDRP) for the repayment scheme of the BuildOperateand
Transfer (BOT) project as alienable and disposable lands of public
domain—a conclusion is necessarily implied, for how else can the
land be used as the enabling component for the Project if such
classification is not deemed made?—Apropos the requisite law
categorizing reclaimed land as alienable or disposable, we find
that RA 6957 as amended by RA 7718 provides ample authority
for the classification of reclaimed land in the SMDRP for the
repayment scheme of the BOT project as alienable and disposable
lands of public domain. Sec. 6 of RA 6957 as amended by RA 7718
provides: For the financing, construction, operation and
maintenance of any infrastructure projects undertaken through
the buildoperateand transfer arrangement or any of its
variations pursuant to the provisions of this Act, the project
proponent x x x may likewise be repaid in the form of a share in
the revenue of the project or other nonmonetary payments, such
as, but not limited to, the grant of a portion or percentage of

the reclaimed land, subject to the constitutional requirements
with respect to the ownership of the land. (Emphasis supplied.)
While RA 6957 as modified by RA 7718 does not expressly declare
that the reclaimed lands that shall serve as payment to the
project proponent have become alienable and disposable lands
and opened for disposition; nonetheless, this conclusion is
necessarily implied, for how else can the land be used as the
enabling component for the Project if such classification is not
deemed made?
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Patrimonial
Properties; The National Housing Authority (NHA) is a
government agency not tasked to dispose of public lands under its
charter—it is an “enduser agency” authorized by law to
administer and dispose of reclaimed lands; The moment titles over
reclaimed lands based on the special patents are transferred to the
National Housing Authority (NHA) by the Register of Deeds, they
are automatically converted to patrimonial properties of the State
which can be sold to Filipino citizens and private corporations,
60% of which are owned by Filipinos.—It may be argued that the
grant of authority to sell public lands, pursuant to PEA, does not
convert alienable lands of public domain into private or
patrimonial lands. We ruled in PEA that
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“alienable lands of public domain must be transferred to

qualified private parties, or to government entities not
tasked to dispose of public lands, before these lands can
become private or patrimonial lands (emphasis supplied).” To
lands reclaimed by PEA or through a contract with a private
person or entity, such reclaimed lands still remain alienable lands
of public domain which can be transferred only to Filipino citizens
but not to a private corporation. This is because PEA under PD
1084 and EO 525 is tasked to hold and dispose of alienable lands
of public domain and it is only when it is transferred to Filipino
citizens that it becomes patrimonial property. On the other hand,
the NHA is a government agency not tasked to dispose of public
lands under its charter—The Revised Administrative Code of
1987. The NHA is an “enduser agency” authorized by law to
administer and dispose of reclaimed lands. The moment titles
over reclaimed lands based on the special patents are transferred
to the NHA by the Register of Deeds, they are automatically
converted to patrimonial properties of the State which can be sold

to Filipino citizens and private corporations, 60% of which are
owned by Filipinos. The reason is obvious: if the reclaimed land is
not converted to patrimonial land once transferred to NHA, then
it would be useless to transfer it to the NHA since it cannot
legally transfer or alienate lands of public domain. More
importantly, it cannot attain its avowed purposes and goals since
it can only transfer patrimonial lands to qualified beneficiaries
and prospective buyers to raise funds for the SMDRP. From the
foregoing considerations, we find that the 79hectare reclaimed
land has been declared alienable and disposable land of the public
domain; and in the hands of NHA, it has been reclassified as
patrimonial property.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The combined
and collective effect of Proclamations Nos. 39 and 465 with Special
Patents Nos. 3592 and 3598 is tantamount to and can be
considered to be an official declaration that the reclaimed lots are
alienable or disposable lands of the public domain.—Petitioner’s
sole reliance on Proclamations Nos. 39 and 465 without taking
into consideration the special patents issued by the DENR
demonstrates the inherent weakness of his proposition. As was
ruled in PEA cited by petitioner himself, “PD No. 1085, coupled
with President Aquino’s actual issuance of a special patent
covering the Freedom Islands is equivalent to an official
proclamation classifying the Freedom islands as alienable or
disposable lands of public domain.” In a similar vein, the
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combined and collective effect of Proclamations Nos. 39 and 465

with Special Patents Nos. 3592 and 3598 is tantamount to and
can be considered to be an official declaration that the reclaimed
lots are alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. The
reclaimed lands covered by Special Patents Nos. 3591, 3592, and
3598, which evidence transfer of ownership of reclaimed lands to
the NHA, are official acts of the DENR Secretary in the exercise
of his power of supervision and control over alienable and
disposable public lands and his exclusive jurisdiction over the
management and disposition of all lands of public domain under
the Revised Administrative Code of 1987. Special Patent No. 3592
speaks of the transfer of Lots 1 and 2, and RI003901000012D
with an area of 401,485 square meters based on the survey and
technical description approved by the Bureau of Lands. Lastly,
Special Patent No. 3598 was issued in favor of the NHA

transferring to said agency a tract of land described in Plan RL
00000013 with an area of 390,000 square meters based on the
survey and technical descriptions approved by the Bureau of
Lands.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The issuance
of certificates of titles in National Housing Authority’s (NHA’s)
name automatically converts the reclaimed lands to patrimonial
properties of the National Housing Authority (NHA); The laws of
the land have to be applied and interpreted depending on the
changing conditions and times—one such law that should be
treated differently is the BuildOperateandTransfer (BOT) Law
(RA 6957) which brought about a novel way of implementing
government contracts by allowing reclaimed land as part or full
payment to the contractor of a government project to satisfy the
huge financial requirements of the undertaking.—Subsequently,
the special patents in the name of the NHA were submitted to the
Register of Deeds of the City of Manila for registration, and
corresponding certificates of titles over the reclaimed lots were
issued based on said special patents. The issuance of certificates
of titles in NHA’s name automatically converts the reclaimed
lands to patrimonial properties of the NHA. Otherwise, the lots
would not be of use to the NHA’s housing projects or as payment
to the BOT contractor as the enabling component of the BOT
contract. The laws of the land have to be applied and interpreted
depending on the changing conditions and times. Tempora
mutantur et legis mutantur in illis (time changes and laws change
with it). One such law that should be treated differently is the
BOT Law (RA 6957) which brought about a novel way of
implementing
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government contracts by allowing reclaimed land as part or full

payment to the contractor of a government project to satisfy the
huge financial requirements of the undertaking. The NHA holds
the lands covered by Special Patents Nos. 3592 and 3598 solely
for the purpose of the SMDRP undertaken by authority of the
BOT Law and for disposition in accordance with said special law.
The lands become alienable and disposable lands of public domain
upon issuance of the special patents and become patrimonial
properties of the Government from the time the titles are issued
to the NHA. As early as 1999, this Court in Baguio v. Republic,
301 SCRA 450 (1999), laid down the jurisprudence that: It is true
that, once a patent is registered and the corresponding certificate
of title is issued, the land covered by them ceases to be part of the
public domain and becomes private property, and the Torrens
Title issued pursuant to the patent becomes indefeasible upon the
expiration of one year from the date of issuance of such patent.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Judgments; It
is a settled precept that decisions of the Supreme Court can only be
applied prospectively as they may prejudice vested rights if applied
retroactively.—The ruling in PEA cannot even be applied
retroactively to the lots covered by Special Patents Nos. 3592 (40
hectare reclaimed land) and 3598 (39hectare reclaimed land).
The reclamation of the land under SMDRP was completed in
August 1996 while the PEA decision was rendered on July 9,
2002. In the meantime, subdivided lots forming parts of the
reclaimed land were already sold to private corporations for value
and separate titles issued to the buyers. The Project was
terminated through a Memorandum of Agreement signed on
August 27, 2003. The PEA decision became final through the
November 11, 2003 Resolution. It is a settled precept that
decisions of the Supreme Court can only be applied prospectively
as they may prejudice vested rights if applied retroactively.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Even if it is
conceded that there was no explicit declaration that the lands are
no longer needed for public use or public service, there was
however an implicit executive declaration that the reclaimed areas
are not necessary anymore for public use or public service when
President Aquino through MO 415 conveyed the same to the
National Housing Authority (NHA) partly for housing project and
related commercial/
248
industrial development intended for disposition to and enjoyment

of certain beneficiaries and not the public in general and partly as
enabling component to finance the project.—Even if it is conceded
that there was no explicit declaration that the lands are no longer
needed for public use or public service, there was however an
implicit executive declaration that the reclaimed areas R10 are
not necessary anymore for public use or public service when
President Aquino through MO 415 conveyed the same to the NHA
partly for housing project and related commercial/industrial
development intended for disposition to and enjoyment of certain

beneficiaries and not the public in general and partly as enabling
component to finance the project. President Ramos, in issuing
Proclamation No. 39, declared, though indirectly, that the
reclaimed lands of the Smokey Mountain project are no longer
required for public use or service, thus: These parcels of land of
public domain are hereby placed under the administration and
disposition of the National Housing Authority to develop,
subdivide and dispose to qualified beneficiaries, as well as its
development for mix land use (commercial/industrial) to provide
employment opportunities to onsite families and additional areas
for port related activities. (Emphasis supplied.) While numerical
count of the persons to be benefited is not the determinant
whether the property is to be devoted to public use, the
declaration in Proclamation No. 39 undeniably identifies only
particular individuals as beneficiaries to whom the reclaimed
lands can be sold, namely—the Smokey Mountain dwellers. The
rest of the Filipinos are not qualified; hence, said lands are no
longer essential for the use of the public in general.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; MO 415 and
Proclamations Nos. 39 and 465 are declarations that proclaimed
the nonuse of the reclaimed areas for public use or service as the
Project cannot be successfully implemented without the
withdrawal of said lands from public use or service.—MO 415 and
Proclamations Nos. 39 and 465 are declarations that proclaimed
the nonuse of the reclaimed areas for public use or service as the
Project cannot be successfully implemented without the
withdrawal of said lands from public use or service. Certainly, the
devotion of the reclaimed land to public use or service conflicts
with the intended use of the Smokey Mountain areas for housing
and employment of the Smokey Mountain scavengers and for
financing the Project because the latter cannot be accomplished
without abandoning the public use of the
249
VOL. 530, AUGUST 15, 2007 249
subject land. Without doubt, the presidential proclamations on

SMDRP together with the issuance of the special patents had
effectively removed the reclaimed lands from public use.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Reclaimed
lands that are made the enabling components of a BuildOperate
andTransfer (BOT) infrastructure project are necessarily
reclassified as alienable and disposable lands under the BOT Law;

otherwise, absurd and illogical consequences would naturally
result.—Reclaimed lands that are made the enabling components
of a BOT infrastructure project are necessarily reclassified as
alienable and disposable lands under the BOT Law; otherwise,
absurd and illogical consequences would naturally result.
Undoubtedly, the BOT contract will not be accepted by the BOT
contractor since there will be no consideration for its contractual
obligations. Since reclaimed land will be conveyed to the
contractor pursuant to the BOT Law, then there is an implied
declaration that such land is no longer intended for public use
or public service and, hence, considered patrimonial property
of the State.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Section 60 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 applies only to “a province,
municipality or branch or subdivision of the Government”—the
National Housing Authority (NHA) is not a government unit but a
government corporation performing governmental and proprietary
functions.—Petitioner relies on Sec. 60 of Commonwealth Act
(CA) 141 to support his view that the NHA is not empowered by
any law to sell reclaimed land, thus: Section 60. Any tract of land
comprised under this title may be leased or sold, as the case may
be, to any person, corporation or association authorized to
purchase or lease public lands for agricultural purposes. The area
of the land so leased or sold shall be such as shall, in the
judgment of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
be reasonably necessary for the purposes for which such sale or
lease if requested and shall in no case exceed one hundred and
fortyfour hectares: Provided, however, That this limitation shall
not apply to grants, donations, transfers, made to a province,
municipality or branch or subdivision of the Government for the
purposes deemed by said entities conducive to the public interest;
but the land so granted donated or transferred to a
province, municipality, or branch or subdivision of the
Government shall not be alienated, encumbered, or
otherwise disposed of
250
in a manner affecting its title, except when authorized by

Congress; Provided, further, That any person, corporation,
association or partnership disqualified from purchasing public
land for agricultural purposes under the provisions of this Act,
may lease land included under this title suitable for industrial or
residential purposes, but the lease granted shall only be valid
while such land is used for the purposes referred to. (Emphasis
supplied.) Reliance on said provision is incorrect as the same
applies only to “a province, municipality or branch or subdivision
of the Government.” The NHA is not a government unit but a
government corporation performing governmental and
proprietary functions.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The transfer of
the reclaimed lands by the National Government to the National
Housing Authority (NHA) for housing, commercial, and industrial
purposes transformed them into patrimonial lands which are of
course owned by the State in its private or proprietary capacity—
perforce, the National Housing Authority (NHA) can sell the
reclaimed lands to any Filipino citizen or qualified corporation.
—PD 757 is clear that the NHA is empowered by law to transfer
properties acquired by it under the law to other parties, thus:
Section 6. Powers and functions of the Authority. The Authority
shall have the following powers and functions to be exercised by
the Boards in accordance with the established national human
settlements plan prepared by the Human Settlements
Commission: x x x x (k) Enter into contracts whenever necessary
under such terms and conditions as it may deem proper and
reasonable; (l) Acquire property rights and interests, and
encumber or otherwise dispose the same as it may deem
appropriate (Emphasis supplied.) Letter (l) is emphatic that the
NHA can acquire property rights and interests and encumber or
otherwise dispose of them as it may deem appropriate. The
transfer of the reclaimed lands by the National Government to
the NHA for housing, commercial, and industrial purposes
transformed them into patrimonial lands which are of course
owned by the State in its private or proprietary capacity. Perforce,
the NHA can sell the reclaimed lands to any Filipino citizen or
qualified corporation.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Bids and
Bidding; The lands reclaimed by and conveyed to the National
Housing Authority (NHA) are no longer lands of public domain—
these lands became proprietary lands or patrimonial properties of
the State upon
251
VOL. 530, AUGUST 15, 2007 251
transfer of the titles over the reclaimed lands to the NHA and
hence outside the ambit of CA 141; The National Housing
Authority (NHA) can legally transfer patrimonial land to any
interested qualified buyer without any bidding conducted by the
Director of Lands because the National Housing Authority (NHA),
unlike Public Estates Authority (PEA), is a government agency not
tasked to sell lands of public domain.—Sections 63 and 67 of CA
141, as amended, are in point as they refer to government sale by
the Director of Lands of alienable and disposable lands of
public domain. This is not present in the case at bar. The lands
reclaimed by and conveyed to the NHA are no longer lands of
public domain. These lands became proprietary lands or
patrimonial properties of the State upon transfer of the titles over
the reclaimed lands to the NHA and hence outside the ambit of
CA 141. The NHA can therefore legally transfer patrimonial land
to RBI or to any other interested qualified buyer without any
bidding conducted by the Director of Lands because the NHA,
unlike PEA, is a government agency not tasked to sell lands of
public domain. Hence, it can only hold patrimonial lands and can
dispose of such lands by sale without need of public bidding.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same;
Statutory Construction; Reclaimed lands cannot be considered
unserviceable properties; Sec. 79 of PD 1445 cannot be applied to
patrimonial properties like reclaimed lands transferred to a
government agency like the National Housing Authority (NHA)
which has entered into a BuildOperateandTransfer (BOT)
contract with a private firm—if the patrimonial property will be
subject to public bidding as the only way of disposing of said
property, then Sec. 6 of RA 6957 on the repayment scheme is
almost impossible or extremely difficult to implement considering
the uncertainty of a winning bid during public auction; The law
does not intend anything impossible (lex non intendit aliquid
impossibile).—Reclaimed lands cannot be considered
unserviceable properties. The reclaimed lands in question are
very much needed by the NHA for the Smokey Mountain Project
because without it, then the projects will not be successfully
implemented. Since the reclaimed lands are not unserviceable
properties and are very much needed by NHA, then Sec. 79 of PD
1445 does not apply. More importantly, Sec. 79 of PD 1445 cannot
be applied to patrimonial properties like reclaimed lands
transferred to a government agency like the NHA which has
entered into a BOT contract with a private firm. The reason is
obvious. If the patrimonial property will
252
be subject to public bidding as the only way of disposing of said

property, then Sec. 6 of RA 6957 on the repayment scheme is
almost impossible or extremely difficult to implement considering
the uncertainty of a winning bid during public auction. Moreover,
the repayment scheme of a BOT contract may be in the form of
nonmonetary payment like the grant of a portion or percentage of
reclaimed land. Even if the BOT partner participates in the public
bidding, there is no assurance that he will win the bid and
therefore the payment in kind as agreed to by the parties cannot
be performed or the winning bid prize might be below the
estimated valuation of the land. The only way to harmonize Sec.
79 of PD 1445 with Sec. 6 of RA 6957 is to consider Sec. 79 of PD
1445 as inapplicable to BOT contracts involving patrimonial
lands. The law does not intend anything impossible (lex non
intendit aliquid impossibile).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; RA 6957 as
amended by RA 7718 explicitly states that a contractor can be paid
“a portion as percentage of the reclaimed land” subject to the
constitutional requirement that only Filipino citizens or
corporations with at least 60% Filipino equity can acquire the
same.—RA 6957 as amended by RA 7718 explicitly states that a
contractor can be paid “a portion as percentage of the reclaimed
land” subject to the constitutional requirement that only Filipino
citizens or corporations with at least 60% Filipino equity can
acquire the same. It cannot be denied that RBI is a private
corporation, where Filipino citizens own at least 60% of the
stocks. Thus, the transfer to RBI is valid and constitutional.
Right to Information; The government agencies, without need
of demand from anyone, must bring into public view all the steps
and negotiations leading to the consummation of the transaction
and the contents of the perfected contract—such information must
pertain to “definite propositions of the government,” meaning
official recommendations or final positions reached on the
different matters subject of negotiation.—Sec. 28, Art. II compels
the State and its agencies to fully disclose “all of its transactions
involving public interest.” Thus, the government agencies,
without need of demand from anyone, must bring into public view
all the steps and negotiations leading to the consummation of the
transaction and the contents of the perfected contract. Such
information must pertain to “definite propositions of the
government,” meaning official recommendations or final
253
VOL. 530, AUGUST 15, 2007 253
positions reached on the different matters subject of negotiation.

The government agency, however, need not disclose “intraagency
or interagency recommendations or communications during the
stage when common assertions are still in the process of being
formulated or are in the exploratory stage.” The limitation also
covers privileged communication like information on military and
diplomatic secrets; information affecting national security;
information on investigations of crimes by law enforcement
agencies before the prosecution of the accused; information on
foreign relations, intelligence, and other classified information.
Same; It is unfortunate that after almost twenty (20) years
from birth of the 1987 Constitution, there is still no enabling law
that provides the mechanics for the compulsory duty of government
agencies to disclose information on government transactions; In
the meantime, it would suffice that government agencies post on
their bulletin boards the documents incorporating the information
on the steps and negotiations that produced the agreements and
the agreements themselves, and if finances permit, to upload said
information on their respective websites for easy access by
interested parties.—It is unfortunate, however, that after almost
twenty (20) years from birth of the 1987 Constitution, there is still
no enabling law that provides the mechanics for the compulsory
duty of government agencies to disclose information on
government transactions. Hopefully, the desired enabling law will
finally see the light of day if and when Congress decides to
approve the proposed “Freedom of Access to Information Act.” In
the meantime, it would suffice that government agencies post on
their bulletin boards the documents incorporating the information
on the steps and negotiations that produced the agreements and
the agreements themselves, and if finances permit, to upload said
information on their respective websites for easy access by
interested parties. Without any law or regulation governing the
right to disclose information, the NHA or any of the respondents
cannot be faulted if they were not able to disclose information
relative to the SMDRP to the public in general.
Same; The other aspect of the people’s right to know apart
from the duty to disclose is the duty to allow access to information
on matters of public concern under Sec. 7, Art. III of the
Constitution; The duty to disclose information should be
differentiated from the duty to permit access to information—there
is no need to demand
254
from the government agency disclosure of information as this is

mandatory under the Constitution, while, on the other hand, the
interested party must first request or even demand that he be
allowed access to documents and papers in the particular agency.
—The other aspect of the people’s right to know apart from the
duty to disclose is the duty to allow access to information on
matters of public concern under Sec. 7, Art. III of the
Constitution. The gateway to information opens to the public the
following: (1) official records; (2) documents and papers pertaining
to official acts, transactions, or decisions; and (3) government
research data used as a basis for policy development. Thus, the
duty to disclose information should be differentiated from the
duty to permit access to information. There is no need to demand
from the government agency disclosure of information as this is
mandatory under the Constitution; failing that, legal remedies
are available. On the other hand, the interested party must first
request or even demand that he be allowed access to documents
and papers in the particular agency. A request or demand is
required; otherwise, the government office or agency will not
know of the desire of the interested party to gain access to such
papers and what papers are needed. The duty to disclose covers
only transactions involving public interest, while the duty to allow
access has a broader scope of information which embraces not
only transactions involving public interest, but any matter
contained in official communications and public documents of the
government agency.
Operative Fact Doctrine; Words and Phrases; Under the
“operative fact” doctrine a legislative or executive act, prior to its
being declared as unconstitutional by the courts, is valid and must
be complied with.—The “operative fact” doctrine is embodied in De
Agbayani v. Court of Appeals, 38 SCRA 429 (1971), wherein it is
stated that a legislative or executive act, prior to its being
declared as unconstitutional by the courts, is valid and must be
complied with, thus: As the new Civil Code puts it: “When the
courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the
former shall be void and the latter shall govern. Administrative or
executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when
they are not contrary to the laws of the Constitution.” It is
understandable why it should be so, the Constitution being
supreme and paramount. Any legislative or executive act contrary
to its terms cannot survive. Such a view has support in logic and
possesses the merit of simplicity. It may not however be
sufficiently realistic. It does not admit of doubt that
255
VOL. 530, AUGUST 15, 2007 255
prior to the declaration of nullity such challenged

legislative or executive act must have been in force and
had to be complied with. This is so as until after the judiciary,
in an appropriate case, declares its invalidity, it is entitled to
obedience and respect. Parties may have acted under it and may
have changed their positions. What could be more fitting than
that in a subsequent litigation regard be had to what has been
done while such legislative or executive act was in operation and
presumed to be valid in all respects. It is now accepted as a
doctrine that prior to its being nullified, its existence as a fact
must be reckoned with. This is merely to reflect awareness that
precisely because the judiciary is the governmental organ which
has the final say on whether or not a legislative or executive
measure is valid, a period of time may have elapsed before it can
exercise the power of judicial review that may lead to a
declaration of nullity. It would be to deprive the law of its quality
of fairness and justice then, if there be no recognition of what had
transpired prior to such adjudication.
Same; The existence of the BuildOperateandTransfer (BOT)
Law (RA 6957) relied upon by the parties and the executive
issuances is an “operative fact” to which legal consequences have
attached—the Court is constrained to give legal effect to the acts
done in consonance with such executive and legislative acts, since
to do otherwise would work patent injustice.—In the instant case,
RA 6957 was the prevailing law at the time that the joint venture
agreement was signed. RA 6957, entitled “An Act Authorizing The
Financing, Construction, Operation And Maintenance Of
Infrastructure Projects By The Private Sector And For Other
Purposes,” which was passed by Congress on July 24, 1989, allows
repayment to the private contractor of reclaimed lands. Such law
was relied upon by respondents, along with the abovementioned
executive issuances in pushing through with the Project. The
existence of such law and issuances is an “operative fact” to which
legal consequences have attached. This Court is constrained to
give legal effect to the acts done in consonance with such
executive and legislative acts; to do otherwise would work patent
injustice on respondents.
Same; Vested Rights Doctrine; The Smokey Mountain
Development and Reclamation Project (SMDRP) agreements have

produced vested rights in favor of the slum dwellers, the buyers of
reclaimed land who were issued titles over said land, and the
agencies and
256
investors who made investments in the project or who bought

SMPPC’s—these properties and rights cannot be disturbed or
questioned after the passage of around ten (10) years from the start
of the Smokey Mountain Development and Reclamation Project
(SMDRP) implementation.—When the ruling in PEA was
rendered by this Court on July 9, 2002, the JVAs were all
executed. Furthermore, when petitioner filed the instant case
against respondents on August 5, 2004, the JVAs were already
terminated by virtue of the MOA between the NHA and RBI. The
respondents had no reason to think that their agreements were
unconstitutional or even questionable, as in fact, the concurrent
acts of the executive department lent validity to the
implementation of the Project. The SMDRP agreements have
produced vested rights in favor of the slum dwellers, the buyers of
reclaimed land who were issued titles over said land, and the
agencies and investors who made investments in the project or
who bought SMPPCs. These properties and rights cannot be
disturbed or questioned after the passage of around ten (10) years
from the start of the SMDRP implementation. Evidently, the
“operative fact” principle has set in. The titles to the lands in the
hands of the buyers can no longer be invalidated.
Prohibition; Words and Phrases; A ministerial duty is one
which is so clear and specific as to leave no room for the exercise of
discretion in its performance—it is a duty which an officer
performs in a given state of facts in a prescribed manner in
obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without regard to the
exercise of his/her own judgment upon the propriety of the act
done.—It has not been shown that the NHA exercised judicial or
quasijudicial functions in relation to the SMDRP and the
agreements relative to it. Likewise, it has not been shown what
ministerial functions the NHA has with regard to the SMDRP. A
ministerial duty is one which is so clear and specific as to leave no
room for the exercise of discretion in its performance. It is a duty
which an officer performs in a given state of facts in a prescribed
manner in obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without
regard to the exercise of his/her own judgment upon the propriety
of the act done. Whatever is left to be done in relation to the

August 27, 2003 MOA, terminating the JVA and other related
agreements, certainly does not involve ministerial functions of the
NHA but instead requires exercise of judgment. In fact, Item No.
4 of the MOA terminating the JVAs provides for validation of the
developer’s (RBI’s) claims arising from the termination of the
257
VOL. 530, AUGUST 15, 2007 257
SMDRP through the various government agencies. Such

validation requires the exercise of discretion.
Same; Prohibition does not lie to restrain an act which is
already a fait accompli.—Prohibition does not lie to restrain an
act which is already a fait accompli. The “operative fact” doctrine
protecting vested rights bars the grant of the writ of prohibition to
the case at bar. It should be remembered that petitioner was the
Solicitor General at the time SMDRP was formulated and
implemented. He had the opportunity to question the SMDRP and
the agreements on it, but he did not. The moment to challenge the
Project had passed.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court.

Prohibition and Mandamus.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & De Los
Angeles for Harbour Centre Port Terminal, Inc. and Reghis
Romero.
Office of the Government Corporate Counsel for
National Housing Authority.
Roberto A. Abad for RII Holdings, Inc. and RII
Builders.
VELASCO, JR., J.:
In this Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus with Prayer

for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction under Rule 65, petitioner, in his
capacity as taxpayer, seeks:
“to declare NULL AND VOID the Joint Venture Agreement (JVA)
dated March 9, 1993 between the National Housing Authority and
RII Builders, Inc. and the Smokey Mountain Development and
Reclamation Project embodied therein; the subsequent
amendments
258

to the said JVA; and all other agreements signed and executed in
relation thereto—including, but not limited to the Smokey
Mountain Asset Pool Agreement dated 26 September 1994 and
the separate agreements for Phase I and Phase II of the Project––
as well as all other transactions which emanated therefrom, for
being UNCONSTITUTIONAL and INVALID;
to enjoin respondents—particularly respondent NHA—from
further implementing and/or enforcing the said project and other
agreements related thereto, and from further deriving and/or
enjoying any rights, privileges and interest therefrom x x x; and
to compel respondents to disclose all documents and
information relating to the project––including, but not limited to,
any subsequent agreements with respect to the different phases of
the project, the revisions over the original plan, the additional
works incurred thereon, the current financial condition of
respondent RII Builders,
1
Inc., and the transactions made
respecting the project.”
The Facts
On March 1, 1988, then President Corazon 2

C. Aquino
issued Memorandum Order No. (MO) 161 approving and
directing the implementation of the Comprehensive and
Integrated Metropolitan Manila Waste Management Plan
(the Plan). The Metro Manila Commission, in coordination
with various government agencies, was tasked as the lead
agency to implement the Plan as formulated by the
Presidential Task Force on Waste Management created by
Memorandum Circular
3
No. 39. A day after, on March 2,
1988, MO 161A was issued, containing the guidelines
which prescribed the functions and responsibilities of
fifteen (15) various government departments and offices
tasked to implement the Plan, namely: Department of
Public Works and Highway (DPWH), Department of Health
(DOH), Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), Department of Transporta
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 34.

2 Id., at p. 513.
3 Id., at pp. 513514.
259
VOL. 530, AUGUST 15, 2007 259

tion and Communication, Department of Budget and

Management, National Economic and Development
Authority (NEDA), Philippine Constabulary Integrated
National Police, Philippine Information Agency and the
Local Government Unit (referring to the City of Manila),
Department of Social Welfare and Development,
Presidential Commission for Urban Poor, National Housing
Authority (NHA), Department of Labor and Employment,
Department of Education, Culture and Sports (now
Department of Education), and Presidential Management
Staff.
Specifically, respondent NHA was ordered to “conduct
feasibility studies and develop lowcost housing projects at
the dumpsite and absorb scavengers 4
in NHA
resettlement/lowcost housing projects.” On the other
hand, the DENR was tasked to “review and evaluate
proposed projects under the Plan with regard to their
environmental impact, conduct regular monitoring of
activities of the Plan to ensure compliance with
environmental standards and assist DOH 5in the conduct of
the study on hospital waste management.”
At the time MO 161A was issued by President Aquino,
Smokey Mountain was a wasteland in Balut, Tondo,
Manila, where numerous Filipinos resided in subhuman
conditions, collecting items that may have some monetary
value from the garbage. The Smokey Mountain dumpsite is
bounded on the north by the Estero Marala, on the south
by the property of the National Government, on the east by
the property of B and I Realty Co., and on the west by
Radial Road 10 (R10).
Pursuant to MO 161A, NHA prepared the feasibility
studies of the Smokey Mountain lowcost housing project
which resulted in the formulation of the “Smokey Mountain
Development Plan and Reclamation of the Area Across R
10” or the Smokey Mountain Development and
Reclamation Project (SMDRP; the Project). The Project
aimed to convert the
_______________
4 Id., at p. 515.
5 Id., at p. 513.
260

Smokey Mountain dumpsite into a habitable housing

project, inclusive of the reclamation of the area across R10,
adjacent to the Smokey6 Mountain as the enabling
component of the project. Once finalized, the Plan was
submitted to President Aquino for her approval.
On July 9, 1990, the BuildOperateandTransfer (BOT)7
Law (Republic Act No. [RA] 6957) was enacted. Its
declared policy under Section 1 is “[t]o recognize the
indispensable role of the private sector as the main engine
for national growth and development and provide the most
appropriate favorable incentives to mobilize private
resources for the purpose.” Sec. 3 authorized and
empowered “[a]ll government infrastructure agencies,
including governmentowned and controlled corporations
and local government units x x x to enter into contract with
any duly prequalified private contractor for the financing,
construction, operation and maintenance of any financially
viable infrastructure facilities through the buildoperate
transfer or build and transfer scheme.”
RA 6957 defined “buildandtransfer” scheme as “[a]
contractual arrangement whereby the contractor
undertakes the construction, including financing, of a given
infrastructure facility, and its turnover after the
completion to the government agency or local government
unit concerned which shall pay the contractor its total
investment expended on the project, plus reasonable rate of
return thereon.” The last paragraph of Sec. 6 of the BOT
Law provides that the repayment scheme in the case of
“land reclamation or the building of industrial estates” may
consist of “[t]he grant of a portion or percentage of the
reclaimed land or industrial estate built, subject to the
constitutional requirements with respect to the ownership
of lands.”
_______________
6 Id., at p. 297; Proclamation No. 39 dated September 9, 1992.

7 RA 7718 was later enacted on May 5, 1994, amending certain sections
of the BOT Law.
261
VOL. 530, AUGUST 15, 2007 261

8
On February 10, 1992, Joint Resolution No. 03 was passed
by both houses of Congress. Sec. 1 of this resolution
provided, among other things, that:
“Section 1. There is hereby approved the following national

infrastructure projects for implementation under the provisions of
Republic Act No. 6957 and its implementing rules and
regulations:
xxxx
(d) Port infrastructure like piers, wharves, quays, storage
handling, ferry service and related facilities;
xxxx
(k) Land reclamation, dredging and other related development
facilities;
(l) Industrial estates, regional industrial centers and export
processing zones including steel mills, ironmaking and
petrochemical complexes and related infrastructure and utilities;
xxxx
(p) Environmental and solid waste managementrelated
facilities such as collection equipment, composting plants,
incinerators, landfill and tidal barriers, among others; and
(q) Development of new townsites and communities and related
facilities.”
This resolution complied with and conformed to Sec. 4 of

the BOT Law requiring the approval of all national
infrastructure projects by the Congress.
On
9
January 17, 1992, President Aquino proclaimed MO
415 approving and directing the implementation of the
SMDRP. Secs. 3 and 4 of the Memorandum Order stated:
“Section 3. The National Housing Authority is hereby directed to

implement the Smokey Mountain Development Plan and
_______________
8 “Joint Resolution Approving the List of National Projects to be

Undertaken by the Private Sector Pursuant to Republic Act No. 6957.”
9 Rollo, pp. 519521.
262

Reclamation of the Area Across R10 through a private sector

joint venture scheme at the least cost to the government.
Section 4. The land area covered by the Smokey Mountain
dumpsite is hereby conveyed to the National Housing Authority
as well as the area to be reclaimed across R10.” (Emphasis
supplied.)
In addition, the Public Estates Authority (PEA) was

directed to assist in the evaluation of proposals regarding
the technical feasibility of reclamation, while the DENR
was directed to (1) facilitate titling of Smokey Mountain
and of the area to be reclaimed and (2) assist in the
technical evaluation 10
of proposals regarding environmental
impact statements.
In the same MO 415, President Aquino created an
Executive Committee (EXECOM) to oversee the
implementation of the Plan, chaired by the National
Capital RegionCabinet Officer for Regional Development
(NCRCORD) with the heads of the NHA, City of Manila,
DPWH, PEA, Philippine Ports Authority (PPA), DENR,
and Development
11
Bank of the Philippines (DBP) as
members. The NEDA subsequently became a member of 12
the EXECOM. Notably, in a September 2, 1994 Letter,
PEA General Manager Amado Lagdameo approved the
plans for the reclamation project prepared by the NHA.
In conformity with Sec. 5 of MO 415, an interagency
technical committee (TECHCOM) was created composed of
the technical representatives of the EXECOM “[t]o assist
the NHA in the evaluation of the project proposals, assist
in the resolution of all issues and problems in the project to
ensure that all aspects of the development from squatter
relocation, waste management, reclamation, environmental
protection, land and house construction meet governing
regulation of13 the region and to facilitate the completion of
the project.”
_______________
10 Id., at p. 296.
11 Id., at p. 295.
12 Id., at p. 436.
13 Id., at p. 476.
263
VOL. 530, AUGUST 15, 2007 263
Subsequently, the TECHCOM put out the Public Notice

and Notice to PreQualify and Bid for the right to become
NHA’s joint venture partner in the implementation of the
SMDRP. The notices were published in newspapers of
general circulation on January 23 and 26 and February 1,
14, 16, and 23, 1992, respectively. Out of the thirteen (13)
contractors who responded, only five (5) contractors fully
complied with the required prequalification documents.
Based on the evaluation of the prequalification documents,
the EXECOM declared the New San Jose Builders, 14Inc. and
RII Builders, Inc. (RBI) as the top two contractors.
Thereafter, the TECHCOM evaluated the bids (which
include the Prefeasibility Study and Financing Plan) of the
top two (2) contractors in this manner:
(1) The DBP, as financial advisor to the Project,

evaluated their Financial Proposals;
(2) The DPWH, PPA, PEA and NHA evaluated the
Technical Proposals for the Housing Construction
and Reclamation;
(3) The DENR evaluated Technical Proposals on Waste
Management and Disposal by conducting the
Environmental Impact Analysis; and
(4) The NHA and the City of Manila evaluated the
socioeconomic benefits presented by the proposals.
On June 30, 1992, Fidel V. Ramos assumed the Office of

the President (OP) of the Philippines.
On August 31, 1992, the TECHCOM submitted its
recommendation to the EXECOM to approve the RII
Builders, Inc. (RBI) proposal which garnered the highest
score of 88.475%.
Subsequently, the EXECOM made a Project briefing to
President Ramos. As 15
a result, President Ramos issued
Proclamation No. 39 on September 9, 1992, which reads:
_______________
14 Id., at p. 477.
15 Id., at pp. 297298.
264

“WHEREAS, the National Housing Authority has presented a

viable conceptual plan to convert the Smokey Mountain dumpsite
into a habitable housing project, inclusive of the reclamation of
the area across Road Radial 10 (R10) adjacent to the Smokey
Mountain as the enabling component of the project;
xxxx
These parcels of land of public domain are hereby
placed under the administration and disposition of the
National Housing Authority to develop, subdivide and
dispose to qualified beneficiaries, as well as its
development for mix land use (commercial/industrial) to
provide employment opportunities to onsite families and
additional areas for portrelated activities.
In order to facilitate the early development of the area for
disposition, the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources, through the Lands and Management Bureau, is
hereby directed to approve the boundary and subdivision survey
and to issue a special patent and title in the name of the National
Housing Authority, subject to final survey and private rights, if
any there be.” (Emphasis supplied.)
On October 7, 1992, President Ramos authorized NHA to

enter into a Joint Venture Agreement with RBI “[s]ubject
to final review and approval of the16 Joint Venture
Agreement by the Office of the President.”
On March 19, 1993, the 17
NHA and RBI entered into a
Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) for the development of
the Smokey Mountain dumpsite and the reclamation of the
area18 across R10 based on Presidential Decree No. (PD)
757 which mandated NHA “[t]o undertake the physical
and socioeconomic upgrading and development of lands of
the public domain identified for housing,” MO 161A which
required
_______________
16 Id., at p. 479.
17 Id., at pp. 6979.
18 “Creating the National Housing Authority and Dissolving the
Existing Housing Agencies, Defining Its Powers and Functions, Providing
Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes” (1975).
265
VOL. 530, AUGUST 15, 2007 265

NHA to conduct the feasibility studies and develop a low

cost housing project at the Smokey Mountain, and MO 415

as amended by MO 415A which approved the Conceptual
Plan for Smokey Mountain and creation of the EXECOM
and TECHCOM. Under the JVA, the Project “involves the
clearing of Smokey Mountain for eventual development
into a low cost medium rise housing complex and
industrial/commercial site with the reclamation of the area
directly across
19
[R10] to act as the enabling component of
the Project.” The JVA covered a lot in Tondo, Manila with
an area of two hundred twelve thousand two hundred
thirtyfour (212,234) square meters and another lot to be
reclaimed also in Tondo with an area of four hundred
thousand (400,000) square meters.
The Scope of Work of RBI under Article II of the JVA is
as follows:
“a) To fully finance all aspects of development of

Smokey Mountain and reclamation of no more than
40 hectares of Manila Bay area across Radial Road
10.
b) To immediately commence on the preparation of
feasibility report and detailed engineering with
emphasis to the expedient acquisition of the
Environmental Clearance Certificate (ECC) from
the DENR.
c) The construction activities will only commence after
the acquisition of the ECC, and
d) Final details of the contract, including construction,
duration and delivery timetables, shall be based on
the approved feasibility report and detailed
engineering.”
Other obligations of RBI are as follows:
“2.02 The [RBI] shall develop the PROJECT based on the Final
Report and Detailed Engineering as approved by the Office of the
President. All costs and expenses for hiring technical personnel,
date gathering, permits, licenses, appraisals, clearances, testing
and similar undertaking shall be for the account of the [RBI].
_______________
19 Rollo, p. 70.
266

2.03 The [RBI] shall undertake the construction of 3,500

temporary housing units complete with basic amenities such as
plumbing, electrical and sewerage facilities within the temporary
housing project as staging area to temporarily house the squatter
families from the Smokey Mountain while development is being
undertaken. These temporary housing units shall be turned over
to the [NHA] for disposition.
2.04 The [RBI] shall construct 3,500 medium rise low cost
permanent housing units on the leveled Smokey Mountain
complete with basic utilities and amenities, in accordance with
the plans and specifications set forth in the Final Report approved
by the [NHA]. Completed units ready for mortgage take out shall
be turned over by the [RBI] to NHA on agreed schedule.
2.05 The [RBI] shall reclaim forty (40) hectares of Manila Bay
area directly across [R10] as contained in Proclamation No. 39 as
the enabling component of the project and payment to the [RBI]
as its asset share.
2.06 The [RBI] shall likewise furnish all labor materials and
equipment necessary to complete all herein development works to
be undertaken on a phase to phase basis in accordance with the
work program stipulated therein.”
The profit sharing shall be based on the approved pre

feasibility report submitted to the EXECOM, viz.:
For the developer (RBI):
“1. To own the forty (40) hectares of reclaimed land.

2. To own the commercial area at the Smokey
Mountain area composed of 1.3 hectares, and
3. To own all the constructed units of medium rise low
cost permanent housing units beyond the 3,500
units share of the [NHA].”
For the NHA:
“1. To own the temporary housing consisting of 3,500

units.
2. To own the cleared and fenced incinerator site
consisting of 5 hectares situated at the Smokey
Mountain area.
267
VOL. 530, AUGUST 15, 2007 267

To own the 3,500 units of permanent housing to be

3. constructed by [RBI] at the Smokey Mountain area
to be awarded to qualified on site residents.
4. To own the Industrial Area site consisting of 3.2
hectares, and
5. To own the open spaces, roads and facilities within
the Smokey Mountain area.”
In the event of “extraordinary increase in labor, materials,

20
fuel and nonrecoverability of total project expenses,” the
OP, upon recommendation of the NHA, may approve a
corresponding adjustment in the enabling component.
The functions and responsibilities of RBI and NHA are
as follows:
For RBI:
4.01 Immediately commence on the preparation of the FINAL
REPORT with emphasis to the expedient acquisition, with the
assistance of the [NHA] of Environmental Compliance Certificate
(ECC) from the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the
[DENR]. Construction shall only commence after the acquisition
of the ECC. The Environment Compliance Certificate (ECC) shall
form part of the FINAL REPORT.
The FINAL REPORT shall provide the necessary subdivision
and housing plans, detailed engineering and architectural
drawings, technical specifications and other related and required
documents relative to the Smokey Mountain area.
With respect to the 40hectare reclamation area, the [RBI]
shall have the discretion to develop the same in a manner that it
deems necessary to recover the [RBI’s] investment, subject to
environmental and zoning rules.
4.02 Finance the total project cost for land development,
housing construction and reclamation of the PROJECT.
4.03 Warrant that all developments shall be in compliance with
the requirements of the FINAL REPORT.
_______________
20 Id., at p. 73.
268

4.04 Provide all administrative resources for the submission of

project accomplishment reports to the [NHA] for proper
evaluation and supervision on the actual implementation.
4.05 Negotiate and secure, with the assistance of the [NHA]

the grant of rights of way to the PROJECT, from the owners of
the adjacent lots for access road, water, electrical power
connections and drainage facilities.
4.06 Provide temporary field office and transportation vehicles
(2 units), one (1) complete set of computer and one (1) unit electric
typewriter for the [NHA’s] field personnel to be charged to the
PROJECT.”
For the NHA:
“4.07 The [NHA] shall be responsible for the removal and
relocation of all squatters within Smokey Mountain to the
Temporary Housing Complex or to other areas prepared as
relocation areas with the assistance of the [RBI]. The [RBI] shall
be responsible in releasing the funds allocated and committed for
relocation as detailed in the FINAL REPORT.
4.08 Assist the [RBI] and shall endorse granting of exemption
fees in the acquisition of all necessary permits, licenses,
appraisals, clearances and accreditations for the PROJECT
subject to existing laws, rules and regulations.
4.09 The [NHA] shall inspect, evaluate and monitor all works
at the Smokey Mountain and Reclamation Area while the land
development and construction of housing units are in progress to
determine whether the development and construction works are
undertaken in accordance with the FINAL REPORT. If in its
judgment, the PROJECT is not pursued in accordance with the
FINAL REPORT, the [NHA] shall require the [RBI] to undertake
necessary remedial works. All expenses, charges and penalties
incurred for such remedial, if any, shall be for the account of the
[RBI].
4.10 The [NHA] shall assist the [RBI] in the complete
electrification of the PROJECT. x x x
4.11 Handle the processing and documentation of all sales
transactions related to its assets shares from the venture such as
the 3,500 units of permanent housing and the allotted industrial
area of 3.2 hectares.
269
VOL. 530, AUGUST 15, 2007 269

4.12 All advances outside of project costs made by the [RBI] to the
[NHA] shall be deducted from the proceeds due to the [NHA].
4.13 The [NHA] shall be responsible for the acquisition of the
Mother Title for the Smokey Mountain and Reclamation Area
within 90 days upon submission of Survey returns to the Land
Management Sector. The land titles to the 40hectare reclaimed
land, the 1.3 hectare commercial area at the Smokey Mountain
area and the constructed units of mediumrise permanent housing

units beyond the 3,500 units share of the [NHA] shall be issued in
the name of the [RBI] upon completion of the project. However,
the [RBI] shall have the authority to presell its share as
indicated in this agreement.”
The final details of the JVA, which will include the

construction duration, costs, extent of reclamation, and
delivery timetables, shall be based on the FINAL REPORT
which will be contained in a Supplemental Agreement to be
executed later by the parties.
The JVA may be modified or revised by written
agreement between the NHA and RBI specifying the
clauses to be revised or modified and the corresponding
amendments.
If the Project is revoked or terminated by the
Government through no fault of RBI or by mutual
agreement, the Government shall compensate RBI for its
actual expenses incurred in the Project plus a reasonable
rate of return not exceeding that stated in the feasibility
study and in the contract as of the date of such revocation,
cancellation, or termination on a schedule to be agreed
upon by both parties.
As a preliminary step in the project implementation,
consultations and dialogues were conducted with the
settlers of the Smokey Mountain Dumpsite Area. At the
same time, DENR started processing the application for
the Environmental Clearance Certificate (ECC) of the
SMDRP. As a result however of the consultative dialogues,
public hearings, the report on the onsite field conditions,
the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) published on
April 29 and May 12, 1993 as required by the
Environmental Management Bureau of DENR, the
evaluation of the DENR, and the recommenda
270

tions from other government agencies, it was discovered

that design changes and additional work have 21
to be
undertaken to successfully implement the Project.
Thus, on February 21, 1994, the parties entered into
another agreement denominated as 22the Amended and
Restated Joint Venture Agreement (ARJVA) which
delineated the different phases of the Project. Phase I of
the Project involves the construction of temporary housing
units for the current residents of the Smokey Mountain

dumpsite, the clearing and levelingoff of the dumpsite, and
the construction of mediumrise lowcost
23
housing units at
the cleared and leveled dumpsite. Phase II of the Project
involves the construction of an incineration area
24
for the on
site disposal of the garbage at the dumpsite. The enabling
component or consideration for Phase I of the Project was
increased from2540 hectares of reclaimed lands across R10
to 79 hectares. The revision also provided for the enabling
component for Phase II of 119 hectares of reclaimed lands
contiguous
26
to the 79 hectares of reclaimed lands for Phase
I. Furthermore, the amended contract delineated the
scope of works and the terms and conditions of Phases I
and II, thus:
The PROJECT shall consist of Phase I and Phase II.

“Phase I shall involve the following:
a. the construction of 2,992 units of temporary housing for

the affected residents while clearing and development of
Smokey Mountain [are] being undertaken
b. the clearing of Smokey Mountain and the subsequent
construction of 3,520 units of medium rise housing and the
develop
_______________
21 Id., at p. 479.
22 Id., at pp. 8094.
23 Id., at p. 83.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id.
271
VOL. 530, AUGUST 15, 2007 271

ment of the industrial/commercial site within the Smokey

Mountain area
c. the reclamation and development of a 79 hectare area
directly across Radial Road 10 to serve as the enabling
component of Phase I
Phase II shall involve the following:
a. the construction and operation of an incinerator plant that

will conform to the emission standards of the DENR

b. the reclamation and development of 119hectare area
contiguous to that to be reclaimed under Phase I to serve
as the enabling component of Phase II”
Under the ARJVA, RBI shall construct 2,992 temporary

housing
27
units, a reduction from 3,500 units under the
JVA. However, it was required to construct 3,520
mediumrise lowcost permanent housing units instead of
3,500 units under the JVA. There was a substantial change
in the design of the permanent housing units such that a
“loft shall be incorporated in each unit so as to increase the
living space from 20 to 32 square meters. The additions
and changes in the Original Project Component are as
follows:
ORIGINAL CHANGES/REVISIONS
1. TEMPORARY HOUSING
Wood/Plywood, Concrete/Steel Frame Structure
ga. 31 G.I. Sheet gauge 26 G.I. roofing
usable life of 3 sheets use as permanent structures
years, future 12 for factory and warehouses mixed 17
SM floor area. sm & 12 sm floor area.
2. MEDIUM RISE MASS
HOUSING
Box type precast Conventional and precast concrete
Shelter structures, 32
component 20
square
_______________
27 Id., at p. 84.
272

meter floor area square meter floor area with loft

with 2.4 meter floor (sleeping quarter) 3.6 m. floor
height; bare type, height, painted and improved
160 units/ architectural fa/ade, 80
building. units/building.
3. MITIGATING
MEASURES
3.1 For Use of clean dredgefill material

reclamation work below the MLLW and SM material
mixed with dredgefill above MLLW.
a. 100% use of Use of Steel Sheet Piles needed for
Smokey Mountain longer depth of embedment.
material as
dredgefill
b. Concrete Sheet
Piles short depth
of embedment
c. Silt removal Need to remove more than 3.0
approximately 1.0 meters of silt 28
after subsoil
meter only investigation.
These material and substantial modifications served as

justifications for the increase in the share of RBI from 40
hectares to 79 hectares of reclaimed land.
Under the JVA, the specific costs of the Project were not
stipulated but under the ARJVA, the stipulated cost for
Phase I was pegged at six billion six hundred ninetythree
million three hundred eightyseven thousand three
hundred sixtyfour pesos (PhP 6,693,387,364).
In his February 10, 1994 Memorandum, the Chairperson
of the SMDRP EXECOM submitted the ARJVA for
approval by the OP. After review of said agreement, the OP
directed that certain terms and conditions of the ARJVA be
further clarified or amended preparatory to its approval.
Pursuant to the President’s directive, the parties reached
an agreement on the
_______________
28 Id., at p. 93.
273
VOL. 530, AUGUST 15, 2007 273

clarifications and amendments required to be made on the

ARJVA.
On August 11, 1994, the NHA and RBI executed an
Amendment To the Amended
29
and Restated Joint Venture
Agreement (AARJVA) clarifying certain terms and
condition of the ARJVA, which was submitted to President
Ramos for approval, to wit:
“Phase II shall involve the following:
a. the construction and operation of an incinerator plant that

will conform to the emission standards of the DENR
b. the reclamation and development of 119hectare area
contiguous to that to be reclaimed under Phase I to serve
as the enabling component of Phase II, the exact size
and configuration of30 which shall be approved by the
SMDRP Committee.
Other substantial amendments are the following:
4. Paragraph 2.05 of Article II of the ARJVA is hereby amended to

read as follows:
2.05 The DEVELOPER shall reclaim seventy nine (79) hectares of the
Manila Bay area directly across Radial Road 10 (R10) to serve as
payment to the DEVELOPER as its asset share for Phase I and to
develop such land into commercial area with port facilities; provided, that
the port plan shall be integrated with the Philippine Port Authority’s
North Harbor plan for the Manila Bay area and provided further, that
the final reclamation and port plan for said reclaimed area shall be
submitted for approval by the Public Estates Authority and the
Philippine Ports Authority, respectively: provided finally, that subject to
par. 2.02 above, actual reclamation work may commence upon approval
of the final reclamation plan by the Public Estates Authority.
_______________
29 Id., at pp. 95104.

30 Id., at p. 98.
274

xxxx
9. A new paragraph to be numbered 5.05 shall be added to Article

V of the ARJVA, and shall read as follows:
5.05. In the event this Agreement is revoked, cancelled or terminated by

the AUTHORITY through no fault of the DEVELOPER, the
AUTHORITY shall compensate the DEVELOPER for the value of the
completed portions of, and actual expenditures on the PROJECT plus a
reasonable rate of return thereon, not exceeding that stated in the Cost
Estimates of Items of Work previously approved by the SMDRP
Executive Committee and the AUTHORITY and stated in this
Agreement, as of the date of such revocation, cancellation, or

termination, on a schedule to be agreed upon by the parties, provided
that said completed portions of Phase I are in accordance with the
approved FINAL REPORT.
Afterwards, President Ramos

31
issued Proclamation No. 465
dated August 31, 1994 increasing the proposed area for 32
reclamation across R10 from 40 hectares to 79 hectares,
to wit:
“NOW, THEREFORE, I, FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of the

Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me
by the law, and as recommended by the SMDRP Executive
Committee, do hereby authorize the increase of the area of
foreshore or submerged lands of Manila Bay to be reclaimed, as
previously authorized under Proclamation No. 39 (s. 1992) and
Memorandum Order No. 415 (s. 1992), from Four Hundred
Thousand (400,000) square meters, more or less, to Seven
Hundred Ninety Thousand (790,000) square meters, more or less.”
On September 1, 1994, pursuant to Proclamation No. 39,

the DENR issued Special Patent No. 3591 conveying in
favor of NHA an area of 211,975 square meters covering
the Smokey Mountain Dumpsite.
_______________
31 Id., at pp. 526533.

32 Id., at p. 435.
275
VOL. 530, AUGUST 15, 2007 275

In its September 7, 1994 letter to the EXECOM, the OP

through then Executive Secretary Teofisto T. Guingona,
Jr., approved the ARJVA as amended by the AARJVA.
On September 8, 1994, the DENR issued Special Patent
3592 pursuant to Proclamation No. 39, conveying in favor
of NHA a 401,485square meter area.
On September 26, 1994, the NHA, RBI, Home Insurance
and Guaranty Corporation (HIGC), now known as the
Home Guaranty33
Corporation, and the Philippine National
Bank (PNB) executed the Smokey Mountain Asset Pool 34
Formation Trust Agreement (Asset Pool Agreement).
Thereafter, a Guaranty Contract was entered into by NHA,
RBI, and HIGC.
On
35
June 23, 1994, the Legislature passed the Clean Air
Act. The Act made the establishment of an incinerator
illegal and effectively barred the implementation of the
planned incinerator project under Phase II. Thus, the off
site disposal of the
36
garbage at the Smokey Mountain
became necessary. 37
The land reclamation was completed in August 1996.
Sometime later in 1996, pursuant likewise to
Proclamation No. 39, the DENR issued Special Patent No.
3598 conveying in favor of NHA an additional 390,000
square meter area.
During the actual construction and implementation of
Phase I of the SMDRP, the InterAgency Technical
Committee found and recommended to the EXECOM on
December 17, 1997 that additional works were necessary
for the completion and viability of the Project. The
EXECOM approved the recommendation and so, NHA
instructed RBI 38 to implement the change orders or
necessary works.
_______________
33 The PNB was later replaced by the Planters Development Bank.

34 Rollo, p. 105.
35 Id., at p. 18. RA 8749, “The Clean Air Act of 1999.”
36 Id.
37 Id., at p. 244.
38 Id., at pp. 747751.
276

Such necessary works comprised more than 25% of the

original contract price and as a result, the Asset Pool
incurred direct and indirect costs. Based on C1 12 A of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of PD 1594, a
supplemental agreement is required for “all change orders
and extra work orders, the total aggregate cost of which
being more than twentyfive (25%) of the escalated original
contract price.”
The EXECOM requested an opinion from the
Department of Justice (DOJ) to determine whether a
bidding was required for the change orders and/or
necessary works. The DOJ, through DOJ Opinion Nos. 119
and 155 dated August 26, 1993 and November 12, 1993,
opined that “a rebidding, pursuant to the aforequoted
provisions of the implementing rules (referring to PD 1594)

would not be necessary where the change orders
inseparable from the original scope of the project, in which
case, a negotiation with the incumbent contractor may be
allowed.”
Thus, on February 19, 1998, the EXECOM issued a
resolution directing NHA to enter into a supplemental
agreement covering said necessary works.
On March 20, 1998, the NHA and RBI entered into a
Supplemental Agreement covering the aforementioned
necessary works and submitted it to the President on
March 24, 1998 for approval.
Outgoing President Ramos decided to endorse the
consideration of the Supplemental Agreement to incoming
President Joseph E. Estrada. On June 30, 1998, Estrada
became the 13th Philippine President.
However, the approval of the Supplemental Agreement
was unacted upon for five months. As a result, the utilities
and the road networks were constructed to cover only the
79hectare original enabling component granted under the
ARJVA. The 220hectare extension of the 79hectare area
was no longer technically feasible. Moreover, the financial
crises and unreliable real estate situation made it difficult
to sell the remaining reclaimed lots. The devaluation of the
peso and the
277
VOL. 530, AUGUST 15, 2007 277

increase in interest cost led to the substantial increase in

the cost of reclamation.
On August 1, 1998, the NHA granted RBI’s request to
suspend work on the SMDRP due to “the delay in the
approval of the Supplemental Agreement, the consequent
absence of an enabling component to cover the cost of the
necessary works for the project, and the resulting inability
to replenish the Asset Pool funds39 partially used for the
completion of the necessary works.”
As of August 1, 1998 when the project was suspended,
RBI had “already accomplished a portion of the necessary
works and change orders which resulted in [RBI] and the
Asset Pool incurring advances for direct and indirect cost
which amount can no longer be covered40 by the 79hectare
enabling component under the ARJVA.”
Repeated demands were made by RBI in its own
capacity and on behalf of the asset pool on NHA for
payment for the advances for direct and indirect costs

subject to NHA validation.
In November 1998, President Estrada issued
Memorandum Order No. 33 reconstituting the SMDRP
EXECOM and further directed it to review the
Supplemental Agreement and submit its recommendation
on the completion of the SMDRP.
The reconstituted EXECOM conducted a review of the
project and recommended the amendment of the March 20,
1998 Supplemental Agreement “to make it more feasible
and to identify and provide new sources of funds for the
project and provide for a new enabling component to cover
the payment for the necessary works that cannot be
covered by
41
the 79hectare enabling component under the
ARJVA.”
_______________
39 Id., at p. 858.
40 Id., at p. 860.
41 Id., at p. 859.
278

The
42
EXECOM passed Resolution Nos. 991601 and 9916
02 which approved the modification of the Supplemental
Agreement, to wit:
“a) Approval of 150 hectares additional reclamation in

order to make the reclamation feasible as part of
the enabling component.
b) The conveyance of the 15hectare NHA Vitas
property (actually 17 hectares based on surveys) to
the SMDRP Asset Pool.
c) The inclusion in the total development cost of other
additional, necessary and indispensable
infrastructure works and the revision of the
original cost stated in the Supplemental Agreement
dated March 20, 1998 from PhP 2,953,984,941.40 to
PhP 2,969,134,053.13.
d) Revision in the sharing agreement between the
parties.”
In the March 23, 2000 OP Memorandum, the EXECOM
was authorized to proceed and complete the SMDRP

subject to certain guidelines and directives.
After the parties in the case at bar had complied with
the March 23, 2000 Memorandum, the NHA November 9,
2000 Resolution No. 4323 approved “the conveyance of the
17hectare Vitas property in favor of the existing or a newly
created Asset Pool of the project to be developed into a
mixed commercialindustrial area, subject to certain
conditions.”
On January 20, 2001, then President Estrada was
considered resigned. On the same day, President Gloria M.
Arroyo took her oath as the 14th President of the
Philippines.
As of February 28, 2001, “the estimated total project cost
of the SMDRP has reached P8.65 billion comprising of
P4.7843 billion in direct cost and P3.87 billion in indirect
cost,” subject to validation by the NHA.
On August 28, 2001, NHA issued Resolution No. 4436 to
pay for “the various necessary works/change orders to
_______________
42 Id.
43 Id., at p. 860.
279
VOL. 530, AUGUST 15, 2007 279

SMDRP, to effect the corresponding enabling component

consisting of the conveyance of the NHA’s Vitas Property
and an additional 150hectare reclamation area” and to
authorize the release by NHA of PhP 480 million “as
advance to the project to make the Permanent Housing
habitable, subject to reimbursement 44
from the proceeds of
the expanded enabling component.”
On November 19, 2001, the Amended Supplemental
Agreement (ASA) was signed by the parties, and on
February 28, 2002, the Housing and Urban Development
Coordinating Council (HUDCC) submitted the agreement
to the OP for approval.
In the July 20, 2002 Cabinet Meeting, HUDCC was
directed “to submit the works covered by the PhP 480
million [advance
45
to the Project] and the ASA to public
bidding.” On August 28, 2002, the HUDCC informed RBI
of the decision of the Cabinet.
In its September 2, 2002 letter to the HUDCC
Chairman, RBI lamented the decision of the government

“to bid out the remaining works under the ASA thereby
unilaterally terminating the Project with RBI and all the
agreements related thereto.” RBI demanded the payment
of just compensation “for all accomplishments and costs
incurred in developing the SMDRP plus a reasonable rate
of return thereon pursuant46to Section 5.05 of the ARJVA
and Section 6.2 of the ASA.”
Consequently, the parties negotiated the terms of the
termination of the JVA and other subsequent agreements.
On August 27, 2003, the NHA and RBI executed a
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) whereby both parties
agreed to terminate the JVA and other subsequent
agreements, thus:
_______________
44 Id.
45 Id., at p. 861.
46 Id.
280

“1. TERMINATION
1.1 In compliance with the Cabinet directive dated 30 July

2002 to submit the works covered by the P480 Million and
the ASA to public bidding, the following agreements
executed by and between the NHA and the DEVELOPER
are hereby terminated, to wit:
a. Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) dated 19 March 1993

b. Amended and Restated Joint Venture Agreement
(ARJVA) dated 21 February 1994
c. Amendment and Restated Joint Venture Agreement dated
11 August 1994
d. Supplemental Agreement dated 24 March 1998
e. Amended Supplemental Agreement (ASA) dated 19
November 2001.
xxxx
5. SETTLEMENT OF CLAIMS
5.1 Subject to the validation of the DEVELOPER’s claims, the
NHA hereby agrees to initially compensate the Developer

for the abovementioned costs as follows:
a. Direct payment to DEVELOPER of the amounts herein

listed in the following manner:
a.1 P250 Million in cash from the escrow account in

accordance with Section 2 herewith;
a.2 Conveyance of a 3 hectare portion of the Vitas Industrial
area immediately after joint determination of the
appraised value of the said property in accordance with
the procedure herein set forth in the last paragraph of
Section 5.3. For purposes of all payments to be made
through conveyance of real properties, the parties shall
secure from the NHA Board of Directors all documents
necessary and sufficient to effect the transfer of title over
the properties to be conveyed to RBI, which documents
shall be issued within a reasonable period.
281
VOL. 530, AUGUST 15, 2007 281

5.2 Any unpaid balance of the DEVELOPERS claims

determined after the validation process referred to in
Section 4 hereof, may be paid in cash, bonds or through
the conveyance of properties or any combination thereof.
The manner, terms and conditions of payment of the
balance shall be specified and agreed upon later within a
period of three months from the time a substantial
amount representing the unpaid balance has been
validated pursuant hereto including, but not limited to the
programming of quarterly cash payments to be sourced by
the NHA from its budget for debt servicing, from its
income or from any other sources.
5.3 In any case the unpaid balance is agreed to be paid, either
partially or totally through conveyance of properties, the
parties shall agree on which properties shall be subject to
conveyance. The NHA and DEVELOPER hereby agree to
determine the valuation of the properties to be conveyed
by getting the average of the appraisals to be made by two
(2) mutually acceptable independent appraisers.”
Meanwhile, respondent Harbour Centre Port Terminal,

Inc. (HCPTI) entered into an agreement with the asset pool
for the development and operations of a port in the Smokey
Mountain Area which is a major component of SMDRP to

provide a source of livelihood and employment for Smokey
Mountain residents and spur economic growth. A
Subscription Agreement was executed between the Asset
Pool and HCPTI whereby the asset pool subscribed to 607
million common shares and 1,143 million preferred shares
of HCPTI. The HCPTI preferred shares had a premium and
penalty interest of 7.5% per annum and a mandatory
redemption feature. The asset pool paid the subscription by
conveying to HCPTI a 10hectare land which it acquired
from the NHA being a portion of the reclaimed land of the
SMDRP. Corresponding certificates of titles were issued to
HCPTI, namely: TCT Nos. 251355, 251356, 251357, and
251358.
282

Due to HCPTI’s failure to obtain a license to handle foreign

containerized cargo from PPA, it suffered a net income loss
of PhP 132,621,548 in 2002 and a net loss of PhP
15,540,063 in 2003. The Project Governing Board of the
Asset Pool later conveyed by way of dacion en pago a
number of HCPTI shares to RBI in lieu of cash payment for
the latter’s work in SMDRP.
On August 5, 2004, former Solicitor General Francisco I.
Chavez, filed the instant petition which impleaded as
respondents the NHA, RBI, RII Holdings, Inc. (RHI),
HCPTI, and Mr. Reghis Romero II, raising constitutional
issues.
The NHA reported that thirtyfour (34) temporary
housing structures and twentyone (21) permanent housing
structures had been turned over by respondent RBI. It
claimed that 2,510 beneficiaryfamilies belonging to the
poorest of the poor had been transferred to their permanent
homes and benefited from the Project.
The Issues
The grounds presented in the instant petition are:
NEITHER RESPONDENT NHA NOR RESPONDENT RII

BUILDERS MAY VALIDLY RECLAIM FORESHORE AND
SUBMERGED LAND BECAUSE:
1. RESPONDENT NHA AND RII BUILDERS WERE

NEVER GRANTED ANY POWER AND AUTHORITY TO
RECLAIM LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN AS THIS
POWER IS VESTED EXCLUSIVELY WITH THE PEA.
2. EVEN ASSUMING THAT RESPONDENTS NHA AND R
II BUILDERS WERE GIVEN THE POWER AND
AUTHORITY TO RECLAIM FORESHORE AND
SUBMERGED LAND, THEY WERE NEVER GIVEN
THE AUTHORITY BY THE DENR TO DO SO.
283
VOL. 530, AUGUST 15, 2007 283

II
RESPONDENT RII BUILDERS CANNOT ACQUIRE THE

RECLAIMED FORESHORE AND SUBMERGED LAND AREAS
BECAUSE:
1. THE RECLAIMED FORESHORE AND SUBMERGED

PARCELS OF LAND ARE INALIENABLE PUBLIC
LANDS WHICH ARE BEYOND THE COMMERCE OF
MAN.
2. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE SUBJECT
RECLAIMED FORESHORE AND SUBMERGED
PARCELS OF LAND WERE ALREADY DECLARED
ALIENABLE LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN,
RESPONDENT RII BUILDERS STILL COULD NOT
ACQUIRE THE SAME BECAUSE THERE WAS NEVER
ANY DECLARATION THAT THE SAID LANDS WERE
NO LONGER NEEDED FOR PUBLIC USE.
3. EVEN ASSUMING THAT THE SUBJECT RECLAIMED
LANDS ARE ALIENABLE AND NO LONGER NEEDED
FOR PUBLIC USE, RESPONDENT RII BUILDERS
STILL CANNOT ACQUIRE THE SAME BECAUSE
THERE WAS NEVER ANY LAW AUTHORIZING THE
SALE THEREOF.
4. THERE WAS NEVER ANY PUBLIC BIDDING
AWARDING OWNERSHIP OF THE SUBJECT LAND TO
RESPONDENT RII BUILDERS.
5. ASSUMING THAT ALL THE REQUIREMENTS FOR A
VALID TRANSFER OF ALIENABLE PUBLIC HAD
BEEN PERFORMED, RESPONDENT RII BUILDERS,
BEING PRIVATE CORPORATION IS NONETHELESS
EXPRESSLY PROHIBITED BY THE PHILIPPINE
CONSTITUTION TO ACQUIRE LANDS OF THE

PUBLIC DOMAIN.
III
RESPONDENT HARBOUR, BEING A PRIVATE

CORPORATION WHOSE MAJORITY STOCKS ARE OWNED
AND CONTROLLED BY RESPONDENT ROMERO’S
CORPORATIONS—RII BUILDERS AND RII HOLDINGS—IS
DISQUALIFIED FROM BEING A TRANSFEREE OF PUBLIC
LAND.
284

IV
RESPONDENTS MUST BE COMPELLED TO DISCLOSE ALL

INFORMATION RELATED TO THE SMOKEY MOUNTAIN
DEVELOPMENT AND RECLAMATION PROJECT.
The Court’s Ruling
Before we delve into the substantive issues raised in this

petition, we will first deal with several procedural matters
raised by respondents.
Whether petitioner has the requisite locus standi to

file this case
Respondents argue that petitioner Chavez has no legal
standing to file the petition.
Only a person who stands to be benefited or injured by
the judgment in the suit or entitled
47
to the avails of the suit
can file a complaint or petition. Respondents claim that
petitioner is not a proper partyininterest as he was
unable to show that “he has sustained or is in immediate or
imminent danger of sustaining some direct and personal
injury as a result of the execution48and enforcement of the
assailed contracts or agreements.” Moreover, they assert
that not all government contracts can justify a taxpayer’s
suit especially when no public funds were utilized in
contravention of the Constitution or a 49law.
We explicated in Chavez v. PCGG that in cases where
issues of transcendental public importance are presented,
there is no necessity to show that petitioner has
experienced or is in
_______________
47 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Rule 3, Sec. 2.

48 Bayan (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan) v. Zamora, G.R. Nos. 138570,
138572, 138587, 138680 & 138698, October 10, 2000, 342 SCRA 449, 478.
49 G.R. No. 130716, December 9, 1998, 299 SCRA 744.
285
VOL. 530, AUGUST 15, 2007 285

actual danger of suffering direct and personal injury as the

requisite
50
injury is assumed. We find our ruling in Chavez v.
PEA as conclusive authority on locus standi in the case at
bar since the issues raised in this petition are averred to be
in breach of the fair diffusion of the country’s natural
resources and the constitutional right of a citizen to
information which have been declared to be matters of
transcendental public importance. Moreover, the pleadings
especially those of respondents readily reveal that public
funds have been indirectly utilized in the Project by means
of Smokey Mountain Project Participation Certificates
(SMPPCs) bought by some government agencies.
Hence, petitioner, as a taxpayer, is a proper party to the
instant petition before the court.
Whether petitioner’s direct recourse to this Court was

proper
Respondents are one in asserting that petitioner
circumvents the principle of hierarchy of courts in his
petition. Judicial hierarchy was made clear in the case of
People v. Cuaresma, thus:
“There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is

determinative of the venue of appeals, and should also serve as a
general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the
extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy
most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of
extraordinary writs against first level (“inferior”) courts should be
filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter,
with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme
Court’s original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed
only when there are special and important reasons therefor,
clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is established
policy. It is a policy that is necessary to prevent inordinate
demands upon the Court’s time and attention which are better
devoted to those matters within its exclusive juris
_______________
50 G.R. No. 133250, July 9, 2002, 384 SCRA 152.
286

diction,51 and to prevent further overcrowding of the Court’s

docket. x x x”
The OSG claims that the jurisdiction over petitions for

prohibition and mandamus is concurrent with other lower
courts like the Regional Trial Courts and the Court of
Appeals. Respondent NHA argues that the instant petition
is misfiled because it does not introduce special and
important reasons or exceptional and compelling
circumstances to warrant direct recourse to this Court and
that the lower courts are more equipped for factual issues
since this Court is not a trier of facts. Respondents RBI and
RHI question the filing of the petition as this Court should
not be unduly burdened with “repetitions, invocation of
jurisdiction over constitutional questions it had previously
resolved and settled.”
In the light of existing jurisprudence, we find paucity of
merit in respondents’ postulation.
While direct recourse to this Court is generally frowned
upon and discouraged, we have however ruled in Santiago
v. Vasquez that such resort to us may be allowed in certain
situations, wherein this Court ruled that petitions for
certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus, though cognizable by
other courts, may directly be filed with us if “the redress
desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or
where exceptional compelling circumstances justify
availment of a remedy within and calling
52
for the exercise of
[this Court’s] primary jurisdiction.”
The instant petition challenges the constitutionality and
legality of the SMDRP involving several hectares of
government land and hundreds of millions of funds of
several government agencies. Moreover, serious
constitutional challenges are made on the different aspects
of the Project which allegedly affect the right of Filipinos to
the distribution of natural
_______________
51 G.R. No. 67787, April 18, 1989, 172 SCRA 415, 424.
52 G.R. Nos. 9928990, January 27, 1993, 217 SCRA 633, 652.
287
VOL. 530, AUGUST 15, 2007 287

resources in the country and the right to information of a

citizen—matters which have been considered to be of
extraordinary significance and grave consequence to the
public in general. These concerns in the instant action
compel us to turn a blind eye to the judicial structure
meant to provide an orderly dispensation of justice and
consider the instant petition as a justified deviation from
an established precept.
Core factual matters undisputed

Respondents next challenge the projected review by this
Court of the alleged factual issues intertwined in the issues
propounded by petitioner. They listed a copious number of
questions seemingly factual 53
in nature which would make
this Court a trier of facts.
_______________
53 1. Petitioner claimed that NHA awarded the Smokey Mountain

project to RII Builders through contract negotiations and that there was
no public bidding awarding ownership of the subject land to respondent R
II Builders, while respondents alleged that NHA publicly bidded out the
right to become NHA’s joint venture partner in the prosecution of the
SMDRP;
2. Petitioner averred that “PEA had no participation whatsoever in

the reclamation of the subject lands” while respondents stated
PEA had a name therein;
3. Petitioner alleged that “neither respondent NHA nor respondent
RII Builders was given the authority [by DENR] to reclaim the
subject lands” while respondents claimed such authority was
granted;
4. Mr. Chavez claimed “that there is no legislative or Presidential act
classifying the submerged areas around Smokey Mountain as
alienable or disposable lands of the public domain open to
disposition” while respondents said that Presidents Aquino and
Ramos made the classification;
5. Whether respondent RII Builders complied with its obligation to
“fully finance” the Project;

6. Whether the Project has been terminated by agreements of the
parties;
288

We find the position of respondents bereft of merit.

For one, we already gave due course to the 54
instant
petition in our January 18, 2005 Resolution. In said
issuance, the parties were required to make clear and
concise statements of established facts upon which our
decision will be based.
Secondly, we agree with petitioner that there is no
necessity for us to make any factual findings since the facts
needed to decide the instant petition are well established
55
from the admissions of the parties in their pleadings and
those derived from the documents appended to said
submissions. Indeed, the core facts which are the subject
matter of the numerous issues raised in this petition are
undisputed. Now we will tackle the issues that prop up the
instant petition.
Since petitioner has cited our decision in PEA as basis
for his postulations in a number of issues, we first resolve
the query—is PEA applicable to the case at bar?
A juxtaposition of the facts in the two cases constrains
the Court to rule in the negative.
The Court finds that PEA is not a binding precedent to
the instant petition because the facts in said case are
substantially different from the facts and circumstances in
the case at bar, thus:
(1) The reclamation project in PEA was undertaken

through a JVA entered into between PEA and
AMARI. The reclamation project in the instant
NHA case was undertaken by the NHA, a national
government agency in consultation with PEA and
with the approval of two Philippine Presidents;
_______________
7. Whether respondents Harbour Centre and Romero fraudulently

caused the dilution of the Asset Pool’s Holdings in HCPTI;
8. Whether Harbour Centre contracts attached to the Petition are
genuine.
54 Rollo, p. 871.
55 Petition, Comments, Reply, and Memoranda.
289
VOL. 530, AUGUST 15, 2007 289

(2) In PEA, AMARI and PEA executed a JVA to

develop the Freedom Islands and reclaim
submerged areas without public bidding on April
25, 1995. In the instant NHA case, the NHA and
RBI executed a JVA after RBI was declared the
winning bidder on August 31, 1992 as the JVA
partner of the NHA in the SMDRP after compliance
with the requisite public bidding;
(3) In PEA, there was no law or presidential
proclamation classifying the lands to be reclaimed
as alienable and disposal lands of public domain. In
this RBI case, MO 415 of former President Aquino
and Proclamation No. 39 of then President Ramos,
coupled with Special Patents Nos. 3591, 3592, and
3598, classified the reclaimed lands as alienable
and disposable;
(4) In PEA, the Chavez petition was filed before the
amended JVA was executed by PEA and AMARI. In
this NHA case, the JVA and subsequent
amendments were already substantially
implemented. Subsequently, the Project was
terminated through a MOA signed on August 27,
2003. Almost one year later on August 5, 2004, the
Chavez petition was filed;
(5) In PEA, AMARI was considered to be in bad faith
as it signed the amended JVA after the Chavez
petition was filed with the Court and after Senate
Committee Report No. 560 was issued finding that
the subject lands are inalienable lands of public
domain. In the instant petition, RBI and other
respondents are considered to have signed the
agreements in good faith as the Project was
terminated even before the Chavez petition was
filed;
(6) The PEAAMARI JVA was executed as a result of
direct negotiation between the parties and not in
accordance with the BOT Law. The NHARBI JVA
and subsequent amendments constitute a BOT
contract governed by the BOT Law; and
290

(7) In PEA, the lands to be reclaimed or already

reclaimed were transferred to PEA, a government
entity tasked to dispose of public
56
lands under
Executive Order No. (EO) 525. In the NHA case,
the reclaimed lands were transferred to NHA, a
government entity NOT tasked to dispose of public
land and therefore said alienable lands were
converted
57
to patrimonial lands upon their transfer
to NHA.
58
Thus the PEA Decision cannot be considered an authority
or precedent
59
to the instant case. The principle of stare
decisis has no application to the different factual setting of
the instant case.
We will now dwell on the substantive issues raised by
petitioner. After a perusal of the grounds raised in this
petition, we find that most of these issues are moored on
our PEA Decision which, as earlier discussed, has no
application to the instant petition. For this reason alone,
the petition can already be rejected. Nevertheless, on the
premise of the applicability of said decision to the case at
bar, we will proceed to resolve said issues.
First Issue: Whether respondents NHA and RBI have

been granted the power and authority to re
_______________
56 “Designating the Public Estates Authority as the Agency Primarily

Responsible for All Reclamation Projects” (1979).
57 Rollo, p. 235.
58 The July 9, 2002 Decision entitled Chavez v. PEA was concurred in
by 13 members of this Court who voted to grant the petition. However, in
the May 6, 2003 Resolution, the Court was divided when it voted 85 to
affirm the Decision. And in the most recent November 11, 2003 Resolution
of this Court, a 77 vote was arrived at. Thus, the July 9, 2002 Decision is
still the valid case law.
59 The doctrine of stare decisis provides that a conclusion reached in one
case should, for the sake of certainty, be applied to those which follow if
the facts are substantially the same even though the parties may be
different.
291
VOL. 530, AUGUST 15, 2007 291

claim lands of the public domain as this power is

vested exclusively in PEA as claimed by petitioner
Petitioner contends that neither respondent NHA nor

respondent RBI may validly reclaim foreshore and
submerged land because they were not given any power
and authority to reclaim lands of the public domain as this
power was delegated by law to PEA.
Asserting that existing laws did not empower the NHA
and RBI to reclaim lands of public domain, the Public
Estates Authority (PEA), petitioner claims, is “the primary
authority for the reclamation of all foreshore and
submerged lands of public domain,” and relies on PEA
where this Court held:
“Moreover, Section 1 of Executive Order No. 525 provides that

PEA “shall be primarily responsible for integrating, directing, and
National Government.” The same section also states that “[A]ll
reclamation projects shall be approved by the President upon
recommendation of the PEA, and shall be undertaken by the PEA
or through a proper contract executed by it with any person or
entity; x x x.” Thus, under EO No. 525, in relation to PD No. 3A
and PD No. 1084, PEA became the primary implementing agency
of the National Government to reclaim foreshore and submerged
lands of the public domain. EO No. 525 recognized PEA as the
government entity “to undertake the reclamation of lands and
ensure their maximum utilization in promoting public welfare
and interests.” Since large portions of these reclaimed lands
would obviously be needed for public service, there must be a
formal declaration segregating reclaimed lands no longer needed60
for public service from those still needed for public service.”
In the Smokey Mountain Project, petitioner clarifies that

the reclamation was not done by PEA or through a contract
executed by PEA with another person or entity but by the
NHA through an agreement with respondent RBI.
Therefore, he concludes that the reclamation is null and
void.
_______________
60 Supra note 50, at p. 221.
292

Petitioner’s contention has no merit.

EO 525 reads:
“Section 1. The Public Estates Authority (PEA) shall be

primarily responsible for integrating, directing, and
National Government. All reclamation projects shall be approved
by the President upon recommendation of the PEA, and shall be
undertaken by the PEA or through a proper contract executed by
it with any person or entity; Provided, that, reclamation
projects of any national government agency or entity
authorized under its charter shall be undertaken in
consultation with the PEA upon approval of the
President.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The aforequoted provision points to three (3) requisites for

a legal and valid reclamation project, viz.:
(1) approval by the President;

(2) favorable recommendation of PEA; and
(3) undertaken by any of the following:
a. by PEA
b. by any person or entity pursuant to a contract it
executed with PEA
c. by the National Government agency or entity
authorized under its charter to reclaim lands
subject to consultation with PEA
Without doubt, PEA under EO 525 was designated as the

agency primarily responsible for integrating, directing, and
coordinating all reclamation projects. Primarily means
“mainly, principally, mostly, generally.” Thus, not all
reclamation projects fall under PEA’s authority of
supervision, integration,61 and coordination. The very
charter of PEA, PD 1084, does not mention that PEA has
the exclusive and sole
_______________
61 “Creating the Public Estates Authority, Defining its Power and

Functions, Providing Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes” (1977).
293
VOL. 530, AUGUST 15, 2007 293

power and authority to reclaim lands of public domain. EO

525 even reveals the exception—reclamation projects by a
national government agency or entity authorized by its
charter to reclaim land. One example is EO 405 which
authorized the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) to reclaim
and develop submerged areas for port related purposes.
Under its charter, PD 857, PPA has the power “to reclaim,
excavate, enclose or raise any of the lands” vested in it.
Thus, while PEA under PD 1084 has the power to
reclaim land and under EO 525 is primarily responsible for
integrating, directing and coordinating reclamation
projects, such authority is NOT exclusive and such power
to reclaim may be granted or delegated to another
government agency or entity or may even be undertaken by
the National Government itself, PEA being only an agency
and a part of the National Government.
Let us apply the legal parameters of Sec. 1, EO 525 to
the reclamation phase of SMDRP. After a scrutiny of the
facts culled from the records, we find that the project met
all the three (3) requirements, thus:
1. There was ample approval by the President of the
Philippines; as a matter of fact, two Philippine Presidents
approved the same, namely: Presidents Aquino and Ramos.
President Aquino sanctioned the reclamation of both the
SMDRP housing and commercialindustrial sites through
MO 415 (s. 1992) which approved the SMDRP under Sec. 1
and directed NHA “x x x to implement the Smokey
Mountain Development Plan and Reclamation of the
Area across R10 through a private sector joint venture
scheme at the least cost to government” under Section 3.
For his part, then President Ramos issued Proclamation
No. 39 (s. 1992) which expressly reserved the Smokey
Mountain Area and the Reclamation Area for a
housing project and related commercial/industrial
development.
Moreover, President Ramos issued Proclamation No. 465
(s. 1994) which authorized the increase of the Reclama
294

tion Area from 40 hectares of foreshore and

submerged land of the Manila Bay to 79 hectares. It
speaks of the reclamation of 400,000 square meters, more
or less, of the foreshore and submerged lands of Manila
Bay adjoining R10 as an enabling component of the
SMDRP.
As a result of Proclamations Nos. 39 and 465, Special
Patent No. 3591 covering 211,975 square meters of Smokey
Mountain, Special Patent No. 3592 covering 401,485
square meters of reclaimed land, and Special Patent No.
3598 covering another 390,000 square meters of reclaimed
land were issued by the DENR.
Thus, the first requirement of presidential imprimatur
on the SMDRP has been satisfied.
2. The requisite favorable endorsement of the
reclamation phase was impliedly granted by PEA.
President Aquino saw to it that there was coordination of
the project with PEA by designating its general manager as
member of the EXECOM tasked to supervise the project
implementation. The assignment was made in Sec. 2 of MO
415 which provides:
“Section 2. An Executive Committee is hereby created to oversee

the implementation of the Plan, chaired by the NCRCORD, with
the heads of the following agencies as members: The National
Housing Authority, the City of Manila, the Department of Public
Works and Highways, the Public Estates Authority, the
Philippine Ports Authority, the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources and the Development Bank of the Philippines.”
(Emphasis supplied.)
The favorable recommendation by PEA of the JVA and

subsequent amendments were incorporated as part of the
recommendations of the EXECOM created under MO 415.
While there was no specific recommendation on the
SMDRP emanating solely from PEA, we find that the
approbation of the Project and the land reclamation as an
essential component by the EXECOM of which PEA is a
member, and its submission of the SMDRP and the
agreements on the Project
295
VOL. 530, AUGUST 15, 2007 295

to the President for approval amply met the second

requirement of EO 525.
3. The third element was also present—the reclamation
was undertaken either by PEA or any person or entity
under contract with PEA or by the National Government
agency or entity authorized under its charter to reclaim
lands subject to consultation with PEA. It cannot be
disputed that the reclamation phase was not done by PEA
or any person or entity under contract with PEA. However,
the reclamation was implemented by the NHA, a national
government agency whose authority to reclaim lands under
consultation with PEA is derived from62its charter—PD 727
and other pertinent laws—RA 7279 and RA 6957 as
amended by RA 7718.
While the authority of NHA to reclaim lands is
challenged by petitioner, we find that the NHA had more
than enough authority to do so under existing laws. While
PD 757, the charter of NHA, does not explicitly mention
“reclamation” in any of the listed powers of the agency, we
rule that the NHA has an implied power to reclaim land as
this is vital or incidental to effectively, logically, and
successfully implement an urban land reform and housing
program enunciated in Sec. 9 of Article XIII of the 1987
Constitution.
Basic in administrative law is the doctrine that a
government agency or office has express and implied
powers based on its charter and other pertinent statutes.
Express powers are those powers granted, allocated, and
delegated to a government agency or office by express
provisions of law. On the other hand, implied powers are
those that
63
can be inferred or are implicit in the wordings of
the law or conferred by neces
_______________
62 “An Act to Provide for a Comprehensive and Continuing Urban

Development and Housing Program, Establish the Mechanism for its
Implementation, and for Other Purposes” (1992).
63 Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. v. Santiago, Nos. L
29236 & L29247, August 21, 1974, 58 SCRA 493, 497.
296

64
sary or fair implication in the enabling act. In Angara v.
Electoral Commission, the Court clarified and stressed that
when a general grant of power is conferred or duty

enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise
of the one or the performance
65
of the other is also conferred
by necessary implication. It was also explicated that when
the statute does not specify the particular method to be
followed or used by a government agency in the exercise of
the power vested in it by law, said agency has the authority 66
to adopt any reasonable method to carry out its functions.
The power to reclaim on the part of the NHA is implicit 67
from PD 757, RA 7279, MO 415, RA 6957, and PD 3A,
viz.:
1. NHA’s power to reclaim derived from PD 757
provisions:
a. Sec. 3 of PD 757 implies that reclamation may be
resorted to in order to attain the goals of NHA:
“Section 3. Progress and Objectives.—The Authority shall have

the following purposes and objectives:
xxxx
b) To undertake housing, development, resettlement or

other activities as would enhance the provision of housing
to every Filipino;
c) To harness and promote private participation in housing
ventures in terms of capital expenditures, land, expertise,
financing and other facilities for the sustained growth of
the housing industry.” (Emphasis supplied.)
_______________
64 Azarcon v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 116033, February 26, 1997, 268

SCRA 747, 761.
65 63 Phil. 139, 177 (1936).
66 Provident Tree Farms, Inc. v. Batario, Jr., G.R. No. 92285, March 28,
1994, 231 SCRA 463, 469; cited in Agpalo, ADMINISTRATIVE CODE 14.
67 “Amending Section 7 of Presidential Decree No. 3 dated September
26, 1972, by Providing for the Exclusive Prosecution by Administration or
by Contract of Reclamation Projects” (2005).
297
VOL. 530, AUGUST 15, 2007 297

Land reclamation is an integral part of the development of

resources for some of the housing requirements of the
NHA. Private participation in housing projects may also
take the form of land reclamation.
b. Sec. 5 of PD 757 serves as proof that the NHA, as

successor of the Tondo Foreshore Development Authority
(TFDA), has the power to reclaim, thus:
“Section 5. Dissolution of Existing Housing Agencies.—The

People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC), the
Presidential Assistant on Housing Resettlement Agency
(PAHRA), the Tondo Foreshore Development Authority
(TFDA), the Central Institute for the Training and Relocation of
Urban Squatters (CITRUS), the Presidential Committee for
Housing and Urban Resettlement (PRECHUR), Sapang Palay
Development Committee, InterAgency Task Force to Undertake
the Relocation of Families in Barrio Nabacaan, Villanueva,
Misamis Oriental and all other existing government housing and
resettlement agencies, task forces and adhoc committees, are
hereby dissolved. Their powers and functions, balance of
appropriations, records, assets, rights, and choses in
action, are transferred to, vested in, and assumed by the
Authority. x x x” (Emphasis supplied.)
PD 570 dated October 30, 1974 created the TFDA, which

defined its objectives, powers, and functions. Sec. 2
provides:
“Section 2. Objectives and Purposes.—The Authority shall have

the following purposes and objectives:
a) To undertake all manner of activity, business or

development projects for the establishment of harmonious,
comprehensive, integrated and healthy living community
in the Tondo Foreshoreland and its resettlement site;
b) To undertake and promote the physical and socio
economic amelioration of the Tondo Foreshore
residents in particular and the nation in general”
The powers and functions are contained in Sec. 3, to wit:

298

“a) To develop and implement comprehensive and

integrated urban renewal programs for the Tondo
Foreshore and Dagatdagatan lagoon and/or any
other additional/alternative resettlement site
and to formulate and enforce general and specific
policies for its development which shall ensure
reasonable degree of compliance with

environmental standards.
b) To prescribe guidelines and standards for the
reservation, conservation and utilization of
public lands covering the Tondo Foreshore
land and its resettlement sites;
c) To construct, acquire, own, lease, operate and
maintain infrastructure facilities, housing complex,
sites and services;
d) To determine, regulate and supervise the
establishment and operation of housing, sites,
services and commercial and industrial complexes
and any other enterprises to be constructed or
established within the Tondo Foreshore and its
resettlement sites;
e) To undertake and develop, by itself or through joint
ventures with other public or private entities, all or
any of the different phases of development of the
Tondo Foreshore land and its resettlement sites;
f) To acquire and own property, propertyrights and
interests, and encumber or otherwise dispose of the
same as it may deem appropriate” (Emphasis
supplied.)
From the foregoing provisions, it is readily apparent that

the TFDA has the explicit power to develop public lands
covering the Tondo foreshore land and any other additional
and alternative resettlement sites under letter b, Sec. 3 of
PD 570. Since the additional and/or alternative sites
adjacent to Tondo foreshore land cover foreshore and
submerged areas, the reclamation of said areas is
necessary in order to convert them into a comprehensive
and integrated resettlement housing project for the slum
dwellers and squatters of Tondo. Since the powers of TFDA
were assumed by the NHA, then the NHA has the power to
reclaim lands in the Tondo foreshore area which covers the
79hectare land subject of Proclamations Nos. 39 and 465
and Special Patents Nos. 3592 and 3598.
299
VOL. 530, AUGUST 15, 2007 299

c. Sec. 6 of PD 757 delineates the functions and powers of

the NHA which embrace the authority to reclaim land,
thus:
“Sec. 6. Powers and functions of the Authority.—The Authority

shall have the following powers and functions to be exercised by
the Board in accordance with its established national human
Commission:
(a) Develop and implement the comprehensive and
integrated housing program provided for in Section hereof;
xxxx
(c) Prescribe guidelines and standards for the reservation,
conservation and utilization of public lands identified for
housing and resettlement;
xxxx
(e) Develop and undertake housing development and/or
resettlement projects through joint ventures or other
arrangements with public and private entities;
xxxx
(k) Enter into contracts whenever necessary under such terms
and conditions as it may deem proper and reasonable;
(l) Acquire property rights and interests and encumber or
otherwise dispose the same as it may deem appropriate;
xxxx
(s) Perform such other acts not inconsistent with this
Decree, as may be necessary to effect the policies and
objectives herein declared.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The NHA’s authority to reclaim land can be inferred from

the aforequoted provisions. It can make use of public lands
under letter (c) of Sec. 6 which includes reclaimed land as
site for its comprehensive and integrated housing projects
under letter (a) which can be undertaken through joint
ventures with private entities under letter (e). Taken
together with letter (s) which authorizes NHA to perform
such other activities “necessary to effect the policies and
objectives” of PD 757, it is safe to conclude that the NHA’s
power to reclaim lands is a power that is implied from the
exercise of its explicit powers
300

under Sec. 6 in order to effectively accomplish its policies

and objectives under Sec. 3 of its charter. Thus, the
reclamation of land is an indispensable component for the
development and construction of the SMDRP housing
facilities.
2. NHA’s implied power to reclaim land is enhanced by
RA 7279.
PD 757 identifies NHA’s mandate to “[d]evelop and
undertake housing development and/or resettlement
projects through joint ventures or other arrangements with
public and private entities.”
The power of the NHA to undertake reclamation of land
can be inferred from Secs. 12 and 29 of RA 7279, which
provide:
“Section 12. Disposition of Lands for Socialized Housing.—The

National Housing Authority, with respect to lands belonging
to the National Government, and the local government units
with respect to other lands within their respective localities, shall
coordinate with each other to formulate and make available
various alternative schemes for the disposition of lands to
the beneficiaries of the Program. These schemes shall not be
limited to those involving transfer of ownership in fee simple but
shall include lease, with option to purchase, usufruct or such
other variations as the local government units or the National
Housing Authority may deem most expedient in carrying out the
purposes of this Act. x x x x
Section 29. Resettlement.—With two (2) years from the
effectivity of this Act, the local government units, in coordination
with the National Housing Authority, shall implement the
relocation and resettlement of persons living in danger areas
such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks,
shorelines, waterways, and in other public places as sidewalks,
roads, parks, and playgrounds. The local government unit, in
coordination with the National Housing Authority, shall provide
relocation or resettlement sites with basic services and facilities
and access to employment and livelihood opportunities sufficient
to meet the basic needs of the affected families.” (Emphasis
supplied.)
301
VOL. 530, AUGUST 15, 2007 301

Lands belonging to the National Government include

foreshore and submerged lands which can be reclaimed to
undertake housing development and resettlement projects.
3. MO 415 explains the undertaking of the NHA in
SMDRP:
“WHEREAS, Memorandum Order No. 161A mandated the

National Housing Authority to conduct feasibility studies and
develop lowcost housing projects at the dumpsites of
Metro Manila;
WHEREAS, the National Housing Authority has presented a
viable Conceptual Plan to convert the Smokey Mountain dumpsite
into a habitable housing project inclusive of the reclamation
area across R10 as enabling component of the Project;
WHEREAS, the said Plan requires the coordinated and
synchronized efforts of the City of Manila and other government
agencies and instrumentalities to ensure effective and
efficient implementation;
WHEREAS, the government encourages private sector
initiative in the implementation of its projects.” (Emphasis
supplied.)
Proceeding from these “whereas” clauses, it is unequivocal

that reclamation of land in the Smokey Mountain area is
an essential and vital power of the NHA to effectively
implement its avowed goal of developing lowcost housing
units at the Smokey Mountain dumpsites. The
interpretation made by no less than the President of the
Philippines as Chief of the Executive Branch, of which the
NHA is a part, must necessarily command respect and
much weight and credit.
4. RA 6957 as amended by RA 7718—the BOT Law—
serves as an exception to PD 1084 and EO 525.
Based on the provisions of the BOT Law and
Implementing Rules and Regulations, it is unequivocal that
all government infrastructure agencies like the NHA can
undertake infrastructure or development projects using the
contractual arrangements prescribed by the law, and land
reclamation is one of the projects that can be resorted to in
the BOT project
302

implementation under the February 10, 1992 Joint

Resolution No. 3 of the 8th Congress.
From the foregoing considerations, we find that the
NHA has ample implied authority to undertake
reclamation projects.
Even without an implied power to reclaim lands under
NHA’s charter, we rule that the authority granted to NHA,
a national government agency, by the President under PD
3A reinforced by EO 525 is more than sufficient statutory
basis for the reclamation of lands under the SMDRP.
PD 3A is a law issued by then President Ferdinand E.
Marcos under his martial law powers on September 23,

1972. It provided that “[t]he provisions of any law to the
contrary notwithstanding, the reclamation of areas,
underwater, whether foreshore or inland, shall be limited
to the National Government or any person authorized by it
under the proper contract.” It repealed, in effect, RA 1899
which previously delegated the right to reclaim lands to
municipalities and chartered
68
cities and revested it to the
National Government. Under PD 3A, “national
government” can only mean the Executive Branch headed
by the President. It cannot refer to Congress as it was
dissolved and abolished at the time of the issuance of PD 3
A on September 23, 1972. Moreover, the Executive Branch
is the only implementing arm in the government with the
equipment, manpower, expertise, and capability by the
very nature of its assigned powers and functions to
undertake reclamation projects. Thus, under PD 3A, the
Executive Branch through the President can implement
reclamation of lands through any of its departments,
agencies, or offices.
Subsequently, on February 4, 1977, President Marcos
issued PD 1084 creating the PEA, which was granted,
among others, the power “to reclaim land, including
foreshore and
_______________
68 Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103882, November 25, 1998,

299 SCRA 199, 303.
303
VOL. 530, AUGUST 15, 2007 303

submerged areas by dredging, filling or other means or to

acquire reclaimed lands.” The PEA’s power to reclaim is
not however exclusive as can be gleaned from its charter,
as the President retained his power under PD 3A to
designate another agency to reclaim lands.
On February 14, 1979, EO 525 was issued. It granted
PEA primary responsibility for integrating, directing, and
coordinating reclamation projects for and on behalf of the
National Government although other national government
agencies can be designated by the President to reclaim
lands in coordination with the PEA. Despite the issuance of
EO 525, PD 3A remained valid and subsisting. Thus, the
National Government through the President still retained
the power and control over all reclamation projects in the

country.
The power of the National Government through the
President over reclamation of areas, that is, underwater 69
whether foreshore or inland, was made clear in EO 543
which took effect on June 24, 2006. Under EO 543, PEA
was renamed the Philippine Reclamation Authority (PRA)
and was granted the authority to approve reclamation
projects, a power previously reposed in the President under
EO 525. EO 543 reads:
“Section 1. The power of the President to approve

reclamation projects is hereby delegated to the Philippine
Reclamation Authority [formerly PEA], through its governing
board, subject to compliance with existing laws and rules and
subject to the condition that reclamation contracts to be executed
with any person or entity go through public bidding.
Section 2. Nothing in the Order shall be construed as
diminishing the President’s authority to modify, amend or
nullify PRA’s action.
Section 3. All executive issuances inconsistent with this Ex
ecutive Order are hereby repealed or amended accordingly.”
_______________
69 “Delegating to the Philippine Reclamation Authority the Power to

Approve Reclamation Projects” (2006).
304

Sec. 2 of EO 543 strengthened the power of control and

supervision of the President over reclamation of lands as
s/he can modify, amend, or nullify the action of PEA (now
PRA).
From the foregoing issuances, we conclude that the
President’s delegation to NHA, a national government
agency, to reclaim lands under the SMDRP, is legal and
valid, firmly anchored on PD 3A buttressed by EO 525
notwithstanding the absence of any specific grant of power
under its charter, PD 757.
Second Issue: Whether respondents NHA and RBI

were given the power and authority by DENR to
reclaim foreshore and submerged lands
Petitioner Chavez puts forth the view that even if the NHA
and RBI were granted the authority to reclaim, they were
not authorized to do so by the DENR.
Again, reliance is made on our ruling in PEA where it
was held that the DENR’s authority is necessary in order
for the government to validly reclaim foreshore and
submerged lands. In PEA, we expounded in this manner:
“As manager, conservator and overseer of the natural resources of

the State, DENR exercises “supervision and control over alienable
and disposable public lands.” DENR also exercises “exclusive
jurisdiction on the management and disposition of all lands of the
public domain.” Thus, DENR decides whether areas under water,
like foreshore or submerged areas of Manila Bay, should be
reclaimed or not. This means that PEA needs authorization from
DENR before PEA can undertake reclamation projects in Manila
Bay, or in any part of the country.
DENR also exercises exclusive jurisdiction over the disposition
of all lands of the public domain. Hence, DENR decides whether
reclaimed lands of PEA should be classified as alienable under
Sections 6 and 7 of CA No. 141. Once DENR decides that the
reclaimed lands should be so classified, it then recommends to the
President the issuance of a proclamation classifying the lands as
alienable or disposable lands of the public domain open to
disposition. We note
305
VOL. 530, AUGUST 15, 2007 305

that then DENR Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr.

countersigned Special Patent No. 3517 in compliance with the
Revised Administrative Code and Sections 6 and 7 of CA No. 141.
In short, DENR is vested with the power to authorize the
reclamation of areas under water, while PEA is vested with the
power to undertake the physical reclamation of areas under
water, whether directly or through private contractors. DENR is
also empowered to classify lands of the public domain into
alienable or disposable lands subject to the approval of the
President. On the other hand, PEA is tasked to develop, 70
sell or
lease the reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain.”
Despite our finding that PEA is not a precedent to the case

at bar, we find after all that under existing laws, the NHA
is still required to procure DENR’s authorization before a
reclamation project in Manila Bay or in any part of the
Philippines can be undertaken. The requirement applies to
PEA, NHA, or any other government agency or office

granted with such power under the law.
Notwithstanding the need for DENR permission, we
nevertheless find petitioner’s position bereft of merit.
The DENR is deemed to have granted the authority to
reclaim in the Smokey Mountain Project for the following
reasons:
1. Sec. 17, Art. VII of the Constitution provides that “the
President shall have control of all executive departments,
bureaus and offices.” The President is assigned the task of
seeing to it that all laws are faithfully executed. “Control,”
in administrative law, means “the power of an officer to
alter, modify, nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer
has done in the performance of his duties and to 71substitute
the judgment of the former for that of the latter.”
_______________
70 Supra note 50, at pp. 222223.

71 Taule v. Santos, G.R. No. 90336, August 12, 1991, 200 SCRA 512,
521522.
306

As such, the President can exercise executive power motu

proprio and can supplant the act or decision of a
subordinate with the President’s own. The DENR is a
department in the executive branch under the President,
and it is only an alter ego of the latter. Ordinarily the
proposed action and the staff work are initially done by a
department like the DENR and then submitted to the
President for approval. However, there is nothing infirm or
unconstitutional if the President decides on the
implementation of a certain project or activity and requires
said department to implement it. Such is a presidential
prerogative as long as it involves the department or office
authorized by law to supervise or execute the Project. Thus,
as in this case, when the President approved and ordered
the development of a housing project with the
corresponding reclamation work, making DENR a member
of the committee tasked to implement the project, the
required authorization from the DENR to reclaim land can
be deemed satisfied. It cannot be disputed that the
ultimate power over alienable and disposable public lands
is reposed in the President of the Philippines and not the
DENR Secretary. To still require a DENR authorization on

the Smokey Mountain when the President has already
authorized and ordered the implementation of the Project
would be a derogation of the powers of the President as the
head of the executive branch. Otherwise, any department
head can defy or oppose the implementation of a project
approved by the head of the executive branch, which is
patently illegal and unconstitutional.
In Chavez v. Romulo, we stated that when a statute
imposes a specific duty on the executive department, the
President may act directly or order the said department to
undertake an activity, thus:
“[A]t the apex of the entire executive officialdom is the President.

Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution specifies [her] power as
Chief executive departments, bureaus and offices. [She] shall
ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. As Chief Executive,
President Arroyo holds the steering wheel that controls the course
of her government. She lays down policies in the execution of her
plans
307
VOL. 530, AUGUST 15, 2007 307

and programs. Whatever policy she chooses, she has her

subordinates to implement them. In short, she has the power of
control. Whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or
regulation to her subordinate, she may act directly or
merely direct the performance of a duty x x x. Such act is
well within72
the prerogative of her office (emphasis
supplied).”
Moreover, the power to order the reclamation of lands of

public domain is reposed first in the Philippine President.
The Revised Administrative Code of 1987 grants authority
to the President to reserve lands of public domain for
settlement for any specific purpose, thus:
“Section 14. Power to Reserve Lands of the Public and Private

Domain of the Government.—(1) The President shall have the
power to reserve for settlement or public use, and for specific
public purposes, any of the lands of the public domain, the
use of which is not otherwise directed by law. The reserved land
shall thereafter remain subject to the specific public purpose
indicated until otherwise provided by law or proclamation.”
President Aquino reserved the area of the Smokey

Mountain dumpsite for settlement and issued MO 415
authorizing the implementation of the Smokey Mountain
Development Project plus the reclamation of the area
across R10. Then President Ramos issued Proclamation
No. 39 covering the 21hectare dumpsite and the 40
hectare commercial/industrial area, and Proclamation No.
465 and MO 415 increasing the area of foreshore and
submerged lands of Manila Bay to be reclaimed from 40 to
79 hectares. Having supervision and control over the
DENR, both Presidents directly assumed and exercised the
power granted by the Revised Administrative Code to the
DENR Secretary to authorize the NHA to reclaim said
lands. What can be done indirectly by the DENR can be
done directly by the President. It would be absurd if the
_______________
72 G.R. No. 157036, June 9, 2004, 431 SCRA 534, 555; citing EO 292,
Book IV, Chapter 7.
308

power of the President cannot be exercised simply because

the head of a department in the executive branch has not
acted favorably on a project already approved by the
President. If such arrangement is allowed then the
department head will become more powerful than the
President.
2. Under Sec. 2 of MO 415, the DENR is one of the
members of the EXECOM chaired by the NCRCORD to
oversee the implementation of the Project. The EXECOM
was the one which recommended approval of the project
plan and the joint venture agreements. Clearly, the DENR
retained its power of supervision and control over the laws
affected by the Project since it was tasked to “facilitate the
titling of the Smokey Mountain and of the area to be
reclaimed,” which shows that it had tacitly given its
authority to the NHA to undertake the reclamation.
3. Former DENR Secretary Angel C. Alcala issued
Special Patents Nos. 3591 and 3592 while then Secretary
Victor O. Ramos issued Special Patent No. 3598 that
embraced the areas covered by the reclamation. These
patents conveyed the lands to be reclaimed to the NHA and
granted to said agency the administration and disposition
of said lands for subdivision and disposition to qualified

beneficiaries and for development for mix land use
(commercial/industrial) “to provide employment
opportunities to onsite families and additional areas for
port related activities.” Such grant of authority to
administer and dispose of lands of public domain under the
SMDRP is of course subject to the powers of the EXECOM
of SMDRP, of which the DENR is a member.
4. The issuance of ECCs by the DENR for SMDRP is but
an exercise of its power of supervision and control over the
lands of public domain covered by the Project.
Based on these reasons, it is clear that the DENR,
through its acts and issuances, has ratified and confirmed
the reclamation of the subject lands for the purposes laid
down in Proclamations Nos. 39 and 465.
309
VOL. 530, AUGUST 15, 2007 309

Third Issue: Whether respondent RBI can acquire

reclaimed foreshore and submerged lands considered
as inalienable and outside the commerce of man
Petitioner postulates that respondent RBI cannot acquire
the reclaimed foreshore and submerged areas as these are
inalienable public lands beyond the commerce of man
based on Art. 1409 of the Civil Code which provides:
“Article 1409. The following contracts are inexistent and void

from the beginning:
(1) Those whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order or public policy;
xxxx
(7) Those expressly prohibited or declared void by law.
These contracts cannot be ratified. Neither can the right to set
up the defense of illegality be waived.”
Secs. 2 and 3, Art. XII of the Constitution declare that all

natural resources are owned by the State and they cannot
be alienated except for alienable agricultural lands of the
public domain. One of the State’s natural resources are
lands of public domain which include reclaimed lands.
Petitioner contends that for these reclaimed lands to be
alienable, there must be a law or presidential proclamation
officially classifying these reclaimed lands as alienable and
disposable and open to disposition or concession. Absent
such law or proclamation, the reclaimed lands cannot be

the enabling component or consideration to be paid to RBI
as these are beyond the commerce of man.
We are not convinced of petitioner’s postulation.
The reclaimed lands across R10 were classified
alienable and disposable lands of public domain of the
State for the following reasons, viz.:
310

First, there were three (3) presidential proclamations

classifying the reclaimed lands across R10 as alienable or
disposable hence open to disposition or concession, to wit:
(1) MO 415 issued by President Aquino, of which Sec. 4
states that “[t]he land covered by the Smokey Mountain
Dumpsite is hereby conveyed to the National Housing
Authority as well as the area to be reclaimed across R10.”
The directive to transfer the lands once reclaimed to the
NHA implicitly carries with it the declaration that said
lands are alienable and disposable. Otherwise, the NHA
cannot effectively use them in its housing and resettlement
project.
(2) Proclamation No. 39 issued by then President Ramos
by which the reclaimed lands were conveyed to NHA for
subdivision and disposition to qualified beneficiaries and
for development into a mixed land use
(commercial/industrial) to provide employment
opportunities to onsite families and additional areas for
portrelated activities. Said directive carries with it the
pronouncement that said lands have been transformed to
alienable and disposable lands. Otherwise, there is no legal
way to convey it to the beneficiaries.
(3) Proclamation No. 465 likewise issued by President
Ramos enlarged the reclaimed area to 79 hectares to be
developed and disposed of in the implementation of the
SMDRP. The authority put into the hands of the NHA to
dispose of the reclaimed lands tacitly sustains the
conversion to alienable and disposable lands.
Secondly, Special Patents Nos. 3591, 3592, and 3598
issued by the DENR anchored on Proclamations Nos. 39
and 465 issued by President Ramos, without doubt,
classified the reclaimed areas as alienable and disposable.
Admittedly, it cannot be said that MO 415,
Proclamations Nos. 39 and 465 are explicit declarations
that the lands to be reclaimed are classified as alienable
and disposable. We find however that such conclusion is

derived and implicit from the authority given to the NHA
to transfer the reclaimed lands to qualified beneficiaries.
311
VOL. 530, AUGUST 15, 2007 311

The query is, when did the declaration take effect? It did so
only after the special patents covering the reclaimed areas
were issued. It is only on such date that the reclaimed
lands became alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain. This is in line with the ruling in PEA where said
issue was clarified and stressed:
“PD No. 1085, coupled with President Aquino’s actual

issuance of a special patent covering the Freedom Islands,
is equivalent to an official proclamation classifying the
Freedom Islands as alienable or disposable lands of the
public domain. PD No. 1085 and President Aquino’s issuance of
a land patent also constitute a declaration that the Freedom
Islands are no longer needed for public service. The
Freedom Islands are thus alienable or disposable lands of the
public domain,
73
open to disposition or concession to qualified
parties.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, MO 415 and Proclamations Nos. 39 and 465

cumulatively and jointly taken together with Special
Patent Nos. 3591, 3592, and 3598 more than satisfy the
requirement in PEA that “[t]here must be a law or
presidential proclamation officially classifying these
reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable 74and open to
disposition or concession (emphasis supplied).”
Apropos the requisite law categorizing reclaimed land as
alienable or disposable, we find that RA 6957 as amended
by RA 7718 provides ample authority for the classification
of reclaimed land in the SMDRP for the repayment scheme
of the BOT project as alienable and disposable lands of
public domain. Sec. 6 of RA 6957 as amended by RA 7718
provides:
“For the financing, construction, operation and maintenance of

any infrastructure projects undertaken through the buildoperate
and transfer arrangement or any of its variations pursuant to the
provisions of this Act, the project proponent x x x may likewise be
_______________

74 Id., at p. 216.
312

repaid in the form of a share in the revenue of the project or other

nonmonetary payments, such as, but not limited to, the grant of
a portion or percentage of the reclaimed land, subject to the
constitutional requirements with respect to the ownership of the
land.” (Emphasis supplied.)
While RA 6957 as modified by RA 7718 does not expressly

declare that the reclaimed lands that shall serve as
payment to the project proponent have become alienable
and disposable lands and opened for disposition;
nonetheless, this conclusion is necessarily implied, for how
else can the land be used as the enabling component for the
Project if such classification is not deemed made?
It may be argued that the grant of authority to sell
public lands, pursuant to PEA, does not convert alienable
lands of public domain into private or patrimonial lands.
We ruled in PEA that “alienable lands of public domain
must be transferred to qualified private parties, or
to government entities not tasked to dispose of
public lands, before these lands can become 75
private
or patrimonial lands (emphasis supplied).” To lands
reclaimed by PEA or through a contract with a private
person or entity, such reclaimed lands still remain
alienable lands of public domain which can be transferred
only to Filipino citizens but not to a private corporation.
This is because PEA under PD 1084 and EO 525 is tasked
to hold and dispose of alienable lands of public domain and
it is only when it is transferred to Filipino citizens that it
becomes patrimonial property. On the other hand, the NHA
is a government agency not tasked to dispose of public
lands under its charter—The Revised Administrative Code
of 1987. The NHA is an “enduser agency” authorized by
law to administer and dispose of reclaimed lands. The
moment titles over reclaimed lands based on the special
patents are transferred to the NHA by the Register of
Deeds, they are automatically converted to patrimonial
properties of
_______________
75 Id., at p. 235.
313
VOL. 530, AUGUST 15, 2007 313

the State which can be sold to Filipino citizens and private

corporations, 60% of which are owned by Filipinos. The
reason is obvious: if the reclaimed land is not converted to
patrimonial land once transferred to NHA, then it would be
useless to transfer it to the NHA since it cannot legally
transfer or alienate lands of public domain. More
importantly, it cannot attain its avowed purposes and goals
since it can only transfer patrimonial lands to qualified
beneficiaries and prospective buyers to raise funds for the
SMDRP.
From the foregoing considerations, we find that the 79
hectare reclaimed land has been declared alienable and
disposable land of the public domain; and in the hands of
NHA, it has been reclassified as patrimonial property.
Petitioner, however, contends that the reclaimed lands
were inexistent prior to the three (3) Presidential Acts (MO
415 and Proclamations Nos. 39 and 465) and hence, the
declaration that such areas are alienable and disposable
land of the public domain, citing PEA, has no legal basis.
Petitioner’s contention is not welltaken.
Petitioner’s sole reliance on Proclamations Nos. 39 and
465 without taking into consideration the special patents
issued by the DENR demonstrates the inherent weakness
of his proposition. As was ruled in PEA cited by petitioner
himself, “PD No. 1085, coupled with President Aquino’s
actual issuance of a special patent covering the Freedom
Islands is equivalent to an official proclamation classifying
the Freedom islands as alienable or disposable lands of
public domain.” In a similar vein, the combined and
collective effect of Proclamations Nos. 39 and 465 with
Special Patents Nos. 3592 and 3598 is tantamount to and
can be considered to be an official declaration that the
reclaimed lots are alienable or disposable lands of the
public domain.
The reclaimed lands covered by Special Patents Nos.
3591, 3592, and 3598, which evidence transfer of ownership
of reclaimed lands to the NHA, are official acts of the
DENR Secretary in the exercise of his power of supervision
and control
314

over alienable and disposable public lands and his

exclusive jurisdiction over the management and disposition
of all lands of public domain under the Revised
Administrative Code of 1987. Special Patent No. 3592
speaks of the transfer of Lots 1 and 2, and RI003901
000012D with an area of 401,485 square meters based on
the survey and technical description approved by the
Bureau of Lands. Lastly, Special Patent No. 3598 was
issued in favor of the NHA transferring to said agency a
tract of land described in Plan RL00000013 with an area
of 390,000 square meters based on the survey and technical
descriptions approved by the Bureau of Lands.
The conduct of the survey, the preparation of the survey
plan, the computation of the technical description, and the
processing and preparation of the special patent are
matters within the technical area of expertise of
administrative agencies like the DENR and the Land
Management Bureau and are generally 76
accorded not only
respect but at times even finality. Preparation of special
patents calls for technical examination and a specialized
review of calculations and specific details which the courts
are illequipped to undertake; hence, the latter defer to the
administrative agency
77
which is trained and knowledgeable
on such matters.
Subsequently, the special patents in the name of the
NHA were submitted to the Register of Deeds of the City of
Manila for registration, and corresponding certificates of
titles over the reclaimed lots were issued based on said
special patents. The issuance of certificates of titles in
NHA’s name automatically converts the reclaimed lands to
patrimonial properties of the NHA. Otherwise, the lots
would not be of use to the NHA’s housing projects or as
payment to the BOT contractor as the enabling component
of the BOT contract. The laws of the land have to be
applied and interpreted depending on the changing
conditions and times. Tempora mutantur et legis
_______________
76 Republic v. Manila Electric Company, G.R. No. 141314, April 9, 2003,

401 SCRA 130, 141.
77 Id., at p. 142.
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VOL. 530, AUGUST 15, 2007 315

mutantur in illis (time changes and laws change with it).

One such law that should be treated differently is the BOT
Law (RA 6957) which brought about a novel way of
implementing government contracts by allowing reclaimed
land as part or full payment to the contractor of a
government project to satisfy the huge financial
requirements of the undertaking. The NHA holds the lands
covered by Special Patents Nos. 3592 and 3598 solely for
the purpose of the SMDRP undertaken by authority of the
BOT Law and for disposition in accordance with said
special law. The lands become alienable and disposable
lands of public domain upon issuance of the special patents
and become patrimonial properties of the Government from
the time the titles are issued to the NHA.
As early as 1999, this Court in Baguio v. Republic laid
down the jurisprudence that:
“It is true that, once a patent is registered and the corresponding

certificate of title is issued, the land covered by them ceases to be
part of the public domain and becomes private property, and the
Torrens Title issued pursuant to the patent becomes indefeasible
upon the78 expiration of one year from the date of issuance of such
patent.”
The doctrine79 was reiterated in Republic v. Heirs80of Felipe

Alijaga, Sr., Heirs of Carlos Alcaraz v. Republic, and the
more recent case81 of Doris ChiongbianOliva v. Republic of
the Philippines. Thus, the 79hectare reclaimed land
became patrimonial property after the issuance of
certificates of titles to the NHA based on Special Patents
Nos. 3592 and 3598.
One last point. The ruling in PEA cannot even be
applied retroactively to the lots covered by Special Patents
Nos. 3592 (40 hectare reclaimed land) and 3598 (39hectare
reclaimed
_______________
78 G.R. No. 119682, January 21, 1999, 301 SCRA 450, 454455.
79 G.R. No. 146030, December 3, 2002, 393 SCRA 361, 373.
80 G.R. No. 131667, July 28, 2005, 464 SCRA 280, 291.
81 G.R. No. 163118, April 27, 2007, 522 SCRA 599, 604.
316

land). The reclamation of the land under SMDRP was

completed in August 1996 while the PEA decision was
rendered on July 9, 2002. In the meantime, subdivided lots
forming parts of the reclaimed land were already sold to
private corporations for value and separate titles issued to
the buyers. The Project was terminated through a
Memorandum of Agreement signed on August 27, 2003.
The PEA decision became final through the November 11,
2003 Resolution. It is a settled precept that decisions of the
Supreme Court can only be applied prospectively as they
may prejudice vested rights if applied retroactively.
In Benzonan v. Court of Appeals, the Court trenchantly
elucidated the prospective application of its decisions based
on considerations of equity and fair play, thus:
“At that time, the prevailing jurisprudence interpreting section

119 of R.A. 141 as amended was that enunciated in Monge and
Tupas cited above. The petitioners Benzonan and respondent Pe
and the DBP are bound by these decisions for pursuant to Article
8 of the Civil Code “judicial decisions applying or interpreting the
laws of the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of
the Philippines.” But while our decisions form part of the law of
the land, they are also subject to Article 4 of the Civil Code which
provides that “laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the
contrary is provided.” This is expressed in the familiar legal
maxim lex prospicit, non respicit, the law looks forward not
backward. The rationale against retroactivity is easy to perceive.
The retroactive application of a law usually divests rights that
have already become vested or impairs the obligations of contract
and hence, is unconstitutional.
The same consideration underlies our rulings giving only
prospective effect to decisions enunciating new doctrines. Thus,
we emphasized in People v. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607 [1974] “x x x
when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is
adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively and
should not apply to parties82who had relied on the old doctrine and
acted on the faith thereof.”
_______________
82 G.R. No. 97973, January 27, 1992, 205 SCRA 515, 527.
317
VOL. 530, AUGUST 15, 2007 317

Fourth Issue: Whether respondent RBI can acquire

reclaimed lands when there was no declaration that
said lands are no longer needed for public use
Petitioner Chavez avers that despite the declaration that
the reclaimed areas are alienable lands of the public
domain, still, the reclamation is flawed for there was never
any declaration that said lands are no longer needed for
public use.
We are not moved by petitioner’s submission.
Even if it is conceded that there was no explicit
declaration that the lands are no longer needed for public
use or public service, there was however an implicit
executive declaration that the reclaimed areas R10 are not
necessary anymore for public use or public service when
President Aquino through MO 415 conveyed the same to
the NHA partly for housing project and related
commercial/industrial development intended for disposition
to and enjoyment of certain beneficiaries and not the public
in general and partly as enabling component to finance the
project.
President Ramos, in issuing Proclamation No. 39,
declared, though indirectly, that the reclaimed lands of the
Smokey Mountain project are no longer required for public
use or service, thus:
“These parcels of land of public domain are hereby placed under

the administration and disposition of the National Housing
Authority to develop, subdivide and dispose to qualified
beneficiaries, as well as its development for mix land use
(commercial/ industrial) to provide employment opportunities to
onsite families and additional areas for port related activities.”
While numerical count of the persons to be benefited is not

the determinant whether the property is to be devoted to
public use, the declaration in Proclamation No. 39
undeniably identifies only particular individuals as
beneficiaries to whom
318

the reclaimed lands can be sold, namely—the Smokey

Mountain dwellers. The rest of the Filipinos are not

qualified; hence, said lands are no longer essential for the
use of the public in general.
In addition, President Ramos issued on August 31, 1994
Proclamation No. 465 increasing the area to be reclaimed
from forty (40) hectares to seventynine (79) hectares,
elucidating that said lands are undoubtedly set aside for
the beneficiaries of SMDRP and not the public—declaring
the power of NHA to dispose of land to be reclaimed, thus:
“The authority to administer, develop, or dispose lands
identified and reserved by this Proclamation and
Proclamation No. 39 (s. 1992), in accordance with the
SMDRP, as enhance, is vested with the NHA, subject to
the provisions of existing laws.” (Emphasis supplied.)
MO 415 and Proclamations Nos. 39 and 465 are
declarations that proclaimed the nonuse of the reclaimed
areas for public use or service as the Project cannot be
successfully implemented without the withdrawal of said
lands from public use or service. Certainly, the devotion of
the reclaimed land to public use or service conflicts with
the intended use of the Smokey Mountain areas for housing
and employment of the Smokey Mountain scavengers and
for financing the Project because the latter cannot be
accomplished without abandoning the public use of the
subject land. Without doubt, the presidential proclamations
on SMDRP together with the issuance of the special
patents had effectively removed the reclaimed lands from
public use.
More decisive and not in so many words is the ruling in
PEA which we earlier cited, that “PD No. 1085 and
President Aquino’s issuance of a land patent also constitute
a declaration that the Freedom Islands are no longer
needed for public service.” Consequently, we ruled in that
case that the re
319
VOL. 530, AUGUST 15, 2007 319

claimed lands are 83

“open to disposition or concession to
qualified parties.”
In a similar vein, presidential Proclamations Nos. 39
and 465 jointly with the special patents have classified the
reclaimed lands as alienable and disposable and open to
disposition or concession as they would be devoted to units
for Smokey Mountain beneficiaries. Hence, said lands are
no longer intended for public use or service and shall form
part of the patrimonial84 properties of the State under Art.

422 of the Civil Code. As discussed a priori, the lands
were classified as patrimonial properties of the NHA ready
for disposition when the titles were registered in its name
by the Register of Deeds.
Moreover, reclaimed lands that are made the enabling
components of a BOT infrastructure project are
necessarily reclassified as alienable and disposable
lands under the BOT Law; otherwise, absurd and illogical
consequences would naturally result. Undoubtedly, the
BOT contract will not be accepted by the BOT contractor
since there will be no consideration for its contractual
obligations. Since reclaimed land will be conveyed to the
contractor pursuant to the BOT Law, then there is an
implied declaration that such land is no longer intended
for public use or public service and, hence, considered
patrimonial property of the State.
Fifth Issue: Whether there is a law authorizing sale of

reclaimed lands
Petitioner next claims that RBI cannot acquire the
reclaimed lands because there was no law authorizing their
sale. He argues that unlike PEA, no legislative authority
was granted to the NHA to sell reclaimed land.
_______________
83 Supra note 73.

84 Article 422. Property of public dominion, when no longer intended for
public use or public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of
the State.
320

This position is misplaced.

Petitioner relies on Sec. 60 of Commonwealth Act (CA)
141 to support his view that the NHA is not empowered by
any law to sell reclaimed land, thus:
“Section 60. Any tract of land comprised under this title may be
leased or sold, as the case may be, to any person, corporation or
association authorized to purchase or lease public lands for
agricultural purposes. The area of the land so leased or sold shall
be such as shall, in the judgment of the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources, be reasonably necessary for the purposes
for which such sale or lease if requested and shall in no case

exceed one hundred and fortyfour hectares: Provided, however,
That this limitation shall not apply to grants, donations,
transfers, made to a province, municipality or branch or
subdivision of the Government for the purposes deemed by said
entities conducive to the public interest; but the land so
granted donated or transferred to a province,
municipality, or branch or subdivision of the Government
shall not be alienated, encumbered, or otherwise disposed
of in a manner affecting its title, except when authorized
by Congress; Provided, further, That any person, corporation,
association or partnership disqualified from purchasing public
land for agricultural purposes under the provisions of this Act,
may lease land included under this title suitable for industrial or
residential purposes, but the lease granted shall only be valid
while such land is used for the purposes referred to.” (Emphasis
supplied.)
Reliance on said provision is incorrect as the same applies

only to “a province, municipality or branch or subdivision of
the Government.” The NHA is not a government unit but a
government corporation performing governmental and
proprietary functions.
In addition, PD 757 is clear that the NHA is empowered
by law to transfer properties acquired by it under the law
to other parties, thus:
“Section 6. Powers and functions of the Authority.—The Authority

shall have the following powers and functions to be exercised
321
VOL. 530, AUGUST 15, 2007 321

by the Boards in accordance with the established national human

Commission:
xxxx
(k) Enter into contracts whenever necessary under such terms
and conditions as it may deem proper and reasonable;
(l) Acquire property rights and interests, and encumber or
otherwise dispose the same as it may deem appropriate”
Letter (l) is emphatic that the NHA can acquire property

rights and interests and encumber or otherwise dispose of
them as it may deem appropriate. The transfer of the
reclaimed lands by the National Government to the NHA

for housing, commercial, and industrial purposes
transformed them into patrimonial lands which are of
course owned by the State in its private or proprietary
capacity. Perforce, the NHA can sell the reclaimed lands to
any Filipino citizen or qualified corporation.
Sixth Issue: Whether the transfer of reclaimed lands

to RBI was done by public bidding
Petitioner also contends that there was no public bidding
but an awarding of ownership of said reclaimed lands to
RBI. Public bidding, he says, is required under Secs. 63 and
67 of CA 141 which read:
“Section 63. Whenever it is decided that lands covered by this

chapter are not needed for public purposes, the Director of Lands
shall ask the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce for
authority to dispose of the same. Upon receipt of such authority,
the Director of Lands shall give notice by public advertisement in
the same manner as in the case of leases or sales of agricultural
public land, that the Government will lease or sell, as the case
may be, the lots or blocks specified in the advertisement, for the
purpose stated in the notice and subject to the conditions specified
in this chapter.
xxxx
322

Section 67. The lease or sale shall be made through oral bidding;
and adjudication shall be made to the highest bidder. However,
where an applicant has made improvements on the land by virtue
of a permit issued to him by competent authority, the sale or lease
shall be made by sealed bidding as prescribed in section twenty
six of this Act, the provisions of which shall be applied whenever
applicable. If all or part of the lots remain unleased or unsold, the
Director of Lands shall from time to time announce in the Official
Gazette or in any other newspapers of general circulation, the
lease of sale of those lots, if necessary.”
He finds that the NHA and RBI violated Secs. 63 and 67 of

CA 141, as the reclaimed lands were conveyed to RBI by
negotiated contract and not by public bidding as required
by law.
This stand is devoid of merit.
There is no doubt that respondent NHA conducted a
public bidding of the right to become its joint venture

partner in the Smokey Mountain Project. Notices or
Invitations to Bid were published in the national dailies on
January 23 and 26, 1992 and February 1, 14, 16, and 23,
1992. The bidding proper was done by the Bids and Awards
Committee (BAC) on May 18, 1992. On August 31, 1992,
the InterAgency Techcom made up of the NHA, PEA,
DPWH, PPA, DBP, and DENR opened the bids and
evaluated them, resulting in the award of the contract to
respondent RBI on October 7, 1992.
On March 19, 1993, respondents NHA and RBI signed
the JVA. On February 23, 1994, said JVA was amended
and restated into the ARJVA. On August 11, 1994, the
ARJVA was again amended. On September 7, 1994, the OP
approved the ARJVA and the amendments to the ARJVA.
From these factual settings, it cannot be gainsaid that
there was full compliance with the laws and regulations
governing public biddings involving a right, concession, or
property of the government.
Petitioner concedes that he does not question the public
bidding on the right to be a joint venture partner of the
NHA,
323
VOL. 530, AUGUST 15, 2007 323

but the absence of bidding in the sale of alienable and

disposable lands of public domain pursuant to CA 141 as
amended.
Petitioner’s theory is incorrect.
Secs. 63 and 67 of CA 141, as amended, are in point as
they refer to government sale by the Director of Lands of
alienable and disposable lands of public domain. This
is not present in the case at bar. The lands reclaimed by
and conveyed to the NHA are no longer lands of public
domain. These lands became proprietary lands or
patrimonial properties of the State upon transfer of the
titles over the reclaimed lands to the NHA and hence
outside the ambit of CA 141. The NHA can therefore legally
transfer patrimonial land to RBI or to any other interested
qualified buyer without any bidding conducted by the
Director of Lands because the NHA, unlike PEA, is a
government agency not tasked to sell lands of public
domain. Hence, it can only hold patrimonial lands and can
dispose of such lands by sale without need of public
bidding.
Petitioner likewise relies on Sec. 79 of PD 1445 which

requires public bidding “when government property has
become unserviceable for any cause or is no longer needed.”
It appears from the Handbook on Property and Supply
Management System, Chapter 6, that reclaimed lands
which have become patrimonial properties of the State,
whose titles are conveyed to government agencies like the
NHA, which it will use for its projects or programs, are not
within the ambit of Sec. 79. We quote the determining
factors in the Disposal of Unserviceable Property, thus:
Determining Factors in the Disposal of Unserviceable

Property
• Property, which can no longer be repaired or recondi

tioned;
• Property whose maintenance costs of repair more than
outweigh the benefits and services that will be derived
from its continued use;
• Property that has become obsolete or outmoded
because of changes in technology;
324

• Serviceable property that has been rendered

unnecessary due to change in the agency’s function or
mandate;
• Unused supplies, materials and spare parts that were
procured in excess of requirements; and
• Unused supplies and materials that [have] become
dangerous to use because of long
85
storage or use of which
is determined to be hazardous.
Reclaimed lands cannot be considered unserviceable

properties. The reclaimed lands in question are very much
needed by the NHA for the Smokey Mountain Project
because without it, then the projects will not be
successfully implemented. Since the reclaimed lands are
not unserviceable properties and are very much needed by
NHA, then Sec. 79 of PD 1445 does not apply.
More importantly, Sec. 79 of PD 1445 cannot be applied
to patrimonial properties like reclaimed lands transferred
to a government agency like the NHA which has entered
into a BOT contract with a private firm. The reason is
obvious. If the patrimonial property will be subject to

public bidding as the only way of disposing of said property,
then Sec. 6 of RA 6957 on the repayment scheme is almost
impossible or extremely difficult to implement considering
the uncertainty of a winning bid during public auction.
Moreover, the repayment scheme of a BOT contract may be
in the form of nonmonetary payment like the grant of a
portion or percentage of reclaimed land. Even if the BOT
partner participates in the public bidding, there is no
assurance that he will win the bid and therefore the
payment in kind as agreed to by the parties cannot be
performed or the winning bid prize might be below the
estimated valuation of the land. The only way to harmonize
Sec. 79 of PD 1445 with Sec. 6 of RA 6957 is to consider
Sec. 79 of PD 1445 as inapplicable to BOT contracts
involving patrimo
_______________
85 Commission on Audit, Professional Development Center,

HANDBOOK ON PROPERTY &SUPPLY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 91
92 (2003).
325
VOL. 530, AUGUST 15, 2007 325

nial lands. The law does not intend anything impossible

(lex non intendit aliquid impossibile).
Seventh Issue: Whether RBI, being a private

corporation, is barred by the Constitution to acquire
lands of public domain
Petitioner maintains that RBI, being a private corporation,
is expressly prohibited by the 1987 Constitution from
acquiring lands of public domain.
Petitioner’s proposition has no legal mooring for the
following reasons:
1. RA 6957 as amended by RA 7718 explicitly states that
a contractor can be paid “a portion as percentage of the
reclaimed land” subject to the constitutional requirement
that only Filipino citizens or corporations with at least 60%
Filipino equity can acquire the same. It cannot be denied
that RBI is a private corporation, where Filipino citizens
own at least 60% of the stocks. Thus, the transfer to RBI is
valid and constitutional.
2. When Proclamations Nos. 39 and 465 were issued,
inalienable lands covered by said proclamations were

converted to alienable and disposable lands of public
domain. When the titles to the reclaimed lands were
transferred to the NHA, said alienable and disposable
lands of public domain were automatically classified as
lands of the private domain or patrimonial properties of the
State because the NHA is an agency NOT tasked to dispose
of alienable or disposable lands of public domain. The only
way it can transfer the reclaimed land in conjunction with
its projects and to attain its goals is when it is
automatically converted to patrimonial properties of the
State. Being patrimonial or private properties of the State,
then it has the power to sell the same to any qualified
person—under the Constitution, Filipino citizens as private
corporations, 60% of which is owned by Filipino citizens
like RBI.
326

3. The NHA is an enduser entity such that when alienable

lands of public domain are transferred to said agency, they
are automatically classified as patrimonial properties. The
NHA is similarly situated as BCDA which was granted the
authority to dispose of patrimonial lands of the government
under RA 7227. The nature of the property holdings
conveyed to BCDA is elucidated and stressed in the May 6,
2003 Resolution in Chavez v. PEA, thus:
BCDA is an entirely different government entity. BCDA is

authorized by law to sell specific government lands that
have long been declared by presidential proclamations as
military reservations for use by the different services of
the armed forces under the Department of National
Defense. BCDA’s mandate is specific and limited in area,
while PEA’s mandate is general and national. BCDA holds
government lands that have been granted to enduser
government entities–– the military services of the armed
forces. In contrast, under Executive Order No. 525, PEA
holds the reclaimed public lands, not as an enduser entity,
but as the government agency “primarily responsible for
integrating, directing, and coordinating all reclamation
projects for and on behalf of the National Government.”
x x x Wellsettled is the doctrine that public land granted to an
enduser government agency for a specific public use may
subsequently be withdrawn by Congress from public use and
declared patrimonial property to be sold to private parties. R.A.

No. 7227 creating the BCDA is a law that declares specific
military reservations no longer needed for defense or
military purposes and reclassifies such lands as
patrimonial property for sale to private parties.
Government owned lands, as long as they are
patrimonial property, can be sold to private parties,
whether Filipino citizens or qualified private
corporations. Thus, the socalled Friar Lands acquired by the
government under Act No. 1120 are patrimonial property which
even private corporations can acquire by
327
VOL. 530, AUGUST 15, 2007 327

purchase. Likewise, reclaimed alienable lands of the public

domain if sold or transferred to a public or municipal corporation
for a monetary consideration become patrimonial property in the
hands of the public or municipal corporation. Once converted to
patrimonial property, the land may be sold by the public or
municipal corporation to private parties,
86
whether Filipino citizens
or qualified private corporations.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The foregoing Resolution makes it clear that the SMDRP

was a program adopted by the Government under Republic
Act No. 6957 (An Act Authorizing the Financing,
Construction, Operation and Maintenance of Infrastructure
Projects by the Private Sector, and For Other Purposes), as
amended by RA 7718, which is a special law similar to RA
7227. Moreover, since the implementation was assigned to
the NHA, an enduser agency under PD 757 and RA 7279,
the reclaimed lands registered under the NHA are
automatically classified as patrimonial lands ready for
disposition to qualified beneficiaries.
The foregoing reasons likewise apply to the contention of
petitioner that HCPTI, being a private corporation, is
disqualified from being a transferee of public land. What
was transferred to HCPTI is a 10hectare lot which is
already classified as patrimonial property in the hands of
the NHA. HCPTI, being a qualified corporation under the
1987 Constitution, the transfer of the subject lot to it is
valid and constitutional.
Eighth Issue: Whether respondents can be compelled

to disclose all information related to the SMDRP
Petitioner asserts his right to information on all documents
such as contracts, reports, memoranda, and the like

relative to SMDRP.
_______________
86 G.R. No. 133250, May 6, 2003, 403 SCRA 1, 3132.
328

Petitioner asserts that matters relative to the SMDRP have

not been disclosed to the public like the current stage of the
Project, the present financial capacity of RBI, the complete
list of investors in the asset pool, the exact amount of
investments in the asset pool and other similar important
information regarding the Project.
He prays that respondents be compelled to disclose all
information regarding the SMDRP and furnish him with
originals or at least certified true copies of all relevant
documents relating to the said project including, but not
limited to, the original JVA, ARJVA, AARJVA, and the
Asset Pool Agreement.
This relief must be granted.
The right of the Filipino people to information on
matters of public concern is enshrined in the 1987
Constitution, thus:
ARTICLE II
xxxx
SEC. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law,
the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure
of all its transactions involving public interest.
ARTICLE III
SEC. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of

public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and
to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions,
or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis
for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to
such limitations as may be provided by law.
In Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr., this Court explicated this

way:
“[A]n essential element of these freedoms is to keep open a
continuing dialogue or process of communication between the

government and the people. It is in the interest of the State that
the channels for free political discussion be maintained to the end
that the government may perceive and be responsive to the
people’s will. Yet,
329
VOL. 530, AUGUST 15, 2007 329

this open dialogue can be effective only to the extent that the
citizenry is informed and thus able to formulate its will
intelligently. Only when the participants in the discussion are
aware of the issues and have 87
access to information relating
thereto can such bear fruit.”
In PEA, this Court elucidated the rationale behind the

right to information:
“These twin provisions of the Constitution seek to promote

transparency in policymaking and in the operations of the
government, as well as provide the people sufficient information
to exercise effectively other constitutional rights. These twin
provisions are essential to the exercise of freedom of expression. If
the government does not disclose its official acts, transactions and
decisions to citizens, whatever citizens say, even if expressed
without any restraint, will be speculative and amount to nothing.
These twin provisions are also essential to hold public officials “at
all times x x x accountable to the people,” for unless citizens have
the proper information, they cannot hold public officials
accountable for anything. Armed with the right information,
citizens can participate in public discussions leading to the
formulation of government policies and their effective
implementation. An informed citizenry is essential 88
to the
existence and proper functioning of any democracy.”
Sec. 28, Art. II compels the State and its agencies to fully
disclose “all of its transactions involving public interest.”
Thus, the government agencies, without need of demand
from anyone, must bring into public view all the steps and
negotiations leading to the consummation of the89
transaction and the contents of the perfected contract.
Such information must pertain to “definite propositions of
the government,” meaning official recommendations or
final positions reached on the different matters subject of
negotiation. The government
_______________
87 G.R. No. 74930, February 13, 1989, 170 SCRA 256, 265.
89 Id., at p. 185; citing V RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
COMMISSION 2425 (1986).
330

agency, however, need not disclose “intraagency or

interagency recommendations or communications during
the stage when common assertions are still in the process
of being formulated or are in the exploratory stage.” The
limitation also covers privileged communication like
information on military and diplomatic secrets; information
affecting national security; information on investigations of
crimes by law enforcement agencies before the prosecution
of the accused; information on foreign relations,
intelligence, and other classified information.
It is unfortunate, however, that after almost twenty (20)
years from birth of the 1987 Constitution, there is still no
enabling law that provides the mechanics for the
compulsory duty of government agencies to disclose
information on government transactions. Hopefully, the
desired enabling law will finally see the light of day if and
when Congress decides to approve the proposed “Freedom
of Access to Information Act.” In the meantime, it would
suffice that government agencies post on their bulletin
boards the documents incorporating the information on the
steps and negotiations that produced the agreements and
the agreements themselves, and if finances permit, to
upload said information on their respective websites for
easy access by interested parties. Without any law or
regulation governing the right to disclose information, the
NHA or any of the respondents cannot be faulted if they
were not able to disclose information relative to the
SMDRP to the public in general.
The other aspect of the people’s right to know apart from
the duty to disclose is the duty to allow access to
information on matters of public concern under Sec. 7, Art.
III of the Constitution. The gateway to information opens
to the public the following: (1) official records; (2)
documents and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions; and (3) government research
data used as a basis for policy development.
331
VOL. 530, AUGUST 15, 2007 331

Thus, the duty to disclose information should be

differentiated from the duty to permit access to
information. There is no need to demand from the
government agency disclosure of information as this is
mandatory under the Constitution; failing that, legal
remedies are available. On the other hand, the interested
party must first request or even demand that he be allowed
access to documents and papers in the particular agency. A
request or demand is required; otherwise, the government
office or agency will not know of the desire of the interested
party to gain access to such papers and what papers are
needed. The duty to disclose covers only transactions
involving public interest, while the duty to allow access has
a broader scope of information which embraces not only
transactions involving public interest, but any matter
contained in official communications and public documents
of the government agency.
We find that although petitioner did not make any
demand on the NHA to allow access to information, we
treat the petition as a written request or demand. We order
the NHA to allow petitioner access to its official records,
documents, and papers relating to official acts,
transactions, and decisions that are relevant to the said
JVA and subsequent agreements relative to the SMDRP.
Ninth Issue: Whether the operative fact doctrine

applies to the instant petition
Petitioner postulates that the “operative fact” doctrine is
inapplicable to the present case because it is an equitable
doctrine which could not be used to countenance an
inequitable result that is contrary to its proper office.
On the other hand, the petitioner Solicitor General
argues that the existence of the various agreements
implementing the SMDRP is an operative fact that can no
longer be dis
332

turbed or simply
90
ignored, citing Rieta v. People of the
Philippines.
The argument of the Solicitor General is meritorious.
The “operative fact” doctrine is embodied in De Agbayani v.
Court of Appeals, wherein it is stated that a legislative or
executive act, prior to its being declared as
unconstitutional by the courts, is valid and must be
complied with, thus:
“As the new Civil Code puts it: “When the courts declare a law to
be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void
and the latter shall govern. Administrative or executive acts,
orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not
contrary to the laws of the Constitution.” It is understandable
why it should be so, the Constitution being supreme and
paramount. Any legislative or executive act contrary to its terms
cannot survive.
Such a view has support in logic and possesses the merit of
simplicity. It may not however be sufficiently realistic. It does
not admit of doubt that prior to the declaration of nullity
such challenged legislative or executive act must have
been in force and had to be complied with. This is so as until
after the judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares its invalidity,
it is entitled to obedience and respect. Parties may have acted
under it and may have changed their positions. What could be
more fitting than that in a subsequent litigation regard be had to
what has been done while such legislative or executive act was in
operation and presumed to be valid in all respects. It is now
accepted as a doctrine that prior to its being nullified, its
existence as a fact must be reckoned with. This is merely to reflect
awareness that precisely because the judiciary is the
governmental organ which has the final say on whether or not a
legislative or executive measure is valid, a period of time may
have elapsed before it can exercise the power of judicial review
that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would be to deprive
the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no
recognition of what had transpired prior to such adjudication.
_______________
90 G.R. No. 147817, August 12, 2004, 436 SCRA 273, 291292.
333
VOL. 530, AUGUST 15, 2007 333

In the language of an American Supreme Court decision: “The
actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination

[of unconstitutionality], is an operative fact and may have
consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past
cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The
effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be
considered in various aspects, with respect to particular relations,
individual and corporate, and particular conduct, private and
official.” This language has been quoted with approval in a
resolution in Araneta v. Hill and the decision in Manila Motor
Co., Inc. v. Flores. An even more recent instance is the opinion of
Justice Zaldivar
91
speaking for the Court in Fernandez v. Cuerva
and Co.” (Emphasis supplied.)
This doctrine was reiterated in the more recent case of City

of Makati v. Civil Service Commission, wherein we ruled
that:
“Moreover, we certainly cannot nullify the City Government’s

order of suspension, as we have no reason to do so, much less
retroactively apply such nullification to deprive private
respondent of a compelling and valid reason for not filing the
leave application. For as we have held, a void act though in
law a mere scrap of paper nonetheless confers legitimacy
upon past acts or omissions done in reliance thereof.
Consequently, the existence of a statute or executive order
prior to its being adjudged void is an operative fact to
which legal consequences are attached. It would indeed be
ghastly unfair to prevent private respondent from relying upon 92
the order of suspension in lieu of a formal leave application.”
The principle was further explicated in the case of Rieta v.

People of the Philippines, thus:
“In similar situations in the past this Court had taken the
pragmatic and realistic course set forth in Chicot County
Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank to wit:
_______________
91 No. L23127, April 29, 1971, 38 SCRA 429, 434435.

92 G.R. No. 131392, February 6, 2002, 376 SCRA 248, 257.
334

The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress,
having been found to be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was

inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties, and hence
affording no basis for the challenged decree. x x x It is quite clear,
however, that such broad statements as to the effect of a determination of
unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The actual
existence of a statute, prior to [the determination of its invalidity], is an
operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be
ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration.
The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be
considered in various aspects –with respect to particular conduct, private
and official. Questions of rights claimed to have become vested, of status,
of prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon
accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute
and of its previous application, demand examination. These questions are
among the most difficult of those which have engaged the attention of
courts, state and federal, and it is manifest from numerous decisions that
an allinclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity
cannot be justified.”
93
In the May 6, 200394
Resolution in Chavez v. PEA, we ruled
that De Agbayani is not applicable to the case considering
that the prevailing law did not authorize private
corporations from owning land. The prevailing law at the
time was the 1935 Constitution as no statute dealt with the
same issue.
In the instant case, RA 6957 was the prevailing law at
the time that the joint venture agreement was signed. RA
6957, entitled “An Act Authorizing The Financing,
Construction, Operation And Maintenance Of
Infrastructure Projects By The Private Sector And For
Other Purposes,” which was passed by Congress on July
24, 1989, allows95 repayment to the private contractor of
reclaimed lands. Such law was relied
_______________

94 Supra note 91.
95 RA 6957, Sec. 6 provides:
335
VOL. 530, AUGUST 15, 2007 335

upon by respondents, along with the abovementioned

executive issuances in pushing through with the Project.
The existence of such law and issuances is an “operative
fact” to which legal consequences have attached. This

Court is constrained to give legal effect to the acts done in
consonance with such
_______________
Section 6. Repayment Scheme.—For the financing, construction, operation, and

maintenance of any infrastructure project undertaken pursuant to the provisions
of this Act, the constructor shall be entitled to a reasonable return of its
investment and operating and maintenance costs in accordance with its bid
proposal as accepted by the concerned contracting infrastructure agency or local
government unit and incorporated in the contract’s terms and conditions. In the
case of a buildoperateandtransfer arrangement, this repayment scheme is to be
affected by authorizing the contractor to charge for the use of the project facility
not exceeding those proposed in the bid and incorporated in the contract: Provided,
That the government infrastructure agency or local government unit concerned
shall approve the fairness and equity of the tolls, fees, rentals and charges except
in case of tolls for national highways, roads, bridges and public thoroughfares
which shall be approved by the Toll Regulatory Board: Provided, further, That the
imposition and collection of tolls, fees, rentals and charges shall be for a fixed term
as proposed in the bid and incorporated in the contract but in no case shall this
term exceed fifty (50) years: Provided, finally, That during the lifetime of the
franchise, the contractor shall undertake the necessary maintenance and repair of
the facility in accordance with standards prescribed in the bidding documents and
in the contract. In the case of a buildandtransfer arrangements, the repayment
scheme is to be affected through amortization payments by the government unit
concerned to the contractor according to the scheme proposed in the bid and
incorporated in the contract.
In the case of land reclamation or the building of industrial estates, the
repayment scheme may consist of the grant of a portion of percentage of the
reclaimed land or industrial estate built, subject to the constitutional
requirements with respect to the ownership of lands.
336

executive and legislative acts; to do otherwise would work

patent injustice on respondents.
Further, in the May 6, 2003 Resolution in Chavez v.
PEA, we ruled that in certain cases, the transfer of land,
although illegal or unconstitutional, will not be invalidated
on considerations of equity and social justice. However, in
that case, we did not apply the same considering that PEA,
respondent in said case, was not entitled to equity
principles there being bad faith on its part, thus:
“There are, moreover, special circumstances that disqualify Amari

from invoking equity principles. Amari cannot claim good faith
because even before Amari signed the Amended JVA on March 30,
1999, petitioner had already filed the instant case on April 27,
1998 questioning precisely the qualification of Amari to acquire
the Freedom Islands. Even before the filing of this petition, two
Senate Committees had already approved on September 16, 1997
Senate Committee Report No. 560. This Report concluded, after a
wellpublicized investigation into PEA’s sale of the Freedom
Islands to Amari, that the Freedom Islands are inalienable lands
of the public domain. Thus, Amari signed the Amended JVA
knowing and assuming all the 96attendant risks, including the
annulment of the Amended JVA.”
Such indicia of bad faith are not present in the instant

case. When the ruling in PEA was rendered by this Court
on July 9, 2002, the JVAs were all executed. Furthermore,
when petitioner filed the instant case against respondents
on August 5, 2004, the JVAs were already terminated by
virtue of the MOA between the NHA and RBI. The
respondents had no reason to think that their agreements
were unconstitutional or even questionable, as in fact, the
concurrent acts of the executive department lent validity to
the implementation of the Project. The SMDRP agreements
have produced vested rights in favor of the slum dwellers,
the buyers of reclaimed land who were issued titles over
said land, and the agencies
_______________
96 Supra note 86, at pp. 2930.
337
VOL. 530, AUGUST 15, 2007 337

and investors who made investments in the project or who

bought SMPPCs. These properties and rights cannot be
disturbed or questioned after the passage of around ten
(10) years from the start of the SMDRP implementation.
Evidently, the “operative fact” principle has set in. The
titles to the lands in the hands of the buyers can no longer
be invalidated.
The Court’s Dispositions
Based on the issues raised in this petition, we find that the

March 19, 1993 JVA between NHA and RBI and the
SMDRP embodied in the JVA, the subsequent amendments
to the JVA and all other agreements signed and executed
in relation to it, including, but not limited to, the
September 26, 1994 Smokey Mountain Asset Pool
Agreement and the agreement on Phase I of the Project as
well as all other transactions which emanated from the
Project, have been shown to be valid, legal, and
constitutional. Phase II has been struck down by the Clean
Air Act.
With regard to the prayer for prohibition, enjoining
respondents particularly respondent NHA from further
implementing and/or enforcing the said Project and other
agreements related to it, and from further deriving and/or
enjoying any rights, privileges and interest from the
Project, we find the same prayer meritless.
Sec. 2 of Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
provides:
“Sec. 2. Petition for prohibition.—When the proceedings of any

tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising
judicial, quasijudicial or ministerial functions, are without or in
excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal
or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified
petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and
praying that
338

judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to desist from

further proceedings in the action or matter specified therein, or
otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may
require.”
It has not been shown that the NHA exercised judicial or

quasijudicial functions in relation to the SMDRP and the
agreements relative to it. Likewise, it has not been shown
what ministerial functions the NHA has with regard to the
SMDRP.
A ministerial duty is one which is so clear and specific as
to leave no room for the exercise of discretion in its
performance. It is a duty which an officer performs in a
given state of facts in a prescribed manner in obedience to
the mandate of legal authority, without regard to the

exercise of
97
his/her own judgment upon the propriety of the
act done.
Whatever is left to be done in relation to the August 27,
2003 MOA, terminating the JVA and other related
agreements, certainly does not involve ministerial
functions of the NHA but instead requires exercise of
judgment. In fact, Item No. 4 of the MOA terminating the
JVAs provides for validation of the developer’s (RBI’s)
claims arising from the termination of 98the SMDRP through
the various government agencies. Such validation
requires the exercise of discretion.
In addition, prohibition does not lie against the NHA in
view of petitioner’s failure to avail and exhaust all
administrative remedies. Clear is the rule that prohibition
is only available when there is no adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.
More importantly, prohibition does not lie to restrain an
act which is already a fait accompli. The “operative fact”
doctrine protecting vested rights bars the grant of the writ
of prohibition to the case at bar. It should be remembered
that
_______________
97 Symaco v. Hon. Aquino, etc., 106 Phil. 1130, 1135 (1960).

98 Rollo, p. 866.
339
VOL. 530, AUGUST 15, 2007 339

petitioner was the Solicitor General at the time SMDRP

was formulated and implemented. He had the opportunity
to question the SMDRP and the agreements on it, but he
did not. The moment to challenge the Project had passed.
On the prayer for a writ of mandamus, petitioner asks
the Court to compel respondents to disclose all documents
and information relating to the project, including, but not
limited to, any subsequent agreements with respect to the
different phases of the Project, the revisions of the original
plan, the additional works incurred on the Project, the
current financial condition of respondent RBI, and the
transactions made with respect to the project. We earlier
ruled that petitioner will be allowed access to official
records relative to the SMDRP. That would be adequate
relief to satisfy petitioner’s right to the information
gateway.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED.
The prayer for a writ of prohibition is DENIED for lack
of merit.
The prayer for a writ of mandamus is GRANTED.
Respondent NHA is ordered to allow access to petitioner to
all public documents and official records relative to the
SMDRP—including, but not limited to, the March 19,
1993 JVA between the NHA and RBI and subsequent
agreements related to the JVA, the revisions over the
original plan, and the additional works incurred on and the
transactions made with respect to the Project.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno (C.J.), Quisumbing, YnaresSantiago,

SandovalGutierrez, AustriaMartinez, Corona, Carpio
Morales, Azcuna, Tinga, ChicoNazario, Garcia and
Nachura, JJ., concur.
340

Carpio, J., No part. I reviewed the Original

Contract but not the Amendment to the Amended and
Restated Contract Asset Pool Agreement.
Reyes, J., No part. Did not participate in
Deliberations.
Petition partially granted.
Notes.—As property of public dominion, the Roppongi

lot is outside the commerce of man. It cannot be alienated.
Its ownership is a special collective ownership for general
use and enjoyment, an application to the satisfaction of
collective needs, and resides in the social group. The
purpose is not to serve the State as a juridical person, but
the citizens; it is intended for the common and public
welfare and cannot be the object of appropriation. (Laurel
vs. Garcia, 187 SCRA 797 [1990])
Standing is a peculiar concept in constitutional law
because in some cases, suits are not brought by parties who
have been personally injured by the operation of a law or
any other government act but by concerned citizens,
taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest.
(Agan, Jr. vs. Philippine International Air Terminals Co.,
Inc., 402 SCRA 612 [2003])
——o0o——
341
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Case A.9 Chavez V Nha

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Case A.9 Chavez V Nha

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8/4/2016 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 530

VOL. 530, AUGUST 15, 2007 235

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL

Judicial Review; Locus Standi; Taxpayer’s Suit; In cases

Mountain Project Participation Certificates (SMPPCs) bought by

236 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Chavez vs. National Housing Authority

as a taxpayer, is a proper party to the instant petition before the

instant action compel us to turn a blind eye to the judicial

VOL. 530, AUGUST 15, 2007 237

Chavez vs. National Housing Authority

instant petition because the facts in said case are substantially

238 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Chavez vs. National Housing Authority

instant case. The principle of stare decisis has no application to

government agency or entity or may even be undertaken by the

VOL. 530, AUGUST 15, 2007 239

Chavez vs. National Housing Authority

power “to reclaim, excavate, enclose or raise any of the lands”

240 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Chavez vs. National Housing Authority

authority granted to National Housing Authority (NHA), a

President. It cannot refer to Congress as it was dissolved and

VOL. 530, AUGUST 15, 2007 241

Chavez vs. National Housing Authority

valid and subsisting. Thus, the National Government through the

the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of

242 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Chavez vs. National Housing Authority

partment head can defy or oppose the implementation of a project

She lays down policies in the execution of her plans and

VOL. 530, AUGUST 15, 2007 243

Chavez vs. National Housing Authority

Same; Same; Same; Alienable and Disposable Lands; The

concession.”—The query is, when did the declaration take effect?

244 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Chavez vs. National Housing Authority

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Build­Operate­and­Transfer

as, but not limited to, the grant of a portion or percentage of

VOL. 530, AUGUST 15, 2007 245

Chavez vs. National Housing Authority

“alienable lands of public domain must be transferred to

converted to patrimonial properties of the State which can be sold

246 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Chavez vs. National Housing Authority

combined and collective effect of Proclamations Nos. 39 and 465

Special Patent No. 3598 was issued in favor of the NHA

VOL. 530, AUGUST 15, 2007 247

Chavez vs. National Housing Authority

government contracts by allowing reclaimed land as part or full

248 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Chavez vs. National Housing Authority

industrial development intended for disposition to and enjoyment

development intended for disposition to and enjoyment of certain

VOL. 530, AUGUST 15, 2007 249

Chavez vs. National Housing Authority

subject land. Without doubt, the presidential proclamations on

reclassified as alienable and disposable lands under the BOT Law;

250 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Chavez vs. National Housing Authority

in a manner affecting its title, except when authorized by

VOL. 530, AUGUST 15, 2007 251

Chavez vs. National Housing Authority

252 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Chavez vs. National Housing Authority

be subject to public bidding as the only way of disposing of said

VOL. 530, AUGUST 15, 2007 253

Chavez vs. National Housing Authority

positions reached on the different matters subject of negotiation.

254 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Chavez vs. National Housing Authority

from the government agency disclosure of information as this is

sufficiently realistic. It does not admit of doubt that

VOL. 530, AUGUST 15, 2007 255

Chavez vs. National Housing Authority

prior to the declaration of nullity such challenged

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; BuildOperateandTransfer

1 Rollo, pp. 34.

Reclamation of the Area Across R10 through a private sector

NHA to conduct the feasibility studies and develop a low

The profit sharing shall be based on the approved pre

area and the constructed units of mediumrise permanent housing