Name: Renz Lyle H.

Laguitao
Special Proceedings (Weekday Class)
Professor: Atty. Brenda Tangarorang

Written Case Reports

Avelino vs. CA, GR no. 115181 (March 31, 2000)

Facts:
Petitioner Maria Socorro Avelino is a daughter and compulsory heir of the late Antonio
Avelino, Sr., and his first wife private respondent Angelina Avelino. She filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration of the estate of Antonio Avelino, Sr., who died intestate and asked that
she be appointed the administrator of the estate. Angelina and the siblings filed their
opposition by filing a motion to convert the said judicial proceedings to an action for
judicial partition, which petitioner duly opposed. The judge issued the assailed order
which converted the petition for the issuance of letters of administration into a judicial
partition of the estate of deceased Antonio Avelino, Sr. The parties were directed to
submit a complete inventory of all the real and personal properties left by the deceased.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Petitioner filed before the
Court of Appeals, a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus alleging grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the trial
court. The respondent appellate court issued the assailed decision which a=rmed the
order of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
The sole issue here is whether respondent appellate court committed an error of law
and gravely abused its discretion in upholding the trial court's finding that a partition is
proper in this case.

Ruling:
When a person dies intestate, or, if testate, failed to name an executor in his will or the
executor so named is incompetent, or refuses the trust, or fails to furnish the bond
required by the Rules of Court, then the decedent's estate shall be judicially
administered and the competent court shall appoint a quali7ed administrator in the order
established in Section 6 of Rule 78. The exceptions to this rule are found in Sections 1
and 2 of Rule 74 which provide: “SECTION 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement
between heirs. — If the decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age or
the minors are represented by their judicial or legal representatives duly authorized for
the purpose, the parties may, without securing letters of administration, divide the estate
among themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the office of
the register of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of
partition. SEC. 2. Summary settlement of estates of small value. — Whenever the gross
value of the estate of a deceased person, whether he died testate or intestate, does not
exceed ten thousand pesos, and that fact is made to appear to the Regional Trial Court
having jurisdiction of the estate by the petition of an interested person and upon
hearing, which shall be held not less than one (1) month nor more than three (3) months
from the date of the last publication of a notice which shall be published once a week for
three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province, and
after such other notice to interested persons as the court may direct, the court may
proceed summarily, without the appointment of an executor or administrator, and
without delay, to grant, if proper, allowance of the will, if any there be, to determine who
are the persons legally entitled to participate in the estate and to apportion and divide it
among them after the payment of such debts of the estate as the court shall then find to
be due; and such persons, in their own right, if they are of lawful age and legal capacity,
or by their guardians or trustees legally appointed and qualified, if otherwise, shall
thereupon be entitled to receive and enter into the possession of the portions of the
estate so awarded to them respectively. The court shall make such order as may be just
respecting the costs of the proceedings, and all orders and judgments made or
rendered in the course thereof shall be recorded in the office of the clerk, and the order
of partition or award, if it involves real estate, shall be recorded in the proper register's
office.” The heirs succeed immediately to all of the rights and properties of the
deceased at the moment of the latter's death. Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court,
allows heirs to divide the estate among themselves without need of delay and risks of
being dissipated. When a person dies without leaving pending obligations, his heirs are
not required to submit the property for judicial administration, nor apply for the
appointment of an administrator by the court.

The basis for the trial court’s order converting an action for letters of administration to
one for judicial partition is Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. It provides that in
cases where the heirs disagree as to the partition of the estate and no extrajudicial
settlement is possible, then an ordinary action for partition may be resorted to, as in this
case. This Court has held that where the more expeditious remedy of partition is
available to the heirs, then the heirs or the majority of them may not be compelled to
submit to administration proceedings. The trial court appropriately converted petitioner’s
action for letters of administration into a suit for judicial partition, upon motion of the
private respondents.

Portugal vs. Portugal Beltran, GR no. 155555 (August 16, 2005)

Facts:
Jose Portugal married Paz Lazo. Subsequently Portugal married petitioner Isabel de la
Puerta and she gave birth to Jose Douglas Portugal Jr., her co-petitioner. Meanwhile,
Lazo gave birth to respondent Leonila Perpetua Aleli Portugal.

Portugal and his 4 siblings executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Waiver of
Rights over the estate of their father, Mariano Portugal, who died intestate. In the deed,
Portugal‘s siblings waived their rights, interests, and participation over a parcel of land
in his favor.

Lazo died. Portugal also died intestate. Having such situation, Portugal-Beltran
executed an “Affidavit of Adjudication by Sole Heir of Estate of Deceased Person”
adjudicating to herself the parcel of land. The Registry of Deeds then issued the title in
her name.

Puerta and Portugal Jr. filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City a
complaint against Portugal-Beltran for annulment of the Affidavit of Adjudication alleging
that she is not related whatsoever to the deceased Portugal, hence, not entitled to
inherit the parcel of land. But such was dismissed by the RTC for lack of cause of action
on the ground that Puerta and Portugal Jr.’s status amd right as putative heirs had not
been established before a probate court, and lack of jurisdiction over the case.

Puerta and Portugal Jr. thereupon appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the
RTC‘s dismissal of the case.

Issue:
Whether or not Puerta and Portugal Jr. have to institute a special proceeding to
determine their status as heirs before they can pursue the case for annulment of
Portugal-Beltran’s Affidavit of Adjudication and of the title issued in her name?

Ruling:
The common doctrine in Litam, Solivio and Guilas in which the adverse parties are
putative heirs to the estate of a decedent or parties to the special proceedings for its
settlement is that if the special proceedings are pending, or if there are no special
proceedings filed but there is, under the circumstances of the case, a need to file one,
then the determination of, among other issues, heirship should be raised and settled in
said special proceedings. Where special proceedings had been instituted but had been
finally closed and terminated, however, or if a putative heir has lost the right to have
himself declared in the special proceedings as co-heir and he can no longer ask for its
re-opening, then an ordinary civil action can be filed for his declaration as heir in order
to bring about the annulment of the partition or distribution or adjudication of a property
or properties belonging to the estate of the deceased.

In the case at bar, respondent, believing rightly or wrongly that she was the sole heir to
Portugal's estate, executed on February 15, 1988 the questioned Affidavit of
Adjudication under the second sentence of Rule 74,Section 1 of the Revised Rules of
Court. Said rule is an exception to the general rule that when a person dies leaving a
property, it should be judicially administered and the competent court should appoint a
qualified administrator, in the order established in Sec. 6, Rule 78 in case the deceased
left no will, or in case he did, he failed to name an executor therein. Petitioners claim,
however, to be the exclusive heirs of Portugal. A probate or intestate court, no doubt,
has jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of a deceased. It appearing, however, that
in the present case the only property of the intestate estate of Portugal is the Caloocan
parcel of land, to still subject it, under the circumstances of the case, to a special
proceeding which could be long, hence, not expeditious, just to establish the status of
petitioners as heirs is not only impractical; it is burdensome to the estate with the costs
and expenses of an administration proceeding. And it is superfluous in light of the fact
that the parties to the civil case — subject of the present case, could and had already in
fact presented evidence before the trial court which assumed jurisdiction over the case
upon the issues it defined during pre-trial. In fine, under the circumstances of the
present case, there being no compelling reason to still subject Portugal's estate to
administration proceedings since a determination of petitioners' status as heirs could be
achieved in the civil case filed by petitioners, the trial court should proceed to evaluate
the evidence presented by the parties during the trial and render a decision thereon
upon the issues it defined during pre-trial.

Delgado vda, dela Rosa vs. Heirs of Marciana Rustia vda. De Damian, GR no.
155733 (January 27, 2006)
Facts:
Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado died intestate and without descendants. Guillermo
outlived Josefa by two years. Petitioners and respondents are their respective relatives
claiming rights to their intestate estate.

The petition for letters of administration stated that Josefa Delgado and Guillermo
Rustia were never married. According to petitioners, sometime in 1917, Guillermo
proposed marriage to Josefa. Josefa and Guillermo eventually lived together as
husband and wife but were never married. To prove their assertion, petitioners point out
that no record of the contested marriage existed in the civil registry. Moreover, a
baptismal certificate naming Josefa Delgado as one of the sponsors referred to her as
“Señorita” or unmarried woman.

Josefa was the daughter of Felisa Delgado by one Lucio Ocampo with five other
children without the benefit of marriage. Felisa had another son by way of Ramon
Osorio who is Luis Delgado, one of the claimants in Josefa‘s estate. But, unlike her
relationship with Lucio Campo which was admittedly one without the benefit of
marriage, the legal status of Ramon Osorio’s and Felisa Delgado’s union is in dispute.

The question of whether Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio ever got married is crucial
to the claimants because if Ramon Osorio and Felisa Delgado had been validly married,
then their only child Luis Delgado was a legitimate half-blood brother of Josefa Delgado
and therefore excluded from the latter’s intestate estate. He and his heirs would be
barred by the principle of absolute separation between the legitimate and illegitimate
families. Conversely, if the couple were never married, Luis Delgado and his heirs
would be entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado’s intestate estate, as they would all be
within the illegitimate line.

Issue:
Whether or not there was a valid marriage between Guillermo and Josefa and between
Felisa and Ramon.

Ruling:
Rule 131, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. — The following presumptions are
satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by
other evidence: xxx xxx xxx
(aa) That a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife
have entered into a lawful contract of marriage;
In this case, several circumstances give rise to the presumption that a valid
marriage existed between Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. Their
 cohabitation of more than 50 years cannot be doubted. Their family and
friends knew them to be married. Their reputed status as husband and wife
was such that even the original petition for letters of administration filed by
Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao in 1975 referred to them as “spouses.”

Yet, petitioners maintain that Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia had simply lived
together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. They make much of the
absence of a record of the contested marriage, the testimony of a witness attesting that
they were not married, and a baptismal certificate which referred to Josefa Delgado as
“Señorita” or unmarried woman.

First, although a marriage contract is considered a primary evidence of marriage, its

absence is not always proof that no marriage in fact took place. Once the presumption
of marriage arises, other evidence may be presented in support thereof. The evidence
need not necessarily or directly establish the marriage but must at least be enough to
strengthen the presumption of marriage. Here, the certificate of identity issued to Josefa
Delgado as Mrs. Guillermo Rustia, the passport issued to her as Josefa D. Rustia, the
declaration under oath of no less than Guillermo Rustia that he was married to Josefa
Delgado and the titles to the properties in the name of “Guillermo Rustia married to
Josefa Delgado,” more than adequately support the presumption of marriage. These are
public documents which are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. No clear
and convincing evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption of the truth of the
recitals therein was presented by petitioners.

Second, Elisa vda. de Anson, petitioners’ own witness whose testimony they primarily
relied upon to support their position, confirmed that Guillermo Rustia had proposed
marriage to Josefa Delgado and that eventually, the two had "lived together as husband
and wife." This again could not but strengthen the presumption of marriage.

Third, the baptismal certificate was conclusive proof only of the baptism administered by
the priest who baptized the child. It was no proof of the veracity of the declarations and
statements contained therein, such as the alleged single or unmarried (“Señorita”) civil
status of Josefa Delgado who had no hand in its preparation.

Petitioners failed to rebut the presumption of marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa
Delgado. In this jurisdiction, every intendment of the law leans toward legitimizing
matrimony. Persons dwelling together apparently in marriage are presumed to be in fact
married. This is the usual order of things in society and, if the parties are not what they
hold themselves out to be, they would be living in constant violation of the common
rules of law and propriety. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. Always presume
marriage.

Vda. De Reyes vs. CA, GR. No. 92436

Facts:
During his lifetime, one Gavino Reyes owned a parcel of land of approximately 70
hectares in Cavite. He sought to bring said land under the operation of the Torrens
System of registration of property. Unfortunately, he died in 1921 without the title having
been issued to him. The application was prosecuted by his son, Marcelo Reyes, who
was the administrator of his property.

The above property was surveyed and subdivided by Gavino's heirs. In the subdivision
plan, each resultant lot was earmarked, indicated for and assigned to a specific heir. It
appears therein that two lots were allotted to Rafael Reyes, Sr., one of Gavino's
children. Per testimony of Juan Poblete, the children thereafter secured tax declarations
for their respective shares.

Around twenty (20) years after the death of Gavino, the original certificate of title for the
whole property was issued. It was, however, kept by Juan Poblete, son-in-law of
Marcelo Reyes, who was by then already deceased. The heirs of Gavino were not
aware of this fact.

On 3 December 1943, Rafael Reyes, Sr. sold a parcel of land to private respondent
Dalmacio Gardiola. The vendee immediately took possession of the property and
started paying the land taxes therein.

When the heirs of Gavino Reyes executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate
based on the aforestated subdivision plan, the lot that was intended for Rafael Reyes,
Sr., who was already deceased, was instead adjudicated to his only son and heir,
Rafael Reyes, Jr. (the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners herein). Private
respondent Rosario Martillano signed the deed in representation of her mother, Marta
Reyes, one of the children of Gavino Reyes.

As a result of the Extrajudicial Settlement, OCT RO-255 was cancelled and in lieu
thereof, several transfer certificates of title covering the subdivided lots were issued in
the names of the respective adjudicatees. One of them is TCT No. 27257 in the name of
Rafael Reyes, Jr. covering Lot No. 1-A-14. The Transfer Certificates of Title were,
however, kept by one Candido Hebron. On 10 January 1969, some of the heirs of
Gavino Reyes filed a case of Annulment of Partition and Recovery of Possession before
the Court of First Instance of Cavite City, which was docketed therein as Civil Case No.
1267. One of the defendants in said case is herein private respondent Rosario
Martillano. The case was dismissed on 18 September 1969, but Candido Hebron was
ordered by the trial court to deliver to the heirs concerned all the transfer certificates of
title in his possession.

After obtaining the Transfer Certificate of Title for Lot No. 1-A-14 from Hebron, pursuant
to the aforesaid order in Civil Case No. 1267, petitioners herein, as successors-in-
interest of Rafael Reyes, Jr., filed on 14 March 1983 with the Regional Trial Court the
abovementioned Civil Case No. RTC-BCV-83-17 against private respondents
(defendants therein) for recovery of possession or, in the alternative, for indemnification,
accounting and damages. They allege therein that after “having definitely discovered
that they are the lawful owners of the property,” (Lot No. 1-A-14), they, "including Rafael
Reyes, Jr., during his lifetime, made repeated demands to (sic) defendants to surrender
the possession of and vacate the parcel of land belonging to the former, but defendants
refused to vacate and surrender the possession of the said land to herein plaintiffs;" the
last of the demands was allegedly made on 8 October 1982. They further allege that
they have been deprived by said defendants of the rightful possession and enjoyment of
the property since September 1969 — which coincides with the date of the order in Civil
Case No. 1267. 4 In their answer, private respondents deny the material averments in
the complaint and assert that they are the owners of the lot in question, having bought
the same from Rafael Reyes, Sr.; that the issuance of TCT No. 27257 is null and void,
for such sale was known to Rafael Reyes, Jr.; that they have been in possession of the
property and have been paying the land taxes thereon; and that petitioners are barred
by prescription and/or laches.

Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred?

Ruling:
The Court of Appeals correctly held that the partition made by the children of Gavino
Reyes in 1936, although oral, was valid and binding. There is no law that requires
partition among heirs to be in writing to be valid.

In Hernandez vs. Andal, this Court, interpreting Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of
Court, held that the requirement that a partition be put in a public document and
registered has for its purpose the protection of creditors and at the same time the
protection of the heirs themselves against tardy claims. The object of registration is to
serve as constructive notice to others.

The intrinsic validity of partition not executed with the prescribed formalities does not
come into play when there are no creditors or the rights of creditors are not affected.
Where no such rights are involved, it is competent for the heirs of an estate to enter into
an agreement for distribution in a manner and upon a plan different from those provided
by law. There is nothing in Section I, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court from which it can be
inferred that a writing or other formality is an essential requisite to the validity of the
partition.

Barcelona, et al. vs. Barcelona, et al., 100 Phil. 251 provides the reason why oral
partition is valid and why it is not covered by the Statute of Frauds: partition among
heirs or renunciation of an inheritance by some of them is not exactly a conveyance of
real property for the reason that it does not involve transfer of property from one to the
other, but rather a confirmation or ratification of title or right of property by the heir
renouncing in favor of another heir accepting and receiving the inheritance.

Cua vs. Vargas, GR. No. 156536 (October 31, 2006)

Facts:
A parcel of residential land with an area of 99 square meters located in San Juan, Virac,
Catanduanes was left behind by the late Paulina Vargas. On February 4, 1994, a
notarized Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs was executed by and among Paulina
Vargas' heirs, namely Ester Vargas, Visitacion Vargas, Juan Vargas, Zenaida V.
Matienzo, Rosario V. Forteza, Andres Vargas, Gloria Vargas, Antonina Vargas and
Florentino Vargas, partitioning and adjudicating unto themselves the lot in question,
each one of them getting a share of 11 square meters. Florentino, Andres, Antonina and
Gloria, however, did not sign the document. Only Ester, Visitacion, Juan, Zenaida and
Rosario signed it. The Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs was published in the
Catanduanes Tribune for three consecutive weeks. On November 15, 1994, an Extra
Judicial Settlement Among Heirs with Sale was again executed by and among the same
heirs over the same property and also with the same sharings. Once more, only Ester,
Visitacion, Juan, Zenaida and Rosario signed the document and their respective shares
totaling 55 square meters were sold to Joseph Cua, petitioner herein. Respondents
argue that said Extra Judicial Settlement cannot bind them for it was executed without
their consent and participation.

Issue:
Whether or not said Settlement would bind the respondents who did not give their
consent?

Ruling:
Not. It would not bind them. The Supreme Court gave the following reason:

The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 is an ex parte proceeding. The rule

plainly states, however, that persons who do not participate or had no notice of an
extrajudicial settlement will not be bound thereby.18 It contemplates a notice that has
been sent out or issued before any deed of settlement and/or partition is agreed upon
(i.e., a notice calling all interested parties to participate in the said deed of extrajudicial
settlement and partition), and not after such an agreement has already been
executed19 as what happened in the instant case with the publication of the first deed
of extrajudicial settlement among heirs.

Reillo vs. San Jose, GR. No. 166393 (June 18, 2009)

Facts:
Spouses Quiterio San Jose (Quiterio) and Antonina Espiritu Santo (Antonina) were the
original registered owners of a parcel of land located in E. Rodriguez Sr. Avenue,
Teresa, Rizal. The said parcel of land is now registered in the name of Ma. Teresa F.
Piñon (Teresa).

Quiterio and Antonina had Cve children, namely, Virginia, Virgilio, Galicano, Victoria
and Catalina. Antonina died on July 1, 1970, while Quiterio died on October 19, 1976.
Virginia and Virgilio are also now deceased. Virginia was survived by her husband
Zosimo Fernando, Sr. (Zosimo Sr.) and their seven children, while Virgilio was survived
by his wife Julita Gonzales and children, among whom is Maribeth S.J. Cortez
(Maribeth).

On October 26, 1999, Galicano, represented by his children and attorneys-in-fact,

Annalisa S.J. Ruiz and Rodegelio San Jose, Victoria, Catalina, and Maribeth
(respondents) Cled with the RTC a Complaint for annulment of title, annulment of deed
of extra-judicial settlement, partition and damages against Zosimo Sr. and his children
Cristina F. Reillo, Leonor F. Puso, Adelia F. Rocamora, Sofronio S.J. Fernando, Efren
S.J. Fernando, Zosimo S.J. Fernando, Jr. and Ma. Teresa (petitioners) and the Register
of Deeds of Morong, Rizal.

It was also alleged that respondents Cled a complaint before the Lupong
Tagapamayapa of their Barangay which issued the required certiCcation to Cle action
for failure of the parties to settle the matter amicably.

Petitioners Cled their Answer with Counter-Petition and with Compulsory Counterclaim
denying that the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate Among Heirs with Waiver of
Rights which was the basis of the issuance of TCT No. M-94400, was falsified and that
the settlement was made and implemented in accordance with law. They admitted that
the deceased spouses Quiterio and Antonina had five children; that the subject property
was not the only property of spouses Quiterio and Antonina and submitted in their
counter-petition for partition the list of the other 12 parcels of land of the deceased
spouses Quiterio and Antonina that petitioners alleged are in respondents' possession
and control.

On January 18, 2000, respondents filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
alleging that: (1) the denials made by petitioners in their answer were in the form of
negative pregnant; (2) petitioners failed to state the basis that the questioned document
was not falsified; (3) they failed to specifically deny the allegations in the complaint that
petitioners committed misrepresentations by stating that they are the sole heirs and
legitimate descendants of Quiterio and Antonina; and (4) by making reference to their
allegations in their counter-petition for partition to support their denials, petitioners
impliedly admitted that they are not the sole heirs of Quiterio and Antonina.

Respondents filed a Reply to Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim with a motion to

dismiss the counter-petition for partition on the ground that petitioners failed to pay the
required docket fees for their counter-petition for partition. Petitioners filed their
Rejoinder 8 without tackling the issue of non-payment of docket fees.
On February 4, 2000, petitioners filed their Comment 9 to respondents’ motion for
judgment on the pleading and prayed that the instant action be decided on the basis of
the pleadings with the exception of respondents’ unverified Reply. Petitioners also filed
an Opposition to the motion to dismiss the counter-petition for partition.

Issue:
The Court of Appeals erred in no vacating the order of the trial court in partitioning the
estate without publication as required by Rule 74 and 76 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.

Ruling:
A deed of extrajudicial partition executed without including some of the heirs, who had
no knowledge of and consent to the same, is fraudulent and vicious. The deed of
settlement made by petitioners was invalid because it excluded respondents who were
entitled to equal shares in the subject property. Under the rule, no extrajudicial
settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no
notice thereof. Thus, the RTC correctly annulled the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of
Estate Among Heirs with Waiver of Rights dated January 23, 1998 and TCT No. M-
94400 in the name of Ma. Teresa S.J. Fernando issued pursuant to such deed.

Comparative Analysis

Gerona vs. de Guzman, GR. No. L-19060 (May 29, 1964)

Facts:
Petitioners Ignacio, Maria Concepcion, Francisco and Delfin, all surnamed Gerona,
allege that they are the legitimate children of Domingo Gerona and Placida de Guzman;
that the latter, who died on August 9, 1941 was a legitimate daughter of Marcelo de
Guzman and his first wife, Teodora de la Cruz; that after the death of his first wife,
Marcelo de Guzman married Camila Ramos, who begot him several children, namely,
respondents Carmen, Jose, Clemente, Francisco, Rustica, Pacita and Victoria, all
surnamed De Guzman; that Marcelo de Guzman died on September 11, 1945; that
subsequently, or on May 6, 1948, respondents executed a deed of “extra-judicial
settlement of the estate of the deceased Marcelo de Guzman”, fraudulently
misrepresenting therein that they were the only surviving heirs of the deceased Marcelo
de Guzman, although they well knew that petitioners were, also, his forced heirs; that
respondents had thereby succeeded fraudulently in causing the transfer certificates of
title to seven parcels of land, issued in the name of said deceased, to be cancelled and
new transfer certificates of title to be issued in their own name, in the proportion of 1/7th
individual interest for each; that such fraud was discovered by the petitioners only the
year before the institution of this case; that petitioners forthwith demanded from
respondents their (petitioners') share in said properties, to the extent of one-eighth
interest thereon; and that the respondents refused to heed said demand, thereby
causing damages to the petitioners. Accordingly, the latter prayed that judgment be
rendered nullifying said deed of extra-judicial settlement, insofar as it deprives them of
their participation of 1/8th of the properties in litigation; ordering the respondents to re-
convey to petitioners their aforementioned share in said properties; ordering the register
of deeds to cancel the transfer certificates of title secured by respondents as above
stated and to issue new certificates of title in the name of both the petitioners and the
respondents in the proportion of one-eighth for the former and seven-eighth for the
latter; ordering the respondents to render accounts of the income of said properties and
to deliver to petitioners their lawful share therein; and sentencing respondents to pay
damages and attorney's fees.

Respondents maintained that petitioners’ mother, the deceased Placida de Guzman,

was not entitled to share in the estate of Marcelo de Guzman, she being merely a
spurious child of the latter, and that petitioners' action is barred by the statute of
limitations.

The trial court rendered a decision finding that petitioners' mother was a legitimate child,
by first marriage, of Marcelo de Guzman; that the properties described in the complaint
belonged to the conjugal partnership of Marcelo de Guzman and his second wife,
Camila Ramos; and that petitioners' action has already prescribed, and, accordingly,
dismissing the complaint without costs. On appeal taken by the petitioners, this decision
was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, with costs against them.

Petitioners maintain that since they and respondents are co-heirs of the deceased
Marcelo de Guzman, the present action for partition of the latter's estate is not subject to
the statute of limitations of action; that, if affected by said statute, the period of four (4)
years therein prescribed did not begin to run until actual discovery of the fraud
perpetrated by respondents, which, it is claimed, took place in 1956 or 1957; and that,
accordingly, said period had not expired when the present action was commenced on
November 4, 1958.

Issue:
When does the prescriptive period of four years begun?

Ruling:
Although, as a general rule, an action for partition among co-heirs does not prescribe,
this is true only as long as the defendants do not hold the property in question under an
adverse title. The statute of limitations operates, as in other cases, from the moment
such adverse title is asserted by the possessor of the property.

The action to annul a deed of extrajudicial settlement upon the ground of fraud may be
filed within four years from the discovery of the fraud. Such discovery is deemed to have
taken place when said instrument was filed with the Register of Deeds and new
certificates of title were issued in the name of the respondents exclusively.

Neri vs. Heirs of Uy, GR. No. 194366 (October 10, 2012)

Facts:
During her lifetime, Anunciacion Neri (Anunciacion) had seven children, two from her
first marriage with Gonzalo Illut (Gonzalo), namely: Eutropia and Victoria, and five from
her second marriage with Enrique Neri (Enrique), namely: Napoleon, Alicia, Visminda,
Douglas and Rosa. Throughout the marriage of spouses Enrique and Anunciacion, they
acquired several homestead properties with a total area of 296,555 square meters
located in Samal, Davao del Norte. On September 21, 1977, Anunciacion died intestate.
Her husband, Enrique, in his personal capacity and as natural guardian of his
minor children Rosa and Douglas, together with Napoleon, Alicia, and
Visminda executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute
Deed of Sale on July 7, 1979, adjudicating among themselves the said homestead
properties, and thereafter, conveying them to the late spouses Hadji Yusop
Uy and Julpha Ibrahim Uy (spouses Uy) for a consideration of P 80,000.00.On June 11,
1996, the children of Enrique filed a complaint for annulment of sale of the said
homestead properties against spouses Uy (later substituted by their heirs) before the
RTC, assailing the validity of the sale for having been sold within the prohibited period.
The complaint was later amended to include Eutropia and Victoria as additional plaintiffs
for having been excluded and deprived of their legitimes as children of Anunciacion
from her first marriage. In their amended answer with counterclaim, the heirs of Uy
countered that the sale took place beyond the 5-year prohibitory period from the
issuance of the homestead patents. They also denied knowledge of Eutropia and
Victoria’s exclusion from the extrajudicial settlement and sale of the subject properties,
and interposed further the defenses of prescription and laches

Issue:
On laches or prescription: Did the Court of Appeals err when it found that laches or
prescription set in?

Ruling:
On the issue of prescription, the Court agrees with petitioners that the present action
has not prescribed in so far as it seeks to annul the extrajudicial settlement of the
estate. Contrary to the ruling of the CA, the prescriptive period of 2 years provided in
Section 1 Rule 74 of the Rules of Court reckoned from the execution of the extrajudicial
settlement finds no application to petitioners Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas, who were
deprived of their lawful participation in the subject estate. Besides, an “action or defense
for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not prescribe” in accordance
with Article 1410 of the Civil Code.

However, the action to recover property held in trust prescribes after 10 years from the
time the cause of action accrues, which is from the time of actual notice in case of
unregistered deed. In this case, Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas claimed to have
knowledge of the extrajudicial settlement with sale after the death of their father,
Enrique, in 1994 which spouses Uy failed to refute. Hence, the complaint filed in 1997
was well within the prescriptive period of 10 years.
 Comparative Analysis on the cases of Gerona and Neri

In the case of Gerona, the Supreme Court ruled that: “The action to annul a deed of
extrajudicial settlement upon the ground of fraud may be filed within four years from the
discovery of the fraud. Such discovery is deemed to have taken place when said
instrument was filed with the Register of Deeds and new certificates of title were issued
in the name of the respondents exclusively.”

While in the case of Neri, the Supreme Court ruled that: “the present action has not
prescribed in so far as it seeks to annul the extrajudicial settlement of the estate.
Contrary to the ruling of the CA, the prescriptive period of 2 years provided in Section 1
Rule 74 of the Rules of Court reckoned from the execution of the extrajudicial
settlement finds no application to petitioners Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas, who were
deprived of their lawful participation in the subject estate. Besides, an "action or defense
for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not prescribe" in accordance
with Article 1410 of the Civil Code.” – “The action to recover property held in trust
prescribes after 10 years from the time the cause of action accrues, which is from the
time of actual notice in case of unregistered deed.”

Unlike in the case of Gerona, the Neri case does not contemplate a situation wherein
there is fraud, rather there was an exclusion to another heirs. The prescriptive period in
both cases are not the same because it contemplates different situations.

Bautista vs. Bautista, GR. No 160556 (August 3,2007)

Facts:
During her lifetime, Teodora Rosario was the owner of a 211.80 square meter parcel of
land (the property) in Pangasinan. She died intestate leaving the said property behind to
her spouse Isidro Bautista, and five children namely: Teofilo, Alegria, Angelica, Pacita,
and Gil Bautista. Later on, Isidro and four of his five children, Pacita, Gil, Alegria and
Angelica (Teofilo not included), executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition of the
property where Isidro waived his share in favor of his four children.

Alegria and Angelica, sold the one-half of the property they have acquired to Pacita and
her common-law husband Pedro Tandoc, by Deed of Absolute Sale. Pacita, with
Pedro‘s consent, later sold one-half of the property in favor of Cesar Tamondong,
Pedro‘s nephew via Deed of Absolute Sale. Teofilo, represented by his Attorney-in-Fact
Francisco Muñoz, then filed a complaint in the Regional Trial Court against his siblings
claiming that his co-heirs defrauded him of his rightful share of the property and that the
Deed of Sale executed by Pacita in favor of Cesar was fictitious because she was
already seriously ill that time.

The RTC ruled in favor of Teofilo declaring null and void and no force and effect the
documents mentioned. On appeal by Tandoc and Tamondong, the Court of Appeals
(CA) reversed the trial court‘s decision and dismissed Teofilo‘s complaint on the ground
of prescription. The CA denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Teofilo. Thus,
this Petition for Review on Certiorari.

Issue:
Whether or not the extra-judicial partition executed by Teofilo Bautista‘s co-heirs is
valid?

Ruling:
The Court of Appeals applied the prescriptive periods for annulment on the ground of
fraud and for reconveyance of property under a constructive trust.

The extra-judicial partition executed by Teofilo‘s co-heirs was invalid. However, as

previously held by this Court in Segura v. Segura, ―no extra-judicial settlement shall be
binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof. As
the partition was a total nullity and did not affect the excluded heirs, it was not correct
for the trial court to hold that their right to challenge the partition had prescribed after
two years.
The deed of extra-judicial partition in the case at bar being invalid, the action to have it
annulled does not prescribe.

Since the deed of extra-judicial partition is invalid, it transmitted no rights to Teofilo‘s co-
heirs. Consequently, the subsequent transfer by Angelica and Alegria of one-half of the
property to Pacita and her husband Pedro, as well as the transfer of one-half of the
property to Cesar Tamondong is invalid, hence, conferring no rights upon the
transferees under the principle of nemo dat quod non habet.
 Macababad Jr. Vs. Masinag, GR. No. 161237 (January 14, 2009)

Facts:
Respondents Fernando Masirag, Faustina Masirag, Corazon Masirag, Leonor Masirag
and Leoncio Masirag Goyagoy (respondents), filed with the RTC a complaint against
Macababbad, Chua and Say. Later, they amended their complaint to allege new
matters. The deceased spouses Pedro Masirag and Pantaleona Tulauan were the
original registered owners of the parcel of land, as evidenced by an Original Certificate
of Title. Respondents Fernando, Faustina, Corazon and Leonor Masirag are the
children of Valeriano and Alfora Goyagoy, while Leoncio is the son of Vicenta and
Braulio Goyagoy. The respondents allegedly did not know of the demise of their
respective parents; they only learned of the inheritance due from their parents in the first
week of March 1999 when their relative, Pilar Quinto, informed respondent Fernando
and his wife Barbara Balisi about it. They immediately hired a lawyer to investigate the
matter. The investigation disclosed that the petitioners falsified a document entitled
Extra-judicial Settlement with Simultaneous Sale of Portion of Registered Land so that
the respondents were deprived of their shares in the lot. The document purportedly bore
the respondents signatures, making them appear to have participated in the execution
of the document when they did not; they did not even know the petitioners. The
document ostensibly conveyed the subject property to Macababbad for a sum of
money.

The RTC, after initially denying the motion to dismiss, reconsidered its ruling and
dismissed the complaint on the grounds that: (1) the action, which was filed 32 years
after the property was partitioned and after a portion was sold to Macababbad, had
already prescribed; and (2) there was failure to implead indispensable parties, namely,
the other heirs of Pedro and Pantaleona and the persons who have already acquired
title to portions of the subject property in good faith. The petitioners moved to dismiss
the appeal primarily on the ground that the errors the respondents raised involved pure
questions of law that should be brought before the Supreme Court via a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The respondents insisted that
their appeal involved mixed questions of fact and law and thus fell within the purview of
the CA’s appellate jurisdiction. The appellate court reversed and set aside the RTCs
dismissal of the complaint.

Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the RTC decision

Ruling:
A ruling on prescription necessarily requires an analysis of the plaintiff’s cause of action
based on the allegations of the complaint and the documents attached as its integral
parts. A motion to dismiss based on prescription hypothetically admits the allegations
relevant and material to the resolution of this issue, but not the other facts of the case.

Dismissal based on laches cannot also apply in this case, as it has never reached the
presentation of evidence stage and what the RTC had for its consideration were merely
the parties’ pleadings. Laches is evidentiary in nature and cannot be established by
mere allegations in the pleadings. Without solid evidentiary basis, laches cannot be a
valid ground to dismiss the respondents’ complaint.

When a party is left out is to implead the indispensable party at any stage of the action.
The court, either motu proprio or upon the motion of a party, may order the inclusion of
the indispensable party or give the plaintiff opportunity to amend his complaint in order
to include indispensable parties. If the plaintiff to whom the order to include the
indispensable party is directed refuses to comply with the order of the court, the
complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the court's own
motion. Only upon unjustified failure or refusal to obey the order to include or to amend
is the action dismissed. In an action for reconveyance, all the owners of the property
sought to be recovered are indispensable parties. Thus, if reconveyance were the only
relief prayed for, impleading petitioners Macababbad and the spouses Chua and Say
would suffice. On the other hand, under the claim that the action is for the declaration of
the nullity of extrajudicial settlement of estate and sale, all of the parties who executed
the same should be impleaded for a complete resolution of the case. This case,
however, is not without its twist on the issue of impleading indispensable parties as the
RTC never issued an order directing their inclusion. Under this legal situation,
particularly in light of Rule 3, Section 11 of the Rules of Court, there can be no basis for
the immediate dismissal of the action.

Comparative Analysis on the cases of Bautista and Macababad

In the case of Bautista, the Supreme Court ruled that: “The deed of extra-judicial
partition in the case at bar being invalid, the action to have it annulled does not
prescribe – since the deed of extra-judicial partition is invalid, it transmitted no rights to
Teofilo‘s co-heirs. Consequently, the subsequent transfer by Angelica and Alegria of
one-half of the property to Pacita and her husband Pedro, as well as the transfer of one-
half of the property to Cesar Tamondong is invalid, hence, conferring no rights upon the
transferees under the principle of nemo dat quod non habet.”

Meanwhile, in the case of Macababad, the Supreme Court ruled that: that “dismissal
based on laches cannot also apply in this case, as it has never reached the
presentation of evidence stage and what the RTC had for its consideration were merely
the parties’ pleadings. Laches is evidentiary in nature and cannot be established by
mere allegations in the pleadings. Without solid evidentiary basis, laches cannot be a
valid ground to dismiss the respondents’ complaint.” It added, that “when a party is left
out is to implead the indispensable party at any stage of the action. The court, either
motu proprio or upon the motion of a party, may order the inclusion of the indispensable
party or give the plaintiff opportunity to amend his complaint in order to include
indispensable parties. If the plaintiff to whom the order to include the indispensable
party is directed refuses to comply with the order of the court, the complaint may be
dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the court's own motion. Only upon
unjustified failure or refusal to obey the order to include or to amend is the action
dismissed. In an action for reconveyance, all the owners of the property sought to be
recovered are indispensable parties. Thus, if reconveyance were the only relief prayed
for, impleading petitioners Macababbad and the spouses Chua and Say would suffice.
On the other hand, under the claim that the action is for the declaration of the nullity of
extrajudicial settlement of estate and sale, all of the parties who executed the same
should be impleaded for a complete resolution of the case. This case, however, is not
without its twist on the issue of impleading indispensable parties as the RTC never
issued an order directing their inclusion. Under this legal situation, particularly in light of
Rule 3, Section 11 of the Rules of Court, there can be no basis for the immediate
dismissal of the action.

Here, the common ground between the two cases is that it both deals with prescription
and/or laches. However, they differ on the presentation of its allegations. In the case of
Bautista, it was explicitly provided that there was an invalid extrajudicial-settlement
because one of the co-heirs is not included, thus the action has not prescribed.
However, in the case of Macababad, there was no prescription because it was not
presented properly by the appropriate party.