Kant and The Problem of Metaphysics PDF

Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics
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MARTIN HEIDEGGER
Kant and the Problem

of Metaphysics
TRANSLATED BY JAMES S. CHURCHILL

FOREWORD BY THOMAS LANGAN
INDIANA UNIVERSITY PRESS

B LOOMINGTON

To the memory of
Max Scheler
SECOND PRINTING I965

COPYRIGHT (q) 1962 BY INDIANA UNIVERSITY PRESS
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

MANUFACTURED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOG CARD NUMBER: 62-8974

CONTENTS
Foreword ix
Translator's Introduction xv
Author's Preface to the First Edition xxiii
Author's Preface to the Second Edition xxv
Introduction: The Theme and Organization of the Inquiry 1
Section One: The Point of Departure of the Laying of the Founda-

tion of Metaphysics 7
§ 1. The Traditional Concept of Metaphysics 9
§ 2. The Point of Departure for the Laying of the Founda-
tion of Traditional Metaphysics 14
§ 3. The Laying of the Foundation of Metaphysics as a
"-
Critique of Pure Reason 18
Section Two: The Carrying Out of the Laying of the Foundation of

Metaphysics 23
A. The Characterization of the Dimension in Which the Regression

Necessary for the Development of the Laying of the Foundation
of Metaphysics Is Carried Out 26
I. The Essential Attributes of the Field of Origin 27
§ 4. The Essence of Knowledge in General 27
§ 5. The Essence of the Finitude of Knowledge 30
§ 6. The Field of Origin of the Laying of the Foundation of
Metaphysics 39
n. The Manner in Which the Origin isRevealed 42
§ 7. The Outline of the Stages of the Laying of the Founda-
tion of Ontology 42
§ 8. The Method by Which the Origin is Revealed 44
B. The Stages of the Realization of the Projection of the Intrinsic
Possibility of Ontology 46
The First Stage of the Laying of the Foundation: The Essential
Elements of Pure Knowledge 47

Knowledge
a) Pure Intuition in Finite 48
§ The Elucidation of Space and Time as Pure Intuitions
9. 48
§ 10. Time as the Universal Pure Intuition 51
b) The Role of Pure Thought in Finite Knowledge 55
§ 11. The Pure Concepts of the Understanding (Notions) 55
§ 12. The Notions as Ontological Predicates (Categories) 58
The Second Stage of the Laying of the Foundation: The Essential

Unity of Pure Knowledge 61
§ 13. The Question of the Essential Unity of Pure Knowledge 62

§ 14. The Ontological Synthesis 64
§ 15. The Problem of the Categories and the Role of Tran-
scendental Logic 69
The Third Stage of the Laying of the Foundation: The Intrinsic

Possibility of the Essential Unity of the Ontological Synthesis 72
§ 16. The Explication of Reason
the Transcendence of Finite
as the Basic Purpose of the Transcendental Deduction 74
§ 17. The Two Ways of the Transcendental Deduction 80
a) The First Way 82
b) The Second Way 86
§ 18. The External Form of the Transcendental Deduction 89
The Fourth Stage of the Laying of the Foundation: the Ground of

the Intrinsic Possibility of Ontological Knowledge 93
§ 19. Transcendence and Sensibilization [Versinnlichung] 94
§ 20. Image and Schema 97
§ 21. Schema and Schema-Image 102
§ 22. The Transcendental Schematism 106
§ 23. Schematism and Subsumption 113
The Fifth Stage of the Laying of the Foundation: The Complete

Determination of the Essence of Ontological Knowledge 118
§ 24. The Highest Synthetic Principle as the Complete De-
termination of the Essence of Transcendence 1 1
§ 25. Transcendence and the Laying of the Foundation of

Metaphysica Generalis 124
Section Three: The Laying of the Foundation of Metaphysics in its
Basic Originahty 131
A. The Explicit Characterization of the Fundamental Ground Estab-

lished in the Laying of the Foundation of Metaphysics 134
§ 26. The Transcendental Imagination as the Formative Cen-
ter of Ontological Knowledge 134
§ 27. The Transcendental Imagination as the Third Fimda-
mental Faculty 141
vi

B. The Transcendental Imagination as tlie Root of Both Stems 144
§ 28. Transcendental Imagination and Pure Intuition 148
§ 29. Transcendental Imagination and Theoretical Reason 153
§ 30. Transcendental Imagination and Practical Reason 162
§ 31. The Basic Originality of the Established Ground and
Kant's Recoil from Transcendental Imagination 166
C. The Transcendental Imagination and the Problem of Human

Pure Reason 177
§ 32. The Transcendental Imagination and Its Relation to
Time 178
§ 33. The Inherently Temporal Character of the Transcen-
dental Imagination 181
a) Pure Synthesis as Pure Imagination 184
b) Pure Synthesis as Pure Reproduction 186
c) Pure Synthesis as Pure Recognition 188
§ 34. Time as Pure Self-affection and the Temporal Charac-
ter of the Self 193
§ 35. The Basic Originality of the Established Ground and
the Problem of Metaphysics 201
Section Four: The Laying of the Foundation of Metaphysics in a

Repetition 209
A. The Laying of the Foundation of Metaphysics as Anthropology 212

§ 36. The Established Ground and the Result of Kant's Lay-
ing of the Foundation 212
§ 37. The Idea of a Philosophical Anthropology 215
§ 38. The Question of the Essence of Man and the True Re-
sult of Kant's Laying of the Foundation 221
B. The Problem of the Finitude in Man and the Metaphysics of

Dasein 226
§ 39. The Problem of a Possible Determination of the Fini-
tude in Man 226
§ 40. The Primordial Elaboration of the Question of Being
as the Means of Access to the Problem of the Finitude
in Man 229
§ 41. The Comprehension of Being and the Dasein in Man 233
C. The Metaphysics of Dasein as Fundamental Ontology 239

§ 42. The Idea of a Fundamental Ontology 240
§ 43. The Inception and Course of Development of Funda-
mental Ontology 242
§ 44. The Goal of Fundamental Ontology 247
§ 45. The Idea of Fundamental Ontology and the Critique
of Pure Reason 251
vii
FOREWORD
"In contrast to the methods of historical philology, which

has its own problems, a dialogue between thinkers is bound
by other laws." Heidegger thus teUs the reader in which spirit
he should approach Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics.
This is a "thoughtful dialogue," hence it is as much Heidegger
as Kant, Indeed the Kantbuch of 1929 is a model for the long
series of dialogues with the leading thinkers of the Western
tradition that form Heidegger's rethinking of the whole his-
tory of ontology. The "laws" governing such dialogue are
grounded in Heidegger's conception of Being and how Being
has come to be.
In the Introduction to Sein und Zeit the role of such dialogue
is explained in terms of a program for estabUshing an authentic,
a "fundamental" ontology. The question of "the Being of the
things that are" itself came to be at a definite moment in time,
with the questioning of the Greek philosophers in the gener-
ation before Socrates. The meaning of the question and the
answers given it were in the beginning indetermined, ambiguous,
pregnant with different sorts of possible interpretation. The
history of ontology, however, has been dominated by a chain
of evolving metaphysical answers, that is, answers all of the
sort that seeks beyond the sum total of things of our experience,
a ground in a super-thing —a Platonic Idea of the Good, an
AristoteUan Thought of Thought, St. Thomas' Actus purus,
Spinoza's Substance.
The meta-physical construction of ontology is necessarily
ix

accompanied by a "conformity" theory of truth: Truth is con-
ceived as the mind's conformity with the principles of a reahty
that is lying there before us, already constituted in itself, and
inviting our submissive grasp of its reaUty. Latent in the meta-
physical conception of Being and the conformity theory of
truth are great tensions: the tension between the "here-below"
and the "thingliest of things" beyond all experience, and
between the ob-jectum "out-there" and the sub-jectum "in
here" which must somehow go out of itself to enfold and
possess this object.
The history of metaphysics has been that of the progressive
domination of the object by the subject. After all, it is the
subject who knows, and it is in the subject that the criteria
of truth are to be found. Descartes takes the decisive step

toward converting the object into the subject's "representation,"
By Kant's time, the way is prepared for the most serious inquiry
into the rules governing the subject's placing (stellen) the rep-
resentation iVor-stellung) before (vor) himself. With this
inquiry the whole historical destiny of metaphysics is fulfilled,
although ironically it is saved by being reversed. Because the

metaphysical tradition began with the unquestioned assumption
that "Being" lies in a reality already constituted in itself before
the human existent arrives on the scene and begins knowing
it, a subject-object polarity was established. Then the gradual
domination of the object by the subject leads ulthnately to the
realization that witnout the consciousness of the subject the
object could not be. With this turn of events the whole question
of Being is projected onto a radically new plane. The "Being"
of things is now seen to be grounded in the possibiUty of
experience. The search for "Being" is now directed not toward
a "reality in itself" but toward the subjective roots of the
transcendental horizons of consciousness. The quest for "Being"
is no longer a search for the "thinghest of things" — the "cause"
meta-ta-phusika responsible for there being any things in the

first place; rather, it is a quest to understand how the existent
can bring to be a world of meaning, a world of time, a history

in which "things" can be with significance.
With Kant, then, the "question of Being" is at a particularly
crucial crossroads. Kant opens the possibility of "transcendental
inquiry" into the fundamental "ground" of Being. But has he

succeeded in penetrating more deeply than the ancient subject-
object split itself, has he plunged through to the authentic
moment of the coming to be — neither a subjective nor an
objective process, but the mating of the Seienden and the
interpretative, time-projecting horizons of the human existent,
a mating which brings into being the historical Thing? Heideg-

ger's later dialogues with Hegel and Nietzsche and his laments
over the destiny of the "planetary domination of the Technique"
are eloquent evidence of his judgment of the historical position
of Kant: With Kant the Western tradition has not yet come into
full possession of a fundamental ontology that need not devolve

either into the subjectivism of the Nietzschean "Will for the
sake of Will," nor into the objectivism of "the Eternal Return
of the Like;" neither into the totalitarian arbitrariness of a
positivistic "Technique," nor into the transcendental Absolut-
ism of Fichte. In Heidegger's dialogue with Hegel we are
invited to gaze on perhaps the most tragic spectacle of all,
a Being-revelation that is so close, ah yet so far! A monumental

ambiguity is the result, making it impossible to know whether
Being is only the creation of the human will or an Absolute
that dips down into time through the medium of the human
subject.
A fundamental ontology must dispel this ambiguity through

a twofold program of inquiry into Being. The published part
of Sein und Zeit begins the task of phenomenological inquiry
into the human existent as "the place where Being comes to
be in time." Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics begins the
second aspect of the task, a rethinking of the whole course of
xi

that historical coming to be of "Being" and "Truth." The two
enterprises — the "existential analytic" and the "recalling of
the historical destiny" of the Western tradition — progressively
illumine one another. Sein und Zeit would not have been
possible if this historical evolution had not brought us to our
present state. And we would not be at that point, that is to say
the history would not be so comprehended and therefore ad-

vanced another step, if Sein und Zeit had not actually been
carried out. Kant and Problem of Metaphysics is, then, a
the
collision of the vision of Sein und Zeit with the vision of the
Critique of Pure Reason, the latter a vision without which Sein

und Zeit would not have been possible, but one which Sein und
Zeit had to transcend, giving the Critique in that very act its
ultimate sense.
In Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics Heidegger is not,
then, trying to say what Kant "really" said, nor what he "meant"
to say. Rather, in this work we simply witness Heidegger in
the very personal act of nourishing the enterprise of funda-

mental ontology on the wine of the first pressing of the Critique.
Against the background of his conception of the history of
ontology and with the basic discoveries of Sein und Zeit in
mind, Heidegger wishes to profit as much as possible from the
Critique's, transcendental analysis of the synthesis of imagination
as foundation of a temporal horizon of significance. Heidegger
wishes to liberate these discoveries from whatever hesitations,
ambiguities, or later subjectivizing or absolutizing interpreta-
tions may keep them from full fruition. This fruition is the
"fundamental ontology" —and Kant and the Problem of Meta-
physics is an instrument of that peculiarly Heideggerian enter-
prise.
Is this work of interest then only to the student of Heidegger

and not to the student of Kant? Were Heidegger's "fundamental
ontology" based on a fantastic and absurd reconstruction of
the history of philosophy, such would then be the lamentable
xii

case. That there are some unacceptable elements in Heideg-
ger's reading of the history of our tradition is undeniable. But
before anyone consigns the whole enterprise to the limbo
of philosophical curiosities, let him, if he is a serious student
of Kant, read the work here translated as evidence that there
is much in what Heidegger says about our history, and that
both his insights and his errors in this regard run on the deepest
possible level of historical explanation. Before Heidegger applied
the phenomenological ontology unveiled in Sein und Zeit to
the Critique of Pure Reason, no one had so clearly seen the
ontological mission of Kant's great work, the sense in which
its anti-metaphysics is precisely fundamental ontology. Heideg-
ger's Being-in-time vision illumines the Kantian doctrine of
the temporal synthesis of the imagination as ground of the
coming to be of the Thing, as it never has been before. And
in this perspective, the First Edition's glimpse of the problem
of the Nothingness of the "Thing in itself" is brought into
stark rehef, and the Second Edition's apparently deUberate
backing away from it is dramatized so that the enigma it
poses cannot be overlooked.

These are contributions of authentic Kantian commentary
of a dialogue with Kant on his own level. Criticism of Kant
and the Problem of Metaphysics should march on this same
level. Only the confrontation of ontology with ontology, and
this in a way that can challenge a whole conception of history,
is worthy of participation in this dialogue. It is in this sense
that the Kantbuch is a model, not only for Heidegger's own
subsequent dialogues, but for all "thoughtful dialogues between
thinkers." Philosophical explanation is only worthy of our
tradition when it moves with the current of Being itself.
THOMAS LANGAN
xm
TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION
The purpose of Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, accord-

ing to Heidegger, is to explicate the Critique of Pure Reason
"as a laying of the foundation of metaphysics as a problem of
fundamental ontology" (p. 3). Metaphysics, Heidegger explains,
can be divided into two distinct parts, ( 1) metaphysica specialis,
which is concerned with the study of the particular spheres of

essents,^ God, nature, and man, within the essent in totality,
i.e.,
and (2) metaphysica generalis, the object of which is the study

of the essent "in general," i.e., ontology — or in Kant's termi-
^
nology, "transcendental philosophy."
It is the second of these branches to which Heidegger refers
in the expression "laying of the foundation of metaphysics."
Hence, "to lay the foundation of metaphysics ... is to reveal
the internal possibility of ontology" (p. 17). And since ontolog-
1. Since there is no form of the verb "to be" equivalent to Hei-

degger's Seiend, a term "alien to our everyday speech" (Martin
Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. Ralph Manheim
[New Haven, 1959], p. 77), I have adopted Ralph Manheim's pro-
cedure in using the term "essent." This word, coined by Manheim,
is "based on the fiction that essens, essentia is the present participle
of sum" {ibid., p. ix).
have translated the words Sein and sein by "Being" and "being"
I
respectively, although the fact that seinis an infinitive and "being"
a participle occasionally makes for awkwardness. In addition, when

the occasion demands it, I use "being" as an equivalent for Wesen.
2. Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (London,
1929), p. 662.
XV

ical knowledge, i.e., the "precursory" (vorgdngig) comprehen-
sion of the Being of essents, is "that which makes . . . ontic
knowledge possible" (p. 15), to interpret the Critique of Pure

Reason as a laying of the foundation of metaphysics is to
interpret it as the establishment of the possibility of that which
makes empirical (i.e., objective) knowledge possible.
As ontology is an inquiry concerned with the Being of things,
so "fundamental ontology" is an inquiry concerned with the

possibility of ontology. In other words, its object is the analysis
of the comprehension of Being as that on which ontology

itself depends; it is concerned to uncover the source of the
"objectivity factor" as that without which objective experience
would be impossible.
If the first Critique is a "laying of the foundation" of ontology
(metaphysics), this foundation being the comprehension of
Being itself as that which makes ontology possible, then the
Critique is ultimately concerned with the "preparation" of this

foundation, i.e., with determining from what and in what
manner this foundation itself arises.
This foundation of the foundation, Heidegger asserts, is
Dasein,^ and the business of determining how the foundation
3. Dasein, the key term in Heidegger's technical vocabulary, is
one which has thus far resisted successful translation. Translations

such as M. Corbin's realite humaine and Professor John Wild's
transience, for example, fail to preserve the neutrality of Dasein
and to convey the sense of place or situation inherent in Da-sein.
On the other hand, translations such as Ralph Manheim's simple
"being-there" seem also to be unsatisfactory. The Da of Dasein
means both "here" and "there" or even "where," in short, place or
situation in general. But the English "there" ("in that place") car-
ries the implication of position in space, "there" as opposed to
"here," and it is just this notion which Heidegger asserts in Sein
und Zeit (p. 52ff.) does not apply to the mode of "being in" the
world characteristic of Dasein.
In view of these and other objections, I have decided to leave
xvi

of metaphysics as the comprehension of Being is grounded in
and arises from Dasein must proceed by an "existential [or as
he expresses it in the Kant-book, an "ontological"] analytic of

Dasein." * The object of the Critique of Pure Reason is just
such an analytic. But this is also the object of Sein und Zeit,
namely, the "working out of the meaning of Being" by means

of an existential analytic of Dasein. Thus, it is apparent that in
stating that the object of Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics
is to present the Critique of Pure Reason "as a laying of the
foundation of metaphysics in order thus to present the problem

of metaphysics as the problem of a fundamental ontology,"
Heidegger looks upon Kant as being engaged in the same task
as that with which he himself is occupied in Sein und Zeit,
namely, in showing how it is possible for man as a "finite being
which as such is delivered up to the essent" to have a compre-
hension of Being by virtue of which this being "is able to bring
forth the ontological structure \Seinsverfassung\ of the essent"
(p. 42), i.e., render objective experience possible.

Heidegger, then, has no quarrel with Kant's basic assumptions.
Both accept the fundamental hypothesis of idealism — that the
principles of order in experience are a priori —and both are

necessarily concerned with the analysis of that which makes
possible the objectivity-factor required by this hypothesis (pure
reason in the one case, Dasein in the other). If Heidegger has
a quarrel with Kant, it is that the latter was too much a prisoner
of tradition to carry this analysis to its ultimate conclusion.
the term in the originalGerman. The meaning of Dasein can per-

haps best be conveyed by stating, as I have intimated, that it is
roughly equivalent to Kant's "pure reason" although without the
rationalistic overtones of this term.
4. Sein und Zeit, 6th ed. (Tubingen, 1949), p. 13; this and sub-
sequent passages from Sein und Zeit are based on the "informal
English paraphrase" of part of this book by Robert J. Trayhern,
John Wild, Bert Dreyfus, and C. DeDeugd.
xvii

namely, that the basis of this objectivity-factor is temporality
as the Being of Dasein or, in Kant's case, pure reason.
In general, Kant's critics fail to appreciate the enormous

importance of time in the development of Kant's critical idealism.
Heidegger is certainly an exception to this observation; indeed,

it can be said that the over-all purpose of the Kant-book is to
show how time, or to be more exact, temporaUty, is involved
in every phase of Kant's thought. This purpose is evident not
only on the basis of the content of this work but also on the
basis of what Heidegger in effect says about it.
Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, Heidegger informs
us in the preface, arose "in the course of the elaboration of
und Zeit" (p. xxiii). The second part of
the second part of Sein
thiswork (which has never appeared) was to have as its title,
The Fundamental Characteristics of a Phenomenological De-
struction of the History of Ontology under the Guidance of
the Problematic of Temporality, and Section Two of Part One
was to have the subtitle, Kant's Doctrine of Schematism and of
Time as the First Stage in the Elaboration of the Problem of
Temporality.^
By the term "destruction," Heidegger tells us, he does not
mean either the "trivial business of relating ontological stand-
points to one another" or the "shaking off" of the history of
ontology, but rather, "the loosening up of a tradition that has
grown rigid" and so conceals and denies access to those
"original 'sources' from which the categories and concepts
relative to Being were in part genuinely created." The primary
concern of this destruction, which is really an uncovering, is
to discover how and to what extent "the interpretation of

Being has coincided thematically with the phenomenon of
«
time."
5. Ibid., p. 39.
6. Ibid., p. 22f.
xviii
Viewed in this light, i.e., as an exercise in the destruction
of the history of ontology, the over-all pattern of the Kant-book
becomes clear. It begins, in Section One, with a characterization
of the ontological tradition which formed the background of
Kant's thought. This tradition not only supplied the frame of
reference for the first Critique as a laying of the foundation of
metaphysics but also predisposed Kant in favor of the supremacy
of reason and the understanding as opposed to such "lower"
faculties as the imagination. This is why, according to Heideg-
ger, even though the whole trend of the Critique points to the
central function of the imagination insofar as the possibility
of the ontological synthesis is concerned, Kant refused to recog-
nize this and in the second edition reduced the imagination
to a "function of the understanding" (p. 167).
Section Two is devoted to a detailed analysis of the Critique

of Pure Reason as a laying of the foundation of metaphysics.
In the course of this analysis, Heidegger brings out the impor-
tance of the imagination as the "formative center" of ontological
knowledge by showing, particularly in his discussion of the
transcendental deduction of the categories and the doctrine of
schematism, that it is the imagination which creates the horizon
of objectivity without which objective experience would be
impossible.
Section Three, "The Laying of the Foundation of Meta-
physics in Its Basic Originality" —wherein, according to Ernst
Cassirer, Heidegger "no longer speaks as a commentator but
as a usurper" ^
— contains the most controversial material of
the Kant-book. In this section, Heidegger with "violence"
wrests from Kant what he "intended to say" but "recoiled from"
because he was a prisoner of tradition, namely, that not only
is temporality the ground of the transcendental imagination, it
7. Ernst Cassirer, Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, Be-
markungen zu Martin Heideggers Kant-Interpretation, Kant-Studien,

XXXVI, No. 1/2 (1931), p. 17.
xix

is also the basis of the "selfhood" of the self —pure practical
reason as well as intuition, understanding, and the imagination.
Properly speaking, Section Three marks the end of Heideg-
ger's interpretation of the first Critique as a laying of the
foundation of metaphysics. What follows, in Section Four,
Heidegger terms a "repetition" [Wiederholung] of the laying
of the foundation of metaphysics.
In Heidegger's terminology, the "repetition" of a philosophical
problem does not signify an abridgment or a summary of the
problem, "but the disclosure of the primordial possibihties
concealed in it. The development of these possibilities has the
effect of transforming the problem and thus preserving it in
its import as a problem" (p. 211).

The repetition of a problem, however, is possible only on
the basis of a preceding "destruction." Only by first "loosening
up a tradition that has grown rigid" and so making accessible
the "original sources" of a problem can the possibilities inherent
in this problem be developed in a repetition which both lets
us see the problem as a problem and at the same time goes

beyond it.
This movement, which might be described as a kind of

dialectic, is exempUfied in connection with the central problem
of the Critique of Pure Reason, that of establishing the possi-
bility of objective experience, or, as Heidegger expresses it,
that of laying the foundation of metaphysics. In the first three

sections of the Kant-book, Heidegger by a destruction of the
history of ontology brings to light the hidden "foundation of
the foundation" of metaphysics, i.e., temporality as the Being
of Dasein. Sein und Zeit (the essentials of which are presented
in Section Four of the Kant-book) is a repetition of this prob-
lem, in the course of which not only is the problem restated and
redeveloped in terms of a comprehension of the Being of things
but it is also transcended as a problem. That is, Heidegger goes
beyond the problem of trying to account for objective experi-
XX
ence by means of a comprehension of the Being of things to
the problem of the meaning of Being in general and its relation
to Dasein.
Nor has this movement, this going beyond, ceased with
Sein und Zeit. On the contrary, as the works written after
Sein und Zeit reveal, it is still going on. And if the trend of
the past thirty years is any indication, its ultimate end seems
to be the emergence of Being as such as a kind of Absolute.
Could it be that in going beyond Kant, Heidegger is "repeat-
ing" the history of immediate post-Kantian German philosophy
and is illustrating within his own thought that the fundamental
hypothesis of ideaUsm leads straight to the HegeUan Absolute?
J. s. c.
XXI

FROM THE AUTHOR'S PREFACE TO THE
FIRST EDITION
In its essentials, the following interpretation was first pre-

sented in a four-hour course held during the winter semester of
1925-26. It was later repeated in lectures and series of lectures
(at the Herder Institute in Riga in September, 1928, and in

connection with the university courses held at Davos in March,
1929).
This interpretation of the Critique of Pure Reason arose in
the course of the elaboration of the second part of Sein und Zeit.
This work is dedicated to the memory of Max Scheler. Its
content was the subject of the last conversation in which the
author was privileged once more to experience the unfettered
power of his mind.
Todtnauberg im bad. Schwarzwald, Whitsunday, 1929
xxiu

AUTHOR'S PREFACE TO THE
SECOND EDITION
This work, the first edition of which was published twenty
years ago and immediately sold out, appears here unaltered.
It is preserved in that form in which in a multitude of ways it
has been effective and ineffective.
My critics have constantly reproached me for the violence
of my interpretations, and the grounds for this reproach can

easUy be found in this work. From the point of view of an
mquiry which is both historical and philosophical, this reproach
is always justified when directed against attempts to set in motion
a thoughtful dialogue between thinkers. In contrast to the
methods of historical philology, which has its own problems,
a dialogue between thinkers is bound by other laws. These
laws are more easily violated; the possibility of going astray is
more threatening, the shortcomings more frequent.

The extent to which I have gone astray in the present endeavor
and the shortcomings thereof have become so clear to me in
the period of time since its first pubhcation that I refrain from
making it a patchwork through the addition of supplements and
postscripts.
Through their shortcomings, thinkers learn to be more

persevering.
Freiburg im Breisgau, June, 1950
XXV

INTRODUCTION
THE THEME AND ORGANIZATION OF
THE INQUIRY

INTRODUCTION
THE THEME AND ORGANIZATION OF
THE INQUIRY
The task of the following mvestigation is to explicate Kant's

Critique of Pure Reason as a laying of the foundation [Grund-
legung] ^ of metaphysics in order thus to present the problem of
metaphysics as the problem of a fundamental ontology.
By fundamental ontology is meant that ontological analytic
1. The English term "ground" with its rich and varied meaning
is generally equivalent to the German Grund except in one particu-
lar. It is not commonly used to denote a foundation in the sense
of a foundation of a building. In Heidegger's usage, at least, the
German Grund does include this sense. Furthermore, it is just this
sense ("foundation" in the sense of the foundation of a building)
which Heidegger suggests (page 4) in his use of the expression
Grundlegung, "laying of the foundation." Therefore, I use the term
"foundation" as an equivalent for Grund in the expression Grund-
legung and otherwise "ground," "principle," or "basis," depending
on the context. For example, on page 5 I have rendered So ist die
Grundlegung ah Entwurf der inneren Moglichkeit der Metaphysik
notwendig ein Wirksamwerdenlassen der Trdgerschaft des gelegten
Grundes as "Thus, the laying of the foundation as the projection of
the intrinsic possibility of metaphysics is necessarily a letting be-
come effective of the supporting power of the established ground."
(J. S. C.)

of man's finite essence which should prepare the foundation for
the metaphysics "which belongs to human nature." Funda-
mental ontology is that metaphysics of human Dasein neces-
sary if metaphysics in general is to be possible. Fundamental
ontology is basically different from all anthropology, even
philosophical anthropology. To analyze the idea of fundamental
ontology means: To set forth the ontological analytic of Dasein
as a prerequisite and to make clear to what purpose and in
what manner, on what basis and under what presuppositions it

puts the concrete question: "What is man?" But if an idea
manifests itself chiefly through its own power to tUuminate,
the idea of fundamental ontology must exhibit and affirm itself
in an explication of the Critique of Pure Reason as a laying

of the foundation of metaphysics.
To this end, it is necessary first to clarify the meaning of
the expression "to lay the foundation of , .
." Its meaning
is best Ulustrated within the field of architecture. To be sure,
metaphysics is not an actual edifice, yet it is present as a "natural

disposition" in all men.^ Accordingly, laying the foundation of
metaphysics can mean either putting a foundation under this
natural metaphysics or replacing one already laid by a new

one. However, it is precisely the idea that it is a matter of
providing a foundation for an edifice already constructed that
must be avoided. Laying the foundation, rather, is the projec-
tion [Entwerfen] of the building plan itself in such a way as to
indicate on what and how the structure wiU be grounded. On
the other hand, laying the foundation of metaphysics is not the
2. Critique of Pure Reason, 2nd ed., p. 21, The first edition (A)
and the second (B) are set over against one another in a masterly
fashion in the text edited by Raymund Schmidt (Meiner's Philo-
sophische Bibliothek, 1926), The following passages will be cited
according to both A and B. (In subsequent citations, the page ref-
erence according to Kemp Smith's translation will be given after
that according to Schmidt.)

mere fabrication of a system and its subdivisions but the trac-
ing of the architectonic limits and design of the intrinsic possi-
bility of metaphysics, i.e., the concrete determination of its
essence. All essential determination is first achieved, however,

in the revelation of the essential ground.
Thus, the laying of the foundation as the projection of
the intrinsic possibility of metaphysics is necessarily a letting
become effective of the supporting power of the estabUshed
ground. If and how this takes place is the criterion of the
basic originahty and depth of a laying of the foundation.
If the following interpretation of the Critique of Pure Reason
succeeds in bringing to light the basic originahty of the origin
of metaphysics, then this basic originality can be essentially
imderstood only if from the outset it is brought into the con-
crete development of the act of origination, that is, if the
laying of the foundation of metaphysics is repeated.
So far as metaphysics belongs to "human nature" and factu-
ally exists with human nature, it is always actualized in some
form or other. Hence, a specific laying of the foundation of
metaphysics never arises out of nothing but out of the strength

and weakness of a tradition which designates in advance its
possible points of departure. With regard to the tradition it
implies, every laying of the foundation when compared with

those which precede it is a transformation of the same problem.
Thus, the following interpretation of the Critique of Pure
Reason as a laying of the foundation of metaphysics must
attempt to clarify these four points
1. The point of departure of the laying of the foundation of
metaphysics.
2. The carrying out of the laying of the foundation of meta-
physics.
3. The laying of the foundation of metaphysics in its basic
originality.
4. The laying of the foundation of metaphysics in a repetition.

SECTION ONE
THE POINT OF DEPARTURE OF THE
LAYING OF THE FOUNDATION OF
METAPHYSICS

THE EXPLICATION OF THE IDEA OF A FUNDAMENTAL ONTOLOGY
THROUGH THE INTERPRETATION OF THE Critique of Pure Reason
AS A LAYING OF THE FOUNDATION OF METAPHYSICS
SECTION ONE
THE POINT OF DEPARTURE OF THE
LAYING OF THE FOUNDATION OF
METAPHYSICS
The exposition of the way in which Kant conceived the point

of departure for the laying of the foundation of metaphysics
is equivalent to answering the question: Why for Kant does
the laying of a foundation of metaphysics take the form of a
Critique of Pure Reason? The answer must be forthcoming
through a discussion of the following three questions: 1. What
concept of metaphysics did Kant inherit? 2. What is the point
of departure for the laying of the foundation of this traditional
metaphysics? 3. Why is this laying of the foundation a Critique
of Pure Reason?
§ 1. The Traditional Concept of Metaphysics
The horizon within which metaphysics appeared to Kant

and within which his laying of the foundation had to begin may
be characterized schematically by means of Baumgarten's defi-
nition: ^Metaphysica est scientia prima cognitionis humanae

principia continens: ^ metaphysics is the science which contains
1. A. G. Baumgarten, Metaphysica, 2nd ed., 1743, § 1.

the first principles of that which is within the comprehension
ofhuman knowledge. In the concept of "the first principles of
human knowledge" lies a peculiar and, to begin with, a neces-
sary ambiguity. Ad metaphysicam referuntur ontologia, cos-
mologia, psychologia, et theologia naturalis.^ The motives and
the history of the development and stabilization of this school-
concept of metaphysics cannot be presented here. However,

a brief indication of what is presented therein should serve to
break up the problematic content of this concept and thus pre-
pare the way for an understanding of the basic significance of
the Kantian point of departure of the laying of the foundation
of metaphysics.^
It is well known that the meaning of the expression meta ta
physika (as the collective name for those treatises of Aristotle

which were classified as following those belonging to the
2. Ibid., § 2.
3. After the precedent set by H. Pilcher's Vber Christian Wolffs
Ontologie, 1910, Kant's relation to traditional metaphysics has been
of late more searchingly and more exhaustively investigated. See
above all, the inquiries by H. Heimsoeth, Die Metaphysischen Mo-
tive in der Ausbildung des Kritischen Idealismus, Kantstudien, vol.
XXIX (1924), p. 121ff.; further, Metaphysik und Kritik bei Chr.
A. Crusius, Ein Beitrag zur ontologischen Vorgeschichte der Kritik
der Reinen Vernunft in 18. Jahrhundert (Schriften der Konigs-
berger Gelehrten Gesellschafft III. Jahr, Geisteswiss. Kl. Hft. 3,
1926). In addition, the longer work by M. Wundt, Kant als Meta-
physiker. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der deutschen Philosophie in
achtzehnten Jahrhundert, 1924. R. Kroner provides an account of
the Kantian philosophy in the light of the history of metaphysics
after Kant in Von Kant bis Hegel, two volumes, 1921 and 1924.
For the history of metaphysics in German idealism see also Nic.
Hartmann, Die Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus, part I, 1923,
part II, 1929. A critical evaluation of these works is not possible
here. One thing should be noted, however; each of them from the
beginning clings to the interpretation of the Critique of Pure Rea-
son as "theory of knowledge" and treats of metaphysics and "meta-
physical themes" only in a subsidiary way.
10

"Physics"), which was at first purely descriptive, later came to
express a philosophical judgment concerning the content of

these works. This change in meaning does not have the harm-
lessness which is attributed to it. Rather, it has forced the in-
terpretation of these treatises in a particular direction and
thereby has determined that what Aristotle discusses therein is
to be understood as "metaphysics." Nevertheless, whether that

which is contained in Aristotie's Metaphysics is "metaphysics"
must be doubted. However, Kant himself stDl attempts directly
to attribute a real meaning to the expression: "With reference
to that to which the name 'metaphysics' refers, it is unbelievable
that it arose by chance since it corresponds so exactly to the
content of the science: since physis means nature, and since
we can arrive at the concept of nature only through experience,
that science which follows it is called metaphysics (from meta
[trans], and physica). It is a science which, being outside the
^
domain of physics, as it were, lies beyond it,"
The classificatory expression which occasioned this particular
interpretation of Aristotle's writings itself arose from a difficulty
concerning the comprehension of the treatises thus classified in

the corpus aristotelicum. In the philosophy of the schools (logic,
physics, ethics) which followed Aristotle, no discipline or
framework could be found into which could be fitted what
Aristotle pursued as prote philosophia, true philosophy, philos-
ophy of the first rank; meta te physika is thus the title of a basic
philosophical difficulty.
This difficulty has its origin in the obscurity which envelops
the essentials of the problems and ideas discussed in the trea-
tises. Insofar as Aristotle expresses himself on the subject, it is
4. M. Heinze, Vorlesungen Kants iiber Metaphysik aus drei Se-

mestern, Abhdlg. der K. Sdchsisch. Ges. der Wissenschaften. Bd.
XIV, phil.-hist. Kl. 1894, p. 666 {Sep. S. 186). Cf. also: Kant,
Vber die Fortschritte der Metapiiysik seit Leibniz und Wolff, Works
(Cassirer) VIII, p. 301ff.
11
evident that there is a curious ambiguity in the definition of
"first philosophy." It is knowledge of the essent [des Seienden]
qua essent (on e on) as well as knowledge of the highest sphere
of essents {timiotaton genos) through which the essent in to-
tality is defined.
This dual characterization of prote philosophia does not con-

taintwo radically different trains of thought nor should one be
weakened or rejected outright in favor of the other. Further-
more, we should not be over-hasty in reconciling this apparent
duality. Rather, through an analysis of the problem of "first
philosophy" we must throw light upon the reason behind this

duahty and the manner in which both determinations are con-
nected. The task is all the more pressing in that the ambiguity
mentioned did not first make its appearance with Aristotle but
has dominated the problem of Being since the first beginnings
of ancient philosophy.
In order to keep this problem of the essential determination
of "metaphysics" in view, it can be said by way of anticipation
that metaphysics is the fundamental knowledge of the essent as
such and in totality. This "definition" is only to be considered,
however, as an indication of the real problem, the question:
Wherein lies the essence of the knowledge of the Being of es-
sents? Inwhat respect does this knowledge necessarily lead to
a knowledge of the essent in totahty? Why does this knowledge
in turn lead to a knowledge of the knowledge of Being [Sein-
serkenntnis]'} Thus, "metaphysics" remains the tide of a funda-
mental philosophical difficulty.
Post-Aristotelian metaphysics owes its development not to

the adoption and elaboration of an allegedly pre-existent Aris-
totelian system but to the failure to understand the doubtful and
unsettled state in which Plato and Aristotle left the central
problems. The formation of the school-concept of metaphysics
mentioned above owes its development primarily to two con-
siderations which, at the same time, have proved to be an ever-
12

growing obstacle in the way of taking up the original problem
again.
The one consideration concerns the organization of meta-
physics with respect to its content and arises from the devout
Christian interpretation of the world. According to this, all that
is not divine is created — the totality of creatures defining the
universe. Among created things man has a special place inas-
much as everything is centered on the welfare of his soul and
his own eternal existence. In keeping with the Christian beUef
concerning the world and existence, the essent in totality is di-
vided into God, nature, and man, each of these realms having
a particular discipline devoted to its study. These disciplines are
theology, the object of which is the summum ens, cosmology,
and psychology. Together they form the discipline called meta-
physica specialis. In distinction from this, metaphysica generalis
(ontology) has as its object the essent "in general" (ens com-
mune) .
The other consideration essential to the development of the

school-concept of metaphysics concerns the mode of knowledge
and the methodology involved. Since the object of metaphysics
is both the essent in general and the highest essent, in which
"everyone takes an interest" (Kant), it is a science of the
highest dignity, the "queen of the sciences." Consequently, its
mode of knowledge must be perfectly rigorous and absolutely

binding. This requires that it conform to a corresponding cogni-
tive ideal, "mathematical" knowledge. Because it is free from
the contingencies of experience, mathematical knowledge is in
the strictest sense rational and a priori, i.e., it is a pure, rational
science. Thus, the knowledge both of the essent in totality
(metaphysica generalis) and of its principal divisions (meta-
physica specialis) becomes "a science established by mere
reason,"
Kant remained faithful to the purpose of this metaphysics;
indeed, he strengthened it and shifted its center of gravity to-
13
ward metaphysica specialis. This last he termed "true meta-
physics," "metaphysics in its final purpose." ^ In view of the
constant "failure" which has attended all undertakings in this
science, their incoherence and their ineffectualness, all further
attempts to extend the knowledge of pure reason must be held

in abeyance until the question of the intrinsic possibility of this
science is settled. Thus, the task arises of the laying of a founda-

tion of metaphysics in the sense of the determination of its
essence. How did Kant set about this essential delimitation of

metaphysics?
§ 2. The Point of Departure for the Laying of the

Foundation of Traditional Metaphysics
In metaphysics as the pure, rational knowledge of the essent

"in general" and of the totality of its principal divisions there
is accomplished a "passing beyond" that which experience can

supply partially and in particular. In passing beyond the sensi-
ble, this mode of knowledge seeks to comprehend the super-
method [however, has]
sensible. "Its hitherto been merely a
random groping, and, what is worst of all, a groping among
mere concepts." ^ Metaphysics lacks a binding proof of its al-
leged insights. What gives metaphysics the intrinsic possibility

of being what it claims to be?
A laying of the foundation of metaphysics in the sense of a
delimitation of its intrinsic possibility must, above all, keep the
final purpose of metaphysics in view, i.e., the determination of
the essence of metaphysica specialis. It is metaphysica specialis
which in a pre-eminent sense is knowledge of the supersensible
essent. This question of the intrinsic possibility of such knowl-
edge, however, is thrown back upon the more general question
5. Vber die Fortschritte . . .

, p. 238.
6. BXV,NKS,p. 21.
14

of the intrinsic possibility of the manifestation [Offenbarma-
chen] of the essent as such. The laying of the foundation is now
the elucidation of a comportment [Verhalten] with regard to
the essent, a comportment in which the essent reveals itself in
itself [sich dieses an ihm selbst zeigt] so that all statements rela-
tive to it become verifiable.
But what does the possibUity of such comportment entail?

Is there a "clue" as to what makes it possible? Yes, the method
of the scientist: "a light broke upon aU students of nature. They
learned that reason has insight only into that which it produces
after a plan of its own, and that it must not allow itself to be
kept, as it were, in nature's leading-strings, but must itself show
the way with principles of judgment based upon fixed laws, con-
straining nature to give answer to questions of reason's own
determining." ^ The "previously projected" plan of nature in
general determines in advance the constitution of the Being
[Seinsverfassung] of the essent to which it must be possible to
relate all modes of questioning. This precursory [vorgdngige]
projection relative to the Being of the essent is inscribed in the
basic concepts and axioms of the natural sciences. Hence, what
makes the relation to the essent (ontic knowledge) possible is
the precursory comprehension of the constitution of the Being

of the essent, namely, ontological knowledge.^
The mathematical natural sciences provide a clue to the es-
sential connection of the conditions which hold between ontic
and ontological knowledge and in this exhaust their function
in the laying of the foundation of metaphysics. For this refer-
ence to the connection of the conditions is not yet a solution of
7. B Xlllf., NKS, p. 20.

8. The between the ontic (the empirical) and the
distinction
ontological is a fundamental one for Heidegger. For a discussion of
the validity of this distinction see: Karl Lowith, Phenomenologische
Ontologie und protestantische Theologie, Zeitschrift fiir Theologie
undKirche, N.F. 11, 1930, p. 365ff. (J. S. C.)
15
the problem but only an indication of the direction in which the
problem, understood in its fundamental generality, must first be
sought. Whether it can be found only in this dhection, or
whether it can be found at all, i.e., whether the idea of meta-
physica specialis can be developed in accordance with the con-
cept of positive (scientific) knowledge — this is still to be de-
cided.
The projection of the intrinsic possibility of metaphysica
specialis has been led back beyond the question of the possi-
bility of ontic knowledge to the question of that which makes
this ontic knowledge possible. But this is precisely the problem
of the essence of the precursory comprehension of Bemg, i.e.,
ontological knowledge in the broadest sense. The problem of
the intrinsic possibihty of ontology includes, moreover, the
question of the possibihty of metaphysica generalis. The at-
tempt to provide a foundation for metaphysics is thus centered

in the question of the essence of metaphysica generalis.
With such an approach to the laying of the foundation of
metaphysics Kant is led immediately into a discussion with
Aristotle and Plato. Now for the fijst tune, ontology becomes a
problem. Thereby the structure of traditional metaphysics un-
dergoes its first and most profound shock. The vagueness and
the obviousness with which metaphysica generalis hitherto
treated of the "generality" of the ens commune disappears. The
problem of the laying of the foundation of metaphysics for the
first time demands a certain clarity with regard to the mode of
generalization and the character of the passing beyond [Vber-
schritt] proper to the knowledge of the constitution of the Being
[of the essent]. Whether Kant himself ever became perfectly
clear with respect to this problem remains a subordmate ques-
tion. It is enough that he recognized the urgency of the problem
and, above all, that he presented it. It is clear, moreover, that

the primary objective of ontology is not a laying of the founda-
tion of the positive sciences. Its necessity and its role are based
16

on a "higher interest" with which human reason is always con-
cerned. However, because metaphysica generalis provides the
necessary "preparation" ^ for metaphysica specialis, laying the
foundation of the former necessarily transforms the essential
determination of the latter.
To lay the foundation of metaphysics in totality is to reveal
the internal possibility of ontology. Such is the true, i.e., the
metaphysical (having metaphysics as its only theme), sense of

that which, under the heading of Kant's "Copernican revolu-
tion," has been constantly misinterpreted. "Hitherto it has been
assumed that all our knowledge must conform to objects. But
aU attempts to extend our knowledge of objects by establishing
something in regard to them a priori, by means of concepts,
have, on this assumption, ended in faUure. We must, therefore,
make trial whether we may not have more success in the tasks
of metaphysics if we suppose that objects must conform to our
knowledge. This would agree better with what is desired,
namely, that it should be possible to have knowledge of objects
a priori, determining something in regard to them prior to their

'^^
being given."
By this Kant means: not "all knowledge" is ontic, and where
such knowledge is given, it is possible only through ontological
knowledge. The "old" concept of truth as the "adequateness"
(adaequatio) of knowledge to the essent is so little shaken by
the Copernican revolution that the latter presupposes the
former, indeed, confirms it for the first time. Ontic knowledge
can be adequate to the essent (to "objects") only if the essent
is already manifest beforehand as essent, that is, if the con-
stitution of its Being is known. It is to this last knowledge that
objects, i.e., their ontic determinabihty, must conform. The
manifestation of the essent (ontic truth) depends upon the reve-
lation of the constitution of the Being of the essent (ontologi-
9. Vber die Fortschritte . . . , p. 302.

10. B XVI, NKS, p. 22.
17
cal truth)." However, ontic knowledge by itself can never con-
form "to" objects, because without ontological knowledge it
cannot have even a possible "to what" [Wonach] of the con-

formation.
It has thus become clear that the laying of the foundation of
traditional metaphysics begins with the question of the internal
possibility of ontology as such. But why does this laying of the
foundation become a Critique of Pure Reason?
§ 3. The Laying of the Foundation of Metaphysics

as a Critique of Pure Reason
Kant reduces the problem of the possibility of ontology to
the question: "How are a priori synthetic judgments possible?"

The analysis of this formulation of the problem is carried out as
a critique of pure reason. The question of the possibility of
ontological knowledge requires a provisional characterization
of that knowledge. In this formulation of the problem, Kant,
following tradition, understands knowledge to be an act of judg-
ment. But what kind of knowledge is found in ontological com-
prehension? Through it something is known, and what is thus
known belongs to the essent no matter how it may be experi-
enced and determined. This known what-ness \Wassein] of the
essent is brought forth a priori in ontological knowledge before
all ontic knowledge, although precisely in order to serve the
latter. Knowledge that brings forth the quiddity [Wasgehalt] of
the essent, in other words, knowledge which reveals the essent
itself, Kant calls synthetic. Thus, the question of the possi-
bility of ontological knowledge turns out to be the problem of
the essence of synthetic judgments a priori.
The instance capable of estabUshing the legitimacy of these
For a more complete discussion of Heidegger's concept of

11.
truth, see Seinand Zeit, p. 212ff., and "On the Essence of Truth,"
in Existence and Being, p. 32 Iff. (J. S. C.)
18

material judgments concerning the Being of the essent cannot
be found in experience, for experience of the essent is itself al-
ways guided by the ontological comprehension of the essent,
which last becomes accessible through experience according to

a determinate perspective. Ontological knowledge, then, is judg-
ment according to principles which must be brought forth with-
out recourse to experience.
Kant terms our faculty of knowledge according to a priori
principles "pure reason." ^^ "Pure reason is that faculty which

^^
suppUes the principles of knowing anything entirely a priori."
If the principles supplied by reason constitute the possibility of
a priori knowledge, then the revelation of the possibility of
ontological knowledge must become an elucidation of the es-
sence of pure reason. The delimitation of the essence of pure

reason, however, is at the same time the differentiating de-
termination of its dis-essence [Unwesen] and, hence, the limit-

ing and restricting (critique) of pure reason to its essential
possibilities. Thus, the laying of the foundation of metaphysics

as the revelation of the essence of ontology is a Critique of
Pure Reason.
It is ontological knowledge, i.e., the a priori synthesis, "for
^*
the sake of which alone our whole critique is undertaken."
Now that the problem which guides this estabUshment of meta-
physics has been fixed, it is all the more imperative that this
synthesis be more precisely defined. Not only does this expres-
sion, as Kant employs it, have many meanings,^^ these meanings
are intermingled even in the formulation of the problem of the
laying of the foundation of metaphysics itself. The question is
concerned with the possibility of synthetic judgments a priori.
12. Critique of Judgment, Preface to the 1st ed., trans. J. H. Ber-

nard (London, 1931), p. 1.
13. All,B24,NKS,p. 58.
14. A 14, B 28, NKS, p. 60.
15. Cf. below, § 7, p. 42.
19
Now every judgment is, as such, an "I connect," namely, sub-
ject and predicate. Qua judgment, even analytic judgments are
synthetic, although the basis of the connection of agreement
between subject and predicate lies simply in the representation
which, forms the subject. Synthetic judgments, then, are "syn-
thetic" in a double sense: first, as judgments as such, and,
second, so far as the legitimacy of the "connection" (synthesis)
of the representations is "brought forth" (synthesis) from the
essent itself with which the judgment is concerned.
But in the problem of synthetic judgments a priori still an-
other type of synthesis is concerned which must bring some-
thing forth about the essent not first derived from it through
experience. This bringing forth of the determination of the Be-
ing of the essent is a precursory act of reference to the essent.
This pure "reference-to . .
." (synthesis) first constitutes the
direction and the horizon within which the essent is first capable
of being experienced in the empirical synthesis. The possibility
of this a priori synthesis must now be clarified. An investiga-
tion concerned with the essence of this synthesis Kant terms
"transcendental." "I entitle transcendental all knowledge which
is occupied not so much with objects as with the mode of our
knowledge of objects insofar as this mode of knowledge is to be
possible a priori.'' ^^ Thus, transcendental knowledge does not
investigate the essent itself but the possibility of the precursory
comprehension of the Being of the essent. It concerns reason's
passing beyond (transcendence) to the essent so that experi-
ence can be rendered adequate to the latter as its possible ob-
ject.
To make the possibility of ontology a problem means: to

inquire into the possibility, i.e., into the essence, of this tran-
scendence which characterizes the comprehension of Being; in
other words, it means to philosophize transcendentally. This is
16. Allf., B25,NKS,p. 59.
20

why when Kant wishes to characterize the problematic of tradi-
tional ontology, he makes use of the expression "transcendental

philosophy" ^^ to denote the subject matter of metaphysica
generalis {ontologia). This is also why, in mentioning this tradi-
tional ontology, he speaks of the "transcendental philosophy of

^®
the ancients."
However, the Critique of Pure Reason does not provide a
"system" of transcendental philosophy but is a "treatise on the
method" ^^ thereof. This expression does not signify a doctrine

relative to the procedural technique involved; on the contrary,
it indicates a complete determination of the "whole plan" and
of the "internal organization" of ontology. This laying of the
foundation of metaphysics, understood as the projection of the
intrinsic possibility of ontology, traces the "complete outUne of
^"
a system of metaphysics."
The purpose of the Critique of Pure Reason is completely
misunderstood, therefore, if this work is interpreted as a "theory
of experience" or perhaps as a theory of the positive sciences.
The Critique of Pure Reason has nothing to do with a "theory
of knowledge." However, if one could admit the interpretation
of the work as a theory of knowledge, it would be necessary to
say that the Critique is not a theory of ontic knowledge but of

ontological. But even this interpretation, although far removed
from the usual interpretation of the aesthetic and transcendental
analytic, does not touch upon what is essential in the Critique,
that therein ontology as metaphysica generalis, i.e., as the es-

sential part of metaphysics as a whole, is provided with a foun-
dation and, for the what it is in itself.
first time, revealed for
With the problem of transcendence, Kant does not replace
17. A 845, B 873f.; A 247, B 303; NKS, pp. 662, 264. Cf. also
Vber die Fortschritte, pp. 238, 263, 269, 301.
18. B 113, NKS, p. 118.
19. B XXII, NKS, p. 25.
20. B XXIII, NKS, p. 15.
21

metaphysics by a theory of knowledge but brings into question
the intrinsic possibility of ontology.
If truth pertains to the essence of knowledge, the transcen-
dental problem of the intrinsic possibility of a priori synthetic
knowledge becomes the question of the essence of the truth of
ontological transcendence. It is a question of determining the
essence of "transcendental truth which precedes aU empirical
truth and makes it possible." ^^ "For no knowledge can contra-
dict it without at once losing all content, that is, all relation to
any object, and therefore all truth." ^^ Ontic truth, then, must
necessarily conform to ontological truth. This is the correct
interpretation of the meaning of the "Copemican revolution."
By this revolution, Kant thrusts the problem of ontology to the
fore. Nothing can be presupposed in dealing with the problem
of the possibility of primordial ontological truth, least of aU the
"fact" of the truth of the positive sciences. On the contrary,
without appealing to such extraneous facts, the laying of the
foundation must trace the a priori synthesis back to its original

sources which permit that synthesis to be what it is (makes it
possible in its essence;.

From his clear insight into the originaUty of a laying of the
foundation of metaphysics, Kant states of the Critique of Pure

Reason: "The task is difficult and demands a reader resolved
to think hunself gradually into a system which is grounded in
nothing regarded as given except pure reason itself, and thus
tries to develop knowledge out of its original seeds without
seeking the support of any fact." ^^
Thus, the task arises of showing how this development of the

possibility of ontology from its sources is carried out.
21. A 146, B 185, NKS, p. 186.

22. A 62f., B 87, NKS, p. 100.
23. Prolegomena: "To any future Metaphysics that will be able
to present itself as a science," trans. Peter G. Lucas (Oxford, 1949),
p. 29.
22

SECTION TWO
THE CARRYING OUT OF THE LAYING OF
THE FOUNDATION OF METAPHYSICS

SECTION TWO
THE CARRYING OUT OF THE LAYING OF
THE FOUNDATION OF METAPHYSICS
In order to project the intrinsic possibility of ontological

knowledge we must first have an insight into the dimension in
which takes place the regression to the ground supporting the

possibility of that which, in its essential constitution, we are
seeking. Now, it is necessarily the fate of every real incursion
into an hitherto unknown field that the dimensions of this field
are only determined "little by little." It is in the course of such

an advance itself that the direction of approach is first estab-
lished and the way made feasible. If this first incursion is
guided by the creative power that reveals the proper direction

with an indefectible certitude, it is not less true that the field
itself is at first neither clearly marked out nor free from ob-
struction. Indeed, every "critique requires knowledge of the
sources, and reason must know itself." ^ And yet, it is only by
the Critique that pure reason acquires with Kant this first
knowledge of itself.
1. Kant's Posthumous Works in Manuscript Form, vol. V, Meta-

physics {Works, ed. by the Preuss. Akad d. Wissenschaften, III,
51), 1928, No. 4892. Cf. B. Erdmann, Reflexionen Kants zur

kritischen Philosophic, II, 217.
25
Because the subsequent interpretation has not yet regained
the original power which projects the direction to be followed,
it must make specifically sure in advance of the guiding insight
and thus anticipate the principal stages of the internal move-
ment of the whole of the laying of the foundation. Before the
laying of the foundation of metaphysics can be carried out
again, an insight into the dimension in which the regressive move-
ment of this laying of the foundation takes place must be secured.
This section, then, is divided as follows
A. The Characterization of the Dimension in Which the Re-

gression Necessary for the Development of the Laying of the
Foundation of Metaphysics is Carried Out.
B. The Stages of the Carrying Out of the Projection of the

Intrinsic Possibility of Ontology.
A. The Characterization of the Dimension in

Which the Regression Necessary for the
Development of the Laying of the
Foundation of Metaphysics
Is Carried Out
The objective is the determination of the essence of ontologi-

cal knowledge through the elucidation of its origin in the
sources which make it possible. This requires, above all, clarity
concerning the essence of knowledge in general and the locus

and nature of its field of origin. In previous interpretations of
the Critique of Pure Reason, the preliminary characterization of
the dimension of origin of this work has either been unduly
neglected or misinterpreted. This is why the efforts, uncertain
to begin with, which have had as their object the determination
of the purpose of this work have been unable to assimilate
26
productively its fundamental tendency. Together with the char-
acterization of the field of origin of the Critique, the particular
way in which the origin is revealed must also be described.
/. The Essential Attributes of the Field
of Origin
§ 4. The Essence of Knowledge in General
Kant does not discuss the essential attributes of the field
of origin thematically; rather, he takes them for granted in
the sense of "self-evident presuppositions." This is all the
more reason why the interpretation should not overlook the

predeterminative function of these "assumptions." They may
be summarized in the following thesis:
The fundamental source of the laying of the foundation

of metaphysics is human pure reason, so that the human char-
acter of reason, i.e., its finitude, becomes essential for the
problematic of the laying of the foundation. It is advisable,
therefore, that in characterizing the field of origin we concen-
trate on the clarification of the essence of the finitude of human
knowledge.
However, the finitude of human reason by no means con-
sists merely and primarily in the fact that human knowledge
exhibits many shortcomings: that it is unstable, inexact, hable
to error, and so on. This finitude, rather, lies in the essential
structure of knowledge itself. The factual limitation of reason

is a consequence of its essence.
In order to disclose the essence of the finitude of knowledge,
a general characterization of the essence of cognition is re-
quired. In this connection, what Kant states in the first sentence
of the thematic discussion of the Critique of Pure Reason is
27
usually regarded all too lightly. "In whatever manner and
by whatever means a mode of knowledge may relate to objects,
intuition is that through which it is in immediate relation to

^
them and from which all thought gains its material."
In order to gain an understanding of the Critique of Pure
Reason, the following must, as it were, be hammered in: Cog-
nition is primarily intuition. From this it is at once clear that
to interpret knowledge as judgment (thought) does violence
to the decisive sense of the Kantian problem. Thinking is
simply in the service of intuition. It is not something which

exists merely beside and in "addition to" intuition, but by its
intrinsic structure serves that to which intuition is primarily

and constantly directed. If thinking is so essentially relative to
intuition, then both intuition and thinking must have a certain
affinity which permits their unification. This affinity, this descent
from the same genus, finds expression in this: that both may
be termed "representation . . , (repraesentatio) ." ^
Representation here has at first the broad, formal sense,

according to which something indicates, announces, gives no-
tice of, or presents something else. This act of representation
can be such that it takes place "with consciousness." * It is
characterized by an awareness that something announces itself
and is announced (perceptio) Now, . if in the act of representing
something by something else, not only this act but also that
which is represented in it is represented as such, i.e., "con-
sciously," then such an act of representation refers to that
which is presented in that act as such. Thus understood as
"objective perception," knowledge is an act of representation.
Knowledge as representation is either intuition or concept
{intuitus vel conceptus). "The former relates immediately
to an object and is single, the latter refers to it mediately by
2. A 19, B 33, NKS, p. 65.

3. A320, B376f., NKS,p. 314.
4. Ibid.
28

^
means of a feature which several things may have in common."
According to the first sentence of the Critique of Pure Reason,
quoted above, knowledge is a thinking intuition. Thought,
i.e., the act of "representation in general," serves only to render
the singular object, i.e., the concrete essent itself, accessible
in its immediacy and for everyone. "Each of these two (intuition
^
and thought) is certainly representation but not yet knowledge."
One could conclude from this that there is a reciprocal and
perfectly symmetrical relation between intuition and thought
so that he could also say with equal right: Knowledge is
intuitive thinking and therefore basically, and in spite of every-
thing, an act of judgment.

In opposition to this, however, it must be maintained that
intuition defines the true essence of knowledge, and that, de-
spite the reciprocity of the relation between intuition and

thought, it is in the first that the true center of gravity is to
be found. This stands out clearly, not only because of Kant's
statement, quoted above, with its underscoring of the word
"intuition," but also because only through this interpretation
is it possible to grasp what is essential in this definition, namely,

the finitude of knowledge. This first sentence of the Critique of
Pure Reason is, indeed, no longer a definition of cognition in
general but the real definition of human knowledge. "On the
other hand, in that which concerns man (in contrast to 'God
or any other higher spirit') all knowledge consists of concept
^
and intuition."
The essence of finite human knowledge is elucidated by

contrasting it with the idea of infinite, divine knowledge, i.e.,
"intuitus originarius." ^ Divine knowledge as knowledge, not

as divine, is also intuition. The difference between infinite and
5. Ibid.
6. Vber die Fortschritte, p. 312.
7. Bid.
8. B 72, NKS, p. 90.
29

finite intuition consists only in this, that the former in its
immediate representation of the individual, that is, the singular

and unique essent taken as a whole, first brings it into being,
that is, effects its coming forth (origo). Absolute intuition
would not be absolute if dependent on an essent already on

hand in adaption to which the object of intuition first became
accessible. Divine cognition is that mode of representation
which in the act of intuition first creates the object of intuition
as such.^ Seeing right through the essent in advance, such cog-

nition intuits it immediately and has no need of thought.
Thought as such, then, is in itself the seal of finitude. Divine
cognition is "intuition, for aU its knowledge must be intuitive,

^®
and not thought, which always involves limitations."
But the decisive element in the difference between finite and
infinite knowledge would not be understood and the essence
of finitude overlooked if one were to say: Divine cognition is
intuition alone, while human cognition, on the other hand, is
a thinking intuition. The essential difference between these

two types of knowledge lies primarily in intuition itself, because,
strictly speaking, cognition is intuition. The finitude of human
knowledge must first of all be sought in the finitude of the
intuition proper to it. That a finite being must "also" think in

order to possess knowledge is an essential consequence of the
finitude of its intuition. Only in this way can the essentially
subordinate role of "all thinking" be seen in its true fight.
Wherein, then, lies the essence of finite intuition and therefore
the finitude of human knowledge in general?
§ 5, The Essence of the Finitude of Knowledge
To begin with, we can say negatively that finite knowledge

is non-creative intuition. What is presented immediately and
in its particularity must be already on hand. Finite intuition
9. B 139, 145, NKS, pp. 157, 161.

10. B 71, NKS, p. 90.
30
looks to the intuitable as something on which it is dependent
and which exists in its own right. That which is intuited pro-
ceeds [herleiten] from such an essent and for that reason is
^^ Finite intuition
also termed intuitus derivatus, "derivative."
of the essent is not able by itself to give itself an object. It
must let this object be given. But not every intuition as such
is receptive —only the finite is so. Hence, the finitude of intuition

Hes in its receptivity. Finite intuition cannot receive anything,
however, unless the latter announces itself [sich melden], that
is, the essence of finite intuition is such that it must be solicited
[angegangen] or affected by a possible object.

Because the essence of knowledge lies primarily in intuition
and because the finite essence of man is a central theme of
the whole laying of the foundation of metaphysics, Kant pro-
ceeds immediately to enlarge upon the first sentence of the
Critique: "But intuition takes place only insofar as the object
is given to us. This again is only possible, to man at least, inso-
far as the mind is affected in a certain way." ^^ The phrase

"to man at least" was first inserted in the second edition. It
only makes clearer that in the first edition finite knowledge
is the theme from the beginning.
If human intuition as finite is receptive and if the possibility
of its receiving something "given" presupposes affection, then
organs capable of being affected — the organs of "sense" — are
necessary. Human intuition, therefore, is not "sensible" because
its affection takes place through "sense" organs. Rather, the
converse is true: it is because our Dasein is finite — existing in
the midst of the essent which already is and to which our

Dasein is abandoned — ^that it must of necessity receive the
essent, that is, offer it the possibility of giving notice of itself.
These organs are necessary in order that the notification be

able to get through. The essence of sensibihty lies in the
finitude of intuition. The organs which serve affection are sense
11. B 72, NKS, p. 90.

12. A 19, B 33, NKS, p. 65.
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organs, therefore, because they belong to finite intuition, i.e.,
to sensibility. Thus, Kant was the first to arrive at an ontological,

non-sensuous concept of sensibility. Consequently, if empirical,
affective intuition of the essent does not necessarily coincide
with "sensibility," then it follows that the possibility of a non-
empirical sensibility remains essentially open.^^
Knowledge is primarily intuition, i.e., an act of representa-
tion that immediately represents the essent itself. Now, if finite
intuition is to be knowledge, it must be able to make the
essent itself, insofar as it is manifest, accessible with respect
to how and what it is to everyone and at any time. Finite beings
capable of intuition must be able to agree in the actual intu-
But finite intuition as intuition is, at bottom,
ition of the essent.
always bound to the particular which is being intuited at any

given moment. However, that which is intuited becomes an
object of knowledge only if everyone can make it intelligible
to himself and to others and in that way communicate it. So,

for example, this intuited particular, this piece of chalk, must
admit of being determined as chalk or as a body in order that
we may be able jointly to know this essent itself as the same
for each of us. In order to be knowledge, finite intuition always
requires such a determination of the intuited as this or that.
In such determination, that which is represented by intuition
is further represented with reference to what it is "in general."
However, this determination does not represent the general
as such thematicaUy; for example, it does not take the corpo-
reahty of a thing as an object. To be sure, the determinative
representation of the thing intuitively represented orients itself
toward the general, but it does this only that it may turn to
the particular thing and determine it with respect to this orien-
13. "Sensible intuition is and time)

either pure intuition (space
or empirical intuition of that which immediately represented, is
through sensation, as actual in space and time" (B 147, NKS, p.

162).
32

tation. This "general" representation, which as such serves
intuition, makes that which is represented more representative
[vorstelligei] in that it comprehends the many under the one
and, on the basis of this com-prehension, "applies to many."
Hence, Kant names this act of representation "representation
by concepts" {repraesentatio per notas communes) The deter- .
minative act of representation appears, then, as "the repre-

sentation (concept) of a representation (intuition)." In addi-
tion, this act is in itself an assertion of something about
something (predication). "Judgment is, therefore, the mediate
knowledge of an object, that is, the representation of a repre-
sentation of it." ^^ The "faculty of judging" is the understanding,
and the act of representation proper to it makes intuition
"capable of being understood."

If the judicative act of determination is essentially directed
toward \angewiesen auf] intuition, thinking is always united

with intuition in order to serve it. Through such a union
(synthesis), thought refers mediately to the object which in
the unity of a thinking intuition becomes manifest (true). In
this way, the synthesis of thought and intuition effects the
manifestation qua object of the essent encountered. Therefore,
we call it the true- (manifest-) making (veritative) synthesis.
It coincides with what has been described above as that which
"brings forth" the determinateness, with regard to content, of
the essent itself.
But thought which is united with intuition in the veritative

synthesis is, as an act of judgment, a unification (synthesis)
in another sense. Kant states: "A judgment is the represen-
tation of the unity of the consciousness of different represen-
tations, or the representation of the relation between them as
far as they form a concept." ^^ A judgment is a "function of
14. A 68, B 93, NKS, p. 105.

15. Cf. I. Kants Logik. Ein Handbuch zu Vorlesungen, ed. by
G. B. Jasche, Works (Cass.) VIII, § 17, p. 408.
33

unity," i.e., an act of representation of the unifying unity of a
concept in its character as a predicate. This unifying act of
representation we call the predicative synthesis.
The predicative synthesis does not coincide, however, with

that act of unification in which the judgment presents itself
as the connection of subject and predicate. This synthesis we

call the apophantic.
Consequently, in the veritative synthesis which constitutes
the essence of finite knowledge, the predicative synthesis and
the apophantic synthesis are necessarily jomed together in a
structural unity of syntheses.
If one asserts that, according to Kant, the essence of knowl-
edge is "synthesis," this assertion says nothing as long as the
term "synthesis" remains indeterminate and ambiguous.
Finite intuition, since it is in need of determination, is
dependent on the understanding. The understanding, in turn,

is not only involved in the finitude of intuition, it is itself
even more finite inasmuch as it lacks the immediacy of finite
intuition. Its mode of representation is indirect; it requires a

reference to something general by means of which, and accord-
ing to which, the several particulars become capable of being
represented conceptually. This detour (discursiveness), which
is essential to the understanding, is the clearest index of its
finitude.
Just as the metaphysical essence of finite intuition as

receptivity retains the general, essential character of intuition,
in that it is "giving," so also does the finitude of the understand-
ing reveal something of the essence of absolute knowledge,
i.e., of an "originative (creative) intuition." This [originative]
type of intuition spontaneously and by its own act brings forth
the essent capable of being intuited. Now, the understanding
bound as it is to finite intuition — is just as little creative as
this [finite intuition]. It never produces the essent, yet, as
distinguished from the receptivity of the act of intuition, it is in
34

a certain sense productive. To be sure, the act of judgment
relative to the essent does not simply create the general char-
acter by means of which the intuited is conceptually represented.

This general character, insofar as its real content is concerned,
is derived from the object of intuition. Only the way in which

this content as an inclusive unity applies to the many is the
work of the understanding.
In producing [herstellen] the form of a concept, the under-
standing permits the content of the object to be put at our
disposition [beistellen]. The representation [proposition vor-
stellen] proper to the act of thought is revealed by this mode of
"position" [Stellen]. The metaphysical essence of the thus
"productive" understanding is indeed determined in part by
this character of "spontaneity" [von sich aus\, but this deter-
mination does not reaUy get to the root of the matter.
Finite knowledge has been characterized up to now as a
mode of intuition which is receptive and, hence, in need of
thought. This elucidation of the notion of finitude was carried
out with reference to the structure of cognition. Considering
the fundamental importance of the notion of finitude to the
problem of the laying of the foundation of metaphysics, the
essence of finite knowledge must be examined from yet another
side, namely, with reference to what is knowable in such
knowledge.
If finite knowledge is receptive intuition, the knowable must
show itself by itself. What
finite knowledge is able to make
manifest, therefore, must be an essent which shows itself, i.e.,

which appears, an appearance. The term "appearance" refers
to the essent itself as the object of finite knowledge. More
precisely, only for finite knowledge is there such a thing as an
ob-ject [Gegenstand]}^ Only such knowledge is exposed to the
16. The literal meaning of Gegenstand, namely, "that which

stands opposite to" should be compared with that of "object."
(J.S.C.)
35
essent which already is. Infinite knowledge, on the other hana,
cannot be confronted by any such essent to which it must
conform. Such a "conforming-to , .
." would be a "dependence
on . .
." and, consequently, a form of finitude. Infinite cog-
nition is an act of intuition which lets the essent itself come
forth [entstehen lassen]. Absolute cognition itself reveals the
essent in the act of letting it come forth and possesses it "only"
as that which arises from this very act, i.e., as e-ject [Ent-
stand]}'^ Insofar as the essent is manifest to absolute intuition,
it "is" precisely in its coming-into-Being. It is the essent as essent
in itself, i.e., not as object. Strictly speaking, then, we fail to
hit upon the essence of infinite knowledge if we say its "object"

is produced in the very act of intuition.
The essent "as it appears" [i.e., as a phenomenon] is the

same as the essent in itself and only this. Indeed, only insofar
as it is essent can it become an object, although only to finite
knowledge can it be such. It manifests itself thereby in con-
formity with the manner and scope of the receptive and deter-
minative power at the disposal of finite knowledge.
Kant used the expression "appearance" in a narrow and
in a broad sense. Finite knowledge as intuition which is recep-
tive and in need of thought makes the essent itself manifest
in the form of "objects," ^^ i.e., appearances in the broad sense
(phenomena). "Appearance" in the narrow sense refers to
what in the appearance (in the broad sense) is the exclusive
correlate of the affection inherent in finite intuition when this
is stripped of the elements supplied by thought (determination)
17. The meaning of the term Ent-stand is "that which stands

forth," the prefix ent having the meaning "forth," "from," or "out
of." Although the English prefix "e" does not have exactly this
meaning, nevertheless, its meaning is close enough to that of the
German ent to support the analogy ob-ject: e-ject: Gegenstand: —

—
Ent-stand and to convey the sense of Ent-stand intended. (J. S. C.)
18. A 235 (heading), B 249, NKS, p. 259.
36

the content of empirical intuition. "The undetermined object
of an empirical intuition is entitled appearance." ^^ To appear
2°
means to be "an object of empirical intuition."
Appearances are not mere illusions but the essent itself.
And the essent, on its side, is nothing other than the thing
"in itself." The essent can be manifest without being known
"in itself," i.e., qua e-ject. The dual characterization of the
essent as thing in itself and as "appearance" corresponds to
the relation in which it stands to infinite and finite knowledge
respectively, as e-ject and ob-ject.
If it is true that in the Critique of Pure Reason, human

finitude becomes the basis of all the problems relative to the
laying of the foundation of ontology, then the Critique must
lay special emphasis on this distinction between finite and in-
finite knowledge. This is why Kant said of the Critique of Pure

Reason that it teaches "that the object is to be taken in a two-
fold sense, namely as appearance and as thing in itself." ^^ In
the strict sense of the term one should not speak of an "object,"
for to absolute knowledge no object can be given. In the Opus
postumum, Kant states that the thing in itself is not something
other than the appearance: "The distinction between the con-
cept of thing in itself and that of appearance is not objective
but merely subjective. The thing in itself is not another object
but another aspect (respectus) of the representation with regard
to the same object." ^^
From this interpretation of the concepts "appearance" and
"thing in itself," an interpretation based on the distinction
between finite and infinite knowledge, the meaning of the ex-
pressions "behind the appearance" and "mere appearance"
19. A 20, B 34, NKS, p. 65.

20. A 89, B 121, NKS, p. 123.
21. B XXVII, NKS, p. 28.
22. Kant's Opus postumum, presentation and critique by E.
Adickes, p. 653 (italics by the author).
37

must now be clarified. This "behind" cannot mean that in spite
of everything the thing in itself still confronts finite knowledge

but in such a way that it is not apprehended in its entirety
but, ghostlike, is now and then indirectly visible. Rather, the

phrase "behind the appearance" signifies that finite knowledge
as finite necessarily conceals and, indeed, from the first, conceals
in such a way that not only is the thing in itself not completely
accessible to such knowledge, it is not accessible to it at all.
That which is "behind the appearance" is the same essent as

the appearance, but because the appearance gives the essent only
as ob-ject, it is basically impossible for it to let the essent be
seen as e-ject. "According to the Critique, everything that mani-
^^
fests itself in an appearance is itself again appearance."
Thus, it is a misunderstanding of the significance of the
"thing in itself" to beheve that it is necessary to prove through
a positivistic critique that knowledge of it is impossible. Such
attempts at proof suppose the thing in itself to be something
which must be considered as an object within the sphere of
finite knowledge but one whose factual inaccessibility can and
must be demonstrated. Correlatively, in the expression "mere
appearance," the "mere" does not signify a limitation and a
diminution of the reality of the thing but serves only as the
denial of the assumption that in finite knowledge the essent
can be known in a manner appropriate to infinite knowledge.
"In the world of sense, however deeply we enquire into its
2*
objects,we have to do with nothing but appearances."
The essence of the distinction between appearance and thing
in itself is revealed with particular clarity in the two meanings

of the expression "outside us." ^^ Both of these meanings refer
23. I. Kant, Vber eine Entdeckung nach der alle neue Kritik
der reinen Vernunft durch eine dltere entbehrlich gemacht werden
soil, 1790, Works (Cass.) VI, p. 27.
24. A 45, B 62f., NKS, p. 84.
25. A 373, NKS, p. 348.
38

to the essent Qua thing in itself, the essent is
itself. outside us
"ince, being finite, we are excluded from the mode of infinite
intuition pertaining to it. When, on the contrary, the expression
refers to appearances, the essent is outside us because we our-
selves are not this essent but yet have access to it. On the other
hand, an examination of the distinction between finite and in-
finite knowledge in terms of the difference in character of

what is known therein reveals that the concepts "appearance"
and "thing iQ itself," which are fundamental to the Critique,
can be made intelligible and the object of further investigation
only if they are based expUcitiy on the problematic of the

finitude of man. These concepts, however, do not refer to two
levels of objects positioned one behind the other in "one" fixed
and completely undifferentiated [field of] knowledge.
What is essential to the dimension within which the laying
of the foundation of metaphysics takes place is revealed with
this characterization of the finitude of human knowledge. At
the same time, we have obtained a clearer indication of the
direction which the regress to the sources of the intrinsic
possibility of ontology must take.
§ 6. The Field of Origin of the Laying of the

Foundation of Metaphysics
The interpretation of the essence of knowledge in general

and of finite knowledge in particular has revealed that finite
intuition (sensibihty) as such is in need of determination by

the understanding. On its side, the understanding, which is
essentially finite, is dependent on intuition, for: "we can under-

stand only that which brings with it, in intuition, something
corresponding to our words." ^^ When Kant states, however,
^'^
that "Neither of these qualities is preferable to the other,"
26. A 277, B 333, NKS, p. 286.

27. A 51, B 75, NKS, p. 93.
39
he seems to be contradicting his previous assertions to the
effect that the basic character of cognition is to be found in
intuition. If thought is based structurally on intuition as the

primary act of representation, then the fact that sensibility
and understanding necessarily belong together does not preclude

but rather implies the existence of an order of precedence.
If one wishes to follow the intrinsic development of the Kantian
problematic, this order of precedence should not be neglected
when considering the mutual relationship of sensibility and
understanding, nor should this relationship be reduced to an
indifferent correlation of content and form.
Nevertheless, in order to ask the question concerning the
field of origin of the possibility of finite knowledge, it seems
sufficient to hold to the simple and reflexive duahty of its
elements. And all the more so since Kant himself expressly

fixed the "springs" of our knowledge in "two fundamental
sources of the mind." "Our knowledge springs from two funda-
mental sources of the mind; the first is the capacity of receiving
representations (receptivity for impressions), the second is
the power of knowing an object through these representations

(spontaneity in the production of concepts)." ^^ And with
even greater emphasis, Kant "we have no [source of]
states:
knowledge besides these two (sensibility and understanding)." ^^

But this duality of the sources is not a simple juxtaposition,
for only in a union of these sources prescribed by their struc-
ture can finite knowledge be what its essence demands. "Only

through their union, however, can knowledge arise." ^^ The
unity of their union, however, is not the subsequential result
of their coming together; rather that which unites them, this
"synthesis," must let these elements spring forth in their
togetherness and their unity. However, if the essence of finite
28. A 50, B 74, NKS, p. 92.

29. A 294, B 350, NKS, p. 298.
30. A51,B75f.,NKS,p. 93.
40

knowledge is to be found in the original synthesis of the funda-
mental sources, and if the laying of the foundation of meta-
physics inevitably must push on into the essential ground of
finite knowledge, then with the first mention of the two "funda-
mental sources," it is to be expected that an allusion to their
field of origin, i.e., to their original unity, is not far off.
Both in the introduction and in the conclusion to the Critique,
Kant provides a characterization of the two fundamental

sources that goes beyond their mere enumeration. "By way of
introduction or anticipation we need only say that there are
two stems of human knowledge, namely, sensibility and under-
standing, which perhaps spring from a common, but to us
unknown, root. Through the former, objects are given to us;
through the latter, they are thought." ^^ "We shall content
ourselves here with the completion of our task, namely, merely
to outline the architectonic of all knowledge arismg from pure
reason; and in so doing we shall begin from the point at which
the common root of our faculty of knowledge divides and throws
out two stems, one of which is reason. By reason I here un-
derstand the whole higher faculty of knowledge, and am there-
fore contrasting the rational with the empirical." ^^ "Empirical"
denotes here the receptive element of experience, sensibility as
such.
In these passages, the sources are envisaged as "stems" which
spring from a common root. But, whereas in the first passage
the "common root" is qualified by a "perhaps," in the second
its existence is affirmed. However, in both passages there is
only a bare mention of this root. Kant not only fails to pursue
the matter further but declares that the root is "to us unknown."
One thing of fundamental importance concerning the general
character of the Kantian laying of the foundation of metaphysics
is clear from this, however; it does not lead to the clear and
31. A 15,B29,NKS,p. 61f.

32. A 835, B863, NKS, p. 655.
41

unconditional evidence of an axiom or first principle but in full
consciousness proceeds into and points toward the unknown.
It is a philosophical laying of the foundation of philosophy.
//. The Manner in Which the Origin

Is Revealed
§ 7. The Outline of the Stages of the Laying

of the Foundation of Ontology
The establishment of metaphysics is the projection of the

internal possibility of the a priori synthesis. The essence of
this synthesis must be determined and the manner of its origin
from its field of origin set forth. The elucidation of the essence
of finite knowledge and the characterization of its fundamental
source have served to fix the dimension wherein the revelation
of the essential origin takes place. The question of the internal
possibility of a priori synthetic knowledge has gained precision
thereby and, at the same time, hasbecome more complex.
The preliminary exposition of the problem of the establish-
ment of metaphysics has yielded the following result: ^^ Knowl-
edge of the essent is possible only on the basis of a precursory,
experience-free knowledge of the ontological structure [Seins-
verfassung] of the essent. But finite knowledge (and it is the
finitude of knowledge which is in question) is essentially a
receptive and determinative intuition of the essent. If finite
knowledge is to be possible, it must be based on a compre-

hension [Erkennen] of the Being of the essent that precedes
every receptive act. Finite knowledge requires, therefore, a
non-receptive (and apparently non-finite) mode of cognition,
a kind of creative intuition.
33. See above, § 2, p. 14.
42

Thus, the question as to the possibility of the a priori syn-
thesis narrows down to this: How can a finite being which
as such is delivered up to the essent and dependent on its
reception have knowledge of, i.e., intuit, the essent before it
is given without being its creator? Otherwise expressed, how

must this finite being be constituted with respect to its own
ontological structure if, without the aid of experience, it is
able to bring forth the ontological structure of the essent, i.e.,
effect an ontological synthesis?

If the question of the possibility of the a priori synthesis
is put in this way, and if aU finite knowledge as finite is com-
posed of the two elements mentioned above, i.e., is itself a
synthesis, then this question of the possibility of the a priori
synthesis acquires a peculiar complexity, for this synthesis
is not identical with the above-named veritative synthesis which
is concerned only with ontic knowledge.
Because the ontological synthesis is, as knowledge, already
synthetic, the laying of the foundation must begin with an ex-
position of the pure elements (pure intuition and pure thought)
of pure knowledge. Thus, it is a matter of elucidating the
character proper to the primordial essential unity of these
pure elements, i.e., the pure veritative synthesis. This synthesis
must be such that it determines a priori the element of pure
intuition. Hence, the content as well as the form of the concepts
pertaining to this synthesis must precede aU experience. This
implies that the pure predicative synthesis which is an essential
element of the pure veritative synthesis is one of a special
kind. In consequence, the question of the essence of the "on-
tological predicates" must be central to the problem of the
a priori (i.e., ontological) synthesis.
The question of the intrinsic possibihty of the essential
unity of a pure veritative synthesis, however, forces us even
further back to the elucidation of the original ground of the
intrinsic possibility of this synthesis. Through the revelation
43

of the essence of the pure synthesis from its ground, we begin
to understand in what sense ontological knowledge can be the
condition which makes ontic knowledge possible. In this man-
ner, the complete essence of ontological knowledge is delimited.
Accordingly, the laying of the foundation of ontology runs
through five stages: ( 1 ) the essential elements of pure knowledge;
(2) the essential unity of pure knowledge; (3) the intrinsic
possibility of the essential unity of the ontological synthesis;
(4) the ground of the intrinsic possibility of the ontological

synthesis; (5) the complete determination of the essence of
ontological knowledge.
§ 8. The Method by Which the Origin is Revealed
The preliminary characterization of the essential structure

[Wesensbau] of finite knowledge has already revealed a wealth
of supplementary substructures which function as modes of
synthesis. So far as the pure veritative synthesis contains, in
a certain sense, the idea of a seemingly non-finite knowledge,
the question of the possibility of ontology for a finite being
is further complicated. FinaUy, the indications given us con-
cerning the nature of the field of origin of the fundamental
sources m finite knowledge lead into the unknown.
Given the nature of the chief problem and the dimension
wherein it must be worked out, it is not surprising that the
method whereby the origin is revealed and the manner of regress
to the field of origin remain at first indeterminate. Certainty
and precision with regard to these matters can be attained
only in the course of the advance into a region hitherto un-
known and by what is revealed therein. Indeed,
the exposition of
the domain of the revelation of the origin of ontological knowl-
edge is none other than that of the human mind [Gemilt]
(mens sive animus). The exploration of this domain is a task
usually assigned to "psychology." However, insofar as the
44

exploration concerns an analysis of "knowledge," the essence
of which is commonly placed in the act of judgment (logos),
"logic" must also be At
given a part in it. first sight, in fact, it
would appear that "logic" and "psychology" are to share this

task, in other words, struggle for supremacy and in the process
transform and extend themselves.

But if, on the one hand, one considers the uniqueness and
originahty of the Kantian investigation and, on the other, the
questionable character of traditional "logic" and "psychology"
neither of which is at aU suited to such a problematic, it is
readily apparent that any attempt to grasp the essentials of the
Kantian laying of the foundation of metaphysics by means of

the method of approach of either logic or psychology, or any
superficial combination thereof, is hopeless. Furthermore, as
soon as one understands the difficulties, both basic and meth-
odological, which are involved in the determination of the
essence of man as a finite being, it is clear that the term "tran-
scendental psychology" is only an expression of bewilderment.
It remains, therefore, only to leave open the method whereby
the origin is to be revealed without attempting prematurely to
force it into the mold of some particular discipline, whether
traditional or newly devised for the purpose. In leaving the
nature of this method open, it is remember what Kant
fitting to
said of the Critique of Pure Reason immediately after its com-

^^
pletion. "An inquiry of this kind wiU always remain difficult."
It is necessary, however, to provide some indication of the
basic character of the procedure involved in this laying of the
foundation of metaphysics. The method of inquiry may be under-
stood as an "analytic" in the broadest sense of the term. It
concerns finite pure reason as that which by its essence makes

the ontological anal)?tic possible. This is why Kant refers to
^^
the Critique of Pure Reason as a "study of our inner nature."
34. Briefe an M. Herz, 1781, Works (Cass.), IX, p. 198.
35. A 703, B 731, NKS, p. 570.
45

This revelation of the essence of human Dasein "to a philosopher
is reaUy a matter of duty."
The term "analytic" as it appears here does not signify a
dissolution in the sense of a reduction, i.e., as if it were a
matter of reducing pure finite reason to its elements. Rather,
the term signifies a "dissolution" which loosens and lays bare
the seeds [Keime] of ontology. It reveals those conditions from
which springs an ontology as a whole according to its intrinsic
possibility. In Kant's own words, such an analytic "is brought
to Ught by reason itself;" it is that which "reason produces
entirely out of itself." ^s This analytic, then, lets us see the
genesis of finite pure reason from its proper ground.
The analytic contains, therefore, the anticipatory projection
of the whole internal essence of finite pure reason. Only as one
pursues the construction of this essence does the essential
structure of ontology become visible. Thus revealed, this struc-
ture determines, at the same time, the disposition of the sub-
structures necessary to it. This anticipatory projection of the
totality which makes an ontology possible in its essence dis-
covers metaphysics on that ground wherein it is rooted as a
"visitation" ^^ on human nature.
B. The Stages of the ReaUzation of the

Projection of the Intrinsic Possibility
of Ontology
At this point, the interpretation of the Critique, anew and

with greater precision, must make certain of the leading prob-
lem. The object of the inquiry is the essential possibility of
the ontological synthesis. Stated precisely, the question reads:
36. A XX, NKS, p. 14.

37. B XV, NKS, p. 21.
46

How can finite human Dasein in advance pass beyond (tran-
scend) the essent when not only has it not created this essent
but also is dependent on it in order to exist as Dasein? Thus,
the problem of ontology is the question relative to the essence
and the essential ground of the transcendence proper to the
precursory comprehension of Being. The problem of the tran-
scendental synthesis, i.e., of the synthesis constitutive of tran-
scendence, can be put in this way: How must the finite essent
that we call man be in his inmost essence in order that in
general he can be open [offen] to the essent that he himself
is not, which essent therefore must be able to reveal itself
by itself?
The stages through which an answer to this question must

pass have already been outlined above.^^ It is now a question
of going through them one by one, without, however, pretend-
ing to provide an equally exhaustive interpretation of each.
We shall follow thereby the inner movement of the Kantian
laying of the foundation but without holding to the disposition
and the formulation favored by Kant. It is advisable to go behind
these in order to be able, by a more fundamental understanding
of the internal character and development of the laying of the
foundation, to pass judgment on the suitability, validity, and
limits of the external architectonic of the Critique of Pure
Reason.
The First Stage of the Laying of the Foundation:

The Essential Elements of Pure Knowledge
If the essence of a priori synthetic knowledge is to be brought

to hght, the elucidation of the standing [des Bestandes] of its
necessary elements is first required. As a mode of cognition
38. Cf. § 7, p. 42.
47

the transcendental synthesis must be an intuition, and, as
cognition a priori, it must be a pure intuition. As pure knowl-

edge pertaining to human finitude, pure intuition must neces-
sarily be determined by means of pure thought.
a) Pure Intuition in Finite Knowledge
§ 9. The Elucidation of Space and Time

as Pure Intuitions
Can such a thing as an act of pure intuition be found in the

finite knowledge of the essent? What is sought is the possibility
of the immediate, although experience-free, encountering of
something singular [Begegnenlassen eines Einzdnen]. To be
sure, as finite, the act of pure intuition is an act of represen-
tation that is receptive. But that which is to be received, if it
is a matter of the cognition of Being and not of the essent,

cannot be something already on hand that presents itself [das
sich gibt]. On the contrary, the pure receptive act of repre-
sentation must give itself something capable of being represented.
Pure intuition, therefore, must be in a certain sense "creative."
What is represented in pure intuition is not an essent (no
object, i.e., not something that appears) but yet not absolutely
nothing. It is all the more necessary, then, to disclose both what
is represented in, and only in, pure intuition, and how the mode
of representation corresponding to it is to be delimited.
According to Kant, the pure intuitions are space and time.
It is advisable first to show how space manifests itself in the
finite knowledge of the essent and to determine that with
respect to which alone its essence can be adequately represented.
In his disclosure of the essence of space and time, Kant,
in each case, deals first with the negative characteristics of
the phenomenon and only then with the positive characteristics
from which the negative foUow.
48

It is no accident that the essential characterization of space
and time begins negatively. This characterization opens by
denying that space and time have this or that property. This
course is followed because the positive characteristics of space
and time, even though in a certain sense unrecognized or even
misunderstood, are essentially familiar to everyone. Spatial
relations — the relations of beside, above, and in back of — are
not localized "here" or "there." Space is not just another thing
on hand; it is no empirical representation, that is, nothing that
can be represented empirically. In order that any given thing
may be able to reveal itself as extended in accordance with
definite spatial relationships, it is necessary that space be already
manifest before the receptive apprehension of the thing. Space
must be represented as that "within which" any actual thing
can be encountered. Space is a pure representation, i.e., that
which is necessarily represented in advance in finite human
cognition.
Insofar as this representation "applies to every" particular
spatial relation, it seems to be a representation which "applies
to many" —a concept. In turn, the essential analysis of that
which under these circumstances is represented as space pro-
vides information about the corresponding act of represen-
tation. Space, Kant tells us —again speaking negatively — is not
a "discursive" representation. The unity of space is not obtained
by reference to the plurality of individual spatial relations and
is not constructed by way of a comparison of these relations.
This unity is not that of a concept but the unity of something
which in itself is one and unique. The many spaces are only
Hmitations of the one unique space. And the latter is not only
the actually limitable; the limiting limits [die einschrankenden
Schranken] themselves have the same essence, i.e., are spatial.
Space as one and unique is wholly itself in each one of its parts.
The representation of space is accordingly the immediate repre-
sentation of a unique particular, an intuition, that is, if it be
49

true that the essence of intuition must be defined as reprae-
sentatio singularis. More precisely, and in accordance with
what has been said above, space is what is intuited in a pure
intuition.
Pure intuition as intuition, however, must not only give that

which is intuited immediately; it must give it as a whole. This
act of pure intuition is no mere reception of a part; in such an
act the whole is present with the part. "Space is represented as
an infinite given magnitude." ^^ To say that space is a magni-
tude does not mean that it is of such and such an extent {Gros-
ses], nor does the expression "infinite magnitude" mean of
"limitless extent." Rather, "magnitude" here means "extensive-
ness" [Grossheit] as that which makes being of such and such
an extent (quantity) possible. "The quantum wherein alone
all quantity can be determined is, with regard to the number of
parts, indeterminate and continuous; such are space and
''o
time."
To say that this "extensiveness" is "infinite," then, does not
mean that space differs from its particular, determinate parts
in the degree and richness of its composition but that it is in-
finitely, i.e., essentially, different. It precedes all its parts as the

unique and Hmitable whole. Unlike the generality of a concept,
this totality does not have the many particulars "under itself"
but, as already co-intuited, "in itself," so that this pure intuition
of the whole can deliver up the "parts" at any time. The repre-
sentation of such "infinite" extensiveness is, therefore, an act
of intuition which gives [itself its content]. If this unique whole
is given at once and as a whole, then the act of representation
in question originates that which is capable of being represented
and in this sense may be termed an "original" act of representa-
tion.41
39. A 25, B 39, NKS, p. 69.

40. Kant's Posthumous Works in Manuscript Form, vol. V, No.
5846, cf. Erdmann, Reflexionen, II, 1038.
41. A 32, B 48; cf. also B 40, NKS, pp. 76 and 70.
50
Thus, in pure intuition there is indeed something intuited and
in such a way that it is given only in and through the correspond-
ing act of intuition itself. The something intuited is not, to be
sure, a given essent, nor in the act of intuition is it apprehended
as such. In handling things and in perceiving them, we un-
doubtedly "intuit" their spatial relations but, for the most part,
do not intend these relations as such. That which is intuited in

pure intuition is presented to us unobjectively and unthemat-
ically in a preliminary insight. This insight has in view that
unique whole which makes coordination according to beside,
under, and in back of possible. That which is intuited in this
mode of intuition is not absolutely nothing.
From what has already been said, the following is clear:
The further clarification of that which is "originally represented"

in pure intuition will be possible only when we have succeeded
in elucidating more precisely the sense in which pure intuition
is "original," i.e., when we understand how it lets that which

is intuited by it spring forth.
§10. Time as the Universal Pure Intuition
In pure intuition, we seek the first of the essential elements

of ontological knowledge on which the experience of the essent
is based. But space as pure intuition merely gives in advance the
totality of those relations by means of which what affects the
external sense is ordered. At the same time, however, we find

"givens" of the "internal sense" which exhibit neither spatial
forms nor spatial relations but manifest themselves as a succes-
sion of mental states [Gemiites] (representations, drives, moods).

That which in experiencing these phenomena is held in view
from the first, although unthematicaUy and unobjectively, is
pure succession [Nacheinander], Time, therefore, is "the form

of inner sense, that is, of our intuition of ourselves and of our
inner state." ^^ Time determines "the relation of representations
42. A33, B49, NKS,p. 77.
51
in our inner state." ^^ Time "cannot be a determination of outer
appearances; it has to do neither with shape nor position." ^^
The two pure intuitions, space and time, thus refer to two
distinct regions of experience, and it seems impossible at first
to find one pure intuition which is constitutive of all knowledge

of the Being of the essent and which, therefore, permits the
problem of ontological knowledge to be formulated in universal
terms. Nevertheless, immediately after having assigned both
pure intuitions to two regions of phenomena, Kant states the
following thesis: "Time is the formal condition a priori of all
appearance whatsoever." ^^ Thus, time takes precedence over

space. As universal pure intuition, it must be the dominant and
essential element of pure knowledge and hence of transcendence
as well, since it is pure knowledge which makes transcendence
possible.
The following interpretation will reveal how time in the

course of the development of the several stages of the founda-
tion of metaphysics comes more and more to the fore and
thereby reveals its proper essence in a more original way than
is possible by means of the provisional characterization in the
Transcendental Aesthetic.
How does Kant justify the precedence of time as the uni-
versal pure intuition? It may seem astonishing at first that Kant
questions the role of external phenomena in the determination
of time, especially when it is in these phenomena in the mo-—
tions of the stars and in natural events in general (growth and
decay) — that everyday experience first discovers time, and in
so immediate a way that time is equated with the "heavens."
However, Kant does not absolutely reject the temporal deter-
mination of external phenomena, if it is true that timeis meant
to be the formal condition a priori of all phenomena. The one
43. A 33, B 50, NKS, p. 77.

44. A 33, B 49, NKS, p. 77.
45. A 34, B 50, NKS, p. 77 (italics are Heidegger's).
52
thesis denies intxa-temporality {Innerzeitigkeit] to physical
things, the other concedes it. How may these mutually opposed
theses be reconciled?
When Kant limits time as pure intuition to the data of in-
ternal sense, i.e., to representations in the broadest sense, this

limitation amounts actually to an extension of the domain
within which time can function as the precursory mode of intui-
tion. Among representations in general are those which as rep-
resentations let essents be encountered which are not like the
being that represents them. Hence, Kant's reflections take this
course
Because all representations as states of the faculty of repre-
sentation fall immediately in tune, what is represented as such
in an act of representation also belongs in time. Thus, by means
of a detour through the immediate intra-temporality of the act
of representation we arrive at a mediate intra-temporality of
that which is represented, i.e., those "representations" which
are determined through external sense. Therefore, since external
phenomena are only mediately intra-temporal, in one sense the
determination of time applies to them, but in another it does
not. The argument from the intra-temporality of the intuition
of external phenomena as a psychical event to the intra-tempo-
rality of what is intuited therein is made easy for Kant because
of the ambiguity of the terms intuition [Anschauung] and rep-

resentation [Vorstellung]. These expressions refer both to states
of consciousness and to what such states may have as objects.
We will not pass judgment at this time on the question as to
whether this argument in support of the universality of time as
pure intuition justifies the central ontological function of time
attributed to it. We will also leave open for the present the
further question as to whether space as pure intuition is de-
prived thereby of a possible central ontological ^^
f unction.
If, in general, it is possible to establish the universality of
46. Cf. below § 35, p. 201.
53
time as pure intuition, such an attempt will succeed only if it
can be shown that, although both space and time as pure intui-
tions belong "to the subject," time is implanted therein in a
more fundamental way than is space. Time as immediately
limited to the data of internal sense can be, ontologically speak-
ing, more universal than space only if the subjectivity of the
subject consists in being overt to the essent. The more that
time is subjective, the more original and extensive is the free-
dom from limitation of the subject.
The universal ontological function that Kant assigned to
time at the beginning of his laying of the foundation of meta-
physics can be justified only if time itself in its ontological func-
tion, i.e., as the essential element of pure ontological knowledge,
forces us to determine the essence of subjectivity more pri-
mordiaUy than heretofore.*'^
The task of the Transcendental Aesthetic is the exposition

of the ontological aisthesis which makes it possible "to discover
a priori" the Being of the essent. Insofar as intuition maintains
the dominant role in all knowledge, "one of the factors required
for solution of the general problem of transcendental philoso-
phy" *^ has been attained.
Just as it is inadmissible to minimize in the slightest degree
the role of pure intuition as an essential element of ontological
knowledge, so one cannot hope to discover the basic function
of an element of pure intuition by considering it in isolation. It
is not a question of eliminating the transcendental aesthetic as
a provisional statement of the problem but of keeping its prob-
lematic while, at the same time, rendering Such it more precise.
must be the true objective of the laying of the foundation of
metaphysics as carried out by Kant, provided that it is aware
of its own task.
But first, by means of an inquiry which, as before, begins by
47. Cf. below § 34, p. 193.

48. B 73, NKS, p. 90f.
54

isolating its object, we must uncover the second essential ele-
ment of pure, finite knowledge, namely, pure thought.
b) The Role of Pure Thought in Finite Knowledge
§11. The Pure Concepts of the Understanding

(Notions)
The other element in the finitude of human knowledge is
thought which as determinative representation is directed

toward what is intuited in intuition and thus is entirely at the
service of the latter. The object of an intuition (which is always

a particular) is determined as such and such in a "general rep-
resentation," i.e., through concepts. Hence, the finitude of re-
flective [thinking] intuition is a mode of cognition through
concepts, and pure cognition is pure intuition through pure con-
cepts. These pure concepts must be exhibited if the complete
essential structure of pure knowledge is to be secured. How-
ever, if one wishes to discover such pure concepts, a clarifica-
tion of the meaning of this expression ["pure concept"] is
necessary.
When one represents, for example, a linden, beech, or Alt
as a tree, the particular thing intuited is determined as such

and such with reference to that which "applies to many." Al-
though this property of "applying to many" describes a repre-
sentation insofar as it is a concept, it does not characterize the
primordial essence of the latter. The property of "applying to
many" as a derived character is itself based on the fact that in
every concept there is represented one element [das Eine] in

which the several particulars agree. Conceptual representation
lets the many come to agreement in this one. In conceptual rep-
resentation, therefore, the unity of this one must be anticipa-
tively kept in view so that it can serve as a standard for all
statements capable of determining the many. This anticipative
55

keeping in view [Herausseheri] of the one in which the many
can agree is the basic act of conceptuahzation. Kant calls it "re-
flection." It is that which "enables different representations to
be comprehended in one act of consciousness." *^
Such a reflection brings before itself a unity which as such

embodies a many, so that with reference to this unity the many
can be compared (comparison). At the same time, that which
is not in accord with this one is disregarded (abstraction, in the
Kantian sense). What is represented in conceptual representa-
tion is "one representation so far as it can be contained in dif-
ferent objects." ^" A concept is not merely a presentation of
something that happens to be common to many things; rather,
it is this being-common-to insofar as it is common [dieses Zu-
kommende, sojern es zukommt], i.e., in its unity. What is so
represented is the concept; hence, Kant says rightly: "It is a
mere tautology to speak of general or common concepts." ^^
Because a representation becomes a concept in the funda-

mental act which anticipatively holds in view the one which is
common to the many, i.e., according to Kant in reflection, con-
cepts are also said to be reflective representations, in other
words, concepts which arise from reflection. The conceptual
character of a representation — the fact that what is represented
therein has the form of an element common to many —always
arises from reflection. However, insofar as the content of the
determinative unity is concerned, this arises, for the most part,
from an empirical which compares and abstracts.
act of intuition
Hence, the origin of the content of such empirical concepts is
not a problem.
Insofar as a pure concept is concerned, however, what is
sought is a "reflected" concept, the content of which can in no

wise be derived from the phenomena. Therefore, its content
49. Logikvorlesung, VIII, § 6, p. 401.

50. Ibid., VIII, § 1, note 1, p. 399.
51. Ibid., note 2.
56

must be obtainable a priori. Concepts, the content of which is
given a priori, Kant terms notions, conceptus dati a priori.^^
Are there such concepts, and are they to be found already
prepared in human understanding? How is the understanding
able to produce a content when it is only an empty connective
function dependent on an intuition which itself supplies a con-
tent? And, finally, can such a content, represented as given, be
found in the understanding if, as is supposed to be the case, the

understanding is cut off from all intuition? If the understanding
in itself is to be the origin not only of the form of every concept

but also of the content of certain concepts, then this origin can
only lie in the fundamental act of conceptualization itself, i.e.,
in reflection.
Every determination of something as something (judgment)
contains "the unity of the act of bringing various representa-
tions under one common representation." ^^ This act of reflec-
tive unification is possible only if it is itself guided by a pre-
cursory reference to a unity in the light of which all unification
becomes possible. The act of representation, quite apart from

whatever concept arises from its action, is already the precur-
sory act of representation of a unity which as such guides and
directs the work of unification. Accordingly, if the act of re-
flection itself is a representation of unity, this means that the
act of representation of unity belongs to the essential structure
of the fundamental act of the understanding.
The essence of the understanding is primordial comprehen-
sion. In the structure of the action of the understanding as a
mode of unification that is representational, there lie already
prepared representations of the directive unity. These repre-
sented unities form the content of the pure concepts. This
content is, in each case, a unity by means of which a unification
becomes possible. The act of representation of this unity is in
52. Ibid., § 4, p. 401; further A 320, B 377, NKS, p. 314.

53. A 68, B 93, NKS, p. 105.
57
itself, by reason of its specific content, already conceptual a
priori. A pure concept does not need to be endowed with a con-
ceptual form; fundamentally it is itself this form.
Pure concepts, therefore, do not result from an act of reflec-
tion. They are not reflective concepts but those which belong,
from the first, to the essential structure of reflection. They are
representations which act in, with, and for reflection; they are
reflecting concepts. "AU concepts in general, no matter whence

comes their material, are reflective, i.e., representations raised
to the logical relation of general applicability. But there are
concepts the entire sense of which is nothing other than to be
constitutive of such and such a reflection, under which the actual
representations as they occur can be subsumed. They may be
called concepts of reflection (conceptus reflectentes), and since
every act of reflection takes place in the judgment, they must,
as the foundation of the possibility of judging, be in themselves,
and in an absolute way, the pure activity of the understanding

^^
which in the judgment is applied to the relation."
Hence, there are pure concepts in the understanding as such,
and the "analysis of the faculty of understanding" must bring
to light these representations which are co-constituents of the
essential structure of reflection.
§12. The Notions as Ontological Predicates

{Categories)
The pure understanding in itself provides a manifold — the
pure unities of the possible modes of unification. And if these

possible modes of unification (judgments) form a closed con-
tinuity, i.e., the complete nature of the understanding itself,
then there lies concealed in the understanding a multiplicity of

pure concepts organized into a systematic whole. This totality
54. Erdmann, Reflexionen, II, 554, Kant's Posthumous Works in

Manuscript Form, vol. V, No. 5051.
58

is the system of those predicates which function in pure knowl-
edge, that is, assert something about the Being of the essent.
The pure concepts have the character of ontological predicates
which of old have been termed "categories." The table of judg-
ments, then, is the source of the categories and their table.
This origin of the categories has been often, and always wUl
be, doubted. The principal objection is centered on the ques-
tionable character of the original source itself, on the table of
judgments as such, and on the sufficiency of its supporting

principles. In point of fact, it is not from the essence of the
understanding that Kant develops the multiplicity of functions
exercised in the judgment. He submits a table already complete
which is organized according to the four "principal moments"
of quantity, quality, relation, and modality.^^ Furthermore,
Kant does not show if, or in what respect, these four moments
are grounded in the essence of the understanding. Indeed,
whether they can be formally established at all must be doubted.
Hence, we must remain uncertain as to the character of this
table of judgments. Kant himself seemed unsure of the nature

of this table, for he called it at one time a "transcendental
table" ^^ and at another a "logical table of judgments." °'^
If
this is so, does not the objection which Kant raised against
Aristotle's table of categories apply also to his own?
But this is not the place to decide whether the many adverse
criticisms of the Kantian table of judgments are justified or
whether they even so much as hit upon its basic defect. Rather,
we must see that such a critique of the table of judgments, if
presented as a critique of the original source of the categories,

has by that token already failed completely to come to grips
with the main problem. Not only are the categories not actually
derived from the table of judgments, they cannot be so derived,
55. Logikv ode sung, § 20, p. 408.

56. A73, B98,NKS, p. 108.
57. Prolegomena, § 21.
59

and for this reason: In the present stage of the discussion in
question wherein the elements of knowledge are examined in
isolation, the essence and the idea of the categories are not
capable of receiving any determination. Indeed, they cannot
even be made a problem.
If, as a matter of principle, the question as to the source of
the categories cannot yet arise, then the table of judgments in-
sofar as the preparation of the question of the possibility of
ontological knowledge is concerned must have a function other
than that indicated above.
It seems easy to satisfy the requirements laid down by the
first stage of the foundation of metaphysics. For what could be
more obvious than the elements of pure knowledge, i.e., pure
intuition and pure concept, when they are set side by side? But
in so isolating these elements, we must never lose sight of the
fact that it is finite pure knowledge that is the object of our
inquiry. As has been stated above, this means that the second
element, pure thought, is essentially at the service of intuition.
Hence, the property of being dependent on intuition is not an
accidental and superficial characteristic of pure thought but an
essential one. When pure concepts are initially apprehended as
notions, the second element of pure knowledge is by no means
obtained in its elementary form. On the contrary, it is deprived
of the decisive moment of its essence, namely, its relation to
intuition. The idea of the pure concept qua notion is only a
fragment of the second element of pure knowledge.
As long as pure understanding is not considered with regard
to its essence, i.e., its pure relation to intuition, the origin of
the notions as ontological predicates cannot be disclosed. The
table of judgments, therefore, is not the "origin of the cate-
gories" but simply "the method of discovery of all pure con-
cepts of the understanding." It should lead us to the complete
totality of pure concepts, but it cannot disclose the full essence
of the pure concepts as categories. Whether the table of judg-
60

ments as Kant intxoduced and presented it can discharge even
this limited function of outlining a systematic unity of the pure
concepts of the understanding must here remain open.
It is now clear from what has been set forth that the more
radically one attempts to isolate the pure elements of finite pure
knowledge, the more apparent becomes the impossibility of

such an isolation and the more evident becomes the dependence
of pure thought on intuition. Thus, the artificiaUty of the first
point of departure of this characterization of pure knowledge

is revealed. Pure concepts can be determined as ontological
predicates only if they are understood in the fight of the essen-
tial unity of finite pure knowledge.
The Second Stage of the Laying of the Foundation:

The Essential Unity of Pure Knowledge
Taken separately, the pure elements of pure knowledge are:

time as universal pure intuition and the notions as that which
is thought in pure thinking. But they cannot be adequately
understood even as elements when considered in isolation; stiU
less can their unity be obtained by a supervenient combination

of the isolated members. The problem of the essential unity of
pure knowledge gains in acuity provided that one does not re-
main satisfied with the negative consideration that this unity
cannot be a merely subsequential bond linking the two ele-
ments.
The finitude of knowledge manifests an original and intrinsic
dependence of thought on intuition or, conversely, a need for
the latter to be determined by the former. The mutual depend-
ence of these elements emphasizes the fact that their unity
cannot be "later" than the elements themselves but must be
estabfished "earfier" in them and serve as their foundation. This
61

unity unites the elements in so original a way that they first
arise as elements in this unification and are maintained in their
unity by means of it. Despite the fact that he proceeds from the
isolated elements, to what extent does Kant succeed in making
this primordial unity visible?
The first characterization of the original essential unity of
the pure elements, and one which prepares the way for all fur-
ther clarification, is given by Kant in the third section of the

first chapter of the Analytic of Concepts, more precisely, in the
part that is headed The Pure Concepts of the Understanding of
Categories.^^ The comprehension of these paragraphs is the
key to the comprehension of the Critique of Pure Reason as a
laying of the foundation of metaphysics.
Because the notions pertaining to the finitude of knowledge
are essentially bound to pure intuition and because this bond
between pure intuition and pure thought contributes to the
formation of the essential unity of pure knowledge, the essen-
tial delimitation of the categories as such is at the same time
the elucidation of the intrinsic possibihty of the essential unity
of ontological knowledge. It is now a matter of presenting Kant's
answer to the question as to the essential unity of pure knowl-
edge through the interpretation of the section mentioned above.
But first, the question itself must be made more precise.
§ 13. The Question of the Essential Unity

of Pure Knowledge
If the elements of finite pure knowledge are essentially de-

pendent on one another, then this dependence alone stands in
the way of any attempt to interpret their unity as the result of
their supervenient combination. However, the isolation of these
elements has concealed and made unrecognizable both the fact
58. A 76-80, B 102-105; in B designated as § 10, NKS, pp.

111-3.
62

and the manner of their dependence on the unity that underlies
them. Even when an analysis is carried out with the resolve to
uncover this original unity, the complete apprehension thereof
is not guaranteed. On the contrary, because of the rigor with
which the isolation has been carried out, and because of the
peculiar character of the second element, a character made
even more prominent by this isolation, it is to be expected that
the work of this isolation cannot be completely undone so that,
in spite of everything, the unity wiU not be expressly developed

from its proper origin.
That the unity is not the result of a simple colligation of the
elements but that which, in unifying them, originates them is
indicated by the term "synthesis" which is appHed to it.
In the full structure of finite knowledge, the many syntheses

involved are necessarily intermingled.^^ To the veritative syn-
thesis belongs the predicative of which, in turn, the apophantic
is an intrinsic part. Which of these syntheses is meant when the
essential unity of pure knowledge is in question? Apparently it
is the veritative synthesis, for it concerns the unity of intuition

and thought. The other syntheses, however, are necessarily in-
cluded in it.
But the essential unity of pure knowledge is supposed to be

constitutive of the total unity joining all structural syntheses.
Hence, in the question of the essential unity of pure knowledge,
the veritative synthesis enjoys a priority only insofar as the
problem of synthesis is concentrated therein. This does not ex-
clude the possibility, however, that this problem is oriented just
as necessarily on the other forms of synthesis.
The question of the essential unity of ontological knowledge
bears, moreover, on the problem of the pure veritative synthesis.
It is, at bottom, a question about the original unification of pure
universal intuition (time) and pure thought (the notions). Now,
pure intuition has in itself— as the representation of a unified
59. Cf. above, § 7, p. 42, § 9, p. 48.
63

whole —a unifying character. Hence, Kant speaks rightly of a
"synopsis" in intuition.^*^ At the same time, the analysis of the
notion as a "reflective concept" has shown that pure thought
as the representation of pure unity is in itself originally a source
of unity, and in this sense is "synthetic."

The problem of the pure veritative or ontological synthesis
is reduced, then, to this question: What is the primordial (veri-
tative) "synthesis" of pure synopsis and the pure reflective
(predicative) synthesis like? It can be seen from the very form
of this question that the synthesis which we are seeking must
be of a special kind if it is to unite entities which in themselves
are synthetic. The synthesis in question, therefore, must from
the first be equal to the forms of synthesis and synopsis to be
unified; it must produce them in the act of bringing them to
unity.
§14. The Ontological Synthesis
The question of the essential unity of pure intuition and pure

thought is a consequence of the previous isolation of these ele-
ments. Thus, the nature of their unity may be designated in
advance by showing how the structure of each of these elements
is such as to require the other. They reveal articulations [Fu-
gen] ^1 which indicate in advance the possibility of their fitting
60. A95,NKS,p. 127.

61. The meaning of "Fuge" is "joint" or "seam" in the
literal
sense of that which is the result of the fitting together of mortises
and tenons. It is a variant of the term Fug, a word which conveys
the meaning of "suitableness," "fitness," but which in modern Ger-
man is almost obsolete save in the expression mit Fug und Recht
("with full right"). These expressions are employed by Heidegger
as early as Sein und Zeit (cf. p. 52ff.) along with the verbs fiigen,
einfugen, and verfugen. In a kind of linguistic evolution typical of
Heidegger (e.g., the words Geschick and Existenz), the root ex-
pression Fug has in his later works come to be a technical term,
64

together. Hence, the veritative synthesis not only dovetails these
articulations by fitting the elements together, it is also that
which first makes these articulations "fit" to be joined.
Kant introduces the general characterization of the essential
unity of pure knowledge with the following consideration:

"Transcendental logic, on the other hand, has lying before it
a manifold of a priori sensibility presented by transcendental

aesthetic, as material for the concepts of pure understanding.
In the absence of this material those concepts would be without
any content, therefore entirely empty. Space and time contain
a manifold of pure a priori intuition, but at the same time are
conditions of the receptivity of our mind —conditions under
which alone it can receive representations of objects, and which
therefore must also always affect the concept of these objects.
But if this manifold is to be known, the spontaneity of our
thought requires that it be gone through in a certain way, taken
up, and connected. This act I name synthesis." ^^
The dependence of pure intuition and pure thought on one
another is first introduced here in a form which is remarkably
superficial. Strictly speaking, "transcendental logic" does not
have "lying before it" the pure temporal manifold. Rather, this
mode of presentation of the manifold belongs to the essential
structure of pure thought as analyzed by transcendental logic.
Correspondingly, the transcendental aesthetic does not supply

the pure manifold; pure intuition is by nature "that which sup-
plies" and furthermore for the sake of pure thought.
What is thus supplied is more rigorously characterized by
Kant as an "affection," although it must be remembered that
affection through the senses is not here intended. Insofar as this
affection "always" pertains to pure knowledge, it signifies that
the meaning of which, namely, "commanding or overpowering or-

der" is far removed from that of the original. Cf. Introduction to
Metaphysics, p. 160f. (J. S. C.)

62. A76f., B 102,NKS,p. 111.
65

our pure thought is always placed before the time which affects
it. How this is possible is not immediately clear.
In connection with this essential dependence of our pure
thought on the pure manifold, the finitude of our thought "de-
mands" that this manifold be accommodated to thought itself
insofar as the latter is determinative by means of concepts. But
in order that pure intuition be determinable through pure con-
cepts, its manifold must be freed from dispersion, i.e., run
through and collected. This reciprocal adaption takes place in
the operation whichKant generally terms "synthesis." The two
pure elements conform to one another spontaneously in this
synthesis, which fits the corresponding articulations together
and thus constitutes the essential elements of pure knowledge.
This synthesis is the affair neither of intuition nor of thought.
Mediating, as it were, "between" the two, it is related to both.
Hence, it must share the fundamental character of the two ele-
ments, i.e., it must be an act of representation. "Synthesis in

general, as we shall hereafter see, is the mere result of the power
of the imagination, a blind but indispensable function of the
soul, without which we should have no knowledge whatsoever,
but of the existence of which we are scarcely ever conscious." •'^
This indicates from the first that everything in the essence of

pure knowledge that has a synthetic structure is brought about
by the imagination. But at present it is a question, particularly
and above all, of the essential unity of pure knowledge, i.e., of
the "pure synthesis." It is pure "if the manifold is not empirical
but is given a priori." ^^ Hence, pure synthesis fits in with that
which as synopsis unifies in pure intuition.
But, at the same time, this synthesis requires a reference to a
directive unity. Therefore, as an act of unification that is rep-
resentative, the pure synthesis must represent in advance and
as such, i.e., in a general way, the unity which pertains to it.
63. A 78, B 103, NKS, p. 112 (italics are Heidegger's).

64. A77,B 103, NKS, p. 111.
66

By this general representation of its specific unity, the pure
synthesis raises the unity which it represents to the level of a

concept and thereby gives unity to itself. Thus, in pure intui-
tion, the pure synthesis acts in a manner purely synoptic and,

at the same time, in pure thought in a manner purely reflective.
From this, it is evident that the unity of the complete essence

of pure knowledge is composed of three parts. "What must
first be given —with a view to the a priori knowledge of all ob-
jects — is the manifold of pure intuition; the second factor in-
volved is the synthesis of this manifold by means of the imagina-
tion. But even this does not yet yield knowledge. The concepts
which give unity to this pure synthesis, and which consist solely
in the representation of this necessary synthetic unity, furnish
the third requisite for the knowledge of an object; and they rest
^^
on the understanding."
Of these three elements, the pure synthesis of the imagination
holds the central position. This is not meant in a superficial
sense, as if in the enumeration of the conditions of pure knowl-
edge the imagination simply fell between the first and the third.
Rather, this central position has a structural significance. In it,
the pure synopsis and the pure synthesis meet and fit in with one
another. This fitting in with one another Kant expresses by
establishing the self-sameness [Selbigkeit] of the pure synthesis
in the syn-thetic character [Syn-haften] of the intuition and the
understanding.
"The same function which gives unity to the various repre-
sentations in a judgment also gives unity to the mere synthesis
of various representations in an intuition; and this unity, in
its most general expression, we entitle the pure concept of
the understanding." ^^ By this self-sameness proper to the syn-
thetic function, Kant does not mean the empty identity of a
formal and universally operative mode of combination but
65. A 78f., B 104, NKS, p. 1 12.

66. A 79, B 104f., NKS, p. 112.
67
the primordial, rich totality of a complex activity which, as
intuition and thought, at once unifies and imparts unity. This
is to say, at the same time, that the modes of synthesis mentioned
earher, namely, the formal, apophantic synthesis of the judi-
cative function and the predicative synthesis of conceptual
reflection, belong together in the unity of the essential struc-
ture of finite knowledge as the veritative synthesis of intuition
and thought. Hence, self-sameness means here an essential,
structural togetherness [Zusammengehorigkeit].

"The same understanding, through the same operations by
which in concepts, by means of analytical unity, it produced
the logical form of a judgment, also introduces a transcen-

dental content into its representations, by means of the synthetic
^"^
unity of the manifold in intuition in general." That which
is now revealed as the essential unity of pure knowledge is
far removed from the empty simplicity of a first principle. On

the contrary, it is revealed as a multiform action, although one
which remains obscure in its character as an action as well
as in the complexity of its modes of unification. This character-
ization of the essential unity of ontological knowledge cannot
be the conclusion but, rather, the right way to begin the laying
of the foundation of this knowledge. This laying of the foun-
dation has the task of bringing the pure synthesis as such to
light. But because this synthesis is an action, it can be made
manifest in its essence only by tracing it back in its coming
into being. Now, we see for the first time, and by virtue of
that which forces itself on us as the theme of the laying of the
foundation, why a laying of the foundation of ontological
knowledge must become a revelation of the origin of the pure
synthesis, i.e., why this synthesis must be revealed in its coming
into being as such.
The foundation of metaphysics has now reached the point
67. A 79, B 105, NKS, p. 112f.
68

"where matters are by their very nature deeply veiled." ^^ If
we have no reason here to complain of this obscurity, then

our need to pause for a methodological reflection' on the pres-
ent state of the laying of the foundation and on the further
course to be pursued is all the greater.
§15. The Problem of the Categories and the

Role of Transcendental Logic
The problem of the essential unity of ontological knowledge

first provides a basis for the determination of the essence of
the categories. If a category is not only, or even in its primary
sense (as the name indicates), a mode of "assertion," schema
tou logou, and if it can satisfy its true nature, which is that
of a schema tou ontos, then it must not function merely as
an "element" (notion) of pure knowledge; on the contrary,
in it must lie the knowledge of the Being of the essent. Knowl-
edge of Being, however, is the unity of pure intuition and pure
thought. The pure intuitivity of the notions, therefore, becomes
decisive for the essence of the categories.
The "metaphysical exposition" of pure intuition is the task
of the Transcendental Aesthetic. The elucidation of the other
element of pure knowledge, pure thought, devolves on the
Transcendental Logic, in particular, on the Analytic of Concepts.
The problem of the essential unity of pure knowledge has led
the inquiry beyond the isolation of the elements. The pure syn-
thesis, therefore, is the act neither of pure intuition nor of
pure thought. It follows, then, that the explication of the origin
of the pure synthesis which we are about to begin cannot be
carried out within the compass either of transcendental aesthetic
or transcendental logic. Accordingly, the problem posed by
the categories belongs to neither discipline.
68. A88, B 121,NKS,p. 133.
69

But within what discipline does the discussion of the central
problem of the possibility of ontology fall? This question was

never considered by Kant. He assigned to the Analytic of
Concepts not only the explication of pure concepts as elements
of pure knowledge but the determination and justification of
the essential unity of pure knowledge as well. In this way,
logic came to have a unique priority over aesthetic even though
it is intuition which is the primary element in knowledge as a
whole.
This oddity requires an explanation if the problematic of the
succeeding stages of the laying of the foundation of metaphys-
ics is to remain clear. This explanation is especially necessary
in view of the fact that the usual interpretation of the Critique
of Pure Reason succumbs constantly to the temptation to under-
stand this work as a "logic of pure knowledge." This remains

true even when intuition and, hence, the transcendental aes-
thetic are granted a relative right.
All things considered, the priority of transcendental logic

in the whole of the laying of the foundation of metaphysica
generalis is, in a certain sense, justified. But precisely because
of this, the interpretation must free itself from the Kantian
architectonic and make the idea of transcendental logic prob-
lematic.
First of all, we must make clear to ourselves in what respect
Kant was justified in presenting in the Analytic of Concepts
not only the discussion of the two elements of pure knowledge
but also the problem of their unity.
If the essence of pure thought consists in its reference to
intuition with a view to serving the latter, then, when properly
conceived, an analytic of pure thought must introduce this
reference as such into the development of its problematic. That
this takes place with Kant thus proves that the finitude of
thought is the theme of the analytic. If the primacy of transcen-
70

dental logic is understood in this sense, it in no wise effects
a diminution of the role of the transcendental aesthetic, to

say nothing of its complete elimination. On the other hand,
if the reason for the priority accorded to transcendental logic

is understood, this priority disappears, not to the benefit of the
transcendental aesthetic but to that of a formulation of the
question which takes up agam, on a more original basis,
the central question of the essential unity of ontological knowl-

edge and its justification.
Because Kant assigned the discussion of the conditions and

principles of the use of pure concepts to the Analytic of Con-
cepts, the relation of pure thought to pure intuition expressed
under the heading of "the use of pure concepts" comes neces-
sarily to be the theme of the exposition. Nevertheless, the
element of thought remains the point of departure for the for-
mulation of the question of the essential unity of pure knowledge.
The tendency to proceed in this way is constantly reinforced
because of the fact that the categories, which at bottom contain
the problem of essential unity, are always presented as notions
under the heading of pure concepts of the understanding. To
this must be added that Kant found it necessary, in view of
his primary orientation on the element of thought, to refer to
traditional formal logic as that which passes judgment on
thought in general. In this way, that which, when transposed
to the transcendental level, leads to the problem of the pure
concepts as categories acquires the character of a logical, albeit
logico-transcendental, exposition.
Finally, this orientation on the logos and on ratio, in con-
formity with the meaning of these terms in Western metaphys-
ics, enjoys from the first a priority in the laying of the foun-
dation of metaphysics. This priority is expressed in Kant's
designation of the laying of the foundation as a Critique of
Pure Reason.
71

Furthermore, in order to organize and present this "com-
plicated web of human knowledge," ^^ which for the first time
was to become manifest through his analytic, Kant had need
of a definite framework which a logic of pure knowledge, newly
devised, could most easily borrow from formal logic.
As self-evident as this dominant and many-sided role of

"logic" in the Critique of Pure Reason may be, the following
interpretation of the later and decisive stages of the laying of
the foundation of ontology must go beyond the architectonic
which governs the external succession of the problems and their
presentation in order to bring to Ught the internal development

of the problematic which led Kant to adopt this form of
presentation.
The Third Stage of the Laying of the Foundation:

The Intrinsic Possibility of the Essential
Unity of the Ontological Synthesis
The answer, apparently firmly estabUshed, to the question

of the essential unity of ontological knowledge is progressively
transformed when one tries to determine this unity with greater
precision and finally becomes the problem of the possibility
of such a unification. In the pure synthesis, pure intuition and

pure thought must be able to meet one another a priori.
But what and how must this pure intuition itself be in order
to satisfy the requirements of such a unification? It is now a
question of presenting the pure synthesis in such a way as to
reveal how it is able to unify time and the notion. The presenta-
tion of the original formation of the essential unity of ontological
knowledge is the meaning and the purpose of that which Kant
termed the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories.
69. A85,B 117,NKS,p. 121.
72
Therefore, if the basic intention of the Deduction is to be
found in the analytical exploration of the fundamental struc-
ture of the pure synthesis, its true content cannot appear if it
is presented as a quaestio juris. The quaestio juris, then, may

not be taken as a guide for the interpretation of the central
doctrine of the Kantian critique. On the contrary, it is neces-
sary to explain, with respect to the fundamental orientation
of the Deduction, why the latter is presented in the form of a
quaestio juris and what the significance of this mode of presenta-
tion is.
For reasons that will be given below,'''^ the present inter-

pretation will be confined exclusively to the development of
the Transcendental Deduction as it appears in the first edition.
Kant repeatedly stressed the "difficulty" of the deduction and

sought to "remedy" its "obscurity." The diversity and com-
plexity of the relations involved in the problem of the deduc-
tion, properties which become increasingly apparent as the
content of this problem is made precise, prevented Kant from
the very beginning from remaining content with a single point
of departure for the deduction and a single way of carrying

it out. But despite the diversity of his approach to the prob-
lem of the deduction, Kant still found his labors immense and
unceasing. Often it is only on the way thereto that the objective
pursued by the deduction is clearly perceived and expressed.
And what should first be disclosed in the course of the deduc-
tion is often anticipated in a simple "preliminary observation."
The intrinsic complexity of the problem also frequently gives
rise to the circumstance that certain relationships, the clari-
fication of which occasions special difficulty, are overemphasized,

this overemphasis in turn leading to an overestimation of their
real significance. This applies particularly to the discussion
of pure thought as it bears on the essential unity of pure knowl-
edge taken as a whole.
70. Cf., below, §31, p. 166.
73
The present interpretation will not follow in detail aU the
tortuous paths of the Transcendental Deduction but will lay
bare the original character and development of the problematic.
To this end, it is necessary first to make sufficiently clear the
true objective of the transcendental deduction with regard to

the chief problem of the laying of the foundation of meta-
physics.
§16. The Explication of the Transcendence of

Finite Reason as the Basic Purpose of the
Transcendental Deduction
A finite cognitive being is able to relate itself to an essent

which it itself is not and which it has not created, only if this
essent can by itself come forward to be met. However, in

order that this essent can be encountered as the essent that
it is, it must be "recognized" in advance as essent, i.e., with
respect to the structure of its Being. But this implies that on-
tological knowledge, which in this circumstance is always
pre-ontological, is the condition of the possibility that an
essent as such can, in general, become an ob-ject for a finite
being.'î AU finite bemgs must have this basic ability, which
can be described as a turning toward . . , [orientation
toward . . .] which lets something become an ob-ject.
71. The literal translation of entgegenstehen, namely, "to take up

a position opposite to" often results in locutions which are extremely
awkward. Hence, except in those passages where a literal translation
is clearly required, term by "become an ob-ject" or

I translate the
"ob-jectification" and Entgegenstehenlassen by "letting become an
ob-ject" or "act of ob-jectification." The use of the hyphen here is
intended to convey the sense of activity implicit in the word "object"

and its German equivalent Gegenstand. It should be noted, however,
that this activity which Heidegger seeks to emphasize by his use of
entgegenstehen is prior to that act of objectification referred to in
theory of knowledge. (J. S. C.)
74

In this primordial act of orientation, the finite being first
pro-poses to itself a free-space [Spielraum] within which some-

thing can "correspond" to it. To hold oneself in advance in
such a free-space and to form it originally is nothing other
than transcendence which marks aU finite comportment [Ver-
halteri] with regard to the essent. If the possibility of ontological
knowledge is based upon the pure synthesis, and if it is on-
tological knowledge which makes the act of ob-jectification
possible, then the pure synthesis must manifest itself as that
which organizes and supports the unified totality of the intrinsic,
essential structure of transcendence. Through the elucidation

of the structure of the pure synthesis the inmost essence of
the finitude of reason is revealed.
Finite knowledge is receptive intuition. As such, it requires
determinative thinking. On this account, pure thought lays
claim to a central role in the problem of ontological knowledge,
although without prejudice to — indeed, because of — the priority
which intuition enjoys in all knowledge.
To what service is pure thinking called in its subsidiary
function? What is its task relative to that which makes the
essential structure of transcendence possible? It is just this
question relative to the essence of pure thought —although
when put in this way it appears to isolate this element anew
that must lead to the core of the problem of the essential
unity of ontological knowledge.
It is no accident that Kant, in the Transition to the Transcen-
dental Deduction of the Categories,''^ aUudes to the finitude,
which he clearly perceives, of our act of representation and
especially to that act as an act of pure knowledge, "for we
are not here speaking of its causality by means of the will."
On the contrary, the question is: What power is the act of
representation as such able to exercise relative to the essent
to which it relates itself? Kant states that the "representation
72. A 92f., B 124f., NKS, p. 125f.
75
in itself" "cannot produce its object so far as its existence is
concerned." Our mode of cognition is not ontically creative;

it is not able of itself to bring the essent before itself, Midway
in the discussion of the Transcendental Deduction, Kant em-
phasizes that "outside our knowledge we have nothing which
we could set over against this knowledge as corresponding to
^3
it."
If our cognition as finite must be a receptive intuition, then

it is not sufficient merely to establish this fact, for the problem
now arises: What does the possibility of this by no means self-
evident reception of the essent entail?

Obviously this: that the essent by itself can come forward
to be met, i.e., appear as ob-jective [Gegenstehendes]. How-
ever, if the presence of the essent is not subject to our control,
then our being dependent on its reception requires that the
essent have in advance and at all times the possibility of becom-
ing an ob-ject.
A receptive intuition can take place only in a faculty which
lets something become an ob-ject in an act of orientation
toward . . . , which alone constitutes the possibiUty of a pure
correspondence. And what is it that we, by ourselves, let become
an ob-ject? It cannot be something essent. If not an essent,
then a Nothmg [Nichts].'^'*' Only if the act of ob-jectification
is a holding oneself into Nothing [Sichhineinhalten in das
Nichts] can an act of representation within this Nothing let,
in place of it, something not nothing, i.e., an essent, come
73. A104,NKS,p. 134.

74. Nichts is usually translated as "nothingness" or "negativity,"
but in view of the fact that Heidegger introduces it in contexts
wherein can only be translated as "nothing" (for example, "What
it
is to be investigated is the essent —

and nothing else; only the essent
— and nothing more; simply and solely the essent and beyond that —
nothing. But what about this nothing?" What is Metaphysics, op. cit.,
p. 358), it seems only consistent to continue to so translate it, capi-
talizing the word to avoid confusion. (J, S. C.)
76

forward to be met, supposing such to be empirically manifest.
Naturally, this Nothing of which we speak is not the nihil
absolutum. What it has to do with the act of ob-jectification
remains to be discussed.
Since Kant so clearly places finitude in the perspective of
transcendence, there is no need, under the pretext of avoiding
an alleged "subjective ideaUsm," of invoking that "return to
the object" about which so much noise is made today, a noise
unaccompanied by an adequate comprehension of the problem.
In truth, a consideration of the essence of finitude inevitably
forces us to a consideration of the question of the conditions
governing the possibility of a precursory orientation toward the
object, i.e., to a consideration of the question of the nature
of the ontological turning toward the object necessary for this.
Thus, in the transcendental deduction, i.e., in connection

with the clarification of the intrinsic possibiUty of ontological
knowledge, Kant is the first to propound the decisive question:
"At this point we must make clear to ourselves what we mean
by the expression 'an object of representations,' " "^^ It is a
matter of investigating the nature of that which confronts
us in the act of ob-jectification. "Now we find that our thought
of the relation of all knowledge to its object carries with it an
element of necessity; the object is viewed as that which prevents
our modes of knowledge from being haphazard or arbitrary,
and which determines them a some definite fashion," "^^
priori in
In this act of letting something take up a position opposite
to , . . as such, is manifested something "which is opposed"
[was dawider isi\.
Kant refers to an immediate datum in order to make this

opposition understandable and does not neglect to character-
75, A 104, NKS, p, 134,

76. Ibid. The expression "was dawider ist" ("which is opposed")
which appears in the original disappears in Smith's translation.
(J. S. C.)
77
ize its unique structure more closely. It should be noted, however,
that it is not a question here of a character of resistance
inherent in the essent or of the pressure of sensation on us,
but of the precursory resistance of Being. The objectivity of
objects "carries with it" something which constrains ("some-
thing of necessity"). Through this constraint all that is encoun-
tered is in advance forced into an accord [Einstimmigkeit],
with reference to which also a manifestation of what is encoun-
tered as not in accord is first possible. This precursory and
constant drawing together into unity [Zusammenzug auj Ein-
heit] involves the [anticipativel pro-position of unity. The act
of representation of a representative and unifying unity char-
acterizes the essence of that type of representation which Kant
names a concept. This designates "a consciousness" in the
sense of an act of representation of unity. ^^ The act of ob-
jectification is, therefore, the "primordial concept" [Urbegriff]

and, insofar as conceptual representation is assigned to the
understanding, is the fundamental activity of the understanding.
The latter as a complete totality contains in itself a diversity
of modes of unification. Consequently, the pure understanding
is revealed as the faculty which makes the act of ob-jectification
possible. The understanding as a totahty gives in advance all
that is opposed to the haphazard. Representing unity originally
and precisely as unifying, the understanding presents to itself
a form of constraint which in advance imposes its rule on all
possible modes of togetherness. "The representation of a uni-

versal condition according to which a certain manifold can
be posited in uniform fashion is called a rule." "^^
The concept
"may, indeed, be quite imperfect or obscure. But a concept is
always, as regards its form, something universal which serves
as a rule." '°
77. A103f.,NKS,p. 134.

78. A113,NKS,p. 140.
79. A106,NKS,p. 135.
78

Now, the pure concepts (conceptus reflectentes) are those
which have such normative unities as their sole content. They
serve not only to furnish us with rules, but, as pure acts of
representation, they provide, first of all and in advance, the
normative as such. Thus, it is in connection with his explanation
of the act of ob-jectification that Kant first arrives at the pri-

mordial concept of the understanding. "We may now char-
acterize it as the faculty of rules. This distinguishing mark is
more fruitful and approximates more closely to its essential

««
nature."
Now, if it is the understanding which makes the act of ob-
jectification possible, and if it is the understanding which has
the power of regulating all that the "intuition" brings forth,
is it not then defined as the supreme faculty? Has not the
servant changed into the master? And what are we to think
of the subsidiary function of the understanding, a function
which up to now has been regarded as essential, as the true
index of its finitude? Supposing his explication of the under-
standing as the faculty of rules to be descriptive of its essence,
has Kant, in the decisive stages of the problematic of the tran-
scendental deduction, forgotten that the understanding is finite?
However, inasmuch as it is the finitude of reason which

gives rise to and defines the whole problem of the possibility
of metaphysics as such, this supposition must be rejected.
But how then may the now dominant role of the understanding
be reconciled with its subordination? Can it be that in its
dominance, as that which ob-jectifies the rules of unity, it is
basically a subordination? Can it be that in this function the
understanding reveals its deepest finitude, since, in letting some-

thing become an ob-ject, it betrays, in a most primordial form,
the neediness of a finite being?
As a matter of fact, the understanding is — in its finitude
the supreme faculty, i.e., finite to the highest degree. And if
80. A 126, NKS, p. 147.
79
it is, then the dependence of the pure understanding on intuition
should come most clearly to light in the fundamental act of
the understanding, namely, in the act of ob-jectification. Nat-
urally, the intuition concerned must be pure rather than em-
pirical.
It is only insofar as the pure understanding as understanding

is the servant of pure intuition that it can remain the master
of empirical intuition.
But pure intuition itself — it above all—bears witness to
a finite essence. It is only in their structural unity that the
finitude of pure intuition and pure thought is fully expressed,
this finitude being revealed as transcendence. However, if the

source of the unity of the elements of pure knowledge is the
pure synthesis, then the disclosure of the total synthetic struc-
ture of this synthesis is revealed as that which alone leads us

to the objective of the transcendental deduction, i.e., to the
elucidation of transcendence.
§17. The Two Ways of the Transcendental

Deduction
The determination of the problematic of ontological knowl-

edge has revealed the inner meaning of the transcendental
deduction. The transcendental deduction is the analytical rev-
elation of the total structure of the pure synthesis. At first
sight, this interpretation of the transcendental deduction does

not seem to correspond to its verbal concept. The interpretation
seems even to contradict Kant's own specific explication of
what is implied by the deduction. But before coming to a
decision about this, we must first trace the development of
the deduction and in this way present it concretely. To this
end, our interpretation will be confined to the Third Section ^^ of
81. A 115-128, NKS, p. 141-9.
80

the Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding, in
which Kant discusses the elements of the deduction "in sys-
^^
tematic interconnection."
The heading of this section expresses clearly that the prob-
lem of the intrinsic possibility of ontological knowledge is
nothing other than the revelation of transcendence. According

to this heading, the deduction treats Of the Relation of the
Understanding to Objects in General, and the Possibility of
Knowing Them a priori. However, if one wishes to understand
the twofold way along which Kant takes the deduction, it is
necessary again to remind ourselves of its objective.
The essent is accessible to a finite being only on the basis of
a precursory act of ob-jectification which at the same time is
orientation toward that something. This [activity] admits in

advance all entities capable of being encountered into the
horizon of unity which forms the condition of all possible modes
of togetherness [Zusammengehorigkeit]. The unity which unifies

a priori must anticipate the encounter able. What is encountered
is itself, however, already included in advance in the horizon
of time pro-posed by pure intuition. The anticipatory, unifying
unity of the pure understanding must itself, therefore, also have
been united beforehand with pure intuition.
This totality composed of pure intuition and pure under-

standing, united in advance, "constitutes" the free-space within
which all essents can be encountered. It is advisable to show,
relative to this totahty of transcendence, how (i.e., here con-
jointly) pure understanding and pure intuition are dependent
on one another a priori.
This proof of the intrinsic possibility of transcendence can

be conducted in two ways.
First, the presentation can begin with the pure understanding
and through the elucidation of its essence reveal its intrinsic
82. A115,NKS,p. 141.

dependence on time. The first way begins, as it were, "from
above" with the understanding and leads down to the intuition.
(A 116-120.) (NKS, pp. 141-44.)

The second way proceeds "from below," ^^ beginning with
the intuition and goes up to the pure understanding. (A 120-
128.) (NKS,
pp. 144-149.)
Each of the two ways achieves the revelation of the "two
extremes, namely, sensibility and understanding [which] must
stand in necessary connection with each other." ^^ What is
essential here is not the connecting of the two faculties but
the structural elucidation of their essential unity. The decisive
factor is that which enables them to be so connected. It is neces-

sary, therefore, in each of the two ways to trace down this
central, unifying factor and to bring it to light as such.The rev-
elation of the pure synthesis takes place by means of this
repeated passage between both extremes. It is now a question

of presenting at least the main points of the twofold course of
the deduction.
a) THE FmST WAY
The necessary dependence of pure understanding on pure

intuition must be revealed in order that the unity which mediates
between them, the pure synthesis, can be made manifest in

its mediative capacity. This requires that the pure understand-
ing as the point of departure of the first way be interpreted
in such a way that from its structure its dependence on a
pure synthesis and, thereby, on a pure intuition becomes visi-
ble.
Consequently, the Deduction is something quite other than

a logical, deductive operation by means of which the existence
of the relations mentioned above between the understanding
83. A119, NKS, p. 143.

84. A 124, NKS, p. 146.
82
on the one hand and the pure synthesis and pure intuition on
the other can be inferred. Rather, from its very beginning the
deduction has in view the totahty of finite, pure knowledge.
The exphcit presentation of the relations structurally consti-
tutive of the totality progresses from one element to the other
while maintaining this inclusive point of view. Every statement
in the Transcendental Deduction remains incomprehensible
unless from the first one keeps the finitude of transcendence
unwaveringly in view.
The character of being in opposition [Dawider], which
makes the act of ob-jectification possible, is manifested in an
anticipatory pro-position [Vorweghalten] of unity. In this act
of representation of unity, the act appears to itself as bound to
unity, i.e., as that which maintains its self-identity even in the
pure action of representing unity as such.^^ Manifestly, "some-
thing" can confront this act of representation only if the act
of representation of unity as such is itself confronted by the
unifying unity as regulative. It is only because the act turns
toward itself in this way that what is encountered is able to
^^
"concern us."
The representation of unity as an act of pure thought neces-
sarily has the character of an "I think." The pure concept as
consciousness of unity in general is necessarily pure self-con-
sciousness. This pure consciousness is not actually present and
operative only on certain occasions but must constantly be
possible. It is essentially an "I can." "This pure original un-
changeable consciousness I shall name transcendental apper-
ception." The act of representation of unity which lets some-

^^
thing become an ob-ject is based on this apperception "as a

faculty." ^^ Only as the constant "I can" is the "I think" able
85. A108,NKS,p. 136.

86. A116, NKS,p. 141.
87. A107, NKS,p. 136.
88. A 1 17, fn., NKS, p. 142.
83
to let the being in opposition of unity become ob-jectified, if
it is true that the act of binding [Bindung] is possible only with

reference to a mode of behavior essentially free. The pure
understanding in originally pro-posing unity to itself acts as
trancendental apperception.
But what is represented in the unity which the transcendental
apperception pro-poses? Is it perhaps the essent in totality
presented all at once in the sense of the totum simul intuited by

intuitus originarius? But this pure thinking is finite and, in con-
sequence, incapable of setting the essent opposite to itself
solely by means of its own act of representation, to say nothing

of representing the totahty of the essent all at once and as a
unity. The unity represented first waits for the essent to come
forward and in this way makes possible the encountering of
[different] objects which manifest themselves at the same time.
As non-ontic, this unity has the essential tendency to unify
that which is not yet unified. This is why Kant, after the
explication of transcendental apperception, states of the unity
represented by it: "This synthetical unity presupposes or in-
^®
cludes a synthesis."
In characteristic fashion, Kant hesitates to define with pre-
cision the structural relations involved in the unity of the
unifying synthesis. In any case, the latter belongs necessarily to
the former. The unity is by nature unifying. This implies that
the act of representation of unity takes place as an act of
unification which, in order to realize its complete structure,
requires an anticipation of unity. Kant does not hesitate to say
that the transcendental apperception "presupposes" the syn-
thesis.
Now, it has already been established in the second stage of

the laying of the foundation that all synthesis is the product
of the imagination. Accordingly, the transcendental apper-
ception has an essential relation to the pure imagination. As
89. A 118,NKS,p. 142.
84
pure, the latter cannot re-present something akeady empirically
given, in relation to which this faculty would be merely repro-
ductive; rather, as pure imagination it is necessarily consti-
tutive a priori, i.e., purely productive. Kant also calls the pure
productive imagination "transcendental." "Thus the principle
of the unity of pure (productive) synthesis of imagination,
prior to [before] apperception, is the ground of the possibility
^^
of all knowledge, especially of experience."
What is the significance here of the phrase "before all apper-
ception"? Does Kant mean to assert that the pure synthesis
precedes the transcendental apperception in the order of the
establishment of the possibility of a pure knowledge? This
interpretation would coincide with the assertion above, namely,
that the apperception "pre-supposes" the pure synthesis.
But does this "before" have yet another significance? In
fact,Kant employs the expression in a way which first gives
the whole statement an essential sense and one so decisive that
the interpretation mentioned above is at the same time included
in it. At one point, Kant speaks "of an object for [before] a

quite different intuition." ^^ In this passage, to replace the
"before" [vor] by "for" [fUr] would not only be useless but
would also serve to weaken the text, especially when one
remembers the Latin expression coram intuitu intellectuali
which Kant likewise employs.^^ Only if one takes the "before"

in the phrase cited to mean coram does the nature of the struc-
tural unity of transcendental apperception and pure imagina-
tion come to light. Consequently, the representation of unity has
essentially in view a unifying unity, i.e., this act is in itself
unifying.
However, the pure synthesis must unify a priori. Therefore,
90. A118,NKS,p. 143.

91. A 287, NKS, p. 293. Cf. Ndchtrage zur Kritik (from Kanfs
Posthumous Works, ed. by B. Erdmann), 1881, p. 45.
92. A 249, NKS, p. 266.
85
what it unifies must be given to it a priori. Now the universal,
pure intuition which is a priori, receptive, and productive is
time. Hence, pure imagination must be essentially related to
time. Only in this way is pure imagination revealed as the

mediator between transcendental apperception and time.
This is why Kant prefaces all discussion of the transcendental
deduction by a "general observation which . . . must be
borne in mind as being quite fundamental." ^^ It states that
all "modifications of the mind . . . are . . . finally subject
to time. ... In it they must all be ordered, connected, and

brought into relation." ®^ One may be surprised at first that
neither in the first nor in the second way of the transcendental
deduction does Kant discuss explicitly and in detail the essential
relation between time and pure imagination. Rather, the entire
analysis is centered on the task of bringing to fight the essential
relation of pure understanding to the pure synthesis of the im-
agination. It is by means of this relation that the true nature
of the understanding, namely, its finitude, is most clearly re-
vealed. The understanding is what it is only insofar as it
"presupposes or involves" the pure imagination, "This unity of

apperception in relation to the synthesis of imagination is the
understanding; and this same unity with reference to the tran-
scendental synthesis of the imagination, the pure understand-
ing >> 95
b) THE SECOND WAY
The necessary dependence of pure intuition on pure under-

standing, i.e., the unity which mediates between them, the
pure synthesis, must be revealed as a mediator. Hence, the
93. A99,NKS,p. 131.

94. Ibid.
95. A119,NKS,p. 143.
86

second way begins with the following words: "We shall now,
starting from below, namely, with the empirical, strive to make
clear the necessary connection in which understanding, by means
^^
of the categories, stands to appearances."
Even here, where it would seem advisable to set forth explic-
itly the pure condition of the receptivity of finite knowledge,

Kant does not linger for a discussion of pure intuition (time)
but proceeds immediately to the proof that although "sensibility"
is receptive, it "has nothing" in itself corresponding to a con-
nection [Verbundenheit] between phenomena. However, this
coimection must be capable of being experienced in finite
cognition, since a finite being never has the essent as a totum

simul; rather, as Kant states exphcitly, what is encountered is
^"^
found "separately and singly." Therefore, if the essents
encountered are to be able to reveal themselves as connected,
it is necessary that "connection" in general be understood in
advance. To re-present connection in advance means that one
must first form, by representing it, the notion of relation in
general. But this power of "forming" relations originally is
pure imagination itself.
According to the "general observation," ®^ the medium

wherein joining and forming connections is possible is time
as the universal pure intuition. The possibility of encountering
an essent capable of revealing itself in its ob-jective [gegen-

stehenden] connectedness must have its basis in the imagination
as that which is essentially related to time. In the pure act of
forming determinate relations, the pure imagination proposes

a mode of unification that is normative and opposed in advance
to the arbitrary reception of what is encountered. This horizon
of normative connection [Bindung] contains the pure "affinity"
96. Ibid.
97. A 120, NKS, p. 144.
98. A 99, NKS, p. 131.
87

of appearances. "That the affinity of appearances . . . should
only be possible by means of this transcendental function of
imagination is indeed strange but is none the less an obvious
^^
consequence of the preceding."
Every act of connection, and particularly the pure act of
forming unity in general, incorporates a preliminary act of
representation of unity. If the pure synthesis is to function
a priori, this act of representation itself must be a priori and
must take place in such a way that it constantly accompanies
all formation of unities as that which is invariably one and the
same. This identity [dieses Selbst] which is "unchanging and
permanent" is the ego of transcendental apperception. As time
pertains to all empirical intuition, so also is the precursory
formation of affinity in the pure imagination necessary to this
same intuition as that which lets the essent be encountered in

the order proper to it. But to pure imagination, however,
"must be added" pure apperception, if reception is to be capable
of being sustained by a pure act of orientation, i.e., by an
act of ob-jectification.^*'"
Now, the first way has revealed that the transcendental apper-
ception which, through the essential mediation of the pure
imagination, must be joined to pure intuition does not exist in
isolation, and, therefore, it is not coupled to the pure imagina-
tion merely because the latter occasionally has need of it. On
the contrary, the transcendental apperception, inasmuch as
it is an act of representation of unity, must in turn have at hand

a unity which is formed by an act of unification. Thus, m the
second way as well as in the first, everything leads to the em-
phasis on the imagination in its role as a mediator. "A pure
imagination, which conditions all a priori knowledge, is thus
one of the fundamental faculties of the human soul. By its
means we bring the manifold of intuition on the one side [and]
99. A123,NKS,p. 146.

100. A124,NKS,p. 146.
88

into connection with the condition of the necessary unity of
pure apperception on the other." ^°^
Thus, the triplicity of the three elements —pure intuition,
pure imagination, and pure apperception — is no longer that

of a mere juxtaposition of faculties. Through the revelation of
the mediating function of the pure synthesis, the transcendental
deduction has estabHshed the intrinsic possibility of the essential
unity of pure knowledge. This constitutes the pure act of ob-
jectification and, by this means, first makes manifest a horizon
of objectivity in general. And because pure knowledge in this
way first opens up the free-space necessary for a finite being,

''^^
i.e., the space in which "aU relation of being or not being"
occurs, this knowledge must be termed ontological.
However, the understanding as that which bears witness
to human finitude has a special part to play in the deduction.
In the course of the various steps which make up the one or

the other of the two ways, the understanding loses its priority
and by this very loss manifests its essence, which consists in
having to be grounded in the pure synthesis of the imagination,
a synthesis which is bound to time.
§18. The External Form of the Transcendental

Deduction
For what reason does the transcendental deduction, the pur-

pose of which is the elucidation of transcendence, assume the
form of a quaestio juris? By what right and within what limits
101. Ibid. The elimination of the "and" proposed by Erdmann

and Riehl robs the exposition —which
put in a way that is perhaps
is
difficult —
of its decisive sense, according to which, the transcendental
imagination on the one hand unifies pure intuition in itself and on
the other unites the latter with pure apperception [Smith also elimi-
nates the "and"].
102. Alio, NKS,p. 138.
89
does this mode of propounding the question take a "juridical"
form, which to be sure appears only in the first introduction
of the transcendental deduction and not in the course of its
development?
Kant did not employ the term "deduction" in its philosophical
sense of deductio as opposed to intuitus,^^^ but in the sense

in which a "jurist" would understand the term. In the course of
a lawsuit "rights" are asserted and "claims" denied. Such a
legal action necessarily involves two factors: first, the establish-
ment of the actual facts and the points under dispute (quid
jacti), and second, the exposition of that which the law recog-
nizes as the underlying right (quid juris) in the case. Jurists

caU a "deduction" the exposition of the conditions necessary
to the establishment of a right.
Why, at this point, does Kant present the problem of the
possibility of metaphysics in the form of such a juridical deduc-
tion? Does a "legal action" underlie the problem of the intrin-
sic possibility of ontology?

It has already been shown how, for Kant, the question of
the possibility of metaphysica generalis (ontology) arises from
the question of the possibility of the traditional metaphysica
specialis.^^^ The object of metaphysica specialis is the rational
knowledge (knowledge by pure concepts) of the super-sensible
essent. In these pure concepts (categories) Hes the pretension
to ontic knowledge a priori. Does this pretension have any
foundation?
The discussion with traditional metaphysics considered with
respect to "its final purpose" and relative to its proper possi-
bihty has become a legal action. Pure reason must "institute
a process;" the witnesses must be examined. Kant speaks of a

"tribunal." ^"^ The legal action thus included in the problem of
103. Descartes, Regulae ad directionem ingenii, Opera, ed. by

Adam Tannery, tom. X,
et p. 368sqq.
104. C/. above § 2, p. 14ff.
105. A 699, B 697; A 703, B 731; NKS, p. 549, p. 553.
90
ontological knowledge requires a deduction, i.e., a demonstra-
tion of the possibility, insofar as pure concepts are concerned,
of referring a priori to objects. Since the right to use these con-
cepts which are not derived from experience cannot be defended
by appealing to the fact of their actual use, they "always de-
^"^
mand a deduction."
The legitimacy of the categories must be decided by the
elucidation of their essence. As pure representations of unities
in a finite act of representation they are essentially dependent
on the pure on pure
synthesis and, hence, Put in intuition.
another way, the solution of the problem, which is formulated

simply as quaestio juris, is to be found in the disclosure of the
essence of the categories. They are not notions but pure con-
cepts which, by means of the pure imagination, are rendered
essentially relative to time. Endowed with such a nature, they
constitute transcendence. They contribute to the act of ob-
jectification. Because of this they are, from the first, deter-
minations of objects, i.e., of the essent itself insofar as it is
encountered by a finite being.

Through the explication of the essence of the categories as
elements or articulations [Fugen] necessary to transcendence,
their "objective reaUty" is demonstrated. However, in order
to understand the problem of the objective reality of the cate-
gories as a problem of transcendence, it is necessary that one

should not take the Kantian term "reality" [Realitdt] in the
sense given it by modem "theory of knowledge," according to
which "Reality" signifies what Kant denoted by the term Dasein
or "existence." Rather, "reality" means, according to Kant's
exact translation, "fact-hood" [Sachheit] and alludes to the
quiddity [Wasgehalt] of the essent which is delimited through
essentia. When Kant brings the objective reahty of the cate-
gories into question, what he is asking is this: In what respect
can the real content (reality) of what is represented in a pure
concept be a determination of that which is ob-jectified in finite
106. A85,B117,NKS,p. 121.

knowledge, i.e., of the essent qua object? The categories are
objectively real insofar as they belong to ontological knowledge
which "produces" [forms] the transcendence of a finite being,
that is, the letting something take up a position opposite to. . . .
Thus, it is evident that if one fails to interpret the expression

"objective reality" from the point of view of the pure synthesis
of the transcendental imagination as that which forms the es-
sential unity of ontological knowledge, if one confines himself
exclusively to the notion of "objective validity," an expression
which Kant employs only in the preUminary formulation of the
transcendental deduction as a juridical question, and if, in ad-
dition, one interprets "validity" to mean the logical validation
of a judgment, an interpretation contrary to the sense required
by the Kantian problematic —then the decisive problem is en-
tirely lost to view.
The problem of the "origin and the truth" ^^^ of the cate-
gories, however, is the problem of the possible manifestation of
the Being of the essent in the essential unity of ontological
knowledge. If this question is to be conceived concretely and
grasped as a problem, then the quaestio juris should not be
understood as a question of vaUdation, Rather, the quaestio
juris is only a way of expressing the necessity of an analytic of
transcendence, i.e., of a pure phenomenology of the subjectivity
of the subject, and furthermore, of the subject as finite.

If the fundamental problem for which the traditional Meta-
physica specialis provided the occasion is thus resolved by the
transcendental deduction, has not the laying of the foundation
already attained its objective in the stage just discussed? At the
same time, does not what has now been stated justify the cur-
rent opinion which holds, with respect to the interpretation of

the Critique of Pure Reason, that the transcendental deduction
is the central point of discussion within the positive part of The
Transcendental Doctrine of Elements? What need, then, is there
107. A 128, NKS, p. 149.
92
of an additional stage of the laying of the foundation of onto-
logical knowledge? What is it that requires an even more pri-
mordial regression to the ground of the essential unity of

ontological knowledge?
The Fourth Stage of the Laying of the Foundation:
The Ground of the Intrinsic Possibility
of Ontological Knowledge
The intrinsic possibility of ontological knowledge is revealed

through the specific totality of the constitution of transcendence.
Its binding medium [zusammenhaltende Mitte] is the pure
imagination, Kant not only finds this result "strange," but also
stresses more than once the obscurity which inevitably engulfs
all discussion of the transcendental deduction. At the same
time, the laying of the foundation of ontological knowledge
strives —over and above a simple presentation of transcendence
— to elucidate this transcendence in such a way that it can be
developed into a systematic whole (transcendental philosophy =
ontology).
Now, the transcendental deduction has raised to a problem
the totaUty of ontological knowledge considered in its unity.
Given the decisive importance of finitude and the dominance of

the logical (rational) approach to the problems of metaphysics,
the understanding — or more precisely, its relation to pure imagi-
nation as the unifying medium —comes to the fore.

However, if all knowledge is primarily intuition and if finite
intuition is characterized by receptivity, then for an explication

of transcendence that is completely vahd the relation of the
transcendental imagination to pure intuition and also that of
pure understanding to pure intuition must be explicitly dis-
cussed. Such a task demands that the transcendental imagina-
93

tion be presented in its unifying function and that thereby the
constitution of transcendence and its horizon be exhibited in
itsmost intimate development, Kant undertakes the revelation
of the essential ground of ontological knowledge in the section
which adjoins the transcendental deduction and is entitled: The
Schematism of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding}^^
This reference to the position occupied by the chapter on
schematism within Kant's system and in the sequence of the
stages of the laying of the foundation in itself reveals that these
eleven pages of the Critique of Pure Reason form the heart of
the whole work. Without doubt, the decisive importance of the
Kantian theory of schematism first becomes obvious only on
the basis of the interpretation of the content of this doctrine.
This mterpretation must let itself be guided by the fundamental
problem of the transcendence of a finite being.
But, as before, Kant first introduces the problem in a form

which is rather superficial, linking it to the question of the possi-
ble subsumption of phenomena under the categories. The justi-
fication of this procedure, in conformity with the treatment of
the quaestio juris, must first await a working out of the internal
dynamic of the problem of transcendence,
§ 19. Transcendence and Sensibilization

[Versinnlichung]
If the essent is to be directly manifest to a finite being as

something already on hand, then this being must be able to re-
ceive it. In order to be possible, reception demands something
on the order of an act of orientation which cannot be arbitrary
but must be of such a nature as to make possible the precursory
encountering of the essent. But if the essent is to be capable of
offering itself, the horizon within which it is encountered must
itself have an offering-character [Angebotcharakter]. This act
108. A 137-148, B 176-187, NKS, pp, 180-8.
94
of orientation must in itself be an anticipatory proposition of
something which has the nature of an offer.
If the horizon of ob-jectification is to be capable of fulfilling
its function, this offering-character must have a certain per-

ceptibility. By "perceptible" we mean that which is capable of
being immediately received by intuition. Hence, the horizon in
its character as a perceptible offer must present itself in advance
and constantly as pure aspect [Anblick]. It follows that the act
of ob-jectification of the finite understanding must offer objectiv-
ity as such in an intuitive manner, i.e., that the pure under-

standing must be based upon a pure intuition that sustains and
guides it.
But what is necessary in order that the horizon of the pre-

cursory act of orientation be made perceptible? A finite being
must have the power of making the horizon intuitive, i.e., of
"forming" spontaneously the aspect of that which is capable of
offering itself. However, if as the transcendental deduction in-
dicates, pure intuition (time) stands in an essential relation to
the pure synthesis, then the pure imagination brings about the
formation of the aspect characteristic of the horizon. Not only
does the pure imagination "form" the intuitive perceptibility of
the horizon, in that it "creates" this horizon by the free tuming-
toward, but also in this act it is "formative" [bildend] in yet a
second sense, namely, in that it provides for the possibility of
an "image" [Bild] in general.
The expression "image" is to be taken here in its most basic

sense, according to which we say that a landscape presents a
beautiful "image" (aspect) or that a group presents a pitiful
"image" (aspect). And in the course of the second way of the
deduction which proceeds from the internal connection of time
and pure imagination, Kant has already stated of the imagina-
tion that it "has to bring into the form of an image." ^°^
. . .
In the occurrence of this double formation of an image (the
109. A 120, NKS, p. 144.
95
production of an aspect) the ground of the possibility of tran-
scendence first becomes visible. This occurrence also renders
intelligible the aspect-character necessary to the essence of tran-
scendence, this essence being precursory, ob-jective, and of the
nature of an offer. But transcendence is, in truth, finitude itself.
If in the act of ob-jectification, transcendence is to render in-
tuitive the horizon formed in this way, finite intuition being
equivalent to sensibility, then to offer an aspect is to make the
horizon sensible. The horizon of transcendence can be formed

only in a sensibilization.
The act of ob-jectification is, considered from the point of
view of the pure understanding, an act of representation of
unities which, as such, regulate all modes of unification. Tran-
scendence is formed, therefore, in the sensibilization of pure

concepts. And since transcendence consists in a precursory act
of orientation, this sensibilization must likewise be pure.
Pure sensibilization takes place as a "schematism." Pure
imagination in forming the schema gives in advance the aspect
(image) of the horizon of transcendence. That the reference to
such a sensibilization is not sufficient, if one does not first know
its essence, follows from the very idea of sensibilization, quite
apart from the fact that this sensibilization can never actually
be exhibited.
Sensibility for Kant means finite intuition. Pure sensibifity
must be an act of intuition such that it receives its object in
advance, before all empirical reception. But the act of finite
intuition as such is not able to create the essent intuited. Hence,

sensibilization must be a reception of something which is formed
in the very act of reception itself, i.e., it must be an aspect
which, however, does not present the essent.
What, then, must be the character of that which is intuited m
pure sensibility? Can it have the nature of an "image"? What is
the meaning of this term "image"? How is the aspect, the pure
schema, "formed" in pure imagination, to be distinguished from
96

an image? And finally, and in spite of everything, in what sense
can the schema be called an "image"? Without a preliminary
interpretation of these phenomena relative to sensibilization,
the notion of schematism as the basis of transcendence remains

wrapped in complete obscurity.
§ 20. Image and Schema
In general, sensibilization denotes the manner in which a

finite being is able to make something intuitive, i.e., is able to
procure an aspect (image) of something. The significance of

the aspect or image differs according to the nature of what is
presented and the mode of this presentation.

Ordinarily, the term "image" means: the aspect of a definite
essent so far as it is manifest as something actually present.
This essent offers an aspect [of itseff]. In a secondary sense,
"image" can also mean an aspect which reproduces something
either now or no longer given; in still another sense, the term
in question can refer to an aspect which provides a model for
something yet to be produced.
In addition, the term "image" can have the very broad mean-
ing of "aspect in general" wherein it is not stated whether some-
thing essent or non-essent is thereby made rntuitable.
In fact, Kant uses the expression "image" in all three of these

senses: as an immediate aspect of an essent, as a given repro-
ductive aspect of an essent, and finally as an aspect of some-
thing in general. But these different senses of the word "image"
are not expressly distinguished from one another. Indeed, it is
even doubtful whether the different significations and modali-

ties [of the word] which have just been enumerated are sufficient
to clarify that which Kant discusses under the heading of sche-
matism.
The most common mode of procuring an aspect (forming
an image) is the empirical intuition of that which reveals it-
97
self. In this case, what reveals itself always has the character
of an immediately intuited particular (a "this-here" ) . To be
sure, this does not exclude the possibility of intuiting a plurality
of "this-here's" which together constitute a richer "this-here,"
for example, this landscape as an individual totality. The land-
scape is called a view [aspect] (image), species, just as if it
viewed us. An image, therefore, is always an intuitable "this-

here." On this account, every image having the character of a
reproduction, for example, a photograph, is only a copy of that
which reveals itself immediately as the "image."
The expression "image" is also frequently employed in this
second sense of reproduction. This thing here, this given photo-

graph qua this thing immediately presents an aspect; it is an
image in the first and broader sense of the term. But in reveal-
ing itself, it also reveals that which it reproduces. According to

this second sense, to procure an "image" no longer signifies
merely the immediate intuition of an essent but such activities,
for example, as taking a photograph or purchasing one.

From such a reproduction, it is possible to make a new re-
production, e.g., one may photograph a death mask. This

second reproduction immediately represents the death mask
and thus reveals the "image" (the immediate aspect) of the
deceased himself. The photograph of the death mask as the
reproduction of a reproduction is itself an image but only be-
cause it provides an "image" of the dead, i.e., shows how the
dead person appears or, rather, appeared. Sensibilization, ac-
cording to the meanings of the expression "image" thus far
differentiated, sometimes refers to the mode of immediate em-
pirical intuition and sometimes to the mode of immediate ap-
prehension of a reproduction presenting the aspect of an essent.
But a photograph is also capable of showing how something
resembUng a death mask appears in general. The death mask
is also able to reveal in its turn how in general the face of a
corpse appears. But a particular corpse can also reveal this.
98

The mask itself is also able to show how a death mask in gen-
eral looks, just as the photograph is able to reveal not only the
object photographed but also how a photograph in general
looks.
But what do all these aspects (images in the broadest sense)
of this dead man, of this mask, and of this photograph reveal?
Which "appearances" (eidos, idea) do they furnish us? What
do they make sensible? They reveal how something appears "in
general" through the one which applies to many. But the unity
which applies to many is what the representation represents
according to the modality of concepts. These aspects, then, are
to provide for the sensibilization of concepts.
But sensibilization in this sense can no longer mean the pro-
curing of an immediate aspect or intuition of a concept. A
concept as a represented universal may not be represented by
a repraesentatio singularis, which is what an intuition always
is. This is why a concept by its very essence cannot be put into
an image.
But in general, what does the sensibilization of a concept
signify? What pertains thereto? How does the aspect of an

essent either empirically present or represented or reproduced
share in such a sensibilization?
We say, for example, that this house which we perceive re-
veals how a house appears in general, consequently that which

we represent in the concept "house." But in what way does the
aspect of this house reveal the how of the appearance of a
house in general? The house itself, indeed, presents a definite
aspect. But we do not have to lose ourselves in this particular
house in order to know exactly how it appears. On the contrary,
this particular house is revealed as such that, in order to be a
house, it need not necessarily appear as, in fact, it does appear.
It reveals to us "only" the "how" of the possible appearance of
a house.
It is this "how" of the possibility of the actual appearance
99
which we represent to ourselves in connection with this par-
ticular house. A house can appear thus. By its appearance, this

actual house has restricted the range of possible appearances to
one particular appearance. But the result of this "decision"
interests us just as little as the result of those which turn upon
the actual appearance of other houses. What does interest us is
the range of possible modes of appearance as such: more pre-

cisely, that which delimits this range, i.e., that which regulates
and predetermines how, in general, something must appear in
order to be able, as a house, to present an aspect corresponding

to its nature. This predetermination of the rule is not a descrip-
tion which simply enumerates the "characteristics" which one
finds in a house but is a "distinguishing characteristic" [Auszeich-
neri] of the whole of that which is intended by "house."
But what is thus intended can, m general, be so intended only
if it is represented as something which regulates the possible
insertion of this complex [the house] into an empirical aspect.
The unity of a concept, insofar as it is unifying, that is, appUes
to many, can be represented only by the representation of the
way in which the rule prescribes the msertion of this pattern
into a possible aspect. If, in general, a concept is that which

serves as a rule, then conceptual representation is the supply-
ing, in advance, of the rule insofar as it provides an aspect cor-
responding to the specific way in which it regulates. Such a
representation is referred by a structural necessity to a possible
aspect and hence is in itself a particular mode of sensibilization.
Sensibilization does not give an immediate, intuitive aspect
of a concept. The immediate aspect which is necessarily called

forth with it is, properly speaking, not intended as such but ap-
pears as the possible object of the presentation whose mode of
regulation is represented. The rule is made manifest in the
empirical aspect precisely according to the mode of its regula-
tion.
Sensibilization, however, does not give us an immediate as-
100
pect of the concept as unity. This unity is not even thematically
intended as the content of an autonomous representation. What
this conceptual unity can and must be as unifying, it manifests
only as regulative. This unity is never apprehended in itself and,
furthermore, it is perceived as essentially determining the regu-
lation only if it is not considered in itself but in the exercise of
its regulative function. In not considering this unity in itself in
this way, we do not lose sight of it; on the contrary, by appre-
hending the exercise of this function we are able to perceive the
unity as regulative.
The representation of the regulative action as such is true
conceptual representation. What has hitherto been so termed,
namely, the representation of a unity which appUes to many,
was only an isolated element of the concept which, with regard
to its function as the rule which governs the specific act of sensi-
bilization just described, remains concealed.
However, if what is thematically represented in sensibiliza-
tion is neither the empirical aspect nor the isolated concept,
but the "index" of the rule which is the source of the image,
then this index must be examined more closely. The rule is
represented in the how of its regulation, that is, according to

the manner in which, in regulating the presentation, it inserts
itself in, and imposes itself on, the aspect which presents the
presentation. The act of representation of the how of the regula-
tion is the free (i.e., not bound to a definite representation)
"construction" [Bilden] of a sensibihzation. The latter, in the
sense just described, is the source of the image.
Such sensibilization takes place primarily in the imagination.
"This representation of a universal procedure of imagination
in providing an image for a concept
I entitle the schema of this
concept." 1^°
The formation of a schema insofar as it is ac-
complished as a mode of sensibilization is called schematism.
To be sure, the schema is to be distinguished from the image,
110. A 140, B 179f., NKS, p. 182.
101
but it is also related to the latter, i.e., the schema necessarily
possesses the character of an image. This character has its own
nature. It is neither only a simple aspect (an "image" in the
first sense) nor a reproduction (an "image" in the second
sense). It wiU be called, therefore, the schema-image.
§21. Schema and Schema-Image
A more precise characterization of the schema-image will

serve to clarify both its relationship to the schema and, at the
same time, the nature of the relation of the concept to the image.
The formation of schemata is the sensibilization of concepts.
What is the relation between the aspect of an essent immediately
represented and that which is represented of it in the concept?
In what sense is this aspect an "image" of the concept? This
question wiU be discussed with respect to two kinds of con-
cepts, namely, those which are sensible and emphical (e.g., the
concept of a dog) and those which are sensible and pure, the
mathematical concepts (e.g., the concept of a triangle or of a
number)
Kant stressed that an "object of experience" (the aspect ac-
cessible to us of a thing actually on hand) "or an image of such
a thing" (an actual reproduction or copy of an essent) never
"attains" ^^^ the empirical concept of the thing. Not attaining
the concept means, first of all, not presenting it "adequately."

But this does not mean that no adequate reproduction of the
concept is possible. With reference to the corresponding con-
cept, an empirical aspect of an essent can, in general, have no
reproductive function. This inadequacy pertains rather to the
schema-image, which, in the proper sense of the term, is the
image of the concept. To be sure, the empirical aspect contains
everything in the concept, if not more. But the aspect does not
contain its object in the manner in which the concept represents
111. A 141, B 180, NKS, p. 182.
102
it, i.e., as the one which appUes to many. The content of the
empirical aspect is presented as being one thing among many,
i.e., as particularized by that which is thematically represented

as such. This particular has renounced the possibility of being
just anything and, by this means, has become a possible example

for the one which regulates the indifferent many. In this act of
regulation, however, the general acquires its own specifically
articulated determination and is in no way to be contrasted with

the particular as being an indeterminate and confused "every-
thing and anything."
The representation of the rule is the schema. As such, it
necessarily remains relative to a possible schema-image to

which no particular thing can claim to be the only possible [ex-
ample]. "The concept 'dog' signifies a rule according to which
my imagination can delineate the figure of a four-footed animal
in a general manner, without limitation to any determinate
figure such as experience, or any possible image that I can
represent in concreto actually presents." ^^^ That the empirical
aspect is not adequate to its empirical concept is an expression
of the positive structural relation of the schema-image to the
schema. This relation makes the schema-image a possible pre-
sentation of the rule of presentation represented in the schema.
This means, at the same time, that beyond the representation
of this regulative unity the concept is nothing. What in logic is
termed a concept is based upon the schema. The concept "al-

^^^
ways refers directly to the schema."
Kant states of the empirical object that it is "even less" ade-
quate to its concept than is the "image" of the pure sensible
concept to this concept itself. Can we conclude from this, then,
that the schema-images of the mathematical concepts are ade-

quate to then: concepts? Obviously, one should not in this case
think of this adequacy in the sense of a reproduction. The
112. Ibid.
113. A 141, B 180, NKS, p. 182f.
103
schema-image of a mathematical construction is vaHd whether
or not it is empirically exact or crudely sketched.^^*
Obviously, Kant is thinking about the fact that a mathemati-
cal schema-image, e.g., a given triangle, must be either acute,
right, or obtuse. These suffice to exhaust the possibilities of a

triangle, whereas the possibilities are much more numerous
when it is a matter of the presentation of a house. On the other
hand, the range of presentability of an acute or a right triangle
is more extensive. Hence, by its limitation such a schema-image
approaches nearer to the unity of a concept, while by its greater
extension it approaches nearer to the generality of this unity.
But, however it may be, the image still has the appearance of
a particular, while the schema-image has "as its intention" the
unity of the general rule governing all possible presentations.
What is essential concerning the schema-image first becomes
clear from the following: The image does not derive its intuitive
character [Anblickscharakter] uniquely or in the first place

from the content of this image. Rather, this intuitive character
results both from the fact that the schema-image comes into
being and from the way in which it comes into being from a
possible presentation which is represented in its regulative func-
tion, thus bringing the rule within the sphere of a possible in-
tuition.
Only when the expression "image" is understood in this sense
of schema-image may five points taken one after the

others be called "an image of the number five." ^^^ The number
never assumes the aspect of these five points, and also it
itself
never assumes that of the symbol "5" or the symbol "V."

Doubtless, these symbols are in another way aspects of the
number in question, but it should be noted that although the
symbol "5" delineated in space has nothing in common with
the number, the aspect of the five points is numerable
1 14. Vber eine Entdeckung, ibid., p. 8, note.
115. A 140, B 179, NKS, p. 182.
104
through the number five. To be sure, this series of points does
not manifest the number merely because it can be run through

and because we are apparently able to take the number from
it but because this series coincides with the representation of
the rule of the possible presentation of this number.
However, we do not first apprehend number by reason
this
of this coincidence; rather, we possess this number beforehand

— as we do all numbers — in the "representation of a method
whereby a multiplicity, for instance a thousand, may be repre-
sented in an image in conformity with a certain concept." ^^^
The possibiUty of the image is already formed in the act of

representing the rule of presentation. This possibility itself, not
the isolated aspect of a multiphcity of points, is the true aspect,
the aspect structurally inherent in the schema, the schema-
image. Whether or not it is possible to take in at a glance a
series of points, either actually set down or merely imagined, is
without importance insofar as the "perception" of the schema-

image is concerned.
This is also why mathematical concepts are never based on
immediately perceptible images but on schemata. "Indeed, it
is schemata, not images of objects, which underlie our pure

^^'^
sensible concepts."
The analysis of the image-character of the schema-image of
empirical as well as pure sensible concepts has led us to the
following conclusion: The sensibilization of concepts is a com-
pletely specific operation which yields images of a particular
kind. Sensibilization as productive of schemata can neither be
understood by analogy with the usual "putting into an image"
nor can it be traced back to this idea. Such a reduction is so
little feasible that, on the contrary, sensibilization in the sense
first described — the immediate, empirical perception of things
and the formation of empirical reproductions of these things
116. A 140, B 179, NKS, p. 182.
117. Ibid.
105
can take place only on tie basis of a possible sensibilization of
concepts in the manner in which this is accomplished in sche-
matism.
All conceptual representation is essentially schematism. Now,
all finite cognition is, as thinking intuition, necessarily concep-
tual. Necessarily contained, therefore, in the immediate per-
ception of a given thing, for example, this house, is the sche-
matizing, preliminary insight [Vorblick] into such a thing as
a house in general. It is by means of this re-presentation [Vor-
stellung] alone that what is encountered can reveal itself as
a house, i.e., can present the aspect of a given house. Thus,

schematism takes place necessarily because our cognition is
fundamentally a finite cognition. This is why Kant must state,
"This schematism ... is an art concealed in the depths of the

human soul." ^^^ Hence, if schematism belongs to the essence
of finite knowledge, and if finitude is centered in transcendence,
then transcendence must take place as a schematism. Therefore,
Kant must necessarily be concerned with a "transcendental sche-
matism" as soon as he tries to bring to light the intrinsic pos-
sibility of transcendence.
§ 22. The Transcendental Schematism
The general characterization of schematism as a specific mode

of sensibilization has shown that schematism belongs neces-
sarily to transcendence. On the other hand, the characterization
of the total structure of ontological knowledge, which last neces-
sarily is intuition, has led to the following insight : Sensibilization
belongs necessarily to transcendence and this sensiblization must

be pure. We have affirmed that this pure sensibilization takes
place as a schematism. It is a question now of confirming the
assertion by proving that the necessary, pure sensibilization of
the understanding and its concepts (notions) is brought about
118. A 141, B 180, NKS, p. 183.
106
in a transcendental schematism. The nature of this schematism
will be brought to light by the revelation of the manner in which
it takes place.
The function of the mode of sensibilization which forms sche-
mata is to procure an image for a given concept. What is in-
tended by the concept has, therefore, an ordered relation to some

intuitivity [Erblickbarkeit] and first becomes perceptible through
this intuitive character. The schema puts itself, i.e., puts the
concept, into an image. The pure concepts of the understanding
which are thought in the pure "I think" require an essentially
pure intuitivity, if that which stands opposite as the result of
the pure act of ob-jectification is to be perceptible as such. Pure
concepts must be grounded in pure schemata which procure
an image for these concepts.
But Kant says expressly: "On the other hand, the schema of
a pure concept of understanding can never be reduced to any
image whatsoever." ^^® If to be put into an image belongs to
the nature of a schema, then the expression "image" in the
sentence quoted above must signify a definite type of image
to the exclusion of all others. It is immediately evident that
it can only be a question here of the schema-image. Thus, to
deny the possibility of forming the schemata of notions into
images means merely to deny that the presentable aspect, whose
rule of presentation is represented in the schema of the notion,
can ever be drawn from the domain of the empirically intuitive.
If "image" is taken to mean "empirical aspect" in the broadest

sense of the term, then obviously the schema of a notion cannot
be put "into an image." Even the aspects which are associated
with the mathematical construction of concepts are, as images
of "quantities," limited to a particular realm of objectivity.
Moreover, the notions as fundamental concepts cannot be put
into such images. These notions represent those rules by means
of which objectivity in general is formed as the precursory
119. A 142, B 181, NKS, p. 183.
107
horizon which makes the encountering of objects possible. In
the phrase cited, the term "image" signifies those schema-images
which are attached to the schemata of empirical and mathe-
matical concepts. The schemata of the pure concept of the
understanding cannot be put into such images.
The elucidation of the intrinsic possibility of ontological
knowledge in the transcendental deduction has yielded the
following: Pure concepts through the mediation of the pure
synthesis of the transcendental imagination are essentially re-
lated to pure intuition (time), and this relation is reciprocal.
Up to now, only the essential necessity of the relation between

the notions and time has been discussed. However, the internal
structure of this relation as that which is constitutive of the
fundamental articulation of transcendence has not yet been
clarified.
As pure intuition, time is that which furnishes an aspect

prior to all experience. This is why the pure aspect (for Kant,
the pure succession of the «ow-sequence) which presents itself
in such pure intuition must be termed a pure image. And in
the chapter on schematism, Kant himself states: "The pure

^^^
image of ... all objects of the senses in general [is] time."
Moreover, the same idea is expressed further on in a passage
no less important where Kant defines the essence of the notion.
The notion is "the pure concept, insofar as it has its origin in
the understanding alone (not in the pure image of sensibil-
ity)." ^î
Thus, even the schema of a pure concept of the understand-

ing can very well be put into an image, provided that the term
"image" be taken in the sense of "pure image."
As a "pure image" time is the schema-image and not merely
the form of pure intuition corresponding to the pure concepts
of the understanding. Consequently, the schema of the notions

has a special character. As a schema in general it represents
120. A 142, B 182, NKS, p. 183.

121. A 320, B 377, NKS, p. 314.
108
unities, and it represents them as rules which bear upon a pos-
sible aspect. According to the transcendental deduction, the
unities represented in the notions have an essential and necessary
relation to time. The schematism of the pure concepts of the
understanding, therefore, must necessarily introduce these con-
cepts into time as the rules thereof. But time, as the transcen-
dental aesthetic shows, is the representation of a "single
object." ^^2 "Different times are but parts of one and the same
time; and the representation, which can be given only through
a single object, is intuition." ^-^ Hence, time is not only the
necessarily pure image of the schemata of the pure concepts of
the understanding but also their only possibility of [presenting]
a pure aspect. This unique possibility of presenting an aspect
reveals itself to be nothing other than time and the tempo-
ral.
Now, if the closed multiplicity of the pure concepts of the

understanding is to have its image in this unique possibility
of presenting an aspect, this unique pure image must be capable
of being formed in a multiple way. The schemata of the notions
derive their image from time taken as a pure aspect by intro-
ducing them in time under the form of rules. The schemata

thus develop the unique possibility of a pure aspect into a
multiplicity of pure images. In this sense, the schemata of the
pure concepts of the understanding "determine" time. "The
schemata are thus nothing but a priori determinations of time
in accordance with rules," ^^^ or, more simply, "transcendental
determinations of tune." ^^^ As such, they are a "transcendental
product of the imagination." ^^^ This schematism forms tran-
scendence a priori and, therefore, is termed "transcendental
schematism."
122. A 3 If., B 47, NKS, p. 75.

123. A 3 If., B 47, NKS, p. 75.
124. A 145, B 184, NKS, p. 185.
125. A 138, NKS, p. 181.
126. A 142, B 181, NKS, p. 183.
109
The ob-jectification of that which offers itself as ob-ject, i.e.,
that which is in opposition, takes place in transcendence and

in this way: Ontological knowledge as schematizing intuition
renders distinguishable and, hence, receivable a priori the tran-
scendental affinity of the rule of unity under the image of time.
Because of its pure schema-image, the transcendental schema
necessarily possesses an a priori correspondence-character. In
consequence, the interpretations of the individual pure schemata
as transcendental determinations of time must exhibit the char-
acter which is constitutive of this correspondence.
Now, Kant borrows the systematic unity of the pure con-
cepts of the understanding from the table of judgments and,
accordingly, gives the definitions of the schemata of the in-
dividual pure concepts of the understanding to the table of
notions. Corresponding to the four moments of the division of
the categories (quantity, quality, relation, and modality), the
pure aspect of time must exhibit four possibilities of taking form,
namely, "the time-series, the time-content, the time-order, and
lastly, the scope of time." ^^^ These characters of time are not
so much developed systematically through an analysis of time
itself as they are fixed in time following "the order of the cate-
gories." ^28 The interpretation of the individual schemata ^^9 be-
gins with a relatively detailed analysis of the pure schemata of
quantity, reality, and substance and then becomes ever more
concise until it finally ends with mere definitions.
In a certain sense, Kant has a right to such a summary pres-
entation. If the transcendental schematism determines the es-
sence of ontological knowledge, then the systematic elaboration

of ontological concepts in the presentation of the system of
synthetic principles a priori must necessarily hit upon the struc-
ture of schematism and bring to light the corresponding tran-
127. A 145, B 184f., NKS, p. 183.

128. Ibid.
129. A 142ff., B 182ff., NKS, p. 183ff.
110

scendental determinations of time. This in fact takes place,
although only within certain limits.^ô
It is easy to see that the more hght one throws on the struc-
tures essential to the transcendental schematism and, in general,
all that pertains to transcendence as a whole, the better he is
able to find his way in the obscurity which envelops these pri-
mordial structures "in the depths of the human soul." Without
doubt, the nature of schematism in general, and of transcendental
schematism in particular, has been determined with sufl&cient
precision. However, one of Kant's own remarks reveals that

this inquiry can be pursued further. "That we may not be fur-
ther delayed by a dry and tedious analysis of the conditions
demanded by transcendental schemata of the pure concepts of
understanding in general, we shall now expound them according
^^^
to the order of the categories and in connection with them."
Is it only the dryness and tediousness of this analysis that
deters Kant from a further determination? The answer to this
question cannot be given as yet.^^^ when it is given, it will also
explain why the present interpretation refrains from any attempt

to develop concretely the Kantian definitions of the pure sche-
mata. However, in order to show that the Kantian doctrine of
the transcendental schematism is no artificial theory but has
its origin in the phenomena themselves, an interpretation brief —

and rough, to be sure — of the transcendental schema of a par-
ticular category, that of substance, will be given.
"The schema of substance is the permanence of the real in
time." ^^3 For the full elucidation of the schematism of this
schema, it is necessary to refer to the First Analogy, i.e., the
Principles of Permanence of Substance.
Substance as a notion signifies first of all only "that which
130. A 158fl., B NKS, p.

197flf., 194flf.
131. A 142, B 181, NKS, p. 183.

132. See below, § 35, p. 201.
133. A 144, B 183, NKS, p. 84.
Ill

underlies" (the subsistent).^^^ Its schema must be the represen-
tation of subsistence so far as this schema is presented in the pure
image of time. But time as the pure now-sequence is ever now.
That is, in every now it is now. Time thus manifests its own con-
stancy. As such, time is "non-transitory and abiding" "while aU
else changes." ^^^ More precisely: time is not one permanent thing
among others, but by virtue of the essential character just men-
tioned — that it is now in every now — it provides the pure aspect
of permanence in general. As this pure image (an immediate,
pure "aspect") it presents the subsistent in pure intuition.
This function of presentation does not become entirely clear
unless the full content of the notion of substance is considered,
something Kant neglects to do here. Substance is a category of
"relation" (between subsistence and inherence). It signifies that
which subsists for an "accident." Time, therefore, forms the

pure image of substance only if it presents this relation in the
pure image.
But time exists as a now-sequence precisely because, flowing
across each now, it remains a now even while becoming another
now. As the aspect of the permanent, it offers at the same tune
the image of pure change in permanence.
Even this rough interpretation of the transcendental schema
of substance, an interpretation which at best cannot uncover
the primordial structure, reveals that that to which the notion
of substance refers can be given a pure image a priori in time.
By this means, objectivity, so far as substance belongs to it as
a constitutive element, becomes visible and perceptible a priori

in the act of ob-jectification. Thanks to this schematism, the
notion as schematized is held in view in advance so that in

this precursory view of the pure image of permanence, an
essent can manifest itself to experience as that which remains
invariable through change. "To time, itself non-transitory and
134. A 182ff., B 224ff.,NKS, p. 212ff.

135. A 143, B 183, NKS, p. 184.
112

abiding, there corresponds in the field of appearance what is
non-transitory in its existence" (i.e., in the given essent).^^^
Consequently, the transcendental schematism is the basis of
the intrinsic possibility of ontological knowledge. It creates the

object which takes up a position opposite to ... in this pure
act of ob-jectification and in such a way that what is represented
in pure thought is necessarily given in an intuitive form in the
pure image of time. As that which presents something [gebende]
a priori, time bestows in advance on the horizon of transcendence
the character of a perceptible offer. But this is not all. As the
sole, pure, universal image, time gives the horizon of transcend-
ence a precursory inclusiveness [Umschlossenheit]. This

unique, pure, ontological horizon is the condition of the pos-
sibility that an essent within it can have this or that particular
overt and ontic horizon. Time not only gives transcendence a
precursory unifying cohesion but as the pure self-giving [sich

Gebende] offers it, in general, something on the order of a
check [Einhalt]. Times makes perceptible to a finite being the
"opposition" of ob-jectivity, which opposition belongs to the
finitude of that act of orientation by which transcendence takes
place.
§ 23. Schematism and Subsumption
In the preceding pages the Kantian doctrine of the schematism

of the pure concepts of the understanding was interpreted in the
light of the intrinsic development of transcendence. Now, in his
laying of the foundation of metaphysics, Kant not only strives
to develop a problematic which renews itself at every step but

also when introducing a decisive element of his doctrine confines
himself to the most possible of the known formulations capable
of presenting the problem. Thus, the transcendental deduction
begins as a "legal action" within traditional metaphysics. This
136. A 143, B 183, NKS, p. 184.
113

action is decided by the proof that the notions must be categories,
i.e., that they must belong essentially to transcendence itself
if they are to be capable of the determination a priori of essents

which are empirically accessible. At the same time, however, the
condition of the "use" of these concepts is fixed.
To make use of concepts signifies in general; to apply them

to objects or —from the point of view of the objects — to bring
them "under" concepts. Traditional logic calls this use of con-

cepts "subsumption." The use of pure concepts as transcen-
dental determinations of time a priori, i.e., the achievement
of pure knowledge, is what takes place in schematism. In fact,
seen from this point of view, the problem of schematism may

be explained, to begin with at least, by reference to subsumption.
But it must be remembered that, from the first, it is a question
here — in ontological knowledge — of ontological concepts and
therefore of a specific, that is, ontological "subsumption."
But from the very first characterization of ontological knowl-
edge, ^^^ Kant has not neglected to draw our attention to the
fundamental difference between "bringing under concepts"
[unter Begriffe bringen] (that which cpncems objects) and
"reducing to concepts" [auf Begriffe bringen] (that which con-
cerns the pure synthesis of the transcendental imagination).
"The reduction to concepts" of the pure synthesis takes place
in the transcendental schematism. It "forms" [bildet] the unity
represented in the notion in order to make it the essential ele-

ment of pure objectivity, i.e., that objectivity which can be
perceived a priori. Only in the transcendental schematism are
the categories formed as categories. If the latter are the true
"fundamental concepts" [Ur begriffe] then the transcendental
schematism is primordial and authentic conceptualization as
such.
Therefore, if Kant begins the chapter on schematism with
a reference to subsumption, it is because he wishes to introduce
transcendental subsumption as the central problem in order
137. Cf. A 78ff., B 104ff., NKS, p. lllflf.
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to show that the question of the mtrinsic possibUity of primordial
conceptuahty arises in the essential structure of pure knowledge.
Empirical concepts are derived from experience and on that
account are "homogeneous" with the content of the essent which
they determine. Their application to objects, their use, poses no
problem. "But pure concepts of understanding being quite
heterogeneous with empirical intuitions, and indeed with all
sensible intuitions, can never be met with in any intuition. For

no one will say that a category, such as that of causality, can
be intuited through sense and is itself contained in appearance.
How, then, is the subsumption of intuitions under pure concepts,
^^^
the application of a category to appearances, possible?"
It is in raising the question of the possible use of the categories
that their true essence first becomes a problem. These concepts
lay before us the question of the possibility of their "formation"
in general. This is why speaking of the subsumption of phe-
nomena "under the categories" is not a solution of the problem
but conceals the very question at issue, namely, that of the sense
in which one may speak here of subsumption "under concepts."
If the Kantian formulation of the problem of schematism as
a problem of subsumption is taken shnply in the sense of an intro-
duction to the problem, then this formulation provides a clue as
to the central purpose and essential content of the chapter on
schematism.
To represent conceptually means to represent "in general."
The "generality" of the act of representation becomes a problem
as soon as the formation of concepts as such is called into
question. But if the categories as ontological concepts are not
homogeneous with the empirical objects and their concepts,
then the "generality" of the categories is not merely that of a

higher degree of abstraction, that possessed by a superior, or
even a supreme, ontic "genus." ^^^ What, therefore, is the char-
acter of the "generality" enjoyed by ontological, i.e., meta-
138. A 137f., B 176f., NKS, p. 180.

139. Cf. Sein und Zeit, p. 3 (J. S. C).

physical concepts? But this is really the question: What is the
meaning of the term generalis in the characterization of ontology
as metaphysica generalis? The problem of the schematism of

the pure concepts of the understanding is a question concerning
the inmost essence of ontological knowledge.
If Kant, in the chapter on schematism, poses the problem
of the conceptuality of the fundamental concepts and resolves
it with the help of the essential definition of these concepts as
transcendental schemata, it is evident that the doctrine of the
schematism of the pure concepts of the understanding is the
decisive stage of the laying of the foundation of metaphysica
generalis.
To a certain extent, however, Kant is justified in relying on

the idea of subsumption to furnish a preliminary explication
of the transcendental schematism. Consequently, Kant may also
be permitted to derive from this idea an indication as to the

possible solution of the problem and to provide a provisional
characterization of the idea of transcendental schematism [in

terms of subsumption]. If the pure concept of the understanding
is completely heterogeneous with the phenomena but still deter-
mines the latter, then there must be a mediating agency which

surmounts this heterogeneity. "This mediative representation
must be pure, i.e., void of all empirical content, and yet at the
same time, while it must in one respect be intellectual, it must
in another be sensible. Such a representation is the transcen-
dental schema." "" "Thus, an apphcation of the category to

appearances becomes possible by means of the transcendental
determination of time, which, as the schema of the concepts of
the understanding, mediates the subsumption of the appearances
^'*^
under the category."
Thus, even the most immediate and superficial form of the
problem of schematism, i.e., when it is considered as a problem
140. A 138, B 177, NKS, p. 181.
141. A 139, B 178, NKS, p. 181.
116
of subsumption, reveals the innermost significance of the tran-
scendental schematism. There is not the slightest reason to com-
plam unceasingly about the alleged incoherence and confusion
of the chapter on schematism. If, in the Critique of Pure Reason,
there is one passage weighed word by word and rigorously
organized, it is certainly this part of the whole work. Because
of its importance, this organization is reproduced explicitly
below:
1) The introduction to the problem of schematism under
the guidance of the traditional idea of subsumption (A 137,
B 176; A 140, B 179; NKS, pp. 180-182: "The schema in
itself is . . .").
2) The prehminary analysis of the structure of the schema in

general and the schematism of the empirical and mathematical
concepts (to A 142, B 161, NKS, p. 180: "On the other hand,
the schema of a pure concept of the understanding . . .").
3) The analysis of the transcendental schema in general (to
A 142, B 182, NKS, p. 183: "The pure image of all magni-

tudes . . .").
4) The interpretation of the particular transcendental sche-

mata under the guidance of the table of categories (to A 145,
B 184, NKS, p. 185: "We thus find that the schema of each
category . . .").
5) The characterization of the four classes of categories

relative to the corresponding four possibihties of the pure for-
mation [Bildbarkeit] of time (to A 145, B 184, NKS, p. 119:
"It is evident therefore . . .").
6) The definition of transcendental schematism as the "true

and only condition" of transcendence (to A 146, B 185, NKS,
p. 119: "But it is also evident . . .").
7) The critical application of the definition of the essence of

the categories, a definition based on the idea of schematism (to
the end of the chapter)
Far from being "confused," the chapter on schematism is
117
perfectly clear in its construction. It does not "generate con-
fusion" but with a wonderful certainty leads to the heart of the
whole problematic of the Critique of Pure Reason. This only
becomes evident, however, when the finitude of transcendence
is comprehended as the ground of the intrinsic possibility (i.e.,
of the necessity) of metaphysics so that the interpretation can

be established on this basis.
To be sure, however, Kant wrote in his last years (1797):

"In general, schematism is one of the most difficult points.
Even Herr Beck cannot find his way about therein. — I hold
^^^
this chapter to be one of the most important."
The Fifth Stage of the Laying of the Foundation:

The Complete Determination of the Essence
of Ontological Knowledge
In the preceding stages we have reached, with the transcen-

dental schematism, the ground of the intrinsic possibility of
the ontological synthesis, and we have thereby attained our
objective. If we now add a fifth stage, this does not mean that
we intend to pursue the laying of the foundation still further,
but that it is necessary to take explicit possession of the ground

thus won, with regard to the possible construction [of meta-
physics].
To do this, we must comprehend the unity of the stages just
traversed, not merely by adding them together, but by an auton-
omous and complete determination of the essence of onto-
Kant lays down this
logical knowledge. decisive determination
in "the highest principle of all synthetic judgments."

^^^ How-
142. Kant's Posthumous Works in Manuscript Form, op. cit., Vol.

V, No. 6359.
143. A 154-158, B 193-197, NKS, pp. 191-4.
118
ever, if ontological knowledge is nothing other than the pri-
mordial formation of transcendence, the highest principle must
contain the central determination of the essence of transcend-
ence. That this is the case must now be shown. From the ground
thus won, we shall obtain a prospect of the additional problems
and consequences of the Kantian laying of the foundation of
metaphysica generalis.
§ 24. The Highest Synthetic Principle as the

Complete Determination of the Essence
of Transcendence
This central part of the doctrine is also introduced by Kant

in the form of a critical attitude taken with regard to traditional
metaphysics. The latter lays claim to a knowledge of the essent
"by means of pure concepts," that is, by thought alone. The
specific essence of pure {blosseni thought is delimited by general
logic. Pure thought is the connection of subject and object (in
the act of judgment). Such connection only explicates what

is represented as such in the connected representations. It must
be purely explicative and nothing more because in it "We have
merely played with representations." ^^* In order to be what it
is, pure thought must "remain" with what is represented as

such. Without doubt, even in this isolation it has its own rules,
namely, the principles, of which the first is the "principle of

contradiction." ^^^ Pure thought is not knowledge; it is only an
element, although a necessary one, of finite knowledge. How-
ever, provided it is taken only as an element of pure knowledge,
it is possible to begin with pure thought and to show that it
refers necessarily to something which in a primary sense deter-

mines knowledge in its totality.
Insofar as the predicate is an element of pure knowledge, it
144. A 155, B 195, NKS, p. 193.

145. A 150ff., B NKS, p. 189flf.
189ff.,
119
is not so much a question of its relation to the subject (the
apophantic-predicative synthesis) as of its "relation" (more
precisely, the whole subject-predicate relationship) to "some-
thing altogether different." ^^^ This "something different" is the
essent itself, with which knowledge —and therefore the judica-
tive relation pertaining to —must be accord." Knowledge,
it "in
therefore, must "go beyond" that with which pure thought, as
isolated in itself, must necessarily "remain." This "relation" to
the totally different, Kant terms "synthesis" (the veritative
synthesis). Knowledge as such is synthetic, since what is known
is always something "totally different." But since the predica-
tive-apophantic connection in pure thought can also be termed
a synthesis, it is advisable to distinguish it, as has been done
previously, from the synthesis which pertains specifically to
knowledge, this synthesis being essentially that which brings
forth (namely, the totally different).
This going-beyond to the "totally different," however, re-
quires an immersion [Darinnenseiri] in a "medium" ^^^ within
which this "totally different," that the knowing being itself is
not and over which it is not master, can be encountered. That

which constitutes the going-beyond, which orients [the knowing
being] and makes this encounter possible, is described by Kant
in the following terms: "There is only one whole in which all
our representations are contained, namely, inner sense and its
a priori form, time. The synthesis of representations rests on

imagination, and their synthetic unity, which is required for
^^^
judgment, on the unity of apperception."
Here reappears that triplicity of elements which was intro-
duced in the second stage of the laying of the foundation with

the first characterization of the essential unity of ontological
146. A 154, B 193f.,NKS, p. 192.

147. A 155, B 194, NKS, p. 192.
148. A 155, B 194, NKS, p. 192.
120

knowledge. The third and fourth stages have shown, however,
how these three elements form a structural unity whose forma-
tive medium is the transcendental imagination. What is formed
there is transcendence. If Kant, in order to provide a definitive

explication of transcendence, recalls this triplicity, these elements
may no longer be presented according to the order, still obscure,
in which they were introduced in the second stage, but in the
clarity of a structure which is finally revealed in the transcen-
dental schematism. And if this fifth stage seems merely re-

capitulative, it also leads to our taking express possession of
the essential unity of transcendence, which was only indicated

as a problem in the second stage. This transcendence henceforth
wUl become transparent to us, since it wUl be apprehended on
the basis of its possibility.
Thus, Kant concentrates the entire problem of the essence of

the finitude of knowledge in the concise formula of "the pos-
sibility of experience." ^*^ The term "experience" denotes the
finite, receptive, intuitive knowledge of the essent. The essent
must be given to knowledge as the ob-ject. However, the term
"possibility" has in the expression "possibility of experience"
a characteristic ambiguity.
The term "possible" in "possible experience" can be under-
stood in terms of the distinction between "possible" and "real."
But in the "possibility of experience," "possible" experience is
no more a problem than is the "real;" both the one and the
other are considered with regard to that which makes them
possible in advance. The expression "possibility of experience"
refers, therefore, to that which makes finite experience possible,
i.e., experience which is not necessarily but contingently real.
The possibility which renders this "contingent" experience pos-
sible is the possibilitas of traditional metaphysics and is identical
with essentia or realitas. "Real definitions are derived from the
149. A 156ff., B 195ff., NKS, p. 193ff.
121

essence of the thing, from the primary ground of its possibility."
They "serve to obtain knowledge of the thing relative to its

intrinsic possibility." ^^^
Hence, the "possibility of experience" denotes primarily the

unified totahty of that which makes finite knowledge essentially
possible. "The possibility of experience is, then, what gives ob-
jective reahty to all our a priori modes of knowledge." ^^^ Con-
sequently, the possibility of experience is identical with tran-
scendence. To delimit the latter in its fuU essence means to
determine "the conditions of the possibility of experience."
"Experience," understood as the act and not the content of
experience, is an act of receptive intuition which must let the
essent be given. To give an object means to present it immedi-
ately in intuition. ^^2 But what is the significance of this? Kant
answers: "that the representation through which the object is
thought relates to actual or possible experience." ^^^ But this
relating-to means that in order for an object to be capable of

being given, there must take place in advance an orientation
toward that which is capable of being "called up." This pre-
cursory orientation takes place as the transcendental deduction
revealed and the transcendental schematism explained in the
ontological synthesis. This act of orientation toward ... is the
condition of the possibility of experience.
But the possibility of finite knowledge requires a second con-
dition: knowledge is knowledge only when it is true. Truth,
however, means "agreement with the object." ^^* There must,
therefore, be encountered in advance something on the order
of a with-what \Womit\ of the possible agreement, i.e., something
150. Logikvorlesung, § 106, note 2, loc. cit., VIII, p. 447; cf. also
B 302, note, A 596, B 624, note, NKS, p. 503.
151. A 156, B 195, NKS, p. 193.
152. A 156, B 195, NKS, p. 193.
153. Ibid.
154. A 157, B 196f., NKS, p. 194.
122
which regulates and provides a standard. It is necessary from
the first that the horizon of the ob-jective be overt and percep-
tible as such. This horizon is the condition of the possibility of
the object relative to its beiag able to take up a position opposite
to. . . .
Consequently, the possibility of finite knowledge, that is, the

act of experiencing that which is experienced as such, stands
under two conditions. These two conditions together must de-
limit the complete essence of transcendence. This delimitation
can be expressed in one proposition which states the ground of
the possibility of synthetic judgments, i.e., judgments char-
acteristic of finite knowledge. This is a proposition which as
such is valid for all "judgments."
What is the definitive formulation given by Kant to this "high-
est principle of all synthetic judgments?" It reads as follows:
"the conditions of the possibility of experience in general are
at the same time conditions of the possibility of the objects of
^^^
experience."
The decisive content of this sentence is not so much to be
found in the words italicized by Kant as in the "are at the
same time." For what does this "at the same time" signify? It
expresses the essential unity of the complete structure of tran-
scendence which lies in this: the act of orientation which lets
something take up a position opposite to . . . forms as such
the horizon of ob-jectivity in general. The going-beyond
to ... , which in finite knowledge is necessary in advance
and at every moment, is accordingly a constant ex-position
[Hinausstehen] to . . . (Ekstasis). But this essential ex-posi-
tion to ... in its position [Stehen] forms and pro-poses to

itself a horizon. Transcendence is in itself ecstatic-horizontal.
This articulation of transcendence, which last in itself is con-

ducive to unity, is expressed by the highest principle.
155. A 158, B 197, NKS, p. 194. Kemp Smith's translation omits

"at the same time" [Zugleich] (J. S. C).
123

The latter may also be grasped in the following form: that
which makes the act of experience possible at the same time
makes possible the content of experience, i.e., the object of
experience as such. This means that transcendence makes the
essent in itself accessible to a finite being. The "at the same
time" in the formulation of the highest synthetic principle does
not signify that the two conditions always occur together, or
that if we think of the one we must also think of the other, or
even that both conditions are identical. The fundamental prin-
ciple is in general not a principle found by inference and one
which must be held to be valid if the validity of experience
is to be defended. Rather, it is the expression of the original
phenomenological knowledge of the intrinsic unitary structure
of transcendence. This structure has been worked out in the

stages of the essential development of the ontological synthesis
already presented. ^^*
§ 25. Transcendence and the Laying of the Foundation

of Metaphysica Generalis
The revelation of the ground of the intrinsic possibility of

the essence of the ontological synthesis was defined as the task
of the laying of the foundation of metaphysica generalis. Onto-

logical knowledge has proved to be that which forms tran-
scendence. The insight into the complete structure of transcend-
ence permits us for the first time to be aware of the complete
156. The foregoing interpretation of the highest synthetic principle

shows inwhat respect this principle also determines the essence of
a priori synthetic judgments and, in addition, can be considered as
the metaphysical principle of sufficient reason when the latter is cor-
rectly understood. Cf. on this subject: Heidegger, Vom Wesen des
Grundes, Festschrift f. E. Husserl. {Ergdnzungsbd. z. Jahrb. f. Philos.
und phdnomenolog. Forsch., 1929, p. 7 Iff., esp. p. 79f.) (This study
also appeared in a special printing, 3rd ed., 1949, p. 15f.)
124

originality of ontological knowledge — its act as well as its
object.
As finite, the act of knowledge must be a receptive, reflective
intuition of that which offers itself; furthermore, this intuition
must be pure. It is a pure schematism. The pure unity of the

three elements of pure knowledge is expressed in the concept
of the transcendental schema as the "transcendental determina-
tion of time."
If ontological knowledge is schema-forming, then it creates
[forms] spontaneously the pure aspect (image). Does it not
follow, then, that ontological knowledge, which is achieved in
the transcendental imagination, is creative? And if ontological
knowledge forms transcendence which in its turn constitutes the
essence of finitude, is not this finitude "overcome" by the creative

character in question? Does not the finite being [man] become
infinite through this "creative behavior?"
But is ontological knowledge "creative" in the manner of
intuitus originarius, for which the essent in the act of intuition
is as e-ject and never as ob-ject? In this "creative" ontological

knowledge is the essent "known," i.e., created as such? Abso-
lutely not. Not only does ontological knowledge not create the
essent, it does not even relate itself directly and thematically
to the essent.
But to what does it relate itself, then? What is known in onto-
logical knowledge? A Nothing. Kant calls it an X and speaks
of an "object." In what respect is this X a Nothing, and in what
respect is it still "something"? A brief interpretation of the
two main passages in which Kant speaks of this X should furnish

the answer to the question as to what it is that is known in onto-
logical knowledge. Characteristically, the first passage is found

in the introduction to the transcendental deduction. ^^^ The
second passage is found in the section entitled: "the Ground of
157. A108f.,NKS,p. 136f.
125

Distinction of all Objects in General into Phenomena and
Noumena." ^^^ This section, according to the plan of the
Critique of Pure Reason, concludes the positive laying of the
foundation of metaphysica generalis.
The first passage reads: "Now, also, we are in a position to
determine more adequately our concept of an object in general.
All representations have, as representations, their object, and
can themselves in turn become objects of other representations.
Appearances are the sole objects which can be given to us im-
mediately, and that in them which relates immediately to the
object is called intuition. But these appearances are not things
in themselves; they are only representations, which in turn have
their object —an object which cannot itself be intuited by us,
and which may, therefore, be named the non-empirical, that

is, transcendental object = X."
What immediately confronts us in experience is that which
is given by intuition. The appearances themselves, however,
are "only representations," not things in themselves. What is
represented in these presentations shows itself only in and for

an act of receptive orientation. This act must "also have its
object." Indeed, it must in general give something in advance
which has an ob-jective character in order to form the horizon
within which an autonomous essent can be encountered. This
terminus [Woraufzu] of the precursory orientation, therefore,
can no longer be intuited by us in the form of an empirical
intuition. This does not exclude —on the contrary, it includes
the necessity of its being immediately perceptible in a pure
intuition. This terminus of the precursory orientation, hence,
can "be named the non-empirical object = X."
"All our representations are, it is true, referred by the under-
standing to some and since appearances are nothing
object;
but representations, the understanding refers them to a some-
thing, as the object of sensible intuition. But this something,
158. A 235flf., B 294ff., NKS, p. 257ff.

126

thus conceived, is only the transcendental object; and by that
is meant a something = X, of which we know, and with the
present constitution of our understanding can know, nothing
whatsoever, but which, as a correlate of the unity of appercep-
tion, can serve only for the unity of the manifold in sensible
intuition. By means of this unity the understanding combines
^^^
the manifold into the concept of an object."
The X is "something" of which we can know nothing. This
X is not unknowable because as an essent it lies hidden "behind"
a layer of appearances, but because in principle it is not able
to become an object of cognition, that is, the object of a knowl-
edge relative to the essent. It can never become such because
it is a Nothing.
By a Nothing we mean not an essent but nevertheless "some-
thing." It serves only as "a correlate," i.e., according to its
essence it is pure horizon. Kant calls this X the "transcendental

object," that which is opposed [Dawider] in transcendence and
is capable of being perceived by transcendence as its horizon.
Now, if the X known in ontological knowledge is, in essence,
horizon, this knowledge must be of such a nature that it holds

this horizon open in its character as horizon. Consequently,
this something may not be the direct and exclusive theme of
an intention. The horizon must be unthematic but nevertheless
still kept in view. Only in this way can it thrust forward
[vordrdngen] and render thematic that which is encountered
within it.
The X is an "object in general," but this does not mean

that it is a universal, indeterminate essent which presents itself
in the form of an ob-ject. On the contrary, this expression refers

to that which in advance constitutes the passing over [Vber-
schlag] of all possible objects qua ob-jective, the horizon of
an ob-jectification. If by "object" we mean an essent thematicaUy
159. A 250, NKS, p. 268. This text has been amended by Kant
himself. Cf. Nachtrage, CXXXIV.
127

apprehended, this horizon is not an object but a Nothing. And
if by "knowledge" we mean the apprehension of an essent,
ontological knowledge is not knowledge.

Ontological knowledge may rightly be termed knowledge if
it attains truth. However, it does not merely "possess" truth, it
is original truth, and it is for this reason that Kant terms the
latter "transcendental truth." The essence of this truth is clar-
ified through the transcendental schematism. "AU our knowledge

is contained within this whole of possible experience, and tran-
scendental truth, which precedes all empirical truth and renders
^^°
it possible, consists in general relation to that experience."
Ontological knowledge "forms" transcendence, and this for-
mation is nothing other than the holding open of the horizon
within which the Being of the essent is perceptible in advance.
Provided that truth means: the unconcealment of [Unverborgen-
heit von\ . . . , then transcendence is original truth. But truth
itself must be understood both as disclosure of Being and overt-
ness of the essent.^^^ If ontological knowledge discloses the

horizon, its truth lies in letting the essent be encountered within
this horizon. Kant says that ontological knowledge has only
"empirical use," that is, it serves to make finite knowledge
possible, where by "fijaite knowledge" is meant the experience
of the essent that manifests itself.
Hence, the question must at least remain open as to whether

this knowledge, which is "creative" only on the ontological
level and never on the ontic, overcomes the finitude of transcend-
ence or whether, on the contrary, it immerses the finite "subject"
in the finitude proper to it.
According to this definition of the essence of ontological

knowledge, ontology is nothing other than the exphcit disclosure
of the systematic whole of pure knowledge so far as the latter
forms transcendence.
160. A 146, B 185, NKS, p. 186.

161. Cf. Vom Wesen des Grundes, op. cit., p. 75ff., 3rd ed., p. 1 Iff.
128

Kant, however, wishes to replace the "proud name of an Ontol-
ogy" ^^2 by that of "transcendental philosophy," the object of
which is the disclosure of the essence of transcendence. And he
is justified, so long as the term "ontology" is taken in the sense
of traditional metaphysics. This traditional ontology "claims
to supply, in systematic doctrinal form, synthetic a priori knowl-
edge of things in general." It seeks to raise itself to the level of
ontic knowledge a priori, a knowledge which is the privilege
only of an infinite being. If, on the contrary, this ontology aban-
dons its "pride" and "presumption," if it undertakes to under-
stand itself in its finitude, i.e., as an essential and necessary
structure of finitude, then one may give the expression "ontol-
ogy" its true essence and at the same time justify its use. It is
in accordance with this meaning, first attained and secured

through the laying of the foundation of metaphysics, that Kant
himself uses the expression "ontology" and, indeed, in that
decisive passage of the Critique of Pure Reason which sets forth
the outline of metaphysics as a whole. ^^^

By this transformation of metaphysica generalis, the founda-
tion of traditional metaphysics is shaken and the edifice of meta-
physica specialis begins to totter. However, the new problems
which are thus posed wUl not be touched on here. Their study
demands a preparation which can be achieved only through a
more profound assimilation of that which Kant attained in the
unity of transcendental aesthetic and logic as a laying of the
foundation of metaphysica generalis.
162. A 247, B 303, NKS, p. 264.

163. A 845, B 873, NKS, p. 643f. Cf. also the use of the term
"ontology" in the Fortschritte der Metaphysik.
129

SECTION THREE
THE LAYING OF THE FOUNDATION OF
METAPHYSICS IN ITS BASIC ORIGINALITY

SECTION THREE
METAPHYSICS IN ITS BASIC ORIGINALITY
Is it possible to grasp the laying of the foundation now es-
tablished on an even more fundamental basis? Or is this un-

ceasing pursuit of originality mere vain curiosity? And is it
not condemned to that misery which is the fatal punishment

of all who wish to know ever more and more? Above all, does
it not apply a criterion to the Kantian phDosophy which is foreign
to it, thus leading to a critique "from without" which is always
unjust?
The investigation of the problem of the originality of the
Kantian laying of the foundation of metaphysics will not follow

any such path. The idea of originaUty here in question must
be taken from the Kantian laying of the foundation itself, if
the discussion of originality in general is not to become a polemic

but is to remain on the level of interpretation. It is a question
of examining Kant's efforts to penetrate the dimension of origin
and his search for the source-ground of the "fundamental sources
of knowledge" by clarifying the preliminary insight which served
him as a guide. In order for this examination to be successful,
it is first necessary clearly to delimit the ground already es-
tablished by the laying of the foundation.
133
A. The Explicit Characterization of the
Fundamental Ground Established in
the Laying of the Foundation

of Metaphysics
§ 26. The Transcendental Imagination as the Formative

Center of Ontological Knowledge
The laying of the foundation of metaphysica generalis is
the answer to the question as to the essential unity of ontological

knowledge and the basis of its possibility. Ontological knowl-
edge "forms" transcendence, i.e., it holds open the horizon
which is made perceptible in advance by the pure schemata.
These schemata "arise" as the "transcendental product" ^ of
the transcendental imagination. The latter as the original, pure
synthesis forms the essential unity of pure intuition (time) and
pure thought (apperception).
But it is not only in the doctrine of the transcendental sche-
matism that the transcendental imagination appears as the central
theme; it occupies that position in the preceding stage of the
laying of the foundation, in the transcendental deduction. Be-
cause the primordial act of unification is undertaken by the tran-
scendental imagination, it is necessary that the latter be men-
tioned with the first characterization of the essential unity of
ontological knowledge, i.e., in the second stage. The transcen-
dental imagination is, therefore, the foundation on which the
intrinsic possibUity of ontological knowledge, and hence of meta-
physica generalis as well, is constructed.
Kant introduces the pure imagination as an "indispensable
function of the soul." ^ To lay bare the established ground of
metaphysics, then, means to determine a faculty of the human
1. A 142, B 181,NKS, p. 183.

2. A78, B 103, NKS, p. 112.
134
soul more precisely. That the laying of the foundation of meta-
physics must finally arrive at such a task is "self-evident" pro-
vided that, in Kant's own words, metaphysics belongs to "human

nature." This is why "anthropology," which Kant discussed
over the years in his lectures, provides us with information
about the established ground of metaphysics.^
"The imagination (facultas imaginandi) is a faculty of in-
tuition even without the presence of an object." ^^ Hence, the
imagination belongs to the faculty of intuition. The definition
cited understands by "intuition" first of aU the empirical intuition

of the essent. As a "sensible faculty," the imagination is in-
cluded among the faculties of knowledge, which last are divided

between sensibility and understanding, the first representing our
"lower" faculty of knowledge. The imagination is a mode of
sensible intuition "even without the presence of an object."
The essent intuited need not itself be present, and furthermore,
unUke perception for which the object "must be represented
as present," * the imagination does not intuit what it apprehends
in its act as something actually on hand. The imagination "can"
intuit, can take in an aspect, and the intuited thing concerned
need not show itself as essent and need not itself provide the
aspect in question.
To begin with, then, the imagination enjoys a peculiar inde-
pendence with respect to the essent. It is free in its reception of
3. H. Morchen in his Marburg dissertation, Die Einbildungskraft

bei Kant has undertaken the task of a monographic presentation and
interpretation of Kant's doctrine concerning the imagination as
found in Kant's Anthropologie, Critique of Pure Reason, Critique of
Judgment, and the other writings and lectures. The work will appear
in Vol. XI of the Jahrbuch fiir Philos und phdn, Forschung. The
present exposition is limited to what is most essential in the light of
the chief problem of the laying of the foundation of metaphysics.
3a. I. Kant, Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hensicht, W. W.
(Cass.) VIII, § 28, p. 54.
4. Reicke, Lose Blatter aus Kants Nachlass, 1889, p. 102.
135
aspects — it is the faculty which, in a certain sense, can give
itself aspects. Hence, the imagination can be termed, in a dual
sense that is characteristic, a formative faculty. As a faculty
of intuition it is formative in the sense that it produces an image
(or aspect). As a faculty not dependent on objects of intuition,
it produces, i.e., forms and provides, images. This "formative
power" is at one and the same time receptive and productive
(spontaneous). In this "at one and the same time" is to be
found the true essence of the structure of the imagination. How-
ever, if receptivity is identified with sensibility, and spontaneity
with the understanding, then the imagination falls in a peculiar
way between the two.^ This gives the imagination a remarkably
ambiguous character which comes to light in the Kantian defini-
tion of this faculty. In spite of this spontaneity, when Kant divides

the faculties of knowledge into two fundamental classes he
lists the imagination under sensibility. As a result of this classifi-
cation, the formation (the production) of images becomes the

decisive element in the act of imagination, something which
is also evident in the definition.
Because of its freedom, the imagination for Kant is a faculty
of comparing, shaping, differentiating, and of connecting in
general (synthesis). "Imagining," therefore, denotes aU non-

perceptive representation in the broadest sense of the term:
fancying, contriving, fabricating, worrying, daydreaming, and
the like. The "power of imagination" [Bildungskraft] is thus
joined with wit, the power of differentiation, and the faculty of
comparison in general. "The senses provide the matter for aU
our representations. It is from this matter that the formative
faculty first derives its representations independendy of the
presence of objects : [first] the power of imagination, imaginatio;
second, the faculty of comparison, wit, and the power of differ-
entiation, judicum descretum; third, the faculty of combining
5. As early as Aristotle's De anima, G3, phantasia stands "be-

tween" aisthesis and noesis.
136
representations, not immediately with their objects, but by
®
designating them by the mediation of a substitute."
But in spite of these attempts to classify the imagination as
a faculty of spontaneity, it still retains its intuitive character.
It is subjectio sub aspectum, i.e., a faculty of intuitive presenta-

tion, of giving. The intuitive representation of an object not
present can take place in two ways.
If this intuitive representation is limited to the present recol-
lection of something perceived earlier, then the aspect which it
offers is dependent on the earlier one offered by the preceding

perception. This presentation which refers back to an earlier
perception is one the content of which is derived from this per-
ception (exhibitio derivativa).
If, on the contrary, the imagination freely invents the form
of its object, then this presentation of the aspect of the object
is "original" (exhibitio originaria). Hence, the imagination is
said to be "productive." "^

This original presentation, however,
is not as "creative" as intuitus originarius, which creates the
essent in the act of intuiting it. The productive imagination only
forms the aspect of a possible object, which last under certain
conditions may also be realizable, i.e., capable of being made
present. This realization, however, is never accomplished by
the imagination itself. The formative power of the imagination
is not even "productive" in the sense that it can form the content
of an image absolutely from nothing, from that which has never
been an object of experience either in whole or in part. It is "not
capable of producing a sensible representation which has never

before been given to our sensible faculty. One is always able
^
to point out the material from which it was derived."
6. Erdmann, Reflexionen, I, MS, -Kant's Posthumous Works in
Manuscript Form, Vol. Ill, 1, No. 339; cf. also, Politz, / Kants Vor-
lesungen Uber die Metaphysilc, 2nd ed., re-edited after the edition
of 1821 by K. H. Schmidt, 1924, p. 141.
7. Anthropologic, op. cit., VIII, § 28.
8. Ibid.
137
Such is the essential information which the Anthropologic
gives us with regard to imagination in general and the produc-
tive imagination in particular. The Anthropologie contains no
more than has already been brought out by the laying of the
foundation of metaphysics in the Critique of Pure Reason. In-
deed, the discussions of the transcendental deduction and of
schematism have made evident in a much more fundamental
way that the imagination is an intermediate faculty between
sensibility and the understanding.
Nevertheless, the definition of the imagination, according to
which the latter can intuitively represent an object without its
being present, does not enter into the exposition of the laying
of the foundation of metaphysics provided by the Critique of
Pure Reason. But not to mention the fact that this definition
appears expUcitly in the transcendental deduction (although only

in the second edition),® has not the discussion of the transcen-
dental schematism revealed just this character mentioned in
the definition of the imagination?
The imagination forms in advance, and before all experience
of the essent, the aspect of the horizon of objectivity as such.
This formation of the aspect in the pure form [Bild] of time not
only precedes this or that experience of the essent but is also
prior to any such possible experience. In offering a pure aspect

in this way, the imagination is in no case and in no wise depend-
ent on the presence of an essent. It is so far from being thus
dependent that its pre-formation of a pure schema, for example,
substance (permanence), consists in bringing into view some-
thing on the order of constant presence [stdndige Anwesenheit].
It is only in the horizon of this presence that this or that "presence
of an object" can reveal itself. This is why the essence of the
imagination, namely, the ability to intuit without a concrete
presence, is grasped in the transcendental schematism in a
manner which is basically more original [than that of the An-
9. B 151,NKS,p. 164f.
138
thropologie]. Finally, and again in a more original sense, the
transcendental schematism also manifests the "creative" essence
of the imagination. The imagination is not ontically "creative,"
but it is creative in the matter of the free formation of images.
The Anthropologic stresses that the productive imagination is
still dependent on sensible representations. In the transcendental
schematism, on the other hand, the imagination has a function

which is originally presentative and which is exercised in the
pure form of time. The imagination has no need here of an
empirical intuition. As compared to the Anthropologic, there-
fore, the Critique of Pure Reason presents the intuitive char-
acter, as well as the spontaneity, of the imagination in a more

original sense.
In view of the above, it is by means
entirely useless to attempt,
of the study of anthropology, to comprehend the imagination

as the established ground of ontology. Not only that, such an
attempt is an error pure and simple in that it not only leads to
a misconception of the empirical character of Kant's anthro-
pology but also, insofar as the Critique of Pure Reason is con-
cerned, fails to evaluate properly the true nature of the observa-
tions on the laying of the foundation and the efforts made in
the Critique to uncover the origin [of the latter].

The Kantian anthropology is empirical in a double sense.
First, the characterization of the faculties of the soul moves
within the framework of the knowledge which ordinary experi-
ence furnishes us concerning man. Finally, the faculties of the
soul, among them the imagination, are studied only with regard
to the fact and the nature of their relation to the essent capable
of being experienced. The productive imagination with which

anthropology is concerned has to do only with the formation of
the aspects of objects considered as empirically possible or im-
possible.
On the other hand, in the Critique of Pure Reason the pure
productive imagination is never concerned with the imaginative
139
formation of objects but with the pure aspect of objectivity in
general. It is pure productive imagination, independent of ex-
perience, which first renders experience possible. Not all pro-
ductive imagination is pure, but pure imagination in the sense
just described is necessarily productive. Insofar as it forms
transcendence, this imagination is rightly termed transcendental.
In general, anthropology does not raise the question of tran-
scendence. Nevertheless, the vain effort on the part of anthro-
pology to interpret the imagination in a more original way shows
that in the empirical interpretation of the faculties of the soul,
which interpretation, by the way, can never be purely empirical,
there is always a reference to transcendental structures. But
these structures can neither be firmly established in anthropology
nor derived from it through mere assumptions.
But what is the nature of that mode of knowledge which
effects the disclosure of transcendence, i.e., which reveals the
pure synthesis and thereby completes the explication of the
imagination? When Kant terms this mode of knowledge "tran-
scendental," the only conclusion that can be drawn from this
is that the theme of the mode of knowledge in question is tran-
scendence. But what characterizes the method of this knowledge?

How does the regression to the origin take place? As long as
the necessary clarity on this point is lacking, it will be impossible
to take the first step toward the laying of the foundation.
It no longer seems possible at this stage of the investigation
to avoid an explicit discussion of the "transcendental method."

But provided that it is possible to clarify this method, the task
still remains to deduce from the principles hitherto established
the direction of the regression required by the dimension of
origin itself. However, whether it is possible to effect an original
interpretation by setting out in the new direction indicated by
the principles in question depends uniquely on knowing whether
Kant's laying of the foundation of metaphysics and our interpre-
tation thereof are sufficiently original to guide us in this new
140

course. This can only be decided by actually carrying out such
an attempt. Insofar as Kant's anthropology is concerned, the

way which seemed at first to be the most natural has turned out
to lead to an impasse. AU the more evident, then, is the necessity
of keeping the interpretation focused on the phenomenon which

manifests itself as the ground of the intrinsic possibility of the
ontological synthesis, i.e., the transcendental imagination.
§27. The Transcendental Imagination as the

Third Fundamental Faculty
To understand the faculties "of our soul" as transcendental

faculties means, first of all, to reveal them according to the
extent and the manner in which they make the essence of tran-
scendence possible. From this point of view, the term "faculty"
[Vermogen] does not signify a "fundamental power" actually
present in the soul; rather, "faculty" here refers to what such
a power is "able to do" [vermag] so far as it renders possible
the essential structure of transcendence. "Faculty" now means
"possibihty" in the sense of that word discussed above.^° Thus
understood, the transcendental imagination is not merely a
faculty which appears between pure intuition and pure thought,
but, together with these, it is a "fundamental faculty" inasmuch
as it makes possible the original unity of the other two and
thereby the essential unity of transcendence as a whole. "A
pure imagination, which conditions aU a priori knowledge, is
^^
thus one of the fundamental faculties of the human soul."
To say that the imagination is a fundamental faculty is also
to say that it is not reducible to the other elements which to-

gether with it form the essential unity of transcendence. This
is why, at the time of the decisive characterization of the es-

sential unity of ontological knowledge, Kant specifically enu-
10. Cf. above, §24, p. 119.

11. A 124, NKS, p. 146.
141

merates three elements: pure intuition (time), the pure syn-
thesis constituted by the imagination, and the pure concepts
of pure apperception.^2 j^ ^hg same context, Kant emphasizes
that "we shall see hereafter" the way in which the imagination
acts as an "indispensable function of the soul without which
we should have no knowledge whatsoever."
The possibility of the unity of these three elements is dis-
cussed in the transcendental deduction and established through

the schematism. In introducing this idea of the pure schematism,
Kant is given another opportunity to enumerate the three pure
elements of ontological knowledge. And finally, the discussion
of the highest principle of all synthetic judgments, i.e., the
final determination of the complete essence of transcendence, is
introduced by the enumeration of the three elements mentioned

above "as the three sources" of the "possibility of pure synthetic
judgments a priori."
Opposed to this unequivocal characterization of the tran-
scendental imagination as a third fundamental faculty in addi-
tion to pure sensibility and pure understanding, a characteriza-
tion derived from the intrinsic problematic of the Critique of
Pure Reason itself, is Kant's express declaration made both at
the beginning and at the end of his work.

There are, however, only "two fundamental sources of our
mind, sensibility and understanding;" there are only these "two
sources;" "we have no other sources of knowledge besides these
two." ^^ To this thesis corresponds the division of the entire
transcendental investigation into transcendental aesthetic and
transcendental logic. The transcendental imagination is home-
less. It is not even discussed in the transcendental aesthetic,
althoilgh as a "faculty of intuition" it really belongs there. On
the other hand, the transcendental imagination is a theme of
the transcendental logic, although as long as logic is confined to
thought as such it should not be. But, this aesthetic and this
12. A78f., B 104, NKS, p. 11 If.

13. Cf. above § 6, p. 39.
142
logic are oriented on transcendence, which last is not merely the
simple sum of pure intuition and pure thought but constitutes
a unique and primordial unity within which intuition and thought
jfunction only as elements. This iswhy the results we attain by
means of the logic and the aesthetic lead us beyond them both.
Could Kant have failed to note this consequence? Or would
the suppression of the above-mentioned triphcity of funda-
mental faculties on behalf of the theory of the duahty of stems
[Stdmme] be at aU reconcilable with his way of thinking? This
is so little the case that in the course of his laying of the founda-
tion of metaphysics, in particular, at the end of the introduction
to the transcendental deduction and again
at the point where
its development Kant speaks explicitly of "three

really begins,
original sources of the soul" just as if he had never established
the doctrine of the duality of stems.
"There are three original sources (capacities or faculties of
the soul) which contain the conditions of the possibility of all
experience, and cannot themselves be derived from any other

faculty of the mind, namely, sense, imagination, and appercep-
tion. . . . AU these faculties have a transcendental (as well as
an empirical) employment which concerns the form alone, and
^*
is possible a priori."
"We saw that there are three subjective sources of knowledge
upon which rests the possibiUty of experience in general and
of knowledge of its objects sense, imagination, and appercep-
tion. Each of these can be viewed as empirical, namely, in its
application to given appearances. But aU of them are likewise

a priori elements or foundations, which make this empirical
employment itself possible." ^^ In both passages it is exphcitly
noted that beside the empirical use of these faculties stands the
transcendental. Hence, the relation to anthropology noted above
is manifested anew.
Thus this triplicity of fundamental faculties and the duality
14. A 94, NKS, p. 127.

15. A 115, NKS, p. 141.
143
of the fundamental sources stand hard by one another. Yet, what
about these two stems? Is it merely by accident that Kant uses
this image to characterize sensibility and understanding, or is
its use meant to indicate that they grow out of a "common

root"?
The interpretation of the laying of the foundation of meta-
physics has revealed that the transcendental imagination is
not merely an external bond which fastens two extremities to-

gether. It is originally unifying, i.e., it is the specific faculty
which forms the unity of the other two, which faculties them-
selves have an essential structural relation to it.
Is it possible that this originally unifying [bildende] center is
that "unknown, common root" of both stems? Is it accidental

that with the first introduction of the imagination Kant says
^®
that "we are scarcely ever conscious" of its existence?
B. The Transcendental Imagination as the
Root of Both Stems
If the established ground does not have the character of an

actual base but that of a root, then it must discharge its func-
tion in such a way as to let the stems grow out of it whUe
lending them support and stability. Thus, we have already
16. A 78, B 103, NKS, p. 112. The specific characterization of

the imagination as a fundamental faculty must have enlightened
Kant's contemporaries as to the significance of this faculty. So
Fichte, Schelling, and in his own way, Jacobi have attributed an es-
sential role to the imagination. We are not able to discuss at this time
the question as to whether these men recognized, maintained, or
even interpreted "in a more original way" the essence of the imagina-
tion as Kant understood it. The following interpretation of the tran-
scendental imagination proceeds from another formulation of the
question and moves in a direction opposite to that of German ideal-
144

found the direction which we sought, with reference to which
the originaUty of the Kantian laying of the foundation of meta-
physics can be discussed within the problematic proper to it.
This laying of the foundation becomes more original when it
does not simply accept the established ground but reveals how
this root is the root of both stems. This means nothing less than
reducing pure intuition and pure thought to the transcendental
imagination.
But apart from the question of its possible success, is not
the doubtful character of such an undertaking obvious? Through
such a reduction of the faculties of knowledge of a finite being
to the imagination, would not all knowledge be reduced to the
purely imaginary? Would not the essence of man dissolve into
mere appearance?
However, if it is a question of showing that pure intuition
and pure thought as transcendental faculties have their origin
in the transcendental imagination as a faculty, this does not

mean that we seek to prove that pure intuition and pure thought
are simply the products of the imagination and as such mere
fictions. The disclosure of the origin which has been character-
ized above shows, rather, that the structure of these faculties is
rooted in the structure of the transcendental imagination in

such a way that the latter can "imagine" something only through
its structural unity with the other two.
Whether what is formed by the transcendental imagination
is pure appearance in the sense of being something "merely
imaginary" is a question which must remain open. To begin
with, we are accustomed to call "merely imaginary" that which
is not really on hand. But according to its nature, what is formed
in the transcendental imagination is not something on hand, if
it is true that the transcendental imagination can never be

ontically creative. On the other hand, what is formed by the
transcendental imagination can never be "merely imaginary"
in the usual sense of that term. On the contrary, it is the
145

horizon of objectivity fonned by the transcendental imagination
— the comprehension of Being —which makes possible all dis-
tinction between ontic truth and ontic appearance (the "merely

imaginary").
But does not ontological knowledge, the essential ground of
which is supposedly the transcendental imagination, have, as
essentially finite, an untruth [Unwahrheit] corresponding to its
truth? ^'^
As a matter of fact, the idea of a transcendental un-
truth conceals within itself one of the most pressing problems
relative to finitude. This problem, far from being solved, has
not even been posed, because the basis for its formulation has
yet to be worked out. This can only be accomplished by the
revelation of the essence of transcendence and, therewith, the
essence of the transcendental imagination. Pure intuition and
pure thought are not to be considered merely imaginary solely
because the possibility of their essence requires that they be
traced back to the essential structure of the transcendental
imagination. The transcendental imagination does not "imagine"
pure intuition but makes it possible for pure intuition to be what
it "really" can be.
But just as the transcendental imagination cannot be con-
sidered to be purely "imaginary" [Eingebildetes] because as a
root it is "formative," so also can it not be considered to be a
"fundamental power" in the soul. This regression to the essen-
17. The untruth of which Heidegger speaks here is not to be con-

fused with "ontic" untruth, i.e., the untruth we encounter in everyday
life. Transcendental untruth (or "error" or "concealment" as he
sometimes terms it) is "a part of the inner structure of Da-sein" (On
the Essence of Truth, op. cit., p. 245) and is the basis of ordinary
untruth or "wrong." Transcendental untruth is ultimately an essential
consequence of man's relation to Being as such (or better, Being's
relation to man), which last as it reveals the essent withdraws and so
conceals itself. See also, What is Metaphysics, op. cit., p. 340ff.; Der
Spruch des Anaximander in Holzwege (Frankfurt am Main, 1950),
p. 310ff.; Vber den Humanismus, p. 19ff. (J. S. C.)
146

tial origin of transcendence is not at all intended to be a monistic-
empirical explanation of the other faculties of the soul in terms
of the imagination. Such an intention would be self-prohibitive,
for, in the end, the disclosure of the essence of transcendence

itself determines in what sense one may speak of the "soul" or
spirit [Gemiit] and to what extent these concepts bear originally

on the ontologico-metaphysical essence of man. The regression
to the transcendental imagination as the root of sensibility and
understanding signifies, on the contrary, only that we wish to
examine [project] anew the constitution of transcendence rela-

tive to the ground of its possibility and in the light of the essential
structure of the transcendental imagination which has been

thrown into rehef within the problematic of the laying of the
foundation. This regression, which is also a laying of the foun-
dation, moves in the dimension of "possibihties," i.e., in the
dimension of that which makes possible. Consequently, the

transcendental imagination as we have known it up to this point
is transformed into more original "possibilities" so that even

the name "imagination" becomes inadequate.
The ensuing stages of the laying of the foundation in its
originality tend even less to supply an absolute basis of inter-

pretation than do those stages of the laying bare of the foundation
already set forth and examined by Kant. The strangeness of the
estabUshed ground, which must have forced itself on Kant,
cannot disappear but will increase as we draw nearer to the
origin, since, after all, the metaphysical nature of man as a finite
being is at once that which is most mysterious and most real.
The problematic of the transcendental deduction and of
transcendental schematism becomes clear only if the transcen-
dental imagination is shown to be the root of transcendence.

The question as to the pure synthesis which is posed here refers
to an original unification in which the unifying element must

from the first be proportional to the elements to be unified. The
formation of this original unity is only possible, however, if
147
the unifying element lets the elements to be unified spring forth.
The root-character of the established ground first makes com-
prehensible the originality of the pure synthesis, makes it
i.e.,
comprehensible as that which lets spring forth.

Although the following interpretation will continue to be
oriented according to the stages of the laying of the foundation
already established, the individual stages will no longer be
described. The specific interrelation of pure imagination, pure
intuition, and pure thought will be revealed only to the extent
indicated by the Kantian laying of the foundation itself,
§ 28. Transcendental Imagination and Pure Intuition
Kant termed the pure intuitions, space and time, "original

representations." The term "original" is not to be understood
here in an ontic or psychological sense and does not concern
the presence or perhaps the innateness of these intuitions in
the soul, but characterizes the manner in which the representa-
tions are represented. The word "original" corresponds to
originarius and means: to let spring forth.
But for all this, these intuitions are, in a sense, formative

in that they pro-pose [vor-stellen] in advance the aspect of
space and time as multiple totalities in themselves. They receive
this aspect, but the reception is in itself a formative act which
gives to itself that which offers itself. The pure intuitions are
essentially "originative," i.e., presentations which let the object

of intuition spring forth, exhibitio originaria. In this act of pre-
sentation lies the essence of pure imagination. Pure intuition
can only be original in the sense just noted, because, according
to its essence, it is pure imagination, an imagination which in

forming aspects (images) spontaneously gives them [to itself].
The enrooting of pure intuition in pure imagination becomes

perfectly clear when we examine the character of what is in-
tuited in pure intuition. Without doubt, commentators are only
148
too quick to deny that something is intuited in pure intuition
for the simple reason that it is supposed to be only the "form

of intuition." The fact is, however, that what is "seen" in
pure intuition is in itself a unified but by no means empty totahty,
the parts of which are always but limitations of itself. This

unified totality from the first must let itself be apprehended
relative to its inclusive multiplicity, which last is generally in-
distinct. Pure intuition as originally unifying, i.e., giving unity,
must perceive this unity. Therefore, Kant is justified in speaking

here not of a synthesis, but of a synopsis. ^^
The totality of that which is intuited in pure intuition does not
have the unity which characterizes the universality enjoyed by

concepts. Hence, the unity of the totality supplied by intuition
cannot arise from the "synthesis of the understanding." It is
a unity perceived from the first in the act of imagination which

forms the image. The "syn" of the totality of space and time
pertains to a faculty of formative intuition. If the pure synopsis
constitutes the essence of pure intuition, it is possible only in
transcendental imagination — all the more so since the latter
is in general the source of all that is "synthetic" in character.^^
The term "synthesis" must therefore be taken here in a sense
broad enough to include the synopsis of intuition and the "syn-
thesis" of the understanding.
Kant once remarked in a reflection at once striking and direct

that "spaceand time are the pre-formative forms [Formen der
Vorbildung] in pure intuition." 2° They form in advance the pure
18. A 94f., NKS, p. 127. Kant says here specifically that he has
treated of the transcendental synopsis in the Transcendental Aes-
thetic.
19. A 78, B 103, NKS, p. 11 If.

Erdmann, Reflexionen, II, 408, Kant's Posthumous Works in
20.
Manuscript Form, op. cit., Vol. V, No. 5934 Adickes, referring to —
Erdmann's reading, erroneously in my opinion, reads "connection"
[Verbindung] instead of "pre-formation" [Vorbildung]. Cf. below,
§ 32, p. 178.
149
aspect which serves as the horizon of that which is intuited in
empirical intuition. But if, in the modahty of its act, pure in-
tuition manifests the specific essence of the transcendental imag-

ination, is it not then true that what is pre-formed therein must
also be imaginative, since it is formed by the imagination
(imagmatio)7 This characteristic of what is intuited as such in
pure intuition is no formal consequence of the foregoing but lies

enclosed in the essential content of that which is accessible to pure
intuition. Hence, this imaginative character of space and time has
nothing extraordinary or strange about it when one considers that
it is a matter here of pure intuition and pure imagination. And as
we have shown, what is formed in the imagination is not neces-

sarily an ontic illusion.
Kant could have understood but little of the essential struc-

ture of pure intuition — he could have had no concep-
indeed,
tion of it —had he been unable grasp imaginative to the char-
acter of what is perceived therein. He states without the slightest
equivocation: "The mere form of intuition, without substance,
is in itself no object, but the merely formal condition of an ob-
ject (as appearance) as pure space and time (ens imaginarium)
These are indeed something, as forms of intuition, but are not
î What perceived in
themselves objects which are intuited." is
pure intuition as such is an ens imaginarium. Therefore, the act

of pure intuition is essentially pure imagination.
The ens imaginarium pertains to the possible forms of "Noth-

ing," to what is not an essent in the sense of something actually
present. Pure space and pure time are "something," but they
are not objects. If one says summarily that "nothing" is intuited
in pure intuition and, therefore, that the latter has no object,
such an interpretation is not only negative but equivocal as well,

as long as it is not clearly specified that Kant is using the term
"object" here in a restricted sense, according to which it is the
A 291, B 347, NKS, p. 195. R. Schmidt remarks that the "(ens

21.
imaginarium)" appears in A three lines higher, after "time."
150
essent that reveals itself in the appearance that is meant. Ac-
cording to this meaning, not just any "something" is an object.
Pure intuitions as "forms of intuiting" are, to be sure, "in-
tuitions without things," ^^ but nevertheless they do have a
content. Space is nothing "real," that is, it is not an essent ac-
cessible to perception but "the representation of a mere possi-
bility of coexistence." ^^ However, the tendency to deny an
object (in the sense of something intuited) to pure intuition is
reinforced by the fact that it is possible to appeal to a character

of pure intuition that is genuinely phenomenal without being
able to determine this character adequately. In our cognitive
relationships to given things organized "spatio-temporally" we
intend only these things. Even so, however, space and time are
not to be disavowed. Therefore, the positive question must
read: How are space and time present in these relationships?
If Kant declares they are intuitions, then the reply is immedi-
ately forthcoming: But they are never intuited. This is certainly
true; they are never intuited in the sense that they become the
objects of a thematic apprehension, but they are intuited ac-
cording to the modality of an act which is originally form-giving
[einer urspriinglich bildenden Gebung]. Precisely because what
is thus intuited is what and how it is, i.e., as essentially a form-
ing [zu Bildendes] — in accordance with the characterized dual
signification of a pure aspect of creating — the act of pure intui-
tion is not able to intuit its "object" in the manner of the thema-
tic apprehension of something actually given.
Thus, the primordial interpretation of pure intuition as pure
imagination first provides the possibility of a positive explica-
tion of what is intuited in pure intuition. As the precursory
formation of a pure, unthematic, and, in the Kantian sense, un-
objective aspect, pure intuition makes it possible for the act of
22. Reflexionen, II, 408, Kant's Posthumous Works in Manuscript

Form, op. cit., Vol. V, No. 5315.
23. A 374, NKS, p. 349.
151
empirical intuition exercised within its horizon not first to have
to intuit space and time in the sense of an expUcit apprehension
of them as a multiplicity.
Hence, if it is true that the innermost essence of transcend-
ence is grounded in pure imagination, then the transcendental
character of transcendental intuition is made clear for the first
time by means of this interpretation of pure intuition. Placed
as it is at the beginning of the Critique of Pure Reason, the
transcendental aesthetic is basically unintelligible. It has only
an introductory character and can be truly understood only in
the perspective of the transcendental schematism.

Although one cannot defend the attempt of the so-called
"Marburg school" to interpret space and time as "categories"
in the logical sense and to reduce the transcendental aesthetic
to logic, one must admit that the attempt is inspired by a legiti-
mate motive. This motive arises from the conviction, certainly
never clearly justified, that the transcendental aesthetic taken

by itself can never constitute the whole of that which hes in it
as a possibility. However, from the specific "syn" character of

pure intuition it does not follow that this intuition is dependent
on the synthesis of the understanding. On the contrary, the
correct interpretation of this "syn" character leads to the con-
clusion that pure intuition originates in the pure imagination.
Moreover, the reduction of transcendental aesthetic to logic
becomes all the more questionable when it is shown that the
specific object of transcendental logic, pure thought, is itself
rooted in the transcendental imagination.^*
24. Only by means of a clear-cut separation between a synopsis

of pure intuition and the synthesis of the understanding is the dis-
tinction, introduced by Kant in B § 26, p. 160, fn. (NKS, p. 170),
between the "form of intuition" and "formal intuition" intelligible.
152
§ 29. Transcendental Imagination and
Theoretical Reason
The attempt to show that pure thought, and hence theoretical
reason in general, has its origin in the transcendental imagina-

tion seems at first sight to be futile for the simple reason that
such a project appears to be absurd in itself. For one thing,
Kant says specifically that the imagination is "always sensi-

ble." 2^ How can a faculty essentially sensible, i.e., "inferior,"
be held to be the origin of a "higher" faculty? That in finite
knowledge the understanding presupposes sensibility, and there-

fore the imagination, as a "base" is comprehensible, but the
notion that the understanding itself springs essentially from
sensibility is obviously absurd.
Yet, before considering any formal arguments, it must be
noted that it is not a question here of the empirical derivation
of a higher faculty of the soul from a lower. If, in the inquiry
into the laying of the foundation of metaphysics, the faculties
of the soul do not form the subject of discussion, then the order
of precedence with regard to "higher" and "lower" cannot be
of significance, not even insofar as the framing of objections is
concerned. But first of all, what is the meaning of "sensible"?

As early as the outline of the point of departure of the laying
of the foundation, we purposely delimited the essence of sensi-
bility according to the definition provided by Kant when he
spoke of it for the first time.^^ According to this definition,
sensibility and finite intuition are one and the same. Finitude
consists in the reception of that which offers itself. What offers
itself and the way in which it offers itself remain indeterminate.

Not every sensible (receptive) intuition is necessarily sensory
and empirical. The "inferiority" of the affections as corporeally
determined does not pertain to the essence of sensibihty. Thus,
25. A 124, NKS, p. 146.

26. Cf. above, § 5, p. 30.
153
not only can the transcendental imagination be sensible, as the
fundamental determination of finite transcendence it must be
sensible.
The sensibility of the transcendental imagination cannot be

taken as a reason for classifying it as one of the lower faculties
of the soul, especially since, as transcendental, it must be the

condition of the possibility of all the faculties. Thus, the most
serious, because the most "natural," objection to the thesis that
pure thought originates in the transcendental imagination is
without foundation.
Reason can now no longer be taken as a "higher" faculty.
But another difficulty immediately presents itself. That pure
intuition arises from the transcendental imagination is conceiv-
able. But that thought, which must be sharply distinguished
from all forms of intuition, should have its origin in the tran-
scendental imagination seems impossible —even if one no longer

attaches any importance to the order of precedence relative to
the understanding and the imagination.
But thought and intuition, though distinct, are not separated
from one another like two totally different things. On the con-
trary, as species of representation, both belong to the same
genus of re-presentation in general. Both are modes of repre-
sentation of. . . . An insight into the primordiaUy representa-
tional character of thought is not less important for our interpre-

tation than is an exact comprehension of the sensible character
of the imagination.
An original disclosure of the understanding must take ac-
count of its innermost essence, namely, its dependence on intui-
tion. This being-dependent-on is the being-as-understanding

[Verstandsein] of the understanding. And this "Being" is how
it is and what it is in the pure synthesis of the pure imagination.
But it might be objected here that although the understanding
is certainly related to pure intuition "through" the pure imagi-
nation, this in no way signifies that the pure understanding is
154
in itself transcendental imagination and not something autono-
mous.
That the understanding is an autonomous faculty is afl&rmed
by logic which does not have to treat of the imagination. And
in fact, Kant always introduces the understanding in a form
attributed to it by a logic [which sets itself up as a science] ap-
parently absolute. Our analysis must proceed from this auton-
omy of thought if the origin of the latter in the imagination
is to be shown.
That traditional logic does not treat of pure imagination is
indisputable. But if logic wishes to understand itself, the ques-

tion as to whether or not it need be concerned with the imagina-
tion must at least remain open. It is also undeniable that Kant
always borrows from logic the point of departure for the
problems which he formulates. And yet it is doubtful whether
logic, merely because it has made pure thought, taken in a
certain sense, its only theme, offers us a guarantee that it can
delimit the complete essence of pure thought or even approach
it.
Does not Kant's interpretation of pure thought in the tran-

scendental deduction and in the doctrine of schematism show
that not only the functions of judgment but also the pure con-
cepts qua notions represent only artificially isolated elements
of the pure synthesis which, on its side, constitutes an essen-
tially necessary "presupposition" of the "synthetic unity of ap-
perception?" Is it not also true that even though Kant always
refers to formal logic as if it were an "absolute," he merges it
with what he terms "transcendental logic," which last has the

transcendental imagination as its only theme. And does not the
rejection of traditional logic go so far that Kant — characteris-
tically, only in the second edition — is compelled to assert: "The
synthetic unity of apperception is, therefore, the highest point
to which we must ascribe all employment of the understanding,
even the whole of logic, and conformably therewith, transcen-
155
dental philosophy. Indeed, this faculty of apperception is the
^^
understanding itself."
The preconceptions relative to the autonomy of thought, and

in the form which they owe to the existence of formal logic as
a discipline apparently supreme and irreducible, cannot them-
selves provide the authority for a decision concerning the
possibility of the origin of pure thought in the transcendental
imagination. It is advisable, rather, to seek the essence of pure
thought in that which the laying of the foundation itself has al-
ready revealed. We can come to a decision concemmg the

possible origin of the understanding only by looking to the
original essence of the understanding itself and not to a "logic"
which does not take this essence into account.
To characterize thought as judgment is indeed pertinent,
but it is stiU a characterization rather far removed from the
essence of thought. The description of thought as "the faculty
of rules" approaches this essence "more closely" ^^ because by
means of this description it is possible to discover a path which
leads to the fundamental determination of the understanding
as "pure apperception."
The "faculty of rules" is that which, by representing them,
pro-poses in advance those unities which guide all possible
modes of unification in the act of representation. These unities
(notions or categories) represented in their regulative function
must not only be disposed in accordance with their proper af-
finity but must also be included in advance in an abiding [blei-
bendeii] unity by means of an act of representation even more

primordial.
The representation of this abiding unity, as the identity of
the complex of the rules of unity, is the fundamental character
of the act of ob-jectification. In such representational self-
orientation toward . . . , the "self" is, as it were, taken out-
27. B 154, fn., NKS, p. 154.

28. A 126, NKS, p. 147.
156

side [hinausgenommen] in the act of orientation. In this act,
more precisely in the "self" "exteriorized" with it, the "I" of
this "self" is necessarily made manifest. It is in this way that the
"I represent" "accompanies" every act of representation. But

it is not a question here of a subsidiary act of knowledge which
takes thought as its object. The "I" "goes with" the act of pure
self-orientation. Inasmuch as this "I" is what it is only m the
"I think," the essence of pure thought as well as that of the "I"
Ues in "pure self-consciousness." This "consciousness" of the
self can only be explained by the Being of the self, not con-
versely. Being cannot be explained or rendered superfluous by
consciousness.
Now, the "I think" is always "I thmk substance" or "I think
causahty," etc. More precisely "in" these pure unities (cate-
gories) "what we assert in them" ^^ is always "I thmk sub-

stance, cause, etc." The ego is the "vehicle" of the categories
inasmuch as in its precursory act of orientation it puts them in
a position wherein, as represented, they can be regulative, uni-

fying unities.
The pure understanding is consequently a pre-formation "by
itself" representative of the horizon of unity; it is a representa-
tional, formative spontaneity which occurs in the "transcenden-
tal schematism." This schematism Kant terms specifically "the

procedure of understanding in these schemata," ^° and speaks
^^
of the "schematism of our understanding."
However, the pure schemata form a "transcendental product
of imagination." ^^ How may these theses be reconciled? The
understanding does not produce the schemata but "employs"
them. This employment, however, is not a mode of activity in
which the understanding occasionally indulges. On the contrary,
29. A 343, B 401, NKS, p. 330.

30. A 140, B 179, NKS, p. 182.
31. A 141, B 180, NKS, p. 183.
32. A 142, B 181, NKS, p. 183.
157

this pure schematism which is grounded in the transcendental
imagination constitutes original being-as-understanding, i.e., the

"I think substance," etc. The apparently independent act of the
understanding in thinking the unities is, as a spontaneously

formative act of representation, a fundamental act of the tran-
scendental imagination. This is all the more evident in view of
the fact that this representational self-orientation does not in-
tend this unity thematically but, as we have already indicated
several times, is the unthematic pro-position of that which is
represented. This pro-position, however, takes place in a forma-

tive (pro-ductive) act of representation.
If what Kant terms "our thought" is this pure self-orienting

reference-to . . . , the "thinking" of such a thought is not an
act of judgment but is thinking in the sense of the free, but not
arbitrary, "envisioning" [Sich-denken] of something, an en-
visioning which is at once a forming and a projecting. This
primordial act of "thinking" is an act of pure imagination.
The imaginative character of pure thought becomes even
more apparent when we attempt, from the vantage point of the
essential definition of the understanding already attained, to
draw nearer to the essence of self-consciousness in order to
comprehend it as reason. Here again, we should not take as
authoritative the distinction, borrowed from formal logic, be-
tween the understanding which judges and reason which draws

conclusions. On the contrary, it is necessary to rely on the re-
sults yielded by the transcendental interpretation of the under-
standing.
Kant calls the understanding "a closed unity." But from
what source does the projected totality which is aflBnity derive
its character as a totality? Insofar as it is a question of the
totality of the act of representation as such, that which provides
this totality must itself be an act of representation. This act of
representation takes place in the formation of ideas. Because
the pure understanding is the "I think," it must, on the basis of
158

its essence, have the character of a "faculty of ideas," i.e., it
must be a [form of] reason, for "without reason we should have

no coherent employment of the understanding." ^^ Ideas "con-
tain a certain completeness," ^^ they represent "the form of a
whole," ^^ and, hence, in a more original sense provide rules.
Now, one might object that in the course of his analysis of
the transcendental ideal which must serve "as a rule and an
archetype," ^^ Kant specifically states that the products of the
imagination "such as painters and physiognomists profess to
carry in their heads" "are of an entirely different nature." ^^
Here the connection between the ideas of pure reason and those
of the imagination is expressly denied. But this passage says
simply that the transcendental ideal "must always rest on de-
terminate concepts" and cannot be an arbitrary and "blurred
sketch" supplied by the empirical, productive imagination. This
does not prevent these "definite concepts" from being possible
only in the imagination.
Now, it would be possible to agree with this interpretation
of theoretical reason with regard to its kinship with the tran-
scendental imagination insofar as the interpretation emphasizes
the act of free formation proper to the representation exercised
by pure thought. However, if the interpretation should conclude
that the origin of pure thought is to be sought in the transcen-
dental imagination, then one would have to raise the objection
that spontaneity constitutes only one element of the imagination
and that consequently, although thought is indeed related to
the imagination, the two are by no means completely identical.
The imagination is also and above all a faculty of intuition, i.e.,
receptivity. It is receptive not merely in addition to, and over
33. A 651, B 679, NKS, p. 538.

34. A 567f., B 595f., NKS, p. 485.
35. A 832, B 860, 653; cf. also Vom Wesen des Grundes, p. 28f.
36. A 570, B 598, NKS, p. 487.
37. Ibid.
159

and above, its spontaneity but in the primordial, non-cx)mposite
unity of receptivity and spontaneity.
We have shown, however, that pure intuition by reason of
its purity has the character of spontaneity. As pure spontaneous
receptivity, it has its essence in transcendental imagination.
If pure thought is to have the same essence, it must, as
spontaneity, exhibit at the same time the character of recep-
tivity. But does not Kant identify understanding and reason
with spontaneity pure and simple?
However, if Kant identifies the understanding with spontane-
ity, this no more rules out a receptivity on the part of the un-
derstanding than the identification of sensibility — finite intui-
tion — ^with receptivity rules out a corresponding spontaneity.

But perhaps the exclusive consideration of empirical intuition
tends to emphasize the receptivity of this intuition just as, cor-

relatively, the consideration of the "logical" function of the
understanding within empirical knowledge leads to an emphasis
of its spontaneity and [coimectivel function.
On the other hand, in the domain of pure knowledge, i.e.,
that which has to do with the problem of the possibility of tran-
scendence, pure receptivity, the mode of receptivity which gives

to itself (spontaneously) that which offers itself, cannot remain
concealed. Therefore, must not the transcendental interpreta-
tion of pure thought, while insisting on the spontaneity of the
latter, just as vigorously set forth a pure receptivity? Without
doubt. This receptivity has already been afl&rmed in the course
of the preceding interpretation of the transcendental deduction
and of schematism.
In order to comprehend the essentially intuitive character of
pure thought, it is necessary only to understand and retain the

true essence of finite intuition as a reception of that which offers
itself. Now, it has been established that the fundamental char-
acter of the "unity" of transcendental apperception is that, as
constantly unifying in advance, it is opposed to all that is hap-
160

hazard. This is why in the representative act of orientation only
this opposition is received and nothing more. The free forma-

tive projection which develops afl&nity while submitting to it is
in itself a receptive act of representation. The rules which are

represented in the understanding, taken as the faculty of rules,
are not apprehended as actually given "ia consciousness" but as
rules of connection (synthesis) which compel as they connect.
If a rule exercises its function only in the receptive act which
lets it rule, then the "idea" as the representation of rules can
itself represent only in the mode of receptivity.
In this sense, pure thought is in itself —not merely accessori-
aUy —pure intuition. Consequently, this spontaneity, which in
the very unity of its structure is receptive, must have its origin
in the transcendental imagination in order that it can be what
it is. As pure apperception, the understanding has the "ground
of its possibility" in a faculty which "contemplates an injBnity
^^
of representations and concepts which it has made itself."
Forming it in advance, the transcendental imagination pro-jects
the complex of possibilities which it "contemplates," thus pro-

posing the horizon within which the knowing self, and not only
this, acts. This is why Kant is able to assert: "Human reason is
by its nature architectonic. This is to say, it regards all our

knowledge as belonging to a possible system." ^^
The intuitive character inherent in pure thought does not
appear so strange to us when we consider that the pure intui-
tions, space and time, are just as "unintuitive" (as long as
"intuitive" is taken to mean "perceptible by organs of sense")
as the categories, provided that we understand them correctly,
i.e,, as pure schemata. The necessity which manifests itself in
the ob-jectification of a horizon of ob-jectivity can only be en-
countered as that which constrains, if the being which en-
counters it is free to accept it as such. Insofar as freedom implies
38. Vber die Fortschritte der Metaphysik, op. cit., VIII, p. 249.
39. A 474, B 502, NKS, p. 429.
161

placing oneself under a necessity which is self-imposed, it is
inherent in the essence of the pure understanding, pure theoret-

ical reason. The understanding and reason are not free because
they have the character of spontaneity but because this spon-
taneity is a receptive spontaneity, i.e., is transcendental imagi-
nation.
As the reduction of pure intuition and pure thought to tran-
scendental imagination is accomplished, we become aware that
by this reduction the transcendental imagination manifests itself
more and more as a structural possibility of transcendence — as

that which makes transcendence as the essence of the finite self
possible. Thus, the imagination not only ceases to be an empiri-

cal faculty of the soul, and one which is discoverable as such;
it also is free from that restriction which hitherto has limited
its essence to being only the source of the theoretical faculty.
And so we must now hazard the last step in the revelation of
the "basic originaHty" of the estabhshed ground.
§ 30. Transcendental Imagination and

Practical Reason
In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant declares: "By 'the
practical' I mean everything that is possible through free-

dom." ^° However, insofar as the possibility of theoretical
reason depends upon freedom, it is in itself, as theoretical,
practical. But if finite reason is receptive even in its spontaneity
and, therefore, arises from the transcendental imagination, then
practical reason must also be based on the latter. However, the
origin of practical reason cannot be "deduced" by means of
such arguments, no matter how sound they may seem to be,
but requires an explicit revelation through an elucidation of
the essence of the "practical self."
According to what has been said concerning the ego of
40. A 800, B 828, NKS, p. 632.
162

pure apperception, the essence of the self lies in "self-con-
sciousness." However, the mode according to which the self
exists and the form in which it exists in this "consciousness"
is determined through the "Being" of the self. The self is
always overt to itself, and this overtness is what it is only

insofar as it co-determines the Being of the self. Now, in order
to examine the practical self relative to the basis of its possi-
bility, it is necessary first of all to dehmit this self-consciousness
which makes the self qua self possible. In considering this

practical, i.e., moral, self-consciousness, we must seek to deter-
mine the respect in which its essential structure refers back
to the transcendental imagination as its origin.
The moral ego, the self, the true essence of man, Kant also
terms the person. In what does the essence of the personality

of the person consist? "Personality itself is . . . the idea of
^^
the moral law and the respect which is inseparable from it."
Respect is "susceptibility" to the law, that which renders us

capable of responding to it as a moral law. If respect consti-
tutes the essence of the person as the moral self, then according
to what has been said, it must be a mode of self-consciousness.
In what way is it such?
Can respect function as a mode of self-consciousness when,
according to Kant's own designation, it is a "feeling"? The
feelings as effective states of pleasure or displeasure belong
to sensibility. But since this last is not necessarily determined
by bodily states, there remains open the possibility of a pure
feeling, one which is not necessarily determined by the affec-
tions but "produced by the subject itself." ^^ It is necessary,
therefore, to examine the essence of feeling in general. The
elucidation of this essence will enable us to decide in what way
41. Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, trans. Theodore

M. Greene and Hoyt Hudson (Chicago, 1934), p. 22f.
42. Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, trans.
Thomas Abbott (New York, 1949), p. 19.
163

"feeling" in general, and therewith respect as a pure feeling,
can constitute a mode of self -consciousness.
Even in the "lower" feelings of pleasure, a fundamental

stracture that is characteristic is revealed. Pleasure is not only
pleasure in something but also a state of enjoyment —a way in
which a man experiences joy, in which he is happy. Thus, in
every sensible (in the narrow sense of the term) and non-
sensible feeling, the following structure is to be found: feeling
is a feeling-for . , . and as such is also a way of feeling one-
self. The modality according to which this feeling renders the
self manifest, i.e., lets it be, is always and essentially co-deter-
mined by the nature of the object for which the subject in
feeling himself experiences a feeling. How is this structure
realized in respect and why is the latter a pure feeling?
Kant presents the analysis of respect in the Critique of
Practical Reason.*^ The following interpretation wiU deal only
with the essentials of this analysis.
As such, respect is respect for . . . the moral law. It does
not serve as a criterion by which to judge our actions, and
it does not first appear after a moral act has been carried out
perhaps as a way of adopting an attitude toward this act. On
the contrary, respect for the moral law first constitutes the
possibility of such an act. Respect for . . . is the way in which
the law first becomes accessible to us. It follows, then, that
this feeling of respect does not, as Kant expresses it, serve
as a "foundation" of the law. The law is not what it is because
we have a feeling of respect for it but conversely: this feeling
of respect for the law and, hence, the way in which the law
is made manifest through it, determines the manner in which
the law is as such capable of affecting us.
Feeling is having feeUng for . . . so that the ego which
experiences this feeling at the same time feels itself. Accord-
43. Critique of Practical Reason, trans. L. W. Beck (Chicago,
1949), p. 180ff.
164

ingly, in respect for the law, the ego which experiences this
respect must also, in a certain sense, become manifest to itself.
This manifestation is neither subsequent [to the acts] nor is
it something that takes place only occasionally. Respect for

the law — this specific way of making the law manifest as the
basis of the determination of action — is in itself a revelation of
myself as the self that acts. That for which the respect is
respect, the moral law, the reason as free gives to itself. Respect
for the law is respect for oneself as that self which does not let
itself be determined by self-conceit and self-love. Respect, in
its specific mode of manifestation, has reference to the person.
*^
"Respect is always directed toward persons, never things."
In having respect for the law, I submit to it. This specific
feeling for . . . which is characteristic of respect is a sub-
mission. In having respect for the law, I submit to myself. I
am myself in this act of submitting to myself. What, or more
precisely who, is the self manifested to myself in this feeling
of respect?
In submitting to the law, I submit myself to myself qua pure
reason. In submitting to myself, I raise myself to myself as a
free being capable of self-determination. This raising the self
by submitting to the self reveals the ego in its "dignity." Nega-
tively expressed: in having respect for the law which I give to
myself as a free being, I am unable to despise myself. Con-
sequently, respect is that mode of being-as-self of the ego
which prevents the latter from "rejecting the hero in his soul."
Respect is the mode of being responsible for the Being of the
self; it is the authentic being-as-self.
The projection of the self, in submission, on the total, funda-
mental possibility of authentic existence, this possibility being
given by the law, is the essence of the self, i.e., practical reason.
The preceding interpretation of the feeling of respect not
only reveals to what extent this feeling constitutes practical
44. Ibid., p. 186.
165
reason but also makes it clear that the concept of feeling in
the sense of an empirical faculty of the soul is eliminated and
replaced by a transcendental, fundamental structure of the
transcendence of the moral self. The expression "feeling" must
be understood in this ontologico-metaphysical sense if we are
to do justice to what Kant means by his characterization of
respect as a "moral feeling" and as the "feeling of my exist-
ence." No further steps are now required in order to see that

this essential structure of respect lets the primordial nature
of the transcendental imagination appear as it is in itself.
The self-submissive, immediate surrender to ... is pure

receptivity; the free self-imposition of the law is pure spontaneity.
In themselves, the two are originally one. Furthermore, only
by understanding that the origin of practical reason is to be
found in the transcendental imagination are we able to under-
stand why it is that in the feeling of respect neither the law
nor the active self is objectively apprehended but that both
are made manifest therein in a more original, unthematic and
unobjective way as duty and action, and form the non-reflective,
active mode of bemg-as-self.
§31. The Basic Originality of the Established Ground

and Kant's Recoil from Transcendental
Imagination
The "highest principle of all synthetic judgments" delimits

the complete essence of the transcendence of pure knowledge.
The transcendental imagination is manifested as the essential
ground of this essence. The more primordial interpretation of
the essence of this essential ground which has been given above
first reveals the true significance of the highest principle. This
principle speaks of the essential constitution of human beings
in general insofar as it is defined as finite pure reason.
This fundamental constitution of the essence of man, "rooted"
166

in the ranscendental imagination, is the "unknown" of which
Kant must have had an intimation when he spoke of "the root
unknown to us"; for the unknown is not that of which we
know absolutely nothing but that of which the knowledge
makes us uneasy. However, Kant did not carry out the primor-
dial interpretation of the transcendental imagination; indeed,
he did not even make the attempt, despite the clear indications
he gave us concerning such an analytic.
Kant recoiled from this unknown root.
In the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason the
transcendental imagination, as it was described in the vigorous
language of the first edition,^^ is thrust aside and transformed
— ^to the benefit of the understanding. But at the same time,
if he is not to undo the entire laying of the foundation, Kant in
the second edition must uphold all that in the first constitutes
the transcendental function of the imagination with respect to
the establishment of the foundation.
We cannot discuss here the sense in which the pure imag-
ination reappears in the Critique of Judgment or whether, in
particular, it reappears in that specific relation to the laying
of the foundation of metaphysics which was described above.
Kant begins by striking out in the second edition the two
principal passages in the preceding edition which specifically
present the imagination as a third fundamental faculty beside

sensibility and the understanding. The first passage ^^ is re-
placed by a critical discussion of the analyses by Locke and
Hume of the understanding, just as if Kant —although mis-
takenly —looked upon his conception in the first edition as
being still too close to the empirical.
The second passage ^^ disappears because of the reworking
of the transcendental deduction as a whole.
45. See above, §§24 and 25.

46. A 94, NKS, p. 127.
47. A 115, NKS, p. 141.
167

Indeed, even the passage in the first edition of the Critique
of Pure Reason wherein Kant first introduced the imagination

as an "indispensable function of the soul," ^^ he later modified,
although only in the author's copy, in a way which is highly
significant.*^ In place of "function of the soul," he substituted
"function of the understanding." Thus, the pure synthesis is
assigned to the pure understanding. The pure imagination is

no longer indispensable as a faculty in its own right. Thus the
possibility of making it the essential basis of ontological knowl-
edge is apparently eliminated, even though the chapter on
schematism, wherein this thesis is presented clearly enough,
remains unaltered in the second edition.
However, the transcendental imagination is not first revealed
as the formative center of pure knowledge in the chapter on
schematism (the fourth stage); it is already revealed as such
in the transcendental deduction (the third stage). If in the
second edition, therefore, the transcendental imagination is to
be set aside insofar as its central function as a fundamental

faculty is concerned, then the transcendental deduction must
first be completely reworked. The transcendental imagination
is the disquieting unknown which supphes the motive for the
new conception of the transcendental deduction. Through this
motive also, the objective of the new treatment of the tran-

scendental deduction first becomes visible.^^ This objective
first provides the proper guide for a more penetrating inter-
pretation of the reworking in question. Such an interpretation

cannot be presented here. We must be satisfied to indicate the
change in position with respect to the transcendental imagination.
The substitution, cited above, of the expression "function

of the understanding" for "function of the soul" characterizes
Kant's new position with regard to the transcendental imag-
48. A 78, B 103, NKS, p. 112.

49. Cf.Nachtrdge.XLI.
50. Cf. below, p. 172.
168

ination. It is no longer a "function" in the sense of an autono-
mous faculty, but is now a "function" only in the sense of an
operation of the faculty of understanding. While in the first
edition, all synthesis, i.e., synthesis as such, arises from the

imagination as a faculty not reducible either to sensibility or
understanding, in the second edition the understanding alone
assumes the role of origin for all synthesis.
At the very beginning of the transcendental deduction as

presented in the second edition, Kant states that "synthesis"
"is an act of spontaneity of the faculty of representation . . .
[which] ... to distinguish it from sensibility, must be entitied
understanding." ^^ One should notice here the neutral expres-

sion "faculty of representation."
"Synthesis" is, in general, the name given to an "act of under-
standing." ^2 The "faculty of combining a priori" is the "under-
standing." ^2 This is why Kant now speaks of the "pure synthesis
^*
of understanding."
However, Kant is not content only implicitly to attribute
the function of synthesis to the understanding; he also states
explicitly that "the transcendental synthesis ... is an action
of the understanding on the sensibility." ^^ "The transcendental
act of imagination" is conceived as "the synthetic influence
of the understanding upon inner sense." ^^
But does not this passage also indicate that, in spite of every-
thing, the transcendental imagination is retained? Certainly,
for its complete elimination in the second edition would have
been much too strange, especially since the "function" of the
imagination remains indispensable for the problematic. More-
51. B 130, NKS, p. 151.

52. Ibid.
53. B 135, NKS, p. 154.
54. B 140, 153; NKS, pp. 158, 166.
55. B 152, NKS, p. 165.
56. B 154, NKS, p. 167.
169

over, the term continues to figure in those unreworked parts of
the Critique of Pure Reason which come before and after the
transcendental deduction.
Nevertheless, in the second edition the transcendental imag-
ination is present only in name. "It is one and the same spon-
taneity, which in the one case, under the title of imagination,
and in the other case, under the title of understanding, brings

combination into the manifold of intuition." ^^ Imagination
is now only the name of the empirical synthesis, i.e., the syn-
thesis as relative to intuition. This synthesis, as the passages
cited above show clearly enough, still belongs qua synthesis

to the understanding. "Synthesis" is termed "imagination" only
insofar as it refers to intuition; fundamentally, however, it is
[a product of the] understanding.^^
The transcendental imagination no longer functions as an

autonomous fundamental faculty, mediating between sensibility
and understanding in their possible unity. This intermediate
faculty disappears and only two fundamental sources of the
mind are retained. The function of the transcendental imag-
ination is transferred to the understanding. And when, in the
second edition, Kant provides a proper name, apparently

descriptive, for the imagination, namely, synthesis speciosa,^^
he shows by this expression that the transcendental imagination

has lost its former autonomy. It receives this name only because
in it the understanding is referred to sensibility and without this
referencewould be synthesis intellectualis.

But why did Kant
recoil from the transcendental imagination?
Did he perhaps fail to see the possibility of a more primordial

laying of the foundation? On the contrary, the preface to the
first edition defines the task of such a laying of the foundation
with great clarity. In it Kant distinguishes two "sides" of the
57. B 162, NKS, p. 171f.

58. B 151, NKS, p. 164.
59. Ibid.
170

transcendental deduction, one "objective," the other "sub-
^"
jective."
This imphes, if one holds to the preceding interpretation

of the transcendental deduction, that this deduction poses
the question of the intrinsic possibility of transcendence and
by its answer reveals the horizon of objectivity. The analysis
of the objectivity of possible objects is the "objective" side of
the deduction.
Objectivity is formed in the self -orienting act of ob-jectifi-
cation. The question of knowing what faculties are involved
in this act and under what conditions it is possible is the ques-

tion of the subjectivity of the transcending subject as such.
It is the "subjective" side of the deduction.
For Kant, what matters above all is the revelation of tran-
scendence in order thus to elucidate the essence of transcendental
(ontological) knowledge. This is why he says of the objective
deduction: "It is therefore essential to my purposes. The other
seeks to investigate the pure understanding itself, its possibility,
and the cognitive faculties upon which it rests, and so deals

with it in its subjective aspect. Although this latter exposition
is of great importance for my chief purpose, it does not form

an essential part of it. For the chief question is always simply
this: what and how much can the understanding and reason
know apart from all experience? not —how is the faculty of
^^
thought itself possible?"
The transcendental deduction is in itself objective-subjective
and at one and the same tune. For this deduction is the reve-
lation of transcendence which first produces the essential
orientation of finite subjectivity toward aU objectivity. The

subjective side of the deduction, then, can never be lacking;
however, its explicit elaboration may well be deferred. If Kant
has decided on such a course, he is able to do so only because
60. A XVIff., NKS, p. 1 Iff.
61. A XVII, NKS, p. 12.

171
of his clear insight into the essence of such an elaboration of
the subjective side of the laying of the foundation of metaphys-
ics.
In the description of the transcendental deduction cited

above,. it is cleariy stated that the deduction must lead back to
"the cognitive faculties" "upon which [the understanding] rests."
Furthermore, Kant sees very clearly that this regression to
the origin cannot be an investigation which is psychologically
and empurically explicative and which "hypothetically" posits
a ground. Now, this task of a transcendental revelation of the
essence of the subjectivity of the subject (the "subjective de-
duction") is not introduced into the preface as an afterthought.
On the contrary, even in the preparation of the deduction, Kant
speaks of an "enterprise never before attempted" which is
necessarily veiled in "obscurity." He does not intend to give

an "elaborate" theory of subjectivity even though the "deduction
of the categories" "compels" us to enter "deeply into the first
^^
grounds of the possibihty of our knowledge in general."
Thus, Kant was aware of the possibility and the necessity
of a more primordial laying of the foundation, but it formed
no part of his immediate purpose. However, this cannot justify
the eUmination of the transcendental imagination, since it is
the latter which forms the unity and ob-jectivity of transcen-

dence. The transcendental imagination itself must have provided
the motive which led Kant to turn away from it as an autono-
mous and transcendental fundamental faculty.
Not having carried out the subjective deduction, Kant con-
tinued to be guided by the notions of the composition and char-
acterization of the subjectivity of the subject provided by tra-
ditional anthropology and psychology. To these disciplines,
the imagmation was a lower faculty within sensibility. In fact,

the result of the transcendental deduction and the doctrine of
schematism, i.e., the insight into the transcendental essence of
62. A 98, NKS, p. 131.
172
pure imagination which they provide, was not in itself enough
to permit the subjectivity of the subject as a whole to be seen
in a new Ught.
How can sensibility as a lower faculty be said to detennine
the essence of reason? Does not everything fall into confusion
if the lower is put in place of the higher? What is to happen
to the honorable tradition according to which, in the long his-
tory of metaphysics, ratio and the logos have laid claim to the
central role? Can the primacy of logic disappear? Can the

architectonic of the laying of the foundation of metaphysics,
i.e., its division into transcendental aesthetic and logic, be
preserved if the theme of the latter is basically the transcen-
dental imagination?
Does not the Critique of Pure Reason deprive itself of its
own theme if pure reason is transformed into transcendental

imagination? Does not this laying of the foundation lead to an
abyss?
By his radical interrogation, Kant brought the "possibility"
of metaphysics before this abyss. He saw

unknown; he the
had to draw back. Not only did the imagination fill him with
alarm, but in the meantime [between the first and second
editions] he had also come more and more under the influence
of pure reason as such.
Through the laying of the foundation of metaphysics in gen-
eral, Kant first acquired a clear insight into the character of

the "universaUty" of ontologico-metaphysical knowledge. Now,
for the first time, he had the means to undertake a critical
exploration of the domain of "moral philosophy" and to replace
the vague, empirical generality of the ethical doctrines of
popular philosophy by those essential and primordial ontological
analyses which alone are capable of securing a metaphysic of
morals and the foundation thereof. In the struggle against the
superficial and palliative empiricism of the reigning moral
philosophy, Kant attached increasing importance to the dis-
173

tinction which he established between the a priori and the em-
pirical. And since the essence of the subjectivity of the subject
is to be found in personahty, which last is identical with moral
reason, the rationality of pure knowledge and of [moral] action
must be affirmed. All pure synthesis, indeed, all synthesis in
general, must as relevant to spontaneity depend on that faculty
which in the strictest sense is free, the active reason.
The purely rational character of the personality, which be-

comes even more obvious, cannot, even for Kant, cast doubt
upon the finitude of man if it is true that a being determined
by morality and duty [Sittlichkeit und Sollen] neither is nor can
become "infinite." Rather, it awoke Kant to the realization
that finitude must be sought in the purely rational being itself
and not first in the circumstance that this being is determined

by "sensibility." Only through this realization can morality
be conceived as pure, i.e., as neither conditioned nor created
by the empirical individual.
This ontological problem of the person as finite pure reason
cannot be formulated with reference to anything pecuhar to
the constitution and mode of existence of a particular type of
finite, rational being. Such, however, is the imagination which
is not only regarded as a specifically human faculty but also
as a sensible one.
Being thus self-reinforcing, the problematic of a pure reason
must inevitably thrust the imagination into the background,
thus concealing its transcendental nature completely.
It is incontestable that the distinction between a finite
rational being in general and man as a particular example of

such a being comes to the fore in the transcendental deduction
as the latter appears in the second edition. Indeed, even Kant's
first "correction," appearing on the first page of the second
makes this clear. To the characterization of finite knowl-
edition,
edge,more precisely, to that of finite intuition, he adds: "to

man at least." ^^ This is intended to show that although aU
63. B 33, NKS, p. 65.
174
finite, intuition is receptive, this receptivity does not necessarily,
as is the case with man, require the mediation of sense organs.

The "strangeness" and obscurity of the transcendental imag-
ination as it appears in its capacity as the estabUshed ground in
the first attempt to lay the foundation, on the one hand, and
the luminous power of pure reason on the other, combine to
obscure anew that prospect of the primordial essence of the
transcendental imagination which, as it were, opened up only
for an instant.
Considered in the hght of the basic problem of the Critique
of Pure Reason, such is the fundamental import of an obser-
vation long made by Kant's commentators, an observation
usually expressed as follows: Kant has turned from the "psycho-
logical" interpretation of the first edition to the more "logical"
interpretation of the second.
It should be noted, in truth, that the laymg of the foundation
is no more "psychological" in the first edition than it is
"logical" in the second. On the contrary, both are transcendental,

i.e., necessarily "objective" as well as "subjective." All that
takes place so far as the subjective transcendental deduction
is concerned is that in order to preserve the supremacy of
reason the second edition has decided for the pure understand-
ing as opposed to the pure imagination. In the second edition,
the subjective "psychological" deduction does not disappear.
On the contrary, because it is oriented on the pure understand-
ing as the faculty of synthesis, the subjective side becomes even
more prominent. To attempt to trace the understanding back
to a more primordial "faculty of knowledge" is, henceforth,
superfluous.
The interpretation of the stages of the laying of the foun-
dation of metaphysics presented above is oriented exclusively
on the first edition and always keeps the finitude of human
transcendence in the center of the problematic. In the second
edition, Kant has enlarged the concept of a rational finite
being to the point where it no longer coincides with the con-
175
cept of man and thus has posed the problem of finitude with
greater comprehensiveness. Is this not reason enough for an
essential interpretation of the Critique to adhere to the second
edition? According to what has been said, it is evident that
this edition is not "better" because it proceeds in a more logical
manner. On the contrary, when correctly understood, this
edition is even more "psychological" simply because it is
oriented exclusively on pure reason as such.

But are not these considerations enough to condemn the
present interpretation and, above all, the primordial expUcation
of the transcendental imagination which it proposes?
But why, from the beginning, has the finitude of pure knowl-
edge been placed at the center [of our interpretation]? Because
metaphysics, with the laying of the foundation of which we
are concerned, belongs to "human nature." Consequently, the
specific finitude of human nature is decisive for the laying of
this foundation. This question, apparently superficial, as to
whether, in the interpretation of the Critique of Pure Reason,
the second edition deserves to be ranked over the first or con-
versely is only the pale reflection of a question which is decisive
insofar as the Kantian laying of the foundation is concerned:
Is the transcendental imagination as the established ground
solid enough to determine primordially, i.e., in its unity and
its totality, the finite essence of the subjectivity of the human
subject? Or, on the contrary, with the elimination of the tran-
scendental imagination does the problem of a finite, human
pure reason assume a more comprehensible form and thus
approach nearer to a possible solution? As long as this question
is not decided, the more primordial interpretation of the tran-

scendental imagination, attempted here, remains necessarily
incomplete.
176

C. The Transcendental Imagination and the
Problem of Human Pure Reason
To begin with, we show by a decisive argument that

will
the Critique of Pure Reason as a laying of the foundation of

metaphysics from the first treats only of human pure reason.
The formulation of the problem of the possibility of meta-

physica generalis reads: "How are a priori synthetic judgments
possible?" Kant's solution of the problem is set forth as follows:
"The problem mentioned above may be solved only relative

to those faculties which permit man to enlarge his knowledge
a priori. These faculties constitute in man what may be properly
termed his pure reason. For, if we understand by the pure
reason of a being in general the faculty of knowing things
independently of experience and therefore of sensible represen-
tations, we by no means determine thereby the manner ia which
such knowledge is possible for the being in question (for ex-
ample, for God or for any other higher spirit), and the prob-
lem, therefore, remains undecided. On the other hand, insofar
as man is concerned, aU knowledge is composed of two ele-
ments: concept and intuition."^*

This passage is to be found in the treatise entitled On the
Progress of Metaphysics. The composition of this treatise
shows that Kant was fuUy and immediately conscious of the

problems inherent La metaphysics as such. In a laying of the
foundation of metaphysics, therefore, the problem is the "spe-
cific" finitude of human subjectivity. And this finitude cannot
be introduced merely as a possible "case" of a finite rational
being.
Human finitude necessarily involves sensibility in the sense
of receptive intuition. As pure intuition (pure sensibility) it is
64. Vber die Fortschritte der Metaphysik, op. cit., VIII, p. 312
(italics are Heidegger's).
177
a necessary element of the structure of transcendence charac-
teristic of finitude. Human pure reason is necessarily pure
sensible reason. This pure reason must be sensible in itself and
not become so merely because it is connected with a body.
Rather, the converse is true; man as a finite rational being
can in a transcendental, i.e., metaphysical, sense "have" his
body only because transcendence as such is sensible a priori.
Now, if transcendental imagination is to be the primordial
ground of human subjectivity taken in its unity and totality,,
then it must also make possible a faculty on the order of pure

sensible reason. But pure sensibility, according to the universal
signification in which it must be taken for the laying of the
foundation of metaphysics, is time.
How can time as pure sensibility form a primordial unity
with the "I think"? Is the pure ego which, according to the
interpretation generally accepted, Kant conceived to be extra-
temporal and opposed to time, to be considered as "temporal"?
And all this on the basis of the transcendental imagination?
How, in general, is the latter related to time?
§ 32. The Transcendental Imagination and

Its Relation to Time
We have shown how the transcendental imagination is the

origin of pure sensible intuition. ^^ Thus, we have proved
essentially that time as pure intuition arises from the tran-
scendental imagination. However, a specific, analytical expli-
cation of the precise manner in which time is based upon the
transcendental imagination is necessary.
As the pure succession of the now-series, time is "in constant
flux." ^^ Pure intuition intuits this succession unobjectively.
To intuit means : to receive that which offers itself. Pure intuition
65. See above, § 28, p. 148.

66. B 291, NKS, p. 255.
178

gives to itself, in the receptive act, that which is capable of
being received.
Reception of ... is usually understood as the act of receiv-
ing something given or present. But this Umited conception
of the receptive act, a conception inspired by empirical intuition,
must not be applied to pure intuition and its characteristic
receptivity. It is easy to see that the pure intuition of the pure
succession of nows cannot be the reception of something
actually present. If it were, then it could at most only "intuit"
the actual now but never the now-sequence as such and the
horizon which it forms. Strictly speaking, the simple act of
receiving something actually present could not even intuit a
single now, since each now has an essentially continuous ex-
tension in a just passing and just coming [Soeben und Sogleich].
The receptive act of pure intuition must in itself give the aspect
of the now in such a way that it looks ahead to the just coming
and back to the just passing.
We now discover, and in a more concrete way, why it is that

pure intuition, which is the subject of the transcendental aes-
thetic, cannot be the reception of something "present." Pure
intuition which, as receptive, gives itself its object is by nature
not relative to the presence of something, least of all to [the
presence of] an essent actually given.
If the act of pure intuition has this character, does it not
follow from this that it is "at bottom" pure imagination? This
follows only insofar as pure intuition itself forms [bildet] that
which it is able to receive. But that this originally formative

act should be in itself, and at one and the same time, an act
of looking at, looking ahead, and looking back — certainly
this has nothing to do with the transcendental imagination!
If only Kant himself had not specifically set forth the three-
fold way in which the act of imagination is formative!
In his lectures on metaphysics and, in particular, those having
to do with rational psychology, Kant analysed the "formative
179

power" as follows: this faculty "produces representations rel-
ative to the present, the past, or the future. Consequently, the
faculty of imagination consists of:
(1) the faculty of forming images [/4 ft WWwng], the repre-

sentations of which are of the present: jacultas for-
mandi,
(2) the faculty of reproducing images, the representations
of which are of the past: jacultas imaginandi,
(3) the faculty of anticipating images, the representations
^^
of which are of the future: jacultas praevidendi."
The expression "forming images" requires a brief explana-

tion. This expression does not signify the making of a repro-
duction in the sense of a copy but signifies the aspect which
is immediately taken of the object, itself present. This forming
of an image does not mean reproducing an image in the like-
ness of the object but putting into an image in the sense of

the immediate apprehension of the appearance [Aussehen] of
the object itself.
Although in this passage, Kant does not speak of the tran-

scendental imagination, it is clear that the "formation of
of images" by the imagination is in itselj relative to time. Pure
imagination, thus termed because it forms its images [Gebilde]
spontaneously, must, since it is itself relative to time, consti-
tute [form] time originally. Time as pure intuition is neither
only what is intuited in the pure act of intuition nor this act
itself deprived of its "object." Time as pure intuition is in one

the formative act of intuiting and what is intuited therein. Such
is the complete concept of time.
Pure intuition can form the pure succession of the new-
sequence only if, in itself, it is imagination as that which forms,
reproduces, and anticipates. Hence it follows that time, above
67. Politz, Vorlesungen iiber die Metaphysik, op. cit., p. 88, cf.
p. 83.
180

all in the Kantian sense, should not be thought of as an in-
different field of action which the imagination enters, as it
were, in order to further its own activity. Although, on the

ordinary plane of experience where "we take account of time,"
we must consider it to be a pure succession of nows, this suc-
cession by no means constitutes primordial time. On the con-

trary, the transcendental imagination as that which lets time
as the now-sequence spring forth is — as the origin of the latter
— ^primordial time.
But can such a radical interpretation of the imagination,
i.e., as primordial time, be justified by Kant's infrequent refer-
ences to the subject? The important consequences which result

from this interpretation demand that it be more concretely and
securely established.
§ 33. The Inherently Temporal Character of the

Transcendental Imagination
In the fiirst edition of the Critique the imagination is termed

the faculty of "synthesis in general." Therefore, if we wish to
exhibit the inherently temporal character of the imagination
we must examine the passage wherein Kant expressly treats of
the nature of synthesis. This passage is found in the section
which prepares the way for the carrying out of the transcenden-
tal deduction according to the two ways previously considered.
The section is entitled: "The a priori Grounds of the Possibility
^^
of Experience"
The location in the text of the thematic analysis of the notion
of synthesis is not arbitrary. And if, in particular, Kant presents
the discussion of this notion in the form of a Preliminary Re-
mark,^^^ one should not take it to be a casual and, at bottom,
superfluous observation. On the contrary, the content of this
68. A 95flf., NKS, p. 129flf.

68a. A 98, NKS, p. 131.
181

passage insofar as its bearing on the transcendental deduction
and the transcendental schematism is concerned must be kept
in view from the first. In this coimection, it will be recalled that
the transcendental deduction as the third stage of the laying
of the foundation has as its object the demonstration of the
intrinsic possibility of the essential unity of the ontological
synthesis.
The three elements of pure knowledge are: pure intuition,
pure imagination, and pure understanding. The possibility
of their unity, i.e., the essence of their original unification

(synthesis) is the problem. For this reason, an elucidation
of the synthesis relative to these three elements is required.
Kant divided his preliminary remark into three sections:
"I. The Synthesis of Apprehension in Intuition; II. The Syn-
thesis of Reproduction in Imagination; III. The Synthesis of

Recognition in Concepts."
But are these modes of synthesis three number because in
the essential unity of knowledge requires three elements? Or

has the fact that there are three modes of synthesis a more
fundamental ground, one which explains why these modes as
modes of pure synthesis are unified and hence capable, on the
basis of this original unity, of "forming" the essential unity of
the three elements of pure knowledge?
Or again, are there three modes of synthesis because time
appears in them, and they express the threefold unity of time
as past, present, and future? Now, if the original unification of
the essential unity of ontological knowledge takes place through
time and if, on the other hand, the basis of the possibility of
knowledge is the transcendental imagination, is it not obvious

that the latter is primordial time? And yet, in the course of
enumerating the three modes of synthesis does not Kant, by

designating the second as "the synthesis of reproduction in
imagination," say in effect that the imagination is only one
182

element among others and in no way the root of concept and
intuition? Yes, he does.
But the transcendental deduction which is to be provided
with a foundation by this analysis of the threefold synthesis
shows just as indisputably that the imagination is not merely

one faculty among others but their formative center. That the
transcendental imagination is the root of sensibility and under-
standing first became evident through the more primordial
interpretation that has been given it. We may not make use
of this result here. Rather, the working out of the inherently
temporal character of the three modes of synthesis should
provide the ultimate and decisive proof that the interpretation
of the transcendental imagination as the root of the two stems
is not only possible but necessary.
In order to be generally understood, the Kantian analysis
of the three modes of synthesis requires clarification on several
points which must be kept in view in what follows.
First of all, Kant's mode of expression needs to be made
more precise. In particular, what is meant by the synthesis
"of" apprehension, the synthesis "of" reproduction, the syn-
thesis "of" recognition? The meaning of this "of" is not that
apprehension, reproduction, and recognition are subjected to
a synthesis, or that they effect a synthesis, but that synthesis
as such has the character of apprehension, reproduction, or
recognition. In other words, these expressions mean respectively:
synthesis in the modes of apprehension, reproduction, and
recognition; or again, synthesis as apprehending, reproducing,
or recognizing. Thus, Kant treats of synthesis, i.e., of the faculty
of synthesis, relative to these three modes, each of which char-
acterize it in a specific way.
On the other hand, it should be noted that in the individual
paragraphs of the transcendental deduction the explication of
the modes of synthesis begins by describing the way in which
183

they function in empirical intuition, empirical imagination, and
empirical thought. This preliminary characterization is also
intended to show that in pure intuition, pure imagination,
and pure thought there are to be found corresponding modes
At the same time, Kant
of pure synthesis constitutive of each.
shows that these modes of pure synthesis constitute the con-
dition of the possibility of the empirical synthesis in the cognitive
relation to the essent.
Furthermore, it should be noted that the true objective
of the interpretation of the three modes of synthesis —although
not always formulated with sufficient clarity — is the exhibition
of the internal and essential interrelatedness which these modes
enjoy in virtue of their common inherence in the essence of
pure synthesis as such.
And finally, as Kant himself specifically requested, we must
not forget that "throughout what follows this must be borne in
mind as being quite fundamental" : "all our representations . . .
are subject to tune." Therefore, if all representation, whether

intuitive, imaginative, or reflective, is governed by the threefold
synthesis, does not this imply that all representation is unified
in advance through its subjection to the temporal character of
this synthesis?
a) PURE SYNTHESIS AS PURE IMAGINATION «»
Empirical intuition as the immediate reception of a "this-

here" [Dies-da] always reveals something manifold. Therefore,
the aspect obtained by this intuition "contains" a manifold.
This manifold can be "represented as a manifold only insofar
as the mind distinguishes the time in the sequence of one im-
pression upon another." In distinguishing time, the mind must
constandy and in advance say "now and now and now" in
order to be able to encounter "now this" and "now that" and
69. A 98-100, NKS, pp. 131-2.
184

"now all this at once." Only by distinguishing the now's in this
way is it possible to "run through" the impressions and hold
them together.
Intuition is a representation of a manifold — a repraesentatio
singularis — only if, as receptive, it takes up and comprehends
"directly" and at once the manifold which presents itself. Intui-
tion is "synthetic" in itself. This synthesis is unique in that it
"directly" takes an aspect (image) of the impressions which

present themselves in the horizon of the succession of now's.
It is, in the sense described, an immediate forming of an image.
It is also we have a pure synthesis
necessary that of appre-
hension, because without it we could not have the represen-
tation of time, i.e., the pure intuition itself. This pure synthesis
of apprehension does not first take place within the horizon
of time; rather, it is this synthesis itself which first forms the
now and the now-sequence. Pure intuition is "original recep-
tivity," an act of receiving that which it spontaneously lets come

forth. Its mode of presentation is a productive one, and what
the pure intuitive presentation (as that which procures an
aspect) produces (creates) is the immediate aspect of the
now as such, that is, it produces at each instant the aspect of
the actual present as such.
Empirical intuition is directly concerned with the essent
present in the now; the synthesis of apprehension, however,
is concerned with the now (the present itself), but in such a
way that this concern with ... in itself forms that with which
it is concerned. The pure synthesis as apprehension is, as
presentative of the "present in general," time-forming.
Now, Kant states specifically: "there must therefore exist
in us an active faculty for the synthesis of this manifold. To
this faculty I give the title imagination. Its action, when imme-
'^°
diately directed upon perceptions, I entitle apprehension."
Synthesis in the mode of apprehension arises from the
70. A 120, NKS, p. 144; cf. also Kant's note.
185

imagination; hence, the pure synthesis of apprehension must
be considered as a mode of the transcendental imagination.
Now, if this synthesis is time-forming, then the transcendental
imagination itself possesses a pure temporal character. Inas-
much as pure imagination is an "ingredient" of pure intuition
and that, accordingly, a synthesis of the imagination is to be
found ki intuition, that which Kant later designates as "imag-
ination" cannot be identical with the transcendental imagination.
'^^
b) PURE SYNTHESIS AS PURE REPRODUCTION
Kant again begins his analysis with a reference to the repro-
ductive synthesis in empirical representation. The "mind" can

represent the essent, i.e., something previously perceived, "even
in the absence of the object." Such representation, or as Kant
says, "imagination," presupposes, however, that the mind has
the possibility of bringing back [beibringen] in the form of a
representation the essent previously represented, in order to
represent it in its real [seiend] unity with the essent actually
perceived. This act of bringing-back-again (reproduction) is
thus an act of unification.

However, this reproductive synthesis can only unify if the
mind in its act of bringing-back-again does not "drop out of
thought" '^2
that which it brings back. Hence, such a synthesis
necessarily includes the power of retention. Essents experienced
earlier can be retained only if the mind "distinguishes time"
and, therefore, grasps such temporal determinations as "earlier"
and "in the past." An essent experienced earlier would be com-
pletely lost with each additional now if it were not capable of
being retained. Therefore, if the empirical synthesis is to be
possible, the no-longer-no w as such must, in advance and
before aU experience, be capable of being brought back to
the present and united with the actual now. This occurs in pure
71. A 100-103, NKS, pp. 132-3.

72. A 102, NKS, p. 133.
186
reproduction as a mode of pure synthesis. And if the empirical
synthesis of reproduction belongs primarily to empirical imag-
ination, then pure reproduction is a pure synthesis of pure
imagination.
But is not pure imagination supposed to be essentially pro-
ductive? Why should a reproductive synthesis pertain to it?
Pure reproduction —does not this imply a productive repro-

duction, a square circle?
But is pure reproduction truly a productive act of repro-
duction? This act forms, in fact, the possibility of reproduction
in general, and in this way: it brings the horizon of the earlier
in view and holds it open as such in advance. '^^ Pure synthesis
in the mode of reproduction forms the past as such. This
signifies, however, that pure imagination, relative to this mode
of synthesis, is time-forming. It can be termed "re-production"
not because it looks back to an essent which has disappeared or
which has been previously experienced but because, in general,
it discloses the horizon of a possible looking-back-to, i.e., the
past, and thus "forms" "posteriority" and the [movement]
"back-to" that which was.
But in this formation of time accordmg to the mode of "the
73. Kant NKS, p. 133) "a reproductive synthesis

asserts (A 102, :
of the imagination be counted among the transcendental acts

is to
of the mind." Now, Kant usually terms the non-transcendental
imagination (i.e., the empirical) reproductive imagination. If one
takes "reproductive" in the sense of "empirical" then the statement
cited above becomes meaningless. For this reason, Riehl (Korrek-
turen zu Kant, Kantstudien, Vol. V [1901], p. 268) proposes to
read "productive" in place of "reproductive." This would un-
doubtedly avoid the alleged inconsistency, but it would also set aside
what Kant intended to express in this sentence, namely, that the pro-
ductive, i.e., here, pure, imagination is purely productive in that it
makes reproduction in general possible. The insertion of "produc-

tive" makes sense only if it is not intended to replace the term "repro-
ductive" but to determine it more precisely. This, however, is made
superfluous by the whole context. If the context is to be amended at
all, it is necessary to read "pure reproductive synthesis."
187
past" where are we to find the pure synthesis? The act which
originally retains "the past" is in itself an act which forms and
retains the no-longer-now. This act of formation is as such united
with a now. Pure reproduction is essentially one with the pure
synthesis of intuition as that which forms the present. "The syn-
thesis of apprehension is therefore inseparably bound up with
the synthesis of reproduction," ^'^
for every now is now already
past. In order to provide the present aspect directly in the form
of an image, the synthesis of apprehension must be able to re-
tain the manifold which it has just run through and, at the same
time, function as a pure synthesis of reproduction.
However, if the pure synthesis of apprehension as well as that
of reproduction is an activity of the transcendental imagination,
then this last must be understood as a faculty of "synthesis in

general" which "inseparably" functions synthetically according
to these two modes. In this original unity of both modes, there-
fore, the imagination can also be the origin of time (as the unity
of the present and the past) . If this original unity of both modes
of synthesis did not exist, "not even the purest and most ele-
''^
mentary representations of space and time could arise."
Nevertheless, if time is the tri-unitary totality of present, past,

and future, and if Kant adds a third mode to the two modes of
synthesis which we have just shown to be time-forming, and
finally, if all representation, including thought itself, must be
subject to time, then this third mode of synthesis must be that
which "forms" the future.
C) PURE SYNTHESIS AS PURE RECOQNmON "^^
The analysis of the third mode of synthesis is much more ex-

tensive than either of the other two, although at first sight it
seems fruitless to seek therein what, according to the "com-
74. A 102, NKS, p. 133.

75. Ibid.
76. A 103-110, NKS, pp. 133-8.

pelling" argumentation just given, one should expect to find.
The synthesis of pure recognition is to constitute the third ele-

ment of pure knowledge, namely, pure thought. But what has
recognition to do with the production of the future? How is
pure thought, the ego of pure apperception, to have a temporal

character when Kant specifically sets the "I think" and reason
in general opposite to all temporal relation?
"Pure reason as a purely intelligible faculty is not subject to
the form of time, nor consequently to the conditions of succes-
sion of time." '^^
And immediately after the chapter on schema-
tism, in the introduction to the determination of the highest
principle of all synthetic judgments, does not Kant show that
all temporal characteristics must be excluded from the "highest
principle of all analytic judgments," the law of non-contradic-
tion, which circumscribes the essence of pure thought? The "at
one and the same time" (ama) can have no place in the formu-
lation of this principle. Otherwise, the proposition would be
"modified by the condition of time." '^^
"The principle of con-
tradiction, however, as a merely logical principle, must not in
any way limit its assertions to time-relations. The above formula
is therefore completely contrary to the intention of the princi-
ple." 79
Is it surprising, then, that one finds nothing in Kant about the
temporal character of the third mode of synthesis? It is fruitless,
however, to indulge in mere supposition or to let the matter be

decided by what can be discovered by a superficial reading of
Kant's discussion of this third synthesis.
Kant begins the exposition of the third mode of synthesis
with a characterization of empirical recognition. He proceeds
from synthesis as reproduction: "If we were not conscious that
what we think is the same as what we thought a moment before,
all reproduction in the series of representations would be use-
77. A 551, B 579, NKS, p. 475.

78. A 152, B 191, NKS, p. 191.
79. A 152f., B 192, NKS, p. 191.
189
less." ^^ The reproductive synthesis must effect and maintain
the unification of what it brings back with the essent actually
manifest in perception.
But when the mind, returning from its regression into the
past, turns again to the essent now present, what assurance does
it have that this essent now present is the same as the one which,
as it were, it previously abandoned in order to effect this re-

presentation?The reproductive synthesis, according to its na-
ture, comes upon something which it holds to be the essent
experienced before, during, and after its work in the present
perception. This perception itself, however, intends only the
essent in its immediate presence.
But does not the whole succession of representations break
up into isolated representations so that the synthesis of repro-
duction when it returns [from the past to the present] must at
every instant unite that which it brings back with the essent
actually at hand, which last, therefore, is always other [than
what is brought back]? What must the unity of intuition, which
apprehends, and imagination, which reproduces, be like if what
they would present to us as one and the same is, as it were,
placeless?
Or, can we say that this place is first created after the achieve-
ment of the perception and the recollection associated with it,
a recollection which would unite its object with the reahty

present in "the actual state"? Or are both of these modes of
synthesis oriented in advance on the essent as present in its
identity?
This is obviously the case. For at the basis of both syntheses
and determining them there lies an act of unification (synthesis)
of the essent relative to its identity. The synthesis intending this
identity, i.e., that which pro-poses the essent as identical, Kant
terms, and justly so, synthesis "in concepts," for a concept is
indeed a representation of unity which in its identity "appUes to
80. A 103, NKS, p. 133.
190

many." "For this unitary consciousness is what combines the
manifold, successively intuited and thereupon also reproduced,
^^
into one representation."
The synthesis which, according to the description of the em-
pirical genesis of concepts, is the third is precisely the first, i.e.,
the one which governs the other two described above. It antici-
pates them, as it were. Kant gives this synthesis of identification

a name which is most appropriate. Its mode of unification is a
recognition. It pro-spects [erkundet] and "investigates" ^^ that
which must be pro-posed in advance as identical, in order that
the syntheses of apprehension and reproduction can find a

closed field of essents within which they can fix and receive as
essent that which they bring back or encounter.
As empirical, this prospective synthesis of identification
necessarily presupposes a pure identification. This means that
just as pure reproduction constitutes the possibility of a bring-

ing-back-again, so, correlatively, must pure recognition provide
the possibility for aU identification. However, if the function of
this pure synthesis is recognition, this does not mean that its
prospecting is concerned with an essent which it can pro-pose

to itself as identical but that it prospects the horizon of pro-
position in general. As pure, its prospecting is the pure forma-
tion of that which makes all projection [Vorhaften] possible,
i.e., the future. Thus, the third mode of synthesis also proves to
be essentially time-forming.And inasmuch as Kant attributes
themodes of forming, reproducing, and pre-forming [A b- Nach-
und Vorbildung] images to the empirical imagination, the act
of forming the prospective horizon as such, pure pre-formation,
is an act of pure imagination.
Although it first appeared fruitless, even absurd, to attempt
to explain the internal formation of pure concepts by consider-
ing them as being essentially determined by time, we have now
81. Ibid., NKS, p. 134.
82. A 126,NKS, p. 147.
191

not only brought to light the temporal character of the third
mode of pure synthesis but have also shown that this mode of
pure pre-formation, insofar as its internal structure is con-

cerned, enjoys a priority over the other two, with which last,
nevertheless, it is essentially connected. Is it not evident, then,

that the Kantian analysis of pure synthesis in concepts, despite
the fact that it apparently has nothing to do with time, in reality
reveals the most primordial essence of time, that is, that it
temporalizes itself primarily out of the future?

Be that as it may, we have succeeded in showing the intrin-
sically temporal character of the transcendental imagination.

If the transcendental imagination as the pure formative faculty
in itself forms time, i.e., lets it spring forth, then the thesis
stated above, that transcendental imagination is primordial
time, can no longer be avoided.
The universal character of pure sensibility, i.e., time, has
now also been revealed. The transcendental imagination, there-

fore, is capable of forming and sustaining the unity and primor-
dial totality of the specific finitude of the human subject which
last has been presented as pure, sensible reason.
But do not pure sensibility (time) and pure reason remain
absolutely heterogeneous? And is not the concept of a pure,
sensible reason self-contradictory? The objections raised against
the attempt to understand the selfhood of the self as intrinsically
temporal, i.e., not limited in its temporal character to the way
in which it is empirically apprehended, seem invincible.
But if the attempt to prove that the self is temporal will
not succeed, perhaps the opposite procedure will have a better

chance of success. In short, what about a proof that time as
such has the character of selfhood? The chance of its being
unsuccessful is the less because it is incontestable that time
"apart from the subject, is nothing," ^^ and this implies that in
the subject it is all.
83. A35, B51,NKS,p. 78.
192

But what is the meaning of the expression "in the subject"?
Time is not contamed in the subject as cells are contained in
the bram. Hence there is little to be gained by constantly in-
voking the subjectivity of time. Is Kant limited then to this
negative insight, that time "apart from the subject, is nothing"?

Has he not shown in the transcendental deduction and in the
chapter on schematism that time is essentially involved in

the intrinsic structure of transcendence? And does not tran-
scendence determine the being-as-selE of the finite self? Must
not this aspect of subjectivity be kept in view if one aspires to
an investigation of the much discussed "subjective" character
of time? If Kant has come upon time in the "depths" of the
essential foundation of transcendence, is what is said about

time by way of introduction in the transcendental aesthetic to
be taken as the last word on the matter? Or is what is there
discussed only a reference to the more primordial nature of
time? AU things considered, cannot the temporal character
of the subject be elucidated only from the subjective character
of time — ^provided, of course, that the latter is correctly under-
stood?
§ 34. Time as Pure Self-affection and the

Temporal Character of the Self
In the passage wherein he first describes the essential unity

of knowledge (the second stage of the laying of the foundation),
Kant remarks that "space and time . . . must also always
affect the concept" ^^ of our representations of objects. What
is the meaning of this seemingly obscure thesis, i.e., that time
affects a concept, in particular, the concept of the representa-
tions of objects?
We will begin the interpretation with a clarification of the
expression "concept of our representations of objects." This
84. A77, B 102,NKS,p. 111.
193
expression refers, first of all, to the "universality" which char-
acterizes all representation of objects as such, i.e., the ob-
jectification of. . . . This act, the thesis asserts, is necessarily
affected by time. But hitherto, observations concerning time

were limited to the assertion that time and also space form
the horizon within which the affections of sense are able to
get through to and solicit us [uns treffen unci angehen]. Now, it
is time itself which affects us. But all affection is a manifestation

by which an essent already on hand gives notice of itself. Time,
however, is neither on hand nor is it "outside" us. Where
does it come from if it is to affect us?
Time is pure intuition only in that it spontaneously pre-

forms the aspect of succession and, as an act both receptive and
formative, pro-poses this aspect as such to itseff. This pure
intuition sohcits itself [geht sich ari] by that which it intuits
(forms) and without the aid of experience. Time is, by nature,

pure affection of itseff. But more than this, it is that in general
which forms something on the order of a line of orientation which
going from the seff is directed toward ... in such a way
that the objective thus constituted springs forth and surges
back along this line.^^
As pure seff-affection, time is not an active affection con-

cerned with the concrete self; as pure, it forms the essence of
all auto-soHcitation. Therefore, if the power of being solicited
as a seff belongs to the essence of the finite subject, time as

pure seff-affection forms the essential structure of subjectivity.
85. Ja, noch mehr, sie ist gerade das, was Uherhaupt so etwas wie
das "V on-sich-aus-zu-auf . .
." bildet, dergestalt, dass das so sich
bildende Worauf-zu zurilckblickt und herein in das Vorgenannte
Hin-zu . . .
For an understanding of this passage, familiarity with Heidegger's

analysis of "decisiveness running ahead of itself vorlaufende Ent-
schlossenheit, i.e., to death as a possibility, is helpful. See Sein und
Zeit, p. 298ff., p. 324ff. (J. S. C).
194
Only on the basis of this selfhood can a finite being be what
it must be: a being dependent on receptivity.
Now we are in a position to clarify the meaning of the

statement: Time necessarily affects the concept of the represen-
tations of objects. To affect a priori the act of ob-jectification
as such, i.e., the pure act of orientation toward . . . means:
to bring up against it something on the order of an opposition,
"It" — the pure act of ob-jectification —being pure apperception,
the ego itself. Time is implicated in the internal possibility of

this act of ob-jectification. As pure self -affection, it originally
forms finite selfhood in such a way that the self can become
self-consciousness.
In working out the presuppositions which are decisive insofar
as the intrinsic problematic of the Critique of Pure Reason is
concerned,^^ we accorded a central importance to the finitude

of knowledge. This finitude of knowledge depends upon the
on receptivity. Consequently, pure knowl-

finitude of intuition,
edge, in other words, knowledge of the ob-jective as such, the

pure concept, is based on a receptive intuition. Pure receptivity
is [found in a subject] affected in the absence of experience, i.e.,
[in a subject which] affects itself.
Time as pure self-affection is that finite, pure intuition

which sustains and makes possible the pure concept (the under-
standing) as that which is essentially at the service of intuition.
Hence, it is not in the second edition that Kant first intro-
duces the idea of pure self-affection, which last, as has now

become clear, determines the innermost essence of transcendence.
It is simply that the idea is formulated more explicitly in
this edition and, characteristically enough, appears [at the
beginning of the work] in the transcendental aesthetic. ^^ To be
sure, this passage must remain obscure as long as the inter-
pretation lacks that perspective assured by the more primordial
86. Cf. above, § 4, p. 27.
87. B 67f., NKS, p. 87f.
195
comprehension of the laying of the foundation of metaphysics
made possible by the preceding presentation of the stages
of this foundation. But given this perspective, the passage is
almost "self-evident."
"Now that which, as representation, can be antecedent to
any and every act of thinking anything, is intuition; and if
it contains nothing but relations, it is the form of intuition.

Since this form does not represent anything save insofar as
something is posited in the mind, it can be nothing but the
mode in which the mind is affected through its own activity
(namely, through this positing of ttheir] representation), and

so is affected by itself; in other words, it is nothing but an inner
^^
sense in respect of the form of that sense."
"Sense" means "finite intuition." The form of sense, there-
fore, is pure receptivity. The internal sense does not receive
"from without" but from the self. In pure receptivity, internal
affection must arise from the pure self, i.e., be formed in the
essence of selfhood as such, and therefore must constitute the

latter. Pure self-affection provides the transcendental ground-
structure [Urstruktur] of the finite self as such. Therefore, it
is absolutely untrue that the mind exists in such a way that,
among other beings, it relates certain things to itself and in
so doing posits itself [Selbstsetzungen ausUbi]. Rather, this

line of orientation from the self toward . . . and back to [the
self] first constitutes the mental character of the mind as a finite
self.
It is at once obvious, therefore, that time as pure self-
88. Ibid. The proposed change of "their representation" {Ihrer

Vorstellung] to "its representation" [seiner Vorstellung] is the result
of a misunderstanding of the essential sense of the text. The "their"
is not meant to express that the representation is a representation of
the mind, but, posited by the mind, re-presents the "pure relations"
of the succession of the now-sequence as such and pro-poses them to
receptivity.
196

affection is not found "in the mind" "beside" pure apperception.
On the contrary, as the basis of the possibility of selfhood,
time is already included in pure apperception and first enables
the mind to be what it is.
The pure finite self has in itself a temporal character. There-
fore, if the ego, i.e., pure reason, is essentially temporal, the
fundamental determination which Kant provides for transcen-

dental apperception must first become intelligible through this
temporal character.
Time and the "I think" are no longer opposed to one another
as unlike and incompatible; they are the same. Thanks to the
radicalism with which, in the laying of the foundation of meta-
physics, Kant for the first time subjected time and the "I think,"
each taken separately, to a transcendental interpretation, he
succeeded in bringing them together in their primordial identity
— without, to be sure, having seen this identity expressly as
such.
Can one still consider it to be of no importance that in
speaking of time and the "I think," Kant used the same
essential predicates?
In the transcendental deduction, the transcendental nature

(i.e., that which makes transcendence possible) of the ego
is thus described: "The abiding and unchanging T' (pure ap-
perception) forms the correlate of all our representations." ^^
And in the chapter on schematism wherein the transcendental

essence of time is brought to light, Kant says: "The existence
of what is transitory passes away in time but not time itself." ^^
And further on: "Time . . . does not change." ^^
Naturally, it could be objected that this coincidence of

essential predicates is not surprising, for Kant in making use
of this terminology intends only to assert that neither the ego
89. A 123, NKS, p. 146.

90. A 143, B 183, NKS, p. 184.
91. A 182, B 225, NKS, p. 213.
197

nor time is "in time." Certainly, but does it follow from this
that the ego is not temporal? Rather, is it not necessary to con-
clude that the ego is so temporal that it is time itself and
that only as such in its very essence is it possible at all?
What does it mean to say that the "abiding and unchanging
'I' forms the correlate of all our representations"? First of aU,
that the "abiding and unchanging" ego carries out the act of
ob-jectification, which act forms not only the relation of from-
the-self-toward . . . [Hin-zu-auf . . . ], but also the correla-

tion of back-to [the selfl, and as such constitutes the possibiUty of
opposition. But why does Kant assert that the "abiding and
unchanging" ego accompUshes [bilde] this act of ob-jectification?
Does he mean to emphasize that the ego is always found at

the basis of aU mental events and "persists" as something
unaffected by the vicissitudes which characterize such events?
Could Kant have meant by the "abiding and unchanging" ego
something on the order of mental substance ^Kant who, —
relying on his own laying of the foundation of ontology, worked
out the paralogism of substantiahty? ^^ Or did he merely wish
to affirm that this ego is not temporal but, in a certain sense,
infinite and eternal although not qua substance? But why does
this supposed affirmation appear precisely where it does
there where Kant delimits the finitude of the ego, i.e., its act
of ob-jectification? For the simple reason that the permanence

and immutabiUty of the ego belong essentially to this act.
The predicates "abiding" and "unchanging" are not ontic
assertions concerning the immutability of the ego but are
transcendental determinations. They signify that the ego is
able to form an horizon of identity only insofar as qua ego

it pro-poses to itself in advance something on the order of
permanence and immutability. It is only within this horizon
that an object is capable of being experienced as remaining
the same through change. The "abiding" ego is so caUed because
92. A 348ff., B 406ff., NKS, p. 333ff.
198

as the "I think," i.e., the "I represent," it pro-poses to itself
the Uke of subsistence and persistence. Qua ego, it forms the

correlative of subsistence in general.
The provision of a pure aspect of the present in general
is the very essence of time as pure intuition. The description
of the ego as "abiding and unchanging" means that the ego in
forming time originally, i.e., as primordial time, constitutes
the essence of the act of ob-jectification and the horizon

thereof.
Nothing has been decided, therefore, concerning the atem-
porality and eternity of the ego. Indeed, the transcendental
problematic in general does not even raise this question. It is
only as a finite self, i.e., as long as it is temporal, that the ego

is "abiding and unchanging" in the transcendental sense.
If the same predicates are attributed to time, they do not
signify only that time is not "in time." Rather, they also signify
that if time as pure self-affection lets the pure succession of the
/20>v-sequence arise, that which thus arises, although it is
considered in the ordinary experience of time as subsisting

in its own right, is by no means sufficient to determine the true
essence of time.
Consequently, if we are to come to a decision concerning
the "temporality" or "atemporality" of time, the primordial

essence of time as pure self-affection must be taken as our
guide. And wherever Kant justly denies a temporal character
to pure reason and the ego of pure apperception, he merely
states that reason is not subject to "the form of time."
In this sense alone is the deletion of "at the same time"
justified.^^ On this subject, Kant argues as follows: If the
93. Cf. above, § 33c, p. 181. A passage in the dissertation of 1770

shows that Kant changed his opinion on the subject of this "at the
same time": Tantum vero abest, ut quis unquam temporis conceptum
adhuc rationis ope aliunde deducat et explicet, ut potius ipsum prin-
cipium contradictionis eundem praemittat ac sibi conditionis loco
199

"principle of contradiction" required the "at the same time"
and hence "time" itself, then the principle would be limited to
intra-temporal reality, i.e., to the essent accessible to experi-
ence.However, this fundamental principle governs all thought
no matter what its content. Therefore, there is no place in it
for temporal determination.

But, although the "at the same time" is undoubtedly a
determination of time, it is not necessarily relative to the intra-
temporality of the essent. Rather, the "at the same time" des-
ignates that temporal character which as precursory "recogni-
tion" ("pre-formation") pertains to all identification as such.
The latter in turn is essentially at the basis of the possibility,
as well as the impossibility, of contradiction.

Because of his orientation on the non-original essence of
time, Kant is forced to deny all temporal character to "the
principle of contradiction." It would be contrary to sense to try
to effect an essential determination of primordial time itself
with the aid of what is derived from it. The ego cannot be con-
ceived as temporal, i.e., intra-temporal, precisely because the
substernal. A enim et non A non repugnant, nisi simul (h.e. tempore

eodem) cogitata de eodem De mundi sensibilis atque intel-
. . .
ligibilis forma et principiis." § 14, 5. Works (Cass.) II, p. 417. Kant

demonstrates here the impossibility of the "rational" deduction of
time, i.e.,of its intuitive character, by alluding to the fact that all
ratio, including the fundamental principle of thought in general, pre-
supposes "time." To be sure, the temporal meaning of tempore iodem
intended remains obscure. If it is interpreted as signifying "in the
same now," then Moses Mendelsohn was right when, with reference
to the subject of this passage, he wrote in a letter to Kant:
"I do not believe the condition eodem tempore to be absolutely
necessary for the law of contradiction. Insofar as it is a question of
the same subject, both A
and non-A cannot be predicated of it even
at different times,and nothing more is required for the concept of
impossibility than that the same subject be provided with two predi-
cates, A and non-A. One can also say: impossibile est, non A praedi-
catum de subjecto A." Kant, Works (Cass.), IX, p. 93.
200

self originally and in its innermost essence is time itself. Pure
sensibility (time) and pure reason are not only homogeneous,
they belong together in the unity of the same essence which

makes possible the finitude of human subjectivity in its totality.
§ 35. The Basic Originality of the Established

Ground and the Problem of Metaphysics
Kant's laying of the foundation of metaphysics seeks the

ground of the intrinsic possibility of the essential unity of
ontological knowledge. The ground which it discovers is the
transcendental imagmation. In opposition to the disposition of

the mind into two fundamental sources (sensibility and under-
standing) the imagination compels recognition as an inter-
mediate faculty. However, the more primordial interpretation

of this established ground has revealed that this intermediate
faculty is not only a central element and one which is originally
unifying but also the root of both stems.

Thus a way is opened to the original source-ground of the
two fundamental sources. The interpretation of the transcen-
dental imagination as a root, i.e., the disclosure of the manner
in which the pure synthesis puts forth and sustains the two
stems, leads naturally back to that in which this root is rooted,
primordial time. The latter alone, as the original tri-unitary

formation of future, past, and present, makes possible the
"faculty" of pure synthesis and with it that which it is capable
of producing, i.e., the unification of the three elements of on-
tological knowledge, the unity of which forms transcendence.
The modes of pure synthesis —pure apprehension, pure
reproduction, pure recognition — are not three in number be-
cause they are relative to the three elements of pure knowledge
but because, originally one, they are time-forming and thus
constitute the temporalization of time itself. Only because
these modes of pure synthesis are originally one in the three-
201

fold unity of time do they constitute the ground of the possi-
bility of the original unification of the three elements of pure
knowledge. This is why the primordially unifying element, the
transcendental imagination, apparently only a mediating, inter-
mediate faculty, is nothing other than primordial time. Only
because the transcendental imagination is rooted in time can
it be the root of transcendence.
Primordial time makes transcendental imagination, which in
itself is essentially spontaneous receptivity and receptive spon-
taneity, possible. Only in this unity can pure sensibility as
spontaneous receptivity and pure apperception as receptive
spontaneity belong together and form the essential unity of
pure sensible reason.
However, if, as takes place in the second edition, the tran-
scendental imagination is eliminated as an autonomous funda-
mental faculty and its function is taken over by the understanding
as pure spontaneity, then the possibility of comprehending the
unity of pure sensibility and pure thought in finite human reason
is lost. Indeed, it cannot even be entertained as an hypothesis.
The first is more faithful to the innermost character
edition
and development of the problematic which characterizes the
laying of the foundation of metaphysics because, by virtue of
its indissoluble primordial structure, the transcendental im-
agination opens up the possibility of a laying of the foundation
of ontological knowledge and, hence, of metaphysics. Therefore,
relative to the problem which is central to the whole work, the
first edition is essentially to be preferred to the second. All

transformation of the pure imagination into a function of pure
thought —a transformation accentuated by German ideahsm
following the second edition — is the result of a misunderstanding
of the true nature of the pure imagination.
Primordial time lets the pure formation of transcendence
take place. Through the fundamental disclosure of the estab-
lished ground which has just been presented, we now under-
202

stand for the first time the necessary course of development of
the five stages of the laying of the foundation and the significance
which has been accorded to the central part of this laying of
the foundation, i.e., the transcendental schematism.

Ontological knowledge is made up of "transcendental deter-
minations of time" because transcendence is temporalized in
primordial time.
This necessary central function of time is usually expressed
in Kant through his definition of it as the universal form of
every act of representation. However, what is essential is the
consideration of the conditions under which this representation
takes place.The "preliminary remark" which precedes the tran-
scendental deduction is intended to show in what respect the
three modes of pure synthesis are in themselves essentially
one. To be sure, Kant does not succeed in showing explicitly
that they are time-forming or how they are one in primordial

time. Nevertheless, the fundamental function of time is em-
phasized, particularly in connection with the analysis of the
second mode of synthesis, that of reproduction in the imagina-
tion.
What is it that constitutes "the a priori ground of a necessary

synthetic unity" capable of reproducmg the essent no longer
present in the form of a representation by linking it to the actual
present? "What that something is we soon discover, when we
reflect that appearances are not things in themselves but are the
mere play of our representations, and in the end reduce to
^*
determinations of inner sense."
Does this mean that in itself the essent is nothing and dis-
solves in a play of representations?
Not at all. What Kant means to say is this: The encountering
of the essent takes place, for a finite being, in an act of repre-
sentation whose pure representations of objectivity are mutually
compatible [eingespielt]. This compatibihty is determined in ad-
94. A 101,NKS, p. 132.
203

vance in such a way that it can come into play in a free-space
which is formed by the pure determinations of the internal
sense. This pure internal sense is pure self-affection, i.e., pri-
mordial time. The pure schemata as transcendental determina-

tions of time form the horizon of transcendence.
Because from the first, Kant saw the problem of the internal
possibility of the essential unity of ontological knowledge in
this perspective and held fast to the central function of time,
he was able, in presenting the unity of transcendence according

to the two ways of the transcendental deduction, to forego an
explicit discussion of time.
It is true that in the second edition, Kant apparently refuses

to acknowledge the transcendental priority of time in the for-
mation of transcendence as such, i.e., he disavows the essential

part of the laying of the foundation of metaphysics, the tran-
scendental schematism.
In the second edition, a General Note on the System of the
Principles,^^ on ontological knowledge as a whole, was added.
It begins with the sentence: "That the possibility of a thing
cannot be determined from the category alone, and that in order
to exhibit the objective reality of the pure concept of under-

standing we must always have an intuition, is a very noteworthy
fact." Here in a few words is expressed the essential necessity
of a sensibilization of the notions, i.e., their presentation in
the form of a "pure image." But it is not stated that this pure
image must be pure intuition qua time.
The next paragraph begins with an explicit reference to the
sentence quoted above: "But it is an even more noteworthy

fact that in order to understand the possibility of things in con-
formity with the categories, and so to demonstrate the objective
reality of the latter, we need not merely intuitions but intuitions
that are in all cases outer intuitions." ^^ Here appears the tran-
scendental function of space, which unmistakably opens up a
95. B 288ff., NKS, p. 252flf.

96. B 291, NKS, p. 154.
204
new perspective for Kant. Space enters into pure schematism.
It is true that in the second edition the chapter on schematism
has not been modified to take this into account. But is it not
necessary to conclude, nevertheless, that the primacy of time
has disappeared? This conclusion would not only be premature,
but to attempt to infer from this passage that it is not time
alone which forms transcendence would also be a complete
misunderstanding of the whole interpretation as carried out
thus far.
But, one might object, if transcendence is not based on time
alone, is it not only natural for Kant, ia limiting the primacy
of time, to thrust aside the pure imagination? In reasoning thus,
however, one forgets that pure space as pure intuition is no
less rooted in the transcendental imagination than is "time,"
insofar as the latter is understood as that which is formed in
pure intuition, namely, the pure succession of the /low-sequence.

In fact, in a certain sense, space is always and necessarily
identical with time thus understood.
However, it is not in this form but as pure self-affection that

time is the primordial ground of transcendence. As such, it
is also the condition of the possibility of all formative acts of

representation, for example, the making manifest of space. It
does not follow, then, that to admit the transcendental function

of space is to reject the primacy of time. Rather, this admission
obligates one show how
to space, like time, also belongs to the
self as finite and that the latter, precisely because it is based
on primordial time, is essentially "spatial."
The acknowledgment in the second edition that space in

a certain sense also belongs to the transcendental schematism
only makes it clear that this schematism cannot be grasped in
its innermost essence as long as time is conceived as the pure
succession of the «ow-sequence. Time must be understood as
pure self -affection; otherwise its function in the formation of
schemata remains completely obscure.
We encounter here a peculiarity inherent in the Kantian lay-
205
ing of the foundation of metaphysics. Although that which is
uncovered by the regression to the source-ground is revealed

in its true nature, i.e., as being constitutive of transcendence, the
faculties of the mind involved therein, and with them time as
pure intuition, are not explicitly and primordiaUy defined in the
light of this transcendental function. Rather, throughout the
course of the laying of the foundation and even in its conclusion,
they are presented according to the provisional conception of
the first point of departure. And because Kant, at the time of
his presentation of the transcendental schemata, had not worked
out an interpretation of the primordial essence of time, his
elucidation of the pure schemata as transcendental determina-
tions of time is both fragmentary and obscure, for time
taken as the pure /low-sequence offers no possible means of
access to the "temporal" interpretation of the notions.^^
Nevertheless, an interpretation limited to a recapitulation of
what Kant explicitly said can never be a real explication, if the
business of the latter is to bring to fight what Kant, over and
above his express formulation, uncovered in the course of his
laying of the foundation. To be sure, Kant himself is no longer
able to say anything concerning this, but what is essential in
all philosophical discourse is not found in the specific proposi-

tions of which it is composed but in that which, although un-
stated as such, is made evident through these propositions.

The fundamental purpose of the present interpretation of
the Critique of Pure Reason is to reveal the basic import of
this work by bringing out what Kant "intended to say." Our
interpretation is inspired by a maxim which Kant himself wished

to see applied to the interpretation of philosophical works and
which he formulated in the foUowing terms at the end of his
reply to the critique of the Leibnizian, Eberhard.

"Thus, the Critique of Pure Reason may weU be the real
apology for Leibniz, even in opposition to his partisans whose
97. Cf. above, § 22, p. 106.
206
words of praise hardly do him honor. It can also be an apology
for many older philosophers about whom certain historians of
philosophy, for all the praises they bestow, speak the purest
nonsense. They do not understand the intentions of these phi-
losophers when they neglect the key to all explication of the
works of pure reason through concepts alone, namely, the
critique of reason itself (as the common source of all concepts),
and are incapable of looking beyond the language which these
^^
philosophers employ to what they intended to say."
It is true that in order to wrest from the actual words that
which these words "intend to say," every interpretation must
necessarily resort to violence. This violence, however, should
not be confused with an action that is wholly arbitrary. The
interpretation must be animated and guided by the power of
an illuminative idea. Only through the power of this idea can
an interpretation risk that which is always audacious, namely,
entrusting itself to the secret elan of a work, in order by this
elan to get through to the unsaid and to attempt to find an ex-

pression for it. The directive idea itself is confirmed by its own
power of illumination.
Kant's laying of the foundation of metaphysics leads to the
transcendental imagination. This is the common root of both
stems, sensibility and understanding. As such, it makes possible
the original unity of the ontological synthesis. This root itself,
however, is implanted in primordial time. The primordial ground

which is revealed in the Kantian laying of the foundation is
time.
Kant's laying of the foundation of metaphysics begins with
metaphysica generalis and so becomes a question as to the
possibility of ontology in general. This question concerns the
essence of the ontological constitution of the essent, i.e., Being
in general.
The laying of the foundation of metaphysics is based on
98. Vber eine Entdeckung, op. cit., VI, p. 71.
207

time. The question as to Being, the fundamental question of
a laying of the foundation of metaphysics, is the problem of
Sein und Zeit.
This title contains the directive idea of the present interpreta-
tion of the Critique of Pure Reason as a laying of the foundation
of metaphysics. This idea, to which the interpretation bears
witness, provides an indication of the problem of a fundamental
ontology. Fundamental ontology should not be viewed as some-
thing which is supposedly "new" in contrast to what is reputed
to be "old." Rather, it is the expression of an attempt to as-
similate the essentials of a laying of the foundation of meta-
physics, thus aiding this foundation, by a repetition, to realize
its own primordial possibility.
208

SECTION FOUR
METAPHYSICS IN A REPETITION

SECTION FOUR
METAPHYSICS IN A REPETITION
By a repetition of a fundamental problem we understand the

disclosure of the primordial possibilities concealed in it. The
development of these possibilities has the effect of transforming
the problem and thus preserving it in its import as a problem.
To preserve a problem means to free and to safeguard its in-
trinsic powers, which are the source of its essence and which
make it possible as a problem.
The repetition of the possibilities of a problem, therefore,
is not a simple taking up of that which is "in vogue" with regard
to this problem and concerning which "one may reasonably
expect to make something." In this sense, the possible is the
aU-too-real which is at the disposal of everyone. The possible,

thus understood, in fact hinders aU genuine repetition and
thereby aU relation to history [Geschichte].
When correctly understood, a repetition of the laying of
the foundation of metaphysics must begin by making sure of
the authentic result of the previous — in this case the Kantian
laying of the foundation. At the same time, what is sought as
the "result" of the laying of the foundation of metaphysics in
the Critique of Pure Reason and the way in which this result
211

is determined will decide how far the understanding of the
possible which governs all repetition extends and whether it is
equal to that which is repeatable.
A. The Laying of the Foundation of

Metaphysics as Anthropology
§ 36. The Established Ground and the Resuh of

Kant's Laying of the Foundation
In going through the individual stages of the Kantian laying

of the foundation, we have discovered how it leads to the
transcendental imagination as the ground of the intrinsic pos-
sibility of the ontological synthesis, i.e., transcendence. Is the
establishment of this ground, in other words, its primordial
explication as temporality, the [true] result of the Kantian
laying of the foundation? Or does the latter yield something
else? Certainly, in order to establish the aforesaid result there
was no need of following with so much effort the internal de-
velopment of the laying of the foundation in each of its stages.
It would have been sufficient to cite the texts relative to the
central function of the transcendental imagination in the tran-

scendental deduction and the transcendental schematism. But
if the result does not consist in the knowledge that the tran-
scendental imagination constitutes the foundation, what other
result can the laying of the foundation be expected to yield?
If the result of the laying of the foundation does not lie in
its "actual conclusion,*' then we must ask ourselves what the

development of the laying of the foundation reveals insofar as
the problem of the estabhshment of metaphysics is concerned.
What takes place in the Kantian laying of the foundation? Noth-
ing less than this: The estabhshment of the intrinsic possibility
212

of ontology is accomplished as the disclosure of transcendence,
i.e., the subjectivity of the subject.
The question as to the essence of metaphysics is the ques-
tion of the unity of the fundamental faculties of the human
"mind." The Kantian laying of the foundation yields this con-
clusion: The estabhshment of metaphysics is an interrogation
of man, i.e., it is anthropology.
However, did not the first attempt to grasp the Kantian lay-
ing of the foundation more originally, the attempt to reduce
it to anthropology, miscarry? ^ Certainly, insofar as it revealed
that what anthropology offers as an explication of knowledge
and its two sources is brought out in a more fundamental way
by the Critique of Pure Reason itself. But all that can be inferred
from this is that the anthropology presented by Kant is empirical
and not an anthropology which can satisfy the requirements of
the transcendental problematic, i.e., that it is not a pure anthro-
pology. Thus, the necessity of an adequate, that is, a "philo-
sophical" anthropology to further the ends of a laying of the
foundation of metaphysics becomes even more pressing.
That the outcome of the Kantian laying of the foundation
lies in the insight into the necessary connection between an-
thropology and metaphysics is affirmed unequivocally by Kant's
own statements. Kant's laying of the foundation of metaphysics
has as its goal the establishment of "metaphysics in its final
purpose," metaphysica specialis, to which belong the three dis-

ciplines: cosmology, psychology, and theology. As a critique
of pure reason, this laying of the foundation must understand
these disciplines in their innermost essence, provided that meta-
physics is to be grasped in its possibility and its Umits as a
"natural disposition of mankind." The fundamental essence of
human reason manifests itself in those "interests" with which,
because it is human, it is always concerned. "The whole interest
1. Cf. above § 26, p. 134.
213

of my reason, whether speculative or practical, is concentrated
in the three following questions
1. What can I know?

2. What ought I do?
2
3. What may I hope?"
These three questions, however, are those with which the
three disciplines of true metaphysics, i.e., metaphysica specialis,
are concerned, Man's knowledge is concerned with nature,

with that which is actually given in the broadest sense of the
term (cosmology); man's activity concerns his personality and
freedom (psychology); finally, man's hope is directed toward
immortality as bhss, as union with God (theology).
These three fundamental interests do not determine man
as a natural being but as a "citizen of the world," They con-
stitute the object of philosophy as a "matter of world citizen-
ship," that is, they define the domain of philosophy. Hence,
Kant states in the introduction to his course of lectures on logic
wherein he develops the concept of philosophy in general: "The

field of philosophy as pertaining to world citizenship can be
reduced to the following questions:
1. What can I know?
2. What should I do?
3. What may I hope?
4. What is man?" 3
Here, a fourth question is added to the three previously cited.
But when we consider that psychologia rationalis as a discipline
of metaphysica specialis already treats of man, are we not con-

strained to beheve that this fourth question relative to man is
only superficially added to the other three and is, therefore,
superfluous.
However, Kant does not simply add this fourth question to
the other three, for he says: "Basically, aU these can be classified
2. A 804, B 832f., NKS, p, 635.

3. Works (Cass.), VIU, p. 343.
214

^
under anthropology, since the first three are related to the last."
With this, Kant states unequivocally the real result of the
laying of the foundation of metaphysics. The attempt to repeat

the laying of the foundation also receives thereby a clear in-
dication of the task involved. To be sure, Kant mentions anthro-
pology only in a very general way. However, in the light of what
has been said above, it seems true beyond a doubt that only
a philosophical anthropology can undertake the laying of the
foundation of true philosophy, i.e., metaphysica specialis. Is
it not necessary to conclude, therefore, that a repetition of the

Kantian laying of the foundation pursues as its specific task
the development of a "philosophical anthropology" and hence

that the idea of such an anthropology must be determined before-
hand?
§ 37. The Idea of a Philosophical Anthropology
What does a philosophical anthropology include? What is
anthropology in general and how does it become philosophical?

"Anthropology" denotes the science of man. It comprises aU
the information that can be obtained about the nature of man
as a being composed of a body, a soul, and a mind. The domain
of anthropology includes not only those given verifiable prop-
ertieswhich distinguish the human species from plants and
animals but also man's latent abihties and the differences of
character, race, and sex. And inasmuch as man not only appears
as a natural being but also as a being that acts and creates,
anthropology must also seek to know what man as an active
being can and should "make of himself." His powers and obliga-
tions depend finally on certain basic attitudes which man as
such is always capable of adopting. These attitudes are called
Weltanschauungen and the "psychology" of these includes the
whole of the science of man.
4. Ibid., p. 344.
215

Since anthropology must consider man in his somatic, bio-
logical, and psychological aspects, the results of such disciplines

as characterology, psychoanalysis, ethnology, pedagogic psy-
chology, the morphology of culture, and the typology of Weltan-
schauungen must converge in it. Hence, the content of such a
science is not only vast but also fundamentally heterogeneous
because of basic differences in the manner of formulating ques-
tions, the necessity of justifying the results acquired, the mode
of presentation of the facts, the form of communication, and
finally the essential presuppositions [of each of the component
disciplines]. Insofar as all of these differences and, in certain
respects, the totality of the essent as well can be related to man

and thus classified under anthropology, anthropology becomes
so comprehensive that the idea of such a science loses all
precision.
Anthropology today, therefore, is not only the name of a
discipline; the term denotes a fundamental tendency charac-
teristic of the present position of man with regard to himself
and to the totality of the essent. According to this tendency, a
thing is known and understood only when it receives an anthro-
pological explanation. Today, anthropology not only seeks the
truth concerning man but also claims to have the power of de-
ciding the meaning of truth as such.
No other epoch has accumulated so great and so varied a

store of knowledge concerning man as the present one. No
other epoch has succeeded in presenting its knowledge of man
so forcibly and so captivatingly as ours, and no other has suc-
ceeded in making this knowledge so quickly and so easily acces-
sible. But also, no epoch is less sure of its knowledge of what

man is than the present one. In no other epoch has man appeared
so mysterious as in ours.^
5. Cf. Max Scheler, Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos,

1928, p. 13f.
216

However, is not the very fact that the problems of anthro-
pology are characterized by this breadth and uncertainty con-
ducive to the formation of a philosophical anthropology and
to the encouragement of its further development? With the
idea of a philosophical anthropology do we not acquire that
discipline in which the whole of philosophy must be concen-
trated?
Several years ago, Max Scheler said of philosophical anthro-
pology: "In a certain sense, all the central problems of philos-
ophy can be reduced to the question of man and his position
and metaphysical situation within the totality of Being, the world,
and God." ^ But Scheler also saw, and with great clarity, that
the many determinations relative to the essence of man cannot

be simply packed together, as it were, in a common definition.
"Man is so broad, motley, and various a thing that the defini-
tions of him all fall a littie short. He has too many sides."
"^
This is why Scheler's efforts, which in his last years became

more intense and more fruitful, were directed not only to the
attainment of a unitary idea of man but also to the working
out of the essential difficulties and complications connected
with this task.^
Perhaps the fundamental difficulty of a philosophical anthro-
pology lies not in the problem of obtaining a systematic unity

insofar as the essential determinations of this multifarious being,
man, are concerned, but in the concept of anthropology itself.
This is a difficulty which even the most abundant and "spec-
tacular" knowledge can no longer explain away.
How, then, does an anthropology become philosophical? Is
it only because its knowledge acquires a degree of generality
6. Cf. Zur Idee des Menschen, Abhandlungen und Aufsdtz, Vol. I
(1915), p. 319. In the second and third editions, the volumes have
been published under the title Vom Umsturz der Werte.
7. Ibid.
8. Cf. Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos.
217
which differentiates it from empirical knowledge, although we
are never able to determine precisely the degree of generality
at which knowledge stops being empirical and becomes philo-
sophical?
Certainly, an anthropology may be said to be philosophical if
its method is philosophical, i.e., if it is pursued as an inquiry

into the essence of man. In this case, anthropology strives to
distinguish the essent we call man from plants, animals, and
every other type of essent, and by this delimitation it attempts
to bring to light the specific essential constitution of this par-
ticular region of the essent. Philosophical anthropology then
becomes a regional ontology of man, coordinated with other
ontologies with which it shares the whole domain of the essent.
Thus understood, philosophical anthropology cannot be con-
sidered without further exphcation as the center of philosophy;
above all, this last pretension cannot be based on the internal
problematic of this anthropology.
It is also possible for anthropology to be philosophical if,
as anthropology, it determines either the objective of philosophy

or its point of departure or both at once. If the objective of
philosophy lies in the development of a Weltanschauung, then
anthropology must define the "position of man in the cosmos."
And if man is accepted as that essent which, in the order of

estabfishing an absolutely certain knowledge, is absolutely the
first given and the most certain, then it is inevitable that, follow-
ing the plan of a philosophy thus conceived, human subjectivity
be placed at the very center of the problem. The first task is
compatible with the second, and both, as modes of anthropo-

logical inquiry, can avail themselves of the method and the
results of a regional ontology of man.
But just these diverse possibilities of defining the philosophical
character of an anthropology are sufficient in themselves to show

the indeterminateness of this idea. This indeterminateness is
increased if one takes into account the diversity of the em-
218
pirical-anthropological knowledge on which, at least in the be-
ginning, every philosophical anthropology relies.

As natural and self-evident as the idea of a philosophical
anthropology may appear in spite of its ambiguity, and as
irresistible as the urge to reaffirm it may be in spite of these
objections, stUl it is inevitable that "anthropologism" in philos-
ophy will always be combated. The idea of philosophical anthro-
pology is not only insufficiently determined, its role within
philosophy as a whole remains obscure and indecisive.
The reason for these deficiencies is to be found in the limita-
tions inherent in the idea of a philosophical anthropology.
This discipline has not been explicitly justified with respect to
the essence of philosophy but only with respect to the object
and point of departure of philosophy as seen from without.
Thus, the delimitation of this idea ends by reducing anthro-
pology to a kind of dumpmg-ground for all basic philosophical
problems. It is obvious that this way of considering anthropology
is both superficial and, from the standpoint of philosophy, highly
questionable.
But even if, in a certain sense, anthropology gathers to itself
all the central problems of philosophy, why may these be

reduced to the question: What is man? Is this reduction pos-
sible only if someone decides to undertake it or, on the con-
trary, must these problems lead back to this question? And if
the latter is true, what is the basis of this necessity? Is it perhaps

that the central problems of philosophy have their source in
man, not only in the sense that man propounds them but also
that in their intrinsic content they bear a relation to him? In
what respect do aU central philosophical problems find their
abode in the essence of man? And, in general, which problems
are essential and wherein lies their center? What is the meaning
of the expression "to philosophize" if the philosophical prob-
lematic is such that it finds its abode and its center in the
essence of man?
219

As long as these questions are not developed systematically
and made precise, it will not be possible to determine the
essential limits of the idea of a philosophical anthropology.
Only the discussion of these questions furnishes the basis for
a possible discussion of the essence, right, and function of a
philosophical anthropology within philosophy.
Again and again there appear new attempts to present plau-
sible arguments for a philosophical anthropology and to defend

the central role of this discipline without, however, basing
the latter on the essence of philosophy. Again and again the
opponents of anthropology are able to appeal to the fact that
man is not at the center of reality and that there is an "infinity"
of essents "in addition" to him — a rejection of the central role

of philosophical anthropology which is no more philosophical
than its affirmation.
Thus, a critical reflection on the idea of a philosophical
anthropology not only reveals its indefiniteness and its intrinsic
limitations but also makes clear that we have at our disposal

neither the basis nor the frame of reference for a thorough
examination of its essence.
Although Kant traced the three questions of true metaphysics
back to a fourth, i.e., the question as to the essence of man,
itwould be premature on that account to consider this question
as anthropological and to entrust the laying of the foundation
of metaphysics to a philosophical anthropology. Anthropology,
simply because it is anthropology, cannot provide a foundation
for metaphysics.
But is not the discovery of this connection between the ques-
tion of the essence of man and the establishment of metaphysics
the real result of the Kantian laying of the foundation? Must not
this connection serve as a guide in the repetition of the laying
of the foundation?
However, the critique of the idea of philosophical anthro-
pology shows that it is not enough simply to formulate this
220

fourth question: What is man? On the contrary, the indefinite-
ness of this question indicates that even now we are not yet
in possession of the decisive result of the Kantian laying of
the foundation.
§ 38. The Question of the Essence of Man and the

True Result of Kant's Laying of the Foundation
It becomes more and more obvious that we will not discover

the true result of the Kantian laying of the foundation as long
as we rely on a definition or a fixed thesis. The manner of philoso-
phizing peculiar to Kant will become accessible to us only if,
with greater resolution than heretofore, we examine not what

he says but what is achieved in his laying of the foundation.
The primordial explication of the Critique of Pure Reason as
we have given it above has as its only objective the revelation
of this achievement.
But what is the true result of the Kantian laying of the
foundation? It is not that the transcendental imagination is
the established ground, not that this laying of the foundation

becomes a question as to the essence of human reason, but
that, with the revelation of the subjectivity of the subject, Kant
recoiled from the ground which he himself had established.
Does not this recoil also belong to the result? What takes
place therein? Is it something inconsequent for which Kant
should be reproached? Is this recoil and this refusal to go the
whole way only something negative? On the contrary, it makes
obvious that in pursuing his laying of the foundation, Kant
undermined the base [Boden] on which in the beginning he set
his Critique. The concept of pure reason and the unity of a

pure sensible reason become problems. Kant's profound study of
the subjectivity of the subject, "the subjective deduction," leads
us into obscurity. It is not only because Kant's anthropology is
empirical and not pure that he does not refer to it but also be-
221

cause, in the course of the laying of the foundation, our mode of
questioning man itself is brought into question. It is not the
answer to the question of the essence of man which must be
sought; rather, it is a matter first of all of asking how in the laying
of the foundation of metaphysics it is possible to bring man into
question and why it is necessary to do this.
The questionable character of the interrogation relative to

man is precisely what is illuminated in the development of the
Kantian laying of the foundation of metaphysics. It now appears
that Kant's recoU from the ground which he himself revealed,
namely the transcendental imagination, is — relative to his in-
tention of preserving pure reason, i.e., of holding fast to the

base which is proper to it— that movement of philosophical
thought which makes manifest the destruction of this base and
thus places us before the abyss [A b grand] of metaphysics.
It is by this result that the primordial explication of the
Kantian laying of the foundation as given above first acquires
its justification and establishes its necessity. All the effort ex-
pended in this interpretation has been inspired not by a vain

pursuit of the primordial and not by a drive to know ever
more and more but only by the task of laying bare the internal
character and development of the laying of the foundation and
the problematic proper to it.
However, if the laying of the foundation seeks neither to

evade the question as to the essence of man nor to supply a
clear-cut answer thereto but only to bring its questionable
character to fight, then what becomes of Kant's fourth question,
namely, that to which metaphysica specialis and with it true
philosophy is to be reduced?
We will succeed in asking this fourth question as it should
be asked only if we forego a premature answer and develop it
as a question through the understanding we have now attained
of the result of the laying of the foundation.

It is now a matter of asking why the three questions — 1.
222

What can I know? 2. What should I do? 3. What may I hope?
—"admit of being related" to the fourth? Why can "all these
be classified under anthropology"? What do these three ques-

tions have in common? In what respect are they one and,
hence, capable of being reduced to the fourth? How must this
fourth question itself be formulated in order to include the

other three and sustain them in its unity?
The most profound interest of human reason forms the con-
necting link between these three questions. In them are brought
into question a power, a duty, and a hope of human reason.
Where there is power and one de-
a question concerning a
is revealed at the same time a non-
limits its possibilities, there
power [Nicht-Konnen]. An omnipotent being need not ask,

"What am I able to do"?, i.e., "What am I not able to do"?
Not only does such a being have no need to ask such a ques-
tion; it is contrary to its nature to be able to ask it. This not-
being-able is not a deficiency but the absence of all deficiency
and aU "negativity." Whosoever asks, "What am I able to do"?
betrays thereby his own finitude. And whosoever is concerned
in his innermost interests by such a question reveals a finitude
in his innermost nature.
When an obligation is brought into question, the being who
raises the question hesitates between a "yes" and a "no," thus
finding himself tormented by the question of what he should
do. A being fundamentally concerned with his duty understands
himself through a not-yet-having-fulfilled, so that he is driven
to ask himself what he should do. This not-yet of the fulfiillment
of something stUl indeterminate reveals a being who, because

his duty is his most intimate interest, is basically finite.
Whenever a hope is brought into question, it is a matter

of something which can be granted or denied to the one who
asks. What is asked for is such that it can be expected or
not expected. All expectation, however, reveals a privation,
and if this privation involves the most intimate interest of hu-
223

man reason then the latter is aflBrmed to be essentially finite.
Thus, not only does human reason betray its finitude by

these questions, but also its innermost interest is concerned
with this finitude. It is not a question of ehminating the power,
the obligation, and the hope in order to evade the finitude but,
conversely, it is a question of becoming certain of this finitude
in order to hold oneself in it.
Hence, finitude is not merely an accidental property of hu-

man reason; the finitude of human reason is finitization [Verend-
lichung], i.e., "concern" ^ [Sorge] about the ability to be finite.
It follows that human reason is not finite only because it
propounds these three questions, but, on the contrary, it pro-

pounds these three questions because it is finite and so radically
finite, indeed, that in its rationality this finitude itself is at stake.
It is because these three questions concern this unique [object],

i.e., finitude, that their relation admits of being estabUshed to
the fourth question: What is man?
But these three questions do not have a merely accidental
relationship to the fourth. In themselves they are nothing other
than this fourth question, that is, according to their essence
they must be reducible to it. But this relation is necessary and
9. In the pages that follow, Heidegger makes increasing use of the

"existentials" of Sein und Zeit, an existential being a determination
of the Being of man in contrast to a category which is a determination

of the Being of essents. Because of their importance insofar as an
understanding of Heidegger's thought is concerned, a brief explana-
tion of these existentials as they appear has been included.
"Concern," according to Sein und Zeit, is the Being of Dasein and
as such has a significance which is wholly ontological, every "ontic
characteristic of man in the sense of an ethical and ideological evalua-
tion of 'human life' " being excluded. (See below, p. 243.) The
structure of concern is characterized by Heidegger as "being-already-
being-among (the
ahead-of-itself [itself-Dasein] as-in- (the- world) as
things which are found world)" (Sein und Zeit, p. 192). As
in the
being-ahead, already-in, and among, concern has a three-fold struc-
ture, corresponding to the three dimensions of time. (J. S. C.)
224

essential only if the fourth question is stripped of its generality
and indeterminateness and acquires the univocal character of
an interrogation of the finitude in man.
In this form this question is not subordinate to the other
three but is transformed into the first, from which the others
are derived.
In spite of this result, in spite of the determinateness of the
question as to man, or rather because of it, the problem which
this question poses is rendered even more acute. It would be
well now to ask what kind of question this question as to man
is, and if in general it can be an anthropological question.
The result of the Kantian laying of the foundation is thus
clarified to the point that we are now able to see in it an au-
thentic possibility of repetition.
The laying of the foundation of metaphysics is rooted in the
question of the finitude of man in such a way that this finitude
itself can first become a problem. The laying of the foundation
of metaphysics is a "dissociation" (analytic) of our knowledge,
i.e., of finite knowledge, into its elements. Kant terms it "a
study of our inner nature." ^^ Such a study ceases to be an
arbitrary, disorderly interrogation of man and becomes a "matter
of duty" ^^ to the philosopher only if the problematic which
governs it is grasped with sufficient originahty and comprehen-
siveness and so leads us to examine the "inner nature" of "our"
self as the problem of the finitude in man.
However diverse and important the knowledge which "phil-
osophical anthropology" may supply concerning man, it can
never pretend to be a fundamental discipline of philosophy,
solely because it is anthropology. On the contrary, it runs the
constant risk of conceahng from us the necessity of developing
the question of man as a problem and of connecting this problem
with a laying of the foundation of metaphysics.
10. A 703, B 731, NKS, p. 570.

11. Ibid.
225

We are not able to discuss here if and how "philosophical
anthropology" —above and beyond the problem of a laying
of the foundation of metaphysics — ^yet has a task which is
proper to it.
B. The Problem of the Finitude in Man

and the Metaphysics of Dasein
We have undertaken the present interpretation of the Critique

of Pure Reason in order to bring to light the necessity, insofar
as a laying of the foundation of metaphysics in concerned, of

posing the fundamental problem of the finitude in man. This
is the reason that finitude has been constantly stressed at the
beginning of the interpretation as well as in the course of its
development. And if in his laying of the foundation Kant under-
mines the base which he himself estabhshed, this signifies for
us that the question of the "presuppositions" impHcit in the

Critique, presuppositions which were indicated at the beginning
of this interpretation ^- and which are relative to the essence
of knowledge and its finitude, now assume the importance of
a decisive problem. Finitude and the singularity of the question

which it raises radically determine the internal form of a tran-
scendental "analytic" of the subjectivity of the subject.
§ 39. The Problem of a Possible Determination

of the Finitude in Man
How is the finitude in man to be examined? Is this in general
a serious problem? Is not the finitude of man evident always,

everywhere, and in a thousand different ways?
In order to uncover the finitude of man is it not enough to
12. Cf. Section Two, p. 25ff.
226

adduce at random any one of his many imperfections? But
in this way we obtain at best only a proof that man is a finite
being. We leam neither in what the essence of man's finitude

consists nor yet how this finitude determines man to be the
essent that he basically is.
And even if we succeeded in adding together the sum of all
human imperfections and "abstracting" what is common to

them, we could understand thereby nothing of the essence of
finitude. We would not be able to know in advance whether the
imperfections of man enable us to obtain a direct insight into

his finitude, or whether, on the contrary, these imperfections
are merely a simple consequence of this finitude and, hence, are
understandable only through it.
And even if we succeeded in doing the impossible, if we

succeeded in proving rationally that man is a created being, the
characterization of man as an ens creatum would only point
up the fact of his finitude without clarifying its essence and
without showing how this essence constitutes the fundamental
nature of the essence of man.
Thus, how the question of the finitude in man — ^the most
common manifestation of his essence — is to be approached is
not at aU self-evident. The sole result of our inquiry, therefore,

is that the question of the finitude in man is no arbitrary ex-
ploration of the properties of this being. On the contrary, the
question arises as soon as one begins the task of a laying of the
foundation of metaphysics. As a fundamental question it is
required by this problem itself. Consequently, the problematic

of a laying of the foundation of metaphysics must include an
indication as to the direction in which the question of the finitude
of man must advance.
Finally, if the task of a laying of the foundation of meta-
physics admits of an authentic repetition, then the essential
connection between the problem of a laying of the foundation
and the question inspired by it, namely, that of the finitude in
227

man, must be exhibited more clearly and with greater precision.
The Kantian laying of the foundation of metaphysics begins
with a justification of metaphysica generalis as that which is at
the basis of true metaphysics, i.e., metaphysica specialis. But

metaphysica generalis —under the name "ontology" — is the
fixed form of that which in antiquity, and finally with Aristotle,
was established as the problem of prote philosophia, philsophiz-
ing in the true sense of the term. However, the question of the
on e on (of the essent as such) is mingled in a very confused
way here with that of the essent in totality (theion).
The term "metaphysics" denotes a conception of the prob-
lem in which not only the two fundamental dimensions of the
question of the essent but also their possible unity become
debatable. This is quite apart from the further question as to
whether these two dimensions are sufficient in themselves to
exhaust the whole of the problematic of a fundamental knowl-
edge of the essent.
If the question of the finitude in man is to be determined
through an authentic repetition of a laying of the foundation
of metaphysics, then it is advisable to turn the Kantian question
from its orientation on the rigid discipline and fixed system of
the metaphysics of the schools and set it on that course which

is suitable to its own problematic. This also implies that the
Aristotelian formulation of the problem cannot be accepted as
definitive.
With the ti to on [what is the essent?], the question of the

essent is posed, but to pose a question does not necessarily
mean that one is capable of mastering and working out the
problematic which animates it. The extent to which the problem
of metaphysics is still enveloped in the question ti to on can
be understood if we realize that the formulation of this ques-
tion does not enable us to determine how it embodies the prob-

lem of the finitude in man. Still less can we obtain an indication
as to how the finitude in man is to be made the object of
228

our questioning merely by a reiteration of this question. The
repetition of the problem of a laying of the foundation of meta-
physica generalis is not equivalent, therefore, to a simple echoing
[nachsprechen] of the question: What is the essent as such?
The repetition must develop as a problem the question which,
in brief, we term the question of Being. The purpose of this
development is to show in what respect the problem of the
finitude in man and the inquiries which it calls for necessarily
contribute to our mastery of the question of Being. Basically

it is a matter of bringing to light the essential connection between
Being as such (not the essent) and the finitude in man.
§ 40. The Primordial Elaboration of the Question

of Being as the Means of Access to the
Problem of the Finitude in Man
The fundamental question of the ancient physiologoi ^^ con-

cerning the essent in general (the logos of the physis) is developed
—and such is the significance of the internal evolution of ancient
metaphysics from its beginning to Aristotle —from a general
idea, indeterminate but rich in content, and leads to the deter-
minateness of the two types of problems which, according to

Aristotle, constitute philosophy in the true sense of the term.
As obscure as the connection between these two types may

be, still it is possible to establish, at least from one point of
view, an order of precedence with regard to them. Insofar as
the question of the essent in totality and in its principal divisions
presupposes a certain understanding of what the essent as such
is, then the question of the on e on must take precedence over
the question of the essent in totality. Relative to the possibility
of acquiring a fundamental knowledge of the essent in totahty,
G 4, 203 b 15: Kant, moreover, speaks

13. Cf. Aristotle, Physics,
in the Critique ofPure Reason (A 845, B 873, NKS, p. 662) of the
"physiology of pure reason."
229

then, the question of knowing what the essent is as such is
primary. Whether this priority also holds when it is a question

of the self-establishment of metaphysics is a matter which we
must be content only to mention here.
But is not the general question ti to on so vague that it no
longer has an object and offers no clue as to how and where
an answer is to be sought?
When we ask what the essent as such is, we wish to know
what determines the essent qua essent. We call it the Being of
the essent, and the question which is concerned with it is the
question of Being.
The object of this question is that which determines the essent
as such. This determining [element] must be known in the
how of its determining and interpreted (i.e., understood) as

such and such. However, in order to be able to understand the
essential determination of this essent through Being, the deter-
mining element itself must be understood with sufficient clarity.
It is necessary, therefore, first to comprehend Being as such,
and this comprehension must precede that of the essent as such.

Thus, the question ti to on (what is the essent) implies a more
original question: What is the significance of Being which is
pre-comprehended [vorverstandene] in this question?
But if the question ti to on is itself very difficult to grasp how

can a question which is more original and at the same time
more "abstract" be admitted as the source of a concrete prob-
lematic?
That such a problematic exists can be verified by referring
to a situation which has always existed in philosophy but which
has been accepted all too easily as self-evident. It is first relative
to its what-being [Was-sein] (ti estin) that we define and ex-

amine the essent which is manifest to us in every mode of com-
portment we exhibit toward it. In the language of philosophy,
this what-being is termed essentia (essence). It renders the
essent possible in that which it is. This is why what constitutes
230

the thing-ness [Sachheit] of a thing (realitas) is designated as
its possibilitas (intrinsic possibility). The appearance (eidos)
of an essent informs us as to what it is. Consequently, the
what-being of an essent is termed idea.
In connection with every essent there arises the question,
unless it has already been answered, as to whether it — the
essent having this determinate what-being — is or is not. There-
fore, we also determine an essent relative to the fact "that it is"
[Dass-sein] {oti eotin) which in the usual terminology of phi-

losophy is expressed as existentia (reality).
In every essent "there is" what-being and that-being [Dass-
sein], essentia and existentia, possibihty and reahty. Has "being"
the same meaning in these expressions? If not, why is it that
Being is divided into what-being and that-being? Does this
distinction between essentia and existentia, a distinction which

is accepted as self-evident, resemble that between cats and
dogs, or is there a problem here which must finally be posed
and which can be posed only by asking what Being as such is?
Is it not true that if we fail to develop this question, the
attempt to "define" the essentiality of essence and to "explain"
the reality of the real will be deprived of a horizon?
And is not the distinction between what-being and that-being,
a distinction whose basis of possibility and mode of necessity
remain obscure, entwined with the notion of Being as being-
true \Wahr-sein]l And does not this last notion come to light
in the "is" of every proposition —and not only there —whether
^*
expressed or not?
Considering what hes concealed in this problem-word "Be-
ing," have we not reason enough to attempt to clarify it? Is
it necessary that this question of Being remain indetermmate,

or should we venture an even more primordial course of action
in order to work this question out?
How is the question, "What is the meaning of Being?" to
14. Cf. Vom Wesen des Grundes, first section.
231

find an answer if the direction from which the answer can be
expected remains obscure? Must we not first ask in what direc-
tion it is advisable to look in order from this perspective to
be able to determine Being as such and thus obtain a concept
of Being with reference to which the possibility and necessity
of its essential articulation will become comprehensible? So
the question of "first philosophy," namely, "What is the essent
as such?" must force us back beyond the question "What is
Being as such?" to the still more fundamental question Whence :
arewe to comprehend a notion such as that of Being, with the

many articulations and relations it includes?
Therefore, if there exists an internal connection between
the laying of the foundation of metaphysics and the question
of the finitude in man, the more primordial elaboration of the
question of Being now more elemental
attained will exhibit in a
way the essential relation of this question to the problem of
finitude.
But at first sight, this connection remains obscure, above all
since one is not generally inchned to attribute such a relation

to the question under consideration. This relation is certainly
evident in Kant's questions cited above, but how can the ques-
tion of Being, particularly in the form in which it is now de-
veloped, i.e., as a question of the possibility of the comprehen-
sion of Being, have an essential relation to the finitude in man?
Within the framework of the abstract ontology inspired by the
metaphysics of Aristotle, the question of Being may acquire a
certain sense and so be presented with some justification as a
special problem, a problem that is scholarly but more or less
artificial. But there seems to be no evidence of an essential
relation between this problem and that of the finitude in man.

If up to this point we have endeavored to clarify the original
form of the problem of Being by orienting it on the Aristotelian

question, this does not imply that the origin of this problem
is to be found in Aristotle. On the contrary, authentic philosoph-
232

ical thinking will be able to come upon the question of Being
only if this question belongs to the innermost essence of philos-
ophy, which in turn exists only as a fundamental possibility of
human Dasein.
When we raise the question as to the possibility of under-
standing a notion such as that of Being, we do not thereby in-

vent this notion and artificially make a problem of it in order
merely to take up again a question characteristic of philosoph-

ical tradition. Rather, we are raising the question of the pos-
sibility of comprehending that which, as men, we already
understand and have always understood. The question of Being
as a question of the possibility of the concept of Being arises
from the preconceptual comprehension of Being. Thus, the
question of the possibility of the concept of Being is once again
forced back a step and becomes the question of the possibility
of the comprehension of Being in general. The task of the
laying of the foundation of metaphysics, grasped in a more
original way, becomes, therefore, that of the explication of the
intrinsic possibility of the comprehension of Being. The elabora-
tion of the question of Being thus conceived first enables us
to decide if, and in what way, the problem of Being in itself
bears an intrinsic relation to the finitude in man.
§ 41 . The Comprehension of Being and the

Dasein in Man
That we, as men, have a comportment [Verhalten] to the

essent is evident. Faced with the problem of representing the
essent, I can always refer to some particular essent or other
whether it be such that Iam not and which is not my like, or such
that I am myself, or such that I am not but because it is a self
is my like. The essent is known to us —
but Being? Are we not
seized with vertigo when we try to determine it or even to con-
sider it as it is in itself? Does not Being resemble Nothing? In fact,
233

no less a person than Hegel has said it: "Pure Being and pure
Nothing ^^
are, then, the same."
With the question of Being as such we are poised on the
brink of complete obscurity. Yet we should not turn away
prenaaturely but should seek to bring this comprehension of
Being in aU its singularity closer to us. For despite the seemingly
impenetrable obscurity which envelops Being and its signifi-
cation, it remains incontestable that at all times and wherever

the essent appears to us, we have at our disposal a certain
comprehension of Being. We concern ourselves with the what-
being and thus-being of the essent, acknowledge or dispute its
that-being and, at the risk of deceiving ourselves, come to de-

cisions concerning its being-true [Wahr-sein]. The assertion of
every proposition, e.g., "Today is a holiday," implies an under-
standing of the "is" and, hence, a certain comprehension of
Being.
In the cry "Fire!" we understand that there is a fire, that help
is necessary, that everyone must save himself, i.e., secure his
being as best he can. And even when we do not say anything
about an essent, even when in silence we assume an attitude
toward it, we understand, although imphcitly, its mutually com-
patible what-being, that-being, and being-true.
In everymood wherein "things are this or that way" with us,
our own Da-sein is manifest to us. We have, therefore, an under-
standing of Being even though the concept is lacking. This pre-
conceptual comprehension of Being, although constant and
far-reaching, is usually completely indeterminate. The specific
mode of Being, for example, that of material things, plants,

animals, men, numbers, is known to us, but what is thus known
is not recognized as such. Furthermore, this preconceptual com-
prehension of the Being of the essent in all its constancy, ampli-
tude, and indeterminateness is given as somethmg completely
15. Science of Logic, trans. W. H. Johnston, L. G. Struthers (Lon-
don, 1921) Vol. I, p. 94.
234

beyond question. Being as such is so little in question that
apparentiy it "is" not.
This comprehension of Being, such as we have briefly
sketched it, remains on the level of the purest, most assured,

and most naive patency [Selbstverstdndlichkeit], and yet if
this comprehension of Being did not occur, man could never be

the essent that he is, no matter how wonderful his faculties. Man
is an essent in the midst of other essents in such a way that
the essent that he is and the essent that he is not are always
already manifest to him. We call this mode of Being existence,^^
and only on the basis of the comprehension of Being is existence
possible.
In his comportment to the essent which he himself is not,
man finds it to be that on which he
by which he is sustained,
is dependent, and over which, for all his culture and technique,
he never can be master. Furthermore, dependent on the essent

that he is not, man is, at bottom, not even master of himself.
With the existence of man there occurs an irruption into
the totality of the essent such that, by this event, the essent
becomes manifest in itself, i.e., manifest as essent — this mani-
festation being of varying amplitude and having different degrees
of clarity and certitude. However, this prerogative [Vorzug] of

not being simply an essent among other essents, which last
are not manifest to one another, but, in the midst of essents, of
being delivered up to them as such [an es als ein solches ausgeUe-
16. Existence (or Ex-sistence, as Heidegger later terms it), like
concern, is another of Heidegger's "existentials." This term "exist-

ence" "is not identical with the traditional concept of existentict'
which opposed to essentia as the possibility of
"signifies reality as
something" {Vber den Humanismus, p. 15). Existence is "The Be-
ing to which Dasein can and always does dispose itself" {Sein und
Zeit, p. 12). It is a "standing forth into the truth of Being;" hence,
to assert that "Man ex-sists is not to answer the question as to whether
man is real or not but the question as to his essence" {Vber den Hu-
manismus, p. 16). (J. S. C.)
235

fert] and of being answerable to oneself as essent, in short,
this prerogative of existing, involves in itself the necessity of
a comprehension of Being.
Man would not be able to be, qua self, an essent thrown
[geworfene] into the world if he could not let the essent as such
be.^''^ However, in order to let the essent be what and how it
is, the existent essent [man] must always have already projected
that which it encounters as essent. Existence implies being
dependent on the essent as such so that man as essent is given
over to the essent on which he is thus dependent.
As a mode of Being, existence is in itself finitude and, as
such, is only possible on the basis of the comprehension of Being.

There is and must be such as Being only where finitude has be-
come existent. [Dergleichen wie Sein gibt es nur und muss es
geben, wo Endlichkeit existent geworden ist.] The comprehen-
sion of Being which dominates human existence, although man
is unaware of its breadth, constancy, and indeterminateness, is
thus manifest as the innermost ground of human finitude. The

comprehension of Being does not have the harmless generality
which it would have were it just another human property. Its
17. The notion of letting-be (sein-lassen) adumbrated in Sein und

Zeit and discussed in this passage in connection with man's situation
in the world of essents, later becomes an important factor in Heideg-
ger's conception of what distinguishes the activity of the artist from
that of the ordinary man. Although never clearly stated as such, this
conception seems to be that the artist differs from the ordinary man
who looks upon essents only as objects having value for him as tools,
etc., in that the artist lets the essent be what it is in itself. This letting-
be, accomplished through restraint {V erhaltenheit) and a tarrying
by the essent qua work of art, is a preservation of it. (See Der Ur-
sprung des Kunstwerkes, Holzwege, p. 7ff.) (It is interesting to com-
pare this notion with Keats' "negative capability.")
There is also a suggestion in Heidegger that the activity of the
thinker (the true philosopher) is not unlike that of the artist in that
the thinker "lets Being be" (Vber den Humanismus, p. 42). (J. S. C.)
236

"generality" is the basic originality of the innermost ground of
the finitude of Dasein. Only because the comprehension of Being
is the most finite in the finite, can make possible even the
it
so-caUed "creative" faculties of human beings. And only

finite
because it takes place in the very bosom of finitude is the com-

prehension of Being characterized by obscurity as well as by
the breadth and constancy which have been noted.
It is on the basis of his comprehension of Being that man
is presence {Da], with the Being of which takes place the revela-
tory [eroffnende] irruption into the essent. It is by virtue of
this irruption that the essent as such can become manifest to a

self. More primordial than man is the finitude of the Dasein in
him.
The elaboration of the basic question of metaphysica
generalis, i.e., the question ti to on, has been thrown back upon
the more fundamental question of the intrinsic essence of the
comprehension of Being as that which sustains, actuates, and
orients the specific question concerning the concept of Being.
This more primordial interpretation of the basic problem of
metaphysics has been developed with the intention of bringing
to light the connection of the problem of the laying of the
foundation of metaphysics with the question of the finitude in
man. It now appears that we do not even have to ask ourselves
about the relation of the comprehension of Being to the finitude

in man. This comprehension of Being itself is the innermost
essence of finitude. We have thus acquired a concept of finitude
which is fundamental to the problematic of the laying of the
foundation of metaphysics. If this laying of the foundation
depends upon the question of knowing what man is, the in-
definiteness of this question is in part overcome, since the ques-
tion as to the nature of man has become more determinate.
If man is only man on the basis of the Dasein in him, then
the question as to what is more primordial than man can, as a
237

matter of principle, not be an anthropological one. AH anthro-
pology, even philosophical anthropology, always proceeds on
the assumption that man is man.
The problem of the laying of the foundation of metaphysics
is rooted in the question of the Dasein in man, i.e., in the ques-
tion of his ultimate ground, which is the comprehension of Being

as essentially existent finitude. This question relative to Dasein
asks what the essence of the essent so determined is. Insofar as
the Being of this essent Ues in existence, the question as to the
essence of Dasein is an existential one. Every question relative
to the Being of an essent — and, in particular, the question rela-

tive to the Being of that essent to whose constitution finitude as
the comprehension of Being belongs — is metaphysics.
Hence, the laying of the foundation of metaphysics is based
upon a metaphysics of Dasein. But is it at all surprising that
a laying of the foundation of metaphysics should itself be a

form of metaphysics, and that in a pre-eminent sense?
Kant, who in his philosophizing was more alert to the prob-

lem of metaphysics than any other philosopher before or since,
would not have understood his own intention had he not per-
ceived this connection. He expressed his opinion concerning it
with the clarity and serenity which the completion of the Critique
of Pure Reason bestowed on him. In the year 1781, he wrote

to his friend and disciple, Marcus Herz, concerning this work:
"An inquiry of this sort will always remain difficult, for it con-
^^
tains the metaphysics of metaphysics."
This remark once and for aU puts an end to all attempts to in-
terpret, even partially, the Critique of Pure Reason as theory of
knowledge. But these words also constrain every repetition of
a laying of the foundation of metaphysics to clarify this "meta-
physics of nietaphysics" enough to put itself in a position to open
up a possible way to the achievement of the laying of the founda-
tion. -
18. Works (Cass.), IX, p. 198.
238

C. The Metaphysics of Dasein as
Fundamental Ontology
No anthropology which understands its own mode of inquiry

and its own presuppositions can claim even to develop the
problem of a laying of the foundation of metaphysics, to say
nothing of carrying it out. The question necessary for a laying
of the foundation of metaphysics, namely, the question of the
essence of man, belongs to the metaphysics of Dasein.
The expression "metaphysics of Dasein" is, in a positive
sense, ambiguous. The metaphysics of Dasein not only treats of
Dasein, it is also the metaphysics which necessarily is realized
as Dasein. It follows, then, that this metaphysics cannot be
"about" Dasein as, for example, zoology is about animals. The
metaphysics of Dasein is in no sense an "organon" fixed and
ready at hand. It must constantly be reconstructed by the trans-
formation which its idea undergoes because of the development
of the possibility of metaphysics.
Its destiny remains bound to the secret coming-to-be [Ge-
schehen] of metaphysics in Dasein in virtue of which man first
numbers or forgets the hours, days, years, and centuries which

he has devoted to his endeavors.
The internal exigencies of a metaphysics of Dasein and the
difficulty of defining this metaphysics have been brought to light
clearly enough by the Kantian endeavor. When clearly under-
stood, the true result of this endeavor lies in the disclosure of
the bond which unites the problem of the possibihty of meta-
physics with that of the revelation of the finitude in man. Thus
is brought to light the necessity of a reflection concerning the
way in which a metaphysics of Dasein should be concretely de-
veloped.
239

§ 42. The Idea of a Fundamental Ontology
In the presentation of its problem as well as in the point of

departure, course of development, and final objective, the laying
of the foundation of metaphysics must be guided solely and
rigorously by its fundamental question. This fundamental ques-
tion is the problem of the internal possibility of the compre-
hension of Being, from which all specific questions relative
to Being arise. The metaphysics of Dasein when guided by
the question of the laying of the foundation reveals the struc-
ture of Being proper to Dasein in such a way that this struc-
ture is manifest as that which makes the comprehension of
Being possible. The disclosure of the structure of Being of
Dasein is ontology. So far as the ground of the possibility
of metaphysics is established in ontology — the finitude of Dasein
being its foundation —ontology signifies fundamental ontology.
Under the designation fundamental ontology is included the
problem of the finitude in man as the decisive element which
makes the comprehension of Being possible.
However, fundamental ontology is only the first stage of the
metaphysics of Dasein. We are able to discuss here neither this
metaphysics as a whole nor the way in which it is rooted histor-
ically in concrete Dasein. Rather, we are now faced with the
task of clarifying the idea of fundamental ontology, which idea
has guided the present interpretation of the Critique of Pure
Reason. Furthermore, only the basic outUne of the characteriza-
tion of fundamental ontology wiU be given here in order thus
to call to mind the principal stages of a preceding attempt.^®

The structure of Being of every essent and that of Dasein
in particular is accessible only through the understanding insofar
as this has the character of projection [Entwurf]. As funda-
mental ontology reveals, the understanding is not simply a
19. Cf. Sein und Zeit.
240

mode of cognition but a fundamental moment of existence.
Hence, the specific achievement of projection, above all when
it is a matter of ontological comprehension, is necessarily con-
struction.
However, the term "construction" does not have here the
sense of free invention. Rather, it is a projection in which the
precursory orientation as well as the trajection must be pre-
determined and made secure. Dasein must be constructed in its
finitude and with regard to that which makes the comprehension

of Being intrinsically possible. All construction relevant to
fundamental ontology is verified by that which its projection
makes manifest, i.e.,by the way in which this projection brings
Dasein to its own overtness and renders its intrinsic metaphysic
present to it {seine innere Metaphysik da-sein Idsst].
The construction proper to fundamental ontology is distin-
guished by the fact that it lays bare the internal possibility of

that which holds sway over Dasein. This dominating element
is not only that which is most familiar to Dasein but is also that
which is most indeterminate and self-evident. This construction
can be understood as an on the part of Dasein to grasp

effort
in itself the primordial metaphysical fact which consists in this,

that the most finite in its finitude is known without being under-
stood.
The finitude of Dasein — the comprehension of Being lies
in forgetfulness {V ergessenheit]?^
This forgetfulness is nothing accidental and temporary but
is constantly and necessarily renewed. All construction relevant
20. The "forgetfulness" of which Heidegger speaks here does not

refer to a mental state but to "an essential relation ofman to Being"
{Vber den Humanismus, an individual engaged in the
p. 21 ) . Both as
ordinary business of living and as a philosopher, i.e., a "metaphysi-
cian," man is concerned with objects and the "is-ness" [Seiendheit]
of objects and "forgets" about Being, this forgetfulness being "some-
thing fated" (Geschick) by Being itself. (J. S. C.)
241

to fundamental ontology, construction which strives toward the
disclosure of the internal possibility of the comprehension of
Being, must in its act of projection wrest from forgetfulness
that which it thus apprehends. The basic, fundamental-ontolog-
ical act of the metaphysics of Dasein is, therefore, a remembering

[ Wiedererinnerung] .
But true remembrance must always interiorize what is
remembered, i.e., let it come closer and closer in its most intrin-
sic possibility. This signifies, relative to the development of

a fundamental ontology, that this remembrance must let itself
be guided constantly, uniquely, and effectively by the question

of Being in order thus to keep the existential analytic of Dasein,
the development of which is the responsibility of fundamental
ontology, on the right path.
§ 43. The Inception and Course of Development

^^
of Fundamental Ontology
The Dasein in man characterizes him as that essent who,

placed in the midst of essents, comports himself to them as
such. This comportment determines man in his Being and
makes him essentially different from all other essents which
are manifest to him.
An analytic of Dasein must, from the beginning, strive to
uncover the Dasein in man according to that mode of Being

which, by nature, maintains Dasein and its comprehension of
Being, i.e., primordial finitude, in forgetfulness. This mode of
Being of Dasein — decisive only from the point of view of a
21.For an adequate understanding of this and the following para-

graphs, a study of Sein und Zeit is indispensable. We refrain here
from taking a position with regard to the criticism which has been
expressed up to this point. This position —
insofar as the rather con-
fused "objections" which have been presented remain within the
limits of the problem —
will be the object of a special publication.
242

fundamental ontology —we call "every dayness" [Alltdglichkeit].^^
The analytic of everydayness must take care not to allow the
interpretation of the Dasein in man to become confused with
an anthropo-psychological description of the "experiences"
and man. This anthropo-psychological knowledge
"faculties" of
is not declared thereby to be "false," but it is necessary to show
that, despite its exactitude, such knowledge is incapable of
coming to grips with the problem of the existence of Dasein,
i.e., the problem of its finitude. A grasp of this problem, how-
ever, is required by the decisive question, namely, that of Being.
The existential analytic of existence does not have as an
objective a description of how we manage a knife and fork.
It is intended to show how all commerce with essents even —
when it seems to concern only the latter —presupposes the tran-
scendence of Dasein, namely, being-in-the-world. With this
transcendence is achieved the projection, hidden and, for the

most part, indeterminate, of the Being of the essent in general.
By means of this projection, the Being of the essent becomes
manifest and intelligible, although, at first and ordinarily, only
in a confused way. In this mode of comprehension the difference
between Being and the essent remains concealed, and man him-
self is presented as an essent among other essents.
Being-in-the-world cannot be reduced to a relation between
subject and object. It is, on the contrary, that which makes
such a relation possible, insofar as transcendence carries out
22. Everydayness and the associated concepts, "lapsing" {Ver-

falien), "the one" {das Man), and "unauthenticity" (Uneigent-
lichkeit), which are the subject of an extended analysis in Sein und
Zeit are, as Heidegger is at pains to point out here and elsewhere, in
no way to be considered as ethical concepts (although that they are

often so considered is, in part, Heidegger's own fault he need not —
have chosen terms which have such obvious moral and religious over-
tones). Rather, these concepts refer to a mode of existence which
is characterized by that "forgetfulness" of Being discussed above.
(J. S. C.)
243

the projection of the Being of the essent. The existential analytic
illuminates this projection (this act of understanding) within

the limits imposed by its point of departure. It is not so much
a question of pursuing a study of the intrinsic constitution of
transcendence as of elucidating its essential unity with feeling
[Befindlichkeit] and dereliction [Geworfenheit].-^

All projection —and, consequently, even man's "creative"
activity— is thrown [geworfener], i.e., determined by the depend-
ence of Dasein on the essent in totality, a dependence to which
Dasein always submits. This fact of being thrown [dereliction]
is not restricted to the mysterious occurrence of the coming-into-
the-world of Dasein but governs being-present [Dasein] as
such. This is expressed in the movement which has been de-

scribed as a lapsing. This idea of lapsing does not refer to
certain negative events of human life which a critique of culture
would be disposed to condemn but to an intrinsic character of
the transcendental finitude of man, a character which is bound

to the nature of projection as "thrown."
The development of existential ontology, which begins by
the analysis of everydayness, has as its sole objective the
explication of the primordial transcendental structure of the
Dasein in man. In transcendence, Dasein manifests itself as
need of the comprehension of Being. This transcendental need
assures [sorgt] the possibility of something on the order of Dasein.
This need is nothing other than finitude in its most intrinsic
form as that which is the source of Dasein.

The unity of the transcendental structure of this need,
23. Feeling is one of the two ways (the other being understanding
[Versteheri], which for Heidegger is essentially projection) in which

man becomes aware of himself and his world. What is disclosed by
feeling in particular is man's dereliction, i.e., that man in the world
finds himself cast or thrown into a situation not of his own choosing
and among things over which he is not master. (J. S. C.)
244

characteristic of the Dasein in man, has been termed "concern."
The word itself is of little consequence, but it is essential to
understand what the analytic of Dasein seeks to express by

means of it. If one takes the expression "concern" — despite
the specific directive that the term has nothing to do with an
ontic characteristic of man — in the sense of an ethical and
ideological evaluation of "human life" rather than as the des-
ignation of the structural unity of the inherently finite tran-
scendence of Dasein, then everything falls into confusion and
no comprehension of the problematic which guides the analytic
of Dasein is possible.
In any case, there is reason to beheve that the explication
of the essence of finitude required for the establishment of
metaphysics must itself always be basically fimite and never
absolute. It follows that this reflection on finitude, which is
always to be renewed, cannot succeed by exchanging and

adjusting various points of view in order finally and in spite
of everything to give us an absolute knowledge of finitude,
a knowledge which is surreptitiously posited as being "true in
itself." It remains, therefore, only to develop the problematic
of finitude as such. Finitude becomes manifest to us in its
intrinsic essence if we approach it in the light of the fundamental

question of metaphysics as primordially conceived, a method
of approach which, to be sure, cannot claim to be the only one
possible.
It is clear from the above that the metaphysics of Dasein

as a laying of the foundation of metaphysics has its own truth,
which in its essence is as yet all too obscure. No one dominated
by an attitude inspired by a Weltanschauung, i.e., an attitude
which is popular and ontic, and particularly no one dominated
by an attitude —whether approving or disapproving — inspired
by theology, can enter the dimension of the problem of a meta-
physics of Dasein. For, as Kant says, "the critique of reason
245

. . . can never become popular, and indeed there is no need
2*
that it should."
Hence, whoever would institute a critique of the transcenden-
tal interpretation of "concern" as the transcendental unity of
finitude —a critique the possibility and necessity of which no
one would deny —must show, first, that the transcendence of
Dasein and consequently the comprehension of Being, do not
constitute the finitude in man, second, that the estabhshment of
metaphysics does not have that essential relation to the finitude
of Dasein of which we have spoken, and finally, that the basic
question of the laymg of the foundation of metaphysics is not
encompassed by the problem of the intrinsic possibility of the
comprehension of Being.
Before presenting an interpretation of transcendence as
"concern," the fundamental-ontological analytic of Dasein pur-
posely seeks first to provide an exphcation of "anxiety" [Angst]
as a "decisive fundamental feeling" in order to show concretely
that the existential analytic is constantiy guided by the question
from which it arises, namely, the question of the possibility of
the comprehension of Being. Anxiety is declared to be the
decisive fundamental faculty not in order to proclaim, from
the point of view of some Weltanschauung or other, a concrete
existence-ideal but solely with rejerence to the problem of
Being as such.
Anxiety is that fundamental feeling which places us before
the Nothing. The Being of the essent is comprehensible —and
in this lies the innermost finitude of transcendence — only if
Dasein on the basis of its essence holds itself into Nothing.

Holding oneself into Nothing is no arbitrary and casual attempt
to "think" about this Nothing but an event which underhes
all feehng oneself [Sichbefinden] in the midst of essents aheady
on hand. The intrinsic possibility of this event must be clarified
in a fundamental-ontological analytic of Dasein.
24. BXXXIV,NKS,p. 31.
246
"Anxiety" thus understood, i.e., according to fundamental
ontology, prohibits us from interpreting "concern" as having
the harmlessness of a categorical structure. It gives concern the
incisiveness necessary to a fundamental existential and thus
determines the finitude in Dasein not as a given property but as
the constant, although generally veiled, precariousness [Erzit-
tern] which pervades all existence.
But the explication of concern as the transcendental, funda-
mental constitution of Dasein is only the first stage of funda-
mental ontology. For further progress toward the goal, we must
let ourselves be guided and inspired with ever increasing rigor
by the question of Being.
§ 44. The Goal of Fundamental Ontology
The next and decisive stage of the existential analytic is the

concrete explication of concern as temporaUty. Since the prob-
lematic of the laying of the foundation of metaphysics has an
intrinsic relation to the finitude in man, it might seem that the
development of "temporality" serves as a concrete determi-
nation of the finitude in man as a "temporal" being. For the
"temporal" is commonly held to be the finite.
But the fact that not only man but aU finite essents are
considered to be "temporal" in the ordinary sense of the term
— a sense which, within its limits, is justified — is enough to
indicate that the interpretation of Dasein as temporality cannot
move within the field of the ordinary experience of time.
One should also not be led to believe that the sense of
"temporal" in question is that which inspires modem philosophy
(Bergson, Dilthey, Simmel) in its attempt to obtain a more
searching and a more intuitive understanding of the "Uveliness"
of life by determining its temporal character.
On the contrary, if the interpretation of Dasein as temporality
is the goal of fundamental ontology, then it must be motivated
247
exclusively by the problem of Being as such. In this way, is
first revealed the fundamental-ontological sense of the question

of time, i.e., the only sense that it has in Sein und Zeit.
The fundamental-ontological laying of the foundation of
metaphysics in Sein und Zeit must be understood as a repetition.
The passage from Plato's Sophist does not serve as a decora-
tion but as an indication that the Gigantomachia [war of the

giants] relative to the Being of the essent first broke out in
ancient metaphysics. Through this struggle, the way in which
Being as such —no matter with what generality and ambiguity
the question of Being may yet be enveloped — is understood
must become apparent. But inasmuch as in this struggle the
question of Being as such is first won but not yet developed

in the manner indicated as a problem of the intrinsic possibihty
of the comprehension of Being, neither the explication of Being
as such nor the horizon necessary for this expUcation can come
to light. This is why, in attempting the repetition of this prob-
lem, it is imperative that we be attentive to the way in which

philosophical thought in this first struggle expressed itself
spontaneously, as it were, concerning Being.

To be sure, the present study cannot provide a thematic
exposition of this gigantomachia, to say nothing of an inter-
pretation of its basic tendencies. An indication of its salient
characteristics must suffice.
What is the significance of the fact that ancient metaphysics

defined the ontos on — the essent which is essent to the highest
degree — as aei on? The Being of the essent obviously is under-
stood here as permanence and subsistence. What projection lies
at the basis of this comprehension of Being? A projection
relative to time, for even eternity, taken as the nunc stans, for
example, is as a "permanent" now conceivable only through
time.
What is the significance of the fact that the essent in the
proper sense of the term is understood as ousia, parousia,
248

i.e., basically as "presence" [Anwesen], the immediate and
always present possession, as "having" [Habe]l ^^ This projection
reveals that "Being" is synonymous with permanence in pres-
ence.
In this way, therefore, i.e., in the spontaneous comprehension
of Being, temporal determinations are accumulated. Is not the
immediate comprehension of Being developed entirely from a
primordial but self-evident projection of Being relative to time?
Is it not then true that from the first this struggle for
Being takes place within the horizon of time?
Is it surprising, then, that the ontological interpretation
of the what-being of the essent is expressed in the to ti en einai?
Does not this "that which has always been" include the moment
of permanent presence and even in the sense of a certain antici-
pation [Vorgdngigkeit]?
Can the a priori which in the tradition of ontology is held
to be a characteristic of the determination of Being be explained
by asserting that the "earlier" which it implies "naturally" has
nothing to do with "time"? Certainly, has nothing to do with
it
the "time" recognized by the ordinary comprehension of time.

But is this "earlier" positively determined thereby, and is this
annoying temporal character pushed aside? Or does it not
reappear as a new and more difficult problem?
Is it therefore simply a habit, more or less fortunate and
formed no one knows where or when, that in the classification
of the essent, i.e., in the differentiation of the essent relative to
its Being, we "spontaneously" determine it as temporal, atem-
poral, or supratemporal?
What is the basis of this spontaneous and "self-evident" com-
prehension of Being through time? Has anyone even attempted,
Anwesen, "presence," commonly signifies the goods and pos-

25.
which collectively form an adjunct to the
sessions, e.g., real estate,
person. The term Habe, derived from the verb haben, "to have," has
a similar meaning. (J. S. C.)
249
by posing this problem explicitly, to ask why this is so and why
it must happen thus?
The essence of time as it was fixed — and, as it turned out,
decisively — ^for the subsequent history of metaphysics by Aris-
totle does not provide an answer to this question. On the con-
trary, it would be easy to show that it is precisely Aristotle's
conception of time that is inspired by a comprehension of Being
which —without being aware of its action — interprets Being
as permanent presence and, consequently, determines the
"Being" of time from the point of view of the now, i.e., from
the character of time which in itself is constantly present and,
hence, (in the ancient sense of the term) really is.
Now it is true that time is also considered by Aristode as

something which takes place in the "soul" and in the "mind."
However, the determination of the essence of the soul, the
mind, the spirit, and the consciousness of man is not guided
directly and primarily by the problematic of the laying of the
foundation of metaphysics, nor is time interpreted in the light
of a preliminary insight into the problematic, nor, finally, is the
explication of the transcendental structure of Dasein as tem-
porahty understood and developed as a problem.
The philosophical "remembrance" of the hidden projection
of Being on time as the central event in the history of the meta-
physical comprehension of Being ia antiquity and beyond
assigns a task to the repetition of the basic problem of meta-
physics: it is necessary that the regression toward the finitude
in man required by this problematic be carried out in such a
way that in Dasein as such temporahty is made manifest as
a transcendental primordial structure. ^-
The attainment of this objective of fundamental ontology
insofar as it is accomphshed by the explication of the finitude
in man makes an existential interpretation of conscience, guUt,
and death necessary.

The transcendental exposition of historicity [Geschichtlichkeit]
250
on the basis of temporality will at the same time provide
a pre-conception of the mode of Being of that becoming [Ge-
schehen] which takes place [geschieht] in the repetition of the
question of Being. Metaphysics is not something which is
simply "created" by man in systems and doctrines; rather the

comprehension of Being, its projection and rejection, takes
place in Dasein as such. "Metaphysics" is the fundamental event
which comes to pass with the irruption into the essent of the
concrete existence of man.
The metaphysics of Dasein which is developed in fundamental
ontology does not claim to be a new discipline within the
framework of an established order but seeks only to awaken
the insight that philosophical thought takes place as the explicit
transcendence of Dasein.
If the problematic of the metaphysics of Dasein is designated
as that of Being and Time [Sein und Zeit] the explication
which has been given concerning the idea of a fundamental
ontology makes it clear that it is the conjunction "and" in the
above title which expresses the central problem. Neither Being
nor time need be deprived of the meanings which they have had
until now, but a more primordial expUcation of these terms
must establish their justification and their limits.
§ 45. The Idea of Fundamental Ontology and the

Critique of Pure Reason
Kant's laying of the foundation of metaphysics, which for the

first time subjects the internal possibility of the overtness of
the Being of the essent to a decisive examination, must neces-
sarily encounter time as the basic determination of finite tran-
scendence if, indeed, it is true that the comprehension of Being

in Dasein spontaneously projects Being on time. But at the
same time this laying of the foundation must go beyond the
ordinary conception of time to the transcendental comprehen-
251
sion of it as pure self-affection. This self-affection is essentially
one with pure apperception and in this unity makes possible
the total structure of pure sensible reason.

It is not because time serves as the "form of intuition" and
is interpreted as such at the beginning of the Critique of Pure
Reason that in its essential unity with the transcendental imag-
ination it acquires a central metaphysical function. On the

contrary, it acquires this function because, by virtue of the
finitude of the Dasein in man, the comprehension of Being
must be projected on time.
The Critique of Pure Reason thus threatens the supremacy
of reason and the understanding. "Logic" is deprived of its
traditional primacy relative to metaphysics. Its basic idea is
brought into question.

If the essence of transcendence is based on pure imagination,
i.e., originally on time, then the idea of a "transcendental
logic" becomes non-sensical especially if, contrary to Kant's
original intention, it is treated as an autonomous and absolute
discipline.
Kant must have had an intimation of this collapse of the

primacy of logic in metaphysics when, speaking of the funda-
mental characteristics of Being, "possibility" (what-being) and

"reality" (which Kant termed "existence"), he said: "So long
as the definition of possibility, existence, and necessity is sought
solely in pure understanding, they cannot be explained save
^^
through an obvious tautology."
And yet, in the second edition of the Critique did not Kant
re-establish the supremacy of the understanding? And as a
result of this did not metaphysics, with Hegel, come to be iden-
tified with "logic" more radically than ever before?
What is the significance of the struggle initiated in German
idealism against the "thing in itself" except a growing forget-
fulness of what Kant had won, namely, the knowledge that
26. A 244, B 302, NKS, p. 262.
252
the intrinsic possibility and necessity of metaphysics, i.e., its
essence, are, at bottom, sustained and maintained by the orig-
inal development and searching study of the problem of finitude?

What is the outcome of Kant's effort if Hegel defines meta-
physics in these terms: "Logic is consequently to be understood
as the system of Pure Reason, as the Realm of Pure Thought.
This realm is the Truth as it is, without husk in and for itself
—one may therefore express it thus: that this content shows

forth God as He is in His eternal essence before the creation
^^
of Nature and of a finite Spirit."
Can there be a more convincing proof that neither meta-

physics "which belongs to human nature" nor human nature
itself is "self-evident"?
In interpreting the Critique of Pure Reason from the stand-
point of fundamental ontology, are we justified in believing that
we are wiser than our illustrious predecessors? Or do our own

efforts, if we dare compare them with those of our predecessors,
evidence a secret withdrawal before something which we —and
certainly not by accident —no longer see?
Has not our interpretation of the Critique of Pure Reason,
an interpretation inspired by fundamental ontology, made the
problematic of a laying of the foundation of metaphysics more
precise even though it stops short of the decisive point? There-
fore, there is only one thing to do: we must hold open the ques-
tions posed by our inquiry.
Moreover, is not the Transcendental Analytic, taken in the
broad sense to which our interpretation is limited, followed by
a Transcendental Dialectic? And if the substance of the latter
consists only in the critical application of the insight attained
relative to the essence of metaphysica generalis to the rejection
of metaphysica specialis, must we not conclude that this appar-
ently negative content of the Transcendental Dialectic also
conceals a positive problematic?
27. Science of Logic, p. 60.
253

And could it not be that this problematic is concentrated
in the question which up to the present has guided, although
in a veiled and implicit manner, every problematic of meta-
physics, namely, the question of the finitude of Dasein?
Kant says that "transcendental appearance," to which tradi-
tional metaphysics owes its possibility, is necessary. Must not

this transcendental untruth be positively estabhshed in its orig-
inal unity with transcendental truth on the basis of the intrmsic
essence of the finitude in Dasein? Does not the dis-essence
[Unwesen] of this appearance pertain to the essence of finitude?
Is it not advisable, then, to free the problem of "transcen-
dental appearance" from that architectonic into which Kant
oriented as he is on traditional logic — forces it, especially since
the position of logic as the possible ground and guide for the
problematic of metaphysics is threatened by the Kantian laying
of the foundation?
What is the transcendental essence of truth? How, on the
basis of the finitude of Dasein, are the essence of truth and the
dis-essence of untruth originally united with man's fundamental
need, as an essent thrown in the midst of essents, to comprehend
Being?
Does it make sense and is it justifiable to think that man,
because his finitude makes an ontology, i.e., a comprehension
of Being necessary to him, is "creative" and therefore "infinite"
when nothing is so radically opposed to ontology as the idea

of an infinite being?
But is it possible to develop the finitude in Dasein even as
a problem without "presupposing" an infinitude? What is the
nature of this "presupposition" in Dasein? What is the signifi-
cance of the infinitude thus "posed"?
Will the problem of Being succeed in recovering its ele-
mentary force and amplitude through all these questions? Or,

at this point, are we so much the fools of organization, bustle,
and speed that we are no longer able to be friends of the essen-
254

tial, the simple, and the stable? This "friendship" (philia) alone
turns us toward the essent as such, a movement from which
springs the question of the concept of Being (sophia) — the
basic question of philosophy.
Or for this also do we first need remembrance?
Let Aristotle speak:
Kai de kai to palai te kai nun kai aei zetoumenon kai aei
aporhoumenon ti to on . . .
(Metaphysics Zl, 1028, b 2 sqq.)
255
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MB-68 ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF ART by R. G. ColUngu'ood
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MB-69 ESSAYSON DANTE edited by Mark Musa (cloth $6.00) $2.45
MB-70 THE INFLUENCE OF DARWIN ON PHILOSOPHY by Johu Deu'Cy $2-45
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MB-73 BEOWULF translated by Lucien Dean Pearson, edited ivith an
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MB-74 LOVE IN literature: STUDIES IN SYMBOLIC EXPRESSION
by Wallace Fowlie $1-65
MB-75 THE POPULATION IMPLICATIONS AND PLANS FOR ACTION
CRISIS:
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A STYLE MANUAL FOR AUTHORS by £dtfard D. Seeber |i-25
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Kant and The Problem of Metaphysics PDF

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Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics

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