THIRD DIVISION

[A.M. No. MTJ-11-1792. September 28, 2011.]

[Formerly OCA I.P.I No. 10-2294-MTJ]

ERNESTO Z. ORBE , complainant, vs . JUDGE MANOLITO Y.

GUMARANG, Pairing Judge, Municipal Trial Court, Imus, Cavite ,
respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA , J : p

Before us is an administrative complaint 1 led by complainant Ernesto Z. Orbe

(Orbe) against Judge Manolito Y. Gumarang (respondent), Pairing Judge, Municipal
Trial Court (MTC), Imus, Cavite for Violation of the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims
Cases and the Code of Judicial Conduct. DEacIT

The antecedent facts are as follows:

Orbe is the plaintiff of a small claims case docketed as Civil Case No. ICSCC 09-
65 entitled E.Z. Orbe Tax Accounting Services, thru, Ernesto Z. Orbe v. L.G.M. Silver Star
Credit Corporation, represented by Librado Montano, led before the MTC of Imus,
Cavite, presided by Judge Emily A. Geluz.
During the hearing of the case on February 9, 2010, the parties failed to reach an
amicable settlement. On the same day, the case was assigned to respondent Judge
Manolito Y. Gumarang, Assisting Judge of the MTC of Imus, Cavite, for the continuation
of the trial.
Complainant alleged that the case was scheduled for hearing on March 4, 2010,
but was postponed by respondent to March 11, 2010 because of power interruption.
On March 11, 2010, again the hearing was reset by respondent Judge Gumarang to
March 25, 2010 as he was due for medical check-up. On March 25, 2010, respondent
conducted another Judicial Dispute Resolution (JDR), and again reset the hearing to
April 15, 2010 when the parties failed to reach an amicable agreement.
Complainant argued that Judge Gumarang violated the Rule of Procedure for
Small Claims Cases for failure to decide the civil case within ve (5) days from receipt
of the order of reassignment.
On August 2, 2010, the O ce of the Court Administrator (OCA) directed Judge
Gumarang to submit his comment on the complaint against him. 2 HEASaC

In his Comment 3 dated September 13, 2010, Judge Gumarang explained that as
Assisting Judge in the MTC of Bacoor, Cavite, he tried small claims cases only on
Thursdays. He admitted that he failed to decide the case within ve (5) working days
from receipt of the order, as mandated by the Rule. However, he pointed out that the
Rule needed clari cation since, as in his case, the ve (5) working days should be
construed to refer to ve (5) calendared trial dates falling on Thursdays only,
considering that he allotted only one day, that is Thursday, to hear and try small claims
cases.
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2018 cdasiaonline.com
 On May 10, 2011, the OCA, in its Memorandum, 4 recommended that the instant
matter be redocketed as a regular administrative complaint. It likewise found Judge
Gumarang guilty of Gross Ignorance of the Law, but recommended that he be ned in
the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) only for violating the Rule of
Procedure for Small Claims Cases.
We agree with the findings and recommendation of the OCA.
Indeed, Section 22 of the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases clearly
provided for the period within which judgment should be rendered, to wit:
Section 22. Failure of Settlement. — If efforts at settlement fail, the
hearing shall proceed in an informal and expeditious manner and be terminated
within one (1) day. Either party may move in writing to have another judge hear
and decide the case. The reassignment of the case shall be done in accordance
with existing issuances.

The referral by the original judge to the Executive Judge shall be made
within the same day the motion is led and granted, and by the Executive Judge
to the designated judge within the same day of the referral. The new judge
shall hear and decide the case within ve (5) days from the receipt of
the order of reassignment . 5
In this case, it is undisputed that it took more than two (2) months for
respondent to render a decision on the subject case as he himself admitted the series
of postponements which occurred during the pendency of the case. His lone argument
was that he hears small claims cases on Thursdays only, hence, he claimed that, in his
case, the period of ve (5) working days being referred to by Section 22 of the Rule
should pertain only to Thursdays.
We are unconvinced. DCESaI

Judge Gumarang must have missed the very purpose and essence of the
creation of the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases, as his interpretation of the
Rule is rather misplaced. It is, therefore, imperative to emphasize what the Court sought
to accomplish in creating the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases, to wit:
. . . Thus, pursuant to its rule-making power, the Court, under the present
Constitution, can adopt a special rule of procedure to govern small claims cases
and select pilot courts that would empower the people to bring suits before them
pro se to resolve legal disputes involving simple issues of law and procedure
without the need for legal representation and extensive judicial intervention. This
system will enhance access to justice, especially by those who cannot
afford the high costs of litigation even in cases of relatively small
value . It is envisioned that by facilitating the tra c of cases through simple and
expeditious rules and means, our Court can improve the perception of justice in
this country, thus, giving citizens a renewed "stake" in preserving peace in the
land. . . . 6

The theory behind the small claims system is that ordinary litigation fails to bring
practical justice to the parties when the disputed claim is small, because the time and
expense required by the ordinary litigation process is so disproportionate to the
amount involved that it discourages a just resolution of the dispute. The small claims
process is designed to function quickly and informally. There are no lawyers, no formal
pleadings and no strict legal rules of evidence. 7

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2018 cdasiaonline.com

 Thus, the intent of the law in providing the period to hear and decide cases falling
under the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases, which is within ve (5) days from
the receipt of the order of assignment, is very clear. The exigency of prompt rendition
of judgment in small claims cases is a matter of public policy. There is no room for
further interpretation; it does not require respondent's exercise of discretion. He is
duty-bound to adhere to the rules and decide small claims cases without undue delay.
DcCIAa

The need for prompt resolution of small claims cases is further emphasized by
Section 19 of the Rule, which provides that:
SEC. 19. Postponement When Allowed. — A request for postponement
of a hearing may be granted only upon proof of the physical inability of the party
to appear before the court on the scheduled date and time. A party may avail of
only one (1) postponement.

In the instant case, it is noteworthy to mention that the postponements were not
attributed to any of the parties to the case. The numerous postponements, which in
some instances were upon respondent's initiative, were uncalled for and unjusti ed,
considering that it was already established that all efforts for amicable settlement were
futile. Thus, the postponements were clear violation of the Rule and defeat the very
essence of the Rule.
Time and again, we have ruled that when the rules of procedure are clear and
unambiguous, leaving no room for interpretation, all that is needed to do is to simply
apply it. Failure to apply elementary rules of procedure constitutes gross ignorance of
the law and procedure. In the instant case, neither good faith nor lack of malice will
exonerate respondent, as the rules violated were basic procedural rules.
We cannot countenance undue delay in the disposition of cases or motions,
especially now when there is an all-out effort to minimize — if not totally eradicate — the
problem of congestion long plaguing our courts. The requirement that cases be
decided within the reglementary period is designed to prevent delay in the
administration of justice. For obviously, justice delayed is justice denied. Delay in the
disposition of cases erodes the faith and con dence of our people in the judiciary,
lowers its standards, and brings it into disrepute. 8
Section 9 (1), Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, provides that
undue delay in rendering a decision or order is classified as a less serious charge, which
is punishable by suspension from o ce, without salary and other bene ts for not less
than one (1) or more than three (3) months; or a ne of more than P10,000.00 but not
exceeding P20,000.00. Considering that the Rule on small claims is a new rule, and that
this is respondent judge's rst violation of the rule, we deem it proper to impose a ne
in the amount of P5,000.00. HDTCSI

WHEREFORE , the Court nds Judge Manolito Y. Gumarang, Municipal Trial

Court, Imus, Cavite, GUILTY of Undue Delay in Rendering a Decision and
Violation of the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases , and is hereby
ORDERED to pay a ne of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) and WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Abad, Perez, * Mendoza and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2018 cdasiaonline.com

 Footnotes
*Designated additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., per
Special Order No. 1102 dated September 21, 2011.
1.Rollo, pp. 1-4.

2.Id. at 43.
3.Id. at 41-42.

4.Id. at 45-47.
5.Emphasis supplied.
6.A.M. No. 08-8-7-SC, RULE OF PROCEDURE FOR SMALL CLAIMS CASES, EFFECTIVE
OCTOBER 1, 2008, p. 34. (Emphasis supplied.)
7.Rollo, p. 36.

8.Visbal v. Sescon, 456 Phil. 552, 558-559 (2003).

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2018 cdasiaonline.com