05GENREPX0015 Rev0

SK316 Development
Project RAM Study

Saipem / ENI / Petronas Carigali
WB/WB/CB859/2613269/13/R/063/3
Visas and revision history
Name Company Date Signature
Writer W. BOUDOUX Bureau Veritas 2013-05-23
Verifier J-R. CONSTANS Bureau Veritas 2013-05-23
Reference : WB/WB/CB859/2613269/13/R/063/3
Table 1: Visas
Rev Date Wri. Ver. Objet

First Revision of the document. This revision is
an intermediate revision of the final report with
0 2013-04-22 WB JRC
only assumptions used for the study (step 1 to
3).
1 2013-05-03 WB JRC First official release with availability results
2 2013-05-13 WB JRC Update with input from clarification meeting.
3 2013-05-23 WB JRC Update with input after clarification meeting #2.
Table 2: revision history
Contact
William Boudoux | RAMS Consultant
BUREAU VERITAS | Technical Center France

"Le Guillaumet", 60 avenue Charles de Gaulle | 92800 Puteaux | FRANCE
Tel. +33 (0)1 47 14 33 52 | Fax. +33 (0)1 47 14 33 99 | Mob. +33 (0)6 33 15 70 78

william.boudoux@fr.bureauveritas.com | www.bureauveritas.fr
Bureau Veritas - SK316 Development Project RAM Study

2/37 Ref : WB/WB/CB859/2613269/13/R/063/3
Table of contents
1. REFERENCES AND GLOSSARY 5

1.1. References 5
1.1.1 Standards and data books 5
1.1.2 Project References 5
1.2. Glossary 7
1.2.1 Acronyms 7
1.2.2 Normative definitions 7
1.2.3 Project definitions Erreur ! Signet non défini.
2. INTRODUCTION 9
2.1. Context and stakes 9
2.2. Mission perimeter 9
2.3. RAM goal and objectives 10
3. OVERALL METHODOLOGY 11
3.1. Generalities 11
4. STEP 1: PRODUCTION AVAILABILITY DIAGRAMS 12
4.1. Objective 12
4.2. Method and tools 12
4.3. Results of the analysis 12
4.3.1 Legend 12
4.3.2 NC3 and NC8 WHP 13
4.3.3 NC3 CPP 14
5. STEP 2: DYSFUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS 15
5.1. Objective 15
5.2. Method 15
5.3. Tables 15
6. STEP 3: SELECTION OF RELIABILITY DATA AND ASSUMPTIONS16
6.1. Overall Assumptions 16
6.2. Assumption per units 17
6.2.1 Wellhead Platform 17
6.2.2 Wellhead Platform Utilities 17
6.2.3 Central Processing Platform Description 17
6.2.4 Gas Cooling facility in CPP 17
6.2.5 Gas / Liquid Separation 18
6.2.6 Condensate Treatment 18
6.2.7 Gas compression 18
6.2.8 Glycol Dehydration System 18
6.2.9 Gas Export 18
6.2.10 CPP Utilities 18
6.3. Equipment reliability data 19

3/37 Ref : WB/WB/CB859/2613269/13/R/063/3
7. STEP 4: AVAILABILITY ANALYSIS 21
7.1. RAM Requirements 21
7.2. Calculation Software and modeling 21
7.3. Plant reliability and availability 22
7.3.1 Plant availability and availability per units 22
7.3.2 Production availability over the years 23
7.4. Criticality Analysis (plant availability) 23
7.4.1 Main units 23
7.4.2 NC8 Utilities 24
7.4.3 NC3 Utilities 24
7.4.4 NC3 Full Well Stream Cooling 24
7.4.5 Gas Dehydration 25
7.5. Glycol system availability and reliability 25
7.5.1 Glycol Package Availability 25
7.5.2 Criticality Analysis 26
7.6. Chemical injection availability 27
7.6.1 Availability 27
7.6.2 Criticality Analysis 28
8. CONCLUSION 29

4/37 Ref : WB/WB/CB859/2613269/13/R/063/3
1. REFERENCES AND GLOSSARY
1.1. References
1.1.1 Standards and data books
Tag Name and reference number
[R01] Offshore Reliability Data Handbook 4 th Edition (OREDA,2002)
[R02] Offshore Reliability Data Handbook 5 th Edition – Vol. 2 (OREDA,2009)
[R03] FARADIP.THREE - (Dr. David J Smith)

Table 1: References (data books)
1.1.2 Project References

Process Control and Safeguarding Philosophy
[R04]
05-GEN-PHL-B-0001 (Revision 0 – 2013/01/15)
Overall Process and Utility System Description
[R05]
05-GEN-MNL-B-0001 (Revision A – 2013/04/13)
[R06] P&ID : 05-NC3-WHP-B-6001-1 Rev. B
[R07] P&ID : 05-NC3-WHP-B-6002-1 Rev. B
[R08] P&ID : 05-NC3-WHP-B-6003-1 Rev. B

[R09] P&ID : 05-NC3-WHP-B-6004-1 Rev. B
[R10] P&ID : 05-NC3-WHP-B-6004-2 Rev. B
[R11] P&ID : 05-NC3-WHP-B-6005-1 Rev. B
[R12] P&ID : 05-NC3-CPP-B-6006-1 Rev. B
[R13] P&ID : 05-NC3-CPP-B-6007-1 Rev. B

[R14] P&ID : 05-NC3-CPP-B-6008-1 Rev. B
[R15] P&ID : 05-NC3-CPP-B-6009-1 Rev. B
[R16] P&ID : 05-NC3-CPP-B-6010-1 Rev. B
[R17] P&ID : 05-NC3-CPP-B-6011-1 Rev. B
[R18] P&ID : 05-NC3-CPP-B-6012-1 Rev. B

[R19] P&ID : 05-NC3-CPP-B-6015-1 Rev. B
[R20] P&ID : 05-NC3-CPP-B-6017-1 Rev. B
[R21] P&ID : 05-NC3-CPP-B-6018-1 Rev. B
[R22] P&ID : 05-NC3-CPP-B-6019-1 Rev. B
[R23] P&ID : 05-NC3-CPP-B-6019-2 Rev. B
[R24] P&ID : 05-NC3-CPP-B-6020-1 Rev. B
[R25] P&ID : 05-NC3-CPP-B-6021-1 Rev. B

5/37 Ref : WB/WB/CB859/2613269/13/R/063/3
[R26] P&ID : 05-NC3-CPP-B-6022-1 Rev. B
[R27] P&ID : 05-NC3-CPP-B-6023-1 Rev. B

[R28] P&ID : 05-NC3-CPP-B-6024-1 Rev. B
[R29] P&ID : 05-NC3-CPP-B-6025-1 Rev. B
[R30] P&ID : 05-NC3-CPP-B-6025-2 Rev. B
[R31] P&ID : 05-NC3-CPP-B-6026-1 Rev. B
[R32] P&ID : 05-NC3-CPP-B-6027-1 Rev. B
[R33] P&ID : 05-NC3-CPP-B-6028-1 Rev. B
[R34] P&ID : 05-NC3-CPP-B-6029-1 Rev. B
[R35] P&ID : 05-NC3-CPP-B-6030-1 Rev. B
[R36] P&ID : 05-NC3-CPP-B-6031-1 Rev. B
[R37] P&ID : 05-NC3-CPP-B-6032-1 Rev. B

[R38] P&ID : 05-NC3-CPP-B-6033-1 Rev. B
[R39] P&ID : 05-NC3-CPP-B-6034-1 Rev. B
[R40] P&ID : 05-NC3-CPP-B-6035-1 Rev. B
[R41] P&ID : 05-NC3-CPP-B-6036-1 Rev. B
[R42] P&ID : 05-NC3-CPP-B-6036-2 Rev. B

[R43] P&ID : 05-NC3-CPP-B-6037-1 Rev. B
[R44] P&ID : 05-NC3-CPP-B-6038-1 Rev. B

[R45] P&ID : 05-NC3-CPP-B-6039-1 Rev. B
[R46] P&ID : 05-NC3-CPP-B-6040-1 Rev. B
[R47] P&ID : 05-NC3-CPP-B-6041-1 Rev. B
[R48] P&ID : 05-NC8-WHP-B-6063-1 Rev. B

[R49] P&ID : 05-NC8-WHP-B-6064-1 Rev. B
[R50] P&ID : 05-NC8-WHP-B-6065-1 Rev. B

[R51] P&ID : 05-NC8-WHP-B-6066-1 Rev. B
[R52] P&ID : 05-NC8-WHP-B-6067-1 Rev. B
[R53] P&ID : 05-NC8-WHP-B-6068-1 Rev. B

[R54] P&ID : 05-NC8-WHP-B-6069-1 Rev. B
[R55] P&ID : 05-NC8-WHP-B-6070-1 Rev. B
[R56] P&ID : 05-NC8-WHP-B-6072-1 Rev. B
[R57] P&ID : 05-NC8-WHP-B-6076-1 Rev. B

6/37 Ref : WB/WB/CB859/2613269/13/R/063/3
[R58] P&ID : 05-NC8-WHP-B-6077-1 Rev. B
[R59] P&ID : 05-NC8-WHP-B-6078-1 Rev. B

Table 2: References (project)
1.2. Glossary
1.2.1 Acronyms
Acronym Signification
BV Bureau Veritas
CM Compression Platform
CPP Central Processing Platform
FWS Full-Well-Stream
LNG Liquefied Natural Gas
MMSCFD Million Standard Cubic Feet per Day
MTTF Mean Time To Failure
MTTR Mean Time To Repair
PAD Process Availability Diagrams
RAM Reliability Availability Maintainability
WHP Wellhead Platform
 Failure Rate (=lambda)
 Repair Rate (=mu)

Table 3: Acronyms
1.2.2 Definitions
Term Definitions
ISO 20815:2008 defines Availability as the “ability of an item to be in a
state to perform a required function under given conditions at a given
instant of time, or on average over a given time interval, assuming that
the required external resources are provided”.
Note: For the scope of this study, availability is defined as the ratio of
the expected average service time which is the total plant design life
minus the assumed scheduled maintenance and calculated unplanned
Availability events down-time divided by the total planned period.
This definitions applies for following objectives :
- availability of 96% for the Plant
- and availability of 96% for the Chemical Injection.
This corresponds to the normative definition of the availability with

consideration of planned shutdowns.

7/37 Ref : WB/WB/CB859/2613269/13/R/063/3
Term Definitions
ISO 20815:2008 defines Reliability as the “ability of an item to perform
a required function under given conditions for a given time interval”.
The reliability of a product or system is the probability that it will be
able to perform its intended function, for a specific time, under
specified operating conditions. Statistical distributions are normally
required to fully describe reliability; however the summary term known
as Mean Time to Failure (MTTF) is normally used.
Note: For the scope of this study, reliability is defined as the ratio of the
Reliability expected average service time which is the total plant design life minus
the calculated unplanned events down-time divided by the total
planned period.
This definition applies for next objectives:
- reliability of 98% for the Plant
- and reliability of 98% for the Glycol Package.
This corresponds to the normative definition of the availability without

consideration of planned shutdowns.
Reliability Availability and Maintainability study. Availability calculations
take into account reliability (failure rate / MTBF) and maintainability
(MTTR) of equipment. RAM study is therefore related to “availability”
RAM Study
calculation. At a system level, maintainability indicators, such as
MTTR, are meaningless. Maintainability and reliability are indicators for
equipment level.
ISO 20815:2008 defines Maintainability as the “(general) ability of an
item under given conditions of use, to be retained in, or restored to, a
state in which it can perform a required function, when maintenance is
performed under given conditions and using stated procedures and
Maintainability resources”. It is the probability that a failed component or system will
be restored to its functioning state, in a given time and in the stated
environment. Like reliability, maintainability is fully described as a
statistical probability, however summary term known as Mean Time To
Repair (MTTR) is used.
Production The production Availability is the ratio of the production to the planned
Availability production over a specified period of time.
Production efficiency is the ratio of average achieved production for a
given period of time to the average planned or required production for
Production the same period. It is an indication of the production volume achieved
Efficiency against target (includes planned shutdowns).
This corresponds to the definition of the “production availability”
without consideration of planned shutdowns.
Table 4: Definitions

8/37 Ref : WB/WB/CB859/2613269/13/R/063/3
2. INTRODUCTION
2.1. Context and stakes
PETRONAS Carigali (CARIGALI) has undertaken the development of NC3 and NC8
gas fields located in SK 316 Block.
NC3 and NC8 are located in Block SK 316, approximately 180km North off Bintulu,
Sarawak with water depth ranging between 104m – 107m. NC8 field is located
approximately 7km South East of NC3. The nearby riser facility, E11RC is located
approximately 80km South West of NC3 and has an existing Trunkline 6 (TL6)
connecting E11RC to shore.
NC3 will be made as hub, which will comprise Central Processing Platform (CPP) and
Wellhead Platform (WHP) bridge-linked to it. Another WHP will be installed at NC8 and
NC 8 will be tied-back to NC3 via an inter field subsea pipeline.
NC3 and NC8 gas production is 600 MMSCFD gross for a plateau period of 15 years.
NC3 field will commence production for 5 years prior to NC8 come on stream to
supplement the production rates thereafter. Gas compression facilities shall also be
considered at NC3 in order to maintain the gas export pressure, as the well head
pressure will be getting depleted for lateral years. Gas compressor facilities shall be
located in separate platform which will be bridge linked to NC3 CPP.
Gas from NC3 and NC8 fields are the main feed gas supplier into LNG Plant Train 9
with NC3 expected to be ready for start-up in December 2015.
2.2. Mission perimeter

The perimeter of the RAM comprises:
 NC3 Wellhead Platform (WHP);
 NC8 Wellhead Platform (WHP) ;
 NC3 Central Processing Platform (CPP);
 NC3 WHP gas export pipeline to E11-RC;
 NC8 WHP – NC3 WHP pipeline;
 E11-RC export pipeline to Shore
The NC3 Compression Platform (NC3 CM) is excluded from the scope of work.
Two configurations will be taken into account:

 Early years configuration with production from NC3-WHP only;
 Later years configuration with production from both NC3-WHP and NC8-WHP;

9/37 Ref : WB/WB/CB859/2613269/13/R/063/3
2.3. RAM goal and objectives
Petronas Carigali reliability target to achieve for the project are as follows:
 Plant reliability : 98%
 Plant availability: 96%
 Glycol system reliability : 98%
 Chemical injection availability : 96%
The definitions that applies for these terms are indicated in the section §1.2.2.

10/37 Ref : WB/WB/CB859/2613269/13/R/063/3
3. OVERALL METHODOLOGY
3.1. Generalities
The RAM study will be conducted in 6 steps:
 Production Availability Diagrams
 Dysfunctional Analysis
 Reliability Data Selection
 Availability Calculation
 Sensitivity Cases
 Final reporting
Figure 1: Presentation of the methodology
The following paragraphs describes the several RAM methodology steps

11/37 Ref : WB/WB/CB859/2613269/13/R/063/3
4. STEP 1: PRODUCTION AVAILABILITY DIAGRAMS
4.1. Objective
The goal of this step is to describe the facilities and identify the equipment/ functions
that shall be included in the RAM study; meaning, the equipment/ functions that have
an impact on process availability during normal operations.
Production Availability Diagrams (PAD) determines the boundaries of the system

under study.
4.2. Method and tools

This first step of the study analyses the redundancy level, the functional links between
the units, in order to determine the consequence on the production availability.
The results are presented on the form of diagrams. The diagram represents functional
interconnection between various equipment, sub-systems or functions to represent the
plant reliability and availability logic.
Dotted box refers to units/functions of the process where a failure does not lead to loss
of gas production. Solid lines boxes refer to units or functions where a failure can have
an impact on production availability. When a description of the system is available, as
the architecture or module capacities, that information is given and indicated on the
diagrams.
4.3. Results of the analysis

4.3.1 Legend
The diagrams are represented with next formalism.
Unit Name
Unit which may have an impact
N*x%
y m3/h on gas production.
Unit Name
Unit with negligible impact on gas
N*x%
y m3/h production
Figure 2: Legend for functional analysis

12/37 Ref : WB/WB/CB859/2613269/13/R/063/3
4.3.2 NC3 and NC8 WHP
NC3 WHP & NC8 WHP
Production and utilities
Gas Production
(initial years)
NC3 Wells Production Manifold Open Drain Vent

Input 4*25% 100% - - Output
600 MMSCFD 600 MMSCFD - -
NC3 Wells Production Manifold NC3 WHP Open Drain NC3 WHP Vent
Gas Production (later years)
Input 4*25% 100% - -

300 MMSCFD 600 MMSCFD - -
NC8 Wells NC8 WHP Open Drain NC8 WHP Vent NC8 Instrument Air Power Generation
Output
Input 4*25% - - - (redundant from NC3
300 MMSCFD - - - CPP)
Diesel Fuel Chemical Injections

- -
- -
Figure 3: NC3 and NC8 functional analysis
These diagrams represent the gas production on initial years and later years from well
production to NC3 CPP. Drain and Vent on NC3 WHP have a negligible impact on
availability.
After start-up of NC8 WHP, gas production will be divided between the two fields
(NC3 and NC8 – 300MMSCF). The NC8 WHP has its own utilities.

13/37 Ref : WB/WB/CB859/2613269/13/R/063/3
4.3.3 NC3 CPP
NC3 CPP
Phase
Glycol Contactor Gas Metering

gas 1*100% 3*50% Output
600 MMSCFD 660 MMSCFD
NC3 Wellstream Coolers Slug Receiver gas

Input 2*50% 1*100%
600 MMSCFD 600 MMSCFD
liquid
Gas Production
3-Phase Separator Tilted Plate Separator Condensate sytem Condensate Metering

- oil - oil 1*100% - 2*100% oil 2*100%
- - 13m3/h 13m3/h
water
water
Produced Water
Treatment
water
1*100%
-
Glycol Regeneration Gas Mercury Removal

Fuel Gas system Instrument Air system Nitrogen system
system system
Input - 2*100% 1*100%
1*100% 1*100%
- - 150 Nm »/h
- -
Diesel Fuel system Sea Water Lift sytem Potable Water system Cooling Water sytem Methanol
Utilities
2*100% / 2*50% 2*100% 2*100% - 1*100% 3*50% - 1%100% -

- - - - -
Corrosion inhibitor Scale inhibitor Power Gen. system Flare & Vent sytem Drain system
- - 3*50% - - Output
- - - - -
Figure 4: NC3 CPP functional analysis
These diagrams represent the NC3 CPP gas production. Condensate production and
water treatment have only a slight impact on gas production and have been excluded
from the scope of work. The gas production consists of well stream cooling (2*50%),
slug receiver (1*100%), glycol contactor (1*100%), gas metering (3*50%).
Glycol contactor and its glycol regeneration will be modeled as there is a reliability
objective on this unit.
As, the compression unit is outside scope, there is no difference between early years
and later years for the NC3 CPP.
Some utilities that have an impact on gas production availability will be modeled as
fuel gas system, nitrogen system, instrument air system, diesel fuel system, methanol
injection, corrosion inhibitor injection, scale inhibitor injection, flare and vent systems.

14/37 Ref : WB/WB/CB859/2613269/13/R/063/3
5. STEP 2: DYSFUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS
5.1. Objective
The purpose of the dysfunctional analysis is to identify failures and to organize them
into a hierarchy depending on their severities and impact on availability.
The objectives of this analysis are to:

 identify all the equipment’s failures which can lead to production losses;
 identify the production losses and potential compensating measures;
 select equipment that are modeled in next step (RAM model);
 propose if necessary compensatory measures in order to reduce the criticality
in terms of conception, exploitation and maintenance;
5.2. Method
For each function/units identified in the PAD, a systematic analysis is conducted:
 identification of the equipment’s;
 identification of equipment’s failure modes;
 and assessment of the effects (on production) associated with those failures.
The results are presented on the form of a table which describes:

 Functions / sub-functions / units;
 Equipment’s and their tag;
 Impact without mitigation.
 Mitigation; and
 Effects
5.3. Tables
Dysfunctional analyses table are available in Appendix 1.

15/37 Ref : WB/WB/CB859/2613269/13/R/063/3
6. STEP 3: SELECTION OF RELIABILITY DATA AND
ASSUMPTIONS
6.1. Overall Assumptions
 Intrinsic failures: The RAM study shall take into account the intrinsic failures
of the system.
 Life time considered: Lifetime considered shall be operating lifetime of the

facilities including maintenance time. Components are to be supposed to have
a life time guaranteed exceeding the lifetime of the facilities. Systems shall not
be studied in other periods (commissioning, transportation, tests …). The life
time considered for this study is 14 years (until 2029).
 Production cases: Two production cases are analyzed: a first case with NC3
production of 600 MMSCFD until 2020, and a second case with 300 MMSCFD
from NC3 + 300 MMSCFD from NC8 until 2029.
 Human factor: Human error is not taken into account within the study as it
difficult to assess. The operating staff shall be supposed to be present and
qualified to operate the facilities, well trained and in a good physical condition.
 Early-Life factor: No factor shall take into account inexperience of operation. It

depends on a lot of parameters (previous experience of the operator, novelty of
the design, training of operators, and quality of the commissioning…) and is not
related to architecture / reliability of components.
 Equipment design: All the equipment shall be supposed correctly designed

regarding all applicable standards and shall be supposed correctly installed.
 Rare events: Rare events not directly linked with a physical random
phenomenon intrinsic to plant’s components (that are phenomenon modeled in
RAM study) shall not be modeled (e.g.: fire, pipe rupture, corrosion supposed
dealt with by design; dropped object faults…). These events shall be
considered as analyzed and correctly covered in other studies like QRA.
 Temporary equipment: Temporary equipment, for example temporary

strainers shall not be taken into account.
 Planned Maintenance: A planned shutdown frequency of once per year have

been modeled with production interruption of one week.
 Planned Events: Full ESD is planned every 6 months and will have a duration
of 8 hours.
 Failure Modes: The failure modes taken into account in this study are only
critical failure modes provided in the databooks with the exception of the two
distillation columns C-9500 and C-9501 (Glycol Package) for which the
degraded modes have been taken into account.

16/37 Ref : WB/WB/CB859/2613269/13/R/063/3
6.2. Assumption per units
6.2.1 Wellhead Platform
The wellhead platform (WHP) process system typically comprises of the flowlines,
production manifold and the gas export launcher facilities.
The expected gas production is 600 MMSCFD gross.
For the RAM study, next assumptions have taken into account.
Initial years from 2016 to Later years from 2021 to

2020 (5 years) 2030 (10 years)
Number of NC3 wells 4 4
NC3 Production 600 MMSCFD 300 MMSCFD
NC3 well redundancy 4*25% 4*25%
Number of NC8 wells 0 4
NC8 Production 0 MMSCFD 300 MMSCFD
NC8 well redundancy 0 4*25%
Table 5: Wellhead configuration
Future wells for NC3 and NC8 (up to 6 wells for each configuration) have not been
taken into account as the modeled design is the most conservative.
6.2.2 Wellhead Platform Utilities

Pigging Operation has been taken into account in the RAM study.Pigging activities will
reduce the flow to 50%. The frequency is 3 months and duration is 8 hours.
Closed and Open drain systems, as much as the Flare & vent systems, have not been
taken into account as a failure of these systems will have minor impact on production.
6.2.3 Central Processing Platform Description

The function of the central processing platform (CPP) is to receive FWS from the NC8/
NC3 WHP, and provide onward transmission to MLNG plant onshore after undergoing
a series of phase separation, dehydration and compression (later years).
6.2.4 Gas Cooling facility in CPP

Gas cooling facilities are provided for both FWS from NC3 and NC8. The cooling
facility is designed to handle 600 MMSCFD of FWS with 2*50% branches. In case of
loss of one branch, the branch can be isolated and the production can proceed at
50%.

17/37 Ref : WB/WB/CB859/2613269/13/R/063/3
6.2.5 Gas / Liquid Separation
For gas/liquid separation, Slug Receiver vessel will provide bulk separation of
gas/liquid from the FWS received. Gas from the Slug Receiver is routed to the
dehydration system while liquid will flow to the 3‐Phase Condensate/ Water Separator.
6.2.6 Condensate Treatment

For condensate treatment, the condensate outlet of the Condensate/ Water separator
will be routed to the Tilted Plate Separator while water will be sent to the Produced
Water Treatment System. Condensate from the Tilted Plate Separator will flow to the
Condensate Coalescer for further removal of water carryover.
Water separated from the Condensate Coalescer will also be sent to the Produced
Water Treatment System. Dewatered condensate is pumped by Condensate Export
Pumps, after which it is mixed with the export gas. The Condensate Export Pumps will
spike dewatered condensate into gas export pipeline.
In the RAM study the condensate treatment have been taken into account with next
assumptions. The condensate treatment can handle condensate if:
 3-Phase separator is available,
 OR if Tilted Plate Separator and Coalescer are available.
In case of unavailability of the condensate treatment, the high high level (HHL) limit
will be reached in the Slug Receiver and Gas production will be stopped (after 90
minutes of condensate production stoppage).
6.2.7 Gas compression

Gas compression and Mercury Removal Unit have has been excluded from the scope
of work.
6.2.8 Glycol Dehydration System

The Glycol Dehydration System function is to dehydrate gas before export. Gas
dehydration should be negligible.
The two glycol make-up pumps are modeled in a 2*50% configuration. The two
circulation pumps are modeled in a 2*100% configuration.
6.2.9 Gas Export

The Gas flow through the Gas Metering Skid and is export to MLNG.
6.2.10 CPP Utilities

Chemical Injection consists of methanol injection, corrosion inhibitor injection or scale
inhibitor injection. A typical chemical injection unit has been modeled. Chemical
injection systems consist of a storage tanks and chemical injection pumps (2*100%).

18/37 Ref : WB/WB/CB859/2613269/13/R/063/3
In WHP, methanol injection facility is provided to prevent hydrate formation
downstream of choke valve. Scaling inhibitor is injected at the WHP to prevent the
scale due to water.
Power Generation is modeled with 3 Power Turbines (3*50%). The turbines can use
Fuel Gas or Diesel Gas to provide energy to the platform.
Diesel system and Fuel Gas system have been modeled. Total Fuel Gas demand is
10 MMSCFD, the main source is SDV-6001 (90%). In case of loss of the Fuel Gas
System, the Diesel system can be used. Detail analysis of failures of the Diesel
system is indicated in Appendix 1.
Drain systems, as much as Flare systems have not been modeled.
6.3. Equipment reliability data

Next table contain all reliability data taken into account for the RAM study. Reliability
data are issued from [R01], [R02] and [R03].
Equipment Type Failure MTTR Source Equivalent equipment in the data book
Rate
3 phase separator 3,59E-05 7,4 OREDA-02 §3.2.8 Separator
Air compressor (incl. 1,72E-04 60 OREDA-02 §2.2.1 Electric Motors / Compressors
Motor) OREDA-02 §1.1.1.1 Compressors / Centrifugal / Electric
Driven
Air Dryer 2,40E-05 8,8 OREDA-02 §3.2.7 Vessels / Scrubber
Air Receiver 6,76E-05 28,5 OREDA-02 §3.2.10 Vessels / Surge Tank
Blow Down Valve 1,37E-05 16,5 OREDA-02 §4.3.1.2 Valves / Ball / Flare,vent & blow-down
Chemical Injector 2,10E-05 14,3 OREDA-02 §4.3.6.1 Valves / Globe / Chemical Injection
Chemical Injection 1,44E-05 12 OREDA-02 §1.3.1.1 Electric Motors / Pump / Chemical
Pump (incl. Motor) OREDA-02 §2.2.2.1 Injection
Pumps / Centrifugal / Chemical Injection
Chemical Tank 2,89E-05 18,3 OREDA-02 §3.2 Vessels
Choke Valve 1,09E-05 9 OREDA-02 §4.3.1.3 Valves / Ball / Gas systems
Coalescer 3,44E-05 55,4 OREDA-02 §3.2.1 Vessels / Coalescer
Contactor 9,14E-05 27,1 OREDA-02 §3.2.2 Vessels / Contactor
Control Valve 1,05E-05 10,7 OREDA-02 §4.3.1 Valves / Ball
Diesel Generator 8,14E-03 8 OREDA-02 §2.1.1 Electric Generators / Motor drive
(FTS) (diesel, gas motor)
Fuel Gas Heater 1,70E-05 5 OREDA-02 §3.3.2 Heaters and boilers / Electric
Filter 1,00E-06 4 FARADIP.THREE Filter (Blocked / Leak)
Flash Drum 1,31E-05 8,4 OREADA-02 §3.2.4 Vessels / Flash Drum
Flow Meter 3,81E-06 9,8 OREDA-02 §4.2.1 Process Sensors / Flow
Glycol Pump (incl. 2,40E-05 12 OREDA-02 §2.2.2.4 Electric Motors / Pump / Cooling
Motor) OREDA-02 §1.3.1.5 systems
Pumps / Centrifugal / Cooling systems
Surge Drum 6,76E-06 28,5 OREDA-02 §3.2.10 Vessels / Surge Tank
HIPPS Valve 1,64E-05 12,6 OREDA-02 §4.4.5 Valves / ESD/PSD
Loading Arm 1,05E-05 10,7 OREDA-02 §4.3.1 Valves / Ball
Motor Operated 1,05E-05 10,7 OREDA-02 §4.3.1 Valves / Ball

19/37 Ref : WB/WB/CB859/2613269/13/R/063/3
Equipment Type Failure MTTR Source Equivalent equipment in the data book
Rate
Valve
Power Turbine 6,71E-05 58,6 OREDA-02 §2.1.2 Electric Generators / Turbine driven
(gas, steam)
Pump 7,08E-05 18 OREDA-02 §2.2.2.7 Electrical Motors / Pump / Gas
OREDA-02 §1.3.1.9 processing
Pumps / Centrifugal / Gas processing
Diesel Pump 3,03E-04 50 OREDA-02 §2.2.2 Electrical Motors / Pump
OREDA-02 §1.3.1 Pumps / Centrifugal
Reboiler 1,70E-05 5 OREDA-02 §3.3.2 Heaters and boilers / Electric
Receiver 6,76E-06 28,5 OREDA-02 §3.2.10 Vessels / Surge Tank
Reflux Condenser 3,83E-05 197 OREDA-02 §3.2.3 Vessels / Destillation column
Scrubber 2,40E-05 8,8 OREDA-02 §3.2.7 Vessels / Scrubber
Separator 3,59E-05 7,4 OREDA-02 §3.2.8 Vessels / Separator
Shutdown Valve 1,64E-05 12,6 OREDA-02 §4.4.5 Valves / ESD/PSD
Still Column 3,83E-05 197 OREDA-02 §3.2.3 Vessels / Destillation column
Superheater 1,70E-05 5 OREDA-02 §3.3.2 Heaters and boilers / Electric
Tank 2,89E-05 18,3 OREDA-02 §3.2 Vessels
Wellhead 2,64E-06 45 OREDA-09-2 §5.8.1 Wellhead & Xmas Tree Conventional
Wet Gas Flow Meter 3,81E-06 9,8 OREDA-02 §4.2.1 Process Sensors / Flow
Shell & Tube Heat 9,70E-06 73 OREDA-02 §3.1.5 Heat exchangers / Shell and Tube
Exchanger
Table 6: Reliability data

20/37 Ref : WB/WB/CB859/2613269/13/R/063/3
7. STEP 4: AVAILABILITY ANALYSIS
7.1. RAM Requirements
Petronas Carigali reliability target to achieve for the project are as follows:
 Plant reliability : 98%
 Plant availability: 96%
 Glycol system reliability : 98%
 Chemical injection availability : 96%
The definitions of these terms are available in section §Erreur ! Source du renvoi
introuvable..
7.2. Calculation Software and modeling

For this RAM Study, the software GRIF 2013 and its Petri Nets module has been
used. The software is based on MOCA-RP.
 Total number of simulations: more than 100 000 stories
 Length of a story: 15 years

21/37 Ref : WB/WB/CB859/2613269/13/R/063/3
7.3. Plant reliability and availability
7.3.1 Plant availability and availability per units
Detailed results of the availability calculation are indicated in the Table 7.
Unit Availability Comments

NC3 WH Capacity 99,97% FWS availability at NC3 WH output
NC3 WHP Production Manifold 100,00% Availability of NC3 WHP Manifold
NC3 WHP Bridge 99,98% Availability of NC3 WHP-CPP Bridge
NC8 UTI Capacity 99,59% Availability of NC8 WHP Utilities
NC8 Production Manifold 100,00% Availability of NC8 WHP Manifold
NC8 Export Capacity 99,94% Availability of NC8 WHP Export
NC8 WH Capacity 99,95% FWS availability at NC8 WH output
NC3 CPP Well Stream Cooling 99,84% Availability of FWS Cooling
NC3 CPP Slug Receiver 99,96% Availability of Slug Receiver
NC3 CPP Gas Dehydration 99,73% Availability of Gas Dehydration
NC3 CPP Gas Metering 99,98% Availability of Gas Metering
NC3 CPP Gas Export 99,97% Availability of Gas Export
Overall Condensate 99,95% Availability of the Condensate treatment
NC3 UTI Overall 99,78% Availability of Utilities
Planned Shutdowns 98,08% Availability (Preventive Maintenance)
Pigging Activities 99,82% Availability (Pigging activities)
ESD Tests 99,81% Availability (ESD Tests)
Production Efficiency 96,94% Production Availability of the plant
Availability 97,27% Availability of the plant
Reliability Production Availability without
99,16%
consideration of planned events shutdowns
Table 7: Availability per unit
The production availability of the plant is 96.94%. This figure corresponds to the ratio
between production versus planned production and includes planned shutdowns,
pigging activities and ESD Tests.
The availability of the plant is 97.27%. This figure means that the plant is available
97.27% of the time, meaning able to produce gas (above 0% production). This figure
takes into account that production is only carried out by NC3 between 2015 and 2020
and that production is carried by both WHP NC3 and NC8 between 2021 and 2030.
The availability objective (96%) of the plant is fulfilled by the design.
The reliability of the plant is 99.16% (it corresponds to the production availability
without consideration of planned events shutdowns).
The reliability objective (98%) of the plant is fulfilled by the design.
One important element to take into consideration regarding the reliability is the number
of times when the system will reach 0% of gas production. The analysis from Petri
Nets and Monte-Carlo simulation estimation is that during 15 years, the system will

22/37 Ref : WB/WB/CB859/2613269/13/R/063/3
produce 0% of the gas production at 41 occasions. A rough estimation is that a gas
production stoppage occur around 2.7 times every year.
7.3.2 Production availability over the years

The production availability/efficiency varies over the time especially when NC8 comes
into operation (see Figure 5).
Figure 5: Production availability between 2016 and 2030
After start-up of NC8, the mean production availability decreases. This is due to NC8
WHP Utilities which insert new possible failures into the system. However, in case of
NC8 failure, gas production is still ensured by NC3 (300 MMSCFD – 50% of gas
production).
7.4. Criticality Analysis (plant availability)

7.4.1 Main units
The main causes of the unavailability can be extracted from results of the Table 7,
Major contributors (highlighted with red) are:
 NC8 Utilities that includes Power Generation and Air Instrument Unit;
 NC3 CPP Well Stream Cooling Unit;
 NC3 CPP Gas Dehydration Unit;
 NC3 CPP Utilities ;

23/37 Ref : WB/WB/CB859/2613269/13/R/063/3
7.4.2 NC8 Utilities
The Power Generation in NC8 is reliable due to the multiple power sources (Diesel
Unit / EDG / Source from NC3 CPP).
The unavailability of NC8 WHP Utilities is caused by the Air Instrument unit. As Air
compressors / Air dryers are redundant, unavailability is coming from air receivers V-
5470 and V-5500.
7.4.3 NC3 Utilities

The conclusions for the NC8 utilities can be applied for NC3 utilities. The Unavailability
is mainly due to the air receiver.
7.4.4 NC3 Full Well Stream Cooling

This unit is composed of two branches (2*50%) with two exchangers on each branch.
The reliability of this unit is 99.84% with no consideration of planned events
shutdowns.
Output Configuration Proportion of time

100% of the output 2 branches available 99.70%
50% of the output 1 branch available 0.28%
0% of the output 0 branch available 0.02%
Table 8: Proportion of time at each production case
This unit will produce 50% of the output if one exchanger in one of the two branches is
in failure and/or maintenance.
The unit will produce 0% of the output if the two branches are unavailable. However,
the main contributor to this production case is a failure of the SDV-2006.
Note: The maintenance of well stream coolers will be optimized in order to be

performed during plant shutdowns and may have a positive impact on
availability (SAIPEM).

24/37 Ref : WB/WB/CB859/2613269/13/R/063/3
7.4.5 Gas Dehydration
In the Gas dehydration unit, the main contributor the unavailability is the glycol
contactor which has a failure rate of 9.2E-05. An extract of the OREDA-02 with
reliability data of this item is reproduced below.
Figure 6: Reliability data for the contactor
7.5. Glycol system availability and reliability

7.5.1 Glycol Package Availability
The glycol availability can be represented over the years.
Figure 7: Glycol package availability

25/37 Ref : WB/WB/CB859/2613269/13/R/063/3
The mean glycol package availability is 98.22%. This figure does not take into account
the planned shutdowns and corresponds to the Glycol Package reliability objective
(see definitions in §1.2.2 and §Erreur ! Source du renvoi introuvable.).
This corresponds to 2340 hours of unavailability on 15 years whether approximately 7

days per year.
The reliability objective (96%) of the Glycol package is fulfilled by the design.
7.5.2 Criticality Analysis

The major contributors to the unavailability are:
 Column C-9500 for 40%;

 Column C-9501 for 40%;
 Exchanger E-9506 for 4%;
 Exchanger E-9506 for 4%.
In order to increase the availability for this unit, the attention should be given to the
distillation columns C-9500 / C-9501. For these columns, reliability data issued from
OREDA-02 are indicated hereafter.
Figure 8: reliability data for distillation column (OREDA-02)
For these two components, there is no critical failure mode identified for the distillation
columns. The identified failure modes in the OREDA are only degraded failure modes
which prevent the system from providing its output within specifications. Such a failure
would usually, but not necessarily, be gradual or partial, a may develop into a critical
failure.

26/37 Ref : WB/WB/CB859/2613269/13/R/063/3
The MTTR is mainly due the “structural deficiency” failure mode with 380 hours of
maintenance time.
Recommendation: One assumption of this RAM study is to take into account only
critical failure modes for the different components. As this data is not available for
distillation columns, degraded failure modes have been taken into account
(conservative approach). A sensitivity case can be created without these two columns
in order to be consistent between the failure mode taken into account for all the
components.
7.6. Chemical injection availability

7.6.1 Availability
The Chemical Injection availability can be represented over the years (see Figure 9).
The same model has been used for Corrosion Inhibitor, Scale Inhibitor and Methanol
Injection.
Figure 9: Chemical Injection Availability
The mean value for Chemical Injection Availability is 99.86%. This figure does not take
into account a planned event shutdown for preventive maintenance. With a planned
event shutdown of 1 week each year, the availability reaches 97.95%.
The availability objective of 96% for the Chemical Injection is fulfilled.
No impact on gas production has been implemented since chemical injections are
used only for start-up and/or intermittent operation.

27/37 Ref : WB/WB/CB859/2613269/13/R/063/3
7.6.2 Criticality Analysis
After planned events shutdowns, the main contributors to the unavailability are the
tanks and the valve at the injection point.
 Tank T-6810 for 39%;

 Tank T-6811 for 39%;
 Injection point for 21%.

28/37 Ref : WB/WB/CB859/2613269/13/R/063/3
8. CONCLUSION
This RAM Study of the SK316 Development RAM Project has been conducted in 4
steps.
First, a functional analysis has been conducted to identify functions and units that
should be assessed in the next phase of the study (see Step 1: Production Availability
Diagrams).
Then, a dysfunctional analysis has been conducted to identify components that may
jeopardize the gas production. This analysis is presented in Appendix (see Step 2:
Dysfunctional Analysis).
The 3rd step has consisted to identify and list assumptions for the study (see Step 3:
Selection of reliability data and assumptions).
The 4th step has allowed modeling the NC3 WHP, the NC8 WHP and the NC3 CPP to
calculate RAM indicators and to compare these indicators to RAM objectives (see
Step 4: Availability Analysis).
The results are:
Objective Objective Results Compliance?

Plant Reliability 98% 99.16% YES
Plant Availability 96% 97.27% YES
Glycol system Reliability 98% 98.22% YES
Chemical Injection Availability 96% 97.95% YES

29/37 Ref : WB/WB/CB859/2613269/13/R/063/3
Appendix
[Appendix 1] Dysfunctional Analysis

30/37 Ref : WB/WB/CB859/2613269/13/R/063/3
Units Causes Tag Effect Mitigation measure Impact on availability
Facility : NC3 WHP
W-0110 system Well Head failure W-0110 Loss of gas production Wellhead can produce 4*25% 75% of production
W-0110 system Choke Valve failure HCV-0410 Loss of gas production Wellhead can produce 4*25% 75% of production
Impossible to measure gas
W-0110 system Wet Gas flow Meter Failure A-0410 Wellhead can produce 4*25% 75% of production
production
W-0110 system Scale inhibitor injector failure SP-0401 Loss of gas production Wellhead can produce 4*25% 75% of production
W-0110 system Methanol injector failure SP-0402 Loss of gas production Wellhead can produce 4*25% 75% of production
W-0120 system See W-0110
Production Manifold SIS Spurious Trip BDV-0402 Loss of gas production Loss of only 4413kg/hr. 99% of gas production
Bridge Closure of SDV SDV-2007 Loss of gas production No mitigation possible 0% of gas production
Bridge SIS Spurious Trip BDV-2003 Loss of gas production Loss of only 8596 kg/hr. 98% of gas production
Facility : NC8 WHP (and utilities) + NC3 WHP (for NC8 pipeline)
W-0110 system See W-0110 (NC3) with HIPPS Valve
0% NC8 production, 50 %
Export Valve failure MOV-0111 Impossible to export NC8 gas No mitigation possible
Production by NC3
Export Closure of SDV SDV-0111 Impossible to export NC8 gas No mitigation possible
Production by NC3
NC3 Import Closure of SDV SDV-0401 Impossible to import NC8 gas No mitigation possible
Production by NC3
NC3 Import Control valve failure LCV-2910 Impossible to import NC8 gas No mitigation possible
Production by NC3
Impossible to fill the diesel tank
Diesel fuel system Arm loading failure - 2*50% arm loading 50% diesel make-up
(10 days of storage)
Diesel fuel system Inlet diesel filter failure S-6730 Impossible to fill the diesel tank By-pass No effect
Diesel fuel system Diesel storage failure T-6700 Impossible to fill the diesel tank 2*100% No effect

31/37 Ref : WB/WB/CB859/2613269/13/R/063/3
Diesel fuel system Diesel transfer pumps failure P-6720 Impossible to export diesel 2*100% No diesel for consumers
Diesel fuel system Outlet diesel filter S-6740 Impossible to export diesel Duplex filters No diesel for consumers
No power for consumers (air
Diesel fuel system Emergency generator failure A-7710 instrument) in case of NC3 CPP No mitigation possible Loss of NC8 production
loss of power
Instrument Air system Air compressor failure A-5410A/B Impossible to produce air 2*100% air compressors No effect (1 spare)
Instrument Air system Air receiver failure V-5500 Impossible to store air No mitigation possible Loss of NC8 production
Instrument Air system Control valve failure PCV-5552 Impossible to export utility air No mitigation possible 0% hose utility air
Impossible to export instrument
Instrument Air system Air dryer failure A-5410A/B 2*100% air dryers No effect (1 spare)
air
Instrument Air system Instrument air receiver V-5470 Impossible to store air By-pass No effect
Instrument Air system Air utility distribution Outside scope
Instrument Air system Air instrument distribution Outside scope
Chemical injection See Chemical Injection (NC3 CPP)
Facility : NC3 CPP (Process)
Wellstream Cooling Closure of SDV SDV-2006 Loss of gas production No mitigation possible 0% of gas production
Wellstream Cooling Coolers failure E-2020A/B Loss of gas production No mitigation possible 50% of gas production
Wellstream Cooling Coolers failure E-2020C/D Loss of gas production No mitigation possible 50% of gas production
See Water
Wellstream Cooling Water cooling failre Cooling
utility
Slug Receiver Receiver failure V-2000 Loss of gas production No mitigation possible 0% of gas production
Slug Receiver SIS Spurious Trip BDV-2001 Loss of gas production Loss of only 43275 kg/hr. 95% of gas production
Slug Receiver Closure of SDV SDV-2002 Loss of condensate production No mitigation possible 0% of condensation production
Slug Receiver Control valve failure LCV-2002 Loss of condensate production No mitigation possible 0% of condensation production
Slug Receiver Closure of SDV SDV-2003 Loss of gas production No mitigation possible 0% of gas production
No effect for atleast 90 minutes 0% of condensation production
3-phase separator 3 phase separator failure V-2010 Incorrect separation of fluids
and tilted separator / coalescer after 90 minutes
3-phase separator SIS Spurious Trip BDV-2002 Loss of condensate production

32/37 Ref : WB/WB/CB859/2613269/13/R/063/3
3-phase separator Closure of SDV SDV-2004 Loss of condensate production
Tilted Plate separator Separator failure V-3000 Incorrect separation of fluids
and 3P Separator after 90 minutes
Tilted Plate separator Coalescer failure V-3030 Incorrect separation of fluids
Tilted Plate separator Closure of SDV SDV-3003 Incorrect separation of fluids
Tilted Plate separator Control valve failure LCV-2006 Incorrect separation of fluids
Condensate stripping No effect for atleast 90 minutes 0% of condensation production
Control valve failure FCV-3101 Incorrect separation of fluids
column and 3P Separator after 90 minutes
Strippring Column failure C-3100 Incorrect separation of fluids
Closure of SDV SDV-3101 Incorrect separation of fluids
Control valve failure PCV-3146 Incorrect separation of fluids
Control valve failure PCV-3118 Incorrect separation of fluids
Closure of SDV SDV-3105 Incorrect separation of fluids
Spare Pump - No effect for
Condensate stripping Impossible to export 0% of condensation production
Export pumps failure P-3010A/B atleast 90 minutes and 3P
column condensate after 90 minutes
Separator
Gas dehydration Glycol contactor clogged C-2200 Impossible to dehydrate gas No mitigation possible 0% of gas production
Gas dehydration SIS Spurious Trip BDV-2201 Impossible to dehydrate gas Loss of only 27838 kg/hr. 96% of gas production
Gas dehydration Closure of SDV SDV-2204 Impossible to dehydrate gas No mitigation possible 0% of gas production
Impossible to retrieve
Gas dehydration Closure of SDV SDV-2201 - No effect
condensate
Impossible to retrieve
Gas dehydration Control valve failure LCV-2203 - No effect
condensate

33/37 Ref : WB/WB/CB859/2613269/13/R/063/3
No impact on gas production
Gas dehydration Lean glycol loss SDV-2203 Impossible to dehydrate gas No mitigation possible
(not dehydrated gas)
No impact on gas production
Gas dehydration Lean glycol control LCV-2202 Impossible to dehydrate gas By-pass
(not dehydrated gas)
Gas dehydration Glycol package failure See Glycol package utility
A-
Gas export metering Flow measurement failure Impossible to meter export gas 3*50% flow meters No effect
2600A/B/C
Gas export metering Methanol injector failure SP-2601 No impact (future) - -
Gas export metering Control valve failure PCV-2601 Loss of gas production By-pass available No effect, manual regulation
Gas export metering Closure of SDV SDV-2601 Loss of gas production No mitigation possible 0% gas production
Gas export Closure of export valve MOV-2601 Loss of gas production No mitigation possible 0% gas production
Gas export SIS Spurious Trip BDV-2903 Loss of gas production Loss of only 18886 kg/hr. 96% of gas production
Gas export Closure of SDV SDV-2901 Loss of gas production No mitigation possible 0% gas production
Facility : NC3 CPP (Utilities)
Impossible to fill V-9509 when
Glycol Regeneration Glycol make-up pumps failure P-9510A/B 2*50% glycol make-up pumps -
needed (intermittent operation)
Glycol Regeneration Glycol surge drum failure V-9509 Impossible to regenerate glycol No mitigation possible 0% lean glycol production
2*100% glycol circulation
Glycol Regeneration Lean glycol pumps P-9511A/B Impossible to use lean glycol No effect
pumps
Glycol Regeneration Lean glycol cooler failure E-9512 Impossible to cool down glycol No mitigation possible 0% lean glycol production
Glycol Regeneration Water cooling failre Glycol is not cooled which leads to loss of TEG, however, gas production continues
Glycol Regeneration Closure of SDV SDV-XXX Impossible to use lean glycol No mitigation possible 0% lean glycol production
Glycol Regeneration Fuel gas failure PCV-XXX Loss of blanketing fuel gas No mitigation possible No effect
Impossible to send excess gas
Glycol Regeneration Fuel gas failure PCV-XXX No mitigation possible No effect
to flare
Glycol Regeneration Lean glycol heat exchanger E-9506 Impossible to cool down glycol No mitigation possible 0% lean glycol production
Glycol Regeneration Lean glycol control valve FCV-XXX Loss of pumps minimum flow No mitigation possible 70% lean glycol production
Outside
Glycol Regeneration Antifoam package
scope
Glycol Regeneration Control valve failure LCV-XXX Impossible to use lean glycol By-pass available No effect

34/37 Ref : WB/WB/CB859/2613269/13/R/063/3
Glycol regeneration still column
Glycol Regeneration C-9500 Impossible to regenerate glycol No mitigation possible 0% lean glycol production
failure
Glycol Regeneration Glycol reboiler failure E-9508 Impossible to regenerate glycol No mitigation possible 0% lean glycol production
Glycol Regeneration Control valve failure TCV-XXX Impossible to regenerate glycol By-pass No effect
Glycol Regeneration Reflux condenser E-9501 Impossible to regenerate glycol No mitigation possible 0% rich glycol production
Glycol Regeneration Glycol flash drum failure V-9502 Impossible to regenerate glycol No mitigation possible 0% rich glycol production
SDV-
Glycol Regeneration Closure of SDV Impossible to regenerate glycol No mitigation possible 0% rich glycol production
XXXX
Glycol Regeneration Flash drum drain collection LCV-XXX No effect on availability production
SDV-
Glycol Regeneration Flash drum drain collection No effect on availability production
XXXX
Glycol Regeneration Rich glycol filters failure S-9503A/B Impossible to filter rich glycol 2*100% filters No effect
Glycol Regeneration Filter failure S-9504 Impossible to filter rich glycol By-pass No effect
Glycol Regeneration Filter failure S-9595 Impossible to filter rich glycol By-pass No effect
Impossible to get gas from
Fuel Gas system Closure of SDV SDV-6001 Gas from another source (10%) Fuel Gas unavailability
process
Impossible to get gas from
Fuel Gas system Closure of SDV SDV-3102 Gas from another source More gas to flare, no effect
process
Fuel Gas system Fuel gas heater failure E-6090A/B Impossible to condition fuel gas 2*100% filters Fuel Gas unavailability
PCV- Impossible to get gas from
Fuel Gas system Control valve failure 2 valves No effect
60xxA/B process
Impossible to provide FG to
Fuel Gas system Fuel gas scrubber failure V-6000 Gas from another source Fuel Gas unavailability
consumers(GTG)
No effect on availability
Fuel Gas system SIS Spurious Trip BDV-xxxx - No effect
production
Fuel Gas system Fuel gas filter failure S-6045A/B Impossible to filter fuel gas 2*100% filters No effect
Fuel Gas system Superheater failure E-6010A/B Impossible to condition fuel gas 2*100% superheaters No effect
Fuel Gas system SIS Spurious Trip BDV-xxxx - No effect
production
Impossible to provide FG to
Fuel Gas system Closure of SDV SDV-6002 No mitigation possible Fuel Gas unavailability
consumers
Impossible to provide FG to 0% Fuel Gas to utility, no loss of
Fuel Gas system Closure of SDV SDV-6007 No mitigation possible
consumers production

35/37 Ref : WB/WB/CB859/2613269/13/R/063/3
Impossible to provide FG to Bypass avilable (updated in rev
Fuel Gas system Control valve failure PCV-6002 -
consumers B)
Instrument Air system Air compressor failure A-5400A/B Impossible to produce air 2*100% air compressors No effect (1 spare)
Instrument Air system Air receiver failure V-5500 Impossible to store air By-pass No effect
Instrument Air system Control valve failure PCV-5505 Impossible to export utility air No mitigation possible 0% utility air
Impossible to export instrument
Instrument Air system Air dryer failure A-5460A/B 2*100% air dryers No effect (1 spare)
air
Instrument Air system Instrument air receiver V-5470 Impossible to store air By-pass No effect
Instrument Air system Air utility distribution Outside scope
Instrument Air system Air instrument distribution Outside scope
0% Nitrogen, no effect on
Nitrogen system Nitrogen generation failure A-5900 Impossible to export nitrogen No mitigation possible
production in early years
Impossible to store air (5
Nitrogen system Nitrogen receiver failure V-5970 By-pass No effect
minutes)
Nitrogen system Nitrogen distribution Outside scope
50% diesel make-up, no impact
Diesel fuel system Arm loading failure SP-6701 Impossible to fill the diesel tank 2*50% arm loading
on production
Diesel fuel system Inlet diesel filter failure S-6700 Impossible to fill the diesel tank By-pass No impact on gas production
Impossible to fill the diesel tank
Diesel fuel system Diesel storage failure T-6710 2*100% storage capacity No impact on gas production
(10 days of storage)
Diesel fuel system Centrifuge package failure A-6750 - No impact on gas production
production
Impossible to fill centrifuge
Diesel fuel system Closure of SDV SDV-6752 - No impact on gas production
package
Diesel fuel system Closure of SDV SDV-6753 Impossible to export diesel 2*100% storage capacity No impact on gas production
Impossible to fill centrifuge
Diesel fuel system Closure of SDV SDV-6754 - No impact on gas production
package
Diesel fuel system Closure of SDV SDV-6755 Impossible to export diesel 2*100% storage capacity No impact on gas production
Diesel fuel system Diesel transfer pumps failure P-6730A/B Impossible to export diesel 2*100% No impact on gas production
Diesel fuel system Outlet diesel filter S-6740 Impossible to export diesel 2*100% No impact on gas production
Methanol injection See Chemical Injection

36/37 Ref : WB/WB/CB859/2613269/13/R/063/3
Chemical injection Tote tank failure T-6811 Impossible to fill tank with CI - No impact on gas production
Chemical injection Tank failure T-6810 Impossible to export CI - No impact on gas production
Chemical injection Pumps failure P-6811A/B Impossible to export CI 2*100% No impact on gas production
Scale inhibitor See Chemical Injection
Power System Power Turbine Failure A-7500 Loss of gas production 3*50% turbines 100% power generation
No Fuel gas and loss of
Power System Closure of SDV SDV-6003 Redundancy with diesel 100% power generation
production
Power System Closure of SDV SDV-7501 No diesel and loss of production Redundancy with fuel gas 100% power generation

37/37 Ref : WB/WB/CB859/2613269/13/R/063/3

05GENREPX0015 Rev0

Uploaded by

05GENREPX0015 Rev0

Uploaded by

SK316 Development

Project RAM Study

Name Company Date Signature

Writer W. BOUDOUX Bureau Veritas 2013-05-23

Verifier J-R. CONSTANS Bureau Veritas 2013-05-23

Rev Date Wri. Ver. Objet

BUREAU VERITAS | Technical Center France

Tel. +33 (0)1 47 14 33 52 | Fax. +33 (0)1 47 14 33 99 | Mob. +33 (0)6 33 15 70 78

Bureau Veritas - SK316 Development Project RAM Study

1. REFERENCES AND GLOSSARY 5

Bureau Veritas - SK316 Development Project RAM Study

Bureau Veritas - SK316 Development Project RAM Study

[R02] Offshore Reliability Data Handbook 5 th Edition – Vol. 2 (OREDA,2009)

[R03] FARADIP.THREE - (Dr. David J Smith)

1.1.2 Project References

[R08] P&ID : 05-NC3-WHP-B-6003-1 Rev. B

[R10] P&ID : 05-NC3-WHP-B-6004-2 Rev. B

[R11] P&ID : 05-NC3-WHP-B-6005-1 Rev. B

[R12] P&ID : 05-NC3-CPP-B-6006-1 Rev. B

[R13] P&ID : 05-NC3-CPP-B-6007-1 Rev. B

[R16] P&ID : 05-NC3-CPP-B-6010-1 Rev. B

[R17] P&ID : 05-NC3-CPP-B-6011-1 Rev. B

[R18] P&ID : 05-NC3-CPP-B-6012-1 Rev. B

[R20] P&ID : 05-NC3-CPP-B-6017-1 Rev. B

[R21] P&ID : 05-NC3-CPP-B-6018-1 Rev. B

[R22] P&ID : 05-NC3-CPP-B-6019-1 Rev. B

[R23] P&ID : 05-NC3-CPP-B-6019-2 Rev. B

[R24] P&ID : 05-NC3-CPP-B-6020-1 Rev. B

[R25] P&ID : 05-NC3-CPP-B-6021-1 Rev. B

Bureau Veritas - SK316 Development Project RAM Study

[R27] P&ID : 05-NC3-CPP-B-6023-1 Rev. B

[R29] P&ID : 05-NC3-CPP-B-6025-1 Rev. B

[R30] P&ID : 05-NC3-CPP-B-6025-2 Rev. B

[R31] P&ID : 05-NC3-CPP-B-6026-1 Rev. B

[R32] P&ID : 05-NC3-CPP-B-6027-1 Rev. B

[R33] P&ID : 05-NC3-CPP-B-6028-1 Rev. B

[R34] P&ID : 05-NC3-CPP-B-6029-1 Rev. B

[R35] P&ID : 05-NC3-CPP-B-6030-1 Rev. B

[R36] P&ID : 05-NC3-CPP-B-6031-1 Rev. B

[R37] P&ID : 05-NC3-CPP-B-6032-1 Rev. B

[R39] P&ID : 05-NC3-CPP-B-6034-1 Rev. B

[R40] P&ID : 05-NC3-CPP-B-6035-1 Rev. B

[R41] P&ID : 05-NC3-CPP-B-6036-1 Rev. B

[R42] P&ID : 05-NC3-CPP-B-6036-2 Rev. B

[R44] P&ID : 05-NC3-CPP-B-6038-1 Rev. B

[R48] P&ID : 05-NC8-WHP-B-6063-1 Rev. B

[R50] P&ID : 05-NC8-WHP-B-6065-1 Rev. B

[R52] P&ID : 05-NC8-WHP-B-6067-1 Rev. B

[R53] P&ID : 05-NC8-WHP-B-6068-1 Rev. B

[R55] P&ID : 05-NC8-WHP-B-6070-1 Rev. B

[R56] P&ID : 05-NC8-WHP-B-6072-1 Rev. B

[R57] P&ID : 05-NC8-WHP-B-6076-1 Rev. B

Bureau Veritas - SK316 Development Project RAM Study

[R59] P&ID : 05-NC8-WHP-B-6078-1 Rev. B

 Repair Rate (=mu)

This corresponds to the normative definition of the availability with

Bureau Veritas - SK316 Development Project RAM Study

This corresponds to the normative definition of the availability without

Bureau Veritas - SK316 Development Project RAM Study

2.2. Mission perimeter

Two configurations will be taken into account:

Bureau Veritas - SK316 Development Project RAM Study

Bureau Veritas - SK316 Development Project RAM Study

Figure 1: Presentation of the methodology

The following paragraphs describes the several RAM methodology steps

Bureau Veritas - SK316 Development Project RAM Study

Production Availability Diagrams (PAD) determines the boundaries of the system

4.2. Method and tools

4.3. Results of the analysis

Figure 2: Legend for functional analysis

Bureau Veritas - SK316 Development Project RAM Study

NC3 Wells Production Manifold Open Drain Vent

Input 4*25% 100% - -

Diesel Fuel Chemical Injections

Figure 3: NC3 and NC8 functional analysis

Bureau Veritas - SK316 Development Project RAM Study

2100% / 250% 2100% 2100% - 1100% 350% - 1%100% -