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CLAWS Journal
Journal
of the
Centre for Land Warfare Studies
Distributed by:
KNOWLEDGE WORLD
KW Publishers Pvt Ltd

New Delhi
CLAWS Journal
CENTRE FOR LAND WARFARE STUDIES
New Delhi
Editorial Committee
Editor-in-Chief Brig Gurmeet Kanwal (Retd)
Director, Centre for Land Warfare Studies
Managing Editor Col Ravi Tuteja

Deputy Editor Dr Monika Chansoria
Members Col Harish Thukral
Col Anil Chauhan
Col SC Meston
Copy Editor Ms Rehana Mishra
CLAWS Journal is published by the Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), New Delhi. CLAWS is
an autonomous think-tank dealing with national security and conceptual aspects of land warfare,
including conventional and sub-conventional conflict and terrorism. CLAWS conducts research that is
futuristic in outlook and policy oriented in approach.
For submission of articles, commentaries, review articles and book reviews, please see “Notes for
Contributors” given at the end of the Journal.
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Contents
Note from the Editor v
The Kargil War: Some Reflections 1

V P Malik
Report of the Kargil Review Committee: An Appraisal 18

Interview with K Subrahmanyam
Kargil War: The Final Battle 28

Mohinder Puri
Kargil: Dynamics of a Limited War Against a Nuclear Backdrop 38

GD Bakshi
Pakistan’s Strategic Blunder at Kargil 53

Gurmeet Kanwal
Kargil 1999: Limited War, Unlimited Consequences 73

Rahul K Bhonsle
Debating Defence Reforms Since Kargil 88

Vinod Anand
Role of the Pakistan Air Force during the Kargil Conflict 101
M Kaiser Tufail
India-Pakistan: The Pangs of Peace 113

Asad Durrani
Terrorism in India: External Ramifications 121

Vikram Sood
Army-Media Relations in Sub-conventional Conflict 132

R K Nanavatty
The Utility of Military Expenditures in South Asia 147

Mohan Guruswamy
Sun Tzu at the Computer: Informationising the “Art of War” 164

Timothy Thomas
Tigers Tamed, but What Next? 183

N Manoharan
Morals and Ethics in the Armed Forces: A De Novo Look 198

Samarth Nagar
Defence Research and Development: 209
Global Trends and Indian Perspective
Pankaj Jha
Emerging Trends in Supply Chain Management 225

Gopal Purdhani
Commentaries
Ground Truths about the US War on Terror in Afghanistan 237
Dinesh Mathur
US Influence in the Indian Ocean Region 244

Bidanda M Chengappa
Why a Nation Needs A Young Military 250

PK Gautam
The Evolution of US Policy Towards Kashmir 257

Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan
Book Reviews
The Icon: Marshal of the Indian Air Force 263

Arjan Singh, DFC, An Authorised Biography
Gurmeet Kanwal
India China Relations: The Border Issue and Beyond 265

Ravi Tuteja
Towards a Nuclear Weapon Free World 267

Swapna Kona Nayudu
Notes for Contributors 271

Note from the Editor
T
he Summer 2009 issue of the CLAWS Journal is now in your hands. I report
with a great sense of pride that we at CLAWS have received very positive
feedback with regard to the quality of our previous issues. In retrospect,
the decision to publish the CLAWS Journal as a bi-annual publication has allowed
us to put together a Journal with substance — a high quality publication worthy
of CLAWS.
A decade after India’s victory in the Kargil conflict, the Editorial Team decided
to review its relevance and also examine how well the Kargil Review Committee
report has been implemented. We are carrying seven highly valuable articles
on the Kargil conflict and a rare interview with Mr K Subrahmanyam, former
secretary for Defence Production, former director, IDSA, and the chairman of
the Kargil Review Committee.
Apart from this, we are also carrying a varied fare from many well known
authors, including an international contribution from Timothy Thomas who is
formerly from the US Army and is now a senior analyst at the Foreign Military
Studies Office at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, USA.
During the last six months, CLAWS has published two monographs, two
Manekshaw Papers and three Issue Briefs. (Details of these are given elsewhere
in this issue of the CLAWS Journal.) CLAWS celebrated the fifth anniversary of its
raising by holding a national seminar on “Threats and Challenges for the Indian
Army: Trends and Responses” on January 14, 2009. Joint seminars with Command
HQ have also become a regular feature. Reports and feedback on all seminars are
disseminated to all Command HQ as also uploaded on the CLAWS website.
The CLAWS website, the international face of CLAWS, has been further
revamped. Its new URL is “www.claws.in”. The feedback on the website has
again been very positive. We hope to start a blog of our own in the near future so
that we get a more varied cross-section of views from across the globe.
Five serving officers out of nine will complete their fellowship at CLAWS
during 2009. We have been flooded with requests and queries from a number
of officers across the country with regard to study leave with CLAWS. A standard
operating procedure (SOP) is being formulated by the MT Directorate (MT-9) on
availing of study leave for research in Delhi. This will be implemented shortly.
Col Ravi Tuteja
Managing Editor
CLAWS Journal
Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS)
Membership Details
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Besides organising conferences and seminars, CLAWS is also engaged in research work and has
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Membership: CLAWS has now opened its membership to individuals, units and formation HQ. The
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For membership, please make all payments in favour of

Centre for Land Warfare Studies payable in New Delhi.
The Kargil War:
Some Reflections
V P Malik
The Kargil War, forced on India ten years ago, will always be remembered for:(a) its
strategic and tactical surprise; (b) the self-imposed national strategy of restraint,
thus, keeping the war limited to the Kargil-Siachen sector; (c) military strategy
and planning, in keeping with the political mandate; and for the (d) dedication,
determination, and daring junior leadership at the tactical level. In fiercely fought
combat actions, on the most difficult terrain that gave immense advantage to the
enemy holding mountain-tops, we were able to evict Pakistani troops from most
of their surreptitiously occupied positions. The Pakistani leadership was forced to
sue for the ceasefire and seek withdrawal of its troops from the remaining areas.
Operation Vijay (the codename of the war) was a blend of strong and determined
political, military and diplomatic actions, which enabled us to transform an
adverse situation into a military and diplomatic victory.
Political Background
India and Pakistan had tested their nuclear weapons in May 1998. With a new
sense of responsibility and with much fanfare, the prime ministers of India
and Pakistan signed the Lahore Declaration on February 20-21, 1999, for a
peaceful and cooperative relationship in future. As part of this Declaration was
a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for the two nations “to engage in
bilateral consultations on security concepts and nuclear doctrines with a view
to developing measures for confidence building in the nuclear and conventional
fields aimed at avoidance of conflict”, with significant clauses for consultations
and communication on nuclear and conventional confidence-building measures
(CBMs) between the two sides.1
General V P Malik (Retd) is former Chief of the Army Staff and Chairman, Chiefs of Staff
Committee during the Kargil War. He is President, Institute of Security Studies, Observer
Research Foundation, New Delhi.
Claws Journal l Summer 2009 1

V P Malik
After the Lahore Declaration, our political leaders expected that cross-border
infiltration and militants’ activities in Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) would taper off.
Army Headquarters’ assessment of the ground situation was different: it indicated
“no change in the ground situation; there could in fact be some escalation in
the proxy war in the immediate future due to Pakistan’s internal compulsions
and its politico-military situation”, and was conveyed in the review meetings in
the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS).
While addressing army commanders in April 1999, I had stated, “This diplomatic
initiative has definitely opened the door for improving relations. But unless
Pakistan translates it into ground realities, and stops sponsoring the proxy war,
these confidence-building measures (CBMs) cannot be expected to fructify.
Pakistan’s military has been, and in the foreseeable future is likely to remain,
negatively Indo-centric.” On May 2, 1999, I gave an interview to a journalist
and stated, “Recent Lahore Declaration has not in any way changed the ground
situation in Kashmir. If anything, the Pakistan Army and ISI are still active in
aiding and abetting terrorism in the state.”2
As we later learnt, just when the preparations for the Lahore meeting had been
going on, the Pakistan Army was busy planning and carrying out reconnaissance
and logistics to initiate the intrusion in the Kargil sector, with a view to:
n Altering the alignment of the Line of Control (LoC) east of the Zoji La and
denying the use of the Srinagar–Kargil–Leh highway to India.
n Reviving jehadi terrorism in J & K.
n Capturing Turtuk, a strategically important village located on the southern
bank of the Shyok river in Ladakh through which an ancient trade route cuts
through the Ladakh Range into the Northern Area of Pakistan.
n Highlighting the Indo–Pak dispute over J&K to the international
community.
Why did the Pakistan Army initiate this operation in the midst of the ongoing
political bonhomie? The reasons could be:
n The Pakistan Army, over the years, has developed an Indo-centric view and
vested interest in maintaining tension with India. Senior Pakistan Army
officers believed “that a stable nuclear balance between India and Pakistan
permitted offensive actions to take place with impunity in Kashmir”.
n Pakistan military planners expected that India would not undertake an all-
out offensive against Pakistan and run the risk of ending in a stalemate.
n India’s preemption on Siachen Glacier in 1984 continues to hurt the Pakistan
2 Claws Journal l Summer 2009

The Kargil War: Some Reflections
Army like a thorn in its flesh; it is a psychological drain. Kargil was seen as a
justifiable response.
n There was a growing concern that the Kashmiri cause was losing its
international salience. The waning militancy in J&K needed to be
rejuvenated.
Intelligence and Surveillance Failure

The fact that India was completely surprised about the intrusion at the political,
strategic and tactical levels cannot be denied. It reflected a major deficiency in
our system of collecting, reporting, collating and assessing intelligence as well as
poor surveillance on the ground. It is, therefore, important to learn how and why
that happened.
In April 1998, the Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW) had assessed that for
Pakistan “waging war against India in the immediate future will not be a rational
decision.” Its assessment in September 1998 was that there was a serious financial
resource crunch within Pakistan in general and its army in particular. The March
1999 assessment reported heavy deployment of troops and artillery in Pakistan
Occupied Kashmir (POK) and stated that Pakistani troops “were prepared for the
contingency of heavy exchange of artillery fire in April/May 1999.” This report
concluded that “waging a war against India in the immediate future would
not seem to be a rational decision from the financial point of view...[the] Nawaz
Sharif government would be left with little option but to pursue belligerence,
abet infiltration, and indulge in proxy war in Jammu and Kashmir as part of an
attempt to keep the hardliners subdued”(italics added).
The Intelligence Bureau too remained focussed on jehadi activities.
In June 1998, it had reported that some jehadi camps were located in
POK, about 50 to 150 km north of the LoC. There was no hint of any impending
military operation with a view to occupying important mountain heights within
Indian territory. The focus of all these intelligence reports and assessments was
on militancy or artillery fire exchanges in Kargil during the coming summer. The
possibility of a conventional conflict with regular forces was consistently negated.
On the other hand, the inputs and assessments reflected a lack of preparedness
on Pakistan’s part for a direct military conflict.
The scale and extent of the Kargil intrusion, however, involved elaborate
planning and preparation. The operation required well-trained, duly acclimatised
troops familiar with the ground that would have to be carefully selected.
Large quantities of snow clothing and other winter warfare equipment would

V P Malik
be acquired. Some new roads and tracks would be required to be built. There
would be a lot of movement besides dumping of artillery and ammunition and
construction/renovation of bunkers. A large number of porters would be needed
for logistical back-up support. Additional infantry battalions and artillery
units would have to be deployed along the LoC.3 No such information except
dumping of artillery ammunition was picked up by any agency or included in the
assessments. As confirmed later, it was completely a Pakistan Army operation
wherein no (or very few) jehadis were involved
In 1997-98, Headquarters (HQ) Northern Command had restructured its
intelligence set-up to meet intelligence challenges in the wake of the overall
internal and external security situation in J&K. Dedicated tactical intelligence
resources were provided to the formation commanders down to the brigade
level. In the process, HQ Northern Command also absorbed some personnel
from the Army HQ liaison units located in J&K. What came out after the war was
that the intelligence agencies at the tactical level i.e. the brigade intelligence
teams and the Intelligence and Field Security Unit, spent considerable time and
resources to accomplish militancy-oriented intelligence missions. The ability of
their officers-in- charge to gather worthwhile intelligence from across the LoC
was limited due to the non-availability of volunteers, sparse population and
inadequate incentives. The intelligence teams were unable to find out that two
additional battalions had been deployed in the area opposite Dras, Kargil and
Turtuk and that field defences were being reinforced. The efforts of the corps
intelligence groups too remained proxy war-centric.
In HQ 3 Infantry Division, incidents on the ground reported in different
brigade sectors were neither linked together nor properly assessed. Most of the
newly created intelligence teams remained obsessed with staff work and neglected
the field work. Formation and unit commanders did not maintain close contacts
with the civil population to obtain the ground-level feel. In some areas, there was
a “strained relationship” between the locals and the men in uniform.4
Surveillance at the brigade and division levels proved to be a serious failing.
Deployment with large gaps in the mountainous terrain lends itself to infiltration.
Investigations later revealed that regular patrolling in the sector, which would
have also ensured that troops were trained to operate in inclement weather
and would have inculcated the determination and will to accomplish missions
despite harsh and difficult battle conditions, was conspicuously absent. There
was no patrolling along the ridgelines. Gaps between defended locations were
not covered. The patrols visited only the nalas and that too halfway to the LoC.

Briefing and debriefing of patrols were not given due Surveillance

importance. In many cases, patrol reports were not at the brigade
even sent to the Brigade HQ. and division
We did not have unmanned aerial vehicles levels proved
(UAVs) that could fly at high altitudes to carry out to be a serious
aerial surveillance. Unattended ground sensors and failing.
local surveillance radars had not been inducted. Deployment
Apart from patrolling, the only other viable means with large
was visual winter aerial surveillance operations gaps in the
(WASO). This too was quite ineffective as there was mountainous
no surveillance equipment onboard. terrain lends
Despite the fact that small-scale infiltration and itself to
intrusions had been going on in the Kargil sector infiltration.
since February 1999, the formation responsible [121
(I) Infantry Brigade] was unable to detect it till May 1999. The brigade commander
considered that the “threat was limited to infiltration of jehadi militants” — a
statement, which has no military justification. If the militants could infiltrate, so
could the regular army personnel. “Attack by infiltration” is a tactical technique
in mountain warfare, taught in the army training establishments. Most probably,
the obsession with jehadi militants made the local commanders neglect this
aspect. Even after the intrusion had been detected, the brigade commander
did not realise the seriousness of the situation. He dismissed the intruders as a
handful of militants and tasked his units accordingly.
There was an impression on the ground that the Kargil terrain during winter
did not allow large-scale, cross-country movement of forces, and that even foot
patrols could not stay away from their bases for any length of time. Despite the
odds, Pakistani forces did operate in such wintry conditions. As disciplined,
determined and acclimatised small bodies of troops, they overcame these
obstacles. We must remember that a determined foe can always achieve surprise,
provided he has clear objectives, is prepared to take risks, and has the advantage
of timing and operational flexibility.5
There has been a lot of misinformation about the practice of the Indian
Army vacating posts along the LoC during winter. That indeed was the practice in
the past. As Pakistan had attempted to capture some of our posts in the Siachen
Glacier thrice in 1997 and eleven times in 1998, all field formations deployed
along the LoC had been directed to be extra vigilant. HQ 15 Corps had ordered
that no posts were to be vacated during the winter of 1998–99.

V P Malik
Pakistani Measures for Surprise and Deception

Some of the measures taken by the Pakistan Army to achieve surprise and
deception were:
n The plan, based on stealth and deception, was kept a closely guarded secret
among select commanders and staff officers. Even the prime minister
was not given details, or the whole truth. Other Service chiefs and corps
commanders were briefed after the Pakistani troops had been infiltrated
across the LoC.
n Regular troops were employed in the garb of jehadis. As a deception measure,
radio transmissions in the Balti and Pashto languages were made to convey
an impression that it was the jehadi elements, which had intruded and were
occupying areas across the LoC.
n Northern Light Infantry units, which were involved upfront and provided
the combat base, and the Chitral and Bajaur Scouts who assisted them in the
logistics, were already located in Pakistan’s Northern Areas. They were fully
acclimatised and had good knowledge of the terrain. As such, not much of
movement of troops was involved.
n The Pakistan Army chose the winter season to carry out reconnaissance of
the area of operations and to establish firm bases when there is minimum
movement of troops and civilians on either side of the LoC. Ammunition
and stores for the operation were put in place over a period of two months.
The bulk of the troops infiltrated across the LoC in April 1999.
n The Northern Areas were placed under army rule to deny access to the media
and to facilitate optimal exploitation of local resources.
A factor that contributed the most to our surprise and to the fog of war was
our inability to identify the intruders for some length of time. We depended more
on the intelligence reports and enemy radio intercepts and took considerable
time to go for enemy identifications on the ground. The failure to anticipate
and identify military action of this nature on our borders by the Pakistan Army
reflected a major weakness in our intelligence system. After the war, this aspect
was questioned by a couple of former officers from the intelligence agencies in
the media. But their reaction was more in anger and turf defence than on the
basis of any logic! One, they had not contradicted any intelligence assessments
of the period. At the level of the CCS and the COSC (Chiefs of Staff Committee),
strategic decisions are taken on the basis of assessments and not individual
reports. Two, had there been a timely and correct assessment of Pakistan’s

military intrusion into the Indian territory, our A factor that

politico-military reactions would have been very contributed
different. In such an eventuality: the most to
n Prime Minister Vajpayee would not have our surprise
visited Lahore in February 1999. I would not and to the fog
have gone on the official visit to Poland and of war was
the Czech Republic in May 1999. our inability
n The Pakistani intrusion would have been to identify the
declared a military aggression, with all its intruders for
domestic and international implications. We some length of
would have had no hesitation in employing air time. The failure
power against the Pakistani military intrusion to anticipate and
from the very beginning. identify military
n The CCS could not have insisted on the Indian action of this
armed forces not crossing the LoC/border. nature on our
borders by the
Due to intelligence and surveillance failures, Pakistan Army
our initial ground-level reaction was in the form reflected a major
of counter-terrorist operations. Movement of weakness in
additional units and subunits at the brigade and our intelligence
divisional levels was done in haste. The hastily system.
moved units and sub-units had neither adequate
combat strength nor logistic support. They were tasked in an ad hoc manner
without any detailed planning. Little effort was made to establish the identity of
the intruders and to collect detailed information about their precise locations in
the area of intrusion.
Political and Military Strategy

The Pakistan Army, proactively, had taken the initiative and achieved tactical
surprise, leading to penetration into our area along a 160 km front. On my return
from abroad and after briefings in Delhi, Udhampur and Srinagar, I realised
that we needed to react more deliberately, and strategically– where our strength
lay. We discussed the situation and its political and military implications in the
COSC and decided to fight the war jointly. The COSC agreed that our substantial
superiority in the air and on the seas should be brought to bear on the enemy to
create the necessary strategic asymmetry, not only in the Kargil sector but also
along the entire western border.

V P Malik
During earlier discussions, the CCS had been keen on exercising restraint. It
was reluctant to escalate the conflict and had refused permission to the flying of
armed or attack helicopters. We needed permission for larger mobilisation to gain
a strategic advantage. The relevant questions that arose in this context were: would
the CCS allow conflict escalation and induction of the other two Services? Would
escalation dominance work in the nuclearised Indo-Pak environment and where
political leaders indulged in rhetorical statements frequently? How would the
government handle international opinion? How long would that diplomatic effort
take? Under these circumstances, what political objectives were likely to be laid
down? Would the government be prepared to declare a ‘war’ and go the whole hog?
Of the three Services, the army takes the maximum time to complete its
mobilisation and is the most visible. As no ‘war’ had been declared politically,
we had to achieve the required mobilisation without causing alarm in the
country and abroad. In the existing circumstances, how soon could we launch
an offensive, if permitted? How would the climate impact our war effort? We also
needed to take stock of our inventories and reassess urgently our capabilities
for defensive and offensive operations. Our logic for an integrated approach at
the level of the COSC was simple. All three Services are national security assets.
For any combat situation, we must employ all three Services optimally, in an
integrated manner. The allocation of specific missions thereafter is a matter of
detailed coordination, keeping in view factors such as the characteristics and
capabilities of assets available with each Service, the level of joint training and
the degree of interaction among the Services.
Before my return from abroad, the air chief had not agreed to the use of air
power. He had two reasons: attack helicopters cannot fly at that altitude and the
use of air power would escalate and enlarge the conflict. Consequently, the CCS
had not allowed the use of air power, including armed helicopters. During our
discussions on May 23, after giving an assessment of the situation, I explained
that it was necessary to gain the strategic initiative in order to facilitate the
operations of the 15 Corps and Northern Command. We had to be prepared
for war escalation, either by Pakistan or by us. In such an eventually, all three
Services would be fully sucked into the war. It would, therefore, be desirable to
take preparatory steps immediately. I suggested that the air force should use air
power in Kargil to assist the 15 Corps’ operations and, hereafter, we should carry
out joint planning for war. I emphasised that we should have unanimity over
this issue in the CCS meeting but also made it clear that if any of my colleagues
were not agreeable to this, I would oppose their view in the CCS meeting. The

COSC then took a unanimous decision to recommend joint strategy, operational

planning and action, including the use of naval and air power. Next day, in the
CCS meeting, after briefing and giving assessment, we sought permission for the
use of air power and deployment of the navy. The CCS approved the proposal
and directed that the intrusion along the LoC should be cleared at the earliest.
However, our forces should not cross the LoC or the international border.
Why the Political Restraint?

Many people still question the logic of the political restraint to not cross the
border or the LoC. It, therefore, needs to be explained. Firstly, we went to war so
soon after the Lahore talks and declaration that our political establishment was
taken aback. No one could believe that all the goodwill and bonhomie generated
through Track-I and Track-II dialogues had collapsed so abruptly. There were no
intelligence indicators like extra tension between opposing forces deployed on
the border, termination of leave of military personnel or recall of those already on
leave, unusual military movements, combat and logistic build-up or preparation
of defences on the border. Although the intelligence agencies did indicate that
jehadi militants would continue their attempts at infiltration across the LoC and
that there could be an increase in violent activities, there was not the faintest hint
that the Pakistan Army was planning or preparing to intrude on a large scale with
regular troops. Due to these inadequacies, and also due to the Pakistan Army
personnel masquerading as Mujahideen, the fog of war remained thick till the
end of May 1999. These factors made the political leaders react tentatively and
adopt a cautious approach.
Secondly, it was essential to ensure that international opinion was
sufficiently in our favour. Such an opinion in a war situation is always a major
force multiplier. We had to convince the world that India was a victim of Pakistani
aggression, which had violated the Shimla Agreement and the sanctity of the
LoC as laid down therein. We had to furnish irrefutable evidence to show that
the infiltrators were not militants but regulars belonging to the Pakistan Army.
Simultaneously, as a nation that had blasted its way out of nuclear ambiguity
recently and caused a major setback to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, there was
the need to show ‘greater responsibility and restraint’. That was the main reason
why we had signed the Lahore Declaration.
Thirdly, the nuclear weapons factor played on the minds of the political
decision-makers. This factor posed little problems for a limited war. But, political
and military planning and preparation for conflict escalation had to be carried

V P Malik
out carefully. Escalation control was essential. It is a well-known fact that during
the ‘hotting up’ period, the civilian political leadership in all nuclear equipped
countries tends to tighten its control over the military, particularly on its nuclear
and missiles assets. There is nothing wrong with that. This is where a responsible
strategic decision-making difference comes to the fore between a democratically
elected government and a military or a semi-military regime.
Fourthly, if the conflict had escalated, the major powers would increase
pressure—directly and through the United Nations—to prevent a nuclear
confrontation. They would seek immediate ceasefire and termination of war.
This could have left a part of our territory (now occupied by the Pakistanis) in
their hands, which would be a major political and military setback. Moreover,
Pakistan and countries friendly to it would have played up the issue of J & K in
international fora. For the military, the grand strategy of exercising ‘restraint’ was
no doubt a handicap. But such a strategy was politically justified, at least to start
with. The COSC accepted it but as I stated clearly in a media briefing on June 23,
1999, we did not consider it as non-reviewable or unalterable. The prime minister
and the national security advisers were also advised that our political leadership
should not give an impression that not crossing the LoC or the international
border had an all-time sanctity.
In a dynamic war situation, one has to cater for all contingencies. New
situations can be caused either due to enemy action or due to some other
unforeseen developments. In all contingency planning, the final goal is always
to achieve the given political objective. Kargil was a limited conventional war
under the nuclear shadow where space below the threshold was available but had
to be exploited carefully. The political embargo on crossing the LoC or the border
notwithstanding, the COSC and the operational directorates of the armed forces
had done their planning and preparations for escalation (crossing the border or
the LoC), if that had become necessary and was authorised by the CCS.
In the following weeks, 446 military special trains rolled towards the western
border to carry troops and logistical equipment. The holding formations, 6 Mountain
Division and 4 Mountain Division were moved by road to their assigned operational
locations. Dual-task formations located in the northeast were moved to their assigned
corps in the west or to interim locations close to the western border. 108 Mountain
Brigade was moved from Port Blair to the west coast by sea. More than 19,000 tons of
ammunition was moved from various depots to the western front.
The Indian Navy had issued instructions for an alert before the CCS meeting
and commenced patrolling off the coast of Dwarka. After the meeting, it

supplemented the Western Naval Fleet with selected Kargil was

units of the Eastern Naval Fleet and moved the latter a limited
from the Bay of Bengal to the Arabian Sea. This conventional
step enabled it to extend the range of deployment. war under
Naval staff carried out an analysis of Pakistan’s oil the nuclear
vulnerability and plans to interdict Pakistani tankers. shadow where
The naval projection of ‘reach and mobility’ had space below
an immediate impact: Pakistan started providing the threshold
escorts to its oil tankers as they moved out from the was available
Gulf to Karachi. but had to
The Indian Air Force (IAF) responded very quickly be exploited
after the CCS approved employment of air power on carefully.
our side of the LoC. It deployed its forces and launched
the first close-support air strikes with MiGs and armed Mi-17 helicopters within
48 hours. After May 23, there were no professional differences whatsoever that
could affect our teamwork or planning.
After the CCS meeting on May 24, the three chiefs were closely involved in
the politico-military decision-making process. The CCS met on an almost daily
basis till the second week of July 1999. Besides the prime minister and the other
CCS members, these meetings were attended by the national security adviser, the
Cabinet secretary, the three Service chiefs, the secretaries of the Defence, Home,
Finance and External Affairs Ministries, the heads of the Intelligence Bureau
and R&AW and the secretary, National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS).
Sometimes, for some specific purposes, special invitees were also called in.
The meetings would generally begin with the heads of the intelligence agencies
giving fresh information or follow-up results. The Service chiefs then briefed
the participants by providing the details of the previous days’ operations. They
also presented envisaged plans that required CCS clearance or coordination.
All politico-military-diplomatic aspects were considered and discussed. The
international environment was monitored continuously. The foreign secretary
gave his briefing on our own diplomatic initiatives and reactions from different
countries. The home secretary provided information on the domestic political
and law and order situation. The defence and finance secretaries noted all
envisaged procurements, movements of troops and material and other actions
that had major financial implications and required procedural clearances.
Complete synergy and consensus was thus achieved among the various organs
of the government, from political direction to execution in the field and to

V P Malik
proactive diplomacy. The political leadership received the views of the Service
chiefs first-hand. After discussions, the concerned executive authorities received
directions from the prime minister. All these developments led to a very integrated
approach to ‘war management’ with the political, economic, diplomatic, media
and military aspects meshed together cogently.
At the level of the armed forces, regular military briefings were carried out
in the Military Operations Room. Besides the three chiefs, representatives of
the Ministries of Defence, External Affairs, Home and the intelligence agencies
attended these briefings. The daily briefings were followed by an ‘in-house’
discussion on a ‘need-to-know’ basis.
Strategic Lessons from the War

Many strategic lessons have emerged from the Kargil War. Some important
lessons that should be noted are as follows:
n There are remote chances of full-scale conventional wars between two
nuclear weapon states. But as long as there are territory-related disputes,
the adversary may indulge in a proxy war leading to a conventional war or a
limited border war.
n Loss of territory is unacceptable to the public or political authority. This is a
strategic handicap and a risk in a conventional war setting, which increases
in a limited war scenario. It implies greater attention to surveillance and
close defence of the borders or lines of controls.
n The new strategic environment calls for speedier, more versatile and
more flexible combat organisations in the mountainous as well as non-
mountainous terrain. The successful outcome of a border war depends
upon the ability to react rapidly to an evolving crisis. The military would be
expected to react quickly in order to localise/freeze/reverse the situation
and to arrest the deterioration, enhance deterrence, and prevent escalation
on the ground.
Capability to wage a successful conventional and nuclear war is a

necessary deterrent. A war may remain limited because of credible deterrence
or escalation dominance, when a side has overwhelming military superiority
at every level. The other side will then be deterred from using conventional
or nuclear war due to the ability of the first to wage a war with much greater
chances of success. It means more room is available for manoeuvre in
diplomacy and in conflict.

n A limited conventional war will require close There are

political oversight and politico- civil-military remote chances
interaction. It is essential to keep the military of full-scale
leadership within the security and strategic conventional
decision-making loop. During a conflict, all wars between
participants must remain in constant touch two nuclear
with the political leadership. weapon states.
n Mobilising and sustaining domestic and But as long
international support for military operations as there are
would depend upon righteous action and territory-related
the ability to operate in a manner that disputes, the
conforms to political legitimacy, for example, adversary
avoidance of civilian and military casualties may indulge
and minimisation of collateral damage. in a proxy war
n A major military challenge in India remains leading to a
political reluctance to commit a proactive conventional
engagement and insistence to retain war or a limited
the authority for approving key military border war.
moves and operational decisions. Political
requirements and military targeting would need a heavy reliance on
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance for target selection.
n Information operations are important due to the growing transparency
of the battlefield. The political requirement of a military operation, and
to retain the moral high ground (and deny that to the adversary) needs a
comprehensive media and information campaign.
Brilliant Junior Leadership: A reflection on the Kargil War will never be

complete without a mention of the brilliant junior leadership that we witnessed
during the battles. It was an eye-opener for those who lament that the armed
forces are no longer attracting the best talent, or that the training in our basic
military institutions has got diluted, or that our young leaders are less motivated.
The Cassandras and pessimists were proved wrong!
In every battle, the young officers were upfront, not hesitating to make any
sacrifice to uphold the regimental and national pride and dignity. With great
determination, high morale and exemplary leadership, our troops performed
superbly. There were countless acts of most extraordinary valour, courage and grit
to achieve what would have appeared impossible under normal circumstances.

V P Malik
Such acts by young officers like Vikram Batra (whose success signal to his
commanding officer was “Yeh dil maange more”), Manoj Pandey, Vijayant Thapar,
Balwan Singh, and soldiers like Sanjay Kumar and Yadav can never be forgotten.
They make us proud. Commanding officers like Ravindernath, Khushal Thakur
and Lalit Rai displayed steely resilience and single-minded devotion to duty.
There were many actions by young artillery forward observation officers (FOO)
who took over companies when their infantry company commander colleagues
were killed. They rallied the men and led them to the objective or to ward off
severe counter-attacks. And for every single brave deed noticed and recognised,
there were many that went unnoticed in the fog of war.
These legendry tales deserve mention not only in our military history books
but also in the textbooks of our primary and secondary schools, to be able to
inspire young children. My regret is that these days we remember gods and
soldiers only at the time of crisis. Both are forgotten as soon as the crisis is over!
Gaps in Defences, Force Levels, Command and Control: Soon after the war,
we realised that in the light of the continuing proxy war with Pakistan (despite
political attempts to underplay it sometimes), we had to restore the strategic
balance in J&K. A peculiar strategic problem that the Indian military faces is that
it cannot trade any space for major offensive manoeuvres elsewhere. Loss of
territory is not acceptable to the public or the political authority. This is a strategic
handicap and a risk, which increases in a limited war scenario. It implies greater
attention to surveillance and close defence of the borders or lines of controls.
The command and control of the Srinagar Corps, having to look after the LoC
with Pakistan and China and active anti-terrorist operations, was over-extended.
This strategic requirement called for raising a separate Corps Headquarter,
reinducting a division (in place of 28 Infantry Division raised for the Siachen sector
but moved to the Valley in 1991), and improving surveillance and overall combat
capability in Ladakh. For this purpose, we raised HQ 14 Corps and retained 8
Mountain Division in the Kargil sector. With additional forces (including the
Ladakh Scouts), better command and control, and improved surveillance
capability, this shortcoming of the Kargil War was overcome quickly.
Reforming the National Security System6: The Kargil Review Committee
Report7 led to the Indian government constituting a Group of Ministers (GoM)
to review the performance of all defence related organisations and recommend
reforms in the national security system. The CCS approved the GoM’s
recommendations, submitted in February 2001. Although in terms of numbers,
most of these reforms are stated to have been implemented, many changes have

only been cosmetic. The willingness and spirit to In the new

change has been lacking. For example, there is strategic
hardly any integration in the Ministry of Defence. environment of
I feel that we need competent and committed unpredictability
political leadership to bring it about. and enhanced
Chief of Defence Staff (CDS): The GoM interactivity, it is
had recommended the appointment of a CDS essential to create
as the existing COSC has serious weaknesses in synergy and
its ability to provide single point military advice optimise defence
to the government, and to resolve substantive and operational
inter-Service doctrinal, planning, policy and planning. A face-
operational issues. In India, there is neither to-face dialogue
a holistic approach to defence planning nor and military
adequate synergy in operational planning and advice is critical
execution. Planning in defence tends to be to success in
‘competitive’ and, thus, ‘uneconomical’. In the politico-military
new strategic environment of unpredictability strategic and
and enhanced interactivity, it is essential to create operational
synergy and optimise defence and operational issues.
planning. A face-to-face dialogue and military
advice is critical to success in politico-military strategic and operational issues.
The appointment of the CDS, therefore, is essential. But the creation of the post
of CDS is still pending, despite statements of the Standing Committee of the
Parliament, which had noted, “Coordination and synergy amongst the armed
forces, Service Headquarters and the MoD is extremely vital for expeditious
decision-making and also for enhancing the capabilities of our defence forces.
The existing structure for higher defence management, viz, the COSC, has not
been able to perform their role and function in bringing together and promoting
coordination amongst the Services.”
Shortage of Arms, Ammunition and Equipment: When the Kargil War
broke out, our ‘bottom line’ holdings and reserves of weapons, ammunition
and equipment were in a depleted state due to continuous lack of budgetary
support, tedious—almost non-functional—procurement system, and raising
of Rashtriya Rifles units without sanctions for weapons and equipment. The
procurement structure in the Ministry of Defence was responsible for the sub-
optimal utilisation of funds and long delays (it continues to be so!). There were
large-scale shortages of weapons and equipment; even of the clothing required

V P Malik
for high altitude warfare. And yet, some bureaucrats complained to the prime
minister about my remarks to the media during the war that “we will fight with
whatever we have.”
For some time, the Kargil War made people conscious of this responsibility.
But modernisation of the armed forces continues to lag behind even now due
to inadequate self-reliance and reluctance to procure big-ticket essential
equipment like the medium artillery guns. The newly constituted Defence
Procurement Board has failed to speed up the process. Instead, it seems to have
added one more tier in clearance of proposals, causing further delays. There is
also an urgent need to streamline and establish accountability in the Defence
Research and Defence Organisation (DRDO). There is no point talking about the
revolution in military affairs, information systems and net-centric warfare if we
cannot induct relevant weapons and equipment in time. No one is affected more
than the soldiers who have always to be prepared for all kinds of contingencies.
We must remember that the military is an organismic being, not a switch on-
switch off robot.
Intelligence and Surveillance: The deficiencies in our system of collection,
reporting, collation and assessment of intelligence have been stated earlier.
With the setting up of the National Security Council Secretariat, this aspect has
improved to some extent. An integrated Defence Intelligence Agency has been
established. However, its technological, coordination, and assessment-making
capabilities need to be further strengthened to make it effective.
The war had highlighted the gross inadequacies in the nation’s surveillance
capability. We sought satellite imagery from two friendly countries but received
unsatisfactory responses. This capability has now been made up with indigenous
satellites. By setting up direct communications from DIPAC to the corps, there
has been substantial improvement in this field. We have also acquired effective
unmanned aerial vehicles, upgraded helicopter capability for day and night
surveillance, and, most importantly, acquired hand-held thermal imagers,
surveillance radars and ground sensors.
Kargil was a limited war; the first of its kind after the Indo-Pak nuclear weapons
tests and the Lahore Declaration. It has now become a more likely operational
norm in the strategic environment where large scale capture of territories, forced
change of regimes, and extensive military damage on the adversary are ruled out
politically. It was not the first time when Pakistan initiated a war; and we must
not assume that it would be the last time. Every good military would like to be
proactive. However, it has also to develop the will and capability to react. The

essence of military leadership lies in the manner in which we react to restore a

situation, however, adverse the circumstances of the battle. The most important
lesson I believe is that sound defence makes sound foreign policies.
Notes
1. “The Lahore Declaration February 21, 1999”, in Defence Related Treaties of India (New
Delhi: ICC India Pvt Ltd).
2. “Malik Sees Trouble on J&K Front”, The Times of India, May 3,1999.
3. The Pakistan Army in the sector deployed two additional battalions in the sector.
These battalions could not be identified or reflected by R&AW in the order of battle of
the FCNA.
4. P Stobdan, who comes from Ladakh and was then working in the Institute for Defence
Studies and Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi, after his tour of the area from June 2 to 9,
1999, reported these facts to me.
5. Kargil Review Committee Report, Para 8.20.
6. Recommendations of the Group of Ministers, February 2001
7. Ordered by the Government of India under the chairmanship of K Subrahmanyam,
with Lt Gen KK Hazari, Mr BG Verghese as members, and Mr Satish Chandra as
member-secretary.

Report of the Kargil Review
Committee: An Appraisal
The Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS) interviewed

Mr K Subrahmanyam, Chairman of the Kargil Review Committee (KRC)
on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the Kargil conflict, with a view
to assess the extent to which the KRC’s recommendations have been
implemented. Team CLAWS comprised Brig Gurmeet Kanwal (Retd) and
Dr Monika Chansoria.
On the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the Kargil conflict, what according to
you are the major lessons learnt, how well have your recommendations been
implemented and what still remains to be done?
The Kargil Review Committee (KRC) report was not an investigation into what
happened at Kargil, but a review of the developments and recommendations as to the
measures to be undertaken to prevent such an occurrence in the future. The report
highlighted that it was a major intelligence failure and several recommendations
were made to rectify the lacunae. The epilogue of the report states, “The Committee
has, after very wide interaction, sign-posted directions along the path to peace,
ensuring the progress, development and stability of the nation.”
How exactly the country should proceed to refashion its security,
intelligence and development shield to meet the challenges of the 21st century
is for the government, Parliament and public opinion to determine. At the same
time, there is no turning away from that responsibility. In a sense, the report
was a breakthrough when it was published. It was unlike any of the reports
commissioned before. Except for a few deletions, most of which I consider
unjustified, the report was published as it is and has not been censored, which
was a positive development. However, on the flip side, although the report was
placed in the Parliament, it was never discussed by the Parliament primarily owing
to partisan politics and evidenced lack of adequate interest in national security
Mr K Subrahmanyam is former Secretary for Defence Production, Ministry of Defence and

Chairman of the Kargil Review Committee.

Report of the Kargil Review Committee: An Appraisal
issues. This was very unfortunate. In addition, even though the government of
the day took the report seriously enough to appoint a Group of Ministers (GoM)
to go through the findings and recommendations of the committee and come
up with their own proposals on reforming the framework of national security,
however, yet again, the recommendations of the GoM were published but not
discussed in the Parliament.
The Kargil Review Committee was considered a pioneer in the sense that
it came out with very radical recommendations. KRC said that the decision-
making process and procedures and organisation were 52 years old, formulated
by Lord Ismay on the higher direction of war. India’s Army, Navy and Air Force
were all inherited from the British just like the police force and the judiciary.
Unfortunately, we have not done anything to think for ourselves in all the above-
mentioned spheres and make our own legislation over the last 60 years. Since
then, there has been the emergence of nuclear weapons and the revolution in
military affairs. There has been no attempt to think about these developments
in respect to India’s security. The type of armed forces that we should have
for the future should be the subject matter of a high-powered independent
commission.
As a matter of fact, although the three Services have often been engaged in such
an exercise, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) has seldom been on board during
the discussion stage.
Today, the probability of inter-state war among major powers is progressively
dwindling. The threats we face are terrorism, weapons of mass destruction being
used by terrorists, civil disturbances, organised crime and narcotics. But we have
not analysed and thought through any of these and, more importantly, have not
looked at how our armed forces will tackle these challenges in the future. I would
like to give credit to the Vajpayee government for having done whatever it did.
Nevertheless, at the same time, we have to acknowledge that India’s political class
is still not in a position to tackle the national security issues with the seriousness
they deserve—a fact that has to be acknowledged with a lot of regret 10 years
after the Kargil Committee Report came out.
What did you see as the more substantive recommendations which you perhaps
felt should be implemented immediately or as early as possible?
Undoubtedly, the most important recommendation was about intelligence. There
has been some headway in a sense with the creation of the National Technical

K Subrahmanyam
Kargil Balance Sheet: Security as a Full Time Job
Kargil will feature as a defining moment in the history of the subcontinent

though as a military conflict it does not compare with the four wars fought
by India in 1947-48, 1962, 1965 and 1971 in terms of forces involved or
casualties incurred. The IPKF operations in Sri Lanka were of a larger
dimension, involved more casualties and spread over a longer period.
Thanks to television, the Kargil War brought the images of the bravery of our
jawans, their professionalism, the national integration they represented and
the majesty of our borders into living rooms all over this country.
Spin-off Benefits
The description of India as “Aa Sethu Himachalam’’ is no longer an abstract
concept. The soldiers, officers and airmen from Kerala and Tamil Nadu
were seen by hundreds of millions of people on the screen defending the
Himalayan peaks. Never before has the country felt so emotionally united as
in these past eight weeks. It is an unfortunate fact of history that elsewhere
in Europe and America, people got integrated as nations only through a
series of wars. The Pakistanis who base their policy towards India on the
assumption that Indian unity will be unsustainable over a period of time,
have contributed to the consolidation of this unity significantly through
their Kargil aggression even as they have undermined their own.
This limited conflict recalls to one’s mind that of 1965. Then too Pakistan
initiated Operation Gibraltar and Operation Grand Slam and sent infiltrators
into Kashmir. India reacted with a counter-attack in the Lahore-Sialkot
sectors. The war ended in a stalemate though India could have won if it had
continued it for another week or ten days since Pakistan was running out of
ammunition. It resulted in the mediation in Tashkent. There was no winner
or vanquished in that war though Pakistan attempted to portray it as a great
victory. But the effects on Pakistan’s domestic politics were long lasting. It
led to East Bengal feeling undefended and consequently to the six-point
programme of Mujibur Rahman.
Since India had not set itself any objective beyond throwing the Pakistanis
out of its territory, this country did not aim at a spectacular victory. Even in
1971, the fall of Dacca and the capture of 93,000 prisoners were not specifically
planned for. Kargil was only a damage-limiting operation and no victory was

aimed at or obtained. But it did produce a number of spin-off benefits which

need to be carefully exploited. If India is not careful, these gains could be
squandered as happened at Simla, with the very best of intentions.
The Kargil campaign is the first one in which a well-coordinated air-land
battle on a restricted scale was fought by Indian forces. This is the first step and
needs to be built on further. One hopes this will sow the seeds for integrated
planning between the two Services. It was no mean achievement for the army
to have concentrated approximately three divisions on the Kargil sector in a
short period and launched high altitude operations with several battalions.
This experience was so new and unprecedented that many generals,
experienced in high altitude warfare, could not anticipate the rapidity with
which our forces could outflank and overwhelm the well-entrenched enemy.
This operation speaks well of the innovation in tactical operations by our
operational commanders, the leadership qualities of our young officers who
led from the front and who took casualties disproportionate to the average
ratios in terms of officers to jawans in normal infantry battles. Those who
predicted that the war would be prolonged into autumn and further were
proved wrong.
Global Security Risk

On the diplomatic front, the G-8 nations came out against Pakistan
on the Kargil issue for their own reasons—perceived threat of Islamic
fundamentalism and international terrorism. China did not support
Pakistan because of its concerns on Tibet and Xinjiang and the possibility of
the ‘Mujahideen’ turning up there. The Indian efforts to project the Pakistani
aggression in Kargil as an international terrorist and Islamic fundamentalist
issue connected with ethnic cleansing in Kashmir and narcotics traffic have
been feeble. No doubt, this time there has been more support for India than
in 1949, 1965 and 1971. But that should not lead to a sense of complacency,
and euphoria but should result in a concerted effort to project the state of
Pakistan and its army, its fundamentalism, terrorism, its narcotics traffic and
its crumbling economy as an international security problem.
In Simla, Indira Gandhi and her advisers fell for Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s
wiles and felt that he was the best bet for India. Consequently, he was not
pushed hard on war crimes trials and converting the Line of Control into an
international border. Now there are people who advance the same kind of
arguments vis-a-vis Mr Nawaz Sharif. India has to deal with the government

K Subrahmanyam
in power in Pakistan and, therefore, with Mr Sharif. Hostilities of the Kargil

type which took a toll of 410 Indian lives should be avoided. Beyond that,
India has to wage a relentless information war against Pakistan to compel
that country to give up its terrorist campaign.
Total Revamp
Pakistan’s denial of basic human rights in the northern areas of occupied
Kashmir, as brought out by the Pakistan Supreme Court, its oppression
of minorities, its sponsorship of fundamentalism and international
terrorism, its ethnic cleansing and its involvement in narcotics traffic have
to be projected to the international community. It should be explained
that Kashmir is only a symptom of fundamentalism and ethnic cleansing
underlying the two-nation theory. This time, India did slightly better in the
information war, thanks mainly to the efforts of the Indian print and the
private sector electronic media. The Government of India is still living in the
pre-information war age.
Kargil proves that national security cannot be handled as a part-time
vocation. It requires full time attention of a national security adviser and
a fully and adequately manned National Security Council secretariat and
well-crafted procedures to ensure that there are no lapses in intelligence
assessment, policy formulation and purposeful direction in matters relating
to the country’s security. That calls for a total revamp of our national security
set-up, which has to be undertaken after the elections.
[Courtesy: The Times of India, 26 July 1999]
Reconnaissance Organisation (NTRO) and Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA).

However, there are doubts whether intelligence culture has permeated into the
Services. Regarding NTRO, while I was deputy secretary, I wrote a paper stressing
the need for setting up such an organisation after the army established its Signal
Intelligence Directorate. As I did my own reading on intelligence in the MoD
as deputy secretary, it appeared to me that the most important intelligence
capability we had to create for ourselves was the signal intelligence capability, an
organisation analogous to the US National Security Agency (NSA). I submitted a
paper that was discussed between the defence secretary and the army chief but
did not go any further.

Similarly, while I was secretary (Defence Production), I suggested the transfer

of the Cipher Bureau from the jurisdiction of the joint secretary (General Staff)
who knew nothing about ciphers, to the scientific adviser since it was a highly
scientific subject. It was a matter of particular satisfaction to me, given that what
was started by me in January 1964, was recommended in January 2000 and finally
implemented.
Nevertheless, the other organisations initially gave the NTRO a very hard time.
Yes. Those who gave a hard time only did that primarily because they themselves
did not know the full scope of their own work. For instance, once I made a
recommendation as secretary (Defence Production) that there should be a
separate Department of Aerospace. Later on, when I appeared before the Estimates
Committee, Madhu Dandavate (MP) was surprised at my suggestion since he
had never come across a secretary to the government who actually wanted his
department to be bifurcated in order to create another independent department.
The primary reason, according to me, was to do justice to the mission on hand. As
a matter of fact, the creation of a Department of Defence in the United States had
also met with stiff resistance. While taking major decisions on strategic bombers
and aircraft carriers, the decision had to be taken by sacking six admirals in a
single day—thus, exhibiting strength of character by the political class in the US.
Change is always resisted and has to be enforced. Unfortunately, we do not have
such people in India at present.
Speaking of the recommendations that are yet to be implemented, why in your

view have two successive governments failed to implement them?
As I said, the main recommendation was on intelligence and I would say that some,
if not all, significant steps have been taken. There is another recommendation
that was not a focussed recommendation though, but was made on manpower
policy. The suggestion was that soldiers after seven years of service should be
transferred to the paramilitary forces. I understand the Sixth Pay Commission
has taken up the issue. This way, training, costs and pensions could be saved
while providing lifetime employment. Thirdly was the issue of sensitisation of the
National Security Council membership to intelligence and the state of security.
There was a recommendation that they should have periodic briefings by the
chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC).
I am told that this was accepted by the GoM but subsequently people raised
reservations saying it was a waste of the time of ministers and in case a crisis

K Subrahmanyam
were to occur, the concerned agency would bring it to the notice of the Cabinet.
There are two different approaches in this case. The first approach is to sensitise
ministers to the state of the security situation regularly so that they are well
informed while arriving at a decision. The second approach is their response
to the security situation once the crisis occurs. In the case of the 26/11 terror
strikes in Mumbai, if the concerned minister had been sensitised to the security
situation, deployment of the National Security Guards (NSG), with dedicated
airlift capability would have been sanctioned without delay. The approach I
suggested that the five ministers of the National Security Council should have
regular periodic intelligence briefings was not followed. I hope that there would
be attempts to review this after the Mumbai terrorist attacks.
The Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) met with a fair amount of frequency
after the Mumbai crisis.
There needs to be an understanding that it is incumbent on the chairman, JIC
to brief the CCS every fortnight for the entire process for intelligence to assume
particular importance. This would enable the ministers to be prepared in case of
an eventuality. The role of intelligence is preparing oneself to anticipate and be
ready to meet a crisis. We are actually neglecting the significance of the process by
stating that the information can be provided when a crisis situation occurs.
Home Minister P Chidambaram has been regularly taking stock of the available
intelligence since he took over. What more needs to be done?That certainly is an
improvement, but is not adequate. The CCS should meet at least every fortnight
and should have one session of intelligence briefing at that point. In the US, the
president is briefed on a daily basis. They have got a Principals Committee and a
Deputy Principals Committee also to review intelligence briefings. In comparison,
I feel that the role of intelligence in national security decision-making in India
has not yet received the central attention it deserves.
Do you feel the role of the national security adviser (NSA) has crystallised
particularly regarding intelligence? The NSA appears to be the person in charge
now.
The Kargil Committee Report mentioned that at that time, two jobs were held by one
person simultaneously, but now that is no longer the case. The principal secretary to
the prime minister is different from the NSA, but since the time of the setting up of
the National Security Council, I was critical of the scheme of the National Security

Council that was implemented. This, in fact, was quite different from the organisation
of the National Security Council recommended by the KC Pant-Jaswant Singh-Jasjit
Singh Committee. I am in agreement with the original recommendation of the KC
Pant-Jaswant Singh-Jasjit Singh Committee, but I disagree with the manner in which
it was actually implemented. The national security adviser in the US is a monitor, an
agenda-setter and an advisor to the president. He is not an executive. The executive
is each individual department. The NSA monitors that each department carries out
the role determined for it by the NSC.
Unfortunately, in India, the NSA has become an executive. Brajesh Mishra,
the former NSA, explained that in Indian conditions, this was needed in order
to get things going. Since he has been in the government and knows how the
system works, I would not challenge it. However, the NSA should equip himself
to carry out the crucial role, namely, a monitor of the decisions of the NSC and a
reviewer of implementation following the decisions of the NSC. The staff of the
present NSA has been expanded to three deputies. I believe that as the NSA has
executive jurisdiction, he becomes increasingly less effective as a monitor of the
implementation of national security decisions.
Implementation of the NSC decisions is not being well supervised. As you are
aware, the NSC initially met very rarely and it is only lately that the NSC has
been meeting regularly. Since the NSC is not really carrying out the functions
of long-term national security planning, that function also has devolved on the
CCS by default. But, implementation of CCS decisions is in the realm of various
ministries as well as of the Cabinet Secretary. Therefore, isn’t there a major
lacuna in the process?
This is happening because the NSC is not performing its primary role, namely,
long-term planning and the CCS is focussing on immediate decisions. Therefore,
the long-term decisions in that respect continue to go by default.
Is there, in your view, any legislative avenue, which could compel the prime
minister and the NSC to meet every quarter or six months in order to carry
out a review of the long-term aspects of national security and report back to
Parliament?
The NSC in the US came into being as a result of legislation as did the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA). In India, the difficulty arises since our Parliament
does not even debate the reports that have been tabled in the Parliament. The
Parliament today is defaulting on its principal role of governance, given that the

K Subrahmanyam
Parliament in its entirety is supposed to govern this country. Both the Opposition
and the ruling party together are supposed to govern the country according to the
constitutional theory. The failure of governance by the Parliament of India is the
core issue. In addition, there is a total lack of responsibility and accountability.
If the Parliament does not have discipline, one cannot expect the state police to
have discipline. There is a correlation between what happens in our Parliament
during disruptions and what happened in Madras High Court when the lawyers
indulged in violence and this needs to be understood.
In your view, are conflicts like the Kargil conflict likely to continue or do you see
a change in Pakistan’s basic strategic outlook, given the current situation and
the challenges that it faces?
The most authoritative person whom I can quote on this question is Gen Pervez
Musharraf who says they will continue. I certainly cannot question his authority
on this subject.
While addressing a question to Gen Pervez Musharraf at the India Conclave held
in New Delhi, I (Brig Gurmeet Kanwal) had asked, “Many Indians are of the view
that the present rapprochement process is a tactical ploy rather than a strategic
change of heart because the Pakistan Army and ISI cannot afford to fight on
three fronts: eastern front with India, Kashmir and elsewhere, internal stability
and Taliban/Al Qaeda on the western borders. Many Indians feel that the real
threat to peace and stability between India and Pakistan are the Pakistan Army
and the ISI and not Pakistan as a nation-state. What would you like to say to
convince us that there has been a change of heart and the Pakistan Army and
ISI are now on board for the peace process?” Apparently, Gen Musharraf had
nothing substantial to say, although he wanted Indians to believe that there has
been a change of heart and added that he is a man for peace.
I would not question that. A general can initiate a war, get defeated and then
claim to be a man for peace. Therefore, the real issue is whether he is a man of
peace out of instinct or out of compulsion.
What are the significant political and military lessons of the Kargil conflict,
which are still relevant for India in your opinion?
The most significant lesson would be the need for eternal vigilance, given that we
have an enemy who is looking for gaps in our preparedness at every given point
in order to exploit it.

We do not seem to have learnt that eternal vigilance is the price of peace as we
have had a spate of terrorist incidents all across the country.
There is a difference. In the case of a Kargil-like conflict, a manned border was
penetrated whilst it was under the control of the army. Brig Surinder Singh (the
Kargil brigade commander) said that he anticipated it but at the same time did
not send patrols because he was afraid of snow casualties. In a situation like this,
a decision has to be arrived upon whether the threat was severe enough to take
the risk or not— this is where the question of eternal vigilance comes in.
Eternal vigilance applies also to internal security. The police needs to be
taken away from party politics and made autonomous and accountable to law—
something that would be difficult to agree upon because in this country the
police is used as an instrument of the government of the day. Ultimately, national
security is rooted in good and fair governance and we must ensure that.
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Kargil War:
The Final Battle
Mohinder Puri
Introduction
Ten years have passed, more or less to the date, when the country was surprised by
the Pakistan Army’s intrusion in the Kargil sector, which set the stage for the fifty-
day war. I had the honour and good fortune to command 8 Mountain Division,
which had been moved from the Valley to the Dras-Mushkoh sectors to restore
the status of the Line of Control (LoC). A number of issues, some important and
some mundane, have been tickling my mind. I intend to put these down more
comprehensively in my book, on which I am presently working. However, for the
reader’s interest, I have included some of them in this article for your reading
pleasure.
Fighting the Last War

During and after the war, there was criticism in some quarters that the Kargil War
was not fought like a modern war but was fought more or less on the lines of the
earlier wars. The critics frequently used the cliché that while generals prepare
for the next war, they normally fight the last war. The reader must appreciate the
environment in which we were fighting this war. The inhospitality of the terrain
and the inclement weather were major factors which restricted and dictated our
tactics and, consequently, the employment of troops. The initial advantage was
with the enemy who had occupied tactical heights from where he could effectively
dominate our movements by observation and fire. We had to evolve a method to
evict him from these heights in the earliest time-frame and definitely before the
Lieutenant General Mohinder Puri (Retd) is former Deputy Chief of Army Staff (Planning
and Systems) and commanded 8 Mountain Division during the Kargil conflict.

Kargil War: The Final Battle
onset of winter. Any delay in recapturing the area would have had a disastrous
effect on our future deployment. Had we failed, he would have had a full season,
albeit the winter period, to consolidate his gains and thus, claim the captured
areas and redraw the LoC. Time and resources were both at a premium. On June
1, 1999, when I assumed command of the Dras-Mushkoh sector, I appreciated
that my operations must get over by mid August. This would give me adequate
time till early November when the road closes, to deploy my division in this area
as well as logistically build them up for the long winter ahead, where at many
places the temperature falls far below sub-zero.
In terms of resources, we were short of critical equipment which was
made up as the operations progressed. However, I would like to highlight the
innovativeness of my staff, which used their ingenuity in making up the critical
shortages of support weapons, ammunition and equipment by pooling in the
resources of battalions that were not going immediately into battle. The assault
battalions were, thus, not short of critical items when they were launched for
their attack.
The next issue which had relevance on our attack plans was the use of the air
force. I am not going into the reasons why the air force was not employed in an
earlier time-frame as enough has been mentioned and written on this aspect. I
will confine myself to the employment of this force in extreme high altitude areas
and its effect on our ground operations. In the initial stages of the war, the air
force, like us, were neither acclimatised nor properly equipped to respond to the
tactical requirements on the ground, with the result that the effect on the target
of a number of their sorties was negligible. In fact, in an interesting incident, a
commanding officer of a battalion, while in the assembly area for his first attack,
passed a message to stop the air from engaging targets as their rounds were
falling in close proximity of his battalion. We had to hurriedly pass the message
to discontinue any further engagement. This is not to deride the impact of the air
on our operations but merely to highlight that despite best efforts by our pilots,
the results for a variety of reasons, like inhospitable terrain, adverse weather
conditions, lack of training in operating at these heights, paucity or inadequacy
of the right ordnance, were not visible. Moreover, the ideal approach for engaging
the targets was from south to north, and since we were not permitted to cross the
LoC, the air space available to the air force was considerably restricted ,with the
result that the air attacks, by and large, were from west to east which reduced
the effect on the target. If I recall correctly, we gave the air force the Pakistan
Administrative Base as a target. This was well concealed in a bowl close to the

Mohinder Puri
LoC. Locating the target was difficult and even after the air force acquired the
laser guided bombs in this area; they were unsuccessful in neutralising the target.
However, the psychological impact of employment of the air force was immense.
For us, it was a morale booster and for the enemy, a feeling of frustration.
In war, the potential of firepower as a battle winning factor cannot be
relegated to an inessential commodity. While the air force had their constraints,
our artillery also faced some inherent problems till the allocation of the Bofors
regiments to my division. We had no gun locating radars which the enemy had
and was using to great advantage. The counter-bombardment, in most cases, from
his artillery was prompt, accurate and as time went by, highly predictable. Our
105mm IFG and 120mm mortars, with limited range, lethality and accuracy, were
poor cousins in the battlefield. However, our equipment profile shortcomings
were more than made up by our innovativeness in the employment of the Bofors
and the grit and determination of the gunners. Engagement of targets, as with
the air force, so with the artillery, was a major problem. The enemy had deployed
himself tactically by cleverly using the reverse slopes for his administrative areas.
We had no precision guided weapons to engage the enemy on the reverse slopes
and, thus, effective engagement was only feasible when the enemy came on the
forward slopes to man his defences. In the initial stages of the operations, we had
tried to move the field gun for the direct firing role in the Dras sector, but were
unsuccessful, mainly because of the limited range of the gun, and the difficulty
in negotiating the steep gradients. The alternative which proved of immense
help was the employment of the Bofors in the direct firing mode. In fact, the
men developed great confidence in the gun, and there were occasions when we
brought the fire extremely close in support of the assaulting troops.
The professional soldier, I am sure, will be able to visualise the constraints
under which, we were fighting the war. We did not have the luxury of creating
shock and awe in the enemy defences, and we could not, therefore, walk onto
the objective with minimum casualties and resistance. The imperatives of
terrain dictated the battles to be predominantly infantry oriented, with, of
course, the support of the artillery and other arms and Services. We had to evolve
a methodology to tackle each objective. In the mountains, the approaches are
limited and one has to follow the spurs and ridgelines to reach the objective. We
could not manoeuvre to his rear due to his pattern of deployment, and later as
the operations progressed, our inability to cross the LoC became a restricting
factor. In almost all cases, our attacks were multi directional and only when
the terrain precluded launching of attacks from more than one direction did

we resort to a single approach attack. To the best of In war, the

my memory, we may have launched an odd attack potential of
from one direction; but the bulk of the attacks were firepower as a
multi-directional. The attacks without exception battle winning
were hard slogging matches, and it is to the credit factor cannot
of the infantry that despite heavy casualties, they be relegated to
succeeded in overcoming the odds to bring victory to an inessential
the nation. In retrospect, I remain convinced that our commodity.
methods to overcome the enemy opposition were
perhaps the best under the circumstances. In all modesty, I think, we rewrote the
tenets of fighting in extreme high altitudes. We, unfortunately, took a heavy toll
of casualties, but this was expected and was predicted. The terrain forced us to
address each objective in the manner in which we did.
Whose War Was It?

Soon after the war, some critics raised the issue as to who actually won the war: was
it the senior commanders or the junior officers? This is not to take away the credit
from our junior leaders, particularly our junior officers who did a commendable
job as is evident from the outcome of the war and the casualties suffered by these
brave officers. There is no second opinion on this and it is my conviction that we
perhaps have the best stock of young officers of any modern army. The sacrifices
made by these officers and their contribution to our victory are incomparable
and need to be recorded in our history in golden letters. Our middle rung officers
who include the commanding officers (COs) in almost all cases, led from the
front and where some displayed hesitation, they were taken to task. The COs
were the ones who shared the privations of war with their command. I am not
for once mentioning this to disclaim their contribution to our victory in the war
but merely to put the record straight so that posterity and critics understand the
functioning of the junior and higher leaderships of the army.
A junior officer, on joining his unit, is made to go through the paces of
soldiering with his men. Whatever be the standard of training he receives in
his pre-commissioning period, it is only when he is in his unit that he picks up
the nuances of command of men. He literally rubs shoulders with them and
understands his command like the back of his hand. He trains, lives, plays and
in operational areas, eats with the men; always maintaining the age-old adage –
being friendly but not familiar with the men. Young officers are best recognised
and respected by their men for their physical fitness and raw courage, besides

Mohinder Puri
their other qualities. It is they who lead their sub-units into battle and not
the generals. It is they who capture real estate in the form of clearly defined
objectives in war, and as a result, are suitably rewarded for their courage and
bravery. The success or failure of an operation finally lies in how well the plan
is executed on the ground, and victory or defeat is accordingly measured by
the degree of courage or otherwise displayed by units and formations. In war, it
must, therefore, be remembered that the best conceived plans can fail if poorly
executed at the grass- root level. So the worth of a junior leader cannot be wished
away as unimportant and the credit must go to him for deservedly giving us the
victory.
While the task of the junior officer is clearly defined, the higher commanders
have a more onerous duty to perform, with the most important to my mind being
preparing their command for war. At whatever level a commander may operate,
his main obligation lies in training his command and provisioning them with
the wherewithal to win a war as and when it is thrust upon a nation. They are
the ones who plan the operations, at both the strategic and tactical levels, from
the beginning to the end and, therefore, must have the foresight to visualise the
situation right till the terminal stage of the conflict. They must plan and cater to
contingencies so that the enemy’s weaknesses are fully exploited and own troops
are never unbalanced. Higher commanders have to manage the environment
and depending on the level at which they are operating, give the required military
advice to the political masters. My experience in the army had taught me that
higher commanders must have the ability to accept responsibility and not shy
away from it. As a consequence, they must be able to withstand the pressures
of war and not allow these pressures to percolate to the rank and file. I must
confess in all honesty that my commanders up in the chain of command gave
me a task and left its operational execution to me. Their unqualified support was
very much there in provisioning my troops with the war materials necessary to
undertake these operations.
At times, there were pressures which in the circumstances were
understandable, but these were not to the extent of unbalancing me or my
command nor did they lead to any hasty or irrational decision on my part. The
Chief of Army Staff (COAS) or the army commander or the corps commander
never interfered in the conduct of my operations and during their numerous
visits, were extremely supportive of my plans. Therefore, while the romantic part
of the war which deals with courage, bravery, deeds in the battlefield in direct
eyeball-to-eyeball contact with the enemy, is totally attributable to the young

officers and their leaders, the planning and ultimate The success
outcome of the war in the field rests squarely on or failure of
the shoulders of the higher leadership. The higher an operation
commander in the field, besides giving his approval finally lies in
or suggestions on a plan, has to also ensure that how well the
resources commensurate to the task are allocated plan is executed
to units and formations before they are launched on the ground
into battle. He has to coordinate the events on the and victory
entire battlefront and make doubly sure that his or defeat is
subordinate commanders and men have the fire accordingly
in them to bring victory. In one of my interactions measured by
with student officers in a school of instruction, the degree
I was asked as to whose war was it, and I replied of courage
that while we must give credit for our success in the or otherwise
Kargil War to the young officers or the middle rung displayed
leaders, I am convinced about where the blame by units and
would have rested in case of a defeat. formations.
Pakistan’s Strategy
A lot has been written on Pakistan’s attempts to foment trouble in Jammu
and Kashmir (J&K) at various stages of its history and the war in Kargil was
another such attempt. The aim which was very obvious and apparent was to
internationalise the J&K issue. Pakistan was well aware that near normalcy had
returned in the Valley, and perhaps it was time to open a new front to continue
with the thrust to internationalise the issue. Militarily, it planned to occupy
heights well within our side, so as to convert the line of intrusion into a de facto
LoC. Sartaj Aziz, the Pakistani foreign minister had repeatedly been commenting
about the “ambiguous” nature of the LoC. Politically, poor strategic calculus was
displayed by Pakistan, essentially on three major counts. Firstly, the operations
were launched without any consideration in its timing in relation to the Lahore
Summit. While politically, the Lahore Summit as a consequence of the visit of
the Indian prime minister saw a thaw in the relations between the two nations,
albeit shortlived, militarily, the planning and execution of the operation was in
full swing and was to cause a major embarrassment to India a few months later.
It is, indeed, difficult for us who are fortunately in a democratic environment
to comprehend the possibility of a national issue like the Kargil operations not
being discussed with the executive head of the country. Whether Gen Musharraf

Mohinder Puri
India’s discussed or briefed his prime minister on the details

retaliation of the operation which was perhaps underway
resulted in during the visit of the Indian prime minister, will
Pakistan continue to be remain shrouded in mystery, at least
coming out in the foreseeable future. The former Pakistan Prime
runners up in Minister, Nawaz Sharif, while in exile in Saudi Arabia,
a war which had confessed that he had been merely informed of
it should not some military action being contemplated in Kargil,
have ventured but was not kept in the picture of the details of the
into. operational plans; an allegation which has repeatedly
been denied by Gen Musharraf. An analysis of the
timing of the operation indicates that indeed the war in Kargil had been planned
and was being executed while Prime Minister Vajpayee was attending the
historical Lahore Summit.
I think the second miscalculation made by Pakistan in selection of the
timing of the attack was in doubting the Indian government’s capability of a
military response. Pakistan continued to tell us and the world that only militants
were operating and no regular troops had been employed. It is evident that the
Pakistani military leadership had not appreciated the retaliation from India,
particularly since a lame duck government was in power which was assessed to
be unable to display the political will in taking major retaliatory measures. The
fact that India did retaliate with its armed forces resulted in Pakistan coming out
finally runners up in a war which in the first place it should not have ventured
into.
The third miscalculation was based on Pakistan’s traditional relationship
with China. Pakistan perhaps appreciated that initiation of trouble on the J&K
borders would get unqualified support from China. It may be recalled that in 1965
and 1971, Pakistan had based its war plans on some form of tacit support from
China. However, in both these conflicts, except for cosmetic moral support in
terms of statements made by China, there was no attempt to physically intervene
in the conflict. Similarly, in Kargil, from Pakistan’s point of view, China’s response
and support was inadequate and like earlier conflicts, there was no military
intervention. China, since the last two decades, has been pursuing its economic
goals with foresight, vigour and determination and I feel that for the next two to
three decades, it will continue to strive for economic and military dominance. Till
it achieves its goal of acceptance as a superpower, it is unlikely to flex its muscles
and is more likely to display diplomatic maturity in handling sensitive issues. A

call to arms may perhaps be the last option which it While the
would like to exercise in the foreseeable future. reasons for not
crossing the
Crossing the LoC LoC may have
There may have been political compulsions for made political
India not to permit the military to cross the LoC. In sense, militarily
the first place, the sanctity of the LoC was violated it did not suit
by Pakistan which, for political reasons we did our tactical
not exploit, and as events later proved, it worked plans and
to our advantage in gaining some brownie points put us under
from the international community, particularly unwarranted
the US, for displaying utmost restraint in the face pressure. Wars,
of grave provocation. While the reasons for not if thrust upon a
crossing the LoC may have made political sense, country, must
militarily it did not suit our tactical plans and put be fought on
us under unwarranted pressure. Wars, if thrust the enemy’s
upon a country, must be fought on the enemy’s territory.
territory; unfortunately, in military terms, we failed
to achieve our objective.
It may be recalled that the Pakistan Army had occupied tactical heights on
our side of the LoC, with the deepest penetration being about 7-8 km, which
incidentally also dominated the national highway by observation. From these
localities, the enemy could bring down effective fire on us and in the initial
stages of the conflict, could successfully interdict the highway at Dras and
Kaksar. There were a number of times, both during day as well as at night, when
my motorcade was fired upon from these enemy intrusions. The enemy’s fire
had caused severe damage to our makeshift transit camp at Dras. Later, with
the induction of HQ 56 and 192 Mountain Brigade in Dras, the HQ was under
constant fire. Fortunately for us, the HQ was well dug down which prevented
any severe damage. With this pattern of deployment, our initial assaults were
tactically restricted. We had to launch operations from the flanks as the terrain
and the enemy’s deployment precluded any assault from the rear. However,
as the operations progressed, the opportunity to address the objectives from
the rear by crossing the LoC was very feasible, but our unambiguous terms of
reference did not permit us to cross the LoC.
While the army’s operations were adversely affected by our not crossing
the LoC, the impact of this decision on the conduct of the operations of the air

Mohinder Puri
force had more serious and wider implications. As mentioned earlier, the lay of
the terrain was such that for a successful air strike, the aircraft had to approach
the objective in a south to north direction; this would have resulted in crossing
the LoC. The air attacks perforce had to be launched in a west to east direction
which provided limited air space and restricted manoeuvrability. The end result
of this was our difficulty in accurately engaging targets and a considerable loss of
effectiveness of the air strikes.
I think the main reason for our policy of not crossing the LoC was to
demonstrate our ability to exercise restraint and, in the process, show ourselves
as a mature democratic power that held the high values of maintaining peace
at all costs, despite the provocation. Politically, we gained from adopting this
policy and were adequately patted for displaying maturity in handling this issue.
However, we also willy nilly accepted the LoC as the de facto international border.
While this may strengthen our case for lasting peace in J&K, it weakens our case
for claiming the entire J&K as an integral part of the country.
There was also a feeling that allowing the forces to cross the LoC would
escalate the situation and with both countries possessing nuclear weapons, the
results could have been disastrous. It is my firm conviction, adequately reinforced
over the years after the Kargil War that we should have called Pakistan’s bluff.
We were poised and balanced in terms of our offensive capability in J&K and
could have handled any response to Pakistan’s misadventure with the firmness it
deserved. On the western border as well, we were ready to take on Pakistan after
our mobilisation. As a result of our actions, I believe that the war would not have
crossed the nuclear threshold and would have remained localised to the Kargil
sector. The final decision in a functioning democracy, in any case, lies with the
political leadership and I am sure inputs from the Service chiefs must have been
taken in consideration of this option.
Ceasefire Declaration
The ceasefire was declared, although militarily our task of throwing back the
intruders across the LoC had not been fully completed. The announcement was
expected as enough indicators were available, pointing towards cessation of
hostilities between the warring states? Did the ceasefire declaration come at the
right time or could it have been delayed. There are pros and cons as to why the
government took the decision to declare the ceasefire, particularly at a time when
our tail was up and we were in a militarily advantageous position. There must
have been very good reasons for the government to take this decision and since

I am not privy to the thought process which went in to negotiate the ceasefire,
my view is purely from the battlefield and the impact which it had on all of us.
Some argue that the declaration of the ceasefire was inevitable. While there is no
issue regarding the declaration of the ceasefire, the timing of the announcement
is questionable. By the time the ceasefire was declared, we had the enemy on
the run, but by accepting it, we offered them an easy route to withdraw to their
country.
As expected, the enemy did not respect the terms of the ceasefire and
planted anti-personnel mines along their route of withdrawal: a route along
which we had to move to clear the area up to the LoC. In the process, we suffered
a large number of casualties which perhaps could have been avoided. One of
the positives of the ceasefire was that we saved on a number of casualties which
we would have inevitably suffered if the war had been prolonged. While every
commander ensures that his plans are executed with minimum casualties, this
should not be a prerequisite for cessation of hostilities. The over-riding factor
for a ceasefire should be dictated by answering a simple question of whether we
have attained our politico-military aims or not. In the Kargil War, while we came
out victorious, we allowed Pakistan an honourable escape route.
The above are some of the issues which come to mind as an aftermath of the
Kargil War. There are other issues as well as lessons learnt. Some of these have
been implemented in our schools of instruction as well in our training policies. I
am sure as we mature as a nation and as an army, we will fine-tune our responses
to our security threats.

Kargil: Dynamics of a
Limited War Against a
Nuclear Backdrop
GD Bakshi
Limited War in the First Nuclear Age

The aim of this paper is to examine the Kargil War as a landmark limited conflict
that was fought against a nuclear backdrop in South Asia. Kargil, therefore, is
very important for the crystallisation of a new Limited War Doctrine that would
be more pertinent and specific to the Asian context in general and the South
Asian context in particular.
It is noteworthy that most theories of limited war originated in the West
during the Cold War era. America had ushered in the nuclear age by employing
20 kilotonne (KT) airburst warheads on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and
Nagasaki. The Soviets had caught up by 1949. Thus, began the nuclear arms race
between the two superpowers. The world was trying to come to terms with this
paradigm shift brought about by the absolute nature of nuclear weapons. They
were so destructive that contemplating their use in a symmetric setting was a
logical absurdity. The Cold War in the West, therefore, did not transform into a
hot war or a shooting war. Nuclear weapons held the peace. Fielding dominant
war-fighting capabilities was the preferred way to deter and dissuade an
adversary from provoking conflict. An arms race, therefore, became a surrogate for
actual fighting during the Cold War era. The first nuclear age (in which the West
introduced nuclear weapons), therefore, was a relatively peaceful era. The basic
fact was that both the armed camps had just emerged from the most destructive
conflict in world history.
Major General GD Bakshi (Retd) is a national security analyst.

Kargil: Dynamics of a Limited War Against a Nuclear Backdrop
World War II had left most of Europe and the Fielding

Soviet Union in smoking ruins. Both sides were dominant
exhausted by the violent bloodletting. The Soviet war-fighting
Union itself had suffered 25 million casualties. Nazi capabilities was
Germany had suffered seven million killed. The the preferred
US, UK, France and the rest of Europe put together way to deter
had suffered a little over one million casualties. and dissuade
No protagonist of the Cold War, therefore, had an adversary
any stomach left for large scale warfare. In such a from provoking
context, nuclear weapons were entirely able to hold conflict. An
the peace during the Cold War. In fact, national arms race,
energies were consumed in a highly stylised nuclear therefore,
arms race backed by absurd civilian theories of became a
fighting nuclear wars. Herman Kahn’s theories of surrogate for
“thinking the unthinkable”, typified this genre. The actual fighting
stability-instability paradox came to the fore in during the Cold
this highly ritualised context of the Cold War. Chris War era.
Gagne had succinctly summarised this as follows,
“To the extent that the military balance is stable at the level of nuclear war, it will
become less stable at lower levels of violence.” The Soviet Union and China began
testing the status quo by promoting and assisting wars of national liberation in
Asia and Africa. This speeded up the process of decolonisation. Faced with these
low level provocations, the West found that the threat of using nuclear weapons
to respond to every crisis was just not tenable.
Bernard Brodie and William Kaufman were the Yale scholars who devised the
theories of Limited War in the Nuclear Age. In the 1950s, Kaufman theorised that
given the nuclear balance, “the communists would not only fight in the peripheral
areas but would also test the limits of US tolerance. Since the US response was
then premised on the “‘all or nothing,’ the Massive Response Doctrine (i.e. a
massive nuclear response to any conventional military violation of the status quo
or nothing at all) would be faced with hard choices. It would have ‘to put up or shut
up’. Shutting up would involve a serious loss of prestige and damage to the west’s
capacity to establish deterrence against further communist aggression.” Both
Brodie and Kaufman, therefore, developed the theories of limited war against a
nuclear backdrop. It was Kaufman who first came up with the notion of nuclear
thresholds. Robert E Osgood had written in 1957 that the decisive limitation upon
war is that of the objectives of war. Bernard Brodie was the leading exponent of

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the idea that war can be kept limited by placing restrictions on the use of force in
war. Limitations in war can be of three types:
n Limitations in aims and objectives.
n Limitations in space and/or in the time duration of the conflict.
n Limitations in the levels of weapons usage e.g. use / non-use of nuclear,
chemical, biological weapons or air power, etc.
The Limited War Doctrine implied that direct conflict between the two
superpowers must be avoided at all costs. A limited conflict, however, could take
place in the peripheral areas through local proxies. A limited conflict generally
ended in a negotiated settlement. Do these conditions apply to Asia?
The Western Experiences of Limited War

Worried about the US nuclear capability, the Soviet Union had refused to
demobilise its massive armies after World War II. This raised the spectre of a
massive torrent of Soviet tanks bursting across the Fulda Gap into Europe. Since
the West could not match the Soviets in sheer conventional military power, the
US responded with the “Massive Response Doctrine”. Any Soviet attack in Europe
would be met with a massive nuclear response that would target the Soviet
heartland.
Thus, the first test of the Limited War Theory came in Korea from 1950-53
itself. The Soviet Union had just acquired nuclear capability in 1949 and as such
the red lines/nuclear thresholds were not clear or defined. Though a limited
war, Korea was a massive conventional conflict—the Chinese had thrown in
a million men. The US and its allies had almost matched their force levels
and relied heavily on firepower and air power to defeat the highly motivated
manpower of the Chinese and North Korean Armies. The battle sea-sawed over
the length of the Korean Peninsula for three years. Gen MacArthur was sacked
when he proposed employment of nuclear weapons and air attacks on the
Chinese mainland. Limitations in the Western conflict implied not using nuclear
weapons and not violating the central sanctuary. Overall, the Korean War ended
in a military stalemate and a negotiated settlement that partitioned Korea along
the 38th parallel.
The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962

The Cuban missile crisis that occurred in 1962 clearly highlighted the unviability
of the Massive Response Doctrine. The major flaw was its all or nothing format.

The world came to the brink of war but no actual The Chinese built
shots were fired and a negotiated settlement led a minimalist
to the removal of Russian missiles from Cuba and nuclear deterrent
that of US missiles from Turkey. In many ways, simply to ensure
therefore, the Cuban missile crisis was more that nuclear
analogous to Operation Parakram in 2001-02 in weapons were
which India and Pakistan came to the brink of not used against
war, but no actual shot was fired. them by their
adversaries.
The Low Intensity Conflict Phase: The sub-text
Vietnam of the Chinese
This led to the evolution of the “Flexible Response minimalists
Doctrine” during the time of US Defence Secretary view was that
Robert McNamara. Limited war, however, took conventional
the form of low intensity conflict (LIC) in Vietnam wars could still
where the USA threw in some 550,000 troops and be waged by
made extensive use of air power. This LIC lasted deterring the
over a decade. Vietnam was a humiliating defeat nuclear threat.
for the US. However, it took its historic revenge
by imposing a similar LIC on the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. The Limited
War Doctrine in the Cold War era, therefore, went through these three stages of
evolution – from highly lethal conventional military conflict in Korea, to coercive
deployments and nuclear posturing in Cuba, to LIC in Vietnam. By and large,
however, the Cold War was relatively peaceful. There was no major deterrence
breakdown. Antagonism was sublimated in a military-economic competition,
with occasional outbreaks of limited wars or LICs in peripheral areas where the
two main protagonists were not directly involved.
The Second Nuclear Age

Paul Bracken (in his book A Fire in the East: The Rise of Asian Military Power in the
Second Nuclear Age), states that the second nuclear age began with India’s peaceful
nuclear explosion (PNE) in Pokhran in 1974. Today, there are five nuclear weapon
states in Asia. These are Russia, China, India, Pakistan and Israel. North Korea is a
de facto nuclear power and Iran is struggling to become one. What would be the
nature of limited wars in this Second Nuclear Age in Asia? The prime differences
are that the Asian nuclear powers are not separated by vast oceans. They have
land borders with one another. In most cases, there are strong rivalries, historical

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animosities and territorial disputes. Unlike in Europe, nationalism is not on the

wane in Asia. It is distinctly on the rise. In such widely differing circumstances,
will limited war in Asia resemble the Cold War experience in Europe? Will it
largely be confined to posturing, coercive deployments and exercises, and highly
stylised and over-hyped arms races? On the face of it, the contexts of Europe and
Asia are so different. The Chinese built a minimalist nuclear deterrent simply to
ensure that nuclear weapons were not used against them by their adversaries.
The sub-text of the Chinese minimalist view was that conventional wars could
still be waged by deterring the nuclear threat. The Chinese views of limited war
(or local wars under conditions of informatisation) envisage very high levels of
the use of conventional military force in limited wars. Let us not forget that the
Chinese had thrown in a million men into Korea and fought the US to a standstill.
In 1979, China decided to teach Vietnam a lesson and threw in 25 divisions. In
any limited war over Taiwan, China is likely to employ some 300,000 troops for
marine and airborne assault and throw in some 80 submarines and its entire
air force and fire some 1,000 conventional tipped missiles to prevent American
naval intervention in such a war. It would yet be called limited.
What about the Indo-Pak dyad? Seen superficially, India has tried to emulate
the Western nations on post-nuclear restraint. The limited war progression in
South Asia has so far, generally followed the Western Cold War model highlighted
above. However, it may not remain so for long. To determine which way it is likely
to unfold, it is essential to take a deeper look at the Kargil conflict as a seminal
limited war in Asia that was fought against a nuclear backdrop.
The Kargil Conflict

There were two competing schools of thought amongst nuclear theorists regarding
the nuclearisation of South Asia. The optimists like Kenneth Waltz had felt that
offsetting nuclear capabilities would be stabilising because they would make war
simply too costly to contemplate. The pessimists like Scott Sagan, however, felt
that the potential, danger of nuclear weapons would far outweigh any stabilising
effect. In particular, they had warned that the initial phase after nuclearisation
would be the most dangerous. Michael Krepon had specifically highlighted that
the most dangerous phase to control comes immediately after nuclearisation,
because the nuclear balance is unclear and red lines and thresholds have not
been defined. The Indian political elite were more inclined to go along with the
Kenneth Waltz formulation. Nuclear weapons it felt had made war a completely
untenable option. As such, it launched a bold peace initiative with a bus journey

to Lahore, with much publicity and fanfare. Concurrently, Robert G Wirsing

reports that a major back channel (Track II) peace initiative was launched to
work out a mutually agreeable formula to settle the Kashmir dispute out of the
media glare. RK Mishra (representative of the Indian prime minister) and Anwar
Zahid (representative of Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif) had some nine
rounds of discussions in New Delhi and Islamabad. The talks were being held
directly between the two prime ministers.
As per Wirsing, the Owen-Dixon Plan to partition Kashmir along the Chenab
was also discussed as a probable solution. However, as the dialogue was being
undertaken, Pakistan’s Northern Light Infantry Troopers had moved into the
areas of intrusion in Kargil. This was an amazing response to the Indian peace
initiative. It highlighted the highly fractured nature of the Pakistani polity and the
bizarre nature of decision-making in that nation. In effect, the Kargil intrusions
proved the nuclear pessimists like Scott Sagan and Michael Krepon right. In fact,
Krepon had highlighted that the initial phase after nuclearisation would be most
dangerous as the nuclear thresholds and red lines had as yet not been defined.
Military Hubris in Pakistan

Viewed in highlight, it is now clearly evident that the Chagai nuclear explosions
had induced a dangerous degree of hubris in the Pakistani military leadership.
They had pegged the nuclear threshold in the subcontinent at absurdly low levels.
They were confident then that they had acquired nuclear weapons capability;
it had stymied whatever conventional military edge India may have enjoyed on
the subcontinent. They were also convinced that India had no viable response
options to Pakistani sub-conventional provocations in Kargil. Should India
choose to conventionalise the conflict, international pressure would force India
to call it off in a week’s time or even less. This would leave Pakistan comfortably
in possession of gains it would make by infiltration.
Hierarchy of Motives
Robert G Wirsing highlights the fractured, cryptic and unmediated character
of Pakistan’s decision-making process that had come to characterise Pakistan’s
weak quasi-democracy in recent decades. There was not enough restraint
on impulse and derring-do. He further highlights the obsessive secrecy and
compartmentalisation on the need to know principle that is so destructive of
the synergy needed to fight a modern war. Lack of inner consultation within
the military on the decision to support such a plan left it unexposed to rigorous

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scrutiny. Even corps commanders and other Service chiefs were excluded from
the original consultative process.
Rodney Jones points out that the Pakistani plan for Kargil may have had a
hierarchy of motives. Wirsing has stated these as under:
n It was to gain an Indian road to shell in response to the Indian shelling of the
road across the Neelam Valley.
n It was possibly to pay India back for Siachen in April 1984. Did the plans
extend to actual recovery of the glacier by threatening the main logistical
lifeline? (Gen V P Malik writes that this plan had originally been proposed
in the tenure of Gen Mirza Aslam Beg. It had been proposed again by Gen
Musharraf when he was DGMO (Director General Military Operations) but
was shot down by Gen Janjua. Apparently, Gen Musharraf resurrected it the
moment he became the Pakistan Army chief.)
n Was it only to gain a qualified success to compel global attention on to
Kashmir? (Or to highlight it as a nuclear flashpoint and seek American
intervention to pressurise India to hand over Kashmir?)
The Lahore peace initiative and back channel diplomacy had lulled India into
complacency and greatly contributed to the degree of strategic surprise. Tactical
surprise was achieved by Pakistan by not inducting any additional formations
but by relying upon the local Northern Light Infantry formations. A clever signal
deception exercise was undertaken to generate militant radio traffic to convince
India that it was a maverick Mujahideen operation over which Pakistan had no
ostensible control. It was a fairly large scale operation in which the Pakistani
Northern Light Infantry troops infiltrated over a frontage of 180 km to a depth
of 8-10 km to bring the Srinagar-Leh highway under the range of direct firing
weapons and observed artillery fire.
India’s Response
India’s response to Kargil was fairly creative and innovative. After it got over
its initial surprise and the fog of war, it reacted in a coherent and deliberate
manner. The intrusion was first detected on May 3, 1999, by some local graziers.
Initially, it was felt that being terrorists, these were in the competence of the local
formations. The local brigade and division sent out a number of patrols and
launched numerous probing attacks. These suffered heavy losses but served to
fix the extent of the infiltration and generated useful contact intelligence. These
probing attacks also cleared the initial fog of war and crystallised the situation.

India then carried out a partial mobilisation of The primary

its armed forces. It built up two divisions worth limitation in
of troops in the area of intrusion and inducted the Kargil War
additional artillery. Permission was sought from was a space
the Cabinet Committee on Security to use the air limitation. India
force. This was initially turned down. However, deliberately
permission was finally granted on May 24, 1999. confined the
The Indian Air Force came in low to support the fighting to
ground troops and relearnt the lessons that the the area of
Israeli Air Force had learnt in 1973. The shoulder- intrusions in
fired surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and air defence Kargil.
(AD) guns proved lethal. Thereafter, air attacks
were kept outside the shoulder-fired SAM envelope. This greatly reduced the
accuracy of the air attacks. The number of precision guidance munitions (PGMs)
was limited but the air force came up with innovative solutions by using global
positioning system (GPS) guidance add-on kits. Deliberate ground attacks were
now mounted after methodical and systematic preparations. A hundred artillery
guns were lined up to support each battalion’s attack.
For this purpose, India milked additional artillery from its strike formations.
This preponderant artillery fire support shook up the Northern Light Infantry and
induced local shock and awe. The Indian infantry displayed tremendous grit and
tenacity as it launched near frontal attacks up narrow and serrated ridgelines.
Since India had confined its offensive to its own side of the Line of Control (LoC),
the world had no locus standi to intervene. It let this shooting war between two
nuclear armed neighbours rage on for over two months. Finally, yard by bloody
yard, the Kargil ridgelines were cleared of the intruders. The heroism displayed
by the Indian infantry was impressive. The young officers led from the front. This
had led an American correspondent to remark “The Indian Army is an army that
truly fights.” Pakistan had not thought beyond the first week or 10 days. They had
not catered for the employment of the Indian Air Force or the mobilisation of the
Indian Navy.
The Pakistani generals were thoroughly disabused of their absurd notions of
a one step escalation ladder in the subcontinent. They were shaken out of their
post-Chagai nuclear hubris. Nawaz Sharif rushed to Washington. He was coldly
left waiting and then asked to withdraw the remnants of his troops from the few
remaining heights they still had with them.

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Force Limitations in Limited War: Space Limitations

The primary limitation in the Kargil War was a space limitation. India deliberately
confined the fighting to the area of intrusions in Kargil. It instructed its troops
not to cross the LoC. As such, the West had no locus standi to ask for or impose a
ceasefire. It was appreciated that in this difficult mountainous terrain, operations
would perforce be slow paced, with slogging matches of attrition. As such,
crossing the LoC would have led to major international pressure for a ceasefire.
This would have put Indian forces under considerable time pressure and left
Pakistan in possession of most of its gains of the Kargil intrusions. Not crossing
the LoC stymied the international reaction.
This issue had generated a heated debate. By deciding not to cross the LoC,
India had constrained itself to a direct and frontal approach that was heavily
premised on attrition. A trans-LoC operation close to the intrusion sites could
have addressed the logistical base areas supporting the intrusion and forced
Pakistan to recoil. That would have been an indirect and innovative approach.
The Indian Army selected the more staid and frontal approach based perhaps on
a realist appreciation of the rates of advance in such terrain. The point at issue
is that if launched in an area where the force to space ratio is low, such offensive
operations, even in the mountains, can make rapid progress after the initial
rupture. The Shyok Valley operations of the Ladakh Scouts in the 1971 War are a
classic example.
However, India’s self-imposed restraint conferred upon it a major diplomatic
and information war advantage. In contrast to Pakistan’s irresponsible
adventurism and recklessness in a nuclear setting, the Indian response seemed
highly responsible, mature and restrained. It formed a striking contrast to
Pakistan’s crass and irresponsible behaviour. The world, therefore, let Pakistan
stew in its own juice for over two months. In this time, the determined Indian
slog of attrition was able to throw out the bulk of the Pakistani intruders from the
Kargil heights.
Long-Term Implications of Not Crossing the LoC

Though the immediate diplomatic pay-offs of not crossing the LoC were high, it
had some significant long-term implications. It almost served to cast the LoC in
stone and virtually conferred upon it the status of an international border (IB).
This could impose needless restraints on Indian options in future wars. Though
the violence of the Kargil response thoroughly disabused the Pakistani generals
of their post-Chagai nuclear hubris, not crossing the LoC gave a very wrong

signal. Peter Lavoy claims that it convinced By deciding

the Pakistanis that it was not so much nuclear not to cross the
deterrence that had worked in the Kargil LoC, India had
War, but Pakistan’s conventional deterrence. constrained itself
The Pakistani military was convinced that its to a direct and
post-Afghanistan, Zarb-e-Momin Doctrine frontal approach
had worked well. The Soviet withdrawal from that was heavily
Afghanistan had freed up Pakistan’s XI and premised on
XII Corps from its western front and given it attrition. A trans-
perceived conventional military parity with LoC operation
India. At the end of Kargil, the Pakistani military close to the
went into a self-congratulatory mode. Its intrusion sites
conventional military parity with India, it felt, could have
had worked wonderfully well. It had completely addressed the
deterred India from crossing the LoC or the logistical base
international border in hot pursuit operations. areas supporting
Peter Lavoy writes that by the time of Operation the intrusion and
Parakram, the Pakistani generals had shifted forced Pakistan to
95 percent of the weight of deterrence from recoil.
the nuclear to the conventional level. This
emboldened the Pakistanis to raise the ante and enhance the level of provocations.
They were certain that they would call India’s bluff of conventionalising the
conflict.
Pakistani jehadi outfits now attacked the Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) Assembly
and then the most iconic symbol of the Indian Parliament itself. No responsible
nation-state could have swallowed such an insult. In response, India now mobilised
its entire armed forces. (The mobilisation in Kargil had been partial.) It has been
speculated by Lt Gen VK Sood and Sawhney that the initial Indian intention was to
launch a limited trans-LoC operation. However, the Indian mobilisation took too
long and the initial window of opportunity was closed. The National Democratic
Alliance (NDA) government then came under tremendous international pressure.
It was assured by the American government that it had prevailed upon Pervez
Musharraf to call off support to the jehadi terrorists and wind up their camps.
Gen Musharraf did give a watered down speech to that effect on television. The
Indian massive force deployment had been highly credible so far. It was now
turned into a coercive deployment or a show of force exercise. The credibility of
this large force deployment petered off rapidly as there was not even a single actual

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combat engagement. The Pakistani perception that their conventional deterrence

had been highly effective had worked was reinforced. It had deterred India from
launching any live operations across the LoC or the IB. From the point of view of
the credibility of India’s deterrence, Operation Parakram turned out to be highly
negative. It only highlighted India’s compulsions and restraints. However, from
the deterrence point of view, India’s complete lack of any military response post-
Mumbai has been an unmitigated disaster for the signalling process that is so very
essential to the mind game of deterrence.
The problem with the Operation Parakram exercise was its massive all or
nothing format. To that extent, it suffered from the same infirmities as the “massive
response” strategy of the Cold War. After Cuba, that had to be transformed into a
“flexible response” strategy. In the realm of limited conventional wars against a
nuclear backdrop, India, therefore, has to do the journey from an “all or nothing”
massive response strategy a la Operation Parakram to a flexible war strategy that
exploits the full width of the escalation spectrum. To be just and proportionate,
Indian responses must start at the lower rungs of the escalation ladder and then
graduate upwards based on the enemy responses.
Viewed in these terms, Kargil was a far more effective compellence exercise
than Operation Parakram. Despite the difference in the scale of national
mobilisation (partial in Kargil, total in Operation Parakram), Kargil was far
more effective as a compellence exercise. To begin with, it involved actual
combat. Operation Parakram ended up as sound and fury, signifying nothing. In
retrospect, the long-term deterrence value of Kargil would have been even higher
if India had towards the end, crossed the LoC to hit the logistical base areas of the
intrusions in the Shaqma-Thanus bowl or towards Skardu-Gilgit.
Limitations in Use of Air Power

One of the excellent features of the Kargil operations was the innovative use of air
power and the credible threat of the employment of naval power. Gen Malik in his
memoir Kargil : From Surprise to Victory, has highlighted how as the Chairman
Chiefs of Staff, he had striven to build up a consensus within the Chiefs of Staff
Committee before going up to the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS). Thus,
on May 18, 1999, the army had sought clearance from the CCS on the use of
air power. This was turned down (considerable controversy has subsequently
attended this issue). The army was asked to clear the intrusions, exercising
restraint to avoid escalation of hostilities. Jaswant Singh, in his memoirs A Call to
Honour: In Service of Emergent India, has highlighted his initial objections to the

use of air power. On p.203 of his book, he states, Despite the

“It was my view that the use of the air force at this difference in the
point was not good policy. My reservations were scale of national
born out of two or three principle considerations. mobilisation
The sheer optical value of the air force is so much (partial in
greater, particularly in a limited and continental Kargil, total
conflict. That is why the loss of an aircraft in Operation
becomes so instantly an issue that catches the Parakram),
public eye as compared to the loss of even a Kargil was far
platoon of infantry.” He continues, “To ask the more effective as
air force to undertake these air missions within a compellence
such narrow, tight confines forced by the LoC exercise. To begin
was to send it on virtual suicide missions. And with, it involved
there was no way the political leadership would actual combat.
permit cross-LoC operations. As such, there were
but two routes for the air force to operate on
and both were extremely narrow funnels. Our missions could fly in this narrow
corridor either east or west or reverse. Thereafter, the fact of the LoC not being a
visibly marked line on the ground compounded difficulties.”
Gen Malik says that once the scale of the intrusion was realised, he tried
to build a consensus on the fact that India’s substantial superiority in the air
and on the seas must be brought to bear on the enemy to create the necessary
asymmetry not only in Ladakh and Kargil, but also the entire western border. Gen
Malik spoke separately with the two chiefs to build a consensus on this issue. The
Chiefs of Staff Committee met on May 23, 1999, to work out a joint stand. On May
24, 1999, the army chief briefed the CCS that in order to gain strategic initiative, it
was essential to employ air power and deploy the navy. This was finally given and
the IAF went into action on May 25, 1999.
It is true that it did take initial casualties as it flew low into the shoulder-
fired AD envelope. This forced the air force to deliver attacks from the mid and
high altitudes rather than the ‘lo-lo’ mission profiles (these are in any case highly
risky in the mountains). Since the IAF did not have a large inventory of PGMs, its
accuracy suffered greatly. It tried to overcome the same by strapping add-on GPS
guidance kits to its dumb (gravity) bombs. The employment of air power in this
limited war, therefore, generated a great deal of controversy.
However, in retrospect, it was a very correct and useful decision to employ
the air force and deploy the navy. It had a tremendous psychological impact

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on Pakistan and the rest of the world. It underlined India’s resolve not to take
the intrusions lying down. It brought to bear India’s substantial superiority in
air power and naval power on this limited conflict. It made the Indian threat of
escalation highly credible. The optical and psychological impact of Operation
Safed Sagar indeed was very high. The media leveraged the shock value of the
use of air power. The complete domination of the sky by the IAF over the area of
intrusion itself served to demoralise the Northern light Infantry troopers in the
area of intrusion. In combination with the artillery, it served to mass effects and
generate an element of shock and awe. Above all:
n It prevented Pakistani helicopters from resupplying the Northern light
Infantry posts. These were reduced to starvation diets and there were reports
of the Northern Light Infantry troopers trying to eat ice to survive.
n It interdicted the logistics supplies of the infiltrators by hitting the logistics
base of Muntho Dhalo.
n In concert with the artillery, it served to stun and add a significant element of
shock and awe over the Kargil battlefield. It was this which disintegrated the
resolve of the well entrenched troops to fight. Indian infantry assaults were
thereafter able to ferret them out at the point of the bayonet.
In historical terms, one of India’s strategic blunders was not to use air power in
the 1962 War against China. Most limited wars in Asia have seen restrictions upon the
use of air power. China did not use air power against India in 1962 (it was not in its
interests to do so, for air operations from Tibetan airfields suffered from significant
constraints). That was the least reason, however, for India not to respond with air
power. In fact, the non-use of air power in 1962 itself was a disaster. It would greatly
have reduced the scale of the disaster and made up for our lack of preparation. China
has always been land power- centric and infantry oriented. It made limited use of air
power in Korea and no use of air power in its invasion of Vietnam in 1979.This was
simply an outcome of its relative weakness in air power.
Mercifully, Kargil was different. The use of air power was a welcome break
from the Asiatic traditions of not employing air power in limited conflicts. The
trend sprang from China’s relative weakness in the domain of air power. India
had a relative edge in air power compared to Pakistan (and locally over China).
Not to exploit an edge in battle makes no military sense. In fact, the experience
of Operation Parakram and our post-Mumbai lack of response indicate that air
and naval powers are far more precise and flexible tools with which to respond
to sub-conventional provocations. Air and naval mobilisations are much faster

than ground mobilisations. Their optical value in an era of telematic wars is

far, far higher. Thomas Schelling calls limited war an exercise in psychological
pressure tactics rather than a means of concrete destruction. In classical war-
fighting terms, the employment of air power sets the stage for the purposive use
of ground forces. Armies can make no headway unless air power and naval power
projection sets this stage. That is the prime lesson of recent military history.
Kargil has set a fine and healthy trend in this regards. The era of single Service
wars is long past. The prime requirement of the modern battlefield is synergy
and harmonisation of response. We must resolve never to repeat the mistakes
of 1962. The global trends indicate that air or naval power must lead the way
for limited wars in Asia. Ground-based operations generate far more of the fog
of war and cannot be as precise and flexible as air power or naval aviation and
cruise missiles. As we commemorate the heroes of Kargil, we must take its lessons
to heart. The best feature of this war was its openness, and the fund of literature
generated in India was a refreshing contrast to earlier wars.
References
1. Bernard Brodie, The Absolute Weapon (Yale University Press, 1952).
2. Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Ageversity (Yale University Press, 1988).
3. Gen V P Malik, Kargil: From Surprise to Victory (New Delhi: Harper Collins Publishers,
2006).
4. The Kargil Review Committee, From Surprise to Reckoning (New Delhi: Sage Publishing,
2000).
5. Robert G Wirsing, Kashmir in the Shadow of War: Regional Rivalries in a Nuclear Age
(Armonk, NY: M E Sharpe, 2003).
6. Jaswant Singh, A Call to Honour: In Service of Emergent India (New Delhi: Rupa & Co.,
2006).
7. Gen Pervez Musharraf, In the Line of Fire: A Memoir (New York: Free Press, Simon &
Schuster, 2006).
8. Gaurav C Sawant, Dateline Kargil (Delh: ABC Publishers,2000).
9. Amarinder Singh, A Ridge Too Far (New Delhi: Vikas Publishers).
10. S Kalyanaraman, “Operation Parakram : An Indian Exercise in Coercive Diplomacy”,
Strategic Analysis, Vol. 26, No. 4 October–December 2002, p. 485.
11. T V Paul, Asymmetric Conflics: War Initiation by Weaker Powers (London: Cambridge
University Press).
12. Henry D. Sokolosky (ed.), Pakistan’s Nuclear Future : Worries Beyond War, Strategic Studies
Institute, US Army, January 2008 (http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army/mil/)

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13. Dr E Sridhar, The India-Pakistan Nuclear Relationship : Theories of Deterrence and

International Relations (New York: New Delhi: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group,
London, 2007).
14. Stephen P Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan (Washington: Brookings Institution Press,
2006).
15. Swaran Singh, Limited War: The Challenge to US Military Strategy (New Delhi: Lancers
Books, 1995).
16. William Kaufman, Military Policy and National Security (Yale University Press, 1956).
17. William Kaufman, The McNamara Strategy (Yale University Press, 1964).
18. Henry Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (New York: Simon & Schuster,
1979).
19. Robert E Osgood, Limited War Revisited (Westview Press, 1979).
20. Herman Kahn, On Thermo Nuclear War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961).
ISBN 978-81-87966-63-0
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Pakistan’s Strategic
Blunder at Kargil
Gurmeet Kanwal
Cause of Conflict: Failure of 10 Years of Proxy War

India’s territorial integrity had not been threatened seriously since the 1971 War
as it was threatened by Pakistan’s ill-conceived military adventure across the
Line of Control (LoC) into the Kargil district of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) in the
summer months of 1999. By infiltrating its army soldiers in civilian clothes across
the LoC, to physically occupy ground on the Indian side, Pakistan added a new
dimension to its 10-year-old ‘proxy war’ against India. Pakistan’s provocative
action compelled India to launch a firm but measured and restrained military
operation to clear the intruders.
Operation ‘Vijay’, finely calibrated to limit military action to the Indian side of
the LoC, included air strikes from fighter-ground attack (FGA) aircraft and attack
helicopters. Even as the Indian Army and the Indian Air Force (IAF) employed their
synergised combat potential to eliminate the intruders and regain the territory
occupied by them, the government kept all channels of communication open
with Pakistan to ensure that the intrusions were vacated quickly and Pakistan’s
military adventurism was not allowed to escalate into a larger conflict. On July
26, 1999, the last of the Pakistani intruders was successfully evicted.
Why did Pakistan undertake a military operation that was foredoomed to
failure? Clearly, the Pakistani military establishment was becoming increasingly
frustrated with India’s success in containing the militancy in J&K to within
manageable limits and saw in the Kashmiri people’s open expression of their
preference for returning to normal life, the evaporation of all their hopes and
desires to bleed India through a strategy of “a thousand cuts”. Prime Minister
Brigadier Gurmeet Kanwal (Retd) is Director, Centre for Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi.

Gurmeet Kanwal
Nawaz Sharif’s government appeared to be inclined to accept India’s hand of

friendship, in keeping with the mood of popular opinion within Pakistan, and
was committed to opening up trade, liberalising the visa regime and encouraging
people-to-people, cultural and sports contacts. Though it did not feature in
black and white in the Lahore Declaration of February 1999, the acceptance
of the concept of the LoC as a permanent border between India and Pakistan
was gaining currency due to the strong public opinion in this regard in both
countries.
Pakistan’s military establishment was apparently unable to come to terms
with the fact that more than ten years of its concerted efforts in destabilising India
through its proxy war in J&K had yielded almost no tangible gains at all. Peace with
India would have also led to a diminishing role for the army in Pakistan’s affairs
and this prospect must have caused immense concern to the military leadership.
It was in such a scenario that, in an act more of desperation than anything else,
the Pakistan Army and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) directorate decided to
launch an organised intrusion into unheld remote areas of Kargil district to once
again ignite the spark of militancy and gain moral ascendancy over the Indian
security forces. They failed miserably in this endeavour.

Pakistan’s Strategic Blunder at Kargil
Pakistan’s Operation Badr Pakistan’s

The overall strategic aim of Pakistan in engineering military
these intrusions under the facade of Kashmiri establishment
militancy was obviously to provide a fresh was apparently
impetus to the flagging jehad and again attempt unable to come
to focus international attention on the Kashmir to terms with
issue. In the Dras, Mushko Valley and Kaksar the fact that
sectors, the military aim was to sever the Srinagar- more than ten
Leh National Highway (NH) 1A to isolate Kargil years of its
district and cut India’s lifeline to Leh with a view toconcerted efforts
eventually choking supplies and reinforcements in destabilising
to Indian troops at Saltoro Ridge across the India through
Siachen Glacier. Failing the full achievement of its proxy war
this aim during the summer months of 1999, the in J&K had
Pakistan Army hoped to establish a ‘firm base’, yielded almost
occupied by regular soldiers, from which traffic no tangible gains
on the Srinagar-Leh highway could be disrupted at all.
at several places by trained mercenaries within
one day’s return march. Occupation of high mountain features overlooking NH
1A was also expected to provide a lucrative opportunity to interdict the highway
accurately through artillery fire. Another military aim in these sub-sectors was to
open up a new route for infiltration into the Kashmir Valley and the Doda region
south of the Pir Panjal range over the Amarnath Mountains.
In the Batalik and Turtok Valley area, which adjoins the Siachen glacial belt,
Pakistan attempted to establish a firm base with a view to eventually advancing
along the Shyok Valley to cut the only road link to India’s Siachen Brigade. As an
aim plus, the Pakistan Army had also planned to physically occupy a chunk of
real estate on the Indian side of the LoC in Kargil district to use as a bargaining
counter subsequently, particularly in respect of future negotiations for a mutual
withdrawal from the Siachen Glacier. The capture of 12 trained mercenaries
in the Turtok sector revealed that a larger aim was also to spread Islamic
fundamentalism in Ladakh. Their interrogation brought to light that Pakistan
had planned to execute its Turtok operation in four phases:1
n Phase 1 – Infiltrate militants into the area to subvert locals and initiate
insurgency.
n Phase 2 – Launch operations to occupy critical areas around Turtok and
the adjacent areas.

Gurmeet Kanwal
n Phase 3 – Launch heliborne/airborne operations in the rear areas of

Turtok sector to facilitate operations of ground forces.
n Phase 4 – Declare Turtok and its adjacent areas as part of the Northern Areas.
As per an Indian Army Headquarters assessment, Pakistan had the following

military aims:2
n Cut off the strategic National Highway 1A (Srinagar-Leh highway).
n Alter the status of the LoC.
n Give impetus to insurgency in Kashmir Valley and elsewhere in J&K.
Even though the actual intrusions took place some time during the spring
months of 1999, preparations had clearly been underway for a long time.3 The
major operational task of intruding into Indian territory across the LoC was
allotted to Force Commander Northern Areas (FCNA), a division-size force.
Pakistan’s regular Northern Light Infantry (NLI) battalions were to be employed for
the purpose.4 Well-trained fundamentalist mercenaries from Pakistan Occupied
Kashmir (POK), Pakistan and several other Islamic countries, armed, equipped,
trained and funded by the ISI, were given a supporting role.5 Their presence in
the area was designed to hoodwink the international community into believing
that the intrusions were a part of the Kashmiri people’s “indigenous freedom
movement” and that the Pakistan Army had no role to play.
During the period from September 1998 to March 1999, when Zoji La Pass
(which separates Kashmir Valley from the Ladakh region of J&K) on the Srinagar-
Kargil-Leh highway was closed and the upper reaches of the entire Kargil
district were snow-bound, the Pakistan Army was engaged in making extensive
preparations for the intrusions planned for the following summer. Additional
artillery units6 were inducted from Pakistan’s 11 Corps at Peshawar.7 Throughout
the winter, the nominated regular troops of the NLI, Chitral and Bijaur Scouts
and selected Special Service Group (SSG) commandos, carried out extensive
training in high-altitude warfare. Headquarters 62 Infantry Brigade of Pakistan
was responsible for operations in the Kargil sector. A logistics and operational
base for the operations was established at Olthingthang. The Northern Areas
were placed under Pakistan Army rule to deny access to the media and “facilitate
optimal exploitation of resources.8
Due to the militarily impassable nature of the terrain, especially for large-
scale sustained military operations, it had been the practice on both the sides to
hold only the tactically important features throughout the year. Some additional

posts were normally established during the summer months when the snow
began to melt. These were used primarily as patrolling bases from which long-
range patrols (LRPs) could be launched to keep the more sensitive areas under
surveillance. For over 27 years since the Indian and Pakistan Armies had been at
eyeball-to-eyeball contact along almost the entire length of the LoC in J&K after
the 1971 War, Pakistan had never disputed the delineation of the LoC in the Kargil
sector.9 Both during 1997 and 1998, Pakistan’s efforts to infiltrate large groups of
Islamic mercenaries through the Mushko Valley sub-sector had been thwarted.
121 Independent (I) Infantry Brigade, with its headquarters at Kargil, was
responsible for operations in the Kargil sector. The brigade group formed part
of 3 Infantry Division at Leh which was responsible for operations in Ladakh,
including the 140-km-long LoC in Kargil district up to NJ 9842, along the 110-km-
long Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL) at Siachen Glacier and along the Line
of Actual Control (LAC) against China.10 With only three infantry battalions on its
order of battle, the defensive dispositions of 121 (I) Infantry Brigade on the LoC
included several large gaps in relatively less threatened areas.
The Pakistan Army’s nefarious designs in this sector took India’s military
planners by surprise. In launching its ill-conceived military adventure in the
spring of 1999,11 Pakistan breached the provisions of the Shimla Agreement and

Gurmeet Kanwal
violated the sanctity of the LoC that had been assiduously maintained by both the
sides since 1972. After the heavy snowfalls were over, NLI soldiers transgressed
the LoC in large numbers in Mushko Valley, Dras, Kaksar and Batalik sub-
sectors and established themselves on the top of high mountain ridgelines (see
map). They quickly set about building bunkers and sangars, bringing forward
their heavy weapons including shoulder-fired Stinger surface-to-air missiles
(SAMs), dumping ammunition, rations and other military stores and laying anti-
personnel land-mines.12 In all, the intruders were estimated to have numbered
approximately 2,000,13 though during May 1999, estimates of their total strength
had varied from 800 to 1,000.14
The extent of intrusions varied from an average four to five kilometres to
a maximum of seven to eight kilometres. On average, each major ridgeline was
held by 40 to 60 NLI soldiers under the command of an officer. Besides personal
weapons with the troops,15 each post was provided and made self-contained in
battalion support weapons such as heavy, medium and light machine guns, rocket
launchers, automatic grenade launchers, mortars, anti-aircraft guns (which could
also be used in the ground role against assaulting infantry) and Stinger SAMs.16
Large numbers of plastic anti-personnel mines were indiscriminately laid along
the expected approaches to the ridgelines. It was ensured that neighbouring
posts were in ‘mutual support’ so that an attack on one could be seriously
interfered with by one or more other posts. In short, the extent of preparation
of the defences proved beyond doubt the involvement of the troops of a regular
army, and the Indian Army had no illusions about what it was up against.
India’s Heroic Fightback

The first reports of the intrusions came in to an army unit in the Kargil sector
from the local people on May 6, 1999.17 Two reconnaissance patrols that were
expeditiously despatched to investigate went missing on May 8 and 10, 1999. On
May 9, 1999, Pakistan artillery achieved a direct hit on the ammunition dump in
Kargil and it went up in smoke. Extensive patrolling immediately followed over
the next few days. The depth of Pakistani intrusions and the extent of preparation
soon became evident and plans were made to evict Pakistani troops from the
Indian side of the LoC as early as possible and with the least possible casualties.
The Indian government also stipulated that the LoC was not to be crossed so as
to avoid escalation to a larger conflict.
The military strategy was to contain-evict-deny, that is, to immediately
contain and limit the intrusions up to the areas already affected, then prepare

for, and evict, the Pakistani soldiers from the The military
Indian side of the LoC and, finally, enhance strategy was to
surveillance, patrolling and deployment, where contain-evict-
necessary, to ensure that the Pakistan Army deny, that is,
is denied the opportunity to launch such a to immediately
venture again. Army Headquarters realised that contain and limit
maximum available firepower would need to the intrusions
be requisitioned, including that of the IAF, to up to the areas
soften enemy positions by way of coordinated already affected,
preparatory bombardment to reduce the combat then prepare
potential of the enemy’s posts and break his will for, and evict,
to fight before infantry battalions could launch the Pakistani
physical assaults to regain each position. Cabinet soldiers from
approval for air strikes against the enemy the Indian side
positions within own territory was sought and of the LoC and,
obtained. The first wave of air-to-ground strikes finally, enhance
was launched by FGA aircraft of the IAF on May surveillance,
26, 1999. patrolling and
In view of the fact that the Tiger Hill and deployment.
Tololing complex dominated the Srinagar-Leh
highway, the highest priority was accorded to the eviction of the intruders from
these features. Next in order of priority was the Batalik-Turtok sub-sector as
it provided access to the Siachen region through the Shyok River. (The Turtok
sub-sector has since been renamed as Haneefuddin sub-sector after Capt
Haneefuddin, a gallant young officer who sacrificed his life in the area.) Relatively
lower priority was given to the Mushko Valley and Kaksar sub-sectors as the
intrusions in these areas had much less tactical significance.
Besides 3 Infantry Division, additional troops of 8 Mountain Division,
engaged in counter-insurgency operations in the Kashmir Valley, were inducted
into the Kargil sector. While 3 Infantry Division remained responsible for the
Batalik and Kaksar sub-sectors, responsibility for the conduct of operations in
the Dras and Mushko Valley sub-sectors was assigned to 8 Mountain Division.18
Additional infantry battalions, artillery regiments and engineers units were
inducted from other sectors in J&K on an as required basis.19 Logistics plans were
fine-tuned to sustain the additional forces in the difficult terrain of the Kargil
sector. Fortuitously, Zoji La Pass opened in early May 1999 (it normally opens
only by mid-June every year) and the induction of additional combat forces and

Gurmeet Kanwal
logistics units became possible when it was most required. Specialised equipment
and extreme cold climate clothing necessary for fighting at super high altitudes
were rushed in from various sectors.
While additional troops were building up and acclimatisation was
underway,20 attempts were made to get around the intruders’ positions and cut
off their supply lines. These efforts were only partially successful due to the
lie of the ground and the dominating observation that the intruders enjoyed.
Along with regular troops, special forces troops were employed for such tasks.
Meanwhile, a vigorous debate was on in the country regarding the need to
cross the LoC in order to bring the intrusions to a quick end with minimum
casualties. Many senior defence analysts strongly recommended that the
restraint imposed on the army and the air force by the government must be lifted
and a free hand should be given to the defence chiefs to conduct operations.
A small minority continued to advocate restraint.21 However, the government
resolutely withstood all pressures to cross the LoC and clarified that if such
a course of action became militarily necessary, the Cabinet Committee on
Security would consider it.
The initial progress in evicting the Pakistani NLI forces from their high
mountain perches was slow and casualties were high. At most places, specialised

mountaineering skills were necessary. As the Thus, as an

weary attackers gained ground and closed instrument of
in with the enemy, they were subjected to national power,
withering small arms fire. However, as more the Indian Navy
and more artillery batteries were inducted and played its part in
began to pulverise the Pakistani positions with convincing the
devastating salvos, Indian attacks gathered Pakistani military
momentum and major heights like Tololing, leadership of
Khalubar and Tiger Hill began to fall in quick the futility of
succession. prolonging the
On June 10, 1999, the Pakistan Army returned Kargil conflict
the horribly mutilated bodies of six soldiers of a and underscored
battalion of the Jat Regiment.22 These brave men the importance
had been taken prisoner, tortured in custody to of harnessing
the point of death and then their bodies had the maritime
been mutilated. The whole nation was shocked dimension
by this barbaric act by the soldiers of a so-called to achieve
professional army. There was no expression national security
of regret or apology from either the Pakistani objectives.
political and diplomatic establishments or from
the military hierarchy.23 “Such conduct,” said Mr. Jaswant Singh, India’s minister
for external affairs, “is not simply a breach of established norms, or a violation of
international agreements; it is a civilisational crime against all humanity; it is a
reversion to barbaric medievalism.”24 No other single incident served to solidify
Indian resolve as much as this gross violation of the Geneva Conventions.
Strategic Moves
While a ‘war-like’ situation prevailed in Kargil25, Pakistan heightened military
tension all along the rest of the LoC. There were increased exchanges of small
arms, artillery and mortar fire, which resulted in casualties to army personnel and
civilians on both sides. Consequently, thousands of civilians in border areas like
Akhnoor, which had witnessed intense fighting during the 1965 and 1971 Wars
between India and Pakistan, abandoned their villages and their land and moved
to safer places.26 The Indian Army carried out selective precautionary deployment
of certain defensive field formations along the International Boundary (IB) with
Pakistan and the Pakistan Army reciprocated. India’s 6 Mountain Division was
inducted into Ladakh “partly through Upshi-Manali and partly through Zoji La.”27

Gurmeet Kanwal
The national press also reported certain strategic military movements and
these must undoubtedly have convinced Pakistan that any attempt to enlarge
the conflict would have serious repercussions for its survival as India was fully
prepared for further Pakistani adventurism. However, the Washington Post report
on July 26, 199928, that “desert elements of India’s ‘strike force’ had been detected
loading tanks, artillery and other heavy equipment on to flatbed rail cars by
American spy satellites and that India was preparing to invade its neighbour,” was
far from the truth and was denied and rejected as “ill-conceived and unfounded”
by the official spokesperson of India’s Ministry of External Affairs.29 Stephen P.
Cohen of the Brookings Institution characterised the Washington Post story as
exaggerating the “nature of the conflict in order to exaggerate the importance of
the US role.”30
In a precautionary move, the Indian Navy deployed the Western Fleet to deter
Pakistan and to ensure that no attempt could be made by Pakistan to launch a
“low intensity insurgency attack”31 on Indian onshore and offshore assets such
as harbours and oil rigs. The naval deployment was subsequently stepped up to
a ‘more visible profile’ in a calibrated manner. The area of the planned annual
exercises of the Eastern Fleet was shifted to the western seaboard. As per Ikram
Sehgal, a Pakistani commentator, this was interpreted in Pakistan to mean that the
Indian Navy was prepared to enforce a “quarantine or blockade the coastline”,32 if
needed, to secure the withdrawal of Pakistani intruders from Kargil. Thus, as an
instrument of national power, the Indian Navy played its part in convincing the
Pakistani military leadership of the futility of prolonging the Kargil conflict and
underscored the importance of harnessing the maritime dimension to achieve
national security objectives. The deployments and manoeuvres also gave the
Indian Navy an opportunity to test its operational readiness.
Endgame in Kargil
Finding the Indian government unrelenting in its resolve to evict every intruder
from its territory, Pakistan’s Prime Minister, Mian Nawaz Sharif, rushed to
Washington in the first week of July 1999 and agreed in his talks with President
Bill Clinton of the United States that Pakistan would pull out its troops from
Kargil. India’s resounding victory at Tiger Hill, the news of which came even as
Prime Minister Sharif was meeting President Clinton, contributed significantly
to Pakistan’s capitulation. As a face saving device, Pakistan’s widely anticipated
pullback was couched in euphemistic terms. Pakistan would “appeal to the
Kashmiri freedom fighters to pull out from their positions in Kargil,” the Pakistan

government announced – the same so-called Mujahideen over whom the

Pakistan government had repeatedly emphasised that it had no control!
At the request of the Government of Pakistan, a meeting was held between
the Indian Director General of Military Operations (DGMO) and Pakistan’s
Director of Military Operations (DMO) at the Attari (Wagah) Border Outpost
near Amritsar on July 11, 1999, to chalk out a time-frame for Pakistani forces to
withdraw from Indian territory. The Pakistani DMO agreed that the Pakistani
withdrawal, which had already commenced at first light on July 10, 1999, from the
Kaksar sub-sector, following his telephonic talks with the Indian DGMO prior to
their meeting, would begin on July 11, 1999, in the remaining areas and would be
completed by first light on July 16, 1999.33 As always, the Pakistanis failed to keep
their word and sought an extension, which was rather magnanimously granted.
Even after the extended deadline, the Pakistani intruders remained entrenched
in small numbers in one pocket each in Dras, Mushko Valley and Batalik sub-
sectors and were eventually physically evicted by July 25, 1999, after suffering
heavy losses.
On July 26, 1999, the Indian DGMO declared at a press conference that all the
Pakistani intruders had been evicted from Kargil district.34 The DGMO also revealed
that Pakistan was yet to implement the understanding arrived at between the two
armies that neither side “should take up new positions within 1,000 metres of the
LoC as a confidence building measure (CBM) in order to ensure that there was
no fresh tension on the LoC.” It has been the experience in the past that Pakistan
almost never reciprocates India’s noble intentions. Eventually, this proposal also
fell by the wayside. In any case, Pakistan has historically never set much store by
bilateral agreements. Its Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz’s statement before coming to
India during the Kargil conflict that the LoC was “not clearly demarcated”35 was as
gross a travesty of the truth as can be committed by a high government official.
A large quantity of arms and ammunition, equipment and clothing items
was recovered from the recaptured posts established by the Pakistani intruders.
Some of the major weapons recovered were as under:36
n 12.7 mm anti-aircraft guns – 4
n Heavy machine guns – 46
n Grenade/rocket launchers – 19
n 81 and 120 mm mortars – 12
n 37 mm twin barrel air defence gun – 1
n Stinger SAM with launcher – 1
n 23 mm air defence gun – 1

Gurmeet Kanwal
n 14,5 mm KPVT – 1
n 105 mm howitzers (without barrels) – 3
n Rifles (G-3/AK/Chinese/M-16/sniper) – 198
India paid a heavy price for Pakistan’s strategic misadventure in Kargil: 25

officers and 436 other ranks (OR) made the supreme sacrifice for a just and noble
national cause, 54 officers and 629 OR were wounded, many of them maimed for
life. Pakistan lost an estimated 45 officers and 700 OR, mainly of the NLI, in over two
months of bitter fighting and gained absolutely nothing militarily, diplomatically
or politically. After its military humiliation in 1971, Pakistan notched up one more
stinging military defeat for which its army feels compelled to take revenge.
In the final analysis, while all the Arms and Services contributed significantly
to the concerted effort to evict the Pakistani regulars from the Kargil sector, the
victory belonged to the indomitable courage and selfless devotion to duty of the
Indian infantryman and the overwhelming firepower of the artillery and the IAF.
The infantry battalions of the Indian Army that participated in the literally and
metaphorically uphill task of evicting the well-entrenched intruders, upheld
the highest traditions of courage under fire of the Indian Army and, in fact,
wrote a new saga of triumph against seemingly insuperable odds. The young
company commanders and the artillery’s forward observation officers (FOOs)
led from the front by personal example and thus motivated their troops to
perform outstanding acts of gallantry. Moreover, the Indian soldier showed his
unflinching resolve to win every battle in the “Year of the Jawan” announced by
Gen V P Malik, the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS PVSM, AVSM, ADC).37 For their
exceptional and exemplary valour and grit in the heroic battles in Kargil, the
COAS honoured 11 infantry battalions, three units of the Regiment of Artillery
and two reconnaissance and observation squadrons of the army with the special
award of Unit Citation.38
Throughout the Kargil conflict, the Pakistan government’s propaganda
machine continued to maintain that the intruders were “Kashmiri freedom
fighters” and that Pakistan had no control over their actions, despite the irrefutable
evidence furnished by the Indian government regarding the involvement of
regular NLI battalions and SSG commandos of the Pakistan Army. The Pakistan
Army, which had initiated the intrusions, had perhaps convinced its government
that this was indeed the case. It was difficult to believe that a professional army
would disown its regular soldiers and refuse to claim its dead. Under Gen Pervez
Musharraf, the Pakistan Army not only suffered a humiliating military defeat in

Kargil, it also sank to an abysmal depth in the eyes Artillery

of military professionals all over the world. firepower plays
The retreating NLI troops had left behind a major part in
the bodies of their comrades at the high-altitude achieving victory
mountain ridgelines that they had surreptitiously on the modern
occupied. Some of these were half buried in battlefield.
shallow pits. Some others had simply been covered Accurate artillery
by rocks and some were left out in the open. All of fire reduces
them were honoured with the Pakistani flag and the enemy’s
39
given a decent burial by Indian troops. Besides defences to
captured arms, ammunition and equipment, a rubble. Sustained
plethora of clinching documentary evidence 40 artillery fire
was provided by the Army Headquarters at New gradually
Delhi to the media and the diplomatic corps wears down
regarding the conduct of operations at Kargil by the enemy’s
the Pakistan Army. Pakistan’s aim in using mainly resistance and
NLI soldiers as cannon fodder was apparently ultimately breaks
to limit the casualties to soldiers belonging his will to fight.
mainly to Pakistan Occupied Kashmir so that
body bags arriving in Lahore and Rawalpindi did not lead to a national uproar.
Only the Pakistan Army could have practised such perfidy on its fellow citizens.
Commentators the world over have labelled the Pakistan Army a “rogue army”.41
Military Lessons: Enhancing Surveillance and Firepower

There is no doubt that the lion’s share of the credit for the military victory in
Kargil must go to the infantry battalions of the army for their unparalleled
grit and determination and indomitable courage under withering fire while
fighting to recapture prepared defensive positions in perhaps the most difficult
terrain anywhere in the world. However, it needs to be acknowledged that the
infantrymen’s extremely difficult task was made much easier by the concentrated
firepower of the FGA aircraft of the IAF and the guns, rocket launchers and mortars
of the Indian artillery. Narrow ridgelines and jagged mountaintops make poor
targets. Yet, if the IAF and the artillery achieved the success that they eventually
did, credit must be given for their ability to improvise and find technical solutions
to peculiar military problems.
Approximately 5,000 artillery shells, mortar bombs and rockets were fired
daily from 300 guns, mortars and MBRLs.42 “9,000 shells were fired the day Tiger

Gurmeet Kanwal
Hill was regained.”43 The much-maligned Bofors FH-77B 155mm gun proved
to be outstanding. The 130mm medium guns and the indigenously designed
105mm Indian field gun played a significant role and so did the 122mm MBRL
Grad BM-21. Mortars of artillery regiments that rendered yeoman service in the
Kargil conflict included 120 mm mortar and the 160 mm heavy mortar. Had
longer range MBRLs such as Smerch, which has a range of about 100 km, been
available, it would have been possible for the Indian artillery to hit Skardu from
Kargil.
It emerged clearly that artillery firepower plays a major part in achieving
victory on the modern battlefield. Accurate artillery fire reduces the enemy’s
defences to rubble. Sustained artillery fire gradually wears down the enemy’s
resistance and ultimately breaks his will to fight. By systematically degrading
the enemy’s fighting potential before a physical assault is launched, the
artillery helps to reduce the casualties suffered by assaulting infantrymen.
It has been estimated that 70 to 80 percent of the casualties on both sides of
the LoC were caused by artillery fire.44 Throughout the offensive phase of the
Kargil conflict, artillery was called upon to respond to emerging situations and
it did so with alacrity and telling lethality. The infantry battalions involved in
the fighting were the first to acknowledge the immense debt of gratitude that
they owe to their artillery comrades.
For too long has the nation been dependent on the grit, determination
and indomitable courage of infantrymen to keep the peace on the borders and
restore adverse situations. While battles will continue to be ultimately won by
infantrymen launching physical assaults under withering enemy fire to capture
tactically important features of terrain, state-of-the-art military technology
can and must be employed to reduce the present dependence on the supreme
sacrifice of hundreds of young men to safeguard India’s territorial integrity. The
Indian Army’s heroic efforts to recapture the high-altitude mountain ridges from
Pakistan’s regular army forces in the Dras, Batalik, Kaksar and Mushko Valley areas
of Kargil district have dramatically highlighted the need for the early acquisition
and deployment of sophisticated surveillance and early warning devices
and precision strike munitions with the artillery and IAF. The much-vaunted
revolution in military affairs (RMA) must be exploited to deliver a devastating
punch and reduce armed forces casualties.
India needs to acquire state-of-the-art military satellites and aerial and
ground surveillance systems to guard against a repeat performance of Kargil
‘99. There is an immediate need for military satellites with a sub-one metre

resolution and multi-spectral (optical, infrared In view of

and radar photography) capability, so that they the current
are effective by both day and night. Satellite and emerging
surveillance must be beefed up and an acceptable threats, the
degree of redundancy achieved through the use defence
of remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs) and ground budget must
surveillance means such as battlefield surveillance be increased
radars (BFSRs) and unattended ground sensors gradually to
(UGS) in remote areas. Regular army aviation this level if
reconnaissance sorties need to be flown to detect ‘many more
intrusions and offensive military activity across Kargils’ are to
the LoC, the AGPL in Siachen and the LAC with be avoided.
China while flying within own territory. Electronic
surveillance means should be used to gain information about the plans and
movement of Pakistan’s regular troops and so-called Mujahideen mercenaries.
The IAF needs to supplement these efforts through its own reconnaissance
flights using long-look optical systems (LLOS), infrared line scan (IRLS) and
synthetic aperture radars (SAR). The IAF should acquire additional surveillance
assets, where necessary, and should provide independent inputs to a national-
level intelligence collection, collation, compilation, analysis, synthesis and
dissemination centre. Quite obviously, HUMINT (human intelligence) means
cannot be neglected and need to be appropriately strengthened. Only then, will
it be possible to develop a comprehensive border surveillance and intelligence
acquisition plan to defeat a belligerent adversary’s nefarious designs. Finally, a
responsive, real-time intelligence dissemination system must be instituted so
that the concerned field commanders can be informed well in time to enable
them to thwart infiltration and intrusion plans.
Once a threat from across the borders has been discerned, the intruding
forces have to be destroyed quickly so that the sanctity of the LoC can be restored.
The artillery, firing 155-mm precision strike ammunition, can best perform this
task, particularly in high-altitude mountainous terrain. Today, laser-guided
artillery shells can destroy bunkers, bridges and small buildings with a single-
shot kill probability as high as 80 percent. Targets which can be seen by the troops
in contact with the intruders can be ‘designated’ (illuminated by a laser beam) by
a ground-based artillery observer (spotter) carrying a laser target designator and
those which are behind crest lines and on reverse slopes can be designated by an
airborne artillery observer in an army aviation helicopter.

Gurmeet Kanwal
Improved conventional munitions (ICMs) shells carrying anti-personnel

grenades and lethal ‘air-burst’ ammunition can be ‘dispensed’ over soft targets
such as administrative bases, rations and fuel storage dumps, headquarters and
rest areas. Though precision strike munitions are relatively more costly than
standard high explosive (HE) shells, these ‘smart’ and ‘intelligent’ munitions are
more effective since only a direct hit from a ‘dumb’ artillery shell can destroy a
bunker. If these are made available in large quantities, artillery can cause much
greater destruction and indirectly reduce the number of casualties that the infantry
has to suffer when the inevitable assault is finally launched. Gun locating radars for
effective counter-bombardment, unarmed aerial vehicles (UAVs) equipped with
TV cameras and suitable for high altitude operations, powerful binoculars for target
acquisition and engagement by day and long-range night vision devices for the
same purpose at night will increase the capacity of the regiment of artillery to act
as a force multiplier on the modern battlefield by several orders of magnitude.45
IAF aircraft that are to be employed for ground strikes also need to be
armed with precision strike munitions to achieve a telling effect. Only laser-
guided and TV-guided bombs can provide the necessary accuracy. Ideally, the
IAF should be equipped with a specialised, dedicated ground strike aircraft
suitable for the mountains. Such an aircraft would also cost only a fraction
of the cost of multi-role aircraft such as the Mirage-2000. Advanced attack
helicopters (AAH) which are light and capable of operating in Himalayan
terrain, can also launch precision strikes and need to be added to the air-to-
ground strike arsenal.
Quoting Jasjit Singh, former director, IDSA, Jairam Ramesh wrote during the
conflict that armed forces “modernisation tends to be cyclical and is undertaken,
if at all, in spurts.”46 After the Kargil conflict and recent terror strikes, it is to be
hoped that appropriate lessons have been learnt by Indian decision-makers
and that long-pending decisions on urgent equipment acquisition will be taken
expeditiously and that the progressive decline in the defence budget since the
end-1980s will be reversed. An annual defence budget of between 3 to 3.5 percent
of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is sustainable. In view of the current and
emerging threats, the defence budget must be increased gradually to this level if
‘many more Kargils’ are to be avoided.
Conclusion
Ever since independence, Pakistan has engaged in relentless confrontation with
India. Since the creation of Pakistan, successive governments in Islamabad have

sought with varying degrees of intensity to destabilise India, wreck its unity and
challenge its integrity. Though the situation in Kargil has stabilised due to the
deployment of 8 Mountain Division, India must remain on guard against more
such sinister operations being launched by the vengeful and devious military
leadership of Pakistan with a hate-India mindset and the mentality of primitive
warlords. It would be futile to hope that internal instability, international pressure
or economic compulsions will dissuade the Pakistanis from embarking on such
trans-LoC excursions in future. The government must send a clear message to the
Pakistani leadership that there is a limit to India’s patience and tolerance and that
India will consider harder options if there is no let-up in the relentless proxy war
being waged from across its western border by the Pakistan Army and the ISI.
After the Mumbai terror attacks, it will be a long time before public
opinion within India once again backs a government effort to negotiate a
final solution to the Kashmir issue with Pakistan. Any further talk of accepting
the LoC as a permanent border between India and Pakistan will have to be
shelved for some years, as the present anti-Pakistan mood of the Indian public
will not change easily. However, the need to deescalate the present situation
and to institute CBMs is unquestionable. Political negotiations for these must
proceed even if a final solution to the dispute appears to be a distant dream
at present.
The most important strategic lesson for India from the Kargil imbroglio
is that a country cannot afford to be complacent and let down its guard on
matters of national security. The progressive decline in the defence budget
since the process of economic liberalisation began in 1991, even as the threats
from across the borders and internal threats and challenges increased manifold,
has drastically affected the armed forces ability to modernise and to prepare
for the type of war they are now being called upon to fight. The inescapable
requirements of national security cannot be compromised. In international
politics, the policy of mutual friendship and cooperation with one’s neighbours
has to be balanced with vigilance. A neighbour’s capacity to damage one’s
security interests should never be underestimated, leave alone disregarded.
Notes
1. Army Headquarters Press Release dated June 11, 1999. Throughout the Kargil conflict,
joint briefings were conducted daily by the official spokespersons of the Ministry
of External Affairs, the Indian Army and the Indian Air Force. These briefings were

Gurmeet Kanwal
extensively covered by the Indian and international media and were followed with
immense interest all over India. Along with television and news coverage from the
front, these media briefings were to a large extent responsible for generating a wave of
nationalism and for uniting the Indian people together as one entity.
2. Pakistan Army’s Misadventure in Kargil, published by the Army Liaison Cell, Army
Headquarters, New Delhi, p. 8.
3. The Pakistan Army purchased large quantities of specialised mountaineering
equipment from several West European firms months before the hostilities in Kargil
commenced. The equipment included special thermal jackets, snowmobiles, snow
tents and 50,000 pairs of snow boots. (Ravi Bhatia and Dinesh Kumar, “Shopping
Spree Preceded Intrusion”, The Times of India, June 24, 1999.) Also see, Prem Shankar
Jha, “The Lessons of Kargil”, Outlook, August 9, 1999, p. 34.
4 In 1973, the Northern Scouts, Karakoram Scouts and Gilgit Scouts were reorganised
as the Northern Light Infantry (NLI) regiment of the Pakistan Army. Almost 85 percent
of NLI troops are from Gilgit and Baltistan and 49 percent are Shia Muslims. “The
NLI battalions specialise in commando operations, snow warfare and anti-heliborne
operations.” (Pakistan Army Misadventure).
5. The ISI had fixed a compensation of US $ 19,000 for those killed and $ 8,500 for the
mercenaries injured during the Kargil operations. (“6 Pak Troops Killed, two Militants
held”, The Times of India, June 9, 1999.)
6. As per Army Headquarters estimates, a total of 20 artillery batteries were provided
to the NLI battalions for supporting the intrusions. (Pak Army Plan for Intrusions,
published by the Army Liaison Cell, Army Headquarters, New Delhi, p. 4.)
7. Praveen Swami, “A Long haul Ahead”, Frontline, July 2, 1999, p. 11.
8. Pakistan Army’s Misdventure.
9. Delineation of the Line of Control, published by the Army Liaison Cell, Army
Headquarters, New Delhi, p. 6.)
10. Shishir Gupta, “Redeployment of Forces Likely in Kargil”, Hindustan Times, June 4, 1999.
11. Lt Gen Javed Nasir, ex ISI chief, wrote on June 26, 1999, “They occupied the vacant
Kargil heights as early as January-February this year and kept building stocks and
improving defences for the next four months.” (Islamisation of Pakistan’s Military,
published by the Army Liaison Cell, Army Headquarters, New Delhi, p. 16.)
12. J N Dixit, “Invasion of Kargil”, Hindustan Times, June 23, 1999. Also see “The Ghosts of
Lahore”, Telegraph, May 30, 1999.
13. Maj Gen Ashok K Mehta, “How Kargil Was Won Back”, Sunday, July 18-24, 1999.
14. Ranjit Bhushan and others, “Kargil, Post Mortem”, Outlook, July 26, 1999.
15. The NLI battalions are organised on similar lines as other regular battalions of the

Pakistan Army. Besides all battalion support weapons, they hold sophisticated night
vision and communications equipment. (Northern Light Infantry, published by the
Army Liaison Cell, Army Headquarters, New Delhi, p. 5.)
16. Lt Gen Krishen Pal, GOC 15 Corps at Srinagar, said that the Pakistani posts had as
much firepower as is generally available to a regular infantry battalion. (Dinesh Kumar,
“What it Took and the Run-up to Operation Vijay”, The Times of India, July 19, 1999.)
17. A G Noorani, “Questions of Accountability”, Frontline, July 2, 1999, p. 22-23.
18. Harinder Baweja, “War by Proxy”, India Today, July 26, 1999, p. 49.
19. Defence correspondents covering the Kargil conflict estimated that up to four
additional brigades were inducted into the Kargil sector to clear the intruders.
(Harinder Baweja, “Peak by Peak”, India Today, June 14, 1999.
20. Lt Gen Krishen Pal, GOC, 15 Corps, stated that it took three weeks to build up an adequate
offensive potential and that the acclimatisation of troops took up to 12 days.
21. Lt Gen V R Raghavan (Retd), “Crossing LoC Not End in Itself”, Hindustan Times, June
29, 1999.
22. “Barbarians at the Gate”, The Times of India, June 11, 1999. Also see, Ashwani Kumar,
“Pakistan’s Barbarity: Crimes Against Indian Soldiers”, The Times of India, June 17, 1999.
23. “Uniform Disgraced”, The Times of India, June 12, 1999.
24. Sukumar Muralidharan, “High Stakes, Hardening Positions”, Frontline, July 2, 1999.
25 The situation was characterised as war-like by Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee on
May 31, 1999. (“Soldier’s Hour”, India Today, July 26, 1999, p. 23.
26. Swami, “A Long Haul Ahead.”
27. The COAS stated this in an interview. (Maj Gen Ashok K Mehta, “The Kargil Campaign
is a Good Tonic for the Country and the Army”, Sunday, July 18-24, 1999.
28. “Clinton Helped Avert Indo-Pak War”, The Times of India, July 27, 1999.
29. Vinod Taksal, “India Debunks ‘Post’ Report”, TheTimes of India, July 28, 1999.
30. L. A. Joseph, “Posting an Untruth”, Outlook, August 9, 1999, p. 38.
31. C Uday Bhaskar, “The Maritime Dimension”, Economic Times, July 21, 1999.
32. Joseph, “Posting an Untruth”.
33. Army Headquarters Press Release dated July 11, 1999. Also see, “Lull after Storm as Pak
Troops Start Withdrawing”, Economic Times, July 13, 1999.
34. “Last Three Pockets of Intrusion Vacated”, Hindustan Times, July 27, 1999.
35. “Sartaj Says LoC not Clearly Demarcated”, The Times of India, June 4, 1999.
36. Pakistan’s Army Misadventure.
37. Maj Gen Ian Cardozo (Retd), “A Soldier’s Story”, Sunday, July 18-24, 1999.
38. Baatcheet, No. 14, July 1999, published by the Army Liaison Cell, Army Headquarters,
New Delhi.

Gurmeet Kanwal
39. The army recovered 249 dead bodies of Pakistani regular soldiers from the area of
operations in Kargil; 244 dead bodies were buried as per military norms with religious
rites; five bodies were accepted by Pakistan and taken back. Two prisoners of war were
taken; both belonged to 5 NLI.
40. Pakistan Army Intrusions in Kargil, published by the Army Liaison Cell, Army
Headquarters, New Delhi.
41. The barbaric torture and mutilation of the bodies of Indian prisoners of war has been
roundly condemned by military and political leaders and diplomats the world over.
The complete lack of professionalism and propriety exhibited by the Pakistani Army
has led to its being labelled a ‘rogue army’. Opposition leader and former Pakistan
Prime Minister, Ms Benazir Bhutto, in a statement calling for the ouster of Prime
Minister Nawaz Sharif, also echoed this sentiment: “Pakistan stands isolated in the
international community and its army is today being called a rogue and a terrorist
army.” (“Benazir Calls to Oust Sharif”, Hindustan Times, July 29, 1999.)
42. “Kargil War: The Facts”, India Today, July 26, 1999, p. 32.
43. Pranab Dhall Samanta, “The ‘Gunners’ War”, Sunday, July 18-24, 1999.
44. Jha, “The Lessons of Kargil”.
45. Most of the deficiencies in artillery equipment listed in this chapter were pointed out
by Lt Gen Krishen Pal, GOC, 15 Corps.
46. Jairam Ramesh, “War and Costs”, India Today, June 28, 1999.

Kargil 1999: Limited War,
Unlimited Consequences
Rahul K Bhonsle
Introduction
In the 60 years of conventional conflict in the Indian subcontinent, operations in
Kargil 1999 or Operation Vijay marked a turning point in the evolution of Indian
war-fighting. For a war which lasted for less than 60 days from contact to severance
between opponents, this may seem an overstatement. Yet the overall context,
reactions and consequences attributable to the Kargil conflict would substantiate
this proposition. Kargil also marked the turning point in Indo-US relations. India
came to be regarded as a responsible nuclear actor in the international arena
leading to the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership, culminating in the Indo-US
Nuclear Deal and 123 Agreement.
The localised limited war, as the operation is being referred to by some,
was the first fought under the nuclear overhang in the traditional Cold War
paradigm of deterrence and within the sub-text of the stability-instability
paradox. Kargil also marked a significant shift in conventional doctrinal thinking
in the Indian military, which was subsequently refined after the experience of
Operation Parakram, to the Cold Start.1 An examination of this transformation
and its impact in the conventional warfare discourse in the years ahead needs
consideration. Kargil, thus, provides an important benchmark to flag a number
of issues in perspective. This paper posits that while operations in Kargil in
1999 were restricted in scope, their consequences have been far-reaching. The
paper would cover the issues, including setting the trend in security sector
reforms; implications of the Line of Control (LoC) as the international border;
transformations in Kashmir from militancy to proxy war; LoC formalisation
Brigadier Rahul K Bhonsle (Retd) is a national security analyst.

and Indian war-fighting strategy; Kargil, Parakram and Cold Start Doctrine;
and Kargil and nuclearisation.
Setting the Trend in Security Sector Reforms

One of the first impacts post Kargil was a review of the national security
structure and responses. While such appraisals have been carried out earlier,
for the first time, these were openly discusse,d thereby denoting a new trend
of transparency not just in the security sector but the overall functioning of
the Government in India. Kargil, thus, set the tone for 21st century security
sector reforms in the country. It was the first time that a committee was set
up and its findings were placed before the general public. The Kargil Review
Committee (KRC) Report brought to light many grave deficiencies in India’s
security management system, particularly in the areas of intelligence, border
and defence management which were subsequently addressed by a Group of
Ministers (GoM) to suggest institutional measures to overcome the drawbacks
observed.
The impetus that the KRC and GoM provided to security sector reforms has
set an important benchmark. This also led to recognition of national security as
a complex dynamic which needs to be addressed institutionally. Many changes
have, thus, been brought about over a period in security management. These
organisational measures have facilitated overall reorganisation of defence
structures, streamlining multiple facets of internal and external security though
these may not have manifested in the manner it was originally intended. Since
much has been said and written about the reforms in security undertaken post
the KRC, apart from benchmarking it as an outcome of the Kargil conflict, this is
not being dwelt upon any further.
Line of Control as International Border

An important outcome of the Kargil conflict was reaffirming the sanctity of the
LoC as a de facto international border, thereby defining the geography of the
conflict with Pakistan in the future. While the Shimla Agreement and the Lahore
Declaration had established the commitment of the governments on both sides
to do so, surprisingly the military in Pakistan seemed to believe that the LoC was
alterable, albeit by an intrusion by the so-called, “Mujahideen”.
India had the option of questioning the status quo once this violation
took place. This was an operationally desirable alternative providing space for
manoeuvre by the Indian forces to evict the intrusion. However, this option was

Kargil 1999: Limited War, Unlimited Consequences
voluntarily abdicated. As Chief of the Army Staff, India had

Gen Ved Malik writes in Kargil: From Surprise to the option of
Victory, during the Kargil operations, the term of questioning the
reference for not crossing the LoC was given in a status quo once
Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) meeting this violation
and was one of the principal riders placed by then took place.
External Affairs Minister Mr. Jaswant Singh and This was an
reiterated by the National Security Adviser, Mr. operationally
Brajesh Mishra. 2 desirable
This decision can be surmised to have alternative
been taken keeping in view the diplomatic and providing space
nuclear factors and consequent possibility of for manoeuvre
major power intervention.3 The limitations on by the Indian
crossing the LoC to an extent were dictated by an forces to evict
understanding that Pakistan would not concede the intrusion.
a major defeat and would retaliate with nuclear
weapons.4 The military accepted this decision without much discussion given
the sound premise on which it was based. For the international community,
India’s decision not to cross the LoC also separated the victim, India, from the
aggressor, Pakistan.5 While this was the imminent advantage that accrued, in
the long term it deemed to convert the LoC into a de facto international border.6
It is not clear, however, if the intent of the Indian leadership in not permitting
transgression of the LoC was to attain this objective or was for other reasons,
as indicated above.
Clearly, this unofficial status of the LoC as the international border has
dictated the course of Indo-Pakistan relations and possibly even resulted
in a détente in the days ahead. As Dr S Chandrasekharan of the South Asia
Analysis Group states, Kargil established the inviolability of the LoC thus, “The
mainstream international perception, thanks to Kargil, is veering round to the
view that the Line of Control cannot be altered unilaterally when both sides are
nuclear capable.”7 The Kasuri interview and the Track II negotiations between
Ambassador Satinder Lambah and former Pakistan President Musharraf’s close
confidante, Tariq Aziz, as indicated by G Parthasarthy in the The Times of India
highlight that a virtual understanding on the sanctity of the LoC had been reached
with former President Musharraf.8,9 Musharraf seemed to suggest the same in his
address at the India Today Seminar on March 7.10 It may not be far-fetched to
believe that Kargil set the ball rolling for such an agreement. Though in the time-

Rahul K Bhonsle
frame that this came about, other factors such as rejection of Pakistan’s strategy
of proxy war by the people of Jammu and Kashmir seemed to have played an
important role.
Kashmir: Militancy to Proxy War

In the domain of counter-insurgency, post Kargil, Pakistan increased the scale
and level of proxy war in Kashmir. It is believed that on January 7, 2000, Gen
Musharraf gave a directive to the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) to intensify
terrorist activity in Jammu and Kashmir through the activities of the Lashkar-
e-Taiyyaba and the Harkat-ul- Mujahideen.11 Thus, intensity of terrorist
operations increased across the board and engulfed the Jammu region to cover
Poonch, Rajauri and Doda, extending to Udhampur. Another substantive shift
was that of suicide attacks, with the first happening in July 1999 on a Border
Security Force camp in Bandipore.12 On November 5, this came much closer
to the centre of gravity of the army’s operations in Kashmir, Headquarters
15 Corps in the high security zone of Badami Bagh Cantonment. The public
relations officer, Major Purshottam fell a victim along with four others.13 This
phase of suicide attacks continued through to 2002 with the most significant
one occurring on December 13, 2001, on the Indian Parliament. This led to
Operation Parakram, deployment of troops across the LoC and the international
boundary for almost a year.
There were other indications of increase of intensity of terrorist operations
by Pakistan such as increase in incidents of infiltration in Kashmir from 1,611 in
2000 to 1,812, in 2001 and 1,604 in 2002 which started tapering to 770 in 2003.14
Similarly, in the Jammu region, the number of terrorists increased from a low of
690 to a high of 1,300 in 2001.15 The induction of more Pakistan-based terrorists
of the Lashkar-e-Taiyyaba, Jaish-e-Mohammad et al was the third facet which
denoted to the Indian leadership the overall dimensions of militancy which had
transformed from a politico-military campaign based on indigenous fighters to
proxy war waged by Pakistani citizens wielding the gun.
However, the Indian reaction stymied the Pakistani intent by an effective
counter- proxy war strategy with a comprehensive policy of sustained anti-
militancy operations, intelligence build-up, economic development and
rehabilitation of the Kashmiri pandits.16 The results were evident in November-
December 2008 with the people opting for elections despite vituperative
propaganda by the separatists.

LoC Formalisation and Indian The Indian

War-Fighting Strategy reaction stymied
The traditional sequence of Indo-Pakistan Pakistani intent
wars has been two-phased: gradual escalation by an effective
in the LoC sector in Jammu and Kashmir from counter- proxy
infiltration and skirmishing on the tripwire war strategy with
to conventional operations followed by a comprehensive
manoeuvres astride the international border. policy of
This phasing arose from a perception of the sustained anti-
LoC as an alterable, ill defined cartographic militancy
alignment with a holders-keepers syndrome. operations,
Post Kargil, the entire Indo-Pakistan intelligence build-
geographical barrier: international border, up, economic
LoC and Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL) development and
came to be regarded as one continuum for rehabilitation
operations. Evolution of the Cold Start Doctrine of the Kashmiri
which specifically presages battle groups pandits.
operating in Punjab and Rajasthan in case
of a conventional operation to respond to a terrorist strike, seems to bear out
this surmise.17 Operational, tactical as well as logistics problems of conduct of
operations in the mountains no doubt had an impact on this decision, but the
implicit belief of a graduated response across the LoC to be escalated on the
international border has been reversed, with firming in of the LoC as not just the
de facto but the ipso facto international border after Kargil.
However, a corresponding operational dividend is not evident in the No
War, No Peace posture on the LoC. Deploying 8 Mountain Division which has
the unique motto of “Forever in Operations” in Kargil led to depriving the army
of a mobile offensive formation trained for operations in the mountains. Fearing
just such a scenario, the Kargil Review Committee had warned that eyeball-to-
eyeball deployment should not be adopted, calling it a “trap of Siachenisation of
the Kargil heights and similar unheld gaps.” Instead, it advocated, “a declaratory
policy that deliberate infringement of the sanctity of the LoC and cross-border
terrorism will meet with retaliation in a manner, time and place of India’s
choosing”.
The issue was very clearly beyond the purview of the military for loss of
territory ab initio and a “declaratory policy” would necessitate political approval.
Any transformation in response by the army necessitated considerable debates

Rahul K Bhonsle
in security circles which had not taken place, thus, leading to adoption of the
most acceptable course. The overall defensive mindset could have also led to
such a response. While in areas of Jammu and Kashmir, the necessity to control
infiltration is also one of the primary reasons for such a deployment, in Ladakh
and Kargil, there is no requirement of deploying regular troops, given that the
LoC is now an internationally acceptable “border”.
Two factors seem to have influenced deployment on the LoC/ AGPL: the
experience during Kargil and in the Siachen Glacier, of heavy casualties in
recapturing heights lost to the enemy and lack of cartographic clarity. The Indian
Army is loath to give up posts such as Bana on the Siachen Glacier, with the
justified fear that once abandoned, it would be virtually impossible to reclaim the
same in case it was occupied by Pakistan. Similarly, as the cartographic alignment
was somewhat disputed, particularly with reference to certain dominant points
on the LoC such as Point 5353 and Point 5070 in the Dras sector and similar
features in other areas, deployment of troops was the safe option exercised by
commanders in the front line.
The performance of 8 Mountain Division during Operation Parakram
seemed to substantiate the prevailing wisdom of defensive deployment. The
extensive domination of the LoC by this formation had led, as per a report
by Sanjay Ahirwal of the news channel NDTV, to dismissal of the entire
Pakistani chain of command, including the brigade commander, and the
divisional commander of the Northern Areas for their general failures and
particularly the loss of Point 5070 in the Dras sector.18 That their counterpart
on the Indian side, Lt Gen Deepak Summanwar was awarded the Uttam
Yudh Seva Medal is an acknowledgement of the total Indian dominance of
this area. As Ahirwal states in his report for the Indian military, “Operation
Parakram was seen to have shown off India’s resolve to have an eyeball-to-
eyeball confrontation with Pakistan. It also helped achieve some political
and military objectives”.19
Let us examine the alternative. Instead of deployment of troops on the
ground for extended periods, the Kargil Review Committee had recommended
development of intelligence through satellite imagery and high altitude
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), with arrangements to disseminate information
so generated to make it widely available for imposing caution on Pakistan for a
misadventure. Thus, the need to occupy the heights, a large number of which
were over 5,000 metres, requiring specially acclimatised and equipped troops for
extended periods, was to be avoided.

Kargil and firming of the LoC, thus, provided the Indian side an adequate
capability for responding with minimal deployment of forces. While the
vulnerability of the road linking Srinagar and Leh in close proximity of the LoC
was one of the premises on which Pakistan had conducted the intrusion in Kargil,
establishment of sanctity of the LoC negated this premise. While the possibility of
using this as a route for infiltration continued, this was restricted to the window
of summers extending from May to October.
This provided the Indian forces an opportunity to reshape their operational
doctrine in the area and, as suggested by the Kargil Review Committee, avoid
“Siachenisation”. By laying a tripwire of surveillance, early warning devices and
selected physical deployment of troops, retaining mobile reserves ready for
offensive operations at the bases, any possibility of ingress by Pakistan could
have been avoided. That this was within the realms of tactical possibility was
demonstrated by lessons derived from infantry operations in Kargil. Given the
integrated air and land fire support means, particularly direct firing 155mm
artillery guns, well trained and motivated units such as 2 RAJRIF, 13 JAKRIF and
8 GRENADIERS amongst others, demonstrated the efficacy of eviction of the
enemy from heights approximating 5,000 metres.
A key indicator of capability of infantry in the mountains is recycling of
troops carried out for attacks on more than one objective. Thus, 2 RAJRIF and
18 GRENADIERS participated in operations in Tololing and soon after in Tiger
Hill. Captain Vikram Batra of 13 JAKRIF was awarded the Param Vir Chakra
posthumously for leading attacks on Point 5140 in Tololing and Ledge in Point
4875 complex, indicating the tactical feasibility of assaulting these features.
There was a golden opportunity for reviewing the operational doctrine in
the area from a defensive one to that of offensive defence which would have been
less taxing on the troops. Underlying, of course, is an assumption that temporary
loss of territory is acceptable. This solution may, however, not be applicable to
the Siachen Glacier at present, given that the AGPL has not been delineated and
accepted by both sides.
Kargil, Parakram and Cold Start Doctrine

The doctrinal aversion in the Indian military has been a bane of the past. In an
interview with Praveen Swami, the Chief of the Army Staff, Gen Padmanabhan
during Operation Parakram lamented that lack of an appropriate military
doctrine and definition of war objectives undermined the overall impact of the
long stand-off with Pakistan.20 The dichotomy in the doctrine was evident, as the

Rahul K Bhonsle
general reiterates, that while some in Delhi wanted the army to strike terrorist
camps immediately after the December 13 attacks, he preferred to muster
enough forces to ensure that Pakistani forces were comprehensively defeated
thus, “If you really want to punish someone for something very terrible he has
done, you smash him. You destroy his weapons and capture his territory.” The
limited strikes would have been, as per Gen Padmanabhan, “totally futile.”21 A
prominent drawback faced to attain this aim was location of offensive formations
in depth areas with 1 Corps based in Mathura, 2 Corps in Ambala and 21 Corps in
Bhopal. The defensive formations which were located close to the international
border/LoC had limited capability to strike. Thus, starting a war in January 2002
would not have attained the desired objectives.
The general, reputed for being a cerebral chief stated, “You could certainly
question why we are so dependent on our strike formations and why my holding
corps don’t have the capability to do the same tasks from a Cold Start? This
is something I have worked on while in office. Perhaps, in time, it will be our
military doctrine.”22 Today, this has been translated into the much talked about
Cold Start doctrine, thereby creating a limited offensive capability in the holding
or pivot corps.
The use of defensive formations for a limited offensive role was also seen for
the first time in Kargil, a concept which has been applied in Cold Start. 8 Mountain
Division and reserve brigades such as the 79 Mountain Brigade were employed
for the offensive, rather than 6 Mountain Division. The former was considered
to be more appropriately placed, acclimatised for combat and suitable to strike
than a formation which had a primary offensive role in the mountains. Given the
problem of a short window of opportunity, employing forward deployed pivot
formations for offensives which could later be converted into launch pads for
strike formations may have been the underlying intent which could be derived
from such a move apart from other local factors.23 When applied in the context
of the Cold Start Doctrine, employment of pivot formations may also provide
an “operational LoC”, the culmination point of offensive operations by the
pivot corps. By imposing a time delay in launch of the strike corps, adequate
opportunity for deterrence can come into play and avoid a nuclear engagement
can be created.
But there is some criticism of the Cold Start doctrine. Given the nuclear
context, the aim should be to upset the decision cycle of the enemy as
demonstrated by the campaigns in the Gulf War by the United States in 1991 as
well as during Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003.24 While these campaigns may

not be exactly against the backdrop of a nuclear Kargil and

weapon, the threat of a chemical and/or biological firming of the
attack existed, thereby enhancing the criticality in LoC, thus,
time. However, by keeping the Iraqi command and provided the
control in disarray, Saddam Hussein was denied Indian side
the ability to deploy his forces to advantage. Such an adequate
a capability would no doubt require a high degree capability for
of information superiority over the enemy which responding
is thought to be difficult to attain in the Indo- with minimal
Pakistan context, thereby leading to a much slower deployment of
and pondering decision-making cycle based on forces.
territorial and counter-force gains as envisaged in
the Cold Start Doctrine.25 Yet if the Indian armed forces focus on information
dominance in the future, it may not be difficult to attain.
Kargil demonstrated to the Indian military leadership that Pakistan will
continue to manipulate violence without leading to an escalatory conventional
and/nuclear war.26 Doctrinally too, the stability-instability paradox denoted that
there was ample scope for Pakistan to wage a multi-dimensional proxy war. 27
Thus, drawing a holistic doctrine which caters for all levels of war to counter
Pakistan’s, “aberrant and errant behaviour” 28 was important. For a doctrine shy
army, Kargil once again proved to be a turning point. The evolution of the Indian
Army Doctrine 2004, Doctrine for Sub-Conventional Operations in 2006 and
subsequently the Cold Start Doctrine are all trends in this direction.
Kargil and Nuclearisation

That the nuclear umbrella was a key factor in Musharraf’s adoption of this
operation is evident from the fact that this was rejected by the late Gen Zia-ul Haq
and Benazir Bhutto when proposed to them as head of the Pakistan government.
The nuclear tests changed the situation, thereby leading to Musharraf giving a go-
ahead to the army.29 Thus, Kargil outlined to both sides the nuances of conflict in
the subcontinental context with nuclearisation.
The first lesson to emerge was that nuclear weapons do not deter a limited
conventional conflict or salami slicing operations, as was intended by Pakistan.
So also, sub-conventional operations such as proxy wars, cross-border militancy
and terrorism are also not constrained.30 Post Kargil and then Operation
Parakram, the window of conflict was further narrowed to terrorism, and post
Mumbai 26/11, it may have been constrained as far as Pakistan is concerned to

Rahul K Bhonsle
that of terrorist acts conducted by indigenous terrorist groups such as the Indian
Mujahideen and not an intentional product of export of asymmetric power of the
state from Islamabad.
For nuclear proliferation optimists, the Kargil War signified a considerably
setback for it exploded the myth that possession of nuclear weapons deters a war
between the possessors. Pakistan, with a declared first use policy, had indulged
in a war, though localised, without possibly thinking through the possibilities
of escalation, perhaps taking advantage of India’s “no first use” policy. The
Kargil conflict, thus, displaced the accepted nuclear theory presumably based
on the logic of the nuclear tests in 1998 that Pakistan would not be overcome
by the paranoia felt by the perceived conventional asymmetry and would opt
for stability.31 This understanding was implicit in the Lahore Declaration of
February 1999, yet failed the test in Kargil just a few months later. Pakistan used
the threat of nuclear weapons for aggression rather than stability, resulting in
manifestation of the classic contours of the stability–instability paradox.32 The
defensive responses by India to these sub-optimal responses, with a high level of
threshold of tolerance, also provided Pakistan with greater options for pursuing
asymmetric war against the country.
Another facet of nuclearisation is that even a localised conflict or as is
seen from Mumbai 26/11, a massed terror attack, can lead to international
intervention.33 For Pakistan, the offensive indulgence in Kargil led to being
branded as an unreliable nuclear weaponised actor, a blot that it is finding it
difficult to remove with the addition of the A Q Khan factor.34
Kargil also brought out that while there is understanding of the stability-
instability paradox, there is an incomplete comprehension of application of the
same in the subcontinent. In the classic Cold War context, the United States and
the then Soviet Union engaged within the context of this paradox in a number
of crises, proxy and surrogate wars, without a direct conflict. As Michael Krepon
denotes, “The stability/instability paradox was embedded in the enormity of the
stakes involved in crossing the nuclear threshold”. 35 No lessons were apparently
learnt by the Indian establishment. Under the rubric of the stability-instability
paradox, stability at the macro level is achieved through nuclear weapons and
instability lies at the lower level, within the overall theory of nuclear deterrence.36
It is evident that a thorough study and analysis of various dimensions of this
phenomenon in the Indo-Pakistan context needs to be undertaken by India
to face the continuing challenges of proxy war extended by Pakistan to the
hinterland.

Kargil also defined the nature and extent of The use of

the window of nuclear as well as international defensive
diplomatic opportunity that was available for formations for a
conduct of conventional operations. While the limited offensive
concerns of nuclear war in the subcontinent were role was also
evident in the various responses by the Indian seen for the first
leadership, the pressure that would come from time in Kargil, a
the international community became evident only concept which
post-Kargil. Furthermore, Operation Parakram has been applied
brought out that the window for conventional in Cold Start.
engagement before these pressures comes into play 8 Mountain
was highly restricted. When related to the long time Division and
required for mobilisation of the strike formations reserve brigades
from their peace-time locations, the evolution of such as the
the Cold Start Doctrine was natural. 37 79 Mountain
The Pakistani propensity to announce the Brigade were
intent to use nuclear weapons that has been employed for
evident from the time of the Kargil conflict was also offensive, rather
seen during the most recent Mumbai strikes when than 6 Mountain
the Pakistani military and political leadership did Division.
not hesitate in claiming it was a nuclear weapon
state and, thus, could not be messed up with. Similarly, in Kargil, this threat was
held out in the very beginning of the localised limited war.38 Subsequent use of
phrases such as, “one rung escalation ladder” has only added to the perception
that Pakistan will use nuclear weapons much more readily than India seems to
believe. While in recent years, the most oft quoted interview of Lt Gen Khalid
Kidwai wherein he speaks of a series of thresholds, space, military, and so on,
seems to denote a shift in Pakistani thinking, given the brinkmanship practised
by both countries, it is unlikely to result in any change in perceptions in the days
ahead.39
Control of escalation is the essence of success in the subcontinental context
where two nuclear powered adversaries are also economically not well endowed to
withstand a high technology war. Thus, conventional and nuclear war avoidance
seems to be predominant strategy being followed by both sides. Kargil 1999
provided a model of limited escalation by indicating the limits of aggression on
the part of the Indian armed forces which had a well defined “red line”, the Line
of Control. The Cold Start has to define these red lines across the international

Rahul K Bhonsle
Control of boundary in as general terms as possible without

escalation is compromising the overall plan to give the desired
the essence of degree of confidence to Pakistan that operations
success in the would be kept below the nuclear threshold at all
subcontinental times. Balancing this with the aim of operations
context where may also be challenging. However, unless these or
two nuclear similar measures are taken, by using shock action
powered and disrupting the decision cycle of the enemy,
adversaries there is a scope for precipitating employment of
are also nuclear weapons, fearing the worst.40,41 These are
economically not real-time issues with significant consequences
well endowed to which need to be debated.
withstand a high The post-Kargil debates, thus, need to
technology war. be enlarged to include the impact of nuclear
weapons on limited wars localised in nature, as
well as subconventional conflict. This discourse will provide options to India for
deterrence against proxy wars as well.
Conclusion
Kargil 1999 was more than a localised limited war with short-term consequences.
Pakistan’s aim in Kargil was quite clearly to force the Indians to operate from a
position of weakness by cutting off the strategic links to Leh.42 The Pakistani
leadership failed to appreciate the nuances of engaging in a conventional conflict
under a nuclear umbrella. To that extent, Kargil was not a limited war. Another
connotation of limited wars is that of these being limited by objectives. Were the
Pakistani objectives in Kargil limited? The span of the objectives could range from
the minimal, that of cutting off Leh to internationalising the Kashmir issue and
coercing India to compromise by putting it in an unfavourable bargaining position.
Thus, purely from the point of view of political objectives, these can hardly be
regarded as limited as they were aimed at changing the territorial, and ipso facto
the entire dialogue between the two countries.
As has been attempted to bring out in this paper, it also saw commencement
of an extended dialogue on conflict scenarios in the Indo-Pakistan context which
continues to this day. If Kargil established the futility of cross-LoC operations,
hopefully other adventures such as Mumbai 26/11 may convince the Pakistani
military the futility of such of “undeniable” acts of violence. Then President
Musharraf learnt his lessons, starting with Kargil and Parakram, combined

with the salutary effect of control of militancy in Jammu and Kashmir by the
Indian Army, Trans-LoC engagements and extended deployment possibly led
to convincing him to hold a composite dialogue with the Indian government,
leading to the proposed détente. Today, it appears that we would have to reinvent
the wheel to start the next round, post Mumbai 26/11.
Notes
1. Arun Sahgal, “Cold Start: New Doctrinal Thinking in the Army,” CLAWS Journal,
Summer 2008, p. 117.
2. Gen V P Malik, Kargil From Surprise to Victory (New Delhi: Harper Collins, 2006),
p. 126.
3. Ibid., pp 340-341
4. V R Raghavan, “Limited War and Nuclear Escalation in South Asia,” The Non-
Proliferation Review, Fall Winter 2001, pdf report, p. 10.
5. Government of India, National Security Council Secretariat, From Surprise to
Reckoning, The Kargil Review Committee Report (New Delhi: Sage, 2000), p. 264.
6. Lt Gen Y M Bammi, Kargil 1999 (New Delhi: Gorkha Publishers, 2002), p. 522.
7. Dr. S Chandrasekharan, “Kargil and Nuclear Deterrence,” August 7, 1999, available at
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers/paper71.html.
8. The Hindu Opinion, “Significant Progress on Kashmir was Made on Backchannels,
says Kasuri,” The Hindu, February 21, 2009. Available at http://www.thehindu.
com/2009/02/21/stories/2009022153661100.htm
9. G Parthasarathy, “We Can Work It Out,” The Times of India, March 3, 2009, available
at http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/Editorial/COMMENT-We-Can-Work-It-Out/
articleshow/4213804.cms
10. “Kashmir Issue About to Resolve in my Era: Musharraf,” available at http://www.
sananews.com.pk/english/2009/03/07/kashmir-issue-about-to-resolve-in-my-era-
musharraf/
11. Gen Y M Bammi, War Against Insurgency and Terrorism in Kashmir (Dehradun: Natraj,
2007), p. 84.
12. Sumantra Bose, Kashmir: Roots of Conflict, Path of Peace (New Delhi: Vistaar, 2003),
p. 141.
13. Bammi, War Against Insurgency and Terrorism in Kashmir, p. 84.
14. Ibid., p. 153.
15. Ibid., p. 203.
16. D Suba Chandran, “Why Kargil?” in Ashok Krishna and P R Chari, Kargil: The Tables
Turned (New Delhi: Manohar, 2007), p. 35.

Rahul K Bhonsle
17. Subhash Kapila, “Indian Army’s Cold Start Doctrine Strategically Reviewed,” available
at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers11%5Cpaper1013.html
18. Sanjay Ahirwal (NDTV), “Operation Parakram: Human Costs Outnumber Kargil,” July
31, 2004, available at http://www.defenceindia.com/26-jul-2k4/news32.html
19. Ibid.
20. Praveen Swami, “Gen Padmanabhan Mulls over Lessons of Operation Parakram,”
available at http://www.hindu.com/2004/02/06/stories/2004020604461200.
htm.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. Sahgal, “Cold Start: New Doctrinal Thinking in the Army,” p. 118.
24. Arzan Tarapore, “The New Army Doctrine in Limited War,” available at http://www.
rediff.com/news/2002/nov/01ashok.htm
25. Ibid.
26. “Limited War Can’t Erupt Any Time: Malik,” The Times of India, January 6, 2000, in V R
Raghavan, “Limited War and Nuclear Escalation in South Asia,” The Non-Proliferation
Review, Fall Winter 2001, pdf report, p. 5.
27. Rajesh Kumar, “Revisiting the Kashmir Insurgency, Kargil, and the Twin Peak Crisis:
Was the Stability/Instability Paradox at Play?” The New England Journal of Political
Science, Vol. III, No. 1.
28. Krishna and Chari, Kargil The Tables Turned (New Delhi: Manohar 2007), p. 262.
29. Jean-Luc Racine, “Indo-Pak Relations: Limited War to Limited Peace?” Centre for the
Study of India and South Asia, Paris, Round Table discussion organised by the Centre
on August19, 2003.
30. P R Chari, “Conclusion: Indo-Pakistan Relations Uncertain Future,” in Krishna and
Chari, Kargil: The Tables Turned, p. 262.
31. V R Raghavan “Limited War and Nuclear Escalation in South Asia,” p. 2.
32. Ibid.
33. Dr S Chandrasekharan, “Kargil and Nuclear Deterrence,” August 7, 1999, available at
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers/paper71.html
34. Ibid.
35. Michael Krepon, The Stability-Instability Paradox, Misperception, and Escalation
Control in South Asia” (Washington: Stimson Centre. 2003), p. 1.
36. Rajesh Kumar, “Revisiting the Kashmir Insurgency, Kargil, and the Twin Peak Crisis:
Was the Stability/Instability Paradox at Play?” The New England Journal of Political
Science, Vol III, No. 1
37. Sahgal, “Cold Start: New Doctrinal Thinking in the Army,” p. 117.

38. V R Raghavan, “Limited War and Nuclear Escalation in South Asia,” p. 12.
39. Nuclear Safety, Nuclear Stability and Nuclear Strategy in Pakistan. A Concise Report of
a Visit by Landau Network - Centro Volta, available at http://lxmi.mi.infn.it/~landnet/
Doc/pakistan.pdf
40. Tarapore, “The New Army Doctrine in Limited War”.
41. Walter C Ladwig III, “A Cold Start for Hot Wars? The Indian Army’s New Limited War
Doctrine.” International Security 32 3, Winter 2007/08, pp. 158-190.
42. Raghavan, “Limited War and Nuclear Escalation in South Asia,” p. 9.
ISBN 978-81-907431-9-8
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Debating Defence Reforms
Since Kargil
Vinod Anand
The Kargil conflict was instrumental in delivering a strategic shock to our

politico-military establishment that led to ushering in a host of defence forms.
While some impetus was imparted in implementation of the suggested defence
reforms in the initial stages, after a while, the pace of reforms floundered
against the ossified and inertial nature of our bureaucratic approach to matters
pertaining to defence of the realm. A certain degree of stasis had set in when
another strategic jolt in the shape of the Mumbai terror attacks hit us in the face.
Increasing the defence budget for 2009-10 by an uncharacteristic 34 percent,
looking again for an overarching structure for coordination and dissemination
of intelligence, stressing the need for a unified concept of command again,
the need for regulating the media, besides introduction of a number of other
measures to spruce up our defence and security structures post-Mumbai was,
in fact, a recognition by our government that we had been remiss in many ways
in implementing defence and security reforms, in both letter and spirit, as
recommended by the Group of Ministers (GoM) in 2001.The GoM had included
in its report almost all the measures which are now sought to be undertaken as a
consequence of the Mumbai massacre.
The government had constituted a GoM in April 2000 to review the national
security system in its entirety and in particular to consider the recommendations
of the Kargil Review Committee (KRC) and formulate specific proposals for
implementation. Review by the GoM had been carried out in the areas of internal
security, border management, intelligence apparatus and management of defence.
The GoM’s main recommendations regarding management of defence included
creation of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) with a designated defence staff with a
Brigadier Vinod Anand (Retd) is Senior Fellow, Centre for Strategic Studies and Simulation,
United Service Institution of India, New Delhi.

Debating Defence Reforms Since Kargil
view to establish synergy and promote jointness among The KRC had
the armed forces, creation of a Defence Procurement observed
Board (DPB), a Defence R&D Board, preparation of a that India is
holistic and integrated defence perspective plan for 15 perhaps the
years, establishment of a National Defence University only major
and effective media management. In addition, democracy
establishment of the tri-Service Andaman & Nicobar where the
Islands Command and Strategic Forces Command, armed forces
integration of Service Headquarters with the Ministry Headquarters
of Defence (MoD) were the other important measures are outside
recommended. The basic purpose was to bring about the apex
improvements in organisations, structures and government
processes through integration of civil and military structure.
components and promote synergy and jointness
amongst the armed forces. Except for the recommendation of creation of the
CDS, which was deferred till political consensus from all political parties could
be obtained, all other recommendations had been approved for implementation
by the government.
This paper analyses the degree and extent of the implementation of defence
reforms recommended by the GoM, particularly with reference to the mission
and objectives of the Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff (HQ IDS) besides
examining the status and evaluation of other reforms related to management of
defence having a bearing on the functioning and goals of HQ IDS.
The Vision Statement of HQ IDS highlights its role to “act as a point
organisation for jointmanship in MoD which integrates policy, doctrine, war-
fighting and procurement by employing best management practices”. While
HQ IDS has made considerable progress in achieving some goals of its vision
statement during over seven years of its existence, there are other areas where
the progress has been very little or it has been excruciatingly slow.
Integration with MoD

The KRC had observed that India is perhaps the only major democracy where
the armed forces headquarters are outside the apex government structure. It
had pointed out that “most opposition to change comes from the inadequate
knowledge of the national security decision-making process elsewhere in the
world and a reluctance to change the status quo… In fact, locating the Services
Headquarters in the Government will further enhance civilian supremacy”.

Vinod Anand
However, even though Services HQ have been given the titles, for instance, of
Integrated HQ of the army and so on, the integration of either HQ IDS or other
Services HQ is only in form rather than in substance. HQ IDS largely remains
outside the MoD. Even the GoM had indicated the problems which have been
arising out of considering the Services HQ as attached offices; problems of inter se
relativities, multiple, duplicated and complex procedures governing the exercise
of administrative and financial powers; and the concept of advice to the minister,
have all contributed to problems in the management of defence.
After a lapse of almost seven years, the MoD candidly admitted before
the Standing Committee on Defence in February 2009, “Renaming of Army
and Naval Headquarters as Integrated Headquarters is merely cosmetic, in the
absence of posting of DoD cadre officers to Service Headquarters and vice versa,
for participation in policy formulation.”1
The MoD has also admitted that postings of officers from the Ministry of
External Affairs (MEA); Defence Research and Development Organisation
(DRDO) and intelligence agencies to appointments created in unified
organisations have not been carried out so far. However, the question that arises
is: how is this situation going to be remedied or is there any will to rectify this
major flaw in the functioning of the MoD? A long time back, Jaswant Singh, a
former defence minister, had stated in his book Defending India that the MoD, in
effect, becomes the principal destroyer of the cutting edge of military morale —
ironic, considering that very reverse of it is their responsibility. The sword arm of
the state gets blunted by the state.
COSC vs CDS: The Unending Debate

The Hamlettian dilemma of the CDS ‘to be or not to be’ persists in our politico-
military establishment despite the recommendations of the KRC, GoM and
Standing Committee on Defence (SCD). In fact, looking at the stance of both
current and the previous government, the SCD had given up reminding the
government, after having remonstrated with it continuously till its Twenty-Second
Report of 2006-07 on the subject. But, in the wake of the Mumbai massacre which
brought to the fore many deficiencies in our national security structures and
processes, the SCD was again constrained to observe in February 2009 the dire
need for the CDS. The SCD noted that the committee is unable to comprehend
whether the present system would prove efficacious enough to ensure quick
response and coordinated action in emergent situations. Therefore,

The Committee are of the considered view that Processes

the creation of CDS to act as Chairman of the for evolving
COSC is essential to ensure optimum level of a national
jointness among the different wings of the Armed security strategy
Forces and to provide single-point military advice leading to the
to the Government...The Committee are of the formulation
firm view that till such time the post of CDS is of a Defence
created, the Government may take steps to give Policy Guidance
appropriate authority to the Chairman COSC in and evolution
the present set-up to command and control the of a National
resources of the Defence Services whenever the Military
situation so demands.2 Strategy are still
in the nascent
The merits of putting in place the institution stage.
of CDS are too well known to bear repetition again.
Awaiting a political consensus has become a mantra to procrastinate and avoid
creation of the CDS. It is too early to say whether the new government, after the
forthcoming elections, would be serious in moving towards creation of the CDS.
Integrated/Tri-Service Commands
Setting up of the Strategic Forces Command and the tri-Service Andaman and
Nicobar Command (ANC) has been considered as a symbol of the three Services
working jointly in operational matters. Yet, the concept of Integrated and Unified
Commands beyond these two structures has not found ready acceptance as the
Services have been reluctant to adjust to each other’s demands. Further, even
in the HQ ANC, besides the continuing deficiency of civilian staff since the
inception of this organisation, there are water-tight compartments as to how
the resources of a particular Service can be used, thus, restricting the flexibility
and command of the ANC’s commander. The desired level of synergy in the
ANC is missing. The Standing Committee on Defence had observed that the
senior officers of the command can issue orders to the personnel belonging to
their respective forces only. There is no jointness of command and control. The
committee felt that this was a very serious lacuna and earnest efforts should be
made to correct it immediately.3 The committee had also recommended in its
Twenty-Second Report circa 2006-07 that coast guard services may also be inter-
connected with the jointness of command and control of the three Services but
it needed a Mumbai terror attack to force the issue4.

Vinod Anand
Integrated Perspective Planning and Force Development

One of the fundamentals of the IDS has been to evolve an integrated perspective
plan for the development of the armed forces in consonance with the rapidly
changing strategic environment coupled with a common appreciation of the
threat perceptions. Processes for evolving a national security strategy leading
to the formulation of a Defence Policy Guidance and evolution of a National
Military Strategy are still in the nascent stage. A well thought out Defence and
Military Capability Plan flowing out from these processes which would be
iterative and interactive in nature between various components of the MoD and
other national security organs and agencies of the government would result in
a systematic development of our armed forces which could respond to a whole
array of multiple spectrum threats.
A draft National Security Strategy (NSS) has been prepared and is doing the
rounds of various ministries and organs of the government. It is expected that the
NSS would be finalised by end December 2009, based on the commitment given
to the SCD. Further, the Long-Term Integrated Perspective Plan (LTIPP) covering
the period 2007-22 is expected to be finalised by end October 2009. Earlier, the
exercise for the preparation of LTIPP 2002-17 was abandoned since a large
portion of the period of the 10th Five-Year Defence Plan (2002-2007) had elapsed
without its approval. The current LTIPP covers the three Five-Year Defence Plan
(FYPD) periods of 11th, 12th and 13th Plans.
Disjunctions in the planning process are fairly obvious. First, the so-called
integrated Defence Plans are only an amalgamation of the respective Services
plans; they can be hardly described as ‘integrated’. Even though the IDS has a
mandate to allot not only inter-Service priorities but also intra-Service priorities,
it lacks the authority to force the issue. In the COSC, every Service chief has to
look after the interest of his own Service and if at all a Service plan’s priority has
to be changed, it has to be based on a consensus, which is a rare occurrence. That
is why the SCD in its latest report, has recommended, as an interim measure,
empowering the chairman of the COSC with additional authority for such tasks till
the creation of the CDS. Second, the FYDPs are being evolved without the benefit
of a common threat perception, a well articulated NSS, and in the absence of a
DPG or Directive of the Raksha Mantri (RM). Ideally, a DPG or a RM’s Directive
for the 11th Plan should have been issued before the commencement of the plan,
that is, in 2006, but that has not been done even after two years into the plan. And
if the threat scenarios have undergone a change in the meanwhile, a review of
DPG/RM’s Directive would have become necessary. But, as mentioned earlier in

the paper, formulation of such processes is still in The absence of

their infancy even seven years since the need was firm indications
identified. of budgetary
The KRC and GoM, in order to ensure the resources
effectiveness of the planning exercise, had available for
recommended that the Defence Minister’s Five-Year
Directive should be issued at least 12 months Defence Plans is
before the commencement of the next Five-Year a major lacuna
Plan. This was expected to form the conceptual that bedevils
basis for the Defence Plan. Both reports also the planning
recommended that the Ministry of Finance (MoF) process.
should give a firm indication of the availability
of financial resources, for a period of five years, at least six months before the
commencement of the ensuing Five-Year Plan. But such recommendations have
been ignored and not implemented in the absence of any statutory provisions to
force the issue.
The absence of firm indications of budgetary resources available for Five-
Year Defence Plans is a major lacuna that bedevils the planning process. The
MoF generally advises the MoD to add about 10 percent to the previous budget in
an incremental manner which obviously has no relation to developing defence
capabilities in a time-bound manner based on the FYPDs. The Parliament’s
Standing Committee on Defence, in its 16th Report (released in April 2007), felt
constrained to remark that “the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Defence
should not shift the responsibility to each other; rather, together they must approve
the Eleventh Plan at the earliest, so that it does not face the same fate as the
Tenth Plan. This will further facilitate both the Ministry of Defence to plan their
finance, equipment acquisition and utilise the allocated amount to the fullest
extent in a time-bound manner.” The committee was also perturbed because of
the mismatch between the projection and budgetary allocation for the first year
(2007-08) of the plan.
Further, according approval to Defence Plans before they commence and
giving a broad allotment of funds was recommended by the Kargil Committee
and GoM. However, the 10th FYPD lapsed without getting approved. This also
led to abandoning of LTIPP 2002-17. A fresh LTIPP (2007-22) focussing on the
joint conventional edge, capabilities to be achieved, aspects of commonality of
equipment; inter-Service prioritisation and indigenisation has been prepared to
cover the 11th, 12th and 13th Plan periods. Further, work on LTIPP (2012-27) has also

Vinod Anand
commenced. But, it needs to be noted that 11th Five-Year Defence Plan (2007-12)
which should have been approved by the government before its commencement
has not been approved so far5. Great hopes are being placed that, at least, by
the end of the current financial year, the 11th FYPD, if not the LTIPP, would be
approved based on the NSS and DPG which are likely to be formulated by the
end of this year.
As far as integration of the Defence Plans with those of DRDO is concerned,
HQ IDS claims that it has carried out an analysis of DRDO’s 11th Plan and a
sincere effort to synchronise it with the Services 11th Defence Plan has been made.
No prizes for guessing whether the effort has been satisfactory or otherwise.
Matters are further compounded by delays in procuring the requirements of
the defence forces. This is despite creation of new structures for acquisition at the
levels of the MoD and HQ IDS. The introduction of new Defence Procurement
Procedures in 2005, 2006 and again revised in 2008 has not smoothened or hastened
the acquisition process. Because of the delays in acquisitions, a portion of capital
funds earmarked in the annual defence budget have been surrendered for the last
several years. Thus, increasing the defence budget by 34 percent for the current
financial year would be of no avail if it cannot be spent fully and usefully.
Doctrine, Organisation and Training

In the sphere of imparting impetus to the process of jointness and maximising
synergies among the three Services, there has been steady progress though it can
also be said that a lot more needs to be done. Within the HQ IDS, there is a great
degree of zeal to implement measures to inculcate jointness and integration but
many bureaucratic obstacles and road blocks, both within the military as well as
civil dispensation, need to be overcome before a meaningful substance can be
added to the defence reforms.
Formulation of a number of joint doctrines and concepts has been one
of the major achievements of IDS towards ushering in the unified thought
processes amongst the Services. In May 2006, then Defence Minister Pranab
Mukherjee had unveiled the first-ever joint doctrine of the armed forces, laying
stress on synergy, development of joint war-fighting capability and keeping
pace with technology6. Preparation of the joint doctrine is considered a most
important step in preparing the armed forces for conducting joint war-fighting.
Formulation of the joint doctrine also highlights the fact that no single Service
can individually achieve the military objectives in the contemporary security
scene and the complex nature of threats facing India.

In addition to the Joint Doctrine for Defence Formulation

Forces, the Joint Amphibious Warfare Doctrine of a number of
has also been released whereas the Joint Special joint doctrines
Forces Doctrine, Joint Psychological Operations and concepts
Doctrine, Joint Sub-Conventional Warfare Doctrine has been one
and a Doctrine for Maritime Operations are said to of the major
be in advance stages of preparation. Further, HQ achievements
IDS has been nominated as the tri- Service single of IDS towards
window for interaction in space by all agencies, ushering in the
including external ones. An Integrated Space Cell unified thought
has been established to coordinate space issues processes
and formulate a Joint Space Doctrine. amongst the
A tri-Services body on Information Warfare Services.
Directorate of Information Warfare & Information
Technology had been formed in 2003 under the HQ IDS to take up the issues
of information warfare (IW) at the tri-Service level. A Joint Information Warfare
Doctrine was formulated by this directorate to serve as the base document for
IW activities. A Defence Information Warfare Agency (DIWA) was raised to look
after the strategic and other IW needs of the three Services. The agency was later
rechristened the Defence Information Assurance and Research Agency (DIARA).
Certain elements of IW are also being dealt with by the Defence Intelligence
Agency while the major portion of those relating to IW missions is being looked
after by DIARA under the Joint Operations branch of the IDS. DIARA has been
providing military inputs through the Chief of Integrated Staff Committee
to the National Security Council and the National Information Board which
coordinate the joint and integrated effort at the national level. At the national
level, a Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-In) exists to evolve suitable
responses to cyber attacks. Services are also coordinating their efforts, through
constituting similar teams at their own level, for instance, CERT-A established by
the army. These measures indicate a movement towards achieving an enhanced
degree of jointness.
Another step to promote joint thought among the Services and security
community was the creation of the Indian National Defence University (INDU). The
Concept of INDU is based on similar institutions existing in countries like the US
and China. The INDU is expected to be a multi-disciplinary “centre of excellence” in
the country in education and research on national security issues. Consequently, it
was to be established by an Act of Parliament. The recommendations also included

Vinod Anand
the provision for the establishment of a War Gaming and Simulation Centre. But
after seven years of acceptance of recommendations, INDU has not fructified.
Even though funds for INDU have been earmarked and Haryana has offered land
for the purpose, no meaningful progress has been made in this regard. This can be
contrasted with Pakistan having announced in March 2007 that it would create a
National Defence University and by March 2008 the same was inaugurated.
A Centre for Joint Warfare Studies has been formed in September 2007 under
the aegis of HQ IDS to promote jointmanship among the Services, ministries and
intelligence agencies connected with national security. It will conduct studies
and research work in joint war-fighting. In addition, it will conduct orientation
courses/ capsules for various ministries/agencies (including procurement
agencies) connected with HQ IDS/Services.
Coordinating and Unifying Intelligence Efforts

The Mumbai terror attacks have again revealed the flaws in our intelligence set-
up. Timely intelligence, even when available in some kind of vague and diffused
form, does not filter down to the consumers who are most concerned with it. The
KRC had recommended creation of the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) and
the expansion of its charter. The KRC has observed, “It is not quite appreciated in
India that the primary responsibility for collecting external intelligence including
that relating to potential adversaries ...is vested in R&AW. The Directorate
General of Defence Intelligence (DGMI’s) capability for intelligence collection
is limited. . . Unfortunately, the R&AW facility in the Kargil area did not receive
adequate attention in terms of staff or technological capability. The Indian threat
assessment has been largely a single track process dominated by R&AW. In most
advanced countries, the Armed Forces have a Defence Intelligence Agency with
a significant intelligence collection capability. This ensures that there are two
streams of intelligence which enables governments to check one against the
other.” (Kargil Review Committee) (Report Para 13.31 & 13.40.)
Even though the DIA has been created under the aegis of HQ IDS and has
been functioning well, its scope and corresponding resources have not been
expanded upon. The SCD in its Action Taken Report of April 2007 had again
recommended to the government that sufficient funds should be made available
to the armed forces for the purpose as recommended by the Subrahmanyam
Committee. Many other inadequacies of intelligence sharing and deficiencies of
requisite resources were highlighted by the KRC which have not been addressed
in the intervening years.

The National Security Council Secretariat Unfortunately,

was tasked to monitor the implementation the R&AW
of the recommendations of the GoM’s report, facility in the
including the intelligence apparatus. Increased Kargil area
incidence of terror attacks, Naxalite activities, did not receive
illegal migration and increased narcotic traffic adequate
is a reflection of the reality that the intelligence attention in
community needs to do more to deliver. Some terms of staff or
progress has been made by establishing Multi- technological
Agency Centres to coordinate intelligence capability. The
efforts. An Intelligence Coordination Group Indian threat
and also the National Intelligence Board have assessment
been created. A Joint Task Force on Intelligence has been
has been put in place to identify the training largely a single
requirements of a specialist nature for a track process
particular type of threat in different states and dominated by
for training their personnel. For enhancing R&AW.
the technical surveillance capabilities, a
National Technical Research Organisation has been created. But, sadly, the
Indian intelligence community had to depend upon the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) for analysing the forensic evidence of technical nature
obtained during the Mumbai massacre.
Media Operations and Perception Management

The KRC had made a number of recommendations on media relations which ranged
from improving interface with the media to instituting new organisations at various
levels and also framing rules of business/guidelines for sharing information and
covering events of a sensitive nature. In the absence of any substantive framework
for reporting, the media was instrumental in undermining the ongoing counter-
terrorist operations against the Mumbai terrorists. When a Bill in the Parliament was
to be introduced to regulate the media for such eventualities, a concerted action by
media leaders prevailed upon the government to allow the media self-regulation.
However, this concept of self-regulation needs to be revisited and guidelines for the
media evolved after taking into account the concerns of all the stakeholders.
Managing or shaping perceptions, though frequently talked about, is an
area that has received little or no attention. Though generally considered a
euphemism for psychological warfare, it has much more significance in the

Vinod Anand
context of the current knowledge age when the target audience or intended
audience is being bombarded with an overload of information through a
multitude of media. The need for perception management has been emphasised
in our Counter-Insurgency Doctrine and even the Ministry of Home Affairs
has recognised its importance in its annual reports. Yet, suitable structures,
processes and mechanisms, along with the necessary resources, have not been
evolved. The concept also does not have any doctrinal and institutional support.
Existing organisations within the armed forces have old antiquated structures
and resources suited to carrying out some elements of psychological warfare.
While an organisation similar to the Strategic Communications Office of the
US at the top of the hierarchy, along with structures at lower levels, could be a
guide, we need to evolve such an organisation suited to Indian requirements
and conditions. Some successes on the perception warfare front were achieved
when a High Power Committee was instituted before the commencement of the
Indo-Pak War of 1971 that resulted in the liberation of Bangladesh. However, the
committee to coordinate the efforts in this area was disbanded thereafter and the
KRC has also overlooked this important force multiplier even though it has laid
emphasis on improving media relations. But, it is much more than that.
Conclusion
In the light of the foregoing, it can be said that while a number of
recommendations of the KRC report and GoM’s reports have been implemented,
some of the key recommendations which would have improved jointness
and integration amongst the armed forces remain to be implemented in a
meaningful manner. The integration of the IDS and Services into the MoD is
only in form and lacks any real substance, with even bureaucrats accepting
that integration is only ‘cosmetic’. The defence planning process which should
have taken off after the creation of IDS continues to suffer from a number of
infirmities. The problems of linkages of FYDP with budgetary resources and
procurement/acquisition plans continue year after year despite introduction
of a series of new Defence Procurement Procedures. Many flaws which ailed
our defence management before Kargil, continue to prevail even after the
Mumbai terror attacks. Lack of unified and coordinated intelligence effort that
was one of the glaring weaknesses revealed during Kargil, revisited us during
the Mumbai massacre.
Therefore, the time has again come to take stock of our defence set-up
and move towards implementing measures already recommended by the KRC

and GoM, in both letter and spirit. But empirical The integration
evidence suggests that it would not be an easy of the IDS and
task, given a number of contextual inhibiting Services into
factors. K Subrahmanyam, the head of the KRC, the MoD is
has recently argued in favour of constituting a Blue only in form
Ribbon Commission for the Indian armed forces and lacks any
for looking into their problems in a comprehensive real substance
manner. This could be modelled after similar with even
commissions in the US and UK. He observes: bureaucrats
accepting that
All these issues could be referred to a high integration is
powered commission headed by an eminent only ‘cosmetic’.
personality who commands high credibility,
like Ratan Tata or Narayanamurty, including retired chiefs of staff from the
three Services, retired chairman of the joint intelligence, retired defence
and foreign secretaries, eminent management specialists and others. At the
same time, it should be clear to the government and Parliament that once
such a commission submits its recommendations, there will be no further
nitpicking by the committee of secretaries but the report should be accepted
and implemented as is done in the US or UK.7
Alternatively, if the government can muster enough political will, statutory

provisions could be enacted in the Parliament to force the issue, otherwise, we
would continue to pay the price for neglecting the defence of our realm. The
costs of this neglect are becoming visible every day and India cannot really have
pretensions of becoming a major power if we continue only pay lip-service to our
defence and security capabilities.
Notes
1. The Ministry of Defence’s first background note to SCD on Restructuring of the MoD.
See Standing Committee on Defence (2008-2009) Report on “Status of Implementation
of Unified Command for Armed Forces”, February 2009, p. 14.
2. Ibid., p. 21.
3. Action Taken Report by the Government on Recommendations contained in the
Twenty-Second Report of the Committee on “Review of Implementation Status
of GoM’s Report on Reforming the National Security System in Pursuance of KRC
Report— A Special Reference to Management of Defence; December 2008, p. 33.

Vinod Anand
4. Review of Implementation Status of Group of Minister’s Report on Reforming the

National Security System in Pursuance to the Kargil Review Committee Report—A
Special Reference to Management of Defence. Presented on July 27, 2007, p. 15.
5. Ibid., p. 35.
6. “First Ever Joint Doctrine Released,” The Hindu, May 18, 2006. Also at http://www.
hindu.com/2006/05/18/stories/2006051818900900.htm
7. K Subrahmanyam, in Dainik Jagran, February 3, 2008.
ISBN 978-81-87966-33-3
Rs. 620.00 US $ 18.00
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Role of the Pakistan Air
Force During the
Kargil Conflict
M Kaiser Tufail
Pakistani writings on the Kargil conflict have been few and, those that have
come out, largely irrelevant and, in a few cases, clearly sponsored. The role
of the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) has been discussed off and on, but mostly
disparagingly, particularly in some uninformed quarters. Here is an airman’s
perspective, focussing on the Indian Air Force’s (IAF’s) air operations and the
PAF’s position.
Operational Planning in the PAF

Since an important portion of this write-up pertains to the PAF’s appreciation
of the situation and the decision-making loop during the Kargil conflict, we will
start with a brief primer on the PAF’s hierarchy and how operational matters are
handled at Air Headquarters.
The policy-making elements at Air Headquarters consist of four-tiers of
staff officers. The topmost tier is made up of the Deputy Chiefs of the Air Staff
(DCAS) who are the Principal Staff Officers (PSOs) of their respective branches
and are nominally headed by the Vice Chief of the Air Staff (VCAS). They (along
with Air Officers Commanding — AOC — the senior representatives from field
formations) are members of the Air Board, the PAF’s ‘corporate’ decision-making
body which is chaired by the Chief of the Air Staff (CAS). The next tier is made up
of Assistant Chiefs of the Air Staff (ACAS) who head various sub-branches and,
along with the third-tier directors, assist the PSOs in policy-making; they are not
on the Air Board, but can be called for hearings and presentations in the Board
Air Commodore M Kaiser Tufail (Retd) is former Commander of a Fighter Squadron of the
Pakistan Air Force.

M Kaiser Tufail
meetings, as required. A fourth tier of deputy directors does most of the sundry
staff work in this policy-making hierarchy.
The Operations & Plans branch is the key player in any war, conflict or
contingency and is responsible for threat assessment and formulation of a suitable
response. During peace-time, war plans are drawn up by the Plans sub-branch
and are then war-gamed in operational exercises run by the sister Operations
sub-branch. Operational training is accordingly restructured and administered
by the latter, based on the lessons of various exercises. This essentially is the
gist of the PAF’s operational preparedness methodology, the efficiency of which
is amply reflected in its readiness and telling response in various wars and
skirmishes in the past.
In early 1999, Air Chief Marshal Parvaiz Mehdi Qureshi was at the helm of the
PAF. An officer with an imposing personality, he had won the Sword of Honour at
the Academy. During the 1971 Indo-Pak War, as a young flight lieutenant, he was
on a close support mission in erstwhile East Pakistan when his Sabre was shot
down and he was taken prisoner of war (POW). He determinedly resumed his
fighter pilot’s career after repatriation and rose to command the PAF’s premier
Sargodha base. He was later appointed as the AOC, Southern Air Command, an
appointment that affords considerable interaction amongst the three Services,
especially in operational exercises. He also held the vitally important post of
DCAS (Ops) as well as VCAS before taking over as CAS.
The post of DCAS (Ops) was held by the late Air Marshal Zahid Anis. A well-
qualified fighter pilot, he had a distinguished career in the PAF, having held
some of the most sought-after appointments. These included command of No
38 Tactical Wing (F-16s), the elite Combat Commanders’ School and PAF Base,
Sargodha. He was the AOC, Southern Air Command before his appointment
as the head of the Operations branch at Air Headquarters. He had done his Air
War Course at the PAF’s Air War College, another War Course at the French War
College as well as the prestigious course at the Royal College of Defence Studies
in the UK.
The ACAS (Ops) was Air Cdre Abid Rao, who had recently completed
command of PAF Base, Mianwali. He had earlier done his War Course from the
French War College. The ACAS (Plans) was the late Air Cdre Saleem Nawaz, a
brilliant officer who had made his mark at the Staff College at Bracknell, UK, and
during the War Course at the National Defence College, Islamabad. There is no
gainsaying the fact that the PAF’s hierarchy was highly qualified and that each
one of the players in the Operations branch had the requisite command and staff

Role of the Pakistan Air Force during the Kargil Conflict
experience. The two top men had also fought in the 1971 Indo-Pak War, albeit as
junior officers.
First Rumblings
As Director of Operations (in the rank of Gp Capt), my first opportunity to interact
with the Army’s Director of Military Operations (DMO) was over a phone call,
some time in March 1999. Brig Nadeem Ahmed called with great courtesy and
requested some information that he needed for a paper exercise, as he told me.
He wanted to know when the PAF had last carried out a deployment at Skardu,
how many aircraft were deployed, etc. Rather impressed with the army’s interest
in PAF matters, I passed on the requisite details. The next day, Brig Nadeem
called again, but this time, his questions were more probing and he wanted some
classified information, including fuel storage capacity at Skardu, fighter sortie-
generation capacity, radar coverage, etc. He insisted that he was preparing a
briefing and wanted to get his facts and figures right, to present to his bosses. We
got on a secure line and I passed on the required information. Although he made
it sound like routine contingency planning, I sensed that something unusual
was brewing. In the event, I thought it prudent to inform the DCAS (Ops). Just
to be sure, he checked up with his counterpart, the Director General Military
Operations (DGMO), Maj Gen Tauqir Zia, who said the same thing as his DMO
and, assured that it was just part of routine contingency planning.
After hearing Gp Capt Tariq’s report, Air Marshal Zahid again got in touch
with Maj Gen Tauqir and, in a roundabout way, told him that if the army’s ongoing
“review of contingency plans” required the PAF to be factored in, an Operations
& Plans team would be available for discussion. Nothing was heard from General
Headquarters (GHQ) till May 12, when Air Marshal Zahid was told to send a team
for a briefing at HQ 10 Corps with regard to the “Kashmir Contingency”.
Air Cdre Abid Rao, Air Cdre Saleem Nawaz and myself were directed by
the DCAS (Ops) to attend a briefing on the “latest situation in Kashmir” at
HQ 10 Corps. We were welcomed by the Chief of Staff (COS) of the corps, who
led us to the briefing room. Shortly thereafter, the Corps Commander, Lt Gen
Mehmud Ahmad entered, cutting an impressive figure clad in a bush-coat and
his trademark camouflage scarf. After exchanging pleasantries, the COS started
with the map orientation briefing. Thereafter, Lt Gen Mehmud took over and
broke the news that a limited operation had started two days earlier. It was
nothing more than a “protective manoeuvre”, he explained, and was meant to
foreclose any further mischief by the enemy, who had been a nuisance in the

M Kaiser Tufail
Neelam Valley, specially on the road on our side of the Line of Control (LoC).
He then elaborated that a few vacant Indian posts had been occupied on peaks
across the LoC, overlooking the Dras-Kargil Road. These would, in effect, serve
the purpose of airborne observation posts (AOPs) meant for directing artillery
fire with accuracy. Artillery firepower would be provided by a couple of field
guns that had been helilifted to the heights, piecemeal, and reassembled
over the previous few months when the Indians had been off-guard during
the winter extremes. The target was a vulnerable section of the Dras-Kargil
Road, whose blocking would virtually cut off the crucial life-line which carried
the bulk of supplies needed for daily consumption as well as annual winter-
stocking in the Leh-Siachen sector. He was very hopeful that this stratagem
could choke off the Indians in the vital sector for up to a month, after which
the monsoons would prevent vehicular movement (due to landslides) and, also
suspend all airlift by the IAF. “Come October, we shall walk in to Siachen – to
mop up the dead bodies of hundreds of Indians left hungry, out in the cold,”
he succinctly summed up what appeared to be a new dimension to the Siachen
dispute. It also seemed to serve, at least for the time being, the secondary aim
of alleviating Indian military pressure on Pakistani lines of communications
in the Neelam Valley that the corps commander had alluded to in his opening
remarks. (The oft-heard strategic aim of “providing a fillip to the insurgency in
Kashmir” was never mentioned.)
When Lt Gen Mehmud asked for questions at the end of the rather crisp and
to-the-point briefing, Air Cdre Saleem Nawaz opened up by inquiring about the
type of air support that might be needed for the operation. Lt Gen Mehmud
assured us that air support was not envisaged and that his forces could take
care of enemy aircraft, if they intervened. “I have Stingers on every peak,” he
announced. Air Cdre Saleem tried to point out the limited envelope of these
types of missiles and said that nothing stopped the IAF from attacking the posts
and artillery pieces from high altitude. To this, Lt Gen Mehmud’s reply was that
his troops were well camouflaged and concealed and, that IAF pilots would
not be able to pick out the posts from the air. As the discussion became more
animated, I asked the corps commander if he was sure the Indians would not
use their artillery to vacate our incursion, given the criticality of the situation
from their standpoint. He replied that the Dras-Kargil stretch did not allow
for positioning of the hundreds of guns that would be required, due to lack
of depth; in any case, it would be suicidal for the Indians to denude artillery
firepower from any other sector as defensive balance had to be maintained.

He gave the example of the Kathua-Jammu The Dras-Kargil

sector where the Indians had a compulsion stretch did
to keep the bulk of their modern Bofors guns not allow for
due to the vital road link’s vulnerability to our positioning of
offensive elements. the hundreds of
It seemed from the corps commander’s guns that would
smug appreciation of the situation that the be required, due
Indians had been tightly straitjacketed in the to lack of depth;
Dras-Kargil sector and had no option but in any case, it
to submit to our operational design. More would be suicidal
significantly, an alternate action like a strategic for the Indians to
riposte by the Indians in another sector had denude artillery
been rendered out of question, given the firepower from
nuclear environment. Whether resort to an any other sector
exterior manoeuvre (diplomatic offensive) as defensive
by the beleaguered Indians had crossed the balance had to be
planners’ minds, was not discernable in the maintained.
corps commander’s elucidation.
Perhaps it was the incredulousness of the whole thing that led Air Cdre Abid
Rao to famously quip, “After this operation, it’s going to be either a Court Martial
or Martial Law!” as we walked out of the briefing room. Back at Air Headquarters,
we briefed the DCAS (Ops) about what had transpired at the 10 Corps briefing.
His surprise at the developments, as well as his concern about the possibility of
events spiralling out of control, could not remain concealed behind his otherwise
unflappable demeanour. We all were also piqued at being left out of the army’s
planning, though we were given to believe that it was a “limited tactical action”
in which the PAF would not be required – an issue that none of us agreed with.
Presented with a fait accompli, we decided not to lose any more time and, while
the DCAS (Ops) went to brief the CAS about the situation, we set about gearing
up for a hectic routine. The operations room was quickly updated with the latest
large-scale maps and air recce photos of the area; communications links with
concerned agencies were also revamped in a short time. Deployment orders
were issued and, within the next 48 hours, the bulk of combat elements were in-
situ at their war locations.
IAF – By Fits and Starts

The IAF deployments in Kashmir, for what came to be known as “Operation

M Kaiser Tufail
Safedsagar”, commenced on May 15, with the bulk of operational assets

positioned by May 18. One hundred and fifty combat aircraft were deployed as
follows:
Srinagar - 34 (MiG-21, MiG23, MiG-27)
Awantipur - 28 (MiG-21, MiG29, Jaguar)
Udhampur - 12 (MiG-21)
Pathankot - 30 (MiG-21, MiG-23)
Adampur - 46 (Mir-2000, MiG-29, Jaguar)
One-third of the aircraft were modern, “high-threat” fighters equipped with

beyond visual range (BVR) air-to-air missiles. During the preparatory stage, air
defence alert status (5 minutes to scramble from ground) was maintained while
Mirage-2000s and Jaguars carried out photo-reconnaissance along the LoC
and ageing Canberras carried out electronic intelligence (ELINT) to ferret out
locations of PAF air defence sensors. Last minute honing of strafing and rocketing
skills was carried out by pilots at an air-to-ground firing range near Leh.
Operations by the IAF started in earnest on May 26, a full 16 days after
commencement of Pakistani infiltration across the LoC. The salient feature of
this initial phase was strafing and rocketing of the intruders’ positions by MiG-
21, MiG-23BN and MiG-27. All operations (except air defence) came to a sudden
standstill on May 28, after two IAF fighters and a helicopter were lost – a MiG-
21 and a Mi-17—to the Pakistan Army’s surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), while a
MiG-27 went down due to engine trouble caused by gun gas ingestion during
high altitude strafing. (Incidentally, the pilot of the MiG-27, Flt Lt Nachiketa,
who ejected and was apprehended, had a tête-à-tête with this author during an
interesting ‘interrogation’ session.)
The results achieved by the IAF in the first two days were dismal. Serious
restraints seem to have been imposed on the freedom of action of IAF fighters
in what was basically a search-and-destroy mission. Lt Gen Mehmud’s rant
about a “Stinger on every peak” seemed true. It was obvious that the IAF had
underestimated the SAM threat. The mood in Pakistan Army circles was that of
undiluted elation, and the PAF was expected to sit it out while sharing the khakis’
glee.
The IAF immediately went into a reappraisal mode and came out with GPS-
assisted high altitude bombing by MiG-21, MiG-23BN and MiG-27 as a makeshift
solution. In the meantime, quick modification on the Mirage-2000 for day/night
laser bombing kits (Litening pods) was initiated with the help of the Israelis.

Conventional bombing that started incessantly While the

after a two-day operational hiatus, was aimed Indians had been
at harassment and denial of respite to the surprised by the
infiltrators, with consequent adverse effects on infiltration in
morale. The results of this part of the campaign Kargil, the IAF
were largely insignificant, mainly because the mobilised and
target coordinates were not known accurately; reacted rapidly
the nature of the terrain, too, precluded as the Indian
precision. A few cases of fratricide by the IAF led Army took time
it to be even more cautious. to position itself.
By June 16, the IAF was able to open up the Clearly, army-air
laser-guided bombing campaign with the help joint operations
of Jaguars and Mirage-2000s. Daily photo-recce had a synergistic
along the LoC by Jaguars escorted by Mirage- effect in evicting
2000s, which had continued from the beginning the intruders.
of operations, proved crucial to both the aerial
bombing campaign as well as the Indian artillery, helping the latter in accurately
shelling Pakistani positions in the Dras-Kargil and Gultari sectors. While the
photo-recce missions typically did not involve deliberate border violations, there
was a total of 37 “technical violations” (which emanate as a consequence of kinks
and bends in the geographical boundaries). Typically, these averaged to a depth
of five nautical miles, except on one occasion when the IAF fighters apparently
cocked-a-snoot at the PAF and came in 13 miles deep.
The Mirage-2000s scored at least five successful laser-guided bomb hits
on forward dumping sites and posts. During the last days of operations which
ended on July 12, it was clear that delivery accuracy had improved considerably.
Even though night bombing accuracy was suspect, round-the-clock attacks had
made retention of posts untenable for the Pakistani infiltrators. Photo-recce of
Pakistani artillery gun positions also made them vulnerable to Indian artillery.
The IAF flew a total of 550 strike missions against infiltrator positions, including
bunkers and supply depots. The coordinates of these locations were mostly
picked up from about 150 reconnaissance and communications intelligence
missions. In addition, 500 missions were flown for air defence and for escorting
strike and recce missions.
While the Indians had been surprised by the infiltration in Kargil, the IAF
mobilised and reacted rapidly as the Indian Army took time to position itself.
Later, when the Indian Army had entrenched itself, the IAF supplemented and

M Kaiser Tufail
To prevent the filled in where the artillery could not be positioned

mission from in force. Clearly, army-air joint operations had a
being seen as synergistic effect in evicting the intruders.
an escalatory
step in the PAF in a Bind
already charged From the very beginning of the Kargil operations,
atmosphere, the the PAF was entrapped by a circumstantial
PAF had to lure absurdity: it was faced with the ludicrous
Indian fighters predicament of having to provide air support
into its own to infiltrators already disowned by the Pakistan
territory, i.e. Army leadership! In any case, it took some effort
Azad Kashmir to impress on the latter that crossing the LoC by
or the Northern fighters laden with bombs was not, by any stretch
Areas. of the imagination, akin to lobbing a few artillery
shells to settle scores. There was no doubt in the
minds of PAF Air Staff that the first cross-border attack (whether across the LoC
or the international border) would invite an immediate response from the IAF,
possibly in the shape of a retaliatory strike against the home base of the intruding
fighters, thus, starting the first round. The PAF’s intervention meant all-out war:
this unmistakable conclusion was conveyed to the Prime Minister, Mr Nawaz
Sharif, by the air chief in no equivocal terms.
Short of starting an all-out war, the PAF looked at some saner options that
could put some wind in the sails after doldrums had been hit. The Air Officer,
Commanding, Air Marshal Najib Akhtar of Air Defence Command was coopted
by the Air Staff to sift the possibilities. Audacious and innovative in equal parts,
Air Marshal Najib had excellent knowledge about our own and the enemy’s
air defence ground environment (ADGE). He had conceived and overseen the
unprecedented heli-lift of a low-looking radar to a 14,000-ft mountain top on
the forbidding Deosai Plateau. The highly risky operation became possible with
the help of some courageous flying by army aviation pilots. With good low level
radars cover now available up to the LoC, Air Marshal Najib along with the Air
Staff, focussed on fighter sweep (a mission flown to destroy patrolling enemy
fighters) as a possible option.
To prevent the mission from being seen as an escalatory step in the already
charged atmosphere, the PAF had to lure Indian fighters into its own territory,
i.e. Azad Kashmir or the Northern Areas. That done, a number of issues had to
be tackled. What if the enemy aircraft were hit in our territory but fell across,

providing a pretext to India as a doubly aggrieved Those not

party? What if one of our own aircraft fell, no aware of the
matter if the exchange was one-to-one (or better)? gravity of the
Finally, even if we were able to pull off a surprise, F-16 operability
would it not be a one-off incident, with the IAF problem under
wisening up in quick time? The over-arching sanctions have
consideration was the BVR missile capability of complained of
IAF fighters which impinged unfavourably on the the PAF’s lack
mission success probability. The conclusion was of cooperation.
that a replication of the famous four-Vampire rout Suffice it to
of September 1, 1965, by two Sabres might not be say that if the
possible. The idea of a fighter sweep thus fizzled PAF had been
out as quickly as it came up for discussion. included in the
While the PAF looked at some offensive initial planning,
options, it had a more pressing defensive issue at this anomaly
hand. The IAF’s minor border violations during (along with many
recce missions were not of grave consequence others) would
in so far as no bombing had taken place in our have emerged
territory; however, the fact that these missions as a mitigating
helped the enemy refine its air and artillery factor against the
targeting, was, to say the least, disconcerting. Kargil adventure.
There were constant reports of our troops on the
LoC disturbed to see (or hear) IAF fighters operating with apparent impunity.
GHQ took the matter up with Air Headquarters and it was resolved that combat
air patrols (CAPs) would be flown by the F-16s operating out of Minhas (Kamra)
and Sargodha. This arrangement resulted in less on-station time but was safer
than operating out of vulnerable Skardu, which had inadequate early warning
in the mountainous terrain; its status as a turn-around facility was, however,
considered acceptable for its location. A flight of F-7s was, nonetheless, deployed
primarily for point defence of the important garrison town of Skardu as well as
the air base.
F-16 CAPs could not have been flown all day long as spares support was
limited under the prevailing US sanctions. Random CAPs were resorted to, with
a noticeable drop in border violations only as long as the F-16s were on station.
There were a few cases of F-16s and Mirage-2000s locking their adversaries with
the on-board radars but caution usually prevailed and no close encounters took
place. After one week of CAPs, the F-16 maintenance personnel indicated that war

M Kaiser Tufail
reserve spares were being eaten into and that the activity had to be “rationalised”,
a euphemism for discontinuing it altogether. That an impending war occupied the
Air Staff’s minds was evident in the decision by the DCAS (Ops) for F-16 CAPs to be
discontinued, unless IAF activity became unbearably provocative or threatening.
Those not aware of the gravity of the F-16 operability problem under sanctions
have complained of the PAF’s lack of cooperation. Suffice it to say that if the PAF
had been included in the initial planning, this anomaly (along with many others)
would have emerged as a mitigating factor against the Kargil adventure. It is another
matter that the army high command did not envisage operations ever coming to
such a pass. Now, it was almost as if the PAF was to blame for the Kargil venture
spiralling out of control. It also must be noted too that other than F-16s, the PAF
did not have a capable enough fighter for patrolling, as the minimum requirement
in this scenario was an on-board airborne intercept radar, exceptional agility and
sufficient staying power. The F-7s had reasonably good manoeuvrability but lacked
an intercept radar as well as endurance, while the ground attack Mirage-III/5s and
A-5s were sitting ducks for the air combat mission.
In sum, the PAF found it expedient not to worry too much about minor border
violations and instead, conserve resources for the larger conflagration that was
looming. All the same, it gave the enemy no pretext for retaliation in the face of
any provocation, though this latter stance irked some quarters in the army that
were desperate to ‘equal the match’. Might it strike some that the PAF’s restraint
in warding off a major conflagration may have been its paramount contribution
to the Kargil conflict?
Aftermath
It has emerged that the principal protagonists of the Kargil adventure were the
Chief of Army Staff (COAS) Gen Pervez Musharraf, Commander 10 Corps Lt Gen
Mehmud Ahmed and Commander Force Command Northern Areas (FCNA):
Maj Gen Javed Hasan. The trio, in previous ranks and appointments, had been
associated with planning during paper exercises on how to wrest control of lost
territory in Siachen. The plans were not acceptable to the then Prime Minister
Benazir Bhutto, to whom the options had been put up for review more than once.
She was well-versed in international affairs and all too intelligent to be taken
in by the chicanery. It fell to the wisdom of her successor, Mr Nawaz Sharif, to
approve the army trio’s self-serving presentation.
In an effort to keep the plan secret, which was thought to be the key to
its successful initiation, the army trio took no one into confidence, neither its

operational commanders nor the heads of the In a country

other Services. This, regrettably, resulted in a where democratic
closed-loop thought process which engendered traditions have
a string of oversights and failures: never been deep-
n Failure to grasp the wider military and rooted, it is no
diplomatic ramifications of a limited tactical big exposé to
operation that had the potential of creating point out that
strategic effects. the military is
n Failure to correctly visualise the response of steeped in an
a powerful enemy to what was, in effect, a authoritarian,
major blow in a disputed sector. rather than
n Failure to spell out the specific aim to field a consensual
commanders, who acted on their own to approach. To my
needlessly ‘capture’ territory and expand mind, there is
the scope of the operation to unmanageable an urgent need
levels. to inculcate a
n Failure to appreciate the inability of the more liberal
army officers to evaluate the capabilities culture that
and limitations of an air force. accommodates
n Failure to coordinate contingency plans at different points
the tri-Services level. of view—a more
lateral approach.
The flaws in the Kargil plan that led to these
failures were almost palpable and, could not have escaped even a layman’s
attention during a cursory examination. The question arises as to why all the
planners got blinded to the obvious? Could it be that some of the subordinates
had the sight but not the nerve in the face of a powerful superior? In hierarchical
organisations, there is precious little room for dissent, but in autocratic ones
like the military, it takes more than a spine to disagree, for there are very few
commanders who are large enough to allow such liberties. It is out of fear of
annoying the superior – which also carries with it manifold penalties and loss of
promotion and perks – that the majority decides to go along with the wind.
In a country where democratic traditions have never been deep-rooted, it is
no big exposé to point out that the military is steeped in an authoritarian, rather
than a consensual approach. To my mind, there is an urgent need to inculcate a
more liberal culture that accommodates different points of view—a more lateral
approach, so to speak. Disagreement during planning should be systemically

M Kaiser Tufail
tolerated and, not taken as a personal affront. Unfortunately, many in higher

ranks seem to think that rank alone confers wisdom and anyone displaying signs
of intelligence at an earlier stage is, somehow, an alien in their ‘star-spangled’
universe.
Kargil, I suspect, like the 1965 and 1971 Wars, was a case of not having enough
dissenters (‘devil’s advocates’, if you will) during planning, because everyone
wanted to agree with the boss. That single reason, I think, was the root cause of
most of the failures that were apparent right from the beginning. If this point is
understood well, remedial measures towards tolerance and liberalism can follow
as a matter of course. Such an organisational milieu, based on honest appraisal
and fearless appeal, would be conducive to sound and sensible planning. It
would also go a long way in precluding Kargil-like disasters.
Tailpiece
Come change-over time of the CAS in 2001, President Musharraf struck at the PAF’s
top leadership in what can only be described as an implacable action: he passed
over all five air marshals and appointed the sixth-in-line who was practically an
air vice marshal till a few weeks before. While disregarding of seniority in the
appointment of Service chiefs has historically been endemic in the country, the
practice has been seen as breeding nepotism and partiality, besides leaving a
trail of conjecture and gossip in the ranks. Given Air Chief Marshal Mehdi’s rather
straight-faced and forthright dealings with a somewhat junior Gen Musharraf,
particularly during the Kargil conflict, there is good reason to believe that the
latter decided to appoint a not-very-senior air chief whom he could order around
like one of his corps commanders. (As it turned out, Air Chief Marshal Mus’haf
was as solid as his predecessor and gave no quarter when it came to the PAF’s
interests.) Whatever the reason of bypassing seniority, it was unfortunate that
the PAF’s precious corporate experience was thrown out so crassly and several
careers destroyed. Lives and honour lost in Kargil is another matter.
(Courtesy: http://kaiser_aeronaut.blogspot.com/2009/01/kargil-conflict-and-
pakistan-air-force.html)

India-Pakistan:
The Pangs of Peace
Asad Durrani
War is easier to make than peace. Anyone can start a war. Peace, on the other
hand, takes at least two to make and almost everyone to keep. We have, therefore,
made more wars than peace. And since we still have not learnt the art of war
very well (remember TE Lawrence!), it is no surprise that we are not terribly
good at making peace. That is no excuse for giving up. Churchill once famously
said: “The Americans would ultimately do the right thing, but before that, they
must exhaust all other options”. The US may be no role model for making peace,
but most of us do no better. Ideally, a country should employ all its elements of
national power, force too if necessary, to create a favourable position to negotiate
peace. In practice, we embark on the peace path only when all other efforts have
been stalemated, in fact, checkmated.
India and Pakistan needed fifty years before they were ready to ‘do the right
thing’. Europe, cited today as the citadel of peace, took longer. During this period,
the two countries developed internal strength, sought external support, acquired
unconventional capabilities, used sub-conventional means, even fought wars
and made some half-baked efforts to peacefully resolve their conflicts. Finally
in 1997, in the belief that they were now well positioned to make amends, both
India and Pakistan decided to work-out a framework to build durable peace.
Evolution of the Concept

The task was entrusted to the two Foreign Secretaries, Salman Haider of India and
Shamshad Ahmed of Pakistan. Their first challenge must have been to create the
right conditions to start a dialogue on Kashmir, the bone of contention between
Lieutenant General Asad Durrani (Retd) is former head of Pakistan’s Inter-Services

Intelligence Directorate.

Asad Durrani
the two countries right from their inception. It had now acquired such complex
dimensions that no meaningful discourse on the subject looked possible. In
Pakistan, securing the right of self-determination for the people of Jammu and
Kashmir is one of the national objectives. It is, therefore, very difficult for any
Pakistani leadership to embark upon a structured dialogue with India that was
not seen to be addressing Kashmir, seriously, if not urgently. India, on the other
hand, having declared the disputed state as its integral part, could not be seen
negotiating its status, not seriously at least. The foreign secretaries’ meeting of
June 1997 found an ingenuous method to circumvent the dilemma.
Their recipe, now popularly known as the “composite dialogue”, was to form
a number of working groups, eight in all, to discuss important bilateral issues
more or less concurrently. Peace, security and Kashmir were to be dealt with at the
level of the foreign secretaries. Relevant ministries or departments could address
the rest like trade, terrorism, drugs and some territorial disputes. Pakistan could
now claim that its “core issue” would be handled at a high level. And the Indians
could take consolation from the fact that the foreign secretaries were unlikely to
meet very frequently, and whenever they did, there would always be matters of
concern to India — cross-border infiltration, for example. With the contentious
issues segregated by type as well as by degree of their complexity, in theory the
dialogue could now begin, perhaps even show quick results since some of the
problems would be easy to resolve. But a clause in the joint statement had the
potential of becoming a serious impediment.
Pakistanis have generally, and understandably, believed that in a dialogue
process, while the Indian interests — like greater economic cooperation — could
be addressed in quick time, talks on Kashmir, due to the complexity of the issue,
would make little headway. There was, and still is, a fairly broad based belief in
Pakistan that if the Kashmir question was not settled before improving other
neighbourly ties with India, the latter would no longer be interested in resolving it.
To address these apprehensions, Clause 4.2 of the joint communiqué stipulated
that all issues were to be discussed in an “integrated” manner. It meant that the
progress on all issues had to be in tandem. Sounded fine; but for a problem. If
there were little or no movement on one issue, one would have to slow down
on all the others. The “favourable environment” needed to deal with the more
complex problems would thus become contingent on progress in all areas. This
was exactly the catch 22 situation that the authors of the dialogue formula had set
out to avoid. The “integrated” part was, therefore, quietly dropped (but not from
the official text). The process was now more like moving with our disputes on

India-Pakistan: The Pangs of Peace
parallel tracks and getting them out of the way as and The
when feasible. No longer “composite”, the dialogue “favourable
retained the politically correct adjective. What we environment”
now had was, in fact, a “multiple-track, multiple- needed to
speed” formula. deal with the
Evolution of this concept was purely a civilian more complex
sector enterprise. All the same, since it is the military problems
that prides itself in the study and development of would thus
strategic wisdom, it may be gratifying to note that a become
military strategist too would have approved the plan. contingent on
When operating along multiple axes, forces that meet progress in all
less resistance continue their momentum. That helps areas.
operations on other fronts as well. In due course,
some critical fronts can be reinforced to achieve a breakthrough and capture the
main objective: in this case, durable peace in the subcontinent.
The Learning Phase

Good concepts, brilliant designs, even sound strategies, have never been enough.
For their success, we make certain assumptions and lay down conditions that
must be fulfilled. It must be assumed, for example, that an agreement, no matter
how favourable to one or the other side, is not to be touted as a one-sided victory.
Eager to make political capital out of the accord, the Pakistani government went
to town for having made the Indians “finally” agree to discuss Kashmir. The
Indians reacted predictably, and “clarified” that the only aspect of Kashmir that
they ever intended to discuss was Pakistan’s support to the insurgency in Indian
held Kashmir. The composite dialogue, and along with it the peace process, were
put on ice.
The following year, 1998, the arch-rivals brought their nuclear bombs out
of the basement. The celebrations that followed in India and Pakistan, and not
only on the streets, were accompanied by plenty of chest beating and bellicosity
towards each other. Obviously, there were also concerns, both inside and outside
the region: how the two nascent nuclear powers would adjust to the new,
potentially dangerous, nuclear environment. At the very least, some measures
were needed to prevent either side from triggering nuclear weapons in panic,
or because it misread a situation — when the other side tested a missile, for
example. Nuclearisation had indeed provided the two countries another chance
to review their chronically tense relationship.

Asad Durrani
In February 1999, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, the then Indian prime minster,
undertook a landmark bus yatra to Lahore. The Lahore Declaration that he
signed on February 21 with his Pakistani counterpart, Nawaz Sharif, went
beyond nuclear confidence-buiding measures (CBMs) and attempted to revive
the peace process. The “composite dialogue” once again formed the bedrock of
the agreement. And once again, it was shelved before it got a fair chance.
It is not clear if India was first to violate the spirit of Lahore when it failed
to notify a routine missile test carried out soon after Vajpayee’s return to Delhi.
But the agreement was most certainly dead when, in early May, Pakistani backed
militia was found occupying the Kargil heights in Kashmir on the Indian side of the
Line of Control (LoC). It was withdrawn after two months of intense fighting and
bilateral as well as multilateral haggling. Pakistan was held entirely responsible
for the breach. Its defence that it was only preempting another Indian incursion
(an earlier, in 1988, had resulted in India occupying the Siachen Glacier) found
no takers. Indo-Pak relations suffered another setback when in October 1999, the
Pakistani Army Chief, Gen Pervez Musharraf, took power in a military putsch. The
Indians believed that the general was the architect of the Kargil misadventure, and
were unwilling to resume the peace process as long as he was in power. But when
Musharraf was found firmly in the saddle, Vajpayee invited him to give “peace
another chance”. Musharraf, who had in the meantime assumed the office of
president, visited India in July 2001 and met Vajpayee in what became known as
the Agra Summit. No agreement was reached this time around.
In the aftermath of 9/11, the events took a further dip. When America decided
to invade Afghanistan to flush out Al Qaida, the group suspected of this enormity,
it sought allies in the region. Pakistan was one of the countries asked. India argued
that Pakistan was “part of the problem”, and, therefore, ill suited to be a partner in
the so-called ‘war on terror’. It offered its own services instead. Pakistan got the
role as it was better placed. Already sulking for being upstaged by Pakistan, India
mobilised for war when members of a banned Pakistani militant group attacked
its Parliament. For most of 2002, the armed forces of the two countries remained
in a state of high alert. There were, however, good reasons that this tension did
not escalate into war, even a limited one.
Some of the reasons are well known: the risk of nuclear conflagration; and,
because of that, third parties primed to restrain the two sides before they went over
the brink. Another, perhaps the more potent constraint, is less known. An all-out
conventional war between the two countries was very likely to end in a strategic
impasse. Since countries do not normally start wars without a reasonable chance

of achieving a major objective, during the last An all-out

three decades, India and Pakistan have not taken conventional
their conflicts beyond build-up on borders and war between the
skirmishes across the LoC. India could still have two countries
initiated a war during 2002, either in frustration, or was very
in the belief that the US presence in the area would likely to end
deny Pakistan its nuclear option. However, there in a strategic
were some other restraining factors as well. War impasse. If the
would have removed all constraints on Pakistan to war did end
support the insurgency in Kashmir, which could without causing
then become more intense and durable. More major damage
importantly, if the war did end without causing to Pakistan,
major damage to Pakistan, it would have deprived it would have
India of a potent card that it had so far used to good deprived India
effect: the threat of war. of a potent card
Even though Pakistan has a reasonable that it had so
chance to prevent India from achieving a decisive far used to good
military victory, it is still sensitive to Indian war effect: the threat
threats. Being much smaller, its economy is more of war.
vulnerable to war-like tensions. After thirty years of
high economic growth, it had experienced its worst recession during the 1990s.
Now that some recovery looked possible, significantly as an important ally of the
US, tensions with India were an unwelcome development. Paradoxically, when
the drums of war receded, both countries found that their threat cards were now,
under the law of the diminishing returns, running out of steam.
Indeed, Pakistan too had time and again threatened that if India did not agree
to settle the Kashmir problem, the region could blow up in a nuclear holocaust.
In the absence of any desperate resolve to back-up these threats, this card was
fast losing its effectiveness. I believe, in 2002, India’s threat of a conventional war
had also run its course. Now that the two countries had manoeuvred each other
into a deadlock, it was time to revive their on-again off-again peace process.
The 2004 South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC) Summit in
Islamabad seemed to be the right moment. Before that, the stumbling blocks
that had caused the failure at Agra had to be removed.
The very fact that the framework evolved in 1997 had survived the nuclear
tests, the Kargil episode, a military coup, 9/11 and the stand-off of 2002, indicates
that it was a robust construct. The secret of its durability is its inbuilt flexibility. We

Asad Durrani
may recall how its founding fathers used ingenuity to accommodate some very
serious concerns from both quarters. In Agra, this capacity was not employed
and the two sides insisted that their respective interests be recognised as “the”
core issue: Kashmir for Pakistan; and the cross-border infiltration for India. To
resolve this conflict in the spirit of the original concept, all one had to do was to
make both concerns part of the process.
Two extracts from the joint press statement of January 6, 2004, after Prime
Minister Vajpayee had met Gen Musharraf to seal the agreement, show how
smoothly it could be done.
President Musharraf reassured Prime Minister Vajpayee that he would not
permit territory under Pakistan’s control to be used to support terrorism in any
manner.
The two leaders are confident that the resumption of composite dialogue will
lead to peaceful settlement of all bilateral issues, including Jammu & Kashmir, to
the satisfaction of both sides.
Launching of the Process

The plan was now perfect, but to give the process, a good start some movement
on the ground — for example, with a round of meetings, even if these were on
mundane issues— was one good idea. Some quarters, however, believed that an
initiative on Kashmir, even a symbolic one, might be the best way to kick-start
the process. Kashmir after all was not only the “core issue” for Pakistan; having
sucked in hundreds of thousands of troops, it was also a “multi-corps” problem
for India.
The gesture had to meet some essential criteria: it should be without prejudice
to the declared Kashmir policy of India and Pakistan; it had to provide some hope
that a resolution of the dispute was seriously sought; and it would sufficiently
engage the Kashmiris to let the two countries work on their less intractable issues.
A meeting of the leadership on both sides of the Kashmir divide seemed to meet
these criteria adequately. Ultimately, it was decided to start a bus service between
the two parts of Kashmir from April 7, 2005. The idea must have been that not
only the leaders, but also the divided families could be brought together. The bus
was also bound to make a bigger and better all-round impact than meetings of a
few individuals — who, in any case, were not expected to show immediate results.
There was, however, a risk involved: if an odd bus was blown up by any of the many
detractors of the peace process, at that nascent stage, it would have suffered a
serious setback. That mercifully did not happen, nor did much else after the initial

euphoria over the bus trips and some high profile visits by the Hurryiat leaders to
Pakistan. The symbolism was still helpful.
The subsequent period has been, and continues to be, rough going for
Pakistan. Internally, the country has gone through a very lively transition from a
military led rule to an elected government. The latter has so far fallen far short of
the minimum expectations of a civil society that is now very vocal and vibrant.
The fallout from the foreign occupation of Afghanistan has seriously affected the
security situation domestically as well as on the western borders. The quiet eastern
front, till its calm was broken by the November 2008 Mumbai blasts, was ,therefore,
a welcome reprieve. India, too, must have been relieved by the post Kashmir bus
developments. It found time to stabilise, as best as it could, its part of Kashmir
and start work on its water resources that in other times would have created quite
a rumpus in Pakistan. It was badly shaken by the Ram Mandir episode but has
possibly recovered. Post Mumbai, however, there may well be a need to review the
peace process and in case it was revived, how to manage it a little better.
Concluding Thoughts
The design logic of the peace process was rightly based on resolving contentious
issues at a deliberate pace; essentially slow, but considering our poor track record
and cautious bureaucratic culture, quite realistic. The problem is that neither our
peoples nor the political leaders are known for the patience needed to keep faith
in a process that did not show tangible results on a regular basis. For a while,
it was possible to keep them in good humour with brave pronouncements and
cultural exchanges, but soon they were demanding increased economic and
trade benefits that the process did not deliver.
And, indeed, there was always the threat of subversion, not only by the
militants who would find periods of no progress ripe for their activity, but
also from any other quarter, external or internal, not in favour of an Indo-Pak
rapprochement. Even though some very heroic statements were once made in
the two capitals that acts of terror could not derail the process, and there were
reasons to believe that both countries understood that the handle over peace
should not be yielded to its detractors, some well planned and well timed acts
of sabotage could seriously set the whole process back. Mumbai is proof, if one
was needed.
Kashmir can also be counted upon as an issue needing constant care.
Though deftly handled for a while, it has the potential to erupt if its people are
not taken on board. Even if the two sides abide by the spirit of the “composite

Asad Durrani
dialogue”, there are bound to be problems. Pakistanis, for example, could become
impatient because the “favourable environment”, that was supposed to help
resolve the issue, was taking too long. Indians, on the other hand, might start
getting nervous if the Muslim majority from their part of Kashmir found greater
affinity with their co-religionists in Pakistan. Some of us were, therefore, feeling
uncomfortable when Musharraf was making proposals in quick succession to
find the “final solution” for Kashmir. The Indian non-response may have been for
any number of reasons, but in keeping with the logic of conflict resolution, such
suggestions were counter-productive. The other side would understandably
suspect that the idea was more beneficial to the initiator. The resolution of the
conflict, was therefore, best left to the evolution of the process — till the improved
atmosphere provided enough confidence to all the stakeholders to accept that
what they had to forego was worth its while.
Conduct of a peace process is too complex an affair to be left to any organ
of the state. Bureaucrats are required to take care of the technical aspects of
an issue. When they are stuck, the political bosses have to take decisions to
break the logjam, and very often, exercise leadership to garner public support.
Occasionally, however, it may be politics that would become the stumbling block.
After Mumbai, for example, any Indian government with an election looming in
its face would have had a hard time not yielding to public sentiment. Who all may
have helped to limit the damage, I do not know, but at times like these, some sane
minds working behind the scenes could be of great help.
Therefore, we can always be well served by unconventional wisdom, not only
to pause when necessary or breakthrough when stuck, but also to discover fresh
grounds to cooperate. There was, for example, not a single “establishment” voice
from either side that supported “joint investigation” after the Mumbai carnage.
Some even recommended dismantling the “joint anti-terror mechanism”.
Anyone tasked to keep the peace process on track would, in fact, have seen these
two instruments as CBMs. That reminds me: the Indus Water Treaty, the longest
running CBM between the two countries, is also in need of some resuscitation.
And, just imagine, if someone were to come up with an idea, how the two
countries could work together to help Afghanistan in this hour of great distress!
Unless some Indians thought it was a Pakistani ploy to lure them in the Afghan
quagmire, or the Pakistanis saw it leading to their “encirclement” by India, it might
become the first regional initiative to get the foreign forces out of our area. A
monkey taking all the cheese from quibbling cats, I believe is a South Asian fable.

Terrorism in India:
External Ramifications
Vikram Sood
India is possibly the only country in the world that has faced insurgencies and
terrorism of all kinds – ethnic, ideological and ethno-religious – for over 60 years.
Yet, despite this sustained onslaught on its very being, India has survived this.
And 60 years after independence, India and Pakistan – the main perpetrator of
terrorism in India – are on different trajectories.
India remains a secular democracy although our secular credentials are
sometimes under some strain. After years of uncertainties, the fortune graph is
now a steady upward curve as India positions itself to become a rising economic
power. Pakistan, on the other hand, is on a downward slope, as it slips into a self-
created jehadi abyss with the Taliban threatening to establish a radical Islamic
regime in the country from its bases in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas
(FATA) where all seven districts are under their control. While the world applauds
India, it increasingly looks at Pakistan with suspicion as an irresponsible state.
In today’s context, international terrorism, invariably invokes references
to jehadi terrorism. Unfortunately, the response to this, described as the global
war on terror, was neither global, nor was it against terror. It remained restricted
to handling the problem in only one part of the globe against targets that were
unevenly defined. The ill planned war in Afghanistan or the unnecessary one in
Iraq, were not about defeating terror because both created more terrorists than
they destroyed. An over-militarised response gave it the wrong description of a
war on terror whereas one should have been thinking and working in terms of
counter-terrorism.
To the Muslim world, Osama bin Laden is not necessarily the devil incarnate
that he is perceived as in the rest of the world. Osama had promised to deliver his
Mr Vikram Sood is former Secretary, Research and Analysis Wing and presently Vice
President, Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi.

Vikram Sood
followers from centuries of oppression and humiliation by the West and by their
own rulers. Western media and propaganda to demonise Osama have made him
into a cult figure. Many believe in him and his ideals and are willing to die for
them. And there is no way you can kill a man who is willing to die.
As harsh extremist Islamic fires rage in Afghanistan and Pakistan, it is no
use exulting in this. There are varying estimates about the number of terrorists
in FATA, from 8,000 to 4,0000. Those who have dealt with terrorism in Kashmir
know what it takes to handle a terrorist force that numbers between 3,000-3,500
at any given moment. Pakistan does not have the ability or the inclination to take
on this terrorist force. Almost surely, these flames will singe us too, as they have
begun to in Jaipur, Mumbai, Hyderabad, Delhi and Ahmedabad. It may not be
long before we could see a Taliban regime in Afghanistan with all its implications
for the neighbourhood. It is fine to say that no religion propagates violence and
terror and, therefore, a terrorist has no religion. But our response to this cannot be
communal either. We have to get prepared to deal with it now and regrettably we
are not prepared to deal with the gathering storm.
In the West, the problem has been that socio-economic factors have led to
political-religious manifestations. In India, externally inspired political factors
threaten India’s already weak socio-economic fabric. In the West, the Muslim
population is a result of immigrations after the World War II and their succeeding
generations. In India, the Muslims are indigenous. In fact, it is Pakistan where
its Muslim immigrants from India – the Mohajirs – after independence, have
had difficulty being accepted by the Punjabi-dominated society. In Europe, the
original population and the host governments have had difficulty in accepting
outsiders who are extremely aggressive about preserving their way of life. The
challenge in the West is how to amalgamate; the challenge in India is how to
preserve the amalgam.
The Use of Islam by the Mullahs

While discussing roots of terrorism in his book No End to this War, Walter Laqueur
says that Muslims have had a problem adjusting as minorities, be it in India, the
Philippines or Western Europe. Similarly, they find it difficult to give their own
minorities a fair deal, Muslim or non-Muslim, in their own countries — the Berbers
in Algeria, the Copts in Egypt or the Christians or Shias in Pakistan or the Sudan.
This has, in turn, led to what Olivier Roy calls globalised Islam – militant Islamic
resentment at Western domination or anti-imperialism exalted by revivalism. State
sponsorship of terrorism as an instrument of foreign policy and strategy to negate

Terrorism in India: External Ramifications
military and other superiority, has been another In India,

facet of this problem. externally
Since religion has been at centre-stage in inspired political
our country in the last few years, it is time we factors threaten
looked at this head on. A person’s religion is India’s already
more often an accident of birth and sometimes weak socio-
an act of faith. The Al Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem, economic fabric.
the Lourdes in Spain, the Wailing Wall of The challenge in
Jerusalem, the Amarnath Yatra in Kashmir and the West is how
the Ram Setu in Rameshwaram are all a matter to amalgamate;
of faith and not a matter of cold scientific logic. the challenge
In a country like ours, with all our religions and in India is how
languages, with our tempers on a short fuse for to preserve the
any number of reasons, the best way to keep amalgam.
our secular identity and sanity intact is to say,
“My religion but our country.”
In our country, Salman Khan celebrates Ganesh Chaturthi; the Indian cricket
team’s speed attack could, on a given day, be led by Zaheer, Irfan and Munaf; like
cricket, Bollywood is India’s great unifier and is dominated by the Khans; and, some
of the best music has come from Naushad and AR Rehman. The finest dhrupad
has been rendered by the Dagar brothers – Fahimuuddin and Rahimuddin. Yet
no one bats an eyelid because they are all Indians and do India proud. But some
fundamentalist mullah from Mumbai served Salman Khan with a fatwa. Salman’s
father was brave enough to reject this and we need to acknowledge his conviction.
Ours is, and has to be, a composite culture. There is no other way.
In Pakistan, they teach them that jehad is the only way. Years ago, they solved
their problem by getting rid of their minorities and today even Shias are kafirs in
a country that never tires of proclaiming that it is a homeland for the Muslims of
South Asia. In Pakistan, the present day purveyors of religion teach their children
that theirs is the Only Faith which must overcome the idol worshiping Hindus,
the Christians and the Jews. In one of his Friday sermons, the Inter-Services
Intelligence (ISI)-backed Pakistani Jamaat-ud-Dawa leader, Hafiz Saeed urged that
“The solution to all your problems and that of the Muslim ummah lies in jehad.”
In dealing with Pakistan, we must remember that there is another Pakistan
beyond the chic and elegant salons of Lahore. And these “others” wield considerable
clout. In the words of Pervez Hoodbhoy, a well known Pakistani academic, “The
Talibanisation of Pakistan’s tribal areas has caused alarm, but it is the rapid

Vikram Sood
developments in the heart of the nation’s capital, Islamabad, that have stunned
many.” Hoodbhoy quotes several incidents to say that he feared that the stage for
transforming Islamabad into a Taliban stronghold was being set. Hoodbhoy’s paper
adds that women nurses will not be able to attend to male patients. Male doctors
will not be allowed to perform ECG or ultra sound on women for fear that women
may lure men away. After the 2005 earthquake, girls under debris in Balakot were
not allowed to be rescued by a male ambulance team. In April 2006, 21 women and
8 children were crushed to death in a stampede in a Karachi madrassa because the
ambulance team comprised men. This is the way the Pakistani society is headed.
The mullahs are winning and this will have repercussions for us.
In India, we have shadowy organisations like the Indian Mujahideen sending
off letters to the Press that spew hate and venom against others and misquoting
the Quran in support of this. In Pakistan’s increasingly intolerant sections, a similar
letter by a minority would have resulted in massive reprisals against that minority.
In India, we let it pass, because the majority of Indians wants to be secular and
believes in it although we do have aberrations like Raj Thakeray in Mumbai and
fringe elements elsewhere. It is also unfair that a Muslim in India should have to
prove his loyalty to the country each time there is a terrorist incident or a Hindu be
accused of being a fundamentalist each time he owns up to being a Hindu.
Hafeez Saeed and others like Abdur Rahman Makki in Pakistan routinely
quote from the Quran when they exhort their followers to launch jehad against
India. They cite verse 9.5 from the Quran, “Fight and kill the disbelievers wherever
you find them, take them, captive, harass them, lie in wait and ambush them
using every stratagem of war” or verse 9.14, “Fight them (the disbelievers) Allah
will punish them by your hands and bring them to disgrace and give you victory
over them and He will heal the hearts of those who believe.” This was also quoted
by the Indian Mujahideen in their fax after the Ahmedabad bombings. The point
is that these are selectively used, out of context, in both time and space. It is
against this misuse of religion that the moderate Muslim majority must speak
out both against those who spread hate and also to educate that Hindu majority
that only gets to read or see the wrong side of the story.
Recently, MJ Akbar wrote about this in The Times of India when he
distinguished between the fasadis and the jehadis. The point is that he knows
this, a lot of us understand this, but those who get killed in terrorist blasts do not
know and those they leave behind do not understand. Nor do those uneducated
unemployed youth understand this for they are fed carefully edited portions
from the Quran written in a language that they do not know. Is it not time that

we translated the Quran into Indian “The Talibanisation

languages so that most of us can read it and of Pakistan’s tribal
understand it? In this age of the internet areas has caused
this should be easier and would help alarm, but it is the
counter the hate that is pasted on the Net. rapid developments
Asghar Ali Engineer (“Making a Mockery of in the heart of the
Jehad”) and Tahir Mahmood, (“If Hindus nation’s capital,
are ‘Mushrik’ What are We?”) have recently Islamabad, that
written on this. The Muslim needs to have stunned
hear the voice of the moderate and not many.”
just that of the extremist-fundamentalist.
Otherwise, the voice of the likes of Hafeez Saeed will prevail.
The Two Great Obsessions

Internationally, the battle is really between globalised capitalism and global Islam.
The clash is between two Great Obsessions – one obsessed to retain its declining
superpower global dominance and the other obsessed with the ambition to become
the dominant religion. One is affluent, powerful, politically empowered, mainly
Christian, but running out of resources; the other is poor, politically unempowered
and Muslim, and resource rich. Both find nationalistic politics an obstacle to their
progress because nationalism impedes economic domination and theological
control. The former wants unhindered access to finance, markets and resources
required to retain primacy while the other strives for Islamic Caliphates, which
practise a puritan Islam, and a return to former glory.
There is a naive assumption that if local grievances or problems are solved,
global terrorism will disappear. The belief or the hope that, if tomorrow, Palestine,
or Kashmir or Chechnya or wherever else, the issues were settled, terrorism
will disappear, is a mistaken belief. There is now enough free floating violence
and vested interests that would need this violence to continue. There has been
a multifaceted nexus between narcotics, illicit arms smuggling and human
trafficking that seeks the continuance of violence and disorder.
International Terrorism as a Way of Life

Modern terrorism thrives not on just ideology or politics. The main driver is money
and the new economy of terror and international crime has been calculated to be
worth US $ 1.5 trillion (and growing), which is big enough to challenge Western
hegemony. This is higher than the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of Britain, ten

Vikram Sood
There is a naive times the size of General Motors and 17 per

assumption that if cent of the US GDP (1998). Loretta Napoleoni
local grievances refers to this as the “New Economy of Terror.”
or problems are All the illegal businesses of arms and
solved, global narcotics trading, oil and diamonds smuggling,
terrorism will charitable organisations that front for illegal
disappear. businesses and black money operations form
There has been part of this burgeoning business. Terror has other
a multifaceted reasons to thrive. There are vested interests that
nexus between seek the wages of terrorism and terrorist war.
narcotics, illicit Narcotics smuggling generates its own
arms smuggling separate business lines, globally connected
and human with arms smuggling and human trafficking,
trafficking and all dealt with in hundred dollar bills. These
that seeks the black dollars have to be laundered, which is yet
continuance of another distinctive, secretive and complicated
violence and transnational occupation closely connected
disorder. with these illegal activities and is really a crucial
infusion of cash into the Western economies.
In today’s world of deregulated finance, terrorists have taken full advantage of
systems to penetrate legitimate international financial institutions and establish
regular business houses. Islamic banks and other charities have helped fund
movements, sometimes without the knowledge of the managers of these institutions
that the source and destination of the funds is not what has been declared. Both
Hamas and the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) have been flush with funds,
with Arafat’s secret treasury estimated to be worth US $ 700 million to $2 billion.
Our main problem has been in dealing with Pakistan-inspired terrorism.
Countering Terror
When terror struck America and Britain, they introduced draconian laws. The
Bush Administration even introduced controversial surveillance laws. In India,
we did away with the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA), but did not consider it
important to have an adequate substitute. Battling terror is a long and arduous
task: the capability to prevent attacks has to be upgraded constantly, with the
knowledge and acceptance that not all attacks can be prevented. It is hard battle
where there are no rules for the terrorist and no scruples. Democracies have
their inhibitions. Terrorism will never be overcome through good intentions. It

will be overcome or managed through exercising We must

hard options. There cannot be communalising of understand that
counter-terror and there cannot be compromises even the best
till the terrorist is on the run. Otherwise it is intelligence can
appeasement, in the terrorist’s lexicon. only minimise
the threat or the
Sharpening Intelligence forewarning will
Capabilities make the attack
Even with our present system, there are many insurmountably
attacks that get aborted. But when intelligence difficult. And
is inadequate and follow-ups incomplete, yet, such
indiscriminate arrests follow which lead to further cooperation is
alienation. Heightened intelligence capability, the most difficult
sustained and built over a period of time, which is to achieve.
able to keep pace with the growing threat, skillful
investigation and forensics, particularly at the state level, sharing intelligence,
national identity cards, CCTVs at important places, speedy justice which is also
seen to be fair, a system of governance that delivers what it is supposed to and
a media that does not compete for TRP ratings over such issues— all this and
more will have to be put in place for us to succeed. The character of terrorism has
changed more rapidly in its operating procedures. There is greater reliance on the
cyber and less on the cell phone and on sleeper cells among the jehadi networks
while the Naxals retain a very strong hierarchical control mechanism. Both retain
their element of surprise but the latter is also a reflection of poor ground state led
intelligence. Both seem better trained, better equipped and extremely mobile.
The counter-terrorist lacks in all three spheres.
It is easy to blame the intelligence agencies for all that occurs. Globally, it has
been found that despite all the state assistance for intelligence agencies, the ability
to collect intelligence about non-state adversaries remains the most difficult and
this includes not just the terrorist, but the mastermind, the arms smuggler, the
safe house owner, the money launderer and other transnational operatives. No
single agency, no single country can provide this information and no one can
still guarantee that every attack will be aborted or every terrorist cell unearthed
on time. There has to be multi-level, multi-agency multi-national cooperation
acting in real time. We must understand that even the best intelligence can only
minimise the threat or the forewarning will make the attack insurmountably
difficult. And yet, such cooperation is the most difficult to achieve.

Vikram Sood
The questions are: why is it that we let it happen again and again, and can we
not do anything to win this war against an unscrupulous and invisible enemy?
Why do we give the impression of being soft and confused? There is no short cut
to improving the intelligence and security apparatus of the country. Spare no
cost and accept no compromises on this. If the country has a well endowed and
trained intelligence apparatus acting without political interference (as distinct
from accountability), it could provide preemptive intelligence that could abort
terrorist acts and lead to arrests. It would also prevent indiscriminate arrests and
all that follows. We could learn from the Americans – not completely but suitably
– they tightened their laws even to the extent that they were draconian, spent
billions of dollars and improved intelligence collection and surveillance, making
them intrusive and they outsourced certain aspects of the work to maximise use
of talent.
In its latest White Paper on Defence and National Security, the French
government has stressed that the world has become “more unstable, more
unforeseeable. New crises, in particular from the Middle East to Pakistan have
come to the fore and have become interconnected. Jehadism-inspired terrorism
aims directly at France and at Europe, which are in a situation of greater direct
vulnerability.” The paper defines its national security strategy as something
that provides a response to “all the risks and threats which could endanger the
life of the Nation.” In another key finding, the White Paper says, “Knowledge and
anticipation represent a new strategic function and have become a priority. In a
world characterised by uncertainty and instability, knowledge represents our first
line of defence. Knowledge guarantees our autonomy in decision-making and
enables France to preserve its strategic initiative. It is knowledge which must be
provided as early as possible to decision-makers, military commanders and those
in charge of internal and civil security in order to go from forecasts to informed
action. Intelligence of all kinds, including from space and prospective studies,
takes on major importance.” Yet we in India show no urgency of this kind.
One cannot forever blame the foreign hand. The French, for instance, realised
quite early that terrorist networks are multi-layered and they routinely infiltrate
them to try and stay a step ahead of their adversary. It was the French external
intelligence – the DGSE – that had picked up signals of Al Qaeda attacks on the
US, including about airplane hijackings as early as January 2001. After 9/11,
the British MI5 was able to prevent a major terrorist attack across the Atlantic
through a combination of telephone, cyber and physical surveillance along with
human intelligence

 In India, our tendency has been to make some post-event superficial
changes, pious declarations of intent and condemnations of the act accompanied
by horrendous photographs of the event, with knee-jerk expert comments from
media rookies. That is, until the next attack takes place. We do not even have
adequate laws to deal with the threat like the British and the Americans do, and
for a country that has had to face terrorism for most of its independent existence;
we do not even have national identity cards because it is politically inexpedient.
Our border controls remain inadequate. Post-event, the investigating agencies
should be allowed to operate in areas and societies from where the attack is
suspected to have occurred or planned. There can be little success if exclusions
are made on the grounds of religion or region.
Lack of Public Awareness, Overzealous Media and

Bureaucratic Lethargy
Public indifference to terrorist incidents may indicate that the people may have
overcome fear which is a positive development but if it is because of indifference
to suffering based on the hope that “I” shall not be the target because tragedies
are only meant for “the other,” then we have a problem. There is inadequate
public response because it is generally assumed that prevention of terrorism is
exclusively the task of the state. This attitude has to change and only the state can
help this change. The average citizen must be encouraged and educated to help
the state by providing clues, warnings and assistance in investigations.
 It has to be acknowledged that the police force is inadequately prepared
to deal with the menace and it is not their fault that this is so. The governments
of the day are responsible for this state of affairs. Ill equipped, ill trained ,in
undermanned station houses, they live in appalling conditions, sometimes
at the mercy of the very don against whom they are supposed to protect the
society. Successive governments have taken away the authority and dignity
of the profession. The public has little confidence in the force and the force is
unsympathetic to the public. The witness protection schemes are badly flawed
and justice is indefinitely delayed. There is little incentive for the public to come
forward with evidence and little incentive for the force to prosecute.
A terrorist event makes a good story or “breaking news” but the media
too need some rules of conduct. It is important to report the truth but it is also
sometimes important when we are fighting a war to sometimes not report or
to modify the report without modifying the truth. Repeated telecast of pictures
of frightened families, terrified children or mangled bodies is a victory for the

Vikram Sood
terrorist. He has succeeded in frightening the people. And photographs of a

prospective witness circulated widely would only help the terrorist. Often we
glorify a terrorist when we refer to him as a fidayeen. All this has to change too if
we want to win the war on terrorism. India must get ready to detect, deter and
destroy this menace before it destroys us.
It is amazing that after 60 years of struggling with terrorism, we still say
that each terrorist attack is a new experience for us. The one institution that
needs major reforms is the Ministry of Home Affairs. It has simply become too
big and amorphous. It is manned by transient bureaucrats forever looking for
greener pastures elsewhere and by junior staff who have no other future. Like the
Ministry of External Affairs, we should think in terms of a Ministry on Internal
Security that is manned by a permanent cadre of regional, subject and language
experts. Further, the running and control top down should belong to this cadre
and not be left to those who qualify for life on the basis of an exam they passed
decades ago.
The Shape of Things to Come

A familiar Pakistani strategy is unfolding in India where the attempt is to hoist all
attacks in India outside Kashmir on the Al Qaeda banner or to pretend that things
are not fully under the control of the army in Pakistan. Anyone who has studied
Pakistan knows that this is not true. And if things are not under control in a
military dictatorship of more or less 60 years standing, then that country is falling
apart. We all know that it is the Pakistanis — essentially of the Punjabi Lashkar-
e-Tayyeba and the Jaish-e-Mohammad who operate from bases in Pakistan and
are members of Osama’s International Islamic Front — who continue to target
India. They are not members of the Al Qaeda which is an Arab organisation but
are ideologically akin.
There are many in India, Pakistan and the West who remain in a state
of denial about the march of Islamic forces in Pakistan. The manner in which
the FATA episode has been dealt with, the manner in which the Lal Masjid
episode was handled, or the innumerable suicide attacks that have taken place,
highlighted by the Marriott bombings in Islamabad, are some of the symptoms
of the disease in Pakistan. Islamic radicalism is not seen in the chic salons of
Lahore but at Miramshah and Wana in the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP)
and FATA and Faisalabad and Jhang in Punjab. One has to do some sustained
reading of the radical Urdu Press, which has a much larger circulation than the
English newspapers, to assess the mood. And, it is Islamic radicalism backed by

the gun. India should worry that this fire in Pakistan will spread to India as well.
In fact, one can see the signs of this happening already.
The truth is that the Pakistani security system still treats India and its
own nationalists as the biggest threat. Perennially fearful of India’s presence in
Afghanistan, the Pakistani establishment feels it not only needs the Taliban but
even nurtures them just as it nurtured elements like the Punjabi Lashkar-e Tayyeba
in Kashmir. It cannot, therefore, be serious about curbing the Taliban. But the
Pakistan Army, no matter who rules, and because of their own proclivities, cannot
take action against the fundamentalists and extremists and also rely on them
for survival. Yet, unless the Pakistan Army moves beyond looking for patchwork
solutions to ensure its own primacy and decides to eradicate this menace, a
spectre of total radicalism haunts Pakistan. The fear is that the Pakistan Army
is now far too much and dangerously radicalised to want to change the system.
We also need to remember that the US has given US $ 10 billion in military aid to
Pakistan in recent years, ostensibly to tackle terrorism.
It is not easy, but the civilised world must counter the scourge of terrorism. In
a networked world, where communication and action can be in real time, where
boundaries need not be crossed and where terrorist action can take place on
the Net and through the Net, the task of countering this is increasingly difficult
and intricate. Governments are bound by the Geneva Conventions in tackling
a terrorist organisation, whatever else Bush’s aides may have told him, but the
terrorist is not bound by such regulations in this asymmetric warfare.
It has to be accepted that there can be no final victory in any battle against
terrorism. Resentments, real or imagined, and exploding expectations, will remain.
Since the state no longer has monopoly on instruments of violence, recourse to
violence is increasingly becoming a weapon of first resort. Terrorism can be contained
and its effects minimised but it cannot be eradicated any more than the world can
eradicate crime. An over-militaristic response or repeated use of the armed forces is
fraught with long-term risks for a nation and for the armed forces. Military action to
deter or overcome an immediate threat is often necessary but it cannot ultimately
eradicate terrorism. This is as much a political and economic battle and also a battle
to be fought long-term by the intelligence and security agencies, and increasingly in
cooperation with agencies of other countries.
Ultimately, the battle is between democracy and terrorism. The fear is that in
order to defeat the latter, we may have to lose some of our democratic values.

Army-Media Relations in
Sub-conventional Conflict
R K Nanavatty
Sub-conventional conflict in India primarily constitutes internal armed conflict

with or without external involvement. The media plays a significant role: it
reports the news, thus, fulfilling the people’s right to information, and it holds the
government and its forces accountable. The media has a complex relationship
with the army and dissident forces.1 Both the dissident forces and the army
seek to use the media: the former for publicity and the latter to keep the people
informed of the various developments in the campaign. Unfortunately, a focus
on public relations; the inappropriateness of existing organisations, regulations
and policies; the absence of suitable mechanisms; inadequate competencies;
and a lack of mutual understanding and appreciation constrain the development
of purposeful army-media relations.
The aim of this paper is to discuss army-media relations in sub-conventional
conflict in India and suggest a way ahead.
Preamble: Sub-conventional Conflict in India

In India, internal conflict is endemic: several well worn reasons contribute to
continuing strife within the state and newer causes of friction are emerging.
Poor governance exacerbates the situation. Government ambivalence and
procrastination cause conflict to simmer – even escalate. Escalation can lead to
the use of physical force and in extreme cases the organised use of armed force
and violence against the state.
The Constitution of India lays special emphasis on the defence of the union
– its cohesion, unity and integrity. Apart from safeguarding the nation against
external aggression, it binds the union to protect the states against internal
Lieutenant General R K Nanavatty (Retd) is former General Officer Commanding-in-Chief

of the Northern Command.

Army-Media Relations in Sub-conventional Conflict
disturbances. In India, the use of armed force and In sub-

violence – armed rebellion – to achieve ideological, conventional
political, social and economic goals – irrespective conflict,
of the reason – is unconstitutional. When faced with the media
a serious internal armed threat to the security of the helps fulfil a
state, the government is obliged to use every legitimate fundamental
means, including the use of counter-force, to quash right of the
the threat and resolve conflict. The use of armed force people –
by dissident forces and the use of counter-force by the the right to
government results in internal armed conflict. information.
Internal armed conflict creates conditions that
invite external interference. It encourages an external power, inimical to the
state, to nurture, foster and support internal threats. It enables an adversary to
intervene directly using covert means or indirectly using non-state actors.
In India, sub-conventional conflict is primarily internal armed conflict.
With or without external involvement, it poses the most serious challenge to the
security of the state, today.
Internal armed conflict is a civil form of conflict. The root causes, as well as
the solutions of the conflict are to be found in the political, social and economic
domains. Prevention, mitigation and resolution of conflict are the responsibility
of the government. In the main, it is the function of the civil administration
and the civil instruments of force. Where the state and central police and
paramilitary forces are unable to fulfil their responsibilities, the government has
no other recourse but to seek the assistance of the army: and the army has an
obligation to assist the government whenever it is called upon to do so. Even
so, the Constitution of India does not provide for martial law. Civilian political
control – including in a national emergency – is supreme. And, the army is always
employed in aid to civil authorities.
Resolution of internal armed conflict is a complex issue. Vexed Centre-state
relations; a propensity to view conflict through the narrow prism of law and
order; and external involvement can compound the problem. An inappropriate
government response can further fuel discontent. It is for the union government
to decide – based on sound professional advice – whether or not to commit
the army to operations in aid to civil authorities for the maintenance of public
order in internal armed conflict in a state. Thereafter, it is the responsibility of
the union and state governments – despite their differences – to work in accord.
Together, they must ensure conditions for the success of the campaign. They

R K Nanavatty
Public must invoke the necessary legal provisions; put

reactions can in place arrangements that will ensure unity of
put intense effort; formulate and articulate a clear aim and
pressure on, comprehensive strategy; and demonstrate resolve
and often in implementing the mutually agreed plan.
coerce, In internal armed conflict, the aim of the
irresolute government is to isolate the dissident forces and
governments gain the support of the people. It strives to achieve
into conceding its goals through a combination of security; good
inappropriate governance; and political accommodation: the three
demands. pillars of the government’s campaign.
The role of the army (and the security forces)
is to neutralise the armed threat and assist the government in the restoration of
normalcy. The army creates conditions in which the government can resolve
conflict peacefully. It fulfils its role through the conduct of intelligence operations,
defensive and offensive combat operations, population and resource control
measures and military-civic action. Information is the key to gaining the support
of the people and the media is the primary means of disseminating it.
Media in Sub-conventional Conflict

In sub-conventional conflict, the media helps fulfil a fundamental right of
the people – the right to information.
Revolutionary technological developments – the cellular phone, the laptop,
satellite communications and broadcast systems, and online services – ensure
that the news is instant; it reaches a wide audience; it is graphic; and it has
compelling emotional impact. Technology virtually precludes the ability to
enforce any form of control, regulation and censorship on the media.2
Commerce - the saleability of the news, competition and ratings drive the
media: being first – breaking news; being exclusive; and being able to attribute
the news is important. Unfortunately, several other virtues of good reporting –
accuracy and truthfulness; objectivity; verification; confirmation; corroboration;
sensitivity and respect for privacy – are often sacrificed.
Speed of transmission, extent of reach and the effect of the news combine
to endow the media with extraordinary power. Not only does the media report
the news; it investigates it; it comments on it; and it expresses its opinion. It has
the power to mould people’s thinking and condition their responses. It can even
influence decision-making and policy formulation in the government without

in anyway being responsible and accountable In India,

for its recommendations. James Adams terms it the media –
“power without responsibility.” He points out that particularly
the “line between reporting, commenting and the electronic
policy-making is blurred” and that politicians, media – revels
government servants and people pandering to in its power. It
the media has encouraged this development. is in danger of
Douglas Hurd warns that “war, peacekeeping both trivialising
and crisis management are not about consensus the news and
and opinion polls. They are about leadership and succumbing to
resolve where principle and conviction (must) sensationalism.
override ill-informed media criticism.” In India,
3
decision-makers, particularly in government, need to demonstrate competence,

confidence and courage to avoid being swayed by the media.
In sub-conventional conflict, the media, the dissident forces and the army
(and the government) have a three-way relationship: the media seeks to report
events; the dissident forces – through the media – seek publicity; and the army
seeks to use the media to keep the people informed.
Paul Wilkinson describes the relationship between dissident forces and
the media as symbiotic. Dissident forces provide the media with hot news that
sells and the media provides dissident forces with its lifeblood – publicity.
The public and the media are obsessed with violence; a single incident draws
the media like a magnet; and the media feeds the insatiable public appetite
for news of casualties, destruction and human tragedy – stories of weeping,
wailing and breast beating. Walter Lacquer points out that the “terrorist act
by itself is nothing; publicity is all.” He goes on to suggest that “publicity is the
very goal of the terrorist act.” Publicity draws attention to the dissident forces
and their cause; it provides the movement with recognition and legitimacy.
It serves to manipulate the emotions of the people. Depending on how the
media chooses to report an incident, it can induce extreme – even irrational
– fear in individuals and communities; spread hysteria; and inflame passions.
While reporting events live the media can be a distraction; assist dissident
forces through the careless disclosure of information – particularly in hostage
taking situations; interfere with, and jeopardise, the conduct of ongoing
operations; and endanger the safety of the participants and, indeed, its own
safety. Publicity can evoke political and public reactions that can hamper
investigation and follow-up action. Public reactions can put intense pressure

R K Nanavatty
on, and often coerce, irresolute governments into conceding inappropriate

demands.
In sub-conventional conflict, the media can become easy prey to dissident
disinformation and propaganda. This is particularly true of the regional
media wherein several factors – ethnicity, belief, sympathy, fear and financial
inducements – can combine to subvert it. While this attitude may well alter as
the security forces gain the ascendancy, a hostile media invariably serves as the
mouthpiece of the dissident forces. Unless it makes a conscious and deliberate
effort, the media can inadvertently end up partnering dissident forces.
Likewise, the media is the prime medium through which the army seeks
to inform, educate, caution and advise the people about its activities in the
campaign. At governmental level, it can often provide a suitable platform for
purposeful discussions on the problem and its possible solutions. Informed
debate helps mould people’s thinking and builds support, but this is only possible
if the government is unafraid and is encouraging of discourse on critical strategic
issues. In sub-conventional conflict, the media also performs a vital watch-dog
function – it ensures that state power is not misused; that human rights are not
violated; that the laws of the land are upheld; and that justice is not only done
but also seen to be done.
In India, the media – particularly the electronic media – revels in its power.
It can be impatient, intrusive, insensitive, frivolous, and irresponsible. It is in
danger of both trivialising the news and succumbing to sensationalism.4 And
yet, it performs the onerous task of keeping – as Thomas Jefferson once said –
“an eye on the government and military” and defending “democratic principles”
admirably.
In sub-conventional conflict in India, the media has every right to
understand, appreciate even empathise with the causes of conflict but, under
no circumstances, can it allow itself to justify the means. It has an obligation to
report the news but it has an equal responsibility to minimise harm and avoid
the spread of alarm and panic amongst the people. It has a responsibility to
deny dissident forces the publicity they crave. The media has a duty to hold the
government and its forces to account but it must realise that while the law may
be harsh – even draconian – the army is only doing its duty as long as it abides
by the law.
The challenge before the government and the media is to ensure honest
reporting without allowing the media to be manipulated into supporting the
dissident forces.5 Given the freedom of the Press in India and the evil of any form

of censorship, the only option is for the media The focus of

itself to demonstrate a sense of responsibility, the army’s
self-control and self-regulation — perhaps, the current media
voluntary adoption of a code of ethics. As Randall policy is public
Bowdish says, “It is the media and not the terrorists relations.
who have the final say on what makes the news.”6 Its primary
concern is the
Public Relations – The Current projection of a
Approach positive image:
Army Rule 21 and Defence Service Regulations to ensure that
(Regulations for the Army), paragraph 322 the army does
stipulate the guidelines for public relations and not generate ill-
interaction between the media and the army. will.
The guidelines ensure that no information on a
Service subject is communicated to the media without the prior sanction of the
Government of India. Even articles on subjects as innocuous as sports, arts and
culture require the approval of a superior officer before publication.
In 1981, the army took the initiative to rationalise policy through an act
of self-legislation contained in Special Army Order 15/S/81. Unfortunately, the
effort came to nought with the issue in 2001 of yet another Special Army Order
3/S/2001/MI which timidly reiterated the provisions of the previous rules and
regulations on the subject.
The focus of the army’s current media policy is public relations. Its primary
concern is the projection of a positive image: to ensure that the army does not
generate ill-will; that it is not discredited; that it does not appear in poor light;
and that it does not cause any embarrassment to the Service. Not surprisingly, the
army spends a disproportionate amount of its time and effort in damage control
and the management of negative reporting. Rules, regulations and policies
restrict interaction with the media to senior ranks – in no case below the rank of
brigadier – and in every case only with the approval of an officer not below the
level of a corps commander, and with a public relations officer of the Ministry
of Defence present. Papers, statements and answers to anticipatory questions
are all required to be submitted for prior approval and no deviation is permitted
during interviews.
In principle, the army may interact with the media only through public
relations officers of the Directorate of Public Relations, Ministry of Defence who
may or may not be officers of the Defence Services. In addition to the public

R K Nanavatty
relations officer (army) at Army Headquarters, regional defence public relations

officers are deployed throughout the country in some 24 select locations. They
act as media advisers to local formation commanders. While they are co-located
with military formation headquarters, they are not part of such headquarters.
Their chain of command is distinct: they remain responsible to the director,
Public Relations, Directorate of Public Relations, Ministry of Defence, who is a
civilian officer of the Indian Information Service. Responsibility for oversight of
the functions of the directorate rests with the Ministry of Defence and the Public
Information Officer of the Government of India. As a consequence, cooperation
and coordination between public relations officers and formation headquarters
are predicated on effective communications, liaison and good personal relations.
In practice, this arrangement subjects public relations officers to awkward dual
control. Defence public relations officers are relatively junior in rank and status;
their selection is seldom accorded the importance it deserves. Their professional
background and comprehension of matters military and of conflict situations
is deficient. They lack aptitude, communicating skills and motivation; and their
preparation and training leaves a great deal of room for improvement. At least
one sub-conventional conflict ridden area – the state of Tripura – is bereft of
dedicated defence public relations officer cover.7
Currently, Government of India defence public relations organisations, rules,
regulations, policies and procedures suggest an overwhelming desire on the part
of the Ministry of Defence to retain control over the dissemination of information
by the army. It betrays a lack of confidence and trust in the professional judgement
and competence of the army. The result is a defensive, under-confident, laggard
and reactive approach to public relations and interaction with the media.
In sum, the Defence Public Relations Organisation and its rules and
regulations as they exist are archaic: they are in urgent need of overhaul.
Inadequacies in the existing organisation and its functioning have repeatedly
surfaced in sub-conventional conflict situations in the country. Further,
during the Indo-Pakistan conflict in Kargil, 1999 glaring deficiencies were
once again highlighted: the Defence Public Relations Organisation was
simply unable to cope with the task.8 It compelled Army Headquarters to
innovate and assume direct responsibility for its public relations campaign.
Army Headquarters was quick to establish the Army Liaison Cell which has
now evolved into an Additional Directorate General of Public Information in
the Directorate of Military Intelligence, Army Headquarters. Subsequently, in
2003, permission was accorded for the establishment of a futuristic General

Staff (Information Warfare) Branch in Headquarters Northern Command

and the headquarters of its 15 and 16 Corps. The branch combines several
information warfare related staff functions to include public information and
interaction with the media.
These measures constitute small, tentative but significant steps. It signals
a deliberate shift in focus from public relations to public information. And, it
recognises and acknowledges the fact that the army should be responsible for its
own public information, particularly in sub-conventional conflict. Nevertheless,
the fledgling organisations suffer from several shortcomings. First, there is a need
for conceptual clarity. Public information is but one component of information
warfare. As the title suggests, its purpose is to disseminate information of the army’s
efforts in the field to the people – the object of the campaign. It is distinct from
the military intelligence function – the acquisition, collation and dissemination
of intelligence of the adversary. Unlike propaganda, it is based entirely on truth.
The public information staff branch is dependent on the intimate information
support of the other branches in a headquarters in order to fulfil its functions.
Second, the army public information organisation overlaps the functions of the
existing defence public relations organisation: it results in turf battles which have
the potential to undermine each other’s functioning. Third, the organisation is
ad-hoc; and the selection of personnel, their preparation, training and career
management calls for much greater attention.
In the absence of a comprehensive, cohesive and coherent central government,
state government and army approach to public information in sub-conventional
conflict, the army often ploughs a lone furrow. Army field formations invariably
combine aspects of public information, propaganda, counter-propaganda and
psychological operations and take upon themselves the task of simultaneously
addressing the various distinct target audiences in the conflict—the external source
of support to the dissident forces, the dissidents themselves and the people – in their
areas of operational responsibility. They assume responsibilities for which they are
not adequately staffed, equipped or trained. The overall effort, commendable for
its enthusiasm and enterprise, is often personality driven, spasmodic, amateur,
lacking in resources and support, and unprofessional.

The media and the profession of arms display several similar characteristics
– idealism, professionalism, commitment and pride – and yet there are stark
differences.9 The media is individualistic, liberal, non-conformist and seemingly,

R K Nanavatty
always in a tearing hurry. The army, on the other hand, is hierarchical, loyal to the
organisation, conservative and deliberate.10
According to the Press Council of India the media in sub-conventional
conflict, “has an adversarial role”; “it questions authority” and establishes “a
relationship of creative tension” necessary in a democratic society.11 The army,
on the other hand – not unreasonably – expects the media to support the
government in the national endeavour to combat dissident forces that pose a
threat to the security of the state: it wants to believe that the two are on the same
side. The army sees the media, according to Gen BC Joshi, as a force multiplier.12
Stephen Badsey clarifies that while “relations (between the army and the media)
should be adversarial they do not have to be antagonistic.”14 The scepticism
that invariably characterises the media’s approach towards the army in sub-
conventional conflict does not necessarily constitute hostility.
The army tends to use terms such as exploit, manage, deal with and
handle the media to describe army-media relations. Such terms hint at
control over the media; it militates against the concept of independence of the
media; and it threatens its credibility. It is for similar reasons that the media,
understandably, baulks at attempts by the army to use it for disinformation
and propagandan.
The media believes that the army lacks accessibility and responsiveness; that
it is not technologically savvy; and that it does not understand the importance
of timely information and the media’s compelling need to adhere to deadlines.
It feels that the army’s concerns of confidentiality are exaggerated and propelled
more by the need to avoid embarrassment to the organisation and its leadership
than the actual need for security of information.15 It perceives the army as being
overly conscious of its image and exceedingly sensitive to criticism.
The army does not understand that it is the media’s prerogative to repackage
the news: it takes exception to the media changing the script. The army finds
the poor knowledge and understanding of matters military; the reluctance to
verify, confirm and corroborate information; the inaccuracy of reports; and the
insensitivity and lack of respect for privacy particularly galling. It wants the media
to maintain a sense of proportion and balance in its reporting.
Clearly, the media and the army must learn to understand and appreciate
each other’s constraints, ethos and methods to be able to work around their
differences and improve army-media relations to mutual advantage16. The
requirement is for appropriate machinery and mechanisms for army-media
interaction; for joint education and training of the army public information

staffs and the members of the media; and for the In sub-
voluntary adoption of self-regulatory guidelines conventional
for the media. conflict, public
information –
Public Information – The Way as distinct from
Ahead public relations
In sub-conventional conflict, the army and the – is the key. The
media lean on each other: the army needs the aim is to gain
support of the media more than ever before. The the people’s
onus lies on the army to find ways and means of support for the
enhancing their relationship and making it more government.
meaningful without trampling on the sensibilities
of the media.
In October 1994, a report of the Press Council of India, Committee on
Defence Coverage, underscored – amongst several other recommendations –
the importance of the people’s support for the national cause; acknowledged
the role of the media in mediating between the armed forces and the people;
recognised the need for strengthening the public relations organisation in the
union government, in the state government and in the armed forces (army); and
demanded a revamp of information and publicity in low intensity conflict (sub-
conventional conflict).17
An overhaul of the government’s defence related information and publicity
mechanism is only possible if two things happen: (a) the delegation of authority
and responsibility for the dissemination of information about the army, to the
army; and (b) a detailed review of the existing rules, regulations, policies and
instructions to formulate appropriate and realistic guidelines.18
The army organisation for information and publicity should be independent
of, but linked to, the Public Relations Organisation of the Ministry of Defence.
This will demand clarity in thinking, openness, jointness but most importantly
it will call for the ministry’s trust and confidence in the Service. It will require
resources, time and effort.19 In the interim, the government should make the
army directly responsible for all information and publicity in respect of its own
activities in sub-conventional conflict.
In sub-conventional conflict, public information – as distinct from public
relations – is the key. The aim is to gain the people’s support for the government.
The target audience is the public. Public information is based on the fundamental
principle of truth. Whereas disinformation may well provide short-term

R K Nanavatty
advantages, in the long run it is bound to adversely affect the credibility, of the
source and prove counter-productive. In sub-conventional conflict, the truth
cannot be hidden.
Public information calls for a holistic approach: the army’s effort is only one
part of the government’s overall public information campaign. The government
must clearly delineate responsibilities for public information between the union
government, the state government and the army in the field; each must target
different sections of the audience in the specific areas of their own expertise
and yet they must integrate and function in consonance. At every level, suitable
machinery and staffs must exist.
Firstly, the army must begin by according its public information command
and staff functions due importance and priority. Responsibility for army
public information in sub-conventional conflict must rest with the highest
military headquarters responsible for the conduct of military operations
in a specific region: for example, in Tripura it would be Headquarters 21
Sector (Assam Rifles); in Nagaland, Headquarters IGAR (North); in Assam,
Headquarters 4 Corps; and in Jammu and Kashmir ( J&K), the headquarters
of the three separate corps responsible for operations in the theatre. Army
public information should primarily include information regarding the
army’s activities in the campaign – both operational and military civic action
related – in its area of operational responsibility. The aim is to keep the people
informed; create awareness; and gain their willing participation in, and
support for, the army’s endeavours. It is a vital part of the campaign to win
hearts and minds. The media should serve as the primary means of providing
information to the people and the regional media should be the focus of the
army’s attention.
Secondly, the General Staff Branch of the highest military headquarters
should – in terms of staff and rank structure – have a tailor-made General Staff
(Public Information) Section, which may well be part of a larger General Staff
(Information Warfare) Branch.20 Below the highest military headquarters in
the region, dedicated army public information staff should be authorised at
all intermediate headquarters down to the level of brigade headquarters (or
equivalent). The existing regional defence public relations organisation should
either be amalgamated with the army’s revamped public information branch or
be dispensed with to avoid duplication of effort and waste.
Thirdly, the public information staff at each headquarters should have
the authority to interact directly with the media in their respective areas of

operational responsibility. The senior General Staff The army

(Public Information) staff officer should be the must adopt an
spokesperson of the headquarters. aggressive and
Fourthly, public information responsibilities transparent –
between the highest military headquarters and nothing to hide
intermediate headquarters must be clearly defined. – policy with
The highest military headquarters should generally regard to the
be responsible for the issue of background papers; dissemination
press releases, rejoinders, rebuttals, assessments and of information
estimates; the regular periodic release of collated pertaining to
data and information; and the preparation and human rights
release of periodic reports on military-civic action violations and
annual plans in the form of White Papers. It should acts of military
establish an information centre for round the clock indiscipline
operations. It should also establish a standard web in relation to
site on the internet for the expeditious, seamless civilians.
and transparent transfer of information and data –
to the media – both on occurrence and periodically. As the army’s technological
ability improves, a video-feed capability should be developed. Where the army
confronts a hostile regional media, serious consideration should be accorded
to the in-house publication of a periodic information news sheet for free
distribution to the public. It should be restricted to factual information – based
on the absolute truth – which would be of particular interest to the people, and
would help establish the credibility of the army. On the other hand, intermediate
headquarters should have primary responsibility to furnish factual information
and data to the media on all incidents that occur in their jurisdiction, immediately
on occurrence. They should also be responsible to furnish information and data
on the completion of individual military-civic action projects in their areas of
operational responsibility. In operations involving several agencies, particularly
in urban areas, the concept of establishing incident command posts must be
adhered to and the authority to interact with the media at the site of an incident
should be delegated to the senior most commander of the force that is playing
the lead role at the site of the immediate incident.
Fifthly, the army must adopt an aggressive and transparent – nothing
to hide – policy with regard to the dissemination of information pertaining
to human rights violations and acts of military indiscipline in relation
to civilians.21 Disciplinary proceedings of personnel on trial for having

R K Nanavatty
committed offences against civilians should routinely be conducted in open

court with access being regulated only to ensure that the efficient conduct of
the courts is not impeded. Consolidated information and data of results of
investigations and trials should be made available to the media periodically
with due care being taken not to jeopardise individual safety and security
and the individual’s right to privacy. These measures may be unpopular but
without them, zero tolerance for human rights violations will remain mere
rhetoric.
Sixthly, the selection, education, training, career profiling and career
management of public information staffs must receive special attention. All
officers on command and staff courses should be exposed to an introductory
capsule on interaction with the media.22 Similarly, in sub-conventional
conflict situations, formal interaction, exchange of ideas, education and
training of army public information staffs and the media – particularly the
local media – at periodic intervals under the aegis of the army would be of
great mutual benefit.
Lastly, the following fundamental principles should govern army public
information in sub-conventional conflict.
Truthful – public information must be based on the truth. Whereas it is not
necessary always to disclose the whole truth, what is conveyed must always be
the truth. There is no scope for disinformation in a public information campaign
that is aimed at a domestic audience. Truth alone will ensure the credibility of
the army. Where it is not possible or desirable to provide information or offer
comment, there must be no hesitation in saying so.
Factual – public information must be factual. It must accurately convey the
essentials – who, what, where and when – of an incident. Answers to the questions
how and why; opinions, assessments and estimates should be left to the highest
military headquarters responsible for the campaign.
Confidentiality – confidentiality of information must be ensured so as to
not jeopardise the security of information and intelligence; the conduct of
intelligence and combat operations; and the right to privacy of an individual.
Public information should not result in the unwarranted disclosure of individual
and unit identities.
Jurisdiction – public information must be restricted to events within the
jurisdiction of the unit or formation as applicable.23
Timely – the dissemination of public information must be timely and with
due regard for media deadlines.

Accessibility – public information organisations and spokespersons must be

accessible to the media at all times.
Proactive – public information policy should be proactive. The army should
overload the media with information. The dissemination of information and
data should be routine.
Delegation – responsibility to debrief the media on a specific incident should
invariably be delegated to the military commander responsible for the incident
on the spot.
Understatement – professionalism and deliberate understatement should be
the hallmark of army public information: exaggeration and hyperbole must be
scrupulously avoided. Self-praise should be sparing.
Conclusion
In sub-conventional conflict in India, the media is the prime medium
through which the army seeks to keep the people informed; gain their
understanding and support; and, thus, contribute to the success of the
government’s campaign. Whilst the media has every right to report the news
with honesty and purpose, it has an equal responsibility – in a situation where
the security of the state is threatened – to ensure that it does not support and
encourage dissident forces, and spread despondency and alarm in society.
Meaningful relations between the army and the media are essential and for
that , the burden quite clearly lies on the army. The army needs to assume full
responsibility for the conduct of its own information campaign. It needs to
focus on public information as distinct from public relations; create suitable
organisations staffed by competent personnel at every necessary level of
command; and decentralise and delegate executive functions as appropriate.
Simultaneously, it needs to take steps to facilitate mutual understanding and
improve its interaction with the media.
Notes
1. The term army is used to denote the armed forces and/or the army as applicable
throughout the paper. Similarly, the term dissident has been used to denote subversives,
terrorists and insurgents.
2. Adams James, “The Role of the Media,” in Campen Alan, Dearth Douglas and Thomas
Gooden, Cyber War (New Delhi: Book Mart Publishers, 2000), p. 110.
3. Ibid., pp. 114-115.
4. Ibid., p. 109.

R K Nanavatty
5. Perl Raphael, “Terrorism, the Media, and the Government: Perspectives, Trends, and
Options for Policymakers,” Congressional Research Service.
6. Randall Bowdish, “Cerberus to Mind: Media as Sentinel in the Fight Against Terrorism,”
Strategic Insights, Vol V, Issue 5, May 2006.
7. AK Chakraborty and VC Natrajan, Defence Reporting in India: The Communication
Gap (Noida: Trishul Publications, 1995), pp. 19-39.
8. Anil Bhat, Information and Security: Where Truth Lies (New Delhi: Manas Publications,
2008), p. 82.
10. SC Tyagi, “Citizenry, Media and Military,” Pinnacle – The ARTRAC Journal, Vol. 2, No. 1.
Shimla, March 2003. p. 85.
11. Ibid., p. 161.
12. Chakraborty and Natrajan, Defence Reporting in India, preface.
13. Ibid., pp. 1-2.
14. Stephen Badsey, “The Armed Forces, Society and Media,” ESRC Programme, May 2002,
Policy Papers, The Armed Forces and Society in Post Communist Europe: Legitimacy &
Change.
15. Chakraborty and Natrajan, Defence Reporting in India, p. 141.
16. Bhat, Information and Security: Where Truth Lies, p. 158.
17. Dinesh Kumar, Soldiers and Scribblers – Media in Information War: A Case Study of
India, IDSA, Occasional Papers Series, New Delhi, 2001, pp. 38-39.
19. Tyagi, “Citizenry, Media and Military,” p. 87.
20. Ibid.
21. Ashok Krishna, “Armed Forces and the Media,” IPCS, Article No. 406, August 16, 2000.
23. Tyagi, “Citizenry, Media and Military,” p. 86.

The Utility of Military
Expenditures in South Asia
Mohan Guruswamy
One does not have to labour too much over the fact that South Asia is the poorest region
in the world with the greatest incidence of poverty, and is just ahead of a handful of sub-
Saharan African countries like Chad and Burkina Faso. South Asia also has the highest
density of population in the world and is the final and probably most formidable frontier
in the battle against the great killers of mankind like malaria and HIV. It is home to dozens
of nationalities, each with a troubled history. It is little wonder then that it is a vast and
seething cauldron of a variety of troubles and conflicts.
As if its own problems were not enough, South Asia is ringed with nations and
regions in turmoil of their own. On the east there is Burma, on the north there are Tibet
and Sinkiang, and on the west, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq and the Central Asian Republics.
The large numbers of refugees as a consequence bring with them their own animosities
and engender even more suspicions between the neighbours. India is home to thousands
of Tibetan and Burmese refugees in addition to Sri Lankans and Bangladeshis. Pakistan
is flooded with Afghans apart from thousands of Uighurs, Uzbeks, Tajiks and Chechens
preparing to wage war on their countries. India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh are
currently facing serious internal security and secessionist challenges. It is, thus, an area of
many contradictions, old and new.
South Asia is also the second fastest growing economic region in the world and the
financial muscle of Indian business is now making a global impact. It has the youngest
population cohort in the world and is poised for a dramatic economic growth. Yet South Asia
is not economically integrated in any meaningful sense. India is its undoubted economic
and military leader but has few linkages with its neighbours. Elsewhere in the world,
regions have grown dramatically because of their economic integration. The Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Japan have been the biggest drivers in the stunning
Dr Mohan Guruswamy is Director, Centre for Policy Alternatives, New Delhi.

Mohan Guruswamy
growth of China. The irony is that despite their relative lack of engagement, the South
Asian countries have been posting impressive growths. Greater integration would only
speed this process and also pave ways for better understanding
There are two aspects to this discussion. The first relates to the external environment,
regional politics and geo-political aspirations. The other aspect pertains to the internal
security environment and capacity to cope with the complex and often conflicting
aspirations of the world’s densest and largest population grouping. The first aspect is easier
to deal with as it mostly pertains to military expenditures. We have to deal with the issue
of: is it out of control or is it just adequate? The internal security aspect is the tougher one
to deal with as it encompasses issues of good governance, social and economic justice and
structures of state. To do justice to this in one short paper is next to impossible. But in the
second part of this paper exactly this will be attempted.
Military Expenditures in South Asia

Military expenditures in South Asia, given its myriad social and economic problems, evoke
a great sense of outrage among many, both within and outside the region. The guns versus
butter arguments still rage furiously. It may be pertinent to recall the eloquent words of Gen
Dwight D Eisenhower, the US president, on April 16, 1953: “Every gun that is made, every
warship launched, every rocket fired signifies, in the final sense, a theft from those who
hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed. The world in arms is not
spending money alone. It is spending the sweat of its laborers, the genius of its scientists,
and the hopes of its children... This is not a way of life at all, in any true sense. Under the
cloud of threatening war, it is humanity hanging from a cross of iron.”
South Asia’s many flashpoints, and most notably between the two nuclear weapon
states in the region, suggest a region furiously militarising. But the facts do not quite
support this view. Even with its huge concentration of people, well over 1.5 billion and
growing fast, South Asia accounts for less than 2 per cent of the world’s military spending.
The developed countries account for over 74 per cent of the world’s military expenditure,
with the USA alone accounting for 47 per cent of this. According to the Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), in 2005, the world spent over $970 billion
on its militaries. The expenditure after the US’ war in Iraq and the North Atlantic Treaty
Organisation’s (NATO’s) war in Afghanistan is now believed to be over $ 1.5 trillion. On
the other hand, the developed countries and particularly the USA may very well be able to
afford these huge expenditures, but can South Asia continue to do so even at the quantum
it does without impacting the future prospects of its teeming millions? The end of the Cold
War did not see any let up in military spending. The slight drop seen in the mid-1990s was
due to the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and disintegration of the USSR. Russia is back on

The Utility of Military Expenditures in South Asia
track now, getting rich on oil exports and its renewed interest in world affairs has begun to
see commensurately rising military expenditures.
Table 1: World Military Expenditure,1995-2004
Given below are two sets of data organised by SIPRI and the International Monegtary
Fund (IMF) respectively (Tables 2 and 3). Both indicate a high bias towards military
expenditure when compared to expenditures on health and education. Whatever we may
conclude from this, we must bear in mind that Asia and Oceania data includes Australian
expenditures. Australia spends almost 4.6 per cent of its Gross National Product (GNP) on
its military, which is the highest in the region. Its per capita military spending puts it right
on top with the world’s top military spenders like the USA, UK, France, Germany, Japan
and Canada. The advanced countries, however, are very niggardly when it comes to aid.
Table 2: Percentage of Gross Domestic Product on
Public Expenditure by Country

Mohan Guruswamy
Table 3: Percentage of Gross Domestic Product on Public Expenditure

by Country -IMF data
Table 4: Military Spending vs Official Development Aid as a Precentage

of Gross Domestic Product 2003
One thing is certain from these. However little by comparison South Asia
may be spending on its militaries, it may still far too much given its well known
and huge socio-economic problems.

Within South Asia, the big spender is obviously Not only is

India, its biggest nation and greatest economy. Not India the
only is India the biggest military spender in Asia, it biggest military
is the world’s greatest importer of weapons and last spender in
year accounted for 13.5 per cent of global imports. Asia, it is the
Yet there are many in India who believe that India world’s greatest
punches well below its weight and needs to further importer
strengthen itself. India’s military expenditure has of weapons
been rising steadily and has now reached almost and last year
$28 billion. This figure, however, does not include accounted for
its spending on its paramilitary forces which 13.5 per cent of
together number about a million. But we must global imports.
bear in mind that defence expenditure in 2007 is
down to 14.06 per cent of the central government’s annual budget and is well down
from the high twenties of the previous decade. Obviously, when it can do so, India is
spending less proportionately on defence. Nevertheless, the expenditures on health
and education pale into insignificance compared to defence. In 2007, the defence
budget has dropped below 2 per cent (1.99 per cent) of the GDP for the first time.
This has caused a great deal of disquiet in India’s strategic community which has
been harking upon the 3 per cent of GDP envisaged by the national planners and
leaders in the previous decades. It is also worth noting that at its current level of
military spending, India is at less than half the levels of its perennial rivals, China
and Pakistan. This declining trend has become more pronounced since 2004-05. It is
also worthwhile to note that India’s military spending as a proportion of GDP is now
well below the global level.
Writing recently in The Tribune, a well regarded newspaper in north India,
Lt Gen Vijay Oberoi (Retd) a highly respected strategic thinker and a former Vice
Chief of the Indian Army writes: “No doubt, in fiscal terms, the allocations have
crossed the one lakh mark, but the increase barely covers normal inflation and is
way below ‘military inflation’, which is always exponentially higher than routine
inflation. In simple terms, it means that while routine revenue expenditure on
maintenance and replacement of existing stores and equipment, training, fuel,
clothing and rations would get covered, the defence forces would be seriously
handicapped in modernizing the forces, where the limited allocations for the
capital budget, meant for new acquisitions, are grossly inadequate.” The slowing
rise of Indian military expenditures and its “inadequacy” in share of GDP terms
with respect some other nations are well depicted in Figs 1 and 2 below.

Mohan Guruswamy
Fig 1
Fig 2
Military expenditures are an outcome of many factors. Some of these are:

national notions about one’s place in the world; neighbourhood situation; internal
political dynamics; and assessment of long-term interests and perceptions of
geo-political evolution; and, lastly, there is the internal security situation within
a country.

National notions are seldom related to any Pakistan’s

real security threat. Take the UK, for instance. military
What plausible threats does that country face for justify their
it to maintain large and expensive military forces expenditures
and a nuclear arsenal? Does it face a threat from based upon
France or Russia? Quite clearly, Britain’s military Indian budgets,
posture is dependent on its notions of its place India upon
and role in world affairs, even if it be a trifle China’s, and
exaggerated. India too might be with a touch of China upon
somewhat grandiose national notions, given its some others,
recent economic trajectory. It is said that the late including the
Shah of Iran had such an exaggerated notion USA and Japan.
about his country’s place in the world that the
only magazine he read seriously was the US
military magazine Aviation News and Space Technology and often the US military-
industrial complex was quite happy to encourage his interests as it helped lower
hardware costs to them.
On the other hand, India’s or Pakistan’s military expenditures depend on
how they perceive the threats emanating from each other. They live in inimical
neighbourhoods. India, for instance, has Pakistan and China to constantly
contend with. Pakistan’s military justify their expenditures based upon Indian
budgets, India upon China’s, and China upon some others, including the USA
and Japan.
Often, the internal political dynamics will determine the role and place of
the military in a nation’s life. It is only logical to expect a military-centric view
to prevail if a country’s military has a major role in its government. Pakistan, for
instance, cannot expect the military to accept anything less than it has so long
been used to. Since the military is a significant and active player in Pakistani
politics and government, a good deal of its expenditures may also owe to the
military being able to realise a good part of its wish list of equipment, stores and
amenities. Similarly, in China too, the military is an active part of government,
unlike India where it is a mere agency well removed from policy-making.
In the last instance, one may want to think of the new Russian military
expansion and postures arising from its fears of a tightening encirclement by
NATO expansion eastwards and tendency to actively intervene in not just Europe
but also in Asia, with or without formal UN sanction. Many Indian analysts view
the US and NATO military involvement in Afghanistan with some concern and

Mohan Guruswamy
often cite this as a reason for increased military preparations. Nepal and Sri
Lanka are good instances of countries where military spending is driven by the
internal security situation.
Unfortunately, military expenditures are often determined by worst case
scenarios, however unlikely they may be. Thus, a port being built in Gwadar with
Chinese aid and by Chinese contractors will be seen in India as a possible naval
base meant to imperil its oil supply routes. What if… the argument will go and
then threats will have to be addressed.Table 5 below compares military spending
in South Asia and China in 2006.
Table 5
Country Mil. Exp. in constant (2005) US $million
China 49,500
India* 23,933
Pakistan 4,572
Bangladesh 692
Sri Lanka 616
Nepal 161
*includes expenditures on paramilitary forces such as BSF, ITBP, Assam Rifles
Quite clearly, these are relatively small amounts when compared with the
GDPs of the countries. Sri Lanka and Nepal are the only countries in South
Asia where military spending as a percentage of GDP has been rising. This is
understandable as Nepal till quite recently had a full blown insurgency on its
hands. Sri Lanka is still battling a well dug in and tenacious Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelam (LTTE).
So is there a case for reduced military spending in South Asia? Of course,
there will always be one as long as the region continues to be so excruciatingly
poor. Even China, whose per capita GDP is twice that of India’s now is still a
relatively poor country. But is there any real possibility of reducing this spending
any further? One must doubt this, given the set of circumstances the region finds
itself in. On the other hand, there is a case for more dialogue between the South
Asian countries. Each one is in some manner of difficulty where a neighbour
can assist. India, for instance, can help the warring Sinhalas and Tamilians in
Sri Lanka resume their interrupted dialogue. Bangladesh can help facilitate
a dialogue between the insurgent groups holed up there and India. India and
Pakistan can always seek to resume greater normalcy between them. Dialogue
can only help reduce tensions. These dialogues can be facilitated within the
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) framework without

the involvement of extra-regional players. Defence

Having said this, I will hazard that there is still spending is
much room for major reform. Defence spending wrapped up
is wrapped up in the cocoon of “national security,” in the cocoon
making a detailed discussion on it often “not in of “national
the public interest”. Even Members of Parliament security,”
(MPs) in India’s otherwise vocal Parliament are making a
routinely fobbed off with this response. This detailed
allows a good part of the military budget to get discussion on it
wasted without responsibility affixed. often “not in the
A few examples will suffice to make this point. public interest”.
The Indian Ordnance Vehicle Factory (IOVF) in
Jabalpur supplies the armed forces vehicles assembled from kits supplied by
private sector manufacturers. The cost of the IOVF assembled trucks is much
higher than that of those supplied by the private companies. But this practice
continues as the IOVF is deemed as critical to national security. It is not as if
Tata Motors or Ashok Leyland will stop supplying vehicles in times of conflict.
So what does “critical to national” security mean? Similarly, over Rs. 14,000 crore
has been expended on the development of the light combat aircraft (LCA). It is
now almost 15 years behind schedule. It is expected to get set back even further
and the delay will almost surely make it quite obsolete and of no interest to the
Indian Air Force (IAF). But work continues. It is not that we have not had a similar
experience before. The HF24 fighter programme of the 1960s suffered a similar
fate. The IAF had to hastily procure aircraft from the former USSR to fill the gap.
Earlier this year, the Indian Defence Ministry invited offers for 126 fighters that
will cost India close to $45 billion over the next few decades. So what happens to
the LCA?
The Indian Army is manpower intensive. It may be that increased lethality
with better equipment and training will actually reduce expenditure. These
issues have never been examined by experts outside the military. This logic is
applicable to the entire region.
Unlike many countries, India does not have a military that has a dominant
role in government. In fact, the military is not deemed a “part of government”
and in that sense has no role in framing security policy. This is an interesting
situation that makes the military little more than an agency of the government
like the railways. Sure, the military advises the civilian masters, but whether it is
heard or not is another matter. Now this results in another institutional malady.

Mohan Guruswamy
It must also Since the political and bureaucratic leadership is

be stated that not fully informed or qualified, the military has to
the failure to take recourse to worst case scenarios to reinforce
govern wisely its demands. This does not augur well for sound
and equitably is and plausible policy planning. This is an area that
the major cause needs looking into. We saw in 1962 how a civilian
of the alarming leaderships woefully out of tune with the security
internal environment and its military capability, led India
security into a disastrous war with China – the wounds of
situation in which are still healing. But oversight and control
South Asia. of the security establishment works well only
when there is greater interaction between the
players and the higher level of government, properly equipped to perform its
role. Institutional capacity building, therefore, is critical. This could be catalysed
by outside government players like think-tanks.
India may not be in a situation like many developing countries where the
military gets its way literally at bayonet point. Nevertheless, it is still a less than
satisfactory situation, the continuation of which will only extract a toll on a poor
nation.
Internal Security Scenario

The internal security situation in the entire region is far from tranquil. Each
and every country in South Asia faces at least one major crisis. Many like
India have multiple challenges to deal with. To complicate matters, the South
Asian neighbours have not been averse to stoke the fires in the neighbour’s
yard when the opportunity presents itself. Long and generally undermanned
and even unmanned boundaries give them many opportunities to be un-
neighbourly. On the other hand, it must also be stated that the failure to
govern wisely and equitably is the major cause of the alarming internal
security situation in South Asia.
The resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism in the waning years of the Cold
War and the entwining of the then prevalent superpower bloody-mindedness and
religious extremists has resulted in a situation that has made good governance
impossible in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The 1979 seizure of the holy mosque
at Mecca and the subsequent torching of the US Embassy in Islamabad did not
sound warning bells either in Washington or Riyadh or Islamabad. For America,
embarrassing the then Soviet Union was paramount and its two client states

went along with it for their own reasons. It would seem that Marx was off the
mark when he wrote that “religion is the opiate of the masses” for it is religion
that has now fired the imagination of young people. The insatiable demand for
opium derivatives like heroin, smack in the lucrative markets of the West, has
made the prevalent version of jehad largely self-financed. This, of course, is the
greatest legacy of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
To compound matters, Pakistan has had a long tradition of military
dominated government, sometimes elected but mostly selected by the general
staff, which makes the system incompatible with any known notions of good and
equitable governance. In the recent months, we have seen the installation of an
elected government in that country and much depends now upon the sagacity of
the new regime to pilot a course for Pakistan out of the current mess.
Nepal is undergoing a transition which, if it succeeds will bring new hope to
its people. We will have to wait and watch.
Sri Lanka is caught in the throes of a deadly and brutal civil war. The
greatest irony here is that Sri Lanka has the best indices of social and economic
development in the region, and it was the political failure to share power equitably
with a large minority that has taken it to the precipice. The model state has now
become a model of how not to rule. At the time of writing, it would seem that the
Sri Lankan military is now gaining the upper hand, but whether it will see the
complete liquidation of the LTTE and Tamil aspirations is another matter. The
transition of guerrilla armies into terrorist cells has been seen elsewhere before
and there is no reason to believe that Sri Lanka will escape this likelihood. The
only solution seems to be a meaningful devolution of power to the regions so that
minority Tamil insecurities can be assuaged and aspirations realised.
Bangladesh is going through yet another transition. The no holds barred and
unrelenting competition for power between the two dominant parties made the
conduct of elections almost impossible. The army has assumed authority and we
will have to wait and see when it will be able to return to the barracks.
As an Indian, I am also much more comfortable dealing with this. The
administrative and bureaucratic templates in South Asia because of their
common colonial legacy are largely alike and what applies to India generally
applies to the other nations, save Afghanistan.
One of the most commonly accepted definitions of a failed state is that of
a state whose central government is so weak and ineffective that it has little
practical control over much of its territory. The term has been used most
often to describe states like Somalia, Afghanistan and more recently Pakistan

Mohan Guruswamy
When measured where authority is exercised by powers that

against lack any constitutional legitimacy and where
“progressive governments are unable to exercise control
deterioration of over these powers. Indeed, India is no Somalia,
public services” Afghanistan or Pakistan. Yet, in recent times,
(a key political India has been witness to growing violence
indicator in which a disintegrating justice and police system
the failed is unable to control. Mob violence is on the rise
state index), in many parts of India. In Bihar, for instance,
India ranks every other day, news reports tell us stories of
worse than people resorting to mob violence against petty
most countries criminals. There are many reasons for this rising
lower than crime but most important is the fact that the
her on other people have lost faith in the justice system.
indicators. Long delays in court cases and low prosecution
rates – according to one estimate, less than 10
per cent crimes end with convictions – have together served to rob people
of any trust in the state to establish law and order and, as a result, they have
increasingly taken to drawing on ‘private’ means of establishing order.
Naxal violence too is on the rise. According to newspaper reportage on the
Naxal violence, the number of incidents of Naxal violence was 1,385 with as many
as 418 civilians having been killed in 2007. Worse, violence is spreading all across
India. In 2005, Naxal violence was reported from 509 police stations in 11 states.
All this while, the government and security establishment continue to grapple
with ways to tackle this violence – which has now spread to over half a dozen
states across the country.
Despite these failings, India does relatively well when viewed from the
perspective of the parameters that define a failed state. According to the recent
failed states index, developed jointly by the Foreign Policy and the Fund for
Peace, India ranks at a relatively respectable 110 out of 177 countries (the lower
the rank, the more failed the state). Measured on the basis of social (mounting
demographic pressures, massive refugee movement, chronic and sustained
human fight), economic (uneven development, sharp economic decline),
political (delegitimisation of the state, suspension of the rule of law, security
apparatus functioning as a state within a state, intervention of external political
actors) indicators, India does all right. But what stands out (and as this discussion
above clearly indicates) is her collective failure to provide public services. When

measured against “progressive deterioration of public services” (a key political

indicator in the failed state index), India ranks worse than most countries lower
than her on other indicators.
India’s failures are particularly glaring when compared with other developing
countries — most crucially China — India’s much touted rival. As Table 6 below
highlights, China is streets ahead of India in terms of its ability to provide basic
amenities to its people.
Table 6: Comparison of India and China

Indicators India China
Population (2004) (in billion) 1.1 1.3
Population as a % of World 17.28 20.42
GDP (in $ US billion) 793 2,264
GDP as a % of World 1.6 4.6
Per Capita GDP (in $ US) 720 1,740
GNP in PPP ($ billion) 2820 3950
Population Density (persons per sq. Km) 328 135
Life Expectancy at birth (years) 65.0 71.5
Birth Rate (per 1000) 24.0 12.0
Death Rate (per 1000) 8.0 6.0
Infant Mortality Rate (per 1000 live births) 63.0 30.0
Human Development Index 0.602 0.755
Rank in HDI of all countries 127 85
Gini Coefficient 32.5 44.7
Poverty (% of population below $ US 1) 36.0 6.0
Literacy Rate (% of people aged 15 years and 61.0 90.9
above)
Internet users per 1000 people 32.0 73.0
Personal Computers per 1000 people 12.0 41.0
TV Sets (% household) 37.0 91.0
Air Passengers carried (‘000) 23,797.0 119,789.0
Motor Vehicles (per 1000 people) 11 15
Mobile phone subscribers (per 1,000 people) 116.4 287.0
Telephone Main Lines (per 1000 people) 41.0 241.0
Rail Route (Km) 63,221.0 61,015.0

Mohan Guruswamy
Indicators India China

Road Network (Total Road Network, millions of 3.0 2.0
Kms)
Paved Roads as a % of total roads 46 91
Electric power consumption (kWh per capita) 435.3 1378.5*
(2003)
Time required to start a business (days) 89 48
Population with sustainable access to improved 30 44
sanitation (%) 2002
Population with access to an improved water 86 77
source (%) 2002
Public Expenditure on health as a % of GDP 0.9 1.9
Public Expenditure on education as a % of GDP 4.1 2.9
Source: World Development Indicators Database 2006, Human Development Report

2005, China and India: A Visual Essay, October 2005, Deutsche Bank Research
One of the most well acknowledged problems with India’s democracy

today is that the executive and legislature have ended up colluding.
Political interference in bureaucratic activity is rampant. The most obvious
manifestation of this is in the form of frequent transfers, arbitrary promotions
and appointments made by political bosses. Take the example of Uttar
Pradesh (UP), where close to 1,000 transfers were made over a period of a
few years between 1996 and 1998. According to estimates, over half the corps
of the Indian Administrative Service (IAS) officers were transferred within
twelve months of posting. In such a situation, where are the incentives for the
bureaucracy to function?
One impact of this politicisation is a collusion of interests, particularly at
the lowest level of the system. Take the instance of education. A recent analysis
of the political economy of education in UP reveals that teachers are strongly
unionised and command a lot of political clout. Many teachers are active
politicians themselves. It is estimated that the proportion of teachers elected
to the Upper House in UP varies from 13 per cent to 22 per cent of the total
members. In the Lower House, teachers accounted for 10.8 per cent of all elected
Members of Legislative Assemblies (MLAs) in the 1993 election, and 8.7 per cent
in the 1996 election. Their share of Cabinet posts was even higher at 16.3 per cent
in 1991-92. This rather high representation of teachers in the UP politics persists
till today. Mayawati, the current UP chief minister, was herself a teacher before
she took the political plunge.

Given this scenario, it is hardly One of the

surprisingly, that policy-makers are reluctant most well
to hold their teachers to account. Worse, in acknowledged
many instances, the policy-makers double up problems with
as teachers. What incentives would they have India’s democracy
to hold their fellow colleagues accountable for today is that
their misgivings? the executive
India operates on the basis of two parallel and legislature
systems where political boundaries do not have ended
match administrative ones. So on an average, up colluding.
an MP’s constituency covers 3-4 districts while Political
an MLA’s constituency covers part of an entire interference in
district. Worse, there is no synergy among bureaucratic
the parliamentary, legislative and panchayat activity is
jurisdictions. An Assembly constituency rampant.
is determined on a very random basis— a
revenue circle in one state, a mandala in another or a police thana limits in
another. This results in constant overlap and chaos which contribute in no small
measure to accountability failures.
The collusion between the legislature and executive ensures that incentives
for monitoring the ‘compact’ remain weak. But even if a policy-maker were
interested in monitoring the government’s activities, the sheer size and scale
of its operations makes such monitoring close to impossible. India today is
composed of 35 states and union territories. UP, the largest of the Indian states,
has a population of 167 million. In terms of sheer population, UP is bigger than
Pakistan or Germany and France put together. If UP were to be a separate country,
only China, the USA, Brazil and Indonesia would be bigger than it. Tamil Nadu,
with a population of 62.2 million, is slightly bigger than Britain and Italy, while
Andhra Pradesh at 76.4 million is about the same size as Germany and Vietnam.
Bihar is bigger than Mexico and Maharashtra with 92.1 million has ten million
more people than Germany. West Bengal is bigger than the Philippines which has
a population of 77 million, while Madhya Pradesh with 81.2 million is bigger than
all the countries in Southern Africa put together.
What does this mean from the point of view of public administration? Large
populations imply large budgetary outlays – the UP government’s budgetary
provision for 2008-09 is Rs. 112,472.72 crore – centralised management of which
is near impossible. In the current administrative system, the state government

Mohan Guruswamy
has the authority and responsibility to monitor the implementation of its various
programmes. But given the sheer size of government, how realistic is it to expect
a state government bureaucrat who is sitting in a state capital to manage and
monitor such large sums of money. Such a centralised system has only contributed
in making government distant and removed from its people. No bureaucrat
sitting in the state capital (or district capital for that matter), could possibly have
the ability or motivation to monitor activities in some remote village.
The district is the bedrock of the current administrative structure in India.
The district emerged as the core of the Indian administrative structure during
colonial rule. The British government carved out 400 districts across India and
appointed Indian Civil Service officers as the executive head to administer the
district. The main tasks assigned to the district collector were the collection of
taxes and the maintenance of law and order.
Independent India inherited this system and left it practically untouched –
except for the periodic addition of districts. We now have 568 districts in India.
However, the scope of governance of the district has expanded beyond mere tax
collection. The district collector is now responsible for the implementation of all
developmental activities in the district.
With the growth in population, the size of districts too has increased. On
average, districts in India have a population of about 2 million people. These
are extremely large when compared with countries, regions, towns and cities
across the world. New Zealand, for instance, has 3.6 million people, and Costa
Rica 3.3 million. Many of the newly formed countries from the former Soviet
Union are even smaller: Slovenia has 2 million people and Estonia, 1.5 million.
Another interesting comparison is to counties in the USA which are responsible
for the delivery of core services such as schooling and health. The median size of
a county in the USA is only 22,000 and only 8 of more than 3,000 counties have
a population of more than two million. A recent study found that less than 80
counties were larger than the smallest district in four states in India.
Simultaneously, budgetary outlays at the district level too have grown.
The general trend towards centralisation has further exacerbated this
problem with a large number of Central Social Services Agencies (CSSA) from
New Delhi directly sending funds to the district. At the most recent count,
the CSSA amounted to Rs. 395 billion for various social sector services.
The bulk of this money is transferred directly to the district. Yet, the ability
of the district collector to function effectively has weakened significantly.
As mentioned earlier, political interference has reduced tenures of district

collectors to an average of seven months. Where then are the incentives for
the district collector? Moreover, the district collector is usually very young— a
typical district collector is in his or her mid-twenties or early thirties; this is
the first major task assigned to an IAS officer who does not necessarily have
the skills to negotiate the complex tasks required of a district collector. This
also weakens their capacity to deal with political actors.
Efforts to redress these accountability failures through decentralisation of
the government from the district down to the village level through the Panchayati
Raj system have, thus far failed. State governments closely guard the powers and
resources available to them and devolution to the Panchayati Raj Institutions
(PRIs) is weak at best. As a result, the state government dominates which itself, as
mentioned, is too far removed and too distanced from its people to be effective
and accountable.
The failure to monitor governments is strongest at the lower end of
the administrative system. In the top echelons, there still remains a strong
relationship of accountability between the legislature and executive (of course,
this sometimes colludes, as discussed earlier). For instance, secretaries of
the Government of India report to their minister, chief secretaries in the state
government report to their respective chief ministers and Assemblies, while
secretaries report to their ministers and the chief ministers who, in turn, are
accountable to their Assemblies. However, this breaks down at the district
level. The sheer size and scale of district level administration is such that the
district collector is accountable to no one. These relationships of accountability
completely break down at the level of the frontline provider where for reasons
discussed, monitoring is simply non-existent.
The Indian state’s inability to discharge the most basic obligations to its
citizens, even as it portrays itself as the next superpower, is indeed evidence
enough to charge it with being a failed state from the perspective of its inability
to deliver public services . The abject failure of the state to safeguard the well-
being of its citizens is rooted in its political economy.

Sun Tzu at the Computer:
Informationising the
“Art of War”
Timothy Thomas
The theoretical thinking of each era, including the theoretical thinking of our
times, is a historical product. It has completely different forms in different times
and has completely different content.1
Introduction
Unrestricted Warfare, a book written in 1999 by two Chinese colonels, introduced
new ways of looking at war and new ways for an inferior force to defeat a superior
force. The book appears in hindsight to have been one of the primary motivating
forces behind the initiation of a new mode of thinking in the People’s Liberation
Army (PLA). The history of warfare demonstrates that nations that take the lead
in transforming their militaries during periods of revolutionary change will
seize the initiative in future war. Without such an impetus, the PLA may have
fallen farther behind Western nations in the military arena. It is evident that the
information age has generated a period of revolutionary change.
The Chinese concept of “informatized warfare” is the outcome of this
transformation in the nation’s mode of thinking. Traditional and mechanised
methods of thought no longer work in an integrated and systems-oriented
environment characterised by rapidly changing time-space relationships. As a
result, the strategic focus of the transformation is “on changing the thinking style,
introducing innovation in operational theory” according to one source.2 Engel’s
prediction was correct. Modern times encourage change and the development of
entirely different forms of military thought and content.
Mr Timothy L Thomas, formerly of the US Army, is a senior analyst at the Foreign Military
Studies Office (FMSO), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

Sun Tzu At The Computer: Informationising The “Art Of War”
China’s White Paper: Formalising the Transformation

Process
Evidence of this change is found in the Chinese White Paper on National Defense
released in January 2009. China’s militaryWhite Papers have traditionally explained
the general direction in which the PLA is headed. The terms “mechanized” and
“mechanization” were used only seven times in the 2009 version while the terms
“informatized” and “informationization”3 were used nearly fifty times, clearly
showing where the emphasis is now placed. Only the terms “nuclear” and
“defense” exceeded these information terms in word count.4
The catalyst for changing the PLA’s thinking style emanates from Chinese
observations of, and lessons learned from, US and coalition actions in the Desert
Storm and Kosovo operations, and then from US/coalition actions in Afghanistan
and Iraq. Traditional thinking was unable to meet the demands of China’s
requirements. The informatisation of the armed forces demands new modes
of thinking that “possess more pronounced comprehensive, dynamic, flexible,
effective, creative, and forward-looking thought functions”5 than conventional
military thought. Such demands result in completely new warfare concepts6 that
affect every branch of the military.
In the PLA’s opinion, these changes are transforming the military from a
closed force into a modern information-age power focussing on new missions
and roles to include peace-keeping, military diplomacy, and joint anti-terrorism
manoeuvres with other nations. These are some of the non-war military actions
addressed in Unrestricted Warfare. Most recently, the PLA’s Navy has accepted the
mission of combating Somali pirates. Such changes not only indicate that China’s
military reform process is underway, but they also demonstrate that China is
increasing its potential capability “to win local wars in the era of information,”7
another focus of the 2009 White Paper.
The PLA’s “informatized thought” transformation is the outer formal
reflection of a much deeper reform of the entire Chinese military establishment,
a transformation that will affect both doctrine and equipment. At the same
time, the fundamentals upon which the PLA’s thought process rests (use of
the dialectic, comprehensive assessments, Sun Tzu’s principles, stratagems,
etc.) remain as the thought platform to which integrated and system-oriented
applications will be attached. Perhaps in this sense not as much has changed
as Chinese theorists like to posit. Mixing the old and the new is akin to having
“Sun Tzu at the computer.”

Timothy Thomas
Informatised Thought: Can the Inferior Still Defeat the

Superior?
The work of PLA Major Peng Hongqi demonstrates the application of informatised
warfare concepts to age-old Chinese military principles that result in a new mode
of thinking. His article, “A Brief Discussion of Using the Weak to Defeat the Strong
Under Informatized Conditions,” was written for the authoritative journal, China
Military Science. The article offers nine ways that an information-based inferior
force could attack an information-based superior force.8
Peng offers a number of suggestions to help an inferior informatised force
(China) overcome a superior informatised force (the US). First, Peng states
that it is imperative that the weaker side in an information confrontation find
a way to limit a superior opponent’s control over information. The weaker side
must adhere to the active offence, he notes, especially in peace-time. This latter
assertion contradicts the active defence emphasis of China’s White Paper. Offence
in peace-time provides the inferior side with a moment of relative equality that
changes the traditional law of the weak always being on the defensive. Active
offence is an asymmetric operation that requires properly determining key
targets such as those that control data and make decisions. An inferior force
must strike first or lose its opportunity to subdue the enemy. Attacks must be
continuous once initiated, Peng notes, and both the military and the people must
be mobilised. Society’s informatised elite must be absorbed into the military’s
plans, since everyone with a notebook computer can become a combatant.9
In a surprise interpretation of United Nations (UN) regulations, Peng states
that, according to the self-defence charter of the UN, “the inferior side carrying
out a preemptive strike to subdue the enemy stems from the need to seize
freedom of military actions, which is fundamentally different than a powerful
enemy interfering in the internal affairs of another country and carrying out
aggressive ‘first strike’ actions.” Thus, Peng seems to imply that it is the RIGHT of
an inferior force to attack a superior force first.10
A second way for an inferior informatised force to defeat a superior
informatised force is through the manipulation of the latter’s “price disparity,”
the point where psychological weakness occurs, and through the use of allies.
Causing massive war losses and casualties may affect the will of the superior
force to continue fighting before it affects the inferior force, since the former fears
paying the price for victory more than the inferior force. This difference in “price
disparity” was clearly evident to US forces in their fight with insurgents in Iraq.
Winning the support of allies and destroying an opponent’s coalition (through

persuasion and the use of the “righteousness of a It is imperative

war effort”) are other ways the inferior can defeat that the weaker
the superior.11 side in an
Third, Peng states that one must grasp the laws information
and circumstances of informatised conditions that confrontation
guide information-based societies and militaries. find a way to
One such issue to exploit is that only 20 per cent of limit a superior
systems actually play key roles in the sustenance of opponent’s
a society or military force. The other 80 per cent are control over
only of secondary importance. The most vulnerable information.
and most important of the 20 per cent are space The weaker
systems, networked systems, and logistics systems, side must
in that order. These are the systems that should adhere to the
be targeted. Another key measure, Peng notes, is active offence.
developing counter-measures in conjunction with
strategy.12 After a well-conceived and integrated strategy is developed, attack
planning can be set in motion.
Fourth, the enemy must not be allowed to control information superiority,
especially “the control of perception.” Control of perceptions allows an inferior
force to induce information confusion in a superior force via information excess,
information inflation, or information inundation. “Technological blind spots”
(those areas not covered by satellites) can also aide an inferior force’s plans.
Studying the operating principles, systems, and conditions of an adversary’s
technical and theoretical conditioning allows Chinese forces to nullify some
components of an adversary’s overall perception system.13
Fifth, Peng believes an inferior force must conduct information
reconnaissance and prepare confrontational responses as asymmetric checks
and balances on an opponent’s strategy. With regard to the element of time, an
inferior force must use the slow to control the fast. An inferior force must control
an adversary’s combat preparations. Protracted control over an enemy is a
means by which effective control is maintained over time and space. Protraction
also requires demonstrating counter-measure potential to a superior opponent;
otherwise the adversary would have no reason to go along with a protracted
fight.14
Sixth, much of an inferior forces’ reconnaissance can now be done
surreptitiously on computers through the use of hackers or other civilian
means. This enhances the PLA’s ability to claim plausible deniability

Timothy Thomas
when accused of being part of the attack. Forces begin engagements and
reconnaissance well before a conflict emerges. Peace-time collection of key
information on another force’s data collection and processing systems is vital
to success and offers an opportunity to act before a war breaks out.15 Peng
states that one should
…treat the peacetime struggle for information supremacy as a “genuine,

perpetual, and never-ending battle” in preparations and implementation.
It must practice strict information secrecy. The essence of information
confrontation is to gain as much enemy information as possible and keep
the enemy from gaining information on one’s own side.16
China appears to have performed Peng’s vision well if the number of

accusations levelled against the mainland is any indicator. India, South Korea,
Germany, Australia, the US, and others have all accused China of penetrating their
computer systems. The Chinese government has denied all of these accusations
against them. Peng also notes that “the only way the inferior side can compete
with a powerful enemy is by taking full advantage of peace-time to energetically
elevate its material and technological foundation.”17
Seventh, Peng states that the process through which information is
understood (and how it can be manipulated) is important for nations to
understand. The struggles between reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance
and deception and counter-deception are indicative of why this requirement is
so important. One side can collect huge amounts of information on the other
side, but if 50 per cent of that information is deceptive input, then the side
collecting information can be placed at a significant disadvantage.18 Verifying
data reliability is a requirement that cannot be delayed.
Eighth, Peng writes that the initiative in battle can only be won when
“external potential” is achieved. “External potential” means using clandestine
special operations (hackers?) to disrupt enemy plans, using the media to advertise
the crimes of an enemy force, and applying external pressure on the enemy
from other countries. External operations are important because science and
technology are shrinking the power of spirit, strategy, and other non-technical
elements. Outside pressures must be increased on these elements as a result.19
With this argument, however, Peng infers that if technology and strategy are
joined in the efforts of the inferior to defeat the superior, then “external potential”
is an element of Chinese strategy.

Finally, Peng contradicts many of his colleagues by noting that at times

there is too much emphasis placed on so-called “trump” weapons. Weapons
alone cannot decide a conflict. They can be countered by other “trump” weapons
that also contain asymmetric superiorities. Inferior forces are required to find
technological niches and occupy a small space in that field if they are to maintain
some type of counter-force (and, thus, balance) when dealing with a superior
opponent. Optimising the use of existing technologies, using strengths to make
up for weaknesses, putting together things that are weak to make something
strong, and using structural changes to enhance combat strength are other
effective measures.20 Perhaps China’s ability to control the US dollar may some
day fall into this category.
Peng’s article indicates that informatised war is a confrontation of not only
technologies but also knowledge and the information-age talents of people, the
“overall confrontation of the two combined.”21 The slant of Peng’s article is very
important since it offers thoughts foreign to many US analysts who don’t (can’t)
think as Peng does due to their own prisms and limitations (legal, ethical, cultural,
etc.). Peng’s thinking resembles the unrestricted warfare thought process.
Peng’s analysis of a simple thought from the era of Sun Tzu, how “the
inferior can defeat the superior,” demonstrates how the PLA’s informatised
thought has not thrown out the baby with the bathwater. PLA theorists
continue to look at new technological advances, in concert with China’s
ancient principles of war that can be integrated into these informatised
developments. Peng is one of many authors who have looked at the use of
strategies in informatised warfare. A Jiefangjun Bao article in January 2008,
for example, examined warfare strategies for network attack and defence, to
include “preserving and breaking,” “attacking and defending,” “peculiarity
and straightness,” “showing the shape,” “form and force,” and “using space”
to influence the struggle over network space.22
Changing a “Mode of Thinking”

The information age offers Chinese leaders a unique chance to make a “quantum
leap” in military affairs and bypass many long years of research and production
of mechanised equipment. The apparent acquisition of tetrabytes of information
from foreign systems (German, Australian, Japanese, etc.) is but one indicator of
this enhanced leap in capabilities.
However, the transformation from a mechanised to an informatised force
requires qualitative changes to the military’s mode of thinking as well. The PLA has

Timothy Thomas
to learn how to apply new technologies and to develop new thinking styles quickly
or risk falling further behind. Military leaders are confronted with digital, high speed
versions of command information, control information, early warning information,
survey information, intelligence information, systems information, and evaluation
information that change the way operations are conceived and executed, according
to several prominent Chinese authors, and requiring new thinking.
Targets have also changed. The foci of Chinese information attacks are enemy
command centres, information systems, and information capabilities rather than
troop formations as in the past. Battles will be fought over information resources
at both the tactical and strategic levels. New modes of thinking are required to
protect operations, logistics, and other associated areas. 23
Li Deyi, deputy Chair of the Department of Warfare Theory and Strategic
Research at the PLA’s Military Academy of Science, highlighted what must change
(and why) in the PLA’s mode of thinking. He stated:
n Changing the mode of thinking is a requirement for ensuring victory
in future war. It moves conventional thinking from individual system
engagement toward systemized thought and system-to-system
engagements. Group and organizational decision-making replace
individual thought.
n Strategy and technology are unified for planning purposes. The
information superhighway can produce information misdirection,
spread the fog of war, and interfere with, and disrupt, the enemy’s strategic
perceptions. Electronic deception, camouflage, and interference along
with viral infiltration and interference with/deception of satellites can
cause enemy errors in judgment.
n Systems methodology has broken armies away from singular cause
and effect determinism that is characteristic of conventional warfare.
Systems use information, information technology, and information
system modes of thought to reduce an enemy’s combat effectiveness.
n Information and information technology determine combat
effectiveness, victory, and defeat in war and stand alongside materials
and power as one of the three major strategic resources.
n Information deterrence (that is, information technology, weaponry, and
resource deterrence as well as counter-information deterrence) are new
modes of strategic thought and are important new deterrent forces, just
behind nuclear deterrence, in achieving national strategic objectives.
n New modes of thinking will enable breakthroughs in control theory.

n New modes of thinking integrate information Informatised

reasoning, analysis, strategic capabilities, and war is a
the experiences of warfare with information confrontation
collection and storage, information of not only
processing, information transmission, technologies
and the logical reasoning capabilities but also
of computers and artificial intelligence. knowledge and
C4ISR system decision-making is scientific, the information-
collective, real-time, and precise. age talents
n Systemized warfare is represented by activities of people,
that have organization, planning, objectives, the “overall
measures, layers, and steps. It is networked confrontation
thought built on a network foundation. of the two
Networks are systems so systemization combined.”
thinking is also “networkization” thinking,
another new mode of thought.
n The design of military system architectures, defensive alignments,
and attack countermeasures must utilize qualitative and quantitative
analysis. Precise analysis, planning, design, guidance, and management
are the requirements of the man/machine process for new thinking.24
Li is not the only Chinese leader to emphasise the need for new thinking
styles. Major Gen Zhan Yu, commandant of the Shijiazhunag Army Command
Academy, believes new problems will emerge that transform solutions based
on books toward solutions based on facts. This transformation requires a
change from conservative to creative thought. Personnel must discuss what
has never been discussed and do what has never been done. This is not a
thought transformation that deals with emergencies but rather with the long
perspective. Finally, this is a “systems engineering” project and ways of thought
must change from “singular” or individual areas to “systemic” thought that is
integrated.25
Another leader emphasising change was the Dean of the Department of
Military Political Work of Shijiazhunag Army Command College, Senior Colonel
Deng Yifei. He wrote that change requires foresight, flexibility, effectiveness,
and awareness of how information resources are expanding infinitely, being
transmitted in an unobstructed way, and being shared without time differences.
Information technical tools enable more complex and precise planning, release

Timothy Thomas
the energy of thinking, and inspire creative thought. Information resources are a
“multiplier” of thinking effectiveness.26
War Engineering: An Example of a New Mode of Thinking

Informatised thought has led to developments in systemic thinking or, as Zhan
Yu noted, “systems engineering.” A close relative of systems engineering is the
Chinese concept of information-age war engineering. Maj Gen Hu Xiaofeng, a
professor in the Information Operations and Command Training-Teaching and
Research Department at China’s National Defense University, noted that the age
of informatisation requires new approaches to the study and management of
information-age wars. War engineering is one of these new approaches.27
War engineering arose, Hu contends, from the requirement to find a
method to study, manage, and control information-age war systems. Chinese
war engineering is “a method of systems engineering that studies, designs, tests,
controls, and evaluates war systems and that is guided by systematic thinking,
based on information technology.”28 The most important element of war
engineering is to maintain control of war systems. Through war systems, control
of the course of operations is possible.29 The concept is centred on managing
warfare and has total victory as its goal. It is quite different from the US concept
of “capabilities engineering” according to Hu.
War engineering looks at combat as a non-linear, complex, adaptive system.
War engineering studies, designs, and manages war requirements, theories,
experiments, and processes. It has five parts: requirements, planning, testing,
control, and evaluation engineering. Control engineering, the most important
element, consists of strategic, campaign, and tactical command information
systems which monitor situations, control decision-making, handle anomalies,
and evaluate results.30
Hu concluded his thoughts on war engineering by quoting Engels, who
noted that “it wasn’t the inventors of new material measures; it was the first
person who, in the correct manner, used a new measure that had already been
invented.” China is searching for a way to be the first to use US inventions (the
internet, information war, etc.) to its benefit and prove Engels correct. China
hopes to be able to manage and control war instead of reacting to it and to make
war-time changes in advance (through simulations) instead of making changes
as war requires or demands. War engineering will be one of several catalysts that
promote the further development of information war studies as China transforms
its military from a mechanised to an informatised force.31

System Attack Warfare and Chinese war

Innovative Thought: The Essence of engineering
a New Mode of Thinking is “a method
New modes of thinking require, above all of systems
else, creativity and innovation. Without them, engineering that
thought will remain stagnant. Dai Qingmin, studies, designs,
the director of the All-PLA Informatization tests, controls,
Consultation Committee (and former head and evaluates
of the Electronic Warfare Department of the war systems and
Chinese General Staff ), wrote an important that is guided
article regarding innovation and informatised by systematic
thought in 2007 in China Military Science. He thinking, based
discussed information attack theories, not on information
active defence theories, and he stressed the technology.” The
importance of innovative developments. most important
Innovation, Dai writes, is the precursor to element of war
the further development of military technology, engineering is to
weapon modernisation, organisational maintain control
restructuring, and changes in military practice.32 of war systems.
The basic task of innovation is to “reveal the law
of informatized warfare, put forward a corresponding strategy for informatized
warfare, and formulate the principles for informatized operations.”33 Innovation
creates new transformation theories, systems integration theories, and
service and arms building theories.34 Technical informatised innovation in the
information age must take into account issues not considered in the past in
China, Dai notes, such as fair competition, a sound investment mechanism, a
legal system for protecting intellectual property rights, and an effective human
resources cultivation mechanism.35
In another article, Dai wrote that one innovative change is to take “system
attack warfare as a guide.” Coming from a person of such renown, this is a very
important statement and one that should concern the West. There is no mention
of active defence in Dai’s writing here, just attack options. He also stated that it is
imperative to grasp the initiative in future war, take information dominance as a
core principle, and develop informatisation operations theories ahead of time.36
These actions require an objective analysis of the contradictions that exist in the
current stage of informatisation,37 and the focus should be on those that can be
exploited. These points and concerns differ markedly from mechanised thought,

Timothy Thomas
where China stressed active defence and the interest in attacking only after first
being attacked. Now, Dai states:
System attack warfare is the basic thought of our armed forces for fighting
operations in the environment of informatization. System attack warfare
stresses the use of asymmetric offensive actions to seize battlefield control
in all battle domains, using elite forces and composite operation means that
mix hard and soft attacks to focus attacks on the core and weak links of the
enemy operation system…38
Zhang Zhiping and Ye Haiyuan mentioned innovation in their work. They

stated that innovation must include new viewpoints, concepts, and thoughts.
Operations theory, for example, might include information warfare, spatial
warfare, precision operations, and integrated joint operations. The development
of strategies for operational issues will be particularly important for future
informatised warfare concepts.39 Again, the focus is on combining technology
with strategies as others (such as Li Bingyan, cited in Decoding the Virtual
Dragon) have repeatedly stressed.
Maj Gen Zhan Yu, mentioned earlier, offered other thoughts on
innovation in operations theory. He stated that systemic destructive attack
must be emphasised; information must take a leading role; and firepower
will control the process of operations, with precision operations the highest
state to be pursued. The PLA’s operational style must change to the joint,
non-linear, precision, and non-engagement (no direct contact) types. Finally,
combat capability must undergo a transformation in command and control,
information operations, precision strike capability, strategic manoeuvre, fast
assault, special operations capability, and comprehensive defence capability
for the conduct of informatised warfare. This will enable a qualitative leap in
military organisation and force structure.40
Naturally, there are serious problems that the PLA will have to overcome
as they change modes of thought from traditional to informatised issues.
These include structural problems such as breaking down section barriers and
department interests; the current inability to independently innovate; and
the clarification of unclear demands for the construction of an information
network.41 Military innovations must solve these problems. The fragmentation
of interests must end.

Culture Affects Innovation Trends Zhan Yu, offered

China’s new mode of thinking will develop other thoughts
differently than would a corresponding on innovation
transformation of thought in the West. This in operations
is due to the impact of culture and history on theory and stated
innovation and due to the development of two that systemic
types of thought processes, metaphysical and destructive
dialectical, according to Chinese analysts. attack must be
Those involved in introducing new emphasised;
modes of thinking in the PLA repeatedly stress information
the importance of innovation and creative must take a
thinking. Innovation affects culture and vice leading role;
versa. Authors Xiao Dongsong, a doctoral and firepower
student in Military Studies at China’s National will control
Defense University, and Li Qing, an associate the process
professor in the Teaching and Research Section of operations,
for Political Theory at the National Defense with precision
University, wrote about the effects of culture operations the
on innovation. Xiao and Li defined culture highest state to be
as “the organic unity of knowledge systems, pursued.
value systems, and methodological systems
of thought.”42 Knowledge is gained from cognitive reflections on the essence,
patterns, properties, and features of the external world. Values are reflected in
the way things and processes are used, resulting in a series of “value reflections,
value assessments, value principles, and value concepts to form a value system for
society.”43 A methodological system of thought is then created out of “how we know
and by what means we know the external world.”44 Informatised thought (such
as that produced over the Internet) has greatly changed “how we know” and has
created new modes of thought. Wikipedia is perhaps the best example of putting a
new spin on “what we know.”
Knowledge system innovation includes new phenomena that must be
recognised, analysed, and summarised. This will require that existing knowledge
categories for military actions, truth, philosophy, and information war be
processed and refitted. Existing categories of knowledge (ethics, etiquette,
benevolence, justice, gain and harm, material substances, actions, systems,
control, information, etc.) must adopt new measures as well.45 “Value system
innovation” is the result of different assessments in attitudes, interests,

Timothy Thomas
enthusiasms, and mental dynamics. Value assessment systems of different

societies are reflected in conditions such as geography, demography, customs,
and means of production. It is also reflected in how God and people, individuals
and groups, mind and strength, and morality and gain are related (and which are
the most important to a culture).46
As a methodological system of thought, culture provides military theory
with innovative tools for thought and with the logical means and patterns
for processing information. As an example, Xiao and Li contrasted Greek and
Chinese thought:
The early Greek method of thought was a simple and substantial way of
thinking, in that the essence of things was within the things themselves. As
such, it held that one should understand the substance, that is, the thing in
and of itself in order to grasp the essential nature and pattern of said thing.
By contrast, the method of thought in Chinese antiquity was a simple and
relational way of thinking, in that the essence of things was reflected in the
relationship between a given thing and other things. As such, understanding
a thing meant understanding various types of relationships. These two
different methods of thinking provide two different anchor points for
thinking; one is substantial, and the other relational.47
Xiao and Li also contrasted views in the West and in China on the concept of
war. They noted:
The West placed emphasis upon seeing war as an entity, in that new
viewpoints, ideas, and theories were extracted during the process
of bringing war in and of itself to light. China, however, placed war
within a larger relational world, and extracted new viewpoints, ideas,
and theories by means of revealing the relationships between war and
politics, war and economics, war and the natural environment, and war
and leadership.48
In terms of logical thought patterns, the West uses metaphysics which

is based on analysis and decomposition according to Xiao and Li. A subject is
understood as a static and isolated presence that is broken down into a series of
mutually independent elements and these elements are analysed as a means of
gaining a precise understanding of the subject. China uses dialectical thought.

Here the logical patterns of thought are represented As a

by a high degree of analysis, with a high degree methodological
of integration. Understanding a subject is seen system of
as a presence with common links and actions. A thought, culture
comprehensive examination of the relationships provides
between the possible and actual, history and the military theory
future, and the whole and the part is performed with innovative
in order to gain an understanding of the essential tools for thought
nature and pattern of things. 49 and with the
New modes of thought are affected by this logical means
cultural thought process. A person brought up in and patterns
the Chinese system will analyse information-age for processing
developments differently than someone brought information.
up in a Western society who performs the same
analysis.
One’s level of expertise in military practice also affects one’s attempts
at innovation. In the area of military practice the PLA is weak since it has not
fought a high-tech war yet. But the PLA’s work on war theory appears strong and
focussed on inculcating information-age technologies into the force. The PLA is
attaching particular significance to an examination of philosophical, historical,
and scientific culture. Philosophy considers the connections and development
of various aspects of nature and society; military history helps summarise the
lessons of military culture; and science, in particular the impact of technology
(with information technology at its core), has caused fundamental changes in
both societal and military activities. Theories of information war and associated
theories (Third Wave, etc.) have evolved from these developments.50
The use of technology (such as the development of simulations) has led to a
closer understanding of military practice and a corresponding move away from
Confucianist practice. Technology has encouraged China to move away from
traditional military thought and toward an advanced culture, one that takes into
consideration new developments and results in innovation in military theory.51
The development of an advanced military culture will increase the
knowledge level of officers and troops, their scientific knowledge and culture
levels, and Chinese combat power. At the same time, the Marxist value system
must be updated and enriched in areas such as patriotic devotion. In a reversal of
traditional values and modes of thought, now the qualitative must be emphasised
over the quantitative and effectiveness emphasised over fairness.52

Timothy Thomas
Final recommendations by Xiao and Li included the following:
Continue to create, learn, and understand new methods of thinking. Pay

attention to the latest changes and results of research and understand the
content and essential characteristics of modern methodology.
Strengthen the systematic buildup of methods of thinking to include

philosophical, sociological, physiological, and psychological methods; and
combine and integrate them. Study the structure, logic, and means by which
this new organic system can be employed.53
Conclusions
In the information age, creative thinking is the pivot point of thinking for
making innovations in military theory and practice, and will become the
“golden key” to the door to success and victory in war.54
—Deng Yifei
Innovations and creative thinking, in the view of the PLA, are the keys to
victory in future war. This requires escaping from the grasp of mechanised
thought and finding new and innovative ways to implement “informatised
thinking.” Innovations involve finding new ways to apply ancient stratagems
to information-age developments. In a certain sense, a new mode of thinking
is an asymmetric answer to a competitor with technological prowess but who
has failed to apply these advances to their fullest. Engels belief that “it wasn’t the
inventors of new material measures; it was the first person who, in the correct
manner, used a new measure that had already been invented” could find new
applicability in the information age. Sun Tzu’s principles integrated with systems
thinking may provide such a cognitive advantage.
The PLA is moving from a mechanised to an informatised force as fast
as possible. For example, the PLA’s University of Science and Technology
(UST) reports it is cultivating junior commanders for joint operations under
informatized conditions. Five training systems have been formed, to include
a “command information engineering” system. Courses have increased their
content on complex electromagnetic environments, information security, and
psychological operations.55
Peng’s analysis and recommendations on how the inferior could defeat
the superior were the closest examples of an actual way to apply Sun Tzu-type

methods to the information age. Li Deyi listed Innovations

twelve changes in the PLA’s mode of thinking that and creative
must be integrated into informatised thought. thinking, in
Systems methodology, information deterrence, the view of the
control theory, and other factors were highlighted. PLA, are the
Some of his recommendations share a common keys to victory
reference point with Western information age in future war.
theory while others do not. Those in the latter This requires
category should be closely examined by Western escaping from
analysts for their potential implications or use. the grasp of
Gen Dai’s new mode of thinking focussed mechanised
more on systems and innovation than on applying thought and
old principles of war. He stated that to grasp finding new and
the initiative in future war, China must take innovative ways
system attack warfare as its guide and develop to implement
informatisation operations theories ahead of “informatised
time. In accordance with this latter idea, it is
56 thinking.”
best, some Chinese believe, to worry about things
before they happen instead of after the fact when it is too late. War engineering,
innovation, and creativity are required ahead of time in order to affect efficiency,
management, strategy, organisation, and theory with information means.57
Culture provides military theory with some of the tools for innovative
thought. Xiao’s and Li’s contrast of Greek and Chinese thought was noteworthy.
While Greek thought emphasises understanding the substance of something,
Chinese thought lays stress on thinking of things in relation to one another. As
the authors noted, these two different methods of thinking provide two different
anchor points for thought; one is substantial and the other relational.58 It is, thus,
to be expected that Chinese theoreticians will be looking for all types of relational
aspects associated with informatised thought.
While the West uses metaphysics based on analysis and decomposition,
China uses dialectical thought. The dialectic enhances the development of
counter-measures merely by its thought process of thesis, anti-thesis, synthesis.
This requires that Western analysts conduct a close analysis of the links and
actions that the PLA stresses and how they are being integrated into the force.
A comprehensive examination of the relationships between the possible and
actual, history and the future, and the whole and the part is performed in order
to gain an understanding of the essential nature and pattern of things.59

Timothy Thomas
In summary, it is quite apparent that the PLA’s approach to informatised

war will vary from Western modes of information-age thought. This is not
unexpected. Perhaps, however, too few Westerners appreciate this fact and
ignore such developments at their risk. To better understand the Chinese and
find ways to work together with them (or to counter any potential aggression), it
is strongly recommended that Western analysts study the Chinese as they study
us—in detail. We must learn from them as they have learned from us. We can
start by better understanding their new modes of thought—and warning them of
some of the perils they are contemplating and introducing.
Notes
1 Selected Works of Marx and Engels, Vol 4 (Beijing: The People’s Press, 1995, Second
Chinese Edition) p. 248, as quoted in Deng Yifei, “A Revolution in Military Thinking in
the Information Age,” China Military Science, No. 6, 2007, as translated and downloaded
from the Open Source Centre (OSC), document number CPP20080527563002.
2. Zhan Yu, “Strategic Considerations for Army Transformation,” Beijing Zhongguo
Junshi Kexue (China Military Science), August 25, 2008, pp. 86-97, as translated
and downloaded from the Open Source Centre (OSC) website, document number
CPP20080825563003
3. The term “informationization” is equivalent to the English rendering
“informatization.”
4. “Full Text: China’s National Defense in 2008,” Xinhua in English 0208 GMT January 20,
2009, as downloaded from the Open Source Centre (OSC) website, document number
CPP20090120968111.
5. Li Deyi, “A Study of the Basic Characteristics of the Modes of Thinking in Informatized
Warfare,” Zhongguo Junshi Kexue (China Military Science), August 20, 2007, pp. 101-
105, as translated and downloaded from the Open Source Centre (OSC) website,
document number CPP20081028682007.
6. Ibid.
7. “Military Support to Peaceful Development,” China Daily, January 6, 2009, at
http://www.china-wire.org/2009/01/military-support-to-peaceful-development.
8. Peng Hongqi, “A Brief Discussion of Using the Weak to Defeat the Strong under
Informatized Conditions,” China Military Science, No. 1, 2008, pp. 142-148,
as translated and downloaded from the Open Source Centre (OSC) website,
document number CPP20080624563002.
9. Ibid.

10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. Liu Wanxin, Dang Wanlong, and Zhang Dan, “Network Attack and Protection also
Need Strategies,” Jiefangjun Bao, January 2, 2008, p. 6, as translated and downloaded
from the Open Source Centre (OSC), document number CPP20080102436002.
23. Li Deyi, “A Study of the Basic Characteristics.”
24. Ibid
25. Zhan Yu, “Strategic Considerations for Army Transformation”.
26. Deng Yifei, “A Revolution in Military Thinking in the Information Age,” China Military
Science, No. 6, 2007, as translated and downloaded from the Open Source Centre
(OSC), document number CPP20080527563002.
27. Hu Xiaofeng, “The Basics of War Engineering,” China Military Science, No. 3, 2007, as
translated and downloaded from the Open Source Centre (OSC) website, document
number CPP20070927478001.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
32. Dai Qingmin, “Ensure Historical Orientation and Promote Comprehensive Innovation
of Military Informationization,” China Military Science, No. 1, 2007, as translated
CPP20070512563001.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid.
36. Dai Qingmin, “Further Understanding on Laws of Military Informatization Building,”
Beijing, Jiefangjun Bao (Liberation Army Daily), February 13, 2007, p. 6, as translated

Timothy Thomas
CPP20070213721038.
37. Ibid.
38. ibid.
39. Zhang Zhiping, Ye Haiyuan, “Trends in World Military Development: Accelerating
Military Transformation with Chinese Characteristics,” Renmin Ribao (Internet
Version), April 9, 2008, p. 7, as translated and downloaded from the Open Source
Centre (OSC) website, document number CPP20080409710003.
40. Zhan Yu, “Strategic Considertion For Army Transformation”.
41. Dai Qingmin, “Further Understanding on Laws of Military Informatization Building.”
42. Xiao Dongsong and Li Qing, “Analysis of the Impact of Culture on the Innovation of
Military Theories,” China Military Science, 2002, No. 3, pp. 31-39.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid.
54. Deng Yifei, “A Revolution in Military Thinking”.
55. Liu Geng’an and Ma Shengwei, “PLA UST Cultivates New-Type Military Talents,”
Jiefangjun Bao, January 5 2009, as translated and downloaded from the Open Source
Centre (OSC), document number CPP20090105702014.
56. Dai. “Ensure Historical Orientation”.
57. Ibid.
58. Xiao and Li. “Analysis of the Impact of Culture.”
59. Ibid.

Tigers Tamed, but
What Next?
N Manoharan
Introduction
Ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka turned violent since the late 1970s as radicalised Sri
Lankan Tamil youth resorted to armed means. Belief in militancy and sympathy
for militants gradually rose among the Tamils, especially after ethnic riots of 1983.
With the massive ingress of Sri Lankan Tamil refugees after the 1983 riots, India
could not “remain unaffected by the events.”1 New Delhi, in view of its national
security interests and stability in the region, offered its good offices to resolve
the conflict. The failure of various peace missions prompted India to enter into
an accord with Sri Lanka in July 1987 “to establish peace and normalcy” in the
Island.2 In a surprising turn of events, the Sri Lankan state turned against India
and secretly aided the Liberation of Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) against the
Indian Peace-keeping Force (IPKF).3 However, within a short span of the IPKF’s
departure, ‘Eelam War–II’ broke out between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan security
forces in June 1990. The new government under Chandrika Kumaratunga in
1994 seriously initiated talks with the LTTE based on comprehensive devolution
proposals. The talks, however, broke down due to the LTTE’s obduracy. Gradually,
Chandrika became convinced of the rightness of the “war-for-peace” programme
after the security forces achieved some spectacular victories in 1995 and early
1996 that included wresting of Jaffna from the LTTE. But the government forces
started facing reverses starting from July 1996. On 22 February 2002, with the
Norwegian mediation, a ceasefire agreement (CFA) was signed between the
government of Sri Lanka (GOSL) headed by Ranil Wickremasinghe and the LTTE.
In due course, however, the CFA was relegated to paper. The LTTE’s sporadic
suicide and air attacks triggered open confrontation between the two antagonists
Dr N Manoharan is Senior Fellow, Centre for Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi.

N Manoharan
in August 2006. The present spell of confrontation reached a new high in 2008-09
as the government under President Mahinda Rajapakse determinately pursued
its “war for peace” programme: resolving the ethnic issue by defeating the LTTE.
As of April 2009, the government was in a position to confine the LTTE to a few
square kilometres in Mullaithivu district, but not without colossal human and
material cost. Parallel efforts towards peace are not encouraging.
End of a Ceasefire and Beginning of a Ceaseless Fire

The Rajapakse government abrogated the CFA in January 2008 stating “the
agreement has become a dead letter” in the wake of “senseless violence by the
LTTE”.4 In reality, however, the government believed that the CFA stood as an
obstacle for its formal military thrust against the Tigers. President Rajapakse
had also been under tremendous pressure from hardline parties like Janatha
Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) and Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU) ever since he
signed Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) with them during his bid for
presidentship in 2005.5 One of the conditions laid by the two parties for supporting
Rajapakse as president was abrogation of the CFA. Rajapakse successfully evaded
the promise for nearly two years, but could not do so for long.
‘Declared war’ commenced with the government forces launching a four-
pronged attack on the LTTE-controlled areas (comprising the full districts of
Mullaitivu and Kilinochchi and parts of Mannar, Vavuniya and Jaffna). Task Force
1 and 58 Division were entrusted with the Mannar front; Task Force 2 and 57
Division took care of advancing from Vavuniya; the newly raised 59 Division was
put in charge of the Weli Oya area; 53 and 55 Divisions guarded forward defence
lines (FDLs) along Muhamaalai in the northern front. The plan was to gradually
encircle Kilinochchi, the LTTE’s administrative capital, from all sides.6
However, the advance of government forces at the Mannar front was
relatively rapid. In April 2008, Madhu was captured. In July, Viduthalaitivu,
one of the key bases of the “Sea Tigers”, fell. By August, the military took
control of Vellankulam, Kalekuda jetty, Thunkkai, Uyilankulam, Palamoddai
and Thannimuruppukulam. During the year, the army captured several other
strategic positions like Adamban, Illuppaikaduvai, Nachikuda, Akkarayankulam,
Devil’s Point, Pooneryn, Nedunkerni, Mankulam and Paranthan from the LTTE.
Kilinochchi, the administrative capital of the LTTE, fell on 2 January 2009 and the
strategic Elephant Pass a week later.7 This was considered as major blow to the
LTTE and a clear indication of the end of its conventional capability. As of end-
April 2009, the Tigers were restricted to few square kilometres in the district.

Tigers Tamed, but What Next?
The Sri Lankan Air Force (SLAF) and Navy The overall
(SLN) ably aided the army in the advancement. professionalism
The SLAF – that gained sophistication to of the Sri Lankan
overcome the air defence systems of the armed forces has
LTTE – played a vital role in supporting the improved in the
ground troops and as well as destroying the recent past. New
Tigers’ military installations and conventional training modules,
defences. Precision aerial bombings to kill coupled with
LTTE leaders, based on specific intelligence, increased training
have also been the SLAF’s additional task.8 The tenures, attractive
SLAF has also been mandated to neutralise the monetary
air power capability of the LTTE. The SLN has compensation,
been used to mainly cut the maritime supply sophisticated
lines of the LTTE and, at the same time, weaken weapon systems,
the “Sea Tigers”. Cooperation of the Indian Navy new fighting
was crucial in this regard.9 With the addition strategies and
of the Rapid Action Boat Squadron that uses tactics, etc have
rigid hull inflatable boats, the SLN was able to increased the
operate even in shallow waters. confidence of
It should be pointed out that the overall the government
professionalism of the Sri Lankan armed soldiers.
forces has improved in the recent past. New
training modules, coupled with increased training tenures, attractive monetary
compensation, sophisticated weapon systems, new fighting strategies and
tactics, etc have increased the confidence of the government soldiers. The
employment of deep penetration units (under long range reconnaissance patrol)
by the Sri Lanka Army, for instance, was a novel, unconventional method to take
on select LTTE targets.10 This paid rich dividends in not only neutralising some
important LTTE commanders, but also in penetrating the thus far impregnable
LTTE-controlled territories. Significantly, this was ably backed by a strong and
determined politico-military leadership in Colombo. The government skilfully
exploited the international environment against “terrorism” to grind its axe
against the Tigers. In addition, the Sri Lankan military has been benefitting from
liberal military help from various countries like China, Pakistan, Israel, India,
United States, Ukraine and Iran.11 The GOSL has also been fairly successful in
obtaining the diplomatic support of important countries like India and the United
States in stifling the LTTE’s supplies – monetary and material – from outside.

N Manoharan
On its part, during ‘Eelam War – IV’, the Tigers have been following three broad
military strategies against the government forces. Firstly, at the conventional level,
the main aim of the Tigers was to resist the rapidly advancing Sri Lankan Army
with air cover. The LTTE, however, failed miserably in this strategy that resulted
in shrinking of their territory from 15,000 sq km in 2006 to just about 15 sq km
in April 2009. The Tigers have been overwhelmed by both superior firepower
and numbers of the government forces. Secondly, the LTTE has been using ‘hit
and run’ tactics in the east and Jaffna to make its presence felt, but also to keep
the security forces occupied. As the conventional capability dwindled, the Tigers
started falling back on guerrilla tactics as the dominant mode of resistance. The
idea is also to kill “informers” and “traitors”, especially those belonging to non-
LTTE Tamil groups like Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Puligal (TMVP), Eelam Peoples
Democratic Party (EPDP), People’s Liberation Organisation for Tamil Eelam
(PLOTE) and Eelam People’s Revolutionary Front (EPRLF.) Thirdly, the Tigers
use suicide tactics to hit vital targets across the Island. The LTTE also uses its air
wing to launch sporadic air attacks on important targets and also to keep alive an
element of surprise.12
Despite these triple strategies, the LTTE had to face a severe military setback
due to a few important factors. Firstly, Karuna, one of the able LTTE commanders
from the east, deserted with a chunk of cadres in March 2004 to connive with
the government forces. Karuna’s men knew the terrain well, and also provided
timely and useful intelligence to the government forces. They also, to a greater
extent, stifled local support for the Tigers in the east.13 Secondly, during the same
period, the LTTE started facing international isolation for various reasons. The
international community was irritated over the LTTE’s obduracy and not being
willing to negotiate, except on its own terms. The way the Tigers violated the CFA
further annoyed the international community, which, especially after 9/11, was
equating any use of illegal violence by non-state actors to “terrorism”. Meanwhile,
the “international safety net” woven by the previous Ranil Wickremasinghe
regime worked. As a result, as of early 2009, the LTTE was banned by as many as 31
countries, the latest being Sri Lanka itself.14 This severely impinged on arms and
funds flows to the Tigers. The LTTE’s network with various Indian militant groups
indirectly pushed New Delhi to cooperate with the Sri Lankan state to dent the
Tigers’ military capability.15 Thirdly, the LTTE has lost some of its best leaders in
the recent past. The list includes, apart from Karuna, Shankar, the founding chief
of the LTTE air wing; Anton Balasingham, the political adviser and ideologue
of the LTTE; Tamilselvan, chief of the LTTE’s political wing; Balraj, considered

as one of the chief military strategists of the The procurement

LTTE, who led the Tigers in many successful modules are
military missions; Charles, head of the LTTE’s directly controlled
military intelligence and considered an able by LTTE agents
fighter. The fall of these “important pillars” operating in the
obviously weakened the LTTE. southern states of
To make a turnaround, the LTTE has India. The modus
been desperately looking for a lifeline. During operandi is that the
his “Hero’s Day” speech delivered on 27 requisite materials
November 2008, the Tiger chief Prabhakaran are procured from
appealed to the international community “to all over India
understand the deep aspirations and friendly and smuggled via
overtures of our people, to remove their ban fishing villages
on us and to recognise our just struggle.” He, along the coasts
especially, requested the leaders and people of Tamil Nadu,
of Tamil Nadu “to raise their voice firmly in Andhra Pradesh
favour of our struggle for a Tamil Eelam state, and Kerala.
and to take appropriate and positive measures
to remove the ban which remains an impediment to an amicable relationship
between India and our movement.”16 Since the LTTE chief was not sure of a
positive response from New Delhi, the appeal was made through Tamil Nadu.
However, the support for the LTTE is not overwhelming and recent protests in
the southern state were mainly against the humanitarian crisis of the ongoing
war.17
However, as resource flow from other sources dwindled, the LTTE was adept
in renewing supply lines from India. India is not only geographically closer, but
also easier for building networks due to the ethnic factor and the presence of a
large number of Sri Lankan Tamils in Tamil Nadu. The list of smuggled materials
includes paraphernalia needed for making bombs, steel or aluminum ingots
for improvised explosive devices, detonators, chemicals, batteries, rations, fuel,
medicine, resin, boat parts, clothes, adhesives, walkie-talkies, global positioning
system (GPS) devices, mobile SIM cards, lifejackets and multitester meters,
torchlights, and satellite receiver phones.18 The procurement modules are
directly controlled by LTTE agents operating in the southern states of India. The
modus operandi is that the requisite materials are procured from all over India
and smuggled via fishing villages along the coasts of Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh
and Kerala. In Tamil Nadu, the network operates mostly along the Rameswaram-

N Manoharan
Tuticorin-Cuddalore stretch. Both Indians and Sri Lankans are part of the
network. Fishermen who are used as couriers are identified carefully. There is
no pattern to frequency and timing of the movement of supplies. However, the
smuggling takes place mostly by night, under the cover of darkness. Supplies of
lethal nature are camouflaged by food materials taken for personal use. Goods
are delivered in mid-sea or near the shore.1
The Cost of Conflict

The ongoing conflict has inflicted severe human and material costs.
The contours of the humanitarian crisis range from people caught in the
conflict areas, the plight of those internally displaced in the northeast and those
who flee from the country as refugees. By conservative estimates, at least 40,000
civilians are still trapped in the crossfire in Mullaithivu district. Appreciably,
the government has suspended heavy firing and aerial raids which would have
caused numerous casualties.20 Yet the situation is life threatening. There is
severe shortage for food, life-saving drugs and other essentials like water. People
are surviving on the food convoys from the World Food Programme and the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). They are too little and too late,
however. It has become difficult even to evacuate the sick and wounded to the
hospitals located in the government-controlled areas.21
The government has designated “safe zones” for the trapped civilians to
cross over. But, the “safe zones” have not been really safe. While the GOSL wants
use these zones to filter out LTTE cadres from non-combatants, the Tigers wish
to infiltrate into government-controlled areas through “safe zones”. Fearing
further loss of territory and attrition, the Tigers do not like the civilians to move
from these “safe zones”. As a result, the sanctity of the “safe zones” is lost. The Sri
Lankan government is unwilling to allow aid agencies and media into the “safe
zones”, citing safety. In reality, however, the government thinks that the presence
of media personnel and aid agencies would hinder military push to capture the
remaining territory from the LTTE.22
Civilians who have crossed over into government-controlled areas remain
displaced, taking shelter in camps and welfare centres. Overall, about 600,000 are
displaced internally, including 235,000 in the past few months; over 30,000 have
fled to India as refugees during ‘Eelam War-IV’, braving arrest by either the Sri
Lankan Navy or the Indian Navy.23 The numbers are expected to increase further
as the forces advance.
Economically, the island is suffering from expensive short-term foreign

debt, declining foreign exchange reserves and a One cannot

high deficit. Present foreign exchange reserves discount the fact
of about $1.5 billion are enough only to finance that durable
two months of imports. Although the oil prices peace can bring a
are currently down, fluctuations may gobble up turnaround to the
the current reserves sooner. The ongoing global ailing economy.
economic crisis has added to the woes by hitting Agriculture and
key export sectors like tea and garments.24 The fisheries are
garment industry, especially, is in peril due to the promising sectors
threat of permanent suspension of lucrative trade in a peaceful
concession by the European Union (EU) if the Sri northeast.
Lankan government continues to ignore human
rights concerns. Called the “GSP+ scheme”, the concessions helped Sri Lanka
net a record $2.9 billion from EU markets in 2007, or 37.5 per cent of the total
export income.25 In addition, travel advisories from important countries like the
United States, Australia, Germany, Canada, Russia, Britain and New Zealand have
constrained tourist flows—tourism is one of Sri Lanka’s main sources of foreign
exchange. The eastern parts of the island, one of the best tourist attractions, have
not yet been made safe for visitors.
Foreign remittances, yet another major foreign exchange earner, have
helped to meet the balance of payments crisis. However, there are concerns that
these inflows would decline as there has been a sudden change in the economic
fortunes of oil-producing countries, where many of the Sri Lankan expatriate
workers are concentrated, with the decline in oil prices. This apart, in the global
context of economic recession, there is a significant fall in the foreign direct and
portfolio investments.26
Appreciably, inflation has come down, but is still a cause of concern to
the common man whose real income has not kept pace with inflation. Rural
areas, President Rajapakse’s main power base, have largely been shielded from
economic woes through populist budgets and development projects. However,
how long this can be sustained is the big question.27 The government is counting
on aid flows meant for post-war reconstruction to bail itself out of the crisis. But
too much reliance on post-dated cheques is economically unwise. At the same
time, one cannot discount the fact that durable peace can bring a turnaround to
the ailing economy. Agriculture and fisheries are promising sectors in a peaceful
northeast. In addition, Sri Lanka is emerging as one of the key backyards of the
services sector, especially business and knowledge outsourcing.

N Manoharan
Thorny Path to Peace...
APRC Report and Polls in the East

The Rajapakse government appointed the All Party Representative Committee
(APRC) in 2006 to “fashion creative options that satisfy minimum expectations
as well as provide a comprehensive approach to the resolution of the national
question”.28 The committee, in its interim report submitted in January 2008,
advised the president to implement the 13th Amendment to the Constitution.29
Even after 63 meetings of deliberations for over 18 months, the committee could
produce nothing “creative”. It just did what President Rajapakse wanted it to do
to demonstrate to the international community that there was “good progress”
on developing a devolution package.30 In reality, however, the problem with the
APRC is its unrepresentativeness. Important Opposition parties like the United
National Party (UNP), Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), Sri Lanka Muslim
Congress (SLMC) and Tamil National Alliance (TNA) are not part of the committee
deliberations. Thus, the principal objective of “generating a consensual political
document” on the ethnic issue is lost. Unless this shortcoming is overcome, all
efforts of the APRC would be in vain.
It is appreciable that President Rajapakse conducted elections firstly to
local councils in Batticaloa district in March and then to the now demerged
Eastern Province in May 2008. Contesting under the ruling United People’s
Freedom Alliance (UPFA) patronage, the militant group turned political party
TMVP returned 11 out of 19 members in the Batticaloa Municipal Council,
while the main opposition, the UNP, and the main Tamil party, Tamil National
Alliance (TNA) boycotted the polls.31 This laid the foundation for the conduct
of Provincial Council polls for the Eastern Province on 10 May 2008 to bring
forth a “new dawn in the East”.32 Except the pro-LTTE TNA, all Opposition
parties participated in the elections that took place after 20 years. This gave
more legitimacy to the polls in which the UPFA and TMVP combined won a
majority to form the Provincial Council government. Condemning the results
as “irreparably flawed”, the Opposition announced a mass agitation. Brushing
aside Opposition allegations, the government interpreted the results as a green
signal to its war against the LTTE in the north.33 However, the post-election
governance in the east under the 13th Amendment does not look promising.
Unfortunately, the Rajapakse regime is planning to emulate this model in the
north as well, which is not appreciable.

Truce Offer A truce, if not

The LTTE’s call for a ceasefire since February 2008 was a ceasefire,
not surprising since they have now been cornered in a can be
small geographical area of the Mullaithivu district. The considered
LTTE, therefore, required a breather in the form of a between
ceasefire. Through such an offer, the LTTE also wanted the two
to demonstrate to the international community antagonists on
that it was a “liberation group” and was ready for a humanitarian
negotiated settlement. As expected, the Sri Lankan and political
government rejected the offer and asked the LTTE grounds.
to “lay down arms and surrender unconditionally”.34
From Colombo’s viewpoint, its forces were on a winning spree and any ceasefire at
this juncture would be demoralising to them. Secondly, the GOSL thinks that the
Tigers are desperate and, therefore, requesting for a halt to the ongoing military
operations only to regroup. But the GOSL wishes to “finish them off” at one go.
Also, the Tigers do not have a good track record of abiding by ceasefires. Thirdly,
President Mahinda Rajapakse needs a convincing military victory over the LTTE
to face the parliamentary elections due next year. Riding on a military victory, he
might even advance the presidential elections to bid for a second term.
However, a truce, if not a ceasefire, can be considered between the two
antagonists on humanitarian and political grounds. If there is a genuine concern
for rescuing the civilians trapped in the cross-fire, a truce would facilitate their
safe cross-over to the “cleared” areas. This could, in fact, be made one of the
conditions of the truce. Such a shift in civilian base would deny the LTTE any
new recruits and a “human shield”. Will it then not be easy to tackle a segregated
LTTE? Hence, any truce at this juncture will not be militarily disadvantageous
to the GOSL – the first time ever in the history of the ethnic conflict. Thus
far, ceasefires between the two parties came either due to ‘hurting’ military
stalemates or to the advantage of the Tigers. As a result, the LTTE dictated terms
during the negotiations. Now, there is an opportunity for the GOSL to have an
upper hand over the LTTE on the political front as well. Such a gesture would be
seen positively not only by the international community, but also by the minority
Tamil community, which is apprehensive of an imposed solution in the aftermath
of military triumphalism.
A Role for India?

India’s consistent position on the island’s ethnic issue has been in favour of “a

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politically negotiated settlement acceptable to all sections of Sri Lankan society

within the framework of an undivided Sri Lanka and consistent with democracy,
pluralism and respect for human rights.”35 New Delhi has repeatedly conveyed
to the GOSL that peace through war is not a good option and is unsustainable
in the long run. India wants the GOSL “to put forward a credible devolution
package at the earliest”.36 In this regard, New Delhi “expressed readiness to share
our constitutional experience.” Ideally, India pushes for a “13th Amendment plus
plus formula” as a final solution and the implementation of the 13th Amendment
as an interim measure until a final solution is reached through the processes
of the APRC. At the same time, having realised the importance of a bipartisan
agreement between the two main Sinhala parties of Sri Lanka (the UNP and Sri
Lanka Freedom Party–SLFP), India has urged UNP leader Ranil Wickremesinghe
to work with President Rajapaksa in finding a consensus on the ethnic issue.37
Although India discouraged the GOSL from exercising the war option, it
did not restrain herself from providing non-lethal military supplies to Sri Lanka
and training of Sri Lankan security personnel. This is where India is caught
in a dilemma: to maintain good relations with Sri Lanka in all spheres, but, at
the same time, taking into consideration sentiments from Tamil Nadu and the
interests of Sri Lankan Tamils. The Tamil Nadu factor, however, has always come
as an intervening variable as and when New Delhi wants to upgrade its defence
relations with Sri Lanka.38 At the same time, Tamil sentiments in India have not
prevented India either in extending the ban on the LTTE or cracking down on the
Tigers’ supply lines from India.
Such Indian actions, however, are perceived by the LTTE as “biased against
the Tamil community”. It is for this reason that the Tigers do not favour a direct
role for India in resolving the ethnic issue. The LTTE argues that “until the
Indian central government approaches this [ethnic question] intellectually and
recognises that ours is a struggle for survival by an oppressed people in the land
of their birth, India cannot make any healthy, fruitful contribution.”39 In this, the
Tigers have partners in the Sinhala hardliner JVP, which sees any Indian role in Sri
Lanka as “hegemonistic”. It needs to be noted that the earlier Indian involvement
in Sri Lanka in 1987-90 was bitterly opposed through armed means by the same
actors.
Nevertheless, India should not get discouraged by the opposition. It is in
India’s interests that peace is established in Sri Lanka. However, it is important
to avoid a direct role—it should be through a consortium of the international
community. The consortium should comprise those international actors that

are capable of exercising leverage on both It is in India’s

antagonists to discourage hostilities and lead interests
them to the negotiating table. that peace is
established in Sri
Conclusions Lanka. However,
Sri Lanka has been witnessing unprecedented it is important
violence, resulting in numerous casualties, to avoid a direct
human suffering and economic loss. Despite role—it should
facing a severe military setback, the LTTE was be through a
obdurate in its resistance, ignoring Colombo’s consortium of
repeated calls for a surrender. For the militant the international
group, it was a “final war.” On its part, the GOSL community
pursued its “war for peace” progamme and went capable of
on to “tame the Tigers”. The ultimate victims of exercising
this war, however, are innocent civilians, who leverage on
are being trapped, killed, wounded, constantly both antagonists
displaced, starved, and suffering all kinds of to discourage
abuses. Both antagonists, disregarding the hostilities and
humanitarian dimension, have stuck to their lead them to the
‘maximalist’ position. negotiating table.
In the absence of the LTTE, the responsibility
of the international community comes to the fore to exercise maximum leverage
on the GOSL to deliver a meaningful devolution package to the minorities.
India can take a lead role in this. Any meaningful devolution should go beyond
the present 13th Amendment. It is true that for the Sinhala hardliners even the
13th Amendment is unacceptable. But, in reality, devolution under the 13th
Amendment is not only ‘too little and too late’, but also unsustainable in the long
run. Devolution of powers based on the federal model is durable and viable.
It is the only mid-way to accommodate plurality and end the cycle of violence
once for all. The fear of the majority Sinhalese that “federalism is the first step
towards separation” is exaggerated, that too in the current context when the pro-
separatist LTTE has been weakened.40
The international community should also make sure that the present
military victory over the LTTE should not result in triumphalism on the part of the
Sinhala-dominated regime over the Tamil minorities. A suitable reconciliation
method could be adopted to construct bridges among all the communities of
the island. This is where a good interim arrangement aimed at ameliorating

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the sufferings of the affected populace and, at the same time, that could build
confidence between the majority and the minority, is vital. Relief, rehabilitation,
resettlement and reconstruction require urgent attention. Else there is clear and
present danger of militancy regaining legitimacy and strength.
It is important that both interim and final arrangements are consensual to
all the parties; otherwise, it may not be sustainable. All Sinhalese parties and, at
the same time, non-LTTE parties and Muslims should be part and parcel of the
process. One of the main drawbacks of the earlier peace process was that it failed
to address the Muslim factor, which continues to be a ‘weak link’ in the entire
peace chain. The two main Sinhalese parties – the UNP and SLFP – should give
up their confrontational politics in the interests of the country. Bipartisanship on
the ethnic issue is a must for the settlement. This is yet another challenge which
requires more energy and maturity. One only hopes that plebiscitary politics
does not return to haunt the ethnic question.
Any peace process will not be credible as long as human rights abuses and
humanitarian crises continue. These issues require immediate and serious
attention. It will be difficult for the government to win over the Tamil population
as long as the security forces are the major cause of human rights abuses. For this,
the current regime has to shed its present authoritarian behaviour and switch to
the democratic mode. Shattered democratic institutions require rebuilding. Else,
Sri Lanka will continue to figure among the failed states.
Notes
1. Prime Minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi, while rejecting a Bangladesh type intervention in
Sri Lanka on behalf of the Tamils, said in the Indian Parliament “India stands for the
independence, unity and integrity of Sri Lanka…. However, because of the historical,
cultural and other such close ties between the peoples of the two countries, especially
between the Tamil community of Sri Lanka and us, India cannot remain unaffected
by the events there.” See A J Wilson, The Break-up of Sri Lanka: The Sinhalese-Tamil
Conflict (London: Christopher Hurst, 1988), p. 203.
2. The Indo-Sri Lankan Accord was signed by Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and
Sri Lankan President J. R. Jeyewardena on 29 July 1987 at Colombo. For the detailed
discussion on the provisions of the Accord, see S D Muni, Pangs of Proximity: India
and Sri Lanka’s Ethnic Crisis (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1993); V Suryanarayan
(ed.), Sri Lankan Crisis and India’s Response (New Delhi: Patriot Publishers, 1991); N
Seevaratnam (ed.), The Tamil National Question and the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord (Delhi:
Konark Publishers, 1989).

3. Ranasinghe Premadasa, who was prime minister and took out an anti-Accord
procession when the Accord was signed, carried on his stand when he became
president in 1988 and asked the IPKF to vacate the Island.
4. B Muralidhar Reddy, “Ceasefire with LTTE Invalid, says Sri Lanka Government,” The
Hindu, 3 January 2008.
5. “JVP and JHU Sign Agreements with Premier,” Daily News, 8 September 2005.
6. For more details of military operations from a government perspective, see “Situation
Report” at http://www.defence.lk
7. During the colonial period when road transport was uncommon, elephants were
used to carry goods to Jaffna peninsula from the mainland across the shallow salty
waters of the isthmus, giving it the name “Elephant Pass”. The Elephant Pass area is
also one of the largest slatterns of Sri Lanka producing thousands of metric tonnes of
salt annually. Realising the strategic importance of the Pass, successive colonial rulers
maintained a garrison in this area. A military base in the modern sense, but in a small
way, popped-up only in the 1950s, mainly to check smuggling and illegal immigration
from India. However, when armed militancy came to the fore since the early 1980s, the
Elephant Pass acted as a transition base for troop movement into the volatile Jaffna
peninsula from the mainland. Since then, it has become the military epicentre of the
ethnic conflict and the ‘mother of all battles’ of the island were fought in this area. As a
result, over a period of time, it became heavily fortified with concrete bunkers capable
of withstanding aerial bombings and artillery shelling.
8. “LTTE’s Days Numbered – Fonseka,” The Hindu, 1 July 2008.
9. “India-Sri Lanka Naval Cooperation ‘Extremely Successful’,” Colombo Post, 15 January
2008.
10. DBS Jeyaraj, “Deep Penetration Squads Notch Up Success Against the LTTE,” http://
transcurrents.com/tamiliana/archives/489
11. “Pakistan, China Role Limits Indian Influence in Sri Lanka,” Daily Times, 30 January
2009.
12. With the last remaining aircraft, the LTTE launched a 9/11 type of aerial attack on
a highrise building in capital Colombo on 22 February 2009. Presently, there is no
evidence of LTTE possessing aircraft.
13. Eastern Sri Lanka had always remained one of the largest recruiting grounds for the
LTTE, especially after Jaffna came under government control in 1995.
14. “Sri Lanka Reimposes ban on the LTTE,” The Hindu, 8 January 2009.
15. “Maoists Approaching LTTE, ULFA for Arms Procurement,” Indian Express, 9
September 2008.
16. For full text of the speech, see http://www.sangam.org/2008/11/Prabakaran_2008.

N Manoharan
php?uid=3169
17. “Protests in Tamil Nadu even as DMK Slams LTTE, India,” The Times of India, 30
January 2009.
18. “India Breaks Another LTTE Smuggling Ring,” Hindustan Times, 5 April 2009.
19. “Politics of Tamil Eelam in TN - II,” News Today, 10 September 2008.
20. “Army Ordered to Stop Using Heavy Weapons – Govt.,” Daily Mirror, 27 April 2009.
21. “Clock Ticking’ for Sri Lanka’s Civilians, Warns UN Humanitarian Chief,” UN News
Centre, 8 April 2009.
22. “Trading Danger for Captivity,” The Economist, 5 March 2009.
23. “More Lankan Refugees Arrive in Tamil Nadu,” Daily Mirror, 22 April 2008.
24. “Economic Gloom the Stimulus Package Failed to Brighten,” The Sunday Leader, 4
January 2009,
25. “Stripping Garments of GSP Plus,” The Sunday Times, 31 August 2008.
26. K R Pushparajan, “How the Global Economic Crisis Affects Sri Lanka,” Mawbima
Lanka News, 28 March 2009.
27. “Lanka’s Inflation will Slide Below 18% after 2010 – ADB Country Director,” Sunday
Observer, 21 September 2008.
28. President Rajapakse’s address to the first joint meeting of all Party Representative
Committee and Panel of Experts, 11 July 2006. For full text of the address, see http://
www.priu.gov.lk/news_update/Current_Affairs/ca200607/20060711all_party_
conference.htm
29. The 13th Amendment outlined devolution to the provinces in the aftermath of the
Indo-Sri Lankan Accord of 1987.
30. Kumar David, “APRC Report is a Sham,” Island, 3 February 2008.
31. “Who Really were the Victors of the East?” Daily Mirror, 13 March 2008.
32. Address by President Mahinda Rajapaksa at the “Neganahira Navodaya” – New Dawn
in the East – celebration, Colombo, 19 July 2007. For full text of the address, see http://
www.priu.gov.lk/news_update/Current_Affairs/ca200707/20070719terror_cannot_
liberate_tamil_people.htm
33. In this regard, President Rajapakse said, “I note that the people of the east have
given a clear mandate for peace through the defeat of terrorism, the strengthening
of democracy and the development of the country.” “Eastern Victory Shows People’s
Endorsement of Govt’s Policy – President,” The Island, 12 May 2008.
34. “President Call LTTE to Surrender,” www.new.lk (official government news portal of
Sri Lanka), 2 February 2009.
35. For India’s official position, see “Sri Lanka – A Fact Sheet,” available at http://meaindia.
nic.in/foreignrelation/srilanka.pdf

36. John Cherian, “Unease in Delhi,” Frontline, Vol. 25, Issue 2, 19 Jan – 1 Feb 2008.
37. Ranil Wickremasinghe, “Peace in Sri Lanka – Putting the Pieces Together,” The Hindu,
4 December 2006.
38. S D Muni, “India’s Tamil Politics and Sri Lankan Ethnic Conflict,” ISAS Issue Brief, No.
86, 6 November 2008.
39. Interview by K V Balakumaran, senior leader of the LTTE to Cheithi Alaigal, an
Australian Tamil Radio, 11 June 2008.
40. Interestingly, the federal idea firstly came from the Sinhalese when they made
representations before the Donoughmore Commission in the late 1920s to make the
entire Sri Lanka into three units – northeast, Kandyan and coastal. The idea, however,
was discarded.
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Morals and Ethics in
the Armed Forces:
A De Novo Look
Samarth Nagar
What the bad man cannot be is a good soldier, sailor or airman.

— Gen John W Hackett
Introduction
Change seems constant in society at large and it would be hypocritical not to
recognise the armed forces as a microcosm of society. Lately, we have been awash
in numerous military scandals. Sad tales abound of armed forces in an existential
identity crisis, financial mismanagement, fake encounters, accusations of sexual
harassment, espionage and involvement in terrorist activities. While a series
of isolated incidents may seem unrelated on the surface, they may also reflect
deeper institutional shortcomings regarding ethical matters and underlying
cultural attitudes regarding duty and accountability.
The aim of this paper is to identify and analyse the real and imaginary
moral erosion in the armed forces. One clearly cannot purport to glibly prescribe
a vague general ethic for the armed forces. Yet the need for overall moral and
ethical standards and adherence to institutional values is glaringly obvious.
Higher Moral and Ethical Standards in the Armed Forces

Morally serious and thoughtful members of the armed forces feel a deep tension
over the perceived moral erosion in their profession. On the one hand, there are
few places in our society where the concepts of duty and ‘service before self’ have
such currency. High and noble ideals have a place in the armed forces that they
Colonel Samarth Nagar is commanding an Armoured Regiment in the Western Theatre.

Morals and Ethics in the Armed Forces: A De Novo Look
have in few other spheres of modern Indian life. For Upholding

many years now, survey data have shown that the ethics in the
average Indian respects and trusts the armed forces armed forces
more than any other group in society. Military service is an absolute
embodies some of the deepest values of human life requirement
in our society, and it produces character that inspires if we are to
admiration and respect. This respect ebbs and flows a retain the
bit, of course, when scandals and conspicuous moral sacred trust of
failures such as a Tehelka, Siachen fake encounter the society and
and sexual harassment of a colleague tarnish the the nobility of
image of the armed forces. Upholding ethics in the the profession
armed forces is an absolute requirement if we are to of arms.
retain the sacred trust of the society and the nobility
of the profession of arms.
For the ancient Greek’s, the word ethics meant character. For Aristotle, the
study of ethics was the study of excellence or the virtues of character. It has come
to mean the study and practice of the good life; the kind of life people ought
to live. In our time, the concept of ethics has broadened to include not only
the characteristics of the good human being, but also the best practices or ethos
in various professions, among them the armed forces. Military ethos embodies
the spirit that binds the profession together. Ultimately, it is the ethos which
incorporates fundamental Indian values and distinguishes a member of the
Indian armed forces from ill disciplined irregulars, mercenaries or members of
another armed force that lacks the defining core values.
Armed forces need under-girding core values in order to function effectively.
I will restrict myself to the discussion of those values which are brought by
individuals, who must unequivocally espouse them. These are character (moral
and ethical consistency), service before self (resisting the urge of personal
gain or pleasure at the expense of the organisational value system), integrity
(consistency and clear definition of individual and organisational competencies)
and excellence (continual pursuit of the highest standards).
Military values and moral values for military members can well be identical
to societal values. Certain values and virtues are held to be important in both our
civilian society and the military profession. Some values receive more attention
and emphasis in civilian society (for example, personal freedoms) and some in
the armed forces (for example, obedience, loyalty, courage). Questionable moral
practices, no matter how widespread they become, should not become part

Samarth Nagar
of military practice just because they are widespread. What we do can only be
morally correct when it confirms to what we know is morally right.
The changes in society are a matter of culture increasingly defined in
terms of consumerism, globalisation and, often, politics. Although there are
disagreements over the implications of the changes, I think there is widespread
agreement that over the last several decades, Indian society has become more
fragmented, more individualistic and arguably less disciplined. These changes
put it at odds with the classic military values of loyalty, self-discipline, sacrifice
and placing the interest of the group over those of the individual. It would be
unwise to assume that the members of the armed forces are immune to the
societal changes. It has been argued that the armed forces must adhere to the
societal standards and ‘move with the times’, but in doing so, is it necessary to
permit erosion of ethical standards because the character of a society changes?
Or does the military virtue stand alone, apart from societal mores, which threaten
the erosion of military standards.
There is a popular disposition to regard ethics and morals as absolute and
enduring, yet they are neither. That which is considered ethical alters with time
in ways between societies, civilisations and even families. The specific content
of society’s ethics is generally determined by accumulative tradition, epochal
convenience and local habit. A question often asked is as to why a society that
tends to condone dishonest and unfaithful practices among its civilian members
demands honesty and commitment in its armed forces. The professional function
of the armed forces is to defend society by being able to fight and win wars. To
do so, the armed forces must have members who are committed to principles
‘outside of themselves’. Military personnel must be willing to risk their own
welfare for the good of others. Military leaders must be so trustworthy and inspire
such confidence in their judgement that their subordinates are willing to follow
their orders even at the risk of death. Certain character traits such as honesty,
selflessness and commitment — traits that inspire such trust and confidence—
must be present in military personnel if the military is to effectively serve the
society. The values gap, the gap in moral standards of conduct between civilians
and armed forces, in a society, is created by a functional demand for these traits
in the military. Still, it does seem that society holds the armed forces to a higher
standard. Armed forces personnel, unlike other professionals, are required to
adhere to their profession driven higher moral standards even in their personal
lives.

Traditional Structures (Society- The concept

Military Relationship) of unlimited
The belief that in some sense armed forces liability in
personnel are bound by a higher moral defence of
standard is equally prevalent in the armed national interests
forces. Even though there are occasional and distinguishes
perhaps inevitable moral failures, there are members of
also numerous internally promulgated codes the military
and moral espousals that enunciate such a profession from
belief. Commanders exhort their troops to other professions,
moral goodness and chastise them when they in that soldiers
fall short. I will now critically examine some may lose their
elements of the Indian armed forces tradition, lives in order to
history, culture and ethics as a background to achieve national
subsequently exploring the moral slide; and military
l Separateness : Common to most military objectives.
organisations is the notion of being different
from the rest of society. The Indian armed forces are no different in feeling
a consequent separateness from society. The notion of separateness flows
from the distinctive mandate of the armed forces to maintain the security,
and defend the sovereignty, of India, if necessary by means of force. Moreover,
the service to be performed by the armed forces is total, involving what has
been called “the clause of unlimited liability — or loss of life”. The concept
of unlimited liability in defence of national interests distinguishes members
of the military profession from other professions, in that soldiers may lose
their lives in order to achieve national and military objectives. The stark
and brutal reality of these differences from normal society has traditionally
been a distinguishing feature of military life, contributing to a sense of
separateness — even superiority — in relation to the civilian population.
l Distinctive Culture : As a result of the distinctive mandate and need to instill

organisational loyalty and obedience, the armed forces have developed
a culture unto themselves, distinguished by, and with emphasis on, the
hierarchy, traditions, customs and distinctive dress and insignias. The
separation between civilian and military society in India, as in some other
countries, is also maintained by physical and social space as in the case of
our cantonments and military stations.

Samarth Nagar
l Regimental System : The regimental system forms a strong subculture

within the armed forces (though to a lesser degree in the navy and air force)
and is a pervasive and common bond within which the personnel live their
daily lives. It is often referred to as a family and its essence is tribal and
corporate rather than bureaucratic. A vertical chain of command within
this culture ensures that discipline is maintained and that information
flows freely through the system. As a flipside, this tribal nature of armed
forces culture may lead to a sense of exclusiveness and apparent tendency
to justify disrespect for authority outside the group (as in assault and affray
with civilians) and at the worst, deliberate hiding of information of moral
wrongdoing that could tarnish the reputation of the organisation.
l Ethics in the Armed Forces : There are three elements to military ethics.
There is the military ethos, which is the general statement of the spirit of
the profession. There is the military ethics, which is usually used as a title
of the various components or facets of military ethos such as obedience,
loyalty, integrity, and so on. Finally, there could be a code of military ethics,
which contains obligatory statements of duty and responsibility. Training
and ethics in morals forms one component of education received by all
ranks in the armed forces. However, formal ethics education is evidently
uneven between the commissioned officers and personnel below officer
rank. Traditionally, the Indian armed forces have relied on unwritten codes
of moral conduct for their members in the belief that the internal checks
and balances in the system would take care of all misdemeanours, from
bouncing cheques to the grave moral wrongdoing of larger dimensions.
The more stressful the situation, the more likely the fundamental character
will show through. It is for this reason that in a profession demanding unlimited
liability from its members, higher moral and ethical standards are a must.
Character is indivisible.
What Ails Us : Societal and Organisational Realities

Having established the strong basis for the perception that the armed forces are
different as far as moral and ethical issues are concerned, it would be prudent to
analyse contemporary societal and organisational realities, and in so doing, the
implicit causes for the moral erosion that leads to gross moral misdemeanours
like the sight of a senior army officer seeking financial gratification in the Tehelka
videos or the chain of command in an infantry battalion being vulnerable to

staging fake encounters, thus, displaying the Traditionally,

lowest of moral standards at the highest battlefield the Indian
in the world. armed forces
l The Pleasure Seeking Culture : There is good have relied
reason to believe that when our country on unwritten
gained independence, the leaders of the codes of moral
community hoped to establish and sustain a conduct for their
virtue seeking culture. They were concerned members in the
about the character of individuals and about belief that the
the way in which culture and government internal checks
could shape the citizens for the better. The and balances in
virtue seeking culture — to the extent that the system would
it existed, it never really took deep root — take care of all
was to a great extent in convergence with misdemeanours.
the ethics and virtues that define the armed
forces. However, the fragile virtue seeking culture in Indian society has
progressively (if one could use the word) moved to being a status seeking
then a wealth seeking and, today, a pleasure seeking culture. Up to a point, the
tensions between the military subculture and the status and wealth seeking
culture were manageable because many of the virtues celebrated in both
were similar. A business organisation might pursue wealth and a military
unit, victory but both cherish discipline, loyalty, honesty, excellence, and
so forth. With obvious exceptions, both encourage teamwork, self-sacrifice
and perseverance as rules for success and both cultures could achieve
considerable agreement on values and conduct that are bad and ought to
be discouraged. On the other hand, a pleasure seeking culture can offer no
similar point of intersection with military culture. A pleasure seeking culture
that promotes the idea of freedom from constraints to pursuing one’s chosen
pleasures can neither commend a set of values and virtues nor condemn
vices. A professional military force cannot exist without subordinating
personal freedoms and aspirations. The cultural problem facing the armed
forces is not how to catch up with the progress of society, but how to maintain
the sound elements of their culture and tradition, their integrity in the face
of deterioration of the national culture. After all, as I have stated earlier,
the armed forces are a microcosm of society and some of its members do
succumb to the pursuit of immoral gains.
l Careerism or Career Fear: Careerism or career fear, as it is often termed,

Samarth Nagar
can eat away at the core values that are at the heart of the armed forces’,
ethical culture and we can ignore it only at our own peril. Careerism is a
pandemic reality among officers of the armed forces. It could be that this is
due to initial perceptions of career opportunities in the armed forces being
too optimistic or the perception that evaluation criteria for promotions
are too subjective. Neither honour, integrity nor courage are fostered in an
atmosphere where a subordinate is reluctant to speak honestly for fear of
displeasing a superior. In such an atmosphere, ‘going along to get along’
often becomes the operating procedure and core values take a beating.
When a single less than optimal outcome can end a career, caution, self-
interest and a strong aversion to take responsibility often replace initiative,
courage and selflessness. This promotes the aberration of individualism and
immoral behaviour to ‘beat the system’ as have come to the fore in the recent
past.
Count thee not on certain promotion but rather to gain it, aspire though the
sight line aims true on the target, there cometh, perchance a misfire.
— Captain Ronald Hapwood, US Navy
l Military Efficiency and Moral Benchmarks: We often hear of good units,
good officers and successful operational conduct and then are faced with
distressing truths about the same individuals and organisations having
violated the norms of good conduct and military discipline to the detriment
of the overall reputation and standing of the armed forces in the society.
One of the possible causes of the presence of such ‘fly by night operators’ in
armed forces could be the absence of any moral benchmark in the military
appraisal system, which rarely questions as to how success has been achieved
as long as nothing abnormal has been brought to the fore till an action or
event is termed a success. In many ways, members of the armed forces are
encouraged by these instances to be more interested in self-gratification
while the good people who are prepared to make the personal sacrifice, go
largely unnoticed.
l Service Conditions, Morale and Societal References: It would be
presumptuous to discuss service conditions in the armed forces,
considering the readership this paper is addressing. Nevertheless, the
issue does merit attention as morale and morality are undeniably linked.
I would even go to the extent of saying that both require each other
to sustain. The pleasure seeking society, busy in the pursuit of its own

pleasures, often denies the recognition that Modern

was awarded to the professional soldier in communications,
the past in the virtue, status and even wealth technological
seeking societies. As a result, at times, under needs of the
sub-optimal leadership in the prevalent armed forces and
service conditions, there is a breakdown of increasing desire
military morale that sustains military ethics. of contemporary
At such times, the armed forces personnel society to
succumb or may succumb to quick gains, know what its
often immoral and counter to the values institutions are
that define the organisation. doing entail
l Perceptions, Media and Legal System: The that the armed
armed forces often feel that they are under forces take up
siege by the civilian culture, which does not the challenge
share the same values. The ever increasing of evolving the
reach of the media, coupled with a large association with
number of armed forces personnel, of society to a new
all ranks, approaching the civilian legal level.
apparatus, seeking relief for the wrongs
done unto them have sometimes contributed to demonising the image
of the armed forces. To be fair to the media and the legal system, they
have a tough job to do in a democracy. However, it becomes a problem
area if the media shows a mercenary willingness to exploit any scandal or
misperception to sell copies, or when the contemporary society, through
the civilian system, gives vent to anxiety about the armed forces’ ability
and readiness to address moral and ethical issues. This has a domino
affect, leading to situations wherein some military professionals succumb
to the temptation of using the media or the civilian system to further their
own cause, instances of which are known to all of us in the environment.
If left unchecked, their dimension of immorality is as much a threat to
our core values as the issues discussed earlier.
Arresting the Fall : Recommendations

There is a growing perception that the armed forces have lost their moral compass.
Though there is a sense within the armed forces that there is an element of truth in
the charges, we lack institutional responses to address the fall. The armed forces
can weather the scrutiny but we cannot and must not remain unresponsive to

Samarth Nagar
the current state as to how military personnel incorporate and reflect the moral
and ethical values in consistently ‘doing the right thing’. Some recommendations
that will contribute to creating an institutional response to the developing moral
crisis are discussed below:
l Evolving from Separatism to Fusionism: The traditional view that the
armed forces need a cocoon in which they can safely generate their own
way of life can no longer be the basis for the military-society relationship.
Modern communications, technological needs of the armed forces and
increasing desire of contemporary society to know what its institutions are
doing entail that the armed forces take up the challenge of evolving the
association with the society to a new level. This is not to suggest that all
barriers between the society and the armed forces be removed to the point
of identicalism. Rather, a suggested relationship would be that of fusionism,
which implies that while armed forces maintain their own ethical ideals
and traditions, and retain a certain degree of desired separation from
the society, stronger institutional connections are fostered between the
military and the society. These connections will represent points of fusion,
which are conversational in nature. Fusionism favours letting the society
as a whole know more about the activities of the armed forces so that the
excuse of ‘military secrecy’ is not used to hide errors and corruption. A
beginning has already been made in this regard with the media gaining
access to proceedings in the Siachen fake encounters case. The evolution
from separatism to fusionism, however, requires greater deliberation and
an institutional approach so as to minimise the ills and maximise the
benefits.
l Comprehensive Dialogue: I suggest that we need to encourage the
widest possible dialogue about the challenges to leadership, morals
and ethics. This means dialogue with people within and outside of the
armed forces, new ideas to encourage and support civilian-military
collaboration wherever and whenever possible. The National Defence
University, if and when created, can be one pillar of a national dialogue
between the military and society (exchange programmes, education,
research, etc). Isolationist tendencies and simplistic assumptions about
the social effect on the armed forces can lead to an internal focus and a
lost mentality.
l Benchmarking Leadership to Morality and Morale : Too often, the
military appraisal system contributes to careerism and career fear by

disregarding morality and ethics against Consistent and

perceived morale and success. This needs non-subjective
to be curtailed and achievement of success performance
within the moral framework should be appraisal and
encouraged. On the other hand, punitive legal systems
action against immoral behaviour needs to within our
be strict and consistent. armed forces
l Moral Education and Character will ensure
Development: The present status of teaching that the armed
of ethics and morals disregards the imparting forces can lay to
of these values to personnel below officer rest the societal
rank, relying heavily on the regimental anxiety about
system for the same. Though a beginning has organisational
been made with institutions like the Junior readiness in
Leader Academy, it needs to be understood capabilities.
that ethical standards need to be explained
to all in armed forces in an evolving society. The regimental culture can
only be relied upon to develop the same once the individual has joined
service.
l Service Conditions : The military personnel demand of their leaders the
moral obligation to project their case to get them the recognition, and,
no doubt, the remuneration, they deserve. A discussion on the need to
constantly update service conditions is beyond the scope of this paper but
optimal service conditions are equally important to preventing the individual
from succumbing to the temptations of immoral gains.
l Perception Management : From the perception of every citizen, it is
not only important what the armed forces do but also how they do it. In
other words, the profession must meet public expectations of consistent
and exemplary behaviour. The armed forces believe that we are able to
police our ranks, in a moral sense, through the subculture’s standards
and a self- applied specialised legal code. Consistent and non-subjective
performance appraisal and legal systems within our armed forces will
ensure that the armed forces can lay to rest the societal anxiety about
organisational readiness in capabilities. A continual and open dialogue
with the media and aiding the media in formulating an ethical framework
to operate in matters related to national security will also help ameliorate
the situation.

Samarth Nagar
Conclusion
Character is like a river. The longer it remains in a particular channel, the deeper
it cuts and the less likely that it will leave the channel. Rivers that frequently
leave their banks to explore other routes, pick up enormous amounts of mud
and silt, clog their original channels and sometimes wind up permanently in
other channels. People may occasionally slip out of their channels, but most
will remain true to their character indefinitely. Although some individuals can
follow contrary ethical guidance (in professional and private life), most cannot.
Character usually shines through regardless of the situation. In a profession,
which demands “unlimited liability — loss of life” from its members and
frequently exposes them to intense stressful situations, higher moral and ethical
standards are the foundation of trust, teamwork and selfless service. Indivisible
character is the key to both personal and military success.
In their interactions with contemporary society, military professionals
are likely to find themselves in situations which pressure them to lower their
standards. The armed forces have to take the necessary preemptive and
corrective action by injecting moral energy into the system to arrest the real and
perceived moral erosion, for the greater good of the organisation and the society.
The soldier ever more often has been a teacher rather than an erring student of
moral questions. The highest service of the armed forces to the Indian state may
well lie in the moral sphere.

Defence Research and
Development: Global Trends
and Indian Perspective
Pankaj Jha
Profound changes in the international security environment were witnessed

in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The Gulf War, the disintegration of the former
Soviet Union and the restructuring of Eastern Europe forced a reexamination
of defence policies, weapons procurement strategies and also the reframing
of research and development agendas around the world.1 For over forty years
after World War II, the security perceptions of Western industrialised states were
defined in terms of the bipolar East-West conflict, the Cold War. It was a system
predicated upon a clearly identifiable adversary in the form of the Soviet Union,
necessitating high and predictably incremental levels of expenditure on defence
equipment and manpower.2 This led to enhanced investments in pursuance of
excellence in the field of science and technology, as well as intensified research
in the defence sector. The words ‘science’ and ‘technology’ are usually combined
into a single term in any discussion on global defence research, but there is an
elementary difference between the two words.
This difference is by no means obvious, especially in many of the high
technology areas which characterise much of the modern military research and
development (R&D). Science and technology are such interrelated disciplines,
involving such similar practices that they can be used as a single term, as
exemplified in Latour’s coinage “technoscience”.3 The two can be distinguished
by simply defining technology as the “appliance of science”. For example,
John Garnett states: “The genesis of a weapon system… begins with a piece of
theoretical science”.4 In the changed world situation, with the compulsion to
Dr Pankaj Jha is Associate Fellow, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.

Pankaj Jha
Collaborative reduce defence budgets, a number of questions arise

weapons over a product’s economic performance, as also a
development number of key questions concerning defence science
offers a and technology:
mechanism nWhat influence does the specifically military origins
for pooling of funding have on the content of technological
defence development?
research, nDo high levels of defence R&D represent a wasteful
development use of resources, or do defence technologies generate
and useful spin-offs?
production nWhat is the potential for conversion of defence
resources. industries and what role should governments play in
this process?
nWith declining defence budgets, incentives may be created to seek cheaper
military equipment and components from overseas sources. Under these
circumstances, how will the country’s economy be affected if aspects of
advanced R&D cease to be conducted indigenously?5
Collaborative weapons development offers a mechanism for pooling defence

research, development and production resources. What role is collaboration
likely to play in the post-Cold War defence procurement process?6 The purported
military benefits of defence R&D include the maintenance of a domestic strategic
capability to ensure independence and security of supply, together with the
ability to develop equipment to meet the requirements of the armed forces. In the
technology sphere, it is claimed that defence R&D ensures that a nation remains
at the frontiers of technology, enabling it to achieve a comparative advantage over
its rivals. There are other economic benefits, such as that defence R& D generates
jobs, contributes to the balance of payments and provides a valuable source of
new ideas and technology, which can be applied to civic uses. But achieving these
benefits has certain costs. Defence R&D in most countries like the UK and the US
has been criticised for their failure to achieve more spin-offs for the civil sector. The
need is to have parallel lines of knowledge cultivation for meeting future defence
requirements of the country. The thumb rule for starting any objective defence R&
D is defence planning and charting out the requirements for the future.
Projections for Future

Defence planners also have to make assumptions about the future and about

Defence Research and Development: Global Trends and Indian Perspective
the likely developments in both technology Being self-reliant

and arms control agreements. Judgements in defence
are also required on a society’s future technology is
willingness to spend more on defence rather no longer an
than on, say, social welfare and on the future option for many
ability to pay for defence as reflected in the countries, owing
economy’s growth rate and its international to the escalating
competitiveness. Defence cuts will have an costs of the
impact on the size, structure, composition and developing new
performance of defence industries. Reduced weapon systems.
spending on equipment will mean fewer new
projects, shorter production runs for projects, more international collaboration
and probably a greater willingness to buy from abroad, all of which will have their
implications on defence R&D. The result would be smaller defence industries,
with likely changes in their composition reflecting modified demands for air,
land and sea equipment.
The compulsion for a decrease in the defence expenditure also raises two
central issues for defence science and technology. Planners are confronted with
the task of identifying potential conflict scenarios and formulating appropriate
defence science and technology policy responses to meet future equipment
requirements. Not only is the assessment of these requirements problematic,
but there are other complicating factors. Under new budgetary regimes, Defence
Ministries and armed forces face an increasingly difficult range of choices, such as:
manpower versus equipment; quantity versus the quality of equipment; nuclear
versus conventional forces: and, army versus naval versus air forces. Furthermore,
being self-reliant in defence technology is no longer an option for many countries,
owing to the escalating costs of the developing new weapon systems. Consequently,
the issue that arises is the implications of technological dependence on overseas
suppliers if the country seeks to offset defence cuts by opting for defence imports.
Then arrives the need to assess the opportunities and costs associated with both
international collaboration in the development and production of future defence
systems, as also the role defence science and technology will play in regional
confidence building, or even entering into R& D alliances.
In fact, the 1990/91 Gulf War was a landmark in the history of wars because
of the extensive use of the state-of-the-art ‘intelligent’ weapon systems, which
gave the winning side a technological superiority and operational advantage. The
immediate lesson for all those participating, as well as observers of the conflict,

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Shrinking of the was clear: the ‘emerging’ or smart weapons

defence budgets technologies about which many had been writing
in most Western and speculating over the previous decade had not
countries has merely arrived, but with adequate logistic support,
reinforced preparation time and intelligence, they had also
the need to demonstrated that they could perform, and
commercialise perform effectively, against designated targets.7
defence
technologies, Role of Defence R&D
and has Defence R&D is a mission-oriented activity
increased comprising basic and applied research for the
the value of development, testing and experimental production
defence R&D of new weapons and weapon systems. The term
expenditures. also covers improvement and modernisation of
existing weapons.8 In the prevalent ‘quality or
quantity’ dilemma, it is R&D that improves the quality of armed forces’ systems.
Nowadays, advanced technologies, coupled with highly trained personnel,
are perceived as the sine qua non of the military. While successfully deployed
technologies have transformed modern armed forces, and changed the ways in
which wars are fought and conflicts solved, their development is a lengthy, risky
and expensive process. Some major weapon systems may take 10 to 20 years and
billions of dollars.9
Several notable trends characterise defence R&D at the beginning of the
21 century. The first is that the revolution in military affairs (RMA) has evolved
st
into “network-centric warfare” (NCW), as exemplified in the Iraq War. The use
of integrative technologies allows armed forces to fight more effectively and
flexibly, deploy smaller numbers of soldiers, thus, minimising casualties. The
USA has placed NCW and integrative technologies at the centre of its military
transformation plan and its allies have found it necessary to implement
changes in its force structure, so as to maintain military interoperability.
Second, the US war on terrorism post-September 11, 2001 attack has brought
into its ambit engagement in military campaigns worldwide, requiring super
efficient intelligence gathering and a new set of weapon systems suitable for
confronting urban, guerrilla-type warfare of the terrorists. In a parallel move,
increased investments are being made in developing and deploying defence
measures that prevent terror attacks and reduce their damage, thus, fortifying
the security of citizens. Third, the strategic change due to the evolution of RMA

into NCW and the ensuing increase in US defence R&D spending have widened
the chasm between the technological capabilities of the USA and the rest of the
world, forcing them to reconsider their defence strategies. Finally, shrinking
of the defence budgets in most Western countries has reinforced the need to
commercialise defence technologies, and has increased the value of defence
R&D expenditures.
Defence R&D: Global Trends

Defence R&D comprises valuable sources of information for assessing a nation’s
military technological capability and its commitment to a national defence
industrial base. It increases a nation’s military capability, thus, enhancing its
national security through improving technology rather than increasing the
quantity of arms. Such R&D might also contribute to a technological arms race
and add to the rising costs of defence equipment, increasing the pressure for
greater defence spending. Furthermore, such R&D creates uncertainty for arms
limitation agreements and leads concerned groups of scientists and engineers
to resist cuts in defence spending. International comparisons require a standard
definition of defence R&D. This is based on the Frascati definition, on which
the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) nations
reached an agreement in 1963, but later revised into basic research, applied
research and experimental development. Frascati defined R&D in terms of an
“appreciable element of novelty”. Such definition provides opportunities for
discretion by both national Defence Ministries and defence industries when
reporting their defence data.10 Apart from this, there is another problem in
coming up with a precise definition because the increasing use of civil technology
in military equipment has blurred the distinction between military and non-
military R&D, begging the question as to whether such civil R&D should be
included in defence R&D and, if so, in what manner.11
The published data on government R&D do not include any non-government
funds (e.g. privately funded defence R&D), nor do they allow for firms that charge
for their R&D in product pricing (i.e. where prices of the product include the
‘mark-up’ for recovering privately funded R&D). It needs to be kept in mind that,
in analysing data, defence R&D can vary substantially from year to year (e.g.
reflecting peaks and troughs in procurement programmes), that long, slow years
of work are involved and successfully completing R&D programmes sometimes
takes even up to 10 years or more for developing the targeted defence equipment.
Moreover, an industry’s performance in defence R&D will reflect a variety of

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factors such as: the efficiency of the national procurement agency; defence
budget problems; whether the programme is a collaborative venture; and, the
efficiency of the industry concerned. Performance in defence R&D should also
be viewed as the result of a stock of knowledge and not on the basis of one year’s
annual flow of knowledge. Finally, of all the military areas, defence R&D is subject
to major security/secrecy problems. Most of the Western countries have covert
research programmes.12
As per Table 1, it is clear that the level of R&D expenditure in non-military
area is far greater than that in the military area. The statistics with regard to
countries like Germany, Italy, Japan, and South Korea show that they are investing
more in the civil sector. This comes in the wake of the fact that the differentiation
between the civil and military technology is getting narrower and the dividends
with regard to civilian technologies are more pronounced. On the other hand,
countries like Israel, Russia, and the USA and to a certain extent France and the
UK are investing a sizeable percentage on defence research, mainly because of
their strong defence industrial base and the demand for their products in the
world market. This shows that the defence conversion strategies are being put
in place because of lesser threat perceptions, as also because it means greater
economy in research spending.
Table1: R&D Expenditure: Global Trends
Countries/Organisations Total R&D Expenditure in Military R&D Expendi-

US $ billion ture in US $ billion
France 39.7 3.5
Germany 58.7 1.0
Italy 17.7 0.4
Japan 112.7 1.0
Korea 24.3 0.8
UK 33.7 3.4
USA 312.5 54.1
EU-25 211.3 11.2
Total OECD 686.7 69.7
China 102.6 5.0
Russia 16.5 4.0
Israel 5.0 1.5
Other Non-OECD 40.0 4
World 850 85.0
Source: OECD, Main Science and Technology Indicators, 2005, Paris; Israel: European
Commission, Key Indicators 2003-2004, Brussels 2005 at http://cordis.europa.eu/

indicators/publications.htm:, Military Expenditures: The number

SIPRI Yearbook 2006. Some selective data is taken of nations and
from Michael Brozoska’s paper presented at an partner firms
international seminar on “Defence Finance and involved in
Economics,” November 13-15, 2006, New Delhi. cooperation
projects has
While most of the countries in the post- a negative
Cold War phase tried to shift to mission oriented influence on
R&D, a sizeable number of them have resorted the efficiency of
to contracting with private firms and non-profit collaboration.
organisations (such as universities) to carry
out research. The government simply specifies its interest in certain types of
technological innovations to private firms and asks them to sponsor the necessary
R&D, the costs of which the sponsor will recover by selling the product.
In a collaborative venture, the R&D costs are shared by the participating
countries and firms. This leads to reduction in the fixed costs, which are borne
by the partner firms or countries. In addition, longer production runs also reduce
variable production costs because of increased learning effects. Numerous
authorities in the field, however, have argued that cooperation produces specific
costs that cancel some of its expected benefits.13 These costs can be categorised
as being mainly organisation costs. In particular, the number of nations and
partner firms involved in cooperation projects has a negative influence on the
efficiency of collaboration. More precisely, the formula offered is that the total
cost of a co-production programme increases by the square root of the number
of nations and partner firms involved. Another source of inefficiency identified in
co-production projects is the frequent duplication of R&D, or of manufacturing
tasks. The most striking example is that of the Concorde airliners. Two separate
assembly lines were set up, one in France and one in Britain, to assemble 16
Concorde aircraft. What effect it had on the costs is not open to the public.
Inter-firm collaborations fall into three broad categories:
1. Unstructured Co-production Projects: These are the most common
projects, launched and developed without any legal entity having been put
in place. When an equity joint venture does not exist, the unstructured co-
production project’s only function is to coordinate the project. It does not
perform any of the operational tasks induced by the project. This category
includes mature projects like Concorde, Jaguar, Tornado, Transall and many
other programmes which are in the R&D stages. The projects are bifurcated

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into those that are finalised and those that are to be abandoned.
2. Semi-Structured Projects: These are cooperative programmes in which
development and manufacturing tasks are distributed among the allied firms
as in “unstructured co-production projects”. But the important difference is
that marketing and sales are carried out by a separate joint venture. This joint
venture is generally an equally owned entity, either a common subsidiary
or a group of industries like Airbus Industries. In semi-structured projects,
the separate marketing and sales organisation is the only interface with the
market and customers. This organisation assumes the total responsibility
for the commercial success of the product.
3. Business-Based Joint Ventures: In these alliances, a separate joint venture,
generally dominated by one of the partners, is in charge of the whole business.
While both unstructured and semi-structured projects are programme-
based and, therefore, limited in time, business-based joint ventures are real
corporations and have no preferred time limit.14
In most of the cases, the trend has been that the “unstructured co-production
projects” category (barring those which are aborted and ongoing projects at the
R&D stage) and the “semi-structured projects” category offered a hypothesis
linking the commercial success of a project with the organisation of the alliance.
Indeed, most matured unstructured projects have been commercially less
successful than semi-structured projects. For example, it is hard to contradict
the fact that programmes such as the Airbus, ATR, CFM, Milan, Hot and Roland
were more commercially successful than the Concorde, BK-117, Transall, Jaguar
or Otomat. The main difference between these two classes being the existence of
a specific marketing and sales organisation in the semi-structured category and
not in the structured one, it is tempting to attribute this success to the wisdom of
separating the task of marketing from manufacturing.
Even at the global level, the returns for defence R&D are not as much as has
been envisaged prior to the launching of any defence R&D. The UK’s defence
projects are over-budgeted by £ 2.6 billion, as per the latest report by the National
Audit Office (NAO). In its major projects report 2006, 20 large defence projects are
found to be still in the assessment phase and there have been significant delays.
Projects that are proving wasteful in time and costs include Nimrod MRA4 (89
months late and 25 per cent over-budgeted), the Astute Class submarine (42
months late and 40 per cent over-budgeted), and the Type 45 destroyer (31 months
late and 20 per cent over-budgeted). But one good point noted in the same report
is that the projects are on track to deliver 98 per cent of the user requirements.15

The delay and cost overruns in defence R&D, India needs

followed by production, are likely to occur owing to the to build up its
changed requirements in the technical development own defence
phase and the add-ons required by the armed forces industrial
during the period of design and development. India base that is
is no exception to the global phenomenon. Given competitive in
this situation, India needs to to analyse and amend price, product
the workings of its defence R&D. and punctuality
of delivery.
Defence R&D: Indian Perspective
As mentioned earlier, defence R&D is known to be a mission oriented activity
comprising both basic and applied research, which involves development and
fabrication, as well as testing of new weapons and weapon systems. The need
today at the world level is project-based intensive R&D, so as to come up with
high quality items even if it means a slight compromise on quantity. India is also
in the churning process of deciding what the priorities should be. In fact, major
weapon systems have taken 10 to 20 years for development and have cost billions
of dollars. Defence R&D also contributes to a technological arms race and, owing
to the rising costs of defence equipment, exerts pressure for increased defence
spending. But, whatever the challenge, indigenous development efforts are
a must for India because of the technology denial regimes that India has been
facing time and again and also due to undependable foreign suppliers who, at
any time may renege because of political pressures.
All this boils down to one simple fact: with missionary zeal, India needs to
build up its own defence industrial base that is competitive in price, product
and punctuality of delivery. Defence planners and commentators have criticised
R&D performance without suggesting any alternatives. Also, the private firms’
commitment to, and performance on, projects they have been given have hardly
been reassuring, given the fact that defence R&D has a long gestation period
and, the longer it takes, the greater the profit for the companies. If this had not
been the case, huge investments could have flowed into the infrastructure sector.
This has not happened and, as of date, our power sector, for one, is still going a
begging for funds. Even in the railways, which require huge investments, there
has not been much private sector participation. The solution to this malaise lies
in building the technological base and scientific infrastructure in the country.
Scientific infrastructure helps the country to be up-to-date enough to develop
even those technologies that are specific to resource endowments.

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In this regard, the private sector can build consortiums with the government’s
help and this should include the higher centres of learning like Indian Institutes
of Technology (IITs) and Indian Institute of Science (IISc), which could be
given project-based funding to develop technical acumen among the budding
engineers. The second step could be to start in-house research programmes
by the private sector, which could go in for joint ventures with foreign firms.
Recently, Singapore Technologies Engineering has signed a joint venture with
Kalyani Group for manufacturing defence equipment in India with 26 per cent
foreign direct investment (FDI) approved by the government.16 This shows that
there is scope even with the 26 per cent FDI, if companies are willing to invest in
this field. Thirdly, the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO),
which has been lambasted for non-performance, has to shed its projects flab
and orient itself to basic defence research. Few countries have allowed their
defence R&D firms to even venture into the commercial market to make it more
economically viable. Fourthly, India has no dearth of PhDs in basic sciences,
but there is serious shortage of doctorates in applied and engineering sciences.
Those who have an exposure in technical fields find greener pastures abroad
rather than hunt for jobs in India. Even South Korea, whose population is about
4 per cent of India’s, produces as many engineers as this country.17 As compared
to other countries, India has a very small a pool of Science and Technology (S&T)
labour for a speedy development of leading edge weapons.
Table 2: Science & Technology: How India Compares

Patents R&D Out- Researchers in Tertiary Students
Granted (Per lays(% of R&D(per mil- in Science,Maths &
Million? ) GNP) lion people) Engineering(% of all
tertiary students)
Finland 5 3.4 7110 37
United States 298 2.8 4999 -
Japan 884 3.1 5321 23
South Korea 490 3.0 2880 34
Britain 71 1.9 2666 29
Germany 205 2.5 3153 31
Malaysia --- 0.4 160 ---
China 5 1.1 584 53
Brazil 0 1.1 323 23
India 0 0.7 157 25
Source: UN Human Development Report, 2004.

In the rapidly changing dynamics of the contemporary world, technology

is also developing very fast. The demarcation between civilian and defence
technology has blurred with more and more of the former providing major
inputs to defence capabilities. In India, the contribution of the private sector to
defence R&D has been miniscule. The war China waged against India in early
1962 jolted India into realising the dire need for a strong defence R&D base to
meet the needs of the armed forces in the eventuality of a conflict. The result of
this indigenisation effort was the birth of DRDO, which has over the last five odd
decades, grown to become a well developed organisation with 49 laboratories
and other establishments. The Department of Defence Production and Supplies
has 39 Ordnance Factories (OF) and eight Defence Public Sector Undertakings
(DPSUs). As noted by former DRDO scientists and the armed forces officers, the
organisation has its fingers in too many technical pies.18 This has led to non-
completion or long delays in the completion of the set tasks and, in some cases,
the product of a completed project fails to meet the precise requirements of the
armed forces at that point of time. Another problem is the result of globalisation.
Many retired decision-makers have chosen to serve new multinational masters.
This is a bad precedence, for it lowers the morale of the forces as well as the
scientists of the country.
There are shortcomings in defence research anywhere in the world and
programme delays dog the developed West too. Being the brunt of criticism has
hardly helped the defence research establishment and it is high time that it went
in for serious introspection to find down to earth solutions to the many ills of the
organisation. As a first step, items that are easily available in the market should
either be outsourced or directly purchased off the shelf. At the same time, the
initial planning and feasibility study for any project should be carried out with
objective and result oriented pragmatism.
India is working on an ambitious missile defence programme of far-reaching
importance to national security. Such a programme must perforce be tenaciously
sustained and brought to its fruition, as it is the sole known counter to weapons
of mass destruction (WMD) threats from nations that are fast reaching a state of
parity with the world’s most militarily developed nations. The success of such
projects makes India a power to contend with. The importance of R &D to this
task cannot be overstressed.
To shut down projects merely because of cost delays is indeed unwise and
impractical. The solution would be to first divide and grade projects according
to priority and drop only the least important ones and those that are technically

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unsound. The nation’s economic compulsion, by itself, would be good enough a

reason to shelve certain projects, but only if defence collaborations and supplies
were freed of political pressures. The pattern of industrial R&D (defence sector),
shown in Table 3 reveals that in the post-liberalisation and pre-Kargil conflict
phase, the magic word was indigenisation.
Table 3: Patterns of Industrial R&D under Liberalisation

(Figures are represented in Rs. 10 million and the data in brackets connote its per-
centage of sales turnover.)
Industry Group 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 1998-99
Electricals &Elec- 128.86(0.6) 136.10(0.6) 185.60(0.28) 204.06(0.30) 200.03(0.29)
tronics
Defence Indus- 79.48(1.9) 79.85(1.7) 144.79(4.44) 180.23(5.22) 218(6.11)
tries
Metallurgical 51.79(0.2) 51.75(0.2) 123.95(0.48) 123.16(0.57) 142.56(0.78)
Industries
Drugs and Phar- 165.81(0.4) 198.73(0.4) 266.34(0.63) 287.49(0.63) 377.50(0.76)
maceuticals
Transportation 170.42(0.9) 226.88(1.0) 133.11(0.47) 201.15(0.79) 152.83(0.60)
Fuels 81.33(0.1) 106.02(0.1) 110.66(0.11) 99.20(0.09) 156.68(0.13)
Chemicals (other 243.46(0.8) 309.16(0.8) 180.49(0.51) 174.67(0.47) 195.14(0.51)
than fertilisers)
Source: Department of Science and Technology, Government of India, and presentation

by Dinesh Abrol, NISTADS, at IDSA, October 5, 2006.
The share of R&D in the sales of military equipment started increasing after
1995-96 and the percentage has been growing. This can be attributed to the long
range missile programmes and also the development of a few indigenous projects.
Sanctions that followed the nuclear tests forced the government to increase the
allocation for R&D. The India’s experience in defence R&D has not been a very
smooth one. Time and again, India has had to face export control regimes and
sanctions on high technology transfer. With such experience to make one wiser,
one needs to examine India’s options.
One such option would be to outsource a few areas of defence R&D to private
players, so as to get an estimate of their competence. There is every likelihood of a
private company resorting to technology transfer from its foreign partners so as to
cut the costs of in-house research. This means the company gets what it wants, but
India does not acquire the technological knowledge it seeks. S&T establishments

in India are centralised, which is a good thing as far Time and

as economy goes, but decentralisation would prove again, India
more advantageous as it would help integrate system has had to
development with a community of users. There is lack face export
of coordination between research in the industry and control
defence establishments. As scientists do not have regimes and
direct links with commercial and defence sectors, sanctions
transfer of technical knowhow through personnel is on high
minimal. Then, there is the problem originating from technology
supplier nations. However, hard Indian industries may transfer.
try to acquire the required technology, what they get
would always be slightly outdated and weighed down with numerous riders. The
possible option is an effective coordination between the private firms’ R&D and
government institutions.
DRDO, which has been unduly criticised for project delays, has found
itself bogged down with shortage of engineers, as was noted in the report of
the comptroller and auditor general of India. Firm initiatives need to be taken
in resolving these issues. What is really surprising is that that Indian defence
establishment has to learn from other countries the lessons of modernisation
and self-sufficiency. A Ministry of Defence (MoD) review, “Self-Reliance: A
Defence Requirement” 1994, showed that only about 30 per cent of the defence
requirement was being provided from indigenous sources and 70 per cent were
imported. Although a determined policy decision was taken by the MoD to reverse
this situation within 10 years from 1995, much remains to be done even today to
infuse self-reliance in, and modernise, the defence forces. The weakness in the
overall system could be traced to various factors such as lack of an integrated
modernisation plan for the three armed forces, the dearth of research institutions
to provide time-bound defence technology innovations and the failure on the part
of the production units to provide competitive and cost-effective equipment and
stores. This does not mean that everything should be privatised, because private
industry, profit-oriented as it is, has a cost driven research agenda and cannot
sustain long gestation periods. Even carefully selecting a few private concerns
will not serve to expand the technology and knowledge base of the country.
The problem can be solved by identifying the factors and responses. Firstly,
with the costs of getting research work done rising because of – among other
things – the high wages being paid to researchers, India is fast becoming the
hub of R&D outsourcing. As it is, our country’s competence in the field is well

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established. In late 2002, the US secretary of defence notified the US Congress

of his intention to designate India as a country eligible for cooperating with in
defence programmes, adding that one of the criteria for this privilege was that
the country concerned should “possess the industrial or technological means to
cooperate meaningfully with the United States in defence research, development,
test, evaluation or joint production programmes.”19
Conclusion
The international trend today favours joint defence ventures between business
groups rather than those between governments. Governments, however, have
been inclined to tacitly promoting and creating a lobby to facilitate the export of
their defence products. On the other hand, the active participation of the private
sector the world over in the development and manufacture of defence products
has given the DRDO the economically advantageous alternative to assign design
and fabrication tasks to competing companies. This is despite past experience
having shown that in fabrication and designing projects, even in a joint R&D
programme, the funding increases with the progress in the work on the product.
This means that as the product nears the completion phase and enters the phase
of manufacturing, the countries concerned start joining the programme with an
eye on a share of the benefits.
A good example is the joint fighter development programme. What steps
should the Indian defence R&D establishment take to stay abreast of such
international trends? The answers are manifold. First, it should abandon projects
for low-technology items, as it would be far more economical in time and money to
buy the items from the world market. On the other hand, for medium technology
products, the better option would be joint technical collaborations with friendly
and strategically like-minded countries, along with an end user agreement. Also,
private units should be invited for the competitive design process, so that the
project is time-based and cost-effective. In the high technology field, the focus
and insistence should be on transfer of technology, so that India moves rapidly
towards its goal of becoming a major technology power. India needs to learn from
the sanctions it suffered post-nuclear tests. If external support is unavailable, it
must have the courage to go ahead with an indigenous time-bound programme
to develop high-tech defence products, involving the best of the talents available
in the country. India, no doubt, has financial constraints that negatively effect
the funding of defence research. But this problem should never be allowed to
come in the way of an important and well-planned project. There is also the

reluctant attitude of the private sector to be taken In the high

into account. And, there have hardly been any technology
credible R&D project plans that could be sustained field, the focus
with the help of the government for a long period and insistence
of time. should be on
The government should take the initiative to transfer of
fathom the research potential of the private sector technology,
by allocating medium level research projects. This so that India
may help them reach global standards, thereby moves rapidly
winning orders from other countries in case the towards its goal
government is unable to absorb the entire bulk of becoming
of the product. Defence R&D is a long, ongoing a major
process, and it is not a good practice to scrutinise it technology
year after year. Few things have a longer gestation power.
period and the academic and defence community
just have to learn to be patient and wait for the results. Channelising the defence
products to the civilian domain is another economically sound option and
would help towards closer civil-military cooperation in R&D, besides swelling
the funds through public–private partnership. Privatisation, in itself, will do
no good to the defence establishment, especially when there is ambivalence
about the capacity of the private sector to meet the demands of the defence
R&D. Transfer of technology, while it has its good points, can never be a match
for transfer of technical knowledge for it would only superficially increase the
technical competence of a nation but does not add to the technical knowledge
base, the top priority for a country like India, which has suffered more sanctions
than international cooperation in the recent past.
Notes
1. Keith Hartley and Todd Sandler (eds.), Handbook of Defence Economics,Vol.1
(Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1995), p. 8.
2. For futher details, see J Spanier, Games Nations Play (New York: Holt, Rinehart and
Winston, 1984), pp. 97-100.
3. B Latour, Science in Action (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987), p. 174.
4. J Garnett, “Technology and Strategy,” in J Baylis, K Booth, J Garnett and P Williams,
Contemporary Strategy (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1987), vol.1: Theories and
Concepts, p. 92.
5. Richard Coopey, Matthew R.H Uttley and Graham Spinardi (eds.), Defence Science

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and Technology: Adjusting to Change (Berkshire: Harward Academic Publishers,

1993), pp. 2-3.
6. Ibid.
7. US Department of Defence, Lessons of the Gulf War: Interim Report, September
1991.
8. M Thee, “Science-Based Military Technology as a Driving Force Behind the Arms
Race,” in NP Gleditsch and O Njolstad (eds.), Arms Races: Technological and Political
Dynamics (London: Sage Publications, 1990).
9. Oren Setter and Asher Tishler, “Introduction: Defence Research and Development in
the 21st Century,” Defence and Peace Economics,Vol. 17(3) June 2006, pp. 165.
10. National Audit Office (NAO), Classification of Defence Research and Development
Expenditure, London, 1991.
11. Keith Hartley, “Defence R&D: Data Issues,” Defence and Peace Economics, Vol. 17 (3),
June 2006, pp. 165-167.
12. Ibid., pp. 165-167.
13. Keith Hartley, NATO Arms Cooperation: A Study in Economics and Politics (London:
George Allen and Unwin, 1983).
14. A Latham and N Hooper (eds.), The Future of the Defence Firm: New Challenges, New
Directions (The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1995), pp. 122-124.
15. Richard Ball, “UK Defence Projects go 2.6 bn Over Budget”, at http:www.
electronicsweekly.com/Articles/Article.aspx?liArticleID=40233.htm (Accessed 30
November 2006).
16. “Kalyani Group Enters into Joint Venture Agreement with Singapore Technologies
Kinetics” at http://www.bharatforge.com/investers/JV_with_Kalyani_Final.pdf
(Accessed 14 December 2006).
17. Ravinder Pal Singh, “An Assessment of Indian Science and Technology and Implications
for Military Research and Development,” Economic and Political Weekly, 29 July 2000,
p. 2764.
18. Amitav Malik, “Whither Defence R&D,” paper presented at the National Seminar
on Public-Private Partnership in Defence, New Delhi, 2006, Observer Research
Foundation.
19. G Balachandran, “Planning for the Future of a Viable Indian Defence Industry,” Agni,
Journal of Forum for Strategic and Security Studies, Vol. 8(4), October-December 2005,
p. 31.

Emerging Trends in
Supply Chain Management
©The present world market scenario and the emerging trends in supply chain
management have posed a new challenge to the major players, forcing them to
reshape their sale and purchase strategies for achieving competitive advantage
in today’s easily accessible, ‘single market’ world. Defence procurements policies
of the nations have not been spared, especially those of fast growing economies
like India. Many eminent thinkers have expressed their concern over the issue
through the media.
Due to the expansion of overall knowledge and the modern global vision of
specialisation, the need to change departmental strategies has gained higher priority
– a trend we cannot afford to ignore. Today, nations have come much closer through
greater sharing of knowledge and the liberty to choose what best suits each nation.
It is, therefore, necessary that we accept the changed scenario and make proper use
of modern strategy from the wide options available. Today, the corporate world is
rapidly setting up manufacturing bases and marketing outlets in other countries
rather than their own, willing to share both technology and profit. Even Indian
players are acquiring the rights of the well established foreign companies. This is the
result of real globalisation and the urge to achieve competitive advantage.
“Through economics, the king brings under his sway his own party as well
as the party of the enemy……material well-being is supreme,” said Kautiliya
(Arthshastra, 4th Century BC). The first ‘globalisation’ in known history was the
empire Chandragupta established with the help of Kautilya, which guaranteed
security over an extraordinarily large area in which trade flourished.
As a young officer in the Army Ordnance Corps, I was told by senior officers
to be very proud that I belonged to an organisation that holds an inventory
of more than five lakh items. Today, the inventory holdings have increased to
nine lakh items. But the professionals are talking of “zero inventory.” That is
the extent of change of the progressive thought process in the field of materials
management, termed as “supply chain management” or simply “supply chain.”
Colonel Gopal Purdhani (Retd) is a former Army Ordnance Corps officer and presently
Director, Indian Institute of Materials Management, New Delhi.

Gopal Purdhani
Of course, the concept of zero inventory can never be applicable to the defence
forces for obvious reasons. We all know that the defence forces buy today for their
requirements of tomorrow.
The need is to cut down the inventory to an acceptable limit, and quick
disposal of items that we do not need. For, there is a huge pile up of wastages
– assemblies, vehicles, components, small items and a surfeit of surplus and
obsolete equipment – choking up the depots. With studies in depth, we may
discover multi-location holdings of the same item and also of different items of
similar usage. This can be avoided by codifying the total inventory.
Today, data is available on demand, thanks to the revolution in information
technology. It has made possible not just swift and accurate inventory holdings,
but also highly efficient “distribution-resource planning” (DRP). This, in turn,
has given the organisation the ability to promptly respond to each demand, thus,
speeding up the process of manufacture. The electronic-data-interchange (EDI)
has, through the internet, enabled partners in the supply chain to act upon real
demands. Shared information in the chain can be fully leveraged through the
process of integration within the organisational structure.
The supply chain is a specialised technical subject that has gained
importance and much popularity in the business world. The benefits are many,
the most important being cost reduction that ultimately adds to the profits. The
present global business scenario has thrown open a great challenge to many
developing countries to consolidate their defence procurement system. The
policy-maker’s immediate task is to take the necessary steps to stay abreast of
the revolution in technology. There is no need for the defence forces to totally
give up the conventional methodology, but there is a definite need to update and
upgrade the system and adopt the prevalent international work process in the
procurement and distribution systems.
The Present
There are three main fundamental stages of the supply chain:
n Procurement stage (raw materials, equipment and manpower).
n Production stage (manufacture to finished goods and packaging).
n Distribution stage (warehousing, transportation and delivery).
All these stages have to be managed independently by effective leadership.
Increasing competitive pressure and market globalisation are forcing enterprises
to develop supply chains that can respond quickly to the customer’s needs.
Both the public and private sector units are facing a new kind of pressure from

Emerging Trends in Supply Chain Management
customers, partners and competitors. Customers Increasing

want more customised products and services, competitive
with precise technical details, as approved by pressure
them. The partners want to work in new ways and and market
the competitors are constantly raising the bar by globalisation
cutting down the prices and increasing operational are forcing
efficiency. With the advancement achieved in enterprises to
communications and information technology, develop supply
as well as the rapidly widening array of logistic chains that
options, companies now have an opportunity to can respond
reduce operating costs by better coordination and quickly to the
efficient management. customer’s
needs.
The Future
Tomorrow’s supply chain is definitely going to be more global and flexible than
ever before. The importance of supply chain strategies that would address the
new markets and access the new sources of supply would certainly need a highly
adaptive attitude of the leadership. For tapping the emerging markets, there
would be far more effective supply chain tactics to deal with product portfolio,
channel management, make-or-buy options, contract logistics and corporate tax
compliance. To source material from low cost countries, the companies would
be better able to streamline end-to-end supply chain (thus, cutting costs), meet
quality objectives, minimise transit inventory and staff, as also meet the required
service criteria with regular, new market objectives. Purchasers would have to
keep options open to buy from anyone who offers the best, and at a competitive
cost, however small the country or enterprise may be. The procedures will need
to be simplified and response as also payment speeded up.
The future will offer numerous opportunities and options of highly advanced
technology, mostly with lifetime warranty and customer-oriented services. The
buyers would have to adopt a speedier system, keeping a larger global eye on
what is available where, rather than the sales people coming to update their
knowledge. Though the customer would still rule the market because the need
originates from him, the vendor development would be his responsibility,
because otherwise, he would end up buying outdated equipment. So, to achieve
optimisation, the future procurement would put a greater burden on the
purchaser to define his need in easy terms and make it known worldwide with
utmost speed, a process that can be called “demand-projection-lead time.”

Gopal Purdhani
Brand Image Management

The global trends and the burgeoning of multinational companies have effectively
changed the traditional methodology to a harder business climate. The demand
for advanced technology has enhanced the product quality but reduced the
product life cycle. Efficiency and cost reduction can now not be used as the
source to achieve competitive edge. Hence, the choice shifts to making one’s
product and services “different” from those of the competitors. The enterprise
tries to promote an easily recognisable distinction (brand image) and, in the
present business scenario of easy approach to the international open marketing
system, the effort is made to project an established world brand image.
We must also remember that the “product brands” are no longer permanent.
The brands are dynamic in nature and, therefore, do not remain constant. The
companies need to accelerate the quality standards and make their products
more suitable to the customer’s requirement and enhance the utility angle
to match the products that are trying to out-date their technology. The rapid
development in technology has produced some side effects like difficulties in
sustaining the competitive advantages of a particular brand. Today, it is not
difficult to copy and produce similar and even more efficient items in a more
presentable guise. Marketing trends also show that most companies are ready
for price reduction and lower profit margins so as to achieve a higher turnover.
The quality standards have risen so high that we are no longer talking about total
quality management (TQM), the hot topic till recent years. One can clearly see
the increasing concern of the industry to provide value added advantage for
the customer. He is offered a wide variety of choices. It has, therefore, become
essential to foresee the requirement of the near future and try to create a need,
with innovative design and technology, as also to educate the prospective buyers
through literature and the media.
The concept of brand management has changed. Now, the idea is to sustain
a brand image by continuous improvement of standards and offering new
models of the product with better utility services to the purchaser. This concept
has become the credo for achieving durable competitiveness. Keeping in mind
the changed concept and the speed with which the new trends in supply chain
management are emerging, it is necessary to consider the shift in organisational
strategy to fine-tune coordination and collaboration in various processes of
production and marketing. To back up a strong brand, suitable marketing tactics
will help in building up of a responsive supply chain.
The challenge is today’s harsh business environment. The measure of

success is the acceptance level of your brand by In the changing

the purchaser. The key word is “adaptability.” scenario, the
To achieve that, you have to ensure that you corporate
sell a product that promises the technology strategy must
of tomorrow, meeting the customer’s precise be reoriented
requirement, plus dependable warranty. There to collecting
are no short cuts to aggressive marketing. and regularly
updating the
Responsive Supply Chain Process market data,
The traditional method of forecasting that was keeping a
based on the wastages pattern is outdated. careful watch
Today, you need to respond to the demand and on the actual
be ever alert to the sensitivities of the market. requirement of
In the changing scenario, the corporate strategy the customer
must be reoriented to collecting and regularly and identifying
updating the market data, keeping a careful the real demand
watch on the actual requirement of the customer of the market.
and identifying the real demand of the market.
The quick response has to be driven by the actual demand pattern. A responsive
supply chain is market sensitive and capable of reading and responding with a
suitable offer to the customer’s actual need. All the agencies in the supply chain
must be well-aligned partners. Information has to be shared among the supply
chain partners through maintaining on line connectivity.
The Essential Ingredients

n Quick reaction to the demand and supply pattern.
n Proven ability to speedily adapt to any changes in demand.
n Manufacture for demand and not for inventory.
n Aggressive marketing tactics.
n Gearing up the sources of the already established outsourcing agencies.
Most companies are confronted with a fundamental problem: the time

taken to procure, make and deliver the goods. The company that achieves a
perfect lead time, with the delivery time fixed by the customer, would not need
to make any forecast or stock the inventories. The lead time taken is considered
as overall ‘responsive time’. Paperless information flow and stockless suppliers
are the keys to the success of a responsive supply chain process. The value added

Gopal Purdhani
At present, the supply chain has inbuilt ingredients of quick

management is response, adaptive attitude, and well aligned
careful during and integrated supplier channel interface with
the three an effective market strategy.
transitional
phases: visibility, Adaptive Supply Chain Networks
velocity and (ASCN)
variability for Falling margins, globalisation and accelerating
making timely innovation cycles are forcing enterprises
and accurate use to switch from traditional supply chains to
of information adaptive supply chain networks that would have
input. The the ability to respond to the changing business
corporate sector environment. At present, the management is
is, therefore, careful during the three transitional phases:
switching over visibility, velocity and variability for making
to the adaptive timely and accurate use of information input.
supply chain The corporate sector is, therefore, switching
network to stay over to the adaptive supply chain network
ahead of the to stay ahead of the competition. Processes
competition. that have till now been managed by a single
enterprise itself, are now beginning to be spread
out to multiple enterprises.
Numerous factors are involved in a new strategy in the supply chain. A few
are as listed below:
n New technology products involving frequent improvements.
n Globalisation of markets.
n Use of the internet for easy accessibility to the required information.
n Falling costs.
n Higher degree of competition.
n Wider publicity options.
The ASCN, a grouping of a few business enterprises, has emerged as a highly

successful and dynamic system. It ensures that the company receives timely and
accurate information, thus, helping it to speed up both its response as well as
the distribution of the data to its supply chain partners. This gives the company
a huge advantage over a single vendor doing all the jobs alone. The simultaneous
work methodologies of the ASCN system may prove to be the “single-most-

critical differentiator” that the system may help create.

To create an adaptive network, a well-charted out plan is required for the
three key evolution stages: integration, collaboration and execution.
The “inter-enterprise-integration” and “intra-enterprise-integration”
are basic drivers that provide operational strength to the network. Once well
integrated, the group will find it easier to enter the collaborative and adaptive
stages.
Business continues to demand technological innovations and new ways of
operation. The ability to adapt is the cushion against any variables and obstacles
that might otherwise cause a time lag in response. An efficient network is more
transparent and more open to adjustments and understandings. The successful
large corporate houses are doing business with the same agents, retailers and
distributors as before, but now, they are called “partners.”
Strategic Sourcing
Strategic sourcing is a systematic procurement process that continuously
improves and reevaluates the purchasing activities of a corporate business
enterprise. It is one of the important methodologies that employ the structured
approach to manage the procurement policy. This is done for the following
purposes.
n Creating value for money spent.
n Developing strategic options for optimal sourcing.
n Increasing competitive positioning.
n Ensuring inbuilt option for any changes required during the demand-lead-
time.
In other words, it is a process designed to procure the best products and

services for the best value. There are many factors that are influencing the
business enterprises to become more strategy oriented in inter-related functions.
Some of these are listed below:
n Active globalisation.
n Liberalised procurement approach.
n Technology advancement.
n Outsourcing necessities.
n Dynamic expectations of customers and higher demand variability.
n Competitive advantages considerations.
n Lower cost considerations.

Gopal Purdhani
n Need for better and newer product acquisitions.

These factors also influence other ingredients of strategic sourcing, as
discussed earlier.
Priorities
Strategic sourcing is an organised and collaborative approach, aiming at targeted
spending across locations with select suppliers who are best suited to add
knowledge and value to the customer-supplier interface. The priorities for the
buyers would include the following:
n Prior allotment of budget and timely payment facility.
n Priority of product procurement.
n Market condition considerations.
n Sourcing and procurement process.
n Considerations on cost saving opportunities.
Using these procurement tools, the purchaser analyses the dependability

of the selected vendors and market conditions. They study the specifications
that help them to minimise risks and costs. More importantly, the focus now has
shifted from cost considerations to value addition in the supply chain, aiming to
meet the buyer’s specific needs and offer value for his money.
Development of Objectives
With the application of the techniques discussed earlier, the companies can
reach the following goals more speedily and effectively:
n Underlining specific guidelines to optimise corporate gains through
improved strategy.
n Corporate strategy through collaborative approach.
n Increase in collective comprehension of value added initiatives.
n Measures to achieve better utilisation on purchased goods and services.
n Elimination in non-value added activities in the process.
n Improvement in visibility, control and operational efficiency.
n Development of supplier’s base and performance analysis.
n Establishment of relationship with all channel partners.
n Prioritisation of spend areas.
Supply Chain Management – Vision 2020

It is not possible to presage what is going to happen by the year 2020. We can only
imagine the extent of advancement that would be made – a world very different
from ours indeed. The human brain has been programmed by nature to do
extraordinary things. We need, sometimes, to let our imagination run wild.
I surrender to this urge and say: In the year 2020 the audience might not be
required to assemble in a convention hall to watch and hear the presentation.
May be, the speaker would switch on a button from his/her study-room or may be
from the bedroom itself. Our fingers may not need to take the trouble of putting
the switch on. It would be for the slave ROBOT to perform all these menial jobs.
The audience may watch and listen from their offices or may be from their study
or bedrooms, as reaching the office would become almost impossible due to
traffic hazards. They may operate from their living places and, may be by that
time, their houses or homes may not be called houses as humans may be living in
disco-auditoriums, all the time dancing, singing and generally making merry –
eating food made of inorganic plastic products. And quite possibly, science may
invent and implant a tiny chip in your brain that would enable you to read other
people’s thoughts just by switching on the knowledge key and the presentation
would be visualised automatically and the faculty might not be needed any
more…
Supply Chain Management 2020, is certainly not going to be that weird or
phantasmagoric, but much more useful, convenient, congenial and realistic. It
will be far more effective, technical and professional, offering ready solutions
at highly competitive prices from the ASCNs. Vision 2020 is not about what will
happen. It is about what we choose and decide to make happen.
It is expected that the year 2020 could witness a phenomenal industrial and
agricultural growth and a great leap forward in per capita income. The retail
business, at present worth about $ 300 billion, would triple and the unorganised
marketing sector may become highly professional. Almost 80-90 per cent of
the people living in cities and towns and about 40-50 per cent of those living
in villages would own cars and air-conditioners. The real estate business would
continue to boom and this, in turn, would generate demand and movement of
goods like cement, steel, bricks, furniture and many others, pushing the supply
chain system to the forefront.
The present focus of the supply chain is applied mostly in urban India,
but after about a decade, it will spread to the rural areas as well. The economic
situation may witness three to four times growth in financial availability and
buying power may multiply many times, resulting in industrial expansion to

Gopal Purdhani
The economic unexpected levels. Experts like Morgan Stanley

situation may and others are predicting that the “Sensex could
witness three to touch the Rs. 50,000 figure in India and similar
four times growth growth in other parts of the business world.”
in financial Needless to say, the supply chain would
availability again come to play a leading role. It would be
and buying because of the following factors:
power may n Highly improved economic position.
multiply many n Overall growth in industrial, infrastructure
times, resulting and agriculture sectors.
in industrial n Aggressive demand and supply.
expansion to n More movements in transfer of goods.
unexpected
levels. According to a study carried out by
Mckinsey & Company, “…. By the year 2020, 80
percent of goods in the world will be manufactured in a country different from
where they are consumed as compared to 20 per cent now.” That means that there
would be tremendous movement of goods involving all means of transport and
warehousing. The trend would increase almost vertically in globalisation, free
trade, and outsourcing. All these are associated with supply chain management
that is going to play a leading role.
The present boom in business opportunities has created highly volatile
and harsh conditions, forcing the entire business world to shrink to a one-
market situation. The advance in infotechnology has ushered in a plethora
of new marketing strategies. They have opened the way for the buyers to take
the right and timely decisions. A well informed customer can now buy exactly
what he needs, choosing from a wider array of products, high-tech value
added to boot.
The defence forces buy tomorrow’s needs today. It is, therefore, necessary
that the enterprises apply their mind to ‘seeing tomorrow’. This means devising
effective means of communications, keeping in view the future trends in the
supply chain. For acquiring the latest technology, the defence forces, if necessary,
should be prepared to even replace the existing equipment, for nothing should
come in the way of their task – the defence of the nation. The main consideration
should be optimisation, not low costs. I am certain that the concerned authorities
would have already realised this, but I find it appropriate here to offer some facts
I have gleaned from the internet.

Today, the land forces are virtually in a state of war because of the terrorist
menace. They fight close combat battles (CQB) with terrorists in buildings
and other urban arenas. This kind of fighting has brought about a technology
revolution in advanced countries like the USA, Israel, the UK, Italy and others,
one of the main aims being the safety and fire effectiveness of the infantrymen.
In India, the weaponry and personnel equipment in use do not provide them
adequate protection. They have to face the enemy to fire at them. There are
rifles and other small arms available with barrel adjustments of up to 90 degree
deflection angles, and the firing mechanism and sights so positioned that the
shooter can see and fire effectively at a target from behind a wall.
Then there is the upgradation kit of heavy vehicles, a new high-tech product
being used in many countries. The kit is relatively low cost and its HP (horse
power) boosting power of engines very high. To replace an engine, you need to
disassemble it from the vehicle and transport it in parts to the base workshop.
But the kit can be replaced in the station workshop itself near the unit that is
using the vehicle.
In any large organisation, such as the Army Ordnance Corps (AOC), there
is bound to be a huge pile up of wastage. The surplus and obsolete/obsolescent
equipment and vehicles and their spares are kept in salvage stores till their
disposal. This amounts to keeping a huge amount of wealth locked up. This begs
the question: is there not a need to reorganise or set up a separate department
within the Ordnance Corps for the speedy disposal and demilitarisation of the
surplus and obsolete items?
Will computerised codification or bar coding help the ordnance depots to
eliminate chances of multi-location of the same item and help relocate items
of similar use? Is there a need to redesign or acquire a customised inventory
control software package that would give the location of an item, whether it is in
a particular ‘bin’ or is in transit or in issue-bay?
A step was taken for modernising inventory in the AOC about 15 years
ago, by establishing the computerised inventory control project (CICP). It has
done a commendable job so far. Is there any need to accelerate its functions
by augmenting that organisation to keep pace with the present rate of progress
being made in other spheres of the business world?
In the section on “Strategic Sourcing,” certain objectives have been fixed. We
need to review them and see if any improvements are needed, as enumerated
below:
n Underlining of specific guidelines to optimise corporate gains through

Gopal Purdhani
improved modern practices.

n Application of corporate strategy through collaborative approach.
n Elimination of non-value added activities in the process.
n Increase in collective comprehension of value added initiatives.
n Measures to achieve better utilisation of the service sector by outsourcing
advisory capacity.
n Improvement in visibility and operational efficiency by becoming more
easily approachable and transparent by being open to accept offers of recent
advancement in technology.
n Development of supplier’s base and performance appraisal to cut down
‘demand-load-time.’
n Establishment of better relationship with all channel partners, including
vendors.
n Prioritisation of spend areas.
The modern trends in supply chain offer the systematic approach to both
suppliers and buyers and cut down time for cost-effective business practices.
The procurement in defence must be ‘better-technology-based’ rather than cost
competitiveness. We have to find out and acquire the best technology available
rather than just opt for Indianisation that can be developed simultaneously.

Ground Truths about
the US War on Terror in
Afghanistan
Dinesh Mathur
Stable peace in Afghanistan is still a distant dream. The Taliban has been a thorn
in the flesh in its south along the Durand Line, especially in Waziristan and
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Al Qaeda has been driven into the
hills on both sides of the border. Iraq appears to have stabilised after the surge
operations, the fresh conflict between Israel and the Palestinian Authority in Gaza
has come to an end, and relations between India and Pakistan have taken a nose-
dive after the Mumbai attacks. All these ominous developments taken together
certainly portend overall escalation beyond the limits of the war on terror which
deeply involves the United States. A bit of introspection over past mistakes and a
bit of crystal gazing, is certainly called for.
Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan was launched in gross violation
of the basic principles of war enunciated by military pundits such as Clausewitz
and Liddel Hart,viz, Selection and Maintenance of Aim. The US led North
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) forces went to war in such unholy haste,
without a clear, unambiguous and singular aim. What to speak of selection, the
aim underwent several revisions within the first three weeks of the war itself.
Consequently, the long-term strategic aims of bringing about broader stability
in the region and the surrounding areas were mixed up with the immediate aim
of destruction of the Taliban and the imperative need to bring about a regime
change. Concomitantly, the emphasis later shifted to destruction of Al Qaeda.
Another violation was on the Principle of Economy of Effort, in which more
than three weeks of air battle continued to pound civil and military targets in
mountainous terrain, which did not achieve results commensurate with the
effort put in.
Brigadier Dinesh Mathur (Retd) is Chief Executive Officer of a facility management

company.

Dinesh Mathur
The US also did not learn from the Russian experience. What they did not
anticipate was that both the Taliban and Al Qaeda’s recruiting organisation
framework in Afghanistan had remained intact for its future cadres. After
operations, Al Qaeda gave up its state sanctuaries by clandestinely occupying
warehouses and small innocuous sites for its survival. These, in turn, provided
the launched pad for the Taliban and Lashkar-e-Tayyeba in global terrorism with
the help of sympathetic Afghan communities.
US strategy to defeat Al Qaeda on its own turf required excellent intelligence,
special operations capability (such as covert forces) and pinpoint air-strikes, and
of the three, intelligence held the key. Human intelligence required a reasonable
gestation period. American led NATO forces lacked human intelligence at the
induction stage, as intelligence acquired from unmanned aerial vehicles and
satellites does not always prove very effective in guerrilla warfare of this blend.
Right now, does one even know whether Al Qaeda exists or not? (Since they have
not carried out any worthwhile operations after 9/11.)
What is relevant is the joint capabilities of the Taliban and new groups, a factor
which the US had apparently not assessed. The Taliban, whether in Afghanistan
or Pakistan, has the advantage of operating in known terrain with a network
of tribal supporters and superior intelligence about current American/ NATO
forces dispositions, their likely future actions and timings of their strike. That the
Taliban declines combat on unfavourable terms and strikes when the American
led NATO forces are the weakest are normal guerrilla tactics. Predictably, despite
enjoying superior force and firepower, the Americans led forces achieved very
little. Hot pursuit operations to destroy the Taliban inside Pakistan, or to cut the
supply lines and destroy the Taliban’s base camps would have been possible if
only the Americans had the troops to operate in both Afghanistan and Pakistan.
The single most important factor of the war in Afghanistan was that it
hardened anti-US sentiments throughout the Arab and Muslim world. Today,
virtual anarchy prevails in Afghanistan, with the revival of warlordism, banditry
and opium production (read narco terrorism) impeding the resumption of
humanitarian relief programmes and return to normalcy. The loyalty of all six
power centres, in existence in Afghanistan today, is suspect (given below) and so
is the genuineness of the US led NATO forces’ intentions.
n Areas around Kabul to its northeast and parts of the Pashtun south are loyal
to Karzai; 12,000 Tajik militias are in readiness to challenge other factions.
Burhanuddin Rabbani, former Afghan president and leader of the Northern
Alliance, who favours the Pashtuns, has joined in.

Ground Truths about the US War on Terror in Afghanistan
n Five other radical Pashtun alliances of fundamentalist leaders and groups

outside the government or on its sidelines including the Peshawar group,
followers of former Afghan Prime Minister Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Haji Abdul
Qadir, head of the Pashtun Eastern Council, former Taliban dissident and
Abdurrab Rasul Sayyaf, are currently allied with former Afghan President
Rabbani.
n Area around Kandahar of four southern provinces under Pashtun Gul Agha
Shirzai, the rival warlord governor of Kandahar, devoted to King Zahir Shah,
but highly sectarian. Commands 3,000 to 5,000 troops.
n Area Mazar-i- Sharif under Uzbek Northern Alliance, 5,000 to 8,000 forces
of Gen Abdul Rashid Dostum, deputy defence minister, remain strongly
independent. Controls five provinces.
n Area Herat. Northern Alliance warlord Ismail Khan controls five western
provinces and 5,000 Tajiks opposed to the Uzbeks.
n Area Bamiyan province. Northern Alliance warlord Mohammad Karim
Khalili, leader of the Shiite Hazara party coalition. Controls a larger swathe
of the Afghan interior and commands as many as 8,000 fighters opposed to
both Uzbeks and Tajiks.
Pakistan holds the key to US efforts to stabilise Afghanistan. Pakistani

interests lie in its own instinct for survival-based on developing an alternative
structure of Pashtun power in Afghanistan without allowing portions of its
territory to be sucked in. It has common security concerns and religious, ethnic,
and institutional ties with Afghanistan. Broadly, its earlier role in the war on
terror was to effectively seal the border in the Northwest Frontier Province
(NWFP) with Afghanistan along the Durand Line, control cross-border terrorism
and infiltration and protect the soft underbelly of US led NATO operations. Part
of the deal was an understanding that the US led NATO troops would not act
unilaterally on Pakistani soil and the US would reimburse the cost incurred
on Pakistani troops and reschedule its foreign debts, pay for logistical support
provided from Karachi port facilities onwards till the forward administrative base
in Afghanistan. It was further stipulated by Pakistan that Israel and India would
not form part of the forces employed in its war on terror.
US President Obama has made his intentions very clear that, by the middle of
2009, the security fulcrum of the war in the Middle East and South Asia is likely
to shift towards Afghanistan. US long-term interests are to prevent Russian and
Iranian influence and build up a stable Afghanistan. Obama now clearly intends

Dinesh Mathur
to increase the number of troops in Afghanistan, thereby intensifying pressure

on the Taliban while opening the door for negotiations with them. Ultimately,
this would see the inclusion of the Taliban elements in a coalition government.
Gen Petraeus pursued this strategy in Iraq with Sunni insurgents, and it is also
likely to be adopted in Afghanistan.
The situation on the Afghan-Pakistan borders has made the American
led NATO operations in Afghanistan more difficult. What is disturbing are the
uninhibited moves by the Taliban in liberated areas around Peshawar, and the
Swat Valley and its support to Al Qaida. The United States must now seek fresh
strategic goals in Afghanistan. The first could be total destruction of the remnants
of the Al Qaeda core group, based in Afghanistan. The second could be to use
Afghanistan as a base for destroying Al Qaeda, Taliban and other Islamist terror
groups such as the banned LeT and its front organisation, Jamaat- ud Dawa in
Pakistan.
The US would be quite willing to task Pakistan de novo, in more unambiguous
terms, as follows:
n Continue to effectively seal its border areas in Waziristan, FATA and NWFP
areas with two divisions.
n Provide intelligence on the Al Qaeda, Taliban and other terror networks and
undertake visible operations under NATO command to destroy them.
n End military support for the Taliban and other terror groups while
pressuring them to surrender and participate in the nation building process
in Afghanistan to refurbish the US image.
n Rein in the activity of pro-Islamic extremists engaged in insurrectionary
activities inside and outside Pakistan (principally in Afghanistan and
Kashmir) and force recruitment areas for Al Qaeda and Taliban to dry up.
n Assemble an alternative Pashtun leadership from among leaders and groups
living in exile and from the Taliban for confining the pan-Pashtun movement
to Afghanistan only, preventing the emergence of Pashtun political
tendencies that might seek to form a greater “Pashtunistan” (comprising
portions of Afghanistan and Pakistan).
These actions do call for a dramatic reorientation of Pakistan’s foreign and

security policy. Along with internal instability and a weakened external security
position, the grave void in leadership after Benazir Bhutto and Musharraf has now
been filled by the military and Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). Notwithstanding
the nuclear symmetry, the military establishment believes that for keeping the

Kashmir issue from going into cold storage, exercising a high risk option such as
suicide bombing of the Indian Embassy and the government’s Interior Ministry
should serve as a reminder.
Disownership of Islamic terror groups by Pakistan is nothing new. The
changed international environment and privatisation scenario has brought in
a new form of threat, i.e., by non-state actors. It also gives rise to the speculation
that the ISI is controlling these non-state actors, privately owned security
agencies comprising ex-Servicemen and mercenaries in the role of terrorists,
working identically on the lines of the US-based company Blackwater, in
Iraq. Mumbai was one such venture under the aegis of the ISI, executed with
finesse.
Roughly three-quarters of US and NATO supplies bound for Afghanistan are
delivered at Karachi and moved in trucks to the Afghanistan border; 80 per cent
fuel used by NATO forces in Afghanistan is refined in Pakistan and delivered via
the same route. There are two crossing points, one near Afghanistan’s Kandahar
province opposite Chaman, Pakistan, and the other through the Khyber Pass.
It is believed that the army launched operations against radical Islamist forces,
presumably, the Taliban which had attacked supply depots and convoys, and the
route remained closed for several days.
If these two routes through Pakistan from Karachi are closed or even
meaningfully degraded, other viable routes would be through Russia via
Turkmenistan/ Uzbekistan and via Iran, west of Gwadar port. The US is also
holding out this threat to Pakistan for greater accountability in its role in the war
on terror in Afghanistan. Going by the recent statements of both leaders on pre-
conditions for talks, relations between Tehran and Washington appear to have
improved.
The US may also have to give concessions to Russia in return for a declaration
that Washington will not press for the expansion of NATO to Georgia or Ukraine,
or for the deployment of military forces in non-NATO states on the Russian
periphery, specifically, Ukraine and Georgia or guarantees that NATO and the
United States will not place any large military formations or build any major
military facilities in the former Soviet republics (now NATO member states) of
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.
Another demand the Russians will probably make is that the United States
guarantee eventual withdrawal from any bases in Central Asia in return for
Russian support for using those bases for the current Afghan campaign. At
present, the United States runs air logistics operations out of Manas Air Base

Dinesh Mathur
in Kyrgyzstan. Other demands might relate to the proposed US ballistic missile

defence installations in the Czech Republic and Poland.
If driven to the wall by the failure of all available options to safeguard its line
of communications for the Afghanistan War, the US, as a last resort, may have to
look after its own security from Karachi onwards and through the Baluchistan
corridor, overriding Pakistan protests.
After Mumbai 26/11, the Americans, despite their preoccupations with the
ongoing economic recession, are also quick to realise that Pervez Musharaff
had fooled them on his banning of the LeT in 2002. Today, the LeT is a global
contender in place of a steadily weakening Al Qaeda and has the motivation
to conduct Mumbai type attacks on American soil if the opportunities arise
and if the cost-benefit calculus shifts in favour of such assaults. The LeT has
fully demonstrated its remarkable ability to forge coalitions with like-minded
Islamic extremists across South Asia in Bangladesh, Myanmar, Pakistan and
Afghanistan (Afghan Taliban / Haqqani network) ; in Central Asia, with both
the Islamic Movement of Uzkekistan and local Islamist rebels in the Caucasus;
and in Europe, with the Muslim resistance in Bosnia, while raising funds and
building sleeper cells in countries such as Spain and Germany. Closer home in
our country, contacts have been established in Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh and
Tamil Nadu. The Bush Administration’s failure to confront Pakistan about its
continued abetting of terrorism against India (and against Afghanistan), despite
eight years of significant assistance to Islamabad, only succeeded in fragmenting
Pakistan. Pakistan has become a well developed epicentre of global terrorism
during the last thirty years as a consequence of American Cold War policies.
India, till recently, a known soft state and strong status quo power, has neither
been able to prevent many of the terrorist acts that have confronted it over the
years nor is capable of retaliating effectively against either its terrorist adversaries
or their state sponsors in Pakistan. The existence of unresolved problems, such
as the dispute over J&K, has also provided both Pakistani institutions and their
terrorist clients with the excuses and there is no assurance that a satisfactory
resolution of the Kashmir problem will conclusively eliminate the threat of
terrorism facing India and the West. However, it remains to be seen if Pakistan is
able to extract any more concessions in J&K from India, in return for a renewed
US pitch for the regional solution to the Afghanistan crises, should any proposal
to include India as a working partner be mooted.
Growing disenchantment in the United States with Pakistan’s performance in
the war on terror and President Obama’s determination to correct the imbalance

in the US-Pakistan bilateral relationship offers Washington an opportunity in the

new found Indian resolve to combat terrorism with all its might and resources.
Unless the US makes Pakistan realise that its war on terror in Afghanistan is
very much its own war in India and on Pakistani soil, there is little which can be
gained from the continuation of the war on terror.
Some initiatives which the Americans may be forced to take to rejuvenate the
flagging war on terror pertain mostly to comprehensive intelligence sharing with
India and Pakistan about specific terrorist groups; training of the law enforcement
and intelligence communities, particularly in the realms of forensics; improved
weapons and tactics; effective intelligence fusion and organisational coordination
for joint operations on Indian and Afghanistan soil. For any meaningful bilateral
cooperation to take place, the Indian government in power must rise above all
petty partisan issues, be prepared to accept the flak from all quarters and execute
what serves our national interests best.
No. 1, 2008 The Impact of Geo-Politics of Southwest Asia on

Manekshaw Paper Afghanistan: A Medium Term Perspective
Brig Rahul K Bhonsle
No. 2, 2008 Indo-US Strategic Convergence: An Overview of Defence
and Military Cooperation
Mr Ashok Sharma
No. 3, 2008 The Al-Qaeda in India
Brig Rahul K Bhonsle
No. 4, 2008 Armed Forces in Disaster Management: A Perspective on
Functional Aspects of Role, Training and Equipment
Col OS Dagur
No. 5, 2008 Trends in Pakistan’s Defence Spending
Ms Shalini Chawla
No. 6, 2008 Insurgency in the FATA & NWFP: Challenges & Prospects
for the Pakistan Army
Mr Samarjit Ghosh
No. 7, 2008 Iran’s Nuclear Quagmire: Trends and Challenges
Dr Monika Chansoria
No. 8, 2009 The Rising Tide of Left Wing Extremism in India and
Implications for National Security
Amit Kumar Singh
No. 9, 2009 Left Wing Extremism in India:
Context, Implications and Response Options
GD Bakshi

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US Influence in the
Indian Ocean Region
Bidanda M Chengappa
Today, US policies in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), viewed within the larger
framework of unipolarity now in its second decade, assume importance, as the
status quo is likely to prevail in the foreseeable future. Washington’s influence
in the region flows from its preponderance as a political, economic, social and
power. The Indian Ocean waters gained importance after entry into force of
Laws of the Seas in 1994, which makes the interests of nation-states increasingly
identify with freedom of navigation and ocean resources. These waters also
assume relevance following 9/11 because it supports the movement of jehadi
terrorists from Afghanistan and Pakistan to the Asia-Pacific region, besides the
transportation of global oil supplies across the globe.
Considering the US sponsored Proliferation Security Initiative which
involves maritime interdiction of suspect ships involved in transportation of
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) material brings the Indian Ocean waters
into sharp focus. Instances of maritime interdiction relate to the seizure of
a North Korean ship, Ku Wol San, in 1999 at the Kandla port, carrying missile
components and related blueprints to West Asia and Pakistan. Similarly, the
interception of another ship, So San, in 2002 by joint US-Spanish efforts while
carrying Scud missiles from North Korea to Yemen, and the BBC China carrying
centrifuge parts to Libya. These non-military threats associated with the Indian
Ocean waters make it important from a US security perspective
The US focus from a global threat during the Cold War years has shifted
to one of regional challenges and opportunities in the region. US policies are
all about engagement and balance of power in the IOR. More specifically, the
US attempts to balance China through the politics of cooperation. Otherwise,
Mr Bidanda M Chengappa, former Senior Fellow, IDSA, is Assistant Editor, Deccan Herald,
Bangalore.

US Influence in the Indian Ocean Region
Washington also seeks to obtain a stronghold in the Persian Gulf, Malacca Strait

as well as beyond the Indian Ocean in the Pacific region with the help of Japan,
India and Australia and other littoral states. For instance, the US Navy’s rescue
and relief efforts in Thailand and Sri Lanka during the tsunami suggest its strong
non-military humanitarian role and project its friendly face in the IOR. In a
sense, US interests in the IOR have not undergone any major change in the post-
Cold War period. Washington’s interests existed even prior to the entry of the
former Soviet Union into the area. In hindsight, it appears the US grew into the
successor state of the British Empire in the context of the Indian Ocean. The US
inherited the interests of Great Britain and developed a commonality with them
in the post-World War II period.
Otherwise, US short-term interests in the region are clearly to cope with Iran
and China. The nebulous nuclear status of Iran worries Washington. Moreover,
with China seeking a larger footprint in South Asia, a new “great game” has started
to take shape in the IOR. China is determined to enhance military and economic
cooperation with the Maldives and Sri Lanka. Beijing also aims to establish a
naval base at Marao in the Maldives; besides, it has an oil exploration business in
Sri Lanka which reinforces the strategic significance of the region.
Background
The IOR comprises 47 countries, which share the coastal waters of the Indian
Ocean. The IOR comprises the Central Indian Ocean where Diego Garcia is
situated; the Western Indian Ocean that comprises the littoral nations of Bahrain,
Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Egypt, Kenya and Pakistan; the Eastern
Indian Ocean with Singapore, Thailand and Australia. The Indian Ocean includes
the Arabian Sea, Bay of Bengal, Persian Gulf, Red Sea, Strait of Malacca, Great
Australian Bight, Gulf of Oman, Mozambique Channel, and other tributary water
bodies. The Indian Ocean as a body of water between Africa, Asia, Australia, and
Antarctica assumes importance as a trade link between the Mediterranean and
the Pacific Ocean.
The IOR is a critical geo-strategic space of competitive naval deployments
that features the presence of extra-regional naval forces. During the pre-1945
period, the IOR was referred to as a “British Lake” with colonial bases. During
the 1950s and 1960s, the United States developed only a peripheral interest in
the region. Following the exit of the British Royal Navy from the East of Suez in
1970, the region witnessed strong superpower interest, resulting in the United
States and the former Soviet naval presence in the region: for instance, the classic

Bidanda M Chengappa
case of the USS Enterprise which sailed into the Bay of Bengal in December 1971
towards the concluding phase of the India-Pakistan War over the liberation of
Bangladesh.
Surprisingly, the US Navy (USN) does not have a separate Fleet Command
for the Indian Ocean – like the two Fleet Commands for the Atlantic and Pacific
Oceans – warships of the Pacific Fleet Command (the Seventh Fleet) and
the USN Forces Europe (the Sixth Fleet) operate in the area. However, when
deploying in the Indian Ocean, these warships come under the jurisdiction
and command of an independent fleet – the Fifth Fleet. Interestingly, the US
Navy is the only dominant non-Asian Navy operating in the Indian Ocean
waters.
During the Cold War, the Nixon Doctrine that highlighted that the US
Navy’s real function in the Indian Ocean is to be stationed at the “water’s
edge” with a preference for an “island strategy” remains relevant even today.
One of the most important aspects of the 1969 Nixon Doctrine was a search
for allies to act as regional gendarmes in the IOR to defend Western interests
and prevent the emergence of crises that might place pressures on the US
to deploy her own military forces in the region. However, with the fall of the
Shah of Iran, who amounted to a gendarme and the Soviet military invasion
of Afghanistan in 1979, the Nixon Doctrine lost relevance and the Carter
Doctrine took shape.
The Carter Doctrine of January 1980 formalises US influence in the IOR. The
doctrine states: “An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian
Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the US and
such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military
force.” President Jimmy Carter created the Rapid Deployment Force to intervene
in the Persian Gulf following the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan in
December 1979.
The Pentagon has historically maintained considerable naval/military assets
in several strategically located states of the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea,
especially the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council – Bahrain, Kuwait,
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. During the Cold War,
the primary US objective was to have the political and military capability to
influence events in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. The USN and Joint Chiefs
of Staff since the early 1960s sought to construct a major military base on Diego
Garcia to defend and expand uncontested Western authority in the Indian Ocean.
The aim of US military power projection in the IOR was to deter indigenous

revolutionary activities that threaten to break the West’s economic and political
hold over the littoral states. Most of the IOR states have aid, trade and investment
linkages with the US.
This is due to US and Western dependence on the region for hydrocarbon
resources, trade and security linkage. US peace-time military diplomacy
has long been one of the essential constituents of its foreign policy and an
effective methodology, to foster bilateral and regional relationships. Military
training cooperation is an essential component of military diplomacy and
has helped to build close ties with other nations. Such cooperation also helps
to strengthen strategic security relationships and address common security
concerns.
US Strategic Interests
US economic interests in the region are oil wealth and transportation routes,
minerals and ocean wealth in the long-term, besides trade and shipping.
Another aspect is control of Chinese and Russian access to West Asian oil
resources. Washington’s political objectives are to curb the influence of Iran,
support Saudi Arabia, with a compliant policy towards US oil giants, besides
support to Pakistan against Afghanistan and, by proxy, curbing Russian
influence in the region.
US military objectives in the region would be to use the ocean as a launch
pad for missile strikes against Afghanistan. Another major interest of the US with
its military-industrial-economic (MIC) driven economy is to excel in the arms
trade with IOR littoral nations and military diplomacy to achieve these objectives.
Also, US maritime security interests would involve control of shipping through
the Malacca Strait.
US forces required for deployment in any Gulf crisis cannot be based there
given the intra-regional political divisions over the need for an overt American
military presence. Also, the unwillingness of regional states to provide Washington
facilities to station military forces highlights the need for maritime superiority in
the IOR. Therefore, the offensive capability of USN forces, sea-based tactical air
superiority and at sea sustainability of the fleet prove relevant in terms of flexible
deployments. For instance, the USN’s carrier strike groups that figure in the
Central Command’s scenarios for American military intervention against Iran
would, therefore, be stationed “over the horizon” in the Arabian Sea and the Gulf
of Oman, at shifting locations that are generally closer to New Delhi and Karachi
rather than to Abadan.

Bidanda M Chengappa
Clearly, a major US worry in the IOR is Africa owing to the security of oil
supplies. At present, sub-Saharan Africa accounts for more than 15 percent of
US oil supplies, a share expected to rise to 25 percent by 2015, according to the
US National Intelligence Council. Nigeria – the continent’s leading producer
that accounts for about 10 percent of current US oil imports – like other leading
African producers such as Angola, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea and Congo, is
located in the Gulf of Guinea.
For the US, Africa is an alternative source of energy supply to the Middle
East, but the region remains largely unstable. In 2006 alone, insurgents seeking
local control over Nigeria’s oil resources – most of which come from the Niger
Delta region – have cut the country’s exports by more than a quarter. With US
companies such as ExxonMobil and Chevron pumping nearly half of Nigeria’s oil,
the country’s southern oil region is widely seen as a likely target of US military
intervention.
China has also stepped up an aggressive effort to secure raw material
supplies, particularly oil, from African producers who traditionally supplied the
West. Visits to Africa by Chinese President Hu Jintao in 2006 and earlier this year
have been aimed at forging new cooperation ties, creating new businesses and
markets for Chinese companies and their products. Therefore, from an energy
security perspective, US influence is essential in the IOR, to be able to project
power in the African continent.
For the US Navy during peace-time, surveillance is a major military activity
to track movements of hostile naval forces in the region. This led to a chain of
US stations in the IOR at Mahe and Bacoa in the Seychelles, and Northwest Gap,
Pine Gap and Nurrungar in Australia. All these stations are for communications,
observation, satellite tracking and “space research.” Otherwise, US military power
projection in the region aims to deter indigenous revolutionary activities that
threaten to break the West’s economic and political hold over the littoral states as
most of them have aid, trade and investment linkages with the US.
Concluding Observations
The IOR is an area of geo-economic and geo-strategic significance owing to the
enormous energy and natural resources of the region which drive its significance.
Besides, the impact of globalisation in the post-Cold War period has potential
for further regional economic development. Also, the IOR is witness to emergent
power rivalries, power transitions and growing asymmetric conflicts. There are
also the geo-energy stakes in the adjoining West Asian and Central Asian Region.

The 9/11 terrorist attacks and the American attempt at regime change in Iraq
through use of force have ushered in a new era, that marks the end of the post-
Cold War period leading to the “post-post-Cold War period” in terms of the
militarised approach to US foreign policy implementation. This explains why the
USN, without a separate Fleet Command for the Indian Ocean – like the two Fleet
Commands for the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans – is the only dominant non-Asian
navy operating in the Indian Ocean waters.
The maritime space of the IOR has undergone a transformation following the
9/11 terrorist attack and the 2003 US-led war on Iraq. At the peak of operations
during the US-led War on Terror, over 100 warships, submarines and support
vessels were deployed in the North Arabian Sea. Today, the maritime dynamics
in the IOR are premised on force postures of the extra-regional navies deployed
for tasks of regional power projection, challenging violent non-state actors,
securing geo-energy reserves and security of energy supply chains. The strategic
significance of the IOR is evident from the emergent missions, new doctrines and
technologies that extra-regional naval forces showcase.
The reality of US influence in the Indian Ocean Region is clear from the
USN air strikes against targets in Afghanistan and Iraq during Operation
Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom in recent years. These missile
attacks demonstrate the USN’s ability to exercise military power against littoral
states deep inland from the sea, as well as its capability to maintain a forward
deployment of its aero-naval forces far away from their home bases in the US.

Why a Nation Needs
a Young Military
PK Gautam
Age Profile of Combat Leaders

Though in general, glorification of youth may be labelled a Western phenomenon,
in combat, universally, young generals, commanding officers and soldiers have
known to have performed better. In creative fields also, peak performance is at
younger age, like that of Shakespeare, Mozart, Einstein and Srinivasa Ramanujan.1
Lamenting on the aged profile of the hidebound and conservative British officer
cadre, the revolutionary thinker and maverick General JFC Fuller in his classic
work Generalship: Its Diseases and Their Cure showed that historically at least 75
per cent of great generals were under 45 years old.2 In an appendix titled “The
Age of 100 General,” Fuller listed the age of great military leaders at their peak
performance: Alexander 25 years, Hannibal 33 years, Caesar 44 years, Jenghiz
Khan 51 years, Napoleon 37 years, Clive 32 years, Wellington 43 years, Grant 41
years, Lee 57 years and Moltke, the oldest of the lot, 60 years in the year 1866.3
A modern example of superior combat generalship was displayed by the
young Israeli generals during the 1967 and 1973 Wars. Most generals were in
their late thirties or early forties. Our post-independence military operations also
point to the importance of young generalship and command. Tables 1, 2 and 3
have some examples.4
1947-48 Operations in Jammu and Kashmir

Table 1: 1947-48 Operations in Jammu and Kashmir
Serial Name Year of Birth Age During Operations
1. Maj Gen KS Thimayya, Divisional 1906 41 years
Commander
Colonel PK Gautam (Retd) is Research Fellow, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses,
New Delhi.

Why A Nation Needs A Young Military
2. Maj Gen Rajinder Singh (Spar- 1911 36 years

row), Divisional Commander
3. Maj Gen Kulwant Singh 1905 42 years
4. Air Cmde Meher ( Baba) Not 35 years

Singh,Air Officer in Chief, Op- Known ( approximate)
erational Command
Source: Compiled by the author.
On partition, there were not many senior Indian military officers.

Promotions thereafter came rapidly. In one way, it facilitated a much younger
higher military leadership which led from the front in operations in high
altitude and mountainous terrain. Table 1 shows that youth and its natural gift
of audacity was one vital factor for feats such as tanks crossing the Zojila Pass
under Gen Sparrow (age 36 years). In May 1948, the landing on an unprepared
strip at Leh at an altitude of 11,540 feet by a flight piloted by Baba Meher( age 35
years), with Thimayya( age 41) on board, was also a function of daring and risk
taking associated with younger generalship.5 Baba Meher as an equivalent of a
present day commander-in-chief of an air command also led the trial landing in
a Harvard aircraft at the beleaguered garrison at Poonch under observed enemy
fire. Post his trial landing, Dakotas’s commenced landing.6
IV Corps: Liberation of Bangladesh in 1971

Table 2 shows the age profile of IV Corps which was the eastern pincer in erstwhile
East Pakistan. The corps, for the first time in our military history, displayed a high
level of operational art and superior combat performance. The corps commander
was 52 years old, divisional commanders were an average 48 years and brigade
commanders and commanding officers were in their 40s/ 30s, and company
commanders averaged five years of service (below 30s) .
Table 2 - IV Corps: Liberation of Bangladesh 1971

Serial Name, Appointment Year of Birth Age During Operations
1. Lt Gen Sagat Singh, 1919 52 years
Corps Commander
2. Maj Gen K V Krishna Rao, Divi- 1923 48 years
sional Commander

PK Gautam

3. Maj Gen B K Gonsalves, 1921 49 years
Divisional Commander
4 Maj Gen RD Hira, 1923 48 years
Divisional Commander
5. Brigade Commanders/ 40s/ 30s
Commanding Officers
6. Company/Squadron/ Below 30s
Battery Commanders
The age profile of some senior officers of the Services is shown at Table
3. The youthfulness is evident and is an important factor for good military
performance.
Table 3: Senior Leadership During 1971

1. Gen SHFJ Manekshaw, 1914 57 years

Chief of the Army Staff
2. Air Chief Marshall PC Lal, 1916 55 years
Chief of the Air Staff
3. Lt Gen Jasjit Singh Arora, 1917 54 years
Eastern Army Commander
4. Lt Gen KP Candeth, 1916 55 years
Western Army Commander
5. Lt Gen ML Thapan, Corps 1918 53 years
Commander XXX Corps
6. Maj Gen JFR Jacob , 1921 50 years
Chief of Staff , Eastern
Command
The Problem of Longevity and Increase in Lifestyle

Diseases
The longevity of an average Indian has improved considerably. The United Nations
Human Development Report of 2006 shows life expectancy at birth for India at 63.6
years. At independence, it was around 40 years. Most of the infectious diseases have
been controlled. However, lifestyle changes, lack of sustainable interest in outdoor

activities and games, and influence of corporate values have led to a disturbing
increase in lifestyle related diseases such as obesity, high blood pressure, heart
problems, and diabetes.
As will be shown later, due to historic reasons, the Indian military is already
burdened with an aged profile of commanding officers and generals. Combined
with inflictions due to environmental factors or lifestyle diseases, the drop in
fitness standards has become an alarming trend and needs a relook from all aspects
of health.7 The old age of commanding officers combined with the propensity of
modern man falling prey to lifestyle disease is a “double whammy” and points to
the need of a younger age profile. This also requires the military to devise health
and medical procedures so that the young generation does not fall prey to these
health problems. This would only result in an unproductive disease burden and
excess of low medical category persons even before battle has been joined.
Present Situation of the Officer Cadre

Due to historic reasons, the Indian Army, for the last two decades or more, has
been facing challenges in age and experience in higher ranks.
An officer must command his unit at 12-14 years,8 a brigade at 16-18 years
and a division at 18 years of service. As a matter of comparison, the rank of a joint
secretary (equivalent in monetary terms to a major general) in civil service is
possible in about 18 years of service. Today (2008), officers of the 1970 batch are
corps commanders at the ripe age of 56 /57 years and will retire having ‘lived’ in
that rank for barely a couple of years. Thus, experience in general rank is limited
and at the tail end of a career – for barely four to eight years. This is both unfair to
the individual and an unprofessional dilemma for the nation. After all, experience
in service does matter, and most senior officers stagnate at the level of brigadier
and are not part of the loop on higher military matters as commanders. Thus,
they do not get the correct environment or experience in higher level national
security related conceptualisation, visualisation and translation of ideas/theories
into practice. If war is thrust upon us, we will have divisional, corps and army
commanders who will be still thinking like unit commanders or colonels as they
have spent their most productive years as colonels and, at the most, as brigadiers.
Battalion Commanders, Company Commanders and Soldiers

The old age of the cutting edge unit commanders and unit officers is another
“combat divider.” Table 4 gives the comparative data. The Indian Army has the
reputation of having the most aged commanding officers. As a matter of fact,

PK Gautam
in an age of visual media, the children of military officers have innocently been
known to ask “why the police officer looks so young on the TV and his counterpart
of the army so old and grey?”
Table 4: Comparative Average Age Profile of Countries

1. Battalion Commanders in Gulf War II(USA) -mid-30s
2. People’s Liberation Army star rank - 50 years
3. Pakistan Army Commanding Officers - 35 years
4. Indian Army Commanding Officers - early 40
5. Indian Armed Forces in 1971 War
a) Average age of military ( troops) - early 20s
b) Battalion Commanders - early 30s
Note: Empirical studies suggest age of commanding officers between 33 to 35
years of age.
Source: Jasjit Singh, “Younger Fighting Force for Combat Effectiveness,” Indian
Defence Review, vol.18, January-March 2003.
Unfortunately, these shocking old age profiles of officers are addressed

either through the prism of Pay Commission dialogues and negotiations or
committees. This nudges the military to seek only a comparative advantage
versus the civil services by way of increase in pay and cadre upgradation. The age
of fighting generals, brigadiers and colonels gets ignored. Combined with this is
the sheer absence of sufficient numbers of young officers. Picking up the rank
of a major now comes very early. But, paradoxically, there are not many sub-
unit commanders posted in a unit to command companies. Company officers
are conspicuous by the absence and most of the young officers in an infantry
battalion are attached officers from the Services for short durations.
Age of Soldiers and Jawans

It is no secret that the youth, with their exuberance, have led nations and people
in all historic revolutionary movements. Similarly, a youthful, trained and battle
hardened soldiery performs military tasks better. It is in this context that an
average jawan (soldier general duty) of the Indian Army who gets enrolled at the
age of 17 to 21 with colour service of 17 years, has to retire in his mid-30s or early
40s.
Due to sizeable and protracted involvement of the army, police and
paramilitary forces in counter-insurgency operations, there may emerge an

impression to compare the retiring age of the police with that of the army.
A constable serves till the age of 60. Financial theoreticians and pundits may
well argue on the following lines: “The tasks have changed—it’s now mostly low
intensity warfare. If the paramilitary is doing its job with a higher age profile, why
cannot the army do likewise.”9 At worst, they may approach these issues even as
a well intentioned welfare measure. This argument then may result in having an
army with jawans in their 40s and 50s in bulk. The lure of short-term financial
gains in raising the age profile may satisfy the discipline of defence economics.
However, as the final product of a military is victory, it is unlikely that an aged
army would deliver victory. Rather, with an aged army, as war approaches, there
will be a stream of soldiers heading to the hospital with toothaches, diabetes,
hypertension, gout, eye problems, and afflictions which visit humans beyond
middle age in any case. As war breaks out, the aged soldiers who get wounded,
would take much more time and resources to recover from wounds and rejoin
for combat duties.
Conclusion
A youthful profile for the armed forces is just not the concern of the Ministry of
Defence and the three Services. It is a concern of the nation at large. Unfortunately,
the shortage of young officers has grabbed the media and policy attention. It is
unlikely that there would ever be a supply problem of senior officers. Thus, a
youthful senior rank profile is not much in the public domain. The age profile
of commanding officers and higher ranks has got caught in a vicious cycle of
“institutionalisation” and comparison with other privileged civil services. The
nation also deserves a youthful military with younger officers at senior levels.
It also needs a full complement of young company, squadron and battery
commanders, captains/lieutenants and other ranks. Rather than treating this as
a turf issue of only the civil-military relations, solutions must be found to keep
our military young at the national level. Fresh thinking needs to be done on this
aspect.
Notes
1. There is reason to cheer. Recent research is showing that the old view of intellectual
power peaking at 40 may no longer be true. See Time, 23 January 2006, pp. 44-53. Also
notice the higher age profile of Nobel Laureates. But here we are dealing with the age
of the military leadership, which also needs other attributes of youth like risk taking,
physical fitness and sustained endurance in exhausting battle conditions.

PK Gautam
2. Maj Gen JFC Fuller, Generalship: Its Diseases and Their Cure (London: Faber and Faber,
1936), p. 63. See Appendix, “The Age of Hundred Generals”.
3. Ibid.
4. Tables 1, 2 and 3 are based on Army List/ information provided by the Centre for
Armed Forces Historical Research, United Service Institution of India, New Delhi.
5. Squadron Leader RTS Chhina (Retd), The Eagle Strikes: The Royal Indian Air Force
1932-1950 (New Delhi: Ambi Publishers, 2006), p. 267.
6. Interview of Squadron Leader, RTS Chhina (Retd), Secretary, Centre for Armed Forces
Historical Reseach (CAFHR), United Service Institution of India, by the author on 28
July 2006.
7. The World Health Report 2002 points out the rapid increase in lifestyle diseases in
developing countries, besides the existing burden of poverty induced unconquered
infectious diseases. See <http://www.who.int/whr/2002/en/Overview_E.pdf>.
Accessed on 22 June 2006.
8. Phase 1 of the Ajay Vikram Singh Committee, implemented in 2005, has in a limited
way, allowed commanding officers of the infantry and artillery with 16½ to 17
years, and armoured corps with 17 to 18 years of service. As far as the lower ranks
are concerned, an acting major needs to have two years of service and six years for
substantive rank. Similarly, the length of service for a lieutenant colonel is 13 years.
The report is not in the public domain. It is learnt that it has also mentioned the age
profile of divisional commanders.
9. Today, erroneously, even personnel from the police and paramilitary forces are being
referred to as “jawans”. Also, one cannot ignore combat dress and military accruements
being sported by non-military organisations.

The Evolution of US Policy
Towards Kashmir
The American policy towards the Kashmir dispute has been inconsistent: from
active efforts to resolve the dispute in the 1950s and 1960s, to benign neglect in
the 1970s, to a more proactive approach during the early Clinton period, to a more
nuanced but hands-off approach subsequently. The US policy on the Kashmir
dispute has changed because the US approach in Kashmir has changed, from
attempting to solve the complicated dispute, a ‘broad’ approach, to ensuring
that the conflict over Kashmir does not lead to instability and war in the region, a
more narrow approach. How the Obama Administration wishes to take the issue
further might be important to analyse what kind of a security-stability index
might appear in the region.
Background
In 1947, at the time of Indian independence, the princely state of Kashmir was
headed by a Hindu King, Maharaja Hari Singh, who ruled over a predominantly
Muslim population. The Pakistan military attack on the western border of
Jammu and Kashmir at the time, when the issue of accession of Kashmir
to India or Pakistan came up, prompted the Maharaja to seek the Indian
government’s support. Support was granted by Prime Minister Jawaharlal
Nehru but on the condition of Kashmir’s accession to India. Following the
agreement, India deployed its forces to repel the invaders, leading to the first
Indo-Pak War over Kashmir in 1947. When a ceasefire was eventually declared
in early 1949, India controlled two-thirds of the territory, a position which
has remained more or less constant over the last half-century, despite a war
over Kashmir in 1965. After remaining dormant through the 1970s and 1980s,
Dr Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan is Senior Fellow, Institute of Security Studies, Observer

Research Foundation, New Delhi.

an insurgency, actively supported by Pakistan, began in the late 1980s, and

continues to this day.
US Policy on the Dispute

The American position on the dispute has shifted several times in the last half-
century. There appear to have been at least two broad approaches in recent
American policy towards the Kashmir dispute, what may be referred to as the
‘narrow’ and the ‘broad’ approaches. Both were motivated by concern that
the Kashmir dispute might lead to a new crisis and war, and possibly, nuclear
escalation. The ‘narrow’ approach focussed on the core American concern — the
possibility of a crisis or war in the subcontinent, which the US tried very hard,
and successfully, to prevent. The ‘broad’ approach sought to solve the Kashmir
dispute itself, as a way of preventing the dispute from having any potential for
escalation. These changes can be seen in the way Washington’s policy evolved
throughout the 1990s.
When the Kashmir insurgency began in 1989, the (elder) Bush Administration’s
primary concern was to avoid a clash between the two countries. Several
Administration officials made clear the US position that it no longer supported
the move for a plebiscite in Kashmir and the stated position was that the United
States thought that the best framework for a resolution of the Kashmir dispute
was through the 1972 Shimla Agreement, in which India and Pakistan agreed to
resolve their dispute peacefully and through bilateral channels. The US policy, in
fact, was in complete endorsement of the Indian position on the dispute that the
Kashmir dispute had to be resolved through bilateral negotiations. The primary
Bush effort as regards the Kashmir dispute was directed at dampening down the
1990 crisis, which US intelligence believed had the potential for escalation.
US policy changed dramatically when the Clinton Administration took
over in 1993. It became much more proactive, attempting to move towards the
resolution of the dispute itself. However, after several missteps, and avoidable
controversies, the US position became much more conservative, eventually
returning to a posture that appeared similar to the earlier Bush approach of
attempting to prevent a war or escalation rather than attempting to solve the
dispute itself. This was best demonstrated by the US approach during the Kargil
War in the summer of 1999.
The second Bush Administration had taken a more conservative approach
to the Kashmir dispute, taking the position that the dispute needed to be
solved through a bilateral framework between India and Pakistan. However,

The Evolution of US Policy Towards Kashmir
after the 9/11 terror attacks in the US, and with the war on terror emerging as
a major foreign and security policy preoccupation, there was a general sense
that this position would change as Pakistan, which has been a frontline state
along with the US, could put pressure on the US to take on a more active role
in the resolution of the dispute. Much to the disappointment of Pakistan,
the US maintained its balanced approach in not dragging Kashmir as part of
the Pakistan-Afghanistan problem. This is not to suggest that the US was not
concerned about the problem. The US, particularly the Bush Administration,
obviously has had serious concerns that the Indo-Pak stand-off might escalate
into full-fledged war in the subcontinent. Operation Parakram and the build-
up of forces on both sides after the terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament
in December 2001, saw a renewed US interest in Kashmir. The approach,
however, was similar to Bush Senior’s approach of attempting to prevent a war
or escalation rather than attempting to solve the dispute itself. In essence, both
the exigencies of the situation (satisfying Musharraf’s desire for a more active
American role), and a perception that Kashmir requires a fundamental solution
could have led to a return to the ‘broad’ approach to the problem of the Kashmir
dispute. But the Bush Administration’s position was much more nuanced. And,
given Bush’s overall approach towards India and Pakistan’s double standard on
the war on terror, there was no return to the broad approach in dealing with
Kashmir.
Bush’s approach towards Kashmir was also conditioned by the 9/11 terror
attacks in the US. There was a decisive shift after the terror attacks, which was
reflected essentially in the definitional aspects of terrorism. The US has had
to accept a broad definition on terrorism to include all forms of terrorism, and
everywhere, and not just acts committed on US soil, and against US citizens or
institutions. Again, although it appeared willing to adopt a broader connotation
to “terrorism,” it was still not clear whether the US was using the same yardstick to
terrorism in the US and in other parts of the world, including India. For example,
the US was reluctant to characterise as terrorism various acts of political violence
that terrorist groups have indulged in the various parts of India. Though the US
did characterise the December 13 attack on the Indian Parliament as a terrorist
act, they have been unwilling to accept the considerable quantity of evidence
that suggests that Pakistan had, at the least, an indirect hand in the attack. Even
the concern that the US had shown appeared more motivated by the desire to
soothe Indian anger rather than the result of genuine concern. This suggests two
different yardsticks to define and tackle terrorism. When terror strikes America,

war and other military action is the immediate response, but when India faces
an attack on its Parliament or a 26/11, restraint is sought.
Another aspect of change in the US approach was about how the US views
liberation movements and freedom struggles all over the world. For example,
violence by terrorists in Kashmir was not considered terrorism until 9/11. Today,
some of the active terrorist groups in Kashmir — Jaish-e-Mohammad, Lashkar-
e-Tayyeba (the two groups responsible for the December 13 attack on the Indian
Parliament) — are designated Foreign Terrorist Organisations (FTOs) under US
law. It is well known that these two groups have been nurtured by the Pakistan
government and its intelligence arm, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). The
Indian demand to Pakistan to take action against these two groups was not
heeded by the Pakistan government until President Bush categorised these two
groups as terrorist organisations. Hence, the US action on different terrorist
groups and its overall approach to tackling terrorism has tremendous impact
on several individual countries’ approach towards terrorism as well as the
international counter-terrorism measures. India, in fact, has had its difficulties
on the manner in which terrorism has been defined by the US. What constitutes
terrorism for India has not been what the US characterised as terrorism.
It is, however, now appropriate to analyse how an Obama Administration
would handle the Kashmir issue in his yearning to solve the Afghanistan problem
and the war on terror. A few fundamental issues are to be borne in mind before
analysing what Obama’s prescription for Kashmir would be.
The Democrats have generally tended to be more interventionist than the
Republicans, as they are of the view that the US should play an active role in
regional conflicts to both resolve these conflicts as well as to protect human rights
during these conflicts. The Clinton Administration had intervened in a number
of such conflicts including in Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia, Yugoslavia, Congo, Liberia,
Albania, Iraq, Afghanistan and Yemen. Obama appears set to continue with that
trend. Susan Rice, a key Obama adviser and US ambassador to the UN, stated
during her Senate confirmation hearing that the Obama Administration will
continue with the traditional Democratic Party policy of promoting democracy
and human rights around the world.
The pro-interventionist strategy of the Democrats has caused problems in
the Indo-US relations in the past. If Obama is to continue with such a strategy,
this would involve the Obama Administration wanting to mediate and seek a
solution to the Kashmir problem. Obama’s recent comments during interviews
to Time magazine in October and December 2008 and the reported consideration

The Evolution of US Policy Towards Kashmir
(earlier) of former President Bill Clinton as a special envoy on Kashmir had created
a major stir in the Indian political and policy circles. Obama in his interview said,
“We should probably try to facilitate a better understanding between Pakistan
and India and try to resolve the Kashmir crisis so that they (Pakistan) can stay
focused not on India, but on the situation with those militants.” Some analysts
in India have tended to believe that a Kashmir-specific proactive policy need not
necessarily be bad, given Obama’s pro-India statements. However, it should be
noted that his pro-India statements in the recent months had more to do with
getting support from the Indian-American community.
The issue, however, is that Obama considers finding a solution to the Kashmir
issue almost a prerequisite for getting Pakistan’s support for the war on terror
in Afghanistan. Linking Afghanistan to the resolution of the Kashmir dispute, as
Obama did in his interview to Time magazine when he said that “working with
Pakistan and India to try to resolve their Kashmir conflict would be a critical task”
for his Administration’s efforts to try to counter growing instability in Afghanistan
and Pakistan, will be problematic. The tendency to link up Afghanistan’s security
with terrorism in Kashmir is a dangerous trend and India must keep a close watch.
The US has to focus on the problem, which is Pakistan, rather than get diverted
by Pakistan’s diversions into Kashmir. As the Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of
Staff, Adm. Mike Mullen, recently noted, it is the Afghan-Pakistan border region
that is the “site of planning for the next attack” on the United States; hence, the
US should not lose sight of their target — Pakistan.
For the time being, the Obama Administration seems sensitive enough to
India’s concerns in this regard. The recent news of the possible appointment of
Richard Holbrooke as the special envoy on South Asia had created concern in
India. Any individual would have been bad, but as one former US official noted
in an article in Foreign Policy, “The Indians do not like Holbrooke because he has
been very good on Pakistan ... and has a very good feel for the place.” However,
thanks to Indian lobbying in Washington, India has been able to ensure that the
official “Terms of Reference” of Holbrooke are limited: he has been appointed as
“special representative for Afghanistan and Afghanistan.” This remains, as the
Foreign Policy reported, “a sharp departure from Obama’s own previously stated
approach of engaging India, as well as Pakistan and Afghanistan, in a regional
dialogue.” South Asian analysts in Washington noted that it was prudent of the
Obama Administration not to include India in Holbrooke’s official mandate, or
else the special envoy’s mission could have been a “non-starter.” It might be true
that the Obama transition team did not meet with any foreign representatives

on the issue, but a meeting of the Aspen group in Washington was attended by
some of the Obama team members where it was categorically stated that “India
might preemptively make Richard Holbrooke persona non grata if his South Asia
envoy mandate officially included India or Kashmir.” Among the Obama team
members who attended the meeting were former Navy Secretary Richard Danzig,
Kurt Campbell, the director of the Aspen Strategy Group who was later named as
assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, and former Pentagon
official and Harvard University professor, Ashton Carter,.
In conclusion, one might say that it will be prudent of the Obama
Administration not to meddle in the Kashmir imbroglio, not because India
cannot withstand those pressures but because it might avoid an irritant in
the otherwise prospering Indo-US bilateral relations. At some level, it can be
concluded that India is comfortable with the ‘narrow’ approach towards Kashmir
that the US has adopted from time to time, as was done during Kargil. It may
not be correct to say that India does not seek US involvement in India-Pakistan
issues. India does seek selective US intervention, as is being witnessed currently
too. After the Mumbai terror attacks, India has been unable to bring Pakistan to
cooperate and so sought US intervention to put pressure on Pakistan. However,
such intervention can only douse the occasional fire, not settle the matter once
and for all.

Book Review
The Icon: Marshal of the Indian Air Force

Arjan Singh, DFC
An Authorised Biography
Jasjit Singh
KW Publishers Pvt. Ltd, and
Centre for Air Power Studies, New Delhi, 2009
Rs 880
In a nation that has few heroes, Marshal of the Air Force Arjan Singh, DFC, a
sprightly 91-year-old Second World War veteran and former Chief of Air Staff,
is a real national icon. Commissioned into the Indian Air Force at the age
of 20 in December 1939, Arjan Singh learnt his trade strafing the tribals in
Waziristan while flying the Westland Wapiti. At 24, commanding the ‘Tigers’,
No. 1 (IAF) Squadron, he helped to fight the Japanese to a grinding halt at
Imphal and to turn Field Marshal Sir William Slim’s defeat into victory in
Burma (Myanmar).
An intrepid pilot and a bold commander, Arjan Singh’s immense
contribution to India’s war effort was soon recognised and Lord Louis
Mountbatten, Supreme Commander, Southeast Asia, and later the last
Viceroy, personally pinned the Distinguished Flying Cross (DFC) on the young
officer’s chest on the tarmac of the Imphal airfield when it was still under
siege. The post-Independence years saw Arjan Singh rise rapidly through the
ranks, serving with professional brilliance through various command and
staff appointments, till he took over as the Chief of Air Staff just before the
1965 War with Pakistan.
He led the Indian Air Force with great distinction during the war in which
Indian Gnats and Hunters ran rings around the US-supplied F-86 Sabre jets
and F-104 Starfighters of the Pakistan Air Force (PAF). A Mystere ground-attack
aircraft shot down a PAF Starfighter! Arjan Singh was honoured with the Padma
Vibushan and became the first Indian to be promoted to the rank of Air Chief
Marshal.

Book Review
After his retirement from the IAF in 1969, he served as India’s ambassador in
Switzerland, with simultaneous accreditation to the Holy See, and then in Kenya.
He served as member of the Minorities Commission, chairman of IIT-Delhi, and
as Delhi’s Lt-Governor. He was able to discharge all of these responsibilities with
immense enthusiasm and great vision. And on January 26, 2002, a grateful nation
bestowed on this visionary leader the ultimate honour an air warrior can aspire
to: the rank of Marshal of the Air Force.
Air Commodore Jasjit Singh (Retd), author of The Icon, is himself a decorated
air warrior, Padma Bhushan awardee, renowned national security analyst,
former director of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, and author
of acclaimed books. He has not only told the story of the life and times of the
Marshal with deep affection and sincerity, but has also woven into the narrative
an analytical history of the IAF during its early years.
The expansion of the IAF, acquisition of new aircraft, setting up of facilities to
manufacture fighter aircraft in India and the perennial air transport operations in
support of the army deployed along far-flung frontiers are all covered in great detail.
The story of why the combat air power of the IAF was not employed against the
Chinese during the 1962 border war, ostensibly to avoid the bombing of Kolkata by
the Chinese, is told dispassionately. It was a major military folly, indeed, for the use of
air power would have made a substantial difference to the end result.
Remarkably, air power was again not used against forces in East Pakistan
in 1965, even though the Kalaikunda air base was attacked by the Pakistan Air
Force (PAF). The book debunks the well-entrenched myth that the PAF won
the air war in 1965 with hard facts about the number of sorties flown, the total
damage inflicted and the air domination achieved. The author says that over 90
per cent of the army’s requirement for close air support was provided and that
the army was more than satisfied with the efforts of the IAF to keep the PAF at
bay.
Jasjit Singh also highlights the gaps in the higher defence organisation, the
absence of adequate intelligence assessments – sadly, still to be corrected – and
the almost complete lack of joint operational planning. The yawning gap in the
civil-military relations is also evident. The Ministry of Defence requested the US
for 12 squadrons of F-104 Starfighters and two squadrons of B-52 bombers in 1962
without consulting the IAF! There are obviously still many lessons that have not
been learnt.
Above all, the book amply reflects the profound compassion for fellow
warriors that the Marshal displayed throughout his long and illustrious career,

Book Review
and still does in his 90s. The Icon is the biography of an air warrior whom
India is truly proud of – a tale well told. It should be compulsory reading for
all soldiers, sailors and airmen – as well as for their political masters and the
bureaucracy.
(Courtesy: Mail Today, May 10, 2009.)
By
Brigadier Gurmeet Kanwal (Retd)
Director, Centre for Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi.
India China Relations: The Border Issue and Beyond

Mohan Guruswamy and Zorawar Daulet Singh
Observer Research Foundation
and Viva Books Pvt Ltd, New Delhi, 2009
Despite booming economic ties between India and China, the

long standing border dispute continues to cast a long shadow
over the relations between the two countries. The border issue
also remains the biggest obstacle to complete normalisation of ties. There has been a
regular high level interaction between the two sides to formulate a strategic dialogue
(2006 was dubbed as “Sino-India Friendship Year”). The strategic dialogue included
the development of bilateral relations, economic and trade development, defence
cooperation and settlement of the boundary dispute as core issues. Yet friction and
tension continues to simmer over many core and fundamental issues. Prominent
among these are the border dispute, China’s reluctance in giving approval at the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to the Indo-US nuclear deal, a continued
lack of support for India’s candidature to the UN Security Council and the Tibet
issue.
With the above backdrop, the authors have sought to shed light on the
historical evolution of the Sino-Indian border dispute. They have traced the
legacy of a great game that was played in the region by the British and the Soviets
to secure a buffer for themselves against each other’s perceived advancements in
the region. In the initial chapters, the book traces a series of cartographic surveys
and conventions undertaken by the British with tribal chieftains on the outer

Book Review
periphery or the ‘ring fence’ of their empire in the subcontinent. These surveys
for the first time led to the formation of a common frontier between India and
Tibet in 1816. The surveys not being very accurate, also led to the formulation of
several ‘claim’ lines by both sides over each other’s territories.
Chapter 2 of the book dwells on the evolution of the boundary with China
under the British rule, while Chapter 3 gives an overview of the India-Tibet-China
relationship as Tibet continues to have a significant influence on the relations
between India and China. Chapters 4 and 5 provide a detailed study on the legacy
that was inherited by India on gaining her independence and major bilateral treaties
signed in the 1950s. A legacy of underlying ‘claim lines’ thereafter culminated in
the debacle of 1962 when policy-makers in India only anticipated China to ‘bark’
and not to ‘bite’ in response to India’s forward policy in relation to its North-East.
In the concluding chapters, the book covers a broad sweep of various
diplomatic efforts and steps taken since the 1970s to mend relations, with
reciprocal visits between both countries at the highest levels. Both sides have
signed a number of trade and cultural agreements. The signing of military
confidence building measures has led to significantly lowered tensions between
the two countries on the Line of Actual Control (LAC).
Although the authors advocate a de jure settlement around a de facto position
coming close to a kind of package deal where both sides authenticate each other’s
present positions in Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh (Tawang) after evolving a
national consensus, in the final analysis, the book could have possibly deliberated
more on other aspects between the two oldest and largest civilisations in the world.
Historically, China has settled land disputes with most of its neighbours, but the little
progress on the border issue with India should also be seen in the light of China’s
phenomenal rise and its ambitions of emerging as a superpower, where it sees India
as the only power in the region which can pose some challenge to it. Hence, ‘other
factors’ could also impinge on an early settlement of the border issue. The transfer of
nuclear technology to Pakistan, its continued diplomatic support to it over Kashmir
and the issue of channeling the Brahmaputra waters northwards and their effects on
finding a quick solution to the border dispute has not found much mention.
The book assumes significance in the present geo-political context where
China is gradually emerging as a power to challenge American hegemony in the
world. The increased US involvement in South Asia, with India entering into a
strategic alliance with the US, is a cause for concern with China. China, in all
likelihood, will continue with the present status so that it can leverage the border
issue with India at the opportune moment.

Book Review
Although the book fails to provide any new solution to the long-standing
border dispute, the manner in which the complete border issue with China has
been presented will be useful for researchers undertaking studies on India-
China relations. Besides, the nature of India’s open society, electoral democracy
where policies are under public scrutiny, vis-à-vis China being a state without
encumbrances of public opinion, combined with China perceiving India as
the only rival it has in Asia, poses yet another challenge to those who proceed
towards a resolution of the border issue between the two countries. The book
will also provide a ready reckoner for future diplomatic and political initiatives
that take place to arrive at a mutually acceptable solution to the complex border
issue with China. It should be compulsory reading for all officers dealing with the
India-China territorial and boundary dispute.
By
Colonel Ravi Tuteja
Deputy Director, Centre for Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi.
Towards a Nuclear Weapon Free World

Manpreet Sethi [Ed.]
KW Publishers Pvt. Ltd, New Delhi
Centre for Air Power Studies, New Delhi, 2009
In June 2008, the Centre for Strategic and International

Studies (CSIS) organised a conference to discuss the
possibilities for global nuclear disarmament. Held along
with the Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA), the
conference explored the opportunities for, and challenges of, a nuclear weapon
free world (NWFW) in the transformed security context of the new millennium.
This book is a compilation of the papers presented at the conference by the
world’s leading experts on disarmament.
Essentially, the conference and the ensuing compendium marked the
twentieth anniversary of the Action Plan introduced by the then Indian Prime
Minister Rajiv Gandhi, at the Third Special Session on Nuclear Disarmament
of the UN General Assembly. As Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said in his
inaugural speech, the Action Plan was a “comprehensive exposition” of India’s
approach towards global disarmament. Ten years before the nuclear explosions

Book Review
of Pokhran II shook the world, it is interesting to note how the Nehruvian

concepts of “atoms for peace” and “global disarmament” simultaneously
constituted India’s nuclear policy. In fact, Rajiv Gandhi had referred to nuclear
deterrence as the “ultimate expression of the philosophy of terrorism”. As much
water has since passed below the bridge, Brazilian diplomat Sergio Duarte
enquires if the Action Plan can still inspire constructive multilateral initiatives
for global nuclear disarmament.
With the benefit of hindsight, it is clear that the post-Cold War euphoria
around the possibility of the universal elimination of nuclear weapons has
sadly demised. There are two diametrically opposing logics for this – one, that
the possession of nuclear weapons by some states has led other states to covet
nuclear weapon technology. As a result, the mistrust, cynicism and frustration
borne out of the failure to shed the “baggage of the past” have resulted in the
inability to move beyond the possession of nuclear weapons and associated
status or stigma. Manpreet Sethi deals with this in the preface and then again in
her paper on devaluing and delegitimising nuclear weapons.
In a contrary scenario, the post-Cold War also brought about a paradigm
shift from competitive to cooperative security. As “decades of hostilities were
replaced with dialogue”, the unlikely fallout was the weakening of the movement
for global disarmament. As Jasjit Singh puts it, “Apparently no longer under the
shadow of the bomb, the international community began to live in complacency”.
Further, the move towards collective security has adopted the protective cloak of
nuclear deterrence. As Ivan Safranchuk proposes in his paper, there is the belief
that nuclear-armed states do not go to war with each other. However, in the
future, will this comfort zone of nuclear deterrence be abandoned in order to
visualise a new, non-nuclear world?
When Ban Ki Moon took over as secretary general of the United Nations, he
pledged renewed support for the cause of disarmament — previously stymied
efforts were to be rekindled “to invigorate disarmament and non-proliferation
efforts”. This begs two critical questions: first, what are the challenges facing
global disarmament and, second, who will assume the role of leadership? Both
are dealt with in the course of the book. While Jasjit Singh’s paper discusses the
need for a common yardstick, it also plays with the possibility of a global zero. But
most importantly, it raises the issue of the “third nuclear wave” and the dangers
of the new nuclear environment where the prospects of nuclear violence by non-
state actors become more real each passing day.
How then must we look forward to a “nuclear weapon free world” and a

Book Review
“non-violent world order to sustain it”? Hamid Ansari suggests in his paper that
the answers lie in investigating the logic of realism as the current disarmament
process is rendered impotent by a political context it cannot change. Ansari also
points out the International Court of Justice (ICJ) dilemma: “Would a higher
priority be accorded to the survival of the state if the survival of humanity were
at stake?”
But even before nuclear abolition can be further debated, it flounders
on two basic issues : “the desirability of achieving such a state and the
feasibility of doing so”. The diplomacy of nuclear disarmament requires
verification, confidence-building and regional restraint. Presuming that the
scope for progress in the short-term is relatively modest, the pragmatic logic
places emphasis on the possible, not the desirable. In the post-post Cold War
scenario, the contemporary security calculus gives the hope for neither –
George Perkovich and James Acton detail the workings of the nuclear industry
which places so much emphasis on non-proliferation controls and ownership
patterns that the call for disarmament doesn’t figure. Incremental as it might
be, is the process of disarmament so difficult to achieve that it is eventually
less desirable?
Additionally, the ambit of this discourse leaves no space for the emergence of
leadership willing to assume responsibility for disarmament. While momentum
for disarmament is building in the West, led by countries such as the US, UK and
Norway, the emergence of Asia’s role and of coalitions across the world such as
the Group of Eight, the Six-Nation Initiative and the Mayors for Peace initiative
have interesting potential. Through the book, there is also mention of the Hoover
Plan, initiated by George Schultz, Henry Kissinger, William Perry and Sam Nunn.
Chinese and Russian perspectives present in the chapters by Li Chang He and
Ivan Safranchuk prefer a global calculus to a regional one, privileging Cold War,
post-Cold War and post-post-Cold War scenario-building to Asian or South Asian
contextualising. But other papers refer to the possibilities for universal change “if
the political will from the top could coalesce with the push of public opinion from
below”.
In the end, the Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan is “consistent with as much as
six decades of work on the inside and on the outside of the UN to advance the
internationally agreed goal of general and complete disarmament”. While the
papers in this book do justice to the revival of the plan, they also raise other
fundamental questions pertinent to the contemporary politico-nuclear scenario.
Has the argum ent for disarmament ceased to be relevant for the survival of the

Book Review
human species? Condoleezza Rice is quoted as saying that for the first time since
the fall of Westphalia, the prospect of violent conflict between great powers is ever
more unthinkable. But as nations learn to compete in peace, will transnational,
borderless entities increase problems of insecurity? And in doing so, will they
irreparably dent the cause of nuclear disarmament?
If nations give up nuclear weapons because other nations have, what about
those unaccounted nukes that are doing the rounds across the world, possibly
in terrorist havens? If our bulwark against proliferation is not strong enough to
save us from the danger of complete annihilation, will states increasingly resort
to nuclear weapons and the time-tested benefits of deterrence? Or will global
nuclear disarmament find a new methodology and survive new hurdles? These
questions and many more are raised and contemplated in the book, Towards a
Nuclear Weapon Free World.
By
Ms Swapna Kona Nayudu
Associate Fellow, Centre for Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi.

Notes for Contributors
General
The CLAWS Journal welcomes professional articles on warfare and conflict, national security and strategic
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Notes For Contributors
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Referencing Style: References should be typed in the form of the following example on first appearance:
(a) Books:
Michael Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge (London: Routledge, 1989), p. 26.
(b) Edited Volume:

James Der Derian (ed.), International Theory: Critical Investigations (New York: New York University Press, 1995).
(c) Articles in Journals:

Samina Yasmeen, “Pakistan’s Kashmir Policy: Voices of Moderation?,” Contemporary South Asia, Vol. 12, No.
2, June 2003, pp. 187-202. In case of two journals having a similar title, the place of publication must be
mentioned, e.g., International Affairs (London) and International Affairs (Moscow).
(d) Articles in Edited Volumes:

Tom Nairn, “The Curse of Rurality: Limits of Modernisation Theory” in John A. Hall (ed.), The State of the

Notes For Contributors
Nation: Ernest Gellner and the Theory of Nationalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998),
pp. 107-34
(e) Articles in Newsmagazines: Gurmeet Kanwal, “Pakistan: On the Brink,” The Week, November 4, 2007, p. 45.
(f) Articles from Newspapers: M. K. Bhadrakumar, “New Regionalism in Central Asia,” The Hindu, July 14,
2004.
(g) References to Websites: United Nations Development Programme, “Arab Human Development Report
2003”, http://www.undp.org/rbas/ ahdr/english2003.html, accessed on October 27, 2007.
(h) Reports and Documents:

l United Nations, UNCED, The Global Partnership for Environment and Development (New York: United
Nations, 1992).
l Canberra Commission, Report on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons (Canberra: Commonwealth of
Australia, 1996). Available on the Internet at <http://www.dfat.gov.au/cc/cchome.html>
(i) Conference Papers:

Michael Williams, “The Discursive Power of Community: Consideration on the European ‘Security
Community’”, Draft Paper presented at the conference on Power, Security and Community: IR Theory and
the Politics of EU Enlargement, Copenhagen, 9-12 October 1997.
(j) Unpublished Theses and Dissertations:

Christopher Strawn, “Falling of the Mountain: A Political History and Analysis of Bhutan, the Bhutanese
Refugees and the Movement in Exile”, Dissertation submitted to the University of Wisconsin, USA, 1993,
Chap. 4.
On subsequent reference (unless immediately following the first reference, in which case Ibid. will be used)
the examples above will become:
(a) Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, p. 72.
(b) Derian, International Theory.
(c) Yasmeen, “Pakistan’s Kashmir Policy,” p. 195.
(d) Nairn, “The Curse of Rurality,” p. 125.
(e) Kanwal, “Pakistan: On the Brink,” p. 45.
(f) Bhadrakumar, “New Regionalism.”
(g) United Nations Development Programme, “Arab Human Development.”
(h) United Nations, UNCED, The Global Partnership.
(i) Williams, “The Discursive Power of Community.”
(j) Strawn, Falling of the Mountain.
Copyright: The copyright of all materials published lies with the Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS),
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CLAWS Journal
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Email: landwarfare@gmail.com
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Claws 2009

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Claws 2009

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The Kargil War: Some Reflections 1

Report of the Kargil Review Committee: An Appraisal 18

Kargil War: The Final Battle 28

Kargil: Dynamics of a Limited War Against a Nuclear Backdrop 38

Pakistan’s Strategic Blunder at Kargil 53

Kargil 1999: Limited War, Unlimited Consequences 73

Debating Defence Reforms Since Kargil 88

India-Pakistan: The Pangs of Peace 113

Terrorism in India: External Ramifications 121

Army-Media Relations in Sub-conventional Conflict 132

The Utility of Military Expenditures in South Asia 147

Sun Tzu at the Computer: Informationising the “Art of War” 164

Tigers Tamed, but What Next? 183

Morals and Ethics in the Armed Forces: A De Novo Look 198

Emerging Trends in Supply Chain Management 225

US Influence in the Indian Ocean Region 244

Why a Nation Needs A Young Military 250

The Evolution of US Policy Towards Kashmir 257

The Icon: Marshal of the Indian Air Force 263

India China Relations: The Border Issue and Beyond 265

Towards a Nuclear Weapon Free World 267

Notes for Contributors 271

v Annual (Ordinary members) - Rs 800/-

For membership, please make all payments in favour of

Claws Journal l Summer 2009 1

2 Claws Journal l Summer 2009

Intelligence and Surveillance Failure

Claws Journal l Summer 2009 3

4 Claws Journal l Summer 2009

Briefing and debriefing of patrols were not given due Surveillance

Claws Journal l Summer 2009 5

Pakistani Measures for Surprise and Deception

6 Claws Journal l Summer 2009

military intrusion into the Indian territory, our A factor that

Political and Military Strategy

Claws Journal l Summer 2009 7

8 Claws Journal l Summer 2009

COSC then took a unanimous decision to recommend joint strategy, operational

Why the Political Restraint?

Claws Journal l Summer 2009 9

10 Claws Journal l Summer 2009

supplemented the Western Naval Fleet with selected Kargil was

Claws Journal l Summer 2009 11

Strategic Lessons from the War

Capability to wage a successful conventional and nuclear war is a

12 Claws Journal l Summer 2009

n A limited conventional war will require close There are

Brilliant Junior Leadership: A reflection on the Kargil War will never be

Claws Journal l Summer 2009 13

14 Claws Journal l Summer 2009

only been cosmetic. The willingness and spirit to In the new

Claws Journal l Summer 2009 15

16 Claws Journal l Summer 2009

essence of military leadership lies in the manner in which we react to restore a

Claws Journal l Summer 2009 17

The Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS) interviewed

Mr K Subrahmanyam is former Secretary for Defence Production, Ministry of Defence and

18 Claws Journal l Summer 2009

Claws Journal l Summer 2009 19

Kargil Balance Sheet: Security as a Full Time Job

Kargil will feature as a defining moment in the history of the subcontinent

20 Claws Journal l Summer 2009

aimed at or obtained. But it did produce a number of spin-off benefits which

Global Security Risk

Claws Journal l Summer 2009 21

in power in Pakistan and, therefore, with Mr Sharif. Hostilities of the Kargil

[Courtesy: The Times of India, 26 July 1999]

Reconnaissance Organisation (NTRO) and Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA).

22 Claws Journal l Summer 2009

Similarly, while I was secretary (Defence Production), I suggested the transfer

Speaking of the recommendations that are yet to be implemented, why in your

Claws Journal l Summer 2009 23