Tenio-obsequio vs CA

Facts:

Respondent Eufronio Alimpoos mortgaged subject land to Eduardo Deguro, and to

guaranty the loan they delivered the original certificate of title to the latter.

Eduardo Deguro and his wife, without the knowledge and consent of herein private
respondents, prepared a document of sale and through misrepresentation and
other manipulations made it appear that private respondents sold the land to them,
and the deed of sale was annotated at the back of the certificate of title.
Subsequently, a new TCT was issued in favor of Eduardo.

Upon the death of Eduardo Deguro, his heirs sold the subject land to Consorcia
Tenio-Obsequio. Consorcia alleged to have purchased the land in good faith and
without knowledge of any flaw or defect.

Private respondents filed a complaint in the court a quo for recovery of possession
and ownership. The lower court ruled in favor of petitioner but was reversed by
the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:Whether or not Consorcia Tenio-Obsequio is the rightful owner of the land

in dispute.

Ruling:

The main purpose of the Torrens system is to avoid possible conflicts of title to
real estate and to facilitate transactions relative thereto by giving the public the
right to rely upon the face of a Torrens certificate of title and to dispense with
the need of inquiring further, except when the party concerned has actual
knowledge of facts and circumstances that should impel a reasonably cautious man
to make such further inquiry. Where innocent third persons, relying on the
correctness of the certificate of title thus issued, acquire, rights over the
property, the court cannot disregard such rights and order the total cancellation
of the certificate. The effect of such an outright cancellation would be to impair
public confidence in the certificate of title, for everyone dealing with property
registered under the Torrens system would have to inquire in every instance as to
whether the title has been regularly or irregularly issued by the court. Every
person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the
certificate of title issued therefor and the law will in no way oblige him to go
beyond the certificate to determine the condition of property.

The Torrens system was adopted in this country because it was believed to be the
most effective measure to guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect
their indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established and recognized. If
a person purchases a piece of land on the assurance that the seller's title thereto
is valid, he should not run the risk of being told later that his acquisition was
ineffectual after all. This would not only be unfair to him. What is worse is that if
this were permitted, public confidence in the system would be eroded and land
transactions would have to be attended by complicated and not necessarily
conclusive investigations and proof of ownership. The further consequence
would be that land conflicts could be even more numerous and complex than they
are now and possibly also more abrasive, if not even violent. The Government,
recognizing the worthy purposes of the Torrens system, should be the first to
accept the validity of titles issued thereunder once the conditions laid down by the
law are satisfied.

Wherefore, the Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the Court of Appeals and
reinstated the decision of the court a quo.
Legarda v saleeby

FACTS: The plaintiffs and the defendant occupy, as owners, adjoining lots in the
district of Ermita in the city of Manila. There exists and has existed a number of
years a stone wall between the said lots. Said wall is located on the lot of the
plaintiffs. The plaintiffs, March 2, 1906, presented a petition in the Court of Land
Registration for the registration of their lot, which decreed that the title of the
plaintiffs should be registered and issued to them the original certificate provided
for under the Torrens system. Said registration and certificate included the wall.

Later the predecessor of the defendant presented a petition in the Court of Land
Registration for the registration of the lot now occupied by him. On March 25,
1912, the court decreed the registration of said title and issued the original
certificate provided for under the Torrens system. The description of the lot
given in the petition of the defendant also included said wall.

On December 13, 1912 the plaintiffs discovered that the wall which had been
included in the certificate granted to them had also been included in the
certificate granted to the defendant .They immediately presented a petition in the
Court of Land Registration for an adjustment and correction of the error
committed by including said wall in the registered title of each of said parties.

The lower court however, without notice to the defendant, denied said petition
upon the theory that, during the pendency of the petition for the registration of
the defendant’s land, they failed to make any objection to the registration of said
lot, including the wall, in the name of the defendant.

ISSUE: Who is the owner of the wall and the land occupied by it?

HELD: The decision of the lower court is based upon the theory that the action for
the registration of the lot of the defendant was a judicial proceeding and that the
judgment or decree was binding upon all parties who did not appear and oppose it

Granting that theory to be correct one , then the same theory should be applied to
the defendant himself. Applying that theory to him, he had already lost whatever
right he had therein, by permitting the plaintiffs to have the same registered in
their name, more than six years before. Having thus lost hid right, may he be
permitted to regain it by simply including it in a petition for registration?
For the difficulty involved in the present case the Act (No. 496) provides for the
registration of titles under the Torrens system affords us no remedy. There is no
provision in said Act giving the parties relief under conditions like the present.
There is nothing in the Act which indicates who should be the owner of land which
has been registered in the name of two different persons.

We have decided, in case of double registration under the Land Registration Act
, that the owner of the earliest certificate is the owner of the land. May
this rule be applied to successive vendees of the owners of such certificates?
Suppose that one or the other of the parties, before the error is discovered,
transfers his original certificate to an “innocent purchaser.” The general rule is
that the vendee of land has no greater right, title, or interest than his vendor;
that he acquires the right which his vendor had, only. Under that rule the vendee
of the earlier certificate would be the owner as against the vendee of the owner
of the later certificate.

It would be seen to a just and equitable rule, when two persons have acquired equal
rights in the same thing, to hold that the one who acquired it first and who has
complied with all the requirements of the law should be protected.

In view of our conclusions, above stated, the judgment of the lower court should
be and is hereby revoked. The record is hereby returned to the court now having
and exercising the jurisdiction heretofore exercised by the land court, with
direction to make such orders and decrees in the premises as may correct the
error heretofore made in including the land in the second original certificate
issued in favor of the predecessor of the appellee, as well as in all other duplicate
certificates issued.
Republic v umali

Facts:

1) Land in question originally purchased on installment from the government by

Florentina Bobadilla, who transferred her right thereto in favor of Martina
Cenizal, et al. Tomasa and Julio assigned their shares to Martina, Maria and
Gregorio, who, in 1971, signed a joint affidavit that they were entitled to the
issuance of a certificate of title over the said land, and that they had already paid
in full.

2) Sec. of Agriculture and Natural Resources executed a deed, and thereafter

a TCT. Several transfers thereafter followed.

3) Republic filed a complaint for reversion on the ground that the original sale
of the land was tainted with fraud based on forgery, and therefore, void ab initio;
claimed that Gregorio died in 1943, Maria in 1959, and could not have signed the
joint affidavit.

4) Respondent claimed that they all acquired the property in good faith and for
value, invoked estoppel, laches, prescription and res judicata, others invoked no
cause of action as no rights were violated, government not a real party-in-interest
because the land is already covered by Torrens system.

Issue:

May deception/fraud in the registration of title make the sale null and void, so as
to make all titles derived therefrom ineffectual ab initio?

Ruling:
No. The status of the defendants as innocent transferees for value was never
questioned, and such accorded them the protection of the Torrens system, thus
rendering the titles obtained indefeasible and conclusive.

In the present case, the private respondents acquired the land not by direct grant
but in fact after several transfers following the original sales thereof. They are
presumed to be innocent transferees for value.

The land now being registered under the Torrens system, the government has no
more control or jurisdiction over it; it is no longer part of the public domain.

The present possessors and owners are innocent transferees for value. They all
believed that the certificate of title that fell into their hands are free from all
encumbrances, except as those indicated on the face of the certificate, and that
the certificate is clean and not tainted with fraud. For that, they are entitled to
the protection of Sec 39 of the Land Registration Act, which affords a title holder
the stoppage of any question of the legality of their title over their land. The acts
of their predecessors, even if proven as fraudulent, did not affect their own titles
because they are presumed transferees in good faith and for value of the subject
property

NB:

A holder in bad faith is not entitled to the protection of the law.

If the patent and the OCT were procured by means of fraud, the land would not
revert back to the State precisely because it has become a private land. The
original transfer was not null and void ab initio but was only voidable. The land
remained private as long as the title thereto had not been voided. In such case, the
nullity arises, not from fraud or deceit, but from the fact that the land is not
under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands (now Land Management Bureau).
Sec. 39, Land Registration Act:

Every person receiving a certificate of title in pursuance of a decree of

registration, and every subsequent purchaser of registered land who takes/taking
a certificate of title for value in good faith shall hold the same free of all
encumbrance except those noted on said certificate.

Sec. 44, P.D. 1529 – Property Registration Decree:

Every registered owner receiving a certificate of title in pursuance of a decree of

registration, and every subsequent purchaser of registered land taking a
certificate of title for value and in good faith, shall hold the same free from all
encumbrances except those noted on said certificate and any of following
encumbrances which may be subsisting, and enumerated in law.
Traders royal bank v c.a

Facts:

A parcel of land owned by the spouses Capay was mortgage to and subsequently
extrajudicially foreclosed by Traders Royal Bank (TRB). To prevent property sale
in public auction, the Capays filed a petition for preliminary injunction alleging the
mortgage was void because they did not receive the proceeds of the loan. A notice
of lis pendens (suit pending) was filed before the Register of Deeds with the
notice recorded in the Day Book. Meanwhile, a foreclosure sale proceeded with the
TRB as the sole and winning bidder. The Capays title was cancelled and a new one
was entered in TRB’s name without the notice of lis pendens carried over the title.
The Capays filed recovery of the property and damages. Court rendered a decision
declaring the mortgage was void for want of consideration and thus cancelled TRB’s
title and issued a new cert. of title for the Capays.

Pending its appeal before the court, TRB sold the land to Santiago who
subsequently subdivided and sold to buyers who were issued title to the land. Court
ruled that the subsequent buyers cannot be considered purchasers for value and in
good faith since they purchase the land after it became a subject in a pending suit
before the court. Although the lis pendens notice was not carried over the titles,
its recording in the Day Book constitutes registering of the land and notice to all
persons with adverse claim over the property. TRB was held to be in bad faith upon
selling the property while knowing it is pending for litigation. The Capays were
issued the cert. of title of the land in dispute while TRB is to pay damages to
Capays.

Issue:

Who has the better right over the land in dispute?

Whether or not TRB is liable for damages

Ruling:
The court ruled that a Torrens title is presumed to be valid which purpose is to
avoid conflicts of title to real properties. When the subsequent buyers bought the
property there was no lis pendens annotated on the title. Every person dealing with
a registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the title and is not obliged
to interpret what is beyond the face of the registered title. Hence the court ruled
that the subsequent buyers obtained the property from a clean title in good faith
and for value. On one hand, the Capays are guilty of latches. After they filed the
notice for lis pendens, the same was not annotated in the TRB title. They did not
take any action for 15 years to find out the status of the title upon knowing the
foreclosure of the property. In consideration to the declaration of the mortgage
as null and void for want of consideration, the foreclosure proceeding has no legal
effect. However, in as much as the Capays remain to be the real owner of the
property it has already been passed to purchasers in good faith and for value.
Therefore, the property cannot be taken away to their prejudice. Thus, TRB is
duty bound to pay the Capays the fair market value of the property at the time
they sold it to Santiago.

Casimiro devt. Corp. V mateo

FACTS:

The subject of this case is a registered parcel of land located in BarrioPulang Lupa,
Las Piñas City, that was originally owned by Isaias Lara, the respondent’s maternal
grandfather. Upon the death of Isaias Lara in 1930, the property passed on to his
children. In 1962, the co-heirs effected the transfer of the full and exclusive
ownership to Felicidad Lara-Mateo, one of the children of Isaias, under an
agreement denominated as Pagaayos Na Gawa Sa Labas Ng Hukuman. Felicidad had
five children, namely: Laura, respondent Renato, Cesar, Candido, Jr. and Leonardo.
With the agreement of the entire Lara-Mateo family, a deed of sale covering the
property was executed in favor of Laura, who, in 1967, applied for land
registration. After the application was granted, Original Certificate of Title (OCT)
No. 6386 was issued in Laura’s sole name.

In due course, the property now covered by OCT No. 6386 was used as collateral
to secure a succession of loans. The first loan was obtained from Bacoor Rural Bank
(Bacoor Bank) which was repaid by Laura. Laura later executed a deed of sale in
favor of Pe, leading to the issuance of a new title in the name of Pe, who in turn
constituted a mortgage on the property in favor of China Banking Corporation
(China Bank) as security for a loan. In the end, China Bank foreclosed the
mortgage, and consolidated its ownership of the property in 1985 after Pe failed to
redeem. Thus, TCT No. (99527) T-11749-Awas issued in the name of China Bank.
On March 4, 1993, CDC and China Bank executed a deed of absolute sale over the
property. Resultantly, on March29, 1993, CDC was issued TCT No. T-34640 in its
own name. On June 6,1991, CDC brought an action for unlawful detainer in the
MeTC in Las Piñas City against the respondent’s siblings, namely: Cesar, Candido,
Jr., and Leonardo, and the other occupants of the property. Therein, the
defendants maintained that the MeTC did not have jurisdiction over the action
because the land was classified as agricultural; that the jurisdiction belonged to
the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB). MeTC ruled in
favour of CDC. The RTC resolved against CDC, and held that the MeTC had acted
without jurisdiction because the land, being a fishpond, was agricultural; hence, the
dispute was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the DARAB. On appeal, CA found in
favour of CDC, declaring that the MeTC had jurisdiction. This decision became
final. Nonetheless, on June 29, 1994, the respondent brought an action for quieting
of title, reconveyance of four-fifths of the land, and damages against CDC and
Laura in the RTC in Las Piñas City. On May 9, 2001, the RTC held in favor of CDC.
CA affirmed. The CA ruled that the decree of registration over the property is
incontrovertible and no longer open to review or attack after the lapse of one (1)
year from entry of such decree of registration in favor of Laura.

ISSUE:

W/N Laura’s title over the disputed property is indefeasible since she

has validly registered the property under her name as evidenced by a Torrens title

HELD:
Yes, Laura’s title is indefeasible and hence, the transfer of title in the name of
Casimiro Development Corporation is valid and subsisting. The land in question has
been covered by a Torrens certificate of title (OCT No. 6386 in the name of
Laura, and its derivative certificates) before CDC became the registered owner by
purchase from China Bank. In all that time, neither the respondent nor his siblings
opposed the transactions causing the various transfers. In fact, the respondent
admitted in his complaint that the registration of the land in the name of Laura
alone had been with the knowledge and upon the agreement of the entire Lara-
Mateo family.

It is unthinkable, therefore, that the respondent, fully aware of the exclusive

registration in her sister Laura’s name, allowed more than 20 years to pass before
asserting his claim of ownership for the first time through this case in mid-1994.
Making it worse for him is that he did so only after CDC had commenced the
ejectment case against his own siblings.

There is no doubt that the land in question, although once a part of the public
domain, has already been placed under the Torrens system of land registration

. The Government is required under the Torrens system of registration to issue an

official certificate of title to attest to the fact that the person named in the
certificate is the owner of the property therein described, subject to such liens
and encumbrances as thereon noted or what the law warrants or reserves .

The Torrens system gives the registered owner

andami wow

Reynes v Barrera
Summary: The applicants for judicial title was challenged by the government for
failing to comply with the length of ownership required by law of two parcels of
land just recently classified as alienable and disposable.

Rule of Law: A land registration case is a proceeding in rem, and jurisdiction in rem
cannot be acquired unless there be constructive seizure of the land through
publication and service of notice.

Facts: The Herbieto (D) brothers, Jeremias and David, filed with the MTC a single
application for registration of two parcels of land located in Consolacion, Cebu.
They claimed to be owners having purchased the lots from their parents.

The government (P) opposed the registration arguing that: (1) the Herbieto’s (D)
failed to comply with the period of adverse possession required by law; (2) their
(D) evidence were insufficient to prove ownership; and (3) the Subject Lots were
part of the public domain belonging to the Republic and were not subject to private
appropriation.

The MTC set the initial hearing on September 3, 1999. All owners of the land
adjoining the Subject Lots were sent copies of the Notice of Initial Hearing. A
copy of the Notice was also posted on July 27, 1999 in a conspicuous place on the
Subject Lots, as well as on the bulletin board of the municipal building of
Consolacion, Cebu. Finally, the Notice was also published in the Official Gazette on
August 2, 1999 and The Freeman Banat News on December 19, 1999.

Issues: Did the MTC acquire jurisdiction over the case?

Ruling: No. The late publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing in the newspaper
of general circulation is tantamount to no publication at all, having the same
ultimate result. Owing to such defect in the publication of the Notice, the MTC
failed to constructively seize the Subject Lots and to acquire jurisdiction over
respondents' application for registration thereof. Therefore, the MTC Judgment
ordering the registration and confirmation of the title of respondents Jeremias
and David (D) as well as the MTC Order declaring its Judgment of final and
executory, and directing the LRA Administrator to issue a decree of registration
for the Subject Lots, are both null and void for having been issued by the MTC
without jurisdiction.

Grey alba v dela cruz

FACTS: The petitioners herein are the he only heirs of Doña Segunda Alba
Clemente and Honorato Grey. The four petitioners, as co-owners, on Dec. 18, 1906
sought to have registered a parcel of agricultural land in Bulacan. The petition was
accompanied by a plan and technical description of the said lot. After hearing the
court, on Feb. 12, 1908, entered a decree directing that described in the petition
be registered in the names of the 4 petitioners.

On Jun, 1908, Anacleto Ratilla de la Cruz filed a motion in the Court of Land
Registration (CLR) asking for a revision of the case, including the decision, upon the
ground that he is the absolute owner of the 2 parcels of land described in said
motion and which he alleges to be included in the lands decreed to the petitioners.
He alleges that the decree of Feb. 12, 1908 was obtained maliciously and
fraudulently by the petitioners, thereby depriving him of said lands. For him, The
petitioners deliberately omitted to include in their registration his name as one of
the occupants of the land so as to be given notice of registration. He further
alleged having inherited the 2 lots from his father, Baldomero R. de la Cruz, who
had a state grant for the same (was duly inscribed in the old register of property
in Bulacan on April 6, 1895.)

He therefore asked a revision of the case, and that the said decree be modified so
as to exclude the two parcels of land described in said motion. The Land Court upon
this motion reopened the case, and after hearing the additional evidence presented
by both parties, rendered, on the Nov. 23, 1908, its decision modifying the former
decree by excluding from the same the two parcels of land claimed by Anacleto
Ratilla de la Cruz.

From this decision and judgment the petitioners appealed.

The court below held that the failure on the part of the petitioners to include the
name of the appellee in their petition, as an occupant of these two parcels of land,
was a violation of section 21 of Act No. 496, and that this constituted fraud within
the meaning of section 38 of said Land Registration Act. The trial court further
held that the grant from the estate should prevail over the public document of
purchase of 1864.

ISSUE:

1. Did the court below commit an error in reopening this case in June, 1908, after
its decree had been entered in February of the same year?

2. Whether or not, the petitioners did obtain the decree of Feb 12, 1908, by
means of fraud.

HELD: The judgment appealed from should be, and the same is hereby reversed
and judgment entered in favor of the petitioners in conformity with the decree of
the lower court of February 12, 1908.

1. The said decree of February 12, 1908, should not have been opened on
account of the absence, infancy, or other disability of any person affected
thereby, and could have been opened only on the ground that the said decree had
been obtained by fraud.

2. The application for the registration is to be in writing, signed and sworn to

by the applicant, or by some person duly authorized in his behalf. It is to contain,
among other things, the names and addresses of all occupants of land and of all
adjoining owners, if known.

The subject land was first rented to Baldomero de la Cruz by petitioners’ uncle
Jose Grey and this contract was duly executed in writing. (While the appellee
admits that his father and brother entered into these rental contracts and did, in
fact, cultivate the petitioners’ land, nevertheless he insists that the two small
parcels in question were not included in these contracts)

The subsequent State grant was obtained by Baldomero after the death of the
petitioners’ parents and while he petitioners were minors. So it is clear that the
petitioners honestly believed that the appellee was occupying the said parcels as
their lessee at the time they presented their application for registration. They did
not act in bad faith, nor with any fraudulent intent, when they omitted to include in
their application the name of the appellee as one of the occupants of the land.
They believed that it was not necessary nor required that they include in their
application the names of their tenants.

Indeed, the Land Registration Act requires that all occupants be named in the
petition and given notice by registered mail. However, this did not do the appellee
any good, as he was not notified; but he was made a party defendant, as we have
said, by means of the publication “to all whom it may concern.” Every decree of
registration shall bind the land and quiet title thereto, subject only to the [given]
exceptions. It shall be conclusive upon and against all persons, including the Insular
Government, and all the branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the
application, notice, or citation, or included in the general description “to all whom it
may concern.”

As to whether or not the appellee can succesfully maintain an action under the pro

NOTES:

The main principle of registration is to make registered titles indefeasible.

The element of intention to deprive another of just rights constitutes the

essential characteristics of actual – as distinguished from legal-fraud

Looked at either from the point of view of history or of the necessary

requirements of justice, a proceeding in rem dealing with a tangible res may be
instituted and carried to judgment without personal service upon claimants within
the State or notice by name to those outside of it, and not encounter any provision
of either constitution. Jurisdiction is secured by the power of the court over the
res. As we have said, such a proceeding would be impossible, were this not so, for it
hardly would do to make a distinction between the constitutional rights of
claimants who were known and those who were not known to the plaintiff, when the
proceeding is to bar all. (Tyler vs. Judges, supra.)

Action in rem vs. action in personam:

If the technical object of the suit is to establish a claim against some particular
person, with a judgment which generally, in theory at least, binds his body, or to
bar some individual claim or objection, so that only certain persons are entitled to
be heard in defense, the action is in personam, although it may concern the right to
or possession of a tangible thing. If, on the other hand, the object is to bar
indifferently all who might be minded to make an objection of any sort against the
right sought to be established, and if anyone in the world has a right to be heard
on the strength of alleging facts which, if true, show an inconsistent interest, the
proceeding is in rem. (Tyler vs. Judges, supra.)

5. Proof of constructive fraud is not sufficient to authorize the Court of Land

Registration to reopen a case and modify its decree. Specific, intentional acts to
deceive and deprive anther of his right, or in some manner injure him, must be
alleged and proved; that is, there must be actual or positive fraud as distinguished
from constructive fraud

6. Advantages of the Torrens System:

1. It has substituted security for insecurity. Law library

2. It has reduced the costs of conveyances from pounds to shillings, and the
time occupied from months to days. Law library

3. It has exchanged brevity and clearness for obscurity and verbiage. Law
library
4. It has so simplified ordinary dealings that he who has mastered the “three
R’s” can transact his own conveyancing. Law library

5. It affords protection against fraud.

6. It has restored to their just value many estates held under good holding
titles, but depreciated in consequence of some blur or technical defect, and has
barred the reoccurrence of any similar faults. (Sheldon on Land Registration, pp.
75, 76.)
Laburada v LRA

FACTS:

Sps. Laburada applied for the registration of Lot 3-A which was approved by the
trial court. Upon motion of petitioners, the trial court issued an order requiring
the LRA to issue the corresponding decree of registration. However, the LRA
refused. Hence, petitioners filed an action for mandamus. The LRA revealed that
based on records, Lot 3-A which sought to be registered by Sps. Laburada is part
of Lot No. 3, over which TCT No. 6595has already been issued. Upon the other
hand, Lot 3-B of said Lot 3 is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 29337
issued in the name of Pura Escurdia Vda. De Buenaflor, which was issued as a
transfer from TCT No. 6595. The LRA contended that to issue the corresponding
decree of registration sought by the petitioners, it would result in the duplication
of titles over the same parcel of land, and thus contravene the policy and purpose
of the Torrens registration system, and destroy the integrity of the same.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the LRA may be compelled by mandamus to issue adecree of

registration if it has evidence that the subject land may already be included in an
existing Torrens certificate of title?

HELD:

NO. It is settled that a land registration court has no jurisdiction to order the
registration of land already decreed in the name of another in an earlier land
registration case. A second decree for the same land would be null and void, since
the principle behind original registration is to register a parcel of land only once.
Thus, if it is proven that the land which petitioners are seeking to register has
already been registered in 1904and 1905, the issuance of a decree of registration
to petitioners will run counter to said principle. The issuance of a decree of
registration is part of the judicial function of courts and is not a mere ministerial
act which may be compelled through mandamus. It is not legally proper to require
the LRA to issue a decree of registration. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby
DISMISSED but the case is REMANDED to the court of origin in Pasig City. The
LRA, on the other hand, is ORDERED to submit to the court a quo a report
determining with finality whether Lot 3-A is included in the property described in
TCT No.6595, within sixty (60) days from notice. After receipt of such report, the
land registration court, in turn, is ordered to ACT, with deliberate and judicious
speed, to settle the issue of whether the LRA may issue thedecree of registration,
according to the facts and the law as herein discussed.
Heirs of lopez v De castro

Facts:

1) Application for registration of the same parcel of land filed 12 years apart
in different branches of the CFI; a certificate was issued in one case while the
other was still pending.

2) In 1956, Predo Lopez, et al. filed an application for registration of a parcel

of land in Tagaytay City, to which the Municipality of Silang, Cavite opposed; a
portion of the land being leased by the municipality to private persons had been its
patrimonial property since 1930.

3) Applicant claimed that part of the land was their inheritance, but was
excluded in the application for registration since it is located in Laguna; same with
the part of the land in Tagaytay which was excluded from the proceedings in the
CFI of Laguna.

4) Lower court denied the motion to dismiss since the oppositor municipality
had no personality to intervene.

5) Meanwhile, the Land Registration Commission discovered that part of the

land had been decreed in favor of private respondent Honesto de Castro, the land
being initially owned by one Hermogenes Orte who sold the land to the father of
de Castro in 1932. However the deed of sale was destroyed during the Japanese
occupation.

6) 7 years later Heirs of Pedro Lopez filed a complaint for execution of

judgment and cancellation of land titles of the defendants, claiming that they had
been unduly deprived ownership and possession of the land due to wrongful
registration by means of fraud and misrepresentation.

Issue:

Were the heirs of Pedro Lopez deprived of their ownership and possession of the
contested land?

Ruling:
No. The petitioners failed to exercise the due diligence required of them as
applicants for land registration. In the same way that publication of their
application for registration was supposed to have rendered private respondents on
constructive notice of such application, the publication of notice in the land
registration proceedings initiated by private respondents had the same effect of
notice upon petitioners. Petitioners were thus presumed to have been notified of
the land registration proceedings filed by private respondents, thereby providing
them with the opportunity to file an opposition thereto.

Petitioners neglected for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do

that which, by exercising due diligence, they could or should have done earlier.
They neglected or omitted to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting
the presumption that they either had abandoned or declined to assert it. In short,
they were guilty of laches.

NB:

A proceeding in rem, such as land registration proceedings, requires constructive

seizure of the land as against all persons, including the state, who have rights to or
interests in the property.

Constructive seizure of the land for registration is effected through publication of

the application for registration and service of notice to affected parties.

In land registration proceeding, all interested parties are obliged to take care of
their interests and to zealously pursue their objective of registration on account
of the rule that whoever first acquires title to a piece of land shall prevail. The
rule refers to the date of the certificate of title and not to the date of filing of
the application for registration of title.

The doctrine of stale demands or laches is based on grounds of policy which

requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and is
principally a question of the inequality or unfairness of permitting a right or claim
to be enforced or asserted.

An applicant for registration has but a one-year period from the issuance of the
decree of registration in favor of another applicant, within which to question the
validity of the certificate of title issued pursuant to such decree. Once the one-
year period has elapsed, the title to the land becomes indefeasible.

This does not mean however that the aggrieved party is without a remedy at law.
If the property has not yet passed to an innocent purchaser for value, an action
for reconveyance is still available. The decree becomes incontrovertible and can no
longer be reviewed after one (1) year from the date of the decree so that the only
remedy of the landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously
registered in another’s name is to bring an ordinary action in court for
reconveyance, which is an action in personam and is always available as long as the
property has not passed to an innocent third party for value. If the property has
passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value, the remedy is an action
for damages.

Venue and jurisdiction are entirely distinct matters. Jurisdiction may not be
conferred by consent or waiver upon a court which otherwise would have no
jurisdiction over the subject-matter of an action; but the venue of an action as
fixed by statute may be changed by the consent of the parties…

Venue is procedural, not jurisdictional, and hence m

Republic v herbieto

Summary: The applicants for judicial title was challenged by the government for
failing to comply with the length of ownership required by law of two parcels of
land just recently classified as alienable and disposable.
Rule of Law: A land registration case is a proceeding in rem, and jurisdiction in rem
cannot be acquired unless there be constructive seizure of the land through
publication and service of notice.

Facts: The Herbieto (D) brothers, Jeremias and David, filed with the MTC a single
application for registration of two parcels of land located in Consolacion, Cebu.
They claimed to be owners having purchased the lots from their parents.

The government (P) opposed the registration arguing that: (1) the Herbieto’s (D)
failed to comply with the period of adverse possession required by law; (2) their
(D) evidence were insufficient to prove ownership; and (3) the Subject Lots were
part of the public domain belonging to the Republic and were not subject to private
appropriation.

The MTC set the initial hearing on September 3, 1999. All owners of the land
adjoining the Subject Lots were sent copies of the Notice of Initial Hearing. A
copy of the Notice was also posted on July 27, 1999 in a conspicuous place on the
Subject Lots, as well as on the bulletin board of the municipal building of
Consolacion, Cebu. Finally, the Notice was also published in the Official Gazette on
August 2, 1999 and The Freeman Banat News on December 19, 1999.

Issues: Did the MTC acquire jurisdiction over the case?

Ruling: No. A land registration case is a proceeding in rem, and jurisdiction in rem
cannot be acquired unless there be constructive seizure of the land through
publication and service of notice.

In the instant Petition, the initial hearing was set by the MTC, and was in fact
held, on 03 September 1999 at 8:30 a.m. While the Notice thereof was printed in
the issue of the Official Gazette, dated 02 August 1999, and officially released on
10 August 1999, it was published in The Freeman Banat News, a daily newspaper
printed in Cebu City and circulated in the province and cities of Cebu and in the
rest of Visayas and Mindanao, only on 19 December 1999, more than three months
after the initial hearing.

Indubitably, such publication of the Notice, way after the date of the initial
hearing, would already be worthless and ineffective.

The late publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing in the newspaper of general
circulation is tantamount to no publication at all, having the same ultimate result.
Owing to such defect in the publication of the Notice, the MTC failed to
constructively seize the Subject Lots and to acquire jurisdiction over respondents’
application for registration thereof. Therefore, the MTC Judgment ordering the
registration and confirmation of the title of respondents Jeremias and David (D)
as well as the MTC Order declaring its Judgment of final and executory, and
directing the LRA Administrator to issue a decree of registration for the Subject
Lots, are both null and void for having been issued by the MTC without jurisdiction.
Secretary of DENR vs Yap

Natural Resources and Environmental Laws: Regalian Doctrine

GR No. 167707; Oct 8, 2008

Facts:

There are two consolidated petitions. The first is G.R. No. 167707, a petition for
review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the
Regional Trial Court in Kalibo, Aklan, which granted the petition for declaratory
relief filed by respondents Mayor Jose Yap, et al. and ordered the survey of
Boracay for titling purposes. The second is G.R. No. 173775, a petition for
prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No. 1064 issued by
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo classifying Boracay into reserved forest and
agricultural land.

Then President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1801 and approval of
Circular No. 3-82 by the Philippine Tourism authority declaring Boracay Island,
among others, as tourist zone and marine reserve.

Respondents-claimants Mayor Jose S. Yap, Jr., et al. filed a petition for

declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan claiming that such circular and
proclamation precluded them from filing an application for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes.

The RTC rendered a decision in favor of the respondents. The court upheld the
right of the respondents to have their occupied lands titled in their name. It ruled
that neither Proclamation No. 1801 nor PTA Circular No. 3-82 mentioned that lands
in Boracay were inalienable or could not be the subject of disposition.The Circular
itself recognized private ownership of lands.The trial court cited Sections 87 and
53 of the Public Land Act as basis for acknowledging private ownership of lands in
Boracay and that only those forested areas in public lands were declared as part of
the forest reserve.
Upon appeal by the Office of the Solicitor General, the Court of Appeals held that
respondents-claimants could not be prejudiced by a declaration that the lands they
occupied since time immemorial were part of a forest reserve.

On May 22, 2006, during the pendency of G.R. No. 167707, President Arroyo issued
Proclamation 1064 classifying Boracay Island into 400 hectares of reserved forest
land (protection purposes) and 628.96 hectares of agricultural land (alienable and
disposable).

Petitioners-claimants in G.R. No. 173775 contended that there is no need for a

proclamation reclassifying Boracay into agricultural land. Being classified as neither
mineral nor timber land, the island is deemed agricultural pursuant to the Philippine
Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926, known as the first Public Land Act. Thus, their
possession in the concept of owner for the required period entitled them to
judicial confirmation of imperfect title.

The OSG argued that petitioners-claimants do not have a vested right over their
occupied portions in the island. Boracay is an unclassified public forest land
pursuant to Section 3(a) of PD No. 705. Being public forest, the claimed portions
of the island are inalienable and cannot be the subject of judicial confirmation of
imperfect title. It is only the executive department, not the courts, which has
authority to reclassify lands of the public domain into alienable and disposable
lands. There is a need for a positive government act in order to release the lots for
disposition.

FACTS:

This petition is for a review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals
(CA) affirming that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Kalibo Aklan, which
granted the petition for declaratory relief filed by respondents-claimants Mayor
Jose Yap et al, and ordered the survey of Boracay for titling purposes.

On Nov. 10, 1978, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1801 declaring Boracay
Island as a tourist zone and marine reserve. Claiming that Proc. No. 1801 precluded
them from filing an application for a judicial confirmation of imperfect title or
survey of land for titling purposes, respondents-claimants filed a petition for
declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan.

The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) opposed the
petition countering that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the public
domain. It formed part of the mass of lands classified as “public forest,” which was
not available for disposition pursuant to section 3(a) of PD No. 705 or the Revised
Forestry Code.

ISSUE:

Whether unclassified lands of the public domain are automatically deemed

agricultural land, therefore making these lands alienable.

HELD:

No. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable,
the applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government
such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order, an administrative action,
investigative reports of the Bureau of Lands investigators, and a legislative act or
statute.

A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with
the presumption of state ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized that
there must be a positive act of the government, such as an official proclamation,
declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land for agricultural or other
purposes.

The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the
State, that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land and
charged with the conservation of such patrimony.

All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State. Thus, all lands that have not been acquired from
the government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the State as part of the
inalienable public domain.
Private claimants are not entitled to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect
title under CA No. 141

There are two requisites for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title
under CA No. 141:

(1) open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the
subject land by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest under a bona fide
claim of ownership since time immemorial or from June 12, 1945.

--Private claimants apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under

Proclamation No. 1064, with respect to those lands which were classified as
agricultural lands. Private claimants failed to prove the first element of open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of their lands in Boracay since June
12, 1945.

--The tax declarations in the name of private claimants are insufficient to prove
the first element of possession. The earliest of the tax declarations in the name of
private claimants were issued in 1993. Being of recent dates, the tax declarations
are not sufficient to convince this Court that the period of possession and
occupation commenced on June 12, 1945.

(2) the classification of the land as alienable and disposable land of the public
domain. (Del Rosario-Igtiben v. Republic; Republic v. Lao, supra.)

--As discussed, the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and Proclamation No. 1801
did not convert portions of Boracay Island into an agricultural land. The island
remained an unclassified land of the public domain and, applying the Regalian
doctrine, is considered State property.

Their entitlement to a government grant under our present Public Land Act
presupposes that the land possessed and applied for is already alienable and
disposable (Public Land Act, Sec. 48(b). Where the land is not alienable and
disposable, possession of the land, no matter how long, cannot confer ownership or
possessory rights (Public Estates Authority v. Court of Appeals, supra).

Commercial investments cannot give vested rights over Boracay

The continued possession and considerable investment of private claimants do not
automatically give them a vested right in Boracay. Nor do these give them a right
to apply for a title to the land they are presently occupying.
Reyes v. Raval Reyes

Facts

 Petitioners Mateo, Francisco, and Juan Reyes (Brothers) owns Lots 1, 2, 3, 4

covered by OCT 22161, and Lots 5 and 6, covered by OCT 8066.
 Mateo and Juan later filed for an issuance of a Writ of Possession over all
the lots against Mateo Raval[[ Reyes (not the same Mateo).
 Raval Reyes opposed. According to him he was only occupying the lots under
OCT 22161 and not the lots under OCT 8066.
 Raval Reyes, however, claims that he should be entitled to the lots covered
by OCT 8066 as he previously bought the ⅓ undivided share of Francisco.
 The court granted the Writs of Possession applied for by Mateo and Juan.
No appeal by Raval Reyes was made.
 Mateo and Juan then filed an ordinary civil action against Raval Reyes for
the recovery of the products of the land or their value.
 Of course, Raval Reyes opposed. Duh. , he is their (plaintiffs') co-
owner, he having bought from plaintiffs' brother, Francisco H.
Reyes, the latter's undivided one- third (1/3) share, interest
and participation to these disputed lots. 
 So Mateo and Juan filed a motion to compel Raval Reyes to surrender to
them his owner’s duplicate of OCT Nos. 22161 and 8066.
 RTC denied the motion as the lands are still subjects of litigation in the civil
case that has not yet been decided on the merits.
 Mateo and Juan argues otherwise claiming that the subject of the civil case
is the products of the land and not the land itself.
 They further argue that since Raval Reyes already raised the issue of
ownership and possession when he opposed to the motion for a writ of
possession and did not file any appeal, Raval Reyes is barred and estopped
and barred by res judicata.
 Raval Reyes argues that since Francisco, the other co-owner, was not
impleaded, the writ of possession issued by the RTC only covers the ⅔
portion of the land, and not his ⅓ bought.

Issue:

1. Who has the better right over the lands and the duplicates of both OCTs?
Ruling:

1. The person whose name is registered and inscribed in the OCT has a better right

to the possession that a person whose name does not appear in the certificate

and has yet to establish possession.

While we agree with the court a quo that the disputed lots are subjects in
litigation in 'Civil Case No. 3659, it appearing that respondent, as defendant
therein, had presented a counterclaim for partition of the lots covered by the
titles, we see no valid and plausible reason to justify the withholding from the
registered owners, such as the petitioners-appellants herein, the custody and
possession of the owners' duplicates of certificates of title. In a decided case,
this Court has already held that: the owner of the land in whose favor and in whose
name said land is registered and inscribed in the certificate of title has a more
preferential right to the possession of the owner's duplicate than one whose name
does not appear in the certificate and has yet to establish his right to the
possession thereof.

2. Mateo and Juan already availed of an independent civil action to recover their ⅓

co-owners share by filing a counterclaim in the ordinary civil action. His rights are

now protected.

3. They may also may also avail of the notice of lis pendens.

4. Raval Reyes was ordered to surrender the duplicates of the OCTs.

NATIONAL GRAINS AUTHORITY, plaintiff-appellee, vs. INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT, MELECIO MAGCAMIT, NENA COSICO and EMELITA
MAGCAMIT, defendant-appellants.

G.R. No. L-68741 | 1988-01-28

Facts:

 On December 2, 1971, the spouses Paulino Vivas and Engracia Lizardo, as owners
of a parcel of land
 Sold for 30k to the respondents by way of Sale with right to repurchase.
Recorded in the Register of Deeds
 Executed a Deed of Absolute Sale for 90k over said land. 50k as` DP and the
remaining 40k after the certificate of title was issued. Then and there they
Remained in peaceful, adverse and continuous possession.
 Title was issued without the knowledge of respondents.
 Spouses executed an SPA in favor of Ramirez to which the latter mortgage the
property to the petitioners.
 On May 2, 1974, the counsel for the petitioner wrote the Provincial Sheriff in
Sta. Cruz, Laguna, requesting for the extra-judicial foreclosure of the
mortgage executed by Irenea Ramirez on May 18, 1975, covering, among others,
the property involved in this case covered by OCT No. T-1728, for unpaid
indebtedness in the amount of P63,948.80 in favor of the petitioner.
 The petitioner was the highest and successful bidder so that a Certificate of
Sale was issued in its favor on the same date by the Provincial Sheriff.
 On July 10, 1974, the petitioner in its capacity as attorney-in-fact of the
mortgagor sold the subject real property in favor of itself.
 Private respondent Nena Magcamit offered to pay the petitioner NGA the
amount of P40,000.00 which is the balance of the amount due the Vivas spouses
under the terms of the absolute deed of sale but the petitioner refused to
accept the payment.
 Respondent made formal demands against spouses to comply with their
obligations pursuant to the Absolute Deed of Sale
 private respondents filed a complaint before the then Court of First Instance
of Laguna and San Pablo City, Branch III, San Pablo City, against the petitioner
and the spouses Vivas and Lizardo, praying, among others, that they be declared
the owners of the property in question and entitled to continue in possession of
 the same, and if the petitioner is declared the owner of the said property, then,
to order it to reconvey or transfer the ownership to them under such terms and
conditions as the court may find just, fair and equitable under the premises.
 RTC- in favor of petitioner
 CA- Reversed, hence this petition

ISSUE: whether or not violation of the terms of the agreement between the
spouses Vivas and Lizardo, the sellers, and private respondents, the buyers,
constitutes a breach of trust sufficient to defeat the title and right acquired by
petitioner NGA, an innocent purchaser for value.

RULING: May Breach pero not enough to defeat the title under Torrens

while the registration of the conditional sale with right of repurchase may be
binding on third persons, it is by provision of law "understood to be without
prejudice to third party who has better right" (Section 194 of the Administrative
Code, as amended by Act No. 3344). In this case, it will be noted that the third
party NGA, is a registered owner under the Torrens System and has obviously a
better right than private respondents and that the deed of absolute sale with the
suspensive condition is not registered and is necessarily binding only on the spouses
Vivas and Lizarda and private respondents.

this Court has ruled that the proceedings for the registration of title to land
under the Torrens System is an action in rem, not in personam, hence, personal
notice to all claimants of the res is not necessary in order that the court may have
jurisdiction to deal with and dispose of the res. Neither may lack of such personal
notice vitiate or invalidate the decree or title issued in a registration proceeding,
for the State, as sovereign over the land situated within it, may provide for the
adjudication of title in a proceeding in rem or one in the nature of or akin a
proceeding in rem which shall be binding upon all persons, known or unknown. It is
thus evident that respondents' right over the property was barred by res judicata
when the decree of registration was issued to spouses Vivas and Lizardo. It does
not matter that they may have had some right even the right of ownership,
BEFORE the grant of the Torrens Title.
Flaviana CAJAYON Carmelita Constantino vs Sps. Batuyong

Facts:

• Originally, petitioners and Candelaria are co-owners 260 sq.m of lot

• February 1, 1995- said co-owners subdivided this parcel of land by virtue of

a Partition Agreement

• Partition: Petitioners own Lot 6-B 160sq.m while Respondents own Lot 6-A
100sq.m

• May 30, 1995 - Candelaria sold his share to the herein respondents: Santiago
and Batuyong, including the improvements thereon, in the sum of ₱100,000.00,
under a Deed of Absolute

• Sometime in May 21, 1996 - petitioner started construction works in the

area and intruded into the lot owned by the defendants causing the latter to
protest and report the matter to the barangay authorities; parties were summoned
to appear before the Barangay Chairman wherein defendants agreed to stop the
construction works

• June 7, 1996 - they agreed to defer the matter pending the result of a
survey to be conducted by a government surveyor

• September 5, 1996 - Geodetic Engineer Florentina C. Valencia conducted a

survey of the aforesaid property and placed the concrete monuments thereon in
the presence of plaintiffs and defendants

• November 12, 1996 - verification survey report was submitted by Geodetic

Engineer Florentina C. Valencia together with the survey verification plan

• The survey showed that the petitioners indeed encroached within the
property of the defendant and despite petitioner’s knowledge of the property
boundary, and despite repeated serious objections from defendants, Cajayon
proceeded to construct a seven-door bungalow-type semi-concrete building,
occupying at least 10.18 square meters and another 10.43 square meters for the
right of way, thus encroaching upon at least 20.61 square meters of plaintiffs’ lot,
and further demolishing plaintiff’s wall
• Cajayon in manifest bad faith, wanton attitude, and in a malevolent and
oppressive manner and in utter disregard of the property rights of plaintiffs, have
failed and refused, and still fail and refuse

Respondents filed and ejectment suit

MeTC- ordered the petitioners to vacate

RTC- Affirmed

CA- Affirmed - ejectment cases are within the lawful jurisdiction of MeTC

Hence this petition

Petitioner argues that MeTc has jurisdiction over the instant suit. The averments
in the complaint do not make out a case for ejectment, they claim, as their entry
into the disputed lot was not made by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or
stealth. Neither was their possession of the disputed property by virtue of the
tolerance of respondents or the latter’s predecessor-in-interest. and that
respondents were already barred by prescription

ISSUE: WON, the respondents are barred by prescription in filing action.

Ruling:

2. The suit was filed well within the one (1)-year period mandated by law.
Records show that the ejectment suit was instituted on 11 April 1997. Petitioners’
actual entry into the property, according to the complaint, took place on 21 May
1996.

Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court allows a plaintiff to bring an action

in the proper inferior court for forcible entry or unlawful detainer within
one (1) year, respectively, after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of
possession. In forcible entry, the one-year period is counted from the date
of actual entry on the land.

The words "by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth" include every
situation or condition under which one person can wrongfully enter upon real
property and exclude another, who has had prior possession thereof. To constitute
the use of "force" as contemplated in the above-mentioned provision, the
trespasser does not have to institute a state of war. Nor is it even necessary that
he use violence against the person of the party in possession. The act of going on
the property and excluding the lawful possessor therefrom necessarily implies the
exertion of force over the property, and this is all that is necessary.[26] In the
case at bar, petitioners' encroachment into respondents' property in an oppressive
and malevolent manner, coupled with their refusal to vacate the premises despite
knowledge of the proper boundaries and heedless of respondents' serious
objections, indelibly connotes "force" within the meaning of the law.

Petitioners contend that while they concede they might have intruded on
respondents' property, the action is barred by prescription because it was filed
more than one (1) year after the occurrence of the alleged intrusion. The
contention is baseless. Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court allows a plaintiff to
bring an action in the proper inferior court for forcible entry or unlawful detainer
within one (1) year, respectively, after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of
possession. In forcible entry, the one-year period is counted from the date of
actual entry on the land.[27]

Records show that the ejectment suit was instituted on 11 April 1997. Petitioners'
actual entry into the property, according to the complaint, took place on 21 May
1996. Thus, the suit was filed well within the one (1)-year period mandated by law.
Valenzuela v Mano

FACTS:

 Petitioner Federico Valenzuela (Federico) is the son of Andres Valenzuela

(Andres) who was the owner and possessor of a parcel of land with an area of
938 square meters, more or less, located at Dampol 1st, Pulilan, Bulacan.
 Andres died on October 10, 1959, and the possession of said property was
transferred to Federico. On August 5, 1980, a document denominated as
Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman at Pagpaparaya o Pagkakaloob[7] was executed
by the heirs of Andres who waived all their rights to the property in favor of
Federico.
 Feliciano sold a land to Jose Mano (Conditional Sale) 2,056sqm
 On March 4, 1992,[10] Jose applied for a Free Patent and on April 10, 1992,
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-351[11] was issued in his name. This
time, the property was indicated as covering an area of 2,739 square meters.
 Sometime in 1999, Federico instructed Vicente to construct a perimeter fence
on his property but he was prevented by Jose, claiming that the 447 square
meters was his property as reflected in his TCT No. T-112864. On the other
hand, Federico is claiming it as part of the property he inherited from his
father, Andres.
 When the matter could not be settled amicably, the petitioners lodged a
Complaint for Annulment of Title and/or Reconveyance, Damages with the RTC
of Malolos, Bulacan. The case was set for pre-trial conference on March 27,
2000. Thereafter, trial ensued.
 RTC: the trial court found that the preponderance of evidence showed that the
disputed area of 447 square meters rightfully belongs to Federico. This was a
part of Lot No. 1306 originally owned and possessed by Andres as identified and
described in the Declaration of Real Property No. 7187.
 CA: REVERSED
 Petitioner argues that Jose purchased a parcel of land from Feliciano measuring
only 2,056 square meters but his application for free patent indicated a lot with
a total area of 2,739 square meters.
 Respondents on the other hand contends that they have a better title to the
property. The certificate of title issued in their name is an absolute and
indefeasible evidence of ownership of the property. It is binding and conclusive
upon the whole world.
ISSUE: Who has the better right

RULING: Federico is the owner of the disputed 447 square meter lot. The Deed of
Conditional Sale described the property purchased by Jose.

during the ocular inspection,[22] it was observed that all the neighboring lots are
either square or rectangle. There is an old fence, measuring about 40 meters long
(abutting the newly constructed fence), which bounds the true and actual area
purchased by Jose. Thus, if the old fence is followed, the land purchased would
either be square or rectangular like the adjoining lots. However, if the disputed
447 square meters would be included in the land purchased by Jose, the same
would slant remarkably to the right, to the extent of covering the entire area
fronting the provincial road, which as per tax declaration of Federico, is the
boundary of his land on the north.

"Settled is the rule that a person, whose certificate of title included by mistake or
oversight the land owned by another, does not become the owner of such land by
virtue of the certificate alone. The Torrens System is intended to guarantee the
integrity and conclusiveness of the certificate of registration but is not intended
to perpetrate fraud against the real owner of the land. The certificate of title
cannot be used to protect a usurper from the true owner."
Caraan vs CA

Facts:

On September 16, 1992, private respondents-spouses Salcedo R. Cosme and Nora

Linda S. Cosme, alleged owner of a land with TCT No. 214949 in QC, filed a
complaint (accion reivindicatoria) with damages against Dionisio Caraan in the RTC.

sometime in March 1991, they discovered that the land was being occupied by
petitioner who had built his residential house thereon; such occupancy by
petitioner was effected through fraud, strategy and stealth without private
respondents' knowledge and consent; demands to vacate, both oral and written,
were made upon petitioner, the last written demand having been received by
petitioner on August 7, 1992, but said demands went unheeded; thus, private
respondents prayed that judgment be rendered ordering petitioner and all persons
holding title under him to vacate the subject premises and deliver possession
thereof to private respondents;

In his Answer with Counterclaim, petitioner alleged that he had acquired the land
in question through extra-ordinary prescription of thirty years of continuous,
public, open and uninterrupted possession; private respondents' title was one of
the numerous titles derived from TCT No. 3548 in the name of Eustacio Morales
and Vicente Villar doing business under the style of Vilma Malolos Subdivision,
which was in turn derived from TCT No. 33531 which came from TCT No. 26285
and derived from (OCT) No. 614; and OCT No. 614 had been declared null and void
by the RTC, Quezon City (Branch 83).

RTC: Vacate premises

CA: Affirmed “the indefeasibility of the Torrens title under their [herein private
respondents'] names buttresses the presumption ad homini that they have a better
right of ownership over the land” Hence this petition

Dionisio Caraan died- survived by his heirs

Petitioner contends: Petitioners insist that private respondents' TCT No. 214949
is a derivative of OCT No. 614 and TCT No. 3548 which had been declared spurious
and null and void; Dionisio Caraan has a better right of possession because he had
been in open, public, adverse, continuous, and uninterrupted possession in the
concept of owner of subject land for more than thirty years; and the subject land
is part of a large tract of public land not yet classified for alienation to private
ownership

Issue: Who has the better right? WoN the possession of the petitioner for more
than 30 years made them acquire the land through prescription.

RULING: Priv resp has better rights

"a certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible title to the property in

favor of the person whose name appears therein."

It should be borne in mind, however, that Section 48, Presidential Decree No. 1529
(P.D. No. 1529), provides that "a certificate of title shall not be subject to
collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct
proceeding in accordance with law."

... When is an action an attack on a title? It is when the object of the action or
proceeding is to nullify the title, and thus challenge the judgment pursuant to
which the title was decreed. The attack is direct when the object of an action or
proceeding is to annul or set aside such judgment, or enjoin its enforcement. On
the other hand, the attack is indirect or collateral when, in an action to obtain a
different relief, an attack on the judgment is nevertheless made as an incident
thereof

Even petitioners' claim that subject property could not have been titled in favor of
private respondents because the same has not yet been classified for alienation
for private ownership, cannot be given consideration because, as clearly stated in
Apostol vs. Court of Appeals, "[t]he issue of the validity of the title of
respondents can only be assailed in an action expressly instituted for that purpose.

petitioners' defense that they have a better right over the subject land because
they had been in open, public, adverse, continuous, and uninterrupted possession in
the concept of owner for more than 30 years must be struck down. Section 47 of
P.D. No. 1529 provides that "[n]o title to registered land in derogation of the title
of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession."
De Guzman vs Agbala

Facts:

The spouses Elias P. Javier and Maria Sison died on May 8, 1942 and July 1936,
respectively in Pangasinan. They were survived by their six children, namely:
Conrado Javier, respondent Praxides Javier Agbagala, Nicasio Javier, Carmen
Javier, Encarnacion Javier Ongnoy[4] and Juana Javier. They left 13 parcels of
land which their children inherited and divided among themselves in a public
document of extrajudicial partition dated June 29, 1948. Five of the parcels of
land were inherited by Carmen. On February 25, 1984, she died single, without any
compulsory heir and survived only by her sisters Encarnacion, respondent Praxides,
Juana and brother Nicasio.

According to respondent and her daughter, Milagros Agbagala Gutierrez, one

afternoon sometime in mid-1987, a certain Rosing Cruz went to their house to
borrow P30,000 from Milagros. Rosing offered as collateral a document which
turned out to be a deed of donation dated January 25, 1977 purportedly signed by
Carmen in favor of her niece Madelene Javier Cruz, daughter of Juana and sister-
in-law of Rosing. Milagros told Rosing that she had no money to lend. Thereafter,
Milagros, upon the request of respondent, went to the Register of Deeds in
Lingayen, Pangasinan to verify the existence of such donation. She found out that
it was indeed duly registered. It was the first time respondent came to know of
such donation and the transfer of Carmen's properties to their niece Madelene.

According to Madelene, she lived in her Aunt Carmen's house and had been her
companion since she was four years old. She transferred to Manila only when she
graduated in 1970. On January 25, 1977, Carmen executed the deed of donation in
her favor. She was present when all the signatories thereon, including the notary
public, signed the document. From that time on, she received the rentals of the
properties covered by the donation. Carmen even informed her tenants that
Madelene would inherit the properties upon her death.

On November 18, 1987, respondent filed civil case no. 16516 against Madelene
praying that the deed of donation be nullified, as well as the subsequent transfers
to other parties of the properties covered by the spurious donation.[11] An
amended complaint was filed on September 15, 1988[12] to include the
transferees[13] of the properties including petitioner spouses Raymundo and Perla
de Guzman, who were the transferees of the land located at Tampac, Aguilar,
Pangasinan.[14]

Respondent claimed that the deed of donation was fake. This was confirmed by the
handwriting expert of the National Bureau of Investigation, Rogelio G. Azores, who
examined the document and compared it with several documents bearing the
signature of Carmen. He found that the purported signature of the late Carmen on
the deed of donation was forged.

Petitioner claims that: hey applied for a free patent over the subject area on
August 10, 1987 and on November 26, 1987, they were issued free patent no.
165790. On December 11, 1987, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-30187
was registered in their name.

RTC: Deed of Donation as well as the sale by Madeline of the lands are all null and
void ab initio

CA: affirmed, hence, this petition.

Petitioner argues: at the time of the filing of the amended complaint on September
15, 1988, OCT No. P-30187 had already been issued in their name. Thus this
certificate of title can only be nullified in an action directly attacking its validity.

Respondents: not yet indefeasible since less than one year had lapsed.
Furthermore, she asserts that the doctrine of indefeasibility does not apply if the
free patent is null and void ab initio.

ISSUE: WoN the title had already become indefeasible

Ruling: No.

The principle of indefeasibility does not apply when the patent and the title based
thereon are null and void. An action to declare the nullity of a void title does not
prescribe and is susceptible to direct, as well as to collateral, attack.

OCT No. P-30187 was registered on the basis of a free patent which the RTC ruled
was issued by the Director of Lands without authority. The petitioners falsely
claimed that the land was public land when in fact it was not as it was private land
previously owned by Carmen who inherited it from her parents. Hence, registration
was void.
Heirs of Maximo Labanon vs. Heirs of Constancio Labanon

Facts:

Constancio settled upon a piece of land. He asked his better educated brother,
Maximo, to have it registered with an express agreement that they would divide
the same when it becomes feasible to do so.

Maximo succeeded in registering the same under homestead application

Maximo Labanon executed a document denominated as assignment of Rights and

Ownership' to safeguard the ownership and interest of his brother Constancio
Labanon. Later on,

Maximo executed a sworn statement reiterating his desire that his elder brother
Constancio, his heirs and assigns shall own the eastern portion of the Lot.

After the death of Constancio, his heirs executed an (e)xtra judicial settlement of
estate with simultaneous sale over the aforesaid eastern portion of the lot in favor
of Alberto Makilang, the husband of Visitacion Labanon, one of the children of
Constancio.

Subsequently, the parcel of land was declared for taxation purposes in the name of
Alberto. T

he defendant’s heirs of Maximo caused to be cancelled from the records of the

defendant provincial assessor of Cotabato the aforesaid tax declaration and the
latter, without first verifying the legality of the basis for said cancellation,
cancelled the same.

The heirs of Constancio demanded the owner’s copy of the certificate of title
covering the aforesaid Lot to be surrendered to the register of deeds.

Petitioners argue that respondents can no longer question Maximo Labanon's

ownership of the land after its registration under the principle of indefeasibility
of a Transfer Certificate of Title

RTC: in favor of heirs of Maximo

CA; reversed, hence this petition

ISSUE: Whether or not Original Certificate of Title No. 41320 issued on April 10,
1975 in the name of MAXIMO LABANON be now considered indefeasible and
conclusive

HELD: No.

While it is true that Section 32 of PD 1529 provides that the decree of

registration becomes incontrovertible after a year, it does not altogether deprive
an aggrieved party of a remedy to recover the property fraudulently registered in
the name of another. The acceptability of the Torrens System would be impaired,
if it is utilized to perpetuate fraud against the real owners.

The mere possession of a certificate of title under the Torrens system does not
necessarily make the possessor a true owner of all the property described therein
for he does not by virtue of said certificate alone become the owner of the land
illegally included. It is evident from the records that the petitioner owns the
portion in question and therefore the area should be conveyed to her. The remedy
of the land owner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in
another's name is, after one year from the date of the decree, not to set aside
the decree, but, respecting the decree as incontrovertible and no longer open to
review, to bring an ordinary action in the ordinary court of justice for
reconveyance or, if the property has passed into the hands of an innocent
purchaser for value, for damages.
Rep v Guerrero

Facts:

Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. 8991 dated August 16, 1982 was issued in favor of
respondent Guerrero. Pursuant thereto the corresponding Original Certificate of
Title No. 0-28 was issued on August 27, 1982.

Angelina Bustamante filed a protest with the Bureau of Lands claiming that
respondent obtained the sales patent through fraud, false statement of facts
and/or omission of material facts considering that 174 square meters awarded to
respondent covered the land where her house is situated and where she has been
residing since 1961.

Petitioner argues in esse that respondent procured his sales patent and certificate
of title through fraud and misrepresentation. To support its basic posture,
petitioner points to the verification survey conducted by Engr. Ernesto Erive of
the DENR, which, to petitioner, argues for the proposition that respondent's
entitlement to a public land award should have been limited to a 91-square meter
area instead of the 174 square meters eventually granted.

On the other hand, respondent contends that his OCT No. 0-28 which he secured
pursuant to a sales patent is conclusive and indefeasible under the Torrens system
of registration. As such, his title can no longer be altered, impugned or cancelled.

Ruling:

While Angelina Bustamante indeed protested the award of a sales patent in favor
of respondent, the protest was, however, filed with the Bureau of Lands instead of
with the regional trial court as mandated by the aforequoted provision of Section
38 of Act No. 496. Said provision expressly states that a petition for review of a
decree of registration shall be filed in the "proper Court of First Instance" (now
Regional Trial Court). The law did not say that such petition may be filed with an
administrative agency like the Bureau of Lands. To be sure, what the law
contemplates in allowing a review of the decree of registration is a full-blown trial
before a regular court where each party could be afforded full opportunity to
present his/its case and where each of them must establish his case by
preponderance of evidence and not by mere substantial evidence, the usual
quantum of proof required in administrative proceedings.

Instead of stabilizing the Torrens system, petitioner, in filing a suit for the
amendment of OCT No. 0-28, derogates the very integrity of the system as it
gives the impression to Torrens title holders, like herein respondent, that their
titles can be questioned by the same authority who had approved their titles. In
that case, no Torrens title holder shall be at peace with the ownership and
possession of his land, for land registration officers can question his title any time
they make a finding unfavorable to said title holder. This is all the more
frustrating for respondent Guerrero considering that he had bought the subject
lot from the government itself, the very same party who is now impugning his title.

While the Torrens system is not a mode of acquiring titles to lands but merely a
system of registration of titles to lands,[35] justice and equity demand that the
titleholder should not be made to bear the unfavorable effect of the mistake or
negligence of the State's agents, in the absence of proof of his complicity in a
fraud or of manifest damage to third persons. The real purpose of the Torrens
system is to quiet title to land and put a stop forever to any question as to the
legality of the title, except claims that were noted in the certificate at the time
of the registration or that may arise subsequent thereto.[36] Otherwise, the
integrity of the Torrens system shall forever be sullied by the ineptitude and
inefficiency of land registration officials, who are ordinarily presumed to have
regularly performed their duties.[37]
Javier, et al vs Concepcion

Facts;

Lim Chua, Tan Tian On and Tan Siok Tan filed for the reconveyance of a parcel of
land (known as Lot 12 consisting of 50 hectares) and recovery of the produce since
the petitioner took possession, against the petitioners Urbano Javier and Leonila
Albiela.

Lot 12 is allegedly a portion of a big parcel of land (Lot 6 1,849,172 sqm) located in
Quezon. Petitioners alleged that Lot 12 was ordered excluded from Lot 6 by Chua
et. al. Petitioners also said that Lot 12 can never be a part of Lot 6 because the
big(50 wide- 20m deep) Guhit River serves as a natural boundary between the Lot
12 (which was located in Dolores, Quezon) and Lot 6 (located in Candelaria,
Quezon).

As a defense, Javier alleged that they acquired Lot 12 by part-purchase and part-
inheritance; that they have a Spanish title to the lot; that the lot was adjudicated
to their predecessors-in-interest in Land Registration Cases, that they have
declared the land for tax purposes; that they planted the land with numerous
fruits w/o interference from Chua et. al; and that Chua et. al, were never owners
of Lot 12 as they have acquired their title through fraud and deceit.

RTC rendered judgment in favor of Chua et. al. It held that Lot 12 was part of Lot
6 as evidenced by the records of the Chief Surveyor of the Land Registration
Office. Javier knew of this fact. His contention that the Commissioner’s report
and the plotted area should not be admitted has no merit because of the
manifestation of the Chief Surveyor.

The CA affirmed the decision thus the certiorari.

Petitioner now contends before the supreme court that assuming they are in bad
faith, they still have acquired ownership through prescription.

1914- decree of registration in favor of respondents

Decmber 29, 1927- time of possession

October 17, 1959- time of case of reconveyance

They also averred that respondents are already barred by statute of limitations.
ISSUE: WoN the petitioners acquired the land through prescription. And whether
or not the respondents are already barred by latches when they filed the case for
reconveyance.

Ruling: Without merit. The rule is one cannot acquire title to a registered land by
prescription or adverse possession. rights There are no intervening of 3rd persons
w/c may be affected by a decision directing the return of Lot 12 to Chua et. al.

TUASON vs Bolaños: Nor could title to that land in derogation of that of plaintiff,
the registered owner, be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. Adverse,
notorious and continuous possession under claim of ownership for the period fixed
by law is ineffective against a Torrens title. and it is likewise settled that the
right to secure possession under a decree of registration does not prescribe

The defense of laches will likewise not apply in this case. (Section 46, Act No. 496)
there were innocent third persons intervening in the cited case. 37 years.
Here, there are no intervening rights of third persons which may be affected or prejudiced by a decision
directing the return of Lot No. 12 to plaintiffs-respondents. Hence, the equitable defense of laches will not also
apply as against the registered owners in this case.

No. Fraud as a legal basis for review of a decree means actual/positive fraud as distinguished
from constructive/legal fraud.  Actual fraud is a question of fact. Lot 12 was found to be part of
Lot 6 under TCT 16817 issued in the name of    Chua. Furthermore, the decree of registration
has long become final. Under sec 38 of Land Registration Act:  the person allegedly deprived of
the land by a decree of registration under fraud should file in the CFI a petition for review w/in
1 yr. after the entry of the decree, provided no innocent purchaser for value has acquired an
interest. Granting that there was no actual/ positive fraud in securing the title, Javier is barred
from questioning it.
Madrid

Facts:

Spouses owns land

Sought to recover possession through accion publiciana

The respondents-plaintiffs alleged that they acquired the properties from the
spouses Procopio and Encarnacion Castelo under a Deed of Absolute Sale dated
June 20, 1978. They merely tolerated the petitioners-defendants' continued
occupancy and possession until their possession became illegal when demands to
vacate the properties were made. Despite the demands, the petitioners-
defendants continued to occupy and unlawfully withhold possession of the
properties from the respondents-plaintiffs, to their damage and prejudice. Efforts
to amicably settle the case proved futile, leaving the respondents-plaintiffs no
recourse but to file a complaint for ejectment which the lower court dismissed
because the respondents-plaintiffs should have filed an accion publiciana.

The Mirandas countered that Gregorio Miranda owned the properties by virtue of
an oral sale made in his favor by the original owner, Vivencio Antonio (Antonio).

Petitioner-defendant Bernardo also asserted ownership over the portion he

occupies based on an oral sale to him by Antonio

On the basis of the length of their claimed occupation of the properties, the
petitioners-defendants likewise invoked Section 6 of Presidential Decree No. 1517
(PD 1517), also known as the Urban Land Reform Law, which provides that
legitimate tenants of 10 year or more, who have built their homes on these lands
and who have continuously resided thereon for the past ten years, shall not be
dispossessed of their occupied lands and shall be allowed the right of first refusal
to purchase these lands within a reasonable time and at reasonable prices.

RTC: In favor of respondents. Absent any public instrument or at least a note or

memorandum supporting their claims

CA: Affirmed. Petitioners never submit proof of ownership

ISSUE: Who has the better right of ownership, given that the petitioner alleges
bad faith of the respondents who allegedly obtained the land through fraud

Alternative: WoN the attack on the validity of title is cognizable.

No.

Registration of land under the Torrens system, aside from perfecting the title and
rendering it indefeasible after the lapse of the period allowed by law, also renders
the title immune from collateral attack.[20] A collateral attack transpires when, in
another action to obtain a different relief and as an incident of the present action,
an attack is made against the judgment granting the title.[21] This manner of
attack is to be distinguished from a direct attack against a judgment granting the
title, through an action whose main objective is to annul, set aside, or enjoin the
enforcement of such judgment if not yet implemented, or to seek recovery if the
property titled under the judgment had been disposed of.[22] To permit a
collateral attack on respondents-plaintiffs' title is to water down the integrity and
guaranteed legal indefeasibility of a Torrens title.[23]

The petitioners-defendants' attack on the validity of respondents-plaintiffs' title,

by claiming that fraud attended its acquisition, is a collateral attack on the title. It
is an attack incidental to their quest to defend their possession of the properties
in an "accion publiciana," not in a direct action whose main objective is to impugn
the validity of the judgment granting the title.[24] This is the attack that
possession of a Torrens Title specifically guards against; hence, we cannot
entertain, much less accord credit to, the petitioners-defendants' claim of fraud
to impugn the validity of the respondents-plaintiffs' title to their property.
Carbonilla vs Abiera

Facts:

Carbonilla filed an ejectment against Abiera within MTCC

The land is purportedly covered by a certificate of title, and declared for

assessment and taxation purposes in petitioner's name and he acquired through a
Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate (Residential Building) with Waiver and
Quitclaim of Ownership.

He maintained that the building was being occupied by respondents by mere

tolerance of the previous owners. He sent demand letters to no avail

Petitioner asserted that they occupied the building as owners, having inherited the
same from Alfredo Abiera and Teodorica Capistrano, respondent Marcelo's parents
and respondent Maricris' grandparents. They maintained that they have been in
possession of the building since 1960, but it has not been declared for taxation
purposes. As for the subject land, respondents claimed that they inherited the
same from Francisco Plasabas, grandfather of Alfredo Abiera.

MTCC: in favor of respondents However, with respect to the building, the court
declared respondents as having the better right to its material possession in light
of petitioner's failure to refute respondents' claim that their predecessors had
been in prior possession of the building since 1960

RTC: reversed MTCC with regards to the ownership of the building.

CA: Reversed RTC hence this appeal

Abiera Paredes died- asphyxia due to hanging

ISSUE: Who has a better right with regards to the building

Ruling:

To set the record straight, while petitioner may have proven his ownership of the
land, as there can be no other piece of evidence more worthy of credence than a
Torrens certificate of title, he failed to present any evidence to substantiate his
claim of ownership or right to the possession of the building. Like the CA, we
cannot accept the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate (Residential
Building) with Waiver and Quitclaim of Ownership executed by the Garcianos as
proof that petitioner acquired ownership of the building. There is no showing that
the Garcianos were the owners of the building or that they had any proprietary
right over it. Ranged against respondents' proof of possession of the building since
1977, petitioner's evidence pales in comparison and leaves us totally unconvinced.