Damien Janos

Avicenna on the Ontology of Pure Quiddity

Scientia Graeco-Arabica

Herausgegeben von
Marwan Rashed

Band 26
Damien Janos
Avicenna on the Ontology
of Pure Quiddity
ISBN 978-3-11-063598-0
e-ISBN (PDF) 978-3-11-065208-6
e-ISBN (EPUB) 978-3-11-065121-8
ISSN 1868-7172

Library of Congress Control Number: 2020935436

Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek

The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie;
detailed bibliographic data are available on the Internet at [Link]

© 2020 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston

Printing and binding: CPI books GmbH, Leck

[Link]
Στoν ήλιο μου, στην σελήνη μου, στην Ιθάκη μου.
There cannot be beauty or splendor surpassing the quiddity’s being purely intelli-
gible [an takūna l-māhiyyah ʿaqliyyah maḥḍah], pure goodness, free from any defi-
ciency, and one in all respects.
(Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Cure, VIII.7,
translation by Marmura, revised)

The essences of Avicenna are so many ghosts of Plato’s Ideas.

(Étienne Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, 76)

This theory obviously implies that all the flora and fauna are regularly destroyed,
and then come to be again. Avicenna posited that this regeneration of the species
is brought about by natural necessities, including the assistance of the agent intel-
lect.
(Gad Freudenthal, The Medieval Hebrew Reception, 272)
Acknowledgements
This book was a long time in the making. Its various parts were composed at differ-
ent periods, in different places, and in different states of mind. My access to the pri-
mary sources required for such a large research project has been irregular, and I
could not always get my hands on what I needed at a particular moment, or consult
the best or most recent editions of certain texts. All of these variables are reflected in
the book. In spite of its shortcomings, I hope that this study will stimulate further
research on Avicenna and challenge some deeply entrenched assumptions concern-
ing his philosophy. Even if scholars disagree with the solutions I proffer, I hope that
the cluster of questions I raise will prove valuable and thought-provoking. In nuce, I
try to show that Avicenna’s interpretation of the ontology of pure quiddity is complex
and unique, and also forms the matrix of innumerable threads that unfold in the me-
dieval and early modern periods and radically changed the philosophical landscape
after him. Avicenna himself is just as remarkable for the longue durée philosophical
problems he bequeathed to posterity as for the intricate interpretations he formulat-
ed in his works. Among other things, this study wishes to persuade the (still uncon-
vinced) reader that Avicenna’s thought represents a crucial and unique ‘moment’ in
the history of philosophy and, more precisely, in the development of Jewish, Christi-
an, and Islamic metaphysics and epistemology.
I wish to express my sincere gratitude to the following people: Frank Griffel, who
conveyed innumerable comments and sound advice, which greatly improved the
draft; Olga Lizzini, with whom I had several stimulating conversations; Jules Janssens
for his valuable feedback; David Twetten, for a protracted and very constructive dis-
cussion; Amos Bertolacci for his help with the manuscript evidence on Avicenna;
and Robert Wisnovsky for his unfaltering support and his readiness to share his ex-
pertise in Islamic intellectual history. I am also grateful to Rosabel Pauline Ansari,
Pauline Froissart, Mateus Domingues da Silva, Salimeh Maghsoudlou, and Naser Du-
mairieh for sharing some results of their ongoing research and for their valuable sug-
gestions, as well as Florian Ruppenstein at De Gruyter for his outstanding editing.
Fariduddin Attar’s feedback and incisive comments also greatly improved the
draft. Finally, I owe a tremendous debt of gratitude to Marwan Rashed. Not only
did he accept to publish this study in his erudite series; his work on Avicenna and
Yaḥyā b. ʿAdī was a key source of inspiration for my analysis. Particularly in this
case, I wish to acknowledge the precious help and contribution of these scholars
and stress that any errors or misinterpretations of the evidence are entirely my own.

[Link]
Contents
Introduction 1

Chapter I: Pure Quiddity in Context 19

 Introducing the problem 19
 The status quaestionis on the issue of the ontological status of quid-
dity in itself 32
 Theoretical and methodological considerations 50
. Whence esse essentiae? 50
. Essence and the meaning of ‘in itself’ (min ḥaythu hiya hiya) 55
. Modulation (tashkīk) 58
. Mental existence 60
. Modes, contexts, and senses of existence 69
. Conclusion 78

Chapter II: Quiddity in Itself and Mental Existence 79

 The terminological inquiry 79
. Quiddity in itself as iʿtibār 79
.. iʿtibār and conceptual unity and multiplicity 93
.. iʿtibār as neither faculty- nor object-specific 96
.. iʿtibār, conceivability, and mental existence 101
.. iʿtibār after Avicenna: some preliminary remarks 113
.. Conclusion 123
. Quiddity in itself as an intelligible form (ṣūrah maʿqūlah) 124
. Quiddity in itself as a meaning or idea (maʿnā) 128
. Conclusion 148
 Pure quiddity, universality, and mental existence 152
. The universal (al-kullī) and universality (al-kulliyyah) as a mental
concomitant 155
. Separation, distinctness, and the various conditions (shurūṭ) applied
to quiddity 170
. The constitutive elements (muqawwimāt) of quiddity and the notion of
essential irreducibility 189
.. Pure quiddities and primary notions 199
. Two modes of mental existence? 202
. Essential and accidental universality 212
. Avicenna and some Baṣrian Muʿtazilites on ‘the thing in itself’ in the
intellect 221
 Some later commentators on pure quiddity and mental
existence 233
. Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī 239
X Contents

. Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī 246

. Taftāzānī 250
. Qushjī 252
. Tahānawī 257
. Ṭabāṭabāʾī 258
 Conclusion 259

Chapter III: Quiddity in Itself in the Concrete World 265

 The move towards an Avicennian metaphysical realism or
formalism 271
. Quiddity and common nature 281
. The mereological construal of quiddity 284
. Quiddity and form 301
 Is pure quiddity in concrete beings intelligible? 326
 Is pure quiddity in concrete beings universal? 342
 Avicenna’s predecessors on common things 349
. The late-antique philosophers 349
. Yaḥyā b. ʿAdī 359
. Avicenna and the Bahshamites on essential similarity and
commonness 366
.. Similarity and commonness in Bahshamite ontology 367
.. Similarity and difference in existence and nonexistence 369
.. Avicenna and the Bahshamite connection 371
. Recapitulation 374
 The issue of the real distinction of essence and existence 375
 Quiddity in itself and psychological abstraction (tajrīd) 388
 The post-Avicennian tradition on quiddity in concrete beings: some
preliminary remarks 402
. Bahmanyār 402
. Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī 403
. Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī 406
. Jurjānī 409
. Ḥillī 409
. Jāmī 410
. Qushjī 410
. Tahānawī 411
. Ṭabāṭabāʾī 411
. Muḥammad al-Mahdī al-Ḥusaynī al-Shīrāzī 412
. Recapitulation 413
 Conclusion 417
 Contents XI

Chapter IV: The Special Ontological Mode of Quiddity in Itself 424

 The simple, irreducible, and prior existence of pure quiddity 424
. The enigmas of Metaphysics V.1. 426
. The modulation of existence (tashkīk al-wujūd) and the ontological
modes according to Avicenna 434
.. From the modulated terms (asmāʾ mushakkikah) to ontological
modulation 437
.. The various modes or aspects (anḥāʾ, aḥkām) of tashkīk al-
wujūd 441
.. Tashkīk, the theological inquiry, and essential being 449
. Tashkīk and ontological and essential priority 460
. Pure quiddity as ‘divine’ and ‘absolute’ 478
. Reassessing the conditions (shurūṭ) of pure quiddity 481
 Senses of existence in Avicenna’s ontology 489
. ‘Affirmative’ or ‘established’ existence’ and ‘realized existence’ (wujūd
ithbātī, wujūd muḥaṣṣal) 489
. ‘Proper existence’ (wujūd khāṣṣ) 498
.. The evidence from The Cure 498
.. The evidence from Philosophical Compendium for ʿAlāʾ al-
Dawlah 514
.. Yaḥyā b. ʿAdī and Avicenna on essential being 521
. Essence and existence revisited 531
. Possibility/contingency (imkān) and the ontological status of pure
essence 537
. Quiddity and existence in God 539
. The problematic case of prime matter 551
 Essential ‘realization’ and ‘subsistence’ and Avicenna’s theory of
causality 555
 Substance, essence, and the metaphysical inquiry 568
. The notion of ‘existing by virtue of one’s self’ or ‘from one’s essence’
(al-wujūd bi-dhātihi, min dhātihi) 584
 Being quiddity: Avicenna’s response to the mutakallimūn 591
. Avicenna and Bahshamite ontology and theology 591
.. The Attribute of the Essence and pure quiddity 594
.. Essential entailment 598
.. The attribute of realized existence 599
.. Theological implications 607
. Avicenna and Ashʿarite ontology 613
 The later reception of Avicenna’s ontology of quiddity: some prelimi-
nary notes 615
 Conclusion 625
XII Contents

Chapter V: The Divine Origin of Pure Quiddity 631

 The existence of the pure quiddities in God 631
. The pure quiddities and divine knowledge and intellection 631
. The problem of the multiplicity of the quiddities in God 647
. The problem of the universality of the quiddities in God 657
. Knowing quiddity: Avicenna’s response to the mutakallimūn 665
 The pure quiddities and the Agent Intellect 669
 The pure quiddities and divine causation 687
. Intellection and causation 687
. The Neoplatonic tripartite division and other Avicennian
distinctions 694
. Pure quiddity, possibility, and divine causation 699
 Conclusion 711

Conclusion 716

Appendix 1: The Avicennian terminology of pure quiddity 723

Appendix 2: The existence of pure quiddity: A list of textual references 725

Appendix 3: Quiddity and Avicenna’s matrices of distinctions 727

Bibliography 728
Primary sources 728
Secondary literature 733

Index of Names and Places 747

Index of Technical Terms 749

Introduction
As the volume of research on Avicenna’s philosophy and its impact on subsequent
intellectual history keeps growing, so does scholars’ appreciation of this thinker’s
contribution to the fields of logic, physics, psychology, and metaphysics. Although
Avicenna, or Ibn Sīnā (d. 1037 CE) in Arabic, has always been considered a towering
figure in Islamic philosophy, modern scholars are increasingly keen to describe his
life and works as a landmark in the intellectual history of the Islamic world, and,
more broadly, in the history of Western and medieval philosophy.¹ So much so,
that it has now become commonplace to speak of the ‘pre-Avicennian’ and ‘post-Avi-
cennian’ periods in Islamic intellectual history, or of ‘Avicenna’s philosophy’ as op-
posed to ‘Avicennism’ or the ‘Avicennizing’ philosophical tradition that flourished
after the death of the ‘leading master’ (al-shaykh al-raʾīs), as he came to be
known.² Even the now conventional division between the ‘classical’ and ‘postclass-
ical’ periods of Islamic intellectual history implicitly presupposes a distinction be-
tween Avicenna’s career and that of his predecessors and close disciples, on the
one hand, and a new era marked by the creation of large philosophical and theolog-
ical syntheses, many of which were inspired by this Avicennian heritage, on the
other.³ If anything, the study of these intellectual developments has confirmed the
hypothesis that Arabic philosophy did not die with Averroes in 1198 CE as a result
of Ghazālī’s (d. 1111 CE) earlier onslaught in his Refutation of the Philosophers (Tahā-
fut al-falāsifah).
As it turns out, complex philosophical systems were still being elaborated long
after the end of the classical period, and Avicenna’s ideas contributed to this phe-
nomenon in a decisive manner. Later Muslim scholars borrowed, criticized, and ela-
borated upon many of the theories that the master had articulated. With hindsight, it

 I use the term ‘medieval’ here mainly in reference to the European Christian and Jewish traditions
and as a broad chronological marker, bearing in mind that it is inadequate to describe the Islamic
world, which never experienced, technically speaking, a ‘Middle Age’ between antiquity and modern-
ity. As for connecting Islamic philosophy with the ‘Western’ tradition, it is justifiable on several
counts: the common Greek sources it shares with Latin and Jewish philosophy; its roots in the Abra-
hamic tradition; and its numerous formal parallels with Latin scholasticism. In that sense, it can be
contrasted to the ‘Eastern’ traditions, such as Buddhist and Hindu philosophy. Even then, all of these
notions are obviously problematic and open to discussion and qualification.
 See Wisnovsky, Avicenna’s Islamic Reception; idem, Towards a Genealogy; idem, Essence and Ex-
istence.
 The cutoff for the end of the classical period and the beginning of the postclassical period in Islam
is alternately given as 1130, 1200, or even 1256 CE, the last date corresponding to the Mongol invasions
of the Middle East. Griffel, The Formation (forthcoming) makes a convincing case to the effect that
Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 1210 CE) should be regarded as the first major ‘postclassical’ thinker in
Islam. In terms of philosophical history specifically, however, the main distinction in my eyes is be-
tween the ‘pre-Avicennian’ and ‘post-Avicennian’ periods, given the depth and scope of Avicenna’s
influence on subsequent Islamic thought.

[Link]
2 Introduction

becomes easier to see that Avicenna’s philosophy is not just the end of the formative
era of Islamic thought and the apogee of the ‘classical’ period; it also marks the be-
ginning of a new, highly diversified, and sophisticated philosophical culture in
Islam, which lasted up to the present day in some parts of the world. During this
time, philosophical ideas were expressed frequently in commentaries written on
works of the shaykh al-raʾīs, as well as in independent treatises and in large philo-
sophical-theological summae. These works spanned the genres and disciplines of
theology (kalām) and philosophy (ḥikmah).⁴ In modern parlance, they often dis-
played a combination of theological and philosophical concepts and theories. Yet,
most of these works were marked in some way or other by Avicenna’s terminology,
theories, and outlook.
One salient example of Avicenna’s influence on this later tradition, which hap-
pens also to coincide with his most famous contribution to philosophy in general,
is his theory of the distinction between essence and existence. Avicenna argues
that essence or quiddity (māhiyyah) and existence (wujūd) are two distinct and irre-
ducible notions in the mind and that one can think of the former without invoking
the latter. That is to say, one can conceive of essence or quiddity solely ‘in itself’
and in complete abstraction from any consideration of existence. Nevertheless, all
caused and contingent beings—whether concepts in the mind or concrete entities
in the world—have an essence and an existence which can be apprehended together.
The various implications of these claims for the fields of epistemology, ontology, and
theology were endlessly discussed and debated in the post-Avicennian tradition,
both in commentaries on Avicenna and in independent works of ḥikmah and
kalām. What is more, the Avicennian terminological and conceptual framework
that underpins this distinction was borrowed and refined by later authors to further
their philosophical and theological projects. The unfolding of these complex process-
es of transformation and naturalization of Avicenna’s philosophy in the various
fields that make up the intellectual landscape of postclassical Islam is fascinating,
and it has deservedly received increased scholarly attention. But these developments
are not by any means limited to Muslim authors. As is well known, many of the Chris-
tian philosophers of medieval Europe responded enthusiastically to Avicenna’s phil-
osophical ideas, which contributed to shaping the scholastic discussions of essence
and existence, causality, and the universals, to name only a few key topics. And there
is growing evidence that Avicenna’s views had a profound impact on medieval Jew-
ish thinkers as well.⁵
In addition to its reception in postclassical Islam and in the medieval Jewish and
Latin philosophical traditions, the Avicennian problem of the relation between es-
sence and existence has also informed much of the modern historiography on this

 For the development and characteristics of these two genres in the postclassical tradition, see Grif-
fel, The Formation (forthcoming). I am deeply indebted to him for sharing an early version of his
book.
 See, among other works, Hasse and Bertolacci (eds.), The Arabic.
 Introduction 3

thinker. Although some scholarship on Avicenna was already being produced in the
nineteenth and early twentieth century by European orientalists, it was Amélie-Marie
Goichon’s monograph entitled La distinction de l’essence et de l’existence d’après Ibn
Sīnā, published in 1937, which first oriented the attention of modern readers to the
philosophical depth and significance of Avicenna’s doctrine of essence and exis-
tence.⁶ Goichon’s work, in spite of some inevitable shortcomings—some of them im-
posed by the limited number of texts and editions available at the time, others stem-
ming from the overly scholastic outlook through which Goichon read Avicenna—is
still regarded as a masterful philological and analytical study, written at a time
when many of Avicenna’s works could be consulted only in manuscript form. Subse-
quent to Goichon’s monograph, studies on Avicenna’s theory of essence and exis-
tence continued to flourish. More than any other aspect of his thought, it is this ques-
tion that has lain at the forefront of the modern discussions and debates in
Avicennian studies. The modern literature on this topic is rich and intricate, and it
is marked by certain watershed moments. Dimitri Gutas’s Avicenna and the Aristote-
lian Tradition, published in 1988, provided, for the first time, an adequate chronolog-
ical and methodological framework to study the Avicennian corpus.⁷ Although it
does not focus on the essence/existence problem in any depth, this work offered a
decisive methodological reorientation by promoting a new kind of contextual, philo-
logical, and developmentalist analysis of Avicenna’s thought. This approach is exem-
plified in a monograph by Amos Bertolacci.⁸ Robert Wisnovsky’s Avicenna’s Meta-
physics in Context, published in 2003, is another prime example of this new wave
of studies on Avicenna. Building on the insight of an article by Jean Jolivet, it dis-
cusses some of the key notions underlying Avicenna’s metaphysics and provides a
detailed contextual analysis that pays heed not only to the ancient Greek philosoph-
ical tradition, but also to classical Islamic theology and especially to early Ashʿarite
kalām. In addition to providing new insight into the Avicennian modalities of ‘the
possible’ and ‘the necessary’ and their application to ontology and theology, Wisnov-
sky’s study also acutely problematized the notion of essence in a manner that made
it virtually impossible for later scholars to ignore the gravity of this question in the
master’s philosophy; all the more so, since Avicenna himself appears to say contra-
dictory things about essence in his various works. More recently, a series of mono-
graphs by Tiana Koutzarova, Olga Lizzini, Alexander Kalbarczyk, and Fedor Benev-
ich on Avicenna’s logic and metaphysics have yielded valuable insight into this

 This work in effect firmly established the relationship between essence and existence as the central
problem in the modern historiography on the shaykh al-raʾīs.
 A re-edited and expanded version of this seminal study was published in 2014.
 Bertolacci’s monograph, The Receptionof Aristotle’s Metaphysics, furthered our appreciation of Avi-
cenna’s understanding of metaphysics as an Aristotelian science and shed valuable light on the
manuscript transmission and textual aspects of Metaphysics of The Cure.
4 Introduction

philosopher’s theories of essence and existence.⁹ The last two studies in particular
deal extensively with the logical dimension of Avicenna’s theory of essence and
also explore some of its ontological implications. Quite some time before, Alain de
Libera had addressed this topic from the perspective of the Avicenna latinus in two
hefty books devoted to the history of the universals in medieval philosophy.¹⁰ It is
noteworthy that, although written from outside the field of Arabic philosophy, de
Libera’s studies constitute the most sustained and detailed analysis of Avicenna’s
theory of pure quiddity. To these monographs, one should add a dizzying number
of articles dealing with various aspects of Avicenna’s metaphysics, which testify to
the fact that, since Goichon’s landmark publication, the number of studies on this
thinker have increased steadily over time.
In spite of this plethora of works, some thorny questions and nagging uncertain-
ties pertaining to Avicenna’s theory of essence have endured. Does Avicenna intend
the distinction between essence and existence solely at the conceptual level, as a
purely intramental one, or is it grounded also in the real world, so that it may be
called a ‘real’ distinction as well? What exactly is the ontological status of essence,
of ‘pure quiddity’ or ‘quiddity in itself,’ both in the mind and in concrete beings? And
in what ways do logic and ontology interrelate and interface in Avicenna’s descrip-
tions of essence? Finally, in what manner is Avicenna’s doctrine of essence connect-
ed with his theological views and with his theory of God’s intellection and knowl-
edge? In other words, does God know the essences of each thing in addition to
His own essence? The academic rigor of the above-mentioned monographs notwith-
standing, none of them addresses Avicenna’s theory of pure quiddity expressly and
exhaustively. With the notable exception of de Libera’s studies, they say little on the
specific issue of the ontological status of essence and how it fits in the shaykh’s gen-
eral ontology. More to the point in this regard is a set of articles published by differ-
ent authors over the course of several decades, which, when taken as a whole, cast
valuable light on the topic. Accordingly, they form the basis of my approach and
analysis in the present book.¹¹ By building on these contributions, I aim to explore
the prototypically Avicennian notion of pure essence and to tackle head-on the
issue of its ontological status. To that effect, I provide a sustained textual analysis
of the evidence related to pure quiddity and try also to cast new light on a cluster

 Koutzarova, Das Transzendentale; Lizzini, Fluxus; Kalbarczyk, Predication; and Benevich, Essentia-
lität. Benevich’s interesting study became available to me only after the completion of my draft and at
around the same time that the latter was accepted for publication by De Gruyter. Although I could not
do justice to Benevich’s various results, I tried as much as possible to integrate the main lines of his
conclusions into my analysis. The same holds for his and other articles published in 2018.
 De Libera, La querelle; idem, L’art. Only specific sections of these two books deal directly with
Avicenna. I describe de Libera’s contribution to the topic in some detail in chapter I.
 Marmura, Quiddity and Universality; idem, Avicenna’s Chapter on Universals; Rashed, Ibn ʿAdī;
Porro, Universaux; and Benevich, Die ‘göttliche Existenz.’ The results of these studies are discussed
in detail in chapters I and II.
 Introduction 5

of vexed issues pertaining to the master’s philosophy. Indeed, clarifying Avicenna’s

notion of pure quiddity can, in turn, help to solve many of the enduring tensions in
his epistemology, theology, and metaphysics that have puzzled modern scholars,
such as the issues of the various types of universals, of psychological abstraction,
and of God’s knowledge of particulars. This study argues that pure quiddity lies at
the heart of Avicenna’s entire philosophical system and that the latter is comprehen-
sively and cogently interpretable only in light of this crucial notion. It is the cement
that connects virtually all aspects of his philosophy together.
In this book I try to show that Avicenna’s metaphysics is profoundly indebted to
the late-antique debates about the universals and common things as well as to the
Muʿtazilite—and more specifically, Bahshamite—theory of the Attribute of the Es-
sence. These textual and doctrinal precedents enabled Avicenna to develop a distinct
and original theory of pure quiddity (al-māhiyyah min ḥaythu hiya hiya). Although he
approached the debate about the universals and common things chiefly through the
framework bequeathed by the Neoplatonists, and especially within the perspective
of Porphyry’s (d. c. 305 CE) Eisagoge, he made a crucial contribution by shifting
the emphasis of the debate from the universals (al-kulliyyāt) and common things
(al-umūr al-ʿāmmah) to his theory of pure quiddity. This distinction is significant, be-
cause for Avicenna ‘genusness’ and ‘speciesness,’ like universality itself, are mental
attributes that are superadded to pure quiddity, and which therefore do not preclude
a discussion of the logical and ontological status of essence itself in the intellect. So
the key questions for him become not so much whether ‘universal species’ and ‘uni-
versal genus’ exist as such in the world, and, if so, how they exist, as Porphyry had
initially formulated them, but rather whether pure quiddities exist as such, and how
the external concomitants and attributes, such as genusness, speciesness, universal-
ity, and oneness, relate to them in the concrete world and in the mind. This drastic
reframing of the discussion of universals had many implications, one of which was to
increase and refine the theoretical framework used to study these notions and to ar-
ticulate—arguably for the first time—a theory of transcendental objects of thought
that are conceptually removed from all relations or things external to them.
In addition, the present book proposes a novel approach to the question of es-
sence and existence in Avicenna that relies on a detailed terminological and doctri-
nal analysis of the evidence drawn from his entire corpus. This approach also in-
volves a drastic revision of the conceptual framework used to study essence and
existence that has hitherto prevailed in Avicennian studies. One core feature of my
analysis implies renegotiating the boundary between essence and existence by
means of the notion of tashkīk or modulation. Modulation is a crucial, yet understud-
ied, notion that Avicenna applies to many key concepts of his philosophy, be it uni-
versality, oneness, form, matter, necessity, priority, and, of course, existence. The up-
shot is that these notions are neither strictly equivocal nor univocal, but can be
adapted to different philosophical contexts and their meanings modulated in a vari-
ety of ways. When it comes to existence specifically, Avicenna appears to have de-
vised his theory of ontological modulation (tashkīk al-wujūd) mostly on the basis
6 Introduction

of his interpretation of Aristotle’s focal homonymy, but he implements it in a way

that departs sharply from the Greek sources.
Building on a study by Alexander Treiger,¹² I try to show that Avicenna has a rel-
atively systematic understanding of ontological modulation or tashkīk al-wujūd and
that this theory is constituted of a set of well-defined aspects or modes. This theory
enables Avicenna to reconfigure his ontology and allows for a remarkable degree of
flexibility in the way in which existence is predicated of things. By reconstructing
this modulationist theory of existence, one is able to proffer a reinterpretation of
how the master may have envisaged a full-blown ontology of essence. The connec-
tion I propose between these two theories—pure quiddity and ontological modula-
tion—emerged on my view from the problem Avicenna faced of having to account
for the ontological status of this pure object that is quiddity in itself. Like the onto-
logical status of God, that of pure quiddity is somewhat of an oddity or exception in
the Avicennian system, since it differs from the ontological status of all caused and
contingent beings. As a result, these two case studies can only be conducted through
the lens of tashkīk, which allows for a fragmentation and modulation of the notion of
existence. In this connection, the issue of whether ontological modulation is restrict-
ed to the categorical or predicamental level, or whether it can be extended also to the
divine being, is one that has recently received keen attention in the scholarship.¹³
Following Treiger, I argue that tashkīk al-wujūd should be extended to the transcen-
dental level, a move which enables me to tackle in earnest the question of how
tashkīk relates to essential being—first and foremost, God’s essential being. For Avi-
cenna’s new theory, I contend, justifies including the notion of essential being in a
general ontology that otherwise, and as a general rule, regards existence as an exter-
nal concomitant or attribute of essence. On my interpretation, not only does Avicen-
na extend this modulationist approach to God, but he also articulates it in a manner
that recognizes the fundamental distinction between essential existence vs. external
or concomitant existence, thereby anticipating some of the later developments that
appeared in the postclassical period in Islam and in Latin scholasticism. Another re-
lated and thought-provoking query investigated in the book pertains to the connec-
tion between ontological modulation and the various ‘senses’ (maʿānī) of existence
Avicenna outlines in Metaphysics I.5, an issue that has not received sufficient atten-
tion in the modern literature. Ultimately, my amplified interpretation of tashkīk in
general, and of tashkīk al-wujūd in particular, allows me to proffer a comprehensive
account of the place, function, and ontological status of pure quiddity in Avicenna
philosophical system.
I propose to explore these issues in the various ‘contexts’ of existence Avicenna
broaches in his works: human intellectual existence, concrete extramental existence,

 Treiger, Avicenna’s Notion.

 In addition to Treiger, see Mayer, Faḫr ad-Dīn; Griffel, Ismāʿīlite Critique; and Wisnovsky, On the
Emergence.
 Introduction 7

and ‘divine existence,’ i. e., the separate intellects and especially God’s intellect. In
addition, I devote special attention to mental existence and the notion of intelligible
being, attempting to clarify this ontological mode in Avicenna’s philosophy, especial-
ly in connection with the conception of pure essence in the mind. While not all of my
conclusions taken individually are in themselves novel, in the sense that some of
them may best be qualified as rehabilitations or revisions of older scholarly views
held about the master’s system, I believe that the overarching and integrated account
of Avicenna’s theory of essence I provide constitutes a new way of reading his meta-
physical thought. This approach also challenges existing interpretive paradigms re-
garding his theory of essence and existence, which have in general pitted these
two notions one against the other in an overly schematic way. This kind of narrative
excessively prioritizes either essence or existence in Avicennian ontology. From an
interpretive viewpoint, one may say that it crystallized in the cleavage between
‘the foundationality of essence’ (aṣālat al-māhiyyah) and ‘the foundationality of ex-
istence’ (aṣālat al-wujūd) in the later Islamic tradition. In contrast, the main thesis of
this book is that Avicenna elaborated a full-blown and sophisticated ontology and
epistemology of quiddity and, more precisely, of ‘pure quiddity’ or ‘quiddity in itself’
(al-māhiyyah min ḥaythu hiya hiya). The subtlety and complexity of this doctrine—
one might even say its ambiguity—are factors that later contributed to the develop-
ment of the two diametrically opposed intellectual strands mentioned above; their
very existence testifies to the fact that they were seen as valid interpretations of Avi-
cenna’s works, like two streams flowing from a common source.
The analysis aims to show that Avicenna’s ontology of quiddity is multifaceted
and complex. Fundamentally, this doctrine relies on a mereological interpretation
of how pure quiddity can be said to exist in universals in the mind and in concrete
individuals, as well as on a theory of the intelligible reality, irreducibility, and dis-
tinct existence of pure quiddity in the human and divine intellects. What made
this doctrine possible was what scholars have increasingly come to recognize as Avi-
cenna’s ‘ontologization of logic’; in this case, the ontologization of a matrix of logical
distinctions used to express the various relations between the different elements or
aspects of essence: those between quiddity and its internal constituents (muqawwi-
māt) and those between quiddity and its external, non-constitutive concomitants
(lawāzim ghayr muqawwimah). I argue that the basic distinction between pure quid-
dity and its external concomitants—which I call the māhiyyah-lawāzim model—lies at
the very core of Avicenna’s epistemology and ontology and represents the main
framework through which his philosophy should be interpreted. The māhiyyah-lawā-
zim model is applied not only to a logical context, whence it first originated, but also,
remarkably, to the ontological and theological contexts, where it is used to differen-
tiate between various senses and modes of existence, to explain causality, and to
solve conundrums focusing on God’s relation to the world. The process of ontologiz-
ing these various logical distinctions and relationships goes hand in hand with a re-
configuration of the notion of existence (wujūd), which, for Avicenna, is modulated
in nature (tashkīk), and which therefore applies differently to quiddity taken in itself
8 Introduction

and to the realization of its concomitants. In that sense, the study intends to bring
together Avicenna’s logic and ontology in a manner that exposes their foundational
interrelationship in his system.
Another factor that enabled Avicenna to articulate an original theory of the on-
tology of essence was his uncompromising and adamant recognition of mental exis-
tence as a valid and self-contained ontological realm. His position on this issue im-
plies that intelligible objects in the human and divine intellects exist in a robust
sense and possess a truer and prior mode of existence. Coupled with his earnest en-
gagement with late-antique Greek philosophical sources as well as Islamic theolog-
ical texts, especially those emanating from the Bahshamite tradition,¹⁴ this interest
led Avicenna to advance the discussion of intelligible being as a foundational prin-
ciple of reality. On my view, Avicenna’s ontology of quiddity and his theory of its in-
telligible and irreducible existence should be regarded as a turning point in the his-
tory of philosophy in the Islamic, Jewish, and Christian traditions, since it drastically
re-oriented and profoundly shaped subsequent discussions of essence and its rela-
tion to existence. What is more, it decisively validated a full-blown theory not only
of mental existence generally speaking, but more specifically of the intelligible exis-
tence of pure mental objects, whose repercussions can be intuited in the works of
many later scholars, such as Duns Scotus (d. 1308 CE), Gabriel Vasquez (d. 1604
CE), and Francisco Suárez (d. 1617 CE). Avicenna’s daring theories opened a new ho-
rizon for a purely abstract and theoretical mode of reflection of mental objects that
had not been previously envisaged in Islamic intellectual history.
My intention in writing this book is to provide a synthesis of much of the recent
scholarship on the topic that can be easily consulted by students and experts alike as
well as an analytical and source critical study on a crucial concept of Avicenna’s phi-
losophy. My approach is therefore twofold: synthetic and synoptic, on the one hand,
and critical and analytical, on the other. The overarching aim is to provide a compre-
hensive and fresh interpretation of the role of pure quiddity in Avicenna’s metaphy-
sics and epistemology by approaching the Avicennian corpus as a whole and by pro-
viding a detailed examination of the key concepts and technical terms at play. In
order to reach this objective, I collate key passages bearing on the issue of quiddity
gleaned from the entire Avicennian corpus, translate them into English, and examine
them in a comparative manner, thereby providing readers with an opportunity to re-
flect critically on these excerpts within the confines of a single study. My aim is to be
as inclusive as possible, both in terms of the relevant texts brought within the fold of
the discussion and of the scope of the analysis. There are two factors motivating this
approach. First, Avicenna discourses on quiddity in itself in an array of texts pertain-
ing to the disciplines of logic, psychology, and metaphysics. In general, he does not
treat this issue in a systematic and sustained fashion in any one of these works, and

 By the Bahshamite or Bahshamiyyah tradition, I mean the theological current that based itself on
the works and doctrines of the Muʿtazilite thinker Abū Hāshim al-Jubbāʾī (d. 933 CE).
 Introduction 9

his comments on quiddity are typically integrated in a broader philosophical discus-

sion having to do chiefly with existence, logic, noetics, the universals, or some other
pointed topic. One exception is Metaphysics V.1, where Avicenna provides what is
perhaps his most focused and cogent account of the epistemological and ontological
dimensions of pure quiddity. But even then, V.1 is primarily a discussion of the uni-
versal concepts (al-kulliyyāt), or rather, as its title purports, of ‘common things’ (al-
umūr al-ʿāmmah), and the mental concomitants that are attached to them. In view of
this, juxtaposing the key passages that bear on the issue in a systematic manner with
the aim of studying Avicenna’s terminology and intent seems a desideratum, as only
a comparative and synthetic approach to the evidence might result in substantial
headway. What is more, the issue of quiddity bridges the fields of logic, psychology,
metaphysics, and theology in a way that makes it impossible to explore its implica-
tions without a thorough consideration of the interplay between these various disci-
plines. Accordingly, a reconstruction of the master’s doctrine that relies on his entire
corpus and these various disciplines presents itself as the most auspicious path to
tread. The following analysis will pay particular attention to Avicenna’s logical trea-
tises—notably Introduction, Categories, and Demonstration of The Cure, as well as the
logical section of Pointers—on key metaphysical works by the master—notably from
The Cure, Salvation, and Pointers—as well as on psychological works and the little
studied Commentary on Theology of Aristotle. In addition I rely quite heavily on
the later works Notes and Discussions, which provide fascinating insight into the
master’s philosophy, and whose relevance for the study of Avicenna’s thought has
not been fully exploited.
The second reason for adopting a wide scope of analysis has to do with the state
of the secondary literature. Although many insightful studies have been published
on the topic of essence in Avicenna’s philosophy, when it comes to pure quiddity spe-
cifically and the various epistemological and ontological issues associated with it,
scholars have typically focused on specific facets of the problem, with the result
that the contemporary reader is faced with a dishearteningly disparate and fragmen-
tary literature, in different languages to boot. The absence of a handy survey or re-
capitulatory article on the topic only compounds this problem.¹⁵ These studies typ-
ically zoom in on one aspect of the problem and usually omit to relate it to the
greater picture in Avicenna’s philosophy.¹⁶ One argument I make in this book is

 The best starting point to obtain a general understanding of the problem remains Wisnovsky, Avi-
cenna’s Metaphysics, but the ontological and epistemological issues related to pure quiddity are not
explored in any depth in this book. Benevich, Die ‘göttliche Existenz,’ provides a brief summary of
some aspects of the problem.
 Adopting a comprehensive approach is particularly important, because there has been a tendency
in the past scholarship to compartmentalize issues that prove to be, upon closer examination, inter-
related and whose study must be undertaken collectively for a general picture of Avicenna’s views to
emerge. Scholars have in general dealt with the logical and epistemological aspects of quiddity in
itself in isolation of its theological and metaphysical aspects. They have prioritized either the ‘divine’
10 Introduction

that Avicenna’s theory of pure quiddity is a cornerstone of his entire philosophical

system and ties together his epistemology, noetics, ontology, and theology. In view
of this, the results reached by previous studies need to be compared and their inter-
relationship and compatibility examined in detail. Building on these studies, I en-
gage in a project of terminological and conceptual disambiguation of the notions
of quiddity and existence in Avicenna, as well as of a set of other related notions
that pertain to quiddity, such as oneness, priority, and universality. This implies,
to begin with, an analysis of the various terms Avicenna uses to refer to quiddity
in itself, quiddity in the mind, and quiddity in the concrete world. This task is not
only crucial to reach a proper understanding of Avicenna’s doctrine of pure quiddity;
it is also a requisite step in the long-term project of reconstructing the history of the
reception of Avicenna’s ideas in the postclassical period, where the nature of quid-
dity and its relation to mental existence served as one of the dividing lines between
schools and thinkers. In most cases, these debates were propped on intricate termi-
nological distinctions derived directly from Avicenna’s works. As will be stressed on
repeated occasions, Avicenna’s choice of terms when describing quiddity is thought-
ful and deliberate and represents a decisive element of the problem. Yet, the rich and
multifaceted technical vocabulary he taps into in order to describe pure quiddity has
been conveyed in English by means of a limited and often misleading set of terms,
which have furthermore not been subjected to analytical scrutiny. Modern translators
and interpreters have often relied on the expression ‘quiddity in itself’ in their works,
without however fully clarifying its meaning and using it to gloss over a number of
Arabic terms and locutions. As a result, Avicenna’s philosophical language and doc-
trines have sometimes been unintentionally distorted through oversimplification. To
this focus on terminology, I add an emphasis on philology. As I try to show, deter-

context of the pure quiddities or the human epistemological context, with the result that these two
perspectives have often been divorced from one another. A few examples will suffice to show this:
Marmura’s remarkable and groundbreaking studies (Quiddity and Universality; Avicenna’s Chapter
on Universals) focus mostly, if not exclusively, on quiddity and universality in the mind and,
hence, on the mental concepts. Booth, Aristotelian Aporetic Ontology, 107‒125, for his part focuses
mostly on quiddity in the concrete world and how it relates to the mind. In contrast, Goichon, La dis-
tinction, and Rashed, Ibn ʿAdī, are more interested in the divine and theological implications of this
issue. As for Benevich, Die ‘göttliche Existenz,’ he distances himself from these theological consid-
erations and limits his discussion to the mereological existence of quiddity in the mind and the con-
crete world. Hence, the issues of (a) the status of quiddity in itself in the human mind and its con-
nection to human cognition and epistemology, (b) its existence in the concrete world, (c) whether and
how it exists in the divine mind, and (d) its relation to divine causation and creation, have in general
been treated separately in the past, even though they are intertwined and must be tackled alongside
one another if one is to make serious headway on this matter. With that being said, it should be
stressed that the overwhelming majority of Avicenna’s comments pertaining to quiddity in itself de-
fine it as a notion in the human mind, not in the divine mind, so that it is primarily from this angle
that the inquiry should be pursued, at least initially. Only after its status in the human mind has been
clarified can the corollary question of how it relates to God and the separate intellects be tackled.
These points account for the structure of the present book.
 Introduction 11

mining the correct Arabic syntax and grammar of a passage can impact on its overall
meaning and interpretation, sometimes in drastic ways. A telling example related to
essence is a famous passage of Metaphysics V.I, which, on my view, has been misin-
terpreted largely on philological grounds and, it would appear also, to further a par-
ticular interpretation of Avicenna that complies with the status quo of the nonexis-
tence of pure essence (see section II.2.4).
In parallel to this exercise in terminological disambiguation, I articulate a con-
textualist approach and attempt to connect Avicenna’s views with regard to several
major philosophical traditions.¹⁷ This—I believe—is a necessary step to generate ad-
equate philosophical framing for his ideas. The first is the Greco-Arabic philosophi-
cal context, which is of course the main tradition within which Avicenna is operating
and from which he is drawing. This tradition spans from Aristotle (d. 322 BCE) to the
master himself and includes many Peripatetic and Neoplatonic works, some of which
were translated and adapted from Greek and Syriac to Arabic, others of which were
composed in Arabic by some of Avicenna’s predecessors. One central claim of this
book is that Avicenna’s ontology of essence arose from the convergence of two prob-
lematics¹⁸ he inherited from this Greek background: first, Aristotle’s discussion of
being in Metaphysics and especially his theory of ‘core-related’ or ‘focal homonymy’;
and second, the late-antique discussions on the universals and common things. Avi-
cenna not only elaborated considerably on Aristotle’s ontology and theory of focal
meaning, but also—as hinted at by the very title of Metaphysics V.1, “On General
Things and the Manner [or Mode] of their Existence” (Fī l-umūr al-ʿāmmah wa-kay-
fiyyat wujūdihā)—proceeded to examine how existence relates to the various aspects
of the universals and common things. In this regard, I pay particular attention to the
late-antique philosophical background, which subjected Aristotle’s ideas to a process
of sustained transformation and elaboration, and also engendered many innovative
theories that themselves in turn contributed to shaping Arabic philosophy. Illustra-
tive of the significance of this late-antique legacy is Avicenna’s own commentary

 In embracing this contextualist approach, I take inspiration from Wisnovsky, Avicenna, which
masterfully combines an analysis of kalām with Greek and Arabic philosophical sources. Other exam-
ples embodying this type of approach are de Libera, La querelle, and idem, L’art, which merge the
voices of ancient Greek, Arabic, and Latin thinkers. Given the present state of our knowledge, it
seems no longer possible to approach Avicenna’ works and thought by looking only at the Greek phil-
osophical heritage in Islam. Avicenna was also heavily indebted to, and engaged in a direct dialogue
with, various groups of theologians, especially Ashʿarite and Muʿtazilite theologians. In addition, I
believe that the Latin Scholastics were careful readers of Avicenna and have valuable things to say
—and this, in spite of the language divide and chronological gap that separates them from the master.
Likewise, modern studies written on the Avicenna latinus, such as those by Pini and Porro, can be
fruitfully consulted and integrated into the analysis.
 I am aware that this term is rarely used in English in a non-technical, non-philosophical context.
However, it adequately points to the cluster of philosophical issues that are articulated in, and char-
acterize, the Avicennian corpus and that were bequeathed to the Christian, Jewish, and Islamic intel-
lectual traditions, where they enjoyed rich and complex intellectual developments.
12 Introduction

on Porphyry’s Eisagoge, which contains in nuce some of the main philosophical is-
sues relating to quiddity that Avicenna amplifies in his other writings. But the mas-
ter’s reliance on this tradition extends beyond this single commentary and pertains
to the general legacy of the discussion of the universals (sing., τò καθόλου) and com-
mon things (sing., τò κοινόν) that had unfolded in the Greek Neoplatonic and Peri-
patetic circles. Avicenna’s own doctrines on quiddity and universality should be
seen not only as echoing and perpetuating, but also frequently as building on and
re-orienting, the debate about the common things that one finds in the works of
prominent Greek thinkers. The importance of the late-antique discussion about the
universals and common things has been consistently underestimated when ap-
proaching Avicenna’s theory of quiddity.¹⁹ Yet, it represents a crucial piece of the
puzzle and one that calls for scrutiny. Thus, I offer a detailed exposition of how Avi-
cenna reacted to specific issues his predecessors put forth, as well as how he largely
embraced the conceptual framework he inherited from this late-antique tradition and
implemented it in his analysis of quiddity. Building on a crucial study by Marwan
Rashed, I also consider in detail how Avicenna’s views on essence and the universals
relate to those of his Christian predecessor Yaḥyā b. ʿAdī (d. 974 CE), who was himself
an heir to and interpreter of late-antique philosophy.²⁰ I contend that Yaḥyā’s theory
of essential being (al-wujūd al-dhātī) had a profound impact on Avicenna.
But there are other major intellectual currents that informed Avicenna’s thought,
one of which is the early Arabic theological tradition. Recent studies have shown the
extent of his debt to the early kalām debates, especially regarding the relation be-
tween ‘the thing’ (al-shayʾ) and ‘the existent’ (al-mawjūd).²¹ In this connection, an-
other important claim made in the present book is that Avicenna’s theory of quiddity
in itself is heavily indebted in its ontological and epistemological dimensions to the
doctrines of the mutakallimūn, and especially the Baṣrian Muʿtazilite School that co-
alesced around the figure of Abū Hāshim al-Jubbāʾī (d. 933 CE). The latter’s ontology
and theology, as well as those of his main followers, such as ʿAbd al-Jabbār, Abū Ra-
shīd al-Nīshāpūrī, Ibn Mattawayh, and Mānkdīm Shashdīw, can illuminate some im-
portant features of Avicenna’s doctrine and represent some of the key sources under-
lying the master’s metaphysics. The relation between Avicenna and the Bahshamite
theological school, however, is nuanced and complicated: it is informed by processes
of adaption and transformation, as well as by an attitude of opposition to certain of
their ontological and theological doctrines. Building on recent studies, I delve into
the issue of how Avicenna’s ontology relates to the Bahshamite theory of the states
or modes (aḥwāl), which was a crucial aspect of the metaphysical discussions and

 One notable exception is de Libera, La querelle, and idem, L’art, 499‒607, who lucidly contextu-
alizes Avicenna’s theory of quiddity vis-à-vis the ancient philosophical discourse on the universals.
 Rashed, Ibn ʿAdī.
 See notably Wisnovsky, Avicenna’s Metaphysics, which builds on the insight provided in Jolivet,
Aux origines.
 Introduction 13

debates going on at the time.²² My analysis highlights the debt that Avicenna’s theory
of pure quiddity owes to the discussion about essence (dhāt), attributes (ṣifāt), and
states (aḥwāl) emanating from these Muʿtazilite circles, and in particular to the Bah-
shamite theory of the ‘Attribute of the Essence’ (ṣifat al-dhāt).²³
The overarching aim of my approach is to situate Avicenna’s theory of quiddity in
itself at the confluence of the Greek and Arabic traditions and, more precisely, at the
junction of these two broad intellectual debates, i. e., the ancient philosophical de-
bate about the universals and the kalām debate about the ontological status of
‘the thing’ (shayʾ) and ‘the state’ (ḥāl). These trends, I argue, deeply informed Avicen-
na’s doctrine of essence, although the master also steered the discussion in new di-
rections and tackled issues that had previously been ignored or left unexplored. One
major contribution Avicenna adds to the Greek and Arabic legacy he embraced is a
vivid and remarkable interest in the nature, conditions, and implications of mental
or intellectual existence, of what it means to exist in the mind or intellect (both
human and divine). The implementation of Avicenna’s method and philosophical
priorities on this inherited doctrinal substrate, combined with his inquisitive and dy-
namic style of philosophizing, led him to drastically reshape the material he received
from the Greek philosophers and the Muslim theologians. This process ultimately
culminated in the elaboration of an idiosyncratic philosophical system, of which
pure quiddity represents one of its most seminal and outstanding features.
The third and fourth traditions postdate the master and consist of the post-Avi-
cennian Arabic tradition and the Latin scholastic tradition respectively.²⁴ What, it
may be asked, can be gained from a retrospective reading of Avicenna’s works
through the eyes of later authors? Invoking these multifaceted and highly transfor-
mative intellectual traditions in my analysis alongside the late-antique background
and early Arabic theology is admittedly ambitious and also risky from a methodolog-
ical perspective. In spite of this, it can also be seen as a highly desirable and analyti-
cally productive venture. Gaining insight into what some of the most brilliant philos-

 See especially Wisnovsky, Essence and Existence; some insight is to be gained also in Alami,
L’ontologie modale; and Benevich, The Classical.
 Building on the insight provided in Dhanani, Rocks, I will attempt to expose Avicenna’s familiar-
ity with Muʿtazilite sources. Dhanani argues that Avicenna consulted some of ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s phys-
ical works and that he was cognizant of the intra-Muʿtazilite debates on atomism. In addition to this
doctrinal aspect, there are some hints that the master interacted directly with Muʿtazilite theologians.
One hint is Avicenna’s possible exposure to Muʿtazilite kalām during his formative years as a student
of fiqh with Ismāʿīl al-Zāhid in Bukhara. The latter was a specialist of Ḥanafī fiqh, and according Dha-
nani and Bulliet, most of the Ḥanafī scholars in this region and during this time adhered to Muʿta-
zilite theological views; see Dhanani, Rocks, 129, and note 7; Gutas, Avicenna, 13, and note 11. Another
element of some significance is Avicenna’s potential encounter with ʿAbd al-Jabbār during his stay in
Rayy between 1013 and 1015; see Dhanani, Rocks; and Gutas, Avicenna, 296.
 Recent studies have shown that Avicenna exercised some influence on the Jewish tradition as
well, but I refrain here, mostly for reasons of space, from investigating this issue and leave it to others
to examine how the Avicennian theory of essence was received by later Jewish philosophers.
14 Introduction

ophers in the centuries after Avicenna had to say about his doctrine of quiddity can
only enrich and benefit an assessment of the subject. For one thing, these Arabic and
Latin commentators give their own versions and interpretations of Avicenna’s theo-
ries, thereby opening alternate interpretive perspectives. In this respect, it is remark-
able—cultural contexts notwithstanding—to what degree the Latin and Arabic phil-
osophical interpretations sometimes concur and overlap, even when these thinkers
were oblivious to each other’s existence. One salient example concerns the status
of quiddity in concrete beings and the realist metaphysical interpretation of Avicen-
na’s doctrine that appears to have been articulated in postclassical Islam and in the
medieval Latin West. This in itself might tell us something important about Avicen-
na’s theories that goes beyond the mere history of their reception. If something of a
consensus can be reconstructed from these later sources on specific points of doc-
trine (if not on major philosophical themes), it would carry some interpretive weight
or in any case would deserve our careful consideration. But quite apart from this tan-
talizing possibility, these later Latin and Arabic philosophers and interpreters of Avi-
cenna raise fascinating questions and issues pertaining to quiddity and the univer-
sals and develop conceptual distinctions whose analysis can enrich our
understanding of the Avicennian texts. While the Latin reception of Avicenna’s met-
aphysics (including his views on quiddity and common nature) is well known and
has been acknowledged and studied for a long time, the impact of Avicenna’s doc-
trine of essence on the postclassical Arabic philosophical tradition from the twelfth
century onward represents a massive field of study that still awaits detailed re-
search.²⁵
The present study can be regarded as an experiment in contextual analysis, in
that it attempts to bring together these various philosophical contexts and intellec-
tual traditions, which are crucial to the interpretation of Avicenna, but which have
often been dissociated from one another in scholarly works. The main incentive
for this multi-contextual approach has its roots in the unique historical position
that Avicenna himself occupies at the crossroads of the Greek, Hebrew, Latin, Persi-
an, and Arabic philosophical traditions. Like so many other aspects of his thought,
Avicenna’s contribution to the philosophical problems of quiddity and the universals
marks a turning point for later discussions of these subjects. Whether through direct
influence or by way of reacting to his doctrines, the master influenced in one way or
other most metaphysical accounts of the relation of essence and existence formulat-
ed during the twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteenth centuries (and beyond), and this not
only in the Islamic world, but in medieval Europe as well. In the Islamic world, the
framework he elaborated regarding the various distinctions of quiddity and his em-
phasis on its intellectual abstractness proved particularly momentous and transfor-
mative. Whether one reads Maimonides (d. 1204 CE), Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 1210

 In fact, when it comes to quiddity in particular, and with the exception of a cluster of studies by
Toshihiko Izutsu (mentioned in the bibliography), there is a paucity of literature on the topic.
 Introduction 15

CE), Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī (d. 1274 CE), Thomas Aquinas (d. 1274 CE), Henry of Ghent
(d. 1293 CE), or Duns Scotus, Avicenna’s views regarding the epistemological and on-
tological ramifications of quiddity are foundational for these thinkers’ conceptuali-
zation of this philosophical problem, and the technical terms and concepts the mas-
ter deployed reappear in one form or other in their works. What is more, his works
were the funnel through which much of the late-antique discussion about the univer-
sals was transmitted to the postclassical Islamic tradition, albeit in a thoroughly re-
vised and ‘Avicennized’ form. This justifies taking these various contexts into ac-
count, be it only to highlight parallels and commonalities in the reception of
Avicennian philosophy and to identify some of the conceptual turning points in
the later debates about quiddity. In one sense, these later discourses on essence
can be regarded as variations on a common theme that finds its blueprint and
main source of inspiration—if not its very philosophical origin—in the Avicennian
works.
The present book consists of five main chapters. The first provides a survey of the
literature, raises the main conceptual issues to be discussed, and proposes some new
methodological ideas. The last four each cover a ‘context of existence’ in Avicenna’s
philosophy. Chapter II focuses on the domain of human mental or intellectual exis-
tence; chapter III on quiddity in the concrete world; and chapters IV and V on the
divine context, which includes God and the separate intellects. This tripartition re-
flects the Neoplatonic scheme ‘before,’ ‘in,’ and ‘after multiplicity,’ to which Avicen-
na himself refers at the beginning of Introduction I.12. However, I have reversed this
order, beginning with quiddity in the human mind and ending with a discussion of
the pure quiddities in God. The justification for this inversion is rooted in Avicenna’s
own works. Most of the information Avicenna provides regarding quiddity in itself is
found in an epistemological, psychological, and logical context. In these cases, the
emphasis is on the mental or intellectual dimension of quiddity and of how it can be
conceived by the human mind. What is more, the master often begins his metaphys-
ical inquiry, as in Metaphysics I.5, with an analysis of what is better known to us,
which consists of the primary notions, among which is ‘the thing’ (al-shayʾ), which
is closely related to and a shorthand for quiddity, even though it may not correspond
to it exactly. It makes sense, then, that the inquiry into the ontological status of quid-
dity should begin with its status in the human mind.
Chapter I provides what I consider to be a necessary survey of the existing state
of the literature regarding Avicenna’s theory of essence and existence and especially
regarding the pointed issue of the ontological status of pure quiddity. Given the in-
terconnectedness of the various issues at stake, as well as the intricate nature of the
interpretations that have been proposed regarding pure quiddity, it is a requisite to
synthesize this vast pool of information in order to reach a clearer understanding of
the accomplishments that have been made thus far, as well as the various desider-
ata, challenges, and pitfalls that still lie ahead. Two general points emerge from
this review: first, scholars have sometimes proposed enticing interpretations of dis-
crete aspects of the problem, while failing to connect them to the larger picture,
16 Introduction

thereby amputating Avicenna’s theory of essence. Second, the survey suggests that,
in many cases, the existing conceptual and theoretical framework to study essence
and existence is inadequate, because it does not allow for interpretive nuances
and rather crudely opposes two notions whose interface and ‘relationship’ is highly
intricate and nuanced. Hence, in addition to reviewing much of the scholarship on
the issue, I propose some novel conceptual and theoretical distinctions that can aid
in the present quest to bring clarity and precision to the problem.
In chapter II, which is devoted exclusively to the relation between quiddity and
mental existence, I argue that Avicenna defends the view that quiddity in itself is
conceivable and amounts to a distinct intellectual consideration, form, and meaning
in the human mind. Pure quiddity exists in the mind in abstraction from its mental
concomitants and accidents and as a pure intelligible object. This means that quid-
dity in itself possesses its own ontological status in the human intellect, which is dis-
tinct from that of the complex or synthetic universal concept, which it nevertheless
underlies and forms a part of. This thesis goes against the standard view in Avicen-
nian studies that intellectual existents are exclusively limited to a single kind of ob-
ject, namely, the universal concepts that are potentially or actually predicated of ex-
terior beings. Furthermore, the analysis underlines the need to differentiate between
‘quidditative distinctness’ and ‘quidditative irreducibility’: pure quiddity exists intel-
ligibly, both on its own in a distinct manner and as an irreducible part of the complex
universal concept.
The purpose of chapter III is to show that Avicenna upholds a moderate kind of
ontological realism relying on a mereological interpretation of quiddity, according to
which it can be said to exist as an irreducible part of the concrete individual. This
section underscores the close interconnections between Avicenna’s mereological, hy-
lomorphic, and logical distinctions. It also contends that Avicenna adopted, but con-
siderably modified, the threefold Neoplatonic scheme of the universals, which in-
cludes the universals ‘in matter’ or ‘in multiplicity,’ and which he combined with
Alexander of Aphrodisias’s (fl. ca. 200 CE) theory of nature to elaborate a doctrine
of immanent formalism. These late-antique ideas were nevertheless adapted in
light of Avicenna’s view that pure quiddity is something (strictly speaking) distinct
from the mental universal, as well as of a redefinition of the various senses of uni-
versality, one of which can be applied (in a qualified sense) to quiddity in the con-
crete world. Although he rejects the strong realism associated with the Platonic
forms, Avicenna articulates a theory of the irreducible existence of quiddity as a prin-
ciple within concrete beings, which is intended to mirror its existence in the mind. In
addition, I argue, following Jon McGinnis, that pure quiddity lies at the root of Avi-
cenna’s theory of abstraction and establishes a necessary correspondence between
the ontological and epistemic planes. Consequently, pure quiddity assumes the
role of an ontological and epistemological constant in Avicenna’s philosophy. This
not only helps to explain his theories of the distinction between essence and exis-
tence and of causal complexity as these apply to the extramental world. It also
 Introduction 17

opens a fresh perspective regarding the vexed problem of abstraction and emanation
in Avicenna’s works.
Chapter IV analyzes Avicenna’s theory of ontological modulation (tashkīk al-
wujūd) and seeks to show that some of the modes and senses of existence relate di-
rectly to quiddity. It argues that pure quiddity possesses its own special mode of ex-
istence, which is constant, irreducible, simple, prior, and, for these reasons, also ‘di-
vine.’ Essence possesses only a single mode of intelligible existence, and this
regardless of its ‘ontological contexts,’ that is, regardless of whether it is a part of
a complex being (a material and concrete individual, a universal in the mind), or
whether it exists distinctly as a concept in the human mind. This implies a sharp dis-
tinction between three different modes of existence in Avicenna: the realized exis-
tence associated with the concomitants and accidents of complex contingent beings;
the special mode of existence of quiddity; and God’s special mode of existence. The
last two are presented as ontological ‘exceptions’ in Avicenna’s philosophy, inas-
much as they differ from the mode of existence of all other entities, which is com-
plex, caused, and contingent.
Finally, in chapter V, I argue that the pure quiddities exist in all the divine intel-
lects, starting with God and ending with the Agent Intellect (al-ʿaql al-faʿʿāl). The
mode of existence of pure quiddity is fully identical with God’s essence, but becomes
differentiated on purely noetical grounds in the other divine intellects. In this con-
nection, Avicenna’s reliance and elaboration on Neoplatonic theories are highlight-
ed. Locating the pure quiddities—as opposed to the complex mental universals
that are the objects of human intellection—in God and identifying them with His ob-
jects of thought helps to solve many seemingly intractable problems in Avicenna’s
theology, such as his claims concerning God’s knowledge of universals and particu-
lars, as well as the issue of how God can know a plurality of objects without an on-
tological plurality actually existing in the divine essence. The claim that the pure
quiddities exist identically with the divine essence is coherent, because they are in
this state devoid of all concomitants (lawāzim) and attributes (including possibility,
numerical oneness, and plurality), which are the hallmark of intelligible multiplicity.
This makes them the only valid candidates for this kind of divine knowledge and ex-
istence.
By building on the cumulative insights of classical and postclassical Islamic, me-
dieval Latin, and modern interpretations of Avicenna, I argue that pure quiddity pos-
sesses a unique and special mode of existence, which manifests itself differently de-
pending on the ontological contexts at hand: it exists (a) irreducibly in concrete
beings and in universal concepts in the human mind together with external concom-
itants and accidents; (b) in the human mind in a mode distinct from the complex
universal; (c) in the separate intellects, including the Agent Intellect; and (d) in a di-
vine mode that is fully identical with God’s essence. I aim in this manner to formu-
late an alternative solution to the essence/existence conundrum: the distinction is
conceptual and real, albeit in different ways, and both the scholastic theory of essen-
tial being sometimes attributed to Avicenna and the theory of the co-extensionality of
18 Introduction

essence and existence are correct and also compatible in ways that had not hitherto
been envisaged. Finally, I show that Avicenna is in many ways a Neoplatonist when it
comes to his doctrine of the universals and God’s knowledge, in a manner that has
not been fully appreciated, although he also innovated considerably on the ancient
models and eventually fashioned an innovative and daring system out of this philo-
sophical legacy. What emerges from the study is that Avicenna’s theory of the ontol-
ogy of quiddity represents a special ‘moment’ with regard to the slow maturation of
his philosophical system and, more generally, of the history of philosophy. It is a spe-
cial moment, because, for reasons I expound in the book, it is a doctrine that, in its
details and very sophistication, is idiosyncratic to Avicenna and in particular to the
works of his middle period, especially The Cure. Yet, at the same time, it is also a ‘mo-
ment’ in the sense of a turning point, because the main features of his theory exerted
a profound influence on later treatments of essence and outlined some of the main
problematics and issues that were later discussed in the Arabic, Persian, and Latin
commentaries on the master’s works. Indeed, Avicenna’s doctrines influenced entire
generations of postclassical Muslim and medieval Christian scholars, who conceived
of quiddity, existence, and the universals partly through the lens of his philosophical
legacy.
Chapter I:
Pure Quiddity in Context
1 Introducing the problem

Quiddity or essence, for Avicenna, designates the ‘whatness’ or ‘what-it-isness’ of a

thing, its essential structure and principle, as well as its meaning and intelligibility
to the mind. As such, it is what makes conception or conceptualization (taṣawwur)
possible. Quiddity is what is referred to by the definition (ḥadd), according to
which a thing is what it is and not something else, regardless of the mode in
which it exists. In other words, the definition informs us about its thingness
(shayʾiyyah) in abstraction from that thing’s existence, that is, whether it exists
and how or in what mode it exists.¹ Quiddity as such is apprehended as a unitary

 This is the general definition of quiddity embraced by virtually all Arabic philosophers and by
many theologians as well. Avicenna provides definitions of māhiyyah in various places, especially
in the sections dealing with logic (see, for example, Salvation, 12‒13; Pointers, vol. 1, 219‒232;
Logic of the Easterners, 15‒17). There he explains that the reply to the question ‘What is it?’ (mā
huwa)—the Arabic term māhiyyah is derived from this expression—needs to include the various es-
sential (dhātiyyah) or constitutive (muqawwimah) elements of the definition for it to be complete
and accurate. Additionally, there are various ways of framing the answer to this question, the
most common or direct of which is the definition through genus and differentia. In this manner,
one refers to the species through its constitutive features, such as when one answers ‘rational animal’
in reply to the question of what a human being is, where ‘animal’ indicates the genus and ‘rational’
the differentia. The species (nawʿ), for Avicenna, is what corresponds most directly and fully to the
actual existent and the primary substance and is therefore the recommended way of elucidating
the quiddity of a thing. For it includes, in the case of human, “substantiality, corporeity, faculties
of nourishment, growth and reproduction, of sense, movement, speech and others” (Avicenna, Sal-
vation, 13.3‒5; translation by Ahmed in Avicenna’s Deliverance, 9). In other words, it contains all the
differentiae that distinguish human beings from other species of animals. Alternatively, one can ex-
plain the quiddity of a thing through reference to genus alone, such as when one says of a human
being that it is an animal, or of a human being and a horse that they are both ‘animal’; yet, this ap-
proach is more general and less precise, since it does not include all the essential features and differ-
entiae that characterize humanness or horseness as a species. It is important to note that the same
thing can be both genus and species depending on the question asked and on the kind of quiddity
that is defined. Thus, ‘animal’ is a genus in the definition of ‘human being,’ but it is itself a species
when included in the definition of ‘body,’ since it qualifies or specifies generic body into animal body,
which in turn is a genus for the various animal species (see Salvation, 15‒16). One important Avicen-
nian specificity is added to this relatively standard logical account: the master distinguishes sensu
stricto between quiddity in itself and ‘being a species’ or ‘being a genus,’ that is to say, between
the pure nature (e. g., humanness or animalness) and universal genusness and universal speciesness.
For genusness (jinsiyyah) and speciesness (nawʿiyyah) are added as exterior intentions or meanings
(maʿānī) to pure quiddity in the mind. In itself, horseness is neither universal nor genus. I shall dis-
cuss these important points later on in detail. Much later in time, the lexicologist al-Tahānawī
(fl. 1740s), Dictionary, 1423‒4, distinguishes between the views of the logicians (al-manṭiqiyyīn), ac-
cording to whom quiddity is the answer to the question “What is it?” (bi-mā huwa), and those of

[Link]
20 I Pure Quiddity in Context

idea and meaning (maʿnā) in the mind. It is what represents a thing’s essential or
foundational nature (ṭabīʿah) and true reality (ḥaqīqah).² This is because quiddity
contains, and is constituted by, a set of internal and essential components that de-
termine its very nature and, thus, the nature of an existent thing as well. These
are what Avicenna calls the constitutive elements or constituents (muqawwimāt) of
quiddity, which are its inner, essential, and formal constituents. These are sharply
distinguished from (a) the external concomitants (lawāzim), which, in contrast, are
non-constitutive (ghayr muqawwimah) and hence do not enter into the quidditative
core, although they necessarily accompany quiddity when a thing actually exists;
and (b) the accidents proper (aʿrāḍ), which are also external to quiddity, but do
not necessarily attach to quiddity in existence and always remain separate from it.³
Thus, whereas the muqawwimāt are internal (sing., dākhil) to thingness, the
lawāzim and aʿrāḍ are external (sing., khārij). These external attributes essentially
follow the constituents and can always be conceptually dissociated from them. In
Avicenna’s epistemology, these external intentions in the mind include concomitants
and accidents as diverse as universality and particularity, oneness and multiplicity,
genusness and speciesness, actuality and potentiality, etc. Anything that does not
enter into the constitutive core of quiddity will be external to it, either as a necessary
concomitant, i. e., something that necessarily attaches to quiddity when a thing ex-
ists either in the mind or in concrete reality (e. g., oneness) or as an accident proper,
i. e., something that may or may not attach to the essence, but which in any case re-
mains essentially separable from quiddity even when a thing exists (e. g., musical in
Socrates). By way of example, whereas shapeness (shakl, shakliyyah) is always con-
stitutive of triangle, and thus one of its muqawwimāt, being ‘one’ triangle, existing
concretely as an individual wooden triangle or in the mind as a universal triangle,
or even having three angles equal to two right angles are all things that are external

the theologians and philosophers (al-mutakallimīn wa-l-ḥukamāʾ), according to whom it answers the
question “What makes the thing what it is?” (mā bi-hi l-shayʾ huwa). This nuance is interesting inas-
much as it underlines the logical and ontological/causal implications of quiddity, both of which find
important roots in the Arabic intellectual tradition in the works of Avicenna.
 As I will show on various occasions throughout this study, the terms māhiyyah, ṭabīʿah, and
ḥaqīqah are interrelated and often used interchangeably by Avicenna to designate essence, even
though they may convey different nuances depending on the context.
 For informative discussions of the term and notion of lāzim, see Goichon, Lexique, 364‒369; Ber-
tolacci, The Reception of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, 615‒616; Lizzini, Fluxus, especially 557‒561; Kalbarc-
zyk, Predication; and Benevich, Essentialität. The last two authors focus mostly on the logical context.
Although some scholars differentiate between the meanings of the terms lāzim and lāḥiq, it seems to
me that Avicenna uses them quite loosely and interchangeably, so I treat them as broadly synony-
mous in this study. What is important for my purposes is that they express a state of externality or
extrinsicality vis-à-vis pure quiddity; both the lawāzim and lawāḥiq are external to (khārij), non-con-
stitutive of (ghayr muqawwimah), and follow and are entailed by (lazima, laḥiqa) essence. It should
be noted that the term lāzim/lawāzim also appears frequently in the context of Avicenna’s discussions
of God, for which see De Smet and Sebti, Avicenna’s Philosophical Approach. I discuss this issue in
detail in chapter V.
 1 Introducing the problem 21

and concomitant to the pure quiddity ‘triangleness.’⁴ In brief, pure quiddity refers
strictly to the internal constituents of essence, as well as to the unitary concept
that emerges in the mind as a result of their essential and intrinsic relation. When
used in this technical sense as meaning essence or quiddity, the Arabic term
māhiyyah is the direct counterpart of a set of Greek expressions that Aristotle used
in his metaphysics, and which are usually translated into English as ‘essence’: τό
τί ἐστι (as in Posterior Analytics 89a32) and τό τί ἦν εἶναι (Topics 132a4 and Metaphy-
sics 993a18 and 988a10). Although Avicenna inherited this concept from Greek phi-
losophy thanks to the translation movements from Greek and Syriac to Arabic, he de-
veloped it considerably in his own philosophical reflection and teaching, thereby
making a valuable contribution to metaphysics, and one which was to profoundly
influence subsequent intellectual history in Islam and the Latin West. In his system,
the concept of quiddity becomes a foundational concept, a metaphysical corner-
stone, surpassed perhaps only (and arguably) by the concept of existence (wujūd).⁵
One of Avicenna’s major contributions to the philosophical discussion about
quiddity he inherited from antiquity was his insistence on the fact that quiddity
can be conceptually distinguished from any other consideration—even from the con-
sideration of existence—and apprehended strictly in itself. This claim, or rather, the
implications Avicenna teased out of it, proved to be epistemologically and metaphys-
ically momentous, but they remain somewhat obscure and tantalizing, even though
they have been the object of a considerable amount of scholarship. One important
upshot of Avicenna’s view is that existence is not constitutive of quiddity and of
the ‘whatness’ or essential core of a thing. We can reflect on the quiddity or thingness
of a thing without broaching the question of whether that thing exists in actuality
and in what mode (concrete or intellectual) it exists. To know the quiddity of horse-
ness, horseness ‘in itself,’ is clearly a different kind of knowledge from knowing
whether a particular horse exists in the concrete world. It is also distinct from the
apprehension of the universal concept ‘horse’ in the mind, which is a single universal
form that can be predicated of many (maqūl ʿalā kathīrīn). This distinction between
the knowledge of essence and the knowledge of existence reflects two other sets of
distinctions frequently encountered in Avicenna’s works: that between conception
(taṣawwur) and assent or conviction (taṣdīq); and that between the ascertainment
of quiddity (taḥaqquq al-māhiyyah) and the ascertainment of existence (taḥaqquq
al-wujūd). According to Avicenna, then, there is a knowledge of quiddity that is ‘in

 The triangle is one of Avicenna’s favorite examples to illustrate the relation between the constitu-
tive elements and the external concomitants of essence, as well as the distinction between essence
and existence; see Introduction, I.6, 34.10‒15; Categories, II.1, 61‒62; Metaphysics I.5, 31.5‒9; Pointers,
vol. 1, 182, 199; vols. 3‒4, 441‒442. The example of the triangle to discuss essence was used by Aris-
totle at Posterior Analytics, II.7.92b.14 ff.
 For the various Greek terms and expressions that lie behind the Arabic word māhiyyah, as well as
for the relevant texts that informed this notion, see Afnan, Philosophical Terminology, 12‒13, 274‒276,
and especially Endress, Proclus arabus, 79 ff.
22 I Pure Quiddity in Context

itself’ or about quiddity ‘and nothing else.’ The object of this rarefied and fully ab-
stract conception Avicenna calls ‘pure quiddity’ or ‘quiddity in itself.’ Everything that
is not internal to it or constitutive of it, such as universality, oneness and multiplicity,
actuality and potentiality, etc., and even existence (wujūd) itself, can be described as
external intentions and concomitants that do not participate in its definition. This
kind of abstract thinking is possible, because according to Avicenna the rational
soul has the ability to analyze and synthesize concepts at will. Thanks to these men-
tal operations, our mind can distinguish quiddity from other concepts and intentions
and apprehend its pure meaning (maʿnā).
Avicenna’s epistemological claims on behalf of quiddity have received consider-
able attention in the modern scholarship, where they have been discussed in connec-
tion with other important notions the master deploys in his works, especially univer-
sality and intentionality.⁶ If one peruses the modern historiography, one notices that
the lion’s share of the scholarly attention has fallen on the relationship between
quiddity and existence, an issue that has ramifications not only with regard to
human thought and mental existence, but also with regard to the concrete existence
of extramental beings. According to Avicennian doctrine, existence is one of the non-
constitutive concomitants that are entailed by quiddity and apply to it from the out-
side; hence, it does not enter into the definition of the ‘whatness’ of a thing, nor is it
included in the very conception (taṣawwur) of quiddity. As an external concomitant
(lāzim), attribute (ṣifah), and intention or meaning (maʿnā), however, it bears an am-
biguous relationship with quiddity. In the modern historiography on Avicenna, this
relationship has been described variably as an ‘accident’ or ‘accidental,’ as one of
‘necessary concomitance,’ ‘co-relatedness,’ and ‘co-implicativeness,’ or simply as a
‘relationship.’ These are notions that have most often been construed as indicating
a purely ‘conceptual’ or ‘logical’ connection established by the mind. Whatever the
case may be, these two concepts—quiddity and existence—make a distinct and irre-
ducible intensional claim: they can be jointly apprehended and conceptually con-
nected in the mind without ever fusing or losing their semantic and conceptual dis-
tinctiveness.⁷
The questions of how these notions relate to one another as metaphysical prin-
ciples and what their status in concrete reality amounts to have been discussed from

 See notably Izutsu, Basic Problems; Marmura, Quiddity and Universality; idem, Avicenna’s Chapter
on Universals; Pini, Absoluta; Benevich, Die ‘göttliche Existenz’; and Tahiri, Mathematics, especially
section 4.1. The most comprehensive treatment of essence in Avicenna conducted from an epistemo-
logical and logical perspective is now Benevich, Essentialität.
 The only exception to this rule in Avicenna’s philosophy is God or the First Cause, in whom quid-
dity and existence cannot be meaningfully separated, even at the purely conceptual level or as a mere
consideration (bi-l-iʿtibār). Accordingly, scholars have interpreted Avicenna as saying either that God
has no quiddity or that His quiddity is identical with His existence, two formulations that are sup-
ported by the textual evidence from Avicenna’s corpus. Either way, the key idea is that quiddity
and existence do not amount to a duality in God, neither in reality, nor in the thinking mind.
 1 Introducing the problem 23

the early reception of Avicenna’s works in the Arabic and Latin traditions up to the
modern scholarship on this thinker. Yet, in spite of remarkable contributions, the
problem of the relationship between essence and existence continues to be among
the most abstruse and difficult in Avicennian studies. It is also one that has for
years divided—and continues to divide—scholarly opinion in a way that few other
topics in the field of Arabic philosophy have.⁸ From a historical perspective, the
seeds of this disagreement lie in the postclassical Islamic period and in the Latin
Middle Ages, which were heirs to Avicenna’s metaphysical doctrine. Starting shortly
after Avicenna’s death, disciples and detractors alike felt compelled to address his
doctrine of essence and its relation to existence. Scholars stemming from the Arabic,
Persian, Latin (and to a lesser extent, Hebrew) traditions formulated various answers
to the problem in commentaries on the master’s works as well as in independent
treatises. In the process of commenting on the master, they often made the Avicen-
nian essence/existence distinction—or rather their interpretation of it—the corner-
stone of their own metaphysical system.
In this regard, the medieval and modern discussions revolving around the rela-
tionship of quiddity and existence are by no means based on a monolithic or homo-
geneous problematic. Rather, they consist of a set of distinct, albeit related, issues,
all of which present their own character and difficulty. Three points in particular
have proven profoundly fertile. The first is the issue of the intensionality of essence
and existence, of their philosophical meaning and structural and semantic relation-
ships. The second is the issue of their extensionality, the spectrum of entities or
things these notions cover and whether these spectrums partly overlap, are identical,
or differ altogether. Finally, there is the more specifically Avicennian problem of the
epistemological and ontological status of quiddity in itself, a topic to which Avicenna
alludes on various occasions in his works, but which he never analyzes in a system-
atic way.⁹ These three issues are all interrelated. The second issue of extensionality
obviously hinges on the meaning of ‘quiddity’ and ‘existence,’ whereas problem
three is directly dependent on the other two, especially on the second one: if quiddity
is said to be extensionally broader than existence, or if not all quiddities are actual
existents, then what is its ontological status? In other words, what is the ontological
status of those instances of quiddity that cannot be directly correlated with an actual

 This is true not only of modern scholars, but also of some of the postclassical followers and critics
of Avicenna in Islam, who devoted much attention to the master’s doctrine of essence and existence.
For an overview of some of these developments in the post-Avicennian tradition with a particular
focus on essence, see Wisnovsky, Essence and Existence; and idem, Towards a Genealogy. Other
major doctrinal points of contention in the modern literature on Avicenna focus on the place and na-
ture of intuition and abstraction in his epistemology, on his views on divine knowledge, and on the
place of mysticism in his works.
 For the distinction between the extensionality and intensionality of essence and existence, and for
an insightful analysis of these notions, see the groundbreaking study by Wisnovsky, Avicenna’s Met-
aphysics.
24 I Pure Quiddity in Context

existent? While there is a certain scholarly consensus concerning the first point (in-
tensionality), there is only partial agreement concerning the second (extensionality),
and major disagreements concerning the third (the epistemic and ontological status
of pure quiddity). It is accordingly with the last two problems, and especially with
the third problem, that this study will deal. In the meantime, additional comments
regarding these three core issues of Avicennian metaphysics are in order.
The intensional or semantic distinction between quiddity and existence is recog-
nized by virtually all medieval and modern interpreters as constituting one of the
foundational tenets of Avicenna’s philosophy. As scholars have shown, this question,
as it is framed in the Avicennian works, was informed by two distinct traditions. On
the one hand, there is the Aristotelian contribution, as encapsulated especially in
Metaphysics and the appendant commentaries on this work. These texts, with
which Avicenna was thoroughly acquainted, are always in the background of his
own philosophical analysis. Even though Aristotle does not press the distinction be-
tween quiddity and existence in the way Avicenna does, some passages of the Aris-
totelian corpus, such as Posterior Analytics II.7, are certainly at the origin of Avicen-
na’s reflection on the subject. In addition, scholars have suggested that some late-
antique Peripatetic and Neoplatonic texts could have influenced Avicenna’s ap-
proach to this question: these include, among others, Alexander’s Quaestio 1.3
and 1.11 and passages from Theology of Aristotle. Thus, many of the Greek texts
that were rendered in Arabic and consulted in classical philosophical circles in
Islam informed the discussion concerning essence and existence.¹⁰
At any rate, Avicenna’s novelty in this regard was not merely to distinguish be-
tween the ‘whatness’ and ‘thatness’ of an existing thing, that is to say, between what
a thing is (i. e., its essence) and that a thing is (i. e., its actual existence). Rather, it lies
in the claim that we can conceive of quiddity in complete abstraction from existence,
that is, by omitting to consider whether a thing exists or not in actuality. Knowing
what horseness is and the definition of horseness does not in any way require the
awareness that this individual horse exists in the extramental world. This realization
encouraged Avicenna to enshrine mental existence as a particular ontological cate-
gory that stands side by side to concrete existence. This in turn had the effect of shift-
ing the focus of the analysis of quiddity away from extramental ontology to mental
ontology. By the same token, however, this approach posed the acute question of
how quiddity relates not to existence simpliciter, or to concrete, extramental exis-
tence, but specifically to mental existence. Avicenna—and virtually every thinker

 The literature on essence and existence in Avicenna and on the relation of his theories to the
Greek philosophical tradition is immense and cannot be cited in full. Here I mention only some rep-
resentative studies in order to orient the reader: Goichon, La distinction; Wisnovsky, Avicenna’s Meta-
physics; Bertolacci, The Reception of Aristotle’s Metaphysics; idem, The Distinction; Belo, Essence;
Menn, Avicenna’s Metaphysics; Lizzini, Ibn Sīnā’s Metaphysics; eadem, Wuǧūd-Mawǧūd. This study
will focus on the much more narrow issue of pure quiddity in Avicenna, and especially on its onto-
logical status. Relevant studies pertaining to this topic will be cited in the course of the analysis.
 1 Introducing the problem 25

who flourished in his stead—struggled to clarify exactly what this view entailed in
terms of how quiddity relates to mental existence and whether it can be said to pos-
sess some kind of intellectual entitativeness.
While the late-antique Greek background was decisive for Avicenna’s preoccupa-
tion with essence and existence, his approach was also informed by the early Arabic
theological tradition (kalām), which discussed at length the relation between ‘the ex-
istent’ (al-mawjūd), ‘the nonexistent’ (al-maʿdūm), and ‘the thing’ (al-shayʾ), key
terms that appear prominently in Avicenna’s own metaphysical discussions.¹¹ The
Arabic theologians had from an early stage onward initiated a discussion as to
what constitutes the basic or primary entities and notions of reality. The kalām tra-
dition was particularly influential in orienting Avicenna’s approach to the issue of
the extensionality of quiddity and existence, for a similar debate had flourished in
Muʿtazilite and Ashʿarite circles regarding whether ‘the thing’ encompassed both
‘the existent’ and ‘the nonexistent’ or only the former. While some, namely, the
Ashʿarites, claimed that ‘the thing’ and ‘the existent’ are identical and constitute pri-
mary conceptual notions as well as the actual building blocks of reality (i. e., all
atoms or substances are ‘things’ and ‘existents’), others, namely the Muʿtazilites,
claimed that ‘the thing’ is extensionally greater than ‘the existent’ and inclusive of
both it and ‘the nonexistent.’ This implies that ‘things’ can be divided into ‘existent
things’ and ‘nonexistent things,’ a view that led to ontological conundrums regard-
ing the status of ‘the nonexistent thing.’ As Wisnovsky and other scholars have
shown, this specific kalām debate had an impact on Avicenna’s terminology, on
the way he frames the problem of essence, and even on the answers he formulated
to the philosophical questions he found in the Greek and Arabic sources.¹²
Avicenna addresses the issues of intensionality and extensionality in earnest in
what is probably his most famous work to date, Metaphysics of The Cure. Having
clarified some key terms used in his general metaphysics (such as shayʾ, mawjūd,
wujūd ithbātī, and wujūd khāṣṣ) in section I.5, Avicenna goes on to argue for the ap-
parent co-extensionality, co-implication, and reciprocity of ‘thing’ (shayʾ) and ‘exis-
tent’ (mawjūd).¹³ Avicenna’s comments on the relationship of these two notions are

 The main study is Wisnovsky, Avicenna’s Metaphysics, particularly chapters II.7, 8, and 13; see
also Wisnovsky, One Aspect; idem, Notes; idem, Avicenna; Jolivet, Aux origines; Belo, Essence;
and Benevich, The Classical. In general, it is Avicenna’s relation to Ashʿarite kalām that has been
the main focus of attention, although Jolivet, Belo, and Wisnovsky (in Avicenna, 105‒110) have point-
ed to the importance of Muʿtazilite theology to understand his metaphysics.
 Wisnovsky, Notes; idem, Avicenna’s Metaphysics; idem, Avicenna.
 An important clarification here concerns the distinction between the terms ‘thing’ (shayʾ) and
‘quiddity’ (māhiyyah). Following some recent contributions, such as Bertolacci, The Distinction,
and De Haan, A Mereological Construal, I will in what follows distinguish between shayʾ and
māhiyyah. More precisely, I will distinguish between shayʾ, on the one hand, and the terms nature
(ṭabīʿah), reality (ḥaqīqah), quiddity (māhiyyah), thingness (shayʾiyyah), and special existence
(wujūd khāṣṣ), on the other. This cluster of terms refers to what a thing is, to the essence and quid-
ditative reality of a thing taken in an abstract way, whereas shayʾ refers to an actual existent and
26 I Pure Quiddity in Context

well known and have been extensively examined by modern scholars, starting with
Goichon’s classic monograph on Avicenna’s metaphysics.¹⁴ Avicenna’s principal aim
throughout this section of Metaphysics appears to be to emphasize the close relation-
ship and mutual dependence of ‘the thing’ and ‘the existent,’ of essence and exis-
tence. Moreover, Avicenna is keen in this passage to maintain a dual division of ex-
istents into mental and extramental and to correlate this division with two aspects of
quiddity or essence: quiddity connected with concrete individuals, and quiddity con-
nected with mental objects. Understandably, some scholars have taken Metaphysics
I.5 as reflecting Avicenna’s definitive stance on the issue and emphasized the thesis
of the co-extensionality and co-implicativeness of essence and existence. This is the
case, for example, of Bertolacci, who, on the basis of this text, has suggested that it
would be more appropriate to speak of an essence/existence relationship, rather than
an essence/existence distinction, given that these two notions are always co-implied
and pertain to every existent, whether concrete or mental.¹⁵

merely suggests quiddity in that existent. Although ‘the thing’ has sometimes been construed as a
synonym of quiddity or essence, and although Avicenna himself sometimes uses this term loosely
to that effect, there is an important conceptual difference between these two notions. The term
shayʾ really means, for Avicenna, an existing essence or thing. It refers to an entity that possesses
both existence and essence and, hence, to something that can be pointed to (al-mushār ilayhi),
and which is also, by the same token, an entity that is caused and complex or composite. As
such, ‘the thing’ is always interrelated or correlated with ‘the existent’ and fully co-extensional
with it. It is on these grounds that the formula māhiyyāt al-ashyāʾ can in most cases be replaced
with the equivalent expression māhiyyāt al-mawjūdāt. The terms māhiyyah and shayʾiyyah, in con-
trast, express quiddity in a more abstract and theoretical way and often designate ‘pure quiddity’
or ‘quiddity in itself’ specifically. According to Avicenna, it is this abstract notion that can be concep-
tually distinguished in the mind and separated from existence, as in the case of the consideration of
the pure quiddity ‘horseness’ or ‘humanness,’ which, in itself, does not include any consideration of
existence. In these cases, ‘a quiddity’ can only awkwardly be called ‘a thing’ (except, perhaps, in a
non-technical sense), although the idiosyncratic but cognate term ‘thingness’ or shayʾiyyah can be
used more appropriately to refer to the same fundamental meaning. Hence, the distinction between
shayʾ and māhiyyah is not merely a formal difference, but rather reflects a profound philosophical
shift in perspective from studying the ontology and epistemology of quiddity as it is instantiated
in composite or complex existent things (shayʾ, or quiddity in the thing) and as it is conceived of
in itself and in an abstract mode (māhiyyah, shayʾiyyah). In spite of this, there has been a general
tendency in the Western interpretations of Avicenna to conflate these two notions, starting perhaps
with Thomas Aquinas, who identifies ‘being’ and ‘essence’ (esse and essentia)—and not ‘the thing’
(shayʾ, res)—as the primary notions discussed by Avicenna in Metaphysics I.5 (see Thomas Aquinas,
On Being and Essence, 1). Given that the term shayʾ does not illuminate in any useful way the issue of
the ontological status of pure quiddity and is systematically contrasted with a cluster of terms des-
ignating pure quiddity in Avicennian technical parlance, the present study will focus primarily on
the terms māhiyyah and shayʾiyyah.
 Goichon, La distinction. As I will point out in due course, some of my conclusions overlap with
those of Goichon.
 Bertolacci (The Distinction, 287) proposes to use the term ‘relationship’ instead of the term ‘dis-
tinction’ favored by Goichon and many others after her to describe essence and existence. The point, I
presume, is that the latter stresses not only the difference, but also the separateness of essence and
 1 Introducing the problem 27

However, it is with regard to the second problem of extensionality that scholars’

opinions begin to diverge in significant ways. One group, representing by far the ma-
jority of scholars, has argued for a perfect and strict co-extensionality of quiddity and
existence, maintaining that all essences are actual existents and that all actual exis-
tents must necessarily have an essence that makes them what they are. On their view,
whatever is an existent (mawjūd) is also a thing (shayʾ) endowed with a quiddity (mā-
hiyyah) or possessing thingness (shayʾiyyah), and vice versa, so that all quiddities
must exist in actuality, either in the concrete, extramental world or, at the very
least, in the human mind thinking them. This approach in effect reduces the relation
of essence and existence to that between ‘the thing’ and ‘the existent.’ As Bäck no-
ticed, it also implies a “weak principle of plenitude” concerning the existence of
mental quiddities: in order to ‘exist,’ all quiddities must have at least mental exis-
tence, and some of them may in addition become realized in concrete existence.¹⁶
Since Avicenna posits only two kinds or modes of existence in his works—concrete
extramental existence, and intellectual universal existence—these scholars reason
that all quiddities must be subsumed under one or both of these categories. Accord-
ingly, some quiddities can be said to exist in the physical, extramental world (e. g.,
this particular horse) and in the human mind apprehending it (the universal, intelli-
gible form ‘horse’), while others (e. g., the universal form of the phoenix or an artifi-
cial form like a heptagonal house) will presumably exist only in the mind.
As a consequence, it would seem that quiddity is never found in a state that is
fully free from existence (wujūd). Although these scholars are aware that Avicenna

existence, and also suggests strongly a mental or conceptualist context, inasmuch as a distinction is
performed by the mind, and so it seems from the outset to create a certain bias in our thinking about
these notions. The term ‘relationship’ in contrast seems more neutral and puts the emphasis on the
complicated interface between these two notions as they interact in the mind and in the concrete
world, which is the crux of the problem facing modern scholars. However, as Olga Lizzini pointed
out to me, a relationship necessarily presupposes a distinction of some kind, so these notions appear
ultimately to be roughly interchangeable, and it remains unclear what benefit there is to talk of a re-
lationship rather than a distinction. This point notwithstanding, given what was said above concern-
ing the distinction between shayʾ and māhiyyah, it is important to adduce an additional qualification:
the terms al-shayʾ and al-mawjūd pertain primarily to actual existents, whether to things that can be
pointed to in concrete reality, or to distinct objects in the mind. In view of this, it is normal that when-
ever Avicenna is talking about these entities, he would stress the co-extensionality of quiddity and
existence, since these notions are always found together in contingent beings; in other words, a
thing both exists and has a quiddity. In this connection, it is also important to stress that ‘the
thing’ is always, at least conceptually, complex, and, as a result, also caused and contingent (accord-
ingly, God, for Avicenna, is not a shayʾ). As can be seen, this metaphysical template does not provide
an ideal—and arguably even an adequate—framework to examine the ontological status of quiddity
in itself. The reason for this is that, as can be inferred from its very appellation (quiddity in itself),
pure quiddity is taken in abstraction from existence, and so there is no direct link between it and
the mode of existence that applies to the things, i. e., to the actual, caused, composite or complex ex-
istents.
 Bäck, Avicenna’s Conception, 233, 236.
28 I Pure Quiddity in Context

also mentions a third consideration of quiddity in some of his works, namely, that of
quiddity in itself (al-māhiyyah bi-mā hiya tilka l-māhiyyah), which is described as
being independent of both mental and extramental existence, they argue (or assume)
that this aspect of quiddity cannot possess any kind of autonomous existence and,
hence, corresponds to a purely conceptual or epistemological aspect of quiddity
that excludes existence altogether. In that way, the Avicennian proposition that we
can consider quiddity in itself does not, on their view, conflict in any way with
the thesis of the perfect overlap and co-extensionality between essence and exis-
tence. From a textual perspective, this position relies heavily on Metaphysics I.5 of
The Cure, which argues most explicitly for the co-implication and co-extensionality
of quiddity and existence, or rather of shayʾ and mawjūd, a chapter which these
scholars regard as the locus classicus of the Avicennian theory of essence. Indeed,
in this section of his work, Avicenna’s main thesis throughout seems to be that
thing (shayʾ), and, hence, also quiddity (māhiyyah), are co-extensional with, and
co-implicative of, the existent (mawjūd), and, hence, that every ‘thing’ or ‘essence’
is also an ‘existent’ and has existence (and vice versa), although the meanings
and intensionality these terms carry differ. This view seems to be substantiated by
other passages in the Avicennian corpus, such as when Avicenna explains in Salva-
tion that “the thing is either a concrete existent or a form that exists in the estimation
or in the intellect.”¹⁷ This reading of the evidence may be called the default or ‘stan-
dard’ position in Avicennian studies and is the one most frequently encountered in
modern accounts of this thinker’s metaphysics.¹⁸
Other scholars, however, have rightly brought attention to the fact that Avicenna
sometimes intimates that quiddity is extensionally broader than existence (in its con-
crete and mental modes). In other words, there are reasons to think that quiddity can
exist in a mode of being that is separate from its instantiations in mental and extra-
mental objects. In claiming that essence or quiddity may be conceived of in itself and
in abstraction from particular concrete existents and universal mental existents, Avi-
cenna appears to posit an aspect of quiddity that does not immediately fall under,
nor even connect with, existence as such. Since the three aspects of quiddity that Avi-
cenna outlines in Introduction I.2 (in extramental particulars, in universals in the
mind, and in itself) do not square perfectly with the two aspects of existence he rec-

 Avicenna, Salvation, 17.9: al-shayʾ immā ʿayn mawjūdah wa-immā ṣūrah mawjūdah fī l-wahm aw
al-ʿaql.
 Rahman, Essence and Existence in Ibn Sīnā; idem, Essence and Existence in Avicenna, was one of
the first modern exponents of the essence/existence co-extensionality thesis and of the view that
pure quiddity does not exist as such in any special way. He was also a staunch advocate of the
view that the essence/existence distinction in Avicenna is purely conceptual. His general interpreta-
tion of Avicenna’s metaphysics has been followed and expanded by many other scholars up to the
present day. Rahman’s approach was defined largely by what he perceived as an erroneous European
or western interpretation of Avicenna, which had crystallized in the works of the Latin Scholastics
and some modern scholars stemming from this tradition, such as Gilson and Goichon.
 1 Introducing the problem 29

ognizes (actual existence in the extramental world and in the mind), the hypothesis
is that quiddity could be extensionally broader than existence and would cover a
spectrum that only partially overlaps with that of the actually existent things (maw-
jūdāt). As Wisnovsky observes,

A commentator could fairly infer from Avicenna’s assertion that essence is not only logically
prior to existence, it is also extensionally broader than existence. After all, Avicenna now
holds that there are essences which are neither mental nor concrete existents; therefore every
existent will also be an essence, but not every essence will be an existent.¹⁹

Having made this observation, Wisnovsky does not proceed in his book to settle this
issue in any detail. Yet, his comments attest to the profound ambiguity of Avicenna’s
position and to the degree of uncertainty affecting modern interpretations on this
topic. Understandably, scholars have spilled much ink trying to elucidate what Avi-
cenna meant in this and other related passages when he describes quiddity in itself
as pertaining to neither mode of existence. On a first reading, the aforementioned In-
troduction I.2 does suggest that quiddity is extensionally broader than existence, that
is, broader than the two spheres consisting of mental and extramental existents,
since the third class of quiddities mentioned—quiddity ‘in itself’ or ‘insofar as it is
quiddity’ (al-māhiyyah bi-mā hiya tilka l-māhiyyah)—cannot apparently be subsumed
under either of these two ontological groups. And indeed, the evidence that can be
adduced from the various texts studied by Wisnovsky is problematic: If essence or
quiddity is extensionally broader than existence, and if the two concepts are inten-
sionally distinct, then how is one to construe the nature of quiddity in itself in ab-
straction from concrete and mental existence? What ontological status, if any, can
be ascribed to it? More specifically, if it is a consideration or concept in the mind,
then how exactly does it relate to mental existence? Put more bluntly, can it be con-
ceived at all without amounting to a certain mental existent?²⁰
These observations lead to the third, and arguably the most intricate, issue,
namely, the ontological status of quiddity in itself, which is central to the present
study.²¹ Since the two other aspects of quiddity—quiddity in concrete extramental en-

 Wisnovsky, Avicenna, 109‒110.

 In his study on Avicenna’s metaphysics, Wisnovsky does not engage directly with these issues and
does not proffer a solution regarding the problem of the ontological status of pure quiddity, even
though he lays valuable ground for its examination. He adopts what may best be called an agnostic
or skeptical position regarding the issue of quiddity. But in his more recent publications, Wisnovsky is
more keen to stress the co-extensionality of essence and existence, rather than the greater extension-
ality of essence, and he states explicitly that there is “no independent existence of essence in Avicen-
na, only essential priority of essence” (Essence and Existence, 28‒29). He therefore restricts quiddity
to the two classes of mental and extramental existents.
 As Pini, Absoluta, 388, pointedly noted, “Poche dottrine sono tuttavia altrettanto problematiche,
se non addirittura misteriose per l’interprete contemporaneo.” Here I am using the expression ‘onto-
logical status’ in a hypothetical manner as part of the objective or skopos of this study and do not
30 I Pure Quiddity in Context

tities and quiddity in mental entities—are said to overlap with the two modes of ex-
istence (universal mental existence and concrete extramental existence) usually de-
scribed by Avicenna, it is quiddity in itself (and only this aspect of quiddity) that
could potentially constitute an exception to the rule of co-extensionality and justify
the greater scope of quiddity over existence. But from the instant that the greater ex-
tensionality of quiddity over existence is posited, then it becomes a priority to clarify
what ontological status quiddity in itself could be said to possess. Does it have an-
other, distinct, and autonomous mode of existence that differs from the two men-
tioned previously? Is it a nonexistent thing, which can nonetheless be conceived
of in the mind? Or is it to be regarded as a kind of universal mental existent after
all, in spite of the provisos Avicenna emits in this regard?
It is in respect to these last points that the greatest disparities in scholarly opin-
ion have become manifest, with a variety of interpretations being formulated, but no
consensus emerging from the literature. What is more, it is not only modern scholars
who have been puzzled by these questions, but also the postclassical Muslim think-
ers involved in the reception, interpretation, and transmission of Avicenna’s philo-
sophical system. In this connection, Wisnovsky has drawn a useful list of difficult
philosophical issues that later commentators on Avicenna inherited from the master
and which they tackled in their own works. Among these issues, Wisnovsky includes
the ontological problem of pure quiddity. He writes:

In one famous passage [Introduction I.2], Avicenna says that essence (or quiddity, māhiyya) has
three aspects: one when the essence is considered as a universal, i. e. as a mental existent; an-
other when the essence is considered as a concrete individual, i. e. as an extramental existent;
and a third aspect, when the essence is considered in and of itself, i. e. as unrelated to either
mental or concrete existence. If it has neither the ontological status of a universal nor the onto-
logical status of a concrete individual, what exactly is the ontological status of essence when it is
considered “in and of itself” in this third way?

Immediately afterwards, Wisnovsky adds: “The exposure of these and other apparent
inconsistencies and contradictions prompted post-Avicennian thinkers to create a
newly systematized version of Avicenna’s philosophy.”²²
At root, the problem of the ontological status of pure quiddity arises from a para-
dox embedded in the textual evidence. On the one hand, Avicenna explicitly affirms
that quiddity in itself exists neither in the concrete world nor in the mind, which
would suggest that it does not exist at all, since Avicenna only recognizes—on the
traditional interpretation—two spheres or modes of existence: particular/concrete
and universal/mental. Accordingly, one can have a vague mental awareness or enter-
tain a logical consideration of quiddity in itself, without it amounting to any kind of

want to imply from the outset that quiddity in itself does possess existence; rather, as I will show
shortly, the ‘ontological status’ referred to in my introduction can correspond to a ‘positive,’ ‘neutral,’
or ‘negative’ status, depending on one’s interpretation of the evidence.
 Wisnovsky, Avicenna’s Islamic Reception, 202.
 1 Introducing the problem 31

distinct and autonomous existent. On the other hand, Avicenna repeatedly refers to
the existence (wujūd) of quiddity in itself in Metaphysics V.1 of The Cure, and even at
205.1‒2 to its “divine existence” (wujūd ilāhī), an expression that has puzzled medi-
eval exegetes and modern researchers alike. If it is quite clear that, according to Avi-
cenna, quiddity in itself does not exist independently in the concrete world along the
lines of a Platonic Form, its relation to mental existence is in contrast much more
obscure. Avicenna routinely describes it in mental, intellectual, and intentional
terms, and he also dispenses some effort to explaining how the mental state of quid-
dity in itself can be distinguished from that of the universal existent, with the impli-
cation that these two objects are located in the human mind. Hence, the possibility
that pure quiddity possesses at the very least a distinct mental existence has to be
seriously taken into consideration. Admittedly, this seems to flatly contradict the pre-
vious claim to the effect that pure quiddity does not exist in the mind. What is more,
and to compound the problem, Avicenna also asserts that quiddity in itself exists in
concrete beings. He appears to claim that it exists as a part (juzʾ) of concrete entities.
At first glance, this seems contradictory, since the expression ‘in itself’ would seem to
cancel out that possibility and to allow only (and purely hypothetically) for an imma-
terial and separate mode of existence of quiddity comparable to that of the Platonic
forms. What is more, assuming that this kind of extramental existence were possible,
one would then have to explain how quiddity in itself could be located in two very
different ontological contexts, the mental and the concrete. How these various claims
and features of Avicenna’s doctrine relate to one another and what exactly ‘in itself’
means in these different contexts are questions that remain to be clarified.
Understandably, scholars have been baffled by these paradoxical statements,
and the number and variety of answers they have proffered over the years to try to
resolve them testifies to the complexity of the issues at stake. Part of the problem
has to do with the sheer number of concepts, terms, and issues that need to be tack-
led for an examination of the topic to claim any degree of comprehensiveness. Avi-
cenna articulates his views on essence in logical, psychological, and metaphysical
contexts, and these intersect with many other problematics in his works. As a result,
the textual evidence that is relevant to the subject and that needs to be considered is
scattered over a large number of works. If used in a haphazard or partial way, it can
serve to support any number of interpretations, most of them irreconcilable with one
another. This is the case, for instance, of Avicenna’s views on universality and the
universals, which are highly complex and nuanced, and whose analysis must rely
on additional texts apart from the famous passage in Metaphysics V.1. As a prelimi-
nary to the task of comprehensively and systematically analyzing this subject, I pro-
vide an outline of the main issues to be tackled and the various interpretations for-
warded by scholars.
32 I Pure Quiddity in Context

2 The status quaestionis on the issue of the ontological status

of quiddity in itself
It will seem sensible that the scholars who defend the strict co-extensionality of
quiddity and existence, or rather of ‘thing’ and ‘existent,’ regard the issue of the on-
tological status of quiddity in itself as somewhat moot. Since quiddity and existence
are always co-implied or co-related, there cannot, as a rule, be a quiddity that is de-
void of existence. Since Avicenna recognizes only two modes of existence, the mental
existence of universals and the concrete existence of particulars—an ontological
spectrum covered by the Arabic technical term al-wujūdayn—then quiddity must as-
sume one or both of these ontological modes and exist in one or both of these onto-
logical contexts. No quiddity will lie ‘outside’ of their scope, and there is no third,
special ontological mode corresponding to pure quiddity. Another way of substanti-
ating this position is as follows: since Avicenna claims that quiddity in itself is con-
sidered in abstraction from existence and does not relate to any of the existents or
modes of existence—he says at Metaphysics V.1.196.11 that it exists “neither in the
mind nor in the concrete world”—quiddity in itself must be regarded as something
nonexistent or as lacking the status of an existent proper.
On this view, quiddity in itself will be a mere mental aspect or consideration de-
void of any entitative or substantive quality, of any independent and distinct exis-
tence. It can be described at most as a logical or epistemic consideration in the
mind, without ever assuming the status of an intellectual existent proper. According-
ly, whenever Avicenna discusses quiddity in itself, he does not intend to present it as
an autonomous or special case of quidditative existence that would be distinct from
particular and universal existence, but as a purely logical, psychological, or episte-
mic object. Whatever the case may be, quiddity exists only as a universal in the mind
or in concrete individuals in the exterior world, and there is no special, third mode of
existence attached to pure quiddity.²³ And if ever it is possible to regard this consid-

 This view may be called ‘standard’ in Avicennian studies. It has been either explicitly defended or
implicitly endorsed by many specialists of Avicenna: see, among others, Rahman, Essence and Exis-
tence in Avicenna, and idem, Essence and Existence in Ibn Sīnā; McGinnis, Avicenna, 35; idem, Logic
and Science, especially 168‒171; Druart, Shayʾ, 133 ff.; Bertolacci, The Distinction; Germann, Ibn Sīnā;
Lizzini, Wuǧūd-Mawǧūd, and eadem, Ibn Sīnā’s Metaphysics; Menn, Avicenna’s Metaphysics, espe-
cially 153‒158; Galluzzo, Two Senses, 311‒312. Menn and Wisnovsky, Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī On the Four Sci-
entific Questions, 76, assert: “Avicenna, drawing on his distinction between essence and existence,
denies that the quiddity has a third mode of existence. Although a quiddity can be considered in it-
self, it exists only as bound up either with the mind or with enmattered individuals.” Even scholars
working on the Latin philosophical tradition and with Latin translations of Avicenna, such as M.M.
Tweedale (Duns Scotus’s Doctrine, 85), have held this view, in spite of the fact that several medieval
Latin interpreters of Avicenna developed a theory of esse essentiae on the basis of the Persian mas-
ter’s works. As mentioned above, Bertolacci recommends speaking about the relationship, rather than
the distinction, between essence and existence. Unlike the latter term, the former presupposes the
necessary co-extensionality of these notions, which is presumably why Bertolacci opts for it. This nat-
 2 The status quaestionis on the issue of the ontological status of quiddity in itself 33

eration itself as somehow existing in the mind qua consideration, its object or refer-
ent—quiddity in itself—would be deprived of any kind of positive and distinct exis-
tence in the mind.²⁴ Just as we can have a consideration of the nonexistent and of
prime matter, this does not mean that the nonexistent and prime matter actually
exist in the world. It may not even be the case that they exist as valid intelligible
forms in our minds. They may, like the absolute void, be counted among what Avi-
cenna in Physics II.8 calls “vain intelligibles” (sing., maʿqūl mafrūgh). The most we
can say regarding our mental consideration of these objects is that it may be located
at the level of the imagination or estimation, rather than intellection proper.²⁵ Like-

urally implies that quiddity cannot exist on its own. Bertolacci, The Distinction, also contends that
existence always precedes essence causally and ontologically in the concrete, extramental world, al-
though it may be said to follow it conceptually in the mind. For Goodman, Avicenna, 78, as well, ex-
istence is “prior logically and ontologically to the full determination of any essence,” and there is
“nothing prior to existence.” See also Lizzini, Wuǧūd-Mawǧūd, 120‒121, 125, concerning the co-exten-
sionality and priority of existence; Lizzini makes the same claims more forcefully in eadem, A Mys-
terious Order, 238, 254. Quite disarmingly, many of the scholars who uphold the strict co-extension-
ality of quiddity and existence do not comment in any detail on the Avicennian texts that focus on
quiddity in itself and its ontological implications, topics which are broached, for example, in Intro-
duction I.2 and I.12 and Metaphysics V.1 of The Cure. At any rate, since they uphold the necessary co-
implicativeness of quiddity and existence, it is clear that they do not regard pure quiddity as consti-
tuting a special case of autonomous existence. Being devoid of existence, it is by definition ‘nothing’
or ‘something lesser than an existent,’ such as a logical object, so that quiddity exists only as a men-
tal universal and/or as a concrete particular. In contrast, a recent article by Benevich, Die ‘göttliche
Existenz,’ has focused expressly on the issue of the ontological status of pure quiddity. Benevich de-
velops a mereological interpretation and argues that the “divine existence” Avicenna mentions in
Metaphysics V.1 (205.1‒2) is that of quiddity in itself as it is caused to exist by God as a part of con-
tingent existents both in the mind and the extramental world. Benevich provides valuable insight into
the matter; in particular, he connects the issue of pure quiddity with other central issues in Avicen-
na’s philosophy, such as divine causality and human knowledge, and explores the interface between
the ontological and epistemic planes in Avicenna. One aspect that is lacking in his study, however, is
a detailed investigation of how pure quiddity relates to mental existence.
 This point concerns the relation between a consideration (iʿtibār) and the object of a considera-
tion. In other words, should one distinguish between the ontological status of a consideration in the
mind and the ontological status of the object to which it refers? This point will be examined in more
detail later on.
 It remains unclear, however, whether prime matter should be placed in the same class of mental
objects as the nonexistent. There are important epistemological and ontological differences between
the two. As one learns in Notes, 135‒136, section 181, matter is to be counted among the things that
are simple (al-basāʾiṭ). This, as in the case of other simple essences (the First Cause, the separate in-
tellects), makes it difficult for the mind to actually apprehend it with clarity. Like the void and abso-
lute nonexistence, pure matter can hardly be known in a scientific way, since no positive essence cor-
responds to it. But as Fariduddin Attar reminds me, Avicenna posits prime matter as the result of a
philosophical reasoning that requires a fundamental substrate for all change. This reasoning may be
intellectual in nature, and it is deployed in Avicenna’s works on physics and metaphysics. In this re-
gard, McGinnis (Space, 61) defines prime matter as “a hypothetical limit of a process of abstraction
that a full analysis of physical bodies requires.” What is more, Avicenna does not say that prime mat-
ter does not exist, but rather that it has potential existence (for the ambiguous ontological status of
34 I Pure Quiddity in Context

wise, our having a consideration of quiddity in itself does not imply its independent
existence, whether in the concrete world or as an intelligible form in the mind. This
view seems to find some traction in Avicenna’s famous statement in Metaphysics V.1
to the effect that “in itself, it [the pure quiddity horseness or farasiyyah] is nothing at
all except horseness. For, in itself, it is neither one nor many and does not exist in
concrete things and in the soul [lā mawjūd fī l-aʿyān wa-lā fī l-nafs].”²⁶ Given that,
on most scholars’ account, these two modes of existence—mental/universal and con-
crete/particular—are the only ones posited by Avicenna, if horseness as such does
not exist in the mind or separately in the concrete world, then it is tantamount to
being a nonexistent or a philosophical chimera.
One could conclude, as some scholars have, that Avicenna denied any existence
to quiddity in itself, in a manner reminiscent of the way in which some Stoics denied
any substantive existence to the Platonic Forms and considered them mere ‘noth-
ings.’²⁷ Since quiddity and existence are strictly co-extensional, any ‘excess’ quiddity
or essence that could be posited (such as, hypothetically, quiddity in itself) will have
to be regarded as a nonexistent. Since Avicenna upheld the principle of the excluded
middle, according to which something either exists or does not exist, quiddity in it-
self would either exist or not exist, and, if the former, it could only exist as a mental
or extramental concrete existent. Hence, upholders of the thesis of the strict co-ex-
tensionality of essence and existence are compelled, on their own premises, to regard
pure quiddity as nothing over and above the quiddities existing in these beings,
since, on their view, quiddity is always accompanied by existence and actualized
as an existent. Accordingly, quiddity in itself can be described as a ‘nothing,’ a non-
existent, or at most as a mere mental consideration or epistemic object produced by
the rational mind, but one which in itself does not amount to true mental existence.
From an ontological perspective, this consideration of pure quiddity will not be dis-
tinct from the universal aspect of quiddity, but will merely represent a different way
of conceiving of the universal: thus the quiddity in itself ‘horseness’ and ‘universal
horse’ in the mind are one and the same ontological entity, but amount to two dis-

prime matter, see section IV.2.6). So in spite of corresponding to a concept of pure potentiality in the
mind, and not existing in itself actually in the world, prime matter is not tantamount to pure non-
existence. It remains somehow intelligible and is also hypothetically a principle of physics.
 Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Cure, V.1, 196.11. Whether the statement lā mawjūd fī l-aʿyān wa-lā fī
l-nafs is best translated as “does not exist in concrete things and in the soul” or as “exists neither in
concrete things nor in the soul” is secondary at the moment. The point here is that both formulations
seem to leave little leeway for another kind or mode of existence that could hypothetically be ascri-
bed to quiddity in itself. For on the traditional interpretation, Avicenna posits only two aspects or
modes of existence in his works, which he often calls al-wujūdayn, literally “the two existences,”
i. e., mental and concrete existence.
 Booth, Aristotelian Aporetic Ontology, 111, 118, describes quiddity as “ontologically void.” For the
Stoic view, see Sorabji, The Philosophy, vol. 3, 129 and 147; idem, Universals Transformed, 106‒108.
 2 The status quaestionis on the issue of the ontological status of quiddity in itself 35

tinct ways of considering or conceiving of the same concept. Their extensionality will
be the same, but their intensionality will differ.²⁸
This ‘standard’ interpretation, however, is not without its difficulties. To claim
that quiddity in itself is merely a consideration of the human mind, a logical or epis-
temic aspect that arises as a result of some mental operation, but which, as such,
does not participate in mental existence, is problematic on various counts. First, it
conflicts with the terminological evidence that can be gleaned from Avicenna’s
works and with his technical descriptions of essence. This is especially true, not
so much of the term iʿtibār, but of the terms ṣūrah, maʿnā, and maʿqūl, which Avicen-
na frequently employs to describe pure quiddity, and which suggest that it does pos-
sess substantiality or an existential content in the mind. In addition, there is the
problem of accounting for the doctrinal evidence in Metaphysics V.1‒2, which in-
cludes frequent references to the “existence” (wujūd) of pure quiddity. Finally, this
position would seem to go against the grain of recent research, which stresses the
strong connection between logic and metaphysics in Avicenna’s works and which
identifies a tendency in his thought to ‘ontologize’ logical categories and notions,
in line with a particular reading of Eisagoge, the seminal logical work written by Por-
phyry (d. ca. 305 CE).²⁹
But perhaps more egregiously from a methodological perspective, the problem
with this approach is that it raises the very question it attempts to answer. For in
drawing attention to the fact that quiddity in itself is merely or only a logical con-
struct or consideration, these scholars inadvertently point to the issue of what this
consideration exactly amounts to ontologically in the human mind. What is the on-
tological status of this special object that is pure quiddity? And what kind of consid-
eration or object are we talking about in the first place? Should we not assume that
considerations (iʿtibārāt), according to Avicenna, have mental existence, or, at the
very least, that the intellectual ones do?³⁰ Recall in this connection that, for Avicen-

 This is what Pini, Absoluta, 396‒404, calls the “gnoseological interpretation” of the problem,
since it draws a purely mental or epistemic distinction between pure quiddity and universal quiddity
in the mind without ascribing a different ontological status to each one. This interpretation recogniz-
es the existence of the universal alone and makes pure quiddity a mere epistemological aspect of the
universal.
 Bertolacci, The ‘Ontologization’; Kukkonen, Dividing Being.
 In this fashion, a fundamental ambiguity undermines the analyses of many modern scholars who
reject the existence of pure quiddity, and yet refuse to regard it as a mere ‘nothing.’ In their view,
although a nonexistent, it is endowed with some kind of ‘reality,’ which, however, is not properly
defined. Thus, Pasqua, L’essence, 79, writes: “Si l’essence n’est rien de réellement existant, elle a
donc simplement une réalité intelligible représentant une réalité extra-mentale.” Likewise, Geoffroy
tantalizingly mentions the “être définitionnel” of essence, while not ascribing to it a proper ontolog-
ical status (in de Libera, L’art, 648, note 4). In his articles, Bäck repeats the claim according to which
“quiddities in themselves do not exist, yet have ‘being’ (kuwn) [sic],” without, however, explaining in
any way how this ‘being’ should be interpreted (Bäck, The Triplex, 134; idem, Avicenna’s Ontological
Pentagon, 94). Elsewhere he writes: “he [Avicenna] insists that quiddities in themselves do not exist,
36 I Pure Quiddity in Context

na, concepts and universals exist in the mind and are full-blown existents (mawjū-
dāt). This is true, of course, of the intelligibles, but it might also apply to a lesser ex-
tent to the objects of the estimation and imagination, which may also exist in the
soul, albeit not qua intelligibles.³¹ At any rate, one needs to clarify the nature of
an iʿtibār, especially as it relates to intellectual entities, and to determine whether
the very awareness and consideration of quiddity in itself, or, alternatively, whether
its intellectual conceivability or conception, are implicative of mental existence.
Since, for Avicenna, we can have a consideration of almost anything, regardless of
how that thing relates to concrete existence, elucidating the relationship of an
iʿtibār to its object and to that which is being considered is crucial for the present
inquiry. Admittedly, describing quiddity in itself as a consideration (iʿtibār), a ‘notion’
or ‘meaning’ (maʿnā), and a form (ṣūrah) says nothing about its ontological status
until these terms have been analyzed, their content identified, and their relationship
to mental existence clarified.³² By way of illustration, in Introduction I.2 Avicenna
also calls universal quiddity in the mind a ‘consideration’ (iʿtibār), but in that case
it can be unambiguously identified with an intellectual existent. These remarks
call for a detailed examination of Avicenna’s terminology, as well as of the criteria
he attaches to mental existence in his philosophy.
Another approach to the present quandary consists in situating quiddity in itself
in a sphere between existence and nonexistence and as describing it as something
possessing ontological neutrality or ambiguity. Accordingly, pure quiddity can be
said neither to exist nor not to exist; it is neither an existent (mawjūd) nor a nonexis-
tent (maʿdūm), but might instead be said to ‘subsist,’ where subsistence means some-
thing quite different from actual existence. Some time ago, Gilson described quiddity
in itself as “ontologically neutral” (“existentiellement neutre”).³³ He was followed by

though they have a sort of reality” (The Triplex, 143). As I explain below, a similar ambiguity mani-
fests itself in the studies of Izutsu and Marmura.
 On this issue, see Black, Mental Existence; eadem, Avicenna on the Ontological. This last point,
however, requires further clarification and will be examined later on.
 In addition to Marmura, Bäck, Avicenna’s Conception, 236, also keenly perceived this difficulty:
“The problem lies in two areas: mental supposition and intellectual intuition. Does either of these
suffice to generate something existing in intellectu?” Bäck adds that “what inevitably comes to
exist in intellectu is the mental act of supposing or imagining or intuiting; what is the object or con-
tent of that mental act need not exist in intellecu.” This point becomes even more problematic when
one remembers that Avicenna distinguishes between the intellect, intellection, and its object in the
case of human thought.
 Gilson, L’être et l’essence, 131. Here an important semantic clarification is called for. The expres-
sion “ontological neutrality” poses an interpretive problem, because it is ambiguous and has been
used in different ways. On the one hand, there is a weak interpretation of quiddity’s ‘neutrality,’
which has a long history in the reception of Avicenna’s philosophy, and which refers to quiddity’s
ontological ‘indifference’ to actual mental and concrete existence. In this regard, scholars often
speak of the ‘indifference of essence’; cf. de Libera, L’art, 501, who refers to “l’indifférence de l’ess-
ence.” In this case, it is used merely to stress that quiddities can exist either as concrete or mental
beings, without a preference or preponderance for either mode of existence. This interpretation
 2 The status quaestionis on the issue of the ontological status of quiddity in itself 37

Nuseibeh who, in a study devoted to Avicenna’s epistemology, argued for a distinc-

tion between “subsistence” (thubūt) and “existence” (wujūd) and contended that the
Avicennian quiddity in itself “subsists rather than exists.”³⁴ More recently, an article
by Marwan Rashed has dealt directly with this issue. Consisting largely of a compa-
rative analysis between the views of the Christian philosopher Yaḥyā b. ʿAdī (d. 974
CE) and Avicenna, it contextualizes the question in light of the philosophical dia-
logue they initiated with ancient authorities such as Alexander of Aphrodisias (fl.
ca. 200 CE) and Themistius (d. ca. 385 CE). Rashed argues that Avicenna borrowed
and transformed Yaḥyā b. ʿAdī’s threefold scheme of existents (‘natural,’ ‘logical,’
and ‘divine’) and that he ascribed one of these three ontological modes to pure quid-
dity.³⁵ According to Rashed, the Avicennian pure essences fall neither under the class
of mental objects nor under that of extramental existents. This third class is charac-
terized by a special and distinct ontological status, which Rashed describes as onto-
logically neutral. In addition, Rashed argues that Avicenna located these neutrally
existing quiddities in the divine mind. Hence, on Rashed’s interpretation, Avicenna
creatively modified Ibn ʿAdī’s threefold scheme in order to integrate this third and
special type of entities, which would correspond to the divine quiddities in them-
selves. Rashed’s study is by far the one that argues most clearly and forcefully for

goes hand in hand with Avicenna’s claim that quiddity can be considered or envisaged logically in
abstraction from mental and extramental existence. ‘Indifference’ and ‘neutrality’ in this case do
not refer to a distinct and special ontological status that would be proper to quiddity in itself—in
the sense that it would be neither existent nor nonexistent—but rather to the fact that quiddity
can be conceptually associated and dissociated from concrete or intellectual existence. In this regard,
de Libera, La querelle, 240, also speaks of pure quiddity’s “tolérance ontologique.” On the other
hand, there is a strong construal of the ontological neutrality of quiddity, according to which quiddity
possesses its own special ‘neutral’ ontological status, which is identical neither with nonexistence
nor with concrete and mental existence. In that case, it refers to a third ontological status or mode
in Avicenna’s philosophy that would belong exclusively to quiddity in itself. Although it is unclear
in what sense Gilson originally used this formula, others, such as Izutsu, Nuseibeh, and Marwan
Rashed seem to intend it in this strong sense; see below.
 Nuseibeh, Al-ʿAql al-Qudsī, 48‒49. Izutsu emphasizes a similar view. According to him, pure
quiddity is “neither existent nor non-existent,” and is “in itself neutral to both existence and non-ex-
istence” (The Fundamental Structure, 65). Although he does not elaborate on this point in this work,
Izutsu appears in other writings (Basic Problems, 8 ff.) to regard pure quiddity as existing in an epis-
temically transcendent realm. It should be stressed that Izutsu’s interpretation is deeply informed by
the postclassical exegetical tradition on Avicenna as well as by modern European philosophy. In La
querelle, de Libera also sometimes comes close to ascribing a special neutral ontological status to
pure quiddity understood in this manner. He asks whether pure essence is “une chose intermédiaire
entre l’abstrait et le séparé qui ne serait ni abstraite ni non abstraite, ni séparée ni non séparée, d’un
mot : un objet pur, indifférent à toute existence comme à toute non-existence” (La querelle, 239). De
Libera’s allusion to an “objet pur” recalls Meinong’s theory of objects. Yet, in his later work L’art des
généralités, de Libera definitively rejects the hypothesis that pure quiddity has its own ontological
mode, construed either in a neutral or positive way; see L’art, 577‒584.
 Rashed, Ibn ʿAdī; for an English translation and brief analysis of Yaḥyā’s treatise, see Menn and
Wisnovsky, Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī On the Four Scientific Questions.
38 I Pure Quiddity in Context

the view that a third and distinct mode of existence be devoted exclusively to quid-
dity in itself. On his reconstruction, this third mode coincides with the ontological
neutrality (construed in a ‘strong’ sense) of pure quiddity.³⁶
The modern proposition that Avicenna attributes a neutral ontological status to
quiddity is not as odd as it may seem at first. It relies on certain classical and post-
classical Islamic theories of ontological neutrality. Perhaps the most famous one is
the Muʿtazilite Bahshamite theory of the special ontological mode of the states
(aḥwāl) and attributes (ṣifāt), which, according to the technical parlance of this
school, are neither existent (mawjūd) nor nonexistent (maʿdūm), but possess a spe-
cial kind of reality or actuality (thubūt) that is proper to them. Another important in-
stance occurs in Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s (d. 1210 CE) metaphysics, which, at least ac-
cording to a report by Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī (d. 1274 CE), posits essences in the concrete
world that possess a subsistence (thubūt) that is distinct and prior to their existence
(wujūd).³⁷ It is in this regard that Rāzī has sometimes been described as advocating
an extreme essentialist interpretation of Avicenna’s doctrines. At any rate, Rashed’s
study opens new interpretive possibilities concerning Avicenna’s doctrine of quiddity
and will prove useful for my own analysis in a subsequent chapter of this book. Nev-
ertheless, for the present purposes, suffice to say that the contention concerning the
ontological neutrality of pure quiddity is problematic, if it is understood as implying
more than the mere logical ‘indifference’ of essence to mental and concrete exis-
tence. As I see it, there are two main problems with this thesis. First, Avicenna
does not mention anything that could even remotely be taken to suggest ontological
neutrality in the strong sense, nor is there an Arabic term or expression used in his

 As Rashed, Ibn ʿAdī, puts it: “En maintenant le terme “ existence ”, wujūd, pour les quiddités
pures, Avicenne conserve les trois grandes classes entitatives de son prédécesseur [Ibn ʿAdī]. Mais
en substituant le propre à l’essentiel, il entend rompre avec un réalisme des quiddités…“ (149‒
150); and 159; “elle [quiddity in itself] est coextensive au réel tout en jouissant d’un principe d’indé-
pendance ontique dépassant un statut simplement logique” (113‒114). Nevertheless, some ambiguity
arises when one compares Rashed’s various claims and tries to pinpoint his exact views on the on-
tological status of these pure quiddities. For although Rashed endows the essences with an independ-
ent status of their own and claims that Avicenna regarded them as a third group of ontological en-
tities—this suggests that Avicenna held a tri-partite ontology—he is at the same time reluctant to
regard these essences as having positive existence or as existents proper. Thus, he mentions the “on-
tological neutrality” (“‘neutralité’ ontologique”) of the quiddities and the fact that they dwell in a
realm “beyond existence” (“espace entitatif au-delà de l’existence”), and he also insists at times
that they are not really existents (mawjūdāt) (see Rashed, Ibn ʿAdī, 122, 116, and 142 respectively).
But in other places Rashed is keen to regard them as existents or at least as having some kind of ex-
istence (122, 130, 149‒150). These various claims are not easy to reconcile. Nevertheless, for my pur-
poses, Rashed’s contentions (a) that the pure quiddities have their own ontological status, and (b)
that, as such, they are to be located in the divine mind, are inspirational. The present study builds
on Rashed, although it also departs from his interpretation regarding the mode of existence of the
pure quiddities.
 Ṭūsī, Commentary on Pointers, vols. 3‒4, 462.24‒463.1.
 2 The status quaestionis on the issue of the ontological status of quiddity in itself 39

works that would correspond to this notion.³⁸ And while it is true that Avicenna was
familiar with the views of previous and contemporary (especially Bahshamite) theo-
logians who did employ the concept of ontological neutrality in their systems, and
that Avicenna himself might have borrowed extensively from these kalām sources,
there is virtual no evidence that the master was keen to elaborate on this specific as-
pect of their ontology.³⁹ In fact, Avicenna staunchly adhered to the principle of non-
contradiction as formulated in Aristotle’s Metaphysics Γ.3, 1005b19−20, and he ex-
pressly criticized other scholars for failing to uphold this principle. According to
this postulate, “the same attribute cannot at the same time belong and not belong
to the same subject and in the same respect.” Translated to the context of Avicenna’s
metaphysics, this means that something either exists or does not exist, and there is
no alternative or middle ground to these two options. The second difficulty with the
notion of ontological neutrality is Avicenna’s occasional ascription of existence
(wujūd) to quiddity in itself, especially in Metaphysics V.1. This textual evidence in-
dicates that, if an ontological status is to be ascribed to pure quiddity, then it
would be a positive one rather than a neutral one.
It is the desire to bypass the conceptual pitfalls associated with these interpre-
tations of quiddity that has motivated scholars to seek other solutions to the prob-
lem. Rather than deflating or plainly negating the existential status of quiddity in it-
self, attempts were made to salvage or rehabilitate it. Three distinct strategies have
been implemented in this regard. The first is to identify pure quiddity with a mental
existent and, hence, to attribute mental existence to it, but one distinct from the
mental existence of the universals—and this, in spite of Avicenna’s dictate that
pure quiddity does not exist in the mind. This approach was briefly and hesitantly
advocated—uniquely to my knowledge—by Michael Marmura in two important arti-
cles devoted to Avicenna’s theory of essence.⁴⁰ Marmura, on the basis of a new dis-
tinction he established between quiddity ‘in itself’ and quiddity ‘by itself,’ argued
that humans can envisage pure quiddity in their minds and that this conception
must amount to a kind of mental existence alongside that of the universal. He pro-
posed that while the former (‘quiddity in itself’) is merely a logical consideration, the
latter (‘quiddity by itself’) seems to correspond to a kind of separate mental existent,

 The interpretation articulated by some postclassical commentators on Avicenna as well as by

some modern scholars such as Izutsu to the effect that quiddity is neither existent nor nonexistent
is a later exegetical development that should be construed in light of Muʿtazilite and Ashʿarite ontol-
ogy and, more specifically, of attempts by postclassical scholars to reconcile Avicenna’s philosophy
with kalām. But the formula lā mawjūd wa-lā maʿdūm, which some of these theologians apply to the
states (aḥwāl) in their system, is to my knowledge never used in Avicenna’s works to describe es-
sence.
 For Avicenna’s reliance on kalām ideas in his metaphysics, see Wisnovsky, Avicenna’s Metaphy-
sics, II.7‒8 and 13; idem, Notes.
 Marmura, Quiddity and Universality; idem, Avicenna’s Chapter on Universals, especially 46.
40 I Pure Quiddity in Context

albeit one distinct from the universal existent.⁴¹ Although Marmura’s suggestion is
stimulating, it was merely hinted at in his study and not developed at any length.
Moreover, this insight ultimately led him to a conundrum that he was unable to
solve satisfactorily: the challenge of having to reconcile his interpretation of quiddity
with Avicenna’s statement to the effect that quiddity in itself exists neither in the
concrete world nor in the mind. This obstacle notwithstanding, Marmura also expe-
rienced difficulty explaining exactly how pure quiddity could be regarded as an in-
stance of mental existence. If it exists in a manner distinct from the universal in the
mind, then what mode of existence does it possess? It would seem either that it is a
universal, or that it does not exist at all. As a result, and ostensibly puzzled by this
paradox, Marmura oscillated inconclusively with regard to the ontological status of
pure quiddity.⁴²

 Bäck, The Triplex; idem, Avicenna’s Ontological Pentagon; idem, Avicenna’s Conception, also fo-
cuses on the task of distinguishing between quiddity in itself and the universal aspect of quiddity in
the mind (especially in the first study), but he approaches the problem mostly from a logical angle. As
a result, he has little to say about the ontological status of pure quiddity.
 Marmura, Quiddity and Universality, especially 83‒86. Marmura recognizes this paradox when he
states (Avicenna’s Chapter on Universals, 38‒39): “In places, he [Avicenna] insists that this essence is
neither mental nor extramental. In other places … he refers to it as existing only in the mind.” Over-
all, Marmura’s analysis waivers between regarding quiddity as a distinct ontological entity and as a
mere logical consideration. Izutsu appears to have hesitated between these two options as well, and
his position is in any case not spelled out in detail. He sometimes describes quiddity in itself as a
mere mental consideration or aspect, but at other times (e. g., Izutsu, The Fundamental Structure,
71‒72) he designates it more straightforwardly as a “concept” in the human mind, which is suggestive
of mental existence. In fact, Izutsu’s position is mystifying, as illustrated by the following quotation:
“The reason why it [existence] is regarded as ‘concomitant’ (lāzim) is that a ‘quiddity’ cannot subsist,
whether in the external world of reality or in the mind, without ‘existence,’ although conceptually
and on a high level of abstraction ‘quiddity’ can be differentiated from ‘existence’ and considered
in itself as pure ‘quiddity’ without regard to ‘existence,’ whether external or mental” (69, note 18).
Izutsu does not explain what this conception of quiddity at a “high level of abstraction” amounts
to in the human intellect and why it should not qualify as a kind of mental existent. In fact, in an-
other article (Basic Problems, 8 ff.) dealing with some postclassical sources, he is much more inclined
to regard pure quiddity as somehow existing in the mind. According to Izutsu, some Muslim philos-
ophers conceived of it as a kind of transcendental mental object that lies beyond consciousness and
the reach of reason. It is “in a primary mode of being, and as such the light of consciousness is not
shed upon it” (8). Izutsu’s interpretation relies in part on the difficult and obscure concept of nafs al-
amr—crucial for postclassical authors, but scarcely researched by modern scholars—which he con-
strues here as being indicative of ontological reality. In the end, it is difficult to pinpoint Marmura’s
and Izutsu’s exact understanding of the ontological status of pure quiddity, as they were visibly puz-
zled by the evidence they found in Avicenna. In spite of this, I believe that Marmura was correct in his
main hypothesis and that he deserves credit for envisaging the mental existence of pure quiddity as a
serious interpretive option. It should be noted that the key difference between Marmura’s interpreta-
tion and the ‘standard’ one revolves around whether Avicenna’s description of quiddity in itself as a
distinct mental consideration or aspect (iʿtibār) implies or entails any kind of mental existence of its
own. In other words, is Avicenna’s claim merely logical and epistemic, or ontological as well? While
 2 The status quaestionis on the issue of the ontological status of quiddity in itself 41

A second and more common approach has been to adopt a mereological inter-
pretation and to regard pure quiddity as existing merely as a part of the universal
in the mind. Although Marmura himself envisaged the mereological construal of es-
sence in connection with the universal, he was reluctant to emphasize this kind of
existence as philosophically significant and confined himself generally to the episte-
mological aspects of quiddity. Others, on the other hand, have developed a more ro-
bust ontological interpretation of quiddity based on Avicenna’s mereological theory,
thereby exposing an important way in which existence could be ascribed to pure
quiddity in a manner consistent with other Avicennian dictates.⁴³ In this case, the
fundamental premise is that pure quiddity cannot exist on its own and autonomous-
ly from either universals or concrete beings, although it underlies them and forms a
part of their ontological reality. This interpretation strikes one as a kind of compro-
mise between Avicenna’s insistent refutation of Platonic realism and his claims that
pure quiddity somehow exists together with, or in, mental and concrete things. Need-
less to say, this approach raises a host of difficult questions regarding the exact mode
of existence of pure quiddity in composite things and how it relates to the other
‘parts’ of the composite. For instance, it is not clear whether its being a ‘part’ of
the universal in the mind is the same or different from its being a ‘part’ of the con-
crete entity; how it can be conceived of simultaneously as ‘a part’ and ‘in itself’;
whether it remains distinct even when it is with other things, etc. So this interpreta-
tion merely defers the key issue of the ontological status of quiddity taken ‘in itself.’
Moreover, this mereological approach appears to cover only certain specific com-
ments that Avicenna makes, but seems inadequate to address others, such as his rec-
ognition of a distinct consideration of quiddity ‘in itself’ in Introduction I.2.
In view of the limitations inherent to a mereological approach, it is not surpris-
ing that some scholars have attributed a special sense or mode of being to pure quid-
dity that would correspond neither to the existence of the concrete things nor to the
existence of the universals in the human mind. Accordingly, essence in itself would
have a third and special ontological mode that is proper to it. This interpretation of
Avicenna’s metaphysics is associated with the reception of his philosophy in the
Latin West and with scholastic theories of ‘the being of essence’ or esse essentiae.
In the process of elaborating their own metaphysical systems, these philosophers si-
multaneously engaged in the task of interpreting Avicenna’s philosophy, and in so
doing they put forth a certain interpretation of his thought that was to have a lasting
and consequential influence on the later philosophical tradition. Now, it is extremely
challenging to provide a coherent and systematic account of the various ways in
which the formula esse essentiae has been used in the medieval Latin context and

most scholars deny that pure quiddity exists in the mind, Marmura intuited that it did, although he
struggled to explain how.
 See Pini, Absoluta, 396‒404 (this is what Pini describes as his “ontological interpretation,” which
is one of two interpretations he articulates in his study); De Haan, A Mereological Construal; and es-
pecially Benevich, Die ‘göttliche Existenz.’
42 I Pure Quiddity in Context

in the modern historiography.⁴⁴ This expression has been applied to a wide array of
theories and views, which are not always compatible with one another. But quite
apart from its intrinsic historiographical and philosophical interest, this scholastic
legacy profoundly informed the modern reception of Avicenna’s metaphysics. One
witnesses its mark particularly in the neo-Thomistic circles that flourished in the
nineteenth and early twentieth century. As a result, a theory of essential being is—
either implicitly or explicitly—ascribed to the master (often alongside a ‘real’ distinc-
tion of essence and existence) in the studies of M.D. Roland-Gosselin, Étienne Gilson,
Louis Gardet, A.-M. Goichon, and Joseph Owens.⁴⁵ More recently, and working from
different perspectives, Alain de Libera, Marwan Rashed, and Pasquale Porro have
also resorted to the notion of esse essentiae in their interpretation of Avicenna.⁴⁶ It
should be noted in this regard that modern scholars have understood it in different
ways: either in connection with common nature and the extramental universals, or
with a third ontological realm distinct from concrete and mental existence, or,
more frequently, with an aspect of universality ‘before multiplicity’ that would be
identical with the objects of God’s thought.⁴⁷ According to the last interpretation, es-
sence would have a special being, an ‘essential being,’ by virtue of existing in God’s
intellect, and, hence, in a state or mode distinct from that of concrete beings and
concepts in the human mind. Even though the textual underpinnings of this view
are rarely spelled out in detail, one assumes that Avicenna’s rather cryptic reference
to the “divine existence” of quiddity in Metaphysics (V.1, 205.1‒2), combined with his
insistence that the First knows all things in a universal way and his recognition, at
the beginning of Introduction I.12, of a class of universals that exist “before multiplic-
ity” (qabl al-kathrah), all played a key role in steering the discussion in this direc-

 I discuss this issue in more detail in section I.3.1.

 Goichon, La distinction, 31, 211, 222; eadem, La philosophie, 29‒35; Gilson, L’être et l’essence, es-
pecially 129‒131; idem, Being, 76; Gardet, La pensée religieuse, 58‒61; and Owens, Common Nature;
idem, The Relevance, especially 44‒46. Owens, for one, enthusiastically advocated this reading of
Avicenna’s metaphysics, which he took for granted from the works of the Scholastics. To his credit,
however, his assessment of Avicenna’s influence on the Latin tradition was largely positive and re-
garded as beneficial. Others, such as Goichon and Gilson, tend to regard the theory of essential
being and other aspects of Avicenna’s metaphysics (such as the essence/existence distinction) as fun-
damentally flawed, while at the same time acknowledging their influence on scholasticism, an am-
bivalent attitude that was common in Thomistic circles.
 De Libera, La querelle; Rashed, Ibn ʿAdī; Porro, Universaux.
 I am not quite certain where to place the interpretation of other scholars, such as Marc Geoffroy,
who regard the reference to wujūd khāṣṣ in Metaphysics I.5 as amounting to a kind of “definitional
being” or “être définitionnel” (in de Libera, L’art, 648, note 4). Although Geoffroy presumably
does not intend this “être définitionnel” as a distinct mode of existence in Avicenna, it is hard to con-
ceive that it would not consist of a kind of intelligible being in the mind. So such an approach im-
mediately raises the question of whether we are dealing here with another kind or mode of mental
existence. This approach would intersect with some interpretations of esse essentiae that have been
put forth, especially in the Latin tradition.
 2 The status quaestionis on the issue of the ontological status of quiddity in itself 43

tion.⁴⁸ Among the Scholastics, this particular reconstruction of Avicennian metaphy-

sics and theology was proposed notably by Henry of Ghent in Quodlibeta I.9 and III.9,
as well as by Albert the Great and Duns Scotus along different lines from those of
Henry. Although the view that the essences exist in God’s mind is chiefly associated
with the reception and interpretation of the Avicenna latinus, it has also been en-
dorsed by specialists of Avicenna working within the Arabic tradition.⁴⁹
Nevertheless, this theological interpretation of essence is not without its own set
of problems. First, are the quiddities to be located in God alone or in all the separate
intellects? Scholars have oscillated on this question. While some have located them
chiefly in God’s mind, others have identified the Avicennian Giver of Forms (wāhib al-
ṣuwar) or Agent Intellect (al-ʿaql al-faʿʿāl), rather than God, as the main seat of the
pure quiddities, perhaps in an attempt to skirt a cluster of theological problems,
which are formulated below. Second, what kind of mode of existence would these
quiddities possess in their divine habitat? How would this divine intellectual exis-
tence differ from human intellectual existence? And are the quiddities contemplated
by these intellects universal and, if so, according to what sense of universality? These
points are fraught with ambiguity in the scholarship, where little effort has been dis-

 The term ‘divine,’ ilāhī in Arabic, like the Greek term θεῖος, can refer to God or to any of the im-
material and eternal existents of ancient and medieval cosmology that exists in the superlunary
world. Although not on a par with God or the One, the gods of Greek philosophical systems and
the separate intellects (al-ʿuqūl al-mufāriqah) of Arabic philosophical systems possess many of the
qualities that also define the Godhead, such as oneness, immateriality, eternality, immutability, intel-
lection, etc. In Avicenna’s cosmology, there is also the distinction between the Agent Intellect, the
‘Giver of Forms,’ and the other separate intellects. So one key question that arises here is that of
the ‘localization’ of the quiddities in the divine world. Although by far the most common interpreta-
tion of the being of essence has been to locate the pure quiddities in God’s mind, in which case the
meaning of ‘divine’ is either confined to, or construed chiefly in connection with, the First Cause, an-
other closely related trend has been to attribute knowledge of the pure quiddities to all the separate
intellects of Avicenna’s cosmology and especially to the Agent Intellect, the ‘Giver of Forms.’ The lat-
ter has been regarded by some as the main seat of the quiddities and forms in the divine world, re-
moving God Himself from any kind of association with the essences.
 See Bäck, Avicenna’s Conception, 236; idem, Avicenna on Existence, 364‒365; Rashed, Ibn ʿAdī;
Porro, Universaux; and de Libera, La querelle, 231‒232; and idem, in L’être et l’essence, 24‒26. Debor-
ah Black touches on this subject in her study on fictional beings in Avicenna. Although she does not
examine Avicenna’s theory of quiddity in any depth, she nonetheless states that in “both the Isagoge
and the Metaphysics, Avicenna recognizes that those quiddities which become universals in our
minds have a prior existence in the pure intellects of God and the separate intelligences” (Black, Avi-
cenna, 11); see also eadem, Mental Existence, 26‒27, and 12: “And since Avicenna upholds the exis-
tential dependence of all beings upon God and the other separate intellects, all real quiddities must
pre-exist in the divine intellect in some way.” Black therefore sides with Bäck and Rashed in locating
the quiddities in God’s mind. Porro, Universaux, especially 38‒40, and 44‒46, provides a comparative
analysis of the views of Henry of Ghent and Avicenna and argues that the latter likely endorsed a
version of the theory of esse essentiae, which was also later ascribed to him by the Scholastics. In
chapter V, I approach the problem of quiddity from this theological angle, reaching conclusions
that are in many ways congruent with the views of these scholars.
44 I Pure Quiddity in Context

pensed toward distinguishing between the divine and human modes of intellection
and existence of the quiddities. One factor behind this uncertainty lies in Avicenna’s
theory of universality, which he ascribes to human and divine mental objects, but
which is at the same time the subject of various criteria and qualifications.⁵⁰
Furthermore, if one locates the essences in God, a host of theological complica-
tions ensues. To begin with, this move raises the question of how these quiddities
could exist in God without causing multiplicity in the divine essence. The issue at
stake here is how God can remain one if His essence contains all the other essences
and if He contemplates them in order to create external things.⁵¹ A second issue fo-
cuses on the idea that the actual existence of the quiddities in God would precede
their actual existence in caused things. If the quiddities in themselves can be said
to possess their own kind of existence and to assume a special ontological status
in the divine mind, then it would seem that they can be said to somehow pre-
exist the divine creation or causation of concrete beings in the external world. The
question then becomes one of explaining how these two kinds of existence relate
to one another and how existence can be superadded to existence, which seems tau-
tological and absurd. The third issue runs as follows: if the quiddities exist in God,
they are possible (mumkin) of existence and, hence, dwell in the divine mind qua a
set of not yet realized possibles (mumkināt). But this would introduce possibility in
the very core of the divine essence, which Avicenna describes as pure necessity or
necessary existence. If God is said to necessarily exist in Himself and to necessarily

 Some scholars, like Benevich, Die ‘göttliche Existenz,’ recognize only one kind of universal men-
tal existents, which are ascribed to both human and divine thought. Porro, Universaux, especially 44,
distinguishes between human mental existence and divine intellectual existence and argues that the
special existence of essences should be construed in connection with the latter. It is not entirely clear,
however, whether Porro regards the quiddities in the divine intellects as kinds of universals or as the
pure quiddities Avicenna mentions in such passages as Introduction I.2; in fact, Porro does not elab-
orate on the difference between these two aspects of quiddity in connection with the divine world.
But since he seems to ascribe a theory of esse essentiae to Avicenna (40, 46), it stands to reason
that he would recognize three aspects or modes of existence of essence, the third of which would cor-
respond, presumably, to the divine existence of the pure quiddities in the Agent Intellect or God.
Rashed, Ibn ʿAdī, provides valuable insight into this issue and an elegant solution concerning the
existence of the quiddities in God.
 To solve this problem, Rashed argues that the pure quiddities can be said to exist in God in a
neutral state or in a state “beyond existence,” and, hence, in a way that would not conflict with
His perfect unity and simplicity. In contrast A.-M. Goichon, who also located the quiddities in God
(La distinction, 211, 222, 276‒284), believed that Avicenna had not convincingly addressed this
point. She regarded this as one of the main shortcomings of his theology and metaphysics. Louis Gar-
det, La pensée religieuse, also implicitly maintained the theory of the divine existence of the quiddi-
ties and regarded this aspect of Avicenna’s metaphysics as foundational in the master’s explanation
of creation, a theme dear to Muslim and Christian scholars alike. Unlike Goichon and Rashed, how-
ever, Gardet does not seem to think that this represents a theological problem. It should be noted that
the issue of the divine provenance or localization of quiddity in itself is distinct from the issue of its
ontological status, although they are obviously related. In other words, scholars need not agree on
these two points in tandem.
 2 The status quaestionis on the issue of the ontological status of quiddity in itself 45

cause things to exist from Himself (whence His name of Necessary of Existence, wājib
al-wujūd), then how can this absolutely necessary being co-exist with a multitude of
possible things?⁵² Finally, and to complete this rather disquieting account, Avicenna
describes God’s knowledge as being a universal kind of knowledge. But if one posits
that the pure quiddities—which are by definition abstracted from universality—exist
in God, then how could they constitute the basis of a divine universal knowledge?⁵³
It is apparent, then, that the theory of the esse essentiae that was ascribed to Avi-
cenna—both in its medieval and modern articulations—has serious implications for
his theology and metaphysics. To put it mildly, locating the quiddities in God or in
the Agent Intellect raises a host of intricate questions that need to be addressed in
detail. In light of the foregoing, one may legitimately wonder about the rationale
for defending this thesis. If anything, Avicenna’s discussion of quiddity in itself un-
folds overwhelmingly within the context of human—not divine—noetics, so that lo-
cating these pure quiddities in the divine mind may seem an unwarranted interpre-
tive leap. This approach also presents some textual difficulties. For example, is
Avicenna’s isolated reference to the “divine existence” (wujūd ilāhī) of quiddity in
Metaphysics (V.1, 205.1‒2) really to be construed as a statement about the localization
of quiddities in God? Many scholars have denied this.⁵⁴ Moreover, why is it that Avi-
cenna does not articulate more clearly a threefold scheme of existents that would in-
clude the pure quiddities in their divine environment, if that had in fact been his doc-
trine? In any case, one pressing issue associated with the move of attributing a
special existence to the pure quiddities becomes that of localization: if these quiddi-
ties possess their own mode of existence (whether neutral or positive), where are
they supposed to exist? Are they to be located solely in the human mind? In God’s
mind? In the Agent Intellect and in all the separate intellects? In a realm or sphere

 This difficulty has been at the forefront of a dialogue between Zedler and Lizzini. Zedler, Saint
Thomas and Avicenna, argues that an order or sphere of pure possibles (or pre-existing essences)
must be posited to make sense of Avicenna’s theology and theory of divine creation. Replying to Ze-
dler’s interpretation, Lizzini, A Mysterious Order, argues that the theory of the pre-existence of es-
sence is incorrect, and she defends the co-extensionality thesis whereby all essences need corre-
spond to a mental or concrete existent. In a nutshell, Lizzini argues that, for Avicenna, essence
and existence are inseparable, that possibility and necessity attach only to the essence qua existing
thing, and that God creates both the existence and essence of things (on this last point, see also Be-
nevich, Die ‘göttliche Existenz’). As a corollary, Lizzini argues that all possible essences either exist or
must eventually come to exist, which leads her to conclude that Avicenna’s philosophy posits a prin-
ciple of plenitude. Lizzini’s views reflect those of many other scholars working on the Arabic Avicen-
na, but that is not to say that there is even the shadow of a consensus looming, as the previous survey
has shown.
 The scholars mentioned above have not addressed these points in detail, even though the latter
are a direct effect of locating the pure quiddities in the Agent Intellect and/or in God. With that being
said, the expression esse essentiae is equivocal, since it can mean different things to different people,
and can (but need not) be connected with existence in God. Providing qualifications is therefore a
requisite in each individual case.
 Menn, Avicenna’s Metaphysics, 155 and note 25; Benevich, Die ‘göttliche Existenz.’
46 I Pure Quiddity in Context

of their own, as Platonic Forms or the pure objects posited by Alexius Meinong? This
issue of localization cannot be avoided the moment one tackles the problem of the
ontological status of pure quiddity in a committed way.
At this juncture, a word should be said about two important contributions to the
topic by Alain de Libera. In his two massive surveys of the problem of the universals
in medieval philosophy, La querelle des universaux (1996) and L’art des généralités
(1999), de Libera devotes a detailed treatment to Avicenna’s theory of essence and
its impact on Latin scholasticism. Taken together, these sections amount to the
most sustained and substantial analysis of Avicenna’s theory of pure quiddity that
has been offered in the modern literature.⁵⁵ In view of this, it is somewhat ironic
that these studies were conducted chiefly (albeit not exclusively) on the basis of
the Latin translations of Avicenna, in addition to translations of his works in modern
European languages. In spite of this, de Libera articulates a highly engaging and so-
phisticated analysis of Avicenna’s position on various issues, ranging from the topic
of common nature in the concrete world to the conception of pure quiddity in the
mind. Although he emphasizes in particular the logical aspects of the master’s doc-
trines, de Libera also explores some of the ontological implications that arise from
Avicenna’s theory of essence and devotes some pages also to the theory of esse es-
sentiae. One remarkable feature of de Libera’s analysis is that it weaves together ma-
terial taken from the Greek, Arabic, and Latin traditions in an effort to precisely con-
textualize Avicenna’s theories, especially vis-à-vis the late-antique and medieval
debates regarding the universals and common things. Although de Libera insists
on regarding Avicenna’s works as aligned with what he calls “l’épistémé alexandri-
nienne”⁵⁶ and as an elaboration on the views put forth by Alexander of Aphrodisias,
he also evokes the potential influence of the Muʿtazilites on the master’s thought and
seeks to chart some key features of his Latin reception. In this regard, de Libera’s
contextualist approach represents a model for the present book.
When it comes to the more pointed issue of the ontological status of pure quid-
dity, de Libera’s works are stimulating, but inconclusive. One reason for this is that
his interpretation of the evidence underwent considerable change. The later work
L’art des généralités decidedly shifts the emphasis away from ontology and towards
logic and rejects unequivocally the hypothesis of ‘the being of essence,’ which had
been envisaged in de Libera’s earlier works. In La querelle des universaux, the author
examines some key Avicennian passages that led to the formulation of the theory of
esse essentiae in the Latin context. In the process, he also recognizes the ambiguity
of Avicenna’s position on this issue and the possibility that the master may have en-
tertained such a theory. This view is reiterated more explicitly in another work by de
Libera published the same year.⁵⁷ But in L’art des généralités, the author depicts such

 De Libera, La querelle, 223‒262; idem, L’art, 499‒607.

 De Libera, L’art, 501.
 De Libera, La querelle, 238‒239, 261‒262; idem, L’être et l’essence, 23‒26.
 2 The status quaestionis on the issue of the ontological status of quiddity in itself 47

interpretations of Avicenna as misguided and wrong: the Avicennian essence is nei-

ther endowed with its own being, nor is it comparable to the pure objects of Alexius
Meinong. In fact, he perceives this work as an opportunity to “correct” these falla-
cious interpretations (“d’expliquer et de corriger ces deux erreurs”).⁵⁸ In that work,
de Libera not only squarely rejects esse essentiae; he also aligns himself with a nom-
inalist reading of Avicenna according to which the universals have absolutely no ex-
istence or reality in the exterior world.
Although it would be out of place to unduly criticize de Libera’s masterly studies,
I wish to briefly highlight three problematic points that are relevant to the present
book and have informed my analysis. The first is that although de Libera stresses
the distinction between the concept of pure quiddity and the complex universal con-
cept in the mind, he does not address in earnest the issue of the ontological status of
the former in the context of human thought and of Avicenna’s theory of mental ex-
istence. In that regard, his analysis presents the same limitation as Marmura’s. Sec-
ond, de Libera’s most consequential study of the subject, L’art des généralités, focus-
es exclusively on the epistemological and logical aspects of quiddity in the human
mind. Unlike the earlier La querelle, it omits any contextualization of essence in Avi-
cenna’s cosmology and does not discuss its relation to the divine world, the Agent
Intellect, and God’s intellection. There is hardly any mention in L’art of the sense
of universality ‘before multiplicity,’ which, following some Neoplatonists, Avicenna
associates with the intellection of the First and the separate intellects, in spite of
the fact that this connection had been duly acknowledged in La querelle. Finally,
de Libera focuses disproportionately on the relation between Avicenna and Alexand-
er, thereby neglecting other thinkers who may have been equally influential in shap-
ing the master’s views.⁵⁹
The foregoing shows that we are far from having reached a scholarly consensus
on the issue of the ontological status of pure quiddity. An overview of the most im-
portant and recent studies on the topic points to an unwieldy variety of approaches,
arguments, and conclusions, most of which are incompatible with one another. Al-
though a vibrant and constructive dialogue has arisen, partly within the field of Ara-
bic philosophy, and partly between Arabists and Latinists working on the Avicenna
latinus, the way in which Avicenna’s theory of quiddity in itself connects with
other aspects of his philosophical system continues to puzzle scholars.⁶⁰ This is un-

 De Libera, L’art, 577.

 Given these points, it is not clear to me that L’art des généralités should be regarded as consis-
tently improving on the earlier La querelle des universaux, in spite of de Libera’s claim to that effect.
The latter often provides a more balanced account of Avicenna’s position, which addresses the cos-
mological and theological aspects of the problem in addition to the logical ones, and which seems
less influenced by the staunch nominalist position that comes through in the former work.
 There is no doubt that this dialogue will continue unimpeded and even perhaps amplify in the
coming years, as new manuscripts of Avicenna continue to be edited and interpretations honed.
For example—and purely hypothetically—the discovery of the complete text of the Easterners, in
48 I Pure Quiddity in Context

derstandable, because this issue intersects with other key aspects of the master’s
metaphysics and epistemology. Furthermore, it should be stressed that the stakes
concerning this problem are high: not only does it in itself represent a core element
of Avicenna’s metaphysics, but it also has a potentially decisive bearing on other as-
pects of his philosophical system, such as his views on divine knowledge and crea-
tion, his theory of causation, and human epistemology and psychology, not to men-
tion the theories of determinism and the principle of plenitude, which have been
frequently assigned to the shaykh al-raʾīs in the modern literature. To recap, the con-
temporary reader must grapple with a rich array of views and interpretations regard-
ing pure quiddity in Avicenna. This poses a serious challenge to the coherence of the
Avicennian metaphysical system and to the proper understanding of its legacy. The
various interpretations thus far advanced by scholars can be synopsized as follows:

(1) Quiddity in itself does not exist distinctly, separately, or autonomously

in any way and does not possess a special kind of existence, which
would amount to a third ontological mode in Avicenna’s philosophy;
as such, it is a mere mental or logical consideration or aspect, which
does not possess a distinct mental existence; all quiddities exist either
as universals in the mind or as concrete individuals in the extramental
world.⁶¹

(1a) Quiddity in itself possesses a mereological kind of existence and is an

irreducible part (juzʾ) of the universal concept and of the concrete ex-
istent that is not identical with these existents taken as complex enti-
ties. Thus, in the mental context, it does not exist distinctly from the
universal, but rather in the universal. Its existence at any rate is tied
to that of the universal, and the two considerations (of pure quiddity
and the universal) do not amount to two distinct existents in the
mind, but to a single entity. Like (1) above, this mereological approach
correlates the pure quiddities with mental and concrete existents.⁶²

which Avicenna is said to have discussed subtle points related to essence, divine creation, and pos-
sibility, could impact our assessment of specific Avicennian metaphysical doctrines. Indeed, in two
passages of his Commentary on Theology of Aristotle, 58.7‒9 and 61.22‒24, where Avicenna discusses
the complicated issue of how possibility and multiplicity relate to quiddity, he notes that he explored
this topic in detail in Easterners and uses this to justify his short treatment of it in the commentary.
 This is by far the most common view among modern scholars and may be accordingly described
as the ‘standard’ or ‘default’ position; for an example, see de Libera, L’art, 499‒607.
 This mereological approach has been hypothesized most lucidly by Pini, Absoluta, 396‒404; Be-
nevich, Die ‘göttliche Existenz’; and De Haan, A Mereological Construal. Marmura’s articles also
delve into the mereological aspect of Avicenna’s doctrines in connection with the mental universals.
 2 The status quaestionis on the issue of the ontological status of quiddity in itself 49

(2) Quiddity in itself possesses a neutral ontological status between exis-

tence and nonexistence or one that is ‘neither existent nor nonexis-
tent.’ There is therefore a third ontological mode corresponding to the
essence’s ‘indifference’ or ‘neutrality.’⁶³

(3) Quiddity in itself possesses a kind of mental existence that is distinct

from the mental existence of the complex universals in the human
mind.⁶⁴

(4) Quiddity in itself possesses a special ‘divine’ existence and (a) is to be

located in God’s mind, and/or (b) is to be located in the Agent Intel-
lect.⁶⁵

Another convenient way of summarizing these various views would be to say that
scholars have regarded the ontological status of quiddity in itself in a positive (1a,
3, 4a and 4b), neutral (2), or negative (1) way. The mereological construal of essence
(1a) is complicated, because it is not clear on what grounds the existence of pure
quiddity as a part of the composite substance is to be distinguished from the exis-
tence of the whole. Moreover, this mereological approach lends itself equally to epis-
temological and ontological distinctions.⁶⁶ At any rate, it should be noted that these
various hypotheses are not mutually exclusive and have sometimes been combined
with one another. This is especially true of hypotheses (2), (3), and (4a and 4b). Hy-
potheses (4a and 4b) in particular are reconcilable with hypotheses (2) and (3). Rash-
ed, for instance, describes the ontological status of quiddity in itself as neutral (2),
but also contends that it is to be located—in this neutral state—in God’s mind
(4a). Benevich for his part construes the ‘divine existence’ of pure quiddity solely
in terms of its mereological existence (1a). Here one gets a sense of the difficulty in-
volved in delineating the various positions that have been articulated in the scholar-
ship. This is chiefly due to the intertwinement of the various threads that together
constitute the problematic of quiddity in Avicenna, as well as to the fact that scholars
have combined different elements in their interpretations, often in an incompatible
way. For this reason, there is a pressing need to disentangle these various elements
and address them separately in the analysis.⁶⁷

 This view has been intimated by Izutsu, Nuseibeh, and Rashed, although major differences be-
tween these scholars’ arguments also have to be highlighted. Moreover, as indicated above, Rashed’s
position oscillates between (2) and (4).
 This view was briefly and tentatively put forth by Marmura. Bäck and Izutsu seem at times to have
oscillated between (1) and (3). Yet, none of these authors articulates an elaborate argument concern-
ing the distinct mental existence of pure quiddity.
 Goichon, Bäck, de Libera in La querelle, Porro, Black and Rashed all uphold a variant of this po-
sition.
 Pini, Benevich, and De Haan do not tackle this issue in depth.
 The complexity and interconnectedness of these various scholarly positions on Avicenna’s theory
of quiddity have to be recognized fully before a new interpretation is proffered. Benevich’s overview
50 I Pure Quiddity in Context

In hindsight, the studies listed above constitute the status quaestionis on the
issue of the ontological status of quiddity in Avicenna. They have focused on various
facets of the problem and have generated valuable insight without which further
progress would not be possible. In spite of this, only few of these studies are devoted
expressly to the issue of the ontological status of quiddity in itself. This specific ques-
tion has in general been treated cursively in connection with other issues pertaining
to essence or merely routinely in the context of a more general exposition of Avicen-
na’s philosophy.⁶⁸ Moreover, the scholarly literature still does not include a compre-
hensive examination of the terminological and textual evidence pertaining to this
issue. The tendency has been in general to focus on discrete textual segments,
with the result that the interrelationships between the various passages in which Avi-
cenna discusses quiddity have not been studied comparatively and systematically. In
view of this, the aim of this study is to provide a comprehensive and systematic dis-
cussion of this topic by building on the previous scholarship and by exploring a clus-
ter of key concepts and issues that lie at the heart of Avicenna’s doctrine of quiddity.
But before turning to this material, and as a propaedeutic to my own analysis, I wish
to address what are in my eyes some of the main conceptual and terminological dif-
ficulties involved with the study of quiddity in itself in Avicenna. The following con-
siderations, it is hoped, will also serve as an aid to those wishing to take a future stab
at the problem.

3 Theoretical and methodological considerations

3.1 Whence esse essentiae?

Avicenna’s influence on the development of medieval Latin philosophy has long

been recognized by scholars. Even though the master’s works had a significant im-
pact on disciplines as varied as medicine, logic, psychology, physics, and metaphy-
sics, it is arguably his metaphysical legacy that proved the most complex and mo-
mentous.⁶⁹ From the twelfth century onward—a time when some of his works
become widely accessible in Latin—Avicenna’s views were instrumental in shaping
most of the discussions of essence and existence that were articulated by the Chris-
tian thinkers. More precisely, Avicenna’s works are one of the sources—in many

of the scholarship on the topic of the ontological status of quiddity (Die ‘göttliche Existenz,’ 104‒105)
is incomplete and conveys an oversimplified picture of the variety of scholarly opinions that have
been put forth, as well as of the major points of disagreement.
 Two exceptions are the studies by Rashed and Benevich mentioned above.
 For some insight, see Goichon, La philosophie d’Avicenne; Hasse, Avicenna’s De anima; idem, In-
fluence; and the various contributions in Hasse and Bertolacci (eds.), The Arabic. A general study that
would survey the reception of Avicenna’s metaphysics in Latin philosophy and provide a list of quo-
tations and mentions of the Arabic thinker by name in the Latin sources is a desideratum.
 3 Theoretical and methodological considerations 51

cases, the main source—for a cluster of issues that lie at the heart of these medieval
debates: the ‘real’ distinction between essence and existence; essence qua common
nature in concrete beings; the tripartite division of the universals ‘before,’ ‘in,’ and
‘after multiplicity’; the pure conception of essence in the mind; and the ontology
of essence, and especially the notion of esse essentiae.
The expression esse essentiae finds its origin in some medieval Latin texts writ-
ten under the direct influence of Avicenna’s theory of essence. In developing their
views on essence, these Latin authors relied on some of the translations from Arabic
that had been achieved during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries CE, mostly in the
city of Toledo in Spain under the supervision of Abraham Ibn Daud and Dominicus
Gundissalinus or Gundisalvi (both flourished in the latter part of the twelfth century
CE).⁷⁰ Although used primarily to qualify scholastic theories, the expression esse es-
sentiae came by extension to describe the thought of other philosophers, including
Avicenna himself. From a textual perspective, the key passages that informed this
notion are Metaphysics I.5, where Avicenna ascribes one sense of existence, wujūd
khāṣṣ (proper being), to essence, and Metaphysics V.1, where he discusses the exis-
tence (wujūd) of essence and alludes on one occasion to its “divine existence”
(wujūd ilāhī). These texts inspired the Latin theories of esse proprium (the direct
translation of wujūd khāṣṣ) and various notions of essential being. Two additional
passages from Introduction further contributed to the development of this notion:
the first in I.2, which displays Avicenna’s famous threefold distinction of essence,
one of which is the essence taken ‘in itself’; and the other in I.12, where the master,
following late-antique examples, distinguishes between the universals ‘before,’ ‘in,’
and ‘after multiplicity.’ Starting with Albert the Great, the latter text appears to have
been responsible for the diffusion and wide endorsement of this tripartite paradigm
in the Latin West.⁷¹
In spite of the direct textual and historical connection between Avicenna and
theories of essential being in the Latin West, one wonders how relevant this expres-
sion really is in the context of Islamic philosophy, and whether it can be used con-
structively to study Avicenna’s system. This question is all the more relevant, given
that modern scholars sometimes rely on the notion of essential being to study the
Avicennian system, sometimes within a comparative approach and in relation to
Latin thought.⁷² To begin with, it should be pointed out that even in the context of
medieval Latin philosophy, the expression esse essentiae is ambiguous, because it

 For an overview of the translation movement from Arabic to Latin, see Burnett, Arabic into Latin;
idem, The Coherence.
 De Libera, La querelle, 322‒335; Wéber, Le thème avicennien; for Albert’s relation to Arabic phi-
losophy, see Endress, Der arabische Aristoteles.
 This is true both of scholars who ascribe a theory of ‘essential being’ to Avicenna and of those
who oppose it: see Owens, Common Nature; Aertsen, Medieval Philosophy as Transcendental Thought,
87‒88; Rashed, Ibn ʿAdī, 114‒115, note 12; Porro, Universaux; Gracia, Cutting the Gordian Knot; and
Black, Mental Existence, 25‒27.
52 I Pure Quiddity in Context

can refer to a wide range of views on the relation between essence and existence and
on the ontological status of essence. In no way can it be made to neatly encapsulate
all the theories articulated on these topics. Although primarily associated with Henry
of Ghent and his distinction between esse essentiae and esse existentiae, the notion
of essential being is also discussed in one form or other in the works of many other
Scholastics, such as Martin of Dacia (d. 1304 CE), Boethius of Dacia (fl. 1275 CE),
Siger of Brabant (d. c. 1284 CE), Duns Scotus, Thomas Aquinas, John Wyclif (d.
1384 CE), Richard of Clive (d. after 1306 CE), John Capreolus (d. 1444 CE), Thomas
Cajetan (d. 1534 CE), and Francisco Suárez. As Alain de Libera has shown, it
seems that essential being was understood in at least three distinct ways: (a) as
pointing to the special ontological status of the essence in itself—or to the ontolog-
ical ‘indifference’ of essence—in abstraction from mental and concrete existence; (b)
in connection with the divine intellection and as corresponding to the objects of
God’s thought; and (c) as referring merely to mental existence or the existence of
the universals in the mind.⁷³ (a) can be associated chiefly with Henry, although his
position might bear also a relation to (b). (b) refers to the aspect of the universals
‘before multiplicity’ and can be reconciled, as in the works of Albert the Great and
Aquinas, with a reading of the Platonic forms or the essences as existing in the
mind of the Creator; (c) has sometimes been equated with a theory of mental exis-
tence, where essential being refers merely to the objects in the intellect. A rich set
of terms was devised to buttress these theories, which bear varying relations to
the notion of essential being. Among them are quidditative being (esse quidditati-
vum), intentional being (esse intentionale), intramental being (esse in anima), proper
being (esse proprium), diminutive being (esse diminutum), being as known (esse cog-
nitum), objective being (esse obiectivum), and rational being (esse rationis). As some
of these terms suggest, many Latin thinkers conceived of essential being—if they did
at all—in a manner that bears a close relation to intelligible and conceptual being.⁷⁴
Overall, then, the expression ‘esse essentiae’ is relevant not because it refers to a spe-
cific interpretation of Avicenna, but rather because it captures the general awareness

 de Libera, L’art, 578‒579; idem, La querelle, 258‒259.

 The literature on these topics is too vast to be cited exhaustively. For general discussions of esse
essentiae and the relation between essence and existence in the Latin West, see Owens, Common Na-
ture; Wippel, Essence and Existence; DeGrood, Philosophies of Essence; Conti, Essenza; de Libera, La
querelle, especially 255‒262; idem, L’art, 577‒580; Bertolacci, The Reception of Avicenna; and Twet-
ten, Really Distinguishing. The theory of esse essentiae taken in a robust sense is associated chiefly
with Henry of Ghent, Quodlibeta I.9 and III.9, who distinguishes between esse essentiae and esse ex-
istentiae (see Porro, Universaux; idem, Henry). Godfrey of Fontaines discusses esse essentiae, but
chiefly in order to refute Henry (Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought, 136‒138). Starting from a different
angle in Avicenna, Duns Scotus explores essential being, or rather the existence of the universals, in
connection with both human thought and the ‘common natures’ (sing. natura communis) of concrete
beings (Gilson, Jean Duns Scot; Cross, Scotus’s Collatio). See also Wood, Aquinas; Wippel, The Reality.
For Wyclif’s construal of esse essentiae, see Conti, John Wyclif. For Cajetan, see Muñoz, Dificultades.
Sanz, La doctrina, explores for his part the relationship between Henry and Suárez.
 3 Theoretical and methodological considerations 53

on the part of the medieval Latin philosophers that the master had articulated an on-
tology of essence.
As I argue in this book, it is plausible that these three principled ways of inter-
preting essential being are prefigured in the Avicennian works. In spite of this, they
are best regarded as elaborations on the Avicenna latinus proper to medieval Europe,
and they represent an important and intriguing feature of the scholastic discussions
about essence and existence from Albert the Great to Francisco Suárez and beyond. It
would seem at first glance that the theory—or rather the theories—of esse essentiae
as they came to be articulated in the medieval European context have no counterpart
in the Islamic tradition, at least not in the well-defined form in which they are found
the Latin texts. What is more, there is no standard Arabic equivalent to the Latin for-
mula esse essentiae that promptly comes to mind and that would have been used by
generations of Muslim thinkers. In fact, one struggles to find a correlate in the con-
text of Avicenna’s philosophy, who was the main responsible for triggering this trend
in the West. Yet, it would be inaccurate to infer from these observations that notions
of essential being were never discussed in the Islamic context, especially if one main-
tains a certain flexibility in the way in which this notion is understood. Discussions
of mental existence and the objects of God’s knowledge thrived in the classical and
postclassical periods of Islamic thought. Hence, it would be surprising if the idea of
essential being had never been envisaged in these ontological contexts. The first
great Arabic philosopher, Kindī (d. c. 870 CE), broaches this topic when he defends
a theological position (comparable in many ways to that of the Muʿtazilites) that sub-
sumes all of the divine attributes under the divine essence. For Kindī, God exists and
is one essentially, and he seeks to distinguish these senses of essential being and es-
sential oneness from those that are predicated accidentally of all the other beings. So
it is quite clear that for Kindī, God exists and is one ‘by essence.’⁷⁵ Several years later,
the Arabic Christian theologian and philosopher Yaḥyā b. ʿAdī promotes a threefold
distinction of essence modelled on late-antique sources, which also corresponds to
three ‘kinds’ of existence (aṣnāf al-wujūd), and which puts forth a doctrine of the es-
sential being of essence. On his account, there is one aspect of essence or form that
has “essential existence” (wujūd dhātī) and “divine existence” (wujūd ilāhī).⁷⁶ As for
Miskawayh (d. 1030), who was a contemporary of Avicenna, in his work entitled Book
of Triumph (Kitāb al-Fawz al-aṣghar) he distinguishes between existence that is acci-
dental (al-wujūd bi-l-ʿaraḍ), which belongs to all contingent things, and existence
that is essential (al-wujūd bi-l-dhāt), which belongs to God alone.⁷⁷ These precedents
probably informed Avicenna’s approach to metaphysics and theology: the First, or
the Necessary Existent, for Avicenna, exists by virtue of Its essence; it has being es-
sentially; and its quiddity is Its existence. What is more, Avicenna in Metaphysics V.1

 Adamson, Al-Kindī, 47 ff.; idem, Before Essence.

 See Menn and Wisnovsky, Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī On the Four Scientific Questions, 96; Rashed, Ibn ʿAdī;
and sections III.4.2 and IV.2.2.3 of this book.
 Miskawayh, Book of Triumph, 54.13‒55.1; see also Gutas, Avicenna, 296‒297.
54 I Pure Quiddity in Context

describes pure quiddity as having ‘existence’ and even ‘divine existence.’ In a differ-
ent context in Physics, he refers to the fact that form “is prior to it [matter] with regard
to essential being [mutaqaddiman ʿalayhā fī l-wujūd al-dhātī].”⁷⁸ Shortly after the
master’s death, Ghazālī (d. 1111 CE) in The Decisive Criterion for Distinguishing
Islam from Unbelief (Fayṣal al-tafriqah bayna l-islām wa-l-zandaqah) provides a
breakdown of the various senses of existence, one of which is essential being (al-
wujūd al-dhātī), even though he uses this notion in a way that differs markedly
from both Ibn ʿAdī and Avicenna.⁷⁹ Furthermore, there is evidence that the question
of the ontological status of quiddity in itself was sometimes pointedly raised in the
Arabic sources. Apart from Avicenna’s works, which constitute the locus classicus for
this question, one finds this issue broached explicitly in Bahmanyār’s (d. 1066 CE)
magnum opus, The Book of Validated Knowledge. There he asks: “Does humanness
inasmuch as it is humanness exist or does not exist?”⁸⁰ Two centuries later, Taftāzānī
notes that some philosophers uphold the mental existence of a fully abstract and
‘negatively-conditioned’ aspect of quiddity in the mind and proceeds to refute this
position.⁸¹ Finally, when it comes to the other (not strictly Aristotelian) traditions
in Islam, one could argue that both the Muʿtazilite theory of the nonexistent things
(ashyāʾ maʿdūmah) and Ibn al-ʿArabī’s theory of the fixed entities (aʿyān thābitah)
attribute a special and intrinsic ontological status to nonexistent objects, in a man-
ner that recalls Alexius Meinong’s theory of the pure objects.
As we can see from these various examples, the presumption that some objects
have a kind of essential being (regardless of the corollary issue of whether they are to
be located in the human mind, in the divine mind, or in a realm of their own) has
been occasionally entertained in Islamic intellectual history. This problematic is re-
flected in the use of such explicit Arabic terms as wujūd dhātī, wujūd ilāhī, wujūd
ʿaqlī, as well as Avicenna’s celebrated formula wājib al-wujūd bi-dhātihi, which
means literally, ‘the Necessary of Existence by virtue of Its essence.’ These all
imply a certain notion of essential being. But what is striking in this regard is
that, as in the Latin context, the various aspects discussed by Arabic scholars that
pertain to essential being cannot be grouped under a single heading, but belong
to different fields, including theology, epistemology, ontology, and logic; and they
bridge issues as diverse as the objects of God’s knowledge; the status of intellectual
forms in the human mind; the status of natures and essences in real concrete beings;
and the notion of uncaused existence as it applies to God. As a result, the nexus of

 Avicenna, Physics, I.10, 66.9. McGinnis translates this segment as “essentially prior in existence to
[the matter],” but the Arabic syntax connects dhātī to wujūd.
 Ghazālī, The Decisive Criterion, 43, 45, and 49; for an analysis of this passage, see Griffel, Al-Gha-
zālī, 111‒115. By wujūd dhātī, Ghazālī apparently intends the true existence of things in the exterior
world, along the lines of an Ashʿarite position where existence and essence are one and the same
thing.
 Bahmanyār, The Book of Validated Knowledge, 499.14‒15.
 Taftāzānī, Commentary on the Aims, vol. 1, 404.
 3 Theoretical and methodological considerations 55

issues linked to the notion of essential being amounts to different philosophical

problematics in the Islamic tradition, as it does in the Latin tradition. Finally, the for-
mula esse essentiae, when it is used with regard to Islamic intellectual history, has
the added disadvantage that it is imported from a foreign field. As a result, scholars
may inadvertently minimize the differences between the Latin and Arabic contexts
and draw comparisons whose value is questionable. Thus, if the expression esse es-
sentiae seems inadequate to describe the diversity of views elaborated by Latin think-
ers, it seems doubly inadequate to study the Arabic philosophical texts.
In light of these comments, we may conclude that one of the main obstacles in
approaching the problem of essential being in the Islamic philosophical and theolog-
ical traditions is terminological and definitional in nature. The formula esse essentiae
appears imprecise, reductionist, and even misleading. Moreover, inasmuch as this
notion can be amplified or distended to include such diverse problematics as mental
existence, God’s knowledge, the essential nature of concrete beings, or the ontolog-
ical status of nonexistent things, it can be said to have traction in the Islamic con-
text, albeit without contributing anything precise to the analysis at hand. In sum,
it is not that this notion bears no relation to Islamic intellectual history, but rather
that it should be studied through the terminological and textual evidence that char-
acterizes that tradition. In view of this, I have systematically avoided using the term
esse essentiae in this book and have prioritized the Arabic terminology instead. It is
mentioned only when a direct connection is made between Avicenna’s legacy and
Latin philosophy.

3.2 Essence and the meaning of ‘in itself’ (min ḥaythu hiya hiya)

Many of the conceptual issues at play in this study are intricately connected with the
terminological evidence that can be found in Avicenna’s works, so that in most cases
their investigation has to be accompanied by a process of terminological disambig-
uation. As can be expected from a study dealing with the ontological status of
pure quiddity, the two concepts that will lie at the core of the forthcoming analysis
are ‘quiddity’ and ‘existence.’ Let me provide some pointed remarks concerning each
term. One vital task concerning the first term is to understand what Avicenna means
exactly by the expression quiddity in itself, which is a shorthand in English for a va-
riety of expressions one finds in the Arabic sources. On one interpretation, quiddity
in itself refers to the state of quiddity considered in abstraction from everything else
—that is, in a state of distinctness or separateness from all other things. But it is not
obvious whether the qualification in itself here refers merely to an epistemic consid-
eration or to an ontological state, or to both, albeit in different ways. In other words,
in itself could be interpreted along different lines, as meaning either ‘epistemologi-
cally distinct’ or ‘ontologically distinct or separate.’ What is more, one should also
differentiate between a state of ‘ontological separateness’ in a strong sense, i. e.,
as pertaining to the concrete world, and in a weak or secondary sense, i. e., as refer-
56 I Pure Quiddity in Context

ring to distinct existents in the mind—which is what I shall call a state of ‘ontological
distinctness.’ These distinctions can lead to widely divergent metaphysical implica-
tions and conclusions. Now, although there is surely one sense in which this quali-
fication of distinctness is immediately true from an epistemological or psychological
perspective—Avicenna assures us that we can have a consideration and a mental re-
alization of quiddity in itself by abstracting it from all other things in our mind—it is
unclear whether this psychological state in itself also corresponds to a putative on-
tological state in itself in the mind.
What is more, to limit one’s interpretation of in itself as expressing merely ab-
straction, distinctness, or separation (whether in an epistemic or ontological
sense) would be reductionist, because Avicenna also believes that there is a sense
in which quiddity in itself is irreducible and is present or exists in other things. Ac-
cordingly, another possible reading of Avicenna’s argument here is that quiddity ex-
ists as a simple and irreducible part, aspect, or principle of more complex existents.
At Metaphysics V.1, the master explains that

The consideration of ‘animal in itself’ is possible [iʿtibār al-ḥayawān bi-dhātihi jāʾizan], even
when it is with another [thing], because it [always] remains itself even when it is with another.
Its essence, therefore, belongs to it in itself [fa-dhātuhu lahu bi-dhātihi], whereas its being with
another is [merely] an accidental occurrence or a certain concomitant of its nature [amr ʿāriḍ
lahu aw lāzim mā li-ṭabīʿatihi], as in the case of animalness and humanness.⁸²

This mereological approach appears to be vindicated on the grounds that, according

to Avicenna, concrete and mental complex existents are composed of pure quiddity
and extraneous concomitants and accidents that attach to it. What is more, Avicenna
and (especially) his later commentators appear to have endorsed a realist or formalist
version of this mereological theory and not merely a conceptual and definitional one:
pure quiddity exists in each concrete existent as a common nature and form. Accord-
ingly, quiddity or nature qua ‘part’ can be said to exist in a different mode from the
synthetic whole to which it belongs. In these cases, in itself can hardly be glossed
over as meaning ‘separate,’ ‘in abstraction from,’ or ‘in isolation of.’ Rather, in itself
here would convey a meaning closer to ‘irreducible’ or ‘foundational,’ with the idea
that quiddity (in itself) always remains quiddity (in itself) and preserves its funda-
mental identity, regardless of whether it is envisaged as a distinct object or combined
with other things. Here the qualification in itself would point to an irreducible, self-
contained, simple, and constant entity, regardless of whether it can also be said to
exist with other things.
The key distinction that emerges from these two cases is not one between quid-
dity in itself and quiddity not in itself, but rather one between quiddity in itself in ab-
straction from all other things and quiddity in itself taken together with other things. In
other words, quiddity is always in itself according to one meaning (i. e., irreducibil-

 Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Cure, V.1, 201.8‒10.

 3 Theoretical and methodological considerations 57

ity), even though it may not be in itself according to the other (i. e., distinctness or
separateness). Avicenna’s argumentation fully exploits these two conceptual aspects
in subtle ways, and it is crucial to grasp this basic distinction in order to avoid dire
misunderstandings concerning his terminology and doctrine of essence. At the same
time, these remarks point to the inherent limitations of the English translations that
have been relied upon to render the plethora of Arabic terms and expressions Avicen-
na uses when describing quiddity, which convey different meanings and intentions.
At any rate, it is important to recognize from the outset that the problem of the on-
tological status of pure quiddity transcends the mere qualification of it as something
in itself qua ‘distinct’ or ‘separable,’ and that the inquiry will consequently also focus
on the alternative meaning of irreducibility.⁸³ In order to cope with these conceptual
challenges, the present study will introduce a new methodological framework in-
tended to facilitate the analysis. One fundamental feature of this framework involves
the distinction between (a) essential irreducibility, and (b) essential distinctness,
both of which qualify pure quiddity, and both of which can be intended by the Ara-
bic expressions fī nafsihi, min ḥaythu hiya hiya, etc. This distinction is particularly
useful in the context of human thought and intellectuality, where quiddity can be
conceived of either as an irreducible part of a larger whole (viz., the complex univer-
sal concept), or in a distinct and abstracted state. These various distinctions and
qualifications may or may not apply to the same aspect of quiddity, and it will be
precisely the task of this study to examine how they can be said to apply to it in
each case.
In light of the foregoing, the present study assumes that some of the major co-
nundrums and scholarly disagreements associated with quiddity in Avicenna have
arisen primarily from terminological or translational haziness. Accordingly, a system-
atic investigation into the technical vocabulary associated with quiddity can help to
alleviate many of these concerns. Indeed, many other key terms that appear in the
Avicennian sources, such as iʿtibār and maʿnā, could be mentioned to illustrate
the need for terminological scrutiny. But nowhere is this desideratum more strongly
felt than with regard to the notion of existence (wujūd). For the apparently daunting
questions regarding the co-extensionality of essence and existence and whether es-

 For a recent exploration of the notion of irreducibility (among many others) in a logical context,
see Strobino, Per se. Some scholars have recognized that ‘in itself’ can designate a kind of essential
irreducibility in Avicenna’s philosophy. McGinnis, Logic and Science, 170, writes: “he [Avicenna] is
claiming that existing in the body or in the intellect are different descriptions of the essence in itself,
neither one of which necessarily and essentially belongs to the essence in itself.” Benevich’s analysis
also relies on a certain notion of essential irreducibility. He construes the ‘divine existence’ men-
tioned by Avicenna at Metaphysics V.1, 205.1‒2, as referring to the existence of pure quiddity in com-
posite things. However, Benevich restricts the divine existence of quiddity solely to this mereological
reality, which he also regards primarily as an epistemic (as opposed to an ontological) aspect. In sum,
it is not so much the idea of the irreducibility of quiddity that has proven controversial in the scholar-
ship, as the hypothesis of its existing as a distinct or separate entity, which can also theoretically be
implied by the expression ‘in itself.’
58 I Pure Quiddity in Context

sence possesses its own ontological mode depend entirely on one’s definition and
understanding of existence in Avicenna’s philosophy.⁸⁴ These questions are liable
to receiving nuanced answers based on a set of ontological distinctions Avicenna
makes in his works. These distinctions need to be fleshed out for a proper assessment
of his position on the ontology of quiddity to emerge.

3.3 Modulation (tashkīk)

The issue of whether existence (wujūd) for Avicenna is best described as a univocal,
equivocal, ambiguous, analogical, or modulated notion is one that has preoccupied
the minds of medieval and modern interpreters alike and received divergent answers
over the centuries.⁸⁵ Following some recent studies on the topic, I shall argue in
chapter IV that existence for Avicenna is neither a pure univocal nor a pure equivocal
term, but rather ‘a modulated term’ (ism mushakkik) and that, as a corollary, his doc-
trine of being is one of ‘ontological modulation’ (tashkīk al-wujūd). The analysis of
wujūd as a modulated notion enables a reassessment and reconsideration of how ex-
istence relates to quiddity and a reframing of the issue of the co-extensionality of es-
sence and existence. In this regard, Alexander Treiger’s study on ontological modu-
lation (tashkīk al-wujūd) was the first to emphasize the importance of this notion in
Avicenna’s metaphysics. Building on an earlier article by Wolfson, it also traces the
roots of this notion in ancient Greek and classical Arabic philosophy.⁸⁶ What has not
been sufficiently appreciated, however, is the fact that Avicenna extends the notion
of modulation or tashkīk to many of the crucial concepts underlying his physical and
metaphysical system, and not just to existence or wujūd. In fact, most of the key phil-
osophical terms used by the master are modulated or said ‘by modulation’ (bi-l-tash-
kīk). This is the case of oneness (waḥdah),⁸⁷ priority (taqaddum),⁸⁸ necessity
(wujūb),⁸⁹ form (ṣūrah), matter (māddah), and privation (ʿadam),⁹⁰ as well as univer-

 It is somewhat ironic that, although the subject of the present study is quiddity, much of the dis-
cussion will revolve around Avicenna’s understanding of existence. In particular Avicenna’s views on
the various modes, aspects, and senses of existence are elusive and have led to divergent scholarly
interpretations. Yet, this point impacts directly on the inquiry into pure quiddity, for the issue of
whether quiddity exists depends partly on a clarification of what one intends by existence.
 The issue of how to interpret the Avicennian concept of wujūd flares into a full-fledged debate
already in the works of Shahrastānī, Ṭūsī, and Rāzī and extends all the way to the present day.
 Treiger, Avicenna’s Notion; see also Wolfson, The Amphibolous Terms.
 Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Cure, beginning of III.2.
 Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Cure, beginning of IV.3.
 Avicenna, Categories of Middle Compendium of Logic, 31v.7‒11 of the ms. Nuruosmaniye 2763, from
Benevich, Essentialität, 57.
 Avicenna, Physics, I.3, 31.
 3 Theoretical and methodological considerations 59

sality (kulliyyah),⁹¹ in addition to existence (wujūd).⁹² Given that this point has not
been firmly established in the scholarship, but that it will play a vital role later on
in this study in fashioning a new interpretive paradigm of Avicenna’s philosophy,
it seems important to briefly go over some of the main features of modulation.
Avicenna is keen to point out that many of the central notions of his philosophy
are modulated. For example, he begins chapters III.2 and IV.3 of Metaphysics of The
Cure, which are devoted to oneness and priority respectively, by explaining that these
notions are said “according to modulation” (bi-l-tashkīk), and that it is by virtue of
their modulated nature that they should not be regarded as pure equivocals. He
also makes the same statement with regard to existence in various parts of his cor-
pus, arguing that wujūd possesses a focal meaning, which, even though it can be
modulated, does not result in pure semantic ambiguity or equivocity. As Wolfson
and more recently Treiger and Wisnovsky have shown, Avicenna’s discussion of ex-
istence as a modulated term is inscribed in a long philosophical tradition and was
informed by Aristotelian and Neoplatonic sources.⁹³ One may hypothesize that Avi-
cenna extended the notion of modulation he applies to existence to other notions
of his philosophy. In this respect, the various ‘senses’ of core philosophical terms Ar-
istotle outlines in Book Δ of Metaphysics was also likely a source of inspiration for
the shaykh al-raʾīs, who similarly proceeds to disambiguate key notions of his meta-
physics before engaging in their analysis proper. What is more, the idea that modu-
lation characterizes a core set of philosophical terms and notions appears to have
been endorsed also by some of Avicenna’s immediate disciples.⁹⁴
As we can see from these remarks, modulation, for Avicenna, is not some hap-
hazard idea, but a well-thought out theory that is consistently applied to the central
concepts of his physical and metaphysical system. It is discussed in various works of
the master and in different contexts (logic, physics, psychology, and metaphysics).
As I will show later on, it is also grounded in, and articulated by, a set of well-defined
modes or aspects (anḥāʾ, aḥkām). In the case of existence, these modes include such
notions as priority and posteriority, possibility and necessity, autonomy and need,
and even strength and weakness. Although the last two notions were trivial for Avi-
cenna, they came to play a crucial role in the postclassical understanding of tashkīk
al-wujūd, particularly in the works of Mullā Ṣadrā. At any rate, these modes explain
how modulation functions and also justify why existence or wujūd is best regarded
as a modulated term as opposed to a strict univocal or equivocal term.

 Avicenna does not explicitly describe universality (al-kulliyyah) as being modulated, but many of
his comments seem to support such an interpretation; see Avicenna, Metaphysics, V.2, 207, and the
analysis in chapters III and IV, especially III.2.5 and IV.3.
 For a detailed discussion of the modulation of existence, see chapter IV.
 Wolfson, The Amphibolous Terms; Treiger, Avicenna’s Notion; and Wisnovsky, On the Emergence.
 See, for example, Bahmanyār, The Book of Validated Knowledge, 35.16; 467.4; 281; and 294, who
regards ‘priority’ and ‘existence’ as modulated notions.
60 I Pure Quiddity in Context

The implications that derive from regarding the Avicennian philosophical termi-
nology as a flexible, adaptable, and modulated one, as opposed to a rigid and fixed
one, are momentous. For this hypothesis suggests that many of the issues that have
plagued Avicennian studies up to the present day cannot, by definition, receive a di-
chotomic answer, and that they require instead a nuanced treatment that systemati-
cally takes into account the notion of modulation. Accordingly, such questions as: Is
pure quiddity universal? Does pure quiddity exist? Is essence in any way prior to re-
alized or established existence? What is the ontological status of a form (ṣūrah)? etc.,
cannot be answered simply in the affirmative or the negative, but call for an inves-
tigation of Avicenna’s theory of modulation and of exactly how these terms are
used in any given context. In light of these considerations, much attention will be
paid in the present study to Avicenna’s theory of modulation, particularly with re-
gard to the three following questions: What are the aspects and structural features
that inform and provide the rationale for modulation? In what way can modulation
be regarded as a systemic feature of Avicenna’s philosophy and one that is deliber-
ately implemented to solve philosophical problems? Is its scope limited to the predic-
amental or categorial level or does it apply also to the transcendental or theological
level? In other words, can modulation be invoked to explain God’s existence and at-
tributes as well? It is my contention that addressing these various queries will in turn
cast some light on the central issues related to quiddity. The reason is that Avicenna
explicitly and deliberately applies several of these modulated notions to pure quid-
dity. The challenge that confronts us then is to understand exactly how, and with
what end in mind, he uses them to describe essence.

3.4 Mental existence

Mental existence remains a nebulous area of Avicenna’s philosophy. But it is also a

crucial one, which requires to be carefully probed in connection with quiddity.⁹⁵
Given that this thinker is sometimes credited with “the discovery of mental exis-
tence,”⁹⁶ one would assume that there would be a special link between this ontolog-
ical mode and the equally original Avicennian theory of the essence in itself. Al-
though this assumption seems compelling, we need first to adequately delineate
Avicenna’s theory of mental existence. Yet, this task if far from simple, and one
can from the outset identify a series of difficulties. The first one is terminological.
Avicenna relies on a wide array of terms and expressions to designate mental enti-
ties, such as maʿānī, maʿqūlāt, mawjūdāt, iʿtibārāt, etc. Moreover, these can be ‘in

 For valuable insight into mental existence in Avicenna, see Marmura, Avicenna’s Chapter on Uni-
versals; Black, Mental Existence; eadem, Avicenna on the Ontological; Wisnovsky, Avicenna; Benev-
ich, Die ‘göttliche Existenz’; idem, The Reality; and idem, Essentialität, 63‒70, 368 ff.
 Adamson, Existence. Although one may object that this statement is an exaggeration, it adequate-
ly captures in my eyes the importance Avicenna devotes to this ontological mode in his various works.
 3 Theoretical and methodological considerations 61

the intellect’ (fī l-ʿaql), ‘in the mind’ (fī l-dhihn), ‘in conception’ (fī l-taṣawwur), ‘in
the estimation’ (fī l-wahm, fī l-awhām), and, more generally, ‘in the soul’ (fī l-
nafs), with the last expression theoretically encompassing all the others. It is not al-
ways clear whether the master employs these terms synonymously and with the
same extension and scope or whether they are intended to convey subtle differences
in meaning. In spite of these terminological variations, when Avicenna speaks of a
‘mental’ or ‘intellectual existent’ (mawjūd dhihnī or mawjūd ʿaqlī), he usually
means a universal form (ṣūrah), idea (maʿnā), and intelligible (maʿqūl) in the
human intellect, such as the universal idea of ‘human’ or ‘triangle.’
But these considerations immediately raise another issue, which can be called
the ‘faculty issue.’ This new problem concerns the possibility that other, sub-intellec-
tual entities or objects could be said to exist in the mind or in the soul, albeit in a
weaker sense. These objects would not fulfil all the criteria of the universal forms
or intelligibles, but would be associated with the other psychological faculties,
such as the inner senses of imagination, estimation, or memory. The point is that al-
though they would not share the robust sense of mental existence that characterizes
the universal forms in the intellect, these other kinds or classes of mental objects
would nevertheless possess some kind of existence, presence, or reality in the
mind according to some weaker sense. This problem is compounded by the fact
that some of the terms used in Avicenna’s psychology, such as maʿnā, are applied
equally to the intelligibles in the intellect and to the objects of the estimation.⁹⁷
Hence, the hypothesis of sub-intellectual mental existents needs to be carefully test-
ed by future scholarship, as it seems to find some traction in certain comments Avi-
cenna makes regarding entities in the estimation or imagination. The key issue for
my purposes will be to determine whether the notion of pure quiddity, which Avicen-
na often describes as a maʿnā, falls on the side of intellectual or sub-intellectual ob-
jects.
Unfortunately, Avicenna remains vague about the various classes of mental ex-
istents, and he does not at any rate provide a definitive and exhaustive list of the cri-
teria that define mental existence. Although immateriality and universality are obvi-
ous candidates for mental existence to obtain, it is not clear that they apply
exclusively to the intellectual forms. Objects of the inner senses, for example, appa-
rently enjoy some degree of abstraction from matter. What is more, the modulated
nature of universality and the fact that Avicenna recognizes various senses of ‘the
universal’ (al-kullī) makes the issue more intricate. The questions of what exactly
qualifies as a mental existent and of how many classes of mental existents there
are still represent elusive points in the master’s philosophy. This problem is com-
pounded by Avicenna’s use of the term ‘consideration’ or iʿtibār, which is applied
to a wide variety of objects in the mind, while remaining ontologically vague. In
this regard, the fictional and artificial forms represent a particularly problematic

 On this point, see Hall, Intellect, 65 and 80.

62 I Pure Quiddity in Context

set of entities in Avicenna’s philosophy whose ontological status remains unclear.

Scholars have pondered extensively on the various classes of universals Avicenna
outlines in Metaphysics V.1 of The Cure and on what constitutes a valid universal
and a valid mental existent, but these questions are still a matter of ongoing discus-
sion.⁹⁸ Many of these points are picked up later in chapter II.
Then there is the issue of ‘cognitive identity.’ Is the existence of the mental object
distinct from that of the intellect or identical with it? Avicenna generally holds to the
position that, in God, intellect, intellection, and intellectual object are absolutely one
and fully identical, but that, in the case of human intellection, there is an irreducible
difference between thinker (ʿāqil) and object of thought (maʿqūl). This is because,
were the intellect ontologically identical with its object, it could only ever think
one single thing and could not move from one intelligible to another. The only excep-
tion Avicenna seems to allow in this context focuses on self-awareness or self-knowl-
edge, since this implies an irreducible, intuitive, and reflexive kind of cognition,
where knower and thing known are essentially one.⁹⁹ But when it comes to the intel-
lection of external intelligibles, thinker and object of thought appear to be always
distinct. Yet, although the thinker is its own separate substance and possesses a dis-
tinct existence vis-à-vis the intelligible, it would seem, on the other hand, that we
can conflate the act of thought or intellect (ʿaql) with its object (maʿqūl); that is to
say, the existence of the act of intellection would be identical with the existence of
the object of intellection, for as long as the thinking process lasts.¹⁰⁰ Unfortunately,
this hypothesis does not help us much with regard to the previous question about the
different objects that could potentially be said to exist in the mind or in the soul. But
it does suggest that whatever is thought of or reflected upon at the level of the intel-
lect must necessarily exist in one way or other. All of the things that we can actually
apprehend intellectually must somehow exist in the mind according to Avicenna.
Finally, there is a ‘category’ or ‘context issue’ pertaining to mental existence.
What is the relation between human and divine mental existence? A basic distinction
between human intellectual existence and divine intellectual existence has been main-
tained by some scholars and applied to their treatment of quiddity,¹⁰¹ but the exact
conditions corresponding to these ontological modes have not been fleshed out in a
satisfactory manner, particularly when it comes to the mental accidents and concom-
itants of essence, which seem to accompany human intellection, but would presum-

 Black, Avicenna, and Druart, Avicennan Troubles.

 For a discussion of self-awareness in Avicenna, see Kaukua, Self-Awareness; Adamson, Avicenna;
and Alwishah, Avicenna.
 Avicenna, Notes, 4.5‒6, section 1: “Knowledge [al-ʿilm] is a pattern that exists in the knower, and
which exists with the existence of the object of thought [wujūd al-maʿlūm], and is cancelled with the
latter’s disappearance.”
 See, for instance, Adamson, Non-Discursive Thought; and Porro, Universaux. But this basic dis-
tinction implicitly underlies most modern discussions of intellection in Avicenna.
 3 Theoretical and methodological considerations 63

ably be absent from divine intellection.¹⁰² More specifically, there is the issue of
whether the objects of human and divine intellection are characterized by the
same kind of universality, whose primary definition according to Avicenna is a men-
tal concomitant of essence in the human mind. This issue has rarely been addressed
in earnest.
Avicenna’s terminology is, yet again, partly responsible for this state of affairs,
since the human and divine intellects can be described by resorting to the same
set of Arabic terms and expressions (ʿaql, maʿqūl, wujūd ʿaqlī, kullī, maʿnā, etc.).
In addition, the master uses the same set of terms (kullī, kulliyyah) to designate
the universals and universality in the human mind and in the supernal intellects.
Thus, the Agent Intellect and God Himself are defined by Avicenna as separate intel-
lects (sing., ʿaql mufāriq) that reflect universals (kulliyāt). But this is potentially mis-
leading, because when Avicenna talks about a mental or intellectual existent in con-
nection with quiddity, and when he talks about universality in the mind, he is almost
always referring to human thought and psychology. This is clear from the very word-
ing he relies on: ‘existent in the mind’ (mawjūd fī l-dhihn), ‘existent in the estimation’
(mawjūd fī l-awhām), ‘existent in the soul’ (mawjūd fī l-nafs), and even—in most
cases—mawjūd fī l-ʿaql (‘existent in the intellect’) typically refer to human psychology
and not to some divine intellect. Only the last expression, mawjūd fī l-ʿaql, together
with the related expressions wujūd ʿaqlī (‘intellectual existence’) and mawjūd ʿaqlī
(‘intellectual existent’), are ambiguous, since they can potentially refer to the sepa-
rate intellects, in addition to the human intellect. As we can see, a key desideratum
is to engage in a nuanced analysis of Avicenna’s terminology and theory of mental
existence, and especially to delineate its relation to key notions such as universality
and conceivability. Any attempt to locate the quiddities in God or in the Agent Intel-
lect—a thesis that has been proposed by some scholars—calls for precise qualifica-
tions regarding the category of intellectual existence and its attributes, especially
universality. Claiming that quiddity has an ‘intellectual’ and ‘universal’ existence
in God or in the Agent Intellect says little about its exact ontological mode, apart
from the fact that it is obviously an immaterial one. What would distinguish this
mode of intellectual existence from that of the universals in the human mind?
And on what grounds could they equally be called ‘universal’? In this study, I
shall discriminate between two distinct problems pertaining to mental existence:
the problem of the intelligible mode of existence of pure quiddity, and the problem
of its localization. Although these two questions are interrelated, they are not iden-
tical and call for a separate treatment. In addition, the analysis will attempt to dis-
ambiguate the problematic term kullī, which is loaded with late-antique philosoph-
ical connotations in Avicenna’s philosophy.

 This specific issue is broached in McGinnis, Logic and Science; idem, Making Abstraction; and
Hasse, Avicenna’s Epistemological Optimism.
64 I Pure Quiddity in Context

The topic of mental existence acquires a new significance, and also a new level
of difficulty, when it is connected specifically with Avicenna’s theory of essence. The
reason for this stems from his claim that we can conceive of quiddity in itself without
thinking about existence. This immediately raises the question of the ontological sta-
tus of the conception of pure quiddity in the mind. More specifically, the question of
whether pure quiddity can be regarded as an instance of mental existence, as an ex-
istent mental object (mawjūd dhihnī or ʿaqlī), or as something entirely different is a
crucial one for the present inquiry. First raised by Marmura in an acute way, it has
recently been the object of some scholarly scrutiny, but remains understudied.¹⁰³
In addressing this problem, I shall follow Marmura’s initiative and rely on a series
of studies he devoted to this subject. Yet, although Marmura provided groundbreak-
ing insight into this issue, his conclusions were ultimately marred by his inability to
produce a consistent and compelling account of how mental existence relates to
quiddity. Perhaps baffled by the refractory nature of the evidence, Marmura wavered
inconclusively between regarding quiddity in itself as a distinct mental existent and
regarding it merely as a logical aspect in the mind. But it should be noted that this
ambiguity is not idiosyncratic to Marmura and other modern scholars; it also under-
pins many of the postclassical commentaries written on the Avicennian works. In
fact, the challenge of determining whether one should assign a distinct mental status
to quiddity is an issue that generated much concern in the postclassical period. Dur-
ing this time, Arabic philosophers and theologians were faced with the task of inter-
preting Avicenna’s philosophy, including his views on mental existence and its rela-
tion to essence.¹⁰⁴ This exercise in philosophical exegesis often assumed a highly
theoretical or technical form, which suggests that the issue of how pure quiddity re-
lates to mental existence was particularly perplexing to the generations of thinkers
who came after the master. This issue underlies much of the postclassical discussion
about quiddity, from Rāzī and Ṭūsī to Ḥillī (d. 1325 CE), Qushjī (d. 1474 CE), and be-
yond. Given the proliferation of answers they formulated, Avicennian thinkers of the
postclassical period appear to have been highly interested in, and somewhat baffled
by, this issue, to the extent that the distinctions they make between various aspects

 Marmura, Quiddity and Universality, 82, had already pinpointed this as one of the crucial issues
to be investigated further: “A main ambiguity in his [Avicenna’s] writings is the relation of the quid-
dity in itself to mental existence.” In my eyes, subsequent scholars have not sufficiently paid heed to
Marmura’s observation, and this has led to a conceptual quagmire in the scholarship. Generally
speaking, scholars have endorsed Avicenna’s claim that we can have a mental consideration of quid-
dity in itself, but interpreted it in purely logical terms, so that they have omitted to clarify its onto-
logical status and exactly what this consideration amounts to in the mind. A detailed discussion of
this crucial point is absent, for instance, from Pini’s and Benevich’s articles, as well as Tahiri’s mon-
ograph, all of which nevertheless discuss aspects linked to intentionality and epistemology.
 On this issue, see Benevich, The Reality; idem, The Metaphysics; and idem, The Essence-Exis-
tence Distinction.
 3 Theoretical and methodological considerations 65

of quiddity are often difficult to unravel with precision—at least, at this early stage in
the study of postclassical Islamic intellectual history.¹⁰⁵
I believe there are three main factors that contributed to this state of perplexity
concerning the relationship between pure quiddity and mental existence in the post-
Avicennian tradition and in the modern scholarship on Avicenna. The first is the par-
adoxical evidence that can be found in the Avicennian works regarding this topic: at
Metaphysics of The Cure, V.1.196.11, Avicenna claims that quiddity in itself exists “nei-
ther in the mind nor in the concrete world,” but in other passages of the same work,
such as V.1.205.5‒9 and especially V.1.204.1‒7, he appears to claim that quiddity in
itself does exist in the mind.¹⁰⁶ These contradictory claims can lead, and in some
cases have actually led, scholars to two divergent and incompatible conclusions: ei-
ther that pure quiddity exists neither in the concrete world nor in the mind; or that it
exists only in the mind. The second factor stems from a reasoning that at first blush
appears sensible, but which ultimately leads to a conundrum: (a) Avicenna contends
that it is possible to have a consideration (iʿtibār) and conception or conceptualiza-
tion (taṣawwur) of quiddity in itself; (b) this conception would presumably amount to
true knowledge, insofar as it focuses on the essence of a thing and is closely tied to
its definition; (c) but any true cognition and scientific object of knowledge according
to Avicenna must be a universal form and intelligible in the mind; (d) hence, the con-
sideration of quiddity in itself must be a universal in the mind. Yet, confusedly, (e)
Avicenna is keen to distinguish the consideration of pure quiddity from that of the
universal, so that pure quiddity cannot ultimately amount to a universal existent,
hence the paradox. The third reason emerges from the terminological and conceptual
confusion surrounding the various qualifications or conditions (sharṭ/shurūṭ) Avicen-
na attaches to quiddity, and which he discusses in such central texts as Introduction,
Salvation, and Metaphysics V.1: lā bi-sharṭ shayʾ, bi-sharṭ lā shayʾ, and bi-sharṭ
shayʾ. ¹⁰⁷ Although valuable insight into these conditions has been generated in the

 This is the case notably of the distinction between quiddity in itself and universal quiddity,
which is discussed in connection with mental existence. This distinction often becomes blurred in
the works of postclassical authors and is difficult to delineate with precision (see sections I.3 and
II.8). The category of mental existence generally appears to have greatly preoccupied these thinkers,
and with good reason, since it was discussed extensively by Avicenna and his early commentators, so
that one priority for any thinker who flourished after them was to clarify what these scholars had to
say about it. But there were other causes and incentives as well, such as the development of a more
sophisticated mathematical system, which raised questions pertaining to the mental status of math-
ematical objects and the planetary models hypothesized by mathematical astronomy; for insight into
this issue, see Fazlıoğlu, Between Reality. The advent of algebra and the development of a highly the-
oretical realm of mathematical thought also likely played a role; see Roshdi Rashed, Mathématiques,
34‒35; and Tahiri, Mathematics.
 Cf. Marmura, Avicenna’s Chapter on Universals, 38‒39, and note 30 above.
 Clarifying these various conditions and their epistemic and ontological implications represents
one of the keys to solving the problem of quiddity in Avicenna’s philosophy and in subsequent Avi-
cennian philosophical systems. I have accordingly devoted much attention to this aspect of the prob-
lem.
66 I Pure Quiddity in Context

modern literature, especially with regard to their logical dimension, there is still no
systematic analysis available detailing the various ontological implications of these
conditions as they apply to quiddity. This shortcoming affects not only our appreci-
ation of Avicenna’s metaphysics, but also our understanding of the later reception of
his thought. For much of the postclassical discourse (from Rāzī and Ṭūsī to Qushjī)
that grew out of these seminal Avicennian passages centers on the issue of how these
conditions relate to the mental and concrete existence (wujūd) of quiddity. What is
more, post-Avicennian thinkers appear to have used these expressions quite freely
and creatively to suit their philosophical agenda, no doubt in an attempt to adapt
Avicenna’s concepts and theories to their own system, thereby articulating ideas
that were not necessarily the ones Avicenna had in mind when he first composed
The Cure. ¹⁰⁸ In order to adequately explain some of these later argumentative elab-
orations, one must first elucidate how Avicenna himself intended these conditions
and how, on his view, they relate to the various ontological contexts of quiddity.
There is therefore a concrete difficulty involved in pinning down the criteria of
mental existence in Avicenna. As a result, scholars have attempted to devise useful
methodological tools in order to cope with this problem, as well as with the more
pointed issue of how pure essence relates to mental existence. One such proposal
is to distinguish between ‘the epistemic’ and ‘the ontological.’ It points to one of
the crucial features of the problem of quiddity in Avicenna: the need to distinguish
between the cognitive, epistemological, and logical dimensions of his discourse of

 These remarks illustrate the kinds of risks involved in using post-Avicennian commentaries to try
to better understand Avicenna’s own doctrines. With this in mind, I have devoted special sections of
this book to discussing the reception of Avicenna’s theory of quiddity in the works—commentaries on
the master as well as independent treatises—of some major post-Avicennian thinkers. Although I
often use this later material as additional evidence to support my own interpretations, the analysis
of Avicenna and of his commentators is divided in discrete units in the book, and I try as much as
possible to keep both issues separate. One should also be aware of the intentional differences be-
tween Avicenna and his later commentators, whose philosophical agendas and objectives differed
drastically. But the later tradition is also studied for its own sake and for the fascinating insight it
provides into the reception and transformation of Avicenna’s doctrines. In that sense, I enthusiasti-
cally embrace Wisnovsky’s distinction between “Avicenna’s philosophy” and (the later) “Avicennian
philosophy.” As I shall argue, when taken in its details, Avicenna’s position was idiosyncratic, but
some of its main features appear to have been endorsed by many later exegetes, who subjected
them to close scrutiny and elaborated on them considerably. With regard to mental existence specif-
ically, there is an ambiguity running through the later exegetical tradition on the Avicennian texts: it
is often unclear whether these authors are talking about quiddity in the mind qua universal existent
or qua quiddity in itself. These two aspects of quiddity, which Avicenna goes through great pains to
distinguish, are not clearly differentiated in their exposition; this is the case, for instance, of Fakhr al-
Dīn al-Rāzī and Qushjī. It is often difficult to grasp how exactly they envisaged quiddity in itself in
relation to universal quiddity or whether they even followed Avicenna’s theory of pure quiddity. For
insight into another post-Avicennian interpretation of this issue, see Ibrahim’s analysis of Rāzī (Ibra-
him, Freeing Philosophy). As Ibrahim shows, Rāzī’s works display salient departures from Avicenna’s
doctrines. Hence, every subsequent reading of Avicenna’s theory of quiddity was tantamount to a
transformation of his views.
 3 Theoretical and methodological considerations 67

quiddity, on the one hand—this includes how we can know quiddity, what we can
say about it, what logical qualifications or conditions attach to it in the mind—and
the ontological dimension of the problem, on the other, which concerns how, and
in what mode, quiddity can be said to exist in the mind and in the concrete
world, regardless of the human intentionality that is often attached to it. Fundamen-
tally, these are two distinct problems that should receive two distinct answers. I have
accordingly attempted to separate them as much as possible. For example, and for
argument’s sake, one could argue that Avicenna recognized the epistemic distinct-
ness and abstractedness of pure quiddity as an object in the mind, while at the
same time denying that it could actually exist in this very intellectual state. This
view represents the majority opinion on the mental status of pure quiddity.¹⁰⁹
With that being said, the epistemological and ontological planes are also inti-
mately connected in Avicenna’s philosophy, and the interface between them is
more slippery than might first appear. For one thing, Avicenna performs a highly on-
tological reading of Aristotle’s logical treatises and of Porphyry’s Eisagoge, a fact
which he himself freely admits to in Introduction and Categories, and which modern
scholars have been increasingly keen to emphasize.¹¹⁰ This point is further com-
pounded by the importance Avicenna places on mental existence and the centrality
of this notion in his philosophy. In this context, one cannot convincingly raise the
question of the epistemological status of quiddity in itself in the mind while at the
same time entirely ignoring the corollary question of its ontological status. This is be-
cause the concepts that convey true scientific knowledge in Avicenna’s epistemology
also happen to be mental existents proper. Just because we can envisage pure quid-
dity as a concept in abstraction from existence—a claim that seems to be purely epis-
temic in nature—need not entail that pure quiddity qua this same concept is actually
devoid of, or unconnected with, intelligible existence. In fact, in the context of Avi-
cenna’s philosophy, the epistemic aspect could be said to presuppose and even de-
pend on the ontological one. For if pure quiddity did not exist in any way, it would
presumably not be possible for us to conceive it in the first place. In this regard, one
needs to examine how conceivability is linked to mental existence in Avicenna’s
noetics. What is more: it would seem that for Avicenna we can know pure quiddity
in an intellectual way. But if the consideration (iʿtibār) of pure quiddity turns out to
be an intellectual kind of consideration, does this not imply an intellectual object and
intellectual existence of some kind? These questions suggest that the tendency to
summarily pit ‘the epistemic’ against ‘the ontological’ is an oversimplistic and ulti-
mately unproductive way to proceed, for it fails to provide a nuanced account of how
these planes interface in Avicenna’s philosophy. This is especially true of the various

 The approaches endorsed by de Libera, La querelle, 223‒262, and L’art, 499‒607, as well as Pini,
Absoluta, are articulated along the lines of a distinction between ‘the ontological’ and ‘the epistemo-
logical’ in Avicenna. See also Porro, Immateriality, especially 299‒303, where this author distin-
guishes between the “eidetic” and the “ontological” or “metaphysical.”
 Bertolacci, The ‘Ontologization,’ notes the “ontologization of logic” in Avicenna’s philosophy.
68 I Pure Quiddity in Context

conditions (shurūṭ) Avicenna applies to quiddity, which are particularly problematic,

precisely because they carry both epistemological and ontological implications.¹¹¹
Hence, notwithstanding the fact that I myself have adopted the distinction be-
tween ‘the epistemic’ or ‘epistemological’ and ‘the ontological’ as part of my basic
framework, I believe that scholars have sometimes gone too far in their advocacy
of this distinction as a tool to interpret the master’s philosophy. Avicenna himself
seems to have been frequently engaged in negotiating and clarifying the boundary
between these two spheres. But his position regarding mental existence and the
fact that he defines intelligible entities as full-fledged existents should stand as cav-
eats for those advocating a sharp or robust distinction between the two domains. The
mental sphere for Avicenna is not some second hand or sub-ontological domain. It is
a legitimate and fundamental sphere of existence, which applies to all intellectual
beings. Avicenna regards intelligible forms in the mind as existents on a par with,
albeit existing in a different mode from, the concrete individual existents. In fact,
mental existence is arguably the primary and real sphere of existence, given that
the higher principles of Avicenna’s metaphysics enjoy exclusively this kind of intel-
lectual, immaterial existence and are themselves constantly engaged in the act of ap-
prehending concepts. Hence, intellectual or intelligible existence essentially pre-
cedes material existence. Or, as Avicenna puts it in Metaphysics I.2, “the existent
inasmuch as it is existent [al-mawjūd bi-mā huwa mawjūd], as well as its principles
and accidents … are all prior in existence to matter [mutaqaddim al-wujūd ʿalā l-
māddah].”¹¹² As we shall see in this book, this holds true not only for the separate
intellects, but also for the objects or intelligibles contemplated by these intellects
and especially by the Agent Intellect before the emanation of the species-forms
from the latter onto the world of nature.
These points are particularly important for the present inquiry, given that one of
the main issues revolves around whether—and if so, how—pure quiddity can be
granted the status of a mental existent when it is considered in the human intellect
as a distinct epistemic object. As Marmura aptly perceived, one interpretive priority
when it comes to pure quiddity is to solve the issue of its status in the human mind,
since it is in this context that essence is most frequently discussed in the Avicennian
works. In this case, maintaining a sharp distinction between the purely epistemolog-

 It is perhaps similar considerations that led Benevich, Die ‘göttliche Existenz,’ to describe pure
quiddity in the mind as possessing a kind of “epistemological existence.” Here Benevich proposes to
merge the two notions. In this connection, he construes the statement about the “divine existence” of
quiddity in Metaphysics V.1 chiefly in an epistemic—not an ontological or metaphysical—way, and he
contrasts metaphysical existence with epistemic or epistemological existence. However, these two
spheres are not precisely defined in his paper, nor is the distinction between epistemic existence
and intellectual existence. This is problematic, because for Avicenna intellectual existence is a
valid and real mode of existence, and not some derivative mode that is opposed to ‘metaphysical ex-
istence.’
 Avicenna, Metaphysics, I.2, 15.14‒15.
 3 Theoretical and methodological considerations 69

ical and the ontological is not helpful, since these two planes are inextricably mesh-
ed in Avicenna’s writings. It is more precise to say that the issue of how pure quiddity
relates to the human mind is simultaneously an epistemological and an ontological
question, and that these aspects should be tackled side by side. Finally, it is impor-
tant to point out that the interface of ontology and epistemology is an issue that ap-
plies not only to quiddity in the mind—where, given Avicenna’s elaborate doctrine of
mental existence, it is raised in a stark manner—but also with regard to how it can be
said to exist in the concrete world. In this case, the question of the relation between
what we can know about quiddity in the concrete world and how it actually exists in
the concrete world comes to the fore and constitutes a thorny problem. There has
been a marked tendency in the modern scholarship to regard Avicenna’s position
as being thoroughly conceptualist and opposed to a realist stance, according to
which quiddities would exist in the exterior concrete world independently of our cog-
nition of them. The trend hitherto has been to emphasize the logical and epistemo-
logical elements in Avicenna’s doctrine of quiddity, with the result that his position
has been implicitly or explicitly described as conceptualist or nominalist in nature.¹¹³
Yet, this aspect of Avicenna’s doctrine of quiddity, and more specifically the ques-
tions of how it intersects with his mereological and hylomorphic theories, as well
as his theory of the universals and their relation to the physical world, have received
relatively little attention from scholars and have been the object of a rather partial
examination. This is regrettable, because this topic has decisive implications con-
cerning Avicenna’s theology, theory of causality, and psychology (notably his theory
of abstraction). It was also the focus of a rich and sustained discussion in the post-
Avicennian tradition, whose main interpretive trajectories are philosophically signif-
icant and deserve to be outlined. Hence, one central objective of the present book is
to explore the ontological and epistemological scope of Avicenna’s theory of quiddity
as it applies to the concrete world, as well as its relation to the mental aspects of
quiddity. This issue is tackled in chapter III of this book.

3.5 Modes, contexts, and senses of existence

The previous considerations about mental existence point to a more general problem
in studies on Avicenna, namely, the uncertainty regarding the number of modes of
existence in his philosophy. On the ‘standard’ interpretation of his metaphysics, Avi-
cenna posits only two modes of existence: concrete individual existence and univer-
sal mental existence. But are these two modes really exhaustive of the Avicennian
conception of existence? Can they really accommodate all the entities of his ontolo-

 See, for instance, Counet, Avicenne, 243‒246; these aspects are also emphasized in the ap-
proaches of Benevich, Die ‘göttliche Existenz,’ and De Haan, A Mereological Construal.
70 I Pure Quiddity in Context

gy? And to what extent are they really different? What is more, how do these modes
relate to the senses (maʿānī) of existence Avicenna mentions at Metaphysics I.5?
Avicenna in his works frequently distinguishes between existence in the mind or
in the intellect (wujūd fī l-dhihn or fī l-ʿaql) and existence in concrete reality (wujūd fī
l-aʿyān). Scholars have traditionally taken this to mean that some existents exist in
an immaterial and universal state in the human mind, while others exist in a con-
crete, extramental state in the world around us. Accordingly, they have described
these notions in terms of ontological modes, each requiring different criteria. This
view seems to cohere with Avicenna’s parallel use of the expression ‘the two
modes of existence’ (al-wujūdayn)—literally, ‘the two existences’—which overlaps
with the former distinction. Although this approach seems warranted, it is not
clear, on the other hand, that all existents within these two realms share the exact
same mode of existence; that is to say, it is not clear that all entities in the mind
share a single mode of existence, and that all entities in the concrete world share an-
other single mode of existence. In light of this, it remains an open question whether
these expressions are best construed as referring to ‘modes’ of existence or to ‘con-
texts’ of existence. The point is that the notion of an ontological mode in Avicenna is
more directly conveyed by the terms naḥw al-wujūd and kayfiyyat al-wujūd. In this
regard, Avicenna never explicitly states that there are only two modes of existence
that would be exhaustive of all things. Upon closer scrutiny, it becomes quite obvious
that the categories fī l-aʿyān and fī l-ʿaql do not encompass all the modes of existence
and that they are more helpfully understood as pointing to general ‘contexts’ or ‘do-
mains’ of existence. Among the extramental existents, or existents that are found ‘in
the concrete world,’ one finds perishable, material entities (rocks, trees), eternal and
unchanging celestial bodies (the moon), immaterial separate intellects, and even, on
one construal of the expression, God Himself. But these various beings evidently do
not share an identical mode of existence, however it may be conceived of. Rather, if
they can all be said to exist fī l-aʿyān or in the concrete, extramental world, defined
here as a general domain or context of existence, each class of these entities possess-
es its own mode of existence. Even if God and the separate intellects are excluded
from this picture and removed from the realm of things that are fī l-aʿyān, the fact
remains that distinct modes of existence have to be posited to account for these spe-
cial ontological cases, and that these modes would not coincide with the general on-
tological mode of the beings that are fī l-aʿyān.
A similar point applies to entities in the mind or in the intellect. Are we to as-
sume that the intelligibles in the human mind and those in the supernal intellects
and in God’s mind have exactly the same mode of existence? There are several rea-
sons to think otherwise: Avicenna’s distinction between universals ‘before multiplic-
ity’ (qabl al-kathrah) and those ‘after multiplicity’ (baʿd al-kathrah) in Introduction
I.12; his distinction between simple, nondiscursive knowledge and complex, discur-
sive knowledge; and the composite or synthetic nature of the universal forms in the
human mind, which, qua compounds of pure quiddity and its various mental and
accidents and concomitants, seem proper to it, and may not be the very same objects
 3 Theoretical and methodological considerations 71

contemplated by the separate intellects. An inverse argument to the above can be

made that leads broadly to the same conclusion. If existents in the mind and con-
crete beings share obvious differences—the former are immaterial and universal,
the latter material and particular—they also share numerous commonalities. Mental
and concrete existents are caused, contingent, and composite or complex in some
way. They are all, on Avicenna’s view, ‘possible in themselves’ and ‘necessary with
respect to another,’ which means that they require a cause. Approached from this
angle, the mode of existence of these various concrete and mental entities would
be the same; and this ontological mode would stand in contrast to another, special
mode that would coincide with God’s essential existence, His being Necessary of Ex-
istence in Itself. Thus, if the metaphysical and causal commonalities, rather than the
differences, between mental and concrete beings are stressed, one could argue that
they share an identical mode of existence marked by causedness, contingency, and
complexity, even though they exist in different ontological realms or domains viz.,
mentally and extramentally. On this interpretation, then, what would differentiate
mental from concrete beings would be not so much a different ‘mode’ of existence
as a different ‘context’ or ‘domain’ of existence. Ultimately, all existing things
apart from God are, according to Avicenna, possible of existence in themselves
and necessary of existence through their cause. Yet, they can exist in different context
or domains of existence.
These considerations show how slippery the notion of an ontological mode is in
Avicenna’s philosophy. They also highlight the need to precisely define what consti-
tutes a valid mode of existence and how many such modes the master recognizes in
his metaphysics. To limit the modes of existence to merely two seems schematic and
oversimplistic. Rather, it would seem that beings exist in different ways in the intel-
lect and in the concrete world, and that whenever Avicenna is referring in general
terms to mental and concrete existence, he has in mind broad ‘domains’ or ‘contexts’
of existence, rather than an exhaustive list of ontological modes proper. If one hy-
pothesizes—be it only for argument’s sake—that Avicenna’s metaphysics allows for
more than the two ontological modes that are routinely recognized by scholars—
and this, in line with the idea that existence is modulated (mushakkik)—then this
would call for a reassessment of the issues of the co-extensionality of essence and
existence and of whether there is a distinct mode of existence that could be said
to belong to essence alone. Interestingly, there are a few precedents for this approach
in the modern literature, although they diverge widely in scope and intent. One
thought-provoking attempt was made by Marwan Rashed, who ascribes a threefold
scheme of existence to Avicenna (the third one corresponding to the ontological
state of the quiddities in the divine mind) and who argues that this feature of Avicen-
na’s doctrine was modeled on Ibn ʿAdī’s metaphysics.¹¹⁴ Pasquale Porro, for his part,
appears to distinguish between human intellectual existence and divine intellectual

 Rashed, Ibn ʿAdī.

72 I Pure Quiddity in Context

existence, identifying only the latter with a kind of esse essentiae. ¹¹⁵ As for Pini, Be-
nevich, and De Haan, they have advocated a mereological interpretation of quiddity
and suggested that pure quiddity qua part of substantial composites could possess
its own ontological status. It is this mereological aspect that would seem to charac-
terize the special ontological mode of pure quiddity.¹¹⁶ Likewise, the interpretation
tentatively proffered by Marmura, which grants a special mental and entitative status
to quiddity in itself in the mind that is distinct from that of the universal, also re-
spects the basic dictate of the co-extensionality thesis, but at the same time goes be-
yond the traditional dual ontological scheme of mental vs. concrete existence recog-
nized by most scholars.
As one can see, these interpretations do not bluntly deny existence to quiddity,
but entertain the possibility that a special mode or aspect of existence can be attrib-
uted to it. According to some of these interpretations, pure quiddity would be char-
acterized by a third mode of existence, one, however, which is not recognized by the
‘standard’ approach. By implication, however, quiddity would never be found with-
out existence, so that the co-extensionality thesis would in the end be preserved,
even if through a different route.¹¹⁷ In sum, we notice that the problem of co-exten-

 Porro, Universaux.

 Pini, Absoluta; Benevich, Die ‘göttliche Existenz’; and De Haan, A Mereological Construal. Be-
nevich raises this issue and ascribes a kind of ‘epistemological existence’ to quiddity in the mind. But
in the final analysis, this author appears to abide by the traditional dual mode of existence in Avi-
cenna’s philosophy (concrete and mental), since he does not conceive of the divine existence of quid-
dity as a full-fledged and distinct ontological mode in itself. In fact, the more general question of how
additional ontological modes (to particular concrete and universal mental existence) could be posited
on the basis of the Avicennian texts has been rarely discussed in detail; Rashed, Ibn ʿAdī, comes clos-
est to introducing a third ontological mode in Avicenna. In contrast, Menn and Wisnovsky, Yaḥyā ibn
ʿAdī On the Four Scientific Questions, who also discuss Avicenna’s position in connection with Yaḥyā’s
treatise, maintain the twofold scheme of existents and claim that Avicenna rejected the threefold
scheme he found in Ibn ʿAdī. It is true that Avicenna nowhere explicitly outlines in his works a three-
fold scheme of existents in the manner achieved by Yaḥyā and advocated by Rashed, and this not-
withstanding the fact that he presumably knew about the ʿAdīan treatises dealing with this subject.
The fact that Avicenna is otherwise remarkably consistent in The Cure (see, among other passages,
Metaphysics, III.8; Introduction, I.2, 15.1‒7; I.6, 34.5‒35.5; Categories, II.1, 62.3‒4) and in his other
works (Pointers, vol. 1, 202.4‒5) in maintaining a twofold scheme of existents, and not a threefold
one, would seem to undermine the attempt to ascribe such a theory to him. The only element that
could, at first glance, be used to support a threefold distinction of existents is the scheme before,
in, and after multiplicity that is described (but not, at first sight, explicitly endorsed) by Avicenna
in Introduction I.12, where he explains that this manner of conceiving essence was a trope in the (an-
cient?) philosophical schools. Nevertheless, this scheme seems to pertain primarily to the relation be-
tween the universals and multiplicity or matter, and it is not at any rate a statement on the ontolog-
ical status of quiddities. So this distinction may not entail different kinds of existents, but rather
different ways of looking at the universals. In spite of this, and as we will see, I believe Rashed is
correct in maintaining the view that quiddity amounts to a third ontological mode in Avicenna.
 Marmura’s, Rashed’s, and Porro’s interpretations are equally consistent with regard to the thesis
of the overlap of essence and existence in Avicenna, since ultimately even the pure quiddities would
 3 Theoretical and methodological considerations 73

sionality hinges on one’s definition of the number and nature of the ontological
modes in Avicenna’s philosophy. Denying that there are only two modes of existence,
as per the ‘standard’ interpretation, does not necessarily entail rejecting the thesis of
co-extensionality, but rather consists in articulating an alternative account of the re-
lation of essence and existence that takes into consideration additional ontological
aspects or new ways of conceiving of Avicenna’s ontology.¹¹⁸
Building on these studies, I intend to reconstruct a model of Avicenna’s metaphy-
sics that can specifically accommodate what one could call an ontology of quiddity. I
argue in the present book that analyzing the modes of existence in Avicenna’s phi-
losophy eventually necessitates a reformulation of the relationship between essence
and existence in a quite drastic way. For if a certain, distinct mode of existence can
be identified that would belong to the pure essence alone, then this finding would
call for a re-evaluation of how existence relates to essence. The co-extensionality the-
sis and the theory of essential being would both turn out to be correct. This hypoth-
esis, according to my analysis, needs to be approached in connection with the no-
tions of modes, contexts, and conditions that are applied to quiddity. As this study
will endeavor to explain in detail, the various conditions (sharṭ/shurūṭ) posited by
Avicenna in relation to quiddity represent one of the keys to a proper understanding
of the problem. Far from being limited to a logical scope, they possess ontological
implications that specify the mode or context of existence of quiddity. So that when-
ever Avicenna appears to affirm or negate something about the existence of quiddity
by means of these conditions, these individual statements should not be taken abso-
lutely (as has sometimes been the case in the modern literature), but rather as reflect-
ing one ontological aspect of quiddity that the master wishes to highlight in a par-
ticular passage, context, or discipline. This is why he can (coherently) claim, as he
in fact does in various places, that pure quiddity exists neither in the concrete
world nor in the human mind; that it exists in concrete beings and in universal con-
cepts; and that it exists distinctly in the human mind and in the divine intellects. If
construed absolutely or exhaustively, each one of these statements would be false,

not be devoid of existence, although they would exist according to a special mode. In that sense their
views do not differ from the ‘standard’ approach and the co-extensionality thesis. Yet, these scholars
construe the essence/existence relationship and Avicenna’s ontology in divergent ways, which neces-
sitates a reframing of the ‘standard’ approach.
 In other words, if quiddity in itself is shown to possess its own, special kind of existence, then
one could argue that the co-extensionality thesis is preserved on the grounds that even quiddity in
itself would not be found in total abstraction from existence. In light of this, even the esse essentiae
thesis found in the Latin tradition would respect this basic dictate of the co-extensionality thesis,
even though it rests on a redefinition of existence and its various modes in Avicenna. It should be
pointed out also that previous studies on Avicenna’s theory of essence have not discussed it in rela-
tion to tashkīk al-wujūd; this is a desideratum that is tackled in the present book.
74 I Pure Quiddity in Context

because it would make an exclusivist claim that Avicenna never intended and would
therefore obscure other equally important facets of his ontology of quiddity.¹¹⁹
In light of the foregoing, I shall deploy in the course of the analysis a set of dis-
tinctions whose purpose is to highlight the differences between ‘modes,’ ‘contexts,’
‘aspects,’ and ‘senses’ of existence in Avicenna’s works. These terms are intended
to introduce some order in my analysis of the master’s discussion of existence in spe-
cific relation to quiddity. Let us start by disambiguating the first three notions. A ‘con-
text’ of existence relates to the question of where quiddity may be said to exist. In
other words, it concerns the issue of the localization of pure quiddity, without, how-
ever, tending to the issue of exactly how, or in what mode, quiddity can be said to
exist. In his works, Avicenna mentions several ‘contexts’ of existence in connection
with quiddity: the extramental concrete world; the sphere of human thought and in-
tellectuality; the divine intellects; and God’s knowledge and essence. In contrast, an
‘aspect’ introduces a qualification concerning the context in which quiddity is dis-
cussed. It therefore provides additional information on the context, without,
again, conveying information about the ontology of quiddity per se. It seems impor-
tant to implement the notion of ‘aspect’ especially in the context of human thought
and noetics, where the analysis requires more subtle distinctions that are not con-
veyed by the notion of ‘context.’ An example concerns Avicenna’s distinctions of var-
ious ‘aspects’ or ‘considerations’ of quiddity in Introduction I.2. In that passage, the
master refers only to two ‘contexts’ of quiddity (in the mind and in the concrete
world). But with regard to quiddity in the mind, he specifies that it can be considered
either ‘in itself’ or as a universal, which are two different ‘aspects’ of how quiddity
can be envisaged mentally. Yet, in this very passage, Avicenna does not proceed to
explain what ‘modes’ of existence, if any, characterizes these various aspects of quid-
dity in the mind (this, of course, raises the question of their relation to mental exis-
tence and what ontological mode should be ascribed to them). On the basis of this
example, it is easy to perceive the difference between a context, an aspect, and a
mode.
The notion of a ‘mode’ of existence is by far the most delicate to define. It should
be noted from the outset that it does not correspond strictly to the Avicennian ‘mo-
dalities’ (jihāt) of ‘the possible,’ ‘the necessary,’ and ‘the impossible.’ As it turns out,
the modalities taken as a whole are only one of the various aspects of ontological
modulation (tashkīk al-wujūd) that Avicenna theorizes in his works: others include
priority and posteriority, autonomy and need, and relevance and priority (see chapter
IV). And although they form a central feature of his metaphysics and have justifiably
been the focus of extensive scholarship, they are somewhat inadequate to study

 This has made my assessment of, and response to, the previous scholarly interpretations of
quiddity in Avicenna a particularly painstaking and difficult process. Many of the arguments that
have been advanced by scholars are correct and insightful when taken individually, but they are
often accompanied by an exclusivist claim regarding the place of quiddity in Avicenna that leaves
out equally important aspects of the problem or prevents a comprehensive picture to emerge.
 3 Theoretical and methodological considerations 75

quiddity.¹²⁰ One reason for this is that the modalities do not qualify quiddity taken ‘in
itself,’ but rather its relation to an external cause and to realized existence and,
hence, to the composite thing as it comes to exist in actuality. Much more useful
for my purpose is the ontological mode of ‘priority and posteriority’ (al-taqaddum
wa-l-taʾakhkhur), which Avicenna narrowly connects with ontological modulation,
and which seems to be its foremost marker. At any rate, these aspects of modulation
determine the basic structure and divisions of Avicenna’s ontology, of which the mo-
dalities are only one facet. Hence, a mode (naḥw) of existence is really the manner
(kayfiyyah) according to which something exists, which is defined by the sum of
the aspects constituting ontological modulation, of which the modalities (jihāt) are
only one among many. All of this, as we saw, is to be differentiated from the general
context (human and divine, mental or extramental) in which something exists.
Naturally, there is some overlap between the notions of ‘contexts,’ ‘aspects,’ and
‘modes’ of existence, which suggests that this framework should not be used rigidly,
but rather flexibly and heuristically. For instance, the extramental and concrete
world is an ‘ontological context’ that also happens to correspond generally to a
‘mode’ of existence that involves concrete and material substances—both can be con-
nected with the expression wujūd fī l-aʿyān. Likewise, a universal concept is located
in and exists in the context of human thought and intellectuality—or simply ‘in the
intellect’ (fī-l-ʿaql)—and it also possesses an intellectual mode of existence (wujūd
ʿaqlī or dhihnī), which is defined as immaterial, universal, and abstract. At the
same time, however, there need not be any symmetry between these various notions,
particularly when it comes to essence. For example, on any straightforward reading
of Introduction I.2, pure quiddity is an ‘aspect’ and a ‘consideration’ located in the
‘context’ of the human mind, but it is not attributed any ‘mode’ of existence by Avi-
cenna, at least in this very passage. What is more, it is as yet unclear whether, in Avi-
cenna’s psychology, all mental and intentional objects (maʿānī)—that is, all notions
and intentions located in the ‘context’ or ‘domain’ of the human soul and human
thought—are characterized by the same mode of mental existence.¹²¹ Finally, God
and the separate intellects can be regarded as existing extramentally and individu-
ally (fī l-aʿyān), but they obviously do not share the same mode of existence as
the material beings located in this context. As mentioned above, one can even
make the case—quite convincingly on my view—that God’s existence represents a
distinct mode of existence sui generis. This seems substantiated not only from the

 Wisnovsky, Avicenna’s Metaphysics, provides a rich and detailed discussion of the modalities.
 Briefly put, the issue is whether conceivability is necessarily synonymous with mental existence,
or whether the latter category is restricted to the universal concepts. This would make, say, logical
considerations a kind of mental ‘notions’ or ‘aspects’ that in themselves would not amount to mental
existents proper. This issue also intersects with the distinction between the intellect and the internal
senses in Avicenna; in what way can imaginative and estimative forms be said to exist, and how does
their existence differ from the intelligible forms? These issues are picked up in chapter II in connec-
tion with the consideration of pure quiddity.
76 I Pure Quiddity in Context

point of view of the modalities, since God is the only being in Avicenna’s ontology
that is Necessary of Existence in Itself (wājib al-wujūd bi-dhātihi); but also by the
fact that the sense of ‘realized’ or ‘acquired existence’ (wujūd muḥaṣṣal) Avicenna
formulates in Metaphysics I.5 can only awkwardly be ascribed to God (I elaborate
this point below).
This set of terms and distinctions will prove particularly valuable when explor-
ing the issue of the ontological status of quiddity. This is because pure quiddity for
Avicenna can be said to exist in different contexts (extramental and intramental,
human and divine) and, within a single context (e. g., the intellectual), under differ-
ent aspects (as ‘a part of’ and ‘with other things,’ and ‘distinctly’), while also poten-
tially maintaining its own distinct and unique ontological mode and status. In other
words, this conceptual framework enables us to entertain the possibility that the on-
tological mode of pure quiddity could remain the same, even though the contexts
and aspects related to it may change. This hypothesis finds traction in the dual no-
tion of quidditative irreducibility and distinctness I adumbrated earlier, which sug-
gests that quiddity can be regarded from different angles and in varying relations
to things, while remaining strictly itself.¹²² The above distinctions between ontologi-
cal contexts, aspects, and modes are helpful for the very reason that quiddity in itself
disrupts the standard account of the relationship between contexts and modes of ex-
istence in Avicenna’s philosophy. Together with God’s existence, pure quiddity would
seem to represent an exception to what would otherwise be a quite symmetrical on-
tological picture in Avicenna’s philosophy between modes and contexts of existence
(i. e., fī l-aʿyān vs. fī l-ʿaql, particular vs. universal, etc.).
Intricately connected to the inquiry into the ontological modes and contexts is
the one focusing on the various senses (maʿānī) of existence that Avicenna outlines
in his works, especially in Metaphysics I.5. In that passage, the master draws a dis-
tinction between “established existence” (wujūd ithbātī), which is also synonymous
to “realized” or “acquired” existence (wujūd muḥaṣṣal), on the one hand, and “prop-
er existence” (wujūd khāṣṣ), on the other. What is the relation, if any, between these
senses and the modes and contexts of existence described above? Moreover, how do
these senses relate to ontological modulation and the various aspects that constitute
it? More fundamentally, how are we to construe these two senses of wujūd? These are
difficult questions, the first two of which have to my knowledge not been tackled in
the modern literature on Avicenna. As for the last one, it has given rise to conflicting
views, and there is to this date no consensus regarding its proper interpretation. Suf-

 One helpful analogy to illustrate this distinction focuses on the notion of the atom in ancient
philosophical systems. The mode of existence of an atom is irreducible and remains the same regard-
less of its ontological contexts and the aspects under which it is considered, that is, either in itself or
as part of a larger entity such as a body. Naturally, the analogy falls apart the second one contrasts
the materiality of the atom with the conceptual nature of quiddity. But the analogy adequately illus-
trates, I believe, the point I am trying to make here between modes, aspects, and contexts, on the one
hand, and between irreducibility and distinctness, on the other.
 3 Theoretical and methodological considerations 77

fice to say here that by far the most prevalent interpretation construes ‘established’
or ‘realized’ existence as encompassing all the existent things in the concrete world
and in the mind. This means that this sense of existence could be applied to the two
basic modes of existence traditionally identified by scholars: concrete, particular re-
alized existence and mental, intellectual realized existence. These two modes would
together constitute the realm of the existents (al-mawjūdāt) in Avicenna’s ontology.
Yet, as we saw, this classification raises certain problems. The question of whether
God’s existence represents a separate and distinct mode and whether the predicate
mawjūd can be rightly applied to Him illustrate this difficulty. In a similar manner, it
is unclear whether God’s existence can be defined by the sense of ‘established’ and
‘realized’ existence that is mentioned in that passage. Equally problematic is how
these senses relate to quiddity. Recently, Stephen Menn has offered a thought-pro-
voking interpretation of these two senses: ‘established existence’ would bear some
connection to Fārābī’s (d. 950 CE) ‘being-as-truth,’ while ‘proper existence’ is the
being of the categories outside the mind.¹²³ As we can see, various and often incom-
patible interpretations of the evidence have been proposed, which, moreover, focus
only on a single aspect of the problem.¹²⁴
One novel assumption made in the present book is that the issues regarding (a)
ontological modulation (tashkīk al-wujūd), (b) the modes of existence (naḥw al-
wujūd, kayfiyyat al-wujūd), and (c) senses of existence (maʿānī l-wujūd) are all inter-
connected in Avicenna’s philosophy and need to be analyzed in relation to one an-
other. This methodological perspective has not been sufficiently emphasized—or
even for that matter recognized—in the previous literature, partly because of the
fact that Avicenna’s theory of ontological modulation remains poorly understood
to this day, and partly due to the lasting—and mostly nefarious—assumption that
there are only two modes of existence in Avicenna’s philosophy. In view of the fore-
going, it appears that the crux of the debate regarding the ontological status of quid-
dity, as well as the relation between essence and existence, hinges directly on one’s
construal of wujūd. For scholars to agree on the issue of co-extensionality, they
would need first to explain precisely how they construe the various modes and
senses of existence in Avicenna’s philosophy. If one, following the ‘standard’ inter-
pretation of Avicenna’s ontology, recognizes only two modes of existence, i. e.,
those of concrete particulars and mental universals, or maintains a single sense of
existence coinciding with ‘realized’ or ‘acquired’ existence (wujūd muḥaṣṣal),
which necessarily entails such notions as complexity, causedness, and contingency,

 Menn, Fārābī; idem, Avicenna’s Metaphysics.

 Indeed, I say nothing here about scholars’ interpretations of ‘proper existence,’ which are equal-
ly divergent. For Black, Mental Existence, 26, “to the extent that the nature’s proper being has any
truly existential force for Avicenna himself, it is to be identified with divine existence, that is, with
the preexistence of the nature in the providential knowledge of the separate intellects.” This is exact-
ly the interpretation of proper existence that other scholars, such as Menn and Benevich, reject. These
points are discussed in detail in chapter IV.
78 I Pure Quiddity in Context

and which pertains to all the particular composite beings in the concrete world and
the complex entities in the mind, then it is clear that any supposition of quiddity that
does not conform to these ontological criteria and that is not immediately subsumed
within them would result in the greater extensionality of essence over existence. This
is the kind of scenario that Wisnovsky exposes in his book, when he pinpoints the
tension between Avicenna’s description of two modes of existence, but of three as-
pects of quiddity. ¹²⁵ On the basis of this evidence, there would be quiddities that
lie outside and beyond existence, thereby suggesting that quiddity is indeed exten-
sionally broader than existence. But reconfiguring this ‘standard’ ontological frame-
work allows for alternative interpretations of the status of pure quiddity and its re-
lation to existence.

3.6 Conclusion

The foregoing considerations have clarified some important conceptual issues in-
volved in the modern study of Avicenna’s theory of quiddity. It has also oriented
the investigation towards two specific queries: first, the relationship between quiddi-
ty in itself and mental existence; and second, and more generally, the number and
nature of the various modes of existence Avicenna outlines in his works and how
they connect with the ontology of quiddity. One may also note from the foregoing
that the debate regarding the ontological status of quiddity has centered to a large
extent on the question of whether quiddity in itself exists—with most scholars reach-
ing a negative conclusion. This is in spite of the fact that the more relevant and
thought-provoking questions might very well be how and in what mode it could be
said to exist. This of course implies that the Avicennian theory of existence is actually
richer and more flexible than previously thought, a hypothesis that will be substan-
tiated in the remaining chapters of this book. One could argue that this general short-
coming in our understanding of Avicenna’s ontology, and more specifically of his cat-
egorization of the various modes or states in which something can be said to exist,
has affected and even conditioned our understanding of the ontological status of
pure quiddity. One priority in this regard is to explore Avicenna’s doctrine of ontolog-
ical modulation (tashkīk al-wujūd) in order to better understand how it applies to
quiddity. For, from the moment one argues that quiddity in itself is not ‘nothing’
or a mere mental or logical aspect devoid of an ontological status, then it becomes
imperative to qualify what mode of existence could be ascribed to this pure quiddity;
and modulation, it would seem, provides a way to do so.

 Wisnovsky, Avicenna’s Islamic Reception, 202.

Chapter II:
Quiddity in Itself and Mental Existence
1 The terminological inquiry

1.1 Quiddity in itself as iʿtibār

Avicenna provides some of the most extensive discussions of quiddity in itself in In-
troduction I.2 and Metaphysics V.1 of The Cure, and it is accordingly with these texts
that we shall begin our inquiry.¹ In these two works, his analysis relies on a cluster of
technical terms that should be subjected to minute examination.² In that connection,

 Some striking differences with regard to the treatment of quiddity in Introduction I.2, on the one
hand, and Metaphysics I.5 and V.1, on the other, should be stressed right away. In the latter work,
the discussion of essence and existence unfolds against a metaphysical, not a logical, background,
even though the language and arguments Avicenna uses in this work are often borrowed directly from
the logical sphere and buttressed with logical terms and notions. In that sense, Avicenna’s metaphys-
ical exposition depends directly on the logical treatises that precede it. At any rate, the master focuses
more readily on the ontological aspects of quiddity in Metaphysics; accordingly, he opens the analysis
with a pointed discussion of the relationship between ‘thing’ and ‘existent’ and ‘quiddity’ and ‘exis-
tence,’ rather than the various epistemological aspects or considerations (iʿtibārāt) of quiddity, as he
does in Introduction. Nevertheless, I will argue that the general picture that arises from Avicenna’s
logical and metaphysical works is fully consistent.
 In these and other passages, Avicenna resorts to a rich and diverse technical vocabulary to describe
quiddity in itself (see Appendix 1 for a detailed list of terms and expressions). In general, these terms
are broadly synonymous, but reflect different aspects of quiddity depending on the context and the
exact meaning Avicenna wants to convey. These various nuances and aspects will be teased out in the
course of the analysis. Suffice to say here that this terminology aims to convey the basic notion of self-
identity and of pure quiddity as an object considered in itself and in abstraction from everything else.
This is the case, for example, of the expressions al-māhiyyah min ḥaythu hiya hiya, al-māhiyyah bi-mā
hiya tilka l-māhiyyah, and al-ḥayawān bi-dhātihi (or bi-mā huwa ḥayawān or fī ḥaqīqatihi), among
many other examples. ‘Animalness’ (al-ḥayawāniyyah) and ‘humanness’ (al-insāniyyah) are the two
standard examples Avicenna exploits in his writings. As already mentioned in the introduction,
the meaning in itself conveyed by these various terms is ambiguous, because it can be construed
in two basic ways: either as meaning ‘distinctness’ or ‘separation,’ or as meaning ‘irreducibility’
and ‘foundationality.’ These two senses will be explained in the course of the study. Other terms
are attached to quiddity whose interpretation is not immediately obvious and needs to be fleshed
out: this is the case, for example, of “abstract quiddity” (al-māhiyyah al-mujarradah), or of the var-
ious conditions (shurūṭ) applied to quiddity. Finally, there is a wide list of synonyms of quiddity Avi-
cenna uses, which require much unpacking, and which play a crucial role in his philosophy. They
consist mostly of the following: nature (ṭabīʿah), reality (ḥaqīqah), thingness (shayʾiyyah), and mean-
ing or entity (maʿnā). The terms nature and reality appear mostly in the context of Avicenna’s discus-
sion of quiddity in the concrete world, although they also pertain to the status of pure quiddity in the
mind; this topic is discussed in detail in chapter III. The term shayʾiyyah refers primarily to the intel-
ligible reality of essence and, hence, to quiddity as a pure notion in the mind. This study will not have
much to say about dhāt and shayʾ, which point primarily to the essence of a concrete existent and

[Link]
80 II Quiddity in Itself and Mental Existence

what one notices from the outset is the intentional, mental, or mind-dependent na-
ture of most of these terms, as well as (for some of them) their logical implications:
Avicenna refers to quiddity as a consideration (iʿtibār), an aspect or mode (naḥw and
wajh), a meaning or idea (maʿnā), and an intelligible form (ṣūrah and ṣūrah maʿqū-
lah). It is these mind-related or mind-dependent terms that will detain us here, inso-
far as they can help to illuminate the issue of how quiddity in itself relates to mental
existence.
Introduction I.2, extensively analyzed by Marmura in two important articles, pro-
vides perhaps the best entry point into the problem of quiddity in Avicenna. This
treatise is, as its very name (al-Madkhal) indicates, a propaedeutic to logic, and,
through logic, to philosophy as a whole. Although based on Porphyry’s Eisagoge,
and following a long line of late-antique Greek and early Arabic commentaries on
this seminal work, this treatise is a free and personal disquisition on some of the fun-
damental notions and terms used in philosophical analysis as well as on the relation
between logic and ontology. It is in the course of his exposition in Book I that Avi-
cenna broaches the topic of quiddity. In a famous passage, he explains that there
are three aspects or considerations (iʿtibārāt) of quiddity (māhiyyah): one aspect of
quiddity is associated with universal mental existents (I shall refer to it henceforth
as ‘universal quiddity’); the other aspect is associated with concrete particular exis-
tents in the extramental world (‘extramental or concrete quiddity’); and the third as-
pect is quiddity in itself, taken in abstraction from these two modes of existence
(mental and concrete) as well as with the concomitants and accidents connected
with them. Although Avicenna also describes quiddity as having various considera-
tions (iʿtibārāt) in Metaphysics of The Cure, Introduction I.2 provides the most con-
densed and schematic exposition of this doctrine. Below is a translation of the
key passage:

Text 1: The quiddities of things can be either in concrete beings or in the act of conceiving [i. e.,
in the mind, fī-l-taṣawwur], and they are subject to three considerations [iʿtibārāt]: (a) the con-
sideration of quiddity inasmuch as it is that very quiddity [al-māhiyyah bi-mā hiya tilka l-mā-
hiyyah] unconnected to either mode [or aspect] of existence [al-wujūdayn] and to what follows
from it [quiddity] insofar as it is like that [wa-mā yalḥaquhā min ḥaythu hiya ka-dhālika, i. e.,
in one of these two modes]; (b) the consideration of it [quiddity] insofar as it is in concrete be-
ings [fī l-aʿyān], in which case there are accidents attached to it that specify its [mode of] exis-
tence [takhuṣṣu wujūdahā]; and [finally] (c) the consideration of it insofar as it is in the mind, in
which case there are [also] accidents attached to it that specify its [mode of] existence, such as

which are fully co-extensional with ‘the existent’ (al-mawjūd); for the difference between māhiyyah
and shayʾ, see Bertolacci, The Distinction; De Haan, A Mereological Construal. In view of this, the
work that lies ahead consists to a large degree in providing disambiguation and analysis of these
key terms. In what follows, I will use the expressions ‘pure quiddity’ and ‘quiddity in itself’ as my
default expressions and treat them as fully synonymous.
 1 The terminological inquiry 81

subject and predicate, universality and particularity in predication, what is essential [i. e., con-
stitutive] and accidental in predication, and other such things as you will learn [shortly].³

Although it may seem at first blush that this passage encapsulates an entirely new of
way of looking at quiddity—and this is indeed true to some extent—it is nevertheless
to be connected to ancient philosophical discussions regarding the various aspects
of the forms and the universals, especially those that had unfolded in late-antique
Neoplatonic circles aiming to reconcile Plato’s and Aristotle’s views on the univer-
sals. To begin with, Avicenna’s account is directly related to the Neoplatonic tripartite
schematization of ‘the common things’ (sing., τò κοινόν) and universals (sing., τò κα-
θόλου) into what is ‘before,’ ‘in,’ and ‘after’ multiplicity. Two of the aspects Avicenna
outlines above intersect directly with this classification: (b) corresponds to universals
in concrete things, while (c) corresponds to the universals qua concepts in the human
mind. As for (a), I will show later on that it corresponds—albeit only partially—to
what is ‘before’ multiplicity.⁴ Given that Avicenna was aware of this Neoplatonic tri-
partite scheme—he reports it at the beginning of Introduction I.12—it is reasonable to
assume that it stands in the background of his account of quiddity in chapter I.2 as
well. After all, the threefold distinction in I.2 can be easily mapped onto the one that
is outlined later in I.12. This point seems further corroborated by the fact that this
threefold distinction, as well as its implementation to effect a typology of universals,
forms, or essences, also underpins the works of some of Avicenna’s predecessors,
such as those of the Jacobite theologian and philosopher Yaḥyā b. ʿAdī, whose meta-
physics appears to have exerted a deep influence on the shaykh al-raʾīs. Both Yaḥyā
and Avicenna tackle the issue of the ontological status of the kulliyyāt and umūr
ʿāmmah, Arabic terms which correspond directly to the Greek words for ‘universals’
(καθόλου) and ‘common things’ (κοινά) respectively, and they also conceive of these

 Avicenna, Introduction, I.2, 15.1‒6. I am grateful to Frank Griffel for his valuable help and advice in
translating this passage.
 See, in particular, Ammonius, Commentary on Eisagoge, 41.17‒20; 42.10‒21; and 104.27‒31; Philopo-
nus (?), Commentary on Posterior Analytics, 2, 435.28‒30; Simplicius, Commentary on Categories,
82.35‒83.20; 69.19‒71.2 (all in CAG); as well as Proclus, Commentary on Euclid’s Elements, 50.16‒
51.9 (I owe these references to Sorabji, Universals Transformed). The literature focusing on this tripar-
tite Neoplatonic classification of the universals and its influence on medieval thought is extensive.
Here I provide only a few references to orient the reader: Sorabji, The Philosophy, vol. 3, 128 ff.;
idem, Universals Transformed; and de Libera, La querelle, 230 ff. The scholastic treatment of this
topic seems inextricably linked to the reception of Avicenna in the medieval Latin world; see
Owens, Common Nature; Wéber, Le thème avicennien; Erismann, Immanent Realism; and de Libera,
L’art. Other references are given in due course. As I explained in the introduction, each chapter of the
present book can be regarded as tackling one of these three aspects, albeit in reverse order. One
should bear in mind, however, that this tripartite scheme represents only one of many frameworks
Avicenna adopts to elaborate his doctrine of quiddity. Given that he inherits this scheme from the
ancient sources, it is not surprising that there is only a partial overlap with his theory of quiddity.
The differences have to do mostly with Avicenna’s strict differentiation between quiddity and univer-
sality and how quiddity relates to ontology, issues that will be discussed later on.
82 II Quiddity in Itself and Mental Existence

notions in close relation to form and essence.⁵ In addition, Yaḥyā differentiates be-
tween three aspects of the forms or universals on the basis of their relation to multi-
plicity, which he describes as ‘divine,’ ‘natural,’ and ‘logical.’⁶ There can be little
doubt that Yaḥyā’s approach was inspired by the Neoplatonic scheme outlined
above and that it provided a model for Avicenna’s understanding of this topic.
Furthermore, Avicenna’s account in Introduction I.2 should be read in light of
Porphyry’s discussion of the universals at the very beginning of Eisagoge (1.9‒16).⁷
In this section of his work, Porphyry formulates three questions that were to have
a lasting impact on later philosophers: (a) do the universals exist or are they mere
concepts?; (b) if they exist, are they corporeal?; and (c) do they exist separately or
in concrete things? In late antiquity, a wide number of commentaries and works
were written that addressed these questions, often within an overarching Platonic
metaphysical framework and in connection with the theory of the forms. The general
outlines of this philosophical debate were undoubtedly known to the early Arabic
philosophers as a result of the translation movements from Greek and Syriac to Ara-
bic. Avicenna is no exception, and it is apparent from his works that he was fully
aware of the long discussions this text had given rise to in the late-antique philo-
sophical circles. In fact, there can be little doubt that in broaching the issue of the
various ontological contexts of quiddity, Avicenna was responding directly to Por-
phyry’s own interrogations about the universals in Eisagoge. ⁸ Notice, however, that

 See, for instance, Yaḥyā b. ʿAdī, Treatise on Unity, in Philosophical Treatises, 400.16‒17, which men-
tions the “universals and common things” (hiya l-kulliyāt wa-l-umūr al-ʿāmmiyyah); and Avicenna,
Metaphysics, V.1, who relies on both terms in his analysis.
 See Rashed, Ibn ʿAdī; Menn and Wisnovsky, Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī On the Four Scientific Questions. As
Adamson, Knowledge of Universals; and Rashed, Ibn ʿAdī have shown, Yaḥyā anticipated some
key features of Avicenna’s account of essence and the universals, one of which is a threefold distinc-
tion that closely resembles the one provided by Avicenna in Introduction. More specifically, Yaḥyā ar-
gues that the idea, meaning, or entity (maʿnā) man or animal is neither universal nor particular, and
that universality amounts to another maʿnā added to it in the mind. Accordingly, the maʿnā human or
animal can be in the particular, in the mind, or considered as an absolute (muṭlaq), a statement that
anticipates Avicenna’s argumentation; see Adamson, Knowledge of Universals, 153‒157. Although
Yaḥyā has rightly been regarded as a crucial link between the late-antique philosophers and Avicen-
na, there are also important differences concerning the way in which these two thinkers regard the
universals, which, I think, have not been sufficiently highlighted. I will have many occasions through-
out this study to return to the parallels between these two thinkers.
 For the Arabic version of this key passage, which quite faithfully reproduces the Greek original, see
Porphyry, Īsāghūjī, 67.9‒12. For the place and influence of Porphyry in the Aristotelian tradition that
was bequeathed to the Islamic world, see Chiaradonna, Porphyry. For additional insight into the Ara-
bic reception of Eisagoge, see Gyekye, Arabic Logic, 13‒22. This text played a crucial role in shaping
the development of not only Arabic logic, but also, due to its ontological implications, of Arabic met-
aphysics and theology. Numerous commentaries on this work in Arabic and Persian have survived,
which testify to the sustained interest it generated in Islamic intellectual history.
 Avicenna further exposes his awareness of the ontological implications connected with the discus-
sion of the universals in another passage of the same work (27.7‒14); the statements he makes there
can also be seen as a direct response to the questions asked by Porphyry. Avicenna will proceed to
 1 The terminological inquiry 83

unlike the Greek sources, Avicenna in this passage is not discussing common things,
but only quiddity (māhiyyah). In other words, he is talking about the various onto-
logical contexts of quiddity, not of the common things or universals, as the problem
was usually framed in the late-antique sources. This is an important difference. Al-
though some late-antique philosophers, such as Alexander of Aphrodisias, seem to
have differentiated terminologically between the common thing (κοινόν), which
somehow exists in extramental reality, and the universal (καθόλου), which exists
only in the mind, the boundary between these notions in the Greek texts is slippery,
and in any case the crux of the discussion focused on the common thing/universal,
not on quiddity or essence.⁹ For Avicenna, in contrast, the core issue focuses on the
various aspects of quiddity. Universality is merely a mental concomitant of quiddity,
and universals as such are concepts that exist only in the mind.
Moreover, the ontological implications of the various questions raised by Por-
phyry acquire new depth in Avicenna’s philosophy as a result of the latter’s distinc-
tion between genus and species, on the one hand, and pure quiddity, on the other.
So, for Avicenna, the issue at stake is not only: What is the ontological status of es-
sence-genus and essence-species?, but also: What is the ontological status of the es-
sence in itself, once it has been stripped of genusness and speciesness? And whereas
Porphyry presents these points as philosophical conundrums in his work and relin-
quishes the responsibility of actually having to resolve them, Avicenna is describing
what appears to be an established point or theory that is well anchored in his system.

address some of these points also in Metaphysics of The Cure. In chapter I.4, 26.3‒5, Avicenna formu-
lates a series of questions that strongly recalls the Porphyrian passage: in the discipline of metaphy-
sics, he writes, “it is proper to acquaint ourselves with the state of the universal and particular … the
manner of existence of the universal natures, whether they have an existence in external particulars,
the manner of their existence in the soul, and whether they have an existence separate from [both]
external particulars and from the soul” (translated by Marmura in Avicenna, The Metaphysics, 20).
Some scholars have, understandably, approached Avicenna’s ontology chiefly through the lens of
the ancient and medieval debates about the universals; this is the case, for instance, of Booth, Aris-
totelian Aporetic Ontology, 107‒129. Although it represents a crucial dimension of the problem, it must
be complemented with an investigation of other traditions and issues, such as early Islamic kalām
ontology and especially its disquisitions on the ontological status of ‘the thing.’ It is the confluence
of these two major ontological traditions in the works of Avicenna that informs the present analysis.
 For this distinction in Alexander, see Pines, A New Fragment, 80‒83. At any rate, some of these
nuances may have been lost in the Arabic tradition, given that ‘the common thing’ and ‘the universal’
were often translated by means of the single Arabic word kullī. In spite of this, one does also encoun-
ter the expressions al-umūr al-ʿāmmah and al-ashyāʾ al-ʿāmmah in the Arabic texts, which must refer
to the Greek κοινά. It is found, for instance, and relevantly, in a treatise by Yaḥyā b. ʿAdī entitled On
Clarifying the Existence of the Common Things (Fī tabyīn wujūd al-umūr al-ʿāmmiyyah), as well as in
the title of section V.1 of Metaphysics of The Cure, ‘On General Things and the Mode of their Existence’
(Fī l-umūr al-ʿāmmah wa-kayfiyyat wujūdihā). Finally, Pines notes that Alexander’s notion of the com-
mon thing bears some connection to that of essence, and that both are to be contrasted to the uni-
versal as a concept in the mind. This might prefigure an important distinction also in Avicenna be-
tween pure quiddity and the universal. I return to this issue later on.
84 II Quiddity in Itself and Mental Existence

These differences notwithstanding, both Porphyry and Avicenna address the prob-
lem of the mental and concrete contexts in which the common things and quiddity
could be said to exist. Avicenna has reformulated in his own words and addressed
some the main philosophical queries articulated by Porphyry at the beginning of
his logical treatise.
What is more, Avicenna’s claim that we can have a conception or consideration
of quiddity ‘in itself’ in contradistinction to that of the universal stands out quite
clearly in this passage and represents another difference with Porphyry’s account
and the Neoplatonic tripartite scheme. At first sight, this statement looks like an in-
novation on Avicenna’s part, and it seems to go hand in hand with his extensive in-
terest in human psychology and epistemology. It is to be connected especially with
the capacity the human mind has to divide, analyze, and posit or nullify relations
between things, in this case between quiddity and its concomitants and accidents.
In spite of this, the idea that essence, or form, or the universal, can be appre-
hended ‘in itself’ does have several precedents in the history of philosophy. One fre-
quently cited starting point is Aristotle’s attempt to disentangle essence from exis-
tence in his exposition of demonstration and definition in Posterior Analytics II.7,
which is a text that underpins Avicenna’s entire approach to this issue.¹⁰ In a very
different context, some Neoplatonists sometimes speak of a form ‘in itself,’ such
as ‘the animal in itself,’ which is identified as one of the Platonic forms.¹¹ Equally
relevant here is Alexander’s endeavor in some Quaestia and other texts to separate
the nature of a thing from its universality and to regard the latter merely as a mental
accident. This would seem to imply that the human mind can apprehend the natures
in themselves.¹² This argument was transmitted to the Islamic world and expanded
by Yaḥyā b. ʿAdī, who argues in some of his treatises that essence and universality

 In particular, Aristotle’s statements that definition cannot account for both the essence and exis-
tence of a thing because “definition does not prove that the thing defined exists,” (92b19) and that
“what human nature is and the fact that man exists are not the same thing” (92b10‒11) can be
said to constitute one of the premises of Avicenna’s own exploration of the topic of quiddity. The lat-
ter will expend much effort trying to clarify the relationship between these two concepts in his logical
and metaphysical works.
 This is the case, for example, of Simplicius in his Commentary on Categories (I discuss the rele-
vant passage later on). It should be stressed from the outset that, in spite of some terminological and
doctrinal parallels, Avicenna’s doctrine of essence is not grounded in Plato’s metaphysics and that he
rejects the theory of independently and transcendentally existing Forms. But bringing a Platonic met-
aphysical framework on board is not altogether ludicrous. I will argue in chapters IV and V that it
plays a role (in its Neoplatonic permutation) in understanding the status of quiddity in the divine
world and as objects of divine intellection.
 See Tweedale, Alexander; idem, Duns Scotus’s Doctrine; Rashed, Ibn ʿAdī; Menn, Avicenna’s Met-
aphysics, 155. The impact of Alexander’s works on the history of Arabic philosophy, including Avicen-
na’s philosophical system, is well known and has been highlighted on numerous occasions. For my
purposes, scholars have pointed to the Arabic translations of some of Alexander’s treatises as possi-
ble sources of inspiration for Avicenna’s theory of essence and universality.
 1 The terminological inquiry 85

are two different meanings or ideas (maʿānī), which can be conceived of separately.¹³
Finally, the potential influence of Muʿtazilite epistemology and ontology on Avicenna
should be acknowledged and represents an equally important aspect of the problem.
The Muʿtazilites, who were active long before Avicenna, distinguished sharply be-
tween ‘the thing’ and ‘the existent’ and made this conceptual distinction the basis
of their epistemology and ontology. What is more, the Baṣrian Muʿtazilite Abū Hā-
shim al-Jubbāʾī sometimes speak of ‘an attribute of the essence’ (ṣifat al-dhāt),
which refers to the way a thing is in itself and in abstraction from all other things.
It designates, to quote R.M. Frank, “the thing’s total identity with itself as it is pre-
dicated of itself without any implication of duality.”¹⁴ This doctrine anticipates in
some important ways Avicenna’s theory of pure quiddity and underlines the need
to include the early history of kalām in order to get a broader picture of the master’s
sources and philosophical interlocutors.¹⁵
Although these sources help to contextualize Avicenna’s own approach to this
issue, they do not lucidly convey the various epistemological and mental distinctions
he makes between quiddity and the various external accidents and concomitants
that attach to it. In that sense, the account in Introduction I.2 represents Avicenna’s
own elaboration, and at any rate it finds no counterpart in Porphyry’s Eisagoge. One
remarkable feature in the Avicennian text is the claim that quiddity can be the object
of various mental considerations (iʿtibārāt). It should be noted that a similar argu-
ment can be found in two other works by the master, the early Provenance and Des-
tination and the late Notes, which suggests that Avicenna consistently held to this
view throughout his life.¹⁶ On this account, human beings can envisage quiddity
in different contexts and either strictly in itself or in relation to other things.
Hence, the master appears to be making an epistemological or logical point,
which hinges to a large extent on the term iʿtibār itself. Avicenna employs the
term iʿtibār frequently in his writings, and in many cases it does not seem to carry
any technical meaning.¹⁷ However, it always implies a kind of mental or logical con-
sideration or process that unfolds in the mind. Moreover, in other instances, the
noun iʿtibār and the corresponding adjective iʿtibārī do seem to assume a more spe-

 See, for instance, Yaḥyā b. ʿAdī, Notes on Various [Philosophical] Notions, in Philosophical Trea-
tises, 171.6‒13; see also Rashed, Ibn ʿAdī; and Adamson, Knowledge of Universals, 153‒157.
 Frank, Beings, 53.
 The parallels between Avicenna and the Muʿtazilites regarding this specific issue have to my
knowledge not been thoroughly explored in the scholarship. I will have several opportunities to re-
turn to them in the course of my analysis. For brief but cogent discussions of the Muʿtazilite Attribute
of the Essence, see Frank, Beings, 53‒57; and Thiele, Abū Hāshim.
 Avicenna, Provenance, 3.4‒6: “The consideration of the relation and connection [of a thing] is
other than the consideration of the very essence of that thing [iʿtibār nafs dhāt al-shayʾ]”; and
Notes, 200, section 304: “Considering the essence [of a thing] is one thing, and considering it as
being in a [certain] state is another thing” (iʿtibār al-dhāt shayʾ wa-iʿtibār kawnihi bi-ḥāl shayʾ ākhar).
 Use of a search engine has enabled me to establish that Avicenna uses the term iʿtibār at least 324
times in the logical, physical, and metaphysical works of The Cure.
86 II Quiddity in Itself and Mental Existence

cific sense and are used expressly to emphasize an object’s mental or conceptual na-
ture, as opposed to something more concrete, such as when Avicenna in Discussions
distinguishes between “sensual and conceptual premises” (muqaddimāt ḥissiyyah
wa-iʿtibāriyyah).¹⁸ Avicenna is one of the first thinkers in Islam to make such exten-
sive use of the term iʿtibār, and he is certainly the first to apply it with such consis-
tency to quiddity.¹⁹ Yet, partly as a result of the lack of a clear philosophical prece-
dent in Arabic, and partly because this topic has not been studied systematically, the
meaning of iʿtibār in Avicenna’s philosophy is difficult to establish. At root, it means
a ‘conceptual,’ ‘mental,’ or ‘psychological aspect’ or ‘consideration,’ that is, some-
thing that unfolds in the human mind when the latter is engaged in actual thought
and deliberating about a specific object. It has been diversely translated by modern
scholars as a “consideration,” “mental construct,” “mental aspect,” and “contempla-
tion,” to quote only a few of the available renditions. Regardless of which translation
is preferred, notice that they all stress the intentional and mind-dependent nature of
an iʿtibār, although they say virtually nothing about its relation to mental existence
and of what kind of mental act it consists.²⁰ Because it involves a reflective or rati-

 Avicenna, Discussions, 210, section 622; cf. 204, section 608, which mentions “consideration
based on the senses” (al-iʿtibār al-ḥissī).
 To my knowledge, the term iʿtibār does not play a significant role in the philosophical literature
prior to Avicenna. At any rate, it is not part of the basic technical vocabulary of Kindī, Abū Bakr al-
Rāzī, and Fārābī. Likewise, although it plays a key role in post-Avicennian kalām, it is not used in a
systematic way in the early theological sources. Nevertheless, some early authors do discuss this term
in some detail. One of them is al-Ḥārith b. Asad al-Muḥāsibī (d. 857 CE), who, in Book of Instructions
(al-Waṣāyā), 288, devotes a section to this term (I am grateful to Salimeh Maghsoudlou for this refer-
ence). According to this author, an iʿtibār is “an inference from one thing to another thing” (al-istidlāl
bi-l-shayʾ ʿalā l-shayʾ). Al-Muḥāsibī goes on to describe this in turn as a kind of certain knowledge
stemming from the heart (qalb). Clearly, this author attributes a different meaning to iʿtibār from
the philosophical one and integrates it in a distinctively Sufi framework. For this reason it is unlikely
that his works—or those of other early Sufis for that matter—had any impact on the Avicennian phil-
osophical conception of this term. On the other hand, Avicenna’s repeated technical use of this notion
had a profound impact on later discussions of quiddity in kalām and falsafah. It was later to become
a salient feature of the post-Avicennian philosophical terminology, starting with Bahmanyār and es-
pecially with the works of Suhrawardī (d. 1191 CE), Abū l-Barakāt al-Baghdādī (d. 1165 CE), Fakhr al-
Dīn al-Rāzī, and Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī, up to the later commentaries of Qushjī, Quṭb al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī
(d. 1311 CE), and many others. It figures prominently in a work as recent (given the time span covered
in this study) as Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s (d. 1981 CE) Introduction to Philosophy (Bidāyat al-ḥikmah), also trans-
lated as The Elements of Islamic Metaphysics, published around 1970. Given its importance in Avicen-
na’s philosophy as well as its extraordinarily rich fate in the postclassical tradition, it deserves atten-
tive commentary, which is provided below.
 Given its importance in the Arabic philosophical and theological traditions, it is surprising that
the term iʿtibār has not received more attention in the modern historiography. What follows is an over-
view of the main, but always brief, attempts at defining it in the modern scholarship. Surprisingly,
neither Afnan, Philosophical Terminology, nor Goichon, Lexique, dedicates an entry to this term.
For some insight into the use of iʿtibār in Avicenna and especially in the post-Avicennian tradition,
see Izutsu, in Sabzavārī, The Metaphysics, 9, 42‒43; idem, The Fundamental Structure, especially
65 ff.; and idem, Basic Problems, which focuses explicitly on the issue of quiddity in the postclassical
 1 The terminological inquiry 87

ocinative process, it would appear that in most cases an iʿtibār is to be connected

with the intellect (ʿaql), a connection that is occasionally explicitly made in the Avi-
cennian texts.²¹ This explains why the term appears frequently in Avicenna’s discus-
sions of celestial noetics to describe the various objects of thought of the separate
intellects, in addition to his logical writings. In spite of this, an iʿtibār need not be
strictly limited to the intellect and may also solicit the lower faculties of the soul,
such as the estimative and imaginative faculties. At any rate, this last point requires
further research.
Bearing these points in mind, Avicenna’s main objective in Introduction I.2 seems
not to be to discuss the ontological status of quiddity, but to explicate the various
ways in which quiddities can be envisaged by the human mind as logical, intention-
al, or psychological notions—an objective that seems perfectly aligned with the log-
ical scope of the treatise. Accordingly, one does not expect a protracted discussion
focusing on the ontology of quiddity, since this topic falls outside the scope of the
treatise. Avicenna intends here to discuss the three “considerations” of quiddity, a
term which does not in itself suggest existential content, but merely points to a con-
ceptual or epistemological distinction of this notion. At any rate, this threefold dis-

tradition. Izutsu describes iʿtibār as “an aspect” and “a subjective manner of looking at a thing” (Izut-
su, The Fundamental Structure, 65), “something mentally posited” (Izutsu, in Sabzavārī, The Metaphy-
sics, 9), as well as, with regard to the present topic, “the various possible ways in which ‘quiddity’ can
be viewed at the level of conceptual analysis” (Basic Problems, 4). Although he discusses the notion
of iʿtibār in connection with quiddity in some detail, Izutsu does not directly tackle the issue of its
relation to mental existence. Furthermore, his tendency to move back and forth between Avicenna
and his later exegetes and to interpret the former’s doctrine in light of the postclassical tradition
is methodologically problematic and somewhat obscures the contours of Avicenna’s thought. For in-
stance, Izutsu’s claim that Avicenna regarded pure quiddity has “neither existent nor non-existent”
(The Fundamental Structure, 65) is a later exegetical development, which was probably influenced by
kalām theories, and which is not stated in this way by the shaykh himself; see section II.3. Wisnovsky,
Essence and Existence, especially 27, note 2, alternates between the translations “aspect” and “con-
sideration” in his study on the reception of Avicenna’s metaphysics, while Fazlıoğlu, Between Reality,
has recently opted to translate iʿtibār as “mental construct.” Walbridge’s and Ziai’s take on this is
more committal, as they render iʿtibār in Suhrawardī’s philosophy as “a being of reason” (Suhra-
wardī, The Philosophy of Illumination, xxii, xxv). They explain: “these attributes have no being out-
side the mind and are actually products of our thought about things.” It can be inferred from their
study and especially from their translation “a being of reason” that they regard an iʿtibār as referring
specifically to a mental existent (cf. the Arabic text, 52.10‒11), although Walbridge elsewhere alter-
nately translates this key term as “intellectual fiction” (Walbridge, The Science of Mystic Lights,
45‒46). At any rate, its ontological status in Suhrawardī’s philosophy remains to be precisely de-
lineated. Finally, for a discussion of iʿtibār in Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī and his interpretation of Avicenna,
see Ibrahim, Freeing Philosophy, 243‒289, especially 255‒256, 266‒269, 272 n. 410. For the purposes of
this study, I follow the standard translations of iʿtibār as “consideration” or “mental aspect,” with an
emphasis on its epistemological role and formal meaning.
 See for instance Categories, 242, where the expression fī iʿtibār al-ʿaql occurs. And in Discussion,
308, section 865, he glosses iʿtibār as “intellectual form” (dhālika l-iʿtibār ayḍan ṣūrah ʿaqliyyah). Cf.
also Discussions, 308‒309, sections 864‒865.
88 II Quiddity in Itself and Mental Existence

tinction is established from the point of view of the human mind pondering about a
fundamental epistemological notion, which it can scrutinize under various angles.
This conceptual or logical approach seems appropriate, given the genre of the
work, which not only opens Avicenna’s treatment of the Organon, but also inaugu-
rates the entire oeuvre of The Cure.
Notice in this connection that Avicenna describes quiddity in itself as one of
three considerations that the human mind can entertain with regard to quiddity in
general.²² It is important to stress that his intention in this passage is not to posit
three different ‘kinds’ or ‘types’ of essences, but to posit three ways of considering
quiddity in the mind from a rational or logical viewpoint. Hence, it is only the rela-
tion of quiddity to its external concomitants (whether corporeal or mental) that
changes according to these various considerations, not quiddity itself. In fact, for
Avicenna, ‘quiddity in itself’ is just quiddity and nothing more, and it is its associ-
ation with mental and corporeal concomitants or lack thereof that determine its
mode of existence. So Avicenna is not by any means enumerating kinds of essences
that would be distinct one from the other. He is explaining how the same quiddity,
say horseness, can be envisaged in relation to its concomitants and accidents and, by
extension, to the modes of mental and extramental existence that characterize it,
even though in itself the quiddity horseness always remains quiddity and possesses
an irreducible nature.²³ With that being said, Avicenna in this passage does broach
the issue of how these various considerations relate to existence, and in this regard

 Interestingly, in the postclassical tradition, the focus set by Avicenna in this passage appears to
have shifted. For while Avicenna describes quiddity in itself as one of three considerations of essence
in Introduction I.2, later authors often speak of the various considerations added to quiddity in itself,
with the implication that there need not be a consideration of pure quiddity itself. In other words, the
question of whether there is such a thing as a pristine consideration of pure quiddity itself without
any of its concomitants and any other consideration being attached to it (as Avicenna seems to sug-
gest in Introduction I.2) is not clearly addressed in most of the later, postclassical works. But this in-
quiry in any case depends on a precise evaluation of each individual author; cf. the brief analysis
below of Rāzī, Ṭūsī, and Qushjī, to name only three important authors. In fact, later thinkers often
regarded the various considerations of pure quiddity as corresponding directly to the concomitants
and attributes that attach to it, for instance, the consideration of universality as it attaches to quid-
dity. This issue is, of course, directly related to these thinkers’ stance regarding mental existence and
whether they allow abstract mental objects to count as existents proper. But this represents an inter-
esting development of the later commentatorial tradition, which adopted a creative and transforma-
tive approach to Avicenna’s doctrines, and which ultimately gave rise, as Wisnovsky suggests, to ‘Avi-
cennism’ or to an ‘Avicennian’ or ‘Avicennizing’ philosophical tradition (to be distinguished from
Avicenna’s philosophy proper); see Wisnovsky, Avicenna’s Islamic Reception; idem, Towards a Ge-
nealogy; and idem, Essence and Existence.
 In recognizing a distinct consideration of pure quiddity that excludes its concomitants and even
existence, Avicenna may be elaborating on Aristotle’s claims in Posterior Analytics II.7. There Aristotle
explains that the definition of essence or of “essential nature,” strictly speaking, does not indicate
whether a thing exists and, hence, does not include existence. Aristotle, however, does not in this
passage use the expressions ‘pure quiddity’ or ‘quiddity in itself.’ This seems to be an Avicennian
terminological innovation.
 1 The terminological inquiry 89

he puts forth several vital points. First, he makes an important claim with regard to
mental existence. Although the three considerations Avicenna enumerates are all
‘mental,’ in the sense that they take place in the mind and are apprehended from
the point of view of a rational, thinking subject, only one of them can be straightfor-
wardly connected with a mental existent, namely, the consideration of quiddity in
the mind as a universal form.²⁴ This is because this aspect of quiddity presupposes
the mental concomitants attached to existence in the mind, chief among them being
universality. In being the object of a universal kind of knowledge, this aspect of quid-
dity correlates with an intelligible form or existent, and it is tantamount to what Avi-
cenna otherwise calls an intelligible (maʿqūl), a universal (al-kullī), an intelligible
form (ṣūrah maʿqūlah), as well as a mental existent (mawjūd fī l-dhihn). Apart
from being immaterial, what these intelligibles all have in common is a universal

 In this study, the expressions mawjūd fī l-dhihn (existent in the mind), fī l-ʿaql (in the intellect),
and fī l-taṣawwur (in conception) will be treated as being broadly synonymous and as designating
mental or intellectual existents. What is more, inasmuch as we are dealing here with intellectual ex-
istents, the expression mawjūd fī l-nafs (existent in the soul) and mawjūd fī l-awhām or fī l-tawahhum
(existent in the estimation) will also in many cases be construed in a similar way, even though nafs is,
strictly speaking and admittedly, a term that encompasses much more than rational thought, and al-
though tawahhum means literally ‘estimation.’ I shall distinguish between these expressions and the
various psychological nuances they convey only when raising the specific question of whether Avi-
cenna recognizes sub-intellectual psychological existents; in this case, distinguishing between exis-
tence ‘in the intellect,’ ‘in the mind,’ ‘in the estimation,’ and ‘in the soul’ becomes more relevant.
It should be noted, however, that in most cases Avicenna appears to use all of these expressions
quite loosely to refer to intellectual existents. Lizzini, Intellectus, argues for a sharper semantic dis-
tinction between the terms ʿaql and dhihn in Avicenna. As Lizzini explains, ʿaql can apply to both
human and divine (or superlunary) intellection, while dhihn is applied only to human thought. More-
over, there is the question of whether existents ‘in the mind’ overlap neatly with those ‘in the intel-
lect,’ if one posits a potential difference in the way the human mind and intellect relates to the ex-
terior world and especially to the forms in the Agent Intellect (it should be noted that fictional forms
represent a particularly problematic case in this regard, since on this line of reasoning they could be
said to exist ‘in the mind,’ but not necessarily ‘in the intellect’). This prompts Lizzini to distinguish
epistemologically between the intellect (whose objects are commensurate with those in the Agent In-
tellect) and the mind (which can include human error, possibility, or doubt). I agree with Lizzini that
dhihn and dhihnī apply to human minds, not the divine intellects. But these points notwithstanding,
and with regard to the majority of cases in which Avicenna uses these terms, I think it is difficult to
establish a significant difference in meaning between them, especially when they relate to the uni-
versal intelligibles in the human mind. It seems to me that, on the whole, Avicenna employs these
terms synonymously, and that whenever he speaks of existents ‘in the mind,’ these are in essence
the same as existents ‘in the intellect.’ One example will suffice to illustrate this: in Introduction,
I.12, 66, Avicenna shifts back and forth between the terms dhihn and ʿaql when discussing quiddity,
but throughout this passage he is employing these terms with the same meaning. He refers to the
mind’s (al-dhihn) apprehension of the “intelligible form of animalness,” and later to the fact that
the meaning of animal is “in the intellect” (fī l-ʿaql). In brief, it would seem that context is the
only way to discern whether Avicenna in each case intends a significant difference in meaning be-
tween these terms. As mentioned above, one problematic case concerns the fictional forms, which
call for further investigation.
90 II Quiddity in Itself and Mental Existence

quality, which, on Avicenna’s definition of universality, means that they are poten-
tially predicable of a multiplicity of existents.²⁵
As for the other two considerations, they do not at first sight qualify as mental
existents: the consideration of quiddity in concrete beings entails considering quid-
dity together with material accidents and concomitants, and hence cannot amount to
an intellectual concept per se, since it would not be immaterial. Rather, it would
seem to represent a kind of sensual, imaginative, or estimative consideration, and
at any rate one whose level of abstraction is below that of the pure intelligibles.²⁶
As for the consideration of quiddity in itself, its exact nature and status are not clari-
fied in this passage. These points help to explain why Avicenna states that we can
have three considerations (iʿtibārāt), and not three intellectual concepts, of quiddity.
Nevertheless, part of the issue at stake is to determine whether the consideration of
pure quiddity amounts to an intellectual consideration, like that of universal quiddi-
ty, or to a consideration located at a lower cognitive level, comparable to that of quid-
dity taken together with its material trappings. A second point to bear in mind is that
whereas the two considerations of quiddity as a universal and in concrete beings
refer to an object that is not co-extensive with quiddity itself—since that object in-
cludes external concomitants and accidents in addition to the quiddity itself—the
consideration of pure quiddity seems to have only itself as an object and is therefore
fully abstracted from all other things.
Hence, in spite of the logical focus of Introduction, Avicenna (like Porphyry and
other early commentators such as Boethius) is keen already in this prefatory work to
introduce the issue of the ontological status of quiddity or at least to raise some
questions concerning the relation of quiddity and existence (wujūd) taken in both
its mental and extramental modes. This is keeping in line with his view about the
congruence of logic and metaphysics, but it has the effect of immediately and starkly
raising the problem of the ontological status of quiddity in itself. Notice that Avicen-
na partially correlates two aspects of quiddity with two modes of existence [al-wujū-
dayn], but leaves the third one, quiddity in itself, indeterminate with regard to either
mode of existence. He opens this passage by mentioning two ontological states for
quiddities: “in concrete things” (fī aʿyān al-ashyāʾ), or as concrete extramental exis-
tents, and “in (human) conception” (fī l-taṣawwur), or as mental existents, a division
which is reiterated some lines below. This distinction, it should be noted, is main-

 In fact, a universal is predicable of (at the very least) one individual existent, either potentially (a
fictitious or artificial form) or actually (a species having only one individual in existence, such as the
Sun). But in the majority of cases, it is predicable of several existents (a natural form, e. g., horse). The
relation between quiddity and universality is treated in depth below; see also Marmura, Quiddity and
Universality, and idem, Avicenna’s Chapter on Universals.
 But Avicenna’s views on this point are more complex than might first appear, since he believes
not only that we can somehow conceive of quiddity as it exists in concrete beings intellectually,
but also abstract this quidditative meaning from the concrete individuals; see chapter III.
 1 The terminological inquiry 91

tained consistently throughout the Avicennian corpus.²⁷ But the shaykh al-raʾīs re-
mains silent about the ontological status of the third—and seemingly purely concep-
tual—sense of quiddity he tantalizingly refers to in this passage. These pure quiddi-
ties are not granted any positive existential status and seem to represent merely an
epistemological aspect under which they can be considered by the mind.
Now, the fact that this passage suggests that this particular consideration of
quiddity corresponds to neither existential mode, while the other two each corre-
spond to one mode respectively, should not automatically be taken to imply that
these quiddities constitute a third, autonomous ontological group, and that they
should be regarded as existents (mawjūdāt) distinct from mental and extramental ex-
istents. Such a symmetrical typology of essences and existents appears to have been
put forth by Avicenna’s predecessor Yaḥyā b. ʿAdī.²⁸ But for argument’s sake, even if
Avicenna had intended this, one would not expect him to discuss the ontological im-
plications of this third aspect of quiddity in this very passage, since we are dealing
here with a treatise on logic. What this passage implicitly does, however, is raise the
question of how the logical consideration of quiddity in itself relates to existence,
and more specifically to mental existence, given that a consideration is an act or op-
eration unfolding in the subject’s mind.²⁹ In its emphasis on intentionality and men-
tality, the term iʿtibār, which figures conspicuously in this passage of Introduction, is
vital to the present query and should be examined with care. In this regard, two
points should be stressed. First, it should be noted that it appears consistently in Avi-
cenna’s logical and metaphysical works in connection with pure quiddity. For exam-
ple, it is used repeatedly in Metaphysics V.1‒2 of The Cure, where it fulfills basically
the same semantic purpose as in Introduction. Avicenna explains in that work that
the human mind has the capacity to “envisage” or “consider” essences or quiddities
in themselves (e. g., horseness as such) in abstraction from the concomitants and ac-
cidents that attach to the mental and extramental existents. Avicenna affirms, for in-
stance, that “considering animal in itself is possible” (iʿtibār al-ḥayawān bi-dhātihi
jāʾizan),³⁰ and he also alludes to our “consideration” (naẓarunā) of humanness (in-
sāniyyah) in abstraction from its concomitants and the things that attach to it.³¹ Avi-
cenna goes on to say that quiddity in itself is something that can be “considered” or
“reckoned” (manẓūr, nuẓira, bi-iʿtibār)³² as having a distinct meaning (maʿnā).³³ All

 Avicenna, Introduction, 15.17.

 See Rashed, Ibn ʿAdī; and Menn and Wisnovsky, Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī On the Four Scientific Questions.
 Even though Introduction I.2 can be taken as advocating the broader extensionality of essence
over existence, it is of course not immediately apparent to the reader that it should be construed
in this manner, and in any case it sheds little light on the issue of the ontological status of quiddity
in itself. See the discussion in Wisnovsky, Avicenna’s Metaphysics, 158‒160, 178‒180, who relies heav-
ily on this passage in his discussion of essence and existence.
 Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Cure, V.1, 201.8.
 Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Cure, V.1, 198.7‒8.
 Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Cure, V.1, 200.15; 203.4‒5; 203.12‒14.
 Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Cure, V.1, 203.6‒7.
92 II Quiddity in Itself and Mental Existence

in all, there is a remarkable terminological and doctrinal overlap between the two
texts. Avicenna’s consistent use of the term iʿtibār in these works to refer to quiddity
in itself is particularly striking. As will be made clear, the terminology and views ex-
pounded in Introduction are not only fully compatible with the evidence that can be
found in Metaphysics; they are also elaborated upon in the latter work.
Second, the term iʿtibār weighs on the issue of the ontological status of pure
quiddity in the mind in two direct ways. First, given the general ambiguity and
vagueness surrounding this term in the context of Avicenna’s psychology, there is
a distinct possibility that the iʿtibār of quiddity in itself could be something sub-in-
tellectual, perhaps to be associated with the estimative or imaginative faculties. This
possibility was alluded to previously, and it needs to be reckoned with, since human
beings can have various kinds of considerations, not all of which are presumably of
an intellectual nature. What is more, the psychological elasticity of the term finds
some textual corroboration in the postclassical tradition in the wake of the diffusion
and appropriation of the Avicennian terminology by various groups of theologians
and philosophers. This may be called the problem of the intellectuality of iʿtibār. ³⁴
The second problem concerns the criteria required to make an iʿtibār an intellectual
existent proper once the assumption of its intellectuality has been endorsed. This
problematic can be delineated with some precision and corresponds to actual argu-
ments that are carefully deployed by Avicenna and other thinkers. At play here are
the issues of the mental concomitants and accidents that are required to posit mental
existence and whether the iʿtibār of pure quiddity meets these specific criteria. For
according to Avicenna and many Arabic philosophers who followed his doctrines,
to be an intellectual existent is to exist according to a special ontological mode,
which presupposes mental concomitants, such as universality, oneness, actuality,
etc. Hence, to exist intellectually in the real sense of the word is to possess these
mental qualities. So, even if an iʿtibār is granted the status of an intellectual or men-
tal object and is defined as an intellectual consideration specifically, it may still not
be conceived of strictly as a mental existent, because it could be present in the mind
while being devoid of these concomitants and hence ultimately fail to meet the requi-
site criteria of mental existence.³⁵

 It should be noted that this argument can be extrapolated from the Arabic sources, but is not ex-
plicitly adduced by any of the thinkers whose works I have browsed in order to reject the mental ex-
istence of pure quiddity. Rather, later authors will rely instead on the argument that the intellect can
have conjectural or suppositional considerations that, while intellectual in nature, do not amount to
real existents in the mind. From our standpoint, however, the question of the intellectuality of iʿtibār
and of whether it always corresponds to a rational or intellectual process—as opposed to something
sub-intellectual involving, for instance, the imagination—is worth asking.
 For this discussion, which dominates the postclassical literature on quiddity and mental exis-
tence, see Taftāzānī, Commentary on the Aims, vol. 1, 404; Qushjī, Commentary, 400‒406; Tahānawī,
Dictionary, vol. 2, 1424; and Izutsu, Basic Problems.
 1 The terminological inquiry 93

In line with this reasoning, some later Arabic and Persian scholars posit a di-
chotomy between true mental existents (mawjūdāt dhihniyyah) and suppositional
or conjectural quiddities (māhiyyāt iʿtibāriyyah), also grouped under the generic
heading of ‘conjectural considerations’ (iʿtibārāt).³⁶ On this construal, something
that is iʿtibārī is merely conceptual or conjectural, but not grounded in true existence.
This can be called the problem of the existentiality of iʿtibār. ³⁷ The question that
emerges is whether this kind of argumentation finds any traction in the Avicennian
works themselves. On either view, then, the iʿtibār of pure quiddity would not qualify
as an intellectual existent, either because it lacks intellectuality, or because, while
being nominally a mental or intellectual object, it is purely logical or conceptual
and lacks the criteria of true mental existence, or for both reasons. Many Arabic
and Persian thinkers who flourished after Avicenna deftly deploy variants of these
arguments in order to reject the mental existence of pure quiddity and certain cate-
gories of mental objects. These points will be addressed in more detail below.

1.1.1 iʿtibār and conceptual unity and multiplicity

One key aspect of iʿtibār is its relation to conceptual unity and multiplicity. According
to Avicenna and many thinkers who followed in his stead, such as Ṭūsī, the human
mind can devise various considerations of a single object, without this activity result-
ing in a real multiplicity in the concrete world. This means that the human mind has

 See, for instance, Jurjānī, Definitions, 272.16; Tahānawī, Dictionary, vol. 2, 1424; Izutsu, Basic Prob-
lems; Fazlıoğlu, Between Reality, 28 ff. It is unclear to me at this point whether the postclassical sour-
ces articulate two arguments or merely one argument against the ontology of an iʿtibār. The first argu-
ment outlined above seems corroborated by the evidence in the postclassical sources, although it
finds its point of origin in Avicenna’s works: it revolves around the mental concomitants of quiddity,
how these relate to pure quiddity, and whether these concomitants are necessary to posit the mental
existence of quiddity. On this view, pure quiddity would correspond merely to an iʿtibār, but not to a
mental existent proper, since it is devoid of the requisite concomitants that characterize mental ex-
istence. Much of the analysis developed in this study focuses on this issue. A second—potentially dis-
tinct, yet closely related—argument could focus instead on the relation of mental notions to an inde-
pendent and self-referential realm of truth called ‘the thing in itself’ or ‘the fact of the matter’ (nafs al-
amr) in the Arabic sources and on their correspondence (muṭābaqah) with the exterior world of actual
existents. The idea here is that only those intelligibles that conform to those found in God’s mind—if
this indeed is how nafs al-amr is to be understood—could be said to truly exist. These terms find a
precedent in Avicenna’s works, but it is likely that the post-Avicennian authors used them in idiosyn-
cratic ways that find no exact match in Avicenna. Furthermore, there is a terminological difficulty
involved here, inasmuch as the objects that fail to qualify as intellectual existents according to
this second argument appear to have been described also as iʿtibārāt, i. e., mere suppositional or con-
jectural considerations, thereby potentially blurring the lines between the two categories of mental
objects described above. At any rate, the questions of how these various ideas and arguments inter-
connect in the postclassical literature and their exact relationship to Avicenna’s thought are intricate
and deserve further research.
 For some insight into this issue in the works of Ibn Kammūna, see Eichner, The Chapter, especial-
ly 156 and 166.
94 II Quiddity in Itself and Mental Existence

the ability to multiply considerations about a single entity at will and to regard it
from different angles, aspects, or perspectives, thereby generating and embracing
a mental multiplicity that need not have a counterpart in the object’s concrete na-
ture. For example, in their discussions of the First Cause, Avicenna and Ṭūsī articu-
late the divine act of self-intellection into a trinality of thinker, thought, and object of
thought. Although these three aspects or considerations are conceptually distin-
guishable, they all correspond to a single and simple reality in God, since the divine
intellect, its intellection, and the object of its intellection are one and the same thing
in the divine being.³⁸ In that case, then, these various considerations (iʿtibārāt) do
not correspond to a real multiplicity in the divine being and consist only of a plural-
ity of mental aspects and, hence, to a purely conceptual multiplicity.³⁹ These multi-
farious aspects are generated thanks to the mind’s ability to establish various rela-
tions with respect to the same object.⁴⁰
In another passage of his commentary, Ṭūsī further explains that considering the
privation of existence (or nonexistence) of a thing (iʿtibār ʿadam shayʾ) does not en-
tail any multiplicity in the real world, lest existing things become composite as a re-
sult of the addition of various nonexistent things associated with them. As he states,
“the condition of nonexistence [or privation] is something added only conceptually”
(sharṭ al-ʿadam amr zāʾid fī l-iʿtibār faqaṭ).⁴¹ Since considerations can be multiplied
infinitely, this conceptual multiplicity would exist in the concrete world if there was a
strict correspondence between the two spheres.⁴² Hence, like many other interpreters

 Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Cure, VIII.6‒7; the main argument is mirrored in Notes, 206, section
322; and in Salvation, 587‒590, where Avicenna argues that the distinction between thinker (ʿāqil) and
object of thought (maʿqūl) in God does not entail a duality either in His essence (fī l-dhāt) or even in
terms of human consideration (fī l-iʿtibār); and Fārābī, On the One, section 23, who also uses this ex-
ample. Avicenna, Commentary on Book Lambda, chapter 9, elaborates on this point, but with the pro-
viso (73.275‒276) that if these various aspects are one in God, they are not necessarily one in the case
of other beings (i.e., in human beings, the intellect does not become identical with the object of in-
tellection).
 Avicenna, Metaphysics, VIII.6, especially 358.7‒13. Unsurprisingly, the term iʿtibār appears repeat-
edly in Avicenna’s theological exposition in VIII.6. Ṭūsī, Commentary on Pointers, vol. 2, 152.19, pro-
vides another example: he explains that on one consideration (iʿtibār), nature is matter (māddah),
but on another consideration, it can be regarded as genus and species. In another passage (Ṭūsī,
Commentary on Pointers, vols. 3‒4, 456.11‒14), he explicates that some things can be distinguished
in the concrete world (qad takhtalifu bi-l-aʿyān), while others are distinguishable only conceptually
(bi-l-iʿtibār) and remain one and united in external reality; to illustrate the latter, he provides the ex-
ample of the distinction between knower and object of knowledge. Ṭūsī is implicitly referring to the
divine intellect in this passage. Establishing a distinction between things that are actually divisible or
multiple in the real world and things that are so only conceptually in the human mind is a step Ṭūsī
deems important to prove God’s absolute oneness in extramental reality.
 Accordingly, the term iʿtibār often appears in discussions that involve relations between a thing
and other things; thus, according to different iʿtibārāt, the same thing may be prior and posterior to
other things, general and specific, possible and necessary, etc.
 See Ṭūsī, Commentary on Pointers, vols. 3‒4, 478.15‒16.
 Ṭūsī, Commentary on Pointers, vol. 2, 341.20.
 1 The terminological inquiry 95

of Avicenna, Ṭūsī is therefore keen to construe an iʿtibār as something merely mental

that need not have any correspondence or relation to the external world. Another in-
stance of this use of iʿtibār, as it was largely practiced by the post-Avicennian tradi-
tion, was to regard the essence/existence distinction purely as a conceptual or men-
tal (iʿtibārī) distinction, not as a real distinction. In this case, the conceptual duality
of essence and existence would have no ontological counterpart in the concrete
world, where essence and existence exist as one inseparable thing in concrete indi-
viduals.⁴³
At the level of mental activity, an iʿtibār inevitably leads to the production of re-
lations. At the very least, there will be a relation between the thinking mind and the
various objects of thought, which may be purely mental and without necessarily im-
plying counterparts in the extramental world. At Physics I.3, Avicenna alludes to the
accidental and limitless “relational considerations” (al-iʿtibārāt al-iḍāfiyyah) that we
may entertain about a thing.⁴⁴ A consideration may or may not have a counterpart in
the concrete world (e. g., the form of horse vs. a mathematical object or a fictional
form). Regardless, the fundamental and irreducible relation between the mind and
its object seems to underlie the very core of an iʿtibār. In addition, other relata can
be introduced between the mind and various aspects pertaining to the same object.
The mind has the power to produce and distinguish various considerations pertain-
ing to the same object: the relations between the object and the mind will be multi-
ple, although this multiplicity will not affect the object itself. Thus, as Avicenna ex-
plains in Physics I.6, nature (ṭabīʿah) and form (ṣūrah) are identical in simple
elements (basāʾiṭ), such as water, but the mind can nevertheless apprehend either
principle distinctly according to a different iʿtibār: nature, according to the iʿtibār
connected with the power of motion, and form, according to the iʿtibār connected
with the power of the subsistence of species.⁴⁵ As the previous examples illustrate,
iʿtibār is a highly flexible notion that is applied to domains as different as physics
and theology. This in turn explains why some post-Avicennian thinkers sometimes
frame the discussion of the divine attributes in terms of notional or conceptual rela-
tions (nisab), which also correspond to considerations in the mind (iʿtibārāt).⁴⁶ Their
use of the term iʿtibārāt to express the relations between the mind and the various
aspects of an object is comparable to the way that some Arabic Aristotelians employ
this term to gloss Aristotle’s distinction between intellect, intellection, and intellect-
ed in Book Lambda 9. In these examples, the term iʿtibār is closely related to a plu-

 For this important epistemological and metaphysical development, see Izutsu, Basic Problems;
Wisnovsky, Essence and Existence; Rizvi, Roots of an Aporia.
 Avicenna, Physics, I.3, 31.2.
 Avicenna, Physics, I.6, 45.7‒11.
 One example is ʿAyn al-Quḍāt al-Hamadānī’s The Essence of Truth, 38‒39, wherein he explains
that God’s attributes can be regarded as one or many depending on our considerations (iʿtibārāt)
of their relations (nisab). I wish to thank Salimeh Maghsoudlou for this reference and insight into
ʿAyn al-Quḍāt’s use of this term.
96 II Quiddity in Itself and Mental Existence

rality of relations, which nevertheless all have their basis or source in the thinking
mind. Yet, establishing conceptual relations between things in the mind through
iʿtibārāt may not lead to the multiplication of existing entities outside the mind,
but it may suggest that these things and relations somehow exist in the mind.
Now, it should be noted that the aptitude to multiply mental objects at will is
described by Avicenna as a faculty of the intellect (ʿaql), which suggests that we
are dealing here first and foremost with intellectual considerations.⁴⁷ At any rate,
the human capacity to conceptually multiply the considerations of a single object
at will raises the hypothesis that this is exactly what Avicenna is doing in Introduc-
tion I.2 when he enumerates the three aspects of quiddity. Accordingly, he would not
be describing three different types or kinds of quiddities, but three ways of looking at
the same thing, three aspects of what is fundamentally the same quiddity. This would
suggest a certain ontological irreducibility of quiddity as well as a mereological ac-
count of how it is present in complex or composite things, since what would change
would be not the quiddity itself but its relation to external things. These points never-
theless remain to be demonstrated. The validity of this hypothesis depends on our
ability to prove that quiddity in concrete existents, in mental existents, and in itself
exists in these three states and, moreover, that quiddity in itself can somehow be
said to exist irreducibly in all of these states. But I defer this discussion until later on.

1.1.2 iʿtibār as neither faculty- nor object-specific

Although Avicenna employs the notion of iʿtibār primarily in connection with ration-
al thought or reasoning, and hence with regard to the intellectual faculty, it would
appear that it can encompass sensual, imaginative, and estimative considerations
as well and need not be confined strictly to intellectual concepts. In that sense, an
iʿtibār seems to be neither faculty-specific nor object-specific. Accordingly, the master
sometimes refers in his works to considerations related to the senses (iʿtibārāt ḥis-
siyyah), to individual things (iʿtibār al-shakhṣ), and to nonexistent things (iʿtibār al-
ʿadam), none of which amounts to a universal concept in the mind.⁴⁸ When Avicenna
explains in Introduction I.2 that we can have a consideration of quiddity as it exists in
concrete individuals, and hence in association with its material concomitants and ac-
cidents, he is in this case presumably referring to an iʿtibār that relies on the senses
and the imaginative faculty and which involves a level of abstraction inferior to that

 See Avicenna, Compendium on the Soul, 364.6‒7; On the Soul of The Cure, V.5, 236.6‒7; cf. Meta-
physics of The Cure, III.3, 105.1‒7, where Avicenna argues that unity is better known to the intellect
and multiplicity better known to the imagination, and where he also comments on the interactions
of the two faculties. This suggests that the imagination likely plays a role in the process of conceptual
multiplication described above.
 Avicenna, Categories, 246; Discussions, 204, section 608; 59, section 59; Physics I.3, 31.1‒2.
 1 The terminological inquiry 97

of the intellectual concept.⁴⁹ Granted, there is an ambiguity in this case as to whether

this iʿtibār is tantamount to the actual sensual, imaginative, or estimative apprehen-
sion of the individual object, or whether Avicenna is merely referring to the logical
realization or consideration that such an apprehension is theoretically possible
(i. e., knowing that we can have such a consideration). Either way, this consideration
would not correspond ontologically to a universal intellectual object. When the soul
apprehends the humanness of Zayd, for instance, it apprehends it together with
Zayd’s individual accidents as mediated through the senses. In another passage of
Metaphysics V.1, Avicenna refers to this kind of apprehension as a conditioned con-
sideration (bi-sharṭ shayʾ), since it necessarily involves other things apart from pure
quiddity. In this regard, the consideration of quiddity with its concrete accidents and
concomitants would appear to be more appropriately located at the sensual, imagi-
native, and estimative levels of apprehension. It presupposes an individual and par-
ticular ‘thing’ that can be pointed to and prevents a kind of universal cognition of the
object. This consideration seems to be closely tied also to Avicenna’s theory of the
vague individual.⁵⁰
Since considerations can be infinitely multiplied at will, it is likely that not all of
them would correspond to an intellectual concept or a universal and that some of
them would rest on other psychological faculties located below the purely intellectu-
al one. After all, the imagination, like the intellect, enables us to multiply images at
will, and it also encompasses a very wide range of objects. Hence, it would seem that
the objects of an iʿtibār may be either particular or universal, mental or extramental,
concrete or abstract. According to the example provided above, the soul can envisage
either a universal kind of humanness or humanness together with Zayd’s accidents
and individual features, and both constitute a valid iʿtibār. In addition, its objects
may have a correspondence in the exterior world (such as when the mental consid-
eration of horseness corresponds to a particular corporeal existent, e. g., this horse);
or they may be confined to the human mind itself (as in the case of artificial and fic-
tional forms and of certain objects that are impossible of existence in the exterior
world, such as the (relative) nonexistent). In this sense, it would appear that an
iʿtibār can focus on things that cannot properly or actually be said to exist in the con-
crete extramental world. Accordingly, we may have a consideration of prime matter

 This point is endorsed in later commentaries as well. Qushjī, Commentary, 400.4‒9, mentions the
consideration (iʿtibār) of the “mixed quiddity” (al-māhiyyah al-makhlūṭah), i. e., of quiddity combined
with its material accidents, which is formulated “with the condition of a thing” (bi-sharṭ shayʾ), and
which therefore involves the sensual and imaginative faculties. In this case, the object of this consid-
eration cannot be a pure intellectual concept.
 On this notion, see Black, Avicenna’s ‘Vague Individual.’ Black writes (267): “the vague individual
differs from the true universal because it does not simply represent the nature or essence itself —‘hu-
manity’— but includes with it the sensible accidents that accrue to the nature when individuated in a
particular instance—such as baldness in ‘Socrates.’ It is these accidents that render the vague indi-
vidual concrete rather than abstract, and they are what must be ‘peeled away’ in order for the intel-
lect to grasp the universal.”
98 II Quiddity in Itself and Mental Existence

(al-hayūlā l-ūlā) and the nonexistent (al-maʿdūm), without these objects ever
amounting to actual, concrete things in the world. In this connection, Ṭūsī explains
in his Commentary on Pointers that reflecting on a privation or on something that
does not exist (iʿtibār al-ʿadam) does not result in these things actually existing in
the real world, but only perhaps in the mind qua considerations.⁵¹ Only the iʿtibār
one has of these things will be said to exist somehow. For Bahmanyār (d. 1066 CE)
as well, who was one of Avicenna’s main disciples, our mental judgments (aḥkām)
of the nonexistent (al-maʿdūm) have a kind of existence in the mind; but it is the
mental act itself, not the nonexistent as such, that can be said to exist in this man-
ner.⁵² Hence, we can presumably entertain considerations of any of these things with-
out this entailing their actual existence in the concrete world. An iʿtibār does not au-
tomatically entail the existence of its object in the extramental world, although it is
in all cases something that is considered in the mind. It is for this reason that an
iʿtibār is to be regarded primarily as a mental aspect or construct.
In view of the foregoing, it appears that the iʿtibārāt encompass a much wider
range of objects than the class constituted by the universal mental existents that
have a direct counterpart in the concrete world. Consequently, an iʿtibār is not imme-
diately determined by the nature of the object under examination and can focus on
objects that either do not exist in the real world or that may not even exist in the in-
tellect per se as valid intelligibles. At any rate, Avicenna’s writings do not provide a
set of criteria that enable us to precisely define or delineate the scope covered by an
iʿtibār, making this notion much more elusive than that of an intellectual concept,
which refers to a mental existent and which can be adequately defined in terms of
universality (kulliyyah), abstractness (tajarrud, mujarrad, tajrīd), and intelligibility

 There is also the question of whether these kinds of considerations could be said to be truly valid
mental existents, since they refer to things that cannot ever actually exist in the concrete world; in
this regard, they constitute a class of mental entities distinct from that of the artificial forms in the
human mind (e. g., the heptagonal house), but at the same time they do not constitute absolute log-
ical impossibles, like the square circle or a ‘nonexistent existent.’ The nonexistent is nothing more
than the idea of the nonexistent, of which only the consideration can perhaps be said to exist men-
tally. On these points, see Ṭūsī, Abstract of Correct Belief, 117.1‒5; cf. idem, Commentary on Pointers,
vols. 3‒4, 478.15‒16. The latter passage, which focuses on the relation between the mental and extra-
mental spheres, is to be connected to another interesting passage that focuses this time on mental
existence (Ṭūsī, Commentary on Pointers, vol. 3‒4, 463.1‒4). There Ṭūsī explains that the mind can
deliberately refrain from considering certain aspects, such as existence in connection with quiddi-
ty—the implication being that quiddity can be considered purely in itself—but this is different
from considering a thing’s nonexistence. In the former case, a thing may exist mentally or otherwise,
but be excluded from the iʿtibār, while in the latter case, the iʿtibār focuses on that thing’s nonexis-
tence. Prime matter and nonexistence obviously fall in the latter category. Hence, Ṭūsī believes that
we can have a consideration of these nonexistent things. The difficulty that remains is to determine
whether these kinds of iʿtibārāt exist in the mind in the same way as the iʿtibārāt of extramentally
existing things.
 Bahmanyār, The Book of Validated Knowledge, 489.4‒7.
 1 The terminological inquiry 99

or intellectuality (ʿaqliyyah).⁵³ As a corollary, and because it does not overlap neatly

with the universal existent, an iʿtibār inevitably assumes a certain subjective status
in the mind, as Izutsu remarked some time ago.⁵⁴ An experienced philosopher may
have more facility envisaging the same object under a variety of iʿtibārāt than, say, a
neophyte, or he may even entertain considerations about this object that are inacces-
sible to others. A consideration therefore need not, unlike a universal concept, be
universally and scientifically demonstrable and cognizable. It can be proper to the
thought process of a particular person.⁵⁵ This being said, Avicenna’s comments on
the consideration of quiddity in itself suggest that it is a cognitive state accessible
to human beings in general. Since it is discussed in the context of logic, it presum-
ably is not subjective to the point of not being understandable and communicable to
a majority. It is therefore an object of shared or shareable knowledge and can be ac-
cessed by any sound rational mind.
In view of the difficulty involved in pinpointing the kind of object to which an
iʿtibār refers, another approach would be to regard it as a deliberative process,
i. e., a way or method of conducting a rational examination. Construed in this
sense, the term would be equivalent to the cognate word naẓar, which Avicenna
also uses in a similar context, and which possesses a similar ambiguity in its dual
meaning as ‘view’ or ‘aspect’ on the one hand, and ‘approach,’ ‘inquiry,’ or ‘investi-
gation’ on the other.⁵⁶ When describing quiddity or essence, Avicenna relies heavily
on these two terms, and in each case there is some uncertainty as to whether he is
talking about a process, a ‘logical inquiry’ into quiddity, or about its consideration as
an object or entity in the mind. Regardless of the ambiguity involved in regarding
iʿtibār in terms of an object or a process, it is clear that both senses are related insofar
as the deliberative process requires an object and that the object may be reached or is
actualized in the mind as a result of the process itself. Hence, whether one prefers to
stress the ‘status’ or ‘object’ sense of iʿtibār or its ‘process’ or ‘deliberative’ sense,
both are grounded in Avicenna’s writings, and they are discussed in a logical context
and hence in connection with the philosophical method. This being said, putting the
accent on an iʿtibār qua object of rational thought exacerbates a key question this

 As mentioned previously, this hypothesis seems borne out by Avicenna’s application of the term
iʿtibār to the three ways in which quiddity can be examined: only one of those three aspects corre-
sponds to an object that qualifies as a mental existent proper qua universal (i. e., quiddity combined
with universality), while the other two are just ways of conceiving or considering quiddity in abstrac-
tion from mental existence: one focuses on the concrete extramental existence of quiddity with its
accidents and concomitants, and the other on quiddity regarded in itself. One could argue that the
former is sub-intellectual, the latter merely epistemological, and that neither fulfills the criteria to
be an intellectual concept.
 Izutsu, The Fundamental Structure, 65.
 This is very much in keeping with the modern sense of the term, where iʿtibārī in Modern Stan-
dard Arabic can mean “relative” or “subjective.”
 The notion of iʿtibār as process and its close relation to naẓar are expressed clearly in Jurjānī’s
definition of the term iʿtibār as “huwa l-naẓar fī l-ḥukm al-thābit…”) (Definitions, 53.1‒2).
100 II Quiddity in Itself and Mental Existence

study seeks to answer, namely, the ontological status of an iʿtibār when it is con-
ceived in the mind. In effect, if one describes the various aspects under which quid-
dities can be known as considerations, and if these considerations are distinct one
from the other or distinguishable through rational thought, then the relation of
each one to the notion of existence needs to be clarified. What is more, since
these considerations are mental phenomena, their relationship to mental existence
specifically needs to be elucidated. Obviously, emphasizing the ‘object,’ ‘status,’ or
‘state’ meaning of iʿtibār will underline this issue in a way that stressing its meaning
as ‘process’ or ‘method’ will not, for the simple reason that Avicenna does not explic-
itly ascribe an ontological status to mental processes as such, but he does ascribe
one to mental objects.⁵⁷
At any rate, one sometimes encounters in the post-Avicennian tradition the for-
mula “intellectual considerations” (iʿtibārāt ʿaqliyyah), which suggests that some au-
thors deemed it important to specify that they were referring to rational or intellec-
tual considerations specifically as opposed to imaginative or estimative ones.⁵⁸ What
is more, some post-Avicennian thinkers appear to have distinguished between con-
siderations “on account of the estimation and imagination” (bi-ḥasab al-wahm wa-
l-khayāl) and considerations “on account of the intellect” (bi-ḥasab al-ʿaql).⁵⁹ Al-
though these are later developments, they suggest that, already in Avicenna, the
term iʿtibār is not semantically fixed, but is used somewhat flexibly in connection
with the various faculties of the soul. This means that iʿtibār is not faculty- or ob-
ject-specific. With that being said, Avicenna appears to use this term chiefly in con-
nection with the rational operations of the mind and its ability to unite and divide

 It may be argued that Avicenna does ascribe an ontological status to mental processes and to
thought itself when he refers to mental existence (wujūd dhihnī and wujūd ʿaqlī). But given that,
on his view, thought is always thinking of something, i. e., that there is always an object grounding
our thought processes, it is unclear whether wujūd ʿaqlī would mean something beyond and above
the wujūd of the various objects constituting it and, hence, the wujūd of the mawjūdāt dhihniyyah
or ʿaqliyyah. Perhaps the only exception in the context of Avicennian psychology would be self-aware-
ness, whose reflexiveness unifies ontologically subject and object; on this topic, see Kaukua, Self-
Awareness. In any case, the point here is that Avicenna does not explicitly ascribe a specific ontolog-
ical status to iʿtibār, a fact which has generated much grief in the secondary literature.
 See, for instance, Suhrawardī, The Philosophy of Illumination, xxv; idem, Paths and Havens,
340 ff.; Ṭūsī, Commentary on Pointers, vols. 3‒4, 511.6 and 14‒15; idem, Abstract of Correct Belief,
119.12‒17; see also Wisnovsky, Essence and Existence, 45; and idem, On the Emergence, 306.8,
where a hitherto unpublished excerpt from the work of ʿAlī b. Sulaymān has “true intellectual con-
siderations” (al-iʿtibāriyyāt al-ḥaqqiyyah al-ʿaqliyyah).
 I am quoting the translation of Fazlıoğlu, Between Reality, 4. This author provides valuable in-
sight in his article into the meaning of iʿtibār, especially as it came to be used in discussions of math-
ematical objects and their relation to mental existence. He argues that prior to the fifteenth century,
mathematical objects and the ‘mental constructs’ or iʿtibārāt proper to mathematics and astronomy
belong to the conjectural and imaginary spheres, not to intellection proper. See also Wisnovsky, Es-
sence and Existence, 39, who, in the context of Shahrastānī’s refutation of some theological positions,
mentions “mental and estimative considerations” (iʿtibārāt dhihniyyah wa-taqdīriyyah).
 1 The terminological inquiry 101

intellectual concepts as well as to create and multiply relations and distinctions be-
tween them. Perhaps for this reason, he applies it quite consistently to quiddity,
which enables him to distinguish between quiddity ‘in itself’ and quiddity in relation
to other things.

1.1.3 iʿtibār, conceivability, and mental existence

The foregoing remarks have exacerbated an ambiguity found in Avicenna’s writings
concerning how the term iʿtibār relates to mental existence. Unlike in the case of an
intelligible (maʿqūl) or a universal (kullī), the master nowhere specifies or defines in
his works the exact relationship of an iʿtibār to mental existence, nor does he even
provide a definition of this important term. The problem is that the object of a con-
sideration can focus directly on a mental existent (as in the case of the iʿtibār of uni-
versal quiddity), but it may also be connected with objects that do not as such pos-
sess existence in the intellect (as is the case of ‘mixed quiddity’ in concrete beings,
and of quiddity in itself, according to one possible interpretation of this notion). It is
important to reiterate in this connection that although the three iʿtibārāt Avicenna
outlines in this passage are all mental objects or operations and, hence, participate
in cognitive states, only one of them, namely, the consideration of quiddity as a uni-
versal in the mind, refers expressly to an object that is at the same time an intellec-
tual or mental existent proper (mawjūd ʿaqlī or dhihnī), which Avicenna also defines
as a universal intelligible (maʿqūl kullī or simply kullī). As for the other two objects,
they may have nothing to do with intellectual existence proper, even though, again,
they are distinctions that occur in the human mind thinking about the world. Since
Avicenna uses the same term to describe our considerations of these different aspects
of essence, no clear picture of the ontological status of an iʿtibār emerges from his
account in Introduction I.2. Moreover, while quiddity in itself would seem to fall in
the category of a purely mental object, the nature and status of this object remain
to be clarified.⁶⁰
In light of these remarks, Avicenna’s treatment of iʿtibār strongly suggests that
there could be a discrepancy between the mental status of a consideration and the
mental status of the object being considered. This problem intersects with the
well-known issue of how the thinking mind relates to the object of thought in the
case of human intellection. For our purposes the pressing question that needs to
be addressed is whether a consideration of pure quiddity that deliberately excludes
existence necessarily entails the nonexistence of this pure quiddity as a mental ob-
ject. This points requires elucidation. Moreover, there is the issue of how the iʿtibārāt

 One thing, however, is clear, namely, that Avicenna does not regard all iʿtibārāt as constituting a
merely suppositional class of objects that would be devoid of the criteria for mental existence. This
point is important, because some postclassical thinkers appear to have regarded iʿtibārāt precisely in
this way and in opposition to the ‘true’ mental and concrete existents (mawjūdāt ḥaqīqiyyah); see
Tahānawī, Dictionary, vol. 2, 1424; Fazlıoğlu, Between Reality, 28 ff.
102 II Quiddity in Itself and Mental Existence

relate to the notion of conceivability, whether an iʿtibār must by necessity be of some-

thing conceivable, and how conceivability is defined in this context. This is all the
more important, given that there appears to be a strong correlation between conceiv-
ability and mental existence in Avicenna’s psychology. I emitted previously the hy-
pothesis that an iʿtibār can have a whole range of dissimilar objects, which cannot
be said to exist in the same way. In effect, it would seem that on Avicenna’s view
we can have considerations of various kinds of entities that each possess a different
ontological status. Some of these entities, such as the quiddities of the natural spe-
cies, have a counterpart in the concrete world, so that our consideration of horse-
ness, for example, finds a correspondence in extramental reality in the individual
horses. In addition, we can have a consideration of purely mental entities, such as
fictional and artificial forms, which have no, and may never have any, actual con-
crete instantiations, although their conception and concrete realization is not logical-
ly impossible. Finally, it appears that we can have an iʿtibār of negative things that,
properly speaking, exist neither in concrete reality nor in the mind. This is the case,
for instance, with the consideration of the nonexistent (al-maʿdūm) and presumably
of prime matter (al-hayūlā l-ūlā), which can never exist actually in the concrete
world, nor even, it would seem, as universals in the mind. Hence, whereas the intel-
lectual consideration of ‘universal horse’ can be said to exist in the mind both in the
sense that the intellectual consideration exists and the quiddity ‘universal horse’ ex-
ists (these being one thing in the mind), the consideration of the nonexistent or
prime matter can be said to exist in the mind only inasmuch as the consideration it-
self exists, not in the sense that the nonexistent or prime matter exists in the concrete
or as intellectual universal forms.⁶¹ In view of this, an iʿtibār would always somehow
exist in the mind as a conceptual act, operation, or construct, but the object of that
iʿtibār would entertain a varying relationship to mental existence depending on the
nature of its object. Put differently, we may conceive of and consider a whole range of

 Shahrastānī, Struggling, 28, faults Avicenna for not recognizing that prime matter has a quiddity
that can be said to exist independently, at the very least in the mind: “matter has a quiddity and re-
ality by itself without form being its constituent part. Were form a constituent part of it, it would be
impossible for the idea of it to be inscribed in the mind without its constituent part.” In fact, Avicen-
na recognizes the quiddity and reality of prime matter; see section IV.2.6 of this book. Nevertheless, it
is not entirely clear whether, on Avicenna’s mind, we can have a valid consideration of things that
cannot ever exist actually in the concrete world. In Notes, 57, section 43, a distinction is made be-
tween ‘the relative’ nonexistent or maʿdūm, which pertains to things that come into being after having
not existed, and which appears to be conceivable and is described as a mode of existence (naḥw min
al-wujūd), and ‘the absolute’ nonexistent or maʿdūm, which has no form whatsoever (lā ṣūrata lahu
al-battata), and which is the contrary of the First. The implication seems to be that the former should
be connected with possibility and the latter with impossibility. This would make the consideration of
the relative nonexistent—but not that of the absolute nonexistent—possible of consideration in the
mind. As for prime matter, it is conceivable inasmuch as it has a quiddity, but one would be hard-
pressed to explain what that consideration or conception amounts to in the mind, and whether it
would be an intellectual consideration or an estimative one.
 1 The terminological inquiry 103

things that may or may not exist in actuality at any point in time and that bear a vary-
ing relation to mental existence, and we may even have a mental consideration of
things incompatible with, or opposed to, actual existence, such as the nonexistent
or prime matter. Accordingly, one could argue that investigating the ontological sta-
tus of a consideration is one thing, and investigating the ontological status of that on
which a mental consideration focuses—its content or the object to which it refers—is
something else altogether.
This point seems compounded by the fact that Avicenna in some of his mature
works (The Cure and Pointers) maintains a distinction between thought and object of
thought in the context of human noetics.⁶² He argues that, when it comes to human
intellection, the intellect, the act of intellection, and the object of intellection consti-
tute three distinct aspects or entities and do not form a perfect unity in the mind. He
accordingly criticizes those who hold a thesis of intellectual identity, unity, or iden-
tification (ittiḥād) and accuses Porphyry in particular of being responsible for spread-
ing this erroneous view.⁶³ Human intellection, for Avicenna, implies a certain relation
(iḍāfah) between the intellectual form and the thinker.⁶⁴ Among the many arguments
Avicenna deploys to rebut the identification thesis, one focuses on the impossibility
for the existence of object A to be identical with the existence of the intellect, for if
this were the case, then the intellect would not be able to apprehend object B, whose
existence is distinct from that of object A. There are always relata involved in human
intellection that preclude a complete identity between the mind and its object, the
only potential exception being the case of self-awareness. In other words, when
the object of thought coincides with the essence of the thinker (as in the act of
human self-awareness), then the ʿāqil and the maʿqūl may be regarded as one, but
if the object is external to the ʿāqil (such as the universal form ‘horse’), then a relation
and duality ensue. For Avicenna, human thought is generally distinguished from di-
vine intellection on the grounds of an epistemic and ontological multiplicity and se-
quentiality, which translates into a discursive cognitive mode that is characteristic of
human beings. The upshot of this view is that the mode of existence of the intellect
cannot be collapsed entirely with the mode of existence of its object. The two need to
be separated, lest one end up endorsing the unification thesis.⁶⁵ In fact, it would

 As Black, Mental Existence, 19, aptly notes, “On the basis of this understanding of cognition as a
new instantiation of the quiddity in a mental mode of being, Avicenna is also led to reject the clas-
sical Aristotelian conception of knowledge as the identity of knower and known, to which I will refer
as the principle of cognitive identification.”
 Avicenna, On the Soul of The Cure, V.6, 239‒240.
 Avicenna, Notes, 265, section 450, where it is said that the forms that are acquired in the mind
have two relations: one to the mind, the other to the exterior world through potential or actual pred-
ication.
 This Avicennian doctrine caused some perplexity and much disagreement from the twelfth cen-
tury onward. Not only was it incompatible with some famous statements Aristotle had made in On the
Soul of The Cure III.5 that appear to support the identification thesis; Avicenna also seems to contra-
dict himself in Provenance, where he subscribes to the unification thesis. One of the most vocal but
104 II Quiddity in Itself and Mental Existence

seem that when it comes to human intellection, the thinker (ʿāqil), the intellect (ʿaql),
and the object of thought (maʿqūl) remain distinct to some extent.⁶⁶ Returning to the
issue at hand, on the assumption that we are dealing here with intellectual appre-
hension, the two investigations (that of the ontological status of the consideration,
and that of the ontological status of the content or object of the consideration) ap-
pear to be distinct, for these reflect to some extent the distinction between the
ʿaql and the maʿqūl. Consequently, clarifying the mental status of the iʿtibār of quid-
dity in itself mentioned in Introduction I.2 will tell us nothing about the ontological
status of quiddity in itself. One may surmise—be it only for the sake of argument—
that while the consideration of quiddity in itself somehow exists in the mind and
has a positive ontological status qua cognitive act, quiddity in itself remains devoid
of any kind of true and valid existence in the mind.⁶⁷ In that case, one would be
forced to conclude, as some scholars have, that the reality or existence of the object
of that consideration is reducible to that of the universal concept merely envisaged

informative critics of Avicenna regarding this point was Mullā Ṣadrā, whose works delve into this
issue in detail and provide a useful overview of the argumentative history surrounding it; see Bon-
mariage, L’intellection comme identification; and Kaukua, Self-Awareness.
 Avicenna clearly believes that the thinker (ʿāqil) and the object of thought (maʿqūl) remain dis-
tinct in the act of thought; what is less clear is whether the intellect (ʿaql) can be to some extent iden-
tified with either the maʿqūl or the ʿāqil. It would also be interesting to investigate how this trinality
relates to the threefold semantic distinction of the term ʿaql Avicenna provides in his Commentary on
Book Lambda, 73.284‒290, which glosses ‘intellect’ as “substance” (or more precisely as “substance
of the essence,” jawhar al-dhāt); as “relation” (nisbah) between this essence and its object; and as a
“power” and “disposition” (quwwah and istiʿdād). In this commentary, as in his other works, Avicen-
na’s primary aim appears to be to stress the distinction between ʿāqil and maʿqūl in all beings other
than God.
 Bäck, Avicenna’s Conception, 239, maintains a similar distinction: “We may talk about impossible
objects, and our talk about them exists in intellectu. But it does not follow that impossible objects
have an existence in intellectu. Hence Avicenna says that the concept of S, in ‘S does not exist,’ exists
in intellectu. But it does not follow thereby that this S exists in intellectu.” The comments above and
the Introduction passage raise the thorny question of the relationship between a consideration (iʿti-
bār) and existence (wujūd). More specifically, it prompts one to ponder on the conundrum of whether
all considerations must correspond to existing things or existents and be about things that actually
exist, either in the mind or extramentally, or whether human beings can have considerations of non-
existent and impossible things as well. In the absence of any detailed studies on the Avicennian no-
tion of consideration, it is difficult to answer this question definitively, especially given its overlap
with the equally vexed issue of the conceivability and universality of fictional entities in Avicenna.
The remarks provided above are merely tentative. Suffice to say that the distinction between a con-
sideration and a mental existent plays a role in understanding how Avicenna envisaged quiddity in
itself. One of the main challenges is to clarify the boundaries between mental existents, on the one
hand, and considerations (iʿtibārāt), meanings and ideas (maʿānī), and forms (ṣuwar), on the other.
Avicenna himself remains vague when it comes to these distinctions, and they introduce considerable
complexity in the task of elucidating the status of pure essence.
 1 The terminological inquiry 105

under a different aspect.⁶⁸ Or, alternatively, the consideration of pure quiddity could
be similar to that of an impossible object devoid of any intrinsic existence (such as
the void or the absolute nonexistent) with even more dire epistemological conse-
quences. But is this really the case?
Two lines of inquiry can help to alleviate this difficulty in connection with quid-
dity in itself: first, exploring the conceivability of an iʿtibār and, more generally, how
the notion of conceivability relates to mental existence; and second, conducting a
comparative analysis of the term iʿtibār and the other technical terms Avicenna
uses in connection with quiddity in itself with the aim of elucidating what these
terms denote with regard to conceivability and mental existence. I address the first
point here and shall address the second point later on. If, according to Avicenna,
it is true that we can have mental considerations of objects that possess a different
ontological status, our consideration of them and the nature of that consideration
nevertheless depend in each case on the intrinsic conceivability of these objects.
This would seem to hold true even when we consider things that do not exist in ac-
tuality in the concrete world (e. g., artificial and fictional forms, and the temporary or
relative nonexistent, such as future contingents) or things that cannot ever actually
exist as such in the concrete (e. g., prime matter), since there is nothing intrinsically
impossible about conceiving these things. The main factor at play here in generating
such considerations seems to be the inherent conceivability of these objects, regard-
less of how and in what mode they may otherwise be said to exist. Horseness, prime
matter, and artificial forms such as heptagonal house are all somehow conceivable
(even though they may be conceivable in different ways). Likewise, a consideration
may focus on a purely logical object or meaning, such as the modes of the necessary
and the possible, which do not exist in a reified state and independently in the con-
crete world, but only as abstract logical notions in the intellect. Thus, Avicenna often
speaks of our consideration of things that are in themselves only possible.⁶⁹ Because
there is nothing intrinsically impossible about conceiving these things, Avicenna
concludes that their consideration is “possible” or “allowed” (jāʾiz).⁷⁰ And it is pre-

 This is in line with what Pini, Absoluta, calls the “gnoseological interpretation,” where the con-
sideration of pure quiddity is merely an epistemic aspect derived from the universal, which is the only
mental entity to possess an ontological status properly speaking.
 Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Cure, I.6, where the term iʿtibār recurs frequently. Ṭūsī, Commentary
on Pointers, vols. 3‒4, 511.6, also regards the consideration of possibility in itself as an “intellectual
consideration” (iʿtibār ʿaqlī).
 It is worth recalling that the term jāʾiz conveys strong legal connotations and occurs frequently in
texts on Islamic law and legal theory. In her overview of Avicenna’s metaphysics, Lizzini comments
that any mental act or object entails mental existence and that only absolute nonexistence and pure
impossibles are inconceivable according to Avicenna, while the relative nonexistent is partially con-
ceivable (Lizzini, Ibn Sīnā’s Metaphysics). She therefore seems to correlate mental existence and con-
ceivability. Griffel, Al-Ghazālī, 168‒169, also strongly correlates the two notions, although his focus is
a discussion of the modalities, not the universals. This being said, there is some disagreement about
what exactly is conceivable and a potential object of intellection according to Avicenna, especially in
106 II Quiddity in Itself and Mental Existence

cisely this intrinsic conceivability that allows the formation of a consideration in the
mind. On the basis of what Avicenna holds, this notion of a possible (jāʾiz) consid-
eration would seem to extend to virtually all objects that do not possess a logically
impossible nature. As such, the notion of iʿtibār would seem to be closely related not
only to the intellect, but also to the activities of the imaginative and estimative fac-
ulties, which can conjecture and emit hypotheses, potentially of a scientific nature.⁷¹
A short entry in Notes seems to be closely related to the previous comments.⁷²
There Avicenna distinguishes between “the necessary and primary [principles or no-
tions]” (al-wājibiyyāt wa-l-awwaliyyāt), on the one hand, and “considerations” or
“presumed [notions]” (iʿtibāriyyāt), on the other. Unlike the former, the latter are
not in themselves necessary and become necessary only “on account of our aware-
ness of them [or reflection about them] and the mind bringing attention to them” (bi-
ḥasab al-shuʿūr bi-hā wa-l-tanabbuh lahā). This implies, first, that these iʿtibāriyyāt
are conceivable, but in themselves merely possible, and, second, that a certain dis-
crepancy between the act of thought and these objects exists, inasmuch as aware-
ness or reflection serves to mediate between the mind and these objects. Conversely,
a completely necessary, irreducible, and primary principle, such as the law of non-
contradiction or God’s thinking of Himself, does not imply any degree of possibility.
In contrast to these wājibiyyāt and iʿtibāriyyāt, something that cannot be conceived
of in any meaningful way or that is fundamentally or logically impossible (e. g., a
square circle or absolute nonexistence) obviously does not represent an adequate ob-
ject of consideration and thought.⁷³ A square circle or a thing that would be simul-
taneously existent and nonexistent (and thereby contravene the law of non-contra-
diction) are strict impossibles, with the implication that they cannot even be
considered and investigated by reason, let alone be regarded as existents in the
mind and/or the concrete world. Hence, from a logical perspective, it appears that
an iʿtibār must be something, or focus on something, that is intrinsically conceivable
and conceptualizable and—when construed in light of the Avicennian modalities—
something that is in itself either necessary (wājib, ḍarūrī) or possible (mumkin,
jāʾiz), but not impossible (mumtaniʿ). Or, according to a more minimalist interpreta-
tion formulated on the basis of the passage of Notes mentioned above, an iʿtibār

connection with the issue of what constitutes a proper universal. The problem revolves partly around
the issue of determining whether the fictional beings are intellectual or imaginative in nature, with
potential repercussions on the criteria required for mental existence. Scholars who have dealt with
the issue of the universals in Metaphysics V.1 of The Cure are well aware of this; see notably the recent
studies on fictional beings in Avicenna’s metaphysics by Black, Avicenna on the Ontological, and
Druart, Avicennan Troubles. The notion of conceivability raises other issues, such as its relation to
mental awareness; on this point, see the interesting study in Kaukua, Self-Awareness.
 See the comments by McGinnis in Avicenna, Physics, Introduction, xxiii. As McGinnis notes, Avi-
cenna in this work sometimes uses words from the root w-h-m to discuss thought experiments and
what seems possible from a physical point of view.
 Avicenna, Notes, 486, section 893.
 On this issue and its connection to Rāzī’s epistemology, see Benevich, The Reality, especially 55 ff.
 1 The terminological inquiry 107

could be limited to something possible. Either way, an iʿtibār would seem to require
that a mental operation be feasible or possible and its object intrinsically conceiva-
ble. ⁷⁴ This leads me to distinguish between (a) ‘false’ or ‘relative impossibles,’
which do not actually exist or cannot ever actually exist in the concrete world, but
which nonetheless remain conceivable in the mind, in the sense that their consider-
ation does not entail something logically impossible, absurd, and devoid of meaning
(e. g., prime matter, pure potentiality, the fictional forms, a future contingent or the
relative or temporary nonexistent); and (b) ‘intrinsic’ or ‘absolute impossibles,’ such
as square circle, absolute nonexistence, or something contravening the law of non-
contradiction, which exist neither in the concrete world nor in the mind on account
of the fact that they cannot even be said to be conceivable, since there is nothing to
consider and since no coherent or essential meaning can be associated with them.⁷⁵
The latter, unlike the former, simply cannot be the object of an iʿtibār.
How do these observations apply to quiddity in itself? Avicenna is explicit about
the fact that pure quiddity is conceivable and that it represents a valid object of men-
tal consideration. Not only does he frequently refer to our ability to consider (iʿtabara,

 Distinguishing between these various aspects of impossibility, i. e., impossible of existence in the
concrete world, and impossible of existence in the concrete world and in the mind—or between what I
have called here ‘relative’ and ‘absolute impossibles’—is, I believe, crucial, but has been rarely im-
plemented in the secondary literature; for some insight into this issue, see Wisnovsky, Avicenna,
128‒130; and Lizzini, Ibn Sīnā’s Metaphysics. As a result, some confusion has arisen in the modern
analyses on the topic. For instance, Druart, Avicennan Trouble, and Black, Avicenna, 3‒5, speak of
fictional forms as being impossible (muḥāl) simpliciter, without specifying that they are impossible
merely of concrete existence, while being in some sense possible of existence in the mind. If they
were absolutely impossible, like ‘square circle,’ they would be utterly inconceivable. But Avicenna
apparently does not place the fictional forms in the same category as the square circle, since there
is nothing intrinsically impossible about conceiving—or at least, having a consideration (iʿtibār)—
of a phoenix or a unicorn. Whether this legitimates their status as full-fledged universals on a par
with the universals corresponding to the natural species remains to be established. At any rate,
my proposal would help to alleviate what Black (Avicenna, 8) describes as “the tension between Avi-
cenna’s characterization of unreal forms as both impossible and intelligible.”
 This distinction would make ‘square circle’—but not ‘prime matter’ or ‘the void’—a mere verbal
utterance devoid of any meaning and epistemic traction in the mind. In fact, at Physics II.8,
180.12, Avicenna describes “the absolute void” (buʿd muṭlaqan) as “a vain intelligible” (maʿqūlan ma-
frūghan) (all references to Avicenna’s Physics rely on the edition and translation of that work by
McGinnis). This suggests that the consideration of the void remains fundamentally an intelligible,
even though it may not actually produce true scientific knowledge in the mind. The reason for this
is that one can still entertain some kind of conception of the void, even though it does not exist
in reality. But this is also the case of matter and nonexistence, which, on this reasoning, would ap-
pear to be vain intelligibles as well. Whether these vain intelligibles belong to the same or to another
class as the fictional forms, such as phoenix, remains a moot point, given the paucity of evidence on
the topic. Nevertheless, there might be one crucial difference between them: it is feasible to predicate
phoenix of several (imaginary) instances of phoenix, which is why, incidentally, Avicenna regards the
fictional forms as kinds of universals in Metaphysics V.1; but it is hardly possible to predicate absolute
void, pure or prime matter, and nonexistence of anything.
108 II Quiddity in Itself and Mental Existence

naẓara) and examine it. He also states plainly in Metaphysics that “the consideration
of the [quiddity] animal in itself is possible” (iʿtibār al-ḥayawān bi-dhātihi jāʾizan).⁷⁶
Quiddity in itself, therefore, is something that is by nature conceivable and suscep-
tible of being mentally considered without this entailing a logical or conceptual im-
possibility or absurdity. One thing therefore is certain: pure quiddity is not to be com-
pared to and assimilated with the ‘intrinsic impossible,’ such as the square circle or
pure nonexistence, which is utterly inconceivable and, hence, cannot be said to exist
in any other way than as a mere utterance. At this juncture, the following question
arises: with what kind of conceivable object can pure quiddity be identified? Does
its consideration fall on the side of (a) the natural universal forms in the mind
(i. e., of objects that can possibly exist in the mind and in the concrete world), of
(b) the universal artificial and fictional forms (i. e., of objects that do not exist in
the concrete world, but only in the mind) or (c) of relative impossibles such as
prime matter and the nonexistent (i. e., objects that are impossible of actual exis-
tence in the concrete world, but somehow conceivable in the mind, and which never-
theless remain distinct from ‘intrinsic’ or ‘absolute impossibles’)? For there are pos-
sible considerations (iʿtibārāt) of all of these things, and all of these things are
conceivable in the mind. Some tentative remarks can be made. Overall, it has become
clear that the notion of conceivability, i. e., the possibility for an object to be con-
ceived, represents a sine qua non for the postulation of the existence of that object
in the mind. Thus, if the pure quiddities are fully conceivable and are consequently
not intrinsic impossibles, then there is a strong likelihood that they do exist in the
mind. As Olga Lizzini has put it in a recent article on Avicenna’s metaphysics:
“The primacy of being (everything that is conceived of “is”) leads to an often unseen
consequence: everything that is conceived of or simply mentally represented exists
and hence has at least a mental existence.”⁷⁷ What is more, the conceivability of
pure quiddity is ensured by its purely abstract (mujarrad) and immaterial nature
in the mind. Hence, conceivability and abstractness are two important features
that seem to characterize pure essence as a mental object, and they also happen
to be two conditions that Avicenna posits for mental existence.⁷⁸ Naturally, these
two conditions and criteria also apply to the universal concepts, but in their case,
the additional presence of mental concomitants such as universality represents yet
a further condition for their existence to take place.⁷⁹

 Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Cure, V.1, 201.8.

 Lizzini, Ibn Sīnā’s Metaphysics.
 I will show later on that epistemic and ontological simplicity and irreducibility at the level of con-
ception is another essential feature of pure quiddity, and one that sets it apart from the universal.
 Thus, (a) conceivability or the possibility of being conceived, (b) abstractness or immateriality,
and (c) universality and the other mental concomitants (such as oneness), would be the various cri-
teria needed for universal mental existence to obtain in Avicenna’s philosophy. Black, Avicenna, 2‒3,
mentions only universality and abstractness. In fact, the case may be made that what is inherently
abstract and universal is by necessity also conceivable, so that conceivability is really the outcome
 1 The terminological inquiry 109

Yet, providing additional insight into this issue is difficult at this point. Other as-
pects of the problem must be tackled before it can be addressed in detail, including a
survey of the other terms Avicenna employs to describe quiddity, a task conducted in
the remainder of this chapter. Suffice to say here that Avicenna’s statement in Meta-
physics of The Cure to the effect that quiddity in itself exists neither in the concrete
world nor in the mind would seem to suggest that it is a nonexistent on a par with
prime matter, pure potentiality, and the nonexistent thing itself, and that only its con-
sideration can somehow be said to possess a mental status or existence qua concep-
tual act or operation. Defending such a conclusion, however, would be hasty and is
fraught with conceptual problems. To begin with, and as was shown above, quiddity
in itself is utterly conceivable and corresponds to a distinct mental object. Insofar as
it represents the very essence of a thing, it is not only definable, it is the definition of
a thing, or rather what the definition designates and means. It is the immediate and
prior object of intellectual apprehension that lies at the foundation of certain knowl-
edge. As such, it lies at the core of Avicenna’s epistemology and of his theory of con-
ceptualization (taṣawwur). As the master explains at the beginning of the logical part
of Salvation:

All primary cognition [maʿrifah] and scientific knowledge [ʿilm] is either conceptualization [ta-
ṣawwur] or assenting [taṣdīq]. Conceptualization is knowledge that comes first and is acquired
by means of definition [ḥadd] and whatever is like it. [An example is] our conceptualization of
the quiddity of human being [māhiyyat al-insān].⁸⁰

In this manner, taṣawwur, ḥadd and māhiyyah are interconnected notions. Concep-
tion is of a quiddity, and a definition points to a quiddity.⁸¹ This passage, and Avi-
cenna’s general outlook on conceptualization, is to be connected with his discussion
of prior notions in the mind in Metaphysics I.5, one of which is ‘the thing’ (al-shayʾ),
which refers to the quiddity of an existing being. More specifically, it is to be read in
light of Avicenna’s statements in Metaphysics V.1 concerning the intellectual and es-

of these other conditions, rather than a condition in itself. Yet, if we regard the universal concepts as
complex and caused mental entities or existents, as I think we should, then the modalities of the pos-
sible and the necessary would apply to them as well, albeit perhaps in a qualified sense; in other
words, there would be such a thing as an object that is ‘possible of existence in the mind,’ which
would be close to saying that it is ‘possible of being conceived.’ Since we are dealing here with a
purely intelligible mode of being, the possibility of existence for a concept in the mind would be syn-
onymous with the possibility of its being intelligible or conceivable. Thus, logical impossibles do not
exist in the mind, not because they are not immaterial or universal per se, but rather because their
true conception is impossible.
 Avicenna, Salvation, 7.3‒4, transl. Asad Ahmed, Avicenna’s Deliverance, 3, slightly revised.
 Avicenna, Notes, 24.9‒25.1, section 5, explains that while conception relates to the definition, and
thus also to quiddity, assent (taṣdīq) relates to the causes of concrete existence. Thus, the former en-
joys a certain priority over the latter, since we may conceive of something without seeking to know its
extramental existence. This priority is absolute in the case of God, Who is “primary in conception”
(awwalī l-taṣawwur) (25.3).
110 II Quiddity in Itself and Mental Existence

sential priority of quiddity vis-à-vis its various accidents and concomitants and even
vis-à-vis realized existence. Conceptualization is therefore oriented in a primary and
fundamental way toward pure quiddity, which lies at the root of all knowledge.
Furthermore, the consideration of quiddity in itself is not comparable to the con-
sideration of prime matter, pure potentiality, and the nonexistent: for these notions
convey a lack and privation, a pure negativity, whereas pure quiddity carries the def-
initional and essential core of a thing, or what I shall later call the “quidditative
meaning” (maʿnā) of a thing. Hence, whereas prime matter, privation, and the non-
existent convey a lack or absence, and are hence not philosophically informative,
quiddity in itself is a conveyor of definition and information. Unlike other mental ob-
jects, pure quiddity is conceivable and knowable. It is also epistemically irreducible.
These qualities present it as a valid object of mental consideration and one that ex-
ists in the mind.⁸² In fact, I will argue shortly that the consideration of quiddity in
itself also corresponds, according to Avicenna, to a mental form, and more precisely
to an intelligible form (ṣūrah maʿqūlah) in the human mind, terms that unambigu-
ously stress its substantial and intellectual nature.
Thus, by a process of elimination, the foregoing analysis has boiled down to a
single line of inquiry regarding the ontological status of quiddity in itself: it should
be connected with the intelligible forms of natural things and possibly also with ar-
tificial forms in the mind, that is, with things that are intrinsically conceivable and
possess mental existence. This would seem to grant mental existence and a distinct
mental status to the pure quiddities. Conversely, the consideration of pure essence is
not to be connected with the intrinsic impossibles (square circle), for which there is
no consideration and conception at all.
So far, the terminological investigation of iʿtibār has generated some interesting
but inconclusive results. Three points in particular need to be stressed. First, the term
iʿtibār seems to be applied to different levels of apprehension in Avicenna’s psychol-
ogy. It can be connected with intellection and conceptualization—and thus also with
intellectual existence—quite straightforwardly in some cases (e. g., the consideration
of universal quiddity), but also with estimation and the lower sensual and imagina-
tive faculties in other cases (e. g., the consideration of quiddity together with its ma-
terial attachments in concrete existents). In still other cases, it is unclear at first

 I am even tempted to say that quiddity in itself is eminently conceivable and knowable, since it is
what encapsulates the essential definition and meaning of a thing; more on this later on. It is inter-
esting that many later Arabic and Persian authors dwell on the conceivability of pure quiddity, adduc-
ing it at times as an argument to establish its mental existence. Since we can conceive of the nonexis-
tent, they say, it is in comparison easy for the mind to apprehend pure quiddity in abstraction from all
other things, a fact that suggests its intellectual existence; see, e. g., the discussion in Rāzī, and Ṭūsī’s
response, in Collection, 41, 45, 47 and notes; Shahrastānī, The Book of Religions and Sects, 16.18‒20,
states that intellect (ʿaql) is sometimes said “of the conceptualization of quiddity in itself [taṣawwur
al-māhiyyah bi-dhātihā] without its definition”; Taftāzānī, Commentary on the Aims, vol. 1, 404.10‒13;
and Tahānawī, Dictionary, vol. 2, 1424, who outline the argument that quiddity must exist in the mind
because it is conceivable; and, finally, Izutsu, Basic Problems, 9.
 1 The terminological inquiry 111

whether it is to be connected with the intellect or with the lower faculties of the soul,
such as imagination and estimation (as in the case, potentially, of pure quiddity).⁸³
Second, an iʿtibār can apply to a variety of objects whose ontological status differs
greatly (real existents, artificial and fictional forms, nonexistent things, etc.) and
whose range lies between the actually existent and the nonexistent, but which ex-
cludes the intrinsic or absolute impossibles. Third, the mind can elaborate a plurality
of considerations and relations pertaining to the same object. In other words, we can
have several different considerations of the same entity. In brief, then, the term iʿtibār
appears to be neither object-specific nor faculty-specific and possesses a wide and
flexible range of applications. With that being said, it also emerged from the forego-
ing that the consideration of quiddity in itself is intellectual in nature. As an object of
knowledge, and as the referent of the essential definition, it is eminently conceivable.
It is the constitutive core of a thing that can be grasped directly by the mind in ab-
straction from all other considerations.⁸⁴ And since intellectual concepts and objects
for Avicenna possess existence, the concept of pure quiddity is unlikely to amount
ontologically to a mere ‘nothing’ in the mind.⁸⁵ Rather, it would appear that it pos-

 This problem is compounded by the fact that, according to Avicenna, forms in the estimation can
perhaps also be regarded as psychological existents, albeit not of an intellectual kind. In Salvation,
17.9, Avicenna refers to ‘the thing’ as “an existent form in the estimation or in the intellect” (ṣūrah
mawjūdah fī l-wahm aw-al-ʿaql). As will be argued below, pure quiddity should be regarded chiefly
as an intelligible form in the intellect. In fact, it is what is eminently intelligible in the intellect.
 It seems to me that the validity and distinctness of the consideration of pure quiddity—especially
its distinctness from that of the universal—as well as its very conceivability, can all be corroborated by
a simple thought experiment. If I close my eyes and imagine the essence of triangle, ‘the quiddity in
itself’ triangleness, without any reference to the exterior world and without introducing what Avicen-
na calls “conditions” (shurūṭ), such as particularity or universality, then what I apprehend in my mind
is the pure quiddity triangleness, not the universal triangle. In order for me to apprehend the latter, I
would need to conceptually relate this universal mental form of triangle to an actual or potential plu-
rality of concrete individual triangles or predicate it of a plurality. This act consists in cognizing the
quiddity of triangle in its relation to extramental triangles. At the very least, then, I would have to
cognize the quiddity in itself triangleness together with the added considerations of predicability,
shareability, and commonality and, hence, of a relation to what is other than it. But it is easy to per-
ceive that these things are superadded to the consideration of pure triangleness. In this manner, Avi-
cenna’s thesis seems provable by a simple thought experiment. If anything, the quiddity in itself tri-
angleness is more directly and easily grasped than the universal triangle, which requires that other
conditions, considerations, and relations be introduced together with it. The question still remains,
of course, as to whether this possible and eminently conceivable consideration of pure triangleness
constitutes a distinct existent in the intellect.
 Let us revert briefly to the crucial passage in Introduction I.2 and dwell on one feature of its phras-
ing. Avicenna begins by stating that the quiddities can exist either in conception or in the concrete
world (wa-māhiyyāt al-ashyāʾ qad takūn fī aʿyān al-ashyāʾ wa-qad takūn fī l-taṣawwur), and he adds
immediately after that there are three considerations of quiddity (fa-yakūn lahā iʿtibārāt thalāthah).
This would seem to allow for the possibility that more than one of these considerations can exist
in the mind or that quiddity could exist in the mind qua different aspects, states, or modes. It is
odd in this connection that scholars have sought to establish a symmetry in Avicenna’s account be-
tween the two contexts of existence—the concrete and the intellectual—and the three aspects of quid-
112 II Quiddity in Itself and Mental Existence

sesses its own intelligible reality. Furthermore, this irreducible intelligible reality
means that, for Avicenna, the conception of pure quiddity precedes the knowledge
of whether it actually exists as a realized entity and as a composite existent, i. e.,
combined with attributes and accidents in the concrete world or in the mind. Unlike
other philosophers, such as Aristotle, Fārābī, and Averroes, who make knowledge of
what a thing is follow upon, and depend on, knowledge that it is, Avicenna has no
qualms inverting this epistemological sequence and prioritizing essence over exis-
tence in the order of knowledge.⁸⁶ Witness the following passage from Categories
of Middle Compendium of Logic:

Text 2: Whenever we understand the meaning and definition of a thing, we do not thereby gain
an understanding of whether it is existent or non-existent. For if we know what the right triangle
is, we know which genus or essential differentia it has—and hence it is impossible for us not to
know things like the triangle as such [al-muthallath al-muṭlaq], the figure, and the quality. The
existence [of a right triangle], however, needs to be proven. Therefore, existence is [only] attach-
ed to the quiddity and does not constitute it [lāzim lā muqawwim li-l-māhiyyah].⁸⁷

As we observe from this text, knowledge of the quiddity ‘triangle’—and even of the
absolute quiddity or quiddity in itself ‘triangle’ (al-muthallath al-muṭlaq)—does not
depend on any consideration of existence and amounts to a pure epistemic object
in the mind. For Avicenna, this is possible because existence is an external and
non-essential concomitant of the essence. By the same token, one can infer that
pure quiddity has an intelligible reality that is cognitively graspable in itself and
prior to the consideration of existence. Yet, although the term iʿtibār refers in this
case to a mental operation that is feasible and to a mental object that is by nature
conceivable, it says virtually nothing about the ontological status of this object in con-
nection with mental and extramental existence. In this regard, the various iʿtibārāt
one can have of quiddity are not commensurate with a clear ontological scheme. Al-
though the consideration of quiddity qua universal existent does imply the intellec-
tual existence of this object, the consideration of quiddity in the exterior world to-
gether with material accidents does not, since it also involves the senses and the
imagination. Since Avicenna is referring here to the quiddities in individual, concrete
existents, and since these can be known only through the process of abstraction per-

dity he outlines, when none, I believe, was originally intended. This is why differentiating between
contexts, aspects and modes of existence is useful methodologically. On my view, there are reasons
to believe that the intellectual context can accommodate two different aspects and modes of exis-
tence of quiddity.
 Thus, according to Aristotle in Posterior Analytics II.10, we can know the scientific definition of a
thing only after we know that it exists. Many Arabic philosophers, such as Fārābī and Averroes, ad-
here to and build on this methodological tenet; see Menn, Fārābī’s Kitāb, 85‒89; idem, Fārābī, 64‒67.
But Avicenna’s theory of pure quiddity and the possibility of its immediate apprehension leads him to
reject this view.
 Avicenna, Categories of Middle Compendium of Logic, 331.11‒14; translated in Kalbarczyk, Predica-
tion, 190‒191, revised and my emphasis.
 1 The terminological inquiry 113

formed by the external and internal senses, no intellectual existence proper seems to
be implied by this kind iʿtibār, although it may imply a kind of sensual or imaginative
psychological existence. We would be dealing in this case with psychological proc-
esses distinct from, and unconnected with, mental universal existence. For, from
the moment the mind completes the process of abstraction and apprehends quiddity
in its universal mode, the consideration switches from that of concrete quiddity to
that of universal quiddity.
Now that it has been established that the consideration of quiddity in itself likely
refers to something substantial in the mind—insofar as the object of this considera-
tion is conceivable and is not an ‘intrinsic impossible’—the next step is to determine
whether this iʿtibār falls on the side of intellectual existence or of sensual and imag-
inative existence and whether pure quiddity as a mental object can be said to possess
any kind of existence. These issues will be tackled in the next section.

1.1.4 iʿtibār after Avicenna: some preliminary remarks

If no source composed before Avicenna is truly helpful in shedding light on the prob-
lem at hand, this is definitely not the case with the post-Avicennian period, where the
term iʿtibār appears profusely. Yet, even though much evidence can be gathered from
this later tradition, the question of its relevance to Avicenna is delicate, insofar as
this term underwent considerable semantic transformation and came to be invested
with new meanings or connotations it did not have in his philosophy. Indeed, exam-
ining the post-Avicennian tradition with the express aim of complementing the pre-
vious analysis may appear promising at first sight, but turns out to be a rather risky
enterprise after due consideration. The main reason is that exegetes of Avicenna were
eager to elaborate on the technical term iʿtibār and endow it with philosophical nu-
ances that likely were not intended by Avicenna himself. Moreover, and crucially,
their stance vis-à-vis mental existence often departs considerably from that of the
shaykh al-raʾīs. In spite of this, the reception of the term iʿtibār in post-Avicennian
philosophy has a rich and multifaceted history that bears on the issue at hand. It
should therefore be briefly discussed.
Shortly after the master’s death, the term iʿtibār became a salient terminological
feature of the commentary tradition that developed around his works. It also became
characteristic of independent philosophical treatises that delve into the question of
the relationship of essence and existence. More precisely, starting with Suhrawardī
(d. 1191 CE) and Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 1210 CE), the term iʿtibār becomes a key no-
tion in the debates concerning the conceptual vs. real distinction of essence and ex-
istence.⁸⁸ Many post-Avicennian thinkers strove to determine whether Avicenna in-

 Suhrawardī, for example, devotes an entire section of his work The Paths and Havens (Kitāb al-
Mashāriʿ wa-l-muṭāraḥāt) (340 ff.) to the subject of the “intellectual considerations” (al-iʿtibārāt al-
ʿaqliyyah). On this topic, see also Domingues da Silva, La métaphysique, 163, n. 33.
114 II Quiddity in Itself and Mental Existence

tended this distinction to be merely mental or to possess an ontological foundation

in the concrete extramental world. Accordingly, the term iʿtibār became ubiquitous in
the postclassical literature dealing with the question of the primacy, foundationality,
or priority (aṣālah) of essence or existence.⁸⁹ While some thinkers regard essence as
primary and prior to existence in the external world, and existence as an external
accident accruing to essence, others maintain the absolute priority and reality of ex-
istence and view essence as a mere notional or conceptual object. Among propo-
nents of aṣālat al-wujūd, quiddity is frequently defined as an iʿtibār or as being iʿti-
bārī, that is, merely mental or conceptual with no independent existence in external
reality. Accordingly, only existence (wujūd) is grounded in reality, while quiddity or
essence represents merely the “intrinsic limitations or determinations of existence”
as projected by the mind.⁹⁰ In the systems of these scholars, the meaning of the
term iʿtibār gradually crystallized to mean a ‘conceptual’ or ‘mental’ aspect or con-
sideration, in contrast to the concrete and foundational reality of existence in the ex-
tramental world. According to this framework, ‘the conceptual’ (al-iʿtibārī) is often
contrasted to ‘the real’ or ‘the truly existing’ (al-ḥaqīqī, al-ṭabīʿī, and al-aṣlī).⁹¹ In con-
trast, for someone like Suhrawardī and some of his Illuminationist followers, it is ex-
istence that is a construct of the mind, while essence, or rather light, constitutes what
is metaphysically foundational. In brief, these thinkers make either existence or es-
sence the true principle and ontic foundation (aṣl, aṣīlah) of reality, labelling the
other a conceptual or iʿtibārī notion produced by human ratiocination.⁹² Regardless
of which concept is regarded as being foundational, the distinction and duality be-
tween essence and existence only apply to the thinking mind and are thought not to
exist as such in the concrete world. Accordingly, this duality arises solely out of the
ratiocinative and analytical processes of the intellect, which is capable of distin-
guishing conceptually between a thing’s essence and existence. In the real, extra-
mental world, however, these two principles are reduced to one or form a unity.
As Mullā Ṣadrā, an influential exponent of the foundationality of existence, explains:
“each one of them [quiddity and existence] is different from the other in meaning
when they are analyzed by the mind, but they are essentially and fundamentally
united in reality.”⁹³

 Izutsu, The Fundamental Structure; Rizvi, Roots of an Aporia; Wisnovsky, Essence and Existence.
 Izutsu, in Sabzavārī, The Metaphysics, 9, 42‒44; idem, The Fundamental Structure, 72 ff.
 Omar Khayyam, for instance, distinguishes between ‘existential’ and ‘conceptual’ attributes (waṣf
iʿtibārī); see Wisnovsky, Essence and Existence, 37‒38. One clear instance of the deflationary poten-
tial of the term iʿtibārī is Shahrastānī’s use of it to refer to the Bahshamite states, which are neither
existent nor nonexistent; the implication is that they are ‘merely’ conceptual. Shahrastānī’s concep-
tualist approach implies that they do not qualify as real or actual states in the concrete world; see The
Ultimate Steps, 139, 147‒148. Suhrawardī sometimes employs this term in a similar way (Wisnovsky,
Essence and Existence, 45).
 For an outline of these two positions, see Wisnovsky, Avicenna, 110‒113.
 Mullā Ṣadrā, The Book of Metaphysical Penetrations, 32.2‒3.
 1 The terminological inquiry 115

Another notable development unfolds with regard to mental existence specifical-

ly, which marks a particular take on the Avicennian sources. When compared with
Avicenna’s metaphysics, this trend was often deflationary, insofar as it included
thinkers who either straightforwardly rejected mental existents or downplayed the
importance of such entities in their ontology. In their systems, mental existence ei-
ther does not assume such a prominent role or is subjected to restrictions that dras-
tically limit the number of entities that can be regarded as mental existents proper. In
what amounts to a departure from Avicenna’s metaphysics, mental existence either is
no longer perceived as constituting another sphere of existence on a par with con-
crete existence or sees its scope drastically reduced by means of a new set of criteria
that is introduced. It is against this background that the terms iʿtibār and iʿtibārī
come to denote things that are merely ‘conceptual’ or ‘suppositional’ and that, more-
over, may not possess any correspondence (muṭābaqah) with true reality. These con-
jectural or suppositional quiddities (māhiyyāt iʿtibāriyyah) and objects are contrasted
to ‘the true existents’ (mawjūdāt ḥaqīqiyyah or thābitah) that make up the realm of
‘the thing in itself’ or ‘the fact of the matter’ (nafs al-amr).⁹⁴ While this tendency
is perceivable already to some degree in the works of Rāzī, it reached its pitch in
the works of later authors such as Maḥmūd al-Iṣfahānī (d. 1348 CE), Saʿd al-Dīn
al-Taftāzānī (d. 1390 CE), ʿAlī b. Muḥammad al-Qushjī (d. 1474 CE), and others. In
contrast, some authors such as Ṭūsī appear to have remained more faithful to Avi-
cenna’s original use of the term iʿtibār and his conception of what constitutes mental
existence. In this regard, the chronological aspect of the problem should not be ne-
glected, and attempts should be made to pinpoint the major terminological and doc-
trinal shifts that were brought about on the basis of the Avicennian texts.
As interesting as they are, these later developments in a sense complicate mat-
ters more than they illuminate them when they are projected backward on Avicen-
na’s philosophical system. Relying on them to interpret Avicenna’s doctrines poses
numerous methodological and philosophical problems. In Avicenna, the mental or
intelligible is a full-blown order of existence whose objects belong to the metaphys-
ical inquiry no less than extramentally existing things. But later commentators are
often obscure when it comes to the status of mental objects or depart considerably
from Avicenna on this point.⁹⁵ Even those post-Avicennian scholars who embrace

 See Tahānawī, Dictionary, vol. 2, 1424; Izutsu, Basic Problems, 8 ff.; and Fazlıoğlu, Between Real-
ity, 24 ff. The notion of nafs al-amr seems to refer to a realm of unchanging objects or uncreated quid-
dities, which is often identified with God’s intellection in the postclassical tradition. It also serves as
the foundation of what can truly be said to exist in the world.
 Note that this ambiguity extends to many of the modern studies on the postclassical tradition; for
instance, Rizvi, Roots of an Aporia, omits to specify in his discussion of essence and existence wheth-
er the term iʿtibārī mentioned by those later thinkers refers to a kind of mental existence or something
else altogether that does not qualify as mental existence. To say that the iʿtibārī is merely mental or
conceptual—as opposed to real, concrete, or foundational—does not resolve the issue of how this
term relates to mental existence. Given this crucial ambiguity and the (as yet) lack of scholarship
on this key issue, it is difficult to draw any broad conclusions concerning the post-Avicennian tradi-
116 II Quiddity in Itself and Mental Existence

the theory of mental existence often remain tantalizingly ambiguous about the onto-
logical status of an iʿtibār. ⁹⁶ In addition, and unlike the master, they usually adopt a
clear-cut position with regard to the issue of the foundationality of essence or exis-
tence. Finally, while they often define the terms iʿtibār and iʿtibārī as expressing a
mere mental aspect devoid of existence and contrast it to the ‘real existents,’ the
‘fact of the matter,’ or ‘the true nature or foundation,’ Avicenna himself makes no
such attempts. What he does intimate about these terms suggests a much closer par-
ticipation in mental existence. Various kinds of misunderstandings lurk behind any
attempt to use the postclassical tradition to illuminate Avicenna’s position.
Overall, then, the reception of the term iʿtibār in the works of Avicenna’s main
commentators in the centuries following his death represents an intricate and highly
understudied topic. Although some references have been provided in the previous
pages, additional remarks are in order. Let us begin with the brief observation that
Abū l-Barakāt al-Baghdādī (d. 1165 CE) uses this term routinely in his works, but pro-
vides little insight into its relevance with regard to quiddity. This can be explained
inter alia by the fact that he departed considerably from Avicenna’s philosophical
framework.⁹⁷ In contrast, Ṭūsī, Rāzī, and Suhrawardī make ample use of it in their
logical, psychological, and metaphysical writings to describe quiddity or mental ex-
istents. Ṭūsī and Rāzī in particular frequently employ this term in their glosses on
those very passages in which Avicenna himself had used it, as in Introduction I.2
and Metaphysics V.1‒2. By and large, their use of iʿtibār is relatively close to Avicen-
na’s and serves to designate a purely mental consideration or operation applied to a
wide range of objects. Rāzī, who inherited and adopted much of Avicenna’s technical
vocabulary, pins his discussions of quiddity partly on this term, especially when he is
commenting on seminal passages of the Avicennian corpus dealing with quiddity.
Nevertheless, in his philosophy this term is used in a deflationary way to minimize,
if not to directly undermine, the ontological status of a mental object. Whereas for
Avicenna and Ṭūsī an iʿtibār often corresponds to a mental existent—such as when
they speak of the consideration of universal horseness, of universal triangle, or
even of the nonexistent—for Rāzī describing these mental objects as ‘considerations’

tion on this topic. As a result of this terminological obscurity, Rizvi’s analysis understates the differ-
ences between Avicenna and later thinkers and ends up shaping a narrative of continuity whose cul-
mination is the philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā. To some extent, the same may be said of Izutsu, Basic
Problems.
 One example is Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s The Elements, which endorses mental existents and also describes
abstract quiddity or quiddity in itself as an iʿtibār in the mind, but fails to specify the exact ontolog-
ical mode of this iʿtibār. The author identifies mental iʿtibārāt with universals or the universal aspect
of quiddity, which according to him are mental existents, in line with Avicennian doctrine. Yet,
Ṭabāṭabāʾī in one passage (41) defines the notions of contingency and mental quiddity as a concep-
tual construct (iʿtibār ʿaqlī) that is indifferent to existence and nonexistence, a usage which recalls the
purely logical or suppositional meaning of consideration as found in earlier texts. This statement rais-
es the question of the ontological status of an iʿtibār in his works.
 For some insight, see Pavlov, Abū’ l-Barakāt, 136, 212‒213.
 1 The terminological inquiry 117

serves the primary purpose of demarcating them from real and actual existents and,
hence, of deflating their ontological status in the mind. This is in line with Rāzī’s gen-
eral tendency to demote mental objects, a trend that has been noted by other schol-
ars.⁹⁸
When compared to Rāzī, Ṭūsī more faithfully follows Avicenna’s notion of iʿtibār,
perhaps because he is also engaging with Rāzī’s comments on the issue and seeks to
operate a return to what he regards as the master’s original doctrines. While broadly
endorsing the many facets of iʿtibār outlined by Avicenna, Ṭūsī also provides the fur-
ther interesting distinction between ‘intellectual considerations’ (iʿtibārāt ʿaqliyyah)
and—one surmises—‘non-intellectual considerations.’ This implicit distinction,
which to my knowledge is not found as such in Avicenna, suggests that not all
iʿtibārāt are intellectual in nature. Yet, Naṣīr al-Dīn, like Avicenna, connects iʿtibārāt
chiefly with the mind’s ability to multiply and unify concepts, and he often uses this
term expressly in connection with our apprehension of quiddity (māhiyyah). Whether
in his Commentary on Pointers or in his Abstract, the term iʿtibār denotes the various
aspects of quiddity that can be conceived of in the mind. In this regard Ṭūsī seems to
believe, like Avicenna, that there is such a thing as a distinct and fully autonomous
conception of pure quiddity in the mind, although the question of whether it also
amounts to a mental existent remains unclear.
In Suhrawardī’s (d. 1191 CE) philosophy, the term iʿtibār becomes closely associ-
ated with the distinction between the purely conceptual and mental, on the one
hand, and the true principles of reality, on the other. This distinction intersects
with the dichotomy between existence and essence in his philosophy or, more pre-
cisely, between what truly and actually exists in the concrete world (the hierarchy
of divine lights) and what merely subsists in the mind as a mental notion, and
which is purely the result of mental operations and conceptions (e. g., the concept
of existence, or the modalities of the possible and necessary). It is with Suhrawardī,
it seems, that the term iʿtibār decidedly begins to assume a central place in the long
debate that pitted the proponents of the foundationality of essence against the pro-
ponents of the foundationality of existence. At any rate, the later authors working
within the Illuminationist tradition inherited this contextual use of the term from
him. Suhrawardī describes a consideration as something that is devoid of true or
real existence in the extramental world and that occurs only in the mind. It therefore
possesses mental existence, but this existence finds no counterpart in the concrete
world. In this connection, Suhrawardī famously describes existence or wujūd as an
“intellectual consideration” (iʿtibār ʿaqlī) and as something that is “purely intellectu-
al” (ʿaqliyyah ṣirfah).⁹⁹ As Walbridge and Ziai explain, iʿtibārāt ʿaqliyyah or dhih-
niyyah for Suhrawardī are “conceptions, such as existence and necessity, abstracted
from conceptions rather than concrete things, and thus not necessarily correspond-

 Eichner, ‘Knowledge by Presence,’ 119‒121.

 Suhrawardī, The Philosophy of Illumination, 45.1‒4, and more generally 45 ff.
118 II Quiddity in Itself and Mental Existence

ing to external realities.”¹⁰⁰ The purely conjectural nature of mental considerations is

aptly conveyed in Walbridge’s alternative translation of iʿtibārāt ʿaqliyyah as “intel-
lectual fictions.”¹⁰¹ These intellectual considerations, with their purely mental kind
of existence, stand in sharp contrast to the truly existing principles of the extramen-
tal world, which, in Suhrawardī’s system, are the various hierarchies of divine
light.¹⁰² Suhrawardī’s usage of this term therefore emphasizes the gap between men-
tal and extramental existence. Moreover, through its negative connotations, it plays a
role in his critique of Avicennism, which, on his view, is based on these “intellectual
fictions” that do not correspond to the exterior world and do not tally with our ex-
perience of it. For his part, Suhrawardī prefers to ground his method in our direct
experience of the world and what he calls ‘knowledge by presence.’ Hence, Suhra-
wardī’s use of this term is nuanced. Although he lays the ground for the postclassical
trend of reserving the term iʿtibār for merely suppositional or conjectural entities in
the mind (in opposition to what ‘truly’ exists in the world), and so is deflationary in
that sense, he nevertheless adopts a ‘strong’ interpretation of iʿtibār as indicating
mental existence. In that regard, his usage of the term is not deflationary, as it is
with Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, for example.
One feature of particular interest for our purposes is that Suhrawardī includes
quiddity (māhiyyah) in the category of intellectual considerations and purely intellec-
tual beings. Although he has sometimes been described as an advocate of the foun-
dationality of essence, it is the divine lights, rather than the quiddities, which have
concrete and real existence in his philosophy. Quiddity as such, like existence, is a
purely mental or intellectual notion, with no direct correspondence in the extramen-
tal world. Suhrawardī states: “It [existence] is an intelligible meaning [maʿnā maʿqūl]
… as are the concepts of quiddity, thingness, and reality taken absolutely.”¹⁰³ Suhra-
wardī’s mention of ‘quiddity taken in an absolute manner’ of course brings to mind
Avicenna’s descriptions of ‘quiddity in itself’ and ‘absolute quiddity,’ which are also
mental considerations. I would contend additionally that Suhrawardī followed Avi-
cenna in regarding this absolute conception of quiddity as being endowed with in-
tellectual existence; it is among what Walbridge and Ziai have called “the beings
of reason.”

 Suhrawardī, The Philosophy of Illumination, 176, 195. The question of whether Suhrawardī also
attributes some kind of mental existence to these notions is worth raising, but it transcends the
scope of this book. By translating iʿtibār as “being of reason,” Walbridge and Ziai hint at their belief
that Suhrawardī indeed regarded these mental notions as existing in the human intellect, but this
problem calls for a detailed treatment of this thinker’s theory of mental existence.
 Walbridge, The Science of Mystic Lights, 45‒46. According to Walbridge they may be identified
with what would otherwise be called ‘secondary intentions.’
 There can be no doubt that Suhrawardī recognizes the validity of mental existence; see The Phi-
losophy of Illumination, 50. On this point, he is a faithful follower of Avicenna.
 Suhrawardī, The Philosophy of Illumination, 45.2‒3.
 1 The terminological inquiry 119

Shahrastānī’s works provide another convenient lens through which to assess

the later reception of the Avicennian notion of iʿtibār. This author resorts frequently
to this term in order to expose the elements of Avicenna’s philosophy as well as to
describe the views of Muʿtazilite and Ashʿarite thinkers, a move which is surprising
at first glance. The latter phenomenon can be explained by Shahrastānī’s intention to
systematically compare, assess, and synthesize the philosophical and theological
trends that reached him. In doing so, he frequently implements Avicennian notions
in his kalām accounts, a practice which, from our perspective, results in the cross-
contamination of ideas and terms. Shahrastānī’s approach betrays his belief that
the philosophical discourse on the universals (i. e., of the status of essence in the
mind and in the concrete world) bears a direct connection, or even overlaps, with
the kalām discourse on the states. Both raise the same problematics regarding the
relationship between mental considerations and the concrete entities to which
they refer. Notable in this connection is Shahrastānī’s use of iʿtibār to describe the
Bahshamite theory of states (aḥwāl). For Shahrastānī appears to have perceived a
genuine connection between Avicenna’s discussion of quiddity and its various con-
siderations as outlined in Introduction and Metaphysics and the Bahshamite theory
of the states, mostly in the form in which it had crystallized in the Ashʿarite tradition.
In The Ultimate Steps in the Science of Theology (Nihāyat al-aqdām fī ʿilm al-kalām),
Shahrastānī makes a rapprochement between Avicenna’s notions of iʿtibār and wajh
and the Ashʿarite notions of ṣifah and ḥāl, to the point that he proposes to replace
these kalām terms with this Avicennian nomenclature.¹⁰⁴ His terminology and com-
ments emphasize the fundamentally intentional and mental nature of these various
notions, which he locates exclusively in the human mind. For example, universality,
commonness, species, and genera are things that exist only in the mind, as are, ac-
cording to him, all the states that the theologians discuss in their works. But the lat-
ter have reified many of these concepts and granted them a real status in the concrete
world.¹⁰⁵ Indeed, for the Bahshamites, the attributes possess a reality or actuality
(thubūt) outside the mind, even if they cannot be said to exist in a strong or straight-
forward sense. Thus, Shahrastānī’s purely mental or conceptualist interpretation of
the states as kinds of Avicennian iʿtibārāt is a development that appears in the
wake of the diffusion of Avicenna’s philosophical legacy and of efforts by scholars
to synthesize it with other kalām influences.¹⁰⁶
ʿAlī b. Muḥammad al-Jurjānī (d. 1413 CE) in his Definitions is apparently con-
cerned about the proper use of the term iʿtibār, since he devotes no less than four
independent entries to it (al-iʿtibār, al-amr al-iʿtibārī, al-māhiyyah al-iʿtibāriyyah,
and al-muṭlaqah al-iʿtibāriyyah). It should be noted, however, that the sources he
consulted for these entries were not primarily philosophical and likely included ju-

 Shahrastānī, The Ultimate Steps, 133.9; 139.7‒8; 147.16; 148.12‒149.4.

 Shahrastānī, The Ultimate Steps, 147‒148.
 For Shahrastānī’s reception of Avicennism and his critical discussion of it in light of kalām sour-
ces, see Benevich, The Classical; idem, The Essence-Existence Distinction.
120 II Quiddity in Itself and Mental Existence

risprudential and even Sufi texts.¹⁰⁷ In spite of this, what Jurjānī says confirms the
primary sense of the term iʿtibār as “a mental consideration” (if used as a noun)
or simply “conceptual” or “suppositional” (if used as an adjective). On the specific
issue of quiddity in itself and mental existence, Jurjānī follows—but probably did
not faithfully reproduce—Avicenna’s position, as his various comments introduce ex-
pressions not found in Avicenna and are also difficult to reconcile with one another.
On the one hand, he seems to regard an iʿtibār as a mental existent, since he defines
“the conceptual thing” (al-amr al-iʿtibārī) as “what has no existence except in the de-
liberating intellect as long as it is deliberating” and the “conceptual quiddity” (al-
māhiyyah al-iʿtibāriyyah) as “[this aspect of essence which] does not have existence
except in the intellect of the examiner as long as he is deliberating [hiya allatī lā wu-
jūda la-hā illā fī ʿaql al-muʿtabir mā dāma muʿtabiran].”¹⁰⁸ In this connection, he
seems to use iʿtibārī interchangeably with ʿaqlī and dhihnī, as many other post-Avi-
cennian authors do, in an effort to contrast it to real or concrete existence outside
the mind. On the other hand, Jurjānī also distinguishes between universal mental ex-
istence (and hence universal quiddity in the mind) and quiddity in itself. He seems to
correlate the conceptual quiddity, al-māhiyyah al-iʿtibāriyyah, with the mental univer-
sal existent.¹⁰⁹ As for quiddity in itself, whose definition is conveyed in the entry ti-
tled “the quiddity of the thing” (māhiyyat al-shayʾ), it is “what makes the thing that
which it is [mā bi-hi l-shayʾ huwa huwa]. Insofar as it is itself [wa-hiya min haythu hiya
hiya], it is not existent, nor nonexistent, nor universal, nor particular, nor specific,
nor general.”¹¹⁰ In other words, Jurjānī seems to correlate the conceptual (al-iʿtibārī)
with the mental universal and the intellectual existent. But unlike Avicenna he does
not use the term iʿtibār/iʿtibārī to describe quiddity in itself (recall that for Avicenna
there is an iʿtibār of pure quiddity that is distinct from the iʿtibār of mental universal
quiddity). Furthermore, Jurjānī’s statement to the effect that quiddity in itself is “nei-
ther existent nor nonexistent” is anti-Avicennian, given that the latter does not rec-
ognize an intermediary level of existence between existence and nonexistence. Avi-
cenna often specifies that quiddity in itself can be considered in abstraction from
existence, but he never to my knowledge describes it explicitly as being neither ex-
istent nor nonexistent. This feature of Jurjānī’s description was probably influenced
by kalām considerations and more specifically by the theory of the neutral ontolog-
ical status of the modes upheld by some Muʿtazilites and Ashʿarites. Overall, then,
Jurjānī’s work provides valuable insight into the matter as well as interesting depar-
tures from Avicenna. His definitions provide a typical case study of how later schol-
ars subtly transformed Avicenna’s theories in the process of interpreting them.

 I am grateful to Jules Janssens for bringing this point to my attention. In contrast, Jurjānī’s def-
inition of māhiyyat al-shayʾ (discussed later on) seems to be properly Avicennian.
 Jurjānī, Definitions, 59.14‒15 and 248.10‒11 respectively.
 Jurjānī, Definitions, 237.11 ff.
 Jurjānī, Definitions, 247.8‒9. As Jules Janssens kindly pointed out to me, parts of this definition
seem to be taken directly from Avicenna’s Introduction, I.7, 37.13 and some sections of Metaphysics, V.1.
 1 The terminological inquiry 121

It is interesting that in Introduction to Philosophy (Bidāyat al-ḥikmah), also trans-

lated as The Elements of Islamic Metaphysics, the modern Persian scholar and philos-
opher Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabāʾī (d. 1981 CE) dwells on the various
meanings of the term iʿtibār, thereby offering additional insight into its usage in a
more modern context. The Elements is an introductory treatise that was conceived
for philosophical education in Iranian madrasas, and the fact that the author
deemed it appropriate to clarify this term in order to avoid confusion is in itself tell-
ing. Accordingly, he proceeds to outline its various meanings and tease out its epis-
temological and ontological implications.¹¹¹ He begins by broadly distinguishing be-
tween what he calls “real” (ḥaqīqī) and “suppositional” (iʿtibārī) concepts. The
former refer to quiddities that actually exist in the extramental world and that find
a conceptual counterpart in the mind, for instance the quiddity of human or
horse. These real concepts are grasped by the mind as a result of abstraction. The
latter in contrast refer to abstract universal concepts that exist only in the mind,
such as existence, oneness, genus, and species. These concepts have not been ab-
stracted from reality, since they do not exist as such in the concrete world. Rather,
they are produced by the mind through reflection and analysis.¹¹² This account ap-
pears to demarcate iʿtibārāt or iʿtibārī concepts from other mental concepts quite
sharply. On this model, the quiddities of existing things do not fall in the category
of iʿtibārāt. This point is stressed again later on:

The so-called iʿtibārī concepts are formulated by the mind through a kind of contemplative effort
and applied to their referents, though not in the way quiddity is applied to and predicated of its
individuals and taken within their confines.¹¹³

One complicated point is how both types of concepts relate to mental existence on
Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s view. It can be ascertained from other passages of The Elements that
the author upheld mental existence as a valid ontological category. Furthermore,
he specifically identifies mental existents with the quiddities of things and hence
also with the ‘real’ concepts in the mind. He writes: “Quiddities occur either as ex-
ternal existence, in which they possess certain [material] properties, or as mental ex-
istence, in which case they do not possess these properties.”¹¹⁴ Accordingly, it would
appear that these mental quiddities and true concepts enjoy complete mental exis-
tence, whereas the iʿtibārāt in contrast do not. However, at this point Ṭabāṭabāʾī in-
troduces another notion that complicates this picture: all of these concepts have a
kind of mental subsistence (thubūt). This means that even the suppositional concepts
have an autonomous subsistence or actuality (thubūt) in the mind on the ground of
their general correspondence with external objects, even though they do not com-

 See in particular Ṭabāṭabāʾī, The Elements, 128‒129.

 Ṭabāṭabāʾī, The Elements, 14.
 Ṭabāṭabāʾī, The Elements, 129.
 Ṭabāṭabāʾī, The Elements, 14; see also 21 on mental existence.
122 II Quiddity in Itself and Mental Existence

prise within their scope the quiddities of actually existing things, such as horse or
human, but rather primary notions such as existence, necessity, and oneness.
Taken together, all of these concepts—whether the true concepts or the suppositional
concepts—possess mental subsistence and constitute the fact of the matter (nafs al-
amr).¹¹⁵ As such, they represent the ultimate epistemic reference against which the
truthfulness of statements are gauged.
Thus far Ṭabāṭabāʾī has distinguished between ‘real’ concepts, among which are
the mental quiddities corresponding to concrete existents, and abstract, universal
considerations qua purely suppositional notions, such as existence and genus.
While all of these mental entities possess subsistence and together constitute the
fact of the matter, only true concepts would appear to amount to full-blown mental
existents on the grounds of their direct correspondence to external existents.¹¹⁶ Al-
though clearly influenced by Aristotelian and Avicennian ideas, especially the dis-
tinction between first and second intentions, Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s account in other respects
departs from Avicenna, for whom not only universal quiddity, but also quiddity ‘in
itself,’ amounts to a distinct iʿtibār. Ṭabāṭabāʾī in contrast seems intent on separating
the quiddities (or at least some of them) from the iʿtibārāt produced by the mind.
Nevertheless, it should be noted that Ṭabāṭabāʾī subsequently enunciates other
meanings of iʿtibār, at least one of which seems to overlap with quiddity taken in
a general sense:

It is important to note that there are other meanings of the term iʿtibārī, which are not relevant to
our discussion [in this passage]: (a) one of these is the sense of iʿtibārī as opposed to founda-
tionally real (aṣīl), such as quiddity in opposition to existence; (b) another sense is when
iʿtibārī is used for something which does not have an independent existence of its own, as op-
posed to something that exists independently, as in the case of a relation, which exists through
the relation of its two sides, as opposed to substance, which exists by itself; (c) [finally,] another
meaning of iʿtibārī is that which is applied to and predicated of subjects in a figurative and met-
aphorical sense with a practical end in view, such as the application of the word ‘head’ to Zayd
as someone whose relation to his people is like the relation of the head to the body because he
manages their affairs, solves their problems, and assigns to everyone his particular duties and
tasks.¹¹⁷

Sense (a) outlined above can be applied generally to quiddity in the context of the
debate regarding the ontological foundationality of existence and quiddity. Those,
like Ṭabāṭabāʾī himself, who regard existence (wujūd) as foundational and ontologi-

 Ṭabāṭabāʾī, The Elements, 14‒15

 Nevertheless, it is not clear whether mental subsistence and mental existence are two distinct
notions according to Ṭabāṭabāʾī, or whether they can be used interchangeably. The fact that two
terms are used suggests that they convey different meanings, which seems also supported by some
passages of his work. However, other passages appear to use the term ‘subsistence’ in the sense of
‘existence’; see for instance 15, when the author refers to “external or mental subsistence.” This prob-
lem harks all the way back to Avicenna himself; see section IV.3.
 Ṭabāṭabāʾī, The Elements, 129.
 1 The terminological inquiry 123

cally real (aṣīl), would regard quiddity as merely mental or suppositional (iʿtibārī),
that is, as subsisting in the mind without actually existing in the external world as
such. By implication, this means that the essence/existence duality can be posited
only in the mind and is a mental distinction. In exterior reality, quiddity and exis-
tence are fully unified in each individual existent, and existence is what is truly
real and actual. Apart from the general application of this term to quiddity that
has just been discussed, the most striking feature of Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s philosophy remains
the attempt to separate quiddity as a real (ḥaqīqī) concept in the mind from other
merely suppositional (iʿtibārī) concepts, which strictly speaking do not encompass
mental quiddities. When the term iʿtibār is applied to quiddity, as in (a) above, it
is done so only in a general or abstract way, which overlaps with the suppositional
concepts Ṭabāṭabāʾī describes, and which refers to universal, abstract concepts that
do not exist as such in the extramental world, such as existence, unity, actuality, etc.
This point notwithstanding, in Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s framework the term iʿtibār appears
to maintain a certain fundamental meaning that holds across the various comments
the author makes. It conveys a sense of something that does not exist as such in the
extramental world, but which nevertheless bears a certain correspondence to it. This
is the case of existence, actuality, quiddity (taken in a general or abstract sense), and
of relations, none of which exists as such in this general or universal state in con-
crete reality, but all of which have a correspondence with the external world, thereby
making them part of ‘the fact of the matter’ (nafs al-amr). In contrast, specific quid-
dities (e. g., human or horse) are not suppositional concepts, but real concepts, be-
cause they exist in the concrete world and reach the mind through a process of ab-
straction. Here one perceives clearly the degree of doctrinal transformation to which
the Avicennian texts were subjected in the interval between these two thinkers. Over-
all, Ṭabāṭabāʾī helpfully disentangles various senses of the term iʿtibār/iʿtibārī and
how they apply to quiddity. But as it is found in Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s philosophical system,
the notion of iʿtibār has little to do with the original theories articulated by the
shaykh al-raʾīs and reflects centuries of independent doctrinal reflection and elabo-
ration.

1.1.5 Conclusion
In spite of the ambiguity of the textual evidence and the inconclusiveness of certain
points in the analysis, some substantial progress has been achieved regarding the
various philosophical implications of the term iʿtibār. With regard to its relation to
mental existence, one promising hypothesis was that the ontological status of an
iʿtibār depends on its contents and on the manner and mode in which they are
thought or apprehended by the mind. If the consideration involves a full-fledged
act of intellectual apprehension, whose object is a universal concept, then it is
clear that this consideration will coincide with an intellectual existent and consist
fundamentally of an ‘intellectual consideration’ (iʿtibār ʿaqlī). Conversely, if it is
something lesser than an act of intellectual apprehension, such as a mere imagina-
124 II Quiddity in Itself and Mental Existence

tive, estimative, or suppositional act, then it would fall short of corresponding to an

intellectual existent, and we would be dealing in this case with an instance of imag-
inative or estimative consideration.¹¹⁸ With regard to the consideration of quiddity in
itself, the evidence discussed thus far seems to designate it as an intellectual consid-
eration, which would imply a direct connection with mental existence. But in order to
answer this question in more detail, we need to examine the other terms Avicenna
relies on to describe pure quiddity.

1.2 Quiddity in itself as an intelligible form (ṣūrah maʿqūlah)

In addition to the term iʿtibār, and closely related to it in the context of Avicenna’s
disquisitions on essence, are two other important terms: ṣūrah (form) and maʿqūl (in-
telligible or concept).¹¹⁹ Although both of these terms can refer to the universal forms
(ṣuwar, maʿqūlāt) in the intellect, Avicenna occasionally relies on them to describe
quiddity in itself specifically in Introduction and Metaphysics of The Cure. These
terms, which also bear a strong connection with the notions of rationality and intel-
lectuality (ʿaql, ʿaqliyyah) as well as with intellectual existence (wujūd ʿaqlī), open a
fresh perspective for our interpretation of quiddity in itself. Maʿqūl and ṣūrah are
commonly used in the Arabic philosophical tradition to express the Greek term
noema, which harks back ultimately to Aristotle’s exposition of intellectual knowl-
edge in On the Soul and Posterior Analytics. The term maʿqūl in particular was
used for the Arabic translation of these Aristotelian works and became part and par-
cel of Arabic philosophical terminology as early as Kindī and the group of translators
he directed. According to Aristotle and most Arabic philosophers who follow his
teaching, the intelligibles are universal forms or concepts that encapsulate the es-

 Whether Avicenna posits, or would acknowledge, a class of imaginative and estimative existents
is unclear. For remarks on this potential class of psychological beings, scantly discussed by Avicenna
and modern scholars, see Black, Intentionality, 8, 16, 25; eadem, Avicenna, 14‒19; and Lizzini, Ibn
Sīnā’s Metaphysics. Lizzini writes: “The primacy of being (everything that is conceived of “is”)
leads to an often unseen consequence: everything that is conceived of or simply mentally represented
exists and hence has at least a mental existence (which means either intellectual or imaginary or es-
timative).” Likewise, Black, Mental Existence, 7, states: “On Avicenna’s construal, then, to say that
some thing is in the soul is to say that an essence or quiddity exists in some way in that soul. Avi-
cenna is emphatic that this is truly a mode of existence or being, and that as such it is completely
on a par with concrete existence in the external world.” If one takes Lizzini’s “everything that is con-
ceived of” and Black’s “some thing … in the soul” literally, then it would seem that the objects of the
imagination and estimation exist in the mind. Incidentally, it would also imply that the pure quiddi-
ties exist mentally, because they are intelligible and eminently conceivable.
 Avicenna often employs the key term maʿnā with the similar sense of ‘intelligible’ or ‘concept,’
but due to its complexity and its intricate relation to quiddity, it is the object of a separate section in
the present study.
 1 The terminological inquiry 125

sence of things and whose various combinations and relations in the mind constitute
the foundation of science and syllogistic knowledge.
It should be noted that the term ṣūrah has a wide semantic scope in Avicenna’s
philosophy. As mentioned above, it may apply to the intelligibles in the mind, in
which case it is essentially synonymous with maʿqūl, or, alternatively, it may desig-
nate other psychological and cognitive entities apprehended by the human soul,
which do not qualify as intellectual or universal forms proper. Accordingly, there
are various kinds of forms (ṣuwar) in Avicennian psychology, such as the sensual
and perceptible forms and the forms dwelling in the internal senses, such as the
imaginative and estimative forms, which do not amount to intellectual concepts,
and which should also not be identified with the universal notions used in logical
reasoning. Furthermore, the term ṣuwar can refer to the substantial forms of concrete
things, as well as to the species-forms transmitted by the Agent Intellect to the sub-
lunary realm of nature. These substantial forms inhere in matter, and the combina-
tion of the two produces a hylomorphic being or sunolon. Because of this semantic
flexibility, calling quiddity in itself a ṣūrah in the human soul lands one in the
same quandary as calling it a consideration or a meaning or idea, since this desig-
nation says nothing about its ontological status in the mind, nor does it specify
the kind of form with which quiddity should be identified, intellectual, imaginative,
sensual, or other.
With these preliminary remarks out of the way, let us now turn to the Avicennian
texts. The master explicitly describes pure quiddity as an intelligible object in various
passages of Introduction and Metaphysics: it is, he writes, “an intelligible” (maʿqūl),
“an intelligible form” (ṣūrah ʿaqliyyah, ṣūrah maʿqūlah), and an “intellectual mean-
ing” (maʿnā maʿqūlah). He mentions also the “intelligible form of animal” (al-
ṣūrah al-ḥayawāniyyah al-maʿqūlah).¹²⁰ What is more, in Introduction, Avicenna de-
scribes quiddity in itself as something “intellectual” (ʿaqlī), which strongly points
to its rationality and its location in the intellect (as opposed to the lower mental fac-
ulties).¹²¹ He repeatedly asserts in these texts that it can be “conceived of” (yutaṣaw-
wur), a term that is frequently employed to refer to a concept in the intellect.¹²² One
important passage appears in Metaphysics V.1, where Avicenna explicitly describes
universal quiddity and quiddity in itself as two distinct intelligible forms in the
human mind:

Text 3: There is in the intellect the form of abstract animal [ṣūrat al-ḥayawān al-mujarrad] ac-
cording to the mode of abstraction we mentioned [viz., quiddity in itself], which is in this regard

 Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Cure, V.1, 205.5‒8; cf. Introduction, I.12, 65.16‒18; 66.4‒5.
 On the use of the terms ʿaqlī, ṭabīʿī, and manṭīqī in connection with the various aspects of es-
sence, see Marmura, Avicenna’s Chapter on Universals.
 Avicenna, Introduction, I.12, 65.16‒18. The emphasis here is on ṣūrah as ‘intelligible form’ in con-
nection with quiddity in the human mind. I will show in chapter III that Avicenna applies this term
also to quiddity in the concrete world, with a different aim.
126 II Quiddity in Itself and Mental Existence

called intelligible form [ṣūrah ʿaqliyyah]. There is also [ayḍan] in the intellect the form of animal
with respect to what corresponds in the intellect [yuṭābiqu fī l-ʿaql] to many concrete beings by
means of a single definition [viz., universal quiddity]. So the intellect relates this [numerically]
one form [al-ṣūrah al-wāḥidah] to a multiplicity. It is, on this consideration, a universal [wa huwa
bi-hādhā l-iʿtibār kullī] and a single meaning [maʿnā wāḥid] in the intellect whose relation to
whichever [concrete particular] animal you posit does not vary.¹²³

In this passage, Avicenna argues that quiddity in itself and universal quiddity
amount not only to two different considerations (iʿtibārāt) in the human mind, but
also to two different “intelligible forms” (sing., ṣūrah ʿaqliyyah). The first form of an-
imal Avicenna mentions in this passage is abstract (mujarrad), a term that is consis-
tently applied to quiddity in itself in his logical and metaphysical writings. Note,
however, that this abstract form is said to exist in the mind in this purely abstract
and distinctive state. The second form mentioned by Avicenna is the universal quid-
dity animal, which consists of the quiddity in itself animalness combined with its
mental concomitants, such as universality. This second, universal form expresses
the predicability of the concept animal to many concrete instances. As such, it differs
from the first form, which is quiddity considered solely in itself. Hence, not only is
the latter a distinct “consideration” and “meaning,” but it is also a distinct “intelli-
gible form.”
Avicenna’s other logical and metaphysical writings are consistent on this point.
In Introduction, he alternates between calling quiddity in the mind a genus (jins) and
a form (ṣūrah), the former emphasizing the logical dimension of quiddity, the latter
its ontological status as something intelligible and conceivable.¹²⁴ And in two pas-
sages of Notes, Avicenna refers to pure quiddity again as something abstract (mujar-
rad) and as an intelligible (maʿqūl). What is more, in one of these passages he also
explicitly ascribes this intellectual knowledge of pure quiddity to God Himself:

Text 4: The intelligible concept [al-maʿqūl] of each thing is its abstract quiddity [mujarrad mā-
hiyyatihi], which is relatable to it [i. e., the thing] together with its various [essential] concomi-
tants [lawāzimahu] … . The intelligible that is intellected by the First with regard to this individ-
ual [existent] is this very intelligible form, which is absolute humanness [nafs al-ṣūrah al-
maʿqūlah wa-huwa l-insāniyyah al-muṭlaqah], that is, not a certain individualized humanness
[combined] with accidents and concomitants that can be sensed and pointed to.¹²⁵

I will return to the theological implications of this passage—and other related pas-
sages—in chapter V. Suffice to say here that Avicenna explicitly defines pure es-
sence—in this case “absolute humanness”—as an intelligible (maʿqūl) and intelligi-

 Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Cure, V.1, 205.5‒9.

 Avicenna, Introduction, 68.15‒69.19. He also in this text refers to quiddity as a “natural form”
(ṣūrah ṭabīʿiyyah), an expression that will be explained in chapter III.
 Avicenna, Notes, 43, section 25. The other passage is Notes, 44.2, section 26: “The intelligible of
each thing is the abstract quiddity [mujarrad māhiyyatihi] that belongs to it and on account of which
it [the thing] possesses existence.”
 1 The terminological inquiry 127

ble form (ṣūrah maʿqūlah), which can be apprehended by the intellect and, to boot,
by the divine intellect itself. The status of pure quiddity as a concept in the intellect is
further emphasized in another passage of Notes, where one reads that animal “inas-
much as it is animal is an intelligible concept [or meaning, maʿnā ʿaqlī], which, in
itself [fī dhātihi], is neither universal nor particular.”¹²⁶
Overall, then, in the context of human (and divine) thought, Avicenna makes it a
point to describe pure quiddity as an intelligible form and concept and to distinguish
it from the universal aspect of quiddity. This suggests that quiddity in itself amounts
to its own distinct intelligible form and concept in the intellect, a hypothesis that will
be further borne out by the forthcoming analysis. His argumentation rests inter alia
on key terms that point to the intellectuality and substantiality of pure quiddity in
the mind. Unlike the term ṣūrah, which can be deemed ambiguous, since it could
refer (arguably) to psychological forms (as opposed to intelligible forms strictly
speaking), the terms ʿaqlī, maʿqūl, ṣūrah maʿqūlah and ṣūrah ʿaqliyyah are unequiv-
ocal with regard to intellectuality and, by extension, to mental existence. For, accord-
ing to Avicenna, a true mental existent is an intelligible concept (maʿqūl), and vice
versa. It is the sum of these concepts and their interrelationships that make
human intellectual knowledge possible. Hence, describing pure quiddity along
those lines will, by the same token, appear to imply its very existence in the
human intellect, while at the same time precluding its potential existence in other
faculties of the soul. This point immediately raises the issues of the distinction be-
tween universal quiddity and quiddity in itself and of their respective ontological sta-
tus in the intellect, which are explored in another section.¹²⁷

 Avicenna, Notes, 61.6‒7, section 49.

 For this terminological overview to be complete, one needs to mention Avicenna’s habit in In-
troduction and Metaphysics of referring to quiddity in itself as a nature (ṭabīʿah) and even sometimes
as “the natural” (al-ṭabīʿī) (i. e., ‘the natural universal’). This is a reference to the intrinsic and irre-
ducible quidditative nature of the concrete existent, such as humanness and animalness in Zayd,
and, as such, it is used synonymously with essence. The implication is that ṭabīʿah and māhiyyah
are virtually interchangeable with regard to concrete beings. When apprehended by the mind, this
nature can also be said to be logical, insofar as it is combined with one of the five logical predicates:
genus, species, differentia, property, and accident. In a narrow sense, Avicenna uses the term ‘logical’
to refer to these five predicates, so that, as Marmura has shown, the logical aspect of quiddity (e. g.,
the species) is distinct from the quiddity as such (the nature horseness), and it is the combination of
the two that yield the universal and intellectual concept of universal ‘horse’ in the mind. It is this
composite, universal, intellectual concept consisting of the nature and logical genus that can be pre-
dicated of many things in the external world. It should be pointed out that Avicenna is keener to dis-
tinguish between nature and essence in a physical context, where these notions also bear an ambig-
uous relation to form (ṣūrah); for a detailed discussion of these various relations, see Physics, I.5‒6.
Yet, even in this context, nature, essence, and form can be virtually synonymous, as in the case of
simple things (al-basāʾiṭ) (45‒47).
128 II Quiddity in Itself and Mental Existence

1.3 Quiddity in itself as a meaning or idea (maʿnā)

Avicenna repeatedly describes quiddity in itself as a maʿnā in his logical, psycholog-

ical, and metaphysical writings. Like the term iʿtibār, the term maʿnā is intrinsically
ambiguous, since it can refer to an object of the intellect as well as to an object of the
lower mental faculties, such as the imaginative faculty or the estimation. Although a
maʿnā, like the terms iʿtibār and maʿqūl, refers primarily to a mental or intentional
object, it has arguably a broader scope and application in Avicenna’s philosophy,
since it can also be used to describe quiddity in the extramental world (this point
is discussed further in chapter III). Furthermore, it is also a notion that appears fre-
quently in the context of Avicenna’s discussion of God’s knowledge. Given its rich
semantic scope, maʿnā calls for detailed commentary. It is my contention that a suc-
cessful investigation into quiddity in itself depends partly on the elucidation of this
term, especially of its epistemological and ontological implications. In this regard, it
is desirable to fully acknowledge the dual philosophical and kalām background that
underscores Avicenna’s understanding of this crucial notion.
The word maʿnā is remarkable in that it appears in a wide variety of settings and
possesses different connotations and nuances, making it extremely arduous for
scholars to come up with a single and all-encompassing translation. Depending
on the nature of the discussion, it may designate an idea, concept, attribute, mean-
ing, intelligible, intention, thing, or entity.¹²⁸ In general, however, the term implies

 For the connection between this term and the Greek philosophical background, see Versteegh,
Greek Elements, 184‒190. For insight into its use in Arabic theology, see Horten, Was bedeutet; and
Wolfson, The Philosophy. In the context of Avicenna’s philosophy, Goichon, Lexique, vol. 1, 253‒
255, translates maʿnā as “idée, idée particulière, intention, sens, concept” (surprisingly, Goichon
has very little to say about maʿnā in La distinction); Black, Psychology, 311‒312; Hasse, Avicenna,
127 ff., focuses mostly on the maʿānī related to the internal sense of estimation, but also provides val-
uable insight into this notion in general; and Wisnovsky, Avicenna’s Metaphysics, who chooses to
translate maʿnā as “an intentional object.” A detailed case for the systematic interpretation of
maʿnā as an intention or “intentional object” in Avicenna’s epistemology has recently been made
by Tahiri, Mathematics, 41 ff. According to this author, a maʿnā is necessarily intentional and is
quasi-synonymous with the term qaṣd. In support of his claim, Tahiri cites various medieval Arabic
sources (43, note 2). Yet, it should be pointed out that these mention the term qaṣd, not the term
maʿnā, and his quotations, moreover, are gleaned from non-philosophical sources. With regard to
quiddity, I think it is problematic to restrict the translation of maʿnā to ‘intention.’ Tahiri’s claim
that “intentionality acts as an interaction between the mind and the world” (44) is certainly correct
in many cases, and it can be, for example, quite constructively applied to Avicenna’s theory of the
universals in the mind. For a universal is a notion or maʿnā that is predicated of many, so that it
is necessarily accompanied by an act of intentionality and a relational state between the concept
and its (potential or actual) instantiations. But one should recall that in Avicenna’s epistemology
maʿnā often refers to pure quiddity and the quidditative meaning specifically (as opposed to the uni-
versal), and this in a prior and immediate way. In that case, it bears no relation to the maʿnā of uni-
versality or to any other intentions that are ‘external’ to quiddity, i. e., not constitutive (ghayr muqaw-
wim) of it. Accordingly, the maʿnā of pure quiddity is conceived of in itself and in abstraction from
everything else, i. e., from any intention (such as universality) that can be added to it. In that partic-
 1 The terminological inquiry 129

mentality or intentionality and, hence, appears mostly in the context of human psy-
chology and discussions of language and meaning.¹²⁹ In this context it is often used
to explain the relation between speech and thought, or between an enunciation (lafẓ)
and a concept (mafhūm), and thus assumes a dual linguistic and conceptual role.
This is important for our purposes, because Avicenna’s comments on pure quiddity
have a direct link to human speech (in connection with the definition, ḥadd) and
thought (in connection with conceptualization, taṣawwur). In Avicenna’s philosophy,
a maʿnā refers primarily to a psychological notion or idea abstracted by the senses
and apprehended by one of the faculties of the mind, such as the estimation or
the intellect. In the latter case, when intellectual apprehension is involved, maʿnā
is used interchangeably with maʿqūl to refer to a universal intelligible in the rational
soul. The same term also appears with a related meaning in Avicenna’s theological
disquisitions to refer to the divine intelligibles and the objects of God’s knowledge.¹³⁰
Hence, in the case of intellectual maʿānī, this term may be applied equally to the
human and divine intellects. In contrast, when estimation (wahm) is involved,
maʿnā designates the abstracted intention that is derived from sensory perception
and that corresponds to an external reality, such as when the ewe acquires a
maʿnā of the wolf’s aggressiveness. In that case, the maʿnā also refers to something
that exists in the concrete world, such as the attribute or intention of aggressiveness
that exists in the wolf.¹³¹ In brief, maʿnā may constitute an object of an estimative or

ular case, it is hard to see ‘of what’ this maʿnā of pure quiddity is an intention, if not an intention for
pure conceivability and cognition. At any rate, it is not considered with a relation and intention to
external reality, as in the case of the universal. Thus, Avicenna’s point seems to be precisely that
the conception of pure quiddity is completely abstracted of parasitical intentions. This makes
maʿnā a term whose relation to intentionality is complex, not unilateral, as Tahiri claims. For my
part, I deem the construal of maʿnā as qaṣd too restrictive, since it impedes a full account of the var-
ious epistemological and ontological nuances that are associated with this term. I will show shortly
also that maʿnā carries ontological connotations that have little to do with intentionality per se.
 Thus, Jurjānī, Definitions, 274, defines the maʿānī as “mental forms” (al-ṣuwar al-dhihniyyah).
But he seems to connect them primarily to our ability to enunciate or designate things through lan-
guage. Thus, maʿnā is what connects language or predication (lafẓ) with a concept proper (mafhūm),
and it is literally “what is intended by a [designated] thing.” For Ghazālī, a maʿnā assumes a similar
semantic and conceptual role: it can refer to a meaning, a mental image, or an intelligible and inten-
tional reality (see Jabre, Essai, 212‒214).
 When used interchangeably with maʿqūl in the context of human intellection, maʿnā can be
made to correspond to the Greek term noema. What is important in this case is the emphasis on
the abstractness or intelligibility of maʿnā, a trend which harks back also to other Greek philosoph-
ical terms such as pragma and lekton, with which maʿnā is closely associated; see Versteegh, Greek
Elements, 185‒187. The abstractness and intelligibility of maʿnā is of course a crucial feature of Avi-
cenna’s theory of quiddity.
 Hasse, Avicenna, 131‒132; Hall, Intellect, 65. For Hasse, a maʿnā in connection with the estima-
tive faculty is not primarily a psychological state or object, but a “connotational attribute,” that is,
something existing in the exterior object and retrieved by or transmitted to the human soul. For an-
other interpretation, see Black, Intentionality.
130 II Quiddity in Itself and Mental Existence

intellectual kind of apprehension. There are, accordingly, imaginative, estimative,

and intellectual maʿānī, corresponding to the various faculties of the soul.
Avicenna is of course not the first thinker in the Arabic tradition to use the term
maʿnā in connection with human and divine thought. In this regard, two precedents
should be stressed. The first is Avicenna’s illustrious predecessor Fārābī, who uses
the term mostly in an epistemological context to refer to linguistic and logical no-
tions in the mind. Fārābī appears generally to distinguish between maʿnā, ‘logical
notion’ or ‘logical meaning,’ and maʿqūl, ‘intelligible’ or ‘intellectual existent.’¹³²
Even though there is a connection between a ‘meaning’ and an ‘intelligible’ in Fār-
ābī’s philosophy, his use of the term maʿnā does not on the whole suggest entitative
and ontological content, but rather serves to express linguistic or logical meaning,
and so it is closely tied to his theory of language. Moreover, he uses this term
much more sparingly than Avicenna. Finally, Fārābī does not provide much informa-
tion about mental existents in general and gives virtually no indication as to how this
term relates to mental existence.¹³³ As a result, his writings yield only limited insight
into the present inquiry. The second precedent is equally significant and concerns the
various uses that Christian and Muslim theologians make of maʿnā. As Wolfson lu-
cidly showed several decades ago, Christian theologians writing in Arabic sometimes
refer to each of the hypostases of the Trinity respectively as a maʿnā, which they use
synonymously with other terms, such as uqnūm, shayʾ, and shakhṣ. ¹³⁴ In this context,
the term maʿnā designates real entities or beings, Christ and the Holy Spirit, which
are at the same time subsumed under the Godhead. In this particular case, then, a
maʿnā transcends the sphere of language and logic and designates a real metaphys-
ical entity in the concrete world. Likewise, in Muslim kalām, the term is frequently
used to refer to the divine attributes, which, according to one mainstream interpre-
tation, namely, that of the Ashʿarites, are regarded as real and entitative, although
their reality does not lead to a multiplicity of eternal beings. The divine attributes
qua maʿānī are co-eternal and co-existing entities that are distinct from the divine
essence itself, but they do not undermine God’s unity or unicity. In this usage, the
term also assumes a theological dimension and designates a metaphysical reality
that transcends the realm of human thought. Additionally, in kalām ontology, and
particularly in the Muʿtazilite tradition starting with the works of Muʿammar b.
ʿAbbād al-Sulamī (d. 830), the notion of maʿnā is often employed to designate some-
thing real or entitative in a being, such as a determinant cause (ʿillah), the two terms
being used interchangeably.¹³⁵ It can also bear a narrow relation to the notion of ac-
cident (ʿaraḍ), particularly after Abū Hāshim al-Jubbāʾī, when it also becomes fre-

 Walzer, On the Perfect State, 66.9; Zimmermann, Al-Farabi’s Commentary, xlii and n. 1., 11 n.2.
 For insight into Fārābī’s view on mental existence, see Black, Knowledge; Janos, Al-Fārābī’s On
the One.
 Wolfson, The Philosophy, 112 ff.
 See Frank, Al-maʿnà; Daiber, Das theologisch-philosophische System; van Ess, Theology and So-
ciety, vol. 3, 80‒90; and Leaman, Maʿnā.
 1 The terminological inquiry 131

quently discussed in connection with the theory of states (aḥwāl).¹³⁶ But whereas the
states are neither existent nor nonexistent, the maʿānī of the Muʿtazilites are entities
or entitative causes that exist in reality, and which can thus also be the object of
mental descriptions and attributions. Finally, it is noteworthy that the term maʿnā
occasionally appears in kalām discussions of human psychology and epistemology,
a topic which has hitherto received little attention on the part of scholars.¹³⁷ Given
these observations, it is likely that the notion of maʿnā witnessed various borrowings
between kalām and falsafah. More pointedly, I will argue that the entitative interpre-
tation of maʿnā that was articulated in the kalām sources probably influenced Avi-
cenna. When it comes to human thought, most theologians would not have attribut-
ed an ontological reality to maʿnā qua concept—as many, if not most, of them appear
to have rejected the theory of mental existence in the period prior to Avicenna. On the
other hand, the kalām understanding of this term in a theological context remains
relevant. For when the term is employed to designate something immaterial (a divine
attribute) and also possibly something mental or cognitive (as in the case of, say, the
attributes of divine knowledge and divine will), it appears to be endowed with some
mode of existence. In these particular cases, the term maʿnā refers to a real, existing,
and entitative attribute or quality of the divine being, which is distinct from God’s
essence, and which pertains to God’s mental or intentional activity.¹³⁸
Given this rich and flexible semantic background, it is not surprising that the re-
lation of maʿnā to mental existence represents an ambiguous facet of Avicenna’s psy-
chology. The master uses this term to refer to a wide array of psychological and in-
tentional objects, making it difficult to delineate with precision the relationship
between a psychological maʿnā and a mental existent (mawjūd dhihnī or ʿaqlī).
There are maʿānī associated with human psychological activity, such as the maʿānī
of the internal senses or the perceptual maʿānī, which could be hypothesized to
exist in the lower faculties of the soul. Although they do not fulfill the Avicennian
criteria for intellectual existence proper, namely, immateriality and universality,
these maʿānī are presumably not altogether devoid of existence in the soul and
may amount to kinds of psychological forms. Yet, since Avicenna says virtually noth-
ing about psychological existents other than the universal intelligibles, it is ultimate-
ly unclear whether these sub-intellectual maʿānī may be called existents in any
meaningful way and whether they constitute a legitimate class of substantive psy-
chological objects below the intellectual ones.¹³⁹ At any rate, the present concern

 See Frank, Al-maʿnà; and idem, Meanings. The interesting history of this term has been partly
traced by Wolfson, The Philosophy.
 I am grateful to David Bennett for his valuable comments on the use of this term in early kalām.
 There can be no doubt that Avicenna was aware of these various kalām uses of maʿnā. In fact,
there are intriguing parallels between the kalām and Avicennian perceptions of maʿnā when it comes
to its application to the concrete beings; this is discussed further in chapter III.
 For a discussion of the estimative maʿnā, see Black, Psychology; and Hasse, Avicenna, 127 ff. This
question is in many ways comparable to the question of the ontological status of an intention (inten-
132 II Quiddity in Itself and Mental Existence

is to better understand Avicenna’s description of quiddity as maʿnā in light of this

multifaceted background. The immediate issue can be put as follows. The master fre-
quently calls quiddity in itself a maʿnā and locates it in the soul. But since in Meta-
physics V.1 he distinguishes it from the maʿānī qua universal intelligibles, it remains
to be determined what kind of maʿnā pure quiddity amounts to. If it is something
lower or lesser than a full-fledged intellectual universal existent and is reducible
to a psychological intention or an estimative notion, then quiddity in itself would
not exist as an intelligible, but would constitute a sub-intellectual maʿnā. The
term maʿnā as a general psychological notion thus raises the same kinds of problems
with regard to mental existence that the term iʿtibār, and to a lesser extent the term
ṣūrah, had raised. Given its semantic malleability, and given the fact that Avicenna
employs this term to refer to a diversity of mental phenomena and entities, there re-
mains the challenge of delineating with precision the relationship between a mental
or psychological maʿnā and mental existence.
In the narrower context of Avicenna’s logic, maʿnā usually designates a meaning
or notion in abstraction from any ontological considerations. As Avicenna explains
in On Interpretation, the maʿānī are the notions and the impressions (āthār) produced
by enunciations (alfāẓ). This brings to mind other descriptions of maʿnā, such as
those of Fārābī and, later, Jurjānī.¹⁴⁰ In this regard, the maʿānī mediate between lan-
guage and conceptual thought and can be regarded as the foundation of logic and
reflection. But this mediate status endows this term with an intrinsic ambiguity,
since it can refer either to the purely phonetic and semantic plane of enunciations,
or it can be used interchangeably with the Arabic terms that express a concept
(mafhūm, maʿqūl) to evoke a full-fledged intellectual entity. Additionally, in the
case of Avicennian psychology, it can designate a mental accident, concomitant,
or intention (e. g., universality or oneness) that is added to a quiddity in the mind.
For example, universality is a maʿnā that is added to the maʿnā of horseness.
Hence, the extensional scope of the term maʿnā bridges the grammatical, linguistic,
and semantic, on the one hand, and the conceptual, intellectual, and ontological, on
the other. In this connection, it bears an intricate relationship to quiddity, both as
essential definition and meaning (the linguistic aspect) and as intelligible and men-
tal existent (the ontological and intellectual aspect).¹⁴¹

tio) in the medieval Latin tradition. It should be noted also that the Latin term intentio was often used
to translate the Arabic word maʿnā in the Avicennian texts.
 Avicenna, On Interpretation, 3.1‒2. This sense may be connected with al-Ḥasan b. Ṣuwār’s notes
on Aristotle’s Categories, which also describe maʿnā as arising from the athar produced in the soul;
see Leaman, Maʿnā; cf. Jurjānī, Definitions, 274.
 Construed generally in the context of Avicennian epistemology, maʿnā/maʿānī refer to any log-
ical object examined by the mind. But the logical dimension of maʿnā and its potential to illuminate
Avicenna’s discussion of quiddity in itself should not be underestimated, in particular with regard to
Avicenna’s major philosophical summae. For instance, Metaphysics of The Cure is in numerous ways
a work on the relationship between logic and metaphysics; in many places, Avicenna either enjoins
the reader to consult his logical works or he embarks on protracted logical reflections in the very
 1 The terminological inquiry 133

In this connection, it is notable that at the beginning of Metaphysics I.4 Avicenna

—perhaps anticipating the potential confusion that could arise from a reading of the
later sections of this work—seeks to clarify the respective subject matter of logic and
metaphysics and to dispel any ambiguity regarding this point. He explicates that the
subject matter of logic are the notions and meanings (maʿānī), albeit not considered
qua existents (mawjūdāt), since the study of existents and of absolute existence—or
being qua being—is the prerogative of metaphysics.¹⁴² This point had already been
made in Introduction, when Avicenna explained that logic does not investigate exis-
tents proper.¹⁴³ Hence, while logic studies the maʿānī qua logical notions or consid-
erations, metaphysics studies them qua existents or, at the very least, qua meanings
and concepts related to existents. What renders these methodological observations
blurry, however, is the fact that Avicenna sometimes discusses logical issues in a
metaphysical context and in close connection with his metaphysical theories (and
vice versa), so that the precise logical vs. metaphysical scope of the term maʿnā/
maʿānī cannot be established on the basis of context, discipline, or literary genre
alone. Yet, one important observation that arises from the interface of Avicenna’s
logic and metaphysics is the direct correlation between intellectual meanings and ex-
istents. The ‘universal forms’ and ‘mental existents’ are often described as ‘mean-
ings,’ which themselves correspond to ‘ideas,’ ‘conceptions,’ or ‘intelligibles.’ In
fact, all of these English terms are possible translations of the term maʿānī, depend-
ing on the context, so that there is a high degree of correspondence between them.¹⁴⁴
Since all mental existents are also mental meanings and notions (maʿānī), the key

midst of his metaphysical disquisitions. More often than not, he articulates theories that rely on met-
aphysical and logical considerations weaved together into a distinctive Avicennian discourse. This
suggests that both aspects of maʿnā go hand in hand, especially in a metaphysical context, where
it can mean ‘meaning’ as well as ‘mental existent.’
 Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Cure, I.2, 10.17 ff.
 Avicenna, Introduction, I.2, 15.17‒16.5; one key passage is I.5, 27.10‒14: “And inasmuch as you are
a logician [manṭiqī], it does not befall upon you [to clarify] how these relations [between the universal
and its concrete exemplifications] obtain, and whether a single meaning [maʿnā] possessing com-
monality has existence among concrete individual things that share a commonality [of meaning]
with it, and, in brief, [to examine] the separate and exterior existence [wujūd mufāriq wa-khārij]
[of this meaning], which would be other than the existence [it has] in your mind, or even how it
comes to be in the mind. For the investigation of these issues lies in another discipline, or even in
two other disciplines.” Avicenna is probably implicitly referring to psychology and metaphysics in
the last segment of this passage.
 See the beginning of V.2 of Metaphysics of The Cure, 207.5‒9, where Avicenna alternately refers to
the same mental object as a kullī, a mawjūd, and a maʿnā, thereby showing the intertwinement of
these terms. The fact that maʿānī lie at the boundary of “logical notions” and “intellectual existents”
highlights the difficulty of disentangling these two fundamental senses of the word in Avicenna’s
writings. This point is all the more problematic when it pertains to quiddity in itself, which Avicenna
frequently describes as a maʿnā.
134 II Quiddity in Itself and Mental Existence

implication is one of co-extensionality. In most cases, the terms mawjūdāt fī-l-dhihn,

maʿqūlāt, ṣuwar and maʿānī can all be used interchangeably.¹⁴⁵
Hence, the universals, while being maʿānī in the sense of notions or meanings as
construed in logic, are also mental existents proper, and as such fall within the sub-
ject matter of metaphysics. In their case, maʿnā can designate the epistemological
aspect (the meaning) and the entitative aspect (the intellectual existent or intelligible
object). Following the path opened by Porphyry’s Eisagoge, Avicenna’s discussion of
the universals frequently oscillates between these two planes and implicitly encom-
passes both. For example, the master explains that metaphysics investigates the
“manner of existence of the universal natures” (kayfa wujūd al-ṭabāʾiʿ al-kulliyyah)
and addresses the questions whether universals have existence “in the particular
concrete beings” and “how they exist in the soul.”¹⁴⁶ He also raises the question
of whether they can exist as Platonic forms.¹⁴⁷ Yet, the universals in the human
mind are also the foundation of scientific knowledge and, qua meanings and inten-
tions, the main contents of logic. So, the study of universals occupies an important
place in the metaphysical project, and this for two main reasons: (a) as mental exis-
tents, the universals have to be studied in their own right and as part of ontology;
and (b) as the buildings blocks of certain knowledge and the aim of syllogistic rea-
soning, they play a key role in human cognition and scientific theory. Their investi-
gation accordingly represents one of the main tasks of the epistemological and met-
aphysical inquiry. These various goals and aspects converge in the term maʿnā. ¹⁴⁸
The foregoing remarks apply chiefly to the universal meanings, notions, and intelli-

 According to Goichon, Lexique, 15 and 22, the translators opted to render the Greek νόημα chiefly
by means of taṣawwur and maʿnā. This places the emphasis squarely on the logical and conceptual
aspects of the term and not on the ontological ones. But it should be noted that the topic of mental
existence greatly preoccupied Arabic thinkers like Avicenna, who explores it in a way that his Greek
predecessors did not. This explains why the term maʿnā in his system is invested with an ontological
status.
 Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Cure, I.4, 26.3‒5.
 This passage from Metaphysics should be read in light of Avicenna’s Introduction and Categories,
which similarly combine ontological and purely logical considerations; see, for example, Avicenna,
Introduction, I.2, 15.17‒16.5. At I.5, 27.10‒14 Avicenna raises a set of almost similar ontological ques-
tions, which, he cautions, should be treated in the science of metaphysics. In spite of this injunction,
Avicenna addresses these issues in his logical works, and he even brings theological ideas to bear on
the topic; see chapters IV and V for more insight into the last point.
 Recall that even God is said to contemplate maʿānī. Moreover, God Himself possesses, or rather
is, a special maʿnā, which is impenetrable to all but Him; see Metaphysics of The Cure, I.7, 47.6‒8;
VIII.5, 350.8. It should be noted that the term maʿānī is also the one Avicenna uses to describe the
various aspects that are constitutive of the First Effect’s multiplicity—and by extension of that of
all the separate intellects: “[Intelligible] plurality proceeds from the intellects’ multiple meanings [lit-
erally, meanings of multiplicity, al-maʿānī allatī fīhā min al-kathrah],” Metaphysics of The Cure, IX.4,
407.5‒6; cf. the interesting question Avicenna raises at V.2, 211.8‒9. The term maʿnā therefore appears
frequently in Avicenna’s ontology and theology in addition to his epistemology; in all cases, it bears a
close relation to the conception of essence and its concomitants.
 1 The terminological inquiry 135

gibles in the mind, the universal maʿānī. But they are also relevant for our purposes
inasmuch as Avicenna frequently describes quiddity ‘in itself’ specifically as a
maʿnā. From the outset, this invests quiddity with a logico-metaphysical dimension
of its own. It also immediately raises the question of the relationship between these
two aspects—the logical and the metaphysical. Is quiddity in itself a maʿnā only in
the logical sense or also in the metaphysical sense used for the universal intelligi-
bles, which would imply mental existence?
The difficulty involved in clarifying this question is compounded by the fact that
the textual evidence is scattered in Avicenna’s logical, psychological, and metaphys-
ical accounts. Nevertheless, an attempt should be made to collate Avicenna’s re-
marks on this topic. In what follows, I begin with the description of pure quiddity
as a maʿnā and move on to address the question of its mental vs. entitative nature.
In Metaphysics I.7, Avicenna refers to the essence as a meaning, which is the “true
nature” of a thing (al-maʿnā alladhī huwa ḥaqīqatuhu).¹⁴⁹ In Philosophical Compendi-
um, he talks about the “essential meaning” (maʿnā-yi dhātī) of a thing, and in this
same work he also distinguishes between quiddity in itself and universal quiddity.¹⁵⁰
In Salvation, he explains that the universal as a quiddity (māhiyyah) and quidditative
meaning (maʿnā) is one thing, and that its being one or multiple, common or specif-
ic, is “something else” (shayʾ ākhar). Universality is another maʿnā and a condition
(sharṭ) added to it (zāʾid ʿalā) that is distinct from the core quidditative maʿnā. ¹⁵¹ A
similar account can be found in Introduction I.12, where Avicenna argues that the five
predicates (genus, species, difference, property, and accident) are each one thing
when taken in themselves and another thing when considered in a general or univer-
sal manner (ʿāmm) as applying to a thing. As in Metaphysics, he subsequently pro-
vides an illustration of this point that centers on the genus ‘animal,’ but with the cru-
cial difference that this time Avicenna explicitly describes quiddity in itself as a
maʿnā and uses this central notion to articulate his argument. When considered in
itself, this maʿnā is unrelated to either mental or extramental existence:

Text 5: We say: indeed, animal in itself is a [quidditative] meaning [al-ḥayawān fī nafsihi maʿnā],
regardless of whether it exists in concrete beings or is conceived of [as a universal] in the soul;
for, in itself, it is neither general nor specific … . But animal in itself is a thing that is conceived of
by the mind qua animal [shayʾ yutaṣawwaru fī l-dhihn ḥayawānan]. And on account of the fact
that it is conceived qua animal, it is nothing other than animal alone [lā yakūn illā ḥayawān
faqaṭ]. If one conceives it as being either general or specific or something else, then one con-
ceives it together with another meaning that would be superadded to it [maʿnā zāʾid ʿalā] and
that would accidentally occur to animalness [yaʿriḍu li-l-ḥayawāniyyah].¹⁵²

 Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Cure, I.7, 43.6.

 See Avicenna, Philosophical Compendium, 35 and 33 respectively.
 Avicenna, Salvation, 536‒537, especially 536.11.
 Avicenna, Introduction, I.12, 65.11‒19.
136 II Quiddity in Itself and Mental Existence

In this passage, Avicenna describes quiddity in itself—here animal in itself—as a

“quidditative meaning,” a maʿnā, thereby further enriching the list of technical
words he uses to describe quiddity. The term maʿnā puts an emphasis on the mental
and intentional aspect of quiddity, since one of its primary senses is the ‘meaning’ or
‘concept’ of a thing, in this case, the meaning and concept of the quiddity ‘horseness’
in the rational mind. In that sense it is also closely associated with the definition
(ḥadd) of a thing, since the definition causes this meaning and concept to arise in
the mind. The term maʿnā serves to connect quiddity with its meaning and definition.
The maʿnā of animal is, in a sense, the essential definition of animal and also cor-
responds to the concept of quiddity in itself (animal inasmuch as it is animal).
The quidditative meaning or maʿnā is therefore what contains or implies the core def-
inition of a thing, what unifies the constitutive elements (muqawwimāt) and inner as-
pects or features of a thing, which together constitute its core and essence, its what-
ness. The notions of ‘quiddity,’ ‘meaning,’ and ‘definition’ appear inextricably linked
in Avicenna’s account of quiddity in itself, which explains why they are often used
interchangeably. This undoubtedly has the effect of stressing the gnoseological
and epistemic dimension of quiddity in itself as something that imparts knowledge,
as a thing or entity that conveys information to the rational mind.¹⁵³ Hence, the term

 Interestingly, in referring to the very quidditative core of something, the term maʿnā sometimes
appears to transcend quiddity itself or at least bears an ambiguous relationship with it. In discussing
God’s Necessary Existence, for example, Avicenna states that God is devoid of quiddity, but that He
possesses an irreducible meaning (maʿnā) that belongs solely to Him and which only He can under-
stand. This special maʿnā cannot be shared by anything else. As Avicenna states, “The First has noth-
ing that shares Its meaning [maʿnāhu]” (Metaphysics of The Cure, VIII.5, 350.8). This meaning is inac-
cessible to human reason, and God is the only being that knows it: “It [the First Cause] is a meaning
[maʿnā], the explication of whose term [ism] belongs only to it” (Metaphysics of The Cure, I.7, 47.6‒8).
In a similar spirit, in Pointers, vol. 2, 312‒313, Avicenna explains that in the case of immaterial beings,
human knowledge does not consist of an apprehension of quiddity, but rather of an image (mithāl) of
the quiddity. In those cases, while it is possible to know the meaning (maʿnā) of these entities, this
maʿnā would not correspond strictly to their essence or quiddity, but to a semblance or image of
their quiddity, thereby possibly introducing a chasm between the meaning (maʿnā) and the quiddity
(māhiyyah). Regardless of these statements, which seem to distinguish between maʿnā and māhiyyah
in the case of the Necessary of Existence and also possibly in the case of the separate intellects, Avi-
cenna usually uses maʿnā to refer to the quidditative meaning of something and, hence, often corre-
lates it with pure quiddity. As such, it is something that can be known (maʿlūm) and that represents
the foundation of human cognition insofar as it conveys knowledge about quiddity. In fact, at the
beginning of Metaphysics VIII.5, 349.11‒13, Avicenna states: “the One insofar as He is the Necessary
of Existence, is what He is in terms of Himself, namely His essence [yakūn mā huwa bi-hi huwa wa-
huwa dhātuhu]. His meaning [maʿnāhu] is restricted to Himself either by virtue of that meaning itself
or due to a cause.” Here Avicenna explicitly ascribes an essence or quiddity to God, which is said to
correspond to the maʿnā. Hence, whether quiddity and meaning coincide fully in God depends on
whether Avicenna is amenable to the view that God has a quiddity or not. Moreover, in these various
passages, the irreducible meaning is in any case closely related to quiddity, insofar as it refers to the
inner and special nature or reality of that thing. God, like all other things, possesses a special reality
(ḥaqīqah); see VIII.5, 349.11. Hence, quidditative meaning (maʿnā), quiddity (māhiyyah), and reality
 1 The terminological inquiry 137

maʿnā, when used in relation to quiddity in itself, amounts primarily to a logical and
epistemic claim.¹⁵⁴ In this regard, it is comparable to the term iʿtibār. Both convey the
notional, conceptual, or logical aspect of quiddity as something conceivable and
enunciable. However, the term maʿnā more squarely puts an emphasis on the intrin-
sic intelligibility of pure quiddity. Thus, in Notes, Avicenna explains that the essence
‘animal’ is “an intelligible concept” [or an intelligible meaning, maʿnā ʿaqlī].¹⁵⁵ It is
in this intellectual sense that the term maʿnā also appears in some sections of Meta-
physics, where it seems to be used almost interchangeably with quiddity (māhiyyah)
and true nature or reality (ḥaqīqah).¹⁵⁶ As Text 5 above illustrates, animal in itself can
be described either as a pure quiddity (ḥayawāniyyah) or as an irreducible quiddita-
tive meaning (maʿnā), the two terms being virtually interchangeable.
We are now in a better position to determine what kind of maʿnā pure quiddity
amounts to. Since it is fully intelligible in itself and unconnected to anything else, it
amounts to a kind of abstract, intellectual, and general or universal object in the
human intellect. It differs from the imaginative and estimative maʿānī, which are,
in contrast, tied to a specific and individual thing. Thus, the ewe apprehends the
maʿnā of ‘this’ individual wolf; not of wolves in general. But the maʿnā of ‘wolf’
in general in the human intellect is an intelligible and universal notion. The upshot
is that Avicenna makes identical claims for maʿnā (used in this sense) and māhiyyah:
both can be envisaged in themselves, in abstraction and in isolation of external con-
comitants and of concrete or mental existence.¹⁵⁷ But while the universals may be re-
garded as maʿānī in terms of their logical and epistemic consideration and their on-

(ḥaqīqah) are intimately connected in Avicenna’s discussion of God, a feature that overlaps with his
general metaphysics, where these terms can all refer to pure quiddity. For the interrelationship and
semantic overlap of these terms, see Avicenna, Pointers, vol. 1, 202‒205; Introduction, I.5, 28.13.
 The term maʿnā in Avicenna’s philosophy also carries ontological connotations; those connected
with mental existence are discussed here, while those connected with concrete existence are dis-
cussed in chapter III.
 Avicenna, Notes, 61.7, section 49.
 Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Cure, I.7, 43.4‒12.
 Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Cure, I.7, 43.15‒44.3. Avicenna’s move to refer to quiddity in itself
as a meaning—or more precisely a ‘quidditative meaning,’ which is the translation I opted for here—
has the effect of shifting the emphasis away from quiddity as an entitative or substantial thing and
toward its status as a conceptual object or logical notion. In both kalām and falsafah, one of the core
senses of maʿnā is ‘meaning’ (as in the meaning of a word or sentence) as well as ‘intention’ (the in-
tent underlying a statement or sentence). R.M. Frank has shown convincingly that in the kalām con-
text, maʿnā fulfills an important role in the nominal dimension of theological discussions about lan-
guage, grammar, and ontology. It may refer to the meaning of words, phrases, and sentences, to
intentions, as well as to the referents conveyed by human language. These are relevant to the discus-
sion here, insofar as they enlighten an important aspect of quiddity or essence, which is to be infor-
mative and a conveyor of meaning in the mind (it encapsulates the ‘whatness’ and definition of a
thing) and of intent (insofar as a quiddity is related to conception and cognition). But, as I argue,
this logical and conceptual plane of maʿnā is not incompatible with its having an ontological dimen-
sion as well.
138 II Quiddity in Itself and Mental Existence

tological status, that is, as objects of logic and ontology/metaphysics respectively, the
use of the term maʿnā in connection with quiddity in itself emphasizes its logical and
epistemic dimension and would appear to say nothing definitive concerning its on-
tological status. There is no implication that we are dealing in this case with a mental
existent proper. As a corollary, the problem of extensionality between the notions of
wujūd and māhiyyah can be applied in a similar way to the relation of wujūd and
maʿnā. With that being said, Avicenna’s emphasis on the essential and intrinsic in-
telligibility of pure quiddity qua maʿnā, or rather qua maʿnā ʿaqlī, would suggest
that it has a certain positive ontological status in the intellect. In that sense,
maʿnā goes much further than iʿtibār in conveying a sense of intellectual entitative-
ness or even of intellectual existence. In that regard it is to be connected with other
terms Avicenna ascribes to pure quiddity, such as maʿqūl. This is suggested by a pas-
sage in Notes that refers to pure essence as a maʿnā that is actualized or realized in
the mind:

It is not possible for [pure] animal’s being [pure] animal [kawn al-ḥayawān ḥayawānan] to be-
come varied [or multiple]. Animalness does not become varied inasmuch as it is animalness,
because this quidditative meaning is realized in itself [li-anna hādhā l-maʿnā yaḥṣulu bi-dhāti-
hi].¹⁵⁸

In this passage Avicenna is presumably referring to the realization or existence of

pure quiddity in the mind. What is significant is not only the statement regarding
the constancy and irreducibility of pure quiddity, which cannot become variegated
or multiple (lā yaṣṣihu an yakhtalifa), but also the master’s observation that it is re-
alized in the mind in itself or through its very essence (bi-dhātihi).
Furthermore, one observes that in Text 5 Avicenna extends the term maʿnā to en-
compass the extrinsic concomitants that attach to quiddity in itself. Not only is pure
quiddity a maʿnā, in abstraction from actual existence, but the various concomitants
(lawāzim) of quiddity are also described as maʿānī. ¹⁵⁹ In other words, there are sec-
ondary maʿānī that can be added to the foundational maʿnā qua quidditative mean-
ing.¹⁶⁰ These maʿānī, unlike the core quidditative meaning, are extrinsic and non-
constitutive. In the passage above, Avicenna mentions “the general” and “the specif-
ic” as meanings liable to be added to (maʿnā zāʾid ʿalā) quiddity in itself, but we

 Avicenna, Notes, 394, section 699. Notice the expression kawn al-ḥayawān ḥayawānan, which
seems modelled directly on the Muʿtazilite manner of referring to the Attribute of the Essence
(e. g., kawn al-jawhar jawharan).
 This holds true of the constitutive, inner concomitants that make up quiddity as well as of the
external concomitants that are added to it or connected with it. Avicenna sometimes confusedly de-
scribes both the internal, constitutive elements of quiddity and its external, non-constitutive aspects
by means of the term ‘concomitants’ (lawāzim), so that care should be taken in clarifying its sense in
each case. The former shall be examined later, and I will focus here on the latter, since the present
aim is to clarify how maʿnā relates to mental existence.
 Avicenna, Introduction, 65.18‒19; 66.7‒11, where the term maʿnā is used repeatedly.
 1 The terminological inquiry 139

know from other passages that these also include all the external concomitants of
quiddity, including oneness, multiplicity, universality, particularity, and even exis-
tence. As Avicenna pointedly remarks in Categories, existence (wujūd) is not a
genus and is not univocal. It does not indicate “a meaning [maʿnā] intrinsic to the
quiddities of things,” but rather something extrinsic or external (khārij) that “fol-
lows” and is “concomitant to them” (yalḥaqu, yalzamu, amr lāzim, amr lāḥiq).¹⁶¹ Al-
though it is not explicitly spelled out, the inference is that the intrinsic or irreducible
meaning, the maʿnā, is quiddity in itself and whatever is constitutive of it. As for ex-
istence, it attaches to this quidditative meaning or maʿnā as an external concomitant.
The intrinsic or irreducible quidditative meaning (maʿnā) of things is therefore pure
quiddity or essence unconnected with existence, while existence is a concomitant
that qualifies quiddity or essence from the outside. The implication therefore
seems to be that existence is not a maʿnā in the sense in which quiddity is: it is a
maʿnā that is added to quiddity in itself from the outside, together with the other ex-
ternal concomitants that attach to essence.
To recap, the term maʿnā, when applied to quiddity in itself, conveys the mean-
ing or idea of an essence (e. g., horse) in abstraction from mental existence, or at
least of the kind of mental existence associated with the universal concept. For ex-
istence of this kind consists of mental concomitants (lawāzim) and additional mean-
ings (maʿānī) that are external and additional to the quidditative meaning and,
hence, subsequent to it. Pure quiddity qua maʿnā is thus disentangled from any con-
siderations of existence, as well as from any connection with concrete and mental
attributes. It puts the emphasis on the irreducible meaning and conceptuality of a
thing. When the term maʿnā is used in connection with quiddity in itself, it refers
solely to the irreducible meaning made up of the internal, constitutive parts of quid-
dity, and hence, to its definition. But when it is used to describe the universals, it
refers to the quidditative meaning together with its external concomitants. These
other meanings that attach to it can also be regarded as extraneous maʿānī combined
with the core quidditative maʿnā (with the sum of these maʿānī resulting in a single,
synthetic maʿnā). This means that the maʿnā of pure quiddity is logically and essen-
tially simple and prior when compared to the universal considered as an aggregate of
maʿānī. The universal amounts to a synthesis of the various maʿānī and lawāzim that
constitute it. Avicenna describes the various external and non-constitutive concom-
itants of quiddity as maʿānī that are superadded to (zāʾid ʿalā) the quidditative mean-

 Avicenna, Categories, II.1, 61‒62; cf. Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Cure, III.3, 106.12‒13, where
the same expression amr lāzim is applied to oneness and used to describe its necessary concomitance
from essence. For the terms lāzim and lāḥiq, see also Bertolacci, The Reception of Aristotle’s Metaphy-
sics, 615‒616. I intentionally leave out the issue of whether these comments apply solely to things in
the mind or can be extended to include extramental existents as well; this issue is tackled in chapter
III.
140 II Quiddity in Itself and Mental Existence

ing.¹⁶² As a consequence of Avicenna’s theory of concept formation, a synthesis of

various maʿānī needs to occur in order for a new maʿnā to develop. There are there-
fore important gradations underlying Avicenna’s use of the term maʿnā in the context
of his epistemology.¹⁶³
In a critical passage of Introduction I.12, Avicenna proceeds to break down these
various components and stages for the purpose of didactic clarity. He explains in de-
tail how the universal is formed or fashioned in the mind, and how it is to be distin-
guished from the meaning or nature of pure quiddity. In order to do so, he introduces
another set of distinctions that have a direct bearing on these points, but which he
claims is commonly used by philosophers in order to treat the five universal predi-
cates (genus, species, differentia, property, and accident) and differentiate between
them. These distinctions are between ‘the natural’ (al-ṭabīʿī), ‘the logical’ (al-manṭi-
qī), and ‘the intellectual’ (al-ʿaqlī). What is particularly striking is that Avicenna im-
plements this framework in order to discuss not the difference between these five
universals qua universals, but rather between universal genus and species, on the
one hand, and pure quiddity qua nature, on the other. Again, the implication is
that a nature is extensionally broader than a universal. In that chapter, Avicenna
goes to quite some length to explain the process by which the universal maʿnā is ela-
borated in the human mind: quiddity in itself, qua nature (ṭabīʿah) or ‘the natural,’
combines with ‘the logical’ or with universality as expressed by logical genus or spe-

 Avicenna, Introduction, I.12, 65.18‒19; 66.7‒11. In the latter passage, the master provides an anal-
ogy between how form inheres in the bed and how whiteness inheres in cloth, on the one hand, to
how commonality or universality and genusness combine with the pure quiddity animalness in the
mind, on the other. The master habitually speaks of universality, oneness, and plurality as the main
concomitants to be added to quiddity in itself in the mind, but he sometimes includes existence as
well. This would make existence itself one of the necessary concomitants of quiddity. Hence, although
one might not embrace the idea that Avicenna regarded existence as being added to essence in the
concrete world, there is no doubt that this holds with regard to mental existence. Moreover, one may
wonder whether existence is really a distinct concomitant added to quiddity or, rather, a state that
arises when the other concomitants—chief among which are universality, oneness, multiplicity—
arise in the mind alongside quiddity. In other words, is mental existence the result of a synthetic
process of these concomitants attaching to pure quiddity or is it itself a distinct concomitant? Avicen-
na seems to hold the latter view.
 These points should be connected to the previous discussion regarding the human mind’s abil-
ity to unify and divide concepts at will; in this case, various maʿānī can be combined to create new
concepts. Avicenna’s use of the term maʿnā in Text 5 in connection with pure quiddity and its various
accidents finds an important precedent in the works of his Christian predecessor Yaḥyā b. ʿAdī. Yaḥyā
employs the term maʿnā to refer to an aspect of ‘pure’ or ‘absolute’ quiddity, as well as to other men-
tal intentions that accrue to this pure quiddity. According to Yaḥyā, therefore, the maʿnā ‘human
being’ or ‘animal’ is neither universal nor particular, and universality is an additional maʿnā
added to it in the mind. What is more, Yaḥyā outlines a threefold distinction of essence or form in
terms of a maʿnā that can be in particulars, in the mind, or taken absolutely (muṭlaq); see Adamson,
Knowledge of Universals, 153‒157. In brief, what is striking is not only the doctrinal parallels between
these two thinkers, but also their shared reliance on the term maʿnā to describe these various aspects
of essence.
 1 The terminological inquiry 141

cies, to form ‘the intellectual,’ that is, the universal, intelligible concept. Avicenna’s
reliance on this nomenclature closely mirrors his use of the term maʿnā in connec-
tion with concept formation, since each one of these three stages can be described
as a distinct maʿnā or meaning in that process: the maʿnā of quiddity in itself com-
bines with the maʿnā of the logical universal to produce the maʿnā of the universal
intelligible. What is particularly important here is the fact that these various aspects
of quiddity—the natural, the logical, and the intellectual—are themselves described
as notions or meanings (maʿānī), very much in line with the other texts that were ex-
amined thus far. These various maʿānī combine to compose the universal quiddity, so
that there is a progression from quiddity in itself or nature (ṭabīʿah) qua maʿnā, to the
logical genus qua maʿnā, to, finally, the universal quiddity qua maʿnā.
This threefold scheme, which Avicenna appears to have inherited from late-anti-
que sources, provides the conceptual framework for his discussion of quiddity in
much of Introduction I.12.¹⁶⁴ Briefly put, these terms refer to different ways of consid-
ering quiddity and of describing it according to its relation to the concrete and men-
tal concomitants. Nature (al-ṭabīʿah), and occasionally the natural (al-ṭabīʿī), desig-
nates in Avicennian nomenclature pure quiddity or quiddity in itself, presumably
in reference to its foundational status for each existent, but without its adjoining
concomitants. Nature, for Avicenna, is quiddity divested from its concrete and men-
tal attributes, and in that sense it is used interchangeably with the expressions pure
quiddity and reality (ḥaqīqah).¹⁶⁵ Note, however, that Avicenna uses the term ṭabīʿah
to refer to pure quiddity both in the concrete world and in the mind. So nature is pure
quiddity considered either in an extramental or mental context. This has important
epistemological and ontological implications that will be discussed later on. Next is
the logical (al-manṭiqī), which refers to the attribute of universality that attaches to
the nature or pure quiddity in the mind together with the notions of genusness or
speciesness. Thus, for instance, the natures ‘animalness’ and ‘humanness’ become
universal logical notions when they combine with ‘genusness’ and ‘speciesness’ re-
spectively in the mind. According to this process, ‘the logical’ attaches to nature or
‘the natural’ to constitute the universal, which is called in this case ‘the intellectual’

 This terminology is analyzed in Marmura, Quiddity and Universality, and idem, Avicenna’s
Chapter on Universals. For the late-antique background, see Sorabji, The Philosophy, vol. 3, 128 ff.;
idem, Universals Transformed; and de Libera, La querelle, 230 ff.
 See Avicenna, Pointers, vol. 1, 202‒205, where these technical terms are used by the master.
There is therefore a wide gap in the way Avicenna and the Ashʿarite mutakallimūn construe the
term ḥaqīqah and how it relates to existence. While it denotes essence or quiddity for Avicenna,
for the latter, it refers to actual existence. Witness, for example, Juwaynī’s definition in his
Summa: “The essential reality of an entity is existence; existence is not a meaning superadded to es-
sence [ḥaqīqat al-dhāt al-wujūd wa-laysa l-wujūd maʿnā zāʾid ʿalā l-dhāt],” in Frank, The Ashʿarite On-
tology, 175. Cf. Bahmanyār in his The Book of Validated Knowledge, 11.16‒18: existence is related to (or
added to, muḍāf ilā) and exterior to (khārij) the true nature (ḥaqīqah) of quiddity.
142 II Quiddity in Itself and Mental Existence

(al-ʿaqlī).¹⁶⁶ However, the term ‘intellectual,’ which is used widely by Avicenna in his
discussion of quiddity in Introduction, is inherently ambiguous. For it can refer either
specifically to the universal, qua concept that actually exists in the mind, or it can be
applied more loosely to any of the previous three aspects of quiddity, including ‘the
nature’ or ‘natural’ and ‘the logical.’ In the case of nature or the natural, the impli-
cation could be that the nature that exists in the concrete individuals can be abstract-
ed by the mind and contemplated in abstraction from the concrete concomitants. In
that sense, this nature is intellectual. As for ‘the logical,’ it is plainly intellectual in
the sense that it has no correspondence in the extramental world and is a consider-
ation of universality produced by the thinking mind. In order to avoid potential mis-
understandings, I find it useful to distinguish between two uses of the term ʿaqlī by
Avicenna: a general sense, or ʿaqlī¹, which refers to meanings or intentions in the
mind without any clear entailment of intellectual existence; and ʿaqlī², which is
used to refer specifically to the universal mental existent.
Pondering a moment longer on this important term is advisable, since it is direct-
ly relevant to the present query. Notice that the universal mental existent in the
strong sense, or ʿaqlī², is at root a combination or synthesis of these distinctions,
namely, ‘quiddity in itself’ or ‘nature’ taken as ʿaqlī¹ together with ‘the logical’
also taken as ʿaqlī¹. This synthesis yields the universal quiddity taken qua intellectual
existent (ʿaqlī²). For instance, universal animal is a synthesis, so to speak, of the na-
ture ‘animalness or animal in itself’ (which can be described as ʿaqlī¹, as being mere-
ly in the intellect but not qua universal existent) with the logical genus (al-jins al-
manṭiqī, which is also ʿaqlī¹). Together they produce ‘universal animal genus’ or
‘the intellectual genus’ (al-jins al-ʿaqlī), which is both the universal aspect of quiddity
and a mental existent in the strong sense (and hence ʿaqlī²). Hence, just as the uni-
versal is a composite of various meanings (maʿānī), it is also a composite of various
intellectual (ʿaqlī) aspects or considerations. This process of mental synthesis and
concept formation implies prior and posterior notions. Since the universal is a com-
bination of the natural and the logical, it is posterior and follows these considera-
tions essentially and conceptually. The precedence and autonomy of the meaning
of pure quiddity (or nature) help to explain why Avicenna distinguishes sharply
the intellectual, ʿaqlī², qua full-blown mental existent, from nature and the logical;
these are different meanings, maʿānī, which also correspond to distinct entities in the
mind.¹⁶⁷ The maʿnā of the nature or pure quiddity is the starting point of the various
conceptual stages underlying the formation of the universal consideration of quiddi-

 Avicenna, Notes, 61.1‒2, section 49: “Genusness inasmuch as it is genusness [al-jinsiyyah min
ḥaythu hiya jinsiyyah], if it is considered not in a specific way, such as [when it is connected] with
body or animal, for instance, or with something else—that is, among the notions that attach to
them [viz., the quiddities]—is [called] ‘the logical genus’ [hiya l-jins al-manṭiqī].” Cf. Notes, 56, section
40; and 60, section 47, where Avicenna explains that genusness (jinsiyyah) and speciesness (na-
wʿiyyah) are other than pure quiddity.
 Avicenna, Introduction, I.12, 67.10‒11.
 1 The terminological inquiry 143

ty. It is abstracted by the mind and represents the core meaning to which universality
attaches. As for the logical/manṭiqī aspect of quiddity, it is an operation unfolding in
the human mind, but it is not ontologically tantamount to universal quiddity. It is, in
effect, located somewhere between quiddity in itself and universal quiddity, and it is
a requisite attribute or concomitant for the full-fledged universal to emerge in the
mind. This mental ordering and sequentiality explains Avicenna’s statement to the
effect that the universal intellectual existent, or ʿaqlī², “follows [or is a concomitant,
lāzim] and is connected with [muqārin]” the logical meaning, although the two are
not identical.¹⁶⁸ For the intellectual existent, orʿaqlī², has a substrate/subject and a
logical genusness and universality, and, hence, is composite and synthetic. It is dis-
tinct from quiddity in itself and logical genus or genusness per se. ¹⁶⁹
Hence, inasmuch as ‘the natural,’ ‘the logical,’ and ‘the intellectual’ can all be
described as mental notions, as being conceivable or apprehended by the mind,
they all correspond to notions or meanings (maʿānī) in the mind. But this point is
intertwined with ontological considerations as well, since at least one of them corre-
sponds to a mental existent: namely, the intellectual in the sense of ʿaqlī². Finally, if
there is an existing mental concept of pure quiddity in the mind, it would correspond
to ‘the natural.’¹⁷⁰ What is more, these various maʿānī, like the various iʿtibārāt of
quiddity, can be associated or dissociated at will. The crucial upshot is that, just
as we can have an iʿtibār of pure quiddity that does not correspond to the iʿtibār
of universal quiddity, we can know the maʿnā of pure quiddity as distinct from the
maʿnā of the universal. In addition, the maʿnā of the universal is itself a combination
of the natural and logical maʿānī. Finally, while all three maʿānī are loosely intellec-
tual or mental, the natural or nature in addition has a maʿnā that is not restricted to
the mind, given its role in establishing a relation between the mind and external ob-
jects. In a sense, this maʿnā of nature can be said to exist in the concrete individuals.
I shall return to this feature of Avicenna’s doctrine later on in chapter III.
One important implication of the foregoing is that Avicenna regards what I have
called the ‘quidditative meaning,’ that is, the maʿnā of quiddity in itself, as concep-
tually and essentially preceding the full-fledged mental universal being. It is prior to
the mental universal insofar as the quidditative meaning needs to combine with
other meanings (maʿānī) and concomitants (lawāzim) in order to become a universal
mental existent. The quidditative meaning itself is simple and, hence, the starting

 Avicenna, Introduction, I.12, 67.12‒13.

 Avicenna, Introduction, I.12, 68.17‒69.1. In Notes, 56, section 40, Avicenna argues that genusness
(jinsiyyah) and speciesness (nawʿiyyah) differ from pure quiddity; like universality or oneness, they
are mental external concomitants added to quiddity. At Notes, 60, section 47, the master distinguishes
between genusness and universality on the grounds that if the two were identical, universality could
not be ascribed also to speciesness.
 This last point captures the ambiguity of the concept of nature or ṭabīʿah, which is used by Avi-
cenna primarily to refer to quiddity in concrete beings, but which also by extension refers to the quid-
dity or nature abstracted from these concrete beings in the mind.
144 II Quiddity in Itself and Mental Existence

point or foundation of the various stages required to produce a mental existent. How-
ever, this process does not prevent one also from regarding each one of the universal
concepts as one and simple in a certain way. In fact, Avicenna repeatedly stresses
that the intelligibles are one and simple. As in the case of the separate intellects,
however, this statement requires qualification: a universal is a unitary mental entity
when regarded from one angle, but complex and synthetic when regarded from an-
other.¹⁷¹ Avicenna’s reliance on the term maʿnā to describe these various stages and
to designate pure quiddity specifically is noteworthy, because these stages corre-
spond neither to the final mental universal state of essence, nor strictly to its state
of existent in the concrete world. Rather, this term exposes the status of quiddity
in itself before it assumes the status of full-fledged mental existent. Consequently,
pure quiddity can be regarded as an irreducible quidditative meaning (maʿnā).
This irreducible quidditative meaning can be conceived by the human mind in ab-
straction from anything else and in isolation of universality and particularity. It is
therefore also distinct from concrete and mental existence. However, it was shown
that it also underlies the universal aspect of quiddity. By replacing the term māhiyyah
with the term maʿnā, and by explicitly dissociating both from actual composite men-
tal existence, Avicenna is in effect stating that the consideration (iʿtibār) of quiddity
in itself that is apprehended in the human mind is a maʿnā, a quidditative meaning,
that is present in the human intellect without it amounting to or constituting a case
of actual composite mental existence on a par with the universal. In the final anal-
ysis, it would seem that there are maʿānī or quidditative meanings that are present,
or even possibly exist, in the mind in abstraction from the various properties tradi-
tionally associated with mental existence and that would stand in contradistinction
to the universal existents.¹⁷² Yet again, these points bring us to the threshold of the
problem of how these special entities relate to the sphere of mental existence.

 It is perhaps to this pure, simple quiddity that a passage of Notes, 409.12, refers; there one finds
the statement that “the intellectual meaning [maʿnā] does not divide according to a multiplicity; it
has a simple essence (aḥadī l-dhāt).” It is important to keep in mind in this regard that the simplicity
of the universals will be relative, especially when compared to that of pure quiddity. For the universal
can be subjected to analytical thought and broken down into pure essence, on the one hand, and the
various mental concomitants that attach to it, on the other.
 At this juncture, it is worth invoking the beginning of Metaphysics I.5, where Avicenna introdu-
ces ‘the thing’ (al-shayʾ)—another technical term denoting essence that is closely related to quiddity
(māhiyyah)—as a primary notion and, hence, as one whose meaning is immediately and intuitively
grasped. Note that Avicenna also describes the thing/al-shayʾ as “a meaning” (maʿnā), and, further,
as a primary and irreducible meaning grounded in the human rational soul. As such, it can be under-
stood intuitively in abstraction from the other meaning of ‘the existent’ (al-mawjūd). By virtue of
being primary and indefinable, ‘the existent’ and ‘the thing’ represent irreducible epistemological no-
tions or meanings (maʿānī), and as such they are apprehended in abstraction from the various prop-
erties that may attach to them when mental existents are ultimately constituted. This suggests that
‘the thing’ qua primary notion discussed in Metaphysics could correspond to the third aspect of quid-
dity Avicenna mentions in Introduction I.5, which can be considered ‘in itself’ and in abstraction from
concrete and mental existence. In brief, it is certainly not a coincidence that Avicenna in Introduction
 1 The terminological inquiry 145

Heretofore the analysis has focused on maʿnā as a meaning or notion in the

mind, an aspect that connects smoothly with the epistemic, logical, and conceptual
dimension of this term and its relation to māhiyyah. However, it is noteworthy that
Avicenna often extends maʿnā to his descriptions of the exterior world and applies
it to the concrete, individual existents. In this context, the quidditative maʿnā is pre-
dicated of concrete beings and is used interchangeably with the notions of essential
nature (ṭabīʿah) and reality (ḥaqīqah), all of which are supposed to indicate the quid-
dity of the concrete being. But is Avicenna really implying in those passages that
maʿnā has an entitative reality or existence outside the mind, or is he merely suggest-
ing that the conceptual analysis of quiddity allows us to project logical meanings
and notions onto the concrete beings? A tentative resolution of this complicated
problem must be deferred until chapter III. For now suffice to say that the potential
entitative aspect of maʿnā is most pronounced in Avicenna’s discussion of the com-
mon nature in concrete beings. For the master at times seems to imply that the quid-
ditative maʿnā that exists in the mind also has an entitative grounding in the con-
crete world.¹⁷³ Witness, for example, a passage from Salvation (Text 11, discussed
more fully below), which describes an existent maʿnā in mental and concrete beings:
there Avicenna claims that “a quidditative meaning [al-maʿnā] has an existence
[wujūd] in concrete reality and an existence in the soul.” In fact, there are many
other passages in Avicenna’s metaphysical works where the term maʿnā seems to
lend itself to an entitative interpretation, rather than to a merely logical one. In Met-
aphysics, I.2, Avicenna explains that what is investigated in the science of metaphy-
sics is maʿnā, regardless of whether this maʿnā needs matter to exist. Some lines
below, he adds that the science of metaphysics studies the mode of existence
(naḥw al-wujūd) of things (umūr). These things “all have in common the fact that

I.12 refers to the quiddity of animal in itself as a maʿnā, which is the same word he uses to describe
‘the thing’ as a primary meaning in Metaphysics I.5. By extrapolation, if ‘the thing’ or quiddity is a
primary and irreducible meaning (maʿnā) distinct from the concept of existence, and if all quiddities
in themselves (e. g., animal) are such meanings (maʿānī), then it is possible that these essential mean-
ings would correspond (as a class) to the third consideration of essence Avicenna sometimes adum-
brates, that is, essence taken ‘in itself.’ Here the distinction between the thing and pure quiddities, on
the one hand, and the existent, on the other, would not deprive the thing and the pure quiddities of
an ontological status in the mind; the distinction would be primarily intentional, insofar as we would
be intentionally aware of existence when thinking ‘the existent’ and not necessarily when thinking
‘the thing’; but both objects would exist in the mind. This interpretation, which revolves around
the key term maʿnā, brings together Avicenna’s discussion in Introduction, Metaphysics I.5 and V.1
in an integrated manner, and shows the degree of intertwinement between his logical and metaphys-
ical theories.
 There are two contexts in which this tendency materializes in the Avicennian corpus: first, with
regard to the separate, immaterial beings, where the use of the term maʿnā is particularly ambiguous,
given that, in them, thought and existence are indistinguishable or, at the very least, closely inter-
twined; and, second, with regard to pure quiddity, whose intelligibility for Avicenna is primordial,
but which is frequently located in the concrete beings. An extensive study of this key term in the Ara-
bic philosophical tradition is still lacking.
146 II Quiddity in Itself and Mental Existence

the mode of investigation pertaining to them is in the direction of a maʿnā whose ex-
istence is not in matter.”¹⁷⁴ This passage is admittedly ambiguous and could refer to
the meanings that are extracted from concrete beings and constructed by the analyt-
ical mind, without these meanings or notions having to exist in the concrete world.
But the phrasing of this passage alternately and more likely suggests that these
maʿānī could be said to exist in the real, concrete world, so that they would not
be completely mind-dependent after all. This coheres with a more literal and direct
reading of Avicenna’s statement. Construed along this line, this passage suggests that
all existents, even material things, have a maʿnā that exists in or with them and that
does not require matter for its existence. Likewise, in Metaphysics IV.2, when Avicen-
na refers to the existent and nonexistent maʿānī, he does not seem to restrict them to
notions in the mind, since he explains that the existent maʿnā exists “not in a sub-
ject,” which is the master’s definition of substance. In other word, the maʿnā that ex-
ists not in a subject presumably exists in the concrete world. Finally, in VI.4, Avicen-
na notes that form is said “of every maʿnā in actuality” and infers from this that “the
separate substances are forms.”¹⁷⁵ Here again, maʿnā can only awkwardly be trans-
lated as ‘meaning’ or ‘notion’ in the mind and would seem, rather, to refer to some-
thing substantial or entitative and actual in the concrete world. Thus, in many pas-
sages, Avicenna identifies maʿnā with the quiddities in concrete beings, whose exact
ontological status nevertheless remains to be clarified. It is this particular—and ad-
mittedly secondary—use of the term maʿnā that suggests a possible link with kalām
usages, where maʿnā is grounded in exterior reality and also establishes a link with
mental descriptions and attribution. Hence, the way Avicenna handles this term at
the very least raises the possibility of an entitative grounding of maʿnā in the con-
crete world and also broaches the question of how the maʿnā in the mind relates
to the maʿnā outside the mind.¹⁷⁶
So far, the analysis has shown (a) that Avicenna frequently describes quiddity in
itself as a maʿnā; (b) that a maʿnā in this context is chiefly an irreducible quidditative
meaning and notion that is conceived in the mind and that has a correspondence
with the nature that exists in concrete individual things; this quidditative meaning
also corresponds to the essential definitions of things (i. e., their ḥadd) (c) that
other external meanings (maʿānī, which also correspond to external concomitants,

 Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Cure, I.2, 16.7‒8; translated by Marmura in Avicenna, The Meta-
physics, 12.
 Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Cure, VI.4, 282.6‒7.
 Many passages in Avicenna, e. g., Notes, 153, sections 217 and 218 (among many others) indicate
an entitative understanding of the term maʿnā. This tension was inherited by later thinkers. For in-
stance, Jurjānī, who reconciled philosophical and theological elements in his works, recognizes
the primarily mental sphere of maʿnā, but also connects it with quiddity and true reality, likely as
a result of Avicenna’s influence. As he explains: inasmuch as it is something designated by language
it is a maʿnā; inasmuch as it is something cognized, it is a mafhūm; inasmuch as it responds to the
question ‘what is it?’ it is a māhiyyah; and inasmuch as it is something actual in the concrete, exterior
world, it is a ḥaqīqah; see Jurjānī, Definitions, 274.
 1 The terminological inquiry 147

lawāzim) can be added to this core, quidditative maʿnā to constitute the complex uni-
versal mental existent. Additionally, given (c), it appears (d) that the fundamental
maʿnā underlies, essentially precedes, and is even constitutive of, the universal as-
pect of quiddity. The analysis also suggests (e) that the Avicennian notion of
maʿnā may be extensionally broader than that of the mental existent as customarily
defined (i. e., the conditioned, composite universal intelligibles), since the maʿnā of
nature or pure quiddity underlies the universal intelligible and is a condition for its
existence, even though it is not identical with it and can be envisaged on its own.
Hence, insofar as it is mental, it is an intellectual concept (ʿaqlī¹), which is neverthe-
less to be distinguished from the composite concept of the universal existent (ʿaqlī²).
One can conclude from the foregoing that Avicenna seems to be carefully negotiating
a new mental status for pure quiddity: it is intelligible and intellectual, without being
identifiable with a composite universal existent in the mind. Finally, there are hints
that Avicenna, like earlier and contemporary mutakallimūn, applied the term
maʿnā both to mental and concrete entities. Since this term is applied to pure quid-
dity, and since Avicenna does posit the existence of quiddity in the mind and in the
concrete world, this is not altogether surprising, although it will require clarification.
In the meantime, it should be pointed out that Avicenna’s tendency to extend maʿnā
to the concrete world to describe real entities may not be due only to an influence
coming from kalām. It may stem also from the homological use of the Greek term
εἶδως—and the equivalent Arabic term ṣūrah—to describe objects in the mind (i. e.,
the mental forms) as well as the substantial forms immanent in concrete beings.
For Avicenna, maʿnā qua quiddity is closely related to both aspects.
At any rate, we are now in a better position to try to answer the theoretical ques-
tions that were raised at the beginning of the terminological analysis, namely, wheth-
er quiddity in itself is a ‘nothing’ or a ‘something,’ and, if so, how this ‘something’
relates to mental existence. Quiddity in itself is ‘something’ in that it may be defined
as a consideration, a form, an intelligible, an ‘intellectual’ (ʿaqlī) object, and, most
importantly, an irreducible and simple quidditative meaning (maʿnā). In that
sense, it is clearly a mental entity, which is conceivable and conveys information,
and so is productive of knowledge and science in the mind. Furthermore, while it
is constitutive of universal mental existents, Avicenna does not want us to conceive
of this maʿnā as a ‘standard’ mental existent on a par with the composite universal
concept. In this connection, the foregoing remarks raise a tantalizing hypothesis con-
cerning the ontological status of maʿnā. This is supported by the previous observa-
tions on the terms iʿtibār, ṣūrah, and maʿqūl, which Avicenna employs to describe
pure quiddity. It was suggested that quiddity in itself could possess a distinct subsis-
tence or existence in the mind that would nevertheless be distinct from that of the
full-fledged universal. If this hypothesis proved to be correct, it would to some extent
entail a redefinition of the category of mental existence in Avicenna. This intricate
question will be tackled in earnest later on. Here one should note a relevant and in-
teresting case study concerning Avicenna’s application of the term maʿnā to the di-
vine essence. Avicenna claims that God possesses a maʿnā, a quidditative meaning,
148 II Quiddity in Itself and Mental Existence

which is unique and known to Him alone. Since God is pure existence, and since any
quiddity that may be posited of Him is identical with His necessary existence, this
divine maʿnā would, by the same token, be identical with God’s necessary existence.
So the quidditative maʿnā posited of God exists in God qua this existence, and God
knows His maʿnā as pure existence. In other words, God’s maʿnā necessitates the
postulation of a unique and distinct mode of existence. This divine existence clearly
is not comparable to the mode of existence that characterizes contingent beings.
These remarks raise the possibility that this divine quidditative meaning or entity,
this divine maʿnā, corresponds to a special kind of existence. It also raises the pos-
sibility that something similar could apply to quiddity in itself, namely, that its
maʿnā would correspond to a special mode of existence that would not be collapsible
with that of the conditioned and contingent beings Avicenna routinely talks about.

1.4 Conclusion

Several important points stand out clearly at this juncture. The previous terminolog-
ical investigation showed beyond doubt that quiddity in itself is an object of consid-
eration in the human mind and can be apprehended by the human mind in a rational
and intellectual way. As a result, it is an intellectual concept and form. Qua perfectly
abstract iʿtibār and maʿnā, pure quiddity should be distinguished from the other
iʿtibārāt and maʿānī that are located in the lower psychological faculties, such as
the imagination and estimation, and which are tied to individual things and their ac-
cidents and do not amount to purely abstract mental objects. What is more, quiddity
taken in itself is a concept that is distinct from the complex universal (made up of
pure quiddity and a cluster of mental attributes), since it is conceived of in abstrac-
tion from all mental concomitants, including universality, oneness, etc. In light of
these points, one can conclude that pure quiddity is, at the very least, epistemically
and intellectually irreducible and distinct. By epistemically irreducible, I mean that
pure essence requires nothing else or nothing external to itself that would be more
basic than itself in order to be intelligible and convey meaning or information.
Since it is considered only in itself, neither the concrete nor the mental concomitants
are necessary for the mind to apprehend it and cognize its fundamental meaning
(maʿnā). Moreover, pure quiddity is epistemically irreducible, because it is conceiva-
ble in itself even when it is considered as a part of the complex existents, as in the
case of the universal concept. This explains why Avicenna states at Metaphysics
V.1.201.8 that it is possible to conceive of pure quiddity, “even when it is with
other things” (wa-in kāna maʿa ghayrihi). By epistemically distinct, I mean that it
is an object whose conception occurs in the mind as a separate and autonomous con-
ceptual act and in abstraction from all other considerations. This, after all, is why
Avicenna in Introduction I.2 includes it as one of three distinct “mental considera-
tions” (iʿtibārāt) of quiddity. The epistemic dimension teased out above should
come as no surprise if one recalls that whenever Avicenna broaches the topic of quid-
 1 The terminological inquiry 149

dity in itself, it is usually in connection with human psychology and the cognitive
operations of the human soul. The technical terminology he uses to describe it—
iʿtibār, maʿnā, ṣūrah maʿqūlah, and ʿaqlī—is intentional or mind-related in nature
and indicative of cognitive states or processes unfolding in the soul. The terminolog-
ical evidence therefore strongly points to Avicenna’s intention to lay out the episte-
mological and psychological implications of pure quiddity and to elucidate its role in
human cognition. This terminology and the triplex consideration of essence is dis-
cussed both in his logical and metaphysical works. In light of these results, the in-
tellectual status of pure quiddity as an object of thought seems beyond question-
ing.¹⁷⁷
The more intricate difficulty I began to address in this chapter, however, was
whether quiddity in itself could be ascribed some kind of distinct mental existence,
as Marmura briefly intimated. Some preliminary thoughts on this topic can be
sketched purely on the basis of the previous terminological inquiry. Part of the
issue at stake in the foregoing was to determine whether Avicenna’s terminology
of pure quiddity designates it as a full-fledged intellectual existent or as something
lesser than that. Avicenna’s tendency to refer to quiddity in itself as a consideration
(iʿtibār) could initially convey the impression that it is not to be located in the human
intellect proper, but rather constitutes a lesser cognitive phenomenon, to be connect-
ed, perhaps, with the lower faculties of the human soul, such as imagination and/or
estimation.¹⁷⁸ As was noted above, this position is hardly tenable. Were quiddity in
itself sub-intellectual and to amount to a mere estimative phenomenon, as opposed
to a real mental existent and intelligible, it would not constitute a real object of
knowledge, since only intellectual concepts or maʿqūlāt produce real, scientific
knowledge in the human soul according to Avicenna. But the master seems to regard
the consideration of quiddity in itself as being fundamentally knowledge producing,
since it informs us about the irreducible and distinct whatness, essence, and nature
of a thing. It is a unified concept that arises in our mind from the essential definition.
Its universality is merely an added intentionality or meaning to the effect that this
essence can be predicated of and applied to many concrete instances. Consequently,
it would make more sense to regard quiddity in itself, rather than the universal, as
being connected with intellectual knowledge and the intellect in a fundamental way.
Moreover, the terminological evidence accords with an analysis of the conceivability

 The commensurate nature of the evidence drawn from Avicenna’s logical and metaphysical
works is noteworthy. As Bertolacci has shown, there is much congruence between Avicenna’s logical
and metaphysical works, which were meant to function in a complementary manner. In these passag-
es, three senses of quiddity can be identified: one corresponds to universal existents, the other to con-
crete existents, and one to quiddity in itself. That the third distinction of quiddity (quiddity in itself)
discussed in Metaphysics corresponds to the one broached in Introduction is clear, given the similarity
of the doctrinal and terminological evidence that appears in both passages.
 Goichon, La distinction, 92, had already noticed that, according to Avicenna, the maʿānī appear
already at the level of estimation.
150 II Quiddity in Itself and Mental Existence

of pure quiddity, which places it squarely in the camp of conceivable and possible
notions, not in that of inconceivable and impossible notions or of imaginables. To
Avicenna, what is conceivable must somehow exist in the intellect, so that a certain
commensurability arises between intellectual conceivability and intellectual exis-
tence.
Alternatively, the term iʿtibār could suggest that we are dealing with a rational
operation or logical object, and even with an intellectual object, which, however,
would not qualify as a full-blown universal intelligible and intellectual existent, be-
cause it fails to fulfill the criteria of intellectual existence, and also because it does
not possess the concomitants associated with such a mode of existence. According to
this approach, the consideration of quiddity in itself would not deserve the status of
a mental or intellectual existent. It would stand in sharp contrast to universal quid-
dity, or to the quiddity associated with the universal mental existent, which amounts
to an instance of true mental existence. But this hypothesis also runs into difficulty.
Some of the terms Avicenna relies on are quite indicative of an ontological content:
he describes quiddity in itself as a meaning or idea (maʿnā), an intelligible form
(ṣūrah maʿqūlah), and more loosely as something intellectual (ʿaqlī), all of which sug-
gest not just its location in the intellect proper, but possibly also its status as a men-
tal existent of some kind. Recall in this connection that the terms maʿnā and ṣūrah
can be used as synonyms of maʿqūl and mean a ‘concept’ and an ‘intelligible.’ Ac-
cordingly, the term maʿnā/maʿānī appears frequently in the Greek to Arabic transla-
tions as an equivalent of maʿqūlāt. Avicenna seems to use these various terms inter-
changeably with regard to essence in the mind. Hence, to limit the terminological
analysis of pure quiddity to the term iʿtibār, as has been customary thus far, provides
a lop-sided interpretation of the lexicographic evidence.¹⁷⁹
The foregoing remarks have shed some light on the relationship between pure
quiddity and mental existence, even if the results we reached have been mostly neg-
ative. In other words, they tell us what pure essence in the mind is not. It should not
be regarded as a mental existent according to the standard definition of universal
mental existence Avicenna provides in his works. Although there is a sense in
which quiddity in itself can be regarded as being intellectual, since it is a rational
and conceivable object, it is not, a priori, a full-fledged mental existent, or, more pre-
cisely, it does not coincide with the usual criteria of mental existence the master out-
lines in his works.¹⁸⁰ Because it possesses none of the concomitants associated with

 Previous scholarly analyses of Avicenna’s terminology of quiddity in the mind, such as those by
Izutsu and Rahman, have focused exclusively on the term iʿtibār and thus provide a partial account of
the evidence, which, moreover, does not put the emphasis on intellectuality.
 Or with the criteria of mental existence modern scholars have outlined on behalf of Avicenna,
and which necessarily include immateriality and universality. The claim that only universals—defined
here as complex, synthetic, and intention-laden mental objects—can exist in the intellect is one fre-
quently encountered in modern studies, but it is not one that Avicenna himself explicitly makes. But
 1 The terminological inquiry 151

mental existence, it would appear that quiddity simply cannot be a universal mental
existent in the way this notion is habitually understood. In the process of showing
this, the analysis also cast some light on the causality involved in the production
of complex mental existents and on the mereological relation between them and
quiddity in itself.
In hindsight, it appears that the technical terms Avicenna relies on to describe
pure quiddity are consistent throughout his logical and metaphysical works. They
designate it as an object or entity in the human mind, a cognitive state, and even
possibly a distinct intellectual existent, although the last point remains to be estab-
lished. While some of these terms are ontologically neutral and could be interpreted
primarily along logical or conceptual lines—this is the case of iʿtibār and maʿnā—oth-
ers are more indicative of mental existence and substantiality—this is the case nota-
bly of ṣūrah and certainly of ṣūrah maʿqūlah. Taken on its own, the term iʿtibār is
more puzzling than anything else, but when it is subjected to minute analysis and
juxtaposed to these other terms, a consistent picture of quiddity in itself as some-
thing entitative and ontologically grounded in the intellect that transcends a mere
subjective and conceptual aspect slowly emerges. These points would in turn explain
why Avicenna decides to refer to it as something ʿaqlī (intelligible or intellectual) in
Introduction I.12, a term which would be hard to account for were quiddity something
lesser than an intelligible form.¹⁸¹ In brief, then, the results attained in chapter II sug-
gest that in addition to being epistemically irreducible and distinct, pure quiddity
could also be ontologically irreducible and distinct, at the very least with regard to
its existence in the mind. This issue needs to be further investigated.
Nevertheless, with regard to this particular point, the previous terminological
analysis appears to have led us to an impasse. If one is to locate quiddity in itself
in the intellect, as opposed to the lower faculties of the soul, and, moreover, if
one is to regard it as an intellectual form and intelligible, as Avicenna himself sug-
gests, then on what grounds would this consideration differ from that of universal
quiddity, which is firmly grounded in the intellect and identified with the universal
mental existents that the master describes at length in Introduction, Metaphysics, and
other works? Furthermore, is it not contradictory to surmise that quiddity can be con-
sidered purely in itself and in abstraction from all other things, while at the same
time being connected to existence in the mind? To answer these questions, the ana-
lytical focus must shift from Introduction I.2 to Metaphysics V.1‒2, which introduces
other crucial features of the problem of pure quiddity and also represents one of Avi-
cenna’s most protracted discussions of mental existence. Among the most important

we will see later on that pure quiddity is also a universal in a certain sense and that Avicenna rec-
ognizes various senses of universality.
 Unlike some postclassical thinkers, it is unlikely that Avicenna uses this term to refer to mental
objects that could loosely be said to be intellectual (ʿaqlī), while not fulfilling the criteria of mental
existence. This appears to be a development that postdates Avicenna and especially of the thirteenth
and fourteenth centuries.
152 II Quiddity in Itself and Mental Existence

features he discusses in this section are (a) the distinction between quiddity in itself
and universal quiddity; (b) the fact that pure quiddity somehow underlies both men-
tal and extramental existents; and (c) that quiddity in itself possesses existence
(wujūd) (whose exact nature or mode remains nevertheless to be elucidated). In
brief, although the foregoing analysis has illuminated one negative aspect of the
problem—denying quiddity in itself the status of a full-fledged universal existent—
it has not generated sufficient insight into the question of its ontological status
and whether it could be said to possess its own positive mode of existence in the
mind. This issue is taken up below and also reassessed later in chapter IV.

2 Pure quiddity, universality, and mental existence

Let us take stock of the analysis conducted in the previous sections. One of Avicen-
na’s principal objectives in Introduction I.2 is to maintain the epistemological and
conceptual specificity and autonomy of quiddity in itself relative to other aspects
of quiddity and to situate it within the framework of his logical and metaphysical
system. This position is reaffirmed in Introduction I.12 and Metaphysics V.1‒2, but
there Avicenna complements his account with a typology of the universals and
some valuable comments on mental existence. Avicenna holds that the mind can
contemplate quiddity in itself in abstraction from mental and extramental existence
by divesting it of its various accidents and concomitants, such as universality and
particularity, oneness and plurality. Moreover, Avicenna believes that this consider-
ation of pure quiddity is one of three different considerations (iʿtibārāt) of quiddity
that the human mind can envisage, the others being quiddity as a universal in the
mind and quiddity embedded in concrete individuals in the extramental world.
These three considerations or aspects of quiddity can be described as being intellec-
tual or mental in a loose sense (ʿaqlī¹), because they are the product of human think-
ing and ratiocination. However, on first thought, only one of them amounts to a full-
fledged mental existent (ʿaqlī²), namely, the consideration of universal quiddity. Avi-
cenna also attempts a relative correlation between these three epistemological con-
siderations and his twofold ontological scheme of mental and extramental existents.
Quiddity as a universal in the mind corresponds to the mental existents (al-mawjūdāt
fī l-dhihn), while quiddity combined with material accidents pertains to the individ-
ual concrete existents of the extramental world (al-mawjūdāt fī l-aʿyān). This leaves
quiddity in itself without a definite ontological correlative. At any rate, Avicenna de-
scribes quiddity in itself as the object of a mental consideration on a par with the two
other aspects of quiddity. Because it is considered by or in the mind, quiddity in itself
possesses a mental, and even an intellectual, state, even though designating it as
such does not reveal anything specific about its ontological status and about its
exact relationship to mental existence. If anything, Avicenna seems intent to sepa-
rate this aspect of quiddity from the mental existent proper, which corresponds to
the universal. But on what grounds is this distinction achieved and justified? What
 2 Pure quiddity, universality, and mental existence 153

are the main differences between pure quiddity and universal quiddity? And how do
they bear on the issue of mental existence? In the following section, I intend to ex-
plore the Avicennian doctrine of mental existence as it pertains to pure quiddity and
challenge some of the main assumptions regarding it that have been formulated in
the modern literature on Avicenna.¹⁸²
Before embarking on this analytical journey, however, it is important to realize
that there is a cluster of reasons why scholars have resisted attributing a special men-
tal ontological status to pure quiddity. Providing some background on these interpre-
tive trends and on the main arguments articulated in the postclassical Arabic litera-
ture will help to contextualize the present issue. The first position, embodied mostly
in the Arabic theological or kalām tradition, simply denies the category of mental ex-
istence and regards only the extramental, concrete, and mind-independent entities
as true existents. This position developed quite early in Islam with the theologian
Abū l-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī (d. 935 CE), and it subsequently became a hallmark of the
Ashʿarite School of theology. The mutakallimūn establish a dichotomy between men-
tal entities, which they correlate with nonexistents (maʿdūmāt), and concrete enti-
ties, which constitute the realm of the existents (mawjūdāt) proper. Since the Ashʿar-
ites regard ‘the thing’ (al-shayʾ) and ‘the existent’ (al-mawjūd) as co-extensional, the
only things they tolerate as truly existing will be those that correspond to the con-
crete entities. On this view, all things will be existents, and all existents will exist
in the extramental, concrete world. With regard to the particular issue of mental ex-
istence, the Ashʿarites were joined by most Muʿtazilites, who also denied mental ex-
istence as a full-fledged ontological category. However, unlike the Ashʿarites, the
Muʿtazilites regarded mental entities as nonexistent things, since they held that
‘the thing’ was extensionally broader than ‘the existent.’ In other words, things,
for the Muʿtazilites, can be either existent or nonexistent, so that mental objects
are things, but do not truly exist. Regardless of this difference, these two theological
schools rejected the doctrine that mental objects could amount to a class of existents
proper and that mental existence was on a par with concrete existence. Consequent-
ly, the thinkers inscribed in these theological currents and willing to uphold its cen-
tral tenets would be reluctant to ascribe any kind of mental existence to the pure
quiddities posited by Avicenna, let alone to mental objects in general.¹⁸³
On this point, Avicenna and many of his followers depart sharply from the
Ashʿarite and Muʿtazilite theologians. As is well known, they not only acknowledge
mental existents, but make them an integral aspect of their metaphysical and epis-
temological system, by correlating ‘the thing’ with ‘the existent,’ and by extending

 The issue of mental existence and especially of what objects qualify as mental existents is pres-
ently at the forefront of much research in Avicenna and especially in the post-Avicennian tradition; in
addition to the studies by Marmura, Black, and Tahiri, already mentioned, see Fazlıoğlu, Between
Reality, and the forthcoming book by this same author on this subject.
 For Avicenna’s reaction to the kalām views on mental existence, see Wisnovsky, Avicenna, espe-
cially 105‒113.
154 II Quiddity in Itself and Mental Existence

the latter notion to include the mental entities and concepts. Yet, interestingly, this
did not prevent some postclassical thinkers strongly imbued with Avicennian philos-
ophy from rejecting the theory of the mental existence of quiddity in itself. This is
because even when the co-extensionality between ‘thing’ and ‘existent’ is granted,
and even when these notions are made to include mental entities, there remain at
the very least two compelling reasons for refusing to ascribe existence to pure quid-
dity. The first is the belief that the consideration of pure quiddity does not amount to
an intellectual existent, because that consideration is sub-intellectual in nature and
hence divested from true mental existence. This aspect of the problem, which I pre-
viously termed the faculty or intellectuality issue—i. e., determining whether the con-
sideration of pure essence pertains to the intellect or to another, lower, psychological
faculty—was tackled in the previous chapter.¹⁸⁴ Interestingly, however, this line of ar-
gument appears to have been rarely if ever embraced by later interpreters of Avicen-
na, who all seem to have implicitly recognized that the debate about pure quiddity
was situated at the level of the intellect and rational thought.¹⁸⁵
The second argument, in contrast, is premised on the idea of the intellectuality
of the consideration of pure quiddity, but shifts the focus on how the mental con-
comitants and accidents relate to quiddity in the mind. According to this view, the
consideration of pure quiddity can be described as intellectual, but in the sense of
merely logical or suppositional, and as excluding the conditions required for true in-
tellectual existence. For the Avicennians, to exist in the mind or in the intellect
means to exist with a definite set of mental properties. These mental properties qual-
ify and condition concepts in the intellect in a manner comparable to the way mate-
rial properties and accidents qualify exterior concrete beings. For example, the intel-
ligible or intellectual concept of horse is characterized by universality, which,
according to Avicenna, is a mental attribute attached to the quiddity horse. This en-
ables us to conceive of horses in general and to predicate horseness of all concrete
individual horses. Presumably, all concepts and true intellectual existents for the
Avicennians are universal. In addition, they possess other accidents, such as one-
ness, actuality, etc. Hence, the Avicennians, while not entirely denying mental exis-
tents like the Ashʿarites, imposed some important constrictions on its meaning and
devised a specific set of criteria to define them. This, in turn, could serve as a justi-
fication for denying that pure quiddity exists in the mind, since it is, by definition,

 This position was to my knowledge not systematically articulated by postclassical thinkers, but
it may be extrapolated on the grounds of some of their statements. For example, the expression iʿti-
bārāt ʿaqliyyah, ‘intellectual considerations,’ which appears in some of the postclassical sources, sug-
gests that some considerations were regarded as sub-intellectual and that there was therefore an im-
plicit hierarchy of considerations pertaining to the human soul.
 This, of course, should not be used as evidence to the effect that for Avicenna quiddity in itself
exists in the intellect, but it does tell us something important about how the Avicennian tradition ap-
proached this question and can also help orient our analysis.
 2 Pure quiddity, universality, and mental existence 155

not qualified by and subjected to these accidents.¹⁸⁶ This background information

helps us to delineate the issue at stake addressed in this chapter, which concerns
how pure quiddity relates to the mental accidents described above and, hence, to
the universal aspect of quiddity. In the postclassical philosophical sources, much
of the debate about quiddity and mental existence revolves around the role of
these mental accidents and concomitants and how they relate to pure quiddity.¹⁸⁷
Yet, since this issue finds its origin in the Avicennian works, it is all the more impor-
tant to precisely outline the way in which Avicenna himself dealt with this problem.
More specifically, one needs to inquire whether, on Avicenna’ view, mental existence
can be posited without corollary mental properties and concomitants.

2.1 The universal (al-kullī) and universality (al-kulliyyah) as a mental concomitant

Insight into this issue can be gained from Metaphysics V.1, which puts forth a detailed
discussion of the relationship between quiddity and universality. This implies a shift
from the general context of the essence/existence relationship as exposed in Meta-
physics I.5 to the more focused query of the relation of quiddity and existence as
this problem pertains to mental existence specifically. ¹⁸⁸ In the course of this impor-

 It is not clear how the argument concerning the iʿtibārī nature of pure quiddity in the mind re-
lates to that of the relation of quiddity to its mental concomitants, especially as these issues play out
in the postclassical tradition. With regard to Avicenna’s works, it seems justified to separate these two
points, or at least frame them in terms of two distinct questions: is the iʿtibār of pure quiddity intel-
lectual in nature? And how can the concept of pure quiddity exist in the mind in abstraction from any
mental concomitants? It is possible, however, that these two questions overlap already in Avicenna.
For if one grants—for argument’s sake—that this iʿtibār would be sub-intellectual, then as a corollary
it would not exist with the mental concomitants and criteria associated with a true universal concept,
namely, immateriality and universality. But the main ambiguity in Avicenna and in much of the post-
classical tradition is whether mental existence necessarily entails the presence of these concomitants.
Since there are obviously intellectual iʿtibārāt for Avicenna—and for some of his followers, such as
Ṭūsī—the question can be reformulated as to whether each and every intellectual consideration
would entail mental accidents on the model of universal quiddity. In view of these complications,
and for clarity’s sake, it seems more productive to separate both queries for the time being.
 I address some aspects of the postclassical discussion about quiddity and mental accidents
below. See also Izutsu, Basic Problems, who provides much insight into this issue.
 Marmura provided valuable insight into the question of how universality relates to quiddity. He
was also one of the first to realize that the main conceptual difficulty underlying quiddity in itself
resides in understanding how it differs from the universal concept and, hence, what its relation to
mental existence could be. As Marmura writes (Quiddity and Universality, 82): “A main ambiguity
in his [Avicenna’s] writings is the relation of the quiddity in itself to mental existence.” On those is-
sues, I depart from Bertolacci, who regards Metaphysics I.5 as representing the foundational text on
essence and existence. While this might be true on general terms, from the moment we identify the
main problem as being that of the relation of quiddity in itself to mental existence, then we need to
share our attention between Metaphysics I.5 and V.1. The latter text explores this relationship in depth
156 II Quiddity in Itself and Mental Existence

tant chapter, Avicenna sheds additional light on the status of quiddity in itself and
on its relationship to universal quiddity. There he makes a series of important points:
(a) he suggests, as in Introduction, that pure quiddity can be considered and con-
ceived of (iʿtabara, naẓara, taṣawwara) by the human mind in a manner distinct
from universality and, hence, from universal concepts; (b) he outlines specific crite-
ria to define the mental existence of universals; (c) he argues that, even though quid-
dity in itself can be distinguished from particular and universal things in the mind, it
is also somehow present in, and underlies, universals and particular existents; and,
finally, (d) he articulates a subtle ontological theory concerning the distinctness of
pure quiddity, which is a pendant to—and is intended to complement—its epistemic
distinctness.¹⁸⁹ In Metaphysics V.1, Avicenna’s aim is primarily to discuss the relation-
ship between quiddity and universality, and more specifically between ‘quiddity in
itself’ (min ḥaythu hiya hiya) and ‘universal quiddity,’ i. e., quiddity associated with
the mental concomitants that together constitute the universal concepts. This implies
a fundamental distinction between quiddity in itself and the mental concomitants
that attach to it, such as oneness, multiplicity, actuality, potentiality, and existence,
or in this case, universality.¹⁹⁰ Taken together, these features point to the intellectual
existents, but they may also be examined separately, which is precisely what Avicen-
na intends to do in this section of his masterwork. Naturally, this raises the question
of why he would be intent on doing so, and how this distinction fits in his broader
metaphysical project. One may legitimately assume that there are important ontolog-
ical implications flowing from this distinction that have a role to play in Avicenna’s
metaphysics.
The master opens this seminal and difficult text by distinguishing three types of
universals: those which have several actual instantiations in reality (e. g., the natural
forms), those which have only one actual instantiation in reality (the superlunary
forms, e. g., the sun, which are the only individual instances of their species), and
those which do not have any actual instantiations in reality, but which can be con-
ceived of in the mind and have a nature that can be potentially predicated of

and contains crucial comments regarding how quiddity in itself may be said to exist in the mind. In
this respect, both chapters are closely related and must be examined side by side.
 Marmura, Quiddity and Universality, and idem, Avicenna’s Chapter on Universals, provides a
clear and compelling study of Avicenna’s views about how quiddity relates to the universals. He
was the first scholar to explain that Avicenna separates pure quiddity from universality, which he re-
gards merely as an accident or concomitant of quiddity, one that is nonetheless necessary for the
quiddity to become a mental existent. Moreover, Marmura rightly pointed out—pace earlier scholars
such as Fazlur Rahman—that Avicenna holds quiddity in itself to underlie both mental and extramen-
tal existents, without nevertheless being reducible to them. This doctrine, which may appear surpris-
ing at first glance, represents one of the subtleties of the Avicennian position and needs to be fleshed
out accordingly.
 See for instance Text 5; cf. Physics, I.4, 34.5‒6: “existence is something outside of the definition
of [humanness], while concomitant with its essence that it happens to have [khārij ʿan ḥaddihā lāḥiq
li-māhiyyatihā], as we have explained in other places.”
 2 Pure quiddity, universality, and mental existence 157

many (i. e., artificial and fictional forms broadly speaking).¹⁹¹ According to Avicenna,
a universal intelligible therefore need not have any actual instances in concrete real-
ity, as long as it is theoretically or potentially predicable of many, and as long as it has
a nature that tolerates, allows, or makes possible its attribution to many different in-
dividuals. Thus, it is possible that artificial and fictional forms, for instance, such as
a heptagonal house and the phoenix respectively, exist in the mind, but not in reality,
as they have no concrete instances actualized outside the mind. In spite of this, they
remain universal forms in the mind, since no absurdity results from imagining or
positing a plurality of phoenixes and heptagonal houses.¹⁹² It is typically in his log-
ical works that Avicenna defines ‘the universal’ (al-kullī). The universal is broadly
contrasted to ‘the particular’ (al-juzʾī) and refers to a mental object, notion, meaning,
or intention (maʿnā) that can be predicated of a subject to express a common or
shared feature or nature it possesses together with other actual or potential subjects.
In Logic of Salvation, Avicenna defines the universal as “that which points to a plu-
rality … a plurality that either exists [in the concrete world], like ‘human,’ or a plural-
ity that is permitted by the estimation [fī jawāz al-tawahhum], like ‘sun’ … . It is a
word … whose meaning [maʿnā] is shared by many.”¹⁹³ Hence, the species ‘human’

 This threefold classification of the universals should be compared to the one that is articulated
in Demonstration II.4, 144‒145, in the context of a discussion of the foundations of scientific knowl-
edge. The interpretation of the latter text, however, is more difficult, and it remains to been ascer-
tained whether the various aspects of ‘the universal’ it outlines match those discussed in Metaphy-
sics. I will not delve here into the thorny question of what objects constitute suitable universals for
Avicenna and whether fictional forms are also to be regarded as full-fledged universal existents or
lower, imaginative entities. One interesting realization is that quiddity in itself bears some similarities
with the fictional forms: the crux of the issue concerning their ontological status revolves around
what constitutes the minimum criteria for regarding these things as intellectual existents proper,
rather than as something lesser than intellectual existents. With regard to quiddity in itself, the
issue is whether it is merely an epistemological aspect of universal quiddity or a distinct and auton-
omous mental existent; with regard to the fictional forms, the issue is whether they qualify as full-
fledged intelligibles (maʿqūlāt), in which case they would also be universals in the real sense, or
whether they are ‘merely’ imaginative forms or even ‘pathological’ forms produced by the internal
senses.
 For a treatment of the problematic class of the fictional forms in Avicenna’s epistemology, see
Wisnovsky, Avicenna, 128‒130; Black, Avicenna; and Druart, Avicennan Troubles. Avicenna’s typolo-
gy of the universals is indeed noteworthy for including artificial and fictional forms, a move which is
made possible by his definition of universality as something that is theoretically common to many.
However, other scholars in Islam adopted an even broader and more inclusive typology. This is the
case, for example, of Najm al-Dīn al-Kātibī’s logical work entitled The Epistle for Shams al-Dīn (al-Ri-
sālah al-Shamsiyyah). At the beginning of the treatise (208.14‒17), al-Kātibī divides the universals into
five categories: (a) those whose comprehension in the soul is possible, but whose concrete existence
is impossible (mumtaniʿ al-wujūd fī l-khārij) (such as positing a partner or equal to God); (b) fictional
universals, which are possible of existence (mumkin al-wujūd); (c) universals that have many instan-
tiations, and which are either (c1) finite (mutanāhiyyan), such as the seven wandering planets; or (c2)
infinite, such as the rational souls.
 Avicenna, Salvation, 10.9‒12.
158 II Quiddity in Itself and Mental Existence

or the genus ‘animal’ are universals and can be predicated of many concrete instan-
ces, because individual humans share a common nature and individual animals also
share a common nature. What is more, since no logical absurdity results from the act
of conceiving multiple suns and moons, ‘sun’ and ‘moon’ are also universal notions
in the mind, despite the fact that they are uniquely instantiated in the concrete
world. Following Porphyry and many Greek philosophers, Avicenna regards ‘the
five universals’ (the al-maʿānī l-khamsah of Introduction I.12) consisting of genus,
species, differentia, property, and accident as forming the backbone of the logical
analysis and of our understanding of the world. These universal predicates are the
main logical tools by which reality can be described and thanks to which the quid-
dity of a thing can be formulated scientifically through a definition. Thus, for in-
stance, genus is defined in Logic of the Easterners as “a universal that points to a
quiddity common [māhiyyah mushtarakah] to many real [individual] existents.”¹⁹⁴
For Avicenna, the main criterion for being a universal is therefore that a notion or
essence be theoretically shared or predicated of many in the mind. In other words,
universals are predicable and shareable, as opposed to being actually predicated
or shared.¹⁹⁵ In Introduction, Avicenna emphasizes this point when he states that
“the term ‘universal’ becomes universal only thanks to a certain relation [nisbah
mā]—which either actually exists or is permitted by the estimation [immā bi-l-
wujūd wa-immā bi-ṣiḥḥat al-tawahhum]—to the particulars of which it is predicat-
ed.”¹⁹⁶ This places Avicenna squarely on one side of a debate that had unfolded in
late antiquity regarding the relationship of the various common features (koina) or
universals to their concrete exemplifications. While some thinkers made actual pred-
icability or shareability a condition of the universal, others deemed it sufficient to

 Avicenna, Logic of the Easterners, 18.6.

 Cf. Avicenna, Notes, 67‒68, section 58, where universality and ‘being predicated of many’ are
discussed together. Cf. also Aristotle, On Interpretation 17a39‒40, for whom a universal is “that
which is of such a nature as to be predicated of many subjects” (transl. E.M. Edghill); and Posterior
Analytics 2.19. Avicenna departs markedly from his predecessor Fārābī on this issue. According to the
definition Fārābī provides in his logical treatise on Porphyry’s Eisagoge (see Dunlop, Al-Fārābī’s Ei-
sagoge, 119.3‒5, and 128), the universal is “such that two or more [things] resemble it” and is “such
that it can be predicated of more than one.” This vital feature of Avicenna’s theory of universality
seems to have completely eluded Tahiri, who ascribes to Avicenna a Fārābīan position according
to which a universal essence is one that is predicated of at least two entities in the concrete
world; as a result, Tahiri’s entire interpretation of essence in Avicenna is problematic. For instance,
he claims that Avicenna “ignores abstraction because the mind cannot apprehend the concept cat
from just the perception of a (single) concrete object” (Tahiri, Mathematics, 63); that “essences cannot
really be defined”; and that “the apprehension of essences requires at least two objects” (66). But
Avicenna, in fact, says the opposite: essences and universals are knowable, regardless of the number
of external instantiations they have. Thus, the Sun, which is a unique instantiation of its essence, and
the artificial form ‘heptagonal house,’ which, let us presume, has no instantiation at all, can be
known and conceived of in the mind.
 Avicenna, Introduction, 28.3‒4.
 2 Pure quiddity, universality, and mental existence 159

hold that it could be shared by many instances potentially or hypothetically.¹⁹⁷ What

is more, notice that the universal and universality are intimately tied to the logical
inquiry and constitute primarily intentional notions and meanings. Universality is
a mental judgment (ḥukm) that the thinking, rational mind or the estimation (tawah-
hum) applies to an object of thought in complete abstraction from exterior circum-
stances and of whether this object refers to an actual concrete existent or not.
What determines whether universality applies in any particular case has to do
more with the quiddity and nature of the object, and whether this quiddity and na-
ture tolerate sharedness, common predicability, and universality, than with hard, ob-
jective, ontological facts. This explains why Avicenna believes that universality can
apply to things that are not actually many in concrete existence.
Avicenna’s reception of the ancient Greek theories on the universals is an intri-
cate matter. This is due largely to the shifting terminology in the Greek sources and to
the process of translation from Greek and Syriac to Arabic, which introduces an addi-
tional gap between the Greek philosophical material and Avicenna’s works. On the
one hand, Avicenna’s conception of the universal is directly indebted to these
Greek sources and especially to the Aristotelian tradition. Avicenna follows Aristotle
and some of his commentators, such as Alexander of Aphrodisias, in regarding the
universal primarily as a mental concept and hence as something that is the product
of logical or rational thought. He adheres to Aristotle’s logical definition at On Inter-
pretation 17a39‒40 to the effect that a universal is “that which is of such a nature as
to be predicated of many subjects,” and he also pays heed to Posterior Analytics II.19,
which describes the formation of the universal as a concept in the human mind.
Moreover, Avicenna follows Aristotle’s view that a universal refers to a nature that
need only be shareable or theoretically common to many, not actually so.¹⁹⁸ Finally,
he seems to have been deeply influenced by Alexander’s mentalist approach to
the universal as something that is mind-dependent and a mental construct. Like
Alexander, Avicenna treats genus as a logical notion, which he separates from the
true nature of a thing. This effectively makes universality a mental accident or con-
comitant that can exist only in the human mind.¹⁹⁹ In emphasizing the connection
between the universals and the human mind or human thought, Avicenna accentu-
ated a mentalist or intellectualist interpretation of the universals that already had a

 For this background and for the distinction between shareability and being actually shared, see
Sorabji, The Philosophy, vol. 3, 128 ff.
 On this specific point, Avicenna is closer to the Stagirite than to Alexander of Aphrodisias, for
whom the universal nature needs to have at least two concrete instantiations. See Sorabji, Universals
Transformed, 108‒110.
 This important point of doctrine is conveyed also in the Arabic renditions of Alexander’s works.
In the treatise entitled simply Discourse of Alexander of Aphrodisias translated by Saʿīd b. Yaʿqūb al-
Dimashqī (Badawī, Arisṭū, 279.20‒22) one reads that the universal is an accidental meaning (al-shayʾ
al-kullī maʿnā mā ʿaraḍa lahu an yakūna kullī), and one that cannot subsist on its own but attaches to
something else (al-kullī nafsuhu min ṭarīq mā huwa kullī fa-laysa bi-maʿnā qāʾim ʿalā l-ḥaqīqah lākin
ʿāriḍ yaʿriḍu l-shayʾ ākhar).
160 II Quiddity in Itself and Mental Existence

long and rich development in antiquity and late-antiquity, from Aristotle and the Sto-
ics to Alexander and many of the Neoplatonists.²⁰⁰ Furthermore, it should be noted
that the Jacobite theologian and philosopher Yaḥyā b. ʿAdī, who was Avicenna’s
predecessor, also sharply distinguishes between the mental aspect or intention of
universality and the thing to which it refers. Anticipating Avicenna’s views on this
issue, he explains that the maʿnā of universality is distinct from the maʿnā of, say,
animal in the mind, thereby making universality something external and additional
that attaches to a quidditative meaning. Yaḥyā appears to have been an important
link in the tradition that connects Alexander to Avicenna.²⁰¹ On the other hand,
there are important differences and departures between Avicenna and the Greek
sources. To begin with, Avicenna goes further than Aristotle and Alexander in up-
holding the notion of universal shareability, for he extends it explicitly to artificial
and fictional beings and thus to mental conceptions that never need to exist in con-
crete reality. Thus, Avicenna interpreted Aristotle’s statement “what is of a nature to
be predicated of several things” in a maximalist way, as encompassing not only the
natures of real things, such as trees, giraffes, and human beings, but also the natures
of unique beings, such as the Sun, as well as of artificial and fictional beings, such as
the heptagonal house and phoenix. This move, I suspect, is to be construed in con-
nection with the new and all-important emphasis Avicenna lays on mental existence
and its various criteria, which is in turn to be related to the kalām debate about ‘the
thing’ and ‘the existent’ as it applies to the mental context.²⁰² Thus, Avicenna’s po-
sition is in many ways an intensification of the late-antique trend of interpreting uni-
versals in a mentalist or intellectualist way, to the extent that he makes universality a
condition of mental existence specifically (wujūd dhihnī or ʿaqlī).²⁰³ In some respects,
and especially in the way he connects universality with mental existence, Avicenna’s
position can be regarded as a culmination of this ancient intellectualist trend.
Secondly, Avicenna follows, but again builds upon, Alexander’s initiative to sep-
arate universality from the nature to which it attaches. This represents a crucial fea-
ture of the ancient legacy bequeathed to Avicenna, and one that can partly explain
his theory of pure quiddity. In spite of some ambiguity, it appears that Alexander ar-
gued for a distinction between the universal, qua mental concept, and the shared na-
ture to which the universal refers. This nature, for Alexander, could in turn be iden-
tified with the forms of concrete beings. As a result, and as Sorabji explains,

 Sorabji, Universals Transformed, canvasses the main stages of what he regards as a history of
deflation of the universals qua beings and causes from Plato onwards.
 On this point, see Adamson, Knowledge of Universals, 150‒159.
 For this last point, see Wisnovsky, Avicenna.
 There is therefore a sharp distinction in this regard between Avicenna and some of the Greek
philosophers, such as the Stoics, who regarded the universals merely as concepts or mental notions,
but as ones devoid of existence. The Stoics alternately described these universal notions as ‘not-some-
things,’ ‘nothings,’ or as ‘somethings’ located midway between existence and nonexistence; see Sor-
abji, Universals Transformed, 106‒107.
 2 Pure quiddity, universality, and mental existence 161

Alexander oscillates between regarding universals as thoughts and as forms or na-

tures in the concrete world.²⁰⁴ This tendency is reflected in Alexander’s Greek
works and in the Arabic translations based on his writings that were achieved in
early Islam. Now, it is noteworthy that one finds a similar ambiguity in Avicenna’s
works. In effect, the Persian master sometimes (as in Salvation, see Text 7) refers
to the natures existing in the beings of the extramental world as ‘universals,’ even
though he usually distinguishes between these two concepts. The problem in this
connection is that Aristotle’s definition of universality in On Interpretation (“that
which is of such a nature as to be predicated of many subjects”) could also be
deemed to apply to the common natures in concrete reality, which could be said
to exist independently of human reasoning. As I will show later on, Avicenna’
hefty reliance on notions and theories culled from the late-antique discourse on
the universals (which included the question of how they could be said to exist in
the concrete world) eventually compelled him to address this question in earnest.
More specifically, his view that the natures of beings are, in a certain sense, universal
things should be traced directly to this ancient context. For the shaykh, these natures
are the universals that can be said to exist ‘in multiplicity’ (fī l-kathrah), whereas the
universals qua mental concepts are those that Avicenna would identify with the uni-
versals ‘after multiplicity’ (baʿd al-kathrah).²⁰⁵ Nevertheless, he is in general quite
consistent in reserving the term kullī to the sphere of logic and human intentionality,
thereby betraying the same approach as many of his Greek forebears who had con-
fined the universals proper to the sphere of concepts in the human mind. At any rate,
there is a constant oscillation in Avicenna’s analyses of the subject between treating
the universal as an ontological principle or entity of reality and as a logical predicate
in the mind. But it is precisely in this regard that one perceives one of Avicenna’s key
elaborations on the ancient legacy. Whereas Aristotle and Alexander speak of the na-
ture that is shared, and whereas Alexander seeks to establish a distinction between
the universal as a mental concept and the nature as a principle of concrete beings
that is not in itself universal, Avicenna in a key metaphysical move identifies this na-
ture (ṭabīʿah), which is sensu stricto distinct from universality, with the notion of es-
sence or quiddity (māhiyyah). More specifically, this nature for Avicenna is ‘quiddity
in itself,’ which is distinct from universality both in the mind and in the concrete

 Sorabji, Universals Transformed, 106‒107. For insight into Alexander’s doctrines and its connec-
tion to Avicenna, see Tweedale, Alexander, and especially, idem, Duns Scotus’s Doctrine; Faruque,
Mullā Ṣadrā, 271; and Menn, Avicenna’s Metaphysics, 155‒159.
 This distinction appears in connection with the universals at Introduction, I.12, 65.1‒6. This as-
pect of the problem is treated in much more depth in chapter III of this book, which concerns the
existence of nature and quiddity in the extramental world, and which is not my present focus in
this chapter. But one should stress from the outset that the tension one perceives in much of the an-
cient Greek literature between conceiving of the universal as a purely mental notion and as an ontic
principle of concrete reality reappears in Avicenna’s works and represents one of the most challeng-
ing facets of the problem of essence in his works.
162 II Quiddity in Itself and Mental Existence

world. Avicenna, therefore, shifts the focus away from the form (eidos), the universal
(katholou), the common thing (koinon), and the concept (noema)—technical terms
that had prevailed in the ancient Greek discussions—to the central notion of quiddi-
ty, thereby tying them primarily to the Aristotelian discourse on essence.
What is more, Alexander’s initiative to separate universality from nature seems
to be a starting-point for Avicenna’s own endeavor to arrive at a pristine conception
of pure quiddity, which is abstracted not only from universality, but, Avicenna in-
sists, from all mental accidents and concomitants. In this case as well, Avicenna’s ap-
proach strikes us as a restructuring and intensification of ideas that had circulated in
late antiquity, but which were not exposed in exactly the same way. The master’s
unique approach can best be elucidated if we consider the convergence of the an-
cient discourse on the universals and of the debate regarding the existence or non-
existence of ‘the thing’ (al-shayʾ) in early Islam. This would account not only for the
ontologization of Avicenna’s treatment of the discussion universals (especially in the
mental context), but also for the emphasis one finds in his works on the concept of
quiddity, which he equates grosso modo with ‘the thing’ (or rather ‘thingness’), and
which takes precedence over the universal in his works. Perhaps partly for these rea-
sons, the logical and linguistic scope of the universal is connected, in the master’s
philosophy of mind, with entitative and ontological considerations. For one thing,
this fact illustrates yet again the semantic and ontological interplay conveyed by
the term maʿnā, which is here applied to the universal. For all of these universals,
including those of fictional and artificial forms, if they are being actually apprehend-
ed by the human mind, constitute mental existents (mawjūdāt fī l-dhihn), regardless
of whether they have a correspondence in extramental reality. Thus, ‘universal horse’
and ‘universal human’ exist in the mind. More specifically, according to Avicenna,
universality will exist mentally as a concomitant (lāzim), attribute (ṣifah), and acci-
dent (ʿaraḍ) of the quiddity horse or human, making this quiddity a universal form in
the intellect.
Given Avicenna’s definition of universality, it would seem that a fictional or ar-
tificial form is no less a mental existent than the form of something that exists in the
exterior world—as long as it is being actually apprehended by an intellect.²⁰⁶ Thus,
phoenix exists in the mind, and even ‘universal phoenix,’ since I can conceive of var-
ious phoenixes hypothetically existing with no logical fallacy ensuing. The relation-
ship between these various mental existents and concrete reality will, admittedly,
differ depending on these various cases. In the case of the natural forms, the univer-
sal in the mind will have a correspondence with the concrete, particular instantia-
tions existing in the exterior world, and hence there will be a relation (nisbah) be-
tween the two kinds of existents, for instance, between the universal horse in the

 It is noteworthy that Avicenna, Demonstration, II.4, 144.15‒145.1, concurs with Metaphysics V.1 in
counting the artificial and fictional forms as kinds of universals; the heptagonal house and phoenix
are mentioned there as well.
 2 Pure quiddity, universality, and mental existence 163

mind and the various individual horses existing in concrete reality. Conversely, in the
case of artificial forms that have not been actualized in the concrete world, and in
the case of all fictional forms, there will be no such correspondence and no relation
between mental and extramental existence. Their status will be qua mental existents
alone, with no relationship to the concrete world.²⁰⁷ In spite of this, these fictional
and artificial universals are “among the [realm of] existents” (min al-mawjūdāt),²⁰⁸
although they exist only in the mind and, hence, possess only mental or intelligible
existence.²⁰⁹ What is important here is that, like the natural forms, they are conceiv-
able and, hence, possible objects of intellectual apprehension. Nevertheless, for the
purposes of the present inquiry, I shall focus mostly on the natural forms, namely, on
those intelligible forms that have a counterpart in the concrete, extramental world,
and which thus presuppose a relation between the individual existents and the men-
tal universals that correspond to them.²¹⁰
According to Avicenna, it is the various properties and concomitants (lawāzim
and lawāḥiq) and accidents (ʿawāriḍ) they acquire in the mind that provide these var-
ious forms and entities with the characteristics of intellectual existence. Among
these concomitants, the most prominent are existence (wujūd); actuality (bi-l-fiʿl);
oneness (waḥdah), since even though a universal may relate to many things outside
the mind, it is in itself a numerically one and single idea in the mind; multiplicity
(kathrah), since it is composed of, and can be conceptually divided into, different
meanings and intentions (maʿānī); and especially universality (kulliyyah).²¹¹ Mental
existence for Avicenna therefore implies a set of conditions or criteria that qualify
quiddity in its mental context. These conditions or factors are the various concomi-

 I leave out at this point the issue of whether artificial and fictional forms are related to the cau-
sality of the Agent Intellect.
 Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Cure, V.2, 207.5. Again, a doubt remains as to whether the fictional
forms are really to be counted as intellectual existents.
 But this is true, strictly speaking, of all universals according to Avicenna; see Metaphysics of The
Cure, V.2, 207.10‒12, 209.3‒8, 212.2‒5; these universals do not exist separately in the external world
(207.7).
 The justification for this is that the present analysis does not focus on the universals per se, but
on the relation between quiddity in itself and its various concomitants, among which is universality.
In this regard, the natural forms offer the best case study, because they raise the issues of how both
the mental and physical concomitants apply to pure quiddity, as well as of the relation between quid-
dity in the concrete world and quiddity in the mind. What applies to the universal forms of natural
existents (e. g., horse) in the mind presumably applies to the fictional forms, although this matter re-
mains to be settled in a separate study. At any rate, it should be noted that it is the natural forms,
especially ‘human’ and ‘horse,’ which constitute Avicenna’s stock examples when discussing the uni-
versals, essence, and mental existence.
 Avicenna does not list these criteria systematically in one passage, but they may be inferred
from his overall description of the mental universal existent. Immateriality or intellectuality, abstract-
ness, and universality, are by definition the qualities of entities that exist in the intellect; the mental
concomitants of the one, the many, the actual, and the universal are all discussed in Metaphysics V.1‒
2.
164 II Quiddity in Itself and Mental Existence

tants that attach to pure quiddity from the outside, since they are not constitutive
(ghayr muqawwimah) of quiddity and do not enter into its core definition. Nor are
they required for its conception. One upshot is that this universal mode of mental
existence may be described as synthetic and composite, inasmuch as it requires
that pure essence combine with various attributes and concomitants for the universal
concept to arise. Moreover, Avicenna is explicit in conceiving these concomitants—
especially universality, existence, and oneness—as extraneous and posterior to quid-
dity, with the implication that they essentially follow pure quiddity and adhere to it
from the outside. The master also sometimes observes that they are notions, mean-
ings, or conditions “added to” (zāʾid ʿalā) pure quiddity.²¹² From this synthetic con-
ceptual process there results a corresponding multiplicity of meanings or notions
(maʿānī), since not only pure quiddity, but also each concomitant in itself can be re-
garded as a distinct meaning and notion added to pure essence to form a composite
whole.²¹³
There are several crucial implications that flow out of these remarks. The first is
that a conceptual distinction can be drawn between pure quiddity and universality
and, hence, between pure quiddity and universal quiddity. The insistence and lucid-
ity with which Avicenna defends this point in Metaphysics V.1‒2 are noteworthy and
represent an important philosophical contribution to the ancient and medieval dis-
cussions of the universals.²¹⁴ The second point is that quiddity in itself constitutes
the irreducible principle or core of the universal intelligible. It represents the founda-
tional meaning (maʿnā) on which other meanings, notions, or intentions are added to
compose the universal. These added meanings (maʿānī) correspond to the mental
concomitants (lawāzim) that accompany pure quiddity in the intellect. On this ac-
count, even existence will be abstracted from pure quiddity and regarded as an ex-

 See, for instance, Avicenna, Salvation, 536.11‒12.

 Naturally, what is at stake here is essential and logical sequentiality and posteriority, not tem-
poral succession. Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Cure, V.2, 207.10‒12; cf. Salvation, 514.15‒515.15; in Cat-
egories, II.1, 61‒62. The concomitants that attach to pure quiddity in the mind to form the universal are
chiefly oneness and universality; Avicenna himself dwells mostly on the latter. But he also occasion-
ally describes existence (wujūd) as a concomitant of quiddity in the mind. For example, he describes
existence as “a thing (amr) that necessarily follows [or is necessarily attached to, yalḥaqu] quiddity in
the soul or in extramental reality.” As Avicenna explains in Pointers, vols. 3‒4, 458‒462, the concom-
itant of existence is essentially prior to the others; nothing advenes quiddity before existence (togeth-
er, arguably, with oneness). As for unity and multiplicity, they occupy a special place, insofar as they
are—like existence—inseparable from the actually existing quiddity and are somehow necessarily tied
with existence; in Discussions, 278, n. 799, the author calls them “special accidents” (al-ʿawāriḍ al-
khāṣṣiyyah) to be studied by metaphysics.
 According to de Libera, La querelle, 233: “La grande nouveauté de l’ontologie avicennienne est
la distinction entre l’universel et son universalité.” But Avicenna’s crucial contribution is a distinction
between pure quiddity and universality, which enables us to consider quiddity in itself in abstraction
from universality and the universal (regarded as a composite of quiddity and universality). Funda-
mentally, though, de Libera’s point holds: I shall argue that pure quiddity possesses its own intrinsic
or essential universality.
 2 Pure quiddity, universality, and mental existence 165

traneous, subsequent, and non-constitutive concomitant.²¹⁵ This, in turn, explains

why Avicenna regards pure quiddity as a ‘part’ of these other synthetic aspects of es-
sence—in this case, the universal concept of quiddity—and why he also believes that
we can conceptually distinguish pure quiddity from the universal by conceptually re-
moving its various parts. Yet, although pure quiddity is an intelligible part of the uni-
versal, it remains epistemically irreducible and represents the nature and conceptual
core of this mental composite. Even when it underlies the universal concept, pure
quiddity can be apprehended on its own in the mind. This is clear from Avicenna’s
statement at Metaphysics V.1, 201.8 to the effect that “the consideration of quiddity in
itself is possible [jāʾiz], even if it is with something else [wa-in kāna maʿa ghayri-
hi].”²¹⁶ As we shall see, Avicenna intends this statement to apply to both the concrete
and mental aspects of quiddity—quiddity taken with additional concrete or mental
concomitants—even though with regard to our present purposes it applies chiefly
to the universal in the mind. The fact that we can consider quiddity in itself in ab-
straction from these various mental attributes means that there is a consideration
of it that is not only epistemically irreducible, but also epistemically or intellectually
distinct, since this consideration will focus on pure quiddity and only that. In
other words, quiddity’s intellectual irreducibility also ensures its intellectual distinct-
ness.
Thus, according to Avicenna, human beings can somehow consider, conceive of,
or apprehend (iʿtabara, bi-iʿtibār, manẓūr, naẓara, taṣawwara, ʿaqala, etc.)²¹⁷ quiddity
in itself in a mode distinct from universal quiddity and, hence, from the cluster of
concomitants and properties that combine with the latter. As Avicenna explains, if
we consider humanness or horseness in itself, it is “a meaning [maʿnā] other than
the meaning of universality,”²¹⁸ and it is the combination of these two meanings
or ideas—horseness and universality—that produces the universal intelligible. The
quiddity as such, as something that can be considered or conceived of as having a

 Avicenna’s view that there is an irreducible quiddity that can be conceived by the human mind
in abstraction from all concomitants—both the concomitants and accidents attached to matter in the
external world and the properties and concomitants attached to the universals in the mind—may very
well have been developed as early as Provenance and Destination. In that work, he explains that “the
forms that are in the imagination and memory [fī l-khayāl wa-l-dhikr] are deprived of their matters
[mawāddihā], but accompanied by the accidents attached to their matter. [For instance,] the form
of Zayd in the imagination is found there with his measurements of length and width, with color,
in a certain position and in some place. These are accidents that occur to his [Zayd’s] humanness,
but none of them is required for the essential quiddity [māhiyyatuhu l-dhātiyyah]; or else, all [humans]
would have them in common” (Avicenna, Provenance, 7.4‒8). Avicenna’s rather striking reference to
the “essential quiddity” is a reference to the irreducible quiddity or quiddity in itself, except that in
this work he had probably not yet elaborated the terminology of essence that was to become a hall-
mark of his later works.
 Cf. Rāzī, Eastern Investigations, vol. 1, 141.10‒11, who repeats this formula in a slightly modified
form.
 See the previous discussion about iʿtibār.
 Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Cure, V.1, 196.6‒10.
166 II Quiddity in Itself and Mental Existence

distinct meaning, can be abstracted from all other things in the human mind, and
hence also from the accidents of universal quiddity. One of the clearest statements
to the effect that we can conceive of and apprehend pure quiddity appears in Intro-
duction I.12, when Avicenna states that “animal in itself is a thing that can be con-
ceived of by the mind qua animal, and inasmuch as it is conceived qua animal, it
is nothing other than animal.”²¹⁹ This conception of pure animalness evidently
does not correspond to the synthetic and conditioned universal existent, but to quid-
dity divested of its mental concomitants.²²⁰
As a result, the universal aspect of quiddity will always be epistemically and on-
tologically complex, synthetic, and posterior when compared to the mental state of
pure quiddity. The consideration of quiddity qua universal existent is posterior and
complex when compared to the consideration of quiddity in itself, since the latter
occurs in abstraction from all the concomitants, meanings, and notions superadded
to the former. The consideration of pure quiddity in comparison will be simple and
prior, insofar as it is apprehended free of anything else. This, I believe, is why Avi-
cenna at one point refers to the prior and simple existence of the pure nature or quid-
dity with regard to other aspects of quiddity. At the very least, he intends to under-
line how pure quiddity, as something irreducible, exists prior to the composite and
synthetic universal according to a mereological analysis. But it is plausible that he
also intends this statement in the sense that pure quiddity, as something simple
that is distinct in the mind, precedes the universal. So I would suggest that the ex-
pression ‘in itself’ (min ḥaythu hiya hiya) should be construed in terms of irreducibil-
ity and distinctness.²²¹

 Avicenna, Introduction, I.12, 65.16‒19: bal al-ḥayawān fī nafsihi shayʾ yutaṣawwaru fī l-dhihn ḥay-
awān wa bi-ḥasab taṣawwurihi ḥayawān lā yakūn illā ḥayawān faqaṭ. Cf. Demonstration, II.4, 144‒14,
which also distinguishes between the pure nature (mujarrad ṭabīʿah, nafs al-ṭabīʿah) and the univer-
sal, and which presents the pure nature as being conceivable in the mind: “as for the pure nature, its
conception [alone] [taṣawwuruhā] and its conception as being numerically one [i. e., a one universal
form in the mind] are not one [and the same] thing” (145.5‒6).
 Avicenna appears to extend this pure and abstract conception to numbers as well. This is sug-
gested by his use of abstract nouns such as ithnayniyyah, e. g., to refer to the quiddity ‘twoness,’ as
well as by his description of numbers as abstract (mujarradah) entities in the mind, which, inciden-
tally, is the exact same word he uses to describe the pure quiddities humanness and animalness in
the mind. As some scholars have suggested, Avicenna’s inclination for speaking of quiddities as pure-
ly abstract entities could have been influenced by the advent of algebra and a new and highly the-
oretical approach to mathematical reflection; see Roshdi Rashed, Mathématiques, 34‒35; and espe-
cially Tahiri, Mathematics, 41 who describes numbers as “intentional objects.” Another notion
Avicenna frequently subjects to abstract thought is ‘relationness’ (iḍāfiyyah), a quiddity which ac-
cording to him also exists both in the mind and in the concrete; see Notes, 198‒199, section 302;
262, section 442; 269, section 458; 429‒430, sections 778‒779; and Marmura, Avicenna’s Chapter
“On the Relative.”
 As I mentioned earlier, this simplicity and irreducibility in conception is one of the things that
sets pure quiddity apart from the universal, inasmuch as the two otherwise share a common criterion
 2 Pure quiddity, universality, and mental existence 167

Finally, there are important ontological implications at play. The universal quid-
dity cannot exist in the mind without its concomitants. Just as it is not apprehended
or considered in the mind without its concomitants, so it cannot exist in the mind
without these same concomitants. The latter represents therefore an ontological
requisite or condition to its existing as a universal concept. The upshot is that a quid-
dity can exist actually as a universal only once it has combined with its concomitants,
e. g., existence, oneness, and universality, but it cannot actually exist as a universal
in abstraction from these concomitants. Hence, by making the concomitants of quid-
dity a condition for mental existence, and by setting pure quiddity apart from all of
these concomitants, Avicenna apparently excludes the possibility that essence can
exist actually on its own. But there is a crucial qualification to be made here,
since the mode of existence Avicenna describes consists in composite and condi-
tioned mental existence. For a universal concept to exist, according to Avicenna, is
for it to exist under special conditions and together with specific concomitants,
but these do not apply to pure quiddity. So if pure essence were to exist, it could
not possibly exist in this complex mode. In any case, what characterizes the mental
universal existent may be said to be, (a) its being actually thought by the intellect in
an abstract way; (b) its being thought as something universal and numerically one
but relatable to many instances, and, as a result, (c) its having a conditioned, syn-
thetic, and complex mode of existence consisting of the quidditative nature and
its various mental concomitants. When these three conditions are fulfilled, then a
universal existent proper is formed in the mind. Should one of these conditions be
lacking, we fall short of obtaining universal mental existence.²²²

of mental existence, namely, abstractness or immateriality. Another key difference between the two
is, as this section makes clear, the presence or absence of accompanying mental attributes.
 Explaining Avicenna’s views on how these aspects of quiddity differ from one another repre-
sents the first stage to elucidating his theory of pure quiddity. A crucial difference between Avicenna
and the post-Avicennian tradition needs to be underscored here. Avicenna does not typically frame
his discussion of the various aspects of quiddity according to the distinctions of various kinds of ‘uni-
versals’ (kullī/kulliyyāt), as becomes customary in the post-Avicennian tradition, when authors speak
of the ‘logical,’ ‘natural,’ and ‘intellectual’ universals. Avicenna’s use of the term and notion of uni-
versal appears to be much more restrictive and specific. Since, for Avicenna, universality (al-kulliyyah)
is a property or concomitant of mental existence, he usually speaks of universals only insofar as these
pertain to mental objects and intellectual existents; this is the case of the opening section of Meta-
physics V.1, where the three classes of universals discussed all refer to mental universals. One impli-
cation of this approach is that universality—and, hence, the universals themselves—may be posited in
the mind even when no extramental instantiations occur or exist actually. In Introduction, Avicenna
regards the two aspects of universality—i. e., the logical (al-manṭiqī), which is universal genus or spe-
cies itself irrespective of what it is predicated of, and the intellectual (al-ʿaqlī), which is a nature com-
bined with logical universality (and, hence, a combination or composite of quiddity and logical uni-
versality)—as mental aspects or considerations. These aspects bear a relation (nisbah) to the exterior
world, but in no sense do they exist in the extramental world. Avicenna’s terminology thus contrasts
quite markedly from that found in postclassical works. For example, it became a topos for such au-
168 II Quiddity in Itself and Mental Existence

To recap, if the conditions and criteria of mental existence are made to coincide
with those of universal quiddity, only the latter will exist in the mind. By implication,
this means that pure quiddity as an irreducible part of the universal will also exist in
the mind together with or alongside these mental concomitants. One important con-
clusion, therefore, is that quiddity in itself—at the very least—exists mereologically
and as something embedded in the universal concept of quiddity. In this case, ‘in it-
self’ means not ‘abstracted’ or ‘distinct’ from, but rather ‘irreducible.’ The quiddity
animalness or humanness is in itself neither particular nor general, neither one
nor many, neither actual nor potential, etc., but it is these things (and others) only
in its synthetic relation to the qualified and conditioned existence of universal con-
cepts, that is to say, after it has combined with the fundamental concomitants of one-
ness, universality, and existence.²²³ It is especially in Metaphysics of The Cure V.1 that
Avicenna insists on the distinction between pure quiddity and the necessary concom-
itants that attach to it in universal existence.²²⁴ There he argues that pure quiddity is
an irreducible part of the universal, so that there can be little doubt that, if anything,
pure quiddity exists with or in the universal. Given that it underlies the universal, and
that the universal exists as a mental existent, this claim is sensible. The crux of the
issue is whether pure quiddity also exists as an irreducible and distinct form in the
mind. Does quiddity in itself exist intellectually, whereby ‘in itself’ is construed not
only in terms of ‘irreducibility,’ but also in terms of intelligible ‘distinctness’ and ‘ab-
stractedness’?
Thus, the main problem, i. e., whether pure quiddity can be said to exist in an
intellectual mode that is both ‘irreducible’ and ‘distinct’ from the mental concomi-
tants of the universal, remains unsolved. At first sight, proffering a positive answer
to this question seems unlikely, given what was said above, as well as Avicenna’s oc-
casional denial of the mental existence of pure quiddity. As he explains, in contrast
to mental and extramental quiddities, quiddity in itself possesses no concomitants
and properties, not even the most basic ones (oneness and existence). But all mental
existents must, at the very least, be combined with a certain kind of oneness and uni-
versality. To exist intellectually, for Avicenna, as for Fārābī before him, is in some
sense to exist qua a single or unitary entity and also to exist in a universal
mode.²²⁵ Whereas a universal can be described as an intellectual existent in the
strong sense, a mawjūd fī l-dhihn or fī l-ʿaql—also called here ʿaqlī²—the considera-

thors to refer to what Avicenna calls quiddity in itself or nature (al-ṭabīʿah) as “the physical univer-
sal” (al-kullī l-ṭabīʿī).
 My conclusions regarding these points agree with the findings of Benevich, Die ‘göttliche Exis-
tenz’; and De Haan, A Mereological Construal.
 Jurjānī, Definitions, 247.8‒9, also maintains that pure quiddity is conceived in abstraction from
all concomitants and “insofar as it is itself [wa-hiya min ḥaythu hiya hiya] it is not existent, nor non-
existent, nor universal, nor particular, nor specific, nor general.”
 On how oneness relates to existence in Avicenna’s metaphysics, see de Libera, D’Avicenne à
Averroès; Wisnovsky, Avicenna’s Metaphysics, 158‒160; Menn, Fārābī.
 2 Pure quiddity, universality, and mental existence 169

tion of quiddity in itself would seem to be a mental object in the mind (ʿaqlī¹), but
one divested from the criteria and conditions that characterize the universal mental
existent. On these grounds, scholars have regarded pure quiddity as a mere consid-
eration (iʿtibār), and not as an existing thing and mental existent proper. However,
this conclusion might be unwarranted. Indeed, what is clear from Avicenna’s argu-
mentation in Metaphysics V.1 is not that pure quiddity cannot exist in any way, but
rather that it cannot exist according to the standard Avicennian description of univer-
sal mental existence. ²²⁶
But restricting mental existence to the universals alone may strike us as hasty.
When Avicenna makes it a point to stress the distinctness and abstractedness of
pure quiddity, even with regard to existence, he is presumably referring to the
state or mode of existence that characterizes the universal quiddity in its composite,
synthetic, and derivative aspect. This is not the same as to deny all modes of exis-
tence to pure quiddity. Rather, it correlates one ontological mode with the synthetic
and conditioned universals in the mind. For the mode of existence that is conceptu-
ally separated from pure quiddity is the one that belongs to a specific class of exis-
tents, namely, the universal concepts. Just as the mental consideration of universal
quiddity ignores the material concomitants and accidents of quiddity in the concrete
world, so the consideration of pure quiddity ignores the mental concomitants that
attach to universal quiddity in the mind. The upshot is that the consideration of
pure quiddity need not itself be deprived of its own ontological mode, but only
from that of the universal. Several hints strongly suggest this hypothesis. First, it
was observed already how difficult it is to convincingly separate the ontic from
the epistemic in Avicenna’s philosophy. Since Avicenna assigns a distinct epistemic
and logical status to quiddity in itself in the mind (in that it possesses its own iʿtibār,
maʿnā, and ṣūrah maʿqūlah), it would be coherent if pure quiddity also assumed a
distinct ontological status in the mind, given the general congruence of logic and on-
tology in his philosophy. As we saw, the terminological analysis definitely supports
this hypothesis. It is important to realize that, given the close interplay between the
epistemic and ontic planes in the master’s works, what may appear primarily as an
epistemic argument—i. e., human beings can have a consideration of pure quiddity—
need not be devoid of an ontological foundation. The fact that pure quiddity is con-
sidered in abstraction from existence need not entail that it does not somehow exist
in the mind. As Ṭūsī explains in his Commentary on Pointers, “the absence [or non-
existence] of the consideration of a thing is not the same as the consideration of [that
thing’s] nonexistence.”²²⁷ Ṭūsī’s point—well taken here—can be applied to the case of

 I mean chiefly the one reconstructed by modern specialists of Avicenna, since the master him-
self does not articulate an explicit and unambiguous definition of mental existence.
 Ṭūsī, Commentary on Pointers, vol. 3‒4, 463.1‒4; see also the section on Ṭūsī below. This com-
ment appears in the context of a refutation of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s doctrine regarding subsistent
(and possibly pre-existent) essences in the concrete world. Ṭūsī’s point is that just because we
have the ability to conceptually isolate the consideration of an essence from its existence, it does
170 II Quiddity in Itself and Mental Existence

the Avicennian pure quiddity: omitting or deliberately sidelining the consideration of

pure quiddity’s existence does not automatically imply that it does not exist in any
way. It could, for instance, exist mereologically as a part of a complex entity, or even
in itself, without its existence being taken into consideration. In support of this view,
there are numerous instances where Avicenna explicitly refers to the existence of
pure quiddity in Metaphysics V.1, not only with regard to its intellectual irreducibility
in the universal, but also occasionally with regard to its distinctness from the universal
in the mind.

2.2 Separation, distinctness, and the various conditions (shurūṭ) applied to

quiddity

As may have become clear by now, the crux of the problem lies in the way in which
Avicenna describes pure quiddity in contradistinction to the universal and its various
mental concomitants. In this regard, the proper interpretation of the expression ‘in
itself’ and of the Arabic term mujarrad appear paramount, since they figure in virtu-
ally all of Avicenna’s discussions of this topic. These words need to be clarified, since
they can a priori convey notions as varied as epistemic or ontological separation, ab-
straction, distinctness, and irreducibility. In order to make some headway on this
issue, passages from the Avicennian corpus that discuss the various conditions (shur-
ūṭ) applied to quiddity should be examined. But first, let us return briefly to Text 3.
There Avicenna speaks of pure quiddity as something whose status transcends that
of a mere mental aspect or construct, since it is its own “intelligible form” in the
mind. This expression suggests that pure quiddity and the universal amount to
two distinct intelligible objects in the mind and, hence, also potentially to two dis-
tinct intellectual existents.²²⁸ In this regard, Metaphysics goes considerably further
in its argumentation than Introduction, since it does not shy away from making ex-
plicit ontological claims about quiddity in itself. Yet, at the same time, this passage
is perfectly aligned with Introduction, which had described pure quiddity as a “thing”
(shayʾ) and “form” (ṣūrah) that can be “conceived of” (yutaṣawwar) on its own in the
mind.²²⁹

not mean that this essence is found as such without existence and in this state of isolation in the
mind or in the real world, or that (pace Rāzī) it subsists before existing. It is not clear, however,
that Ṭūsī is referring here to the special intelligible being of pure quiddity as opposed merely to
its existing as a universal in the mind. The latter option—the more likely here—would imply that al-
though we can conceptually contemplate essence in the mind in abstraction from existence, essence
exists as a universal in the mind.
 This is also how Marmura, Quiddity and Universality, understood this passage. He concluded
that quiddity in itself is an object that is distinct from universal quiddity. Notice, however, that the
fact that it does not combine with the mental concomitants makes it quite clear that it cannot be
a mental existent in the way most modern scholars usually understand this notion.
 Avicenna, Introduction, I.12, 65.16‒19.
 2 Pure quiddity, universality, and mental existence 171

Avicenna further describes quiddity in itself as something intellectually and on-

tologically distinct and abstract in another passage of Metaphysics V.1. Here, howev-
er, he introduces another important feature of his discussion of quiddity, which hing-
es on the notion of the various conditions (shurūṭ) that can apply to it. Throughout
Metaphysics, Avicenna frequently relies on this set of linguistic and logical distinc-
tions to frame his discussion of pure quiddity and to tease out the subtle differences
he perceives between the various aspects of quiddity he previously outlined in Intro-
duction. These conditions are of both a positive and negative nature and, while they
express what is primarily a conceptual or logical feature of quiddity they also yield
various ontological implications that have to be fleshed out in detail. The crucial pas-
sage reads as follows:

Text 6: For this reason, there must be a distinction standing between our statement: ‘Animal,
inasmuch as it is animal, is abstract without the condition of some other thing’ [al-ḥayawān
bi-mā huwa ḥayawān mujarrad bi-lā sharṭ shayʾ ākhar], and our statement: ‘Animal, inasmuch
as it is animal, is abstract with the condition that there is no other thing’ [mujarrad bi-sharṭ
lā shayʾ ākhar]. [A] If it were possible for ‘animal inasmuch as it is animal abstracted with
the condition of no other thing’ to exist in the concrete, then it would be possible for the Platonic
Forms to exist in the concrete. [B] Rather, ‘animal [inasmuch as it is animal] with the condition
of no other thing’ exists only in the mind [wujūduhu fī l-dhihn faqaṭ]. [C] As for ‘animal abstract-
ed without the condition of some other thing [i. e., ‘unconditioned animal’] it has existence in
the concrete [lahu wujūd fī l-aʿyān].²³⁰

The importance of this passage for a proper understanding of Avicenna’s theory of

quiddity and for the development of the postclassical metaphysical tradition cannot
be overstated. It is presumably this very passage that lies at the origin of the long
commentatorial debate regarding quiddity and its relation to existence that one
finds in such works as Ṭūsī’s Abstract of Correct Belief and the various writings
that were composed in response to that work. Many postclassical philosophers
must have had this text in mind when expounding on the bi-lā sharṭ and bi-sharṭ
lā distinction, which is ubiquitous in the post-Avicennian philosophical literature.²³¹

 Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Cure, V.1.204.1‒7; translation by Marmura in Avicenna, The Meta-
physics, 155, revised. Marmura translates the second sentence as follows: “If it were possible for an-
imal inasmuch as it is animal to be in abstraction, with the condition that no other thing exists in
external reality, then it would be possible for the Platonic exemplars to exist in external reality.”
The syntax of the Arabic is admittedly awkward, but I think that Marmura’s translation cannot be
correct. Avicenna is not hypothetically positing the nonexistence of everything other than pure animal
in the concrete (which would be somewhat absurd); rather, he is hypothetically positing the existence
of pure animal in the concrete on the condition that no other thing be attached to it. It is this latter
option he deems erroneous and blames the Platonists for upholding.
 Izutsu, Basic Problems, 3‒4, describes these conditions of quiddity as a crucial aspect of post-
classical Islamic metaphysics and rightly pinpoints the condition bi-sharṭ lā as a particularly hotly
debated feature of Avicenna’s legacy.
172 II Quiddity in Itself and Mental Existence

In the text above Avicenna seeks to clarify the meaning of the two assertions bi-
lā sharṭ shayʾ ākhar and bi-sharṭ lā shayʾ ākhar in connection with the various modes
of existence of quiddity.²³² Although these two assertions are negative, one (bi-sharṭ
lā shayʾ ākhar) expresses a condition (albeit a negative one), while the other (bi-lā
sharṭ shayʾ ākhar) expresses the absence of a condition or a state of unconditioned-
ness. As Pasquale Porro and others have shown, Avicenna’s argumentation in this
passage relies on the difference between plain negation and metathetic negation
or negation by equipollence, two forms of negation which Avicenna here applies
to quiddity.²³³ Avicenna’s immediate concern in using these distinctions in this sec-
tion of Metaphysics is to explain which aspects of quiddity exist in the concrete world
and which aspects exist in the mind. This concern is made plain by the recurrence of
the term wujūd throughout this section of the text. In the process of doing so, Avicen-
na articulates three fundamental points (detailed as A, B, and C in the text), all of
which revolve around the proper interpretation of these two conditions and their on-
tological entailments.
The first point [A] amounts to a well-known feature of Avicenna’s metaphysics. It
consists in the refutation that pure quiddity can exist in total abstraction and auton-
omously from the concrete beings in the extramental world. Avicenna levels this
criticism chiefly at the Platonists, who contend that the Forms can exist on their
own and autonomously from the concrete individuals that participate in them and
the minds that think them. In this context, the term ‘abstract’ (mujarrad) should
be understood as meaning a real ontological separation, in the way in which the in-
tellectual substances or separate intellects are separated from matter. Accordingly,
the condition bi-sharṭ lā shayʾ ākhar should be construed both in an epistemic
way (quiddity is apprehended in abstraction from all other things) and in an onto-
logical way (quiddity exists in the concrete world separately from all other things).
Hence, mujarrad here means something close to mufāriq, ‘ontologically separate,’
and more precisely, ‘separate from matter,’ which is the term that Avicenna habitu-
ally relies on to express abstraction or separation in the extramental world.²³⁴ Avi-
cenna’s main claim in this connection is that pure quiddity is not mujarrad or mu-
fāriq in the sense of ‘separate’ in the concrete world in the manner of a Platonic

 I return to these conditions in more detail in section IV.1.5. For the time being, it is worth stress-
ing that, even though these conditions proceed from a logical context and usage, they possess, in
Avicenna’s metaphysical treatises, an ontological scope whose function is to determine and clarify
the mode of existence of quiddity and especially the relationship between quiddity and its concom-
itants. The ontological entailments of these conditions are discussed not only in Metaphysics, but also
in other works such as Elements of Philosophy (ʿUyūn al-ḥikmah), 55, where they are discussed in con-
nection with quiddity and possible and necessary existence.
 See Porro, Immateriality; idem, Antiplatonisme, especially 138‒139; Menn, Avicenna’s Metaphy-
sics, 158‒159.
 Accordingly, the separate intellects are called ʿuqūl mufāriqah and occasionally ʿuqūl mujarra-
dah. In Metaphysics VIII.6 Avicenna alternates between mujarrad and mufāriq to describe God’s im-
material and separate existence; cf. Salvation, 587.11‒15, where God is described as being mujarrad.
 2 Pure quiddity, universality, and mental existence 173

form or an intellectual being.²³⁵ The third point, [C], is directly related to point [A]. It
contends that quiddity in itself can be said to exist in the concrete, extramental
world, but not in abstraction or separately from the concrete instances in which it
inheres. This point is a direct continuation of argument [A], since it clarifies Avicen-
na’s position in contradistinction to the Platonic one. It explains how animal, inas-
much as it is animal, can be said to exist in the concrete world, but not in a mode of
absolute separation from matter. Rather, according to Avicenna, animal inasmuch as
it is animal can be said to exist in each concrete individual animal. Avicenna calls
this aspect of quiddity bi-lā sharṭ shayʾ ākhar, “without the condition of something
else,” which means that it is fundamentally unconditioned and hence epistemically
undetermined with regard to whether it is considered with matter or without matter.
His intention here is to stress that quiddity in concrete beings can be considered ei-
ther with its material concomitants or without them as a result of the process of ab-
straction conducted by the human mind. It is in this sense that this aspect of quid-
dity is unconditioned and undetermined.
However, like the condition bi-sharṭ lā shayʾ ākhar, the expression bi-lā sharṭ
shayʾ ākhar also has ontological bearing, as is clear from the very terminology Avi-
cenna uses in this passage and from the statement “it exists [or it has existence] in
concrete beings” (lahu wujūd fī l-aʿyān). In this case, it signifies a state of ontological
irreducibility. For not only does quiddity bi-lā sharṭ shayʾ ākhar exist in the concrete
individuals of the exterior world, as Avicenna explains in this passage, but it also
exists in them in an irreducible mode, which explains why it can be considered
“not with the condition of something else.” If quiddity were inextricably linked
with other things or thoroughly combined with them, then its existence would not
be described in terms of unconditionality. Rather, quiddity exists in concrete beings
with its material concomitants and accidents, but it retains its identity and true inner
nature. While existing in concrete beings, quiddity bi-lā sharṭ shayʾ ākhar is epistemi-
cally and ontologically irreducible and remains quiddity and only that, or quiddity
inasmuch as it is quiddity. What is more, it is plain from his own remarks that Avi-
cenna intends to contrast quiddity bi-lā sharṭ shayʾ ākhar, which exists irreducibly in
concrete individuals, to quiddity bi-sharṭ lā shayʾ ākhar, which cannot exist in the
concrete individuals and, more generally, in the exterior world.²³⁶

 It is important to stress this point, because some modern authors do not clearly distinguish be-
tween the separateness of a Platonic form or an intellectual being, on the one hand, and the sepa-
rateness of an intelligible object in the divine mind or in the Agent Intellect, on the other. According
to Avicenna, only the first cases have existence that is ‘separate’ or mufāriq. Intelligibles in the divine
and human intellects may be called ‘abstract’ or ‘immaterial’ (mujarrad), but not ‘separate’ (mufāriq).
 The expression bi-lā sharṭ shayʾ ākhar later becomes the standard way of referring to ‘absolute
quiddity’ or ‘unconditioned quiddity’ and—more surprisingly—to quiddity ‘in itself’ as it exists in
concrete beings. It is furthermore frequently identified with the ‘natural universal’ and ‘nature,’
two synonyms that refer to this extramental aspect of pure quiddity; the importance of these devel-
opments in the post-Avicennian tradition is discussed briefly below. But here I wish to tentatively
raise the following pressing point: as its name indicates, unconditioned quiddity theoretically has
174 II Quiddity in Itself and Mental Existence

Another pressing and difficult issue concerns the second argument of this pas-
sage, [B], which revolves around how quiddity “with the condition of no other
thing” (bi-sharṭ lā shayʾ ākhar), that is, essence taken purely in itself and in abstrac-
tion from everything else, can be said to exist. It is unclear at first glance which as-
pect of quiddity it corresponds to. Yet, the proper interpretation of this negative con-
dition points to a key feature of Avicenna’s metaphysics and should be analyzed
accordingly. In two articles devoted to Avicenna’s metaphysics and its reception in
the Latin Middle Ages, Pasquale Porro has construed this condition in light of Avi-
cenna’s refutation of the Platonic theory of the Forms, thereby attributing to it a pure-
ly polemical function. On his view, bi-sharṭ lā shayʾ ākhar refers to the extramental
and separate existence of the pure quiddities, a view Avicenna fiercely combatted.²³⁷

the capacity to acquire other conditions that qualify it. As such, and because it becomes identified
with absolute quiddity, it underlies both the conditions of bi-sharṭ shayʾ and bi-sharṭ lā shayʾ. In
other words, its unconditioned state enables it to be associated both with ‘the condition of something’
(i. e., the material concomitants) and with ‘the condition of not-something or nothing’ (i. e., its ab-
straction from all other things). This epistemic flexibility is clear; what is less clear are its ontological
implications. The first conditioned state corresponds to the concrete existence of quiddity with or in
things. But what about the ontological status of bi-sharṭ lā shayʾ? I provide a preliminary answer to
this question in the rest of this chapter. But in order to fully clarify what this existential mode
amounts to, one needs to examine the status of quiddity in the concrete world, which is the task
of chapter III. Suffice to say here that unconditioned quiddity or quiddity bi-lā sharṭ shayʾ ākhar
can refer, according to a maximalist interpretation, to pure quiddity as it exists both in the concrete
individuals (as an irreducible part) and in the mind, when considered without its material concom-
itants. When considered without its material and mental concomitants, it becomes quiddity bi-sharṭ lā
shayʾ ākhar.
 Porro, Immateriality, 296‒297; idem, Antiplatonisme, 138‒139. This excerpt showcases Avicen-
na’s use of plain vs. metathetic negation in connection with quiddity in itself. These kinds of negation
and their application to Avicennian metaphysics have recently attracted some attention; see, in ad-
dition to Porro, Menn, Avicenna’s Metaphysics; Ibrahim, Freeing Philosophy, 243‒289. Porro, who has
written extensively on the topic, argues that Avicenna reserved the use of metathesis or negation by
equipollence to establish the “positive, ontological separation” of the separate intellects and the First
Cause and that he used plain negation to convey the mere notion of eidetic or mental abstractness.
More specifically, in the context of his discussion of quiddity, when Avicenna describes quiddity in
itself in light of metathesis, he is referring to the Platonic view of the extramental separateness of
the pure quiddities and relies on this approach to reject their position, which would entail an onto-
logical (as opposed to merely eidetic) separation. Thus, one implication flowing from Porro’s argu-
ment is that Avicenna did not define pure quiddity in terms of metathetic negation in his own system,
since, if he had, then he would fall in the camp of the Platonists; see Porro, Immateriality, 296‒297,
299, and 303. However, this approach, although it accounts satisfactorily for the polemical aspect of
Avicenna’s argumentation, does not adequately illuminate his own doctrines on the matter, since
within his system the master correlates metathesis not with a Platonic interpretation of the pure quid-
dities as extramental separate Forms, but as a distinct form in the human mind. So, if one follows
Porro’s terminology, metathesis would suggest in this case pure mental abstractness and distinctness
(‘eidetic separation’), rather than ontological separation in the concrete. But as I argued previously,
such as dichotomy (between ‘ontological’ and ‘eidetic’ separation) is misleading, because Avicenna
regards mental entities as existents, so that ‘an eidetic separation’ is also to be regarded as a kind of
 2 Pure quiddity, universality, and mental existence 175

In other words, Porro limits the application of this term to point [A] above in order to
illustrate how quiddity does not exist according to Avicenna. And indeed, Porro is
justified in connecting this condition with Avicenna’s refutation of the Platonists.
As was shown previously, Avicenna denies that pure quiddity can exist separately
in the concrete world in the manner of autonomous forms. He accuses the Platonists
of unwarrantedly sliding from epistemic (or what Porro calls ‘eidetic’) abstraction to
ontological separation. According to Avicenna’s critique, the Platonists commit the
error of inferring an ontological argument from the bi-sharṭ lā shayʾ ākhar condition
of quiddity on the basis of its being merely epistemically abstractable in the mind. In
brief, the Platonists have transformed a merely linguistic, logical, and epistemic con-
sideration into an ontological doctrine.
While this reconstruction of Avicenna’s critique of the Platonic position is un-
doubtedly correct, it says nothing positive about Avicenna’s own views on the matter
and about the interpretation of point [B] in the above passage, which appears to go a
step further. In this connection, it is important to distinguish between the polemical
intention and tenor of the shaykh’s Platonic refutation and the arguments that reflect
his own philosophical position, a distinction not lucidly conveyed in Porro’s and Be-
nevich’s articles.²³⁸ If, for the purposes of his attack against the Platonists, Avicenna
does indeed associate the bi-sharṭ lā shayʾ ākhar condition with separate existence in
the concrete world (a position he deems untenable), this is definitely not how he him-
self construes this expression in his metaphysics and when elaborating his own doc-
trines. Understandably, other scholars working on the Avicennian tradition have
identified bi-sharṭ lā shayʾ ākhar more positively with an aspect of quiddity in the
mind, namely, with universal quiddity.²³⁹ Many postclassical Arabic scholars also
opted to connect abstractedness (mujarrad) and the special negative condition (bi-
sharṭ lā) with the universal quiddity.²⁴⁰ The rationale underlying this approach is

ontological separation or distinctness, albeit in the mind. This is why the key term mujarrad can be
applied both to the separate intellects and the intelligibles in the mind. At any rate, the key point is
that Avicenna uses metathesis not only to refute the Platonists, but also to establish the doctrine that
the pure abstract quiddity exists in the mind. It is precisely such a distinct or separate object in the
mind, thereby further blurring the line between ontological and gnoseological or epistemic separa-
tion.
 The fact that these two scholars focus almost exclusively on Avicenna’s polemic against the Pla-
tonists and Ibn ʿAdī leads them to ignore the equally important fact that Avicenna employs the con-
dition bi-sharṭ lā to describe quiddity in the context of his psychology and as it exists in the mind.
One of the main problems, of course, with limiting the interpretation of bi-sharṭ lā shayʾ ākhar to
the Platonic Forms is that it fails to account for Avicenna’s statement in Metaphysics according to
which this aspect of quiddity “exists only in the mind.”
 See, e. g., Izutsu, Basic Problems, 6, who identifies ‘negatively-conditioned’ quiddity with the in-
tellectual universal (kullī ʿaqlī). It should be noted that Izutsu’s comments in this article apply primar-
ily to the postclassical developments on Avicenna, not to Avicenna himself. This identification never-
theless is problematic in the context of Avicenna’s philosophy.
 With regard to this specific issue, there seems to be much uncertainty on the part of the post-
classical commentators on Avicenna as well as of his modern interpreters. This issue is discussed
176 II Quiddity in Itself and Mental Existence

that the terms shayʾ ākhar is made to refer to the material concomitants of quiddity in
concrete existents. But since Avicenna rejects the existence of the Platonic Forms,
quiddity without these material concomitants can apply only to the universals in
the mind, which are always disconnected from matter. This seems to make sense,
since it accounts for Avicenna’s statement that quiddity bi-sharṭ lā shayʾ does exist
in the mind.²⁴¹ And since most scholars recognize only the universal aspect of quid-
dity as truly existing in the mind and discard quiddity in itself as a distinct mental
existent, then on this reasoning universal quiddity represents the main candidate for
the bi-sharṭ lā condition.
However, I believe that this interpretation is problematic. On closer examination,
the premises supporting this approach do not cohere with the evidence that can be
drawn from Avicenna’s works. It would seem that the two propositions or conditions
that scholars have applied to universal quiddity in the mind—the bi-sharṭ lā shayʾ
condition and the qualification of abstractness (tajrīd, mujarrad)—are instead to be
applied primarily to quiddity in itself in Avicenna’s philosophy, and more specifically
to the way in which quiddity in itself exists in the mind. As I argue below, there are
strong reasons to believe that these conditions simply cannot refer to universal quid-
dity. Rather, the bi-sharṭ lā condition can refer only to pure quiddity in the mind,
since it is the only aspect of quiddity that can be envisaged ‘with the condition of

in detail below in the section devoted to the post-Avicennian thinkers. One thinker who might ascribe
these qualifications to the universal is Rāzī, although his views are difficult to reconstruct; see Ibra-
him, Freeing Philosophy, especially 243‒289. Ibrahim (272‒273) describes the Avicennian passage
under discussion as “puzzling” and claims that “recognizing the distinction between a quiddity bi-
sharṭ lā and a quiddity lā bi-sharṭ … is an epistemological point foreign to Avicenna’s treatment.
That is, Avicenna posits the distinction but the question of its recognition is not one that arises, or
would arise, in the context of his analysis.” Ibrahim is justified in describing the relation between
these two aspects of quiddity as a problem in the Avicennian works and one undermined by
much ambiguity. In spite of this, Avicenna’s distinctions in this passage remain, I would argue, a cru-
cial feature of his argumentation about quiddity. The main issue at hand here concerns the identity of
quiddity bi-sharṭ lā in the mind. On this point, other scholars have also remained undecided. Menn,
Avicenna’s Metaphysics, 158, locates quiddity bi-sharṭ lā shayʾ ākhar in the human mind without
specifying exactly what aspect of quiddity it refers to, the universal or quiddity in itself. Some
years ago, Izutsu, Basic Problems, provided a detailed discussion of bi-sharṭ lā in the post-Avicennian
context, but it is difficult to reconstruct his view on how Avicenna himself construed these expres-
sions, since he provides scarce information to this effect. As for Marmura, he does not tackle this
point in detail. In brief, there is little guidance to be gained regarding this issue from the modern
studies on Avicenna.
 Recall that in Introduction I.12, Avicenna employs the term “intellectual” (ʿaqlī) in several ways:
in a general manner (ʿaqlī¹) to describe all objects in the mind (including quiddity in itself), and with
a stronger ontological commitment to refer to the universal concept (ʿaqlī²). The idiosyncratic usage of
this term becomes clearer in light of the previous considerations, which unambiguously locate quid-
dity in itself in the human intellect, but at the same time maintain its distinctness from the universal.
This point suggests that Avicenna regards pure essence as an intelligible form distinct from the uni-
versal form, and that it is the former, not the latter, which he qualifies primarily as being mujarrad
and bi-sharṭ lā shayʾ ākhar.
 2 Pure quiddity, universality, and mental existence 177

nothing else,’ where ‘nothing else’ refers not only to the material concomitants, but
also to the mental ones. In light of this point, the universal existent is simply not an
apt candidate for this condition, since it presupposes a cluster of mental concomi-
tants, properties, or meanings that are not constitutive of quiddity in itself and there-
fore qualify as ‘other things.’²⁴²
Let me elaborate on these important points. On the reading of Avicenna’s theory
of universality I proposed earlier, the condition bi-sharṭ lā shayʾ ākhar cannot apply
to universal quiddity, because according to Avicenna the latter is accompanied by
other ‘things,’ namely, the concomitants and attributes that qualify universal mental
existence. Avicenna discusses these concomitants at some length in an earlier sec-
tion of this book, where he explicitly refers to them as following or being entailed
by (talḥaqu), occurring to (taʿriḍu), and conjoining to (taqtarinu ilā) quiddity from
the outside (lā dākhilah) and being other than (ākhar) quiddity.²⁴³ According to the
master’s own terminology, then, universality is a thing added to pure quiddity, as
are oneness and multiplicity. Because the universal is a composite of various mental
things and attributes, it is understandable that Avicenna would have regarded pure
quiddity as being characterized by “the condition of nothing else applying to it”—
precisely in order to demarcate it from the universal, which is composite and inclu-
sive of external ‘things.’ It is quite clear, then, that the ‘thing’ (shayʾ) referred to in
this condition is inclusive of either concrete concomitants and accidents or mental
concomitants. The main point is that quiddity in itself is envisaged in abstraction
from all of these external things, regardless of whether they are concrete or mental.
Accordingly, this negative condition can apply only to pure quiddity, since when

 Here an important clarification is required. As Izutsu, Basic Problems, explains, the later com-
mentatorial tradition distinguished between two different senses of bi-sharṭ lā shayʾ ākhar, which
Izutsu described as System A and System B in his article. In System A, shayʾ ākhar is taken to
mean all extraneous accidents and concomitants of quiddity, including the mental concomitants
that combine with quiddity in the mind. In contrast, System B posits quiddity as an irreducible entity
within a larger, synthetic concept (e. g., ‘animal’ in the definition ‘human is a rational animal’), which
allows us to consider it exclusively in itself and not inasmuch as it relates to these other concepts.
According to Izutsu, this conceptual distinction has its point of origin in Qushjī’s interpretation of
Ṭūsī’s Abstract of Correct Belief, and more precisely of the section the latter devotes to his treatment
of quiddity (which itself relies heavily on Avicenna and especially Metaphysics V.1). But this dual in-
terpretation of ‘negatively-conditioned’ quiddity is to a large extent a later development. My analysis
is based mostly on what Izutsu described as System A, which represents the crux of the issue in Avi-
cenna and in his immediate commentators. The main issue these thinkers tackled was pure quiddity’s
relation to its mental concomitants and how this relation determined its mental existence.
 Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Cure, V.1, 196.6 ff. On this point, cf., Bahmanyār, The Book of Va-
lidated Knowledge, 11.16‒18. Avicenna frequently describes the mental concomitants of quiddity in
the mind as being added to (zāʾid ʿalā) it; for example, at Metaphysics of The Cure, V.1, 204.12, he ex-
plains that oneness is added to the quidditative meaning in the mind. Avicenna does not to my
knowledge make this same statement with regard to existence specifically. But since he defines
both unity and existence as external attributes of essence, there are good reasons to think it could
apply to wujūd as well.
178 II Quiddity in Itself and Mental Existence

quiddity is considered truly in itself and in abstraction from all other things, it is con-
sidered on ‘the condition of nothing else applying to it.’ In fact, I shall argue shortly
that, according to Avicenna, universal quiddity, or quiddity envisaged together with
its mental concomitants, is not bi-sharṭ lā shayʾ, but rather a variant of bi-sharṭ shayʾ,
just as quiddity envisaged with its corporeal concomitants is a variant of bi-sharṭ
shayʾ. The thorny question of how, given these remarks, Avicenna can still claim
that quiddity bi-sharṭ lā shayʾ exists in the mind will also be addressed later on.
For now, suffice to say that these remarks reinforce the previous conclusions con-
cerning the need to posit two distinct modes of mental existence, one for universal
quiddity and one for quiddity in itself.
Furthermore, while it is true that in the post-Avicennian tradition the term mujar-
rad, and especially the expression ‘abstract quiddity’ (al-māhiyyah al-mujarradah),
are used flexibly and even ambiguously by individual authors to designate either
universal quiddity or quiddity in itself, Avicenna for his part is consistent in applying
the root j-r-d to quiddity in itself, not universal quiddity. In virtually every passage of
The Cure where derivatives of the root j-r-d appear in connection with quiddity, their
purpose is to describe pure quiddity, not the universal.²⁴⁴ One indicator of this prac-
tice appears in Text 3 above, where the ṣūrat al-ḥayawān al-mujarrad is said to exist
in the mind and to be distinct from the universal (kullī). In this case, it is obvious that
the “abstract form” is pure quiddity, not the universal concept. The very phrasing of
Text 6 above amounts to strong evidence to this effect as well: there Avicenna juxta-
poses “animal inasmuch as it is animal” (al-ḥayawān bi-mā huwa ḥayawān) with mu-
jarrad, which shows that he intends quiddity in itself, and not the complex universal

 See Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Cure, V.1, 199.3, 204.1 ff., and 205.5; Goichon, Lexique, vol. 1,
38‒40, provides valuable insight into this term, but she does not distinguish its application to
pure quiddity and the universal. Ṭūsī, in his Commentary on Pointers, vol. 1, 205.17, and vol. 3‒4,
440.15‒16, also probably applies the term mujarrad to quiddity in itself. But on his view, this aspect
of quiddity also exists in corporeal beings (for the intriguing post-Avicennian tendency of regarding
the abstract quiddity as existing also in concrete beings, see Izutsu, Basic Problems, and chapter III of
this book). The trend of using the term mujarrad to refer to the universal aspect of quiddity in the
mind appears to be a later development, but again in those cases some uncertainty subsists as to
whether these authors are using it to refer to quiddity in itself or to universal quiddity. For example,
Qushjī, Commentary, 400.4‒9, correlates al-māhiyyah al-mujarradah with quiddity bi-sharṭ lā shayʾ,
but it is unclear whether according to him it refers to pure quiddity or to a kind of mental universal.
At any rate, and what is important here in spite of the uncertainty concerning the later tradition, is
the fact that the position of these later authors may depart substantially from Metaphysics of The Cure
V.1, 204.6, where this expression refers to quiddity in itself as a distinct form in the mind, not to uni-
versal quiddity. The term mujarrad in this passage means complete or absolute abstraction, i. e., ab-
straction or separation from concomitants, which is the state of pure quiddity, but not of universal
quiddity, which is combined with mental concomitants. For additional evidence concerning how
later thinkers departed from Avicenna with regard to mental existence, see Fazlıoğlu, Between Real-
ity.
 2 Pure quiddity, universality, and mental existence 179

concept, to be the truly abstract state of quiddity.²⁴⁵ Finally, in Notes, the expression
mujarrad māhiyyatihi serves to designate pure quiddity, which, in this passage, is ex-
plicitly identified with “absolute humanness” (al-insāniyyah al-muṭlaqah).²⁴⁶ Bearing
this in mind, it is likely that the statement from segment [B], “animal [inasmuch as it
is animal] with the condition that there is no other thing, exists only in the mind”
refers to quiddity in itself, even though Avicenna there omits to mention the qualifi-
cation “inasmuch as it is animal,” probably in order to avoid any superfluous repe-
titions. Yet, the context and general meaning of the passage make this the most sen-
sible interpretive option.
To conclude, the terms bi-sharṭ lā and mujarrad appear in connection both with
Avicenna’s critique of the Platonists, according to whom this abstract quiddity exists
separately in the exterior world, and in the midst of his own argumentation to the
effect that pure quiddity can be conceived of and exists only in the mind. While
the first context is polemical and refutative, the latter is assertive and conveys an im-
portant doctrinal nuance of Avicenna’s metaphysics. For the master, the negative
condition refers to the distinctness of quiddity in the mind, and not to its separate
existence in the extramental world, as the Platonists claim. And, in the mind, it
serves to qualify quiddity in itself specifically, and not the universal aspect of quid-
dity.²⁴⁷ By implication, this means that the universal aspect of quiddity is not nega-

 This is true, even though Avicenna regards this aspect of quiddity in itself as existing immanent-
ly in the composite beings of the concrete world. In fact, this is the ‘absolute’ state of quiddity, which,
in its irreducible mode of existence, is both in the concrete world and in the mind, and which can be
subsequently qualified with conditions (bi-sharṭ …). More insight is provided on these points later on.
 Avicenna, Notes, 43.11; see Text 4 above. Cf. also Notes, 44, section 26; Salvation, 594.6‒10. As a
result, I do not share Black’s statement (Avicenna, 2‒3) to the effect that “within the context of a dis-
cussion of the intelligibles corresponding to material forms, abstractness does imply universality, and
universality in turn implies abstractness: the two criteria are coextensive.” Naturally, the universal
concept is also immaterial and abstract. Nevertheless, Avicenna applies the term mujarrad chiefly
to pure quiddity and nature, not the universal.
 It is true that at Metaphysics V.1.204.1‒8, Avicenna applies the term mujarrad to the clauses bi-
sharṭ lā shayʾ ākhar and bi-lā sharṭ shayʾ ākhar, which seems at first sight to undermine my argument.
But there is in fact no inconsistency here, and the term mujarrad in both cases refers to pure quiddity.
For ‘unconditioned quiddity,’ designated by the clause bi-lā sharṭ shayʾ ākhar, refers to the state of
pure quiddity taken without any conditions. This means that it can refer to the state of pure quiddity
as an irreducible principle in concrete things. In turn, it can be either considered ‘with the condition
of another thing’ (bi-sharṭ shayʾ ākhar) or it can be abstracted by the mind and considered ‘with the
condition of no other thing’; in this unconditioned state, quiddity also corresponds to the nature and
reality of the concrete existent, a nature that, once abstracted, is a pure concept in the mind. If this
occurs, then it becomes the pure concept of quiddity in itself in the mind. In brief, quiddity bi-sharṭ lā
shayʾ ākhar can be said to be derivative of quiddity bi-lā sharṭ shayʾ ākhar; the abstracted state of the
latter (i. e., once it has been extracted from its material context and abstracted from its accidents) cor-
responds to the mental state of the former. This means that nature or pure quiddity exists irreducibly
both in concrete existents and in the mind for Avicenna; these complicated points are discussed in
detail in chapter IV. With regard to the present concern, Avicenna is justified in describing these two
180 II Quiddity in Itself and Mental Existence

tively conditioned (since it is pure quiddity that is negatively conditioned in the

mind), but must be conditioned in other ways, which remain to be clarified. Further
evidence corroborating these points can be found in a passage of Metaphysics of Sal-
vation in which Avicenna discusses the relation of the universal to the individuals
existing in the concrete world. There he argues that common predication, or predica-
tion of many, is the main characteristic of this universal quiddity, which can be re-
garded also as a condition (sharṭ) added to it. In the course of his exposition, Avicen-
na states:

Text 7: If you have understood this, then [you will find it acceptable to say that] ‘the universal’
[kullī] [can be predicated] of humanness ‘with no condition’ [of another thing] [bi-lā sharṭ], and
that it [can be predicated] of humanness ‘on the condition that it be said of the many’ [bi-sharṭ
annahā maqūlah … ʿalā kathīrīn], in one way or another known to us. The universal [al-kullī] on
the first consideration exists in actuality in [concrete] things [mawjūd bi-l-fiʿl fī l-ashyāʾ], and it is
predicated of each one of them, not inasmuch as it is either one or many in essence [bi-l-dhāt],
for these [numerical attributes] do not belong to it [viz., this kind of universal] on account of its
being humanness [bi-mā huwa insāniyyah]. As for the second consideration [of universality], it
consists of two aspects: the first is the consideration of its potentiality in [concrete] existence,
and the second is the consideration of its potentiality when it becomes connected with the in-
telligible form.²⁴⁸

In this important and difficult passage, Avicenna explains that the universal can be
considered in two basic ways. When it is considered without a condition or in an un-
conditioned way (bi-lā sharṭ), that is, without the condition of another thing being
added to it, it is considered as existing in actuality in concrete things.²⁴⁹ This
claim is consistent with Avicenna’s arguments in The Cure that essence actually ex-
ists in every concrete instantiation, although it is noteworthy that in this passage he
refers to it specifically as a kind of universal (kullī); this point will be taken up in the
next chapter of this book. Suffice to say here that, insofar as it exists actually in each
concrete thing together with corporeal concomitants and accidents, quiddity is one
aspect. And insofar as it may be abstracted and become a universal in the mind,
it is another. These aspects apply to quiddity in concrete entities, albeit in different
ways. This intrinsic flexibility of quiddity in the concrete world explains why it is bi-
lā sharṭ shayʾ or “unconditioned”: it can be considered with or without its corporeal
concomitants, and it also has the potentiality to become a universal in the mind once
other conditions are added to it.

aspects of quiddity as mujarrad, since in both cases it refers to the nature alone in abstraction from
any (concrete or mental) concomitants.
 Avicenna, Salvation, 537.10‒17.
 It should be noted that, in these contexts, the expressions bi-lā sharṭ and bi-sharṭ are really a
shorthand for the more complete formulae bi-lā sharṭ shayʾ ākhar and bi-sharṭ shayʾ ākhar. The
point is whether one adds a thing (i. e., a consideration, attribute, or concomitant) to quiddity, or
whether one considers quiddity purely in itself. This can be confirmed by a comparison of this pas-
sage with Text 6 from Metaphysics of The Cure, where these expressions are spelled out in full.
 2 Pure quiddity, universality, and mental existence 181

The other main aspect of quiddity mentioned in this passage is qualified by the
condition “that it be said of many,” and it is this state of quiddity that is of immediate
concern here. This aspect clearly corresponds to the mental universal in the mind,
which is said of (maqūl ʿalā) a multiplicity of concrete individuals, and which there-
fore assumes a logical function. It is conditioned by mental attributes and concom-
itants and is qualified by the clause bi-sharṭ shayʾ ākhar, where shayʾ ākhar refers,
among other things, to its universality, i. e., its predicability or shareability. Avicenna
further explicates that this condition of universality or plural predicability can in
turn be connected with two aspects of potentiality, one in the concrete world and
the other in the mind. What the master presumably means by this is that quiddity
in concrete beings is potentially a universal in the mind, i. e., once it has been ab-
stracted from these concrete instantiations and connected with mental intentions.
As for the second aspect of potentiality, it likely refers to the mind’s potentiality to
reflect on this universal, i. e., to actually engage in its apprehension. At any rate,
what is important is that one of the aspects of conditioned quiddity is applied to
the universal in the mind. In other words, the universal is conditioned, because its
being in the mind requires some mental attributes and conditions that are not re-
quired for its extramental existence. What primarily characterizes it in that mental
state is its logical quality and its universality construed as a condition of potential
predicability. Here, however, one needs to tread carefully in order to avoid certain
pitfalls. In the concrete world, the potentiality of quiddity—or of what Avicenna in
this passage somewhat confusedly calls the universal²⁵⁰— refers merely to the poten-
tiality that the nature or pure quiddity has to be extracted and apprehended by the
mind (this corresponds to the unconditioned aspect of quiddity bi-lā sharṭ shayʾ I
mentioned above). This represents the first cognitive stage in the acquisition of the
universal. In this context, its potentiality in the mind refers to the potentiality quid-
dity has to associate with mental universality and hence to become an actual univer-
sal form. In other words, the mental universal exists in potentiality in concrete things
because the nature or quiddity of each concrete existent can be abstracted by the ra-
tional mind and combined with the attribute of universality and predicability of
many. Nature, as it exists in the concrete world, is therefore theoretically amenable
to mental universalization. Hence, potentiality here refers to the possibility of apply-

 This is confusing insofar as, for Avicenna, the quiddity of a concrete thing is only potentially or
hypothetically a mental universal, but it is not actually so, since, in order to be an actual mental uni-
versal, it needs to be reflected upon in the mind as being predicable of many. This perhaps explains
why Avicenna refrains from talking about the quiddities in the concrete world as universals, and es-
pecially as ‘natural universals,’ as his later commentators will. Instead, he describes them in terms of
nature, reality, and pure quiddity. This point also accounts for his careful definition of what consti-
tutes a universal in Metaphysics V.1 and for his concern to distinguish between the terms māhiyyah
and kullī, which are certainly not interchangeable in most cases. To say that the nature in concrete
beings is a universal, as Avicenna does in this passage, is not to be taken strictly as meaning a mental
universal: it is only potentially a universal in the mind, and what makes it such is the fact that quid-
dity can be abstracted and combined with universality in the mind.
182 II Quiddity in Itself and Mental Existence

ing a condition (sharṭ) of universality and plural predicability to the quiddity that ex-
ists in the concrete world once it has been abstracted from its material accidents in
the mind.
For our purposes, what is crucial in this passage is the fact that the universal in
the mind is also qualified “by the condition that [bi-sharṭ anna] it may be said of
many.” This, in effect, is one of Avicenna’s minimum requirements for the universal
to obtain, since, on his view, even a universal that has no actual instantiation in the
concrete world is theoretically or hypothetically predicable of several things in exter-
nal reality. So that universal quiddity in the mind—regardless whether it is consid-
ered potentially or actually—will be defined by its condition of plural predicability
and universality. This interpretation of the universal as something ‘conditioned’ is
corroborated by other passages taken from the master’s works: in Metaphysics of
The Cure, where Avicenna explains that “horseness, taken with the condition that
[bi-sharṭ annahā] its definition correspond to many things [in extramental reality], be-
comes general [or universal]”²⁵¹; and in Notes, where universality and “what is pre-
dicated of many” (al-maqūl ʿalā kathīrīn mukhtalifīn) is associated with genusness
and speciesness and, thus, with what Avicenna calls there ‘the logical genus’ (al-
jins al-manṭiqī), and not with nature or quiddity in itself, which is a distinct notion
in the mind, and which must be combined with logical genusness or speciesness
to create the universal concept proper. The condition or state associated with the uni-
versal is therefore one of mental complexity on the one hand (i. e., several notions or
intentions must be synthesized and combined in the mind) and also one of multiplic-
ity or of multiple relations being established between the form in the mind and its
various referents in the concrete world on the other. We can conclude from the fore-
going that universal quiddity is not bi-sharṭ lā shayʾ (on the condition of no other
thing), but rather bi-sharṭ annahā maqūlah … ʿalā kathīrīn, which is another way
of saying that it is bi-sharṭ shayʾ. Here the condition consists in regarding quiddity
as being predicable of many and, hence, as being universal in its relation to many,
as opposed to being regarded merely in itself. So, just as there is an application of
bi-sharṭ shayʾ to quiddity in the concrete world (i. e., when quiddity is taken with
its material accidents and concomitants), so there is an application of bi-sharṭ
shayʾ in the mind (i. e., when quiddity is taken with mental concomitants, such as
universality). Clearly, then, the universal is, strictly speaking, neither negatively con-
ditioned nor abstract in the full sense, but conceptually conditioned and composite.
Thus, there are different ways of regarding quiddity in itself in the mind in its
connection with the universal: if quiddity in itself is combined with universality
and other mental concomitants, then it is “with the condition of being predicated
of many” (bi-sharṭ annahā maqūlah ʿalā kathīrīn), which, in Avicennian parlance,
is another way of saying that it is “with the condition of another thing” (bi-sharṭ
shayʾ). In this particular case, the ‘thing’ that conditions pure quiddity is universality

 Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Cure, V.1, 196.14‒15.

 2 Pure quiddity, universality, and mental existence 183

(al-kulliyyah), which makes it pass from one conditioned mental state (bi-sharṭ lā
shayʾ) to another conditioned mental state (bi-sharṭ shayʾ). Recall that Avicenna in
Metaphysics explains that universality and the other mental concomitants that attach
to quiddity in the mind are things (ashyāʾ), attributes (ṣifāt), meanings (maʿānī), and
necessary concomitants (lawāzim, lawāḥiq). As such, they condition and qualify
quiddity. Hence, it is clear that in this universal state quiddity is not bi-sharṭ lā
shayʾ. However, if quiddity is regarded solely in itself in the mind, then it is bi-
sharṭ lā shayʾ ākhar, without any of the aforementioned things. In brief, the expres-
sion bi-sharṭ lā shayʾ ākhar can apply only to quiddity in itself in its state of pure ab-
stractness and distinctness (mujarrad) from everything else, including its mental at-
tributes. Consequently, it cannot refer to the universals in the mind. This conclusion
appears hitherto not to have been firmly established in the scholarship. When it
comes to mental existence specifically, Avicenna appears to rely on these terms to
express the perfect intellectual autonomy of quiddity in itself and to its being free
of all concomitants and accidents. In his account, the term mujarrad goes hand in
hand with the clause bi-sharṭ lā shayʾ. Both, according to my interpretation, would
fulfill the same purpose, i. e., to clear quiddity in itself from any kind of external as-
sociation whatsoever, including that with mental concomitants.²⁵² In this regard,
they enshrine pure quiddity as an object in the mind that is epistemically and onto-
logically distinct.
What is more, it was shown previously that pure quiddity is epistemically irredu-
cible. This is because its apprehension does not require reliance on other things,
whether other concepts with which it is associated and are constitutive of it (e. g., an-
imal and rational in the case of humanness), or the mental concomitants of quiddity
(e. g., universality). While the former are subsumed under a single and simple cogni-
tive act, the latter are external and non-constitutive of pure quiddity, and hence do

 I believe that the semantic congruence of the expressions mujarrad and bi-sharṭ lā shayʾ support
my reading of the evidence, since another construal of mujarrad would not account for Avicenna’s
consistent use of this term in connection with quiddity in itself: in contrast to pure quiddity, the uni-
versal is neither truly mujarrad nor bi-sharṭ lā shayʾ. Here, however, a distinction between Avicenna
and his later interpreters and commentators is called for, since the latter employ these terms in a dif-
ferent way, and often more vaguely, than the master himself. Izutsu, Basic Problems, 6, notes that the
‘negatively-conditioned’ quiddity was often associated with universal quiddity in the mind, but this is
an elaboration that appears subsequent to the master’s death. For one thing, Avicenna himself never
identifies the universal as the ‘negatively-conditioned’ aspect of quiddity, and he goes through great
pains to distinguish both aspects. In spite of this divergence, later authors usually recognize the in-
tricate connection and overlap of mujarrad and bi-sharṭ lā; see for instance Rāzī, Eastern Investiga-
tions, 141.20‒21; and Qushjī, Commentary, 400.4‒9, who also juxtaposes them with regard to the
same aspect of quiddity. As Izutsu notes (5‒6), it is often highly challenging to determine to what
aspect of quiddity these expressions apply. Rāzī, for instance, construes both bi-sharṭ lā shayʾ and
mujarrad as signifying merely “not existing in the concrete world,” which implies that they could
apply to the mental universal. Understanding how post-Avicennian thinkers conceived of the distinc-
tion between universal quiddity and quiddity in itself in the mind is a desideratum for future research
in Arabic postclassical philosophy.
184 II Quiddity in Itself and Mental Existence

not enter into its cognizability. Rather, pure quiddity is apprehended and cognized in
a simple and direct way. But the irreducibility of quiddity also extends to the case of
the universal, which is at root a combination or synthesis of pure quiddity and men-
tal concomitants or intentions. In a psychological context, if one focuses on quiddity
bi-sharṭ shayʾ, one is adding mental attributes and mental ‘things’ to the quidditative
nature. What this means is that even when it is a part of, and when it necessarily un-
derlies, the universal, quiddity remains epistemically irreducible. ²⁵³ This is the other
meaning that can be extracted from the Arabic expression min ḥaythu hiya hiya and
the one at play when Avicenna asserts that “the consideration of quiddity in itself is
possible [jāʾiz], even if it is with something else [wa-in kāna maʿa ghayrihi].”²⁵⁴
In light of these clarifications, I wish to return momentarily to the issue of the
mental existence of pure quiddity. Defining pure quiddity as something that is epis-
temically irreducible and distinct does not imply that it is devoid of an ontological
basis in the mind. Quite the contrary, since it is a concept that is firmly rooted in
the intellect, one should be inclined to regard it also as an intellectual existent.
We saw in this regard that pure quiddity underlies the universal concept and is a
part of it, while at the same time maintaining its own self-identity and nature. Avi-
cenna is keen to develop this mereological argument both in Metaphysics V.1 and Ei-
sagoge. Hence, in addition to being epistemically irreducible, pure quiddity is also
ontologically irreducible. At the very least, it exists irreducibly in the mind together
with the concomitants, attributes, and intentions that together constitute the univer-
sal concept. In this manner, the present analysis agrees with the mereological inter-
pretation already proposed by some scholars.²⁵⁵

 The upshot is that quiddity is epistemically irreducible regardless of whether it is also epistemi-
cally distinct (bi-sharṭ lā shayʾ) or taken together with mental accidents (bi-sharṭ shayʾ). Izutsu, Basic
Problems, 6, also advocates an understanding of quiddity bi-sharṭ lā shayʾ as something irreducible.
 Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Cure, V.1, 201.8.
 Notably Pini, Absoluta; De Haan, A Mereological Construal; and Benevich, Die ‘göttliche Exis-
tenz.’ One point that needs to be clarified is how Avicenna conceives of the irreducibility of pure quid-
dity, especially when one compares it to the notion of self-identity. These two notions seem to be con-
vertible: pure quiddity is irreducible because it is perfectly identical with itself (hiya hiya), and it is
perfectly identical with itself, because it is irreducible. But here a problem arises: in Metaphysics, I.4,
27.4‒8, Avicenna describes identity or the “self-identical” (al-huwa huwa) as one of the derivative
properties (tawābiʿ) of oneness or the one (al-wāḥid). This would seem to imply that the self-identical
cannot apply to pure quiddity, since the latter precedes the concomitant (lāḥiq or lāzim) of oneness
and, a fortiori, of its derivative properties. So how can pure quiddity be said to be self-identical, when
this property is described as essentially following oneness, which itself essentially follows pure quid-
dity? In fact, it appears that Avicenna holds two notions of self-identity: the first applies to the con-
crete existence and essence (al-huwa huwa), that is, to the existent taken as a substantial whole,
which possesses an essence and an existence realized in concrete reality. This is the sense outlined
in this passage of Metaphysics I.4, and its fundamental meaning seems to correspond to the other
Avicennian expression huwiyyah, which means something like ‘essential identity in concrete exis-
tence’; cf. Notes, 431, section 784, and 432, section 785, where a connection is made between hu-
wiyyah, al-huwa huwa, and wujūd. The other notion of self-identity is peculiar in that it applies exclu-
 2 Pure quiddity, universality, and mental existence 185

What is more, one logical outcome of Avicenna’s argumentation is that pure

quiddity is also ontologically distinct in the mind. By ontologically distinct in the
mind, I mean that it exists in the mind with its own maʿnā and ṣūrah, and in abstrac-
tion from all the concomitants that attach to universal mental existence. As a result,
it exists in a mode that is distinct from that of the complex universal concepts. This
ontological distinctness, like the epistemic distinctness of pure quiddity, is signified
equally by the two technical expressions bi-sharṭ lā shayʾ and mujarrad. It is impor-
tant to stress that, given the intellectual or mental context in which Avicenna deploys
these terms, their primary purpose is not to establish the ontological separation of
quiddity in the concrete world, but merely its ontological distinctness in the mind.
In other words, they underscore the argument that pure quiddity exists distinctly
in the intellect. As Avicenna himself makes clear, this is what distinguishes his un-
derstanding of these terms from their Platonic usage. Hence, these expressions refer
not only to the capacity our mind has to epistemically dissociate the concrete and
mental concomitants from pure quiddity, but also to the way that quiddity actually
exists intellectually when such an abstractive process has taken place. Furthermore,
because all concepts must possess some kind of mental existence, and because a
hard distinction in Avicenna’s ontology and epistemology between the thinking of
an intellectual concept and the being of an intellectual concept can hardly be
made, one must conclude that Avicenna intended the qualifications bi-sharṭ lā
shayʾ and mujarrad both in an epistemological and ontological way. When pure es-
sence is considered in a universal way together with its mental concomitants, it exists
in the universal in a mode that is epistemically and ontologically irreducible. How-
ever, when it is considered strictly in itself and as a distinct form or idea, it is both
epistemically and ontological irreducible and epistemically and ontologically dis-
tinct. Ultimately, these conditions serve the function of stressing not only the episte-
mic distinctness of pure quiddity, but also its ontological distinctness in the mind, by
which is meant its autonomous, abstracted, and separate mode of existence from
anything that is not itself. This interpretation is, on my mind, best suited to explain
Avicenna’s statement at Metaphysics V.1.204.5‒6 to the effect that quiddity bi-sharṭ lā
shayʾ ākhar has existence (wujūd) only in the mind.²⁵⁶

sively to pure quiddity and also corresponds to the sense of existence that Avicenna elucidates in Met-
aphysics I.5 and ascribes exclusively to quiddity, namely, proper existence. The main difference is that
whereas the latter is absolutely irreducible, the former is not: the huwiyyah of a concrete being can be
divided (at least conceptually) into its various metaphysical principles or constituents, such as form
and matter, essence and existence, substance and accidents, etc. These distinctions do not apply to
the self-identity of pure quiddity taken as a purely simple and unitary concept in the mind that ex-
cludes exterior and non-constitutive concomitants.
 This interpretation finds independent support in Taftāzānī’s Commentary on the Aims, vol. 1,
404.10 ff. This author relates that some philosophers (baʿḍuhum) attribute mental existence to quid-
dity bi-sharṭ lā. Again in this case, there is some ambiguity as to whether Taftāzānī means mental
existence with or without the mental accidents and concomitants, including universality. However,
given that he previously (404.1‒4) rejected the mental existence of quiddity bi-sharṭ lā on the grounds
186 II Quiddity in Itself and Mental Existence

At this juncture, two potential objections to the previous account should be ad-
dressed. The first is the claim that the condition bi-sharṭ lā shayʾ ākhar cannot pos-
sibly apply to pure quiddity, since in this case we would be faced with a multiplicity
of considerations consisting of (a) the consideration of pure quiddity, and (b) the
consideration of the condition bi-sharṭ lā shayʾ ākhar. Indeed, one may argue,
there is something unsettling about conceiving of pure quiddity as something condi-
tioned—even if negatively—since it was said previously that it is intrinsically uncon-
ditioned. Moreover, it could be argued, a condition, even a negative one, can be re-
garded as something added to quiddity in itself. By way of reply it is important to
stress that the condition or judgment bi-sharṭ lā shayʾ ākhar is an epistemic consid-
eration, and more specifically a negative consideration or judgment, which refers to
an ontological reality in the mind without, however, adding anything to it. Note that
this negative condition is a negation by equipollence, which is absolute and excludes
any other thing or relation applying to quiddity in itself. This epistemic and logical
judgment therefore predicates something purely negatively of its subject, without af-
fecting its ontological reality. In that sense, it may be compared to Avicenna’s habit
of predicating negative attributes or qualities of God, such as oneness, which serve to
stress the simplicity of the divine essence by excluding other things. Or recall Avicen-
na’s description of God as consisting of thinker, thought, and object of thought.
These qualities, predicates, and distinctions add nothing to the divine essence,
which remains irreducible and absolutely identical with itself. Rather, they signify
God’s simplicity and immateriality through a kind of negative theological approach.
What is more, as some scholars have noted, Avicenna occasionally employs met-
athetic negation to describe the existence of the First Cause.²⁵⁷ In some passages of
The Cure, he explicitly applies the condition bi-sharṭ lā shayʾ to God. In this case, it is
a negative judgment that does not affect in any way the ontological reality to which it
refers. It does not add anything ontologically to God’s being or essence. Although
God and the condition of bi-sharṭ lā are two distinct things in the mind, they refer
to a single ontological reality in the concrete world. Since this condition is absolutely
negative, it does not add anything to its object and does not lead to any kind of mul-
tiplicity in the mind thinking it, in the way that a positive judgment and a positive
condition would. In the final analysis, then, the negative condition serves to empha-
size the abstractness and distinctness of quiddity itself. In the case of God, negative
considerations can be formulated without them entailing any corresponding multi-
plicity in the divine essence, thereby leading to a kind of negative theology. Avicen-
na’s particular use of metathetic negation and of the bi-sharṭ lā clause establishes an

that this mode of existence necessarily presupposes mental concomitants, the logical assumption is
that Taftāzānī is describing here philosophers who maintained the mental existence of negatively-
conditioned quiddity without its concomitants. It is possible on my view that he had Avicenna in
mind specifically.
 See Porro, Immateriality, 299, and Menn, Avicenna’s Metaphysics, 158. I return to this point later
on.
 2 Pure quiddity, universality, and mental existence 187

intriguing parallel between God and the pure quiddities. They seem to represent the
only two instances where Avicenna applies metathetic negation in his philosophy.
However, there is another, potentially more dire, criticism that can be leveled at
the previous analysis. It could be argued from the foregoing that the characteristics
of quiddity in itself are intended by Avicenna to express a purely epistemic or logical
status and are not indicative of mental existence per se. In other words, our ability to
logically conceive of quiddity bi-sharṭ lā and mujarrad does not warrant our positing
it as a distinct and autonomous existent in the mind. What is more, the previous rea-
soning could be said to contain an egregious contradiction. On the one hand, there is
the claim that pure quiddity can be conceived of distinctly and in abstraction from all
other things. On the other hand, attributing existence to it would make it dependent
on an external concomitant and undermine its very distinctness and abstractedness.
Given that negatively-conditioned quiddity is, by definition, considered in total ab-
straction from everything else, it seems contradictory that something else, namely, ex-
istence, could be attached to it, because it would render it ‘quiddity together with
something else.’ In brief, the crux of the problem can be put as follows: pure quiddity
would be at the same time ‘on the condition of no other thing’ and ‘with another
thing,’ namely, existence.
One possible way out of this conundrum is to maintain the epistemic and onto-
logical irreducibility and the epistemic distinctness of pure quiddity, while foregoing
its ontological distinctness. This would imply that we can conceive of pure quiddity
in abstraction from all other things, but that it would exist only as a universal in the
mind, or as part of a universal, and thus in an irreducible way and together with its
concomitants. This mereological position has been recently adopted by some schol-
ars.²⁵⁸ In this connection, Ṭūsī, in his Commentary on Pointers, draws a distinction
between the absence, privation, or nonexistence of a consideration of a thing, and
the consideration of the nonexistence of a thing (ʿadam iʿtibār al-shayʾ laysa iʿtibāran

 This is Benevich’s position, Die ‘göttliche Existenz,’ especially 110‒115. According to him, pure
quiddity can be said to be epistemically distinct, but not ontologically distinct. It can be said to exist
only as a part of composite or complex beings—in this case, as a part of the universal. Benevich con-
tends in this regard that mental existence for Avicenna is always and necessarily universal mental
existence. As a consequence, it would appear, even the ‘divine existence’ of quiddity is to be con-
strued in this mereological way, as referring to the existence of pure quiddity as a part the universal.
On this point, I believe Benevich severed the link between Avicenna’s epistemology, on the one hand,
and his ontology and theology, on the other. As I argue in chapters II, IV, and V, the mereological
aspect is only one feature of a more complex ontological theory that also includes another distinct
state of pure quiddity in the human and divine intellects. Thus, I disagree with Benevich’s suggestion
to confine the divine existence of essence to this mereological aspect and his belief that mental ex-
istence is always universal (which is, admittedly, the standard view among interpreters of Avicenna).
On my view, this is true neither of the human context, where pure quiddity exists distinctly in the
mind, nor of the divine context, where a fortiori God’s and the separate intellects’ intellection cannot
be said to be universal on the traditional definition of universality, i. e., as a mental and intentional
accident that occurs to human thought.
188 II Quiddity in Itself and Mental Existence

li-ʿadamihi).²⁵⁹ This statement could be interpreted along the lines that conceiving of
quiddity in abstraction from existence and its other concomitants is not tantamount
to conceiving it as something nonexistent. Thus, it would not entail that pure quid-
dity does not exist at all, but simply that its existence is not being presently consid-
ered. At the very least, it could be said to exist irreducibly in the universal concept.²⁶⁰
The problem with this approach is that it does not cohere with the conclusion
reached above, which stresses the ontological distinctness of pure quiddity in the
mind in addition to its ontological irreducibility. In other words, it may help us to
strengthen the claim that quiddity exists irreducibly in the universal, while at the
same time amounting to its own distinct consideration (iʿtibār), but it does not par-
ticipate in a solution to the problem of its distinct existence in the intellect. It there-
fore fails to address the key statement at Metaphysics V.1, 204.6, according to which
quiddity bi-sharṭ lā exists in the mind, as well as the rich terminological evidence
surveyed in previous sections of this book. Indeed, the hypothesis of essence’s dis-
tinct existence in the mind appears to be supported by too much textual evidence to
be merely brushed aside.
In order to reach a more compelling solution to this thorny problem, a drastic
readjustment concerning Avicenna’s ontology and especially his doctrine of realized
existence is in order. More specifically, one needs to re-examine the view that com-
plex realized or acquired existence (wujūd muḥaṣṣal)—the existence of quiddity
taken with its accidents and concomitants—exhausts all the ontological modes in Avi-
cenna’s philosophy and represents the only two aspects of existence available to
quiddity. If anything, the previous analysis strongly indicates the need to posit, or
at the very least to envisage, two modes of mental existence—a complex and positive-
ly conditioned ontological mode pertaining to the universal concept, and a simple,
fully abstract, and negatively-conditioned mode pertaining to quiddity in itself.
Whereas the former is synthetic and contingent and premised on the inclusion of
the external, non-constitutive concomitants of quiddity, the latter focuses on the sim-
ple and unitary nature of quiddity in itself and the putative ontological mode that
would apply to it in abstraction from all physical and mental concomitants and,
hence, intrinsically or essentially. This distinction would help to alleviate the appa-
rent conundrum of how pure quiddity could be ‘on the condition of no other thing’

 Ṭūsī, Commentary on Pointers, vol. 3‒4, 463.1‒4.

 I am using Ṭūsī’s argumentation purely heuristically here and with no insinuation that he rec-
ognized only the existence of universal quiddity. As I surmise below, Ṭūsī may have regarded both the
universal and pure quiddity as existing distinctly in the mind. One upshot of this position would be
that we are forced to construe Avicenna’s statement concerning the fact that quiddity bi-sharṭ la shayʾ
exists “only in the mind” as referring merely to the irreducible existence of quiddity as a part in the
universal. While not impossible, I contend that Avicenna is making the stronger claim that pure quid-
dity can exist in a distinct mode in the mind; and I believe he takes the parallel claim of the existence
of pure quiddity in the universal as an established point deriving from the premises of the irreduci-
bility of pure quiddity with regard to the composite contingent beings (extramental and mental), the
priority of the part over the whole, of the simple over the complex, etc.—more on this below.
 2 Pure quiddity, universality, and mental existence 189

and yet at the same time ‘exist’ in the mind. But if, as I have argued, one identifies
negatively-conditioned quiddity with pure quiddity in the mind (and not the synthet-
ic universal), then this perspective offers a compelling solution to Avicenna’s puz-
zling statement to the effect that the negatively-conditioned quiddity exists in the
mind.

2.3 The constitutive elements (muqawwimāt) of quiddity and the notion of

essential irreducibility

Avicenna’s logical works provide additional insight into the essential structure of
pure quiddity and the issue of how it can be said to underlie the ontology of complex
existents. On the one hand, the essential meaning (maʿnā) of a thing, Avicenna tells
us, is irreducible under a certain angle and can be immediately grasped by the intel-
lect. As an essence regarded in itself (min ḥaythu hiya hiya), it is a unitary and simple
form (ṣūrah) and meaning (maʿnā) in the mind. Approached from this angle, com-
plexity and multiplicity will be external to pure quiddity and will coincide only
with its concomitants and attributes. In the logical section of Pointers, Avicenna dis-
courses on the differences between the constitutive and essential elements of quid-
dity (muqawwimāt), which are internal to it, and its external or extrinsic concomi-
tants, whether they be necessarily attached to quiddity in existence (the non-
constitutive lawāzim) or separable from it (the true accidents).²⁶¹ Thus, there can
be little doubt that quiddity, in spite of its being constituted by a variety of internal
elements that are spelled out in its definition, can be regarded, at the level of con-
ception (taṣawwur), as a single integrated entity that forms the basis of human intel-
lection. In Pointers, Avicenna explains that “a thing can be known by a simple con-
ception [taṣawwuran sādhijan], as when we know the quidditative meaning [maʿnā]
associated with the term ‘triangle,’ or it can be known through conception [com-
bined] with ascent.”²⁶² The conception of a pure quiddity is simple, because its es-
sential constituents are embraced all at once: “all of the constituents of quiddity
[muqawwimāt al-māhiyyah] enter with the quiddity in conception [taṣawwur], al-
though they are not detailed in the mind.”²⁶³ And in his logical and metaphysical
works, Avicenna’s argumentation relies on the premise of an unmediated and simple
apprehension of pure quiddity in abstraction from its external concomitants and at-
tributes: this is the iʿtibār of quiddity in itself of Introduction I.2; the negatively-con-
ditioned quiddity (bi-sharṭ lā shayʾ ākhar) of Metaphysics V.1; and the pure nature (ṭa-
bīʿah) that is distinct from the mental concomitants (such as genusness and
universality) of Categories I.5. This immediate, unitary, and simple intelligible pres-

 Avicenna, Pointers, vol. 1, 199 ff.

 Avicenna, Pointers, vol. 1, 182.1‒2.
 Avicenna, Pointers, vol. 1, 203.7‒8.
190 II Quiddity in Itself and Mental Existence

ence of quiddity is due to its essential irreducibility. Thus, in Notes, one reads that
“animal inasmuch as it is animal is an intellectual meaning [maʿnā ʿaqlī],” which
“in its essence” (fī dhātihi) and “inasmuch as it is animal” (huwa bi-mā huwa ḥay-
awān) is irreducible even when combined with genusness and other mental attrib-
utes.²⁶⁴ Elsewhere, it is stated that “every quidditative meaning is one in itself and
in its true reality [fī dhātihi wa-ḥaqīqatihi] and does not become multiple in its
true reality; it only becomes multiple due to accidents and attributes.”²⁶⁵ As Black
eloquently puts it, “Avicenna is insistent that the intelligible content of any thought,
as such, is always a single unity: the prior activities in preparation for receiving that
content, and the subsequent sorting out of it, may be multiple and complex, but the
intelligible, as intelligible, is one.”²⁶⁶
This intelligible and conceptual irreducibility of quiddity is what ensures its epis-
temic—and potentially also its ontological—status as something constant and real in
the intellect. In that sense, pure quiddity is something that is immediately true and
real in the mind thanks to its presence and intelligibility: its ḥaqīqah—a term Avicen-
na frequently associates with pure essence—is precisely its being-in-itself or self-
identity. These notions of essential irreducibility, reality, truth, and self-identity are
conveyed by means of various expressions and terms: ‘inasmuch as it is itself
(and only itself)’ (min ḥaythu hiya hiya); ‘x being x and only x’ (al-farasiyyah fara-
siyyah faqaṭ); ‘what it is in its essence’ (mā huwa ʿalayhi fī (or bi‐) dhātihi); its
being ‘negatively-conditioned’ (bi-sharṭ lā), etc.²⁶⁷ It is noteworthy that most of
these formulas can be construed as expressing essential irreducibility and essential
distinctness; in that case, the notion of ‘distinctness’ is contrasted to ‘otherness’ and
‘extrinsicity.’ The notions of essential irreducibility and distinctness are intricately
connected and serve to qualify pure quiddity, albeit in different ways. Yet, it is
clear that for Avicenna, pure essence is distinct precisely because it is irreducible

 Avicenna, Notes, 61.6‒7; cf. also 56, section 40; and 60, section 47, for the view that universality,
genusness, and speciesness are other than pure quiddity. This conceptual immediacy and simplicity
of pure quiddity has its logical counterpart in what Avicenna calls “simple notions” (mufradāt). At
the level of logical or definitional enunciation, these simple notions, such as ‘human’ or ‘horse,’
are contrasted to the composite or complex notions (murakkabāt or muʾallafāt). Thus, the same quid-
dity can be regarded either as simple (human) or complex (mortal rational animal), depending on the
consideration. These notions, however, are not simple when compared to the substances that are
truly simple, such as ‘soul’ and ‘intellect’; thus, “that in which composition can be considered [yuʿ-
tabara] is not simple, for example humanness and animalness, for these can be divided in their def-
inition [bi-l-ḥadd] into many meanings” (Notes, 41.6‒8).
 Avicenna, Notes, 153, section 217. The aim of this section is, ultimately, to prove that God is the
only purely one and simple maʿnā in the world. But notice that Avicenna’s comments can apply to the
pure quiddities in the mind, which are simple and irreducible and become multiple and complex only
when mental attributes and concomitants are added to them. See also Notes, 386, section 684, on the
essential unity and simplicity of the quidditative meaning humanness (maʿnā l-insāniyyah).
 Black, Avicenna, 16.
 For a more complete list of Arabic terms and expressions designating pure quiddity in Avicen-
na’s logical, psychological, and metaphysical works, see Appendix 1.
 2 Pure quiddity, universality, and mental existence 191

and remains itself and only itself regardless of whether it is related to or combined
with other things: thus, “the consideration of animal in itself is possible even
when it is combined with other things.”²⁶⁸
In spite of the foregoing, when approached from an analytical perspective that
focuses on its internal essential structure, pure quiddity can be considered as some-
thing constituted of a plurality of elements and meanings (maʿānī) that coalesce in
its definition. When apprehended as discrete parts, these quidditative elements
amount to a certain multiplicity, at the very least with regard to definition and enun-
ciation, but also perhaps as a conceptual one, if the mind indulges in the task of an-
alyzing each one of them and studying their various relationships.²⁶⁹ Yet, although
these internal constituents can be conceptually separated from the full quidditative
maʿnā, they are intrinsic to it and constitutive of it and unified in conception (taṣaw-
wur), which enables us to have an immediate and cohesive apprehension of an es-
sence (whether an artificial form such as heptagonal house or a natural form such
as horse) without having to go through the process of breaking it down into its var-
ious constitutive parts. But when they are dissected and isolated from pure quiddity,
these elements are themselves meanings (maʿānī), which implies that any complete
or realized quidditative meaning is itself made up of other quidditative meanings,
such as ‘animal’ in ‘human’ or ‘shapeness’ in ‘triangle.’ Although Avicenna usually
refers to these constitutive elements as muqawwimāt, he occasionally calls them law-
āzim, in which case he means lawāzim dhātiyyah, essential or inherent properties.²⁷⁰
Focusing on the example of the triangle, Avicenna explains that shapeness (sha-
kliyyah) is intrinsic to (dākhilah) and constitutive of (muqawwim) the quidditative
meaning (maʿnā) of triangle. In contrast, existence is not intrinsic to and constitutive

 Avicenna, Metaphysics, V.1, 201.8.

 Approached from this angle, the quiddity humanness possesses different meanings (maʿānī
mukhtalifah), as is explained in Notes (41, section 23), and only purely simple substances such as ‘in-
tellect’ are simple meanings or notions (maʿnā basīṭ). Nevertheless, these considerations are all rel-
ative, depending on what is being compared. Strictly speaking, only God will be a maʿnā basīṭ (see
Notes, 153, section 217). Hence, this state of affairs is not dissimilar to what Avicenna says about the
separate intellects: they are simple (basīṭ) according to one consideration, but complex (murakkab) or
possess a multiplicity (kathrah) according to another, if their many objects of intellection and their
intelligible concomitants are taken into consideration. Likewise, pure quiddity can be regarded as ir-
reducible and simple in conception according to one consideration, and liable to division and multi-
plicity according to another, especially if one relates it to definition and speech. In general, one might
say that the pure quiddities are unitary and simple in conception (bi-l-taṣawwur), but divisible in their
definition (bi-l-ḥadd).
 Hence, when applied to the things that relate to quiddity, the term lawāzim is ambiguous, in that
it can refer either to the external concomitants of quiddity (e. g., universality, oneness, etc.), which is
its more common function, or, more rarely, to the constitutive features within it (e. g., ‘animal’ in
‘human’). For the sake of clarity and consistency, I employ the term lawāzim to refer to the external
concomitants of quiddity, and muqawwimāt to refer to its constituents and internal elements. Strobi-
no, Per se, provides a detailed and insightful discussion of these terms based mostly on Avicenna’s
logical treatises.
192 II Quiddity in Itself and Mental Existence

of it. Even though properties of the triangle like shapeness can be conceptually sep-
arated, the consideration of the triangle’s maʿnā is a simple act that intuitively in-
cludes shapeness. Hence, its maʿnā is considered as one thing when envisaged in
its overall essential constitution or subsistence (qiwām) and ascertainment or reali-
zation (taḥaqquq) in the mind.²⁷¹ Thus, as Avicenna puts it in Notes, “every quiddi-
tative meaning [kull maʿnā] is in itself [fī dhātihi] one in all regards and not multiple,
such as humanness, and it becomes multiple only due to something else, which is
matter.”²⁷² With regard to the activities of the human mind, then, an important differ-
ence between the definition and pure quiddity has been underlined: whereas the for-
mer includes a multiplicity consisting in the enumeration of its discrete parts, and,
hence, also amounts to a variety of considerations related to a single object, pure
quiddity, on the other hand, is perfectly unitary and simple with regard to the way
in which it is conceived by the mind. Whereas the definition is tied to language
and is the discursive utterance that points to the quidditative concept, quiddity in it-
self is the actual concept as it is intellectually grasped in abstraction from everything
else.
Having exposed these subtle points, Avicenna then notes that the various intrin-
sic and constitutive features of essence underlie all manifestations or considerations
of quiddity: in the case of the triangle, for example, its essence is constituted by these
internal elements “in the external world [i. e., in concrete things], in the mind [i. e., in
mental existents], and whichever other way [it may be envisaged, kayfa kāna].”²⁷³
The last segment of the sentence is not explicitly spelled out, but it is presumably
a reference to the direct intellectual apprehension of quiddity in itself, which ex-
cludes existence and all extrinsic attributes, but involves the core meaning of triangle
and thus necessarily includes its various constituent elements. In other words,
shapeness and three-sidedness will characterize all triangles, the concrete triangles
existing in the extramental world and the universal concept ‘triangle’ in the mind, as
well as (and in a primary way) the pure quiddity ‘triangleness’ when it is conceived
of in the intellect. These elements always enter into the maʿnā of triangle and in the
quiddity ‘triangle in itself’ abstracted from all other things, since a bare conception
of triangle in itself requires a conception of three-sidedness and shapeness. It is this
quidditative meaning realized by the essential constituents that represents quiddity
in itself in toto and that can be said to underlie universal mental and individual ex-
tramental instantiations of triangle. What is more, the intelligible entity produced by
these internal elements amounts to a single, unified, and immediately graspable con-
cept in the mind, whose conception (taṣawwur) in turn serves as the foundation for
the mental elaboration of the universal concept. In contrast to this constant, unitary,
and self-realized quiddity, whose reality and truth is derived directly from its internal

 See Avicenna, Categories, II.1, 61‒62. The example of the triangle to discuss essence was used by
Aristotle at Posterior Analytics, II.7.92b.14 ff.
 Avicenna, Notes, 144, section 197.
 See Avicenna, Categories, II.1, 61.9‒10.
 2 Pure quiddity, universality, and mental existence 193

principles, the complex universal concept is composed of the nature or quiddity to-
gether with external concomitants, such as universality and numerical oneness. Con-
sequently, this means that the essential reality ‘triangleness’ belongs first and fore-
most to pure quiddity and nature, and to the universal concept ‘triangle’ and the
concrete instantiations only secondarily, posteriorly, and by derivation from this in-
telligible prototype in the mind.
It is significant that Avicenna in Categories II.1 describes these essential constit-
uents as meanings or notions (maʿānī) of quiddity in itself, and more specifically as
“constitutive meanings of quiddity” (al-maʿānī l-muqawwimah li-l-māhiyyah). This
implies that the complete or realized meaning (maʿnā) of pure quiddity is, in the
final analysis, not an absolutely irreducible meaning, but a meaning which is itself
constituted of a series of more fundamental meanings or notions that provide it
with its epistemic validity and intelligibility. Accordingly, the irreducibility I previ-
ously ascribed to pure quiddity can, from this angle, be described as being merely
relative or conditional. Now, since these more basic internal constituents and mean-
ings are essentially prior to the maʿnā of triangle in itself inasmuch as they constitute
it, and since the maʿnā of triangle, Avicenna tells us, is both distinct and prior to its
external concomitants (including existence) and, hence, to realized existence in the
concrete world, these constitutive meanings will, a fortiori, be essentially prior to any
kind of realized existence that can combine with the quidditative meaning. The up-
shot of this is that they certainly cannot be regarded as existents (mawjūdāt) or even
as existing in the same sense or on the same ontological level as the quiddity that is
realized in existence with its external concomitants (whether mental or concrete). The
maʿānī qua constitutive and intrinsic quidditative meanings are more fundamental to
quiddity and essentially prior than any of the external concomitants of realized ex-
istence that can apply to it. This suggests, in turn, that the notion of constituent
meanings (or maʿānī muqawwimah) is distinct and autonomous from realized exis-
tence and the external concomitants or implicates of essence. If quiddity can be
said to be essentially prior to existence in the mind, then it would seem that the
maʿānī (viz., constitutive meanings) of the maʿnā (viz., full and unitary quidditative
meaning) are even more prior to existence than the maʿnā they constitute, precisely
because they are constitutive of it. These would be truly irreducible insofar as they
are constitutive of the quidditative meaning, but nothing seems to be constitutive
of them in their state of embeddedness in quiddity. These points will have interesting
repercussions in the forthcoming discussion of quiddity and mental existence.
It is perhaps partly for this reason that Avicenna believes that, unlike existence,
which is an external concomitant of the quidditative meaning, the internal constitu-
ents of quiddity, for their part, cannot be demonstrated or even understood (tufham).
As he strikingly remarks:
194 II Quiddity in Itself and Mental Existence

It is impossible [yastaḥīl] for the thing [al-shayʾ] that makes a triangle a triangle or the triangle a
shape to be sought [yuṭlab]. But it is not impossible for the thing [al-shayʾ] that makes the tri-
angle existent in the mind or in the external [world] to be sought.²⁷⁴

Avicenna here appears to make a distinction between the essential cause, whose ori-
gin cannot be known, and the efficient cause, which can be known. The former cor-
responds to the inner structure and constituents of quiddity, the latter to its external
concomitants and especially to realized or actual existence. But why would Avicenna
claim that the search for the constitutive elements of the quidditative meaning is
moot or impossible, or—more precisely—that the thing responsible for the constitu-
ents (e. g., triangularity or shapeness of the triangle) cannot be sought? And what ex-
actly does he mean by this?
Avicenna is presumably referring here to the absence of an external cause bind-
ing the various constitutive meanings of a single quiddity—or our ignorance of it—
and this precisely because these maʿānī are irreducible in their very nature. In
other words, human scientific inquiry does not allow us to know what binds the in-
ternal concomitants of the quidditative meaning in the way that it enables us to
know the external concomitants that attach to the quidditative meaning, such as
oneness, existence, and universality. Existence, for instance, can be known inas-
much as it is an external concomitant attaching to a quiddity and insofar as the
cause responsible for this connection or relationship is also external to quiddity
and hence identifiable and knowable. By way of example, if I witness a craftsman
fashioning a triangle out of wood, I witness the efficient cause responsible for the
concrete existence of this wooden triangle. As a result, I know the existence of
this triangle through its cause. Likewise, Avicenna believes that our knowledge of
the existence of the separate intellectual beings is possible, because we can deduce
their existence from even higher causes and infer the necessity of their existence
from the visible celestial motions, which require an immaterial cause and mover.
In this regard, knowledge of the existence of a thing is closely tied in Avicenna’s
mind, as it was in Aristotle’s, with demonstration (burhān), which can formulate a
proof that something exists. However, by witnessing such an event and acquiring
such knowledge, I do not by the same token know the cause binding the constitutive
elements of triangle or the cause of triangularity underlying this very triangle.
Rather, these are already embedded in the quidditative meaning of triangle. The
root cause for this remains unknown, as it would amount to asking: what is the
cause of the whatness of triangle? This quidditative meaning is already in the crafts-
man’s mind when he is working and in my mind when I apprehend this particular
triangle or universal triangle. Moreover, if the definition of a thing, as opposed to
a scientific demonstration, can enunciate the various constituents of this thing’s es-
sence, it cannot on the other hand explain the origin and raison d’être of these very
constituents, or why these constituents (as opposed to others) should constitute that

 Avicenna, Categories II.1, 61.14‒16; cf. Introduction, I.6, 34.10‒15.

 2 Pure quiddity, universality, and mental existence 195

particular definition in the first place. In the case of these meanings, then, there is no
obvious external cause responsible for their being what they are that can be grasped
by the senses or the intellect. For what is essentially constitutive is not caused to be
such from the outside, but is intrinsically and irreducibly so.
Yet, this might strike us as odd, because Avicenna is careful to point out in some
texts that essence has a cause and that this cause is distinct from the cause of the
existence of something. Both essence and existence have their own causes, which
are distinct. What, then, is this essential cause for Avicenna? And why would he
claim that the essential cause of triangle is unknowable? There is, of course, a
way in which this essential causality is knowable; for human beings do have a
grasp of the definitions of things by conceiving of genus, species, and differentia.
For instance, there is a way to frame the cause of essence as the combination of
genus and differentia, which is a relationship internal to it and which obtains in ab-
straction from concrete existence. Hence, the essence of human is made up of animal
and rational, while the cause of triangle would be something like three-sided geomet-
rical figure two of whose angles amount to a right angle. In those cases, human be-
ings can conceive how these essences are composed, so to speak, and they can also
conceive these definitions and derive knowledge from them. However, I do not think
this is what Avicenna has in mind when he argues that what makes a triangle a tri-
angle cannot be known. Rather, his point concerns the rationale underlying why spe-
cific internal constituents should bind together to constitute specific quidditative
meanings in the first place, and what determines these combinations and forma-
tions. In other words, why should triangle have shape, why should trees be made
out of wood, and why should human beings be rational? It is the causality underly-
ing these internal quidditative relationships that, I surmise, Avicenna considers un-
knowable to the human mind, for they indeed seem completely random and unjus-
tifiable demonstratively from a scientific perspective. Note that these questions differ
markedly from the question of existence. Why this particular object exists or why this
individual human being exists, for instance, can be answered quite easily by looking
at the direct causes of these things: this son is the effect of his father and mother, the
statue is the product of the craftsman’s activity, etc. But in the case of the quiddita-
tive maʿānī, no such causal account can be provided, nor can a rationale justifying
the quidditative relationship between the various constitutive concomitants be prof-
fered. The obscurity of the essential causal process binding the constitutive maʿānī to
the quidditative maʿnā when it comes to human cognition may explain Avicenna’s
rather disinterested claim that this kind of causality cannot be known. It lies so to
speak beyond human cognition, since no necessary causal account of it and no dem-
onstration can be formulated.
Although Avicenna is laconic on this point, it appears that he is implicitly mak-
ing a theological argument: the causality binding the relations between the various
maʿānī of triangleness, as well as the truth these relations express regardless of
human judgment (taṣdīq), suggest that this causality must be referred to the Absolute
Truth of all things, namely, God. Ultimately, I suspect that Avicenna makes God qua
196 II Quiddity in Itself and Mental Existence

Divine Truth or Reality (ḥaqq, ḥaqīqah) responsible for determining the relationships
between quiddity and its inner meanings, between the essence of triangle and the
various constituents that compose it. Only an absolute creative agent such as God
can determine the structure of essences in the very act of creation and according
to the perfect order He intended for the universe. Seen from this angle, these quid-
ditative structures are related to the notion of divine providence and to the common
assumption shared by Avicenna and other medieval thinkers according to which God
created a world profoundly imbued with order and goodness. Unlike humans, God
knows these quiddities in themselves and is moreover their cause through His intel-
lection of them. For God’s knowing them and causing them is one and the same
thing, so that the reason or causality underlying the quidditative meanings must
be known to Him. From a human perspective, the cause that makes pure quiddity
what it is represents the limit of human knowledge, insofar as the logical and causal
rationale binding its various constituents escapes direct human understanding. The
causal process lying behind quiddity in itself and responsible for its being such a
quiddity rather than another (the quiddity of triangle being triangleness rather
than humanness) lies beyond the human ken and beyond what can be established
scientifically, since science is occupied with causes it can identify and ascertain. Ter-
minologically, it is also intriguing to realize—and certainly not a coincidence—that
ḥaqīqah is a term Avicenna uses to refer to the pure quiddities and which also has
an application in his theology to describe God, who is the ultimate Truth and Reality
(ḥaqq and ḥaqīqah). Hence, one could say that the truth underlying quiddity in itself
is related to the divine truth insofar as the latter is its cause. It is God, qua “the dem-
onstration of all things” (huwa l-burhān ʿalā kull shayʾ), who establishes the quiddi-
tative meanings and, hence, is the cause of the thingness or whatness of all things.
Human beings, in contrast, cannot know “the thing [al-shayʾ, here used in a non-
technical sense] that makes a triangle a triangle.”²⁷⁵
It is also in this context that Avicenna’s description of God as an unknowable
maʿnā should be considered. In Metaphysics I.7, he states that the First Cause “is a
meaning [maʿnā], the explication of whose term [ism] belongs only to It.”²⁷⁶ Here
again he presents the irreducible quidditative meaning as a mystery from the
human perspective, all the more so since this time it is God’s maʿnā that is the
focus of discussion. This is confirmed in Notes, where one reads that “we cannot
know the true reality [ḥaqīqah] of the First.”²⁷⁷ Hence, knowing the causes of the
true natures and quiddities lies beyond the human ken. This is true of God’s meaning
as well and eminently so: if the ultimate causes underlying the ḥaqīqah and maʿnā of

 For an enlightening discussion of Avicenna’s theory of truth in connection with essence, see Liz-
zini, Ontology and Logic.
 Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Cure, I.7, 47.7. I relied heavily on Marmura’s translation. An alter-
native and more literal translation could be: “but the meaning of the explanation of His name be-
longs only to Him.”
 Avicenna, Notes, 72.7, section 62.
 2 Pure quiddity, universality, and mental existence 197

the pure quiddity of triangleness are unknowable to us, then a fortiori the maʿnā of
God will lie beyond human reckoning.²⁷⁸ The various implications of these points for
Avicenna’s theology are significant and will be discussed in more detail in chapters
IV and V. I wish at this juncture to briefly outline their immediate metaphysical and
epistemological upshots. The foregoing suggests that some of the maʿānī in the
human mind— maʿānī here construed as quidditative meanings—may not correlate
with mental existents construed as complex, universal concepts, but may neverthe-
less underlie all mental and concrete existents. Whereas the conception of pure quid-
dity presupposes the realization (taḥaqquq) of its internal constituents alone and is
thus a kind of purely essential and intelligible realization, the realization of the com-
plex universal ideas implies that quiddity be realized together with its external con-
comitants and attributes. Yet, the most fundamental, immediate, and simple kind of
conception (taṣawwur) does not require them and finds its starting point in the con-
stant intelligible reality of the pure nature and quiddity. What is more, the constitu-
tive elements of the quidditative meanings, which Avicenna usually calls muqaw-
wimāt and maʿānī, are twice removed from the mental existent construed as a
synthetic or complex entity: first, they are removed from the full unitary maʿnā or
meaning of quiddity in itself qua its discrete parts; and second, they are removed
from the additional, external concomitants (existence, oneness, and universality)
that accrues quiddity in itself and makes it a complex mental existent. Avicenna’s
account is thus based on a matrix of logical distinctions regarding the various rela-
tionships between quiddity, its internal constituents, and its external concomitants.
This matrix of logical distinctions is the bedrock on which he elaborates his episte-
mology of pure quiddity and the universal. But it is also one of the foundations on
which he articulates his doctrine of mental existence. When it comes to pure quiddi-
ty, logic, epistemology and ontology are all intimately related in the master’s works.
Yet, even though Avicenna makes the pure quiddities and their constituents the irre-
ducible and elementary building blocks of his epistemology, he stops short of attrib-
uting a positive or full-fledged existence to these maʿānī. This is understandable,
given that existence, on the standard interpretation of his ontology, involves the re-
alization of the extrinsic attributes of quiddity. Consequently, the implication of pos-
iting quidditative meanings abstracted from existence would seem to be that these
maʿānī have nothing to do with existence, or at least—and this is a crucial qualifica-
tion—with the realized, composite, and derivative existence of the extrinsic concom-

 Naturally, the analogy is not to be taken literally inasmuch as God’s maʿnā does not have a
cause, even an intrinsic or constitutive cause, since God’s quiddity—if a quiddity can be ascribed
to Him—is not composed of a variety of constituents, unlike all the other quiddities. As Avicenna
puts it in Notes, 77, section 72, a quiddity that has no parts has no definition. And God’s meaning
is perfectly simple; it is “a meaning one in essence” (al-maʿnā l-aḥadī l-dhāt, Notes, 79.6‒7, section
75; cf. 386, section 683). What is more, while the maʿānī of the other quiddities can be intellected,
it is unclear whether Avicenna would regard God’s maʿnā as truly cognizable by the human mind;
at any rate, this passage seems to deny a true understanding or conception of it.
198 II Quiddity in Itself and Mental Existence

itants of quiddity. This, in a nutshell, is the difference between ‘the ascertaining or

realization of existence’ (taḥaqquq al-wujūd) and ‘the ascertaining or realization of
quiddity’ (taḥaqquq al-māhiyyah) that Avicenna mentions in Pointers. ²⁷⁹
Furthermore, in light of the previous considerations, Avicenna’s comment can be
interpreted to the effect that the essence to which universality is attached in the mind
also exists in extramental reality in concrete beings, if one limits it to its constitutive
elements.²⁸⁰ For the realization of quiddity is not limited to the realm of the intellect,
but also includes the quiddities of concrete individuals. Describing quiddity in itself
as a quidditative meaning (maʿnā) enables Avicenna not only to relate essence to
universal mental existents and particular concrete existents and, hence, to account
for what is common to all of these things—i. e., to account for how we can at the
same time recognize particular concrete triangles and have a universal idea of trian-
gle in our mind, while at the same time isolating the irreducible meaning ‘triangle-
ness’ and conceiving of it strictly in itself—but also to hold that, even when we are
dealing with the concrete instantiations of quiddity, as in the case of individual
human beings, the quiddity in itself and the irreducible meaning (humanness) re-
mains the same: “for this reason it is said that Zayd and ʿAmr both have a unique
meaning [maʿnā] with regard to humanness.”²⁸¹ It is this basic quidditative meaning
that underlies the quiddities associated with universal mental existents as well as the
quiddities associated with concrete extramental existence. Because it is, at the very
least, an irreducible logical and conceptual entity and meaning, it is primitive or
foundational and acts as a kind of substrate for the other aspects of quiddity Avicen-
na outlines in Introduction of The Cure, that is, quiddity together with either mental
or concrete concomitants. Accordingly, in Metaphysics I.2, Avicenna states that quid-
dity in itself is absolute (muṭlaq) with regard to the other aspects of quiddity and en-
compasses them.
Avicenna’s views on how pure quiddity relates to universal and particular things
explain why he may have been reluctant to ascribe it the status of an existent (maw-
jūd). For making pure quiddity a fully autonomous and existent maʿnā would have
entailed a theory of ontological separation and participation of some sort, a view
that the master consistently shuns in his works. Were pure quiddity to exist as
such as an independent existent, in the way that a Platonic form exists, it would

 For a detailed discussion of these notions, see section IV.3.

 Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Cure, V.2, 211.9‒11.
 Avicenna, On the Soul of The Cure, V.5, 236.20‒237.1: wa-li-dhālika yuqālu inna Zayd wa ʿAmr la-
humā maʿnā wāḥid fī l-insāniyyah. As is clear from the context and from similar statements in Meta-
physics, Avicenna is not alluding here to the universal form in the mind, but to quiddity in itself,
which exists as a nature in each human being. The one and unique meaning (maʿnā wāḥidan) can
only refer to humanness in itself, and not to the universal intelligible human, which is a compound
of various maʿānī (humanness, universality, existence, oneness, etc.) and also constituted, at its core,
of the irreducible meaning humanness. For a detailed discussion of this topic, see the next chapter,
which is devoted to quiddity in the concrete world.
 2 Pure quiddity, universality, and mental existence 199

act as an archetype from which the quiddity of mental universals and concrete par-
ticulars would derive or in which they would participate. Defining quiddity in itself
primarily as a logical and notional entity or meaning enables Avicenna to relate it to
the mental and extramental existents and to situate its irreducible meaning at their
very core without falling into the various pitfalls associated with Platonic notions of
separation and participation. Yet, I shall argue that Avicenna’s doctrine includes an
ontological thrust as well, with regard to both the mental and concrete spheres: pure
quiddity is not just an abstract meaning, but its essential irreducibility and reality is
indeed a kind of essential, intelligible being. These ontological considerations derive
from the convergence of Avicenna’s matrix of logical distinctions between the constit-
uents and concomitants of quiddity, on the one hand, and his ontologization of men-
tal objects and his strong interpretation of mental existence, on the other.

2.3.1 Pure quiddities and primary notions

The previous analysis regarding the intrinsic conceivability of pure quiddity raises an
intriguing question: what is the relation, if any, between pure quiddity—or quiddity
taken ‘in itself’—and the primary notions Avicenna describes in Metaphysics I.5?²⁸²
Three elements in particular suggest a close connection between them. The first is
that the primary notions, like quiddity in itself, are closely tied to conception (taṣaw-
wur). In fact, according to Avicenna, they are what make conception possible in the
first place and represent the fundamental building-blocks of abstract thought. As
such, ‘the existent’ (al-mawjūd), ‘the thing’ (al-shayʾ), and ‘the necessary’ (al-ḍarūrī),
as well as, presumably, ‘the one’ (al-wāḥid), are notions or meanings (maʿānī) that
are primary and foundational, and, it seems, acquired intuitively or innately by

 It is well known that Avicenna’s discussion of the primary notions in Metaphysics I.5 had a pro-
found impact on the development of the scholastic theory of the transcendentals; see Aertsen, Medi-
eval Philosophy as Transcendental Thought, especially 81, 83, 159‒160, 193‒194, 421‒422; and Koutzar-
ova, Das Transzendentale. Some medieval authors, such as Thomas Aquinas (as well as some modern
authors after them, such as Aertsen, Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals, 194), re-interpret
the Avicennian primary notions as consisting of being, essence, and oneness, while emphasizing the
primacy of being. Strictly speaking, however, Avicenna mentions ‘the existent’ (al-mawjūd) and ‘the
thing’ (al-shayʾ), not ‘being itself’ and ‘essence itself.’ The question investigated here is whether there
is a pure quiddity of these primary notions, which again presupposes a theoretical distinction be-
tween the thing (al-shayʾ) and thingness (al-shayʾiyyah). This task is rendered more difficult by the
fact that, on Avicenna’s account, both the primary notions and the pure quiddities have an unmedi-
ated link with conception (taṣawwur). One question worth asking, which provides an alternative ap-
proach to this problem, is why Avicenna would want to articulate a theory of the primary notions as
well as a theory of the pure quiddities. It seems that the latter encompass the former and allow for a
much broader ontological and epistemological system to emerge, which can accommodate a theory of
primary notions, together with many other elements. Avicenna’s main motivation for discussing the
primary notions is presumably epistemological in nature and aimed at bypassing the pitfall of circu-
lar reasoning or infinite regress. After all, not all quiddities are epistemologically or logically primary
and foundational.
200 II Quiddity in Itself and Mental Existence

the mind, without our reason having to labor intensively for their acquisition. In this
connection, it is noteworthy that Avicenna stresses that the primary notions are
“conceivable or conceived in themselves” (mutaṣawwarah li-dhawātihā).²⁸³ Later
on, he adds that “existence is known in itself” (al-wujūd yuʿrafu bi-dhātihi).²⁸⁴
Now, these statements are reminiscent of the way Avicenna describes pure quiddity
as something that can be known ‘in itself’ and in abstraction from other things. Like
the primary notions, the pure quiddities can be conceived of and apprehended intel-
lectually in themselves as meanings (maʿānī) and intelligibles (maʿqūlāt) without re-
course to something outside of them.²⁸⁵
The second element focuses on the locutions Avicenna relies on to describe the
primary notions, which again echoes that of pure quiddity. Accordingly, it is not just
the notion of ‘the existent’ that can be known and studied in metaphysics, but rather
“the existent inasmuch as it is the existent” (al-mawjūd bi-mā huwa mawjūd); and
“the existent taken absolutely” (al-mawjūd al-muṭlaq); as well as “existence inas-
much as it is existence” (al-wujūd bi-mā huwa wujūd); and “absolute existence”
(al-wujūd al-muṭlaq).²⁸⁶ Now, these formulas, which have the purpose of emphasizing
the conceptual abstractness and generality of the primary notion ‘existent’—and, by
extension, ‘existence’—are also used by Avicenna in exactly the same fashion with
regard to the pure quiddities. Recall that Avicenna speaks of pure quiddity—say, an-
imalness or humanness—inasmuch as it is animalness or humanness, or animalness
in itself, or absolute humanness (al-ḥayawān bi-dhātihi, al-ḥayawān bi-mā huwa
ḥayawān, al-insān bi-mā huwa insān, al-insāniyyah al-muṭlaqah, etc.).²⁸⁷ In like man-
ner, Avicenna refers to unconditioned existence or “the existent taken uncondition-
ally” (al-mawjūd bi-mā huwa mawjūd min ghayr sharṭ), which directly evokes uncon-
ditioned quiddity (al-māhiyyah bi-lā sharṭ or lā bi-sharṭ).²⁸⁸ These parallels are
significant, I believe, because they show that Avicenna regards the primary notions
as belonging to the same kind of mental objects as the pure quiddities, that is, as
mental objects that can be conceived of in themselves, absolutely, so to speak,
and in abstraction from other conditions and intentions.
Furthermore, and unsurprisingly given the foregoing, Avicenna sometimes refers
to the quiddity (māhiyyah) and essential reality (ḥaqīqah) of the primary notions,
such as existence. For example, in Metaphysics I.2, he explains that, since existence

 Avicenna, Metaphysics, I.5, 29.13‒14.

 Avicenna, Metaphysics, I.5, 36.5‒6.
 An additional and related issue here is how the primary notions of Metaphysics I.5 relate to “the
primary intelligible notions” (al-maʿānī l-maʿqūlah al-ūlā) of Metaphysics I.2. Although Avicenna does
not specify the latter’s nature, the two could be identical. At any rate, what is significant is the fact
that Avicenna describes the primary notions and the pure quiddities equally as meanings or notions
(maʿānī) and intelligibles (maʿqūlāt) that are conceivable (tuṣuwwira) in a direct and primary way.
 Avicenna, Metaphysics, I.2, 13.7‒8 and 12‒13; I.4, 26.17; IV.1, 169.17; VI.3, 276.13; Salvation, 493.5.
 Avicenna, Metaphysics, V.1, 201.8; 201.1‒2; 202.3‒4; Notes, 43.11, section 25. For a detailed list, see
Appendix 1.
 Avicenna, Metaphysics, I.2, 12‒13.
 2 Pure quiddity, universality, and mental existence 201

or the existent inasmuch as it is existent is the subject matter of metaphysics, its def-
inition and quiddity cannot be known with certainty. Yet, in order to proceed with the
metaphysical inquiry, one has to posit hypothetically its existential reality and its
quiddity (taslīm inniyyatihi wa-māhiyyatihi).²⁸⁹ Elsewhere, Avicenna mentions “the
essential reality of the notion of existence” (ḥaqīqah maʿnā l-wujūd),²⁹⁰ the true real-
ity (ḥaqīqah) of possibility (imkān),²⁹¹ and he also treats ‘the one’ or, rather, oneness,
like all numbers, as a pure quiddity in the mind.²⁹² Given that māhiyyah, ḥaqīqah,
and maʿnā are terms that Avicenna employs to describe quiddity in the mind, it
would seem that the primary notions can be said to possess an intelligible reality
comparable to that of the pure quiddities.
At the very least, then, the evidence adduced above suggests a strong link be-
tween the primary notions and the pure quiddities: these are all intelligible and con-
ceivable in a primary way; they are completely abstract and free from all other
things; and they have a reality in the mind that is irreducible, simple, and immedi-
ately graspable from an epistemological viewpoint. What is more, Avicenna applies
the same technical terminology to describe them. Finally, regarding the primary no-
tions as kinds of pure quiddities in the mind would explain one of the marking fea-
tures Avicenna ascribes to wujūd as a primary notion, namely, that it is not a genus.
A pure quiddity, likewise, for Avicenna, is not in itself a genus, although genusness
(al-jinsiyyah) can be attached to it in the mind, which is why the master sometimes
speaks of the various species of entities grouped under the notion of wujūd. If the
notion of existence in the mind does amount to a kind of pure and simple quiddity,
with which it is self-identical, then a remarkable symmetry between Avicenna’s on-
tology and gnoseology would emerge: to the First, Whose quiddity is pure existence
in the extramental world, would correspond, in the human intellect, the pure quid-
dity of existence, whose simplicity and co-extensionality is also complete. The First
would be the only extramental realization or ontologization of the concept of pure
existence that exists in the mind. This tentative interpretation helps to explain why
absolute existence can be regarded as a concept in the mind, a primary notion,
and the main subject matter of metaphysics, on the one hand, and also coincide
with the special mode of existence of God as a real extramental being, on the
other. In both cases, quiddity would be the very intelligible existence of that entity
or meaning (maʿnā), a term, incidentally, together with māhiyyah and ḥaqīqah,

 Avicenna, Metaphysics I.2, 13.10‒12.

 Avicenna, Metaphysics I.2, 12.14.
 Avicenna, Metaphysics I.4, 25.5‒6.
 At the end of Metaphysics I.3, 24.5‒7, Avicenna explains that the essence of number (dhāt al-
ʿadad) and number taken absolutely (al-ʿadad muṭlaqan) are not objects of study for the science of
arithmetic, but of metaphysics. Relevantly, in other sections of the same work (as in IV.1,
164.122 ff.) he studies ‘the one’ (al-wāḥid) and oneness from a metaphysical perspective and in rela-
tion to notions of ontological and essential priority.
202 II Quiddity in Itself and Mental Existence

which Avicenna regularly applies to God and to quiddities in the intellect. In these
cases, then, existence (wujūd) would be identical with quiddity (māhiyyah).²⁹³
In spite of this intriguing suggestion, it remains unclear ultimately whether the
primary notions can really be said to coincide with pure quiddities. One problem has
to do with the notion of intelligible or quidditative irreducibility. As I showed earlier,
the pure quiddities are only relatively simple and irreducible notions, and, at any
rate, a definition can be attached to them that includes division, difference, and,
hence, multiplicity. In contrast, Avicenna seems to conceive of the primary notions
mawjūd/wujūd as being truly and absolutely simple and prior, inasmuch as it cannot
be reduced to anything more elementary or more graspable intellectually than itself.
This could explain also why the master appears to think that it is intuitively grasped,
and why it has no definition. So an important difference in degrees of irreducibility
and simplicity between the primary notion mawjūd/wujūd and the pure quiddity cor-
responding to, say, a natural being, such as horseness (farasiyyah), seems to pre-
vail.²⁹⁴ In any case, the previous comments were intended merely to examine the re-
lation between the pure quiddities and the primary notions in a tentative way; this
difficult issue should be left open for future investigation.

2.4 Two modes of mental existence?

The previous terminological analysis and the investigation into the relationship be-
tween pure quiddity and universal quiddity converge toward an identical conclusion.
They suggest that quiddity in itself does exist as a distinct form and concept in the
mind, and hence that it possesses mental existence, but not in the way this notion is
customarily understood by scholars of Avicenna. This is because the universal men-
tal existent is characterized by conditions and concomitants that do not apply to

 Naturally, such an interpretation would also make the notion of existence vulnerable to the kind
of criticism that the Illuminationists levelled at ‘the Aristotelians’—the exact identity of this latter
group remains unclear, but likely consisted of Ashʿarite Avicennizing scholars—and which rests on
the argument that existence is added to the notion of existence, resulting in an infinite regress;
see Suhrawardī, The Philosophy of Illumination, 46 ff.
 What is more, in a rather obscure passage in Physics I.4, 34, Avicenna appears to fault the phi-
losopher Parmenides precisely on account of his making a definable quiddity and substance out of
wujūd. He credits him with making “the nature of existence (ṭabīʿat al-wujūd) qua the nature of ex-
istence … a single quidditative meaning in definition or description [maʿnā wāḥid bi-l-ḥadd aw bi-
l-rasm].” However, it seems that what Avicenna disapproves of is not the act of regarding existence
as a ṭabīʿah, maʿnā, or māhiyyah per se, but rather of implying that it could exist as such as substance
in the extramental world, which would in turn require that existence vis-à-vis the other quiddities be
in them as an internal principle of their essential constitution (through some kind of participation),
whereas it is in fact an external and non-constitutive concomitant and does not exist in itself in the
concrete. Nevertheless, since this passage of Physics is extremely compressed, the previous interpre-
tation remains tentative.
 2 Pure quiddity, universality, and mental existence 203

quiddity in itself. The latter therefore must exist in a mode distinct from the former.
Instead, quiddity in itself is defined by the sole condition of bi-sharṭ lā shayʾ ākhar,
which is an instance of metathetic negation, and hence excludes all the other aspects
and considerations that pertain to essence. In this unique state of existence as a pure
object in the mind, quiddity in itself cannot be collapsed with the universal mental
existent, since this would imply considering it together with something else that is
extraneous to it. While pure quiddity is an absolutely simple form or concept in
the mind, the universal can be regarded as a synthesis or compound of pure quiddity
and other meanings or concomitants, universality being one of them.²⁹⁵
This suggests that there is another mode of intelligible and mental existence in
Avicenna, which would essentially precede that of the universal existent. This hy-
pothesis can help to explain Avicenna’s apparently contradictory statements to the
effect that pure quiddity exists in the mind and that it exists neither in the concrete
world nor in the mind: it exists in the mind in this special, fully abstract, and purely
negative state, but it exists neither in the mind nor in the concrete world in the mode
proper to the contingent, composite, and conditioned beings. This hypothesis also
caters to Avicenna’s various explicit references to the existence (wujūd) of quiddity
in itself in numerous passages of Metaphysics V.1, which would otherwise remain per-
plexing and unaccounted for. I shall return to this issue in detail in chapter IV and
attempt there to elucidate the mode of existence that can be ascribed to pure quid-
dity. But at this juncture, and with the help of the previous analysis, I wish to return
to the famous and vexed passage at Metaphysics V.1, 196.10‒12, where Avicenna
seems to be arguing that quiddity in itself cannot exist in the mind, or rather, that
it exists neither in the mind nor in the concrete world. Naturally, this passage is prob-
lematic, because I proposed above that quiddity in itself can be said to exist in the
mind as a purely abstract entity. What is more, I will contend in chapter III that pure
quiddity can also be said to exist in the concrete world, not in a state that would be
separate from things, but in concrete existents. This passage, therefore, represents a
real challenge to my interpretation. This is compounded by the fact that scholars
have treated it as a locus classicus to prove the nonexistence of pure quiddity. But
in my view this interpretation is misguided and rests on a flawed partitioning and

 This point seems to have been explicitly acknowledged by some scholars, notably by Marmura
and McGinnis. McGinnis, Making Abstraction; and especially idem, Logic and Science, emphasizes
that it is quiddity in itself that is the product of psychological abstraction and the first object of in-
tellectual knowledge. McGinnis also dissociates the concept of pure quiddity in the mind from the
notion of universality, which in his account is acquired separately from the Agent Intellect (he argues
that the mental accidents and properties that attach to quiddity, such as universality, are emanated
by the Agent Intellect onto the human intellects). McGinnis therefore perceptively realized the impor-
tance of Avicenna’s theory of quiddity in itself in his studies on this thinker’s epistemology. But in
spite of his recognition of a distinct concept of quiddity in itself, McGinnis does not address the ques-
tion of its ontology in the human mind and appears in the same studies to limit the existence of quid-
dity to the universal concepts and the concrete beings, thereby falling back on what I have called ‘the
standard’ interpretation of essence in Avicenna.
204 II Quiddity in Itself and Mental Existence

translation of the Arabic text. In this regard, it is remarkable that this passage has
often been amputated or not quoted properly and in its entirety in modern scholarly
works. This has had the effect of radically distorting Avicenna’s argument.²⁹⁶ More-
over, this passage contains numerous manuscript variants, which can quite radically
alter its philosophical meaning. The priority in what follows is therefore to recon-
struct the most accurate reading of this crucial passage in light of the general phil-
osophical tenor of Metaphysics V.1 and by consulting the available manuscript evi-
dence.²⁹⁷ Below is a full quotation and translation of the passage with my
recommended amendments to the Arabic text:

Text 8: [A] fa-innahu ²⁹⁸ fī nafsihi laysa shayʾ min al-ashyāʾ al-battata illā l-farasiyyah. fa-innahu fī
nafsihi lā wāḥid wa-lā kathīr wa-lā mawjūd fī l-aʿyān wa-lā fī l-nafs wa-lā fī ²⁹⁹ shayʾ min dhālika
bi-l-quwwah wa-lā bi-l-fiʿl [B] ʿalā an yakūna dhālika ³⁰⁰ dākhilan fī l-farasiyyah [C] bal min ḥaythu
huwa farasiyyah faqaṭ. ³⁰¹

 See, for example, Booth, Aristotelian Aporetic Ontology, 118; Marmura, Avicenna’s Chapter on
Universals, 9; Bäck, The Triplex, 146; McGinnis, Logic and Science, 170; and Pasqua, L’essence, 78,
who all omit to quote this passage in its entirety and who thus provide a partial analysis of it.
 Special attention should be given to MS Malek recently published by Bertolacci and Dadkhah,
Avicenna, which according to these two authors represents the oldest extant Arabic manuscript of
Metaphysics. I am tremendously grateful to Amos Bertolacci for his help in obtaining some of the
manuscript evidence discussed in this section of my book.
 The subject of this sentence is quiddity in itself (more precisely, horseness in itself, farasiyyah),
even though it is cast in the masculine in the Arabic text (innahu). This sentence, as well as the larger
passage from which it is drawn, are convoluted, but the masculine subject here most likely harks
back either to the term maʿnā or, more likely, to the term ḥadd, which are used to designate the
pure quiddity horseness. Either way, this grammatical detail does not change the intent of the state-
ment and my interpretation of it.
 Many Arabic manuscripts omit this fī (including MS Malek recently published by Bertolacci and
Dadkhah, Avicenna), as does the Latin translation of Metaphysics; see Bertolacci, The Reception of
Aristotle’s Metaphysics, 511. As a result, it is often left out of modern translations; see notably Lizzini
(Avicenna, Metafisica, 445); and Bertolacci (Avicenna, Libro, 413). Yet, the main text of the Cairo edi-
tion, as well as Anawati and Marmura in their translations, all retain it. The philosophical stakes are
quite momentous, for the point would be either (a) that pure quiddity does not exist as a potential or
actual thing (lā shayʾ), or (b) that it does not exist in one of these things (lā fī shayʾ). Either way, an-
other more decisive point made in segment [B] trumps this issue: pure quiddity would not exist in
this state—(a) or (b)—in a way that its concomitants would be internal to it. Personally, I see no strong
reason to delete this fī, especially given that Avicenna begins this sentence by asserting that horse-
ness is not a thing (shayʾ min al-ashyāʾ). So preserving the fī would in fact add to his argument, name-
ly, that pure quiddity exists neither as a (separate) thing nor within a thing in a way that its external
attributes become internal to it or fuse with it.
 The term dhālika is preserved only in certain manuscripts (see the variants of the Cairo addi-
tion), including MS Malek. Nevertheless, it is, I believe, a much needed amendment to the common
edition and reading of this passage, since it helps to understand the function of segment [B] as a
qualification of segment [A]. More precisely, the generic dhālika here refers to the external concom-
itants of quiddity (oneness, multiplicity, universality, potentiality, and actuality) that Avicenna enu-
merates in [A] and, more broadly, in V.1, and which he strives to dissociate from pure essence.
 2 Pure quiddity, universality, and mental existence 205

[A] And it [the pure quiddity horseness] in itself is absolutely nothing other than horseness. It is
in itself neither one nor many, neither existent in the concrete nor [existent] in the soul, neither
[existent] in a thing from among these in potentiality nor in actuality³⁰²—[B] in a way that this
[i. e., these concomitants] would become internal to horseness—[C] but [only] inasmuch as it is
horseness alone.³⁰³

The first step is to consider this sentence in its entirety and not in a truncated form as
has often been done. As such, it includes three main segments [A], [B], and [C].
Thanks to this approach, one quickly realizes that the two last segments, [B] and
[C]—often omitted by scholars, who typically limit their quotations to [A]—are vital
for a proper grasp of the passage as a whole. In fact, [B] and especially [C] represent
the conclusion of what amounts to a subtle and cogent argument on Avicenna’s part.
As it turns out, Avicenna is not making simply a negative claim concerning the var-
ious ways in which pure quiddity cannot exist; he is also explaining, I believe, how
quiddity in itself can be said to exist in its distinct and irreducible mode. In this re-
gard, there are two crucial elements of the sentence that have two be highlighted. The
first is the qualification of segment [A] brought about by segment [B] “in a way that
this [i. e., these things or concomitants] would become internal to horseness,” sys-
tematically omitted from the scholarly discussion; the other is the issue of what
the ultimate segment, [C], “but inasmuch as it is horseness alone [bal min ḥaythu
huwa farasiyyah faqaṭ]” refers to in the sentence and how it relates to the previous
segments.
Segment [A] strings together several negative claims conveyed by the Arabic ex-
pression lā … wa-lā: pure quiddity cannot exist as one or multiple, either in the con-
crete or in the soul, either potentially or actually, etc., the gist of the argument being
that pure essence cannot exist in the way its concomitants and accidents exist, or on
a par with these things, or, better still, in the way ‘mixed’ or ‘conditioned’ quiddity
taken with these things can be said to exist. Avicenna’s argument in this first part
obviously alludes to the mode of positively-conditioned, contingent, and composite
existence (whether mental or concrete) that necessarily implies the presence of acci-
dents and concomitants alongside quiddity. If one hypothesizes that quiddity exists
in this mode, it would no longer be pure or negatively-conditioned quiddity (bi-sharṭ

 There are many different manuscript variants for segment [C]; see the notes of the Cairo edition,
and Bertolacci, The Reception of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, 511. Both the main text of the Cairo edition
and the original phrasing in MS Malek (Bertolacci and Dadkhah, Avicenna) support the reading main-
tained above. Its philosophical implications are discussed in detail in the main text.
 Strictly speaking, the wording of the Arabic text connects the clause wa-lā fī shayʾ min dhālika
with potentiality alone, with the ensuing translation: “neither [existent] in a thing from among these
in potentiality, nor in actuality.” However, the general meaning of the argument makes it clear that
wa-lā fī shayʾ min dhālika should be connected with actuality as well. This can be inferred from the
previous symmetrical statement, where mawjūd is connected strictly only with fī l-aʿyān, but obvious-
ly applies also to fī l-nafs.
 Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Cure, V.1, 196.10‒13.
206 II Quiddity in Itself and Mental Existence

lā shayʾ ākhar), but rather conditioned quiddity (bi-sharṭ shayʾ ākhar), which, for ex-
ample, is the case of the universal, as was shown previously. Even more to the point,
pure quiddity cannot exist with these things combining or fusing with it, whereby
they would become constitutive of it. This point is stressed by the specification in
segment [B] that pure quiddity cannot exist lest “[these things or concomitants] be-
come internal to horseness [dākhil fī l-farasiyyah].” Indeed, that pure quiddity could
exist simultaneously ‘in abstraction from’ (mujarrad) and ‘on the condition of no
other thing’ (bi-sharṭ lā shayʾ ākhar), as well as ‘together with’ or ‘fused with’ external
things, is absurd and paradoxical. Thus, the rationale for denying existence to pure
quiddity in segments [A] and [B] is not absolute, but rather qualified. It does not refer
to existence simpliciter, but rather focuses on a certain mode or state of existence,
which qualifies the positively conditioned and composite things and necessarily in-
volves the external concomitants.
Yet—and this is the second crucial point—this string of negatives is counterbal-
anced and even canceled out by a positive statement that appears at the very end of
the passage in segment [C], and which is introduced by the Arabic conjunction
bal. ³⁰⁴ At this juncture, however, it is essential to point out that whereas the various
manuscripts of Metaphysics I consulted provide broadly concurring readings of seg-
ments [A] and [B], they adduce multiple variations of segment [C], which are liable to
change the overall meaning of the sentence. This textual diversity is hardly surpris-
ing, given the important philosophical implications at stake here. It undoubtedly re-
flects an uncertainty on the part of later commentators and scribes as to how to in-
terpret the meaning of this sentence and Avicenna’s intention in this passage. For
example, MS Oxford, Pococke 125, offers the reading bal min ḥaythu huwa farasiyyah
farasiyyah faqaṭ ³⁰⁵; MS Leiden Or. 4 has bal huwa min ḥaythu huwa farasiyyah fara-
siyyah faqaṭ ³⁰⁶; MS Malek originally displayed bal min ḥaythu huwa farasiyyah faqaṭ,
which was later amended in the margins to bal huwa min ḥaythu huwa farasiyyah far-
asiyyah faqaṭ ³⁰⁷; finally, the Tehran lithograph edition suggests bal hiya min ḥaythu
hiya farasiyyah faqaṭ. ³⁰⁸ These variants (except for the original formulation of MS
Malek, which, it should be noted, agrees with the Latin translation of this passage³⁰⁹)

 Some translators, such as Lizzini (Avicenna, Metafisica, 445), read this last segment [C] as the
beginning of the next sentence, but I do not think this approach is vindicated by the Arabic syntax.
 MS Oxford, Pococke 125, 327.27.
 MS Leiden Or. 4, 632.4.
 More precisely, the scribe later chose to add an additional huwa and farasiyyah in the margins,
either because of a scribal mistake (a hypothesis that strikes me as unlikely) or because after collating
manuscript variants he opted to read this sentence as an independent clause, in line with other
manuscripts and with some modern scholars.
 Tehran lithograph edition of Metaphysics of The Cure, 200.14.
 Avicenna, Philosophia prima, V.1, 228.36: sed ex hoc quod est equinitas tantum (“but on account
of the fact that it is horseness alone” or “but only inasmuch as it is horseness alone”). The Latin
translation therefore agrees with MS Malek and the Cairo edition. This is significant, since the
Latin translation is based on an early Arabic version of Avicenna’s work.
 2 Pure quiddity, universality, and mental existence 207

have in common the fact that they make segment [C] an independent clause that can
stand on its own, and whose gist could be conveyed as follows: “But inasmuch as it
is horseness, it is horseness alone [and nothing else].”³¹⁰
Now, the philosophical implications of the textual variations between the Cairo
edition, MS Malek, and the Latin translation, on the one hand, and other manu-
scripts such as MSS Oxford and Leiden, on the other, are significant, because, de-
pending on the reading one relies on, one can construe segment [C] either as an argu-
ment pertaining merely to the cognitive self-identity of pure quiddity or, alternatively,
as an argument pertaining to its ontology. One reading, concurrently exemplified in
the Oxford and Leiden MSS and the Tehran lithograph edition, makes segment [C] an
independent clause whose meaning can be isolated from [A] and [B]. The other,
which appears in MS Malek and the Latin translation and was also opted for in
the Cairo edition, makes it a dependent clause, whose meaning only makes sense
if it is connected with what precedes it. If one follows the former and regards [C]
as an independent clause, then Avicenna would merely be repeating a claim he
makes elsewhere in Metaphysics V.1 to the effect that, taken in itself, pure quiddity
is just pure quiddity. This would amount flatly to a self-identity statement and corre-
spond to the way Marmura translated this clause—wrongly, one might add, on the
basis of the Arabic edition he provides, which does not grammatically substantiate
it. Conversely, the other variants, where [C] is made into a dependent clause, allow
for an alternative interpretation, which is laid out below.
However, I need first to explain in more detail my decision to follow MS Malek,
the Latin translation, and the Cairo edition (also favored by Marmura) over and
above the other manuscript variations. Notwithstanding the fact that MS Malek
and the Latin translation represent two of the oldest testimonies in our possession,
there are two compelling reasons why I believe this reading should be deemed the
most accurate. The first is that Avicenna puts forth the self-identity argument on be-
half of quiddity twice already in the paragraph from which Text 8 is taken, making it
unlikely that he would repeat it yet a third time in such a condensed passage. Avi-
cenna states at 196.10 that “in itself, it [horseness] is not a thing at all except horse-
ness” and at 196.16 he reiterates that “horseness in itself is only horseness.” Hence,
this thesis is conveyed clearly enough in this paragraph of V.1, and the repetition
would seem to render segment [C] superfluous and deflationary, if the latter’s sole
aim was to repeat the identity claim on behalf of quiddity. This is compounded by
the fact that the main focus of Text 8 is on existence (from “existing neither…” (lā
mawjūd) forward), and not merely on the irreducibility of quiddity. Given these con-
siderations, if construed merely as reiterating the self-identity thesis, segment [C]
would represent somewhat of an anticlimax to the sentence taken as a whole.
The second reason emerges from a comparison of this text with another passage
of Metaphysics V.1, which contains numerous syntactic and doctrinal parallels with

 Bertolacci opts for a similar reading in his Italian translation (Avicenna, Libro, 412‒413).
208 II Quiddity in Itself and Mental Existence

the text at hand, and whose focus is equally on the existence of quiddity, but this
time explicitly:

Text 9: This consideration [of animal in itself] is prior in existence [mutaqaddim fī l-wujūd] to the
individual animal with its accidents and to [animal qua] universal intellectual existent, in the
way that the simple precedes the complex and the part precedes the whole. With this existence,
it is not genus, or species, or individual, or one, or multiple. Rather, with [or on account of] this
existence, it is animal only and human only [bi-hādhā l-wujūd lā huwa jins wa-lā nawʿ wa-lā
shakhṣ wa-lā wāḥid wa-lā kathīr bal huwa bi-hādhā l-wujūd ḥayawān faqaṭ wa-insān faqaṭ].³¹¹

As we can see, this passage closely mirrors the one in Text 8 above. The last part con-
tains a similar string of negatives (lā … wa-lā), to which is opposed a final clause in-
troduced by the conjunction bal. Moreover, the general wording is extremely close.
Finally, and beyond these purely stylistic and grammatical resemblances, the philo-
sophical gist seems identical: both excerpts aim to contrast pure quiddity to quiddity
taken together with its accidents and concomitants. The only notable difference is
that Text 9 explicitly refers to the existence (wujūd) of pure quiddity, a point that
is only intimated in Text 8. It is on these textual and contextual grounds, and be-
cause it allows for a strong ontological interpretation in line with the general
tenor of V.1, that the reading bal min ḥaythu huwa farasiyyah faqaṭ should be prefer-
red to the other manuscript variants. Not only does this suggestion accord with the
principle of lectio difficilior potior; it is also supported by the oldest extant Arabic
manuscript and by the medieval Latin translation of Metaphysics.
Now that this point has been established, let us turn to the proper interpretation
and translation of this segment. For one thing, if segment [C] is treated as a depend-
ent clause, then the wording leaves no doubt that this segment is grammatically con-
nected to what precedes and that it represents the conclusion of a prior reasoning.
But the question that now arises is of what exactly is this last segment the continu-
ation? From a grammatical and syntactical perspective, the only coherent option is to
connect bal min ḥaythu huwa farasiyyah faqaṭ to the preceding statement that begins
with wa-lā mawjūd. This is a standard Arabic construction, which involves first a neg-
ation and then a positive assertion. Accordingly, Avicenna’s statement can be para-
phrased as follows: quiddity in itself exists neither in the concrete world nor in the
soul with concomitants that combine or fuse with it, “but [only] inasmuch as it is
horseness in itself” (bal min ḥaythu huwa farasiyyah faqaṭ). What this means is
that the clause “but [only] inasmuch as it is horseness in itself” is directly connected
with the term mawjūd in segment [A] and amounts to a positive ontological claim. Its
role is to specify exactly how pure quiddity exists.³¹²

 Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Cure, V.1, 201.10‒13.

 Compare this reading to the translation provided by Marmura (in Avicenna, The Metaphysics,
149) and favored by many scholars: “for, in itself, it is nothing at all except ‘horseness’; for, in itself,
it is neither one nor many and exists neither in concrete things nor in the soul, existing in none of
these things either in potency or in act, such that [these] are included in ‘horseness.’ Rather, in terms
 2 Pure quiddity, universality, and mental existence 209

In this connection, Avicenna explains in this same passage how pure quiddity
can be said to possess a distinct ontological mode, or rather, he begins by specifying
what mode it cannot be said to have: quiddity in itself “exists neither in the concrete
world nor in the soul … in a way that this [i. e., the concomitants] would become in-
ternal to horseness.” The master is introducing a condition or qualification regarding
how quiddity cannot be said to exist. The Arabic expression ʿalā an means literally
“in a way that” or “with the condition that,” thereby turning the sentence into a neg-
ative conditional statement: pure quiddity cannot exist in the mind with the condition
that the accidents or concomitants be internal to it.³¹³ This reasoning leads in turn to
the conclusion that it must exist “[only] inasmuch as it is horseness in itself.” Hence,
on my interpretation, the main thrust of Text 8 would be to distinguish between the
conditioned and complex existence of quiddity taken together with its concomitants

of itself, it is only ‘horseness.’” Notice that Marmura’s translation makes the last segment an autono-
mous clause standing on its own and one that is disconnected syntactically from the previous sen-
tence, in spite of the fact that the Arabic text on which he relies does not allow this. Furthermore, the
Arabic construction min ḥaythu that is used in segment [C] would require a different phrasing to be
construed reflexively, as in the expression min ḥaythu hiya hiya, which appears in other passages of
Metaphysics, or a construction such as fa-l-kullī min ḥaythu huwa kullī shayʾ, which appears shortly
before our text (196.6). Marmura’s translation has the effect of shifting the emphasis from ontology
(pure quiddity exists) to identity (quiddity in itself is just itself). But the latter rendering, quite
apart from the fact that it finds no support in the Arabic phraseology, would be superfluous, since
Avicenna himself makes such a statement immediately after this passage (196.16) in a way this
time that excludes all ambiguity and focuses squarely on the identity of pure quiddity: “In itself, how-
ever, horseness is only horseness [and nothing else] [fa-l-farasiyyah fī nafsihā farasiyyah faqaṭ].” Both
fa-l-kullī min ḥaythu huwa kullī shayʾ and fa-l-farasiyyah fī nafsihā farasiyyah faqaṭ are independent
clauses, unlike bal min ḥaythu huwa farasiyyah faqaṭ, which is a dependent clause. This suggests
that this key segment seeks to establish another, albeit related, point from the one that appears at
196.16.
 Here an important clarification should be provided. It might be objected that even with regard to
the complex universal in the mind, the accidents and concomitants that accompany quiddity are not
internal to quiddity, but merely attach to it from the outside. They are what Avicenna calls external
concomitants. So that, in the very example Avicenna provides in this passage, universality is not in-
ternal to horseness, even when ‘the universal horse’ is considered as a complex concept made up of
quiddity and universality. This is, in fact, correct. On this reasoning, it is interesting to note that Avi-
cenna’s claim that quiddity does not exist in the mind with the condition that the concomitants be
internal to it can apply both to the complex universal and to the distinct concept of pure quiddity.
It even applies to the concrete horse, when other types of concomitants and accidents are intended.
However, I think Avicenna has a more specific point in mind here that concerns the ontology of pure
quiddity specifically. In this passage of V.1, his intent is to distinguish ‘the thing’ (shayʾ) qua complex
universal (i.e., pure quiddity and universality) and ‘the thing’ qua quiddity in itself. Seen from this
perspective, there is a sense in which universality as an accident enters into the complex universal
qua thing, but not into pure quiddity qua thing. Hence, there is a sense in which the concomitants
and accidents can be regarded as internal to the thing, and a sense in which they can be regarded
as external to the thing, depending on what ‘thing’ refers to (pure quiddity, the complex mental con-
cept, the sunolon, etc.) and on whether one adopts a mereological framework. This distinction can be
connected also with the conditions bi-sharṭ shayʾ and bi-sharṭ lā shayʾ.
210 II Quiddity in Itself and Mental Existence

and that of pure quiddity or quiddity taken only in itself. ³¹⁴ This in turn enables us to
propose the amendment bal [mawjūd] min ḥaythu huwa farasiyyah faqaṭ, which ap-
pears auspicious also on account of the close parallels between Text 8 and Text 9
highlighted above. It should be noted that these ontological statements concerning
pure quiddity are very much aligned with the overarching aim of section V.1 and re-
flect Avicenna’s broader intentions in this chapter of his masterwork.³¹⁵ More specif-
ically, they accord with the statement at Metaphysics V.1.204.5‒6 with regard to the
existence of pure quiddity in the mind.³¹⁶
In light of the foregoing, a new, more literal, and more complete translation of
Text 8 can be proposed, which does justice to the crucial ontological underpinnings
of the passage:

[A] And it [the pure quiddity horseness] in itself is nothing other than horseness. It is in itself
neither one nor many, neither existent in the concrete nor [existent] in the soul, neither [existent]
in a thing from among these in potentiality nor [existent in a thing from among these] in actual-
ity³¹⁷—[B] in a way that this [i. e., these various concomitants] would become internal to horse-
ness—[C] but [it exists only] inasmuch as it is horseness alone.

In the final analysis, this key sentence is not merely apophatic, as has long been rec-
ognized, but also prophatic, in that it indicates that pure quiddity exists and how it
exists, i. e., in perfect autonomy from its external concomitants, either of a material
or mental kind, and hence distinctly and irreducibly (as segment [B] in particular

 I am not alone in translating the text in this way and in upholding this particular interpretation
of this key passage. Anawati opted for a similar interpretation in his French rendering of The Cure (La
Métaphysique, 234): “En elle-même [horseness], elle n’est ni une, ni plusieurs, ni existant dans la ré-
alité, ni dans l’âme, ni dans une de ces choses en puissance, ni en acte, en ce sens que cela entrerait
dans l’équinité, mais en tant qu’elle est équinité seulement.” Hence, on Anawati’s mind, the last seg-
ment of the passage, which I italicized, is to be connected grammatically to “ni existant dans … .” Cf.
Marc Geoffroy’s translation (in de Libera, L’art, 656‒657): “Bien au contraire, [la définition de la cab-
alléité existe] en tant qu’elle est la caballéité seulement,” and his glossing wujūd khāṣṣ in Metaphy-
sics I.5 as “être définitionnel” (648, note 4). This “être définitionnel” presumably amounts to a kind of
intelligible being in the mind.
 Recall in this connection that the subtitle of V.1 is “On general things and the manner of their
existence” (fī l-umūr al-ʿāmmah wa-kayfa wujūdihā), which announces the chapter’s emphasis on ex-
istence.
 I cite this specific passage for the express purpose of supporting my argument of how pure quid-
dity can exist on its own distinctly from the composite and contingent mental and concrete existents
and to show therefore that these two modes are not inclusive of all ontological modes. But this rep-
resents only one context of the existence of pure quiddity, and quiddity can also be said to exist in
composite things in an irreducible way.
 Strictly speaking, the wording of the Arabic text connects the clause wa-lā fī shayʾ min dhālika
with potentiality alone, with the ensuing possible translation: “nor in a thing from among these in
potentiality, nor in actuality.” However, the general meaning of the argument makes it clear that
wa-lā fī shayʾ min dhālika should be connected with actuality as well. This can be inferred from
the previous statement and term mawjūd, which is connected strictly only with fī l-aʿyān, but also
obviously applies to fī l-nafs.
 2 Pure quiddity, universality, and mental existence 211

stresses). In this regard this passage is congruent with—and the interpretation of it I

adduced above supported by—many other parts of Metaphysics V.1 that mention ex-
plicitly the existence (wujūd) of pure quiddity.
One point Text 8 does not dwell on in detail, however, is where pure quiddity
exists in this mode. This issue was partially answered previously by means of Meta-
physics V.1.204.5‒6 and a protracted analysis of its implications: at the very least,
there is a concept of pure quiddity that exists distinctly in the human mind. Identi-
fying this concept seems to be one of Avicenna’s main intentions in this part of Met-
aphysics. Moreover, pure quiddity can also be said to exist in the universal and to
underlie it ontologically. Yet, Avicenna in the passage at hand does not elaborate
on the issue of the localization of pure quiddity. In short, Avicenna’s argument
can be paraphrased as stating that quiddity in itself exists neither in the mind nor
in the concrete world in a contingent and composite mode, but exists in the mind
in a mode which concerns only itself and which excludes all other things. It is there-
fore ontologically distinct and irreducible.
If these remarks are properly appreciated, they change the meaning of the state-
ment quite radically from a statement denying pure quiddity any kind of mental exis-
tence to a statement denying it a particular mode of mental existence. So Avicenna
may not be claiming that quiddity in itself in no way exists in the mind. Rather,
he may be explaining that it cannot exist in the mind in a manner that would affect
its pure, abstract nature, i. e., with mental concomitants, like the universal. The up-
shot is that there are two possible modes of existence of pure quiddity: (a) a distinct
mode of existence, in abstraction from all mental concomitants; and (b) an irreduci-
ble mode with or in the universal—with external concomitants, but without these
concomitants affecting its true nature. These two states or modes of mental exis-
tence, the purely abstracted and simple one (pure quiddity), and the composite
and concomitant one (the universal concept), also correspond to two different con-
ditions: bi-sharṭ lā shayʾ ākhar and bi-sharṭ shayʾ respectively, where shayʾ is taken
to mean “mental concomitant,” “universality,” and “predicability of many.” By the
same token, the concept of existence (wujūd) would not apply identically to pure
quiddity and to other things, and it would require further distinctions.³¹⁸ This ap-

 The conclusions I reach here are not altogether new. Marmura had already briefly alluded to—
but not developed in any substantial way—the hypothesis of the dual mental existence of quiddity in
itself and universal quiddity. In effect, Marmura in his studies sometimes regards quiddity in itself as
possessing mental existence (while at the same time maintaining a distinction between it and the
universal existent). On my view, this was Marmura’s most valuable insight regarding quiddity in Avi-
cenna, which, as far as I know, was not picked up by any later interpreter. The most interesting pas-
sage in this connection is the section “The nature in itself and mental existence” of his article, Avi-
cenna’s Chapter on Universals, 43‒47. Marmura, Avicenna’s Chapter on Universals, 46, states: “As an
existent in the mind, the quiddity [in itself] associates with mental accidents—universality, particu-
larity, and the like. But these accidents are not necessary concomitants of the abstracted nature,
since it can exist in the mind without them.” And: “Avicenna also speaks of an essence in itself
as an abstraction—‘in itself’ having the meaning of ‘by itself’, that is, the essence is considered as
212 II Quiddity in Itself and Mental Existence

proach enables us to preserve the premise of the perfect co-extensionality of quiddity

and existence—albeit by construing wujūd in a modulated manner—as well as the
hypothesis that pure quiddity is a distinct existent in the human mind, which
would pay heed to much of the evidence gleaned from Metaphysics V.1‒2. The inter-
pretive position defended here is that quiddity in itself possesses an ontological sta-
tus distinct from that of universal mental quiddity and a kind of existence that can-
not be inclusive of mental accidents and concomitants. Yet, this ontological mode
still needs to be analyzed in detail; this will be the task of chapters IV and V.³¹⁹

2.5 Essential and accidental universality

At this juncture, I wish to touch on a potential shortcoming regarding Avicenna’s

doctrine of quiddity and universality, as well as on two interesting upshots that
could derive from ascribing existence to pure quiddity in the mind. One might

‘something’ that is ‘apart’ from (a) the individuating circumstances that must attach to it in external
existence and (b) the accidents that attach to it in the mind.” However, it must be said that Marmura’s
argumentation in this section is not particularly clear. He seems to have oscillated between regarding
quiddity in itself as a separate existent in the mind and as a nominal or conceptual notion deprived of
true existence and merely as an aspect of the universal mental existent. Furthermore, one of the main
shortcomings of Marmura’s article is that it gives no indications about what this alternative ontolog-
ical state of pure quiddity could be. As a result Marmura struggled with his conclusions, and although
he could not deny the textual evidence he had collected, he failed to distinguish between these two
states of mental existence. He was consequently preoccupied by what he perceived as an irreducible
contradiction in the Avicennian texts. As an attempt to alleviate this difficulty, Marmura, Quiddity
and Universality, 83, and idem, Avicenna’s Chapter on Universals, 46, introduced the distinction be-
tween “the quiddity in itself” and “the quiddity by itself,” but this conceptual distinction appears
more confusing than helpful and is at any rate not supported by any textual evidence in Avicenna.
Marmura was puzzled by the seeming paradox that Avicenna sometimes appears to ascribe existence
to quiddity in itself and claims at other times that it does not to exist in the mind; see Marmura, Quid-
dity and Universality, 83 and idem, Avicenna’s Chapter on Universals, 44, with specific reference to
Metaphysics, V.1.196.11. But, as I argued above, this is a false paradox, since there is another way
of interpreting this statement that harmonizes it with the rest of the evidence. Ibrahim, Freeing Phi-
losophy, 272‒273, who also relies heavily on Marmura in his analysis, intimates at times that quiddity
in itself exists mentally. But he does not elaborate on its mental ontological status and how it differs
from the universal mental existent. Overall, his views on this topic are not fully spelled out. It should
be said, however, that Ibrahim’s focus is Rāzī’s interpretation of Avicenna, rather than Avicenna’s
doctrine per se. In contrast, Benevich, Die ‘göttliche Existenz,’ forcefully rejects the hypothesis of
non-universal mental existence in Avicenna’s philosophy.
 In the final analysis, upholding the interpretation of an alternative ontological mode for pure
quiddity appears to be the most compelling and viable way of preserving three distinct and seemingly
incompatible claims made by Avicenna: (a) that quiddity is always associated with existence, or that
a shayʾ is always also a mawjūd; (b) that quiddity in itself does not exist (i. e., in a certain way or
mode) in the mind and in the concrete world; and (c) that quiddity in itself nevertheless exists in
the mind. The special, intelligible and abstract, and negatively-conditioned ontological mode of
pure quiddity offers a harmonization of these various claims.
 2 Pure quiddity, universality, and mental existence 213

argue that an impasse has been reached concerning the relation between essence
and universality. For despite Avicenna’s best efforts to separate universality from es-
sence, it appears that the latter itself remains on some grounds a universal or endow-
ed with some kind of universality. This conundrum applies not so much in the case
where pure quiddity is regarded either as a consideration of the universal concept
(albeit abstracted of its universality) or as a part of it according to a mereological in-
terpretation—for in this case pure quiddity remains fundamentally identified with
the universal form ontologically—but rather arises from the interpretation of the for-
mal and intelligible distinctness of pure quiddity in the mind, which was defended
above.
Let me spell out this problem in more detail. On the one hand, Avicenna defines
universality as an external concomitant or attribute of quiddity and the universal as
an aspect of essence that is taken ‘with the condition of something else’ (bi-sharṭ
shayʾ ākhar). This ‘something else’ refers to the mental concomitants, chiefly univer-
sality, which is, in turn, defined by Avicenna as ‘being predicated of many’ (al-maqūl
ʿalā kathīrīn). Thus, the universal is a concept that can be conceived of in the mind as
being predicated of, and which is relatable to, many concrete instances. On the other
hand, quiddity, when taken purely ‘in itself’ and theorized as being a distinct mean-
ing, form, or entity, seems to remain, in the final analysis, and in spite of Avicenna’s
best efforts to divest it from this condition and criterion of universality, a special kind
of universal, since it itself can be predicated of many, and since it can be universally
envisaged in the mind as relating to many concrete instances. After all, Avicenna fre-
quently claims that ‘humanness in itself’ and ‘animalness in itself’—and not merely
the universal human or the universal animal—are said of many concrete instances,
and even at times that they exist in each concrete instances of human and animal.
Humanness exists in each actual human being, such as Zayd and ʿAmr. This univer-
sal or generic nature of pure quiddity would seem to undermine or even annul the
validity of the epistemic and ontological distinction between pure quiddity and
the universal concept that Avicenna so eagerly seeks to establish. Worse, it could
lead to a contradiction: if, as I previously argued, pure quiddity in the mind in its
state of complete abstraction is negatively-conditioned (bi-sharṭ lā shayʾ ākhar),
and yet remains predicable of many in that very state, then it would also at the
same time be positively-conditioned, which is contradictory.
Taken at face value, the previous reasoning would seem to substantiate the in-
terpretation put forth by some scholars who deny any strong separation between
pure quiddity and the universal in the mind. This is the case of Pini, for example,
who puts forth two interpretations, neither of which allows us to ascribe a distinct
substantive status to pure essence in the mind. According to Pini, either (a) pure
quiddity and the universal are really two different ways of considering the same men-
tal entity (this is what Pini calls “the gnoseological interpretation”), with the impli-
cation that they are ontologically co-extensional, since pure quiddity is none other
than the universal apprehended from another angle; or (b) pure quiddity is merely
a part of the universal and is not ontologically co-extensive with it. On this mereo-
214 II Quiddity in Itself and Mental Existence

logical interpretation, pure quiddity could be said to exist in the universal. Yet, these
two aspects (pure quiddity and the universal) would ultimately pertain to the same
mental object (this is what Pini calls “the ontological interpretation”).³²⁰ This inter-
pretive problem, which arises in the first place from the ambiguity of Avicenna’s com-
ments on universality,³²¹ is compounded by the fact that the master defines the uni-
versal as that which is theoretically or potentially predicated of many, not as that
which is actually predicated of many. In other words, those essences that have imme-
diate and actual concrete instantiations, such as the natural forms (human, horse,
tree, etc.), as well as those universal concepts that have just one or even no concrete
instantiations, such as certain unica (the Sun) and fictional forms (heptagonal
house), would still qualify as universals. This distinction between actual and poten-
tial predication when it comes to universal concepts is important, because it means
that any mental form that has a conceivable quiddity can be described as a universal
in complete abstraction from its extramental instantiations, as long as predicating it
of many in the mind in a potential or theoretical way encounters no obstacle or
yields no logical absurdity. On Avicenna’s definition of mental universality, the hep-
tagonal house and the Sun remain universals even when many instantiations of
these forms do not actually exist, as long as one attaches the intention and meaning
of universality to them, be it in a purely theoretical or potential manner. On this
added ground of potential predicability, any pure quiddity in the mind would appear
to qualify necessarily as a universal or, at the very least, as a potential universal.
In light of the foregoing, nature and pure quiddity would seem to be potentially
universal as well. What is more, according to a mereological interpretation, the quid-
ditative natures lie at the core of the universal concepts, which are actual universals,
as in the case of human, horse, etc. Thus, nothing prevents one from describing a
pure quiddity like horseness as theoretically common or predicable of many. But,
then again, these are the very notions by which Avicenna defines the various catego-
ries of universals in Metaphysics V.1. This would seem to make pure quiddity and its

 See Pini, Absoluta. It will be noted that Pini restricts the meaning of ‘ontological’ in his article to
mean ‘mereological,’ which is the only ontological mode he envisages for quiddity in the mind. Either
way, this author’s dual interpretation erases any sharp ontological distinction between the universal
and pure quiddity.
 Universality (al-kulliyyah) is, like so many other key metaphysical notions in Avicenna’s system
(oneness, existence, form, etc.), a modulated notion (yuqāl bi-l-tashkīk) that can be considered under
various aspects and together with different qualifications (see sections IV.1.2 and 1.3 for a detailed
analysis of tashkīk). Thus, in both Metaphysics, V.1 and Demonstration II.4, 144.15, Avicenna states
that the universal has “three aspects” (wujūh thalāthah), and the very fact that he applies universality
to things as diverse as scientific concepts in the mind, fictional and artificial forms, and even natures
in reality suggests that it possesses a range of meanings and aspects, all of which need to be high-
lighted. This multifaceted approach can be explained partly by the fact that Avicenna’s conception of
universality was deeply informed by an array of Aristotelian and Platonic theories and views elabo-
rated in the late-antique philosophical tradition, which were not all compatible with one another, and
which the master had to sort out before developing his own doctrine.
 2 Pure quiddity, universality, and mental existence 215

corresponding universal concept equally universal and the entire argument circu-
lar.³²² The task of finding a resolution to this problem is not simple and necessitates
the postulation of another subtle distinction, which would focus this time on differ-
ent kinds or aspects of universality. Indeed, the scholarly assumption thus far has
been that Avicenna only recognizes one kind or mode of universality—the mental
universality associated with concepts—and that he upholds a strictly univocal notion
of universality in his philosophy. But this appears to distort what is at root a much
more subtle doctrine of universality. Just as Avicenna maintains that ‘existence’
(wujūd), ‘the simple’ (basīṭ) and ‘the one’ (wāḥid) are said in many ways—for exam-
ple, the separate intellects, concepts in the mind, and primary elements such as air
or water are not ‘simple’ in the same way and, with regard to themselves, are not ab-
solutely simple inasmuch as they are also characterized by a kind of multiplicity,
making simplicity a relative or modulated notion, especially when compared with
the absolute simplicity of God—so universality appears to be a modulated and se-
mantically flexible notion in his metaphysics. In at least two passages analyzed else-
where (Text 7 and Text 20), the master explicitly distinguishes between the essential
universality of pure quiddity and the accidental universality of quiddity as a univer-
sal concept in the mind. So, although Avicenna is usually intent on separating pure
quiddity from the universal in the mind, he also at times seems to think that pure
quiddity possesses its own special kind of universality, a universality that would be-
long to it intrinsically and essentially and that would not be reducible to that of the
complex universal concept. Indeed, there appears to be a difference between the uni-
versality and predicability of many that attach to an essence as mental attributes and
concomitants, and the conception of this essence in abstraction from these added in-
tentions. The latter, for Avicenna, is also universal, but its universality should not be
regarded as accidental to its nature, but rather as essential and intrinsic to it. Pure
quiddity is conceived of in itself and is in no way attached to these added meanings
and intentions in the mind. Its apprehension occurs regardless of whether there are
or not concrete instantiations of it and also in complete abstraction from a relation to
a potential multiplicity. This distinction expresses, fundamentally, the difference be-
tween quiddity ‘with the condition of something else,’ which corresponds here to the
accidental universal in the mind, and the two negative states of quiddity ‘with the
condition of nothing else’ (bi-sharṭ lā shayʾ ākhar) and ‘not with the condition of
something else’ (lā bi-sharṭ shayʾ ākhar), where ‘something else’ can signify either po-
tential predication (as in the case of the heptagonal house) or actual predication (as
in the case of horse). It is therefore according to a different sense or aspect altogether
that pure quiddity can be said to be predicated of many and a universal when it is

 This critique is articulated by Bahlul, Avicenna, 21‒23.

216 II Quiddity in Itself and Mental Existence

envisaged in its negative aspects. In that case, its being common or universal is es-
sential to it, not accidental to it.³²³
I will argue in chapter III that the ambiguity and subtlety that characterize Avi-
cenna’s thought on this topic reflect similar types of discussions that had unfolded in
late-antique Neoplatonic and Peripatetic circles regarding the nature of common
things (ta koina) and their relation to universal concepts in the mind.³²⁴ For our im-
mediate purposes, and without anticipating too much on the forthcoming analysis,
suffice to say that the distinction between nature and universality amounts, in a cer-
tain way, to a distinction between something that is intrinsically or essentially com-
mon or universal and something that is accidentally so. The latter is defined as a
mental kind of universality and more specifically as an intention generated by the
mind and consciously added to quiddity. The distinction at stake here may therefore
be formulated in terms of essential and accidental universality. Avicenna himself in-
timates that there are various senses or modes of universality at the very beginning of
Metaphysics V.2, when he writes: “you have therefore ascertained what is the univer-
sal among existents [al-mawjūdāt], namely, that it is a quidditative nature to which
one of the senses of universality has occurred accidentally [wa-huwa hādhihi l-ṭabīʿah

 There are other relevant passages in addition to the evidence contained in Text 7 and Text 20. At
Demonstration II.4, 145.4‒6, Avicenna explains that nothing in itself prevents “pure nature” (nafs al-
ṭabīʿah) from being predicated of many in the mind; what does prevent this is an added meaning,
notion, or consideration (maʿnā ākhar), which, one surmises, is the negative condition (bi-sharṭ lā)
in the mind; this makes the pure nature potentially universal. One upshot is that the potentiality
of quiddity in itself is twice removed, so to speak, from the universal that is actually predicated of
many concrete instances in the mind. For (a) a pure quiddity is only potentially a mental universal
predicated of many; and it is also, by the same token, (b) potentially a mental universal predicated
of many in actuality, when that universal happens to correspond to many concrete instantiations. But
given that the main criteria for universality according to Avicenna are conceivability in the mind and
potential or theoretical predication of many (and not predication of actually existing things), the
main aspect of potentiality at play here is that between the pure nature and the mental universal,
and not that between potential and actual universal predication; thus, when Avicenna says that na-
ture (e. g., horseness) is ‘potentially’ a mental universal, he means a mental universal generally, re-
gardless of whether that universal is potentially or actually predicated of many entities in the con-
crete world. Predication of many thus appears as a purely abstract or theoretical condition for
universality, whose main purpose, I would surmise, is to establish whether any given notion is a
true essence or form or a logical impossibility. Accordingly, both horse and heptagonal house can
be potentially predicated of many, but not pure nonexistence or square circle. Another upshot is
that all pure quiddities will be potentially universals in the mind, so that there is co-extensionality
in this regard; only absolute impossibles will correspond neither to pure quiddities nor to universals.
 The Greek thinkers outlined and defended various modes of universality and commonness de-
pending on whether they were discussing Aristotelian mental concepts or Platonic forms, and there
was at any rate no consensus regarding these theories. Avicenna’s ambiguity on the relationship be-
tween quiddity and universality must be regarded as a direct continuation of this rich and often hair-
splitting conversation about the universality of essences, natures, forms, and concepts in the late-an-
tique background.
 2 Pure quiddity, universality, and mental existence 217

ʿāriḍan lahā aḥad al-maʿānī allatī sammaynāhā kulliyyah].³²⁵ In light of this, I would
argue that, in spite of what has been claimed, Avicenna does not restrict universality
to a single sense that would be confined exclusively to the mind and to the complex
universal concepts. Rather, he conceives of this notion in a nuanced and modulated
manner. This gives him the leeway to deploy various senses of accidental universality
(as the aforementioned quotation suggests), as well as to ascribe a kind of intrinsic
universality or commonness to nature in its essential being. This kind of essential
commonness is distinct from the purely mental and logical kind of universality
that attaches to quiddity in the mind accidentally and as an extrinsic concomitant
(lāzim) and added intention (maʿnā).³²⁶
Hence, for Avicenna, mental universality, i. e., the universality that attaches ex-
clusively to the universal concepts in the mind as an external concomitant, is acci-
dental (ʿaraḍī, ʿāriḍ) in that it is not intrinsic or constitutive of the nature as such
and qualifies it from the outside. Yet, it is not an accident proper, since, if it is
‘said of’ (maqūl ʿalā) individual concrete things as a universal, it is on the other
hand not ‘existent in’ or ‘present in’ them (mawjūd fī, fī mawḍūʿ) in the way that
an accident exists in a subject. Accordingly, Avicenna is adamant that the universal
horse does not exist accidentally in Bucephalus. In contrast, the pure nature horse-
ness is common by virtue of its very essence and inner reality, because it is in itself a
common nature (ṭabīʿah ʿāmmah).³²⁷ It is perhaps for this reason that, in contrast to

 Avicenna, Metaphysics, V.2, 207.5‒6.

 Interestingly, Rashed, Essentialisme, 255‒256, ascribes a theory of essential universality to form
to Alexander, who was undoubtedly one of Avicenna’s main sources. This distinction between the es-
sential or intrinsic universality or commonness of the nature or pure quiddity and the universality of
the complex universal concept in the mind will have an important role to play in chapter V when dis-
cussing the topic of divine knowledge and intellection. For universality construed as an accidental
mental concomitant should be confined exclusively to the human mind.
 The term ʿāmm is, like most Avicennian technical terms, somewhat ambiguous or rather, I would
argue, modulated. In some contexts, especially the logical ones, it can be used interchangeably with
kullī to convey the notion of generality or universality in definitional predication. In this case, it is
confined exclusively to the mind (see, e. g., Notes, 162, section 236, where “the general concept”
(al-maʿnā l-ʿāmm) is said to exist only in the mind). However, inasmuch as pure quiddity is said to
exist in the concrete beings as their essential reality, it is clear that Avicenna also ascribes a sense
of commonness to the pure nature in the concrete world. This is done in an effort to account for
the fact that different individuals of the same species have a similar essential structure by virtue
of their nature; but this is an ontological reality that transcends the purely definitional and predica-
tional aspect of the problem. Thus, the pure quiddity or nature humanness is common (ʿāmmah) in
the concrete and shared by (mushtarakah) various individuals, without being strictly a universal
(kullī), or being common because it is a numerically ‘one’ nature; in fact, Avicenna reiterates that
the notion of numerical oneness is external to pure quiddity. A recent discussion of these terms in
the context of Avicenna’s physics was proffered by Lammer, The Elements, 155, 175‒176. Lammer dis-
tinguishes between two senses of ʿāmm, “the numerically common” and “the generically common,”
and concludes, rightly I believe, that form and essence are not numerically one and numerically com-
mon for Avicenna, but rather generically common. However, the latter notion is treated somewhat
vaguely in his analysis, for although he states that, in the case of a generically common form
218 II Quiddity in Itself and Mental Existence

the universal concept, Avicenna holds that it is both ‘said of’ and ‘existent in’ indi-
vidual concrete things, albeit not in the way that an accident exists in a subject, nor
in the way that a universal logical predicate is said of a particular thing. This is why
he strenuously denies that ‘universal horse’ exists in Bucephalus, but argues that
‘horseness in itself’ somehow exists in Bucephalus. The catch here is that things
like horseness and animalness are not existent in the concrete particular qua univer-
sal species and genus, but as something else altogether, because species and genus
are precisely what qualify the mental universal notions (‘animal-genus’ and ‘horse-

such as human, “the ontological status and the epistemological apprehension conform to one anoth-
er” (175), he says nothing precise about this ontological status of the substantial form. Rather, Lamm-
er seems to connect generic commonness exclusively with universality and predicability in the mind
and so to regard it as a purely mental notion. At any rate he does not explain in detail how this logical
commonness relates to the nature and essential forms of beings. Nor does his distinction allow for a
sense of commonness that would qualify the quiddity or nature in itself in the concrete in a mode
distinct from numerical commonness, which is, admittedly, not the sense that Avicenna intends in
this case. So I think there is a qualified sense of the common and commonness that is missing
from Lammer’s analysis, and which is neither numerical commonness nor universal logical common-
ness, but what I shall call ‘essential commonness,’ that is, a commonness that pertains uniquely to
pure quiddity or nature. Another problematic and related point is Lammer’s decision to connect the
term mushtarakah with the numerically common (175) and, more precisely, with God as the numeri-
cally common Agent and End of all things. In fact, Avicenna more frequently applies the term mush-
tarakah to essential nature (ṭabīʿah) as it exists in beings, and not with the sense of ‘the numerically
common.’ So, again in this case, an interpretation additional to the one that Lammer develops is
called for. These points notwithstanding, nature’s commonness is not opposed to the particular so
much as to what is specific (khāṣṣ) and individualizing. But these shifting semantics of ʿāmm and
the attribution of a special kind of commonness to nature pose a problem, inasmuch as Avicenna
in Metaphysics V.1 explains that pure quiddity is neither specific nor common (ʿāmmah). Further-
more, and to make things even more confusing, in Metaphysics I.5, he connects quiddity with special
or proper existence (wujūd khāṣṣ), which would seem to be incompatible with the idea of regarding
the pure nature or quiddity as something common. In each case, however, one should examine in
what context and with what exact purpose Avicenna intends these terms. If the term ʿāmm is used
to suggest mental universality, then obviously pure quiddity will not be ʿāmmah. Hence, whenever
it is applied to quiddity, this notion presumably refers to the mode of existence of quiddity in the con-
crete beings, in which case Avicenna also tolerates that one qualified or modulated sense of univer-
sality be attached to it; see Text 7 and Text 20. As for special existence, it refers to the first and most
pointed answer to the question ‘What is it?’, so that anything is first and foremost distinguished from
other things by its irreducible quiddity, be it blackness or humanness. Hence, the terms ʿāmm and
khāṣṣ here are located at different levels of analysis and discourse, but are not incompatible. This
reflects a typical feature of Avicenna’s methodology based on notional hierarchy. Other relevant ex-
amples focus on his noetics (in the discussion of how the different levels or degrees of intellect relate
to one another) and on his logical classifications, where the same thing (e. g., animal) can be both
genus for one thing and species for another thing. Likewise, pure quiddity is common with regard
to its presence in various individuals endowed with specific accidents and concomitants that distin-
guish them individually and as particulars, but it is specific or specifying with regard to the general
question ‘What is it?’ that is asked of them, and when one seeks to adduce an immediate or primary
criterion of differentiation between these and other beings.
 2 Pure quiddity, universality, and mental existence 219

species’ in the mind).³²⁸ Horseness in itself and animalness in itself are neither acci-
dental nor universal species and genus, but a common nature and essence that is
both ‘said of’ and ‘existent in’ each concrete individuals. Exactly how horseness in
itself can be said to exist in the concrete horse, but not qua accident or universal con-
cept, will be addressed in the next chapter.
What philosophical benefit, if any, can be gained from separating pure quiddity
and nature entirely from the mental universal? One likely hypothesis is that, by sep-
arating accidental, mental universality from pure quiddity, Avicenna is attempting to
articulate a theory of quiddity that is not restricted to the domain of conceptual
thought and logic alone, but also encompasses the mode of existence of concrete be-
ings and allows him to predicate quiddity of such beings in a way that does not land
him in a logical quandary. In other words, defining logical universality as an acci-
dental feature or external concomitant pertaining to the universal concepts allows
him by the same token to endow pure quiddity with an essential commonness or in-
trinsic universality that transcends this logical plane and opens the way for a new
ontological theory of how essence exists in the real world. The philosophical ramifi-
cations linked to the distinction between these two kinds of universality become
even more salient when the question of ontology is addressed. For what is ontolog-
ically common to all existents, for Avicenna, is not the universal qua concept or the
attribute of universality, but rather nature and pure quiddity itself. Quiddity and na-
ture are said, in a qualified sense, to exist both in the concrete individuals and in the
universal concepts in the mind, so that it is quiddity in itself, rather than the con-
comitant of mental universality, which should be regarded as ontologically common.
For there to be many concrete instantiations of horse in the extramental world, and
for there to be a universal concept of horse in multiple individual human minds,
there must be something common that transcends each one of these concrete horses
and each one of the minds thinking the concept ‘universal horse.’ This common prin-
ciple is not the determined, numerically one universal concept of horseness in any
single mind. Rather, it is the undetermined nature horseness that is being synchro-
nously intellected by various individuals together with the intention of universality.
Fundamentally, then, the distinction between pure quiddity and the concomitant of
mental universality is not only valid and justified, but necessary in the context of Avi-
cenna’s metaphysics: it enables the master to maintain a special notion of essential
commonness or universality that serves as the foundation for concrete individuals
and universal concepts. This principle is the foundational and common quidditative
meaning and entity (maʿnā), which, when conceived of strictly in itself, is neverthe-
less unrelated to any other thing and any external concomitant.

 Strictly speaking, Avicenna differentiates between ‘universality’ (kulliyah) and ‘genusness’ (jin-
siyyah), which are two distinct concomitants or attributes of the pure nature horseness in the
mind; indeed, universality also qualifies other things such as species, differentia, etc. The key
point is that they both qualify the universal concept horse in the mind, but are extrinsic to the
pure quiddity horseness as such.
220 II Quiddity in Itself and Mental Existence

Having addressed this difficult point, I turn now to the two thought-provoking
implications that could arise from ascribing existence to pure quiddity in the intel-
lect. The first has to do with Avicenna’s concept of special or proper existence as out-
lined in Metaphysics I.5. I dwell on this concept at length in chapter IV, but it is worth
saying a few words about it in the context of the present discussion of quiddity in the
mind. In that chapter, Avicenna devotes one sense or aspect of existence to quiddity
or thingness, which he calls “special” or “proper existence” (wujūd khāṣṣ). This is a
rather perplexing statement that has caused a great deal of speculation on the part of
scholars ever since the Latin reception of Avicenna’s works and whose exact interpre-
tation is not immediately obvious. Here I wish merely to point out that the context of
his remarks in this chapter validates the assumption that proper existence is primar-
ily intended to qualify quiddity as it is conceived in the mind, and in contradistinction
to what Avicenna calls in this same passage “realized” or “acquired existence”
(wujūd muḥaṣṣal) and “established existence” (wujūd ithbātī), which would seem
to apply chiefly to the concrete world. Now, given that Avicenna’s distinction be-
tween essence and existence is primarily, if not perhaps exclusively, a conceptual
one, and that this chapter of Metaphysics aims chiefly to elucidate primary notions
in the mind, it is sensible to presume that it is also within this mentalist framework
that one should construe the distinction he makes between these two senses of
wujūd: realized existence, which qualifies the complex entity taken together with
its various accidents and concomitants, and proper existence, which qualifies quid-
dity when conceived of strictly in itself. In view of what has been said above regard-
ing essence as maʿnā in the mind, it would seem that proper existence is the state
that corresponds to the maʿnā of pure quiddity when it is conceived of intellectually
and strictly in itself. For horseness or whiteness alone, when conceived of in the
mind, is still something, it is an entity or object that possesses a certain immediate
intelligible reality. One might say that it is an irreducible intelligible entity that pos-
sesses a mental presence or being, regardless of other considerations of realized or
acquired existence, and regardless of whether it is related to a concrete being in the
exterior world—and even, perhaps, to a realized being in the mind, where the latter is
defined as quiddity taken with its external mental concomitants, such as oneness
and universality, and where the universal concept is accordingly regarded as being
‘realized’ in an intellectual setting. In brief, there are reasons to believe that proper
existence could correspond to the mode of existence that characterizes pure quiddity
qua maʿnā in the intellect. This would be in line with the overall conceptualist or in-
tellectualist tenor of the chapter.
The second point is related and concerns the connection between essence and
final causality. Avicenna is often keen to stress that essence, as something that is
conceived in the mind, is a kind of final cause. In this intellectual context, essence
qua final cause can be regarded as something that precedes the realization of exis-
tence and the efficient cause in the exterior world. This intellectual reality and prior-
ity of the final cause is, it would seem, in turn to be connected with the maʿnā of
quiddity and, on the basis of what was said above, with its proper existence in the
 2 Pure quiddity, universality, and mental existence 221

intellect. Hence, just as Avicenna explicitly refers in some passages to the essential
and ontological priority of pure quiddity over realized composite existence, he stress-
es in others the priority of final causality over efficient causality. All of these notions
—pure quiddity in the mind, proper existence, essential distinctness, irreducibility,
and priority, as well as final causality—seem to converge toward the intelligible
state or mode of being of pure quiddity in the mind. There are therefore various—
and at this stage still hypothetical—doctrinal implications that seem to flow from
the hypothesis that quiddity is a distinct and irreducible entity in the intellect. If
the latter hypothesis is correct, it would only make sense that Avicenna would
want to relate this theory of pure quiddity in the mind to some of his other funda-
mental theses about existence, causality, and human knowledge in order to further
ground it as a key tenet of his philosophy. Remarkably, Avicenna’s focus on the in-
trinsic intelligibility and irreducibility of pure quiddity can be traced in part to the
works of Muʿtazilite theologians who struggled with similar epistemological and on-
tological issues.

2.6 Avicenna and some Baṣrian Muʿtazilites on ‘the thing in itself’ in the
intellect

Abū Hāshim al-Jubbāʾī (d. 933 CE) is famous in Islam for having introduced the theo-
ry of the ‘states’ (aḥwāl) in order to solve the conundrum of how a plurality of attrib-
utes (ṣifāt) could be predicated of the divine essence without introducing multiplicity
within It. This theory, and its fate in later Muʿtazilite and Ashʿarite theology, has re-
cently been the focus of several insightful studies.³²⁹ One particularly interesting
phenomenon in Islamic intellectual history is how Abū Hāshim’s theory of the states,
and more generally his ontology, were combined with Avicennian philosophical ele-
ments in the works of later Ashʿarite authors who endorsed this feature of the Muʿ-
tazilite theologian’s system.³³⁰ In what follows, I focus more narrowly on the connec-

 See especially Thiele, Kausalität; Theologie; and Abū Hāshim. For a lucid account of the theo-
logical imperatives and problems that incentivized Abū Hāshim to develop this theory, see Gimaret,
La théorie; and Thiele, Ḥāl.
 This interesting question raises a host of methodological problems. To begin with, there are no
extant works by Abū Hāshim, so that we are almost completely dependent on later reports for a re-
construction of his system. Many of these accounts are conveyed by Ashʿarite authors who were
sometimes hostile to his doctrine or whose priority was to naturalize specific elements of his system
within their theology. An additional problem concerns the post-Avicennian sources on the Bahsha-
mites, which often rely on a terminology that is profoundly colored by Avicenna’s works to describe
the views of Abū Hāshim and his followers; this is the case, for instance, of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī and
especially Shahrastānī. This sometimes makes it difficult to distinguish what is properly Bahshamite
from what is, for want of a better term, a kind of ‘Avicennized Bahshamism.’ If one adds to these
difficulties the inevitable process of doctrinal transformation and adaptation that accompanies the
writing of commentaries, then it becomes clear that the later sources on the Bahshamites should
222 II Quiddity in Itself and Mental Existence

tion between Abū Hāshim (and his early legacy) and Avicenna, thereby limiting my-
self to theological sources that predate or are contemporaneous with the shaykh al-
raʾīs. More specifically, it is Abū Hāshim’s theory of ‘the Attribute of the Essence’ that
will be the main concern here.³³¹ Following brief suggestions by other scholars, I ex-
plore the possibility that this Bahshamite theory represents an important source for
Avicenna’s views on pure quiddity.³³²
The various medieval reports on Abū Hāshim agree in ascribing to him the au-
thorship of the theory of the states. According to most modern reconstructions of
his system, he devised this doctrine in order to explain how the divine attributes
could be said to reflect real (thābitah) attributes, states, or aspects in God without
their entailing a multiplicity of things and existents (ashyāʾ or mawjūdāt) in Him
or alongside Him. Abū Hāshim’s solution was to introduce a new ontological
mode that occupied an intermediary position between existence and nonexistence
and that applied uniquely to these attributes and states. Accordingly, the attributes
are actual and real, but distinct from ‘the existent’ (al-mawjūd) and ‘the nonexistent’
(al-maʿdūm), with the result that predicating them of the divine essence does not re-
sult in a plurality of existing entities. This means that for Abū Hāshim, as well as for
the later followers of his doctrine known as the Bahshamiyyah or Bahshamites, the
divine attributes are neither existent things (ashyāʾ mawjūdah) nor nonexistent
things (ashyāʾ maʿdūmah). In spite of this, they are real states or qualities of God
and hence can be spoken of in a meaningful way and with truthful descriptions
(awṣāf).³³³ This strategy enabled the Bahshamites to claim both that the divine attrib-
utes are real and not just based on sheer linguistic word play, and that they do not
possess entitative existence on a par with God’s unique existence.
Abū Hāshim eventually extended the notions of states and the essential attrib-
utes to his ontology in general to describe how the various properties of a thing relate
to it or its essence. For Abū Hāshim, what truly exists or has existence (wujūd) are

be handled with extreme caution. In spite of these challenges, scholars have elaborated a relatively
consistent picture of Abū Hāshim’s theory of the states by relying on the earliest sources at our dis-
posal and by turning a critical eye to the evidence in the later sources. For my purposes, I have relied
exclusively on Muʿtazilite sources that either precede or are contemporary with Avicenna in order to
eliminate the issue of doctrinal and terminological cross-contamination as much as possible. The fol-
lowing account is based on the works of the prominent Bahshamite thinkers Abū Rashīd, ʿAbd al-Jab-
bār, and Ibn Mattawayh.
 I follow Frank in capitalizing this expression in order to underline the unique status of this at-
tribute and to better differentiate it from the essential attributes.
 To my knowledge, Gimaret, La théorie, 61, and Bonmariage, Le réel, 32‒33, are the only scholars
to have suggested a direct connection between the Bahshamite theory of the Attribute of the Essence
and Avicenna’s doctrine of quiddity.
 On this point, the Bahshamites disagree with their theological opponents the Ashʿarites, who
conceive of the attributes as truly existent entities in God. But it is important to note that the theory
of the states came to be endorsed by some prominent Ashʿarite thinkers as well, such as Bāqillānī
and Juwaynī. For insight into the Ashʿarite assimilation of the theory of the states, see Gimaret, La
théorie; and Benevich, The Classical.
 2 Pure quiddity, universality, and mental existence 223

substances (jawāhir) and accidents (aʿrāḍ), which can be described as primary con-
stituents or things (dhawāt, ashyāʾ), and which are caused to exist by an agent. In-
dividual substances and accidents, and by extension the composite wholes that they
form, can thus be described as concrete and existent essences, entities, or things
(dhawāt or ashyāʾ mawjūdah).³³⁴ By existence or wujūd, the Bahshamites mean exclu-
sively ‘actual’ and ‘realized’ existence in the concrete world. In their view, a mawjūd
is a concrete existent in the exterior world, which is also an individual and deter-
mined thing or essence. In short, all existents are concrete realized beings consisting
of a bundle of substances and accidents. In contrast, the various attributes, proper-
ties, and states that can be predicated of a thing, such as ‘being black,’ ‘being know-
ing,’ or ‘occupying space,’ cannot be said to exist proper. These attributes do not cor-
respond to an existing entity (maʿnā) and thing (shayʾ) in the concrete world, nor are
they an entity in a being, although they can be said to be real (thābit) and to qualify
that being. They are not therefore nonexistent or limited to the purely nominal and
linguistic plane. Rather, the description (waṣf) that is enunciated corresponds to an
attribute (ṣifah) that denotes a real state (ḥāl) in the concrete, realized being or thing.
Consequently, the ontological status of the essential attributes and the states is strict-
ly speaking neither one of existence nor nonexistence, but one of reality or subsis-
tence (thubūt). Because they are neither things (ashyāʾ) nor entities (maʿānī), the at-
tributes and states are neither mawjūd nor maʿdūm, although they can be said to be
real (thābit) and even actual or actualized (ḥaṣala).
One upshot of this ontological system is that ‘the thing’ (al-shayʾ) is extension-
ally broader than the existent (al-mawjūd). Furthermore, since ‘thingness’ or ‘the
state of being a thing’ is common to both a mawjūd and a maʿdūm, it can be said
to possess a certain kind of reality or ontological autonomy in abstraction from real-
ized existence or nonexistence. It is therefore crucial in Bahshamite ontology to dis-
tinguish between the realized and actual existence of a concrete entity, on the one
hand, and the reality of thingness as it applies to substances and accidents in ab-
straction from realized existence, on the other. It is in this context that Abū Hāshim
develops the theory of the ‘Attribute of the Essence’ (ṣifat al-dhāt).³³⁵ According to the

 Abū Hāshim uses the term dhāt to refer exclusively to a determined existent or essence in con-
crete reality, that is, to an actual and individual essence or thing in the world, and not to abstract
essence or quiddity. In that sense, dhāt is close to other terms such as nafs, ʿayn, and even shayʾ maw-
jūd; see Gimaret, La théorie, 59‒60. In Avicenna’s philosophy, in contrast, dhāt can either be used
interchangeably with māhiyyah to express abstract quiddity, or it can also mean an actual being,
in which case it also carries the sense of ‘self,’ as in fī dhātihi or ‘in itself.’ This distinction is impor-
tant for what follows, because Avicenna’s notion of quiddity will turn out to have more in common
with the Bahshamite notion of the ṣifat al-dhāt than with the notion of dhāt.
 For a discussion of the Attribute of the Essence, see Gimaret, La théorie, 57 ff.; Frank, Beings, 53‒
57; idem, Al-maʿdūm; Alami, L’ontologie modale, 61‒71; Thiele, Abū Hāshim, 370‒371; and idem, Ḥāl.
The hypothesis of a Bahshamite influence on Avicenna’s ontology has been briefly entertained be-
fore, but never studied in detail: see in particular Gardet, al-Djubbāʾī; Gimaret, La théorie, 61, 80;
and especially Marwan Rashed, Chose, whose study is the most notable effort in this direction.
224 II Quiddity in Itself and Mental Existence

Bahshamites, the Attribute of the Essence is a special and unique attribute that is
inseparable from the thing itself inasmuch as that thing is either an existent or non-
existent thing. It refers to the way a thing is in itself, essentially, and irreducibly (mā
huwa ʿalayhi fī dhātihi), to what it is to be that thing, and, fundamentally then, to a
thing’s thingness. ³³⁶ These considerations hold irrespective of whether that thing ac-
tually exists or not. In other words, the Attribute of the Essence is an essential and
irreducible qualification that captures the very thingness of a thing. It applies, and
can be known, even when the thing it refers to does not actually exist in concrete
reality. Fundamentally, then, the Attribute of the Essence could be said to encapsu-
late a statement of identity that affirms the thingness and true reality of a thing.³³⁷
The two stock Muʿtazilite examples one finds in the Arabic sources are “blackness’
being blackness” (kawn al-sawād sawādan) and “the atom’s being an atom” (kawn
al-jawhar jawharan). As Frank puts it, the ṣifat al-dhāt express “the thing-itself’s
being as it is in itself” (mā huwa ʿalayhi fī dhātihi) and “its being itself identical
with itself in itself.”³³⁸
By virtue of its conveying the essential core or identity of a thing, the Attribute of
the Essence is irreducible as well as epistemologically and ontologically distinct. It is
what reflects the singularity or specificity of a thing and sets it apart from other
things, such as blackness from whiteness. Moreover, if it bears a close relation to

Alami, L’ontologie modale, compares the Bahshamite and Avicennian views on a number of occasions
in his book, but usually by way of contrast, and he at any rate does not detect a direct influence of
Abū Hāshim on Avicenna. Exactly why Abū Hāshim formulated his theory of the Attribute of the Es-
sence remains unclear. One explanation could be epistemological. Given that, for Abū Hāshim, things
and individual beings are knowable only through, or by virtue of, their various attributes, it was nec-
essary to explain how any intellectual knowledge of these things could be achieved in the first place.
This presumably is the function of the Attribute of the Essence, which, on the one hand, conveys the
basic information about the thingness of an entity, and on the other is the foundation on which the
other attributes can be known.
 As Frank, Beings, 53, in his inimitable style, puts it: “Of itself and in itself as a thing-itself it can
be predicated only of itself, and it is this identity of itself in being itself that abû Hâšim and his fol-
lowers term the Attribute of the Essence.”
 As Thiele, Abū Hāshim, 370, notes, the Attribute of the Essence “describes or defines what a
thing is in itself.” However, it is not strictly speaking a definition in the Aristotelian sense, since it
does not include and enumerate the constituents of a thing. Rather, it is a statement of identity or
self-identity of the kind ‘A is A,’ similar to Avicenna’s formula ‘horseness is just horseness’ or ‘horse-
ness is nothing other than horseness.’ Alami, L’ontologie modale; 53 ff., for his part speaks of the “en-
soi des essences,” which indicates their irreducibility and distinctness; but he also grants them a high
degree of ontological autonomy, to the extent that he regards them as unconnected to not only con-
crete existence, but also to human and divine thought. On Alami’s interpretation, they seem to occu-
py a realm of their own that is not dependent on divine knowledge. This interpretation of Abū Hā-
shim’s ontology, however, is not unanimously accepted. On my interpretation, the Attribute of the
Essence and the nonexistent thing are only such because God thinks them, so that their ontological
status is directly dependent on the divine knowledge. On this point, see also Benevich, The Reality,
33 ff.
 Frank, Al-maʿdūm, 194.
 2 Pure quiddity, universality, and mental existence 225

the existent essence and ‘the thing-itself’ conceived as existing concretely, it is none-
theless unaffected and unconditioned by them. As Thiele notes, this attribute is “not
grounded in or conditioned by any other entity.”³³⁹ Whereas some attributes refer di-
rectly to concrete entities (maʿānī) in beings and are therefore dependent on them or
grounded in them, the Attribute of the Essence does not refer to an entity in the con-
crete world, nor is it itself such an entity. Rather, it reflects the state of the very es-
sence or thingness of a thing. In brief, the ṣifat al-dhāt is a unique, distinct, and ir-
reducible attribute and state.
There are some important epistemological implications flowing from the Bah-
shamite theory of the Attribute of the Essence. This Attribute, for Abū Hāshim, is
what enables the mind—both the human mind and God’s mind—to know something
irreducibly and distinctly and as it is ‘in itself.’ In that sense, it is responsible for the
knowledge we can have of a thing regardless of whether that thing actually exists. So
this attribute produces in our minds the knowledge of the thingness of actually ex-
istent things and nonexistent things, of concrete entities in the world and of future
contingents. The Attribute of the Essence therefore is unique not only because it is
uncaused and ungrounded in the thing-itself and bears a necessary and constant re-
lation to the thing-itself, but also because it is eminently and constantly intelligible
to the mind and informs the knower about the very thingness of a thing. It does this
even when the particular thing does not actually exist. By way of example, nonexis-
tent atoms are still ‘things’ that share the attribute ‘being an atom.’³⁴⁰ Its relation to
the individual essence is therefore permanent and fixed, without however ever being
identical to the existent thing-itself or dependent on its realized existence. So that if a
thing is maʿdūm or nonexistent, the Attribute of the Essence, on the other hand, will
have some kind of intrinsic intelligible subsistence or reality (thubūt) by which it re-
mains cognizable by the human and divine minds.³⁴¹

 Thiele, Abū Hāshim, 370. Gimaret, La théorie, 61, compares the Attribute of the Essence to quid-
dity, because it encapsulates the ‘what-it-isness’ of a thing.
 Abū Rashīd, Issues, 34.18‒19: “We know that the atoms, when they exist, have in common [the
attribute] of ‘occupying space’ [al-taḥayyuz]; and if they do not exist, they still have in common [the
attribute] of ‘being an atom.’” See also the discussion and the views reported at 37.11 ff. For a discus-
sion of the nonexistent, see Dhanani, The Physical Theory, 27, note 34.
 One important but delicate question is whether the reality or subsistence of the Attribute of the
Essence in the mind amounts to a kind of mental existence. According to the Bahshamites, this At-
tribute is, strictly speaking, a state and so is neither existent nor nonexistent; but since it is intelli-
gible and plays a role in cognition, one might be tempted to ascribe to it a kind of mental existence.
Although this question appears to have been debated in the later Arabic literature from several angles
(see Alami, L’ontologie modale; 47‒58), the Baṣrian Muʿtazilites seem to have been generally consis-
tent in denying it any mode of mental existence proper. However, modern scholars seem to have held
different views on this issue. Alami himself rejects this hypothesis, not on account of the special in-
termediary status of the ḥāl, but on account of his claim that the ‘things-themselves’ have an onto-
logical status that depends neither on concrete beings nor on human and divine thought. In effect,
Alami ascribes a fully independent ontological realm to the Muʿtazilite maʿdūmāt, with the result that
Abū Hāshim’s theory of the nonexistent would amount to an original ontology, rather than an aspect
226 II Quiddity in Itself and Mental Existence

What is more, the Attribute of the Essence is a requisite for our perception or ap-
prehension (idrāk) of a thing’s states and attributes when it is in existence. Since cog-
nition of the thingness of a thing precedes its actual existence, it also precedes our
apprehension of the various properties it acquires when it enters concrete existence.
In this regard, although, according to Bahshamite epistemology, ‘the thing known’
(al-maʿlūm) and what is sought from a cognitive point of view is the individual exis-
tent thing-itself (shayʾ) or essence (dhāt), our knowledge is really a knowledge about
it rather than of it. It is a knowledge about the various properties and states that
qualify it in its existence, and it is these properties and states that can be perceived
or apprehended by the mind.³⁴² According to the Bahshamites, we can only ever ap-
prehend and know a thing through or by virtue of its actual and real attributes and
states as they are manifested when that thing exists. For example, an atom is known
with regard to its occupying space (kawnuhu mutaḥayyiz) and of its being in a certain
location (kāʾin fī jihah). But what makes this knowledge possible in the first place is
the Attribute of the Essence, which informs us not only about what kind of a thing it
is, and what its irreducible and essential reality is, but also about the kinds of attrib-
utes and states that thing can have when it exists. As Ibn Mattawayh puts it, “what is
[first] obtained by our apprehension [al-idrāk] from among the attributes is the
atom’s occupying space. But this [apprehension] rests on the Attribute of the Es-
sence, which ceases neither in nonexistence nor in existence. In contrast, occupying
space is conditioned on existence [mashrūṭ bi-l-wujūd], and existence makes it ac-
tual.”³⁴³ Thus, for the Bahshamites, the atom’s occupying space is an attribute en-
tailed by (ṣifah muqtaḍāt) the Attribute of the Essence. Although it only ever becomes
actual and real when the atom exists, its manifestation is a corollary of, and is nec-
essarily entailed by, ‘its being an atom.’ In that sense, everything that can be known
about an existent entity can be said to be posterior to and entailed by the Attribute of
the Essence. As Mānkdīm Shashdīw, a prominent Zaydī Muʿtazilite, explains, “an es-
sence only enters its [state of] being a known essence [dhāt maʿlūmah] by virtue of its

of his theology. Alami’s interpretation, however, does not reflect the majority reading of Bahshamite
ontology. Moreover, with regard to the immediate problem at hand, it seems that Alami confuses the
status of the Attribute of the Essence, on the one hand, which can be known and has an intermediary
ontological status, with ‘the thing,’ on the other, which is either mawjūd or maʿdūm, and which can-
not in itself be known. Frank, Beings, especially 53‒57, distinguishes more clearly between these two
aspects, and as a result his account is, I think, more coherent. He explains that whereas the Attribute
of the Essence is knowable, the thing-itself, whether as mawjūd or maʿdūm, is not. Wisnovsky, Avi-
cenna, 106, suggests that the Muʿtazilites described mental objects as nonexistent things. Thus, the
crux of the issue, at least when it comes to the doctrines of Abū Hāshim and the Bahshamites,
seems to be whether a mental object is better described as an Attribute of the Essence or as a non-
existent thing. Yet, since the former expresses the thingness of the latter, I assume that both formu-
lations are correct. In neither case, however, does this amount to a positive mode of mental existence
according to the Bahshamites, and therein lies the main difference between them and Avicenna.
 Dhanani, The Physical Theory, 23.
 Ibn Mattawayh, Reminder, vol. 1, 13.8‒9.
 2 Pure quiddity, universality, and mental existence 227

being specified by the Attribute of the Essence.”³⁴⁴ As such, our apprehension of an

atom’s occupying space is inextricably linked to our knowledge of the Attribute of the
Essence.³⁴⁵
The picture of Abū Hāshim’s theory I have sketched thus far should already res-
onate with readers, since it contains many features that bear striking resemblances to
Avicenna’s theory of pure quiddity. In fact, the epistemological and conceptual par-
allels between Abū Hāshim’s theory of the Attribute of the Essence and Avicenna’s
consideration of pure quiddity are so striking that they naturally suggest a historical
and doctrinal connection between the two. There is, admittedly, an obvious, albeit
important, terminological and doctrinal difference between their views: what is an
attribute (ṣifah) and state (ḥāl) for Abū Hāshim is a consideration (iʿtibār), meaning
or idea (maʿnā), and form (ṣūrah) for Avicenna. This terminological difference not-
withstanding, these two authors fundamentally agree on the possibility of a pure,
distinct, and eminently intelligible mental consideration of the essence of a thing.
For these thinkers, there is an irreducible mental consideration that refers to the
way a thing is in itself, to the ‘thingness’ of a thing, in abstraction from other con-
siderations, such as existence, and hence regardless of whether that thing actually
exists in the world. Furthermore, these thinkers equally frame this theory in terms
of an identity statement whereby the thing is what it is in itself and by virtue of
its essence. In this regard, Abū Hāshim’s examples of “blackness’ being blackness”
(kawn al-sawād sawādan) and of “the atom’s being an atom” (kawn al-jawhar ja-
wharan) directly echo Avicenna’s formula that “horseness is just horseness.”³⁴⁶ In
sum, both the theory of the Attribute of the Essence and the consideration of quid-
dity in itself are intended to capture the quiddity, thingness, and ‘what-it-is-to-be-a-
thing.’ Both express an identity statement that is immediately intelligible to the
mind.
According to Abū Hāshim and Avicenna, the Attribute of the Essence and the
consideration of pure quiddity are intelligible precisely by virtue of this abstractness
and cognitive purity. They refer to the true reality and inner core of a thing in abstrac-
tion from its other properties and its status in existence. This makes them intrinsical-
ly intelligible and knowable in a mode that is constant and permanent. As Thiele ex-
plains, “Since the identity of an object finds its expression in ‘the attribute of the

 Mānkdīm Shashdīw, Notes on the Commentary, 108.10‒11. This Muʿtazilite theologian, who died
in 1034 CE, and who was therefore a contemporary of Avicenna, wrote a paraphrase or set of notes
(taʿlīq) on the commentary (sharḥ) that ʿAbd al-Jabbār wrote on his own work entitled On the Five
Fundamental Principles (al-Uṣūl al-khamsah). The Cairo edition by ʿUthmān used here mistakenly at-
tributes the text to ʿAbd al-Jabbār. On this point and on the complicated history surrounding the au-
thorship of the Taʿlīq fī Sharḥ al-Uṣūl al-khamsah, see Gimaret, Les uṣūl al-ḫamsa.
 On this point, see Abū Rashīd, Issues, 31.20 ff.
 Not coincidentally, Avicenna also frequently chooses whiteness or blackness as examples in his
own writings, as in Discussions, section 648, p. 218, and in his treatment of quiddity in Metaphysics
I.5, where, I believe, he is directly responding to the Bahshamites and offering an alternative ontolog-
ical model.
228 II Quiddity in Itself and Mental Existence

essence,’ the Bahshamīs regard this attribute as the ground or basis on which some-
thing is intelligible and thereby becomes an object of knowledge (maʿlūm).”³⁴⁷ Like-
wise, for Avicenna, pure quiddity is at the core of true scientific knowledge, since it
underlies our universal concepts in the mind. Here there is an additional parallel be-
tween the two thinkers: for Abū Hāshim, the Attribute of the Essence is conceivable,
but not perceptible. Likewise, for Avicenna quiddity in itself is an intelligible concept
that can be apprehended by the intellect, but not by the senses.³⁴⁸
The Attribute of the Essence, like Avicenna’s conception of pure quiddity, is
therefore irreducible and, as such, distinguishes a thing from another in a permanent
manner. It is, for instance, what essentially distinguishes blackness from whiteness,
or an atom from its accidents. This applies primarily, of course, to the mind and to
human reflection about the world. Things are distinct from another in the mind by
virtue of their different thingness. But according to Abū Hāshim, it applies also in
a certain way to entities in the concrete world. For recall that the attributes, if
they come short of being existents, are nonetheless real and actual. This means
that there is a correspondence between the Attribute of the Essence as it is intellected
in the mind and the essence as it comes to exist in the concrete world. This corre-
spondence is in fact what guarantees the possibility of knowledge and mental dis-
cernment of existent essences and things. One finds a similar premise in Avicenna’s
epistemology, where the very possibility of knowledge and the symmetry between
science and logic is ensured by the presence and reality of quiddity in the concrete
beings and the concepts in the mind. Additionally, for both Abū Hāshim and Avicen-
na, the Attribute of the Essence and pure quiddity are what convey distinctness and
specificity (khāṣṣiyyah), and even difference (ikhtilāf), on the one hand, and similar-
ity (tamāthul) and commonality (mushtarakah), on the other. All atoms can be quali-
fied by the same Attribute of the Essence consisting in the statement “the atom’s
being an atom” (kawn al-jawhar jawharan), just as all horses, for Avicenna, have
in common the pure quiddity horseness (farasiyyah).³⁴⁹ At a fundamental level,
then, both the difference and commonality between things are grasped by the
mind thanks to this irreducible and intelligible consideration, which lays the ground
for further distinctions based on accidents and properties to be drawn at a later stage

 Thiele, Abū Hāshim, 371.

 That is to say, these notions are intelligible in themselves and can be considered in abstraction
from existence. For both Abū Hāshim and Avicenna, what is perceptible are the various manifesta-
tions and properties that are actualized as a result of the thing’s realized existence, although Avicen-
na extends this criterion to the realm of complex universal concepts in the mind, since they too have
concomitants, albeit mental ones. But the essential core in itself is irreducible and intelligible and,
hence, only accessible to the intellect.
 According to Abū Rashīd, Issues, 34.12‒16, all atoms (jawāhir) are common (mushtarakah) in that
they share the same attributes.
 2 Pure quiddity, universality, and mental existence 229

and when the things come to exist and its various manifestations perceived and
known.³⁵⁰
Because it is permanent and irreducible, and because it applies indiscriminately
to all things that can be qualified by it regardless of the circumstances of actual ex-
istence, Abū Hāshim and the Bahshamite claim that the Attribute of the Essence is
“unconditioned by anything else” (ghayr mashrūṭah bi-amr siwāhā).³⁵¹ This goes
hand in hand with this attribute being ungrounded and uncaused (ghayr muʿallalah)
in the thing itself and, thus, also unrelated to the conditions (shurūṭ) of actual exis-
tence, which only affect realized and existent entities and things (i. e., substances
and accidents). The Attribute of the Essence is unconditioned by existence itself,
since it is cognizable in abstraction from existence and thus possesses its own intel-
ligible subsistence. Consequently, for Abū Hāshim, the unconditioned and irreduci-
ble status of the Attribute of the Essence makes it also prior to the attribute of exis-
tence (ṣifat al-wujūd) and prior also to the realization of the thing as an existent in
the concrete world. It is therefore prior in an intelligible and cognitive sense in the
divine and human minds.³⁵²
Needless to say, Abū Hāshim’s description of the Attribute of the Essence as un-
conditioned or ghayr mashrūṭah bi-amr siwāhā directly anticipates Avicenna’s own
view that pure quiddity is unconditioned or bi-lā sharṭ shayʾ ākhar. ³⁵³ Both Abū Hā-
shim and Avicenna associated the state of being conditioned with actual or realized
existence and, hence, with causedness and the relation to an exterior agent. More
specifically, as will be discussed later on in detail, Abū Hāshim construes actual ex-
istence in connection with the various essential attributes that derive from the Attrib-
ute of the Essence and become actualized. Along much the same lines, Avicenna
conceives of existence in connection with the various concomitants (lawāzim) that
are entailed by quiddity, such as oneness and particularity, which are caused to
exist and become realized with the composite substance. When one establishes a re-
lation between pure quiddity and these concomitants and accidents, then quiddity is
conditioned (bi-sharṭ or mashrūṭah), but, if it is taken only in itself, then it remains
unconditioned. At any rate, for the Bahshamites, it is this very unconditionedness
that makes the Attribute of the Essence a ground and root (aṣl) for other attributes,
while itself remaining uncaused and ungrounded. Likewise, for Avicenna, it is the
intrinsically unconditioned mode of quiddity that enables it to be qualified by con-
ditions and to exist either in concrete individuals or in the mind.
The parallels between Abū Hāshim and Avicenna would thus appear to extend
beyond their epistemology and into their ontology as well. More specifically, the in-
tention on the part of these Muʿtazilites and Avicenna to ascribe a special ontological

 See Alami, L’ontologie modale; 77‒101. For the reception of this Muʿtazilite doctrine in the
Ashʿarite tradition, see Benevich, The Classical.
 Frank, Al-maʿdūm, 195‒196.
 Frank, Beings, 54.
 Frank, Beings, 53.
230 II Quiddity in Itself and Mental Existence

status to the Attribute of the Essence and to pure quiddity respectively that coincides
neither with realized existence nor with nonexistence seems to proceed from a
shared concern regarding the intrinsic conceivability and intelligibility of thingness
in itself. These thinkers jointly separate thingness from the notion of realized exis-
tence, endowing it with a distinct status in the mind. Abū Hāshim regards this
mode or state of the Attribute of the Essence as corresponding to a special ontolog-
ical status by virtue of which the thing is what it is or “the way it is in itself,’ and this
regardless of whether the thing-itself actually exists in the concrete world. It is there-
fore something that can be predicated of the thing-itself qua mawjūd or qua maʿdūm.
This ṣifah and ḥāl remains a principle of identity and also of qualification and dis-
tinctness (khāṣṣiyyah) over and above actual existence, because in itself it is ontolog-
ically unconditioned and undetermined. Its permanent intelligible reality transcends
the realm of realized existence and makes it permanently cognizable.³⁵⁴ This is what
motivates Mānkdīm Shashdīw to assert that “the most adequate [definition of al-
maʿdūm] is for the nonexistent to be defined as an object of knowledge that is not
existent” (fa-l-awlā an yuḥḥada l-maʿdūm bi-annahu l-maʿlūm alladhī laysa bi-
mawjūd).³⁵⁵ What makes its essence cognizable is nothing other than the Attribute
of the Essence.
The textual evidence therefore suggests that the ontological status of the Attrib-
ute of the Essence is closely tied to our knowledge and conception of it. For instance,
the Attribute of the Essence of ‘atomness’ or ‘blackness’ can be known and conceived
by the human and divine minds regardless of whether this particular unit of ‘black’
or ‘atom’ is a shayʾ mawjūd or shayʾ maʿdūm. ³⁵⁶ Even though the Bahshamites, unlike
many of the falāsifah, do not recognize a special mode of intellectual existence per
se, their theory of the Attribute of the Essence and its special ontological state are
closely linked to notions of conceivability, intelligibility, and epistemic irreducibility.
This point in particular strikes me as significant, for it can account for some of the
defining features of Avicenna’s own doctrine of essence in the mind, while also di-
recting our attention to some of the ways in which—and to some of the reasons
why—he departed from the Bahshamites. The latter focused especially on the char-
acterization of mental objects as nonexistent things and on the intermediary ontolog-
ical status of the states. In contrast to Abū Hāshim and his followers, Avicenna up-

 Thiele, Ḥāl, 58.

 Mānkdīm Shashdīw, Notes on the Commentary, 176.16‒17.
 By extension, the Muʿtazilite position postulates a relation between what is conceivable and in-
telligible, on the one hand, and what is possible, on the other, i. e., what is possible of existence, the
latter corresponding with the shayʾ maʿdūm. Since the Attribute of the Essence can apply to a non-
existent thing, the latter is in some ways a possible thing, i. e., a thing possible of existence in the
actual world, or else its essence would not be conceivable in the first place. This would imply that
for the Bahshamites, what is impossible of existence is not even conceivable and intelligible. So
even though these theologians do not posit mental existence in the way Avicenna does, there are in-
teresting parallels between their views and Avicenna’s definition of the universals and pure quiddity
as utterly conceivable things in the mind that should be explored further.
 2 Pure quiddity, universality, and mental existence 231

holds the law of the excluded middle and does not recognize an intermediary onto-
logical state between existence and nonexistence. As a result, objects of thought for
Avicenna are existents, albeit of a mental kind. When it comes to pure quiddity spe-
cifically, he does not define its special ontological mode as ‘neither existent nor non-
existent’ (although some of his later Ashʿarite commentators will), but rather as-
cribes to it a sense of existence and defines it within the confines of a positive
ontology. Since Avicenna upholds the law of the excluded middle, the Bahshamite
position clashes with one of the cornerstones of his ontological outlook and must
therefore be rejected.³⁵⁷
In spite of these and other major ontological and epistemological differences be-
tween these thinkers, the Bahshamite position nevertheless intersects with Avicen-
na’s theory of quiddity in an intellectual context in quite remarkable ways. As I ar-
gued, for Avicenna as well, pure quiddity possesses its own distinct ontological
status in the intellect. The Bahshamite idea that the special ontological status of
the Attribute of the Essence is premised on its intrinsic intelligibility and its presence
in human and divine knowledge finds an important parallel in Avicenna. It can be
compared to the master’s ascription of a special sense of existence to pure quiddity
in Metaphysics I.5, a chapter which, I would contend, has to be read in light of Avi-
cenna’s engagement with Bahshamite sources and doctrines. In this passage, Avicen-
na assigns a special ‘sense of existence’ (maʿnā l-wujūd) to pure quiddity, which he
calls ‘special’ or ‘proper existence’ (wujūd khāṣṣ), and which he sharply contrasts
with realized existence (wujūd muḥaṣṣal). The relation between these two senses
of existence will be explored in depth in chapter IV. Here I wish merely to highlight
the fact that this special sense, and possibly mode, of existence of quiddity is men-
tioned in the context of Avicenna’s discussion of human cognition and the primary
notions in the mind. Inasmuch as pure quiddity is eminently intelligible and some-
thing that can be immediately and intuitively grasped by the intellect, the sense of
being Avicenna ascribes to it is to be connected chiefly with its intrinsic conceivabil-
ity and intelligibility, as well as with the status of ‘the thing’ as a primary notion in
the intellect. More precisely, proper existence seems to be tied with the immediate
and simple intellectual conception of quiddity and its mental representation as
something distinct, essentially and intellectually prior (to composite entities that in-
clude the essential concomitants), and irreducible. Notice, in this connection, that
the formula wujūd khāṣṣ that Avicenna uses in this passage directly echoes Abū Hā-
shim’s mention of the specificity or ‘properness’ (khāṣṣiyyah) of the Attribute of the
Essence.
In brief, this essential irreducibility and specificity and the unmediated concep-
tion of thingness in the mind are connected with the special ontological status of
both the Attribute of the Essence and pure quiddity as objects that remain unaffected
by the conditions associated with realized existence. They are what enable the mind

 On this point, see Wisnovsky, Essence and Existence, especially 35‒40.
232 II Quiddity in Itself and Mental Existence

to immediately distinguish a thing from another thing and grasp its essence. Given
that Avicenna in another passage of Metaphysics I.5 directly rebuffs the Muʿtazilite
notion of an intermediary status between existence and nonexistence and upholds
the principle of the excluded middle, it is not far-fetched to surmise that in formulat-
ing his theory of the proper existence of quiddity and thingness in the mind, Avicen-
na was consciously and deliberately responding to the Bahshamite views and more
specifically to their theory of the Attribute of the Essence and its intermediary onto-
logical status. If this hypothesis is correct, then Avicenna’s disquisition in Metaphy-
sics I.5 would be qualified both by significant borrowings and departures from the
Bahshamite tradition. But perhaps the key element to bear in mind here is that
this ‘Bahshamite connection’ bears especially on Avicenna’s conception of the epis-
temological and ontological status of pure quiddity in the mind. Although he may
have found Abū Hāshim’s theory of the Attribute of the Essence thought-provoking
in many ways—it likely helped him to better conceptualize and articulate his own
theory of pure quiddity and its relation to the essential concomitants—he on the
other hand could not endorse the ontological underpinnings that came with it, espe-
cially the theory of the intermediary ontological status of the attributes and states. I
would surmise that Avicenna’s formulation of proper existence in connection with
the conception of pure quiddity in the mind was shaped partly out of a dialectical
encounter with, and reaction to, the Bahshamite theory of the Attribute of the Es-
sence.
Given the somewhat tentative nature of any reconstruction of Abū Hāshim’s doc-
trine, one can conclude with certainty neither that the picture of the Attribute of the
Essence that scholars have painted corresponds exactly to the one initially developed
by Abū Hāshim nor, as a result, that Avicenna would have been directly influenced
by this doctrine. Indeed, the possibility of Avicennian or Avicennizing Ashʿarite con-
tamination of Abū Hāshim’s thought in the reports that post-date the shaykh al-raʾīs
cannot be completely excluded. With that being said, modern studies on the topic,
especially those of Frank, and more recently those of Thiele, have relied heavily
on sources that precede or are contemporaneous with Avicenna, and which at any
rate do not suffer from a potential Ashʿarite bias. There thus appears to be a suffi-
cient volume of evidence and degree of historical accuracy concerning Abū Hāshim’s
theory of the Attribute of the Essence to warrant the tentative conclusions reached
above. Moreover, even if the link between this Muʿtazilite thinker and Avicenna is
tenuous, it remains likely that the latter tapped into other Bahshamite sources com-
posed before or during his time by disciples of Abū Hāshim, especially Abū Rashīd,
Mānkdīm Shashdīw, ʿAbd al-Jabbār, and Ibn Mattawayh. In light of these considera-
tions, the historical and philosophical connection between the Bahshamites and Avi-
cenna assumes a real significance.
To recap, it appears that several crucial features of Avicenna’s theory of pure
quiddity find one of their roots, or at the very least a source of inspiration, in Abū
 3 Some later commentators on pure quiddity and mental existence 233

Hāshim’s innovative theory of the Attribute of the Essence.³⁵⁸ In spite of obvious and
considerable differences, there are salient epistemological and conceptual parallels
between these two theories. Among the commonalities, one notes that the Attribute
of the Essence and the consideration of pure quiddity are, qua mental or intellectual
objects, intrinsically intelligible and conceivable, knowledge-producing, irreducible
and permanent, unconditioned, and prior (even though some of these notions are
construed differently by these authors). To this should be added the fact that, accord-
ing to Abū Hāshim and Avicenna, these objects possess a distinct and special onto-
logical status that does not coincide with realized existence or with nonexistence. In
chapters III and IV I will delve further into the ontological implications of Abū Hā-
shim’s theory, which seem highly relevant when assessing Avicenna’s ontology of
quiddity, especially with regard to the notion of necessary entailment (iqtiḍāʾ, ilti-
zām) and the relation between essence and its concomitants and accidents. If the hy-
pothesis of a Bahshamite influence on Avicenna as delineated above is correct, it
would amount not only to an instance of kalām feeding into the discussions of the
philosophers—in itself not a surprising idea, and one already highlighted by Wisnov-
sky’s studies—but also, in a more implicative fashion, of specific Muʿtazilite ideas
and doctrines making their way expressly in Avicenna’s ontology and epistemology
and being assimilated and combined with the Aristotelian and Neoplatonic materi-
al.³⁵⁹

3 Some later commentators on pure quiddity and mental

existence
Before examining the works of individual authors, I wish to make some general re-
marks concerning the reception of Avicenna’s doctrines of mental existence and
quiddity in the postclassical tradition.³⁶⁰ As I mentioned previously, there are two
main reasons why subsequent thinkers were weary of Avicenna’s theory of the men-

 This possibility was briefly raised by Gimaret, La théorie, 61, who sees in the Attribute of the
Essence an antecedent for the māhiyyah of the Avicennian tradition. The last sentence of Gimaret’s
article reads: “Il est cependant fort probable que les spéculations d’Ibn Sînâ relatives à la distinction
et à la définition de l’existence et de la quiddité doivent en partie leur origine à la théorie des aḥwâl.”
 The previous remarks therefore accord with Dhanani’s, Rocks, hypothesis of Avicenna’s familiar-
ity with some Muʿtazilite sources. I would even suggest that the master may have been influenced by
Muʿtazilite kalām. We should not forget in this regard that this theological school had flourished long
before Avicenna’s time and that some of its prominent representatives, such as ʿAbd al-Jabbār, were
his contemporaries.
 There is now a rich modern literature on the reception of Avicenna’s works and ideas in the late-
classical and postclassical Islamic periods; for general orientation, see Gutas, The Heritage; Eichner,
Dissolving; eadem, Essence; Griffel, Theology; idem, Between al-Ghazālī; and the various studies by
Wisnovsky. In spite of this, the reception of Avicenna’s theories of quiddity and mental existence re-
mains to be analyzed in depth.
234 II Quiddity in Itself and Mental Existence

tal existence of pure quiddity. The first is that they reject the category of mental ex-
istents en masse and recognize only concrete, extramental entities as true existents.
Put differently, the realm of existing things in their system would overlap only with
the objects of the concrete, mind-independent world. This position, however, even
though it was endorsed in some theological circles during the first centuries of
Islam, appears not to have prevailed in the postclassical period.³⁶¹ By far the majority
of thinkers who participated in this philosophical dialogue after Avicenna recognized
some kind of mental existents, even though they debated at length regarded their
exact nature. A more widely defended position by far was the view that quiddity
could not exist in a pure, absolutely abstracted state in the mind, since mental exis-
tence always implies the existence of accompanying mental accidents and concom-
itants. According to this line of reasoning, other considerations are necessarily added
to the consideration of pure quiddity in the mind, with the resulting synthesis
amounting to a mental existent. But quiddity itself, as defined merely by its privation
of accidents and attributes, will not exist in this abstract state. As Izutsu has shown,
some medieval thinkers appear to have advocated this interpretation and to have
criticized their predecessors and contemporaries for failing to tease out the full on-
tological implications of mental concomitants. At any rate, this view—rather than the
more extreme position entailing a complete denial of mental existents—appears to be
the one advocated by thinkers who resisted the identification of pure quiddity with
an intellectual existent.³⁶² This problematic—namely, the elucidation of how mental
concomitants relate to quiddity in the mind—has continued to grasp the attention of
scholars and reached a high level of argumentative sophistication in the postclassi-
cal sources. Alongside the increasing sophistication of the discourse on the mental
concomitants of quiddity, one notices a keen interest in the technical vocabulary
that props these discussions. In this regard, it is important to emphasize that most
of the technical terms and expressions that underpin these ideas in the postclassical
tradition find their origin in Avicenna’s works. In fact, virtually all of them appear at
one point or other in Introduction I.2, I.12, and Metaphysics I.5 and especially V.1.
These sections of the Avicennian corpus provided the foundation on which the ter-

 The denial of mental existence is associated with early kalām circles and especially with al-
Ashʿarī and his followers. With regard to the post-Avicennian tradition, Rāzī is sometimes described
as rejecting mental existents, but additional research on his works is required before a clear picture of
his position on this matter can emerge.
 It is as yet unclear how this interpretive stance connects with the development of the terms
iʿtibār and iʿtibārī as meaning something purely ‘suppositional’ and as opposed to something
‘real’ or ‘true.’ Some thinkers pit the iʿtibārāt, which are merely suppositional or conjectural consid-
erations, against the realm of the true mental existents, which, in their correspondence to the extra-
mental world, convey the realm of the “state of the matter” (nafs al-amr). In this case, the argument
would not be that there is no consideration of pure quiddity distinct from mental concomitants and
accidents, but that such a consideration would not amount to a true mental existent. It is unclear to
me how exactly these ideas and trends are related in the later philosophical literature; further inves-
tigation is required.
 3 Some later commentators on pure quiddity and mental existence 235

minological and conceptual musings of the postclassical period on the issue of quid-
dity developed. Even centuries after Avicenna’s death, the accounts of thinkers such
as Taftāzānī, Qushjī, and Mullā Ṣadrā (d. 1640 CE) are deeply indebted to the termi-
nology the master implemented in those particular works. However, postclassical
thinkers either refined some of the terms they borrowed from the Avicennian or de-
vised new expressions to complement those that were established as part of the stan-
dard nomenclature.
The various semantic developments revolving around the term iʿtibār after Avi-
cenna are a case in point and aptly illustrate the former phenomenon. One notices
a shift in the ontological and epistemic status of the term iʿtibār in later authors
and commentators. While Avicenna had, in Introduction, ascribed a distinct iʿtibār
to pure quiddity, which he appears in Metaphysics V.1 to assimilate to the negative-
ly-conditioned and abstract quiddity, subsequent exegetes often redefine and rene-
gotiate the conceptual relationship between māhiyyah and iʿtibār in light of their
theory of mental existence, causality, and other factors. For example, some thinkers
define pure quiddity and the clause bi-sharṭ lā shayʾ as two distinct considerations,
whose exact relationship was the subject of extensive glossing and bitter controversy.
In parallel, it is noteworthy that the idiosyncratic terminology Avicenna applies to
pure quiddity underwent considerable transformation in the postclassical period.
Later interpreters of Avicenna interpret the j-r-d root and the sharṭ bi-lā shayʾ clause
in a much more flexible way than the master, since they seem to have applied it to a
variety of entities (universal quiddity, or quiddity in itself, or other distinct consider-
ations of quiddity not reducible to the latter) in a way that challenges any attempt at
systematizing the textual evidence. As a result, while (on my reading) Avicenna as-
cribes this condition to pure quiddity in the mind exclusively, these later authors
sometimes appear to depart from his teachings by using it to qualify other aspects
of mental quiddity, including universal quiddity.³⁶³ As a corollary, they often identify
pure quiddity with the unconditioned quiddity (bi-lā sharṭ shayʾ ākhar) rather than
with negatively-conditioned quiddity.³⁶⁴ And with regard to mental existence, they
often regard negatively-conditioned quiddity either as pertaining to the universal
or to some other conditioned aspect of quiddity, but as not amounting strictly to

 I say “possibly” because the present state of research on the postclassical tradition does not
allow us to perceive clearly how these terms where applied to the various considerations of quiddity.
What does seem to be the case, however, is that they were applied in a more flexible way, and not
always in connection with pure quiddity regarded as a distinct form in the human mind.
 This aspect of the problem is tackled in chapter IV with regard to Avicenna’s views as well as the
later philosophical theories he inspired. Strictly speaking, co-relating pure quiddity to unconditioned
quiddity rather than negatively-conditioned quiddity is not un-Avicennian, since, as will be shown
later, it is consistent with Avicenna’s broader metaphysical doctrine. Moreover, it will become clear
then that there is an essential connection between these two aspects of quiddity via the process of
abstraction. But with regard to the context of mental existence specifically, Avicenna connects neg-
atively-conditioned quiddity with pure quiddity in a way that few of his followers, commentators, and
critics do.
236 II Quiddity in Itself and Mental Existence

quiddity in itself. In brief, the various comments Avicenna had made concerning
pure quiddity as a distinct concept in the mind are often adapted and re-applied
to other aspects of essence by the later Arabic philosophers. This leads to a veritable
conceptual puzzle, where the pieces have to be relabeled and rearranged depending
on the philosophical system of individual thinkers.
These broad terminological and conceptual outgrowths from Avicenna’s works
were due, I believe, to two major factors. First, the extensive and continuously re-
newed attempts by postclassical authors to elucidate and pin down the notion of
mental existence and its various criteria. The second factor concerns the intrinsic am-
biguity of Avicenna’s terminology. This is true in particular of those terms and con-
ditions that qualify the way in which quiddity relates to its mental concomitants, a
topic that preoccupied the master, and which also turned out to be a very complicat-
ed issue in the postclassical tradition. A case in point is the term mujarrad. This tech-
nical term is intrinsically marked by ambiguity, since, when applied to quiddity, it
can mean merely ‘separated or abstracted from matter’ or, in a more committal
way, ‘abstracted from all things and all concomitants, including the concomitants as-
sociated with mental existence.’ In other word, mujarrad can mean either abstracted
from the material concomitants or abstracted from both the material and mental con-
comitants. According to the former sense, the mental state of quiddity in itself and
universal quiddity could be said to be mujarrad. But on the latter sense, quiddity
in itself alone is mujarrad, not universal. My conjecture is that later exegetes started
to prioritize either the first sense or the second sense, depending on their intentions,
without always clarifying which. This, naturally, created some confusion. For exam-
ple, some of them apply this term to the various mental considerations of quiddity
(including universal quiddity) that presuppose abstraction from matter and material
accidents, and not just to quiddity in itself, as (I argue) Avicenna had originally in-
tended. While for Avicenna the abstract quiddity is pure quiddity in the mind, for
some later exegetes this expression also applied to the universal mode of quiddity.
They did this in order to emphasize these forms’ separation from matter generally,
rather than their separation from the mental concomitants specifically. This is also
the case of the condition bi-sharṭ lā shayʾ, whose proper interpretation became a mat-
ter of intense controversy. As Izutsu has shown, it became the object of profound ex-
egetical scrutiny and of a variety of interpretations in the postclassical tradition.³⁶⁵
These shifts of emphasis, I believe, engendered some confusion and were responsi-
ble for inspiring a distinct exegetical development with regard to the theory of quid-
dity in itself.³⁶⁶

 Izutsu, Basic Problems.

 See, for instance, the general remarks in Heer, The Sufi Position, where he explains that for
many postclassical thinkers the abstract and negatively-conditioned quiddity is identified with the
intellectual universal (al-kullī l-ʿaqlī), which is none other than universal quiddity. But from an Avi-
cennian point of view this is problematic, given that the mental universal is, strictly speaking, neither
abstract (from mental concomitants) nor negatively-conditioned. This explains why Avicenna applies
 3 Some later commentators on pure quiddity and mental existence 237

Overall, the postclassical elaborations on the terms iʿtibār, mujarrad, and bi-
sharṭ lā shayʾ as applied to quiddity are extremely dense and subtle and mark doc-
trinal departures from Avicenna. This interpretive trend may have started shortly after
the master’s death, although Bahmanyār for one does not seem to have much to say
on the topic.³⁶⁷ It is with the works of Rāzī and later Ṭūsī that the issue gets ad-
dressed in earnest, inaugurating a long exegetical effort that spans at least up to
the twentieth century with Ṭabāṭabāʾī and Muḥammad ʿAbduh. In these works,
the technical terms and expressions iʿtibār, mujarrad, and bi-sharṭ lā shayʾ gradually
position themselves at the forefront of the debate regarding the mental existence of
the various aspects of quiddity. By Ṭūsī’s time, and definitely by the time of Qushjī’s
commentary on Ṭūsī’s Abstract of Correct Belief in the fifteenth century, they have be-
come part and parcel of the technical vocabulary relating to mental quiddity. Accord-
ingly, it seems worthwhile to provide a brief sketch of how later authors use these
terms in their analysis of quiddity and in what ways they depart from Avicenna.³⁶⁸
In addition, new terms and expressions make their appearance in these post-Avi-
cennian sources. Even if they have a fleeting precedent in Avicenna’s works, they are
invested with an entirely new meaning and argumentative function in the later sour-
ces and therefore merit an independent analytical treatment. Two examples are the

these (negative) qualifications to pure quiddity, not universal quiddity. To what extent was this post-
classical exegetical turn prompted by a misunderstanding of the Avicennian doctrines? This question,
to some extent moot, would need to be answered on a case by case basis. What one can say, however,
is that there were other factors that elicited this development. One of them is the tendency in later
works to speak of the various aspects of quiddity generally in terms of universals: ‘the natural,’ ‘log-
ical,’ and ‘intellectual’ universals. This threefold scheme is mapped onto the various distinctions of
quiddity Avicenna discusses in his works, as in Introduction I.2. But the extent to which these distinc-
tions really overlap remains unclear. Avicenna himself in general avoids speaking of the various as-
pects or considerations of quiddity in terms of universals. Yet, this later tendency can explain why the
notion of abstractness was, on my interpretation, shifted from pure quiddity to the universal aspect of
quiddity. Since these various aspects of quiddity—including what Avicenna himself calls nature (ṭa-
bīʿah) and reality (ḥaqīqah), and which he painstakingly dissociates from universality—are regarded
as kinds of universals by these later authors, then it makes sense that they would extend abstractness
to include universals generally. The fact remains, however, that Avicenna himself uses the term mu-
jarrad chiefly in connection with pure quiddity to express the fact that it excludes the mental con-
comitants, including universality.
 Pre-Rāzīan sources, such as Bahmanyār’s The Book of Validated Knowledge and Abū l-Barakāt
al-Baghdādī’s The Book of Personal Reflection, provide little data on the matter.
 For a useful overview of this development, see Izutsu, Basic Problems. Although a useful guide
to the topic, Izutsu’s analysis is also problematic in that it approaches the problem through a post-
classical and decisively idealist—even Kantian—lens. Izutsu’s comments on the status of quiddity in
itself in the human mind are particularly tantalizing and obscure. He seems at times to ascribe to it a
kind of transcendent mental existence free from any kind of consciousness or awareness. According-
ly, when awareness illuminates it, quiddity in itself would exist in another mode and various consid-
erations or mental aspect would become attached to it. While this highly idiosyncratic interpretation
may find some traction in the postclassical Arabic and modern sources, I do not think it can be con-
vincingly attributed to Avicenna himself.
238 II Quiddity in Itself and Mental Existence

expressions nafs al-amr and muṭābiq/muṭābaqah. The first can be translated alterna-
tively as ‘fact of the matter’ or ‘the thing in itself,’ while the latter appears to refer to a
correspondence between the mental and concrete spheres. By the fourteenth century,
but reflecting perhaps earlier developments, these terms appear frequently in the de-
bates concerning quiddity, particularly with regard to the issues of its mental exis-
tence and of how it relates to the concrete world. Although the exact meaning of
nafs al-amr is still unclear and calls for a detailed analysis in the works of individual
authors, it seems to refer generally to an epistemic and ontological criterion, and per-
haps also to an autonomous referential realm, that only partly overlaps with the no-
tion of ‘things,’ but which is inclusive of the things that truly exist and constitute true
reality (regardless of whether these truly existing things are in the mind or in the con-
crete world).³⁶⁹ In addition, the notion often assumes a theological dimension, in
that it can refer to a realm of uncreated quiddities or designate the objects that
are reflected by the divine mind.³⁷⁰ What is important is that the domain of nafs
al-amr is contrasted to the sub-ontological domain of the iʿtibārāt, whose nature is
purely conceptual or suppositional, and which are not grounded in true reality.³⁷¹
The various terminological and theoretical threads described above appear to
have been densely interconnected in the mind of medieval thinkers, making the
task of modern scholars significantly more challenging. What is noteworthy is that
the bulk of the terminological apparatus that was refined over the course of the cen-
turies after Avicenna’s death was intended to address with more pointedness the
issue of how quiddity relates to its mental concomitants and its constitutive parts.
Before Qushjī, whom Izutsu identifies as the main authority behind the dual interpre-
tation of ‘negatively-conditioned’ quiddity, the debate centers more forthrightly on
the relation of quiddity to its mental accidents or concomitants. Exegetes take it
for granted that this issue represents the crux of the problem when it comes to the
mental existence of pure quiddity, and they regard this issue as part of Avicenna’s
metaphysical legacy. One of the starting points of this controversy is Ṭūsī’s Abstract
of Correct Belief, whose exegesis, nevertheless, also later inspired ‘the two-system’
theory of quiddity devised by Qushjī and described by Izutsu. Later authors, such
as Qushjī, excoriated Ṭūsī for failing to distinguish between the different meanings
of shayʾ ākhar, and they proceeded to elaborate not only on Avicenna, but also on

 For insight into the notion of nafs al-amr and its philosophical implications, see Izutsu, Basic
Problems, 8 ff.; Fazlıoğlu, Between Reality, 24 ff.
 For a discussion of nafs al-amr in the works of the seventeenth-century thinker Kūrānī, see Du-
mairieh, Intellectual Life, 282.
 These remarks illustrate the fact that Avicenna’s philosophical language in Metaphysics under-
went extensive interpretation and adaptation, sometimes to the point that scholars ended up forging
new meanings or introducing new nomenclature to elucidate the master’s views. Terminology played
a crucial role in this exegetical process. Until these terms have been fully disambiguated and their
development mapped, they represent an obstacle to the proper understanding of the reception of Avi-
cenna’s doctrines in the later Arabic tradition.
 3 Some later commentators on pure quiddity and mental existence 239

Ṭūsī himself as an attempt to resolve this tension. But this shows quite plainly that
neither Ṭūsī nor his contemporaries, nor even other thinkers before Qushjī, envis-
aged the problem in quite those terms. Rather, their disquisitions elaborate on Avi-
cenna’s fundamental problematic of how quiddity relates to its external concomi-
tants.
Hence, when it comes to Avicenna himself and his immediate followers, there is
little doubt—as can be seen by the protracted discussion in the central chapter of
Metaphysics V.1‒2—that the crux of the matter when it comes to mental existence fo-
cuses on the mental properties or concomitants of quiddity and, hence, on the men-
tal distinction between quiddity in itself and quiddity taken together with its mental
accidents. If anything, then, one should expect the Muslim thinkers active in the pe-
riod stretching from Avicenna to Qushjī to broadly focus on those issues that had pre-
occupied the master and, in many cases, to advocate similar theories to the ones he
had advanced. Inevitably, however, departures, elaborations, and dissensions also
deeply characterize the accounts of Avicenna’s followers and commentators. This
was due inter alia to the ambiguity regarding the criteria required for positing mental
existence and to a shifting use of the technical vocabulary Avicenna had implement-
ed in his works. As interesting as these later developments are, it is important to
stress that they represent subjective and highly transformative interpretations of
the Avicennian sources. The main reason for discussing them here is to provide pre-
liminary insight into how Avicenna’s theory of pure quiddity was critically received
and appropriated by later authors.

3.1 Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī

Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s (d. 1210 CE) disquisition on quiddity in section I.2 of Eastern
Investigations is, among other things, a protracted gloss on Avicenna’s Metaphysics
I.5 and especially V.1‒2.³⁷² One finds in the Ashʿarite scholar’s work many of the
key ideas that had informed Avicenna’s exposition, especially the notion that exis-
tence is an external, non-constitutive concomitant of quiddity; that quiddity can
be conceived of in abstraction from existence; and that universality attaches to quid-
dity only in the mind. More specifically, Rāzī was fully aware of the fact that Avicen-
na had recognized the human capacity to have a pure and fully abstracted mental
consideration of quiddity. In Collection, for instance, he mentions the master by
name and refers to Book I of The Cure where, on his view, Avicenna had explained
that we can conceive of quiddity in abstraction from both concrete and mental exis-

 The crucial section is Rāzī, Eastern Investigations, vol. 1, I.2 “Fī l-māhiyyah.” For a detailed dis-
cussion of Rāzī’s interpretation of Avicenna’s theory of quiddity and other aspects of his epistemology
and metaphysics, see Ibrahim, Freeing Philosophy.
240 II Quiddity in Itself and Mental Existence

tence (al-wujūdayn).³⁷³ In light of this, it is worthwhile to try to understand how Fakhr

al-Dīn defines the mental status of pure quiddity.³⁷⁴
Although Rāzī follows Avicenna’s doctrines and terminology closely, he also
elaborates on his model and seeks to develop his own interpretation of this issue.
In this connection, he seems to have been influenced by certain doctrines derived
from the Ashʿarite camp, to which he nominally belonged. For example, Rāzī de-
scribes quiddity in itself as something that is “neither existent nor nonexistent”
(lā mawjūdah wa-lā maʿdūmah),³⁷⁵ a formula which Avicenna himself does not em-
ploy. Presumably, this idea of the neutral ontological status of quiddity is to be con-
nected with Rāzī’s Ashʿarite background, and more specifically with the theory of the
states (aḥwāl)—described as lying between existence and nonexistence—as it was de-
veloped by some Muʿtazilite and Ashʿarite thinkers from the ninth century onward.³⁷⁶
Another noteworthy departure is Rāzī’s commentary on Avicenna’s statement at Met-
aphysics V.1.201.8 that “the consideration of quiddity in itself is possible [jāʾiz], even
if it is with something else [wa-in kāna maʿa ghayrihi].”³⁷⁷ Recall that for Avicenna
conceiving of pure quiddity as a part in composite things is “permissible” or “possi-
ble” (jāʾiz), and the master appears to hold this of both concrete and mental entities.
For Rāzī as well, this consideration of pure quiddity is prior vis-à-vis the considera-
tion of individual and universal animal, in the same way that the simple is prior to
the complex. Rāzī also informs us later on that the consideration of pure quiddity is

 Rāzī, Collection, 83.8‒21.

 Given the patchy scholarly understanding of Rāzī’s corpus and thought, the following remarks
should be regarded as highly tentative in nature. They aim solely at elucidating how Rāzī appropri-
ated and elaborated on Avicenna’s terminology and theory of quiddity in his philosophical works. In
order to paint a fair picture of his position on this issue, one would have to conduct an analysis of
essence that takes into account his various theological and philosophical works, and not just Eastern
Investigations, a task which cannot be tackled here. For insight into Rāzī’s conception of mental ex-
istence, see Benevich, The Reality.
 Rāzī, Eastern Investigations, vol. 1, 139.6‒140.1.
 The idea of something being neither existent (mawjūd) nor nonexistent (maʿdūm) is thoroughly
un-Avicennian. It implies an intermediary ontological status or state between existence and nonexis-
tence, which finds no support in the Avicennian sources. The only cases that could (and have) been
made for it concern the status of the possible (or the contingent, al-mumkin) and the status of pure
quiddity. For the latter, see the Introduction and the review of the positions of Izutsu and Nuseibeh.
The former deserves additional comments. As something that is neither necessary (and, hence, nec-
essarily existent), nor impossible (and, hence, necessarily nonexistent), the possible or contingent
could be said to possess an intermediary status; this seems to be the case especially of the future
contingents, which do not exist necessarily, but which also are not absolutely impossible, since
they can exist. One way to solve this problem is to argue that the Avicennian possible or contingent
corresponds to the relative nonexistent, which would, as such, be distinct from the impossible and
the absolutely nonexistent. For a discussion of this issue, see Lizzini, Wuǧūd-Mawǧūd, and
eadem, A Mysterious Order. The trend of describing pure quiddity as something that is neither exis-
tent nor nonexistent probably has its origins in the works of Ashʿarite theologians commenting on
Avicenna. Jurjānī and Rāzī are two striking examples of this practice.
 Rāzī, Eastern Investigations, vol. 1, 141.10.
 3 Some later commentators on pure quiddity and mental existence 241

more general (aʿamm) than the other considerations of quiddity and that it is com-
mon to the other two. This is because, in each case, pure quiddity can be apprehend-
ed on its own, even if it exists with other things. Hence, for Avicenna and Fakhr al-
Dīn, pure quiddity is conceivable by the human mind, and this consideration is prior
to the consideration of universal quiddity.³⁷⁸ In spite of this, according to Rāzī, the
consideration of pure quiddity in the mind will, presumably, not amount to a real
(mental) existent. At any rate, Rāzī provides no evidence to this effect. For Avicenna,
on the other hand, there are strong reasons to believe that the consideration of pure
quiddity does amount to a distinct intelligible form and an existent in the human
mind.
This important difference between the two thinkers revolves around their diver-
gent conception of mental existence. Avicenna has a broad and inclusive theory of
mental existence, which makes it quite difficult for him to deny mental objects
any existential status whatsoever. Rāzī, in contrast, and on the basis of what is pres-
ently known of his doctrine, appears to have upheld a more selective or exclusive
theory of mental existence.³⁷⁹ With that being said, Rāzī’s views regarding mental ex-
istence and quiddity in itself are difficult to delineate with precision, as is the ques-
tion of how pure quiddity relates to universal quiddity in his system. This makes any
comment on this topic quite tentative. For our purposes, the most interesting feature
of Rāzī’s discussion, and one liable to shed light on this issue, is his interpretation of
the expressions lā bi-sharṭ shayʾ and bi-sharṭ lā shayʾ, as well as of the term mujarrad,
as they apply to quiddity.³⁸⁰ With regard to the first expression, lā bi-sharṭ shayʾ, Rāzī
follows Avicenna closely and construes it as indicating unconditioned quiddity. Ac-
cording to Fakhr al-Dīn, it pertains primarily to the way quiddity exists in the con-
crete individuals. As he explains, “unconditioned animal exists in the exterior
[world]” (al-ḥayawān lā bi-sharṭ shayʾ mawjūd fī l-khārij).³⁸¹ Rāzī partly associates
quiddity in itself with this unconditioned state, in the sense that pure quiddity is
considered as dwelling in the particulars in an intelligible and irreducible mode
without mixing or fusing with its material trappings. It exists there as an irreducible
part. If, in contrast, it is considered with these material accidents, then it is condi-
tioned quiddity or quiddity bi-sharṭ shayʾ. ³⁸² Finally, and in contrast to these two as-
pects of quiddity, Fakhr al-Dīn employs the terms mujarrad and bi-sharṭ lā shayʾ to
refer to the mental state of quiddity and hence to express the opposite of quiddity
bi-sharṭ shayʾ. These terms evoke what is “not existent in the concrete world” and
“devoid of the exterior accidents” (al-ʿawāriḍ al-khārijiyyah). By implication, they

 For the possibility to conceive of quiddity in itself, see, in addition to the previous passages,
145.11.
 For an overview of this question in Rāzī’s philosophy, see Arnaldez, Fakhr, 138 ff.; Eichner,
‘Knowledge by Presence,’ 119‒121; and Ibrahim, Freeing Philosophy.
 Rāzī, Eastern Investigations, vol. 1, 141.17‒142.8.
 Rāzī, Eastern Investigations, vol. 1, 141.19‒20.
 This aspect of quiddity in Rāzī is discussed in more detail in the next chapter.
242 II Quiddity in Itself and Mental Existence

apply to quiddity in the mind, which is free of these external—in the sense of extra-
mental and concrete—concomitants.³⁸³
Interestingly, however, on Rāzī’s view, the conditions of being abstract (mujar-
rad) and negatively-conditioned (bi-sharṭ lā shayʾ ākhar) are themselves considera-
tions (iʿtibārāt) that are added to (zāʾid ʿalā) quiddity in itself and quidditative nature
(ṭabīʿah).³⁸⁴ This would mean that they characterize not pure quiddity, as in Avicen-
na, who regards the latter as being entirely free of other (added) considerations, but
rather the universal aspect of essence or another intermediary consideration between
pure quiddity and the universal.³⁸⁵ Rāzī opines that the notions mujarrad and bi-sharṭ
lā shayʾ ākhar, even though they are negative, are conditions (shurūṭ) and judgments
(aḥkām) that cannot qualify pure quiddity in the mind, since they themselves

 Rāzī picks up these various distinctions later on (152.21 ff.). There he enumerates three different
considerations (iʿtibārāt): quiddity lā bi-sharṭ shayʾ (quiddity in itself as it exists in the concrete
world, but considered in abstraction from its material accidents and concomitants); quiddity bi-
sharṭ shayʾ (quiddity as it exists in the concrete world and taken together with its material accidents
and concomitants); and quiddity bi-sharṭ lā shayʾ. This last aspect of quiddity is not explained or de-
fined by Rāzī in Eastern Investigations and represents the most obscure feature of his exposition of
quiddity. I believe this feature of quiddity, which derives directly from Avicenna’s discussion in Meta-
physics V.1.204.1 ff., was not universally endorsed by later thinkers, either due to accidental factors or
as the result of a deliberate reflective process, and possibly because they rejected its function in Avi-
cenna’s metaphysics. In Avicenna, quiddity bi-sharṭ lā shayʾ fulfills a dual function: negative, to refute
the Platonist position that pure quiddity exists separately in the extramental world; and positive, to
establish the doctrine of the distinct existence of pure quiddity in the human mind. But Rāzī in con-
trast does not ascribe it a specific mental content and status. In this same passage, he proceeds to
correlate quiddity bi-sharṭ shayʾ with an existential determination or relation (qayd wujūdī) and quid-
dity bi-sharṭ lā shayʾ with a nonexistential determination or relation (qayd ʿadamī). This only begs the
question of what quiddity bi-sharṭ lā shayʾ is supposed to refer to in his system. Since Rāzī does not—
on some accounts—recognize a class of mental existents on the Avicennian model, one interpretation
is that this aspect of quiddity could refer to the universal; another interpretation is that it could refer
to the human consideration of pure quiddity, which would be a mere logical aspect deprived of pos-
itive existence. But since Rāzī defines existence chiefly in terms of actual, concrete existence (in an
Ashʿarite way), this in turn begs the question of the ontological status of the universal itself, which
would not be attributed a clear ontological condition or status. These are questions that await further
investigation. For a discussion of these and other related aspects of Rāzī’s philosophy, see Ibrahim,
Freeing Philosophy.
 Rāzī, Eastern Investigations, vol. 1, 141.19‒23.
 Surprisingly, and unlike Avicenna, Rāzī does not deem it a priority to distinguish quiddity in it-
self and universal quiddity and to elaborate on the significance of the mental concomitants of quid-
dity, in spite of their importance for the query of mental existence. This in turn somewhat obscures
his views regarding mental existence and especially the issue of how the mental consideration of
pure quiddity relates to that of universal quiddity. In Avicenna, these mental concomitants are pre-
cisely what differentiate the two aspects of quiddity, ‘in itself’ and ‘universal.’ It should be noted that
this ambiguity is not proper to Rāzī, but undermines much of the post-Avicennian literature focusing
on quiddity and mental existence. In the works of Qushjī and many other thinkers, distinguishing
between the considerations of universal quiddity and pure quiddity represents a serious interpretive
challenge. See the section on Qushjī below as an illustration of these interpretive difficulties.
 3 Some later commentators on pure quiddity and mental existence 243

amount to “other things” superadded to the raw conception of essence. This position
is implicitly delineated in Collection, when Rāzī defines conceptualization (taṣawwur)
as “the apprehension of a reality (ḥaqīqah)” that amounts to “our considering it in-
asmuch as it is itself alone without a negative or positive judgment applying to it.”³⁸⁶
In contrast, taṣdīq is the conceptualization of a quiddity with such judgments. Now,
it is clear that by reality (ḥaqīqah), Rāzī means pure quiddity, as is borne out by his
description of it as something considered solely in itself. In fact, the vocabulary Rāzī
deploys in this passage (ḥaqīqah, iʿtabara, min ḥaythu hiya hiya) is directly indebted
to Avicenna’s discussion of quiddity in The Cure. So, the important point here is
Rāzī’s claim that pure conceptualization focuses on quiddity in itself in abstraction
from positive and negative judgments or conditions, of which the condition bi-sharṭ lā
shayʾ is an instance. On his view, then, this condition cannot obtain at the level of
pure quiddity, but represents an aspect of quiddity that is already determined in
the mind and hence located at the level of conditioned quiddity. Although Fakhr
al-Dīn does not elaborate on this point, the main candidate for this determination
in his system would be either universal quiddity or a consideration of quiddity locat-
ed midway between pure quiddity and universal quiddity. Nevertheless, what is clear
is that, on Rāzī’s view, although quiddity in itself is free of all extraneous consider-
ations, the qualities of being ‘abstract’ and ‘on the condition of no other thing’ are
considerations (iʿtibārāt), conditions (shurūṭ), and judgments (aḥkām), which, if
they are negative, are still added to pure quiddity. This object is therefore something
other than the aspect of pure quiddity Avicenna describes in Introduction. ³⁸⁷
One important upshot of the foregoing is that on Rāzī’s view, mujarrad and bi-
sharṭ lā shayʾ must refer primarily to the absence of the exterior, material concomi-
tants of quiddity, and not of the mental ones. This is necessitated by the fact that he
regards quiddity “with no other thing” as applying either to the universal or to an
intermediary state between pure quiddity and the universal, but to one in any case
that is intellectually composite, which means that “other thing” here cannot refer
to the mental concomitants and must refer instead to the concrete concomitants of
quiddity. In other words, the expressions mujarrad and bi-sharṭ lā shayʾ count as

 Rāzī, Collection, 25.5‒7: idhā adraknā ḥaqīqah fa-imā an naʿtabirahā min ḥaythu hiya hiya min
ghayr ḥukm ʿalayhā lā bi-l-nafy wa-lā bi-l-ithbāt wa-huwa l-taṣawwur.
 One key issue discussed in the postclassical tradition—and a valid question for modern scholars
as well—is whether the addition of negative considerations and conditions to pure quiddity render it
something complex and thus ‘other’ or whether it still remains pure quiddity and only that. This prob-
lem is compounded by the fact that it involves objects or notions in the mind, so that the epistemo-
logical and ontological planes become completely blurred. The same problem does not apply with
equal force to extramental objects; e. g., our various considerations of the First Cause do not entail
any multiplicity or compositeness in the First Cause, since It exists independently of our thinking
It in a perfectly unitary and simple way. But with regard to mental objects, we are projected back
to one of the initial conundrums raised earlier in this chapter: does the multiplication of considera-
tions regarding a mental object introduce intelligible multiplicity or complexity within that mental
object? Rāzī’s discussion starkly raises this issue, but does not provide a satisfactory answer to it.
244 II Quiddity in Itself and Mental Existence

judgments and considerations that apply to quiddity, and hence they are other things
if construed in terms of mental concomitants. But Rāzī intends “other things” here
chiefly in relation to the concrete, material, and extramental concomitants of es-
sence. This explains why he may apply these considerations to universal quiddity
or an intermediary state of quiddity, which is a bundle of mental concomitants
and conditions, but free of any material attributes. On this point, Rāzī appears to de-
part markedly from Avicenna, who had devoted much of Metaphysics V.1‒2 to ex-
plaining how the pure, abstract, and negatively-conditioned quiddity is devoid of
concomitants, including mental concomitants such as universality or oneness. In
the final analysis, it appears that Rāzī interprets the Avicennian distinction between
bi-sharṭ lā and lā bi-sharṭ chiefly or exclusively with reference to the exterior, extra-
mental, and concrete concomitants of quiddity, i. e., to the issue of whether quiddity
is conceived in connection with external material and concrete concomitants from
which it can be abstracted, in which case it is lā bi-sharṭ, or simply in the mind as
a universal, in which case it is bi-sharṭ lā and mujarrad, because it is necessarily
free from these concrete concomitants. In brief, for Rāzī, the condition bi-sharṭ lā ap-
plies to quiddity in itself in abstraction from its concrete concomitants, but taken to-
gether with its mental concomitants, while for Avicenna it implies the complete ab-
sence of concomitants, both material and mental.³⁸⁸
Another important upshot is that, according to Fakhr al-Dīn, either there is no
true consideration of quiddity in itself or there is a consideration of pure quiddity,
which does not, however, correspond to a distinct mental existent. Rāzī provides lit-
tle information on this point. In the passage of Collection cited above, as well as in
Eastern Investigations, the author’s view appears to be that we can conceive of pure
quiddity, but he does not elaborate either way on whether it constitutes a full-fledged
and distinct mental existent. Rāzī’s position on this issue may have amounted to a
subtle compromise between Avicenna and kalām, or at any rate to have arisen out
of his attempt to reconcile various ontological notions stemming from these tradi-
tions. In one interesting passage of Eastern Investigations, Fakhr al-Dīn argues that
it is possible to consider and even to intellect (ʿaqala) something without being cer-
tain whether this intellectual object exists in the mind.³⁸⁹ The crucial concept that
underpins his argument is that of an intellectual relation (taʿalluq) between the in-
tellect and the intellected object, which need not imply the entitative existence of
this object in the mind. In other words, intellection (taʿaqqul) is an intellectual rela-
tion (taʿalluq) between intellect and object that does not in itself presuppose or es-
tablish the mental existence of this object. This leaves open the possibility that there

 Rāzī, Eastern Investigations, vol. 1, 142.2‒8.

 Rāzī, Eastern Investigations, vol. 1, 115.3 ff. This discussion inserts itself in the broader context of
Rāzī’s argumentation regarding the idea that existence is exterior (khārij) to quiddity. Here he wants
to refute the argument that intellection always presupposes the mental existence of quiddities, which
would suggest that existence is after all not exterior to quiddity, at least when it comes to mental ob-
jects.
 3 Some later commentators on pure quiddity and mental existence 245

can be intellection without mental existence of the object proper. Rāzī proceeds to
draw a distinction between mental presence as it “relates epistemically” to our
awareness (li-l-shuʿūr) and as it “actually occurs” in the awareness or the mind (fī
l-shuʿūr). This conclusion hinges on the quite stark separation of cognition and on-
tology and suggests that Rāzī held a deflationary position regarding mental existence
when compared to Avicenna.
In light of the foregoing, one may tentatively venture the conclusion that for
Rāzī, we can consider (iʿtabara) and conceive of (taṣawwara) pure quiddity, but
that this consideration and conception does not amount to a mental existent or
even presuppose mental existence in a robust sense. This would explain why this au-
thor is reluctant to dwell on the subject of pure quiddity in his metaphysics: it may
not correspond strictly to an ontological entity. At any rate, Rāzī seems more interest-
ed in the epistemological aspects of the problem. Given that he applies the terminol-
ogy Avicenna had used with regard to pure quiddity to universal quiddity, it would
make sense that, if he holds to a theory of mental existence, he would restrict it to
the universal. As a commentator of Avicenna’s metaphysics, Rāzī therefore signifi-
cantly minimizes the sharp distinction Avicenna had drawn between the conception
of pure quiddity and that of universal quiddity, and he also considerably deflates
Avicenna’s theory of mental existence. He virtually ignores the ontological vocabu-
lary that the shaykh al-raʾīs had invested in pure quiddity or attaches it instead to
the universal. On the whole, then, Rāzī takes a different approach regarding the
issue of how these two aspects of quiddity relate to mental existence. It seems
that his approach is dictated largely by his theory of mental existence, which is, un-
fortunately, only implicitly sketched out in his works. The two key features that
emerge from his argumentation are (a) the distinction between intellectual objects
that exist and intellectual objects that do not truly exist, and (b) the dichotomy be-
tween concrete extramental existence and mental existence, and the assumption that
the former is the stronger and truer mode of existence—hence, his emphasis on the
material concomitants of essence, rather than the mental ones. These two qualifica-
tions on mental existence, which tacitly underlie Rāzī’s argumentation, are likely to
have been informed by theological views emanating from the Ashʿarite and Muʿtazi-
lite traditions.
To conclude, Rāzī departs considerably from Avicenna. Although he most prob-
ably followed Introduction I.2, which had defined quiddity in itself as a distinct and
fully legitimate consideration, he, on the other hand, discards Metaphysics V.1, which
had identified it as an existing form and intelligible in the mind. Moreover, he parts
company with Avicenna with regard to the terms mujarrad and bi-sharṭ lā, which the
master had reserved for this pristine aspect of quiddity. For Fakhr al-Dīn, quiddity in
itself is first and foremost a concept, and it remains unclear at this stage whether he
grounded it also in an ontological foundation. Rather, according to Rāzī, quiddity in
itself is what he calls a “nature” (ṭabīʿah) and “the divine thing” (al-amr al-ilāhī). As
he explains, true nature and the divine thing are as such entirely devoid of consid-
246 II Quiddity in Itself and Mental Existence

eration, at least from the human standpoint.³⁹⁰ What emerges from the previous dis-
cussion is that one of the major differences between Avicenna and some of his later
commentators—here Fakhr al-Dīn—focuses on how the mental concomitants relate to
quiddity in itself. I believe this doctrinal discrepancy between Avicenna and Rāzī had
the effect of amplifying what were already serious ambiguities in Avicenna’s philos-
ophy, namely, the relation between pure quiddity and the universal in the mind, as
well as how the clause bi-sharṭ lā shayʾ refers to quiddity and its mental concomi-
tants. Later thinkers (such as Ṭūsī) were keen to realize that the mental concomitants
of quiddity could be regarded on a par with its concrete concomitants and, therefore,
that they also had to be excluded from a consideration of quiddity in itself. For these
thinkers, the clause bi-sharṭ lā shayʾ could refer not just to the material concomitants
of quiddity, but to its mental concomitants as well, with the result that pure quiddity
alone can be described in this manner. This point is not lucidly articulated in Rāzī’s
works, and, if anything, he applies this negative condition chiefly to the concrete
concomitants, with the result that the various aspects of quiddity in the mind cannot
be distinguished clearly on the basis of this condition. Hence, his views on quiddity
may have had the unintended effect of nourishing some the potential misunder-
standings that could arise from an exegesis of the Avicennian texts. It is not a coin-
cidence on my view that much of the postclassical discourse about quiddity appears
to hinge precisely on the issue of how it relates to its mental and concrete concom-
itants and how the conditions (shurūṭ) can be applied to them.

3.2 Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī

Ṭūsī—as the faithful Avicennian interpreter he is often credited to have been, and in
contrast to Fakhr al-Dīn—appears to follow Avicenna more closely with regard to
how he frames the discussion of quiddity in itself and how he construes the various
conditions as they apply to quiddity. His position on this issue, as it is exemplified in
his commentary on Avicenna’s Pointers, should be regarded as a reaction to some of
the ideas put forth by his predecessor Rāzī and as an attempt on his part to return to
the correct interpretation of the master’s doctrine.
Ṭūsī addresses these questions in various works. One important exposition ap-
pears in Abstract of Correct Belief (Tajrīd al-iʿtiqād), in a section entitled “On the [var-
ious] considerations of quiddity” (iʿtibārāt al-māhiyyah), a text which had a profound
influence on the later tradition.³⁹¹ In this crucial passage, Ṭūsī describes “quiddity
freed from all that is other than it” (al-māhiyyah maḥdhūfan ʿanhā mā ʿadāhā) as
that which is bi-sharṭ lā shayʾ, a formula he borrows directly from The Cure. Shortly

 Rāzī, Eastern Investigations, vol. 1, 142.1.

 For a translation and discussion of this crucial passage in light of the postclassical commenta-
torial tradition, see Izutsu, Basic Problems, 5 ff.
 3 Some later commentators on pure quiddity and mental existence 247

thereafter he adds that this aspect of quiddity “exists only in the mind” (lā tūjad illa
fī l-adhhān). Now, these statements can apply only either to universal quiddity or
quiddity in itself, which are the only two aspects of quiddity that could be said to
properly exist in the intellect. It is clear, however, that Ṭūsī has the latter in mind,
since he goes on to describe universal quiddity some lines below as a different aspect
of quiddity. At this point, I will attempt to reconstruct the philosophical rationale be-
hind Ṭūsī’s statements. Ṭūsī’s argumentation in this passage is based on the Avicen-
nian position that the quidditative concomitants can be either concrete or mental,
but that they are in either case external to quiddity in itself and not constitutive of
it. Hence, “quiddity freed from all that is other than it” will also exclude mental con-
comitants, and it exists in the mind in this pure, abstract state. It will only become a
universal when it combines with universality. As Ṭūsī notes, when pure quiddity com-
bines with accidental universality (al-kulliyah al-ʿāriḍah), which is also called the log-
ical universal (kullī manṭiqī), this produces a composite (murakkab), which is the uni-
versal intellectual (ʿaqlī) quiddity. The implication is that universal quiddity is a
compound of nature or pure quiddity together with universality—or, to put it differ-
ently using Ṭūsī’s nomenclature, of the ‘natural’ and ‘logical’ universals—and that it
is distinct from quiddity in itself in the mind.³⁹²
Hence, Ṭūsī follows Avicenna and departs from Rāzī in positing the conceivabil-
ity of quiddity in itself in the mind and in describing it as quiddity bi-sharṭ lā shayʾ.
When regarded strictly in this manner, quiddity in itself is not a part of something
complex or composite, and it excludes the concrete and mental concomitants asso-
ciated with intellectual and extramental existents. It exists as a distinct form in the
mind, free from all concomitants, including mental ones.³⁹³ This explains why Ṭūsī,
having introduced pure quiddity at the beginning of the passage, proceeds to explain
that we can add other considerations (iʿtibārāt) to it. If quiddity in itself were already
part of a composite whole, i. e., a universal, then his remark that other considerations
(such as universality) can be added to it would be devoid of meaning. It is precisely
because pure quiddity is bi-sharṭ lā shayʾ ākhar and distinct from—and even separate
from—all other things in the mind, that the mind can proceed to attach concomitants
and attributes to it. On this point, Ṭūsī has carefully followed Avicenna’s reasoning:
like the master, he has conscientiously distinguished quiddity in itself from universal
quiddity on the basis of the mental attributes and concomitants. Further evidence for
this interpretation can be found in Commentary on Pointers. There Ṭūsī mentions two
aspects of quiddity in the intellect (fī l-ʿaql). He writes (in response to the objection of
an interlocutor who denies that quiddity exists in the material world)³⁹⁴:

 Cf. Ṭūsī, Commentary on Pointers, vol. 1, 204.14 ff. It should be pointed out that some of Ṭūsī’s
technical terms and ideas in this key passage are indebted directly to Avicenna’s discussion in Intro-
duction I.12, a text that should be regarded as one of Ṭūsī’s models for his exposition of quiddity.
 It is unclear, however, whether Ṭūsī believes we can truly conceive this form; see below.
 For a discussion of this point, see chapter III.
248 II Quiddity in Itself and Mental Existence

The objection is solved as follows: by differentiating between the nature of human to which
commonality [al-ishtirāk] or the absence [of commonality] can apply, and between human [nec-
essarily] posited with commonality. The former exists in the concrete world and in the intellect;
the latter exists only in the intellect.³⁹⁵

This statement recognizes the presence of two concepts or considerations of human

in the intellect: one is pure quiddity envisaged as being unconditioned (which ex-
plains why it can be considered with the absence (ʿadam) of commonality); the
other is the consideration of the universal, which necessarily involves positing com-
monality and universality together with pure quiddity. In another section, Ṭūsī re-
futes Rāzī’s claim that quiddities in the concrete world can subsist before they ac-
quire existence, and he argues that quiddity can be fully abstracted from existence
only in the mind.³⁹⁶ Ṭūsī writes:

Quiddity cannot be abstracted from existence except in the intellect [fī l-ʿaql]. [This occurs] not
in the sense that it [quiddity] is fully disconnected from existence [in every way]—for indeed
being in the intellect also amounts to intellectual existence [wujūd ʿaqlī], just as being in the
concrete world amounts to exterior existence [wujūd khārijī]—but in the sense that the intellect
envisages it [only] in itself, without the relation to existence. For the absence [or privation] of the
consideration of a thing is other than the consideration of its nonexistence [ʿadam iʿtibār al-
shayʾ laysa iʿtibār li-ʿadamihi].³⁹⁷

In this passage, Ṭūsī explains that the intellect can conceive (taṣawwara) and have a
consideration of (iʿtabara) quiddity in itself in abstraction from existence, but with-
out it (viz., quiddity in itself) being a nonexistent. The key statement supporting
Ṭūsī’s argument is that “the absence of the consideration of a thing is different
from the consideration of [that thing’s] nonexistence.” This means that the absence
of the consideration of existence (together with quiddity) is not the same as affirming
the nonexistence of quiddity in itself. We can envisage pure quiddity in our intellect
in abstraction from existence, but this does not mean that it does not exist as a men-
tal object. This point suggests that Ṭūsī has pure quiddity in mind in this passage,
and not the universal, since the latter is envisaged together with existence, both in
the sense that the universal is considered together with its concomitants (which con-
dition and determine universal mental existents) and in the sense that the universal
is often apprehended in relation to a plurality of concrete existents. So Ṭūsī’s ration-
ale is that, qua object of knowledge, quiddity in itself must exist and must be an in-
tellectual existent for the cognitive act centered upon it to be possible in the first
place, even though its apprehension excludes the notion of existence. Pure quiddity
is not disconnected from existence after all, even if it is not considered in relation to
existence. Hence, Ṭūsī wants to maintain an epistemic distinction between quiddity

 Ṭūsī, Commentary on Pointers, vol. 3‒4, 438.9‒13.

 Ṭūsī, Commentary on Pointers, vol. 3‒4, 462.22 ff.
 Ṭūsī, Commentary on Pointers, vol. 3‒4, 463.1‒4.
 3 Some later commentators on pure quiddity and mental existence 249

in itself and the universal, but he can also be read as going further in ascribing to
these objects a distinct ontological status in the mind. This approach signals a par-
ticular take on the Avicennian texts, which, as I argued, is likely the one Avicenna
himself intended. In Metaphysics V.1, for example, Avicenna also is keen to empha-
size the difference between the existence of quiddity in itself and the existence of uni-
versal quiddity. Hence, this passage from Commentary concurs fully with the evi-
dence in Abstract of Correct Belief according to which we can conceive of pure
quiddity in our mind in a manner distinct from the universal. Ṭūsī seems to agree
fully with Avicenna on this crucial point.
Nevertheless, there is an important difference between Avicenna’s and Ṭūsī’s ac-
counts, which concerns the way in which they envisage the status of pure quiddity in
the mind. Ṭūsī opens this section with a mention of quiddity in itself, and he follows
it immediately afterwards with a discussion of ‘the three universals,’ an account not
found in Avicenna’s writings in this combined form. These three universals are the
natural universal (i. e., quiddity as it exists in concrete things and as it is abstracted
by the mind), the logical universal (i. e., the attribute of universality in the mind that
becomes attached to the nature or abstracted quiddity), and the intellectual univer-
sal (i. e., the composite of the natural and the logical universals).³⁹⁸ Somewhat sur-
prisingly, however, Ṭūsī ends the passage by concluding that there are only three
considerations or aspects of quiddity (fa-hādhihi iʿtibārāt thalāthah), which corre-
spond to these three universals—the natural, the logical, and the intellectual—and
not four, as one would expect if a distinct consideration was ascribed to quiddity
in itself in the mind.³⁹⁹ While this might strike one as odd at first glance, there is
in fact no discrepancy: the natural universal is just another way by which post-Avi-
cennian authors refer to the pure nature or quiddity as it exists in concrete beings
(when taken together with concrete accidental concomitants) and in the mind
(when divested of these concrete concomitants). What Ṭūsī says about the natural
universal broadly corresponds to what Avicenna affirms about the pure nature.
Pure quiddity or nature—or here, the natural universal—bridges the extramental
and mental spheres and constitutes a point of reference or a constant for both con-
crete and mental beings by serving as the foundation of the abstractive process.
Hence, when Ṭūsī refers to the consideration of the natural universal, he is alluding
to pure quiddity, even though this point requires some unpacking due to his slightly
different terminology.
With that being said, it is undeniable that a certain doctrinal shift has occurred
from Avicenna’s account in Introduction I.2 to Ṭūsī’s treatment of it, as was already
noticed in the case of Rāzī. For in Avicenna’s account, pure quiddity was described

 This passage likely builds on Avicenna’s Introduction I.12 and on the threefold distinction he
makes there between ‘the natural,’ ‘the logical,’ and ‘the intellectual.’
 Ṭūsī, Abstract of Correct Belief, 121.3‒12. This passage became the object of extensive commen-
tary in the following centuries and inspired different interpretations concerning the ontological state
of quiddity in itself.
250 II Quiddity in Itself and Mental Existence

as a consideration (iʿtibār) that was distinct from the considerations of quiddity in

concrete existents and the universal. In Ṭūsī’s account, in contrast, the inference
is that quiddity qua nature or natural universal is somehow identical with the con-
sideration of pure quiddity as an object in the mind. In other words, Ṭūsī does not
recognize an additional distinct consideration of quiddity in itself in the mind,
even though it is implied in the consideration of nature or the natural universal.
This tendency is also hinted at earlier in the same work when Ṭūsī affirms that
“the true nature [i. e., quiddity in itself] of all things is other than the [various] con-
siderations that occur to it accidentally.”⁴⁰⁰ Here as well Ṭūsī employs the term
iʿtibārāt to refer to aspects added to quiddity in itself, but there is no suggestion
that we can have a distinct consideration of quiddity in itself. In the case of Ṭūsī,
unlike in the case of Rāzī, however, we can be almost certain that he would have pos-
ited a consideration of pure quiddity in the mind as a fourth aspect of quiddity. The
reason why he does not explicitly do so in this passage is most likely because his ac-
count often conflates pure quiddity qua nature (ṭabīʿah) as it exists in the concrete
world and as it exists in an abstracted form in the mind, thus pointing to the dual
(concrete and mental) dimension of pure nature or pure quiddity in his philosophy;
this complicated point will be discussed in depth later on.
One unfortunate effect of this ambiguity is that later thinkers who commented
directly on Ṭūsī’s Abstract of Correct Belief (and who also likely read Rāzī), such
as Qushjī in the fifteenth century, understandably do not associate quiddity in itself
with a distinct iʿtibār or consideration in the mind and prefer to speak of the various
considerations added to pure quiddity (so that the exact mental status of pure quid-
dity and whether we can have a true conception of it are points that remain unclear
in their accounts). What is more, and perhaps as a result of this practice, the relation
between pure quiddity and the universal in the mind becomes blurred and difficult to
disentangle. Ṭūsī therefore wittingly or unwittingly sowed the seed for a significant
doctrinal departure from Avicenna’s original doctrine in Introduction and Metaphy-
sics according to which we can have a distinct and autonomous iʿtibār of quiddity
in itself, which even amounts to a distinct form and intelligible in the mind. In con-
trast, one commentatorial position that seems to characterize the later period is that
we can have various considerations of quiddity in the mind, but that no considera-
tion corresponds expressly to quiddity in itself.

3.3 Taftāzānī

Saʿd al-Dīn Masʿūd b. ʿUmar al-Taftāzānī (d. 1390 CE), in his Commentary on the Aims
of the Science of Theology (Sharḥ al-Maqāṣid fī ʿilm al-kalām), delves into the ques-

 Ṭūsī, Abstract of Correct Belief, 121.7: wa-ḥaqīqah kull shayʾ mughāyarah li-mā yaʿriḍu lahā min al-
iʿtibārāt.
 3 Some later commentators on pure quiddity and mental existence 251

tion of quiddity in direct continuation of his predecessors. Like virtually all of them,
he identifies ‘the abstract quiddity’ (al-māhiyyah al-mujarradah) with ‘the negatively-
conditioned quiddity’ (bi-sharṭ lā shayʾ ākhar), but unlike most of them, he takes a
clear stance vis-à-vis the question of the mental existence of this aspect of quiddity.
According to him, the abstract or negatively-conditioned quiddity exists neither in the
concrete world nor in the mind.⁴⁰¹ What is important here is Taftāzānī’s rationale for
defending this claim. The thrust of his argument relies on the premise that mental
existence presupposes mental concomitants and accidents—what Taftāzānī refers
to throughout this passage as ʿawāriḍ—just as concrete existence relies on similar ac-
cidents, albeit of a material kind. As Taftāzānī puts it, “being in the mind is also one
of the accidents that attaches to the mental form [li-anna l-kawn fī-l-dhihn ayḍan min
al-ʿawāriḍ allatī laḥiqat al-ṣūrah al-dhihniyyah], on account of what is external to it,
not [on account] of the abstracted consideration [itself] in the intellect.”⁴⁰² These ac-
cidents provide the determination (taqdīr) of quiddity and define its mode of exis-
tence, which is either mental or concrete. But since ‘negatively-conditioned’ quiddity
by definition cannot possess any of these mental accidents, it cannot possibly exist
in any true sense.
Like many of the postclassical thinkers, Taftāzānī’s position reflects the view that
some things can be described loosely as ‘mental’ or ‘intellectual’ without neverthe-
less qualifying as mental or intellectual existents. This means that ‘negatively-condi-
tioned’ quiddity is merely a consideration with no ontological grounding. I believe
this view was already expressed in nuce, albeit somewhat vaguely, in Rāzī’s works,
and that it was subsequently elaborated upon in the long series of commentaries
that were spun around Ṭūsī’s Abstract, and which includes Taftāzānī’s own commen-
tary. Taftāzānī holds that, even if we may have some kind of conception of ‘negative-
ly-conditioned’ quiddity, it does not amount to an existent, on the grounds that it
bears no correspondence (muṭābaqah) to the real ontological order of things. This
means, presumably, that it does not correspond to something actually existing in
the extramental world, so that it constitutes merely a mental or conceptual consid-
eration. Taftāzānī provides additional information in his commentary, where he re-
lates—interestingly for our purposes—that some philosophers uphold the mental ex-
istence of ‘negatively-conditioned’ quiddity. Their view appears to be based, among
other things, on the idea that the possibility of intellecting nonexistent things points
to a kind of mental existence of that nonexistent thing.⁴⁰³ Taftāzānī, however, objects
to this position and responds as follows:

‘The intellect [has the capacity to] consider the nonexistence of every thing and even nonexis-
tence itself [ʿadam nafsihi]. Hence, it can consider quiddity abstracted from all accidents and

 Taftāzānī, Commentary on the Aims, vol. 1, 404.1‒4.

 Taftāzānī, Commentary on the Aims, vol. 1, 404.3‒5.
 One wonders who exactly Taftāzānī has in mind here, but in light of the present analysis, I
would surmise that he is targeting Avicenna and some of his followers.
252 II Quiddity in Itself and Mental Existence

even from its being in the mind [ḥattā ʿan al-kawn fī l-dhihn], even if it [quiddity] is in itself com-
bined with them [the accidents].’ This is refuted [as follows]: this does not necessitate its being
[i. e., its existing as something] abstract [hādhā lā yaqtaḍī kawnahā mujarradah]. Rather, the final
word on this matter is that the intellect may [merely] conceptualize it in this way as [something]
non-commensurate [with the real world, ghayr muṭābiq].⁴⁰⁴

Taftāzānī argues in this passage that the fact that we can conceive of pure or ‘nega-
tively-conditioned’ quiddity as something epistemically distinct does not entail that it
exists as such in this abstracted state. Its being epistemically distinct does not make
it ontologically distinct. Rather, it is merely a consideration or conceptualization with
no correspondence to true reality. Hence, it cannot even be said to truly exist in the
mind. Notice that this argument rests on the important notion of a correspondence or
commensurate relation between considerations in the mind and real existents. The
upshot of Taftāzānī’s claim would be that only those intellectual considerations or
concepts that have a correspondence with true reality or the real world and that
are commensurate (muṭābiq) with it could be said somehow to exist in the mind.
In other words, a true mental existent must reflect an objectively existing reality
and therefore express a commensuration between the mental and extramental
spheres. This condition in turn necessitates that this consideration have accidents
(e. g., universality) that establish a relation between the concept in the mind and con-
crete reality.⁴⁰⁵ In brief, by denying the mental existence of ‘negatively-conditioned’
quiddity, Taftāzānī bears down heavily on one side of the debate regarding the rela-
tion of the mental concomitants to pure quiddity. According to him, absence of men-
tal concomitants means absence of mental existence, given that these very concom-
itants and accidents are necessary to establish a relation between the mind and
extramental reality. Consequently, given its complete lack of accidents, quiddity bi-
sharṭ lā exists neither in the mind nor in the concrete world.

3.4 Qushjī

The great polymath ʿAlī b. Muḥammad al-Qushjī (d. 1474 CE) also contributed to the
philosophical discussion about quiddity in his Commentary on Ṭūsī’s Abstract of Cor-
rect Belief. But Qushjī goes further in exploiting some of the doctrinal discrepancies
highlighted above in Ṭūsī’s and Rāzī’s writings and commentaries on Avicenna and
departs significantly from these earlier thinkers. He deploys one of the most intricate
and original interpretations of how the various conditions apply to quiddity that can
be found in the postclassical tradition. Let us begin, however, with the common fea-

 Taftāzānī, Commentary on the Aims, vol. 1, 404.13‒17.

 Although Taftāzānī does not resort to the concept of the fact of the matter (nafs al-amr) in this
passage, his view appears close to other subsequent thinkers who defined their position on the basis
of this notion.
 3 Some later commentators on pure quiddity and mental existence 253

tures in their works. Qushjī, like Rāzī and Ṭūsī, correlates the māhiyyah mujarradah
and the māhiyyah bi-sharṭ lā shayʾ ākhar. For Qushjī, as for these other philosophers,
these terms refer jointly to the same aspect of quiddity, which I described earlier as
abstract and negatively-conditioned quiddity.⁴⁰⁶ On this point, these thinkers paid
heed to Avicenna’s pointed remarks in Metaphysics V.1‒2, even though they did
not conceive of this aspect of quiddity in exactly the same way. Another parallel
in their approach is that this negative aspect of quiddity is distinguished from
both unconditioned quiddity (lā bi-sharṭ shayʾ ākhar) and conditioned quiddity
(bi-sharṭ shayʾ ākhar). Finally, Qushjī follows these earlier thinkers—especially Avi-
cenna and Ṭūsī—regarding the issue of the conceivability of abstract quiddity. To
this effect, Qushjī puts forth the (by now familiar) argument that the mind can con-
ceive anything, including nonexistence, from which he infers that it can also envis-
age abstract quiddity. In maintaining this argument, Qushjī makes an important
point: the human mind can conceive of pure quiddity in abstraction even of its men-
tal accidents. He writes:

It is not impossible for the mind to intellect [yaʿqilu l-dhihn] quiddity in abstraction from all the
external and mental concomitants, on account of the fact that it [the mind] considers it and per-
ceives it [abstract quiddity] as free from them [these concomitants], even though it [quiddity] can
be described by some of them on account of the fact of the matter [bi-ḥasab nafs al-amr].⁴⁰⁷

Hence, Qushjī argues that we can have, at the very least, an epistemically distinct
concept of abstract quiddity in the mind. As in the works of most other Avicennians,
he correlates this mental aspect of quiddity with the state of being abstract and neg-
atively conditioned. Moreover, given that this aspect excludes mental concomitants,
it cannot be conflated with the universal in the mind. Rather, it is a distinct consid-
eration of quiddity. With that being said, Qushjī is careful to add that this conception
of pure quiddity may actually possess certain concomitants when considered in light
of ‘the fact of the matter’ (nafs al-amr), a proviso that lifts the veil on the true com-
plexity of his position.
In this connection, it is Qushjī’s differences with these thinkers, rather than his
affinities with them, which should be highlighted, particularly when it comes to two
distinct issues: first, is abstract and negatively-conditioned quiddity the same as
quiddity in itself according to Qushjī? And, second, does pure quiddity possess
true mental existence? Whereas Avicenna and Ṭūsī identified abstract and negative-
ly-conditioned quiddity with quiddity in itself in the mind, Qushjī seems to apply
these features to yet another consideration of quiddity, which corresponds neither
to pure quiddity nor to the universal. What appears to correspond to quiddity in itself
for Qushjī is what he calls “absolute quiddity” (al-māhiyyah al-muṭlaqah), which he
also characterizes as unconditioned quiddity or lā bi-sharṭ shayʾ. According to Qush-

 Qushjī, Commentary, 400.6‒7.

 Qushjī, Commentary, 408.7‒9.
254 II Quiddity in Itself and Mental Existence

jī, quiddity bi-sharṭ lā shayʾ amounts to something more than pure quiddity, since it
is in his view already qualified by a condition, albeit a negative one. Recall also that
for Qushjī we can conceive of abstract quiddity in complete isolation of its concom-
itants, albeit with regard to ‘the fact of the matter,’ quiddity is not entirely separated
from them. As such, abstract or negatively-conditioned quiddity is distinct from quid-
dity taken only in itself in the mind.
Furthermore, and given this definition of negatively-conditioned quiddity as
quiddity and something else (namely, the negative condition of abstraction), it fol-
lows for Qushjī that negatively-conditioned quiddity does exist in the mind. So
Qushjī agrees with his predecessors that abstract quiddity exists in the mind, al-
though he appears to have conceived of abstract quiddity as an aspect distinct
from pure quiddity. More surprisingly at first sight, Qushjī also claims that negative-
ly-conditioned quiddity can be said to exist as a “part” (juzʾ) in things.⁴⁰⁸ But for Avi-
cenna and Ṭūsī, what can be said to exist as a part in things is, strictly speaking, the
unconditioned quiddity or quiddity lā bi-sharṭ shayʾ, which is said of the aspect of
quiddity that exists in the exterior world, not quiddity bi-sharṭ lā shayʾ, which exists
only in the mind in abstraction from everything else.⁴⁰⁹ Finally, and even more sur-
prisingly, Qushjī contends that negatively-conditioned quiddity exists not only in the
mind, but also in the concrete world. Since it exists as a part, abstract or negatively-
conditioned quiddity can also exist as a part of the concrete existents. By the time of
Qushjī, a significant semantic shift in the use of these technical terms had occurred,
which resulted in a thorough re-interpretation of Avicenna’s doctrines.⁴¹⁰
These important doctrinal differences between Qushjī and earlier thinkers stem
in part from his idiosyncratic interpretation of the clause bi-sharṭ lā shayʾ. As Izutsu
showed in an article devoted to the postclassical reception of Avicenna’s theory of
quiddity, Qushjī promoted a dual interpretation of negatively-conditioned quiddity,
which enabled him to establish its existence in both the mental and concrete
spheres. Izutsu explicates how the negative condition bi-sharṭ lā came to be con-
strued in two fundamentally different ways from Qushjī onward: either as referring
to the external mental or concrete concomitants of quiddity; or as referring to the in-

 Qushjī, Commentary, 406.1‒6.

 Qushjī, Commentary, 404.2, 405.8‒9.
 Izutsu, Basic Problems, studied Qushjī’s commentary in detail and had already concluded that it
represents a turning point in the discussion of quiddity in the postclassical period. Izutsu remarked
that Qushjī introduces new theoretical approaches to the problem and uses the Avicennian terminol-
ogy on the various aspects of quiddity in an idiosyncratic manner. Starting from Qushjī, much of the
discussion revolves not only around the issue of the relation of quiddity to its external concomitants,
including its mental concomitants, but also around the relationship of the various constitutive ele-
ments of quiddity, with subtle distinctions being introduced in the process. As was noticed earlier,
this aspect was largely lacking in Rāzī, so that with Qushjī one sees a development in the conceptu-
alization of the problem of quiddity.
 3 Some later commentators on pure quiddity and mental existence 255

ternal, constitutive elements of quiddity in the essential definition of a thing.⁴¹¹ This

discrepancy in the conception of quiddity bi-sharṭ lā shayʾ in turn explains why
Qushjī is dissatisfied with Ṭūsī’s position and conspicuously puzzled by what he
is reading in Abstract of Correct Belief. Because Qushjī regards quiddity bi-sharṭ lā
shayʾ as already existing as an irreducible part in composite beings, he is perplexed
by Ṭūsī’s assertion that something can be added to and removed from this quiddity
bi-sharṭ lā shayʾ. This affirmation strikes Qushjī as contradictory, if (only) the external
concomitants are intended. The idea that something can be added to abstract quid-
dity conflicts with its being devoid of other things. But Qushjī’s exegetical ploy and
his dual interpretation of the negative condition enable him to read Ṭūsī in a differ-
ent light and as stating not only that abstract quiddity can be devoid of external con-
crete accidents (which can be conceptually removed from it)—this corresponds to
System A—but also that it can be envisaged as a distinct and irreducible part of
the definition—this corresponds to System B. On the latter sense of ‘abstract,’
other constitutive elements can be added (e. g., rational to animal), while maintain-
ing the former sense. In other words, on Qushjī’s interpretation of Ṭūsī, quiddity is
always negatively-conditioned according to System A, but not always according to
System B.⁴¹²
If my reconstruction of Qushjī’s views is correct, part of the disagreement be-
tween Avicenna, Ṭūsī, and Qushjī centers on the fact that while the first two ascribe
a negative condition to pure quiddity in the mind, Qushjī ascribes this condition to
another aspect of quiddity. On my interpretation, Ṭūsī follows Avicenna in attributing
the clause bi-sharṭ lā shayʾ ākhar to quiddity in itself as a distinct concept or object in
the mind. But when external concomitants are added, and quiddity is considered as
an irreducible part, say, of the universal, it becomes on their view another aspect of
quiddity, and it is no longer abstract or negatively-conditioned quiddity. Consequent-
ly, for Avicenna and Ṭūsī, ‘adding’ something to the negatively-conditioned quiddity
(e. g., in order to form the universal) is not inconceivable in the way it is for Qushjī,
inasmuch as it ceases to be negatively-conditioned quiddity. On their model, this
would involve the addition of an external concomitant, in which case quiddity
would cease to be considered and to exist in a state of bi-sharṭ lā. Instead, it
would assume a new consideration and condition of “with an external concomi-

 Izutsu, Basic Problems, 9 ff. The term shayʾ, which appears in these various conditions applied to
quiddity could be construed as referring either to the external concomitants of quiddity—both con-
crete and mental—or to the constitutive elements of quiddity. In the latter case, the thing added to
pure quiddity is the differentia, as ‘rational’ can be added to ‘animal’ in the quiddity and definition
‘human.’ Izutsu designates these two interpretations as System A and System B, and he notes that
Qushjī was apparently the first thinker to establish this distinction.
 But Qushjī would probably argue that, strictly speaking, quiddity bi-sharṭ lā shayʾ ākhar is neg-
ative on each count and cannot receive or be complemented by something else, lest it stop being bi-
sharṭ lā shayʾ ākhar. Hence, regardless of how one looks at it, Ṭūsī was wrong in adding external
things to this aspect of quiddity.
256 II Quiddity in Itself and Mental Existence

tant,” i. e., it would become a composite universal entity in the mind. In brief, the
difference between Avicenna and Ṭūsī, on the one hand, and Qushjī, on the other,
revolves around their different conception of what quiddity bi-sharṭ lā amounts to:
for the first two, it is quiddity in itself as an abstract and distinct existent in the
mind; for the latter, it is what exists as a part in an already composite thing.⁴¹³
Yet, Qushjī believes that it is possible to conceive of negatively-conditioned quiddity
in abstraction from all other things, including its mental concomitants. So there ap-
pears to be a difference in Qushjī’s reasoning between the purely epistemological
conceivability of negatively-conditioned quiddity and the fact that it cannot exist
in a distinct state, but merely as a part of a whole.
At this juncture, the concept of ‘the fact of the matter’ needs to be addressed,
since it can help to explain this distinction in Qushjī’s works. For Qushjī, the ab-
stractedness of quiddity bi-sharṭ lā shayʾ, what Ṭūsī describes as “its being free
from all other things” (maḥdhūfan ʿanhā mā ʿadāhā), can refer only to the epistemo-
logical and conceptual aspects of the problem, which are to be separated from its on-
tological dimension.⁴¹⁴ For if we can conceive of quiddity as such, according to the
fact of the matter, negatively-conditioned quiddity exists as a part in a composite
being, and hence not distinctly. As Qushjī notes, it is not devoid of concomitants
in its true state and according to the fact of the matter, nor does it exit separately
from the things that constitute it. This means that the consideration of negatively-
conditioned quiddity as something distinct (whether according to Izutsu’s System
A or B) is purely conceptual, conjectural, or suppositional (iʿtibārī), but it does not
reflect a true ontological state. Only the mereological interpretation of the negative
condition possesses an ontological thrust. To use the terminology I deployed previ-
ously in this study, Qushjī recognizes the epistemic distinctness and ontological irre-
ducibility of negatively-conditioned quiddity, but not its ontological distinctness. In
contrast, for Avicenna, bi-sharṭ lā shayʾ refers to an epistemological aspect as well
as an intramental ontological reality. This coheres with his view that quiddity in it-
self, abstract quiddity, and quiddity bi-sharṭ lā shayʾ—all three expressions refer to
the same entity—exists as a distinct form in the mind.
Further evidence regarding the conceptual disparities between Ṭūsī and Qushjī
focuses on the latter’s belief that quiddity bi-sharṭ lā shayʾ exists both in the mind
and in the concrete world. Qushjī takes issue with Ṭūsī’s claim that this aspect of
quiddity exists “only in the mind” (illā fī l-adhhān).⁴¹⁵ Since Qushjī regards quiddity

 As Izutsu, Basic Problems, has shown, quiddity bi-sharṭ lā shayʾ ākhar also exists in concrete
things according to Qushjī. It therefore has a mental and extramental application. Qushjī appears
to be one of the only thinkers to uphold the existence of negatively-conditioned quiddity in the con-
crete world, an option made possible by his particular dual interpretation of bi-sharṭ lā. Elaborating
on this point, however, would take us too far from our concerns.
 Qushjī, Commentary, 406.7‒9.
 Qushjī, Commentary, 406.3, which opens the way for a protracted discussion of the mental ex-
istence of quiddity.
 3 Some later commentators on pure quiddity and mental existence 257

bi-sharṭ lā shayʾ as being internally simple and irreducible, but as necessarily exist-
ing together with external concomitants (whether of a mental or extramental kind),
his position does not prevent quiddity bi-sharṭ lā shayʾ from existing both in the mind
and in the exterior world. In contrast, for Avicenna, quiddity bi-sharṭ lā shayʾ can
exist distinctly only in the mind. Avicenna and Ṭūsī caution repeatedly that the neg-
atively-conditioned quiddity cannot exist separately in the external world, lest we en-
dorse the theory of the Platonic Forms.

3.5 Tahānawī

Muḥammad Aʿlā l-Tahānawī’s (fl. 1740s CE) Dictionary is a general reference work on
the terminology used in the various branches of Islamic learning, but its treatment of
technical philosophical and theological terms is often quite illuminating. It contains
a detailed section on the term ‘quiddity’ (māhiyyah), which is of some interest to the
present inquiry, since the author reports the views of previous scholars on this sub-
ject and also briefly outlines his own opinions on the matter. He begins by distin-
guishing between two aspects of quiddity, which he calls ‘real or established quiddi-
ty’ (māhiyyah ḥaqīqiyyah) and ‘conceptual or suppositional quiddity’ (māhiyyah
iʿtibāriyyah). The former refers to the state of quiddity without any connection with
human thought and consideration and as it exists in itself in the concrete world. It
is, hence, objectively existing quiddity or quiddity according to the fact of the matter
(fī nafs al-amr). In contrast, the latter is quiddity as it is conceptualized by the
human mind, so that, if it possesses any existence, that existence will be in the
human mind thinking it, and it will also per force be accompanied by a certain re-
flexive deliberation and awareness by the mind that is thinking it.⁴¹⁶
With regard to our present concern, the author provides some information on the
way in which conditions apply to the various considerations of quiddity in the mind.
He repeats accurately the various mental distinctions and conditions of quiddity that
have been examined thus far, focusing particularly on ‘negatively-conditioned’ quid-
dity and its relation to mental existence. With regard to this specific issue, he informs
us that some thinkers have rejected the intellectual existence of pure quiddity on the
grounds that existence itself is one of those mental concomitants or accidents of
which abstract quiddity is supposed to be devoid. Put differently, quiddity would
be abstract in the sense of its being devoid of the material concomitants of the exte-
rior world, but not in the sense of its being absolutely devoid or free (tajarrudihā muṭ-
laqan) of all concomitants, including purely mental ones. According to Tahānawī, the
disagreement between those for and those against the mental existence of abstract

 Tahānawī, Dictionary, vol. 2, 1424.

258 II Quiddity in Itself and Mental Existence

quiddity hinges on this point.⁴¹⁷ In sentences that appear indebted to Taftāzānī and
Qushjī, Tahānawī then explains that others in contrast maintain the mental existence
of pure quiddity, because the mind can conceive of all things, even purely negative
things such as nonexistence. Hence, ‘negatively-conditioned’ quiddity, in spite of its
negative state, can be apprehended by the mind, and no absurdity results from this
claim, thereby pointing to its ontological status in the mind as a valid object of con-
ception. In making these various remarks, Tahānawī appears to draw a relatively sim-
ple correlation between conceivability and mental existence, and he does not intro-
duce the more subtle distinctions that had informed Qushjī’s analysis. Tahānawī
himself appears to endorse this view implicitly and to accept that pure quiddity
does exist in the mind in its ‘negatively-conditioned’ state. Interestingly, he asks
whether the condition of negativity applied to it also amounts to a mental existent,
which would lead to various mental existents being posited. But he replies that it is
essentially identical with pure quiddity and that it does not exist accidentally, which,
if it were the case, would vindicate the position of those who claim that pure quiddity
can exist only with its concomitants.

3.6 Ṭabāṭabāʾī

In his summary work The Elements of Islamic Metaphysics, the great modern Persian
scholar Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabāʾī (d. 1981) devotes several sections to
the notion of pure quiddity. This is surprising at first glance, given the short format
of the treatise, but it should be stressed that this work is intended more as an abridg-
ment of the philosophical curricula as it was passed on by the Persian philosophical
tradition than as a propaedeutic work proper. At any rate, like many of his Persian
predecessors operating within the Avicennian paradigm, Ṭabāṭabāʾī classifies quid-
dity (māhiyyah) into three aspects: (1) bi-sharṭ shayʾ, (2) bi-sharṭ lā, and (3) lā bi-sharṭ.
The first one is also called mixed quiddity (māhiyyah makhlūṭāh) and the last one
absolute quiddity (māhiyyah muṭlaqah). According to the Persian scholar, these
two aspects of quiddity exist in the concrete extramental world. As for the negative-
ly-conditioned quiddity, it is abstract quiddity (māhiyyah mujarradah).
At this juncture, however, Ṭabāṭabāʾī specifies that negatively-conditioned quid-
dity in turn consists of two different aspects. The author distinguishes between the

 Tahānawī, Dictionary, vol. 2, 1424‒1425, which covers all points made in this section. But there
seem to be two closely related points that emerge from the author’s account. Either pure quiddity can-
not exist in the mind because it lacks mental concomitants, or the iʿtibārāt of quiddity are purely sup-
positional and conceptual and, hence, disconnected from the true existence defined by the fact of the
matter (nafs al-amr). It is unclear whether these are two distinct arguments or whether they are es-
sentially related and even dependent on one another. It could be that the iʿtibārāt are not proper men-
tal existents because they lack the accidents and concomitants that attach to true mental existents, or
simply because, being purely suppositional, they are disconnected from nafs al-amr.
 4 Conclusion 259

negatively-conditioned quiddity as (a) a consideration that is both irreducible and

distinct or isolated, and (b) a consideration that is irreducible but may be combined
with something else, in which case it represents its matter.⁴¹⁸ Whereas the former as-
pect of quiddity is always ‘in itself,’ the latter one may be combined with other con-
cepts. This is another way of expressing the distinction that was already encountered
in Qushjī’s commentary, and according to which pure quiddity can be regarded ei-
ther strictly in itself or as a component of a conceptual cluster. However, it is inter-
esting that Ṭabāṭabāʾī explicitly describes these three fundamental considerations of
quiddity as sub-classes of the natural universal (al-kullī l-ṭabīʿī), which, it should be
recalled, was one of the expressions used in the post-Avicennian sources to describe
quiddity in itself. This makes it quite clear that quiddity is in itself irreducible, re-
gardless of how it is envisaged, and that it possesses real existence. According to
the Persian scholar, the physical universal encompasses all of these aspects of quid-
dity and can refer to essence as it exists in the extramental world (qua mixed or ab-
solute) and in the mind (qua universal). All in all, then, Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s account con-
forms in its broad lines with the mainstream postclassical philosophical
interpretation of Avicenna’s theory of quiddity according to which quiddity in itself
is the same as abstract quiddity and also a distinct consideration in the mind, even
though it can also be called ‘the natural universal’ with regard to how it exists in the
concrete world. Unfortunately, Ṭabāṭabāʾī does not tackle the more pointed issue of
whether abstract or pure quiddity exists in the mind as such or only in a universal
state. His account is therefore marked by the same kind of ambiguity that affects
many of the postclassical disquisitions about quiddity and mental existence.⁴¹⁹

4 Conclusion

In the foregoing analysis, I attempted to clarify the epistemological and ontological

status of pure quiddity in the mind. The general problem of the ontological status of
quiddity in itself was narrowed down to the more specific issue of whether it can be
regarded as an intellectual or mental existent (mawjūd ʿaqlī or dhihnī) alongside
what I called the complex or synthetic universals (i. e., pure quiddity combined
with a cluster of mental attributes, including universality). In this regard, some prog-
ress has been achieved. The terminological analysis and the investigation into Avi-
cenna’s theory of mental existence furnished valuable evidence that enables one
to conclude that quiddity in itself exists in the mind as a distinct object of thought
and a distinct intellectual concept. Pure quiddity and universal quiddity, while

 Ṭabāṭabāʾī, The Elements, 47.

 Even though Ṭabāṭabāʾī recognizes a category of mental existents in a previous section of his
work, in that same passage he does not dwell on the issue of the mental existence of quiddity;
see Ṭabāṭabāʾī, The Elements, 21‒31. This is understandable, given the author’s succinct treatment
of philosophical questions in this work.
260 II Quiddity in Itself and Mental Existence

amounting to two distinct mental aspects and considerations (as per Introduction I.2),
also amount to two distinct intelligible forms and mental existents. These two aspects
of quiddity are cognitively and ontologically distinct in the mind as they appear to
our awareness and reason. Accordingly, quiddity in itself in the mind is purely ab-
stract (mujarrad)—it is also, as I will show in chapter III, ‘abstracted’—, irreducible
and distinct (both notions being conveyed by the Arabic expression min ḥaythu
hiya hiya), as well as negatively conditioned (bi-sharṭ lā shayʾ ākhar). It exists in
the mind in this purely abstract and distinct state. In contrast, the complex and syn-
thetic universal quiddity is conditioned (bi-sharṭ shayʾ ākhar) and only ever exists in
the mind in a complex state and together with its mental concomitants.⁴²⁰
Remarkably, Avicenna extends this conception of the pure quiddities not only to
what, in the concrete world, corresponds to the natural substantial forms (human-
ness/insāniyyah, horseness/farasiyyah, corporealness/jismiyyah, etc.), but also to
numbers (oneness/waḥdāniyyah, twoness/ithnayniyyah, tenness/ʿashariyyah), geo-
metrical notions (triangleness/muthallathiyyah, shapeness/shakliyyah), the catego-
ries (substanceness/jawhariyyah, accidentness/ʿaraḍiyyah, relation/iḍāfiyyah), spe-
cific accidents (blackness/al-sawād al-muṭlaq), logical predicates and notions
(genusness/jinsiyyah, speciesness/nawʿiyyah), and many other notions. Avicenna’s
entire epistemological framework relies, fundamentally, on a process of abstraction
and rarefication of mental objects that results in the immediate intellectual appre-
hension and cognition of ‘the thing in itself.’ Appendix 1 testifies to the richness
and sophistication of the Avicennian vocabulary of abstract quiddity and to the sus-
tained efforts dispensed by the master to elaborate this new essentialist conceptual
framework. With regard to epistemology, these purely abstract notions can then be
applied to various contexts—logical, physical, mathematical, and metaphysical—de-
pending on the purpose and needs of the analysis. Remarkably, this feature of Avi-
cenna’s logical and metaphysical method finds a counterpart in his approach to
mathematics, where, as Roshdi Rashed and others noted, a similar tendency towards
abstraction and abstract thought can be detected.⁴²¹ Yet, I believe that the main im-
petus for the kind of raw conceptualization promoted by Avicenna came from his de-
sire to reform the metaphysical and epistemological framework he had inherited
from his Greek and Arabic forebears. In his eyes, they had failed to fully disentangle
the whatness, thingness, and quiddity of things from their parasitical external fea-
tures and attributes, and so had not exploited the full philosophical potential of a
purely abstract and theoretical approach to essence. What seems groundbreaking

 One upshot therefore is that the two qualifications ‘abstract’ and ‘negatively-conditioned’
should be interpreted primarily or even exclusively in Avicenna’s epistemology as applying to pure
quiddity as it exists in the human mind in this state of perfect distinctness, and not to other aspects
of quiddity, such as the universal. The universal can also be equivocally described as mujarrad, al-
though it is certainly not negatively-conditioned. But even then, Avicenna consistently reserves the
j-r-d root to describe pure quiddity in the key passages dealing with essence in The Cure.
 Roshdi Rashed, Mathématiques, 34‒35; see also Tahiri, Mathematics.
 4 Conclusion 261

in this regard is not only Avicenna’s epistemological contribution and his designa-
tion of pure quiddity as a pristine, abstract, and ideal object of scientific knowledge
in the human mind, but also the ontological claim that this object exists intellectu-
ally in a simple and irreducible way.
Avicenna’s views on the status of pure quiddity in the mind represent an impor-
tant instance of the ontologization of logic that he promoted and that has recently
been emphasized by scholars.⁴²² In this connection, it is worth pointing out that
the threefold consideration of quiddity expounded in Introduction I.2 is fully recon-
cilable with the discussion that unfolds in Metaphysics I.5 and V.1‒2. In other words,
Avicenna’s Metaphysics provides a picture of quiddity that is fully consistent with the
one articulated in this logical text. In a kind of elaboration on the logical texts, Avi-
cenna is intent in Metaphysics V.1 to reiterate this scheme and to elaborate on it by
clearly distinguishing quiddity in itself from its various concomitants and hence from
quiddity taken in its ‘universal’ and ‘particular’ contexts.⁴²³ These developments
should also be contextualized in light of the reception of Porphyry’s Eisagoge and
Aristotle’s Categories in classical Islam. Avicenna’s interpretation of these texts is
one that grants entitative and ontological grounding to logical and conceptual no-
tions, including, I contend, the consideration of pure quiddity. If the consideration
of pure quiddity at the cognitive or conceptual level does not involve any awareness
of existence as an added intention or attribute, this does not prevent it from existing
in the intellect with its own special ontological mode. What renders Avicenna’s po-
sition complex and also potentially confusing is the fact that pure quiddity also ex-
ists in the universal concept, that is, with its mental attributes and concomitants. In
this connection, it is worth invoking the distinction that was established in the intro-
duction between ontological and epistemic irreducibility, on the one hand, and on-
tological and epistemic distinctness, on the other. Quiddity in itself in the mind is
irreducible and distinct and can be apprehended in abstraction from all other things,

 See notably Bertolacci, The ‘Ontologization’; and Kukkonen, Dividing Being. It is important to
point out that this trend is already apparent in late antiquity in the works of thinkers such as Porphy-
ry (Chiaradonna, Porphyry, 326‒327) and was therefore inherent to the philosophical outlook inher-
ited by Arabic scholars.
 For the congruence of Avicenna’s logical and metaphysical works, see Bertolacci, The ‘Ontolog-
ization.’ Introduction I.2 and Metaphysics I.5 are texts that are articulated along the same lines and
are complementary, and this in spite of the slight shift of emphasis vis-à-vis ontology one finds in
the metaphysical work. There is a harmonizing thread running through Introduction I.2 and Metaphy-
sics I.5 on the subject of quiddity. As Bertolacci has shown, Avicenna’s logical and metaphysical
works convey a strong impression of argumentative coherence and doctrinal unity. Yet, unlike Berto-
lacci, I do not believe that Metaphysics I.5 encapsulates Avicenna’s entire position on essence and
existence, although it is admittedly a key text. As was correctly observed by Marmura, the crux of
the matter, at least when it comes to pure quiddity, concerns its status in the intellect and its relation
to mental existence. Since Bertolacci does not expressly address this point and is more interested in
sketching a general picture of the essence/existence distinction, it is normal that he would tend to
privilege Metaphysics I.5 over other texts.
262 II Quiddity in Itself and Mental Existence

including mental concomitants. In contrast, quiddity in itself as a ‘part’ of the uni-

versal is irreducible, but not distinct, inasmuch as it is synthetically combined
with mental concomitants and intellected together with them. This synthetic and
complex state determines the mode of universal existence it possesses when appre-
hended by the mind. What is more, since pure quiddity is both irreducible and dis-
tinct, it is prior and simple when compared to the complex universal object. More
specifically, since, for Avicenna, quiddity in itself is not just a logical notion but
also a substantive form in the mind, it is both epistemologically and ontologically
prior and simple vis-à-vis the universal concept. This, perhaps, is the main result
to be emphasized here. Its importance lies in the fact that scholars heretofore
have limited pure quiddity either to a divine intellect (Rashed) or to its mereological
function as a part of the universal concept (Benevich). Either way, they have not ar-
gued for its irreducible and distinct existence in the human mind. Indeed, these var-
ious aspects of the mental existence of quiddity (as a distinct entity and as a part of
the complex universals) have in general not been clearly distinguished in the schol-
arship. This factor was in part responsible for the confusion surrounding the mental
status of essence. But it should be clear by now that quiddity in itself is firmly anch-
ored in the human intellect as a distinct and irreducible intelligible object and lies
therefore at the very foundation of human thought and cognition.
Avicenna’s sustained effort to distinguish the ontological and epistemic aspects
of universal quiddity and pure quiddity in the human mind, as well as the highly
technical terminology he implements to this effect, are salient features of his theory
of mental existence. Not only is it a brilliant achievement on purely conceptual
grounds, but it also helps to explain issues in his epistemology that would otherwise
remain insoluble. One example focuses on the ontological status of fictional quiddi-
ties as valid objects of conception. If actual universality were a condition sine qua
non of intellectual existence and conceivability, then only those quiddities appre-
hended by the mind that have an actual counterpart in the exterior world would
be thinkable or conceivable and exist in the mind. But then, how is it possible to ac-
count for the fact that we can reflect on quiddities that have no known counterparts
in exterior reality, such as the heptagonal house, or on quiddities that will never have
concrete instantiations, like the phoenix? These things are intelligible to the mind
not because they are universals per se, either actually or potentially, but first and
foremost because they possess a quiddity that is not logically impossible or absurd.
In other words, they possess a distinct quiddity that can be apprehended by the
mind, which, in addition, may or may not happen to cohere with extramental instan-
tiations.⁴²⁴ Potential universality (of, say, the heptagonal house or the phoenix) itself
merely derives from the conceivability of these natures and relates to them as an ex-

 As I argued, then, the issue of the conceivability and ontological status of these fictional forms
does pertain primarily to their possessing potential or actual universality, but to the fact that their
pure quiddity is intrinsically conceivable and is, in itself, a valid object of thought.
 4 Conclusion 263

ternal attribute. Accordingly, these artificial and fictional entities will be conceivable
qua pure quiddities in the mind, regardless of their relation to universality, potential-
ity, and actuality. For universality and ‘being predicated of many’ concerns their re-
lation to the extramental world, not their intrinsic conceivability or distinct existence
in the mind.⁴²⁵ Avicenna’s theory of pure essence, in effect, allows for a new classi-
fication of various types of quiddities and for a flexible interpretation of how mental
existents (the pure quiddities in the mind) relate to extramental existents: the rela-
tionship may be fully commensurate (e. g., horse), imbalanced (e. g., one heptagonal
house built randomly), or simply not applicable (e. g., the phoenix). All of these quid-
dities, however, at the very least qua pure, abstract, and distinct quiddities, will exist
in the mind. Only those things that amount to strict logical impossibles or utter ab-
surdities (e. g., a square circle) have neither a quiddity nor existence in the mind and
amount only to mere verbiage. Hence, maintaining a robust ontological distinction
between universality and essence, between the complex universals and the pure
quiddities, has the corollary advantage of opening a new line of interpretation re-
garding the thorny problem of how the artificial and fictional forms relate to the uni-
versals and mental existence.⁴²⁶
Avicenna’s views on pure quiddity and mental existence decisively shaped the
later Islamic philosophical tradition, although it is still too early to understand the
specifics of this later development. Generally speaking, Arabic thinkers were fasci-
nated by the question of how quiddity relates to its corporeal and mental concomi-
tants. In the case of mental existence, a vivid discussion arose in the Arabic sources
concerning the various ways to conceptualize quiddity in the mind and the relation
of these various conceptualizations to existence. This discussion was based on the
Avicennian texts, as well as on Rāzī’s and Ṭūsī’s interpretations of the master. But
these later thinkers departed somewhat from Avicenna’s understanding of these is-
sues, because they invested the Avicennian terminology with other philosophical
meanings or nuances, and because they deployed concepts that were not implement-
ed by the master himself. As a result, exploring this later tradition with the aim of
either confirming or testing one’s reading of the Avicennian texts is a risky enter-
prise, as was already noted earlier. This tradition should instead be gauged chiefly
on the basis of its own developments and philosophical merit. Yet, it is noteworthy
that the pointed issue of whether pure quiddity possesses mental existence, which is
an intricate and ambiguous aspect of Avicenna’s doctrine, received a variety of com-
pelling formulations in the postclassical tradition. Many later thinkers followed Avi-

 At best, one may say that they are potentially mental universals; but this, in fact, can be said of
all pure quiddities, which have the potentiality of combining with mental concomitants and accidents
to form the universal, should the mind attach the conditions of predicability and shareability to them.
Given the interpretation of pure quiddity provided here, mental existence and conceivability should
be dissociated, strictly speaking, from the notion of mental universality.
 In brief, universality—construed in the sense of a mental concomitant and attribute of quiddity—
is not a definitive criterion of mental existence.
264 II Quiddity in Itself and Mental Existence

cenna in describing pure quiddity in the mind as abstract (mujarrad) and negatively
conditioned (bi-sharṭ lā), and, starting with Bahmanyār, they also raised the question
of whether it can exist as such without its mental concomitants. In spite of this, and
the terminological connection notwithstanding, it is still too early to determine
whether some of them articulated a solution that overlaps doctrinally with Avicen-
na’s original position.
In spite of having shed some light on the subject, the foregoing considerations
have also generated a cluster of difficult questions: Exactly what ontological mode
belongs to pure quiddity in the mind? How does the conception of pure quiddity
and universal quiddity arise in the mind, and as a result of what causal process?
While the problem of localization—i. e., where quiddity in itself exists in a distinct
and irreducible manner—has been addressed and partly answered (the discussion
will continue in chapters III to V), the issue of its ontological mode awaits full clar-
ification. What is more, there is a residual conundrum that emerges from the previous
considerations: if the connections I established between pure quiddity in the mind,
abstraction, and the negative condition (bi-sharṭ lā) are correct; and if, in addition,
the hypothesis of its entitative and ontological status in the mind is seriously enter-
tained; then how can pure quiddity be with ‘the condition of no other thing’ and yet
still be said to exist? For if it does exist in the mind, this would imply that it possess-
es something else, namely, existence. What is more, mental existence, according to
most readings of Avicenna, necessitates mental concomitants, so that pure quiddity
would have to be ‘with other things’ after all. In addition to the insight provided in
this chapter, a more complete treatment of this question will be articulated in chapter
IV. In the meantime, I intend to investigate how quiddity relates to the concrete ex-
istents of the extramental world and, hence, to address the third aspect of quiddity
described in Introduction I.2. As in the case of mental existence, this topic also raises
some epistemological and ontological difficulties that call for elucidation.
Chapter III:
Quiddity in Itself in the Concrete World
Another core feature of Avicenna’s argumentation in Introduction I.2 and Metaphysics
V.1‒2—and one whose implications are at first not easy to grasp—is that quiddity in
itself somehow exists in concrete individuals in the exterior world. I write the ‘quid-
dity in itself,’ and not merely ‘quiddity’ or ‘universal quiddity,’ because, as I will ex-
plain below, this is the view Avicenna explicitly articulates in his works.¹ This, of
course, calls for a clarification of what in itself means in this context, since in the
concrete world quiddity is always found ‘with’ other things, namely, material con-
comitants and accidents. Accordingly, the key issues tackled in this chapter concern
how quiddity in itself can be said to exist in concrete beings; what in itself means
exactly in this context when applied to quiddity; what the epistemological and onto-
logical implications of this theory are with regard to other aspects of Avicenna’s phi-
losophy; and, finally, how this issue in turn impacts on the essence/existence dis-
tinction when applied to the extramental world.
Put differently, the main task of this chapter is to determine whether and in what
way Avicenna’s ontology of quiddity assumes a realist dimension that extends to the
concrete beings. Much of the following discussion will accordingly hinge on how Avi-
cenna’s doctrines relate to the ancient philosophical debates about the universals ‘in
multiplicity’ (the universalia in rebus of the medieval Scholastics), as well as to the
various Neoplatonic endeavors to reconcile Aristotle and Plato on this issue. This el-
ement will in turn be connected with an analysis of the set of conditions (shurūṭ) Avi-
cenna attaches to quiddity and of their epistemic and ontological implications.² It
should be noted that many points of Avicenna’s argumentation were subsequently
endorsed by later authors and, in their various doctrinal permutations, came to con-

 It is important to stress that quiddity is only just quiddity for Avicenna and that there are not differ-
ent kinds or categories of quiddity, merely different mental aspects associated with it, e. g., the pure
quiddity ‘horseness’ is the same, regardless of whether it is considered in the mind or in the concrete
world. Hence, it is always irreducible and ‘in itself’ in a certain sense, so that the terms quiddity and
‘quiddity in itself’ are to some extent interchangeable. An ambiguity can arise, however, when quid-
dity is taken together with its external concrete or mental concomitants. In that case, stating merely
‘the quiddity horse’ gives no immediate sense of whether one intends ‘the universal horse’ in the
mind or ‘the quiddity in itself horseness.’ Likewise, the statement ‘concrete horse’ could refer either
to the pure quiddity ‘horseness’ in the concrete horse envisaged only in itself, or to the cluster of quid-
dity together with the concrete accidents and concomitants of this particular horse, in which case
quiddity would be only one part or principle of the composite. These ambiguous cases justify the
panoply of terms Avicenna uses to distinguish pure quiddity from everything that does not enter with-
in it.
 Avicenna’s views on the existence of quiddity and the universals in the concrete world have attract-
ed a fair share of scholarly attention: see especially Booth, Aristotelian Aporetic Ontology, 111‒126;
Rashed, Ibn ʿAdī; Benevich, Die ‘göttliche Existenz’; and Faruque, Mullā Ṣadrā. This is probably
due to its relevance for the issue of the ‘real’ distinction between essence and existence.

[Link]
266 III Quiddity in Itself in the Concrete World

stitute a recurring feature of the postclassical Islamic discourse on essence. Accord-

ingly, it is rewarding to trace some of the interpretations of, and elaborations on, this
issue in the later Arabic and Latin traditions. But unlike in chapter II, where the
focus was almost exclusively on cognition and intramental existence, the present in-
quiry will branch out in two different directions, one epistemological, the other on-
tological, without it being clear from the outset how these two planes relate to one
another. First, there is the question of how and through what means we can appre-
hend or conceive of quiddity in the exterior world, both with regard to its material
accidents and in abstraction from them. On the surface, this is merely an investiga-
tion of one of the cognitive aspects of quiddity Avicenna outlines in Introduction I.2,
when he describes our consideration (iʿtibār) of quiddity in concrete beings. In this
connection, one wonders what cognitive role quiddity plays in the process of abstrac-
tion, which is one of two main accounts Avicenna elaborates to explain the acquis-
ition of the universals in the mind (the other being an emanationist account whereby
the intelligibles are derived directly from the Agent Intellect). Additionally, the issue
revolves around whether we can know pure quiddity when it is embedded in a con-
crete being together with its material concomitants. In this case, how does it relate to
the considerations of universal quiddity and pure quiddity in the mind, as well as to
its logical definition? Moreover, the relation between the extramental and mental
contexts of quiddity also need to be elucidated, with a particular focus on the process
of abstraction as a mediation between these two spheres.
To these primarily epistemological difficulties accrues a set of ontological prob-
lems. These pertain to the question of whether quiddity truly or actually exists in
concrete beings independently of our thinking about them, and, if so, of the exact
ontological mode in which it exists in that domain. What does Avicenna mean exact-
ly when he states that quiddity—and specifically quiddity in itself (al-māhiyyah min
ḥaythu hiya hiya)—exists (mawjūdah) or possesses existence (wujūd) in the exterior
world? How does this mode of existence compare to its mental mode? This brings
to the fore the questions of what demarcates mental existence from concrete exis-
tence, the two modes of existence (al-wujūdayn) Avicenna frequently refers to in
his works, and how pure quiddity fits in this picture. In spite of ample evidence
pointing to the existence of quiddity in concrete beings, some scholars have subject-
ed these ontological considerations to the primacy of the logical and conceptual as-
pects described above or have ignored them entirely. They have reduced Avicenna’s
comments on quiddity in concrete beings to the epistemological and purely cognitive
considerations he discusses, denying or barely recognizing that quiddity has any ex-
tramental reality or existence.³ Recall that in chapter II, I argued that pure quiddity is
epistemically irreducible and distinct, that is, it is an irreducible and distinct concept

 Rahman, Morewedge, Pini, and Marmura, whose studies focus overwhelmingly on the ‘conceptu-
alist’ dimension of the universals and essence in Avicenna, could be mentioned as examples of this
trend. They have little to say about the ontology of quiddity in the concrete world.
 III Quiddity in Itself in the Concrete World 267

in the mind thinking it. In addition, I provided substantial evidence to the effect that
pure quiddity can also be said to be ontologically distinct in the mind, since it
amounts to a self-contained intelligible form. At the same time, and according to a
mereological interpretation, pure quiddity also ontologically underlies and forms
part of the universal concept. One question to be addressed in the present chapter
is whether there is any symmetry between the intramental and extramental states
of quiddity when it comes to this mereological framework. In other words, can
pure quiddity be said to be ontologically irreducible in the concrete world as well?
And what kind of arguments does Avicenna articulate to settle these points?
The issue of the ontological status of quiddity in the extramental world inter-
sects with another well-known problem in Avicenna’s philosophy: should the es-
sence/existence distinction be construed as a real one or merely as a conceptual
or mental one with no repercussions on the extramental world?⁴ These questions
—the mode of existence of quiddity in concrete beings, and the essence/existence
distinction—were topics that were extensively discussed and debated in the post-
classical tradition. Although these issues, and many of the answers articulated by
postclassical Muslim thinkers, have their roots in the Avicennian texts, they also rep-
resent intricate and thought-provoking elaborations on Avicenna’s position. Accord-
ingly, they will receive a tentative and independent treatment in the following anal-
ysis.
Before turning to the ontological dimension of the problem, I wish to make a few
epistemological comments. The fact that pure quiddity is epistemically and cogni-
tively irreducible suggests that it can be applied neutrally to a variety of ontological
contexts, such as the mental and concrete spheres. Indeed, Avicenna holds that quid-
dity can be equally considered or conceived of in relation to both the universals in
the mind and the concrete individuals of the extramental world. With respect to
the latter, in Introduction I.2 he explicates that we can have a consideration (iʿtibār)
of quiddity in the exterior, concrete beings, which is one of three considerations of
quiddity the human mind can apprehend. Avicenna’s point here appears to be pri-
marily epistemological or logical: we can conceive or consider quiddity in individual,
concrete beings, although this consideration tells us nothing about whether—and if

 This thorny issue has inspired many recent studies, with different interpretations being promoted
by scholars; I shall refer to them in the course of my analysis. It is interesting that these modern iter-
ations sometimes echo the extensive philosophical discussions that had unfolded in the postclassical
commentatorial tradition on Avicenna. The modern scholarly views on this subject are therefore often
traceable to particular schools or movements that flourished in the postclassical period and should
be regarded as new developments of an old debate in the Islamic and the medieval Latin world. With
regard to the modern literature, two broad interpretive trends may be identified: the first regards the
essence/existence distinction as a purely conceptual one with no counterpart in the concrete world
(this approach is historically indebted to the ‘foundationality of existence’ tradition (aṣālat al-wujūd)
that emerged in the postclassical Islamic world); the second one allows for the ontological relevance
of this distinction in the exterior world, which often involves a more or less realist interpretation of
these principles and devotes a distinct ontological status to essence.
268 III Quiddity in Itself in the Concrete World

so, how—quiddity actually exists in those entities. It could very well be that the mind
infers essence from the observation of concrete individuals or even projects a con-
ception of essence unto these concrete entities that would allow it to identify individ-
uals belonging to the same species, without quiddity actually existing in a strong
sense in those individuals.
The important point here is that Avicenna’s comments in Introduction I.2 can be
construed in abstraction from ontological notions and on a purely logical or concep-
tual plane. This interpretive openness also means that they can be connected with a
rich variety of ontological theories, not all of which are reconcilable with one anoth-
er. Thus, Avicenna’s epistemological comments about quiddity in Introduction and in
his logical works more generally present a certain flexibility or fluidity and do not
evoke a unique and rigid ontological scheme that could be superimposed on this log-
ical account. I already discussed the key passage in Introduction I.2 in some detail
and concluded that the emphasis there is on the logical and epistemological aspects
of the term iʿtibār, on its mind-relatedness and psychological content, and that this
term bears an ambiguous relationship to the notion of existence, both in its concrete
and mental states. Hence, ontological considerations notwithstanding, the main
claims of Introduction I.2 appear to be that we can conceive of quiddity as it applies
to exterior existents, either together with, or in abstraction from, the material acci-
dents attached to it in that context, and that the mind can establish a correspond-
ence between the mental universal and the particulars of the concrete world.
This implies that, even though intellectual and scientific knowledge is based on
the abstract, universal forms, we can apprehend essence together with its concomi-
tants in particular things, presumably with the help of the senses and the imagina-
tive and estimative faculties. We can apprehend the humanness of ‘this’ specific in-
dividual Zayd together with his attributes and accidents (what Black calls the
‘determinate’ or ‘designated individual’ (al-shakhṣ al-muʿayyan).⁵ This leads to the
formation of a kind of individual essence in the mind, which also corresponds to
what Avicenna calls the ‘vague individual’ or ‘vague human’ (insān muntashar) be-
longing to a species. So the master seems to believe that both in the mental and con-
crete contexts, we can to some extent conceive of essence together with its accidents
and concomitants. In the case of the universal, this apprehension will unfold at an
intellectual level only, and essence will be conceived of with mental concomitants
exclusively, whereas in the case of concrete individuals or ‘vague individuals,’
their essence can be considered with their attributes and accidents in a cognitively
deficient way and by virtue of the lower psychological faculties, such as sense per-
ception, imagination, and estimation.⁶ This synthetic apprehension of quiddity de-

 Black, Avicenna’s ‘Vague Individual,’ 260.

 The aspect of quiddity that Avicenna connects with physical existence does not exist independent-
ly in the concrete world and in a realm of its own, like a Platonic form; rather, it exists embedded in,
and entangled with, material and corporeal attributes and accidents, and can only be apprehended
intellectually once it has been abstracted from this material ‘cluster’ or ‘complex.’
 III Quiddity in Itself in the Concrete World 269

rived from the lower psychic faculties does not presumably amount to intellectual or
scientific knowledge proper. As Avicenna explains, we can consider humanness as it
is ‘embedded,’ so to speak, in individual things, “as with the essence [dhāt] of this
Zayd to whom one points. For [in this case, the essence] cannot be estimated [tuta-
wahhama] except as belonging to him alone.”⁷ Notice that this essence, together with
its concomitants, can be “estimated,” not “intellected” (ʿuqila). This is because scien-
tific knowledge proper for Avicenna consists only in the contemplation of the imma-
terial, universal forms. But Zayd taken together with his accidents does not constitute
a valid object of certain and intellectual knowledge. Nevertheless, on the master’s ac-
count human reason can somehow consider (iʿtabara) this particular and concrete
expression of quiddity alongside its considerations of universal quiddity and quiddi-
ty in itself.⁸
In this connection, the consideration of quiddity together with its material acci-
dents and concomitants is what Avicenna elsewhere describes as quiddity ‘on the
condition of something else’ (bi-sharṭ shayʾ ākhar) or simply ‘with something else’
(maʿa shayʾ ākhar), since it is quiddity considered not strictly ‘in itself.’ This is the
aspect of quiddity as particularized and conditioned by extraneous accidents,
which also happen in this case to be concrete, material accidents and concomitants.
Here it is quite clear that quiddity bi-sharṭ shayʾ does not amount to an intelligible
form in the intellect, since the participation of the senses, imagination, and estima-
tion are required for this understanding of quiddity to arise in the soul in the first
place, and since this apprehension includes particular accidental things.⁹ With
that being said, Avicenna believes that we are also able to reach an abstracted (mu-
jarrad) conception or consideration of quiddity as it exists in concrete beings, if and
when it is divested from the material accidents and all the other attributes that sur-
round it, i. e., when the mind divests it from the composite being in which it is em-
bedded and apprehends it strictly without ‘another thing.’ This suggests that quiddi-
ty never fuses with or is never collapsed with its accidents and remains in a state of
epistemic autonomy and irreducibility. Once this process of extracting or divesting
has occurred, the mind can envisage quiddity either as ‘unconditioned’ (lā bi-sharṭ
shayʾ ākhar or bi-lā sharṭ shayʾ ākhar, with a similar meaning), that is, ‘not with

 Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Cure, V.1, 196.4‒5. Notice the use of the term dhāt in this passage,
which is intended to convey the notion of quiddity as individualized in Zayd, or quiddity as existing
together with its particular concomitants in Zayd, as opposed to the irreducible quidditative meaning.
 So it seems that we can form individual and universal considerations of quiddity in the mind, al-
though only the latter will be located at the intellectual level. Both, however, are equally based on the
notion of pure quiddity. Because the main challenge, in a psychological context, is to determine
whether pure essence exists intellectually or intelligibly, I do not pursue the study of these individual
considerations any further. Naturally, their ontological status remains problematic, since they poten-
tially point to a class of sub-intellectual psychological existents in Avicenna’s philosophy.
 Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Cure, VIII.6, 359.7‒11 sharply distinguishes between the intellectual
and imaginative apprehension of quiddity, depending on whether quiddity is taken with its material
accidents or not; cf. Provenance, 7.1‒9.
270 III Quiddity in Itself in the Concrete World

the condition of another thing,’ or, more radically, it can apprehend it as ‘negatively-
conditioned’ or ‘on the condition of no other thing’ (bi-sharṭ lā shayʾ ākhar). These
two considerations, unlike the first, can be said to be much closer to a fully intellec-
tual kind of apprehension, because they do not imply external ‘things’ apart from
quiddity itself and do not rely on the sub-intellectual faculties.
What stands out thus far is the epistemological and logical dimension of Avicen-
na’s argumentation. Its gist is that all concrete instances of a quiddity share a com-
mon definition (ḥadd) and a common quidditative meaning (maʿnā), which can be
extracted or divested from all the other elements that constitute a concrete individ-
ual. This meaning can be considered in the mind either ‘in itself’ or in connection
‘with other things.’ At first glance, calling quiddity a maʿnā severs it somewhat
from a putative ontological or substantive foundation and accentuates its role as
an epistemic and logical notion and a purveyor of knowledge for the human
mind. It enables a starker separation between quiddity qua meaning and quiddity
qua intrinsic existential feature of actually existing things. This becomes particularly
salient when the definitional maʿānī are invoked in a logical context or in connection
with logic (as in Introduction), since in this case Avicenna states explicitly that these
maʿānī are considered in abstraction from existence.
Calling quiddity in itself a meaning and stressing its logical and epistemological
aspects provides Avicenna with additional options for his theorization of quiddity in
the concrete world. It allows him to extend the same quiddity to various particulars
without committing himself to an ontological account of how quiddity exists in the
concrete beings. By using the term maʿnā in a more logical sense, Avicenna can
argue that various individual beings belonging to the same species or genus at the
very least share a common quidditative meaning and concept and form a certain def-
initional unity in the mind. The master expresses this point in a passage of Salvation,
which will be analyzed in detail in a short while (see Text 11 below). In that passage,
quiddity, and more specifically quiddity in itself or thingness, is what is described as
being common (mushtarak) to mental and concrete existents. As Avicenna puts it in
other instances, it is a nature (ṭabīʿah) common to all things that share a single genus
or species. Thus, for instance, humanness (insāniyyah) and horseness (farasiyyah)
are natures common to all individual concrete humans and horses, as well as all
the universal concepts ‘human’ and ‘horse’ apprehended in multiple minds. These
things, regardless of their contexts, do not differ in their fundamental or irreducible
quidditative meaning (maʿnā) and thingness (shayʾiyyah), even though they differ
when considered together with their accidents and concomitants. The term maʿnā
therefore serves the purpose of establishing a strong conceptual connection between
various entities by pinpointing what is epistemologically irreducible and common
among them, namely thingness, pure quiddity, or nature. It is this semantic and for-
mal quidditative commonness between various beings belonging to different ontolog-
ical contexts that makes it permissible for us to speak of a certain definitional one-
ness of things in the mind and in the concrete world. The pure quiddity horseness
underlies and is common to both the individual concrete horses and the universal
 1 The move towards an Avicennian metaphysical realism or formalism 271

concept ‘horse’ reflected in multiple human minds. Even then, this definitional and
conceptual oneness belong more properly to the universal than to quiddity in itself,
since oneness and universality are, strictly speaking, non-constitutive concomitants
of quiddity. The definition and universal form ‘horse’ is one (wāḥid) in the human
mind thinking it, and so the various relations it bears to individual concrete horses
in the exterior world are all unified by virtue of this single intelligible form and
meaning.¹⁰ What is more, the meaning and definition of horse is one with regard
to each and every instance of concrete horse to which the universal is related. This
must be the case, or else it would not be possible for us to predicate horseness of
this concrete horse and assert that it is ‘a horse’ or ‘one horse.’ Thus, even though
pure quiddity is, in itself, neither one nor many, its universal apprehension in the
mind enables us to conceive it as one and to predicate it as one of a plurality of in-
dividuals. For Avicenna, the universal species ‘horse,’ which qualifies as a secondary
substance in the mind,¹¹ is what is said of many (maqūl ʿalā kathīrīn), although it
cannot be said to be ‘present in’ or ‘exist in’ the individual concrete subjects, due
to the fact that it is a mental universal, and that mental universals exist only in
the mind according to Avicenna’s ontology. It is presumably due to similar consider-
ations that some scholars have alluded to the ‘definitional being’ of quiddity in Avi-
cenna.¹² At any rate, the philosophical thrust of Avicenna’s account in Introduction
I.2, which is later on picked up in Metaphysics V.1‒2, is that quiddity is, at the
very least, epistemically simple, irreducible, and distinct in the mind with regard to
its relation to the universals and the concrete beings. Not only is it simple and dis-
tinct, because it can be considered in itself in abstraction from all other things, but it
is also irreducible in that it logically and conceptually underlies each quidditative
being, whether mental or physical, enabling the mind to recognize or identify a con-
crete horse and the universal horse as sharing a common and underlying quiddita-
tive meaning and definition, namely, horseness.¹³

1 The move towards an Avicennian metaphysical realism or

formalism
One intricate question is how this logical or epistemic aspect relates to the ontolog-
ical status of quiddity in the concrete world, a topic that is explicitly broached in Avi-
cenna’s logical and metaphysical works. If scholars can agree broadly on the defini-

 Avicenna, Elements of Philosophy, 56.12, explains that the universal is one on account of its def-
inition (ḥadd).
 See Avicenna, Categories, III.1, 95.1‒11 and III.2, 100.11.
 Geoffroy, in de Libera, L’art, 648, note 4; Bahlul, Avicenna.
 Some scholars, e. g., Bahlul, Avicenna, 11, have limited their interpretation of quiddity in Avicen-
na exclusively to this epistemic, definitional, and logical aspect. In spite of its intrinsic interest and
importance, it has to be connected with Avicenna’s ontological doctrines.
272 III Quiddity in Itself in the Concrete World

tional and logical relevance of pure quiddity, they on the other hand disagree starkly
when it comes to answering the question of its existence in concrete reality. Avicenna
in many instances does not limit himself to describing quiddity as a meaning com-
mon to the concrete entities, but depicts it as something that exists in them. In
those passages, he seems reluctant to confine his account of quiddity in the exterior
world to a purely semantic or definitional one, where essence would be a mere inten-
tional or subjective aspect of the mind projected onto concrete objects. Avicenna de-
velops a sophisticated doctrine concerning the objective and extramental existence
of quiddity in individual beings whose purpose is to mirror his account of how quid-
dity can be said to exist irreducibly and mereologically in the mental universal. It is
to this aspect of his thought that I now wish to turn. In what follows, I begin by
gleaning the evidence in Avicenna’s works pointing to the ontological realism of
quiddity, that is, the view that quiddity somehow exists in concrete beings.¹⁴ Once
this premise is established on the basis of the textual evidence, I engage in the
task of elucidating and fleshing out his theory of essential realism and his mereology
in light of the late-antique discussions about the universals as well as Avicenna’s re-
lation to the Platonic and Aristotelian traditions. With regard to the latter, I argue,
following Marwan Rashed, that it is mostly in the works of Alexander of Aphrodisias
and Yaḥyā b. ʿAdī that the master found the methodological tools to elaborate his
doctrine. Avicenna’s approach rests heavily on logical and metaphysical distinctions
in addition to a mereological interpretation of essence that were devised by his pred-
ecessors and that he accessed in part thanks to the Arabic translations of Alexandri-
an treatises. In the following analysis, I also pay attention to how quiddity in con-
crete beings relates to the notion of universality and its modulation (tashkīk), as
well as to the repercussions that Avicenna’s essentialist doctrines have on the
topic of psychological abstraction.
The trend of ontologizing essence in the concrete world is apparent in Metaphy-
sics V.1, where Avicenna makes repeated and perspicuous claims to the effect that
quiddity in itself is present in and exists in both the universal and concrete beings.
This, after all, is what enables us to recognize the same quiddity in these various
kinds of existents, so that we can ascribe a single definition to these beings. If
there was no ontological relation whatsoever between concrete existents and mental
universals, then there would be no epistemological correspondence between them as
well, and hence no cognitive realization that these things relate to one another in an

 Whenever I use the term ‘realism,’ it is to refer primarily to a moderate kind of metaphysical real-
ism espoused by Yaḥyā b. ʿAdī, Avicenna and other thinkers in the Islamic tradition. These thinkers
rejected the strong realism entailed by the theory of the Platonic forms, but believed that essence and
the universals (with some important qualifications) can be said to exist in concrete beings. Their po-
sition may be described as moderate realism or formal immanentism, and it is also based on a so-
phisticated mereology. But it is important to bear in mind that classical Arabic does not have tech-
nical terms to refer to these notions, so that their use is somewhat artificial and schematic and
calls for a case by case analysis of the evidence.
 1 The move towards an Avicennian metaphysical realism or formalism 273

essential way. As a result the mind would not be able to establish any connection
between concrete horses A and B, horseness in itself, and the universal mental
horse that is predicable of many. Hence, denying any ontological grounding or reality
to quiddity in the concrete world would result in an epistemological gap. So it ap-
pears that a minimal degree of ontological continuum is required for the epistemic
sharedness or commonality of pure quiddity to hold between these various contexts.
What is more, the ontological thrust of this argument can be pushed further: as
McGinnis aptly observed, if somehow the same quiddity in itself (e. g., horseness)
was not present in mental and concrete existents, then only either the universal
horse or concrete horses would exist. But the fact that both exist suggests that
they have something in common, which is quiddity in itself.¹⁵ In this metaphysical
context, Avicenna goes beyond talking about a mere epistemological connection be-
tween mental and extramental objects. He argues for a kind of ontological constancy
of pure quiddity as a principle underlying each mental and concrete existent.
That quiddity somehow exists (mawjūdah) and has existence (wujūd) in concrete
individuals is reiterated by Avicenna on numerous occasions in his metaphysical and
even in his logical writings.¹⁶ More specifically, the master argues that quiddity in it-
self somehow exists in concrete instances of a species in a way comparable or similar
to the way it exists in universals in the mind. In Metaphysics V.1, he explains that,

Text 10: Animal abstracted ‘without the condition of anything else’ [mujarrad lā bi-sharṭ shayʾ
ākhar] has existence in the concrete [lahu wujūd fī l-aʿyān]. For, in itself and in its true reality [fī
nafsihi wa-fī ḥaqīqatihi], it is without the condition of another thing, even though it may be with
a thousand conditions that associate with it externally. Hence, animal, [considered as] pure [or
abstracted] animalness¹⁷ has existence in the concrete [fa-l-ḥayawān bi-mujarrad al-ḥayawā-
niyyah mawjūd fī l-aʿyān]. This does not render it necessary for it to be separate [or separable,
mufāriq]. Rather, it is the thing in itself [huwa alladhī huwa fī nafsihi], devoid of the attendant
conditions, which exists in the concrete, but which has been enclosed from the outside by con-
ditions and states.¹⁸

 McGinnis, Avicenna, 33‒35; idem, Logic and Science, 168‒170. For Avicenna’s arguments on this
point, see Introduction I.12 at 65.12‒16; a similar argument appears in Pointers, vol. 1, 202‒205.
 The famous passage on the tripartite division of quiddity at Introduction I.2 opens with the words
(15.1): “the quiddities of things can be [or exist] in concrete things or in the conception” (wa-māhiyyāt
al-ashyāʾ qad takūn fī aʿyān al-ashyāʾ wa-qad takūn fī l-taṣawwur); this statement echoes many sim-
ilar passages in Avicenna’s metaphysical writings.
 One could also translate this clause as follows: “animal [taken] together with pure animalness
has existence in the concrete,” with the same fundamental meaning.
 Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Cure, V.1, 204.6‒10, translation by Marmura in Avicenna, The Meta-
physics, 155, revised; cf. VIII.6, 355.6‒10, where Avicenna explains that, in the case of a human being,
‘humanness’ exists extraneously in other particular human beings, but not so for the First Cause,
where “nothing of the genus of His existence [jins wujūdihi] is exterior to His existence and exists
in another.” When referring to the foundational ontological state of quiddity in itself in connection
with extramental existents, Avicenna often uses the terms “nature” (ṭabīʿah) and “reality” (ḥaqīqah)
to describe it. These terms highlight this seminal ontological aspect and differ from the term maʿnā,
which emphasizes the definitional, epistemic, and intentional aspect of quiddity in itself (notwith-
274 III Quiddity in Itself in the Concrete World

These statements are echoed in other parts of Metaphysics V.1:

Animal [in itself] considered as existing in the concrete [mawjūd fī l-aʿyān] … is animal and a
thing, and not animal considered on its own.¹⁹

Animal with this condition, even though it exists [in kāna mawjūdan] in every individual, is not
rendered by this condition a certain animal [ḥayawān mā] … . The fact that the animal exists in
the individual as a certain animal does not prevent animal inasmuch as it is animal—i. e., not
with the consideration that it is in some [determined] state—from existing in it … . Hence, animal
[in itself], which is a part of this certain animal, exists [in the concrete].²⁰

Such a stance is replicated in Avicenna’s late works, as illustrated by this passage of

Notes, which refers to the concrete beings:

[The differentia] ‘rational’ makes possible the existence of animalness [in the concrete], but not
the true reality of animalness [al-nāṭiq bihi yaṣṣihu wujūd al-ḥayawāniyyah wa-laysa yaṣṣihu bihi
ḥaqīqat al-ḥayawāniyyah].²¹

Finally, in Salvation Avicenna goes so far as to assert the existence of a universal es-
sence in concrete reality:

The universal [kullī] can be said of unconditioned humanness [al-insāniyyah bi-lā sharṭ] … the
universal according to [this] consideration exists in actuality in [concrete] things [mawjūd bi-l-
fiʿl fī l-ashyāʾ].²²

standing the fact that, on my interpretation of this term, maʿnā also carries ontological implications).
Avicenna actively seeks to avoid a Platonic theory of participation and refuses to regard quiddity in
itself as a separate existent in the concrete world. However, I believe Avicenna found a way around
those problems by developing his theory of quiddity in itself, which should be interpreted as an on-
tological principle in addition to an epistemic one.
 Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Cure, V.1, 201.5‒6, translation by Marmura in Avicenna, The Meta-
physics, 153, revised.
 Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Cure, V.1, 201.15‒202.5, translation by Marmura in Avicenna, The
Metaphysics, 153, revised.
 Avicenna, Notes, 394, section 697. That this passage deals with concrete beings is made clear by
the fact that, in the mind, genus need not at all rely on differentia to exist as a universal notion. The
gist of the argument here is that genus in itself or absolute animal cannot exist as such in the con-
crete and needs to be specified by a differentia into a distinct species. It can thus only be said to exist
with the differentia and as or in a species. Whether animal/genus retains any autonomous and dis-
tinct existence in that state or is to be fully collapsed with the existence of the species is a difficult
question concerning which Avicenna adduces conflicting evidence; for more insight on this point, see
sections 1.2 and 1.3 of this chapter.
 Avicenna, Salvation, 537.10‒13. Avicenna’s use of the term kullī in this sentence and his statement
to the effect that the unconditioned quiddity exists in the concrete world in actuality (bi-l-fiʿl) are
problematic and call for a detailed explanation, which is provided below. Here I merely want to re-
inforce the point that unconditioned quiddity somehow exists in the concrete world.
 1 The move towards an Avicennian metaphysical realism or formalism 275

On the basis of these passages, one may put forth the hypothesis that Avicenna re-
gards quiddity or nature as somehow existing in concrete beings. In this connection,
it should be pointed out that he believes that numbers as well have extramental ex-
istence, albeit not a separate one. As he puts it, “number has existence in concrete
things and existence in the soul.” Their ontological status in the concrete world is
therefore comparable to that of the natural quiddities such as humanness and horse-
ness: both somehow exist extramentally in individual beings, albeit not as separate
substances.²³ As in his discussion of quiddity in the mind, Avicenna’s statements re-
garding the existence of quiddity in the concrete world hinge largely on the various
connotations of the term maʿnā. I intimated previously that a maʿnā in Avicenna’s
philosophy can refer either to a notion in the mind or, it appears, to something en-
titative or real within the concrete existent. It is to this latter aspect of the problem
that I now wish to turn.
A good starting point for this analysis is a passage that appears in Salvation, in
which Avicenna refers explicitly to the existence of maʿnā in concrete beings:

Text 11: It is clear that thingness is something other than existence in concrete reality [wa-farq
bayna l-shayʾiyyah wa-l-wujūd fī l-aʿyān]. For a quidditative meaning [al-maʿnā] has an existence
[wujūd] in concrete reality and an existence in the soul, as well as something common [amr
mushtarak] [i. e., common to it in these two contexts]: what is common is thingness.²⁴

Here it is apparent that the term maʿnā can lend itself to an ontological or entitative
interpretation in addition to a purely conceptual one. Avicenna stresses in that pas-
sage that the quidditative meaning or entity exists (or has existence, wujūd) in mental
and concrete beings, with the implication that it is more than a mere meaning and
possesses a substantive ontological grounding as well. In fact, it would seem that
maʿnā in this extramental context can amount to an entity or principle that exists
in the concrete object, and that it is not merely a mental attribute predicated of it.
Avicenna’s mention of quiddity as maʿnā and amr in Text 11, two terms which, on
purely etymological considerations, can possess entitative implications, seems to
go hand in hand with his claim that the pure nature of a thing somehow exists in

 See Avicenna, Metaphysics III.5; and Tahiri, Mathematics, chapter 4.

 Avicenna, Salvation, 520.1‒2; translation by Wisnovsky, Avicenna’s Metaphysics, 163, with only the
translation of al-maʿnā modified from the original. This passage should be compared to what Fārābī
says in The Book of Particles, 101.11: “The intelligible [or concept, maʿqūl] of a thing is the thing itself,
but the intelligible is that thing inasmuch as it is in the soul, while the thing is that intelligible in-
asmuch as it is outside the soul.” According to Fārābī, then, there is something common between
the intelligible and the extramental thing, or even something identical and constant (“the intelligible
of a thing is the thing itself”), which is quiddity. His phrasing to the effect that “the thing is that in-
telligible inasmuch as it is outside the soul” is intriguing, as it connects terminologically and concep-
tually with Avicenna’s own views.
276 III Quiddity in Itself in the Concrete World

the concrete world.²⁵ There can be no doubt that what is common (mushtarak) to the
mental and concrete instantiations of this maʿnā is pure quiddity, which in this pas-
sage is referred to as thingness (shayʾiyyah).²⁶ The passage as a whole therefore pos-
sesses an undeniable ontological thrust and goes beyond envisaging maʿnā merely
as a meaning or logical object. Its use in this context establishes the existence of
quiddity as a metaphysical principle in beings.²⁷ What is more, this excerpt under-
lines the fact that thingness or nature becomes an epistemic and ontological bridge
linking the two realms of concrete and mental existence.
These various points appear to be borne out by other passages in which Avicen-
na refers to the pure nature or quiddity in concrete beings as a maʿnā and a common
principle in these existents. This is the case notably of an excerpt in Salvation and
another in On the Soul, which should be highlighted also because they broach the
related topic of psychological abstraction, which will be addressed in depth later on:

Text 12: The first [way in which the animal powers can assist the rational soul] is by extracting
for the soul the single universal [notions] from the particulars, by means of [a process of] ab-
straction of the quidditative meanings [ʿalā sabīl tajrīd li-maʿānīhā] from matter and from
their material attachments and attributes, and by preserving what is common in it [murāʿāt
al-mushtarak fīhi] and what is distinguished by it. For what is essential has its existence, and
what is accidental [also] has its existence [wa-l-dhātī wujūduhu wa-l-ʿaraḍī wujūduhu]. The prin-
ciples of conception [mabādiʾ al-taṣawwur] are produced in the soul as a result of this [process],

 In Christian and Muslim kalām contexts, the terms maʿnā and amr also often carry an entitative
and ontic dimension, whether they are used in reference to the divine attributes, entitative accidents
in concrete beings, or to the hypostases of the Trinity.
 What Zimmermann (in Al-Farabi’s Commentary, 11, n. 2) says about Fārābī applies just as well to
Avicenna: “Maʿnā [meaning, point of reference] can mean reference as well as the object of reference.
It is frequently reduced to near-synonymity with shayʾ, since a thing becomes a maʿnā the moment it
is referred to.” This is all the more relevant if one remembers the connection between shayʾ/
shayʾiyyah and quiddity in Avicenna; the maʿnā does not merely refer to the thing (taken as a com-
plete substance), but more specifically to the quidditative meaning or thingness of or in that thing. In
the present analysis, I take thingness and quiddity to be roughly synonymous and do not overly con-
cern myself with the differences Wisnovsky perceives between these two terms and the conjectural
development they may have undergone; see Wisnovsky, Avicenna’s Metaphysics, especially 177‒180.
 A similar use of maʿnā appears at Metaphysics, I.2, 15.16 ff. (translated by Marmura in Avicenna,
The Metaphysics, 12): “If, in this science [metaphysics] one investigates that which is not prior to mat-
ter [i. e., that which is material], what is being investigated therein is only a maʿnā, this maʿnā not
requiring matter for its existence.” And shortly thereafter, he adds that “the mode of investigation
pertaining to them [the various kinds of material and immaterial existents] is from the angle of a
maʿnā whose subsistence in existence is not through [or by virtue of matter].” In this passage as
well, the idea is not that the maʿnā does not exist in any way in matter, but rather that it need
not be dependent on matter for its existence and can exist intelligibly in the mind; this is an impor-
tant nuance. It seems that Avicenna is referring here to the pure quiddity of these existents, and that
he could have used the term māhiyyah or ṭabīʿah instead of maʿnā, all of which can be abstracted by
the intellect.
 1 The move towards an Avicennian metaphysical realism or formalism 277

which occurs thanks to the assistance of the processing power of the imaginative and estimative
[faculties].²⁸

Text 13: The hylomorphic form has states and things [aḥwāl wa-umūr] that occur to it, not be-
cause of its own self and the fact that it is form, but because of matter. Sometimes, the removal
[al-nazʿ] [of the form] from matter occurs with all or some of these [material] attachments, and
other times it is [in contrast] a complete [kind of removal]. This is due to the abstraction of the
quidditative meaning [bi-an yujarrada l-maʿnā] from matter and the concomitants that belong to
it on account of matter. An example is the form of humanness [ṣūrat al-insāniyyah] and the quid-
dity of humanness [māhiyyat al-insāniyyah] as a nature that is necessarily shared [ṭabīʿah lā mu-
ḥālata tashtariku fīhā] equally by all the individuals of the species. It is one thing in definition,
although it accidentally occurs to it to exist [wujidat] in this or that individual and, hence, to
become multiple. Nevertheless, this [multiplicity] does not belong to it inasmuch as its nature
is humanness.²⁹

There are three points of interest that can be inferred from these passages. The first is
the rough semantic equivalence of the terms ‘form’ (ṣūrah), ‘quiddity’ (māhiyyah),
‘nature’ (ṭabīʿah), and ‘quidditative meaning’ (maʿnā). These all point to the same
thing, namely, pure quiddity (in this case ‘humanness’) in concrete beings. Second,
this nature and quidditative meaning can be removed or extracted from (nazʿ, intizāʿ)
the concrete individuals and thus also abstracted (yujarrad, tajrīd) from matter and
its various attachments and relations. Thus, even though the nature and pure quid-
dity are in the physical object, they can be fully divested from it. Likewise, the maʿnā
of the substantial form is not in itself material, but rather accidentally combined with
matter, and in any case not reducible to it. These passages quite explicitly support a
doctrine of abstraction as a process by which the quidditative meaning is transferred
from the particulars to the mind. Third, and by implication, the maʿnā can somehow
be said to exist in the object and to precede abstraction. This meaning is not project-
ed onto the object by a thinking mind once abstraction has occurred. It is the other
way around: the existence of the maʿnā in the object is what justifies the process of
abstraction. So maʿnā here also has a strong ontological or entitative sense and not
merely an epistemic or gnoseological sense. It “exists” or “is present in” (wujidat) the
object, with the corollary that its presence in the object somehow precedes its pres-
ence in the mind. What is more, and as a corollary, this quidditative meaning or en-
tity is not merely conceptually common, but also ontologically common in (mushtar-
ak fī) the concrete beings.³⁰ Like Text 11, then, these two excerpts point to a certain
ontologization of pure quiddity qua maʿnā in concrete beings, thereby also underlin-
ing Avicenna’s particular usage of this term and the possible influence of kalām the-
ories on his understanding of it. In the case of immaterial beings, it is quite clear that

 Avicenna, Salvation, 372.1‒5.

 Avicenna, On the Soul of The Cure, II.2, 58.7‒15.
 It is worth invoking here Avicenna’s distinction in Introduction I.12 between what is ‘in multiplic-
ity’ and what is ‘after multiplicity,’ which in the late-antique background was often thought to coin-
cide with two different types of universals.
278 III Quiddity in Itself in the Concrete World

their maʿnā exists independently of human intellection and, moreover, that the mind
cannot grasp the true nature of these beings.³¹ In this case, the maʿnā and māhiyyah
of the separate intellects is identical with their immaterial substantial forms, and
these things can be known by human beings only in a derivative manner and
through influences or impressions (āthār). Whereas in the case of concrete material
beings, an intelligible maʿnā is fully abstracted and contemplated by the mind (ya-
tajarradu minhā maʿnā yuʿqalu), in the case of the immaterial beings, in contrast, the
quidditative maʿnā exists intelligibly in itself (yūjad al-maʿnā ka-mā huwa), and it is
accidentally impressed on the mind, albeit not ‘in itself.’ This metaphysical use of
the term maʿnā to describe the immaterial beings further confirms its ontological
and entitative dimension in Avicenna’s philosophy.³²
One can infer from the foregoing that Avicenna makes a distinctive usage of the
notion of maʿnā in the context of his ontology, where it designates something real
and entitative in the concrete beings. This is true of both the immaterial beings
and the composite existents. In the latter case, it becomes closely associated with
the master’s doctrine of psychological abstraction, to which I shall return in detail
later on. In this context, one should not translate maʿnā merely as ‘quidditative
meaning,’ but also as ‘quidditative entity’ or ‘quidditative principle,’ which points
to pure quiddity or pure nature as a kind of metaphysical principle of reality.³³ But
how unique or idiosyncratic is Avicenna’s understanding of this notion in connection
with concrete beings?
The kalām understanding of maʿnā was already sketched in chapters I and II. In
the present context, the Ashʿarite and Muʿtazilite handling of this term should be em-

 In fact, Avicenna frequently refers to the maʿnā of God as well. In this context, the term maʿnā is
not only entitative and existent in reality, it exists independently of our thinking it. It is fully identi-
fied with the true nature and quiddity of the immaterial beings.
 See Avicenna, Metaphysics, III.8, 143.5‒8.
 In On the Soul of The Cure, I.5, 43.9‒11, Avicenna provides a definition of maʿnā as something de-
rived from sensible objects, but which can be apprehended only by estimation or reason, not by the
external senses: “As for maʿnā, it is a thing [shayʾ] apprehended by the soul from sensible things [min
al-maḥsūsāt], which is not first perceived by the external senses.” In this connection, Marmura and
Hasse have already noted that in Avicenna’s psychology, a maʿnā can refer to something entitative in
the real world, in addition to the impression that thing makes on the soul of the beholder. Thus, when
the ewe perceives the maʿnā of the wolf, the mental impression or form in its soul corresponds to
something that truly exists in the wolf, such as aggressiveness, strength, or stealth; see Marmura, Avi-
cenna’s Chapter on Universals, 55, note 36, where he suggests that it refers to “a characteristic” or
“entity” in a concrete thing, while Hasse, Avicenna’s De anima, 127 ff. describes it as a “connotational
attribute” and as something in the exterior object that is transmitted to the senses and the internal
faculties. When it is related to quiddity, however, maʿnā no longer refers to a mere accident or attrib-
ute, but rather to a fundamental structural principle of that being, to its very essential form and sub-
stance, as is made in clear in Text 11. In that excerpt, then, Avicenna appears to claim that pure quid-
dity qua maʿnā exists in all realized beings, including the composite material beings of the exterior
world. The implication seems to be that the maʿnā or quidditative meaning of horse exists in the uni-
versal and concrete horse.
 1 The move towards an Avicennian metaphysical realism or formalism 279

phasized once more, given that it often refers to something real in the concrete world,
and not primarily to a meaning in the mind. By the time Avicenna was writing, there
was an already long kalām tradition stretching back to the Muʿtazilite theologian
Muʿammar in the late eighth and early ninth centuries that regarded maʿnā as some-
thing entitative and real in concrete beings.³⁴ Furthermore, as Versteegh has shown,
a similar construal of maʿnā seems to have been broadly embraced in Arabic philo-
sophical circles during the eleventh century.³⁵ A he contends, “maʿnā is often used in
almost the same way as the eîdos of Platonism: it is then an abstract correlate of
something physical in the physical world. This abstract correlate can be situated
within or outside the mind, i. e. in the speaking subject or in the objects.”³⁶ Ver-
steegh, following Gätje, regards Avicenna as an upholder of this kind of theory:
“in their theories [Avicenna’s and Averroes’s] maʿānī are those elements in the ob-
jects which are not perceived by the physical senses, but only by some sort of perceiv-
ing faculty of the mind.” Thus, he concludes, for Avicenna, a maʿnā “is situated with-
in the physical objects. In that case, the meaning of maʿānī is close to the Aristotelian
theory of ‘form.’”³⁷ Here Versteegh is referring to the immanent forms of concrete be-
ings. It should be pointed out as well that maʿnā was sometimes used by the Syriac
and Arabic translators to render the Greek term πρᾶγμα.³⁸ There was therefore a rich
tradition that had flourished prior to Avicenna’s time that regarded maʿnā either as
something physical or, more relevantly in our case, as something non-physical pre-
sent in a physical object. Just as the Greek term εἶδως was used in the ancient texts to
refer alternatively to the immanent forms of things, to concepts in the mind, as well
as to the Platonic archetypes, so the terms ṣūrah/ṣuwar and maʿnā/maʿānī in the Ara-
bic philosophical tradition appear to have maintained this dual epistemic and onto-
logical function.³⁹ Avicenna’s application of maʿnā to concrete and mental objects, as
well as the close relation he perceives between maʿnā and ṣūrah—inasmuch as both

 See Frank, Al-maʿnà; Daiber, Das theologisch-philosophische System; and van Ess, Theology and
Society, vol. 3, 80‒90.
 Versteegh’s analysis, Greek Elements, 184 ff. has the merit of covering the two linguistic/semantic
and metaphysical/entitative aspects of maʿnā and also provides some valuable insight into the Greek
philosophical background that informed the translations and reception of this term in the Arabic tra-
dition.
 Versteegh, Greek Elements, 187.
 Versteegh, Greek Elements, 189. What is more, Versteegh also notes that some thinkers in the Ara-
bic tradition, such as the Muʿtazilites, attributed a certain causal agency to maʿnā in this concrete
setting. What is particular significant in this connection is their view that maʿnā can somehow be
said to exist in a non-physical mode in a physical object. I think the Avicennian maʿnā should be in-
terpreted in much the same way, since it exists in concrete beings, but is not reducible to their ma-
terial constituents.
 For instance, maʿnā appears as a translation of πρᾶγμα in the Arabic rendition of On Interpreta-
tion, I.7.17a39‒40, where the Greek term is usually rendered as “thing” in English.
 See de Libera, L’art, 503‒504.
280 III Quiddity in Itself in the Concrete World

terms pertain to the essence—suggest a certain continuity with these ancient Greek
and Arabic philosophical trends.
In retrospect, then, the hypothesis of the reality and existence of pure quiddity in
concrete beings seems corroborated on textual grounds drawn from Avicenna’s
works, by an analysis of his use of the technical term maʿnā, as well as by the phil-
osophical practices of the time, which frequently endowed this term with an ontolog-
ical thrust. On this interpretation, quiddity exists in particular entities not only as a
quidditative meaning or definitional aspect (the gnoseological plane), but also as a
foundational nature (ṭabīʿah) and reality (ḥaqīqah) (the ontological plane), two key
terms that are used interchangeably with the expression ‘quiddity in itself.’ The no-
tion of maʿnā, which encapsulates the semantic, cognitive, and entitative aspects of
essence, seems perfectly adequate to sustain this Avicennian doctrine. Accordingly, it
is used interchangeably with the terms ṭabīʿah and ḥaqīqah to designate the essence
of concrete beings. Moreover, it is important to stress that it is not merely quiddity
that is said to exist in concrete beings, but quiddity in itself. Avicenna is keen to insist
on this point by using such expressions as mujarrad al-ḥayawāniyyah, al-ḥayawān bi-
mā huwa ḥayawān, fī nafsihi, fī ḥaqīqatihi, etc., some of which figure in the previous
examples.
On the basis of this textual evidence, the main issue appears to be not whether
Avicenna believes that quiddity exists in the extramental world, but rather in what
sense and according to what mode it can be said to exist.⁴⁰ In spite of this, Avicenna’s
exact views on the concrete existence of quiddity remain elusive. One faces a host of
problems when trying to articulate a clear account of the master’s position. One im-
mediate difficulty is understanding exactly how a common mental notion or mean-
ing such as quiddity, which is typically conceived of universally in the mind, can be
said to possess an entitative status or exist in the world in a strong sense. In order to
clarify this problem, other aspects of Avicenna’s essentialist account have to be ex-
amined. Apart from the language of being that he explicitly ascribes to quiddity and
his rehandling of the term maʿnā for his own philosophical purposes, there are three

 Tackling this point in earnest is deferred until chapter IV. The idea that pure quiddity somehow
exists in the concrete beings has been strongly opposed in the modern scholarship; for a striking ex-
ample, see de Libera, L’art, 566‒567, 575. Other relevant passages drawn from Avicenna’s works are
admittedly more ambiguous when it comes to this issue, although they still on my view point to the
entitative nature of quiddity when they are read in parallel to the evidence highlighted above. In
Logic of Pointers, vol. 1, 204.5‒205.1, Avicenna refers to the “foundational nature” (al-ṭabīʿah al-
aṣliyyah)—another expression for pure quiddity—that underlies all concrete instances and is “constit-
utive” (muqawwimah) of them, while in Physics, I.1, 7.3, and I.7, 53, and I.13, 85, he refers to the “uni-
versal nature” (ṭabīʿah kulliyyah) of things, and mentions that the human intellect “extracts the na-
tures of things common in species” (fa-yantaziʿu al-ṭabāʾiʿ al-ʿāmiyyāt al-nawʿiyyah) in order to
apprehend them (I.1, 7.7); cf. Demonstration III.5 and On the Soul II.2. As he explains in Metaphysics,
these natures are permanent in their concrete reality, as in the case of humanness; for “the nature of
humanness is constant” (baqāʾ al-ṭabīʿah al-insāniyyah). Although universality is (primarily) a mental
concept for Avicenna, nature on the other hand finds a direct correspondence in concrete beings.
 1 The move towards an Avicennian metaphysical realism or formalism 281

additional features that characterize Avicenna’s seeming brand of metaphysical real-

ism: the notion of common nature; the mereological dimension of his argumenta-
tion; and the place of hylomorphism.

1.1 Quiddity and common nature

One notion that lies at the core of Avicenna’s discussion of quiddity in concrete be-
ings is that of nature (ṭabīʿah) or, more precisely, of a common or shared nature
(ṭabīʿah mushtarakah). This Avicennian theory had a fertile legacy in the postclassi-
cal Islamic period, where it is often connected with the discourse on the universals
(al-kulliyāt). In the later Islamic tradition, one frequently encounters the distinction
between ‘the natural universal’ (al-kullī l-ṭabīʿī), which was thought to somehow exist
in concrete beings, and the logical and intellectual universals (al-kullī l-manṭiqī and
al-kullī l-ʿaqlī), which were usually restricted to the sphere of human thought. For
these thinkers, ‘the natural universal’ became another way of referring to Avicenna’s
doctrine of common nature or essence in the concrete world.⁴¹ It should be noted
also that this Avicennian doctrine was transmitted to the Medieval Latin West
where it underwent a different but equally rich development. Starting at least with
Albert the Great, it was endorsed by numerous medieval Christian thinkers who pro-
ceeded to adapt this theory to their own system.⁴²
Like the term maʿnā, it appears that Avicenna in many cases uses the term
ṭabīʿah as a virtual synonym of essence or quiddity. Accordingly, it can refer either
to the human cognition of essence as a mental concept or to the reality of essence
in concrete existents.⁴³ I showed in chapter II that Avicenna speaks of nature in
the context of concept formation, which finds its starting point in the apprehension
of the ṭabīʿah of a concrete being. Thus, for example, the pure nature or quiddity ‘hu-
manness’ can be conceived of as such in the mind and distinctly from the universal
attribute that can be attached to it. Nevertheless, the main concern in this chapter is
nature construed as a common principle existing in concrete beings. Nature is com-
mon, according to Avicenna, because it characterizes in the same way all the exis-

 See section III.7 for more details. I would argue that the very fact that ‘nature’ and ‘the natural
universal’ became closely associated in the later philosophical tradition points already to the ambi-
guity of these notions in Avicenna’s works. Much effort will be expended here to disambiguate Avi-
cenna’s notion of universality. I will show that it, like many other Avicennian notions, is multifaceted
or, rather, modulated.
 The Avicennian doctrine of common nature has been intensively studied in the field of medieval
Christian philosophy and in Latin Avicennism; for insight into the vast literature on the topic, see
(among many other studies), Owens, Common Nature; de Libera, La querelle; idem, L’art; Erismann,
Immanent Realism; Galluzzo, Two Senses; Pini, Absoluta.
 The more precise formulation would be to say that whereas maʿnā expresses the transition from
the human intellection of essence to the reality of essence in concrete beings, ṭabīʿah expresses the
transition from essence as a reality in concrete beings to the human intellection of it.
282 III Quiddity in Itself in the Concrete World

tents that share it or fall under it, such as humanness in Zayd and ʿAmr. Neverthe-
less, it is not common in virtue of being a single form or universal entity in the con-
crete world that could be described as being numerically one (wāḥid bi-l-ʿadad).
Rather, it is a non-numerical principle of commonness that ensures that members
of the same species, such as Zayd and ʿAmr, have an identical essence, as well as
an identical set of actualized concomitants entailed by this essence (such as partic-
ularity, oneness, corporeality, etc.). It can be said to be ‘one’ only definitionally and
semantically, with regard to a single definition in the mind that would be predicated
equally of each concrete being.
One acute problem that emerges from Avicenna’s works is how nature can be
common in concrete beings, while not being strictly a universal. Although Avicenna
does, albeit rarely, refer to the common nature as universal (kulliyyah) or something
general (ʿāmmah) in concrete beings—the relevant passages will be mentioned and
discussed shortly—he usually refrains from doing so and prefers to describe it merely
as something common (mushtarakah).⁴⁴ This would seem to imply that commonness
is, in this context, something lesser, or of weaker implication or strength, than uni-
versality. More specifically, unlike universality, which is attached to a single, numeri-
cally one and determined form in the mind, commonness in the concrete world is not
defined by numerical determination. Recall that, for Avicenna, the universal form in
the mind is a single and distinct thing or mental existent, which can be described as
‘one.’ Thus, the universal ‘horse’ in the mind is ‘a single one form’ (ṣūrah wāḥidah),
and oneness is a mental concomitant or attribute of that essence. Common nature, in
contrast, refers to the state of pure quiddity as it exists in each individual instance,
without it being reducible to a numerically one thing, or without its possessing an
accidental unity that would be essentially attached to it. For, as Avicenna is keen
to remind us, in itself, pure quiddity is neither one nor many. So the quidditative na-
ture is essentially common, or common in a qualified Avicennian sense, while at the
same time resisting numerical determination.⁴⁵ This means that it is identical neither

 Avicenna expresses the commonness of the essential nature by resorting to different terms, mush-
tarakah being one of the most frequent. But he also relies on the term ʿāmm, as in Physics, I.1, 8.4,
where he mentions that “animal is a common notion” (maʿnā ʿāmm). Finally, and much more rarely,
Avicenna calls it a universal or universal nature (ṭabīʿah kulliyyah). The differences expressed by the
terms mushtarakah, ʿāmmah, and kulliyyah, which for Avicenna can all convey the notion of essential
commonness as opposed to other senses of commonness or universality, are subtle and on my read-
ing reflect the gradual transition from ontological commonness (mushtarakah) to conceptual or intel-
lectual commonness and universality (ʿāmmah and especially kulliyyah primarily refer to the purely
theoretical concept of universality in the mind). Nevertheless, Avicenna’s use of these terms is not
always systematic, which can lead to tensions in interpretation; for another reading of these terms
in Avicenna’s physics, see Lammer, The Elements, 165‒179.
 For the distinction between the “numerically common” and the “generically common” with re-
gard to forms in concrete beings, see Lammer, The Elements, 154‒201. Lammer restricts the latter
mostly to notions in the mind and thus to an epistemic aspect, and so he does not allow for a
 1 The move towards an Avicennian metaphysical realism or formalism 283

to the concrete particular substance nor to the mental universal, which are each nu-
merically one, delineated, and determined. It should be noted that in setting nature
apart from the particular entity taken as a whole and the mental universal proper,
Avicenna appears to be drawing on an earlier Greco-Arabic philosophical tradition,
which conceived of the nature of concrete individuals as something common (κοι-
νόν), but distinct from the universals in the mind. The closest proponent of this
view to Avicenna’s time was Yaḥyā b. ʿAdī, who was likely building on theories
first articulated by Alexander of Aphrodisias.⁴⁶
Emphasizing this notion of nature can help us to better understand how com-
monness, as opposed to universality proper, can be said to exist in concrete beings.
Just because quiddity or nature is not a separate and single universal thing in the
exterior world does not imply that it does not have any kind of reality or traction
in the exterior world. One way of approaching this issue is to say that nature does
exist, but in a non-numerical way, since it is, in itself, devoid of oneness and multi-
plicity. Quiddity, as it is found in concrete beings, cannot be reduced to, or framed in
terms of, a numerical oneness or unity, since oneness is a concomitant of essence
that is predicated either of the complex existent, e. g., one individual horse, or of uni-
versals in the mind, e. g., the genus animal, but not of pure quiddity itself.⁴⁷ Conse-
quently, we speak of ‘one human being,’ e. g., Ulysses, and not of ‘one pure quiddity
humanness’ in Ulysses. In brief, nature or quiddity has a common existence in con-
crete beings that evades numerical determination, since the latter is associated only
with the external concomitants of essence. Note that this solution, which is based on
the māhiyyah-lawāzim model, and which is therefore firmly grounded in Avicenna’s
works, anticipates in some ways Duns Scotus’s theory of common nature as some-
thing ‘less than numerical unity.’⁴⁸ By removing the condition of numerical determi-
nation or specification, Avicenna is able to maintain two theses that at first might
seem mutually exclusive: that pure quiddity or nature exists as a common principle
of concrete beings; but that it is also not a single, one, universal form on the Platonic
model. He is able to do so by evading the constriction of numerical determination,

sense of ‘common’ to apply specifically to the nature in itself; at any rate, he says little about the
ontological status of nature in the concrete beings.
 On this notion of nature in Alexander of Aphrodisias and Yaḥyā as something distinct from the
concrete particular and the universal in the mind, see Ehrig-Eggert, Yaḥyā, especially 54‒56. As I will
show below, however, the Avicennian common nature can be regarded as universal on a certain con-
strual of that notion.
 At Metaphysics, III.2, 97, Avicenna sketches the various senses of ‘the one’ and explains that ‘the
one by essence’ can be said of genus, species, correspondence, subject, and number. The one said
essentially of genus and species (or differentia) pertains to the universal concepts in the mind, not
to pure quiddity or nature as such. Avicenna stresses this point shortly after (98.6‒8), when he ex-
plains that the one in species can include the universals that are numerically many (as in the case
of human beings) or numerically one (as in the case of the sun).
 See Tweedale, Duns Scotus’s Doctrine; and Cross, Medieval Theories, which, remarkably, does not
mention Avicenna in this context.
284 III Quiddity in Itself in the Concrete World

which in his system follows quiddity or nature as an external concomitant (lāzim),

and which refers to the oneness of the realized existent, of the substance taken as
a whole or sunolon. This approach fits perfectly with the tenor of Avicenna’s polemic
against Platonic metaphysics. But it does not amount to a wholesale rebuttal of the
existence of quiddity in the concrete world. It consists rather in introducing a set of
qualifications regarding its correct mode of existence, which, for Avicenna, is imma-
nent in the concrete beings themselves.
But how is such a view tenable, when the expression ‘quiddity in itself’ evokes
isolation, separation or at least distinctness, and, hence, would seem to imply that
quiddity exists without anything else being attached to it? Avicenna’s position
here involves a conceptual subtlety: pure quiddity exists ‘in itself’ in the sense of ‘ir-
reducibly,’ as a foundational and irreducible nature for the individual, not in the
sense that it is ontically ‘separate’ from everything else, a view which would
smack of Platonism. In other words, in the specific context of physics or the concrete
world, ‘in itself’ does not mean ‘ontologically separate or transcendent’—a state that
would be the counterpart in the extramental world of its being distinct in the mind—
but rather irreducible, in the sense that it preserves its core nature even when it is
attached to other things in the concrete being. This implies a mereological account
of quiddity whereby ‘humanness in itself’ or ‘animalness in itself’ amounts to an ir-
reducible part of the composite substance. It is to this aspect of Avicenna’s argumen-
tation that I now turn.

1.2 The mereological construal of quiddity

At this juncture, Avicenna’s thought-provoking claim that pure quiddity is a part

(juzʾ) of the concrete existent needs to be fleshed out. Prior to this, however, a few
general remarks about his mereological framework are in order. It should be pointed
out that the master applies a mereological reasoning to different topics, which have
different degrees of relevance to the notion of quiddity. Some of them are standard
and shared by many other ancient and medieval philosophers, such as when he re-
fers (a) to the constitutive parts of the definition, in which case the genus ‘animal’
and the differentia ‘rational’ are parts of the definition of the species ‘human’; (b)
to the species as a part of its genus, where ‘human’ and ‘horse’ are parts of the
genus ‘animal’; (c) to form and matter as parts of the composite substance; and
more generally (d) with regard to his discussion of ‘whole and part’ (al-kull wa-l-
juzʾ), which constitutes the field of mereology proper.⁴⁹ However, Avicenna also ap-
plies mereological analysis to considerations that are more particular—even idiosyn-

 One important passage dealing with mereology appears at the end of Metaphysics V.2 (212.3‒16).
Although what Avicenna outlines there in a rather schematic fashion is clear, the way in which he
proceeds to apply some of these distinctions to his metaphysics and ontology is on the other hand
much more nebulous, for it becomes entangled with considerations of existence and causality.
 1 The move towards an Avicennian metaphysical realism or formalism 285

cratic—to him, and which seem to go in the direction of a kind of metaphysical mer-
eology. One example is when he speaks of pure quiddity as existing as a ‘part’ of the
universal concept and the concrete being. It is especially this latter aspect that is of
interest here. Yet, due to the fact that this aspect is often intertwined with some of the
other considerations outlined above, especially (a) and (c), it is particularly challeng-
ing to distinguish what pertains to logic and what pertains to metaphysics in the
master’s argumentation.⁵⁰ Now, I argued in chapter II that Avicenna embraces a mer-
eological construal of pure quiddity with regard to concept formation. He regards it
as an integral part of the universal concept. Since the human mind has the ability to
analyze and synthesize concepts at will, as well as to consider things under various
angles and according to various considerations (iʿtibārāt), it is not altogether surpris-
ing that it can distinguish between pure quiddity and its mental concomitants and
‘deconstruct’ the complex universal concept. This mereological reasoning is, after
all, the justification for regarding quiddity either as a unitary, cohesive, and distinct
mental entity that can be immediately grasped or, alternatively, as being made up of
various constitutive parts that together form the complex definitional concept of a
thing. It is also, at the level of conception or taṣawwur, what distinguishes the sim-
plicity of quiddity in itself from the composite and intention-laden universal concept,
which consists of the nature and various external concomitants—and, hence, of var-
ious ‘things’ or ‘parts.’ However, when applied to the concrete world and the realm of
composite physical substances, Avicenna’s mereological interpretation of quiddity
raises a fresh host of issues it did not carry in relation to thought and mental exis-
tence. For if, in the latter context, a part can be construed as corresponding to a con-
ceptual object, an intention, or a consideration in the mind, in the extramental con-
text it is much less clear how pure quiddity can be said to exist as a ‘part’ of the
concrete individual.
Before tackling this issue in earnest, we should take note of Avicenna’s various
formulations on the matter. Some of his statements pertain to the logical considera-
tion of species and genera and to the ways in which these are related in the definition
of a thing. In those cases, it is important to stress that Avicenna has in mind the uni-
versal predicates of quiddity, such as universal genus ‘animal’ or universal species
‘horse,’ and not the quiddity ‘animal in itself’ or ‘human in itself.’⁵¹ In contrast, Avi-

 There is very little scholarship on mereology in Avicenna and more generally in the Arabic tradi-
tion. Recently, however, this aspect of Avicenna’s argumentation has attracted some attention; see
notably De Haan, A Mereological Construal; and Benevich, Die ‘göttliche Existenz.’ Marmura, Avicen-
na’s Chapter on Universals, and idem, Quiddity and Universality, also to some extent focuses on the
mereology of the universals in the human mind. Beyond its logical foundation, the intriguing feature
about the way mereology is employed in the Arabic philosophical sources concerns its application to
physics and metaphysics as a tool to explain the constitution of concrete beings. In that context, it
lies at the interface of logic and ontology.
 Avicenna, Categories, 18.15‒17; 19.14‒15. Thus, when Avicenna asserts that “human is a part of an-
imal,” he means that the universal species human is subsumed under and a part of the universal
genus animal alongside other animal species. Alternatively, as in Notes, 56, section 41, ‘animal’
286 III Quiddity in Itself in the Concrete World

cenna in other instances applies a mereological reasoning to explain the status of

quiddity within a larger composite whole, where quiddity this time is considered
not as a universal logical predicate, but as a metaphysical principle or nature,
such as ‘human in itself’ or ‘animal in itself.’ Below are examples of these types
of arguments gleaned from Categories and Metaphysics V.1:

Text 14: ‘Human’ is a subject for ‘animal,’ because ‘animal’ is not an external concomitant of it,
but rather constitutes it and is a part of its existence [juzʾ wujūdihi].⁵²

Text 15: Thus, animal [inasmuch as it is animal], which is a part of this certain animal, exists [fa-
l-ḥayawān alladhī huwa juzʾ min ḥayawān mā mawjūd]. This is like ‘the white’ [al-bayāḍ]: al-
though it is not separable from matter, it is in its whiteness [bi-bayāḍiyyatihi] existent in matter
as something else [shayʾ ākhar], considered [strictly] in itself and endowed with a quidditative
reality of its own [muʿtabar bi-dhātihi wa-dhū ḥaqīqah bi-dhātihi].⁵³

This point receives a more sustained treatment in another section of the same chap-
ter:

Text 16: As for general animal, individual animal, animal considered in potentiality as either
general or individual, animal considered as existing in the concrete world [mawjūd fī l-aʿyān]
or intellected in the soul—this is animal [in itself] and a thing [shayʾ], but not animal considered
[in itself] alone. And it is well known that, if it is [considered as] animal and a thing, then animal
is in them [i. e., the composite of these two things] as a part [juzʾ]. The same applies to [the pure
quiddity] human. Hence, the consideration of the [quiddity] animal in itself is possible [iʿtibār al-
ḥayawān bi-dhātihi jāʾizan], even though it is with another [thing], because it [always] remains
itself even when it is with another. Its essence, therefore, belongs to it in itself [fa-dhātuhu lahu
bi-dhātihi], whereas its being with another is [merely] an accidental occurrence or a certain con-
comitant of its nature [amr ʿāriḍ lahu aw lāzim mā li-ṭabīʿatihi], as in the case of animalness and
humanness. This consideration [of animal in itself] is prior in existence to the animal that is in-
dividuated through its accidents or universal, in concrete existence or in the mind, in the way
that the simple precedes the composite and the part precedes the whole [wa-l-juzʾ ʿalā l-kull].⁵⁴

can be conceived of as a part of ‘human,’ i. e., as a part of the definition of human by genus and dif-
ferentia.
 Avicenna, Categories, I.3, 19.13‒15.
 Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Cure, V.1, 202.5‒8.
 Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Cure, V.1, 201.4‒11; translation by Marmura in Avicenna, The Meta-
physics, 153. This passage is a longer quotation of Text 9 discussed previously. For a discussion of
these passages from Metaphysics in Avicenna and Rāzī, see Ibrahim, Freeing Philosophy. In this ex-
cerpt, Avicenna is referring to animal as a ‘part’ of a larger whole, but it is not clear at first glance
whether he intends it as a constitutive part, i. e., as genus of the quiddity human, or as part of the
composite substance, i. e., quiddity taken together with its external and non-constitutive concomi-
tants. Put differently, is he referring to a part vis-à-vis the other constitutive elements or vis-à-vis
the external concomitants that constitute the composite whole? Either way, what is important here
and what calls for elucidation is that pure animal is regarded as a part of the concrete being. This
mereological argumentation, it should be noted, attracted much attention in the post-Avicennian tra-
dition, with regard to how quiddity could be regarded as a part according to the two aspects outlined
above. Qushjī in particular dwells at length on this issue; see Izutsu, Basic Problems.
 1 The move towards an Avicennian metaphysical realism or formalism 287

How are these passages to be interpreted? More specifically, how do their blatant on-
tological content and references to existence (wujūd) relate to Avicenna’s purely log-
ical use of mereology? In what sense do they allow for an additional metaphysical
reading that would ground pure quiddity in concrete existence as a principle or en-
tity within the composite thing? In brief, what are, if any, the ontological implications
of these passages? Before attempting to shed some light on these questions, I wish to
point out that this use of mereological reasoning seems to have been relatively com-
mon in the classical Arabic philosophical tradition. Another similar instance of it can
be found in a hitherto unstudied and unedited manuscript, which preserves the re-
plies made by Abū Bishr Mattā b. Yūnus to logical questions asked by his pupil
Yaḥyā b. ʿAdī. Below is a translation of the relevant passage:

It cannot be denied that there can be two things whereby one precedes the other in one respect,
but follows it in another respect. Indeed, ‘human’ precedes Socrates inasmuch as it is the nature
of ‘human’ [ṭabīʿat al-insān] and a part among the various parts of Socrates [juzʾ min ajzāʾ Sūq-
rāṭ], but it follows Socrates inasmuch as it is a universal [min ḥaythu kullī] whose existence [in
the mind] is dependent on [or requires] the particulars, while the existence of the particulars
does not require the universal.⁵⁵

Noteworthy terminological parallels notwithstanding—this is the case especially of

the expression ṭabīʿat al-insān—the mereological claim that Mattā puts forth antici-
pates in many ways Avicenna’s own application of mereology to the concrete exis-
tents. Whereas Mattā intends the second part of the argument to refer to the universal
‘human’ in the mind, the first section appears to put forth a mereological picture
whereby the nature human is literally “a part” (juzʾ) of the concrete individual
human, in this case Socrates. What is more, this part precedes the composite and
complete substance Socrates taken as the sum of its various parts. Apart from
Mattā, Yaḥyā b. ʿAdī, another preeminent member of the Baghdad School, frequently
develops mereological arguments in his works to discuss essence, including how it
can be said to exist in the concrete particulars. On the one hand, Yaḥyā appears to
hold a realist view of the universals whereby these exist immanently in the concrete
individuals. On the other hand, these universals or—more accurately in the context of
Yaḥyā’s philosophy—these essences or forms exist as parts of the concrete beings.⁵⁶
So members of the Baghdad School—including Mattā and Yaḥyā—appear to have
raised similar mereological questions to those discussed by Avicenna in his logical
and metaphysical works.
Avicenna appears to apply mereological reasoning to two distinct aspects of
quiddity in his works. The first is primarily—if not exclusively—logical and concerns
the relationship between quiddity and its essential constituents. In that case, the no-
tion of ‘part’ refers to the relationship between the various constituents of quiddity

 Janos and Wisnovsky (in preparation), Abū Bishr Mattā’s Responses.

 See Rashed, Ibn ʿAdī; Arnzen, Platonische Ideen, 71‒74; and section III.4.2.
288 III Quiddity in Itself in the Concrete World

and the complete quiddity taken as a unitary and intelligible meaning and concept,
as well as a complete definition, such as the relation of the genus ‘animal’ to ‘horse’
or of the differentia ‘rational’ to ‘human.’ Thus, at Metaphysics V.6, the master ex-
plains that “genus is predicated of species as a part of its quiddity [juzʾ min māhiyya-
tihi]”⁵⁷; in Logic of the Easterners, he states that ‘animal’ and ‘rational’ are each a
‘part’ of human⁵⁸; and in Physics I.1 that genus is a part of the definition of species
and that, as such, its knowledge precedes the knowledge of the definition.⁵⁹ As parts
of the definition and quiddity, genus and differentia are also constitutive of them.
They are constitutive parts (sing., juzʾ muqawwim).⁶⁰ These various assertions strike
one as purely logical in intent. Recall, however, that in Text 14 above, Avicenna had
made the exact same statement, but with the specification this time that animal is a
part of the existence of the human being (juzʾ wujūdihi). In an even more committal
way, he claims that animal in itself exists in the concrete.⁶¹ Furthermore, in yet other
instances, Avicenna applies mereological analysis not to the relation between the
various constitutive elements of quiddity, but between quiddity and its external con-
comitants, which pertain to quiddity once it is realized in existence. In these cases,
basing himself on the māhiyyah-lawāzim model, Avicenna contends that quiddity as
a part should be contrasted to the other non-constitutive things (ashyāʾ) that attach
to it in existence. So when Avicenna describes humanness in itself or animalness in
itself as a part of a complex existent, it is presumably this last interpretation that he
is promoting.
The last two applications, in contrast to the first, explicitly introduce the notion
of existence and represent a metaphysical or ontological use of mereology. They
pointedly raise the question of how the constitutive elements and the external con-
comitants of quiddity relate to one another in existence. This problematic was estab-
lished already in chapter II in connection with mental existence and the complex
universal concept, but Avicenna extends this metaphysical mereological argument
to encompass the concrete beings as well. In a psychological context, Avicenna
had described the concomitants (lawāzim) of essence as distinct meanings or notions
(maʿānī), attributes (ṣifāt), conditions (shurūṭ), and things (ashyāʾ) that are added to
(zāʾid ʿalā) the quidditative nature in the mind. In the exterior world, these external

 Avicenna, Metaphysics, V.6, 232.16.

 Avicenna, Logic of the Easterners, 14.19‒20.
 Avicenna, Physics, I.1, 5.4‒8.
 Avicenna, Notes, section 48, 60, where differentia is called a constitutive part. For the relation be-
tween being a ‘part,’ being ‘constitutive,’ and being ‘internal’ in Avicenna’s logic, see Kalbarczyk,
Predication, 106‒109.
 It is possible that Avicenna alludes to this same distinction between a purely logical and an on-
tological aspect of mereology in Logic of the Easterners, 17.8‒10, when he explains that the constitu-
tive element (al-muqawwim) can be either “the genus of a thing, or the genus of its genus,” or, alter-
natively, “it can be other than that and yet continue to be a part of its essential reality or the essential
reality of its genus [wa-immā an lā yakūn ka-dhālika bal lā yazālu yakūn juzʾan min ḥaqīqatihi aw
ḥaqīqah jins lahu].”
 1 The move towards an Avicennian metaphysical realism or formalism 289

‘things’ or ‘parts’ include both non-constitutive concomitants (e. g., oneness) and
material accidents proper, such as blackness.⁶² It is noteworthy that in this physical
context, Avicenna’s vocabulary retains some of the terms employed in his psycholo-
gy (notably lawāzim, lawāḥiq, and ashyāʾ), but also resorts to other terms to empha-
size the separation or gap between pure nature and its material attachments: the lat-
ter are “exterior” or “foreign items” (umūr gharībah) relative to nature; they are
material (māddiyyah); and they occur accidentally (yaʿriḍu, yaṭraʾu) to nature.⁶³
The principal difference between these concrete concomitants and the mental ones
is therefore that they are imposed by, and connected with, matter (māddah), whereas
the others were imposed by the requisites and conditions of intentionality and uni-
versal thought. This point notwithstanding, both accounts—that of the mental con-
comitants and that of the concrete concomitants—are modelled on the fundamental
māhiyyah-lawāzim paradigm.
These various aspects of mereological analysis are hinted at in a compressed sec-
tion of Metaphysics V.2, which seems to be a kind of blueprint for the way in which
Avicenna conceives of the extramental existence of quiddity:

Text 17: [A] The whole inasmuch as it is a whole exists in [concrete] things, whereas the univer-
sal inasmuch as it is a universal exists only in conception [fī l-taṣawwur]. [B] Moreover, the
whole is enumerated by its parts and each one of its parts enters into its subsistence [qiwāmihi].
In contrast, the universal is not enumerated by its parts, nor do the particulars contribute to its
subsistence. [C] In addition, the nature of the whole does not cause its parts to subsist, but
rather is caused to subsist through them, whereas the nature of the universal causes its parts
to subsist. [D] Likewise, the nature of the whole never becomes one of its parts, whereas the na-
ture of the universal is a part of the nature of the particulars [ṭabīʿat al-kullī juzʾ min ṭabīʿat al-
juzʾiyyāt], either because (1) they are a species and therefore subsist in virtue of two universal
natures—namely, genus and differentia—or because (2) they are individuals [ashkāṣ], in which
case they subsist in virtue of the nature of all the universals [that constitute them], as well as
of the nature of the accidents that are embedded in matter.⁶⁴

Segments [A] and [B] are relatively straightforward and cohere with Avicenna’s re-
peated caveat to the effect that the universals per se do not exist in the concrete
world. Rather, what exists in the concrete are composite substances, each one of
which is a whole (kull) that can be divided into its various constitutive parts. It
should be pointed out that these parts can consist of the sum of the physical ele-
ments that make up a thing, such as the various wooden parts or pieces that
make up a table, or they can be conceived of as principles (mabādiʾ), such as
form and matter, which, Avicenna holds, are also ‘parts’ of the composite whole.⁶⁵
Accordingly, whereas one can provide an exhaustive or enumerative account of the

 See Avicenna, Salvation, 344.14‒345.5.

 Avicenna, Salvation, 344.14‒345.5.
 Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Cure, V.2.212.4‒12, translation by Marmura in Avicenna, The Meta-
physics, 161‒162, revised.
 See notably Avicenna, Metaphysics VI.1.
290 III Quiddity in Itself in the Concrete World

various parts of a concrete whole, a universal is never depleted by the enumeration

of the particulars that fall under it. What is more (segment [C]), because the parts
make up the whole, they participate directly in its subsistence. The whole, in fact,
could not subsist or exist without the combined existence of its parts. Thus, when
one dismantles the string and limbs of a bow, the bow as such no longer exists ac-
tually. And when a wax figure is melted, that specific composite of form and matter
no longer exists. In contrast, the universal species human is responsible for the sub-
sistence of the genus ‘animal’ and the differentia ‘rational’ in its definition, since it
unifies them into a single definition and concept.
Segment [D] is by far the most relevant to the present query. There it is said that
“the nature of the universal is a part of the nature of the particulars” (ṭabīʿat al-kullī
juzʾ min ṭabīʿat al-juzʾiyyāt), a statement that immediately brings to mind and chimes
with Avicenna’s and Mattā’s comments in the preceding passages regarding the ex-
istence of ‘human’ and ‘animal’ in the concrete beings. In fact, the language used
here and the ubiquitous reference to the nature (ṭabīʿah) of the universal make it
clear that this represents the mereological aspect these thinkers are relying on
when they appear to postulate the concrete existence of quiddity. In this regard, Avi-
cenna strategizes two ways of approaching this idea. The first is to regard the partic-
ulars collectively as a species—e. g., all individual humans are subsumed under the
species human— in which case the universal genus ‘animal’ and the universal differ-
entia ‘rational’ will, as constitutive elements, be ‘part’ of the essence of that species,
and by extension of each human being, precisely in virtue of their belonging to that
species. In this connection, it is unclear whether Avicenna intends this aspect in
purely logical terms or as corresponding to real quidditative parts of the concrete
being. But given that he describes them as parts in each particular (juzʾī), and that
he elsewhere seems to contend that the quiddities exist in them, this mereological
aspect appears to transcend the purely logical plane. This in fact seems confirmed
by the second way of approaching the issue [D2]: if the particulars (juzʾiyyāt) are con-
sidered as realized individuals (ashkāṣ), as composites of the essential principles and
individualizing features brought about by matter, then the universals can be consid-
ered as essential parts that subsist in them alongside their accidental material parts.
The distinction between [D1] and [D2] seems to boil down, ultimately, to a mer-
eological analysis of the constitutive parts of quiddity vs. a mereological analysis of
the constitutive parts of quiddity, on the one hand, and of the non-constitutive con-
comitants and accidents of quiddity, on the other. To put it differently, there is the
mereology of what is internal (dākhil) and essential (dhātī) to quiddity, and the mer-
eology of what is external (khārijī) and accidental (ʿaraḍī) to quiddity, as well as how
it relates to what is internal. What is noteworthy is that Avicenna subjects these var-
ious aspects to a mereological analysis and deems that both the differentia ‘rational’
and the material non-constitutive accident are somehow ‘parts’ of the concrete and
individual existent, albeit in different ways. These parts subsist or exist in the con-
crete and participate (albeit again in different ways) toward the completion and re-
alization of the composite, whole substance that is Bucephalus or Socrates. It would
 1 The move towards an Avicennian metaphysical realism or formalism 291

seem that Avicenna’s understanding of mereology in this specific respect possesses a

physical and metaphysical thrust and goes beyond logic, since it serves to account
for the ontological reality and constitution of the particular beings.
In light of these points, a few observations pertaining to Text 16 above are in
order. Notice to begin with that Avicenna uses a mereological approach in these pas-
sages to distinguish pure quiddity—in this case ‘animal in itself’ and ‘human in it-
self’—from other ‘things’ (ashyāʾ), whose identity or nature nevertheless remains
to be clarified. Moreover, Avicenna’s examples include not only what corresponds
in the mind to a genus (‘animal’), but also what corresponds to a species
(‘human’), so that it is not entirely clear how they can both be regarded as a ‘part’
of the concrete existent. Avicenna presumably does not intend to say that the univer-
sal genus animal exists in ‘a certain animal,’ since the universal genus animal exists
only in the mind. As was just noted, these passages focus on the pure quiddity ani-
malness, not on the mental universal genus animal. The example focusing on the
pure quiddity humanness seems equally problematic, albeit for different reasons:
for, it would seem, the only ‘part’ it can occupy is that of a species when subsumed
under the genus animal in the mind (such as when it is said that ‘horse’ and ‘human’
are species subsumed under the genus ‘animal’). But this again has to do with log-
ical classifications and definitions, which do not seem to apply to these excerpts.
What this implies is that the kind of mereological reasoning that underlies these pas-
sages has no real connection with the mereology of the universal predicates used in
logic to explain the relation between species and genera. Limiting the scope of Avi-
cenna’s argumentation to the purely logical plane runs into a series of difficulty and
seems to miss the point entirely. In this particular case, the focus appears to be on
the relationship between quiddity and its external concomitants, as well as on the
ontological status of pure quiddity in concrete beings. There is, to begin with, the ex-
plicit language of existence attached to these mereological claims. Text 16, for in-
stance, locates the mereological status of animal in itself in the concrete existent
(among other things) and is therefore to be connected with the many other passages
where Avicenna unambiguously asserts the existence of pure quiddity in concrete in-
dividuals. What this passage adds to this basic claim is the mereological nature of
this ontological mode: animal in itself exists as ‘a part’ of each concrete animal.
These explicit references to concrete existence befit the framework of Metaphysics,
but they also suggest a distancing from more traditional and purely logical usages
of mereology. This hypothesis coheres with one important sense of ‘part’ that Avicen-
na recognizes in his philosophy:

Text 18: Among [the various senses of] ‘the part,’ there is that [according to which] a thing is
divided not according to quantity, but in existence [lā fī l-kamm bal fī l-wujūd], like the soul
and body in the animal, and the form and matter in the composite, and in general with regard
to the various principles [mabādiʾ] by which a composite thing is composed.⁶⁶

 Avicenna, Metaphysics, IV.3, 191.3‒5.

292 III Quiddity in Itself in the Concrete World

The idea that something can be divided and possess parts “in existence” (fī l-wujūd),
combined with the description of some of these parts as principles (mabādiʾ), ena-
bles one to conceptualize the various parts of quiddity as somehow existing in the
concrete qua principles. Given that Avicenna otherwise correlates hylomorphic dis-
tinctions with logical distinctions in the mind, and in particular that he establishes
a strong correlation between essence and form, this hypothesis deserves to be pur-
sued further; it will be picked up in the next section.
What is more, the mereological framework applied in those texts supports the
distinction between pure quiddity and the concomitants and accidents that accom-
pany it in realized existence. In this connection, one important gloss on Text 16
above should focus on the term shayʾ. Here it refers not to the individual thing
taken as a whole (and thus construed as co-extensional with mawjūd), but to the ex-
ternal accidents and concomitants that attach to quiddity and are not constitutive of
it, such as universality, oneness, or the various material accidents in the concrete be-
ings. These various extrinsic ‘things’ can accompany quiddity in actual existence, but
they do not prevent the essence from being conceivable ‘in itself’ and from enjoying
an irreducible and distinct status in the composite thing or whole. Given that the
mereological argument at stake here focuses on the relation between quiddity and
its extrinsic concomitants and aims to clarify in what sense quiddity can be said
to exist in the concrete world, limiting its thrust to the purely logical or definitional
plane would be unduly reductionist. One key point that emerges from these texts is
that the cognitive distinction between māhiyyah and shayʾ is possible precisely be-
cause māhiyyah is irreducible and remains ontologically distinct vis-à-vis its concom-
itants and accidents taken as external ‘things.’ The upshot appears to be that quid-
dity, although an irreducible principle and part in concrete and mental beings,
combines with these external things, the sum or synthesis of which yields the actual
composite existent. Hence, the nature (ṭabīʿah) and pure quiddity should be regarded
as a part (juzʾ) of a larger, composite entity, which is composed of quiddity and other
things (ashyāʾ) that derive from it and are related to it qua accidents and concomi-
tants. All of this is in line with the Avicennian māhiyyah-lawāzim model.
One of the effects of this mereological construal and of a realist, or at least for-
mal, interpretation of essence, would be to ground Avicenna’s theory of abstraction
in an ontological foundation. Abstracting the intelligible form from the concrete in-
dividuals would be possible on account of the epistemic and ontological correspond-
ence between extramental and universal quiddities. As Avicenna explains in Text 6
above, quiddity in the concrete world is unconditioned (lā bi-sharṭ shayʾ ākhar) on
account of the fact that the external things, accidents, and concomitants (shayʾ,
ʿāriḍ, and lāzim) that combine with it in concreto do not affect its inner nature
and reality. It remains an ontologically constant and irreducible part within the
whole, an essential principle that can be distinguished from the composite entity.
As Avicenna puts it in Text 16 “it [pure quiddity] itself with another is still itself,
and its essence belongs to it by virtue of itself” (dhātahu maʿa ghayrihi dhātuhu
fa-dhātuhu lahu bi-dhātihi). Regardless of whether one approaches these passages
 1 The move towards an Avicennian metaphysical realism or formalism 293

primarily from an epistemological or ontological vantage point, their main thrust is

that pure quiddity remains irreducible even when it exists in concrete beings.
An echo of this claim can be found in a passage of Notes, which stresses the dif-
ference between two types of intelligibles: the intelligible corresponding to the ab-
stract quiddity that belongs to a thing (mujarrad māhiyyatihi allatī lahu), and the
kind of composite intelligible that is constituted by the abstract quiddity taken
with its concomitants:

The intelligible [maʿqūl] of this individual [thing] consists of quiddity taken with [that thing’s]
accidents and properties, which constitute and individualize it, and not of the abstract quiddity
alone. For ‘this human’ is not what it is [solely] on account of abstract humanness, but [also] of
the composite [majmūʿ] of form and matter, as well as of the accidents by which it becomes in-
dividualized in terms of quantity, quality, place, etc.⁶⁷

Avicenna’s mereological framework establishes the epistemic and ontological irredu-

cibility of essence, whereby the pure quiddity ‘animalness’ exists as an irreducible
part in each concrete instantiation ‘animal’ as well as in each universal concept ‘an-
imal.’⁶⁸ What is more, according to this text, it seems to allow for a kind of modified
and complex intelligible apprehension of the individual thing, which would consist
of pure quiddity taken with its accidents and concomitants, that is, with ‘other
things.’ When it comes to the apprehension of both the universal concept and of
the composite and hylomorphic individual described here, which is perhaps to be
identified with the notion of ‘vague individual,’⁶⁹ the crux of Avicenna’s argumenta-
tion hinges on the distinction between pure quiddity and the ‘things’ external to it.
This distinction is crucial, because it allows the master to say not only that human-
ness can be said of Zayd (in a way not dissimilar to how the universal ‘human’ can be
‘said of’ Zayd), but somehow also that humanness exists in and as a part of Zayd. The
implicit distinction between pure quiddity and the mental universal that underlies
these texts is significant, because it precludes the affirmation that it is the universal
genera, species, and differentiae as such that exist in concrete beings, although they
can legitimately be said of concrete beings. In contrast, the pure quiddities and na-
tures are not, as such, universal differentiae, species, and genera. This distinction
opens a new perspective regarding the ontological reality of the pure natures in
the concrete world.
One upshot is that the various conditions of quiddity mentioned previously—
positively conditioned (bi-sharṭ shayʾ), negatively conditioned (bi-sharṭ lā shayʾ),
and unconditioned (lā bi-sharṭ shayʾ)—are all epistemic aspects that ultimately

 Avicenna, Notes, 44.2‒6, section 26. In some passages, as in this one, Avicenna appears to recog-
nize the human capacity to obtain intelligibles of concrete things that would include concomitants
and accidents in addition to the quiddity itself. This point requires further investigation and cannot
be pursued here.
 That is, in the various concepts of universal animal reflected by the various human minds.
 See Black, Avicenna’s ‘Vague Individual.’
294 III Quiddity in Itself in the Concrete World

refer to a single, irreducible ontological reality and mode of existence of quiddity.

Accordingly, what changes is the conceptual consideration of how quiddity relates
to its extrinsic concomitants and accidents, to the other ‘things’ that are not itself.
By extension, these conditions suggest different ‘contexts’ of existence (concrete or
mental), which dictate the presence of a set of concomitants accompanying essence.
In the case of concrete beings, quiddity exists unconditionally or in an uncondi-
tioned way (lā bi-sharṭ shayʾ), because although (under one aspect) it exists ‘with
other things,’ (under another aspect) it remains irreducible and only itself. As a con-
sequence, it may be apprehended by the mind with or without its concomitants and
accidents, depending on one’s intention. In either case, these external accidents do
not affect the quidditative nature in any way, which remains constant, and whose
unique ontological status transcends the attributes imposed by positively-condi-
tioned mental and concrete existence. Thus, the idea of the unconditionedness of
pure quiddity depends directly on its ontological and epistemic irreducibility.
Let us return to Avicenna’s claim that pure quiddity exists as a part of the com-
posite substance—whether the universal concept (taken as secondary substance) or
the concrete and individual being (taken as primary substance)—for some points still
remain obscure. The most pressing question focuses on the part or principle of the
concrete existent with which pure quiddity should be identified. Thus far, the anal-
ysis and the evidence gathered suggest that it is with its form. Form (ṣūrah) is defined
as a part (juzʾ) and principle (mabdaʾ) of the composite, and Avicenna moreover em-
phasizes its strong connection with essence. Given these parallels, it stands to reason
to correlate quiddity primarily with form. But before turning to this issue in earnest
in the next section, it is important to dwell on some potential interpretive pitfalls,
some of which are acknowledged by Avicenna himself. In this regard, there are
two options that should be rejected from the outset. The first is the assumption
that pure quiddity exists solely as a material part or constituent in the concrete beings
and, hence, that it would be limited to their material constitution or represent a ma-
terial cause of some sort. This view is untenable, because it would reduce essence to
a kind of materialism that Avicenna did not embrace. If anything, quiddity and es-
sence are to be associated with form, not with matter, and Avicenna at any rate
does not connect quiddity exclusively with the material elements or with prime mat-
ter.⁷⁰ Thus, unlike many theologians who were his contemporaries, Avicenna is not a
materialist in the sense that he would recognize only material principles or irreduci-

 Nevertheless, some qualifications are called for. Avicenna, Pointers, vols. 3‒4, 441.3‒6, connects
the material cause with quiddity; thus, the surface and geometrical body of triangle are like (ka‐) its
material cause. Furthermore, matter fulfils one of the definitions of substance for Avicenna, and mat-
ter also has its own quiddity, which is pure receptivity for form. But form is substance and essence in
a primary way and has priority over matter; more on this shortly.
 1 The move towards an Avicennian metaphysical realism or formalism 295

ble material constituents of reality.⁷¹ Moreover, assuming (for the sake of argument)
that quiddity does exist as a concrete or material part of physical beings, then all in-
dividuals belonging to the same species would need to have this material part in
common. In other words, all human beings would need to share the material part
‘humanness’ in order to qualify as members of the same species. This view would
entail a kind of participation in the same material principle. But there is no single
and already existent matter that human beings have in common that accounts for
their humanness. Rather, what is common on Avicenna’s account is the essential na-
ture and form humanness, matter being what particularizes each and every individ-
ual of the species.
Nor should Avicenna’s position be construed as implying a kind of participation
in an essence or form that would be separate and numerically one and the same in
all concrete instances along the lines of a Platonic form. There is no numerically one
and determinate form of humanness shared by all human beings, or in which these
instances would all participate, whose source would at the same time transcend and
lie outside the sum of these individual instances.⁷² As Avicenna explains in Introduc-
tion, animalness in the exterior world is not an “individual that can be pointed at”
(shakhṣan mushāran ilayhi), nor does it exist separately in actuality.⁷³ Accordingly
the master is keen to refute the doctrines of the separate extramental existence of
essence and of Platonic participation. In spite of this, Avicenna does regard quiddity
in itself as somehow existing in all concrete beings. As I will argue shortly, he also
conceives of quiddity in itself as something intelligible, yet not in the way defined by
the Platonists. The difficulty involved here is therefore to grasp how Avicenna can
uphold such a claim and at the same time emerge unscathed from the criticism he
levels at the Platonists.
At first glance, the claim that quiddity in itself exists in the concrete individuals
would seem to require a theory of formal participation and the postulation of a sep-
arate ontological state of essence. But this need not be the case. I showed previously
that Avicenna attributes some kind of ontological mental distinctness and abstrac-
tion to pure quiddity, but rejects the view that it may exist separately and autono-
mously in the extramental world. As Marmura, Porro, and Menn have showed, Avicen-
na mounted an acerbic critique of the Platonic position that relied among other
considerations on the distinction between plain and metathetic negation and espe-
cially on how this distinction applies to the relationship between quiddity and exis-

 Recall, in this connection, that juzʾ is the term favored by the theologians to express the atom: al-
juzʾ alladhī lā yatajazzaʾ. The atom or juzʾ in their systems also coincides with unitary substance or
jawhar. Avicenna departs radically from these views.
 I already devoted some attention to Avicenna’s rebuttal of the Platonic theories of the forms and
participation in chapter II. What needs to be stressed here, however, is that Avicenna articulates this
critique in connection with quiddity in itself explicitly, which he regards as an inherent principle in
beings, not a transcendent one like the Platonic Forms.
 Avicenna, Introduction, I.12, 65.19.
296 III Quiddity in Itself in the Concrete World

tence.⁷⁴ One of Avicenna’s key objectives is to show that the consideration of quiddity
in itself in abstraction from all other things, that is, of ‘negatively-conditioned’ quid-
dity or quiddity ‘on the condition of no other thing’ (bi-sharṭ lā shayʾ ākhar), does not
imply the separate extramental existence of this quiddity, as the Platonists claim. Al-
though this aspect of pure and abstract quiddity can be conceived of in the mind, it
does not possess a separate and autonomous being in the extramental world. In the
extramental world, quiddity is always combined with material accidents. Even in the
latter case, however, the mind can, through its abstractive powers, disentangle es-
sence from these material accidents, isolate it as an object of thought, and conceive
of it fully in abstraction from them.⁷⁵ In this state, however, quiddity is not a mental
universal, but rather a common nature, in itself irreducible, yet immanent in a com-
posite and concrete substance. This extramental aspect of quiddity is ‘uncondi-
tioned’ or ‘not on the condition of another thing’ (lā bi-sharṭ shayʾ ākhar), meaning
that essence may be combined with material accidents and conceived in association
with them (its actual state of existence in the extramental world) or abstracted from
them and conceived in itself. It is this conceptual flexibility that makes it uncondi-
tioned. Either way, this aspect of quiddity is markedly different from the bi-sharṭ
lā shayʾ aspect, which Avicenna claims exists only in the mind, and which is never
combined with material accidents—both on the polemical Platonist reading Avicenna
provides and on his own interpretation of this negative condition in the frame of
human cognition. Hence, and to recap, the main point to which Avicenna objects
is that pure quiddity can be ‘negatively conditioned’ or bi-sharṭ lā shayʾ ākhar in
the extramental, concrete world. On Avicenna’s view, Platonists have mistakenly infer-
red the ontological separateness of pure quiddity in the concrete world on the basis
of its purely mental and epistemic distinctness.⁷⁶
Avicenna’s refutation of a robust realist position associated with the legacy of
Platonism in Islam can be gauged also from another document, which consists
this time of a letter he wrote to the scholars (ʿulamāʾ) of Baghdad. In that letter, Avi-
cenna asks these scholars to adjudicate between his position and that of Abū l-Qāsim

 These authors, however, limit their comments to the connection between negatively-conditioned
quiddity and the Platonic forms, thereby focusing exclusively on its function in Avicenna’s polemic
against Platonic metaphysics.
 As suggested earlier, one may surmise that the epistemic abstractability of pure quiddity is de-
rived from its being ontologically irreducible in the concrete world. Were pure quiddity not to exist
at all in the concrete world or to be fully devoid of reality, it would not be possible for us to recognize
and apprehend the whatness of individual beings and to abstract their essence.
 See especially Metaphysics of The Cure, VII.2, 314.9 ff. Porro in particular emphasizes this distinc-
tion, because his focus lies chiefly on the Avicennian attack against Platonism and against the theory
of the extramental existence of the quiddities or forms. Understandably, he is eager to show that Avi-
cenna condemned the theory of the extramental separate existence of the pure quiddities. The notion
of an ‘eidetic’ separation also appears in de Libera, La querelle, 234. These two authors construe it as
referring to the possibility of conceiving quiddity as a form in the mind without this entailing its ex-
tramental separation.
 1 The move towards an Avicennian metaphysical realism or formalism 297

al-Kirmānī regarding a set of philosophical issues, one of which concerns the onto-
logical status of universals. This text, which was studied briefly by Yahya Michot,
Marwan Rashed, and Rüdiger Arnzen, contains Avicenna’s summary of al-Kirmānī’s
views followed by his responses to them.⁷⁷ Although the Letter, which was written in
or shortly after 1015, a date which marks Avicenna’s debate with Abū l-Qāsim in
Hamadhān, precedes by several years the redaction of Metaphysics of The Cure, it
puts forth a similar argumentative strategy aimed at undermining the thesis of the
extramental existence of the universals and at confining their existence to the
mind. Now, although this document can be interpreted as a wholesale rejection of
the extramental existence of common things and universals, it is important to
point out that Avicenna’s intention appears to be primarily to clarify in which way
these cannot be said to exist in the concrete world. More specifically, anticipating
on the anti-Platonic polemic he unleashes in Metaphysics, he is intent on showing
that the essences cannot exist as numerically one or single entities in the concrete
world, as well as the fact that they do not exist separately like Platonic forms.⁷⁸ In
conveying al-Kirmānī’s views, Avicenna tells us that the former regarded humanness
as “one humanness” (insāniyyah wāḥidah), “one essence” (dhāt wāḥidah), “one re-
ality” (ḥaqīqah wāḥidah), and as “subsisting” in itself (bāqiyah), as well as the
fact that he held that “the one reality [e. g., humanness] is one essence in [concrete]
existence” (al-ḥaqīqah al-wāḥidah dhāt wāḥidah fī l-wujūd).⁷⁹ The key points that
emerge from the Letter are that an essence, say, humanness, is not a numerically
one thing or nature in the concrete; that the humanness of Zayd is different from
that of ʿAmr, even though both are humanness and nothing else; and that human-
ness as such is not separate and distinct from the particulars that instantiate it. Ad-
mittedly, it remains unclear whether Avicenna in this text is polemicizing solely
against a Platonic model of separate forms, or whether he would extend that critique
to include other more moderate Platonic positions that posit the essences (such as
humanness) as a distinct concept in the divine mind. This point notwithstanding,
Avicenna’s argument seems primarily aimed at the notion that a single and numeri-
cally one essence can be said to exist in the world separately from the particulars.
Because of its polemical quality and compressed format, however, the Letter pro-

 Michot, Lettre au vizir, 10‒16; Rashed, Ibn ʿAdī, 122‒129; Arnzen, Platonische Ideen, 95‒96, 355‒
370; see also Gutas, Avicenna, 503; and Reisman, The Making, 166‒185. Avicenna appears to have
written several short letters or treatises with the express purpose of refuting al-Kirmānī’s philosoph-
ical positions, and this mindset is also reflected in Discussions, which often takes aim at al-Kirmānī’s
views. Rashed suggests that Avicenna regarded al-Kirmānī as a mediocre (and not so faithful) disciple
of Ibn ʿAdī, particularly on the topic of the universals, whose position al-Kirmānī distorted and exa-
cerbated in the direction of a more salient form of Platonism. It should be said that the Letter is tex-
tually problematic and most probably corrupt in many places. It should accordingly be interpreted
with care.
 This is also how both Rashed, Ibn ʿAdī, 122‒129, and Arnzen, Platonische Ideen, 357, have under-
stood the text.
 Avicenna, Letter, 77‒79.
298 III Quiddity in Itself in the Concrete World

vides a rather schematic outline of Avicenna’s position. As such, it does not yield
new philosophical insight beyond the information that can be gathered from The
Cure. What is more, its impression on the reader may distract from the more nuanced
position the master articulates in Metaphysics V. At any rate, its contents need to be
evaluated in light of the chronology of Avicenna’s works and of the richer and longer
treatment of the universals in Metaphysics V.
Returning to the latter text, one important Arabic term underlying Avicenna’s
discussion is mufāriq (‘separate,’ and by extension, ‘immaterial’). When Avicenna
uses this term in his works, it is almost always in order to refer to extramental exis-
tents that are separate from matter, such as when he refers to the immaterial movers
of the orbs as ‘separate beings’ and ‘separate intellects’ (al-mufāriqāt, al-ʿuqūl al-mu-
fāriqah). In the context of his refutation of the Platonists, a similar meaning seems to
hold. It is in this case meant to refer to the autonomous and separate existence of the
Forms in the concrete world. Avicenna chastises the Platonists for holding that the
quiddities are mufāriqah in the exterior world, in the same way in which the separate
intellects can be said to be mufāriqah. In a similar vein, the master cautions that the
universals cannot exist as ‘individually separate’ (mufrad) in the concrete world.⁸⁰
This Platonic background explains why Avicenna virtually never describes the
pure quiddities as being mufāriqah and mufradah. If applied at all to these objects
in the context of his own doctrine, the term mufāriq conveys the weak sense of ‘men-
tally abstract or distinct’ or ‘existing distinctly in the mind,’ and not the strong sense
of ‘endowed with separate existence in the concrete world,’ which is precisely how
the Platonists construe it. For all intents and purposes, Avicenna uses this term as a
synonym of mujarrad (abstract or abstracted in the mind) when it comes to pure
quiddity.⁸¹
In this connection, Avicenna draws a distinction between “separate [or separa-
ble] in definition” and “separate [or separable] in existence” (mufāriq bi-l-ḥadd
and bi-l-wujūd) and uses it to stress the difference between a meaning (maʿnā)
that is separate or distinct in the mind and a being (mawjūd) that is separate in ex-
istence.⁸² Whereas quiddity in itself is separate or separable in the first sense, it is
not separate according to the second sense.⁸³ With that being said, one must remem-

 Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Cure, V.2, 207.7.

 Thus, the main difference between Avicenna’s and—on Avicenna’s view—the Platonists’ usage of
these terms is both contextual and semantic and focuses on the distinction between the concrete and
mental spheres.
 See the discussion at Metaphysics of The Cure, VII.2, 311.8 ff.
 One qualification is in order here. The term mufāriq is equivocal, and whether it can be applied to
the quiddities and forms in Avicenna’s philosophy depends on one’s construal of it. In the context of
the present discussion and of Avicenna’s response to the Platonic theory of the forms, mufāriq can be
applied to quiddity only if one construes it as meaning not only ‘separate from matter,’ but also ‘ex-
isting in an intellect,’ and not ‘separate from matter’ and ‘existing alone or in itself like a Platonic
form.’ In this regard, the term mufāriq is ambiguous, since immaterial existence can be in the
mind (e. g., a concept) or it can also refer to an exterior existent (e. g., a separate intellect); neverthe-
 1 The move towards an Avicennian metaphysical realism or formalism 299

ber that forms and intelligibles in the human mind are existents, so that eidetic or
mental abstractness or separation will, on Avicenna’s view, constitute a qualified
kind of ontological separation as well. But the key distinction here is between distinct,
separate, or abstract existence in the intellect and in the extramental and concrete
world. Whereas all the human intelligibles and pure quiddities belong to the former
category, the latter includes only God and the separate intellects in Avicenna’s meta-
physics.⁸⁴ Hence, Avicenna intends to refute the view that the pure quiddities can
exist separately in the extramental world, as well as to deny that the clause bi-
sharṭ lā shayʾ ākhar can be applied to them in that context (contra the Platonic posi-
tion).⁸⁵ Nevertheless, Avicenna leaves open the possibility that these same quiddities
can exist either abstractly in the human mind and/or immanently in concrete beings.
In fact, if he explicitly rejects the extramental separate existence of the pure quiddi-
ties, we saw that he endorses their mental existence as distinct intelligible objects.
The master believes that the pure quiddities exist in a state of pure abstractedness
and distinctness from everything else in the mind. It is in this case, and in this

less, Avicenna opts to designate the former with the term mujarrad in the vast majority of cases. When
confronting Plato’s theory of the Forms, Avicenna’s point is that the pure quiddities, unlike the Forms,
are not mufāriqah in the sense that they exist separately on their own. As I shall argue in chapter V, the
pure quiddities are mufāriqah in that they exist immaterially, but also in the separate intellects. It is to
avoid this confusion, I believe, that Avicenna in most cases prefers to describe the quiddities as being
mujarrad, abstract or abstracted, rather than mufāriq, separate. He does, however, refer to the sepa-
rate forms, but this is presumably a reference to the separate intellects themselves. For a discussion of
the term mufāriq in connection with Avicenna’s epistemology and the Neoplatonic sources, see D’An-
cona, Degrees of Abstraction; and Hasse, Avicenna’s Epistemological Optimism.
 Indeed, the issue is more complicated than it might first appear. For on Avicenna’s account, men-
tal objects—and especially the intellectual concepts, such as the form of humanness mentioned in
this passage—are full-fledged existents of a mental or intellectual kind. By implication, this means
that their separation will not merely be of an epistemic or gnoseological nature—or what Pini and
Porro call a “gnoseological distinction” and an “eidetic separation” respectively—but will in addition
correspond to an intellectual ontological mode. Insofar as these concepts are existents, their separa-
tion must by the same token be an ontological one, that is, an ontological separation from what is
material, although this separability will be proper to intellectual existence. These considerations
are reflected in the ambiguity of the Avicennian terminology, for the master uses such terms as mu-
jarrad to refer to existents that are separate or abstract both in the mind and in the exterior world. In
light of this, it becomes difficult, perhaps even moot, to distinguish between a purely epistemic or
gnoseological vs. an ontological separation in Avicenna’s account. In order to maintain this distinc-
tion, one would need to refine it further and differentiate between ‘extramental ontological separate-
ness’ and ‘mental or intellectual ontological separateness,’ or, as I prefer to put it in this case, ‘dis-
tinctness.’ The latter refers to a concept as an immaterial and intelligible entity in the mind and as
having a distinct ontological status.
 See, in particular, Metaphysics VII.2, 314.9 ff. Later interpreters, such as Ṭūsī, will follow Avicenna
closely. In Commentary on Pointers, vol. 3‒4, 463, Ṭūsī, responding to the comments of Fakhr al-Dīn,
tries to establish that the pure quiddities do not exist autonomously and separately in the concrete
world and that they are not agents or causes of realized existence. This seems to be a veiled criticism
of the Platonic forms qua causes. Like Avicenna, however, Ṭūsī leaves open the possibility that the
quiddities can exist distinctly in the human mind and immanently as forms in concrete beings.
300 III Quiddity in Itself in the Concrete World

case only, that the clause bi-sharṭ lā shayʾ ākhar can be applied to quiddity. To sum
up, Avicenna’s argumentation in The Cure VII.2 may be described as twofold, rather
than one-dimensional: (a) inasmuch as quiddity in itself can be considered in ab-
straction from all other things and constitutes a distinct form in the intellect, it en-
joys an eidetic and ontological separation (or rather distinctness) proper to the mind;
but (b) it would be a mistake to infer from this—as the Platonists have—that it also
enjoys a separate existence in the extramental world.
Now that the polemical aspect of Avicenna’s position and the views that he did
not embrace have been examined, let us focus on the theory he upheld with regard to
how quiddity can be said to exist in concrete beings. In this regard, one may ask the
following question: how did Avicenna reconcile his critique of the Platonists with the
affirmation of the existence of pure quiddity in concrete beings? Although Avicenna’s
position precludes a separate, autonomous, and entitative existence of quiddity in
itself on the model of a Platonic form, the potential problem of participation and
of how essence can exist in, and be a part of, each individual existent without it
being a numerically single or one thing common to all of them still needs to be ad-
dressed. This argumentative nuance—that quiddity in itself does not exist separately
in the extramental world, but that it somehow exists immanently in each individual
existent—is the key to understanding Avicenna’s position on the issue. Significant in
this connection is the notion of maʿnā as applied to quiddity in itself. As we saw pre-
viously, this notion borders on the logical and the ontological, and in its dual mean-
ing as ‘idea or meaning’ and ‘thing or entity,’ it expresses the dual epistemic and on-
tological aspects of pure quiddity in the human mind and the concrete world. With
regard to the point being examined here, Avicenna claims that all instances of hu-
manness, i. e., all individual human beings, possess or are qualified by the maʿnā hu-
manness, but he refutes the view that there exists a single and numerically one
maʿnā (maʿnā wāḥid) shared by all of them. In other words, he rejects the possibility
of a single quidditative meaning in which all the concrete instances of human would
participate in the way that, according to Plato, beautiful things all participate in the
Form of beauty. As he states in Metaphysics VII.2, “when we say that humanness is
one, we do not intend by this that it is one meaning [or entity, maʿnā wāḥid], which
would be the very same one that is found in many and by which it would become
many by means of relation.”⁸⁶ Earlier in the same work, he had warned against
the view that the humanness of Zayd and the humanness of ʿAmr are “numerically
one [wāḥidah bi-l-ʿadad].”⁸⁷
In spite of this, Avicenna does believe that there is a maʿnā, a quidditative mean-
ing, of humanness that is the same in Zayd and in ʿAmr and in all the beings that fall
under its definition. So that his position is not that quiddity in itself, e. g., animal-
ness, does not exist simpliciter in the concrete particulars, but rather (a) that it

 Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Cure, VII.2, 315.6‒8.

 Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Cure, V.1, 198.11‒12.
 1 The move towards an Avicennian metaphysical realism or formalism 301

does not exist as a numerically determined entity or principle, and (b) that it does not
exist separately from these particulars. Barring these two misinterpretations, quiddi-
ty in itself may be said to exist in the concrete particulars. It is the same meaning in
each one of them, just as the meaning of being a father or fatherhood is the same
with regard to the various father-son relations existing in the world. So like the Pla-
tonists, he believes that quiddity in itself exists in extramental reality. But unlike
them, he believes that it does not exist separately from the concrete particulars. In
order to articulate his theory, he begins by quoting the following view:

Someone, however, may say: [a] ‘Animal inasmuch as it is animal does not exist in individuals.
[This is] because that which exists in individuals is a certain animal, not animal inasmuch as it
is animal. [b] Moreover, animal inasmuch as it is animal exists. It is, hence, separate from indi-
viduals.’⁸⁸

Having put forth this account, Avicenna proceeds to describe it as “feeble and inane”
and to criticize it on a number of counts. What is important for our purposes is that
he rejects not only the theory of the separate existence of animal in itself or the tran-
scendent form animal [b], but also the claim according to which it simply does not
exist in particulars [a]. In response to [a], Avicenna believes that quiddity in itself—
and not merely quiddity in a vague or diffused sense—does exist in concrete reality,
but, in contrast to [b], he holds that it exists only in the particulars and not as a sep-
arate and independent form. Avicenna’s criticism of the Platonic position is therefore
a nuanced one rather than a wholesale one. It is not centered on the issue of whether
quiddity in itself exists in extramental reality, but of how and in what mode it can be
said to exist. In light of this, much of the contents of Metaphysics V.1—in line with its
title, “On general things and how they exist”⁸⁹—consist of an elucidation of how pure
quiddity can be said to exist in the concrete world, in the same manner that it tries to
explain in what sense pure quiddity can be said to exist in the human soul.

1.3 Quiddity and form

In order to make headway on this issue, I wish to examine how the common nature
or quiddity in concrete beings relates to form and especially to the theory of imma-
nent forms or forms existing in material beings. For Avicenna’s mereological account
of quiddity in the concrete world is closely tied to his hylomorphic theories. The latter
provide a lens through which to interpret the idea that pure quiddity is ‘a part’ of the
composite substance. In this regard, even though form (ṣūrah) is, in the context of
the concrete beings, one of the foundational principles (mabādiʾ) of physics, I will

 Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Cure, V.1, 202.9‒11.

 Literally, “on the howness of their existence” (wa-kayfiyyat wujūdihā), which of course raises the
issue of different modes and states of existence.
302 III Quiddity in Itself in the Concrete World

argue that Avicenna’s theory of form, and especially of form inasmuch as it intersects
with essence, is more adequately studied within a metaphysical framework.⁹⁰
In line with the Aristotelian tradition, Avicenna frequently correlates essence
and form in his works, describing the form (ṣūrah) as that which provides an existent
with its essential structure, determinateness, and constitutive features. Form is what
actualizes matter and also specifies it into a definite kind of existent, whether a rock,
tree, or horse. Without form, there would be only generic prime matter, and nothing
else. There can be no doubt that Avicenna was familiar with those passages in which
Aristotle defines form as essence, such as Physics II.3,194b27, which describes the
form as “the statement of the essence,” and Metaphysics, Book Zeta, where the
Greek term eidos that is used to mean form is narrowly connected with essence
and substance.⁹¹ For Aristotle, as for Avicenna, the essence of a hylomorphic com-
pound is primarily form, not matter, and it is form also that is to be identified primar-
ily with substance.⁹² Nevertheless, I will attempt to show in what follows that Avicen-
na’s approach to this issue is characterized by two important features: first, an ultra-
essentialist stance that effectively and fundamentally identifies form with pure quid-
dity, and, second, a mereological argument according to which form-essence exists
irreducibly as a part (juzʾ) of the concrete individual. In order to establish this, sev-
eral interconnected points will have to be addressed: that quiddity and nature (ac-
cording to one sense) correspond to form in concrete beings; that form, construed
in this manner, is also substance and essence; and that the essential and substantial
form can be regarded as a part of the composite hylomorphic existent. The main chal-
lenge in what follows is to provide an account of form and pure quiddity that under-
scores the interface between these notions, but at the same time resists their strict
identification and allows for a certain flexibility with regard to how they relate to
one another.

 For a recent and informative study of Avicenna’s physical theory of form, see Lammer, The Ele-
ments, especially chapter 3.
 Unlike the Arabic term ṣūrah, the Greek term eidos can mean both form and species. This is rel-
evant, of course, inasmuch as one can speak of the species-form of the individual, such as ‘human,’
which many later interpreters would identify with a substantial form and an effect of the causation of
the Agent Intellect. Even though Avicenna distinguishes between species and form (nawʿ and ṣūrah)
terminologically and conceptually—the former is one of the universal logical predicates in the mind,
the latter a physical principle in concrete beings—the two notions are closely related in his discussion
of the substantial form and of the issue of how essence can be said to exist in the individual. In his
system as well, the substantial form is primarily to be identified with the species-form, and quiddity
is at any rate most immediately and cogently connected with species, since the latter includes within
it the various constitutive parts of the definition.
 Aristotle neatly sums up the connection between form, essence, and substance at Metaphysics
VII.7,1032b1: “by form I mean the essence of each thing and its primary substance”; cf. Metaphysics,
VII.10.1035b32 and VIII.4.1044a35‒36, and, for Avicenna, Lammer, The Elements, 165‒179. The relation
between form and substance in Avicenna is discussed below.
 1 The move towards an Avicennian metaphysical realism or formalism 303

The connection, if not the straightforward equation, between quiddity, nature,

and form is one that Avicenna makes repeatedly in his works with regard to mental
and concrete existents. I showed in chapter II that Avicenna uses the terms
māhiyyah, ṭabīʿah, maʿnā, and ṣūrah interchangeably in Introduction in the context
of his onto-epistemological analysis of quiddity in the human mind. In his logical
and metaphysical works, the master extends this terminological nexus to the extra-
mental world, where the quiddity and nature that exist in concrete beings can be syn-
onymously described as form, and especially as the essential or substantial form of
the existent. In this case, form is broadly equivalent to quiddity’s status as a founda-
tional nature (ṭabīʿah) in concrete beings, and, as such, it can be regarded as an es-
sential form (ṣūrah dhātiyyah) and a substantial form (ṣūrah jawhariyyah).⁹³ In Phys-
ics I.6, Avicenna explains that the form of a body is “its quiddity by which it is what it
is” (wa-ṣūratuhu hiya māhiyyatuhu allatī bi-hā huwa mā huwa), and elsewhere he de-
scribes form in itself as “a kind of quiddity” (al-ṣūrah māhiyyah mā bi-nafsihā).⁹⁴ In
Physics I.10, the master specifically differentiates the meaning of ṣūrah qua the shape
(shakl) of a thing and qua its quiddity. The latter point appears to pertain to quiddity
both in the concrete world and in the mind: “form may be said of quiddity [mā-
hiyyah], which, when it is realized [ḥaṣalat] in matter, constitutes it [qawwamathā]
as a species, as well as of the species itself [in the mind].”⁹⁵ Approached from this
angle, Avicenna’s entire analysis of how quiddity exists in the concrete world re-
volves around the notion of essential form, which emerges as a key concept in his
physics and metaphysics.⁹⁶
One notes also the ambivalence of form inasmuch as pure quiddity is correlated
to form both in a concrete and intellectual context. In this manner, the formal nature
bears a direct relation to the mental existence of quiddity, inasmuch as the nature is
precisely what is abstracted and apprehended by the mind from concrete particulars
in its attempt to grasp the universals. In this case, the abstracted essential form, or
more precisely the nature in itself, is combined with logical notions such as genus,
species, or differentia, as well as with universality or the theoretical predicability of
many, to produce the universal logical notions, such as ‘the universal genus animal’
or ‘the universal species horse,’ and, hence, ultimately, an ‘intelligible form’ (ṣūrah
ʿaqliyyah). Accordingly, in Definitions, the master explains that ṣūrah can mean uni-

 Avicenna, Definitions, 21, which glosses one sense of ṭabīʿah as ṣūrah dhātiyyah.
 Avicenna, Physics, I.6, 45.3‒4; I.2, 21.5.
 Avicenna, Physics, I.10, 70.1‒2. The connection between quiddity and form is stressed in many
other parts of this work; see notably 21, 45‒47, 70, and 104.
 Strictly speaking, ṣūrah is a technical term used in psychology and, by extension, in metaphysics,
but not in logic, since it conveys—or at the very least inevitably raises—notions of substantiality and
ontology. Accordingly, this term appears profusely in Avicenna’s physical and metaphysical writings
and—more sparingly—in his logical writings as well (as is the case of Introduction I.12) to describe
essence in relation to concrete individuals. The extension of ṣūrah to the concrete and intellectual
contexts is reflected in Avicenna’s philosophy in the role of the Agent Intellect.
304 III Quiddity in Itself in the Concrete World

versal species (nawʿ), as well as refer to every quiddity (māhiyyah) and quidditative
reality (ḥaqīqah), in whichever mode these may be.⁹⁷ In Notes, Avicenna uses the
terms form (ṣūrah) and quidditative meaning (maʿnā), as well as specific examples
of pure quiddity (such as humanness), to describe the essence of concrete beings.⁹⁸
As he further explains in Introduction, it is most fitting that the same quiddity, such
as animal in itself (al-ḥayawāniyyah fī nafsihā), be called at times ‘natural form’
(ṣūrah ṭabīʿiyyah), when one is referring to its ontological status as the form of a nat-
ural existent, and at other times, ‘intelligible form’ (ṣūrah ʿaqliyyah), when it is being
contemplated by the intellect in itself or as a universal.⁹⁹ By the same token, and con-
sidered absolutely, nature or pure quiddity is not to be identified strictly either with
the hylomorphic form or with the logical species or genus per se. The following state-
ment in On the Soul of Salvation neatly brings together these various notions and
technical terms:

The form of humanness [ṣūrat al-insāniyyah] and the quiddity of humanness [māhiyyat al-insān-
iyyah] are a nature [ṭabīʿah] that is necessarily shared equally by all the individuals of the spe-
cies … It is one thing in definition, although it accidentally occurs to it to exist [wujidat] in this or
that individual and, hence, to become multiple, although this [multiplicity] does not belong to it
inasmuch as its nature is humanness.¹⁰⁰

As this excerpt shows, ṣūrah can, in a physical and metaphysical context, refer to the
nature (ṭabīʿah) and pure quiddity (māhiyyah) in the individuals. What is more, it is
apparent that this nature and quiddity, which corresponds to form in the hylomor-
phic compound, also has a correspondence in the mind, where it coincides with
the numerically one universal concept and definition. As such, however, this nature
is essentially common, regardless whether it is related to the hylomorphic forms or to
the universal logical notions (such as species and genus).
In view of this, it is important to distinguish between the two domains of logic
and abstract thought, on the one hand, and concrete reality, on the other. For the in-
terplay between these notions applies primarily to the realm of intellectual concep-
tion, that is to say, to the abstract consideration of how quiddity relates to its con-
comitants. The ‘universal human’ in the mind is, properly speaking, a species, a
form, and a quiddity. One might say more specifically that it is a single universal in-

 Avicenna, Definitions, 16.

 See Avicenna, Notes, 143‒144, sections 196 and 197.
 Avicenna, Introduction, I.12, 68.18‒19.
 Avicenna, Salvation, 344.10‒13. The verb wujidat used here can refer either to ṣūrah or māhiyyah
or ṭabīʿah, all of which are feminine nouns. The ambiguity could be intentional, and in any case it
fully accords with the Avicennian doctrine that form is quiddity and nature in the concrete being.
Moreover, there is also the ambiguity of ṣūrah as a term expressing the interface of mental and con-
crete forms, both of which again coincide with quiddity and nature. Cf. Notes, 386, section 684, where
it is said that the quidditative meaning humanness becomes multiple only as a result of concomitant
causes (bi-asbāb lāḥiqah).
 1 The move towards an Avicennian metaphysical realism or formalism 305

telligible form referring to a definite species. But these logical notions do not exist
actually in the concrete world according to Avicenna. Not only does genus per se
and species per se not exist as an extramental form along the lines of the Platonic
ideas, but Avicenna would also not tolerate the claim that the genus ‘animal’ and
the species ‘human’ can exist separately and actually in the concrete world as a nu-
merically one generic and specific form respectively. In external reality, therefore,
there is a sense in which the universal quiddity and form are dissimilar, since quid-
dity qua species or qua genus will not exist as such, with the apparent implication
that the essential or substantial forms in concrete beings are not universal.¹⁰¹ Avicen-
na expounds on this difference in Metaphysics V generally, where his main argument
throughout relies on the fact that universals cannot exist actually in the concrete in-
dividuals. In Metaphysics V.8 he justifies this view on the grounds that whereas quid-
dity encompasses both the differentia-form and the genus-matter in its definition,
form is merely a part of the composite substance, and one that is distinct from mat-
ter. Definition and quiddity, as analyzed and conceived by the rational soul, cannot
therefore correspond strictly to the form in the concrete human being. In spite of this,
Avicenna insists that quiddity does exist in the concrete individual and that it can be
identified with form. So how can one reconcile these various claims?
Avicenna’s approach to the issue of how the logical predicates in the mind relate
to the hylomorphic constitution of concrete beings seems to have relied heavily on
the Arabic translations of works by Alexander of Aphrodisias. The latter developed
some of the main distinctions that are expounded also by Avicenna in order to ad-
dress the relation between quiddity and hylomorphic form. As Marwan Rashed
has shown in a remarkable study, Alexander articulated an essentialist interpretation
of form that enabled him to define it not only as a part of substance, but as substance
itself, and as the foundational essential principle in composite beings. Thus, form
has ontological priority over the species as a whole and is also the primary principle
of substantiality in the individual. What is more, Alexander establishes a close cor-
respondence between differentia and hylomorphic form by conjoining logic and on-
tology. Thus, there is “a semantic identity between differentia and hylomorphic
form,” where both differentia and form can be regarded as substance, although
these notions are ultimately kept separate.¹⁰²

 The issue of the universality of the substantial forms is discussed in Aristotle’s Metaphysics,
Book Zeta, and also informs much of the medieval discourse of how the logical categories in the
mind relate to a hylomorphic framework and to concrete existence. Avicenna’s philosophical system
is no exception and brings this same point into focus, with the difference that, in his works, the prob-
lematic acquires a special dimension due to the separation of universality from essence. Nonetheless,
and in spite of this separation, one may legitimately raise the question of whether the natures and
forms that Avicenna posits in concrete beings are universal in their own way; this issue is tackled
in more detail below.
 Rashed, Essentialisme, 44‒47, 53, 81, 85 ff., 94, 132, 147 (my translation from the French). Some of
the key treatises by Alexander used in Rashed’s analysis have been preserved in Arabic. This indi-
cates that Avicenna could have consulted them when elaborating his own doctrines. Rashed’s trans-
306 III Quiddity in Itself in the Concrete World

It is noteworthy that some crucial features of Alexander’s method appear to have

been co-opted by Avicenna for the purposes of his own philosophical treatment of
quiddity. Perhaps the most striking parallels between these two thinkers are their
conception of the intricate relationship between logic and ontology, as well as
their intention to discuss form in light of this logico-ontological framework.
Among the conceptual tools outlined by Alexander and endorsed by Avicenna are
the distinction between genus and matter, on the one hand, and between differentia
and form, on the other; the corollary idea that form and differentia have an immedi-
ate correspondence, that they are part of substance and a cause of substantiality for
the whole substance; and that the universality of form is somehow intrinsic and es-
sential to it and not merely an accidental attribute. Although Rashed’s study enables
us to highlight the formal and methodological parallels between Alexander and Avi-
cenna in a useful way, the priority with regard to the present analysis is to try to un-
derstand why Avicenna would have been interested in Alexander’s arguments and
what he hoped to achieve by maintaining these distinctions. In what follows, I
argue that Avicenna pursued and expanded Alexander’s essentialist approach in
order to establish pure quiddity at the center of his ontology of composite beings.
Avicenna, following Alexander and some members of the Baghdad School who
were directly influenced by the Greek philosopher,¹⁰³ is intent on maintaining a set of
distinctions whose immediate function appears to be to delineate what belongs to
the domain of logic and conceptual thought and what belongs to the entitative do-
main of physics and metaphysics. One such seminal distinction focuses on the differ-
ence between ‘body’ or ‘animal’ qua genus and qua matter, as well as on the differ-
ence between ‘rational’ qua differentia and qua form. These distinctions are
obviously important to Avicenna, because he returns to them on numerous occasions
in his corpus. They are articulated, for example, in Demonstration I.10, Categories I.3,
and Metaphysics V.3. If Avicenna dwells at length on these notions in his works, he
on the other hand does not explain why they are significant for his philosophical
project as a whole. In order to answer this question in a satisfactory way, one should
not only acknowledge the Persian thinker’s debt to Alexander, but also emphasize in
what way he goes further than his predecessor in what Rashed has called an ‘essen-
tialist’ interpretation of form. Yet again, the crux of Avicenna’s method focuses on the
notion of pure quiddity, which is arguably one of the main doctrinal differences be-
tween these two thinkers, who otherwise adhered to a common set of Aristotelian

lations of two of these texts are by far the most up-to-date and precise renditions into a European
language; see notably That Matter is not Genus (95 ff.) and especially On Difference (Fī l-faṣl) (104 ff.).
 Yaḥyā b. ʿAdī wrote a commentary on Alexander entitled On the Difference between Genus and
Matter (Fī l-farq bayna l-jins wa-l-māddah), as well as another text on the distinction between body
qua substance and body qua quantity (on the latter, see Menn and Wisnovsky, Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī and
Ibrāhīm ibn ʿAdī), both of which show that he was preoccupied by similar questions. Yaḥyā also
says relevant things about this in his treatise dealing with the three kinds of existence; see Menn
and Wisnovsky, Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī On the Four Scientific Questions.
 1 The move towards an Avicennian metaphysical realism or formalism 307

theses and shared a similar outlook shaped by Categories and Metaphysics. In the
context of Avicenna’s thought, I would argue, these distinctions serve a specific pur-
pose, namely, to explain how quiddity in itself can be said to exist both in the mind
(e. g., quiddity combined with genus or differentia and universality) and in concrete
beings (quiddity qua immanent form). Distinguishing between differentia and form,
but connecting both notions with pure quiddity, enables Avicenna to locate the latter
in the mental, logical domain, as well as the physical, hylomorphic domain, without
strictly identifying these notions and collapsing them into a single plane, which
would result in insurmountable interpretive difficulties.¹⁰⁴ If this hypothesis is cor-
rect, then, the set of distinctions Avicenna takes over from Alexander would have
been designed to buttress his essentialist account of the distinctness and irreducibil-
ity of pure quiddity by enabling its localization in the mental and concrete contexts.
If differentia or species does not exist as such in concrete beings, since it is a logical
universal notion, the pure quiddity that underlies differentia or species, on the other
hand, does exist in concrete beings. Thus, Avicenna would not limit himself, like
Alexander, to a “semantic identity” between differentia and form,¹⁰⁵ but, I contend,
would make a parallel ontological claim: the quiddity of the differentia in the mind is
fundamentally the same as the quiddity of the form in the concrete, so that there
would be, on his account, an ‘ontological identity’ between differentia and form if
these are considered with regard to their irreducible essential principle, which is
pure quiddity. What justifies this elaboration on Alexander’s account is the unique
Avicennian doctrine of essence, which can be envisaged solely ‘in itself.’
The distinctions between logic and physics, between differentia and form, be-
tween universal species in the mind and common hylomorphic forms in the concrete,
suggest that Avicenna is conceiving of quiddity in two different ways. If conceived of
logically in relation to the definition (ḥadd), quiddities are universal logical notions
or predicates that are parts of the definition and participate in the realization of the
complete essence. If conceived of physically as principles of concrete beings, quiddi-
ties are substantial forms that can also be regarded as parts of the composite sub-
stance, even though they do not inhere in matter the way an accident inheres in a
subject. As Avicenna explains in Metaphysics V.8, “form is always part of the quid-
dity in composite [substances].”¹⁰⁶ And in Metaphysics VI.5, he mentions “the
form of humanness in human matter” (ṣūrat al-insāniyyah fī l-māddah al-in-

 One of these difficulties has already been addressed: how can a universal exist in concrete be-
ings? If the universal genus animal in the mind was identical with an exterior form, then absolute
animal would exist in the concrete like a Platonic form.
 Rashed, Essentialisme, 44; cf. Avicenna, Notes, 77.1‒5, where it is said that genus “corresponds
to” (yunāsibu) matter and differentia to form.
 Avicenna, Metaphysics, V.8, 245.6; see also Text 18. That form and matter are ‘parts’ of the com-
posite substance is a standard feature of Avicenna’s physics; see, for instance, Avicenna, Physics,
I.10‒11; and the physics section of Elements of Philosophy, 17.
308 III Quiddity in Itself in the Concrete World

sāniyyah)¹⁰⁷ as an example of this. This implies that the differentia ‘rational’ that is a
part of the definition in the mind corresponds directly to a form in the concrete
being, which endows it with rationality and, hence, contributes to the substantial re-
alization of its humanness. In both cases, however, it is quiddity in itself that under-
lies the two sides of the distinction: the pure quiddity ‘rationalness’ qua differentia
and qua form. Likewise, the quiddity in itself ‘animalness’ qua genus and qua mat-
ter.¹⁰⁸ At any rate, Avicenna appears to establish a correlation between the parts of
quiddity in the mind and the parts of the actual entity in existence. More specifically,
the parts of the definition correspond to causes and principles in the concrete indi-
vidual. As he explains in Physics I.1, “when the causes enter into the constitution of
the effects as parts of them—as, for example, the case of wood and shape relative to
the bed—then their relation to the effects is that of simple parts to composites.”¹⁰⁹ In
other words, the parts of the definition in the mind have a direct counterpart in the
causes and parts of the composites in extramental reality. Quite daringly, Avicenna
applies the term ‘quiddity’ to all of these principles.¹¹⁰
Here, however, a certain dissymmetry has crept in: for ‘animal’ qua genus in the
mind is a universal form that is a part of the definition and essence ‘human.’ How-
ever, it corresponds to matter or body in the realized concrete substance, since to be
an animal in concrete reality means to possess a certain type of body endowed with
certain corporeal and psychological powers and functions, such as growth, sensa-
tion, and nutrition. The species to which the definition points (say, human) will
therefore amount to a composite of matter and form, rather than to form alone.
How, then, can the quiddity ‘animalness’ be a universal form in the mind and at
the same time correspond to matter or body in the concrete horse or human? This
problem is compounded by the fact that, on the evidence of Text 16 above, both
‘human’ and ‘animal’ can be said to somehow exist in the concrete individual,
when one corresponds to a species in the mind and the other to a genus. It is true
that in the case of composite substances, the definition by genus and differentia
will always refer to a composite of form and matter in external reality. This, of course,

 Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Cure, VI.5, 294.12.

 In this fashion, there is a certain symmetry in Avicenna’s mereological thinking: universal differ-
entia and genus are parts of the definition in the mind; form and matter are parts of the composite
substance in concrete reality. In each case, however, it is really the pure quiddities qua form or uni-
versal logical concept that are parts, but in different ways. For the interconnection between these no-
tions, see also Notes, 143‒144, sections 196 and 197.
 Avicenna, Physics, I.1, 10.2‒4. In fact, earlier in that passage Avicenna uses the term “correla-
tion” (muqāyasah) to express the link between these various principles.
 The relation between quiddity and the four causes is discussed in chapter IV. The notion that
form qua principle is a part (juzʾ) of the concrete composite being is articulated in various sections
of Physics: I.3, 32; I.6, 46‒50; and I.10, 70‒72. Ṭūsī neatly encapsulates the correspondence between
essence-differentia and essence-form in his Commentary on Pointers, vol. 1, 203.9‒11, when he states
the following: “The causes of quiddity are: genus and difference when it comes to mental existence;
and matter and form when it comes to concrete existence.”
 1 The move towards an Avicennian metaphysical realism or formalism 309

is another reason why Avicenna is intent on distinguishing between animal qua

genus and animal qua body or matter: the logical, universal notion of genus,
which is a form in the mind, corresponds to a corporeal or bodily entity in the con-
crete world, but for this same reason the two cannot be identical. Here the problem is
not only one of universality—i. e., how can a universal genus exist in the concrete?—
but also one of materiality—i. e., how can an intelligible form in the mind be identi-
cal with, or correspond to, something corporeal or material? Yet, to infer from this
that there is a radical ontological disconnect between these two aspects is also mis-
guided, since it fails to appreciate the idiosyncrasies of Avicenna’s hylomorphic theo-
ry, which are closely tied to this doctrine of cosmological emanation and causation.
The principles that ensure an essential link between the two are, first, Avicenna’s
doctrine of pure quiddity, and, second, his identification of quiddity or essence
with form as something emanated from the Agent Intellect. For the purpose of the
following exposition, I provide a schematic account of how matter relates to form
and refer to forms in the plural (ṣuwar), deferring temporarily the important ques-
tions of the number of substantial forms in matter and whether Avicenna should
be regarded as pluralist on this question.
According to Avicenna’s hylomorphic theory, individual concrete existents arise
thanks to the information of prime matter by a series of forms, starting with the cor-
poreal form, followed by a series of substantial forms, the generic forms (e. g., animal
body) and the specific forms (e. g., two-footed animal, rational, etc.), and ending
with the accidental forms (black, etc.). What this means is that even animal body
is not pure matter, but will consist, at least conceptually, of a compound of prime
matter and several forms that already inhere in it. Thus, that to which genus corre-
sponds to will always, in reality, entail forms in matter or ‘informed’ matter. Matter
itself, strictly speaking, is just prime matter for Avicenna and nothing else. It does
not exist actually, and it certainly is not identical with animal body. For this reason,
if animal body can be regarded as a genus for human, it, on the other hand, is also a
species for generic body, which implies its prior assumption of form. Thus, in spite of
the foregoing—or rather, thanks to the foregoing—it is also possible to conceive of
genus itself as a form rather than matter: not only as a universal intelligible form
in the mind, but also as a hylomorphic form inhering in a more undetermined
state of matter in concrete reality. Further still, it is possible to conceive of pure quid-
dity (e. g., animalness) as a form both in the mind (genus) and in the composite sub-
stance (substantial form). Since genus is not really matter itself or matter simpliciter
(which is prime matter), but rather informed matter or, more precisely, forms in mat-
ter, it is form that will specify matter into a particular body/genus, e. g., animal or
mineral body. In other words, genus corresponds, in the concrete world, to a form
that has specified and determined matter to be a certain kind of corporeal entity.
What genus corresponds to (yunāsibu) in reality will be more appropriately regarded
as form.
Hence, if quiddity is conceived of in itself as a single, simple, and irreducible
thing, that is, if human in itself and animal in itself are intended, and not the univer-
310 III Quiddity in Itself in the Concrete World

sal notions to which they give rise in the mind, then there is a sense in which these
pure quiddities can be identified with the various forms that inhere in a concrete
being.¹¹¹ In that case, as Avicenna himself puts it, the expressions ‘the form of hu-
manness,’ ‘the nature of humanness,’ and ‘the quiddity of humanness’ point to
the same ontological and physical principle (mabdaʾ) in concrete reality, namely,
the form that inheres in matter and provides the existent with its essential identity
and structure. This interpretation would apply to both ‘human’ and ‘animal,’ and
it would explain why Avicenna is intent on locating the quiddities ‘animal’ and
‘human’ in concrete beings, i. e., quiddities that, in the mind, correspond to different
logical predicates.¹¹² For animal-genus in the mind translates, in the concrete world,
into animal-form in matter, which is a substantial form specifying a state of undeter-
mined matter or body, while rational-form will also be a form that endows animal
body with yet another level of formal specification. This hypothesis has the merit
of paying heed to the notion of essential hierarchy or martabah in Avicenna’s philos-
ophy, which dictates that one and the same thing, e. g., animal, can be both species
and genus depending on what it is related to. Thus, animal is species for corporeal
matter, but genus for human or horse.¹¹³ In the concrete being, animal can be
seen as species-form for the matter or body it specifies, where undetermined corpo-
real matter would stand to it as its genus. In this manner, animal-form and human-
form can be posited as substantial forms in the concrete individual, inasmuch as
their rank and degree of ontological specification would differ. Or, alternatively,
they can be posited as quidditative meanings (maʿānī) subsumed within a single
form, if one intends to shun a pluralist model of the substantial forms. Either way,
there is a sense in which the pure quiddities underlie the forms in the concrete. Avi-
cenna seems to imply just this in a passage of Physics:

Text 19: In the case of composite bodies, the nature is something like the form [ka-shayʾ min al-
ṣūrah], but not the true being of the form. [That] is because composite bodies do not become
what they are by a power belonging to them that essentially produces motion in a single direc-
tion, even if they inevitably have those powers inasmuch as they are what they are. So it is as if
[ka-anna] those powers [quwā] are a part of their form [juzʾ min ṣūratihā], and as if [ka-anna]
their form is a combination of a number of quidditative meanings [tajtamiʿu min ʿiddat

 Perhaps this is what Avicenna had in mind when he states at Physics, I.2, 21.5 that “form, in it-
self, is a certain quiddity” (al-ṣūrah māhiyyah mā bi-nafsihā).
 See also Text 13, which appears with some variations in On the Soul, Physics, and Metaphysics of
The Cure, and which presents māhiyyah, ṭabīʿah, and ṣūrah as cognate terms in this context. The dis-
tinction Avicenna makes in Metaphysics V.8 between quiddity and form is not intended absolutely,
but is rather motivated by the context at hand and the aim of his discussion. There he shifts the em-
phasis toward the epistemological and definitional aspects of essence in the mind in order to clarify
how it can be said to differ from form as an ontic principle in beings. This does not mean, however,
that form in concrete reality is not related to essence in any way. As was stressed earlier, one meaning
of ṣūrah in the concrete world is essence, in which case one may speak of the ‘essential form’ of
things.
 For a formulation of this point in connection with genus, see Avicenna, Salvation, 14.
 1 The move towards an Avicennian metaphysical realism or formalism 311

maʿānī], which become unified [fa-tattaḥidu]. An example would be humanness [al-insāniyyah],

since it includes [tataḍammanu] the powers of nature as well as the powers of the vegetative,
animal, and rational soul; and when all of these are in some way ‘combined,’ they yield the
quiddity of humanness. (The particulars of this manner of combining are more fittingly ex-
plained in first philosophy).¹¹⁴

This excerpt aptly shows that the various quidditative meanings (maʿānī) that are
necessary for the essential constitution of something to be fully realized can all be
said to underlie the form of that existent. What is remarkable in that passage is
that Avicenna applies mereological reasoning to the form itself, suggesting that it
can be envisaged as a combination of various pure quiddities, among which are an-
imalness and rationality. When all are present or existent in the form, they yield the
pure quiddity ‘humanness.’¹¹⁵
One upshot seems to be that every quiddity in itself, such as animalness, ration-
ality, humanness, horseness, etc., regardless of whether it is considered as a univer-
sal genus, species, or differentia in the mind, corresponds, in the concrete world, to a
substantial form—or, alternatively, to a maʿnā embedded within that substantial form
—that inheres in and informs bare three-dimensional matter or generic body to de-
termine and specify it into the class of existent that it is. This form is, in a sense,
a pure quiddity, since it is horseness in itself that endows matter and body with

 Avicenna, Physics, I.6, 46.3‒8, translation by McGinnis, slightly revised.

 In this case as well, it is ultimately unclear whether Avicenna regards these various quidditative
meanings as being fully unified and indistinguishable from one another in existence, or whether they
remain irreducibly existent and distinct from one another in the composite. The former reading is sug-
gested, inter alia, by the claim that these maʿānī and quwā become unified (fa-tattaḥidu), but at the
same time, Avicenna maintains a mereological interpretation and a vocabulary of synthesis and ad-
dition (tajtamiʿu, tataḍammanu) that would seem to exclude that possibility. Another way to ap-
proach this problem is through the intramental/extramental distinction, where the mereological
and synthetic aspects of Avicenna’s argumentation could be said to be purely logical or conceptual
and the result of analytical thought. This approach seems vindicated in this text by the locution ka-
anna, which suggests a mere analogy or image between the conceptual distinctions drawn by the
mind and reality. Yet, although these distinctions are definitely—and even perhaps primarily— con-
ceptual, this interpretation would not do justice to the many other related texts where Avicenna’s lan-
guage is more explicit with regard to the extramental realization of these notions. What is more, Avi-
cenna’s injunction in this passage that this issue should be addressed in “first philosophy” (i. e., in
metaphysics) suggests that its implications transcend the purely logical domain. On my view, and as I
argue in this section, the point seems to be that there is no strict identity between the logical notions
in the mind and the physical principles of concrete beings, but that they have a certain correspond-
ence or correlation in virtue of the common quidditative meanings that bridge these two realms. This
explains the oscillation in Avicenna’s language between emphasizing mere correspondence and anal-
ogy, on the one hand, and a realist status of quiddity, on the other. This problem to some extent over-
laps with the issue of whether only one or several substantial forms should be posited in Avicenna’s
physics and metaphysics. For positing a single substantial form that would somehow subsume all
others would seem to go hand in hand with a conceptualist reading of the various parts, meanings,
and powers of quiddity as potentially illustrated in the passage above.
312 III Quiddity in Itself in the Concrete World

the essential identity, structure, and features that belong to individual horses. These
quidditative forms provide determinedness to bare matter. They function as pendants
to the logical parts of the definition in the mind. It is in this regard that one can say
that quiddity, nature, and even (with some important qualifications) genus, differen-
tia, and species, all correspond to a formal and essential principle in the concrete
existents inasmuch as they crystallize in their forms. Summing up these senses, Avi-
cenna at Metaphysics VI.4 explains that “form [ṣūrah] is [also] said of a thing’s spe-
cies, genus, differentia and all of these things [taken together],”¹¹⁶ and at Metaphy-
sics V.3 he further notes that “nowadays, in our time and according to the custom in
scientific books, species refers only to logical species [al-nawʿ al-manṭiqī] and to the
forms of things [ṣuwar al-ashyāʾ].”¹¹⁷
The implication of the foregoing seems to be that the substantial form ‘human’ in
concrete beings and the universal intelligible form ‘human’ in the mind have some-
thing irreducible in common, which is the pure quiddity ‘humanness.’ Consequently,
it is not the hylomorphic form per se that is abstracted by the mind in order to be
contemplated, but rather the quidditative meaning and nature that is intrinsic to
it. Avicenna says precisely this in a passage of Notes:

These existent essences [dhawāt] do not become forms [ṣuwar] for the soul or the intellect, in
spite of what some people claim. Rather, it is their quidditative meanings [maʿānī] that become
forms for it [the soul or intellect].¹¹⁸

In light of the foregoing, one better understands why, although Avicenna regards
genus and species primarily as logical notions, he at times extends them (especially
species) to the concrete world and speaks of generic and specific forms as existing or
as being realized or actualized in external reality. Such instances appear in Metaphy-
sics V.3‒6 when the master states that “the generic nature [ṭabīʿat al-jinsiyyah] occurs
to the thing that is a species both in existence and in the mind together when the
species comes to be in its completion”¹¹⁹; that species is “the nature realized both
in existence and in the mind”¹²⁰; and that “genus becomes differentia and species
in actual existence [fī l-wujūd bi-l-fiʿl].”¹²¹ Thus, Avicenna sometimes loosely refers
to ‘the form of genus’ and ‘the form of species’ as being realized in existence or in

 Avicenna, Metaphysics, VI.4, 282.12‒13. Cf. Physics, I.10, 70, where Avicenna states that “the for-
mal cause might be related to [or in an analogical relation to, bi-l-qiyās ilā] either genus or species—
that is, the form that makes matter to subsist.”
 Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Cure, V.3, 213.8‒10; translated by Marmura, in Avicenna, The Met-
aphysics, 162.
 Avicenna, Notes, 191.4‒5, section 285.
 Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Cure, V.3, 217.12‒13; translated by Marmura, in Avicenna, The Met-
aphysics, 166, revised.
 Avicenna, Metaphysics, V.5, 228.4.
 Avicenna, Metaphysics V.6, 231.1‒2. It is not entirely clear, however, how exactly Avicenna con-
ceives of the realization of these principles ‘in existence.’ I return to this point in section IV.3.
 1 The move towards an Avicennian metaphysical realism or formalism 313

concrete beings. It is noteworthy that he identifies species especially with the pure
quiddity, nature, and substantial form of a concrete thing. In Definition, he glosses
one meaning of ṣūrah as species (nawʿ),¹²² and evidence from Metaphysics can be
gathered to further corroborate this connection.¹²³ As in Aristotle, then, where the
Greek term eidos can mean both form and species, ṣūrah, when related to essence,
designates first and foremost species, which is what corresponds the closest to the
realized nature of an individual and to primary substance.¹²⁴
By holding these views, though, the master does not intend to say that there is a
single and numerically one form of the genus animal or of the species horse that ex-
ists in concrete reality as a Platonic form. Rather, his point is that each horse has a
nature horseness and a nature animalness, which are encapsulated in the quiddita-
tive meaning (maʿnā) (or quidditative meanings, maʿānī) of that being, and which
can be abstracted by the intellect and made to correspond to the universal logical
notions species-horse and genus-animal in the mind. Accordingly, the nature and es-
sential form ‘animalness’ is what makes it an animal body, as opposed to a generic
three-dimensional body. And the nature and essential form ‘horseness’ is what speci-
fies it as a horse and not an elephant or a lion.¹²⁵ The natures and quiddities of an-

 Avicenna, Definitions, 16.

 Metaphysics of The Cure, V.3, 213.8‒10.
 Species, it should be recalled, is also the most direct answer given to the question asked about
the quiddity of things, as in the question: what are Zayd and ʿAmr?
 Avicenna’s insistence on distinguishing matter and form from genus and differentia respectively
may have the aim of establishing the priority of form as an ontological principle. Indeed, it is form
that in each case makes the actually existent thing the thing it is, and it is form that Avicenna, fol-
lowing Aristotle and Alexander, identifies as essence and substance. He regards all the constitutive
elements of quiddity as being describable in terms of forms inhering in matter in the context of ex-
terior existence. Although there is a sense in which genus corresponds to matter, what exists in the
concrete world is really informed matter, not genus. These notions are therefore not interchangeable.
Genus and species are universal logical notions that exist only in the mind. Particular, concrete be-
ings are in reality composed of form and matter, not genus and differentia. Since prime matter, or
prime matter together with the form of corporeality, needs to be further specified in order to be ac-
tualized into a specific kind of existent, every component or part added to matter will be added qua
form. Hence, in the case of a human being, animal is a form added to matter that specifies generic
body into animal body; and human or rational is a form added to animal body to further specify it as
a rational animal, etc. Thus, even when Avicenna contrasts body qua matter and body qua genus, he
intends not pure matter, but informed and specified matter. The same distinction can be applied to
‘animal.’ These distinctions proceed from the same concern to demarcate logical considerations from
ontic states or situations. McGinnis calls this the ‘synthetic process.’ He also points out that, in the
concrete world, the more specific ontologically precedes the more general; rational animal precedes
animal; and animal body precedes body. In other words, the more informed state of matter precedes
the less informed; this is due, among other things, to the actuality and priority of form. In contrast, in
logic and in reflection, this order is reversed: genus precedes species; body precedes animal body and
animal body precedes rational animal body; see McGinnis, Logic and Science, 173‒178. Aquinas, fol-
lowing Alexander and Avicenna, also distinguishes between matter and form, on the one hand, and
314 III Quiddity in Itself in the Concrete World

imalness and horseness do exist as forms in each concrete horse, or else there would
only be indeterminate matter or body. But these forms qua natures are neither sub-
ject to numerical unity nor are they the participated forms of a transcendent and in-
dependent archetypal form of animal and horse.¹²⁶ And they are, like the mental uni-
versal notions that correspond to them, ultimately reducible to the quidditative
meaning (maʿnā) and nature (ṭabīʿah) that exist in the concrete horse.
To be sure, then, one possible reconstruction of Avicenna’s view of how the uni-
versal predicates relate to the hylomorphic composite beings implies a plurality of
substantial or essential forms. On this interpretation, every natural existent would
be composed of prime matter combined with a variety of forms: first, the corporeal
form, then, the generic and specific forms, and, finally, a plurality of accidental
forms.¹²⁷ Each one of these essential forms would have its own pure quiddity and na-
ture (corporeality, animalness, rationalness, humanness, etc.) and would also corre-
spond to a universal predicate in the mind. Moreover, under one aspect, these forms
would ontologically precede the logical notions that correspond to them in the mind
and that are derived from them through abstraction.¹²⁸
It is on this reasoning that genus, differentia, and species are sometimes loosely
identified with the substantial and essential forms in concrete beings. Although Avi-

genus and differentia, on the other, although in his philosophy as well there is a strong connection
between these notions; see Galluzzo, Aquinas.
 Avicenna at times does describe the substantial forms in nature as being one: thus, in Notes,
143‒144, sections 196 and 197, the substantial form human is described as being “in itself unchang-
ing” (al-ṣūrah fī dhātiha ghayr mukhtalifah) and as corresponding to “a single quidditative meaning”
(maʿnā wāḥid). Difference and diversity are said to come exclusively from matter. It is quite clear, nev-
ertheless, that the oneness attributed to form is due to its relation to the mental universal concept,
which is a numerically one thing in the mind.
 It is intriguing that Avicenna, on at least one occasion (Definitions, 17), appears to regard even
prime matter as a kind of form or as possessing its own special and unique quidditative form (cf.
Notes, 342.2). Since prime matter possesses a quiddity, as well as a kind of potential existence,
and since it is also substance (jawhar) according to Avicenna, it is not altogether surprising that it
could also be said to possess an essential form in a qualified sense. Prime matter is, after all, “created
absolutely” (mubdaʿah) (Notes, 171.7, section 251) and emanated from the Agent Intellect, and so it
must be emanated as a form, since the Agent Intellect is the ‘Giver of Forms’; see Davidson, Alfarabi,
76; Janssens, The Notions. But it should be noted that in Notes, 135, section 181, Avicenna rejects the
literal ascription of a form to prime matter that would be different from its essence or something
added to it. So if form there is, it would be the form of prime matter itself and nothing else, i. e., a
form identical with its essence as pure receptivity. In contrast, at Notes, 142, section 193, Avicenna
says that the receptivity of pure matter is not literally form, but something “like form” (shabīh bi-l-
ṣūrah). Nevertheless, all of this is quite tantalizing and not expressly spelled out by Avicenna.
 As McGinnis, Logic and Science, 173‒178, points out, form and matter as causes and as real prin-
ciples in the concrete world precede the logical notions of genus and differentia that exist in the
mind. In concrete reality, the more specific precedes the more general, since what exists is the
human being with all its forms and not just animal per se. This order is reversed in the mind,
where the more general (e. g., the genus animal) logically precedes the more specific (e. g., rational
animal).
 1 The move towards an Avicennian metaphysical realism or formalism 315

cenna occasionally allows for a qualified sense of universality to be applied to them

in this context (see Text 7, Text 17, Text 20, and Text 21), he by far prefers to describe
them as common (mushtarakah). All of this is not as surprising as it may sound. Be-
cause genus and species, or rather ‘genusness’ and ‘speciesness’ (al-jinsiyyah wa-l-
nawʿiyyah), are logical notions and intentions applied to the pure quiddities in the
mind, and because, on Avicenna’s view, the pure quiddities do exist extramentally
under another aspect, by implication these logical notions will have a correspond-
ence with the ontological principles in the concrete world, namely, the essential
and substantial forms of individual beings, which are the extramental instantiations
of the pure quiddities. So, “in the composite [murakkab],” Avicenna writes, “genus
corresponds to [yunāsibu] matter, and differentia to form.”¹²⁹ The terms ‘quiddities’
and ‘forms’ thus emphasize the fundamental ontological symmetry or correspond-
ence between the concrete and mental spheres in Avicenna’s physics and metaphy-
sics, while maintaining a difference in emphasis between logical predication and on-
tological realization: whereas the universal quiddity-species and quiddity-genus are
merely predicated and said of, quiddity-form is ontologically real and exists in the
composite being. As one can see, this metaphysical symmetry or correspondence
is, ultimately, predicated on the ontological irreducibility and constancy of pure
quiddity.
Another important facet of Avicenna’s argumentation, which also partially harks
back to Aristotle and Alexander, is his identification of form with substance. It ap-
pears that nature or quiddity, qua form, can also be defined in terms of substance
(jawhar) in the composite thing. Following a well-established philosophical custom,
Avicenna upholds a multifaceted definition of substance as consisting either of mat-
ter, or form, or the composite of form and matter. However, Avicenna assigns the pri-
mary sense of jawhar to substance qua form, making form in itself substance and
also a principle of substantiality for the composite as a whole. One direct source
of inspiration for this identification is Aristotle’s discourse on substance, form,
and essence in Metaphysics, Book Zeta. In Z.4 in particular the Stagirite argues
that essence is substance and—importantly for our purposes—that the substantial
forms in concrete beings can be said to correspond to the essences of these beings.
Aristotle returns to this topic later on in the same book (Z.17) to contend that the
main cause of being a substance is form or essence. As a result, form, essence,
and substance are all closely related in Aristotle’s reckoning when it comes to ac-
counting for the substantiality of the concrete individual: Socrates is a primary sub-
stance, and his substancehood and his being this kind of substance can be defined
in terms of his form and essence. Avicenna broadly follows these lines of reasoning
and especially the identification of substance with form and essence. However, and

 Avicenna, Notes, 77, section 72.

316 III Quiddity in Itself in the Concrete World

yet again, his theory of pure quiddity dictated that he conceive of the ontological
ramifications of these notions in a divergent way.¹³⁰
In approaching this issue, Avicenna seems once again to follow Alexander close-
ly. For Alexander, who is building on Aristotle, form is the main principle of substan-
tiality and essentiality in composite beings, and it is what brings the composite to its
state of substantial completion; it is, in fact, a cause of substance.¹³¹ Alexander ar-
ticulates a sophisticated interpretation of the proposition that the parts of substance
are substance. He has in mind especially form as a part of the composite substance,
which for him is substance in a primary or eminent way and is ontologically prior.¹³²
Avicenna adheres to many of these ideas, but the postulation that form is substance
takes on an additional dimension in his works, due to his theory of pure quiddity: it
is not only form or eidos, which can be said to be part of substance, substance itself,
and principle of substance for the composite, as Alexander claims. It is, fundamen-
tally, pure quiddity that assumes this status in his ontology. Although this point will
be fully fleshed out in chapter IV, it is important to stress here that Avicenna directly
connects the essential form in things with substance, thereby lending even more mo-
mentum to the ontological relevance of quiddity-form in the concrete world.
Although Avicenna provides numerous, and slightly varying, schemes conveying
these distinctions in his works, he is consistent in regarding form as the primary
sense of substance or jawhar. According to this sense, form is what endows the com-
posite being with its essential identity, determinedness, and inner structure, as well
as part of its substantiality. For example, form—in this case the corporeal form—is
what gives body (jism) its essential nature and substantiality by virtue of which “it
is what it is” (wa-huwa bi-hā huwa mā huwa).¹³³ This kind of form subsists in a re-
ceptacle (viz., matter), but not in a subject, which validates its status as substance,
given that Avicenna defines substance as that which does not exist in a subject (lā fī
mawḍūʿ). In Physics, he describes form as “the disposition of the substance” (hayʾat
al-jawhar) and what deserves most to be called substance in a composite, because it
is what “provides the thing with its substantiality” (mufīdah li-l-shayʾ jawhariyyata-
hu) and is itself “in the category of substance.”¹³⁴ Nevertheless, the actuality and ex-
istence of form do not depend on and are not derived from matter. This means that

 The correlation of essence and substance is reflected quite strongly in the early Arabic version of
Metaphysics Book Zeta produced by Usṭāth, except that there the notion of essence is conveyed by
means of the term anniyyah, not māhiyyah; see Averroes, Great Commentary, vol. 2, 767 ff, which pre-
serves lemmata of this early translation. Interestingly, some of the technical terms that appear in the
Arabic text are echoed in Avicenna’s own works; for example, substance-quiddity is what is bi-dhāti-
hi, huwa huwa, and huwa mā huwa bi-l-anniyyah (784, 821, 830‒831). For anniyyah in the sense of es-
sence, see Endress, Proclus arabus, 79‒109.
 Rashed, Essentialisme, 147, 164.
 Rashed, Essentialisme, 45‒53, explains that, for Alexander, parts of substances are substances;
in that sense, both differentia and form are substances.
 Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Cure, II.2, 63.13‒14.
 Avicenna, Physics, I.2, 21; I.6, 48‒49; and I.11, 72 respectively.
 1 The move towards an Avicennian metaphysical realism or formalism 317

substance is most straightforwardly and adequately definable in terms of essential

form in Avicenna’s metaphysics. Accordingly, in Categories the master argues that
form is substance “in an eminent or absolute way” (hiya jawhar ʿalā l-iṭlāq).¹³⁵
This is also vindicated by his doctrine of the immaterial beings. Where immaterial
beings are concerned, their substance and quiddities correspond fully and directly
to their forms, since the latter do not include any material principle within them.
As such, they are simple, intelligible forms and substances.¹³⁶ Hence, according to
Avicenna, pure quiddity not only exists as a nature and form in the concrete thing
alongside its material accidents, but it is also a cause of the substance and essence
of the thing. The pure essence ‘humanness’ that somehow exists as a common nature
and form in each concrete and individual human being is responsible for their sub-
stantiality and essentiality as human. As Avicenna explains in Introduction I.5 with
regard to the individual human being, “The inner reality of its existence is only
through humanness [ḥaqīqat wujūdihi bi-l-insāniyyah], and the quiddity of each indi-
vidual [human being] lies in its humanness, although its individual existence [in-
niyyah] is realized [tataḥaṣṣalu] from quality, quantity, and other [accidental] things
similar to them.”¹³⁷
The foregoing points to a narrow relationship in Avicenna between essence, sub-
stance, and form, which can be traced historically to some passages in Aristotle and
especially to Alexander’s interpretation of the Stagirite.¹³⁸ But when compared to his
predecessors, Avicenna accentuates the prioritization of essence by placing pure
quiddity at the very heart of his logico-ontological treatment of hylomorphism and
substance. The notion of essence is the thread that connects the various logical,
physical, and metaphysical facets of Avicenna’s system and lends it remarkable
unity and coherence. The master not only follows the essentialist approach of Aris-
totle in Book Zeta (especially in 4 and 17) and of Alexander’s ontology (as recon-
structed by Rashed), but builds on them and amplifies them to ascribe a maximalist
role to pure quiddity in his philosophy. The latter is the foundational ontological and
gnoseological ground connecting logical notions in the mind and ontological princi-
ples in concrete reality. As I will further argue in chapter IV, it is also the main crite-
rion of substantiality. The physical, or rather metaphysical, notion of form or ṣūrah
therefore opens a constructive perspective regarding the issue of how quiddity and
nature can be said to exist in concrete beings according to Avicenna. The essential

 Avicenna, Categories, I.6, 47.5. The connection between substance and form is articulated in var-
ious passages of Metaphysics as well; see, for instance, II.1, 59.15 ff.
 Avicenna, Elements of Philosophy, 48.
 Avicenna, Introduction, I.5, 29.11‒13; cf. Booth, Aristotelian Aporetic Ontology, 112.
 In light of the foregoing, it would appear that Avicenna made a key contribution to the philo-
sophical reflection on the topic of how hylomorphic form relates to essence and substance. Not
only did he bequeath (in an Avicennian garb) many of the crucial ideas articulated by Alexander,
but he also accentuated the latter’s essentialist account by means of his special theory of pure quid-
dity. Again on this issue, the Latin Scholastics were deeply influenced by Avicenna’s account.
318 III Quiddity in Itself in the Concrete World

and substantial form is, it appears, another manifestation of pure quiddity, this time
as it can be said to exist in the concrete world, as opposed to its existing in the mind.
This approach allows for the postulation of a formal existence of pure essence in the
concrete world. This in turn helps to accommodate a variety of claims that Avicenna
makes in parallel: that differentia/genus and form/matter are different from one an-
other, but also directly correlated with regard to essence; that pure quiddity exists as
‘a part’ of the concrete being and in the concrete being; and that essence-form holds
the primary sense of substance. Due to its semantic ambivalence, form or ṣūrah is
also what corresponds to genus, differentia, and species in the mind qua logical
predicates, in which case quiddity is this time regarded as a universal intelligible
form. The constancy and ubiquity of pure quiddity throughout these various settings
is what ensures the symmetry between Avicenna’s epistemology and ontology. As
McGinnis showed, it is what provides scientific validation to the correspondence be-
tween the ontic reality of a concrete existent and our logical and conceptual appre-
hension of it.¹³⁹ Admittedly, this makes the term ṣūrah somewhat ambiguous or
equivocal (as Avicenna himself suggests in Definitions)¹⁴⁰ or, better said, yet another
modulated term endowed with an array of semantic nuances, a conclusion that was
reached already with regard to the notions of universality, oneness, and existence.¹⁴¹
In the foregoing, I attempted to make sense of Avicenna’s mereological construal
of quiddity in concrete beings by resorting to a hylomorphic framework and by estab-
lishing an essentialist correspondence—and not just a mere analogy—between his
theory of logical predication in the mind and his views on substantial form in con-
crete beings. Perhaps the most remarkable feature to emerge from the previous anal-
ysis is the embeddedness of pure quiddity in the various levels of forms that Avicen-
na posits. Not only do the substantial and intelligible forms have a ‘semantic
correspondence’ to one another; these forms are ontologically grounded in pure
quiddity, which grants them essential reality and substantiality in the concrete
world and in the mind (for Avicenna’s view on the secondary substances, see section
IV.4). In this regard, the existence of the natures and quiddities as hylomorphic forms
facilitates an understanding of the mereological dimension of Avicenna’s doctrine,
whose ontological implication may at first be difficult to grasp. Construed in this
light, form, nature, and essence can be regarded as a part (juzʾ) of the concrete

 McGinnis, Logic and Science.

 Avicenna, Definitions, 16.5.
 Is it truly a coincidence that Avicenna regards some of the most fundamental notions of his met-
aphysics—namely, existence, oneness, universality, and form—as being modulated (mushakkikah) or
as possessing a variety of senses (kathīr al-maʿānī)? One interesting realization is that the master does
not make this claim on behalf of quiddity. This is not only because quiddity is posited univocally of
beings (‘human’ of Zayd and ʿAmr, for the humanness of Zayd is not ‘more human’ than the human-
ness of ʿAmr), but also, I reckon, because the quiddity ‘in itself’ taken as a unitary and simple intel-
lectual concept is irreducible and therefore does not allow for this kind of ontological modulation.
The only exception could be by way of priority and posteriority; see sections IV.1.3 and 1.4.
 1 The move towards an Avicennian metaphysical realism or formalism 319

being, inasmuch as these terms all point to the essential and substantial form and
principle of a thing qua part of the composite, and without necessarily referring to
its matter per se or to prime matter as a distinct ontic and substance principle.¹⁴²
As the master explains in a variety of texts, such as On the Soul and Metaphysics
II.1, form qua substance or jawhar is a part (juzʾ) of the composite.¹⁴³ This statement
should be tied to his other claims in Metaphysics V.1 to the effect that quiddity in it-
self is ‘a part’ of each individual existent. The reason why Avicenna is intent on de-
scribing quiddity and form in concrete things in a mereological manner is precisely
because he is speaking, fundamentally, about quiddity in itself, the quidditative
maʿnā, which, thanks to its special nature, never combines, identifies, or fuses
with its surrounding accidents and concomitants.¹⁴⁴ In this case, ‘in itself’ means
not ‘separately,’ but rather ‘irreducibly.’

 To conclude, the term ṣūrah in Avicenna’s metaphysical works reflects a semantic ambiguity that
locates it midway between logic and ontology. It encapsulates the interface between the logical and
conceptual status of intelligible form qua genus and species in the mind and its role as substantial
and essential form and ontological principle in concrete existents; this perhaps explains why the
master describes ṣūrah as an “equivocal term” (ism mushtarak) in Definitions, 16.5. In spite of this
statement, it is perhaps better defined, like the other principles of physics, as a ‘modulated’ notion,
as Avicenna indicates in Physics I.3, 31. In this fashion, form is tied to the reality of the common na-
tures in concrete beings and at the same time to their conception as genus or species in the mind. This
implies the essential and substantial priority and foundationality of pure quiddity in these various
domains of formal existence. At Physics, I.10, 70.1‒2, Avicenna acknowledges this ambiguity by stat-
ing that “the form may be said of quiddity [māhiyyah], which, when it is realized in matter, constitutes
a species, as well as of the species itself,” a view also intimated in Introduction and Definitions, 16‒17,
where he explains that the term ṣūrah can refer to the species and genus as well as to the quiddity of
a thing. In the same work, 21, he also identifies nature (ṭabīʿah) with the “essential form” (ṣūrah dhā-
tiyyah). In Salvation, 14.7‒10, Avicenna begins by providing a standard logical definition of “genus” as
“that which is said of many that differ in species as an answer to the question: What is it?,” but then
proceeds to gloss the term “species” as “forms and essential realities” (al-ṣuwar wa-l-ḥaqāʾiq al-dhā-
tiyyah). These texts not only provide corroboration regarding the linkage of essence, form, and genus
and species in Avicenna’s analysis; they also reveal that the universals of species and genus used in
logical discussions have a counterpart in reality in the substantial forms of concrete beings and that
all these notions in turn are in a sense reducible to the pure quiddities.
 Avicenna, On the Soul, I.1, 5.6‒7: “form is a part through which the thing [al-shayʾ] is what it is in
actuality.” In that same passage, Avicenna proceeds to identify the substantial form of human being
with the soul (5.8‒6.1).
 For a discussion of mereology in Avicenna and how it relates to essence and existence, see De
Haan, A Mereological Construal. De Haan, however, limits his statements mostly to the epistemic or
logical aspect of the problem and does not delve into its ontological implications. Benevich, Die ‘göt-
tliche Existenz,’ also recognizes the mereological component in Avicenna’s discussion, and he con-
nects the ‘divine existence’ of pure quiddity Avicenna speaks of in Metaphysics V.1 with its existing as
a part in things; oddly, however, Benevich insists on calling this existential mode an epistemic (as
opposed to ontological) one. The problem, as I have already noted, is that it is highly artificial to sep-
arate the epistemic and the ontological in Avicenna’s philosophy. Benevich’s approach would seem to
ascribe an ‘epistemic existence’ to pure quiddity in the mind, but this in turn raises the question of
how this consideration would relate to mental existence, and especially to the universal, which also
320 III Quiddity in Itself in the Concrete World

In spite of this, some interpretive ambiguities remain. One aspect of Avicenna’s

account that is left hanging concerns the status of the substantial form. For it is not
altogether clear whether he would posit a single substantial form in the individual
that would be responsible for all of its essential features or whether he would
allow for a multiplicity of substantial forms to accumulate within the same material
entity. This issue seems directly related to the consideration of whether, for Avicenna,
species is the only quiddity and form that is realized (taḥaqqaqa) in the concrete
world as a unitary thing, or whether its various constituents can be said to be real-
ized alongside it and in a distinct ontological mode. Conflicting evidence on these
points can be drawn from the Avicennian corpus.¹⁴⁵ Recently, this question has re-
ceived a detailed treatment by Andreas Lammer in the context of Avicenna’s physics
and, to some extent, of his cosmology.¹⁴⁶ This author concludes quite emphatically
that Avicenna was a monist when it comes to the substantial form, and he also pro-
vides arguments and textual evidence to undermine a pluralist reading. Although
Lammer’s discussion of the topic is informative, I am not convinced that the new evi-
dence he adduces is as decisive as he deems it. For one thing, it focuses mostly on
physics, so that Lammer’s analysis does not sufficiently take into consideration is-
sues related to Avicenna’s metaphysics and especially to his views on essence. For
instance, one quite straightforward problem with the monist approach is that Avicen-
na is insistent about the extramental existence of animalness or animal in itself.
Now, since animal does not exist as a separate Platonic form in the extramental
world, it presumably is to be connected with a substantial form in matter, namely,
the form that specifies generic body into animal body, making it in turn a genus
for horse, human and other species. It is true that, on one reading, Avicenna can
be understood as saying that animalness exists together with or subsumed under
the species-form, e. g., horse, so that animalness would be merely implied by that
species-form or realized together with the realization of the species, in a manner I
will elucidate below. But it may also very well be the case that animalness and horse-
ness are distinct forms inhering in generic body. In fact, given that the Agent Intellect
contemplates the forms and pure quiddities (see chapter V) and that it is ‘the Giver of
Forms’ (wāhib al-ṣuwar), it would certainly be odd if that separate being did not

exists in the mind. Moreover, it by the same token does not adequately address the issue of how quid-
dity can be said to exist in concrete existents, if this state is merely ‘epistemic.’
 The issue of whether Avicenna was a monist or a pluralist with regard to the substantial form is
of course relevant for the study of his reception in Latin scholasticism, where advocates of both po-
sitions can be found. Aquinas, for example, advocated the doctrine of a single substantial form,
whereas others, such as Duns Scotus, posited a plurality of substantial forms. What is interesting
is that, as in many other cases, evidence to support both positions can be gleaned from Avicenna’s
works, even though modern scholars have in general tended to regard him as a pluralist, mostly on
the basis of his theory of the corporeal form; for insight into this issue, see Stone, Simplicius and
Avicenna; Shihadeh, Avicenna’s Corporeal Form; and Lammer, The Elements, who summarizes
much of the past scholarship on this topic.
 Lammer, The Elements, 166 ff.
 1 The move towards an Avicennian metaphysical realism or formalism 321

somehow intellect the form ‘horseness’ as distinct from ‘animalness’—with the impli-
cation that it would also emanate the latter to the sublunary world. As Lammer him-
self acknowledges, there are passages that point to a plurality of substantial forms in
Avicenna. Some of these excerpts were cited earlier and refer to the existence or re-
alization of forms in the concrete world that correspond to species, genera, and dif-
ferentiae in the mind.¹⁴⁷ This alternative pluralist or synthetic narrative would have
the merit not only of paying heed to the notion of a hierarchy of forms and stages or
degrees of actualization—crucial features also in Avicenna’s noetical and logical ac-
counts¹⁴⁸—but also of contextualizing his comments within a cosmological frame-
work whose premise is that the Agent Intellect encompasses all the forms of nature
and emanates them to the concrete world. It would also account for Avicenna’s belief
that pure animalness and pure humanness—to give only two examples—both exist in
concrete beings, when animalness corresponds to a genus in the mind and human-
ness to a species. When translated into an emanationist and hylomorphic framework,
these various quiddities could be identified with different forms and also with differ-
ent stages of realization in the process leading to the gradual determination of mat-
ter.¹⁴⁹

 Naturally, a pluralist reading of Avicenna would also dissociate the corporeal form from the
other substantial forms, something which Lammer, The Elements, strongly rejects. Avicenna speaks
of the corporeal form (al-ṣūrah al-jismiyyah) that is necessarily added to prime matter to provide it
with three-dimensionality. To this initial substantial form, others are presumably added that further
specify matter and body into something increasingly definite, e. g., animal, biped animal, etc. to ar-
rive ultimately, in the case of human, at rational animal, where ‘rational’ is the ultimate differentia
that specifies animal as human. In terms of a synthetic hylomorphic reasoning, then, a variety of
forms would be required to arrive at a definite species such as human. It is the Agent Intellect, in
its capacity as universal provider of forms (wāhib al-ṣuwar), which would fulfil the task of endowing
foundational prime matter with these various layers of forms. This suggests that the genera and dif-
ferentiae that appear in a logical context in the definition could also have their own ontological re-
alization in the concrete being and could be said to correspond to distinct substantial forms in the
individual. Accordingly, Avicenna at times appears to maintain the concurrent realization of genus
alongside differentia or species in the concrete entity, which would imply that different substantial
forms inhere in matter after the corporeal form. This is because, as Avicenna explains in Metaphysics
V.7, genus and species have their own distinct quiddities (māhiyyāt), so that if these quiddities are
hypothesized to exist in the concrete individual, then they presumably also refer to different forms
specifying matter and body. Finally, it should be pointed out that even in some passages of Physics
(I.2, 14.8‒10, and 15.1‒3), Avicenna refers to many forms in the natural body and seems to envisage
two possible scenarios of how the corporeal form relates to the other forms, one of which requires a
pluralist account.
 With regard to noetics, each intellectual level is metaphorically form for the one below it, and
substrate for the one above it; with regard to logic, animal can be seen as species for body, but genus
for horse. Naturally, this poses questions about Avicenna’s method and of the potential dialectical or
analogical use of these frameworks for purely didactic purposes.
 Allebban, Conservation, has recently offered an alternative interpretation of the Agent Intellect.
She emphasizes the role of the Agent Intellect in the perfecting of the species and the human rational
soul, arguing that this intellect is a cause of species, not a cause of the individuated forms in concrete
322 III Quiddity in Itself in the Concrete World

On the other hand, there are also compelling metaphysical reasons, and strong
textual evidence, to subsume all the constituents of the definition and essence in the
mind under a single substantial form in the concrete individual. Avicenna believes
that it is the species that is primarily (exclusively?) realized in the concrete world.
Thus, in Metaphysics he describes species as “the realized nature [al-ṭabīʿah al-mu-
taḥaṣṣilah] both in concrete existence and in the mind,” and likewise in Categories
he refers to human as “a realized nature that does not require what constitutes it
[once it is realized in existence]” (al-insān ṭabīʿah mutaḥaṣṣilah lā taḥtāju mā yuqaw-
wimuhā).¹⁵⁰ In this fashion, the essential nature can be made to correspond most di-
rectly to the species-form in the individual, such as the substantial form of human-
ness in Zayd. In Notes, this substantial form is described as being unchanging and
one.¹⁵¹ If this is the case, then speaking of the realization of genus-form or differen-
tia-form as real parts of the realized species or the substantial composite would seem
misleading or superfluous. They would only be parts of the definition in the mind,

beings. She criticizes the view that this intellect represents a direct cause in the formation of material
beings, bringing attention to the fact that its agency is not mentioned in Avicenna’s biological trea-
tises. Her approach therefore departs markedly from earlier accounts, such as those of Davidson, Al-
farabi, and Janssens, The Notions, which depict the Agent Intellect both as a cause of intellectual
knowledge and as a cause of the existence of sublunary beings. Allebban states: “I argue that ema-
nation must accordingly be revised, as not some intervention of the Active Intellect in each physical
sublunar process of generation, but as a causing of the contingent essences that populate the cosmos
which are individuated by material and physical efficient causes and processes” (8). Allebban artic-
ulates an engaging analysis of the relation between biological and metaphysical causality in Avicen-
na’s account of concrete beings. It seems clear, for instance, that Avicenna conceives of individuation
as the result of sublunary processes and especially the role of matter, and that the Agent Intellect
does not emanate individualized or particular forms. However, my interpretation of pure quiddity
in Avicenna and of the fundamentally Neoplatonic structure of his cosmology leads me to conclude
that the Agent Intellect has a direct causal role to play in sublunary processes. Given that on my read-
ing this being contains all the forms and quiddities prior to multiplicity (see chapter V), its causality
must affect all sublunary instantiations of which the quiddities represent a formal and final para-
digm. In addition, there is evidence pointing to its efficient causality as well; see Janssens, The No-
tions, 553. These points seem independently substantiated by Avicenna’s somewhat odd theories of
cosmic flooding and spontaneous generation. This theory entails the complete destruction of species
at certain intervals in time and the spontaneous generation of individuals through the intervention of
the Agent Intellect. This theory therefore indicates that the re-actualization of individuals and of the
species in concreto depends directly on the causality of the Agent Intellect and that sublunary proc-
esses alone are not sufficient for this to occur (on this topic, see Freudenthal, The Medieval Hebrew
Reception; and Bertolacci, Averroes, especially 42). It should also be noted that the fact that the Agent
Intellect plays no role in the biological accounts studied by Allebban is not altogether surprising. It
would be out of place to discuss metaphysical causality in a work of biology, and Avicenna was in-
deed quite sensitive about issues of disciplinary consistency in the various genres he explored. But
even then, Janssens has found instances where this intellect’s causality intervenes in biological proc-
esses and in the information of sublunary matter; see Janssens, The Notions, especially 553‒554.
 Avicenna, Metaphysics, V.5, 228.4; Categories, 18.15‒17.
 Avicenna, Notes, 143.10, section 196: “this form is in itself not diverse and is a single quidditative
meaning” (wa-l-ṣūrah fī dhātihā ghayr mukhtalifah fa-innahā maʿnā wāḥid).
 1 The move towards an Avicennian metaphysical realism or formalism 323

but not in concrete reality, where they would be ontologically subsumed under the
species-form. This, perhaps, is why Avicenna states that “the generic nature comes
to be [yaḥduthu] in the thing that is the species both in the mind and in [concrete]
existence when the species fully comes to be.”¹⁵² Additionally, he explains elsewhere
that “genus subsists in [fī] the species and has the subsistence of the species.”¹⁵³ This
idea is developed to greater length in a passage of Notes:

Genus does not subsist in actuality, for it is differentia that makes it subsistent in actuality. And
if differentia is annulled [baṭala], the share of the genus [ḥiṣṣatuhu min al-jins] that was made
subsistent by the differentia is also annulled. For it [genus] is not something subsistent in itself
in actuality that could be a substrate for two consecutive differentiae. If [for example] human-
ness or rationality [al-insāniyyah aw al-nuṭqiyyah] were to become annulled, it is not possible for
this share of animalness [belonging to humanness] to remain subsistent [in actuality].¹⁵⁴

This excerpt—as well as other similar sections in Notes—indicates that species and
differentia—or, rather, what corresponds in the concrete to species and differentia
in the mind, i. e., forms—are what exist primarily in actuality, and that what corre-
sponds to genus subsists only derivatively and dependently on the species. Accord-
ingly, it is species and differentia that are to be identified chiefly with the substantial
form of the individual being. Finally, in Metaphysics V.7, Avicenna expounds on the
fact that the distinction between genus and differentia is primarily mental, since it
involves the potentiality of the genus to be realized as a species by virtue of this dif-
ferentia. But once realized, the genus is one with the species. Thus,

This potentiality [that attaches to the species] is not on account of [concrete] existence, but
[only] on account of the [operations of the] mind … and inasmuch as genera and differentiae
are natures that refer to a [single] nature [i. e., the species], as you well know, they are predicated
of the [same] definiendum. For we state that the definition in reality is a meaning [designating] a
single nature [ṭabīʿah wāḥidah].¹⁵⁵

The evidence adduced above seems to confine essential realization (taḥaqquq al-
māhiyyah)¹⁵⁶ in the concrete world to that of the species-form alone, in a way in

 Avicenna, Metaphysics, V.3, 217.12‒13.

 Avicenna, Metaphysics, V.2, 208.7‒8.
 Avicenna, Notes, 402, section 712. Cf. 392, section 696. A more ambiguous section is 698: there it
is said that “[the differentia] ‘rational’ makes possible the existence of animalness, but not the true
reality of animalness” (al-nāṭiq bihi yaṣṣihu wujūd al-ḥayawāniyyah wa-laysa yaṣṣihu bihi ḥaqīqat
al-ḥayawāniyyah). The existence of animalness is presumably to be understood together with the dif-
ferentia and thus in the species, so to speak, and not as something distinct.
 Avicenna, Metaphysics, V.7, 240.15‒241.7.
 As the terminology and ideas of these various excerpts make clear, what is at stake here, and the
focus of the discussion, is how the essential parts of the definition and quiddity in the mind can be
said to be realized and to subsist in external reality. This is different from the analysis of the way in
which existence, as a non-constitutive concomitant of quiddity, applies to the concomitants and ac-
cidents of quiddity as well as to the composite substantial entity taken as a whole. In this regard,
324 III Quiddity in Itself in the Concrete World

which the other constitutive elements of quiddity would be somehow subsumed

under it or implicitly included in it, without this leading to ontological multiplicity
or a pluralist model of the substantial forms. This would imply that the individual
human, for instance, has a single substantial form (humanness), which, together
with matter—in this case construed either as prime matter (if one, with Lammer,
also subsumes the corporeal form within the single substantial species-form) or mat-
ter together with the corporeal form (if one does not)—constitutes the essential core
of the individual human being.¹⁵⁷ And just as quiddity-species in the mind (e. g., uni-
versal horse) logically combines genus and differentia and points to a single and uni-
fied concept, so quiddity-substantial-form in the individual would encapsulate all
the essential features of that existent.¹⁵⁸
Let me recapitulate. The previous comments have opened another angle from
which to approach Avicenna’s mereological construal of quiddity in the concrete
world. Avicenna holds that form is a part (juzʾ) of the composite substance; it is a
part that inheres in matter, but is not technically speaking in a subject; form is
also identified with essence and substance; it is the essential and substantial form
of the concrete individual that completes it substantially and ontologically and
makes it what it is; this substantial form pertains especially to species, but one
should also perhaps take into account the substantial forms that correspond to the
various differentiae, for all qualifications, differentiae, and specifications added to
prime matter can be regarded as forms and also as pure quiddities. Naturally, this
notion of a formal and essential ‘part’ applies only to corporeal beings, since imma-
terial beings are not hylomorphic and, hence, do not have parts. In their case, they
are pure intellectual substances. In the course of the analysis, a doubt was raised as
to whether Avicenna would identify a single substantial form, a species-form that
would be realized in the concrete existent and subsume all the other substantial
forms, and which would also be identical to the pure quiddity that corresponds to
the species in the mind and in definition, e. g., universal horse; or whether he up-
holds a pluralist model of the substantial forms and reckons that every instantiation
of the pure quiddities in the concrete individual corresponds to a distinct substantial
form gradually specifying prime matter or corporeal matter, e. g., corporeal form, an-
imal form, rational form. This would imply that each quiddity-form pertaining to that
thing would be realized in existence. There seems to be textual evidence in favor of
both interpretations, making Avicenna either a monist or a pluralist with regard to

notice that Avicenna in general avoids using the term wujūd in these passages; the notions of essen-
tial realization and subsistence are typically conveyed by terms deriving from the roots q-w-m and ḥ-
q-q; for a more detailed discussion of this point, see section IV.3.
 Naturally, the previous comments do not dissipate the need to posit the corporeal form, unless it
too be subsumed under the substantial form human.
 Much of Metaphysics V.7 seems devoted to establishing precisely this point and showing the es-
sential unity of quiddity in the mind and its formal unity in the concrete world, at least when it comes
to the notion of species.
 1 The move towards an Avicennian metaphysical realism or formalism 325

substantial forms. This would explain to some extent why later interpreters of the
master disagreed on this point and ultimately landed on either side of the issue.
One point calls for additional comments. It is perhaps not correct, strictly speak-
ing, to claim that for Avicenna the substantial form in concrete beings is identical
with the intelligible form in the mind—the former, after all, is a hylomorphic form
that exists in matter, the latter a universal intelligible form that exists in the intel-
lect.¹⁵⁹ Yet, there is a direct correspondence between these various levels of forms,
inasmuch as pure quiddity is essentially common to them. This ensures their trans-
lation from one plane to the other. As Avicenna explains in Introduction,

Sometimes the intelligible form [al-ṣūrah al-maʿqūlah] is in some manner a cause for the occur-
rence of the form that exists in external reality [al-ṣūrah al-mawjūdah fī l-aʿyān]; sometimes the
form in external reality is in some manner a cause of the intelligible form, that is, [the latter]
occurs in the mind after it has existed in external reality.¹⁶⁰

In Physics I.1, Avicenna himself uses the term “correlation” or “correspondence” (mu-
qāyasah) to describe the interface between the parts of the definition in the mind and
the formal and material causes as parts in the concrete being.¹⁶¹ Nevertheless, I
would argue that the rationale for this correspondence of form is metaphysical
and focuses on the epistemic and ontological irreducibility of the quidditative mean-
ing (maʿnā) and nature (ṭabīʿah) in these two contexts. This implies not that a mean-
ing that exists in the mind is projected onto the world of nature, but rather that this
maʿnā is a metaphysical principle that exists in concrete beings and in the mind.¹⁶²
Accordingly, the substantial form and the intelligible form of, say, horse, are equally
grounded in, and derive their substantiality from, the same pure quiddity horseness
(farasiyyah). The pure nature horseness is common to both and also a metaphysical
part of the composite that is the individual horse and the universal horse. This, at the
very least, ensures a metaphysical correspondence and commonness between the
two.¹⁶³

 Wisnovsky, Avicenna’s Metaphysics, 46‒49, provides interesting comments regarding how this
issue plays out in Alexander’s works.
 Avicenna, Introduction, I.12, 69.7‒9; translated by Marmura.
 See Avicenna, Physics, I.1, 10.1.
 As should be clear by now, my contention relies partly on the hypothesis that Avicenna did not
divest the notion of maʿnā of all the entitative aspects and connotations that were associated with it
from the ancient Greek tradition (through the Arabic translations) and from Christian and Muslim
kalām. Given that in the theological and philosophical traditions it was the norm rather than the ex-
ception that maʿnā should be construed in an entitative way, the idea that Avicenna would regard it
exclusively as a linguistic or semantic notion would be surprising and strikes me as unlikely.
 If there was no essential and ontological commonality at all between the concrete world and the
thinking mind, then how would it be at all possible to relate our ideas to the concrete entities or vice
versa? And how would scientific knowledge be possible? The analysis in McGinnis, Logic and Sci-
ence, proceeds on a similar premise.
326 III Quiddity in Itself in the Concrete World

What is crucial from the metaphysical and methodological perspectives is that

Avicenna’s differentiation of pure quiddity from the universal notions in the mind,
such as universality, genusness, and speciesness, enables him to posit an ontological
reality and presence of the pure quiddities in concrete individuals as well. In this
context, quiddity in itself is connected with another seminal feature of the master’s
philosophical system, namely, hylomorphic form. While building on Alexander and
maintaining a distinction between the two sets of notions (differentia/form and
genus/matter), Avicenna manages to ground them equally in the theory of pure quid-
dity and preserve the latter’s ontological autonomy. Thus, ‘human’ is a universal spe-
cies in the mind and, as such, a purely logical notion, but it can also be said to exist
as a formal part of this individual concrete human being, because the foundational
nature (humanness) of these two things is common, irreducible, and constant. The
pure nature humanness can be either universal species in the mind or substantial
and essential form in the concrete individual; the pure nature animalness can be ei-
ther genus or informed matter, depending on the domain of its existence, etc. It was
argued in this connection that Avicenna’s sustained effort to distinguish between hy-
lomorphic principles (body, form, matter) and logical notions (genus, species, differ-
entiae)—a project he took over from Alexander and to some extent from the Baghdad
Peripatetics—was combined in his works with the intention to establish pure quiddi-
ty as a common, irreducible, and foundational principle for these notions. Although
it underpins these various logical and hylomorphic notions, pure essence at the
same time preserves its ontological and epistemic autonomy and self-identity as
‘the thing in itself.’ In this manner, Avicenna elaborated on Alexander’s essentialist
approach to establish pure quiddity as the cornerstone of his logico-ontological sys-
tem.

2 Is pure quiddity in concrete beings intelligible?

The foregoing raises the question of the mode in which pure quiddity qua nature
(ṭabīʿah), form (ṣūrah), and quidditative meaning or entity (maʿnā) can be said to
exist in concrete beings. At the beginning of Metaphysics V.2, Avicenna describes
this problem as one that causes doubt in the mind. But the only reply he provides
there consists of an implicit rebuttal of the Platonic forms.¹⁶⁴ So although one may
take it for granted that the master would not locate these quiddities in an independ-
ent and transcendent realm of forms, since they are not ontologically separate (mu-
fāriqah), the mode of their immanence in concrete beings still calls for clarification.
Inasmuch as Avicenna states that the pure quiddities exist in concrete beings; as he

 Avicenna, Metaphysics, V.2, 207.5‒9. The question of how quiddities exist in extramental reality
is not restricted to natural forms, but concerns also numbers and relations, which, according to the
shaykh al-raʾīs, exist both in the mind and in concrete reality.
 2 Is pure quiddity in concrete beings intelligible? 327

equates the nature and quiddity in concrete beings with substantial forms; as form is
distinct from matter and fulfils one—and arguably the most important—definition of
substance and essence; and as this form is abstractable from concrete beings and be-
comes intelligible in the human intellect when contemplated; then it stands to rea-
son to assume that the quidditative forms Avicenna postulates exist intelligibly in the
concrete existents. More precisely, there are reasons to surmise that, in themselves,
these pure quiddities exist intelligibly and irreducibly in the concrete beings, while at
the same time remaining immanent in them and surrounded by their material acci-
dents. This hypothesis seems to cohere with an ontological interpretation of Avicen-
na’s doctrines of pure quiddity as something intrinsically intelligible, as well as with
the terminological and textual evidence at our disposal that indicates a strong con-
nection between form and essence.
The problem, however, is that Avicenna is also adamant that the intelligible can-
not dwell in the material. He sharply distinguishes between ‘the sensible’ (al-maḥsūs)
and ‘the intelligible’ (al-maʿqūl) in his works (especially in his accounts of psycho-
logical abstraction) and argues that the intelligible cannot actually exist in the ma-
terial or sensible. This argument is premised on the idea that whatever is in itself and
actually intelligible must be a self-thinking intellect (ʿaql). In the concrete world,
what is essentially intelligible is also necessarily engaged in intellective thought.
This is the case of the separate intellects. They are immaterial and intelligible
forms, and, thus, also by necessity, intellectual beings. But this cannot possibly be
the case of the hylomorphic forms, which exist only in a material substrate.¹⁶⁵ It is
on these grounds that, in Pointers, Avicenna quite explicitly rejects the possibility
that hylomorphic forms can be actually immaterial or intelligible and cautions
that their extramental existence is of a material kind.¹⁶⁶ Avicenna’s metaphysics
therefore posits immaterial forms on the one hand—these can in turn be subdivided
into the separate intellects of the exterior world and the intelligibles in the human
mind—and hylomorphic forms on the other. Yet, the caveat that forms in concrete be-
ings are material would seem to undermine Avicenna’s theory of psychological ab-
straction as a valid intellectual process designed to obtain the intelligibles from
physical objects. For if the substantial forms of concrete beings are not in any way
intelligible, then how can the intellect ever abstract them and apprehend them as
such? And how can the faculties of the soul successfully effect the transition from
the material to the intelligible?
In view of these considerations, maintaining a dichotomy between the sensible
and the intelligible in such a forceful manner seems oversimplistic. After all, there
are two instances or ‘moments’ in Avicenna’s philosophy where the interface be-
tween the material and immaterial planes is disrupted. The first is the cosmological

 For the ontological status of material and immaterial forms in Avicenna, see Arnzen, Platonishe
Ideen, 86‒99.
 Avicenna, Pointers, vol. 2, 398.3, states that “the existence of [these forms] in the concrete is ma-
terial” (wa-ammā wujūduhā fī l-khārij māddī).
328 III Quiddity in Itself in the Concrete World

transition from the intelligible realm of the separate intellects to the corporeal realm
of the celestial orbs (recall that the First Effect is credited with the causation of the
first body, viz., the outermost celestial orb, thereby inaugurating the creation of the
heavens). The second is the gnoseological transition from the perceived sensible to the
cognized intelligible (where, on an abstractionist reading of Avicenna, the intellect
can ‘extract’ the intelligibles from the concrete particulars). These two cases deter
from a schematic account of how the material relates to the intelligible and call
for a more subtle interpretation of the evidence.¹⁶⁷ More specifically with regard to
the present concern, there is a set of considerations that calls into question the as-
sumption that the quidditative principle could not in any way exist intelligibly in
the concrete individual. First, Avicenna’s repeated claims to the effect that pure quid-
dity (e. g., humanness in itself or animalness in itself) exists in the concrete individ-
uals would seem to go in this direction, since it is not reducible to a material prin-
ciple. Second, his occasional intimation that the universal—or rather, one kind of
universality—somehow exists in the concrete, either potentially or actually. Third,
the clear indications in his works regarding the human intellect’s ability to extract
(intazaʿa, etc.) and abstract (jarrada, tajrīd) the quidditative meanings from the con-
crete beings, as well as peel away (yaqshiru) the various layers of material attach-
ments that surround the maʿnā embedded in particulars. Indeed, the claims that
pure quiddity somehow exists in the concrete, that one aspect of the universal
also exists in the concrete, and that the quidditative maʿnā can be extracted from
the particulars all point to an intelligible ontological mode of essence. Moreover,
one could argue, if there was nothing intelligible underlying the concrete individu-
als, then it would simply be impossible for the intellect to ever cognize them at
the theoretical, universal, and intellectual level, with the result that the disconnect
between the corporeal and the intelligible would be fully consummated in Avicenna’s
philosophy. But this, clearly, is not the case. So how can one make sense of these
various points and harmonize Avicenna’s position on this issue?
I believe it is possible to articulate a nuanced account of how quiddity exists in
concrete beings by promoting the distinction between the hylomorphic form and the
pure nature—or, more relevantly in this context, the quidditative meaning or princi-
ple (maʿnā). These admittedly are closely knit notions, but they are not identical.
More specifically, it is not as far-fetched as it may seem at first to attribute some de-

 Avicenna does not adequately account for the transition from the intelligible to the material in
his cosmology. More specifically, he does not explain in a satisfactory way how the activity of an im-
material intellect (i. e., theoretical thought) can cause a material or corporeal being. Instead of at-
tempting to demonstrate it, the master seems to have accepted this cosmological postulate on the au-
thority of the Peripatetic and Neoplatonic authors whose systems he builds on. This aspect of
Avicenna’s philosophy undoubtedly calls for a certain ‘leap of faith’ on the part of his readers, al-
though much the same can be said about most dualistic philosophical systems that presuppose
the causation of the material from the immaterial. Nevertheless, from an interpretive perspective,
they represent two interesting problematics that call for additional reflection and study.
 2 Is pure quiddity in concrete beings intelligible? 329

gree of intelligibility to the essential forms in concrete beings on account of the

maʿnā of these forms. For just as the core quidditative meaning is other than the
complex universal concept in the mind, so it is not fully identical with the substan-
tial form in the concrete object, although it underlies both and can be associated
with both. The point is that while it may be false, strictly speaking, to say that the
hylomorphic form is intelligible or that the universal exists in the concrete (without
any qualifications), it seems to be the case, on the other hand, that the maʿnā of the
form is intelligible and that, in virtue of its very self, this maʿnā possesses a kind of
essential universality. So one may surmise that the substantial or essential form hu-
manness in Zayd is intelligible, because, ultimately, the maʿnā humanness in Zayd is
intelligible, and because form is the thing that is most closely associated with this
maʿnā in Zayd. In fact, form is this maʿnā as it comes to exist in the object and as
a part (juzʾ) of the composite.
I argued previously that the term maʿnā in Avicenna’s philosophy refers not only
to an idea or meaning in the mind, but also assumes an entitative or substantive
quality in concrete beings, where it signals the existence of a quidditative nature.
One may also say that it points to the existence of the essential meaning in things,
inasmuch as a meaning can be reified or objectified. Accordingly, the maʿnā in con-
crete beings exists irreducibly and is essentially intelligible, and in this respect it
should be identified with the same maʿnā that exists in the mind. Alternatively,
one could say that the hylomorphic form is potentially intelligible and universaliza-
ble (thanks to this maʿnā), inasmuch as it can become an object of intellectual
thought and acquire the accident of universality in the mind. These two aspects of
maʿnā—in the concrete and in the mind—are inseparable and, in the case of Avicen-
na’s doctrine of essence, reflect the irreducible reality of pure quiddity in these two
contexts of existence.¹⁶⁸ In this manner, the proposed distinction between the hylo-
morphic form (which is ‘material’ or, rather, necessarily inheres in matter and is a
part of the form-matter composite) and the maʿnā (which is the essential and intelli-
gible core of the form and what is abstracted and intellected from the physical ob-
ject) enables one to reconcile a set of difficult claims Avicenna maintains alongside
one another: that pure quiddity and maʿnā exist in the concrete; that they can be ab-
stracted from the physical objects and apprehended as immaterial concepts; that
form is eminently essence and substance; and that the hylomorphic forms have a
material existence and that, at any rate, what is essentially intelligible cannot
dwell in matter. Maintaining a distinction between pure quiddity and the other hylo-

 At Pointers, vol. 2, 402.3‒4, Avicenna speaks of a certain preparedness (istiʿdād) that belongs to
the quiddity (li-l-māhiyyah) of the concrete object and that precedes its connection (muqāranah) with
the thinking intellect. This vocabulary is reminiscent of the technical terms he employs to describe
the preparedness of matter for form. But here it is applied to essence, so that Avicenna has in
mind a kind of intelligible preparedness or disposition, which should be identified with the essential
nature or maʿnā. What this passage underlines, though, is the objective and intrinsic (potential) in-
telligibility of pure quiddity in the physical object.
330 III Quiddity in Itself in the Concrete World

morphic principles Avicenna outlines, as well as singling out quiddity’s irreducible

mode of existence in the substantial form, appear to solve many of the tensions re-
garding how form and essence can be said to exist in a concrete being. Ultimately
these views define the true essence of a human being—the maʿnā humanness—as
an intelligible principle. This, it should be noted, also fits with Avicenna’s substance
dualism and definition of the human rational soul as an immaterial principle dwell-
ing in a concrete body.¹⁶⁹
This interpretation of maʿnā as an intelligible meaning and principle that dwells
in the forms of concrete beings facilitates an understanding of Avicenna’s epistemol-
ogy and theory of psychological abstraction. Indeed, his theory of abstraction is pre-
dicated precisely on the intrinsic intelligibility of pure quiddity in the concrete world,
and not merely on the mind’s ability to identify and universalize the quidditative
maʿnā. ¹⁷⁰ In this connection, it was already pointed out that the master occasionally
refers to pure quiddity as a universal or common thing in the concrete world, which
makes it clear that—on the assumption that one gives credence to this claim and at-
tributes a special kind of universality to pure quiddity—its only possible mode of ex-
istence in this context would be intelligible.¹⁷¹ These considerations in turn should
be connected with the fact that nature in itself is described as irreducible (min ḥaythu
hiya hiya) and also as intelligible (maʿqūlah) when it is contemplated by an intel-
lect.¹⁷² Admittedly, this last feature, i. e., of contemplation by an intellect, could be
deemed a sine qua non that prevents us from regarding quiddity as something intel-
ligible in itself in the concrete beings. However, this condition seems tied primarily to
the criteria of intelligibility, intentionality, and universality in the mind, i. e., with re-

 Kaukua, Self-Awareness. Kaukua writes (24): “Avicenna opts for a full-blooded substance dual-
ism: the individual human essence is an immaterial substance, which is not strictly speaking a form
of the human body, although it does perform the functions of a form, animating and using the body
for its own ends.”
 I develop this point in greater detail below; see also McGinnis, Logic and Science.
 See notably Text 7, Text 17, Text 20, and Text 21. At Metaphysics V.2, 207.12‒13, the master states:
“as for the universality in the exterior [world] [al-kulliyyah min khārij], it occurs according to another
consideration [iʿtibār ākhar] [i. e., from the one regarding mental universality], and we discussed it
previously.” This is a hint that Avicenna does indeed recognize one aspect of universality in the con-
crete. Overall, then, one finds the same ambiguity with regard to the intelligibility of quiddity as the
one that characterizes Avicenna’s views on its universality in concrete beings: the maʿnā is essentially
universal and intelligible, but not in the sense in which these terms are typically used to designate
mental objects.
 Thus, if Avicenna in some texts is keen to stress the chasm between ‘the sensible’ and ‘the in-
tellectual,’ pure quiddity can be said to represent an exception to this general rule, since its existence
in concrete things is intelligible or at least potentially intelligible. This explains why Introduction, I.12,
68.18‒19 describes humanness as a natural form and an intelligible form; why the term ‘nature’ (ṭa-
bīʿah) can be applied both to concrete beings and to essences in the mind; and why this nature can be
intellectually ‘extracted’ and ‘abstracted’ from concrete individuals in the first place. On my view Ne-
oplatonic doctrines inflected this aspect of Avicenna’s philosophy; they will be discussed in more
depth in chapter V.
 2 Is pure quiddity in concrete beings intelligible? 331

gard to the mental universal as a constructed concept, which is different from the
issue of the quidditative maʿnā as it exists in itself in the concrete. Thus, whenever
Avicenna speaks of the potential universality and intelligibility of the universal in
the concrete (as he does implicitly in Text 20 below), this statement pertains primar-
ily to human thought and mental universality—i. e., the maʿnā’s potentiality to be ab-
stracted and conceived as a universal in the mind. This mode of universality should
be differentiated from the essential intelligibility and universality of ṭabīʿah and
maʿnā as it exists in the concrete. In contrast to the mental universal, the latter
can be described as something intrinsically or essentially universal or common. In-
deed, one could argue, even if no human intellects were present to apprehend the
universal concept ‘horse’ and predicate it of individual instances, there would still
be something essentially common in these concrete horses, namely, the pure nature
or maʿnā horseness. This explains why it remains identical at all times, even when it
coexists with matter and material accidents, as well as why this mode of existence
seems to be fundamentally unconnected to the issue of universality in the mind.
These points suggest a modulated construal of universality in Avicenna’s system.
At any rate, if the maʿnā were material, its irreducibility and cognitive separability
through abstraction would not be possible, and quiddity would simply fuse or col-
lapse irreversibly with its material substrate.
As I already showed in chapter II, the master goes through great pains to distin-
guish the meaning or maʿnā of quiddity in itself from the meaning or maʿnā of uni-
versality with which it is potentially connected, and he regards the universal as a
synthetic combination of these two meanings. The same would seem to apply to
the concrete existents, where the meaning or idea of quiddity in itself is present in
them qua foundational nature. It can be abstracted from these concrete beings
and also from the other things (accidents and concomitants) that accrue to it in
that context. It is this process of abstraction that enables us to recognize things
for what they are, e. g., Zayd for human.¹⁷³ As Avicenna explains in Introduction:

Animalness [al-ḥayawāniyyah] does not become an individual that can be pointed to except
through its connection with something that makes it [a thing that can be] pointed to. Likewise
with regard to the intellect: it [animalness] becomes such [a definite thing] only when the intel-
lect attaches [another] specifying meaning [maʿnā] to it.¹⁷⁴

 Avicenna’s belief that quiddity in itself can be abstracted engenders some epistemological com-
plications. There is at present a debate as to the place and importance of abstraction in Avicenna’s
epistemology and how abstraction relates to the emanation of forms coming from the Agent Intellect.
What is significant in this connection is that the evidence from Metaphysics V.1, on my analysis, sug-
gests that quiddity in itself represents the utmost degree of mental abstraction. Hence, I claim that
Avicenna regards abstraction as pertaining to the intellectual state of quiddity in itself, although
the issue of whether abstraction also expresses a process leading to this state should remain open
for the time being. Suffice to say here that several statements in Metaphysics V.1 seem to support
this view: 204.6‒8; 205.5‒6, and especially 8‒13. This point is discussed in more detail below.
 Avicenna, Introduction, I.12, 65.19‒66.1.
332 III Quiddity in Itself in the Concrete World

This passage attests that the core meaning of mental and extramental existents de-
rives from the same intelligible nature. Furthermore, it stresses that these existents
exist as individuals or numerically one things as a result of their maʿnā combining
with external attributes and concomitants that condition or qualify them. However,
even though this synthetic process ultimately results in composite or complex exis-
tents, the irreducible meaning that constitutes their quiddity, viz., animalness, re-
mains a constant throughout these ontological and epistemological processes. As
a result, it always remains conceptually abstractable, even when these entities pos-
sess a plurality of material attributes attached to them. Avicenna’s views on psycho-
logical abstraction provide additional evidence concerning the intelligible existence
of the essential maʿnā in concrete beings. Although this point will be addressed in
detail later on (see section III.6), one example is called for here to illustrate this con-
nection. In Commentary on Theology of Aristotle, the master explains that the intel-
lect can “unbind” (taṣarrafa), “extract” (tanziʿu), and “abstract” (jarrada, tajrīd)
the “essential reality” (ḥaqīqah) of things, as well as “peel away” (yaqshiru) the var-
ious layers of material attachments and accidents that surround this essential reality
in the composite thing.¹⁷⁵ Avicenna’s language in that passage is highly evocative and
points to the existence of the ḥaqīqah or maʿnā as an intelligible principle in the con-
crete that is divested from matter by the powers of the intellect. Moreover, pure quid-
dity, Avicenna tells us elsewhere, is related to the composite in the way that the sim-
ple is related to the complex and the part to the whole. It is prior and, so to speak, a
principle for the existence of what follows, with the implication that it can also be
conceptually separated from it, just as the simple or the part can be conceived of
in isolation of, and as being prior to, the multiple or the whole.¹⁷⁶
There is furthermore a cosmological aspect to the problem, which lends addi-
tional support to the view that the forms of concrete beings remain somehow intrins-
ically intelligible. The fact that the substantial and essential forms in concrete indi-
viduals have their origin in the Agent Intellect and are emanated by this immaterial
being suggests an intelligible state of immanence of these forms in their material
substrate.¹⁷⁷ Recall that Avicenna describes the Agent Intellect as the ‘Giver of
Forms’ (wāhib al-ṣuwar)—the Dator formarum of the Latin Scholastics—in reference
to its role as a purveyor of forms to the sublunary realm. If the pure natures and quid-
dities exist in this being as well—a reasonable assumption, which will be substanti-
ated in chapter V—then it is clear that they possess an intelligible state that would
essentially precede their instantiation ‘in multiplicity’ or ‘in matter.’ Anticipating
slightly on chapter V, the ontological and epistemic status of these forms in the
Agent Intellect corresponds roughly to the Neoplatonic class of universals that are

 Avicenna, Commentary on Theology of Aristotle, 40.

 For the priority of pure quiddity, see Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Cure, V.1, 201.8 ff.; see also
sections IV.1 and 3.
 See Lammer, The Elements, 170, and note 200, for a brief discussion of this topic and relevant
secondary sources on the Agent Intellect; cf. Janssens, The Notions; Allebban, Conservation.
 2 Is pure quiddity in concrete beings intelligible? 333

‘before matter’ or ‘before multiplicity,’ and which are also described as ‘theological’
in some Greek sources. Now, on the Neoplatonic account, the hylomorphic forms are
directly related to these divine archetypes and participate in them. Although Avicen-
na shuns a theory of participation, it is not outlandish to presume that in his cosmo-
logical system as well the hylomorphic forms are essentially related to the forms in
the Agent Intellect (via the notion of pure quiddity), which are emanated from It unto
the realm of nature. Quite tellingly, the master in Commentary on Theology of Aristotle
describes in a Neoplatonic way the forms in matter as “imitations of the true intelli-
gible forms” (muḥākiyyāt li-l-ṣuwar al-ʿaqliyyah al-ḥaqqah) that belong to the super-
nal intellects. Although these forms in themselves cannot be identical, they neverthe-
less share the same essential maʿnā. ¹⁷⁸ What is more, he refers elsewhere to “the pure
intelligible notions and the intelligible notions that become material particulars” (al-
maʿānī l-ʿaqliyyah al-ṣirfah wa-l-maʿānī l-ʿaqliyyah allatī taṣīru juzʾiyyah māddiyyah)
as existing in the divine intellects.¹⁷⁹ Finally, he argues that the corporeal world is
“engraved” by the maʿānī it receives from the intellectual world.¹⁸⁰ These passages
explicitly stress the essential and ontological continuity between the maʿānī in the
Agent Intellect and those in concrete beings. Moreover, they suggest the fundamental
intelligibility of all forms in nature when these are related to their divine causes and
archetypes. This is true a fortiori of the human souls, which are immaterial forms
whose pure quiddity or maʿnā is emanated by the Agent Intellect to material sub-
strates predisposed to receiving it and that participate directly in Avicenna’s sub-
stance dualism.¹⁸¹ The evidence adduced above also indicates that the essential
maʿānī could be said to transcend their individual concrete instantiations, not in
the manner of the Platonic forms proper, but in the manner of intelligibles dwelling
in the divine intellects. This hypothesis would lend additional momentum to the idea
that quiddity in the concrete object possesses a special intelligible mode of being,
which mirrors its divine origin and status. The intelligible nature of the forms, ac-
quired at their originative source in the Agent Intellect, would endure in the concrete
individual. Admittedly, however, this interpretation rests largely on the most Neopla-
tonic work by Avicenna, namely, his Commentary on Theology of Aristotle, whose
exact relation to the rest of the Avicennian corpus requires further exploration.
In retrospect, when Avicenna notes in Introduction I.12 (Text 24) that nature and
quiddity are best referred to sometimes as “natural form” and other times as “intel-
ligible form,” I believe his intention is not to establish a hard ontological distinction
between these two aspects of form, but merely an epistemological one. Nature and
pure quiddity always remain ontologically the same in these two contexts. After

 Avicenna, Commentary on Theology of Aristotle, 40 and 46.

 Avicenna, Commentary on Theology of Aristotle, 48.7‒8.
 Avicenna, Commentary on Theology of Aristotle, 58.12‒13. This hypothesis would be particularly
compelling if one presumes that it is the pure quiddities themselves that exist in the Agent Intellect,
not the universals. This point is discussed at length in chapter V.
 See Kaukua, Self-Awareness, 23‒25, 43‒61. Cf. Allebban, Conservation, especially 218‒219.
334 III Quiddity in Itself in the Concrete World

all, it is the same nature (ṭabīʿah) that lies at the root of the mental and concrete
forms and endows them with their essential reality. Nature in the concrete being is
not another meaning (maʿnā) or quiddity (māhiyyah) than the one in the mind. By
implication, it is not the case that the former is material and the latter immaterial.
The pure nature in concrete beings is also intrinsically intelligible and is merely
transferable to the mind through a process of abstraction. It is this same nature
and form, which, when abstracted, is ‘intentionalized’ and ‘universalized’ and con-
nected with the logical notions of genus or species in the mind so as to be predicated
in relation to many things. Hence, the potentiality that attaches to pure quiddity in
concrete beings is not a potentiality for a state of intelligible existence per se, since it
is already characterized by it, but rather a potentiality to become a universal form in
the mind and be logically predicated of many, i. e., acquire the accident of mental
universality. This means that the pure quiddities in concrete beings are already es-
sentially universal and intelligible. They are only potentially the synthetic universals
that are predicated of many in the human mind.¹⁸²
What is more, if generic and specific nature and quiddity are identified with the
substantial forms in concrete beings, then they will per force be ontologically prior to
pure matter, given that Avicenna is keen on the actual priority of form over matter.¹⁸³
In actual existence, form precedes matter, which, by the same token, makes form qua
nature and quiddity essentially and ontologically prior to matter. This applies even
with regard to the composite substance, where the hylomorphic whole consists of

 One may perceive here an echo of the Neoplatonic theories of form or common thing as it exists
in multiplicity, where the forms in beings are always related somehow to the transcendent forms. This
hypothesis seems corroborated not only by the fact that Avicenna, following the Neoplatonists, some-
times refers to the nature and quiddity in concrete beings as common (ʿāmm) and even as universal
(kullī), but also by the intrinsic ambiguity of the term ṣūrah in his philosophy, which can mean hylo-
morphic form, mental intelligible, or immaterial existent; this point should be regarded as more than
a mere Neoplatonic residue in his philosophy and represents a key aspect of his treatment of essence.
In this connection, it is fascinating to realize (together with Jolivet, Aux origines) that the Arabic term
ṣūrah (pl. ṣuwar) was used in some of the translations of Greek works to render Aristotle’s immanent
forms as well as the Platonic transcendent Forms or archetypes. That there is at the very least a rem-
nant of a Neoplatonic interface between these planes and senses of ‘form’ in Avicenna’s treatment of
essence and the universals seems likely to me and can account to some extent for the ambiguity of his
phrasing and views. This has put some modern interpreters in an awkward situation. For example,
Booth, Aristotelian Aporetic Ontology, stresses the purely Aristotelian background of Avicenna’s ac-
count of the universals and quiddity, going so far as to ascribe to Avicenna a strand of “radical Aris-
totelianism” (123) and stating that “there are no elements of Neoplatonism in the ontology of al-
Shifāʾ” (125). Yet, at the same time, he feels compelled to highlight other elements, such as Avicenna’s
view that the natures or quiddities exist in the divine intellects and that the Agent Intellect emanates
forms on the sublunary world, which are undeniably of Neoplatonic origin. Unsurprisingly, Booth
says little about these points and how they fit in Avicenna’s “radical Aristotelianism.”
 This is true, even though, in the case of material beings, there is a qualified sense in which mat-
ter can be said to precede form due to its potentiality for existence and its receptivity for form; see
Metaphysics, IV.2. This possibility (imkān) associated with matter can be said to temporally precede
the existent.
 2 Is pure quiddity in concrete beings intelligible? 335

a combination of these two principles, since it is always form, in the end, which ac-
tualizes and grants reality and existence to matter.¹⁸⁴ In this case, the priority of form
as a part of the composite also has to do with the fact that, as Avicenna explains in
Salvation, the part essentially precedes the whole.¹⁸⁵ Finally, form and especially spe-
cies-form is what is most closely and immediately predicated of concrete individuals
and primary substances. It is on these grounds that, on Avicenna’s mind, form is sub-
stance in a primary or even absolute sense (muṭlaqan).
The intelligibility of the essential maʿnā of the substantial forms of concrete be-
ings ensures the correspondence Avicenna so eagerly seeks to establish between
these substantial forms and the intelligible forms in the mind. Another relevant pas-
sage that should be mentioned in this connection is Introduction, I.12, 69.7‒18 (Text
45). This passage, which will be analyzed in more depth in chapter V, stresses the cor-
respondence and common metaphysical origin of these forms: sometimes the sub-
stantial forms in concrete beings are causes of the intelligible forms in the mind;
other times it is the intelligible forms in the human and divine intellects that are
causes for the hylomorphic forms in nature. Avicenna’s oft repeated claims that
the universal intelligible in the human mind can be derived from any particular con-
crete object to which it relates; that the pure quiddities and natures are sometimes
found in concrete beings and other times in the mind; and that the same form is
sometimes better described as ‘intelligible’ and other times as ‘natural,’ should all
be taken quite literally as emphasizing the fundamental epistemic and ontological
correspondence of these forms in virtue of the quidditative maʿnā. These statements
are coherent precisely because they presuppose that the substantial forms are con-
stituted, in their core, by the pure quidditative maʿnā, whose transferability to the
intellect is ensured by its intrinsic intelligibility and irreducibility. Thus, the intelligi-
ble form (ṣūrah maʿqūlah) can flourish in the intellect as a result of the apprehension
of any concrete instantiation (Zayd or ʿAmr), or, conversely, it can arise in the mind in
abstraction from any concrete instantiation and then cause a corresponding substan-
tial form to exist in the exterior world (e. g., the architect who conceives a heptagonal
house), because the pure maʿnā is constant, irreducible, and common and thereby
ensures the epistemological and ontological symmetry between the concrete and
mental planes.¹⁸⁶ In this fashion, Avicenna’s metaphysics bridges concrete and men-

 For Alexander as well, form has ontological priority; see Rashed, Essentialisme.
 Avicenna, Salvation, 552.
 Additional evidence for the possibility of the existence of an immaterial principle in matter, or
rather, in close relation to matter and body, can be derived from Avicenna’s theory of the human soul,
which is described as an immaterial substance inhering in a body or at the very least co-existing with
a body; either way, this leads to a substance dualism. However, the difference, in that case, is that the
human soul is an intellect reflecting intelligibles, which, on Avicenna’s account, inevitably makes it
an intellectual substance in actuality. In contrast, the substantial and essential forms of non-rational
beings, such as horse or granite, are not in themselves intellectual for Avicenna. In spite of this, they
must be seen as possessing an intelligible principle, which is their essential maʿnā.
336 III Quiddity in Itself in the Concrete World

tal existence by making essence in itself or the irreducible maʿnā the common de-
nominator of the concrete and intelligible ṣuwar. If approached from this angle,
forms are all fundamentally intelligible quiddities, regardless of whether they exist
in the mind or in the concrete world. If reduced to their pure ṭabīʿah and maʿnā,
the substantial forms in concrete beings and the intelligible forms in the mind are
the same. The ṣūrah ṭabīʿiyyah and ṣūrah jawhariyyah are not, fundamentally, a ma-
terial form. They are just a maʿnā that happens to exist in concrete beings and that is
surrounded by a cluster of material accidents.
Accordingly, in Metaphysics III.8, Avicenna explains that the meaning and exis-
tence of quiddity in the concrete and in the mind are fundamentally identical, on the
assumption that one intends pure quiddity and not quiddity taken with the accidents
and concomitants that follow it. What changes, on the other hand, is the way in
which this quiddity becomes realized and fulfills its perfections. Thus, if the
maʿnā of motion, for example, is fundamentally the same when contemplated in
the mind and existing in the concrete, the actualization and completion of motion
only ever actually takes place in the physical beings. Yet, motion in itself as a quid-
dity exists both in the mind and the concrete and its true nature (ḥaqīqah) is identi-
cal. As Avicenna explains, the essence of motion

Is, in the intellect, a quiddity [māhiyyah] that is in the concrete the perfection of something in
potentiality. But its being in the concrete and its being in the intellect do not differ [laysa yakh-
talifu kawnuhā fī l-aʿyān wa-kawnuhā fī l-ʿaql]. For it is in both according to a single mode [or
judgment, ḥukm wāḥid] and it is in both a quiddity [māhiyyah], which exists in the concrete
as a perfection of what is in potentiality.¹⁸⁷

Although Avicenna provides us here with a specific example (another one he resorts
to in this section is the power of the magnetic stone), the more general point he seeks
to establish in this chapter is that the pure quiddities of all substances exist in the
intellect and in the concrete, even though the definition of what a substance is
(‘to exist in the concrete not in a subject’) is obviously realized only in exterior real-
ity. As the above example illustrates, this position implies that the maʿnā and ṭabīʿah
that correspond to a pure quiddity are in a sense identical in the mind and in the
concrete and, hence, constant and irreducible. These passages should be collated
to the assertion that appears at Metaphysics I.5 according to which “an essential re-
ality [ḥaqīqah] exists [mawjūdah] either in the concrete extramental world, or in the
soul, or absolutely [muṭlaqan] [in a way that] is common to both” (see Text 25). Since
Avicenna in that same passage had just glossed ḥaqīqah as meaning māhiyyah and
wujūd khāṣṣ, it appears that these texts seek to make an identical argument regard-
ing the mental and concrete equivalence of quiddity.
Now, although the foregoing applies to all the forms, natures, and quiddities of
concrete beings, Avicenna makes it a point at the end of Metaphysics III.8 to exclude

 Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Cure, III.8, 141.4‒6.

 2 Is pure quiddity in concrete beings intelligible? 337

the separate intellects from this picture.¹⁸⁸ In their case, and in their case alone, the
intelligible forms in our minds cannot possibly correspond to the substantial forms
of these intellects as they exist in the exterior world. On account of the ontological
remoteness and immateriality of these intellects, we cannot even acquire these intel-
ligible forms in the first place. So there is a discrepancy here between the maʿnā and
māhiyyah of these intellects as they exist in the concrete world, and our derivative
and imperfect cognition of them, which consists rather of traces, images, or deriva-
tive forms that in any case cannot be identified with their substantial forms proper.
This particular case study stresses once again, albeit in a negative way this time, the
identity of the substantial and intelligible forms in Avicenna’s philosophy: it is be-
cause the substantial and essential forms of the separate intellects are identical
with their intellection and thus with all the intelligible objects they contemplate—
and which we would also intellect as a result of acquiring their maʿnā, were it pos-
sible—that there is a disconnect between the existence of these immaterial beings
and the human knowledge concerning them, between their intelligible essences
and the imperfect impression of them we acquire in our minds.¹⁸⁹
To recap: although in Avicenna’s metaphysics there is no ontologically separate
form of animalness or humanness that could be identified with a transcendent Pla-
tonic archetype, the foundational nature of each individual thing exists formally, im-
manently, and intelligibly within it. In parallel to his rebuttal of the theory of the Pla-
tonic forms and of a strong realist position, Avicenna appears to broadly endorse the
Aristotelian theory of immanent forms. What is more, he also grounds his theory of
essence in an Aristotelian hylomorphic framework, which, by building on Alexander,
allows him to maintain the autonomy and priority of essence-form over pure matter.
However, Avicenna’s theory of immanent formalism and his hylomorphism are com-
bined with the postulation of the Agent Intellect, which, in the final analysis, con-
nects the sublunary forms with a heavenly intelligible principle acting as a paradigm

 Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Cure, III.8, 132.8 ff.

 The main reason Avicenna deploys to justify this exclusion is that if it were possible to appre-
hend the pure quiddities of these intellects as they really are in themselves, then human beings would
possess all the intelligible forms at once, given that the intelligible forms dwell in these intellects. So
the argument here does not hinge on a distinction between the substantial form and the intelligible
form—on the contrary, it is premised on their identity: both are identical in the separate intellects,
given their immaterial nature—but rather on the fact that human beings cannot acquire these sub-
stantial/intelligible forms directly as they truly exist outside the mind. At 143.5 Avicenna explains
that what is realized in the human mind is not the essence (dhāt) of the separate intellect, or the sep-
arate intellect itself, but rather the maʿānī māhiyyātihā, “the notions [derived from] their quiddities.”
In this particular case, the term maʿnā is obviously not synonymous with ‘quiddity in itself,’ but
rather refers to various meanings ‘associated’ with quiddity, and so should perhaps be taken more
in the sense of ‘concomitants’ (lawāzim), which is another possible translation of maʿnā (such as
when Avicenna describes the external concomitants or lawāzim of quiddity as maʿānī). It is in this
qualified sense that Avicenna believes that we can know the concomitants and effects of the separate
beings, but not their true reality and quiddity, a point which he applies especially to God.
338 III Quiddity in Itself in the Concrete World

or blueprint for the realm of nature below it.¹⁹⁰ The substantial and essential form is
what provides an individual with its common essence (such as horseness), whereas
matter provides the individuating characteristics proper to it. In this regard, the es-
sential form can be said to inhere in each existent like a ‘part,’ and in this capacity it
contributes to the actualization of the form-matter composite that is the complete
substance. This implies a strong correlation between essence and form, which Avi-
cenna inherited from Aristotle and the Aristotelian-Alexandrian tradition, but
which he adjusted to fit his new theory of quiddity. Not only does Avicenna employ
the terms māhiyyah and ṣūrah in virtually the same sense when discussing essence in
concrete beings, but his theory of the immanent existence of pure quiddity implies
that the hylomorphic form is what comes to be most closely associated with the es-
sential maʿnā. Quiddity in itself, nature, and substantial form are roughly equivalent
in the concrete existent, even though these notions can convey different nuances de-
pending on the context. This in turn explains how the human mind can effect the
transition from the extramental to the mental consideration of quiddity. The intrinsic
intelligibility of quiddity establishes an ontological and epistemological correspond-
ence, even a continuum, between the concrete form and the mental form. The quid-
ditative maʿnā emerges as a constant of concrete and mental existence.
The foregoing remarks have addressed some Avicennian passages that present
quiddity in concrete beings as something existent (mawjūd), abstract or potentially
abstract (mujarrad), unconditioned (lā bi-sharṭ shayʾ ākhar), and even—in a qualified
sense—universal (kullī). By attaching these epithets to pure quiddity, Avicenna does
not intend to say that it is separate from the concrete individuals, but rather that it is
an immanent formal principle in those beings on account of its essential irreducibil-
ity and intelligibility.¹⁹¹ Approached from this angle, pure quiddity can be described
as an irreducible substantial part of composite beings, which also correlates with
their common nature (ṭabīʿah), essential reality (ḥaqīqah), and quidditative meaning
(maʿnā), as well as, in a looser sense, with their essential form (ṣūrah). We saw that in
Avicenna’s cosmology these principles are emanated from the Agent Intellect unto
the realm of sublunary beings. In view of this, it is important to emphasize, over
and against recent interpretations, that Avicenna’s mereological account is not
only epistemic or logical and intended to lay the ground for his epistemology
(which it undoubtedly does), but also amounts to a variant of ontological formalism
or realism. In effect, Avicenna embroiders this feature of quiddity with a rich vocabu-
lary of being. Even in his logical exposition at Introduction I.2 and I.12, he speaks not
merely of our consideration of pure quiddity in the extramental world (an epistemic

 The role of the Agent Intellect is discussed further in other sections of this book. Avicenna’s
theory of immanent formalism bears some resemblance with other such theories developed in the
medieval Latin context; see Erismann, Immanent Realism.
 Interestingly, the theory that quiddity or nature somehow exists intelligibly in concrete beings
and in an unconditioned state became a hallmark of the later Arabic philosophical tradition from
Ṭūsī onward, and it also underwent a parallel development in the Latin West; see below.
 2 Is pure quiddity in concrete beings intelligible? 339

or logical point), but more precisely of our consideration of its existence (wujūdihā)
in concrete beings (an ontological point), expounding on the issue of how this pure
quiddity exists in the world. He pursues and amplifies this approach in Metaphysics,
as illustrated in the proposition that “the nature to which universality occurs exists
in the concrete world [mawjūdah fī l-aʿyān].”¹⁹² In brief, Avicenna’s mereological in-
terpretation is intended also to amount to an ontological account of how quiddity ex-
ists in the concrete world, and one which provides an alternative to the Platonic the-
ories of the Forms and participation.
In retrospect, arguing for an inherent, formal, intelligible, and irreducible mode of
existence of essence in concrete beings represents perhaps the only viable option at
Avicenna’s disposal, if he intends to convincingly maintain the following set of prop-
ositions: (a) that quiddity exists as forms and parts of these existents; (b) that it does
not exist as a material part; and (c) that it does not also exist separately from these
concrete beings in the exterior world like a Platonic form, with an ensuing theory of
participation. Avicenna’s solution to this problem, which he fashions in contradis-
tinction to the views adopted by some of his predecessors, displays elements of Ar-
istotelian hylomorphism interpreted in light of Neoplatonic noetical and causal the-
ories as well as—as we shall see shortly—Ibn ʿAdī’s legacy. The mode of existence he
ascribes to quiddity is adequately conveyed by the expression ‘in itself’ (min ḥaythu
hiya hiya). One should distinguish here between the mode of existence of pure quid-
dity and the existence that pertains to the composite substance made up of form and
matter. Compared to quiddity taken ‘in itself,’ the existent taken as a whole is poste-
rior and complex, i. e., a composite of form and matter. As Avicenna notes, pure quid-
dity precedes it in the way that the part precedes the whole, and the way the simple
precedes the complex or multiple. One may also add that it precedes it in the way the
intelligible precedes the material. Notice that Avicenna is not claiming by the same
token that the mode of existence of pure quiddity precedes the complex substance
temporally (bi-l-zamān). In other words, he does not believe that pure quiddity can
exist in the concrete world on its own and without being a part of a larger ontological
structure in which it inheres. This is a point to which the master returns time and
again in the works of his middle and late period. In concrete reality, nothing pre-
cedes the efficient cause and the existence of primary substance, so that there cannot
be any autonomously pre-existing essences floating around that await realized exis-
tence. Rather, the kind of priority Avicenna intends in this context is primarily essen-
tial, logical, and conceptual and is to be connected also with the notion of final cau-
sality.¹⁹³

 Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Cure, V.2, 211.9‒12.

 Nevertheless, these notions are closely connected with a sense of ontological priority as well for
Avicenna; these points are discussed in more detail in chapter IV. A useful example to illustrate the
foregoing focuses on the human soul. The human rational soul, according to Avicenna, does not pre-
exist the human body, but it exists immaterially and represents its essential and formal principle. It
also participates in the process of reversion and the final causality of human life by orienting human
340 III Quiddity in Itself in the Concrete World

In any case, Avicenna’s mereological theory of quiddity amounts to a formalist or

realist position, in that essence turns out to be a fundamental principle of reality and
a foundational concept of his ontology of concrete beings.¹⁹⁴ Not only does he believe
in the mental existence of quiddity as something irreducible and distinct, but he also
advocates the existence of quiddity as something irreducible (albeit not separate) in
concrete beings. What is more, the ontological irreducibility of quiddity in the univer-
sals in the mind is comparable to its ontological irreducibility in the concrete world.
In both cases, pure quiddity preserves its ontological distinctness, identity, and inner
reality, although it exists ‘with’ other things, which are its material or mental acci-
dents and concomitants. In either case, it remains the fundamental nature and
maʿnā of beings. As McGinnis noted, this essentialist doctrine makes Avicenna a “sci-
entific realist” in addition to a metaphysical realist, because it establishes logic as a
tool that adequately reflects the real order and structure of the world.¹⁹⁵ It postulates
a strict ontological and epistemic symmetry between the quiddities that exist truly
and actually in the concrete world and those that exist in the mind. On my analysis,
Avicenna’s ‘scientific realism’ is premised on a kind of ‘ontological realism’ or ‘for-
malism.’
By virtue of its sheer ontological scope and depth, Avicenna’s formalist or realist
theory of quiddity also lays the ground for some of the core features of his epistemol-
ogy, a fact that has not been fully appreciated thus far due to the resistance facing
such a reading of his metaphysics.¹⁹⁶ What has not been sufficiently insisted upon
in particular is the crucial role that Avicenna’s theory of unconditioned quiddity in
the concrete world—and the terminology attached to it—plays in his account of the
processes and operations underlying abstraction and human thought. The crucial
terms that connect Avicenna’s theory of quiddity in the concrete world and in the
mind are nature (ṭabīʿah) and quidditative meaning (maʿnā). These two notions
bridge the ontological and epistemic spheres in Avicenna’s philosophy. The intelligi-
ble nature (ṭabīʿah) existing in physical things is also described as a quidditative
meaning or entity (maʿnā) that exists in each one of them. These two terms explicitly

beings back to their originative source and the divine principles of knowledge and being. Hence, even
though it is not temporally prior to the body, the soul is essentially prior and simple when compared
to it.
 This conclusion agrees in part with Rashed, Ibn ʿAdī; De Haan, A Mereological Construal; and
Benevich, Die ‘göttliche Existenz,’ especially 111‒112. Benevich in particular articulates this mereolog-
ical interpretation of pure quiddity in composite beings. It is in fact the only mode of existence of
quiddity that he recognizes. Benevich accordingly limits Avicenna’s descriptions of the existence
of quiddity—including the tantalizing reference to its ‘divine existence’—to this aspect. To use my ter-
minology, Benevich recognizes only the irreducible existence of pure quiddity (as a part in other
things), but not its distinct existence (whether in the mind or elsewhere).
 McGinnis, Logic and Science, 165.
 For some insight into the intersections between ontology and epistemology with regard to es-
sence, see McGinnis, Avicenna, 33‒35; and especially idem, Logic and Science; and Benevich, Die
‘göttliche Existenz.’
 2 Is pure quiddity in concrete beings intelligible? 341

refer to pure quiddity in those beings as well as to the abstracted concept in our
minds.¹⁹⁷
What is more, Avicenna’s brand of metaphysical formalism or realism should be
connected not only with Aristotle’s doctrine of formal immanence, but also with Neo-
platonic antecedents. On the one hand, the Persian master adopts and modifies the
Aristotelian view that forms exist inherently in individual beings, and he also pur-
sues Aristotle’s battle against Plato’s theory of transcendent forms. On the other
hand, and in spite of his polemical engagement with Platonism, it is apparent that
Avicenna’s position stemmed from a direct acquaintance with Neoplatonic sources.
For the master correlates these essential forms with the natures of things, which
can be regarded as special kinds of universals in the concrete and also as intelligible
principles.¹⁹⁸ These points, especially when they are connected with the theory of the
Agent Intellect, mark an important departure from Aristotle’s doctrine. As Nicholas
Heer pointed out, this particular position reflects one of the various interpretive op-
tions available to Arabic scholars that was outlined by Porphyry in the notorious pas-
sage of Eisagoge concerning the existence of the universals in the concrete world.¹⁹⁹
There Porphyry asks—among other questions—whether the universals exist in con-
crete things, and, if so, whether they exist in an intelligible or physical mode. But
while Porphyry follows a late-antique philosophical convention and speaks of ‘uni-
versals’ and ‘common things,’ Avicenna reframes the same questions with regard to
the various aspects of quiddity. In spite of this terminological and conceptual differ-
ence, I would contend that Avicenna had Porphyry’s passage in mind when address-
ing these seminal questions and especially that of the ontological mode of quiddity
in the concrete world in Metaphysics V. More specifically, the Persian master intend-
ed to tackle in that text the set of conundrums that Porphyry had raised in connec-

 For the overlap of these technical terms, see Introduction, I.5, 28.13; Pointers, vol. 1, 202‒205, Met-
aphysics of The Cure, V.1 passim. Due to its semantic elasticity, the term maʿnā in particular empha-
sizes the dual state of essence as a principle existing in concrete individuals and as a meaning exist-
ing in the mind.
 It is interesting that Albert the Great, Metaphysics, XI.2.10, places Plato and Avicenna in the
same group of thinkers on account of how they explain the nature of the sublunary forms and
trace their origin back to a supernal intellect. Albert apparently perceived Avicenna’s theory of the
Giver of Forms as Platonic or Platonizing in nature.
 Heer, The Sufi Position, 1‒2. For a recent study of the reception of Avicenna’s views on the uni-
versals in the later tradition, see Faruque, Mullā Ṣadrā. The Avicennian doctrine of formal imma-
nence and the existence of nature in concrete beings were endorsed by many thinkers of the post-
classical tradition. These thinkers—whether philosophers, theologians, or even Sufis—often identify
quiddity qua nature in concrete existents with the natural universal (al-kullī l-ṭabīʿī), which, on
their view, exists in the external world in a robust or real sense. In contrast to ‘the natural universal,’
both ‘the logical’ and ‘intellectual’ universals exist only in the mind. Although Avicenna himself usu-
ally refrains from applying the term ‘universal’ to quiddity in the external world, it is clear nonethe-
less that (a) the commentators’ identification of the natural universal with nature and unconditioned
quiddity, and (b) their belief in the existence of this nature and unconditioned quiddity in concrete
particulars represent an amplification of Avicenna’s position.
342 III Quiddity in Itself in the Concrete World

tion with universal natures, that is, whether and how they can be said to exist in the
concrete world, or, as Porphyry himself put it, “(a) whether genera and species are
real or are situated in bare thoughts alone, (b) whether as real they are bodies or in-
corporeals, and (c) whether they are separated or in sensibles and have their reality
in connection with them.”²⁰⁰
Avicenna adopts a relatively committal stance vis-à-vis this set of questions, al-
though he modifies the terminology in the process, speaking of pure quiddities and
natures instead of species and genera (‘speciesness’ and ‘genusness’ being according
to him attributes of the mind). With regard to questions (a) and (c), he believes that
pure quiddities and natures do exist in the concrete world, not as separate arche-
types, but in concrete beings. With regard to question (b), he holds that they exist
in an intelligible manner and are not in themselves corporeal, although they may
also be considered together with their corporeal accidents and concomitants in the
mind. What is more, these essential maʿānī have their origin in the separate intel-
lects, as will become clear in chapter V, so that their ontological source is purely in-
telligible. What led to this position is to a large extent Avicenna’s original rehandling
of the notion of maʿnā. In addition to the Muʿtazilite sources, I would suggest that his
particular conceptualization and implementation of this notion was shaped to some
extent by Neoplatonic theories of form and the universals. As a result, his doctrine
reconciles a kind of formal immanentism with the theory of the existence of quiddity
in the human and divine intellects. On my reconstruction of the evidence, Avicenna
himself embraced the threefold model of the universals he mentions at the beginning
of Introduction I.12, adapting it to his theory of pure quiddity and his māhiyyah-lawā-
zim paradigm. While it may appear baffling at first that he would combine these var-
ious Aristotelian and Neoplatonic theories, which historically belonged to incompat-
ible or, at the very least, competing philosophical systems, the synthesis he achieves
is rendered coherent by his subjective and innovative theory of pure quiddity. It
should be said also that the trend of harmonizing Platonic and Aristotelian views
was one of the salient characteristics of the late-antique Neoplatonic legacy Avicen-
na tapped into. Building on this legacy, he elaborated a highly integrated and crea-
tive theory of essence that enabled him to answer Porphyry’s conundrums in a new
way.

3 Is pure quiddity in concrete beings universal?

The analysis deployed thus far has designated the common nature in concrete beings
as the cornerstone of Avicenna’s brand of metaphysical formalism or realism. But,
one may ask, inasmuch as it is common to several individuals, why is this nature

 Porphyry, Eisagoge, 1.9‒14, transl. by Paul Vincent Spade, reproduced in Sorabji, The Philosophy,
vol. 3, 157.
 3 Is pure quiddity in concrete beings universal? 343

not in itself a kind of universal? And for what reasons would Avicenna want to insist
on distinguishing common nature from universality in concrete beings?²⁰¹ Avicenna
in general insists that it is pure quiddity, nature, and reality that exist in concrete
beings, not the universals themselves. He relies on the term mushtarakah to express
the idea of an essential commonness of nature in multiple concrete beings, which he
distinguishes from universality proper. The rationale for this distinction can be ap-
proached from different angles. First, Avicenna regards universality (al-kulliyah)
and, consequently, the universals (al-kulliyāt) primarily as mental or intellectual ob-
jects, which arise and are actualized in the mind or intellect. Although the natures
and realities can be regarded potentially or theoretically as universals, given that
they can be abstracted and apprehended by the mind in relation to their extramental
instantiations, the universals as such exist only on the mental plane. For example,
Avicenna would say that it is ‘pure animalness’ or ‘the nature animal’ that exists
in concrete, particular animals, not ‘universal animal’ or ‘the universal genus ani-
mal.’ These universal notions exist only in the mind, since they are the product of
logical ratiocination. As Avicenna explains:

Text 20: If we then say that the universal nature exists in external things [al-ṭabīʿah al-kulliyyah
mawjūdah fī l-aʿyān], we do not mean inasmuch as it is universal in this [mental] mode of uni-
versality [bi-hādhihi l-jihah min al-kulliyyah]. Rather, we mean that the nature to which [mental]
universality occurs exists in things external [to the mind]. Hence, inasmuch as it is a nature, this
is one thing; and, inasmuch as it is something from which it is likely that a universal form is
intellectually apprehended, this is something else.²⁰²

Hence, in order to be truly regarded as universals, or rather, as mental universals,

these natures have to be actually conceived by the human mind or combined with
the intention of predicability of many, whereby a relation between the universal
and individuals (whether actual or potential) is established. This means that a rela-
tion to a certain multiplicity (kathrah) is necessarily implied. Universality (al-kulliyah)
is, as Avicenna explains in Salvation, “a condition added to [the pure quiddity]
human” (sharṭ zāʾid ʿalā annahu insān). It is a logical consideration added to the
pure nature in the mind.²⁰³ On this point, there is a marked terminological distinc-
tion between Avicenna and his later exegetes, since they will speak routinely, and
rather systematically, of the ‘natural universals’ (sing. kullī ṭabīʿī) as another way

 These questions are compounded by the seemingly conflicting state of the textual evidence,
which at times seems to support the concrete existence of universals, and at others seems to reject
this option entirely. They are also rendered more complicated by Avicenna’s use of different technical
terms and notions to qualify nature, such as commonness (mushtarakah), generality (ʿāmmah), and
universality (kulliyyah) whose nuances are not always easy to disentangle and whose senses seem to
overlap to some degree.
 Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Cure, V.2, 211.9‒12, translation by Marmura in Avicenna, The Met-
aphysics, 161, revised; cf. Introduction, I.12, 66.4‒11.
 Avicenna, Salvation, 536.11.
344 III Quiddity in Itself in the Concrete World

of referring to the natures and quiddities that exist in concrete beings. For Avicenna,
sensu stricto, it is pure quiddity and nature that can be said to exist in its irreducible,
simple, and intelligible mode in the concrete particulars, not the universal. The latter
are formed through a process of intentionality and discursive rationality in the
human mind, and they are epistemically and ontologically distinct from pure quid-
dity.
In contrast to the logical and universal notions present in the mind, the natures
and realities in concrete beings are primarily ontological principles that exist inde-
pendently of human ratiocination and intentionality. This distinction is important,
inasmuch as it introduces a sharp distinction between the entitative dimension of
common nature, on the one hand, which truly exists in each concrete individual,
and the epistemological and intentional dimension of universality, on the other,
which is a notion that exists only in the human intellect. Whereas the commonness
of nature or pure quiddity is intrinsic to it and arises out of its ontological indiffer-
ence to external circumstances, its universality is an intention and meaning added to
it in the reflective mind. Naturally, the two aspects coincide and overlap, but they
should nevertheless be distinguished if one intends to do justice to Avicenna’s argu-
mentation.²⁰⁴ With that being said, and in spite of Avicenna’s insistence on this in-
tellectual context, intellectuality does not ultimately represent the main or, for that
matter, the only, criterion of universality. For Avicenna, the universal is fundamental-
ly something that can be predicated of many things, and it is this predicative capaci-
ty that appears to trump intellectuality and make it universal. As he notes, “its uni-
versality is not due to its being in the soul [fī l-nafs], but to its relating to many
individuals, existent or imagined, whose judgment about them is a single judgment
[of universality].”²⁰⁵ In spite of this, it is clear that predicability of many and intellec-
tuality in theory go hand in hand, since it is the rational powers of the human soul
that predicate a single idea of many things and hence conceive it as a universal. The
chief characteristic of the universal, such as the universal genus ‘animal,’ as opposed
to pure quiddity, is that it can be logically predicated of many in the mind.

 Although scholars of Avicenna have sometimes conflated the two notions of common nature and
universality, or discussed them as if they were one, it is clear that they need to be differentiated.
Booth, Aristotelian Aporetic Ontology, 117‒125, recognizes the gap between these notions and articu-
lates his analysis around it. At the same time, however, he regards the common nature as a kind of
universal. As he explains (119), “the most important aspect [associated with Avicenna’s theory of na-
ture] is the acceptance of the presence of the universal in things. The analysis provides a structural
account of the quality of common-ness in a common, which it distinguishes from the subsequent in-
tellectual formation of a universal.” Although perceptive, Booth sometimes goes too far in his merg-
ing of the two notions (120): “the nature, present in things as their common, is the nature indifferent
in itself, but determined to universality.” It is hard to see how the same thing could be at the same
time indifferent and determined. Pace Booth, the nature in itself is not more determined to universal-
ity than it is to individuality, if universality is construed here as a mental intention.
 Avicenna, Metaphysics, V.2, 209.6‒8.
 3 Is pure quiddity in concrete beings universal? 345

The main arguments Avicenna puts forth to reject the concrete existence of uni-
versals are negative and concern the impossibility for a single and numerically one
universal form and universal essence to exist in many material beings. In Metaphy-
sics V.2, Avicenna explains that a single essence (dhāt wāḥidah) cannot exist simul-
taneously in many concrete beings, lest it exist with contradictory accidents and lest
these accidents enter into the quiddity and definition of the thing. Moreover, Avicen-
na insists that a numerically one universal nature or essence (dhāt wāḥidah bi-l-
ʿadad) cannot exist separately in actuality (bi-l-fiʿl), since, if it did, it could not at
the same time be shared by different beings (Avicenna rejecting the Platonic theory
of participation), nor could it be reflected by a plurality of human souls. Rather, nu-
merical oneness is something that attaches to the nature or universal in the mind
thinking it. In a nutshell, then, universality and oneness are notions superadded
to essential nature in the mind, a determinate and conditioned state that precludes
it from existing in this manner in the concrete world.
In spite of these various arguments, Avicenna does concede that there is a spe-
cial sense or kind of universality that can be applied to the concrete natures. Some of
the crucial texts in this regard have already been studied (Text 7, Text 17, Text 20, and
Text 21), but at this juncture additional evidence can be adduced. Before proceeding
further, however, it is important to emphasize that the kind of essential universality
Avicenna ascribes to quiddity in the extramental world is related to his mereological
interpretation of the universals and focuses on quiddity as a part and principle of
concrete beings. It does not rely on the assumption that quiddity can exist separately
in the concrete world.²⁰⁶ With regard to the former, the master sometimes loosely re-
fers to the quiddities and natures that exist in concrete reality as universals and also
reserves a sense of universality for this external context. Thus, in Metaphysics V.2, for
example, he states that “universality [kulliyyah] may attach to it [the conception of
nature or pure quiddity], but there is no existence for this kind of universality except
in the soul. As for universality in external reality [al-kulliyyah min khārij], it obtains
according to another consideration, which we have previously explained.”²⁰⁷ Further

 The distinction is crucial, but it has sometimes been misrepresented. One example is Physics, I.7,
51, when Avicenna says about the nature (ṭabīʿah) that is predicated universally of species (kulliyyah
bi-ḥasab nawʿ) and in an absolute sense (kulliyyah ʿalā l-iṭlāq)—the latter is possibly a reference to
nature ‘in itself’—: kullāhumā lā wujūda lahumā fī l-aʿyān dhawāt qāʾimah illā fī l-taṣawwur. In his
translation of this work, McGinnis renders this segment as “neither of these has an existence in con-
crete particulars as subsisting entities, except in conceptualization” (my emphasis). But this transla-
tion is misleading, because Avicenna’s intention here is to contrast the separate existence of the es-
sences in the extramental world on the model of the Platonic forms (an option he rejects) with their
distinct existence in the mind (an option he allows). Accordingly, fī l-aʿyān dhawāt qāʾimah is better
translated simply as “as subsistent entities [or essences] in the concrete world,” and not in “concrete
particulars.” For as should be clear by now, Avicenna does recognize a qualified sense in which they
can be said to exist in the concrete particulars. The only thesis he consistently rebuts in his works is
that the quiddities or natures exist as separate substances.
 Avicenna, Metaphysics, V.2, 207.11‒13.
346 III Quiddity in Itself in the Concrete World

on he adds regarding the nature in itself (min ḥaythu hiya ṭabīʿah) in concrete beings:
“If this consideration is taken in the sense of universality, then this nature with uni-
versality would be in concrete beings [kānat hādhihi l-ṭabīʿah maʿa l-kulliyyah fī l-
aʿyān].” Hence, on Avicenna’s own admission, there is a sense in which the univer-
sals can be said to exist in concrete reality, and there is a consideration according
to which the universals exist in concrete beings. This aspect of universality corre-
sponds to the notion of essential commonness (mushtarakah) that was highlighted
previously. In this case, then, Avicenna’s reference to universality in concrete beings
would be more than a simple manner of speech, a façon de parler, and it would point
to a deeper ambiguity or tension in his philosophy. The master himself acknowledges
this ambiguity at the very end of Metaphysics V.1, when he concedes that “the general
things [al-ʿumūr al-ʿāmmah] in one sense exist in the exterior world [mawjūdah min
khārij], and in another sense do not.” These comments, for all intents and purposes,
make universality a modulated (mushakkik) notion alongside oneness, existence, and
many other core notions in Avicenna’s philosophy. Although the master does not
state this himself, it is clear nevertheless that he regards universality as possessing
different senses and aspects and as applying differently to things.²⁰⁸
Regarding the pure nature as a kind of universal in the concrete appears to be va-
lidated on two additional grounds: the distinction between potential and actual uni-
versality, and the distinction between numerical existence—or existence according to
numerical determination—and non-numerical existence. With regard to the first
point, the evidence in Avicenna’s works appears to warrant the conclusion that
the essential natures exist in concrete beings qua actual and potential universals.²⁰⁹

 Avicenna’s position is comparable to the way Aristotle’s theory of forms has sometimes been
construed. According to Galluzzo, Aristotle regards the forms in concrete things as universal, al-
though they do not correspond to what he usually refers to as ‘universals.’ As Galluzzo, Universals,
209, explains, “Aristotle’s realism about universals comes down to the view that while the ordinary
objects of our everyday experience are particulars, their forms are universals. Forms are universals
because they are repeatable entities, i. e. entities that exist as one and the same in different particu-
lars: all individuals belonging to the same species have the same form, which exists as one and the
same in different parcels of matter.” Yet, “forms are universals (for they are repeatable and shareable
entities) but are not the kinds of things that Aristotle refers to by the word “universals” or equivalent
expressions” (247). Likewise in Avicenna’s system, pure quiddity is in a sense universal or can be
loosely described as such, because it is essentially common to many and is in itself intelligible.
But Avicenna usually refrains from describing it as such in the human mind, and, a fortiori, in the
concrete world, and he reserves this term for the complex universal concept in the mind.
 One pointed issue should be addressed at this juncture, namely, Avicenna’s claim in Salvation,
538.10‒13, to the effect that unconditioned quiddity exists ‘in actuality’ (mawjūd bi-l-fiʿl) in the con-
crete world. The problem here is compounded by the fact that Avicenna in this passage uncharacter-
istically speaks of quiddity in concrete beings as a universal (kullī). The difficulty can be framed as
follows: how can unconditioned quiddity, which by definition is not qualified by anything specific
or determinate, be said to be actual? Since ‘the actual’ is one of the conditions and concomitants
that Avicenna itemizes as being extrinsic to quiddity in Metaphysics, how can he claim that pure
quiddity exists in concrete beings in an actual state? The foregoing analysis on the mereological
 3 Is pure quiddity in concrete beings universal? 347

They are in themselves and essentially actual—especially in their immediate connec-

tion with the principle of form (ṣūrah), with which they are closely associated in the
concrete—but only potentially universal with regard to the mental universality char-
acteristic of human thought. This potential universality is what enables them to be
abstracted and contemplated by the rational soul qua actual universal notions.
Thus, like matter, which is potentiality for form, the nature is potentially an actual
universal in the soul (see Text 7 and Text 20). The second qualification was discussed
previously and amounts to the claim that nature, in spite of being common, does not
possess numerical determination and so has a mode of non-numerical existence: it is
not a single or one universal nature of horseness that exists, but simply horseness. In
that sense, it differs from the universal concept in the mind, which possesses numer-
ical determination and is a single ‘one’ meaning or intention predicated of many.²¹⁰
Hence, there are two ways to approach the notion of universality in the concrete
world. On the one hand, the pure quiddities and essential forms of the concrete
world result, through a complicated psychological process, in the logical universal
notions that exist in the mind, so that they can be regarded as ‘potential universals.’
On the other hand, and in a certain sense, the substantial forms and pure quiddities
in things are already universal, since they are essentially common to many concrete
beings in abstraction from predication, without this common nature being numeri-
cally determined in any way. The pure quiddity humanness is in actuality common
to many individual human beings, even though it cannot be subjected to numerical
qualification, and regardless of whether it is predicated of many by the human mind.

and irreducible mode of existence of quiddity in concrete beings can help us to address this difficulty
and provide tentative answers. In addition to the interpretation deployed in the main text above,
which ascribes a kind of qualified actual essential universality to the nature in concrete beings, an-
other approach is to surmise that Avicenna is referring primarily to the actuality of form or of the
complex being in which quiddity is embedded, and not to the mode of existence of quiddity itself.
As he points out in Text 10, pure quiddity exists in the concrete, but “has been enclosed from the
outside by conditions and states,” one of which is the actuality and realization of its concomitants
and accidents. This would mean that quiddity can be said to exist in actuality only by extension, be-
cause it exists in the hylomorphic form or in the composite that exists in actuality. At any rate, in this
passage, Avicenna’s main intention is to contrast quiddity as an essential principle of concrete beings
to quiddity as a universal predicate in the mind. Whereas the former is actual (in that quiddity is pre-
sent in an actual being), the latter is only potential, in that quiddity or nature needs to be abstracted
and intellected by a thinking mind for the mental universal to become actually existent in the mind.
What Avicenna is contrasting, then, is not two different modes of existence of pure quiddity, but
rather two different aspects of universality vis-à-vis the human mind.
 This explains one important feature of Avicenna’s disquisition in Metaphysics V.2 concerning the
impossibility for universal nature to exist in the concrete world. Throughout this passage, Avicenna
refers to a single or one essence (dhāt wāḥidah) or to a nature that is numerically one (wāḥidah bi-l-
ʿadad). Hence, in this passage he has something else than pure quiddity in mind, since the latter is
unconditioned and cannot be numerically determined in any way; furthermore, Avicenna does not
usually refer to pure quiddity by means of the term dhāt, which designates instead the realized
and actually existing entity.
348 III Quiddity in Itself in the Concrete World

In light of this, although Avicenna usually restricts the term ‘universal’ (kullī) to men-
tal aspects and objects, he sometimes, as in the salient passage of Salvation dis-
cussed above (Text 7), treats the quiddities and forms in concrete things as special
kinds of universals.²¹¹ To put it differently, the quiddities in concrete beings can be
regarded as being somehow universal, without however being universals or universal
objects on Avicenna’s intellectualist and intentionalist definition of this term.²¹² Al-
ternatively, one can say that nature is potentially a universal with regard to human
intentionality. This underlines the foundational commonality of the nature in concre-
to and in the mind as well as the fact that universal concepts only actually exist in
the human intellect.²¹³
The foregoing illuminates to some extent Avicenna’s rationale for distinguishing
between common nature and the universal while at the same time reserving a quali-
fied sense of universality for the former. This daring move enables Avicenna to pre-
serve a gnoseological link between concrete entities and the mind that justifies sci-
entific knowledge and cognition, which are based on universal concepts, as well as
to explain how nature can be common and even universal and yet exist in a plurality
of individuals. From a historical perspective, Avicenna’s ambiguous handling of the
term ‘universal’ betrays his indebtedness to the philosophical debate about univer-
sals and common things that had begun with Plato and Aristotle and extended all
the way to the works of the late-antique philosophers of the sixth and seventh cen-
turies CE. As I show below, it might also bear a connection to the rich discussion of
similarity and commonality he inherited from Muʿtazilite sources. One finds in those
traditions a similar ambiguity concerning the questions of whether, and if so, how,
universals and common things can be said to exist in concrete things, as well as their
relationship to the thinking mind.

 In that passage, Avicenna, Salvation, 539.10‒13, he proposes another, more daring, distinction
focusing on the “general universal” (al-kullī l-ʿāmm), which exists only in the mind, and, one infers,
the non-general universal, which, on the basis of what precedes this passage, can be said to exist in
concrete beings.
 This tension is at its most visible if one compares Metaphysics of The Cure V.1 and the section on
universals in Salvation (536‒539). With that being said, the passage in Salvation is somewhat unique
in its ambiguity on this point and should hold a secondary place in our analysis on account of the
fact that this work is derivative of The Cure and was not intended by Avicenna to hold the same sta-
tus. Nonetheless, it reflects various aspects of the late-antique discourse on common things that the
master had to integrate and make sense of in his own works.
 On this point, see Averroes, Incoherence, 111‒117. Averroes has this to say: “The theory of the phi-
losophers that universals exist only in the mind, not in the external world, only means that the uni-
versals exist actually only in the mind, and not in the external world, not that they do not exist at all in
the external world, for the meaning is that they exist potentially, not actually in the external world;
indeed, if they did not exist at all in the outside world they would be false” (111.8‒12, translated by van
den Bergh, 65, my emphasis).
 4 Avicenna’s predecessors on common things 349

4 Avicenna’s predecessors on common things

4.1 The late-antique philosophers

Avicenna’s views on the relation between nature and universality, on the intrinsic
shareability and commonality of nature, and on the ontological status of nature in
concrete beings all appear indebted to late-antique Greek philosophical works stem-
ming from Peripatetic and Neoplatonic circles.²¹⁴ According to a threefold scheme
that was widespread in late antiquity, and which Avicenna reports at the beginning
of Introduction I.12, philosophers were in the habit of distinguishing between the uni-
versals ‘before,’ ‘in,’ and ‘after multiplicity.’ Avicenna in this same section implicitly
correlates this threefold distinction with another tripartite distinction consisting of
‘the natural,’ ‘the logical,’ and ‘the intellectual,’ to which I have already referred
in previous sections of this book. At this juncture, let us turn our attention to
these important lines in an attempt to fully appreciate Avicenna’s relation to the
late-antique heritage with regard to the issue of the existence of nature in the con-
crete world:

Text 21: It is the custom when trying to understand these five [universals] to say that [they can
be divided into] what is natural [ṭabīʿī], logical [manṭiqī], and intellectual [ʿaqlī]. One may also
say that [they can be divided into] what is prior to multiplicity [qabl al-kathrah], in multiplicity
[fī l-kathrah], and after multiplicity [baʿd al-kathrah]. It is also customary that this inquiry be
connected with the inquiry regarding genus and species [specifically]—even though it is com-
mon to the five universals [al-kulliyāt al-khams]. We therefore say, following our predecessors,
that each one of the things that is taken as an example for one of these five [universals] is in
itself a thing [huwa fī nafsihi shayʾ], and [another] thing inasmuch as it is genus, or species,
or differentia, or property, or general accident.²¹⁵

Avicenna in this passage reports the tripartite division of the common things that can
be found in a set of Neoplatonic works dealing mostly with logic.²¹⁶ In addition to
these ancient authors, it should be noted that some predecessors and contempora-
ries of Avicenna also rely on this scheme, which attests that it was widespread in
classical Islam.²¹⁷ This framework, I contend, is crucial for understanding Avicenna’s

 For the late-antique background to Avicenna’s views, see de Libera, La querelle, 230 ff.; idem,
L’art, 499‒515; Sorabji, The Philosophy, vol. 3, 128 ff.; idem, Universals Transformed; and Chiaradon-
na, Alexander. There are key parallels between Alexander and Avicenna, which are discussed below.
 Avicenna, Introduction, I.12, 65.4‒11.
 See Ammonius, Commentary on Eisagoge, 41.17‒20; 42.10‒21; 104.27‒31; Philoponus (?), Com-
mentary on Posterior Analytics, 2,435.28‒30; Simplicius, Commentary on Categories, 82.35‒83.20;
69.19‒71.2 (all in CAG); as well as Proclus, Commentary on Euclid’s Elements 50.16‒51.9 (I owe
these references to Sorabji, Universals Transformed).
 According to Madkour, L’organon, 146‒148; and Vallat, Du possible au nécessaire, 91, 98‒99 and
note 30, 116‒121, it underpins Fārābī’s theory of the universals; cf. Albert the Great, Posterior Analyt-
ics, 1.1.3, who mentions the view of “Alfarabius.” This threefold scheme forms the backbone of Ibn
350 III Quiddity in Itself in the Concrete World

theory of quiddity in itself, even though it represents only one piece of the puzzle. In
effect, Avicenna correlates this tripartite division with other frameworks and distinc-
tions, including the threefold distinction between ‘the natural,’ ‘the logical,’ and ‘the
intellectual,’ as well as the various considerations (iʿtibārāt) of quiddity, thereby
elaborating a unique approach to the problem of universals.
According to this threefold distinction, one aspect of the common thing or the
universal is its existence in multiplicity, that is, in the multiple individuals that
make up the concrete world, or what Avicenna calls al-mawjūdāt fī l-aʿyān. In this
context, it is to be connected, first, with the second consideration of quiddity that
Avicenna outlines in Introduction I.2, i. e., quiddity “in concrete beings” (fī aʿyān
al-ashyāʾ and min ḥaythu hiya fī l-aʿyān), and, second, with what Avicenna describes
as ‘nature’ (ṭabīʿah) and ‘the natural’ (al-ṭabīʿī, and by extension, the natural univer-
sal, al-kullī l-ṭabīʿī) in the above passage. In spite of the divergent phrasing, these
terms all refer to the common nature and pure quiddity immanent in concrete be-
ings, such as horseness in the concrete horse.²¹⁸ In the particular context of chapter
I.12, these terms are to be distinguished from the logical notions of species and
genus, which exist only in the mind, and which Avicenna refers to in this passage
as ‘the logical’ (al-manṭiqī, i. e., the logical notions). This is made clear at the end
of the passage, when Avicenna argues that the nature, say, of animal, is one thing,
and its being a genus or species is another thing that is predicated of it in the
mind. Accordingly, in the lines immediately following this excerpt, Avicenna men-
tions the nature ‘animal in itself’ to illustrate how this pure quiddity is distinct
from its concomitants and from the logical notion of genus, which is attached to it
through thought. By extension, what Avicenna calls in this passage “the five univer-
sals” (al-kulliyāt al-khams), namely, genus, species, differentia, property, and acci-
dent, are logical notions confined to the human mind. They are explicitly made to
correspond to the ‘logical universal’ and implicitly made to correspond to the aspect
of the universal ‘after multiplicity.’ Nevertheless, there is one feature of Avicenna’s
account that may be confusing: ‘the logical,’ inasmuch as it is produced by the
human mind, can also be described as ‘intellectual.’ But for our purposes, the impor-
tant point here is Avicenna’s determination, as in Metaphysics V.1, to disentangle na-
ture and pure quiddity from universality and its various concomitants. In line with
this strategy, in the rest of this chapter of Introduction, he refrains from applying
the term universal to natures such as humanness and animalness. There is therefore

ʿAdī’s discussion in his treatise On the Four Scientific Questions. Abū l-Faraj b. al-Ṭayyib also refers to
it in Introduction, 54.1, where he mentions that “Plato believed that genera and species have three
[modes of] existence [wujūdāt thalāthah].”
 Avicenna’s analysis of quiddity in concrete things in this section of Introduction rests on a clus-
ter of closely related terms: nature (ṭabīʿah), the natural universal (al-kullī l-ṭabīʿī), the natural form
(al-ṣūrah al-ṭabīʿiyyah), meaning (maʿnā), and the corresponding stock examples horseness (fara-
siyyah) and humanness (insāniyyah). All of these terms refer to the same thing in concrete beings,
namely, common nature and pure quiddity.
 4 Avicenna’s predecessors on common things 351

a palpable intention in this work, which goes hand in hand with his approach in Met-
aphysics V.1‒2, to focus the analysis on nature and quiddity and to reserve the term
and notion of ‘universal’ (kullī) for ideas in the human mind.²¹⁹
The tripartite distinction between ‘the natural,’ ‘the logical,’ and ‘the intellectual’
serves another purpose. It helps Avicenna to explain the process by which pure quid-
dity acquires the status of a universal in the mind, that is, how pure quiddity (‘na-
ture’ or ‘the natural’) relates to the intention and concomitant of universality (‘the
logical’) to form the universal concept in the human intellect (‘the intellectual’). It
is apparent that these distinctions are not applied indiscriminately to the ‘universals’
per se, but rather to the relation between quiddity and universality.²²⁰ In brief, Avi-
cenna employs this matrix of distinctions he inherited from antiquity as a framework
to discuss, not universals in general, but the more focused issue of how quiddity re-
lates to its material and mental concomitants, which is one of his main concerns in
his logical and metaphysical works.²²¹ While embracing this ancient framework, he
has shifted the main focus from the common thing to pure quiddity specifically and
to the māhiyyah-lawāzim relation. In addition, the master has accentuated the men-
talist or intellectualist framework in which the discussion of the universal proper
should unfold. To be sure, then, there are telling differences between the Greek com-
mentators’ and Avicenna’s treatments of this issue. The Greek scholars, unlike Avi-
cenna, routinely speak of universals (katholou) or common features (koinon), rather
than quiddities or essences specifically. For Avicenna, in contrast, the crux of the dis-
cussion focuses on the various aspects or considerations (iʿtibārāt) of quiddity, in-
cluding quiddity in itself, and he consistently reserves the term universal (kullī) for
mental existents, which correspond only to the universal aspect of quiddity in the
human mind. There is, admittedly, an important terminological divergence in that re-
gard. In addition, whereas the theory of the Platonic Forms plays a foundational role
in the metaphysics of many, if not most, of the late-antique Neoplatonic thinkers who
engaged with this issue, it plays no role at all in Avicenna’s system, which articulates

 The ‘predecessors’ Avicenna alludes to in Text 21 to justify this practice are likely to be Alexand-
er of Aphrodisias and some Neoplatonists, although it is conceivable that he also had Yaḥyā b. ʿAdī in
mind, since the latter appears to have distinguished between these notions.
 Accordingly, a basic division of the text can be proposed: first, Avicenna reports the views of the
late-antique philosophers (I.12.65.1‒8), who referred to these various aspects of the universals; then he
embarks on his own analysis (65.8 ff.), which presupposes a sharper distinction between nature and
the universal. Nevertheless, as was highlighted before, one can perceive a certain ambiguity in Avi-
cenna’s endorsement of the term kullī.
 The various tripartite schemes deployed in Introduction I.2 and I.12 are crucial to understanding
how Avicenna positions himself vis-à-vis the late-antique discussion about the universals. However,
their interrelationship as well as the issue of exactly how they reflect specific doctrines from the late-
antique philosophical context are points that have to be examined. Marmura, Avicenna’s Chapter on
Universals, 39 ff., provides only limited insight into these questions and appears to regard these var-
ious sets of distinctions as fundamentally unrelated. I disagree with Marmura on this point; addition-
al comments are provided below.
352 III Quiddity in Itself in the Concrete World

a theory of quiddity and the universals that dispenses entirely with this metaphysical
model of externally existing separate entities.
In spite of these important terminological and doctrinal differences, it is likely
that this threefold scheme—and more generally the late-antique philosophical reflec-
tion on the universals—shaped Avicenna’s thought on quiddity in decisive ways, par-
ticularly his views on how the universal relates to the concrete existents. As some
scholars have remarked, Avicenna’s triplex distinction of quiddity unfolds against
a rich and intricate philosophical background highlighted by the late-antique
Greek commentaries dealing with the nature, epistemological status, and ontology
of the universals.²²² In this connection, it is notable that the Greek commentators an-
ticipate many of the questions raised in this study in connection with the Avicennian
texts: indeed, the number of aspects or considerations of the universals, their nature,
as well as their ontological status and localization are all issues raised by these au-
thors that reverberate in the master’s own writings. More specifically, the status of
common things in the mind vs. in the concrete world and their causal relationship
across these contexts are points debated at length in the late-antique commentaries,
some of which were translated in whole or in part into Arabic and may have been
available to Avicenna.
There are three points in particular that should arrest our attention. Although the
Neoplatonists recognized a wide variety of common things or universals, it was com-
mon to outline three aspects in particular: those in concrete individuals or in species,
those in the human mind, and those corresponding to the Platonic Forms, which
were, strictly speaking, not universals, but often loosely described as such and listed
alongside the other kinds of universals. In the Greek philosophical literature, these
universals are often described as being ‘before,’ ‘in,’ and ‘after plurality’ or ‘the
many.’ This scheme appears, in one form or another, in the works of Porphyry, Sim-
plicius (fl. c. 530 CE), and Ammonius Hermiae (d. c. 526 CE).²²³ In upholding this
threefold division, these thinkers were trying to distinguish between (a) those com-
mon things or universals that are causally and essentially prior to their embodiment
in concrete things (i. e., the Platonic Forms), (b) those that exist in concrete things
(i. e., the substantial forms), and (c) those that exist in the human mind as a result
of intellectual abstraction (the intellectual forms). This threefold distinction of the
universals arose partly out of a dialectical effort aimed at synthesizing Aristotle’s un-
derstanding of the universal as “that whose nature it is to be predicated of many”—
and which he made out to correspond primarily to mental concepts—with the Platon-
ic Forms as transcendent ontological archetypes and causes of the reality of things. It
should be noted that this tripartite scheme reappears in the works of the Syriac think-

 See Tweedale, Alexander; idem, Duns Scotus’s Doctrine; de Libera, La querelle, 223‒262; Heer,
The Sufi Position, 1‒2, whose comments pertain mostly to the post-Avicennian tradition.
 See Ammonius, Commentary on Eisagoge, 68.25‒69.3; and Simplicius, Commentary on Categories
82.35‒83.20 in CAG.
 4 Avicenna’s predecessors on common things 353

er Sergius of Reshʿaynā (d. 536 CE).²²⁴ Now, there can be no doubt that Avicenna was
cognizant of this Neoplatonic tripartite scheme, even though he may not have been
well informed about the metaphysical background from which it stemmed. He re-
ports it at the beginning of Introduction I.12 and explains there that it is “customary”
(jarat al-ʿādah) among philosophers to divide things in this threefold way. Although
no specific names or texts are cited to support this statement, it echoes the similar
division that can be found in the works of these Neoplatonic and Christian thinkers,
even though the terminology has been modified slightly. What is more, as is apparent
from a later section of Introduction I.12, Avicenna himself relied on this classification
to discuss quiddity in its human and divine contexts. There he draws a distinction
between the meanings (maʿānī) in God and in the supernal intellects, which are “be-
fore multiplicity” (qabl al-kathrah), and those in matter and in the human intellect,
thereby implementing the tripartite scheme outlined at the beginning of the chap-
ter.²²⁵
At times, the terminological and doctrinal overlap between Avicenna and these
earlier thinkers assumes a more specific form. Simplicius in his Commentary on Cat-
egories, 82.35‒83.20, explicitly outlines three kinds of “common feature” (koinon):
the Forms, the common item or feature in species of the same genus, and the com-
mon item or feature qua concept in the mind. In the section describing the first of
these, namely, the Platonic Form qua common feature, the Greek philosopher focuses
on the example ‘animal,’ which he also alludes to as the “first animal” (πρῶτον
ζῷον) and “the animal in itself” (αὐτοζῷον). Incidentally, this form is also a “nature”
(φύσιν), which transcends the concrete particulars in which it inheres.²²⁶ According
to both Simplicius and Avicenna, then, it is “animal in itself”—a separate and tran-
scendent form for Simplicius, an immanent form for Avicenna—that endows all con-
crete animals with a certain commonality (κοινότητα, adj., mushtarak) and an iden-
tical nature (φύσιν, ṭabīʿah), namely, animalness. The two philosophers also agree
that it is “by means of abstraction” (ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως, tajrīd) that the human intellect
grasps these common items or nature.²²⁷
In light of this, there is an obvious sense in which the threefold distinction dis-
cussed in the Greek commentaries corresponds to the Avicennian triplex scheme:
two of these aspects are virtually identical (‘in particulars’ and ‘in the mind’),

 See Hugonnard-Roche, Les Catégories, 352, which provides a French translation of Sergius’s
Treatise to Philotheos. The threefold distinction is mentioned in that text, with the difference that
the universals ‘before multiplicity’ are said to lie “next to God,” which is probably a reference to
the Platonic forms. In fact, Sergius in that treatise attributes this scheme to Plato, although, as Hu-
gonnard-Roche notes (358), it is instead to be traced to the works of the Neoplatonists.
 Avicenna, Introduction, I.12, 69.7‒18; see Text 45 in chapter V.
 Simplicius, Commentary on Categories, 82.35‒83.20, especially 83.3; see also Sorabji, The Philos-
ophy, vol. 3, 128‒131, 133. It is, of course, not a coincidence that Avicenna’s stock example when dis-
cussing quiddity, namely, ‘animal,’ also appears in Simplicius and other late-antique Neoplatonic
discussions.
 Simplicius, Commentary on Categories, 83.8 in CAG.
354 III Quiddity in Itself in the Concrete World

while the third aspect is in Simplicius’s and Avicenna’s systems distinct from the
other two, yet somehow more real and foundational than them. More specifically,
the universal qua Platonic Form, ‘the Animal in itself,’ may be said to correspond
in some ways to Avicenna’s quiddity in itself, since both are responsible for the
very nature of a thing in abstraction from other accidents and concomitants. The
fact that Simplicius calls this aspect a nature (φύσιν), and that Avicenna later on
also calls it a nature (ṭabīʿah), strengthens the connection between their views.
The following analysis will also highlight other similar features that connect the
late-antique and Avicennian accounts, in particular with regard to ontology and cau-
sality. These parallels notwithstanding, the differences between these thinkers re-
main considerable and should not be understated: while one endorsed the theory
of the Forms and made it the cornerstone of his theory of common things, the
other rejected the Forms and operated within a revised Aristotelian paradigm
where existents are either mental or concrete, but where universals and quiddities
cannot exist separately on their own.
Avicenna’s belief that universality is merely an accident that attaches to quiddity
in the human mind also finds a salient precedent in the Greek commentators and es-
pecially in the works of Alexander of Aphrodisias. Alexander is quite explicit in some
of his works that universality is a mental construct and an accident that occurs to a
thing in the mind and that it is to be distinguished from the real entities of the ex-
tramental world. Alexander appears to make the universals “mind-dependent” (to
use Sorabji’s formula), a view which seems to have been advocated also by Porphyry
some time later.²²⁸ Moreover, Alexander in his commentary on On the Soul argues
that these universals exist only inasmuch as they are being actually thought or intel-
lected by the mind, and that they cease to exist when the mind ceases to contemplate
them.²²⁹ These points also appear in Avicenna’s noetic account and constitute the
basis of his views of the universals. For Avicenna as well, the universals exist only
in the human mind and are hence mind-dependent; universality is an accident—or
rather a concomitant—that attaches to quiddity qua mental existent; and a universal
concept or intelligible object may be said to truly exist only insofar as it is being ac-
tually intellected.
Defining universality as a purely mental or mind-dependent accident enables
Alexander and Avicenna to establish a sharp distinction between the nature of a
thing, which exists in the concrete world, and the universal as such, which exists
only in the mind. In this regard, by far the strongest parallel in the way these two
thinkers conceive of universals appears in Quaestio 1.11. In that text, Alexander
seemingly argues for the concrete existence of natures as opposed to universals,
which should, strictly speaking, only be posited as existing in the human intellect.

 Sorabji, The Philosophy, vol. 3, 149‒156; Chiaradonna, Porphyry. The key text here is Quaestio
1.11, which, as Stephen Menn already pointed out, might have deeply influenced Avicenna’s concep-
tion of quiddity and universality; see Menn, Avicenna’s Metaphysics, 155‒159.
 Sorabji, The Philosophy, vol. 3, 149‒151.
 4 Avicenna’s predecessors on common things 355

As Tweedale has already observed, this would imply that Alexander, before Avicen-
na, had sharply distinguished between the ‘natures’ of things and their ‘universality’
and regarded the former as being prior to the latter. In turn, this suggests that he at-
tributed some degree of extramental existence only to the former.²³⁰ The key passage
encapsulating this doctrine in the original Greek text is the following:

For since the genera are universal, and what is universal is of certain things, it is universal [as]
being something. For it is not the case that, being nothing, it [nevertheless] is universal and a
genus and is predicated unequivocally; but there must be some thing to which ‘universal’ attach-
es. That to which ‘universal’ attaches is a [real] thing; the universal is not a [real] thing in its own
right, but something that attaches to that thing. For example, ‘living creature’ is a [real] thing
and indicates a certain nature; for it signifies an animate being with sensation—and this in
its own nature is not universal.²³¹

Alexander defines the universal as something that “attaches” to a real thing or na-
ture and as “an accident that supervenes on some thing,” which recalls Avicenna’s
similar description of universality as a mental concomitant and accident of nature or
pure quiddity. In other words, Alexander appears to defend exactly the same kind of
moderate realist position as can be found in the Avicennian works. In both cases,
this moderate realism is predicated on a distinction between the essential nature
that somehow exists in the concrete world and universality that exists only as a men-
tal accident.²³² The relevance of the Alexandrian antecedent increases when one re-
alizes that Quaestio 1.11 was among the writings of Alexander to have been translated
into Arabic.
There is a final, and for us crucial, aspect one finds debated at length in the
Greek commentaries: the ontological status of the various kinds of universals or com-
mon features posited by the Neoplatonists. Attempting any kind of summary of this
difficult question in the present study would be vain. Suffice to say that the issues of
whether, and if so, in what state or mode, these various universals or common fea-
tures can be said to exist generated intense discussion among the various schools of
late antiquity. One crucial question for the Neoplatonists in particular was how the

 Alexander, Quaestio 1.11, in Quaestiones 1.1‒2.15, 50‒55 in the translation by R.W. Sharples; for a
study of universals in Alexander’s philosophy and its importance for Avicenna, see Tweedale,
Alexander; idem, Duns Scotus’s Doctrine, especially 81‒89.
 Alexander, Quaestio 1.11, 23.21‒29. A similar idea is articulated in the Arabic adaptations of
Alexander’s works. In Discourse of Alexander of Aphrodisias (Badawī, Arisṭū, 279.22), one reads
that “the animal on account of its nature [ṭabīʿah] is not universal,” so that universality is an accident
that is added to it in the mind.
 Chiaradonna, Alexander, 319‒325, describes Alexander’s position as a kind of essentialism and
“abstractionist realism, according to which definitions refer to real natures that exist in individuals.
These are natures that are not universal as such, but only insofar as our soul isolates them from mat-
ter and conceives of them by themselves” (323). What Chiaradonna says about Alexander can be ap-
plied with equal validity to Avicenna. This indicates that Avicenna is approaching the issue of quid-
dity and the universals partly within an Aphrodisian tradition.
356 III Quiddity in Itself in the Concrete World

common features in concrete things relate to the archetypal forms and paradigmatic
causes. This issue arose from their adherence to Platonic metaphysics. As it turns
out, some of the Neoplatonists who tackled this issue, and, later, many of the medi-
eval thinkers who relied on their writings, defended a version of a realist metaphys-
ical interpretation of quiddity (or, rather, in the ancient context, of ‘the common
thing’). Alexander defended some features of a realist position, even though he
did not adhere to the Platonic theory of the forms. Porphyry, possibly influenced
by Alexander, also appears to defend a doctrine of formal immanentism, according
to which the essential form that inheres in concrete beings corresponds to the com-
mon nature or item that is shared by all individuals of the same species, but remains
distinct from the universals proper in the human mind. What is more, as Chiaradon-
na explains, Porphyry, probably following Alexander, defines this nature or form as
an intelligible part of the concrete being.²³³ In brief, Porphyry appears to have bor-
rowed from Alexander’s essentialist and realist views and adapted them to his meta-
physical system.
This trend of doctrinal adaptation continues in the metaphysics of Avicenna. Ac-
cording to the master, who follows these Greek thinkers, the existence of this com-
mon feature in concrete beings is often referred to as ‘a nature,’ which is in turn iden-
tified with quiddity in itself. Furthermore, this φύσις qua quiddity is regarded as
being immanent in the thing itself. It constitutes one of its ontological principles,
without which that entity would not be what it is. For many Neoplatonists, and re-
gardless of the specificities of their individual systems, the common things in the
concrete world are ontically real and embedded in the very fabric of things. Qua in-
telligible forms, they constitute a part of the whole substantial being. There is there-
fore an essentialist, realist, and mereological trend running through their works,
which, I would like to contend, was bequeathed to Avicenna and reappears in an idi-
osyncratic form in the master’s treatment of quiddity. This makes Avicenna a direct
heir to the late-antique philosophical deliberations about the universals and to some
of the Neoplatonic theories attached to them. At the same time, Avicenna reformulat-
ed key aspects of this problematic by deploying his own philosophical language and
by shifting the emphasis from the common things and their Platonic background to a
more recognizably Aristotelian notion of essence or quiddity, while also preserving
important Neoplatonic elements. At any rate, it is partly in this Avicennian form en-
riched with the Persian master’s numerous conceptual elaborations that the Latin
Scholastics approached the problem of essence and the universals during the twelfth
and thirteenth centuries.²³⁴

 Chiaradonna, Porphyry, 327‒328. For the views of Plotinus and Porphyry on universals and their
instantiation, see also Adamson, One of a Kind.
 Wéber, Le thème avicennien; Wippel, Essence and Existence; and Conti, Realism, provide a use-
ful overview of key features of scholastic realism, many of which find an echo in, or were directly
influenced by, Avicenna’s works (surprisingly, however, Conti does not integrate the Avicennian leg-
acy in his analysis). These include a realist interpretation of the essence/existence distinction; the
 4 Avicenna’s predecessors on common things 357

To summarize, Avicenna regards the (mental) universal as existing potentially in

the concrete world, but actually in the mind. He regards pure quiddity as existing in
the concrete world and in the mind according to its own ontological mode, which (in
itself) excludes both potentiality and actuality, oneness and compositeness, as these
notions are customarily applied to the contingent beings. Yet, from a purely ontolog-
ical and epistemological standpoint, the universal, on the one hand, and the com-
mon nature and pure quiddity, on the other, always remain distinct. In holding
these views, it is possible that Avicenna sought to reconcile two major, albeit seem-
ingly incompatible, passages found in Aristotle concerning the universals: first, the
statement at Posterior Analytics II.19.100a.6‒7 where Aristotle describes the universal
as “the one beside the many which is a single identity within them all,” and, second,
the passage in On the Soul I.1, 402b7 where Aristotle states that we should treat uni-
versals “either as nothing at all or as a later [or posterior] product.”²³⁵ Following the
latter statement and Alexander of Aphrodisias, Avicenna holds that the universals,
strictly speaking, are posterior to the concrete entities, since they exist truly only
in the human mind and as a result of abstraction. But he also argues that there is
a principle from which the universals are derived through abstraction, which exists
as an immanent form in concrete beings, namely, pure quiddity or common nature.
This shows that he also paid heed to the passage in Posterior Analytics. Avicenna’s
solution to this conundrum appears profoundly indebted to the Aphrodisian tradi-
tion and revolves around a distinction between the universal or universality per se
and nature. While the former exists only in the mind, the latter exists in each con-
crete being. Avicenna’s main innovation was to amplify Alexander’s distinction
and to adapt it to his own metaphysical system, in which the nature—but not the uni-
versal—is identified with quiddity in itself. This theory in turn developed deep roots
in Avicenna’s philosophy and came to constitute one of the cornerstones of his on-
tology and epistemology. In elaborating his doctrines, Avicenna engaged in a prac-
tice that was at the very heart of the Neoplatonic philosophical project and that con-
sisted not only in reconciling some aspects of Platonic and Aristotelian doctrine, but
also in reconciling Aristotle with himself and harmonizing various passages of his
works.²³⁶

notion of common natures existing in concrete beings; the identification of this common nature with
quiddity in itself or absolute quiddity; the tripartite division of universals and their relation to matter
and multiplicity as exposed in Introduction I.12; regarding universals as second intentions and mental
objects; and attributing a special mode of being to essence.
 It should be said that in the rest of Posterior Analytics II.19 Aristotle describes the universal as
arising in the soul as a result of sense-perception and the inductive study of particular things. The
main ambiguity that could have struck Avicenna and other Arabic thinkers, above and beyond this
text, is whether, in addition to existing as an idea in the human mind, the universal should also
be regarded as somehow existing in each particular concrete beings.
 On this trend in Avicenna, see Wisnovsky, Avicenna’s Metaphysics.
358 III Quiddity in Itself in the Concrete World

In the final analysis, it seems that Avicenna defends a variant of Aristotelian im-
manent realism against the transcendental realism of the Platonic tradition. More-
over, Avicenna’s version of this moderate realism appears to have been considerably
colored by Alexander of Aphrodisias’s doctrines in the form in which they reached
him in Arabic translation. Perhaps more surprisingly at first glance, what Avicenna
also appears to be doing in some respects is reconciling Plato with Aristotle by pos-
iting a fundamental and archetypal principle or model—which for him is not the
ideal form, but quiddity in itself—and making it immanent in each concrete instan-
tiation. Although his position is in general closer to that of Aristotle, Avicenna also
inherited some features of late-antique Neoplatonism that shaped his views on quid-
dity. One of them consists in recognizing a real, unchanging, and intelligible princi-
ple that underlies all the natural beings and endows them with their true nature.
Although Avicenna rejects the separate and autonomous forms of Platonic metaphy-
sics, he regards the pure quiddities as one of the main ontological components of
concrete beings, as a foundational principle that is intelligible and unconditioned,
and which, not coincidentally, he correlates with form (ṣūrah). He furthermore
seems to have borrowed the mereological framework that was used by the Neopla-
tonists to interpret common things and their relation to concrete instantiations.²³⁷
One could argue that Avicenna collapses within pure quiddity some of the features
of the transcendent forms of Plato and the immanent forms of Aristotle. This quin-
tessentially Avicennian doctrine possesses features indebted to both philosophical
systems. In this regard, it was influenced by the harmonizing efforts of the Neopla-
tonic tradition. Finally, Avicenna was also cognizant of, and profoundly influenced
by, the Neoplatonic doctrine of the three ontological states of the universal, as it
was defended by thinkers such as Ammonius, Elias, David, and Simplicius, although
he transformed and adapted this doctrine to fit his own philosophical system. It is
within this broad tripartite paradigm he inherited from the late-antique tradition
that the Persian master implements many of his innovative metaphysical ideas.
One question worth addressing at this juncture is how the various matrices of
distinctions Avicenna unravels in Introduction interrelate with one another.²³⁸ In
what follows, I shall limit my comments to the present inquiry of quiddity in the con-
crete world. In light of the results reached in the previous analysis, one may surmise
that there are salient interconnections between these sets of distinctions. For exam-
ple, it is quite blatant that the consideration of quiddity as it exists in concrete beings
(fī l-aʿyān) (Introduction I.2) corresponds to what Avicenna loosely describes as the
universal ‘in multiplicity’ (fī l-kathrah) (Introduction I.12), and that these two distinc-
tions are in turn related to the description of pure quiddity as a ‘nature’ (ṭabīʿah) or
‘the natural thing’ (al-ṭabīʿī) in concrete beings (Introduction I.12). Furthermore, the

 For the Neoplatonic use of this mereological framework in connection with common things, see
Adamson, One of a Kind.
 I provide a more comprehensive answer to this question in chapter V, once the analysis of the
existence of quiddity in the divine context has been completed.
 4 Avicenna’s predecessors on common things 359

universal aspect of quiddity in our conception or mind (fī l-taṣawwur) described in

Introduction I.2 corresponds to what is ‘after multiplicity’ (baʿd al-kathrah) (Introduc-
tion I.12), and it is also to be connected with both ‘the logical’ (al-manṭiqī) and ‘the
intellectual’ (al-ʿaqlī). These correlations, however, are not strict or rigid, but rather
fluid. Moreover, it is still unclear at this stage whether quiddity in itself can be cor-
related in any meaningful way with the remaining distinction ‘before multiplicity’ of
I.12. I return to this issue in chapters IV and V.
Given (a) Avicenna’s articulation of a threefold description of quiddity in Intro-
duction I.2 that is reminiscent of the classification some late-antique thinkers employ
with regard to universals or common things; (b) his use of the concepts of nature
(ṭabīʿah), common nature (ṭabīʿah mushtarakah), and common thing (amr mushtar-
ak) to refer to quiddity (modeled on the Greek practice of referring to the extramental
universals as common things in concrete beings and in the divine intellects); (c) his
mereological doctrine of quiddity as a part and principle of concrete beings; and (d)
the general trend to ontologize universals and to expressly address the issue of their
ontological status in the concrete world, the realist connection between Avicenna
and some of these Greek thinkers should be taken seriously and represents a key
component of the master’s approach to metaphysics. These parallels are compound-
ed by the Neoplatonic tripartite scheme ‘prior, in, and after multiplicity,’ which is re-
produced in Introduction. In this regard, the consideration in the late-antique sources
of what is in multiplicity or in matter announces in a critical way Avicenna’s account
of the existence of quiddity in concrete beings. Not only does the master regard this
aspect of quiddity as existing in multiple physical individuals and, hence, in multi-
plicity—without itself being subject to numerological considerations or becoming
multiple—but he also explicitly refers to pure quiddity in this context as a ‘nature’
(ṭabīʿah) or ‘the natural form’ (al-ṣūrah al-ṭabīʿiyyah), and to the compound of
pure quiddity and its material accidents as ‘the natural thing’ (al-shayʾ al-ṭabīʿī).²³⁹
The presence of this terminological connection and the metaphysical realism implied
by it cannot be coincidental in these various texts. Rather, the late-antique discourse
about whether and how the universals and the forms can be said to exist in the ma-
terial world appears to have shaped the main contours of Avicenna’s doctrine of pure
quiddity in the concrete world.

4.2 Yaḥyā b. ʿAdī

Even though these parallels are striking, there is an important precedent much closer
to Avicenna’s time that deserves scrutiny: the Jacobite Christian theologian and phi-
losopher Yaḥyā b. ʿAdī. As Arnzen already pointed out, Yaḥyā defends a realist inter-

 Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Cure, V.1, 204.17.

360 III Quiddity in Itself in the Concrete World

pretation of the essences and universals.²⁴⁰ According to Yaḥyā, forms, essences, or

universals (Yaḥyā conceives of these notions in close terms) inhere in the concrete
individuals and exist irreducibly in them. In his Treatise on Unity (al-Maqālah fī l-ta-
wḥīd), he describes both particulars and universals as “creatures” (sing., khalīqah)
and as things that are contingent and caused to exist by God.²⁴¹ The term “creature”
or “created thing” that Yaḥyā uses in that passage and applies to particulars and uni-
versals alike already suggests that the latter should be conceived of as actual entities
or as substantive things in the world, or else it would be hard to account for the claim
that they are “created.” It also suggests that Yaḥyā in that section of his work is dis-
cussing extramental existence or existence in the concrete world primarily. But how
exactly can the universals be said to exist in concrete reality? In this connection, he
goes on to state the following:

And it is clear that the general things and universals [al-umūr al-ʿāmmiyyah wa-l-kulliyyah] re-
quire, for their existence, individual things in order for them [i. e., the general things and univer-
sals] to exist in them [the particulars] [li-tūjada fīhā]. For the things that exist in themselves [in
the concrete world] are only the individuals. As for the common things, their subsistence and
existence is the essential existence [al-wujūd al-dhātī] [they have] in [fī] their particulars and in-
dividuals.²⁴²

The key point Yaḥyā seeks to establish in this passage and in the one immediately
preceding it is that the universals and common things can only be said to exist in
the concrete world in particular and individual things. Since the particulars are cre-
ated from nothing, likewise the common things present in them must be (ultimately)
created from nothing. In following this line of reasoning, Yaḥyā is implicitly setting
God aside ontologically from all the other things in existence, both particular things
like Zayd and universal things like humanness. The foil against which he unfolds his
argument is a Platonic position that would locate the universals as substantive things
in the exterior world but separate from the particulars themselves. Yet, in the process
of establishing this point, Ibn ʿAdī puts forth what is quite clearly a realist and mer-
eological interpretation of the universals according to which these exist immanently
in the concrete individuals (li-tūjada fīhā, fī juzʾiyyātihā wa-ashkhāṣihā). In this con-
text, Yaḥyā mentions the “essential being” (al-wujūd al-dhātī) of the common things,
a notion to which I return briefly below and in more detail in chapter IV. Suffice to
stress here that Yaḥyā’s interpretation of the common things and how they relate to
the extramental particulars opens an important perspective with regard to my inter-
pretation of Avicenna’s position. In order to delve deeper into this issue, we need to
examine other works by Yaḥyā that have a bearing on the matter.

 Arnzen, Platonische Ideen, 71: “Al-Fārābīs Schüler Yaḥyā b. ʿAdī vertritt eine dezidiert realisti-
sche Interpretation der Universalien.”
 Yaḥyā b. ʿAdī, Treatise on Unity, in Philosophical Treatises, 400.14‒18.
 Yaḥyā b. ʿAdī, Treatise on Unity, in Philosophical Treatises, 401.1‒3.
 4 Avicenna’s predecessors on common things 361

In two treatises entitled On the Four Scientific Questions Concerning the Three
Kinds of Existence (Fī l-buḥūth al-ʿilmiyyah al-arbaʿah ʿan aṣnāf al-wujūd al-thalā-
thah), which was recently analyzed and translated by Robert Wisnovsky and Stephen
Menn, and On Clarifying the Existence of the Common Things (Fī Tabyīn wujūd al-umūr
al-ʿāmmiyyah), which was the object of a detailed study by Marwan Rashed, Yaḥyā
seeks to establish a classification of the existents (mawjūdāt) by means of a threefold
division he inherited from the late-antique sources, but which he revised in the con-
text of his own philosophical system.²⁴³ In these texts, the Christian thinker argues
that the existents can be divided into ‘the natural’ (al-ṭabīʿī), ‘the intellectual’ (al-
ʿaqlī) or ‘logical’ (al-manṭiqī), and ‘the divine’ (or the ‘metaphysical,’ al-ilāhī). More
specifically, since he is to some extent operating within a revised Platonic framework
(without however going so far as to endorse the separate existence of the Forms), he
intends to examine how these ontological modes apply to the underlying forms
(ṣuwar) and essences (dhawāt) of things.²⁴⁴ Yaḥyā argues that the essences found
in the divine world, in concrete reality, and in the human mind have a distinct
kind of existence, hence the title of his first treatise. One important point he
makes is that the essences found in nature and in the human intellect depend on
the divine (or metaphysical) mode of existence of essence or form, which is essential-
ly prior, since it focuses on the definition of the thing taken ‘in itself.’ This divine (or
metaphysical) mode of existence, which Yaḥyā also describes as “essential exis-
tence” (wujūd dhātī) and “true or real existence” (wujūd ḥaqīqī), is to be located pre-
sumably in the divine mind, although Yaḥyā does not elaborate on this point. More-
over, according to Yaḥyā, these quiddities or forms can be regarded as a simple part
(juzʾ) of the concrete composite beings. As he puts it, “because these forms are parts
of the composite and for this reason are causes of it, and every cause is prior by na-
ture to its effect, forms free of all concomitants will therefore be prior by nature to
their effects.”²⁴⁵ Finally, quiddity, although it exists in concrete beings, can be ex-
tracted and dissociated from its various material concomitants and related to the es-
sence taken in itself and contemplated by the mind.
Now, although Menn and Wisnovsky have emphasized the doctrinal differences
between Yaḥyā and Avicenna, Adamson and Rashed for their part believe that Avi-
cenna was deeply influenced by Yaḥyā and that he likely developed his understand-
ing of quiddity and the universals by elaborating on the Christian thinker.²⁴⁶ Building

 Menn and Wisnovsky, Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī On the Four Scientific Questions; Rashed, Ibn ʿAdī. These
two treatises develop similar ideas and should be read side by side.
 For these points and Yaḥyā’s relation to Platonism, see Arnzen, Platonische Ideen, 71‒74.
 Menn and Wisnovsky, Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī On the Four Scientific Questions, 95.
 Menn and Wisnovsky, Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī On the Four Scientific Questions; Menn, Avicenna’s Meta-
physics, 154‒157 (although Menn acknowledges Avicenna’s debt to Yaḥyā and notes some important
parallels, he stresses mostly the differences between these two thinkers’ conception of essence);
Rashed, Ibn ʿAdī, especially 146, 149‒150; Adamson, Knowledge of Universals, 150‒159; and Ehrig-Eg-
362 III Quiddity in Itself in the Concrete World

on their insight, and bearing in mind the topic of the present chapter, I wish in what
follows to provide a comparative analysis of these thinkers’ views on how quiddity
relates to the concrete existents and on the extramental existence of the common
things. My hypothesis is that the Ibn ʿAdīan theory of existing quiddities and
forms in concrete beings anticipated Avicenna’s metaphysical realism as well as
his mereological argument that the pure quiddities constitute an irreducible and sim-
ple part of these beings.
Although Yaḥyā entitled his treatise On the Four Scientific Questions Concerning
the Three Kinds of Existence, the bulk of his analysis focuses on the forms and quid-
dities, and especially on how these can be said to exist in the divine, physical, and
intellectual spheres. In fact, Yaḥyā states that he intends “to investigate the pure es-
sences” (al-baḥth ʿan al-dhawāt al-maḥḍah), and throughout the treatise, he goes
back and forth between the terms form (ṣūrah), essence (dhāt), and quiddity (mā-
hiyyah) to refer to what is, at root, a Platonic or Platonizing conception of form.
What is more, his tripartition of existents (mawjūdāt) and existence (wujūd) corre-
sponds clearly to a threefold distinction of essences envisaged either in matter, in
the mind, or in themselves. This indicates that Ibn ʿAdī conceives of these three
kinds or modes of existence as applying to the same essences taken in these various
contexts, and not to different kinds of essences.²⁴⁷ This, from the very outset, some-
what connects Yaḥyā’s terminology and outlook with Avicenna’s own agenda in In-
troduction and Metaphysics to investigate the pure quiddities in their various ontolog-
ical contexts, one of which is concrete reality. Beyond this general concern for
classifying the ontological contexts of essences, which jointly characterizes Yaḥyā’s
and Avicenna’s approaches, it is the similarities in their discussion of how essence
exists in the concrete individuals which should retain our attention here.
In the course of his analysis, Yaḥyā makes a number of points that are directly
relevant to my interpretation of Avicenna’s metaphysics. According to the Christian
thinker, the essences exist in concrete beings together with the material concomi-
tants and accidents that surround them. This is what Yaḥyā describes as the ‘natural
existence’ of form or essence, in contradistinction to its ‘logical or intellectual state’
(in the human mind) and to its ‘divine state’ (presumably in God’s mind). In this
physical or natural context, Yaḥyā tells us, essence is taken “in that it is in matter
and with specifying accidents” (bi-annahu fī hayūlā wa-maʿa aʿrāḍ khāṣṣah). This im-
plies, for example, taking the definition of human with its external things, or, as
Yaḥyā puts it, taking “the rational mortal animal existing in matter with accidents”
(al-ḥayawān al-nāṭiq al-māʾit al-mawjūd fī hayūlā wa-maʿa aʿrāḍ).²⁴⁸ In spite of this

gert, Yaḥyā, who does not focus on the relation between Avicenna and Ibn ʿAdī, but provides insight
into Yaḥyā’s theory of nature and the universals.
 For a pellucid statement of this important point, see Menn and Wisnovsky, Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī On the
Four Scientific Questions, 96 (66b15).
 Ibn ʿAdī, On Clarifying the Existence of the Common Things, in Philosophical Treatises, 151.22‒23,
152.17.
 4 Avicenna’s predecessors on common things 363

state of embeddedness in matter, the essence can be conceptually extracted and con-
sidered solely in itself, since it constitutes an irreducible part (juzʾ) of the composite
concrete existent.²⁴⁹ This is because, in themselves, the forms or essences are pure
and devoid of the accidents and concomitants (lawāḥiq) that attach to them.²⁵⁰
Such pure and irreducible forms nevertheless exist in the concrete individuals as a
simple part (juzʾ) exists in a more complex or composite being.²⁵¹ Thus, on Yaḥyā’s
mind, these simple parts are nothing other than the essences envisaged without
their attachments and concomitants.
One point that remains somewhat unclear in Yaḥyā’s two treatises is how the di-
vine mode of existence of the form or essence relates to the other two modes. It is
evident that in his view the logical or intellectual aspect of essence is posterior to
concrete individuals and, hence, to natural existence. But how exactly does the di-
vine existence relate to concrete beings and to natural existence? And why would
Yaḥyā in Treatise on Unity describe the immanent existence of the form in the partic-
ular as a case of ‘essential existence’? Yaḥyā’s use of the expression ‘divine exis-
tence’ would seem to suggest at first that such forms exist only in the divine
world or, more specifically, in God’s mind, and that they are disconnected from
the realm of matter and multiplicity. In that sense, they would correspond to the uni-
versals ‘before multiplicity’ one finds outlined in the Neoplatonic sources. But the
text from Treatise on Unity quoted above seems to suggest otherwise: divine existence
can also be construed as the existence of the universals and common things in con-
crete particulars according to a realist interpretation. This means that the notion of
‘essential being’ or ‘divine being’ or ‘true being’ pertains to the essences taken in
themselves, regardless of their ontological context, i. e., regardless where they are lo-
cated. Thus, even when they are embedded in concrete things, the essence or defini-
tion in itself somehow preserves its ‘divine’ existence. In sum, the definition or es-
sence in itself, the ‘definitional’ or ‘essential being,’ can be predicated of the
concrete thing and exists immanently in each concrete individual according to a mer-
eological mode. As a result, this third type of existence can be said to be essentially
prior and also to encompass and subsume the other two types of existence.
The various points Yaḥyā develops in his argumentation appear to have directly
informed Avicenna’s understanding of quiddity, even though he adapts them to his
metaphysical system. Like his forerunner, the master upholds a mereological ap-
proach whereby pure quiddity represents a simple part (juzʾ) of the composite exis-
tents and can be said to exist irreducibly in the concrete beings (this horse) and in
the universal complex beings (universal horse).²⁵² While Yaḥyā speaks of “the

 Ibn ʿAdī, On Clarifying the Existence of the Common Things, in Philosophical Treatises, 152.1‒3.
 Menn and Wisnovsky, Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī On the Four Scientific Questions, 65b5, 65b30, 66b5, 66a25.
 Menn and Wisnovsky, Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī On the Four Scientific Questions, 66a25‒35, 66b10‒15.
 I would argue that what Menn (Avicenna’s Metaphysics, 154) writes about Yaḥyā, “it is this neu-
tral essence, not the universal concept, which is predicated of Socrates and Plato, since Socrates is
not in fact the concept human,” can be applied to Avicenna as well with some qualifications. Al-
364 III Quiddity in Itself in the Concrete World

pure essences” (al-dhawāt al-maḥdah), Avicenna for his part discourses on ‘quiddity
in itself.’ Both seek to distinguish the essence taken ‘in itself’ from the consideration
of essence taken with its concomitants and accidents as it is found in composite sub-
stances. In this regard, there is significant overlap between Yaḥyā’s and Avicenna’s
terminology: the former’s description of essence in a material setting as “in that it
is in matter and with specifying accidents” (bi-annahu fī hayūlā wa-maʿa aʿrāḍ khāṣ-
ṣah) directly echoes Avicenna’s formula “on the condition of something else” (bi-
sharṭ shayʾ ākhar), where shayʾ ākhar, for the master, can mean material concomi-
tants and accidents. In fact, Yaḥyā and Avicenna (in Metaphysics V.1) jointly provide
the example of the human being to explain how the essence humanness can be en-
visaged either ‘with other things’ or solely in itself. The essence in itself, for Yaḥyā, is
the definition “to which no other thing is connected” (min ghayr an yuḍāfa ilayhi
shayʾ ākhar), while for Avicenna it is “unconditioned” quiddity or quiddity “without
the condition of something else” (lā bi-sharṭ shayʾ ākhar), with the same sense in-
tended.²⁵³
This tactic of differentiating between pure essence and essence taken together
‘with something else,’ and, hence, as existing in a composite, is developed in a par-
ticularly cogent way in Yaḥyā’s treatise On Clarifying the Existence of the Common
Things. There Yaḥyā differentiates between essence taken in itself, essence in con-
crete beings, and essence in the mind. The last state, which Yaḥyā describes as “in
that it is conceived or in the soul” (bi-annahu mutaṣawwar aw fī l-nafs) also repre-
sents a condition added to essence or essence taken together with something
else.²⁵⁴ As such, it intersects with Avicenna’s theory that the universal in the mind
is quiddity ‘with something else,’ where ‘something else’ this time refers to the men-
tal concomitants and the condition of ‘being predicated of many.’ Although Yaḥyā’s
treatise builds on a long Greek tradition of differentiating between various classes of
‘common things’ (koina)—some of which are in the mind, others in the concrete
world—his designation of one class of common things as coinciding with the essen-
ces and as being conceivable purely ‘in themselves’ emerge as a salient elaboration
on this heritage.
To recap: Yaḥyā appears to have anticipated some of the logical and ontological
distinctions of essence Avicenna draws in his works. Both thinkers reject a strong

though Avicenna believes that the universal concepts (universal human, universal animal) can be
predicated of the individuals, he also argues that it is ‘humanness in itself’ and ‘animalness in itself’
that are in Zayd, not the universal concepts ‘human’ and ‘animal.’ In Avicennian parlance, the differ-
ence at stake is between the mental universals that are predicated conditionally or ‘on the condition
of something else’ and pure quiddity that is predicated unconditionally or ‘without the condition of
something else.’ I believe the latter aspect can be traced back to Yaḥyā, although Avicenna elaborates
it considerably in light of his logical distinctions and adapts it to his ontology. In fact, Menn himself
acknowledges that Avicenna’s mereological interpretation of essence is akin to Yaḥyā’s (155, note 24),
although he also insists on major differences as well (see notably 157‒158).
 Ibn ʿAdī, On Clarifying the Existence of the Common Things, in Philosophical Treatises, 153.2.
 Ibn ʿAdī, On Clarifying the Existence of the Common Things, in Philosophical Treatises, 151.22‒23.
 4 Avicenna’s predecessors on common things 365

Platonic realist position whereby the pure forms exist separately in the concrete
world, but they maintain that essence exists as a principle in concrete things. They
articulate a similar mereological interpretation of essence that makes it a part of
composite concrete (and complex mental) beings, but which also allows it to retain
a special ontological status in these states. Both thinkers believe that the common
things or universals—in one qualified sense—can be said to exist in the concrete par-
ticulars, and even that essence as such exists in them. In addition to these various
parallels, in chapter IV, it will become clear that Avicenna regards the mode of exis-
tence of quiddity in itself as irreducible, prior, simple, and even ‘divine,’ in a manner
not altogether dissimilar to Yaḥyā.²⁵⁵ And I will argue in chapter V that, as in Yaḥyā’s
metaphysics, the mode of existence of quiddity in concrete beings is also to be con-
nected to a prior state of the pure essences in the separate intellects and in God’s
mind. So there are many important parallels in the way these thinkers conceive of
essence, even though their terminology does not always match perfectly and they
disagree on other issues.²⁵⁶ The link between Yaḥyā and Avicenna is an important
element in the reconstruction of the textual matrix—Aristotelian, Alexandrian, Bah-
shamite, ʿAdīan—that shaped Avicenna’s doctrine of quiddity. I would suggest that
On Clarifying the Existence of the Common Things and On the Four Scientific Questions
should be regarded—along with the Alexandrian and Bahshamite sources highlight-
ed previously—as key sources that informed Avicenna’s theory of quiddity. This ac-
cords with recent research that emphasizes the influence of Ibn ʿAdī on Avicenna.
At any rate, by taking the bulk of Metaphysics V.1 into account, and by compar-
ing it with the logical writings and especially Introduction I.2 and I.12, one may con-
clude that these texts show a remarkable degree of overlap and harmony and appear
to support an integrated, systematically argued, and metaphysically coherent doc-
trine of how quiddity can be said to exist in concrete beings. They put forth the
dual doctrine of the existence of pure quiddity as a part, nature, and reality in con-
crete things and of the inherent epistemic and ontological irreducibility, simplicity,
and unconditionedness of pure quiddity in this context. The existence of pure quid-
dity in concrete individuals is an irreducible principle, with the result that the nature

 On this point, see Benevich, Die ‘göttliche Existenz’; Menn, Avicenna’s Metaphysics, 154‒155. Be-
nevich construes the epithet “divine” in a mereological sense; for Menn, it is merely a concession to
Yaḥyā’s position that should not be taken literally in the case of Avicenna. My interpretation partly
overlaps with that of Benevich: quiddity is divine not only because it remains a simple and irredu-
cible part of the complex existents, but also because it has a divine origin and exists in the supernal
intellects (see chapter V). My interpretation therefore suggests that Avicenna considerably modified
Yaḥyā’s theory.
 Indeed, there are also significant differences between Yaḥyā and Avicenna, which will become
clear later on in chapter IV. Suffice to say here that Avicenna does not explicitly recognize three
“kinds” (aṣnāf) of existence and diverges profoundly from Ibn ʿAdī in the manner in which he ap-
proaches the issue of the senses (maʿānī) and modes (anḥāʾ) of existence as well as the issue of
whether existence is an equivocal notion. In this connection, Avicenna’s theory of ontological mod-
ulation (tashkīk al-wujūd) plays no role in Yaḥyā’s system.
366 III Quiddity in Itself in the Concrete World

and pure quiddity can be abstracted by the mind and considered either with or with-
out the material concomitants that accompany it in the exterior world. One observes
that Avicenna’s epistemological theories rest directly on his ontology. Because it un-
derlies and is constitutive of the concrete existents, quiddity in itself bridges the con-
crete and mental spheres of existents and explains how knowledge of exterior things
is possible. For it to be possible for the mind to perform this abstractive task, there
must be something in the exterior world that corresponds directly to this aspect of
mental quiddity. Or else, the mind would not be able to recognize and identify ob-
jects at all. Hence, the account articulated in Introduction is premised on the idea
that quiddity does exist in concrete things, and that it is this objective and mind-in-
dependent existence of quiddity in concrete beings that enables the operations of the
mind to unfold.
One upshot of the foregoing is that the only thing that is common to both uni-
versal and concrete beings is the irreducible meaning of quiddity in itself, which is
somehow constitutive of the thing or existent taken as a composite whole (taken to-
gether with its concomitants). This crucial feature of Avicenna’s argumentation ap-
pears to have been inspired in part by Yaḥyā’s works. On the one hand, the pure es-
sence defines that existent in its capacity as a quidditative meaning and definition
(ḥadd). Pure quiddity is therefore a definitional constant of mental and extramental
existents. Moreover, it is also an ontological constant, since this maʿnā corresponds to
an intelligible nature and reality that exists in things. This nature eventually becomes
conditioned, specified, and individualized in these existents through the addition of
external ‘things’ and concomitants that specify it as either a mental or concrete ex-
istent, but it remains ontologically the same, or rather ‘it itself remains itself’ (al-
though not numerically one) regardless of the number and types of attributes it com-
bines with. It is on these grounds that both Yaḥyā and Avicenna hold that the
universals and essences exist in the concrete world in a qualified sense, while at
the same time rejecting a full-blown Platonic model of the separate existence of
the forms.

4.3 Avicenna and the Bahshamites on essential similarity and commonness

Avicenna’s concept of a common nature that can be applied to a plurality of existents

in the concrete world may have been informed by some kalām arguments in addition
to the Greek sources. In this regard, the works of the Bahshamite School contain so-
phisticated discussions about the relationship between our perception and appre-
hension (idrāk) of concrete beings and our descriptions (awṣāf) of them, on the
one hand, and the ontological status of the attributes (ṣifāt) and entities or determi-
nant causes (maʿānī) in those beings, on the other. So the Bahshamite thinkers, like
Avicenna, were interested in exploring the interface between predication and mental
representation and their ontological correspondents in the exterior world. In what
follows, I begin by exposing some key features of Bahshamite doctrine and then
 4 Avicenna’s predecessors on common things 367

turn to the question of how they may help us to better understand Avicenna’s theory
of common nature.
One key kalām term that can help to shed light on this topic is maʿnā. ²⁵⁷ In its
basic usage in an epistemological context, the term maʿnā refers to ‘meaning’ or ‘no-
tion’ and therefore bears some connection with the way the philosophers employ it.
But in the context of their ontology the Muʿtazilite theologians endow it with a more
technical sense that refers to an ‘entity,’ ‘ground,’ or, according to Frank, “an entita-
tive accident.”²⁵⁸ It is with this underlying meaning that the term is usually encoun-
tered in the primary sources, where it points to the entitative ground of the attributes
and descriptions. Hence, for most Muʿtazilites (and some Ashʿarites) mutakallimūn,
the notion of maʿnā in an ontological context refers to a real entity or entitative ac-
cident that can be said to exist in an existent thing or in a substance. The maʿānī are
distinguished from the states and attributes, which are predicated of these external
entities, but which, strictly speaking, do not exist in the external world.²⁵⁹ The notion
of maʿnā thus serves to ground the attribute and state in a real entity and provides it
with its rationale and ontological justification. This term encapsulates the Muʿtazilite
position that, even though the attributes and states cannot be said to exist in the con-
crete world, they are grounded in entitative accidents (maʿānī), which themselves
exist and are real entities in beings.²⁶⁰ Consequently, the descriptions (awṣāf) of
these states and attributes are not mere verbal statements with no reference to,
and traction in, reality, but adequately reflect the ontological structure of reality.
This ensures a direct conformity between knowledge and reality and a correspond-
ence between predication and our experience of the exterior world.

4.3.1 Similarity and commonness in Bahshamite ontology

It is with regard to this interface between epistemology and ontology centered on the
notions of the attribute, the state, and the entity or entitative accident, that the Bah-
shamites usually discuss the notions of the similarity (tamāthul), commonness
(mushtarakah, ishtirāk), and difference (ikhtilāf) of substance and accident. These no-
tions reflect the commensurate or analogous nature of the relationship binding our
knowledge (ʿilm) of things to their actual reality in the extramental world. For the
Bahshamites, ‘to be similar to’ (tamāthala), as well as the corollary notion of similar-

 This term was already analyzed in section II.1.3 and at the beginning of chapter III, with relevant
references to its kalām background. Here I dwell on it to explore a potential link between Avicenna
and the Bahshamites by relying on Frank’s interpretation of this term.
 See Frank, Beings, 194; and idem, Maʿnā.
 As Frank, Beings, 194, explains, the term maʿnā in its ontological sense means “the entitative
accident, sc., the basis of the truth of the predication and the ground of the actuality of the attribute
or characteristic.”
 More specifically, according to Bahshamite doctrine, it is the states and attributes that are
grounded and caused (muʿallalah) that refer to real entities (maʿānī) in the concrete world.
368 III Quiddity in Itself in the Concrete World

ity (tamāthul), can be predicated of multiple things on account of the fact that they
share a common set of attributes and characteristics. In other words, ‘to have an at-
tribute or characteristic in common with’ (shāraka, ishtaraka, with the corresponding
nouns mushārakah, ishtirāk),²⁶¹ implies that a certain similarity can be attributed to
these things and becomes apparent to our mind. Both similarity and commonality
are directly linked to, and dependent on, the various essential attributes that are at-
tached to thingness or the Attribute of the Essence. More specifically, these notions
are implied by the Attribute of the Essence and the essential attributes it entails,
since all things that share the same Attribute of the Essence will also necessarily
have the same essential attributes. Thus, atoms have in common not only their
‘being an atom’ and the thingness ‘atomness,’ but also the essential attributes of ‘oc-
cupying space’ (taḥayyuzuhā, kawnuhā mutaḥayyizah) and their being existent (kaw-
nuhā mawjūd).²⁶² As Abū Rashīd explains in his work entitled Issues Concerning the
Disagreement between the Baṣrian and Baghdādī [Muʿtazilites], “we know [ʿarafnā]
that they [the atoms] are common [mushtarakah] in their being atoms [fī kawnihā ja-
wāhir] and common also in their occupying space upon their existence [mushtarakah
fī l-taḥayyuz ʿinda l-wujūd].” And it is on account of the fact that the atoms share or
are common with regard to these ṣifāt that “they must be deemed similar” (wajaba l-
qaḍāʾ bi-annahā mutamāthilah).²⁶³ Elsewhere Abū Rashīd states that “that which ef-
fects [or actualizes, yuʾaththiru] similarity is the Attribute of the Essence or the en-
tailed [attributes] from the Attribute of the Essence [i. e., the essential attributes].”²⁶⁴
And as Mānkdīm Shashdīw notes, things belonging to the same kind must share all
of their essential attributes, not just one.²⁶⁵ That is to say, from the moment that two
things have the same Attribute of the Essence, then they will have all the essential
attributes in common.²⁶⁶
What is more, the atoms and all existents also differ from one another in virtue
of these same attributes and characteristics. The notion of difference (ikhtilāf), as
well as the fact of ‘being qualified or characterized by’ a particular attribute (ikhtaṣ-
ṣa, in passive, ukhtiṣṣa), is the counterpart of similarity in the Bahshamite ontology
and epistemology. For example, atoms occupy different units of space, while some
are receptacles for blackness and others for whiteness. At a more fundamental
level, things are distinguished by having different Attributes of the Essence. It is

 For these terms, see Frank, Beings, 192, 197.

 As Frank, Beings, 65, explains, “similarity and dissimilarity, sameness and difference, are deter-
mined through the Attribute of the Essence or through the essential attributes that flow directly from
it.” See also Alami, L’ontologie modale; 59‒62.
 Abū Rashīd, Issues, 34.13‒16.
 Abū Rashīd, Issues, 36.23; cf. 37.8‒9.
 Mānkdīm Shashdīw, Notes on the Commentary, 110.2‒7.
 This applies to the divine essence as well. Mānkdīm Shashdīw, Notes on the Commentary, 129.3‒
4, explicitly makes the Attribute of the Essence responsible for both the difference and commonality
between God and other things.
 4 Avicenna’s predecessors on common things 369

this attribute that distinguishes and sets apart ‘being an atom’ from ‘being black’ and
‘being black’ from ‘being white.’ The Attribute of the Essence differentiates one kind
(jins) of things from another.²⁶⁷ Thus, the attributes and states account for the onto-
logical differences in beings as well as the corresponding conceptual differences that
are grasped by the human mind as a result of perception. In this connection, the
Bahshamites sometimes refer to ‘the most specifying attributes’ (akhaṣṣ ṣifātihā) of
a thing, which together constitute the jins of a thing, and which amount to the
sum of the attributes and states that characterize a thing and set it apart from
other things.²⁶⁸
The Bahshamites are keen to insist, however, that difference does not arise from
the attribute of existence itself, since the latter is one for all existent things and is
predicated univocally of all beings. Rather, difference arises from the actualization
of the states and characteristics on account of the existence of a thing. Thus, it is
when they exist that atoms can be said to occupy different units of space or be a re-
ceptacle for whiteness or blackness. In sum, then, the set of attributes that is predi-
cated of the essence or thing-itself, and which is the principle of resemblance in
things, is also, by the same token, a principle of distinction or difference. This
dual principle of difference and similarity stems ultimately from the Attribute of
the Essence, first, because the essential attributes derive from it or are entailed by
it, and, second, because the Attribute of the Essence is itself a principle of similarity
and difference by differentiating between the essences of things and conceptually
setting them apart from one another.

4.3.2 Similarity and difference in existence and nonexistence

One important distinction here concerns the manner in which similarity and differ-
ence apply to existent and nonexistent things. The Bahshamites apply these notions
primarily to existent things or essences. The reason for this is that the attributes and
characteristics that derive or are entailed by the Attribute of the Essence become ac-
tualized or real only with the attribute of existence, that is, only when the entities to

 In Bahshamite ontology and epistemology, the term jins is in general more adequately translated
as ‘kind’ than ‘genus.’ In this context it does not refer to the Aristotelian genus, but rather to the fact
that these things are one of a kind and share a similar set of essential attributes. Thus, the atoms are
one jins because they have the four essential attributes in common, namely, being an atom, occupy-
ing space, being existent, and having a specific location.
 Gimaret, La théorie, 67; Benevich, The Classical, which explores what the author calls the
“ʿumūm wa-khuṣūṣ argument.” As Frank, Beings, 78, notes, the akhaṣṣ sifātihā necessarily involve
the actualization of the essential attributes, and so they refer to existent things. These attributes
taken together form the jins of an existent thing, the ‘kind of thing’ it is, which encapsulates the no-
tions of similarity and differences, since it characterizes kinds of things in contrast to other kinds of
things, e. g., atoms in contrast to instances of blackness. As was explained in chapter II, the Attribute
of the Essence extends the principles of similarity and difference to the realm of nonexistent things
(sing. shayʾ maʿdūm) inasmuch as we can consider them in the mind.
370 III Quiddity in Itself in the Concrete World

which they refer can be said to possess realized existence. It is in virtue of the con-
dition (sharṭ) of existence, for instance, that an atom can be said to actually occupy a
unit of space or to receive blackness. All the attributes—with the exception of the At-
tribute of the Essence—necessitate the attribute of existence in order to be actual or
be actualized (thābitah, muʾaththarah), with the consequence that similarity and dif-
ference are to a large extent conditioned upon existence. It is ‘on the condition of
existence,’ therefore, that attributes and characteristics are actualized in a being,
leading also to the actualization of its similarity and difference vis-à-vis other beings.
In that sense, our perception of similarity follows that of the essential attributes and
especially the attribute of existence.
With that being said, the Attribute of the Essence represents an exception, since
it is not grounded in, or conditioned by, existence. It is intelligible in abstraction
from the realized existence of a thing and can be predicated of nonexistent things.
In fact, the Attribute of the Essence is a sufficient factor to establish both the simi-
larity of things that share it and the fundamental difference between them and
other things, such as atomness from blackness or blackness from whiteness. The up-
shot is that even ‘nonexistent things’ can be said to be similar in that they share the
same Attribute of the Essence, or different in that they do not. This is what distin-
guishes one nonexistent thing from another. By the same token, this means that
the difference between two things can be specified beyond the Attribute of the Es-
sence only in the case of their existence (wujūd). If they are not existent, they will
be differentiated only at the level of their Attribute of the Essence.
In this connection, however, it is interesting to note that some disagreement
seems to have arisen within the Baṣrian Muʿtazilites as to whether a nonexistent
atom (jawhar) can be legitimately described as an atom, or merely as a nonexistent
thing (shayʾ maʿdūm). Abū Rashīd reports that some masters believed that the atom
is an atom even in the state of its nonexistence, whereas others contended that the
maʿdūm is not a substance (an atom), but merely a thing (shayʾ).²⁶⁹ This point not-
withstanding, what is important here is that at least some Bahshamites believed
that the Attribute of the Essence represents a principle of difference and similarity
even when things do not presently exist. It is what enables us, for example, to com-
pare this presently existing unit of blackness to that no longer existent unit of black-
ness. To return to the example of the atom, atomness remains intelligible and con-
ceivable even when predicated of a nonexistent thing. Fundamentally, then, and
on a minimalist reading of the Bahshamite sources, various things can be said to
be similar or common on account of the fact that they share the same Attribute of
the Essence, which is constant and irreducible and remains intelligible regardless
of ontological considerations attached to the thing. The following passage taken
from Abū Rashīd’s work vividly illustrates this point:

 Abū Rashīd, Issues, 37.10‒38.3.

 4 Avicenna’s predecessors on common things 371

The atom is [intrinsically] distinguished from what is not an atom in its ‘being an atom’ [bi-kaw-
nihi jawharan] and its occupying space. We know that the atoms once they exist [lit., upon their
existence, ʿinda l-wujūd] are common [mushtarakah] in their occupying space [i. e., they share
this similar essential attribute]. And if they do not exist, then they are common [mushtarakah]
in their being an atom, even though they are not common in their occupying space.²⁷⁰

Essential commonness and similarity are therefore notions that remain meaningful
and intelligible even in the case of nonexistent things, since they derive from the At-
tribute of the Essence and from its entailed attributes. Atomness (jawhariyyah) or
‘being an atom’ (kawnuhu jawharan) is an epistemic and intelligible constant that
forms the basis for our cognition of the commonness and similarity between existent
and nonexistent things or atoms.

4.3.3 Avicenna and the Bahshamite connection

Some features of Avicenna’s conception of common nature are highly likely to have
been shaped as a result of his exposure to Bahshamite doctrines. I wish to outline
three points in particular that seem to indicate such a connection. The first one is
Avicenna’s frequent description of quiddity in concrete beings as a maʿnā. Although
this term has a well-established range of meanings and usages in the Arabic philo-
sophical tradition, where it is usually translated as ‘idea,’ ‘meaning,’ ‘intention,’ or
‘intelligible,’ the manner in which Avicenna uses it to express the reality of quiddity
and nature in concrete beings may very well carry some Bahshamite connotations.
For Avicenna holds not only that we can have a mental conception of the quidditative
maʿnā of a thing, but that this maʿnā is a real principle of the concrete existent and
that it somehow exists in the concrete being (see Text 11).²⁷¹ This term therefore
seems to carry certain entitative and ontological implications that transcend the do-
main of logic and conceptualization. In the context of Avicenna’s philosophy, it also
serves to justify the ontological and epistemological link between the natures of ex-
terior beings and our apprehension of these natures through abstraction and intellec-
tion, and, ultimately, between the concrete and mental existence of quiddity. Hence,
even though the term maʿnā has a fundamentally different meaning in their systems,
since it refers to an entitative accident for the Bahshamites and to quiddity or nature
for Avicenna, in both cases it possesses a dual cognitive and ontological function,
which, moreover, serves to cement the veracity of the human cognition of the exterior
world by granting it some degree of entitative grounding and traction in reality. Just
as maʿnā is an entitative ground for some of the Bahshamite attributes and states, so

 Abū Rashīd, Issues, 34.17‒19.

 As Hardy, Avicenna on Knowledge of the Self, 37, notes, maʿnā is an intention or concept that lies
between the thing and the thing thought.
372 III Quiddity in Itself in the Concrete World

in Avicenna’s metaphysics, it refers to the foundation, ground, or reality (ḥaqīqah) of

the essence of a concrete being.²⁷²
Secondly, Avicenna, even though he does not develop a full-blown theory of sim-
ilarity and difference on the Bahshamite model, regards nature in concrete beings as
a principle of commonness. Quiddity in concrete beings is a common nature (ṭabīʿah
mushtarakah). According to Avicenna, beings that share the same nature or species,
for example, the nature ‘humanness’ in Zayd and ʿAmr, have an essential common-
ness that is real and even existent in them, even though it does not amount to a uni-
versal form that is numerically one or single. This latter proviso, however, does not
prevent nature from being something real or even existent in those beings and,
hence, from amounting to something more than a mere definitional commonality.
At Metaphysics VII.1, Avicenna explains that what is the same or identical in species
can be described as similar (mā kāna huwa huwa fī l-nawʿ qīla mumāthil).²⁷³ Notice in
this regard that he relies on the same root m-th-l as the Bahshamites to express the
idea of similarity ‘in kind’ or species. Even though Avicenna is referring to the logical
universal species in the mind, it corresponds ontologically to the nature or quiddity
in the concrete individuals.
In brief, Avicenna shares with his Bahshamite counterparts the notions of essen-
tial commonness and similarity, as well as terms derived from the roots sh-r-k and m-
th-l to express them. What is particularly striking is that these theories are equally
based on the idea of a commonness that derives from the essence and that, conse-
quently, has little to do with the notion of existence: commonness is entailed by
the Attribute of the Essence in the Bahshamite sources, and by pure quiddity or na-
ture in Avicenna’s case. Interestingly, the Attribute of the Essence and pure quiddity
are also, by the same token, a principle of difference, since they are what distin-
guishes one thing(‐ness) from another thing(‐ness). And just as further differences,
specifications, and particularizations are entailed by the actualization of the essen-
tial attributes and characteristics in Bahshamite ontology, so they are entailed, in
Avicenna’s system, by the concomitants and accidents of quiddity. For Avicenna,
then, quiddity in concrete beings is an irreducible principle of commonness and dif-
ference, and it fulfills a role that is in many ways similar to that of the Attribute of the
Essence in Abū Hāshim’s ontology.

 Before Avicenna, Ibn ʿAdī uses maʿnā in his discussion of essence to describe its various as-
pects; see Adamson, Knowledge of Universals. Ṭūsī, Commentary on Pointers, vols. 3‒4, 625.21‒22, fol-
lows Avicenna in using maʿnā to refer to the nature that is common to a species (ṭabīʿah ʿāmmah), by
which he means the nature that exists in those individuals. There are many instances in the Avicen-
nian corpus where the term maʿnā seems more appropriately translated as ‘entity,’ rather than ‘mean-
ing,’ and, relevantly for our purposes, as ‘quidditative entity,’ rather than ‘quidditative meaning.’
Such a slippage from the purely semantic plane to the entitative or ontological plane, wich appears
so typical of Avicenna, can be partly explained in light of the influence of Avicenna’s predecessors,
whether Ibn ʿAdī or the Muʿtazilites, who all ascribe a certain entitative grounding to this term.
 Avicenna, Metaphysics, VII.1, 304.4.
 4 Avicenna’s predecessors on common things 373

Combining the two points above leads to an interesting realization and to anoth-
er potential link between the Bahshamite and Avicennian positions. For the Persian
philosopher, common nature does not exist as an actual universal in concrete things
or as a single transcendent form that would be shared by individual instantiations.
Nevertheless, it is real and may even be said to exist in each being according to a
certain mode proper to it, which is not conflatable with the realized existence of
the complex entity. To my mind, it is probable that the Bahshamite notion of subsis-
tence (thubūt) used to describe the attributes may have influenced Avicenna’s under-
standing of the reality of common nature in concrete beings. After all, it is these real,
actual, and subsistent (but not existent) attributes and states that constitute the Bah-
shamite principle of commonness and similarity. These states are located midway be-
tween existence and nonexistence and thus possess their own ontological status.
Avicenna’s ambiguity concerning the exact ontological status of the common nature
in concrete beings may have something to do with this kalām background and his
acquaintance with the Bahshamite theories of the ḥāl and maʿānī. Common nature
does not exist as an actual universal form in concrete beings, but it is nevertheless
a principle of commonness and may even be said to be potentially universal. More-
over, it possesses its own ontological status as something irreducible and constant,
which is different from the existence of the complex being in which it inheres. The
Bahshamite states and the Avicennian common nature therefore both possess a spe-
cial ontological status that is not identical with or reducible to the existence of the
thing-itself in reality. This suggests a possible rehandling of Bahshamite theories
and their adaptation to Avicenna’s ontological system. But since the latter does
not accommodate the theory of the states and maintains the law of the excluded mid-
dle, he had to angle for solutions based on a theory of ontological modulation and a
reinterpretation of the notion of wujūd. ²⁷⁴
Finally, the cognition of the notions of commonness and difference that are im-
plied by the Attribute of the Essence and Avicenna’s theory of common nature ap-
pears to be irreducible and constant. In both cases, commonness and difference
arise from the abstract consideration of the essence in the mind—either the Attribute
of the Essence, or the essential nature—even when the actual beings to which they
may potentially correspond do not exist in the concrete world. So the common nature
and the Attribute of the Essence at the same time inform us about what is common to
all atoms, black things, or human beings that exist or may potentially exist, in addi-
tion to what is unique about their thingness in abstraction from these concrete be-
ings. This would seem to make commonness and difference necessary mental con-
comitants of the Attribute of the Essence and pure quiddity, which nonetheless
find a correspondence in concrete beings. When the essence of atomness or horse-

 This connection is explored in much more detail in chapter IV. My point here can be boiled
down to the observation that essential commonness, for Avicenna, has, like the Bahshamite states,
an elusive entitative status in concrete beings, for although it is real and is even existent (in a way the
states are not), it is not so in the way that a complex being or accident is existent.
374 III Quiddity in Itself in the Concrete World

ness is reflected upon and grasped by intellectual apprehension, it informs us about

what is unique about it and proper to it, as well as what is common in the various
beings of which it can be predicated.²⁷⁵ What is more, the Bahshamites and Avicenna
believe that further degrees of specification or particularization beyond the funda-
mental essential differences evoked by the Attribute of the Essence and common na-
ture require the perception of accidents and attributes that do not pertain directly to
the essence of the thing, such as blackness in the atom or musicality in Socrates.
These things, which are manifested to the senses, do not enter into the Attribute
of the Essence and pure quiddity, but are additional to them and can be conceptually
separated in the mind.²⁷⁶

4.4 Recapitulation

Avicenna’s approach to the problem of universality and the ontological status of the
universals in the concrete world is complex and nuanced. It was shaped by, and in
some regards perpetuates, the ancient philosophical and kalām developments that
had reached him. His insistence that the universals are properly speaking mental
or intellectual objects, combined with his recognition of a special and modulated
sense of universality that applies to the natures and essences of concrete particulars,
can both be traced to the late-antique trends that informed his works.²⁷⁷ Building on
this legacy, Avicenna puts forth some innovative ideas, which have to do notably

 Avicenna, Metaphysics, VII.1, 303.3‒4, 13, describes ‘the similar’ (al-mumāthil) as a concomitant
or appendage (lāḥiq) of unity and as something that specifies unity. But oneness is itself a concom-
itant of pure quiddity for Avicenna. So if similarity is twice removed from quiddity, then how can it be
said to qualify it? As in the case of identity, or the self-identical (al-huwa huwa), there are two distinct
notions at play here: there are the identity and similarity that pertain to, and are predicated of, the
complete substance (as when we say that Socrates and Plato are similar in being philosophers); and
there is the identity and similarity that is predicated of quiddity in itself. Thus, horseness is just
horseness and identical to itself, although one may also say that two horses are similar in having
this horseness in itself in common. But the latter statement excludes all the concomitants and acci-
dents that follow horseness.
 It is fascinating to observe that Shahrastānī, intuiting the fundamental parallels between the
Bahshamite and Avicennian doctrines, proceeds to synthesize them and also to adjudicate between
them in his work. For example, Shahrastānī attempts to merge the two discourses—the Bahshamite
and Avicennian—in his analysis of the notions of resemblance (tamāthul) and difference (ikhtilāf), as
well as of essence and the states. More specifically, he adopts Avicenna’s framework and distinctions
regarding essence and the universals in order to interpret the theory of the states, stressing the ger-
mane outlook between the mental considerations (iʿtibārāt) Avicenna speaks of and the attributes
and descriptions of the Muʿtazilites; see Shahrastānī, The Ultimate Steps, 147‒148.
 On the other hand, Avicenna’s general insistence on restricting the universals proper—and, ac-
cordingly, the term ‘universal’ or kullī—to the sphere of human intellectuality contrasts with what be-
came a standard practice in the postclassical Arabic tradition of referring to the natural universals
(sing. al-kullī l-ṭabīʿī).
 5 The issue of the real distinction of essence and existence 375

with the scope he attributes to these universal mental entities as existents in the
mind, the redefinition of the boundary between pure essence and universality
(both in the mind and in the concrete), as well as the general reorientation of the
ancient discussion of common things toward the core notion of pure quiddity. The
latter feature can be attributed in part to the influence of the mutakallimūn. In this
manner, Avicenna creatively reshaped much of this material and bequeathed an orig-
inal philosophical synthesis to the later Islamic philosophical and theological tradi-
tions.²⁷⁸

5 The issue of the real distinction of essence and existence

One issue in Avicennian studies that has received continuous attention on the part of
scholars up to the present day is the applicability of Avicenna’s distinction of essence
and existence to the concrete world. Does this distinction refer to a real state of af-
fairs in the world and a metaphysical reality in concrete beings? Or is it a purely men-
tal or logical distinction that should be confined to conceptual thought? While virtu-
ally all scholars agree on the conceptual nature and scope of Avicenna’s distinction,
there is some disagreement regarding the corollary question of ‘the real distinc-
tion.’²⁷⁹ Without pretending to settle this long-standing issue in any decisive way, I
wish in what follows to underline two points that emerge from the previous analysis
and that can feed into the ongoing debate regarding this aspect of Avicenna’s
thought. I shall also return to it at a later stage in chapter IV with additional insight.

 Thus, Bahmanyār, The Book of Validated Knowledge, 500, follows his master Avicenna in devot-
ing one sense of the universal to the essence that exists in concrete beings, which is unconditioned
essence.
 The purely conceptual nature of this distinction has been assiduously defended by Rahman, Es-
sence and Existence in Avicenna, and idem, Essence and Existence in Ibn Sīnā; Morewedge, The Met-
aphysica, and idem, Philosophical Analysis; and Izutsu, The Fundamental Structure, 63‒64 (although
at 86 Izutsu acknowledges that Avicenna is ambiguous when it comes to the issue of whether the es-
sence/existence distinction is mental or extramental). More recently, it has been endorsed by Wisnov-
sky, Avicenna; idem, Essence and Existence. Wisnovsky makes Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī largely respon-
sible for the interpretation of Avicenna’s metaphysics according to which essence and existence
amount to a real distinction, where existence is ‘superadded to’ (zāʾid ʿalā) quiddity in the concrete
world. Through Rāzī’s works, this interpretation could have been diffused to later Islamic intellectual
history. In contrast, there is a long scholarly tradition stemming from the philosophical circles of me-
dieval Europe that ascribes a real distinction to Avicenna, and which extends to the studies of the
neo-Thomists; see notably Goichon, La distinction. But the ‘real’ or ‘metaphysical distinction’ has
sometimes been given serious consideration by specialists of Arabic philosophy, such as Bertolacci,
The Distinction; Lizzini, Wuǧūd-Mawǧūd; eadem, Ibn Sīnā’s Metaphysics; Belo, Essence; and Adam-
son, Existence. It should be said that this issue is particularly intricate, because it intersects with
many other aspects of Avicenna’s philosophy, such as causality, the modalities, hylomorphism,
and individuation, to name only a few notions.
376 III Quiddity in Itself in the Concrete World

The various results attained thus far in the present study do not seem to harmo-
nize well when it comes to the topic of ‘the real distinction.’ One point that has
emerged clearly from the analysis conducted in chapter II is the primarily intellectual
and intelligible nature of pure quiddity. Avicenna discusses pure quiddity primarily
in a logical and epistemological context that has to do with our conception and cog-
nition of essence. Moreover, his comments are also directly linked to, and in fact rely
on, the notion of mental existence, because objects of thought in Avicenna’s philos-
ophy typically coincide with mental existents. The relationship between conceivabil-
ity and existence in the mind is therefore a topic to which Avicenna contributed sig-
nificantly in his works. In this connection, the preliminary hypothesis that was
sketched in chapter II, and which will be further strengthened in chapters IV and
V, is that if any special ontological mode is to be ascribed to pure quiddity, it is
an intelligible and intellectual one that is to be located chiefly in the human and di-
vine minds. These considerations accord with the general tenor of Metaphysics I.5,
where Avicenna distinguishes between the primary notions of existence and essence,
or rather ‘the existent’ and ‘the thing,’ in what is primarily a discussion about the
foundations of human conception. If one follows this line of reasoning, there are
no obvious and convincing reasons why Avicenna would want to extend this prob-
lematic to the exterior world and why he would not be satisfied with positing merely
a conceptual or mental distinction between essence and realized existence. If this in-
terpretation is retained, then the distinction between essence and existence, between
‘the thing’ and ‘the existent,’ would be fundamentally the product of a mental con-
sideration. It is the mind-dependent nature of these notions and the intentional dif-
ference between them that would prevail—with no actual extensional and ontologi-
cal difference obtaining between them in concrete beings. Indeed, this is exactly how
many post-Avicennian thinkers understood the distinction. They argued that the dif-
ference between essence and existence is merely conceptual (iʿtibārī).
With that being said, the evidence collected thus far in chapter III compels us to
reconsider this picture somewhat and to articulate a more nuanced account of Avi-
cenna’s position. His statements regarding quiddity in the concrete world raise a
new set of difficult questions. Avicenna expounds the view that the common natures
exist in concrete beings, and he seems to angle towards a moderate form of meta-
physical realism. According to this approach, there is a sense in which quiddity,
qua nature and form, and even, in a highly qualified way, qua universal, can be
said to exist in each concrete instantiation. One—but by no means the only—repre-
sentative statement to that effect appears in Text 11 (from Salvation), where Avicenna
posits a distinction between wujūd and shayʾiyyah specifically in the concrete world
or in concrete beings (fī l-aʿyān). In a similar vein, in some passages of Metaphysics
V.1, he states quite plainly that there is a sense in which pure quiddity exists irredu-
cibly in concrete beings and should be distinguished from the attributes and acci-
dents that together constitute the sunolon. These statements seem to unequivocally
point to a real distinction. Or, at the very least, they pose a serious challenge to
the thesis of the identity of essence and existence in concrete beings. In this regard,
 5 The issue of the real distinction of essence and existence 377

the analysis of nature conducted above squarely places Avicenna in the camp of the
moderate realists. Avicenna, however, is not a realist in the way this term is tradition-
ally used in medieval Latin philosophy. He is not a realist about ‘universals,’ strictly
speaking, because he locates actual universals in the human mind and does not pos-
tulate the existence of a single, actual, universal form responsible for actualizing the
nature of multiple concrete beings in which they would participate. Rather, Avicenna
is a realist in a more qualified sense, because he upholds the immanent and irredu-
cible existence of the pure quiddities and common natures in individual beings. He
does not believe that ‘universal human’ exists in the concrete world. But he does be-
lieve that ‘human in itself’ or ‘the pure nature humanness’ somehow exists in each
individual human being. By extension, he does not regard universality as a mode of
existence in the concrete world—rather, according to him, universality is an attribute
that exists only in the mind. But he does regard the pure quiddities as enjoying a
mode of existence of their own in the extramental composite entities, and a rather
special one at that, since it is qualified neither by numerical determination nor by
the realized existence that is an attribute of essence and that can be predicated of
the composite and contingent being as a whole. So although it would be plainly
wrong to assert that the essences exist separately in the concrete world on the
model of Plato’s forms, it would be equally fallacious to claim, according to Avicen-
na, that the existence of pure quiddity in the concrete horse is identical to the exis-
tence of the concrete horse taken as a complex entity or sunolon. It is by navigating a
middle course between these two pitfalls that Avicenna developed his doctrine of es-
sence in the concrete world. It may not be outlandish in this regard to compare Avi-
cenna’s theory of the essential nature to the Bahshamite theory of the state, which
has a certain reality, even though it cannot straightforwardly be said to exist on
the conventional meaning of that term. For Avicenna as well, quiddity in the concrete
world is a reality (ḥaqīqah), whose ontological status is to be distinguished from the
realized existence of the composite substance or sunolon. This makes Avicenna’s
brand of metaphysical realism somewhat unique or idiosyncratic.
This last point notwithstanding, some of the results compiled here go against the
grain of much recent scholarship on Avicenna (starting with Rahman), which depicts
his doctrine of quiddity as being exclusively located on the conceptual or logical
planes. The ideas that Avicenna defended a realist position and argued that quiddity
somehow exists in concrete beings as a distinct principle have not been popular
among scholars and are typically regarded as interpretive residues bequeathed by
the scholastic approach, which regards existence as a real accident of essence.
Many Avicennian scholars nowadays regard the essence/existence distinction as a
purely conceptual and logical one effected by the mind and without any ontological
grounding in the concrete world. Moreover, they typically regard existence as being
foundational and primary in Avicenna’s metaphysics, reminding us that Avicenna
himself defines the subject matter of metaphysics as the investigation of being qua
being. Interestingly, however, this interpretive approach to Avicenna’s works may it-
self have been informed to some extent by one of the intellectual strands that devel-
378 III Quiddity in Itself in the Concrete World

oped out of the master’s legacy during the postclassical period, and which is usually
referred to as the ‘foundationality of existence’ (aṣālat al-wujūd) tradition. This com-
mentatorial trend and philosophical current, which are considered to have reached
their apogee in the works of Mullā Ṣadrā, regard quiddity as a mental construct
and the essence/existence distinction as a mere mental consideration. This approach
prioritizes existence over essence and regards wujūd as the foundational ontic prin-
ciple of reality, relegating essence to a purely mental object. In spite of this, and as I
tried to show above, the evidence regarding the real or conceptual distinction of es-
sence and existence in Avicenna remains fundamentally ambiguous.
At this juncture, two additional considerations can be adduced. The first—for
what it is worth, given that the evidence it relies on postdates the Avicennian cor-
pus—concerns the reception of Avicenna’s moderate metaphysical realism in the
later period, both in Islam and the Latin West. It is a historical fact that many illus-
trious interpreters of Avicenna construed his metaphysics through the lens of his
theory of nature and quiddity and also ascribed to him a real distinction between es-
sence and existence. Among their ranks, one finds Muslim luminaries such as Aver-
roes, Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, and, in a more nuanced way, Ṭūsī, as well as, in the Latin
West, Scholastics such as Albert the Great, Aquinas, and Henry of Ghent. Although it
is not always clear in the Islamic context that Avicenna—as opposed to Avicennian
thinkers who flourished in the centuries following the master—is the main subject
of these reports,²⁸⁰ important evidence that can be gleaned from the works of later
authors points to a trend to interpret Avicenna’s theory of the universals, as well
as his distinction between essence and existence, in a realist manner.²⁸¹
The second consideration is significant, because it throws light on a potential
reason why Avicenna may have deemed it worthwhile to defend the real existence
of quiddity and nature. The key in this regard rests on the connection between a
real essence/existence distinction and the notion of the compositeness and contin-
gency of concrete beings. Recall that for Avicenna, the theory of the internal com-
plexity or compositeness of all caused existents is a crucial feature of his metaphy-
sics, one of whose functions is to prop the distinction between the Necessary of
Existence and all other beings. On the one hand, there is God who, qua necessary
of existence, is perfectly one, simple, and indivisible (in the mind and in reality),
and whose quiddity is identical with His existence. On the other hand, there are

 For an interesting case study, see Wisnovsky, Essence and Existence, which focuses inter alia on
Suhrawardī’s criticism of what appears to be the later reception of Avicenna’s doctrines.
 This observation does not in itself prove anything, of course, especially given that the reception
of Avicenna’s ideas always entailed adaptation and transformation. Nonetheless, the question of why
many prominent philosophers who commented on Avicenna ascribed a real distinction—or at the
very least, a doctrine of the real existence of nature or essence—in concrete beings remains a valid
one. It also raises the interesting methodological question of how much weight should be placed
on the postclassical interpretations of Avicenna when examining the works of the master.
 5 The issue of the real distinction of essence and existence 379

all the contingent and caused entities, in which existence and quiddity are distinct
and, hence, amount to a duality of ontological principles. As Adamson notes:

If contingent things are indeed composed of essence and existence, then they are, by virtue of
this very fact, sharply distinguished from God, whose essence is simply His existence. Insisting
on the real distinction thus allows us to give a rigorous account of God’s simplicity, as He is the
one existent for whom the distinction fails to apply.²⁸²

Hence, this fundamental distinction can be explicated in light of Avicennian theories

of causality: the composite existent is possible of existence in itself (i. e., its quiddity
is only possible or contingent), but necessary of existence with regard to its cause
(i. e., its quiddity is necessarily caused to exist by its cause), which makes it depend-
ent on an exterior agent for its actual existence. As Avicenna succinctly puts it, “Ev-
erything that has a quiddity other than existence is caused.”²⁸³ There is therefore a
direct interconnection for Avicenna between the notions of causation, composite-
ness, and the essence/existence distinction. As Wisnovsky has lucidly shown, Avi-
cenna relied on different matrices of distinctions at different periods of his life to
argue for the composite and contingent status of caused beings, eventually making
the modalities of ‘the possible’ and ‘the necessary’ the cornerstone of his mature
theory.²⁸⁴ This developmentalist account notwithstanding, what remains constant
throughout Avicenna’s engagement with this issue is the correlation he establishes
between compositeness and causedness: whatever is composite (murakkab) or en-
dowed with internal multiplicity (kathrah) must be caused. In this context, Avicenna
frequently resorts to the duality of essence and existence as a rationale to explain the
compositeness of extramental beings, a duality which he sometimes identifies with
possibility and necessity respectively. This doctrine, and especially the implication
that what has a distinct essence and existence must be caused, represents a key argu-
ment of his metaphysics. Conversely, according to this metaphysical rule, every con-
tingent and caused existent amounts to a duality, either because it can be divided in
its essence and existence or because it has a possible or contingent quiddity and re-
ceives necessary existence from an external cause.²⁸⁵

 Adamson, Existence. Adamson intends these remarks chiefly with regard to the post-Avicennian
tradition, where some thinkers explicitly articulated ideas that are found only in nuce in Avicenna’s
works.
 See the crucial section in Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Cure, VIII.4, 346.13 ff.
 Wisnovsky, Avicenna’s Metaphysics, especially chapters 8‒9 and 11‒14.
 The phrasing Avicenna employs in such passages and his correlation of existence and essence
with necessity and possibility respectively are problematic, inasmuch as, strictly speaking, for Avi-
cenna, it is the quiddity that is both contingent in itself and necessary through another. In other
words, the modalities apply to quiddity, not to existence itself. Existence is just existence, and it is
quiddity that determines whether existence is necessary or only possible. Hence, God’s quiddity ne-
cessitates existence, whereas all other quiddities are intrinsically possible, but necessary with regard
to their cause. Furthermore, there is the added difficulty that, strictly speaking, the modalities are
380 III Quiddity in Itself in the Concrete World

These points are illustrated by many passages in the Avicennian corpus that sup-
port a real distinction on the grounds of this theory of causal contingency. Witness,
for example, the following excerpts gleaned from various works by the master:

Therefore what [is caused to] exist from the First [Cause] [i. e., the First Effect] from the outset
exists as [something that is] one in essence, but because it is necessitated by a certain relation
[iḍāfah], there must be some multiplicity after its existence is constituted.²⁸⁶

Its [the First Effect’s] multiplicity does not derive from the First, for its possibility of existence is
something belonging to its very essence, and which is not due to the causality of the First. But it
receives from the First the necessity of its existence.²⁸⁷

Insofar as it [the First Effect] is caused, nothing prevents it from being constituted of a multiplic-
ity of things [min mukhtalifāt]. How could this be otherwise, when its quiddity is possible and its
existence is necessary due to something else?²⁸⁸

A similar statement can be found in Notes:

The First [has] a simple essence completely devoid of multiplicity. But the efficient act that is
entailed by [the First] [i. e., the First Effect] [wa-l-fiʿl al-faʿʿāl al-lāzim ʿanhū] contains multiplicity
from the outset, because it is a quiddity whose existence is given to it by the First.²⁸⁹

One of the clearest formulations of this theory appears in Avicenna’s commentary on

Theology of Aristotle, wherein he explains that multiplicity cannot regress infinitely
in caused beings, lest there result an endless multiplication of ontological principles.
Rather, quiddity and existence are two irreducible principles in caused beings:

The first [kind of] duality [ithnayniyyah] in what is created [al-mubdaʿ]—whichever created thing
that may be—is that possibility [al-imkān] belongs to it by virtue of itself and existence [or ne-
cessity]²⁹⁰ belongs to it by virtue of the First Truth [al-ḥaqq al-awwal] … . This process cannot go
on infinitely, and we must therefore posit two fundamental entities [waḥdatayn ṣirfatayn]. The
very least is to affirm that one is the quiddity [māhiyyah] and the other the existence deriving
from the First.²⁹¹

These passages, which are gleaned from various works by the master that span his
entire philosophical career, aptly show the correlation between complexity or com-

considerations added to the pure quiddities. They are concomitants of essences, but are not constit-
utive of them. Ultimately, then, the modalities qualify existence as it pertains or relates to any given
essence, and, as such, they represent one aspect of Avicenna’s theory of ontological modulation
(tashkīk al-wujūd); see section IV.1.2. In the final analysis, the modalities shed little light on the on-
tological status of quiddity taken in itself.
 Avicenna, Philosophy for ʿArūḍī, 161.5‒7.
 Avicenna, Provenance, 79.7‒8.
 Avicenna, Pointers, vol. 3‒4, 652.2‒653.1.
 Avicenna, Notes, 208.10‒11.
 One can read either wujūd or wujūb, with a roughly similar argument.
 Avicenna, Commentary on Theology of Aristotle, 60.18‒61.7.
 5 The issue of the real distinction of essence and existence 381

positeness—in this case the duality of essence and existence—and causedness. The
first passages focus on the complexity of the First Effect and therefore pertain chiefly
to a cosmological context. They are intended as a real, descriptive account of exter-
nal existents, of the way things really are, and not as a purely abstract metaphysical
analysis of being in general or being qua being. Rather, Avicenna’s comments seem
to underscore a real ontological complexity and compositeness in the First Effect—
and by extension in the other intellectual beings and all caused entities. This is
the case particularly with the text from Avicenna’s commentary on Theology of Aris-
totle, which attributes a “duality” (ithnayniyyah) and “two fundamental or irreducible
entities” (waḥdatayn ṣirfatayn) not only to the First Effect, but to all caused or creat-
ed beings (sing., mubdaʿ), “whichever created thing that may be.” And since the mas-
ter pinpoints the duality of essence and existence as a source of multiplicity in those
beings and as a rationale for their causality and contingency, it is quite clear that he
intends this distinction as a real one extending to the extramental world. By further
implication, the duality between the ontological principles of essence and existence
can be applied to all contingent beings and serves to account for their compositeness
and causedness. We may infer, therefore, that (a) the essence/existence distinction,
(b) ontological compositeness (or complexity), and (c) ontological causedness all
go hand in hand in Avicenna’s metaphysics. This in turn sheds some light on why
Avicenna would be committed to making quiddity a real ontological principle of
the world and why he would want to claim that it possesses a kind of existence in
concrete beings.
Nevertheless, although they may amount to a philosophical rationale, the previ-
ous remarks say little about the actual relationship between essence and existence in
concrete beings. Beyond the simple recognition that essence and existence can be
designated as real metaphysical principles, the ontological status of both in reality
and their connection with causality remain somewhat obscure. For example, main-
taining a real distinction between essence and existence does not clarify whether
one enjoys priority over the other, nor does it answer the difficult query of exactly
how essence comes to exist in the concrete individual.²⁹² Furthermore, in making
these remarks, my aim is not to minimize the importance of being or wujūd in Avi-
cenna’s metaphysics. It is, admittedly, moot to negate the crucial place Avicenna as-
signs to it in the metaphysical inquiry. Rather, the previous analysis suggests that his
theory of quiddity represents a valuable and highly sophisticated counterpart to his
theory of existence, and that it occupies an equally significant place in his account of

 These are separate issues that call for a detailed inquiry, and they will be addressed in chapter
IV in connection with the ontological mode of pure quiddity. Defining the relationship between es-
sence and existence in the concrete world now presents itself as the main issue that remains to be
tackled, once a moderate form of metaphysical realism has been recognized. The challenge that
lies ahead, therefore, is not, as some medieval and modern scholars have striven to do, to interpret
Avicenna’s metaphysics exclusively in light of one of these principles, i. e., either essence or exis-
tence, but to elucidate their ‘relationship,’ and this, both in the concrete world and in the mind.
382 III Quiddity in Itself in the Concrete World

external reality and its underlying principles. It would appear, or so I have argued,
that existence and quiddity are jointly to be regarded as metaphysical principles
that inform Avicenna’s account of concrete existence (wujūd fī l-aʿyān).
I wish at this juncture to stress two caveats linked to the previous hypothesis. The
first is that Avicenna’s strand of moderate realism should not be interpreted as im-
plying the prior and fully separate and autonomous existence of quiddity in the con-
crete world. As is well known, the master rejects the theory of the Platonic forms, so
my analytical approach will focus rather on the relationship of essence and existence
within the realized substance. It is this state of inherence qualifying the relationship
of these principles that calls for heightened attention. What this boils down to is that,
if it is blatantly false to claim that quiddity already exists before acquiring existence
from its cause, it seems also highly incorrect to claim that, on Avicenna’s account,
the existence of pure quiddity in the realized substance is identical with the exis-
tence of the substance taken as a whole. It is this difference in formulation, as
well as the relation between essence and substance it implies, that remain to be elu-
cidated.
The second point pertains to the notion of accidentality that has often been as-
sociated with the essence/existence distinction. Indeed, the assumption of a real dis-
tinction between essence and existence directly raises the issue of the accidentality
of existence vis-à-vis essence, because Avicenna quite explicitly describes existence
as an external attribute of quiddity and something distinct from it. It is this issue,
more than any other perhaps, which has plagued modern discussions about the
real distinction, with scholars on one side regarding existence as a full-blown acci-
dent of quiddity, and others rejecting this view and maintaining the purely concep-
tual nature of the essence/existence distinction. It should be stressed, however, that
(a) the issue of the real distinction, or better, of the real relationship, between es-
sence and existence, and (b) of the accidentality of existence, are distinct, if inter-
connected, topics in Avicenna’s philosophy.
One way to make progress with regard to the latter issue is to highlight the differ-
ence between an accident proper and something whose relation to another thing is
merely accidental in the sense of being external and non-constitutive. It is quite clear
that Avicenna does not regard existence as an accident (ʿaraḍ) of essence according
to the standard or most straightforward acceptation of this notion. In other words,
existence is definitely not an accident in the sense in which ‘musical’ can be an ac-
cident of Socrates or ‘black’ an accident of ‘this cat.’ Rather, in technical Avicennian
language, wujūd is a concomitant (lāzim, lāḥiq) of quiddity. Now, for Avicenna, the
definition of something lāzim or lāḥiq is that it is external (khārij) to quiddity and,
hence, not constitutive (ghayr muqawwim) of it. The concomitants are not internal
and essential constituents of quiddity, and in that sense they not participate in
the definition of what a thing is. Accordingly, existence, qua concomitant, does
not enter the definition of a thing, and it is possible to conceive of essence in com-
plete abstraction from any consideration of existence. This in turn legitimates the
Avicennian position, against Aristotle and later also Averroes, that the knowledge
 5 The issue of the real distinction of essence and existence 383

of the quiddity of a thing conceptually and logically precedes the knowledge of its
existence.
Nevertheless, the very state of being external to, and non-constitutive of, quiddi-
ty represents a qualified state of accidentality on Avicenna’s reckoning. This is the-
oretically justified by the ambiguous or modulated nature of what it is to be an ac-
cident. Accordingly, in Definitions, the master deploys various senses of the term
‘accident’ or ʿaraḍ, the third of which states that an accident is “any meaning or en-
tity [maʿnā] that exists externally of a thing’s nature.”²⁹³ This definition applies to
what it is to be a lāzim or lāḥiq and therefore includes the external attributes such
as existence or oneness. On this interpretation, wujūd, as something external (khārij)
to the nature of a thing, would be an accident in a qualified sense. Further evidence
corroborating this view can be found in Philosophical Compendium, where the master
glosses ‘realized existence’ as an accidental meaning or notion (maʿnā ʿaraḍī).²⁹⁴
That Avicenna in fact regards one sense of accidentality as applying to the state of
being an external concomitant (lāzim) is also corroborated by a passage of Metaphy-
sics, where the two terms are juxtaposed and used quasi-synonymously: “essence be-
longs to it [the existent] in itself [fa-dhātuhu lahu bi-dhātihi], whereas its being with
another is [merely] an accidental occurrence or a certain concomitant of its nature
[amr ʿāriḍ lahu aw lāzim mā li-ṭabīʿatihi].”²⁹⁵ There it is apparent that the composite
existence that occurs to the pure quiddity of a concrete thing—“its being with anoth-
er”—is both a state of accidentality and a state of concomitance, the two notions
jointly emphasizing the externality of existence vis-à-vis pure quiddity.²⁹⁶ A similar
idea is articulated in Avicenna’s later works. In a passage of Notes, existence is ex-
plicitly described as an accident: “all the quiddities receive their existence externally,
and existence is an accident in them” (al-māhiyyāt kulluhā wujūduhā min khārij wa-l-
wujūd ʿaraḍ fīhā).²⁹⁷ In Discussions, in a wording that seems indebted to the mutakal-
limūn, the master describes existence as “one of the attributes of a thing” (al-wujūd
min ṣifāt al-shayʾ).²⁹⁸ Elsewhere in the same work he states that “existence is an ac-
cident in things that have quiddities from which existence follows [al-wujūd ʿaraḍ fī l-
ashyāʾ allatī lahā māhiyyāt yalḥaquhā l-wujūd].”²⁹⁹
This textual evidence can help to explain why, on Avicenna’s ontological model,
the attributes or concomitants can be said to be ‘added to’ (zāʾid ʿalā) the essence, a

 Avicenna, Definitions, 25.

 See section IV.2.2.2.
 Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Cure, V.1, 201.4‒11.
 Bahmanyār, The Book of Validated Knowledge, 11.9‒12, has no qualms regarding existence as
something “accidental” (ʿaraḍī).
 Avicenna, Notes, 561, section 983. It should be noted that the term māhiyyāt here is used gener-
ically and in a non-technical sense and could easily have been replaced by other terms, such as
mawjūdāt or ashyāʾ.
 Avicenna, Discussions, 131, section 350.
 Avicenna, Discussions, 272, section 789.
384 III Quiddity in Itself in the Concrete World

claim the master makes explicitly on behalf of ‘the one,’ ‘the general,’ ‘the specific,’
and ‘the universal.’³⁰⁰ It is true that, as Wisnovsky noted, the master usually refrains
from applying this formula to existence in his core works.³⁰¹ But since existence, like
these other notions, is an external concomitant of essence, it would seem to follow
that it as well can be conceived of as added to essence, all the more so given the nar-
row relationship between oneness (waḥdah) and existence (wujūd) Avicenna occa-
sionally highlights in his works. So it comes as no surprise that a passage of Notes
describes existence as being “external” and “added to” (zāʾid ʿalayhā) the quiddities
of the categories,³⁰² while in another passage the master asserts that existence (al-an-
niyyah) “supervenes” or is “added to” (ṭāriʾ ʿalayhi) the thing that has a quiddity.³⁰³
These comments connect with the claim made in the same work that existence is an
accident (ʿaraḍ) of the quiddities, as was shown above.³⁰⁴ Nevertheless, the view that
existence is somehow external, accidental, and added to essence should not by any
means be taken to imply that it is added to fully autonomous and pre-existing essen-
ces in the concrete world, or that these essences somehow subsist independently
prior to existing in actuality, a view Ṭūsī accuses Rāzī of upholding.³⁰⁵ Rather, it sug-
gests that, within the composite being or substance, and according to a mereological
analytical framework, pure quiddity exists irreducibly and immanently, while the ex-
istence that together with it forms the sunolon remains extraneous to it and distin-
guishable from it. Just as the human rational soul does not pre-exist and precede
the existence of the body and of the complete human being, and yet constitutes a
distinct ontological principle within it and has, in a sense, its own mode of immate-
rial existence, so the being of pure quiddity is distinct from that of the complex en-
tity, where the concomitants, attributes, and accidents can be thought of as external
‘additions’ to quiddity, making it quiddity “with other things” (bi-sharṭ shayʾ
ākhar).³⁰⁶ This fundamental irreducibility and distinctness between essence and ex-
istence seem ultimately tied to Avicenna’s causal theories and metaphysics of contin-
gent beings. As Belo put it, “it is with the introduction of the concept of causality, at

 See Avicenna, Introduction, I.12, 65.18‒19; 66.7‒11; Metaphysics of The Cure, V.1, 204.12; Salvation,
536.11‒12.
 Wisnovsky, On the Emergence, 275.
 Avicenna, Notes, 565.4, section 992; this passage is mentioned by Wisnovsky, On the Emergence,
275, note 31, who still describes Rāzī as the “inventor” of this formula. I think it is in part Avicennian
and that Rāzī departs from Avicenna chiefly in applying it to God as well, something which would
have been unimaginable for the master.
 Avicenna, Notes, 977, p. 557.7.
 Avicenna, Notes, 561, section 983; cf. 571‒2, section 996.
 Ṭūsī, Commentary on Pointers, vols. 3‒4, 462‒463. Ṭūsī criticizes Rāzī for holding that the essen-
ces have subsistence or a reality (thubūt) prior to actually existing.
 Bahmanyār, who was one of Avicenna’s immediate disciples, endorses the view that existence is
something external that is added to essence. In The Book of Validated Knowledge, 11.16‒18, he argues
that existence is “added” (muḍāf ilā) and “exterior” (khārij) to the true nature (ḥaqīqah) of quiddity.
 5 The issue of the real distinction of essence and existence 385

a metaphysical level, that existence comes to be seen as an accident, in a metaphys-

ical rather than a logical sense as something that befalls the essence or thing.”³⁰⁷
Granted, the foregoing does not decisively prove that existence is a distinct prin-
ciple added to quiddity in the concrete world, and one could insist that Avicenna’s
remarks regarding the accidental status of existence vis-à-vis essence should be con-
strued chiefly on a conceptual plane.³⁰⁸ Nevertheless, it is important to point out that
there is nothing in Avicenna’s philosophy that bluntly precludes such an interpreta-
tion, and some evidence even appears to support it. Moreover, some of the master’s
later commentators and critics did in fact proffer such a realist account of his doc-
trine. Averroes, for example, states that Avicenna regarded existence “as something
added to quiddity outside the soul” (shayʾ zāʾid ʿalā l-māhiyyah khārij al-nafs).³⁰⁹
What is more, and remaining within the confines of Avicenna’s system, we saw
that there is one sense of accidentality that can be justifiably applied to wujūd. Final-
ly, even when it comes to the contentious formulation of existence being ‘added to’
the essence, Avicenna seems to provide conflicting information in his works. In ad-
dition to the evidence from Notes mentioned above, witness the following statement
from Physics I.2:

Form is distinct from privation in that the form is, in itself, a certain quiddity [al-ṣūrah māhiyyah
mā bi-nafsihā] that adds existence to the existence that matter possesses [zāʾidat al-wujūd ʿalā l-
wujūd alladhī li-l-hayūlā], whereas privation does not add to the existence that belongs to mat-
ter.³¹⁰

This statement and the larger passage from which it is drawn would deserve a careful
analysis, which cannot be provided here. Nevertheless, and for our immediate pur-
poses, it attests to the fact that Avicenna at times intends his distinction to apply
to an extramental ontological context.
To sum up, the issues of the accidentality of existence and of the real distinction
are intricate and call for a highly nuanced appreciation and interpretation of Avicen-
na’s various statements on the matter. Avicenna’s position regarding these points has

 Belo, Essence, 413.

 Wisnovsky, Essence and Existence, argues that Avicenna makes these comments in the context
of his logical and conceptual analysis of essence and existence and does not extend them to the con-
crete world. He makes Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī responsible for spreading the view that existence is ‘added
to’ and distinct from essence in concrete beings, and he also contends that Suhrawardī in his onto-
logical critique of this position is responding to Rāzī and his followers rather than to the shaykh al-
raʾīs himself. Whatever the case may be, Rāzī did not consider his own position to be incompatible
with Avicenna on this issue (unlike in other instances). What is more, Wisnovsky, On the Emergence,
275, himself recognizes that later Muslim authors did not ascribe this view to Rāzī. I would argue that
the seeds of his doctrines can be found already in the Avicennian texts, although they were consid-
erably amplified and developed by this commentator in one particular direction.
 Averroes, Incoherence, 302.14‒15.
 Avicenna, Physics, I.2, 21.5‒6.
386 III Quiddity in Itself in the Concrete World

too often been oversimplified, in spite of the fact that the relevant evidence that can
be gleaned from his various works is highly ambiguous. For the time being, one im-
portant conclusion is that one may posit the duality of essence and existence as met-
aphysical principles in concrete beings without naively embracing the view that ex-
istence is an accident (ʿaraḍ) of essence on the straightforward or standard construal
of this notion. This interpretation, which finds its origin in the polemical writings that
Ghazālī and Averroes penned against Avicenna (and perhaps even more in the mod-
ern interpretations of these writings), finds little traction in the Avicennian works
themselves.³¹¹ It is much more accurate to say that Avicenna regards existence as
a concomitant and attribute of quiddity, which expresses a state of qualified acciden-
tality, in the sense that existence qua concomitant is external to, and non-constitutive
of, the essence of a thing. This implies that in concrete beings essence is always and
necessarily accompanied by existence, that essence and existence are always found
together in the concrete substance. This interpretation is not only fully aligned with
Avicenna’s refutation of the Platonic forms, but also hints at the co-extensionality of
‘the thing’ and ‘the existent’ in his system. Yet, this view can also be reconciled with
the claim—in line with other conclusions reached in this study—that essence and ex-
istence remain irreducible principles in the concrete being and cannot be fully col-
lapsed in the realized substance.³¹² If anything, then, the previous remarks prompt
us to question and potentially also to reconfigure the prevailing interpretive model
that dismisses or downplays Avicenna’s views concerning the extramental reality
and existence of pure quiddity, the (qualified) accidentality of existence, and the nar-
row philosophical links between causation, compositeness, and the essence/exis-
tence distinction. Given these remarks, Avicenna’s conception of how existence re-
lates to essence should be contextualized not only in light of the legacy of Greek
metaphysics in Islam, but also in light of the ontological models of the mutakallimūn,
especially those stemming from the Bahshamite School. In describing existence as
an external attribute of essence and one that is added to essence by virtue of a sep-
arate cause, Avicenna’s position displays close parallels with these thinkers’ theory
of the attribute of existence (ṣifat al-wujūd). According to the Bahshamites, the attrib-
ute of existence is distinct from the Attribute of the Essence (ṣifat al-dhāt), and it is
also added to it from the outside by means of an agent (fāʿil). Moreover, like Avicen-

 For this medieval interpretation of Avicenna and its transmission to the Latin West, see Berto-
lacci, The Reception of Avicenna, 255‒259.
 Hence, Averroes’s qualms with Avicenna’s metaphysics and his accusation that Avicenna failed
to perceive that existence is fully identical with essence in the concrete being. But we can see that
Averroes’s sustained critique of Avicenna’s ontology is not completely without ground, although I
would argue that it is somewhat oversimplified for polemical purposes. For instance, Averroes
says nothing or very little about Avicenna’s views on quiddity in itself, ontological modulation (tash-
kīk al-wujūd), and nuanced understanding of accidendality. As befits a polemical treatise, there is lit-
tle effort to engage with the subtleties of Avicenna’s position. On the critical reception of Avicenna’s
theories by Averroes, see Menn, Fārābī; and Cerami, A Map.
 5 The issue of the real distinction of essence and existence 387

na, the Bahshamite attribute of existence is derived from the essence, but imposes a
condition (sharṭ) on the essence.³¹³
At any rate, it is not my pretension in this study to adjudicate between the var-
ious interpretations concerning the real vs. conceptual distinction in Avicenna.
Rather, the previous comments emerged as a by-product of my analysis of quiddity,
and my conclusions on the subject were reached via another route. Because the tex-
tual and philosophical evidence supports the reading that Avicenna maintained a re-
alist and mereological theory of quiddity in concrete beings, one can by the same
token infer that he also supported to some extent a real distinction between essence
and existence, and that he may also have insisted on the qualified accidentality of
existence vis-à-vis essence on account of its being something external to it and
non-constitutive of it. These theories are to some extent intertwined and mutually de-
pendent on one another. A posteriori, of course, this conclusion appears to fit square-
ly with other aspects of Avicenna’s metaphysics and cosmology, such as his views on
causality and substantial complexity, notions which interrelate deeply, and which
would be harder to explain convincingly if one relied on a purely conceptualist or
nominalist framework. As we saw, Avicenna himself at times explicitly identifies
the real or metaphysical compositeness or complexity inhering in caused beings in
terms of a duality of essence and existence. This distinction rests on the corollary
postulation that quiddities somehow truly exist in concrete beings as a distinct prin-
ciple. Finally, it should be noted that some of the major philosophers and commen-
tators who flourished after Avicenna perceived the argumentative potential of the
real distinction for their ontology and especially for their theology. In fact, the meta-
physical projects of thinkers like Suhrawardī, Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, and Naṣīr al-Dīn
al-Ṭūsī acquire additional relief if interpreted against the backdrop of a realist read-
ing of Avicenna’s theory of quiddity, or, at the very least, if one allows for the pos-
sibility of such an interpretation of the Avicennian texts.³¹⁴ Overall, then, the various
pieces of the puzzle that consist of pure quiddity, the real distinction, the universals,
as well as the notions of ontological causedness and complexity, all fit together in-
tricately in Avicenna’s metaphysical system and appear to be doctrinally intercon-
nected. It is these conceptual matrices and interpretive ramifications that enabled

 For a more complete treatment of this issue and a detailed comparison of the Avicennian and
Bahshamite positions, see section IV.5.
 The case of Ṭūsī is particularly nuanced and interesting, and one finds in his works many of the
ambiguities and tensions that underscore Avicenna’s system. It is true that Ṭūsī at times seems to un-
equivocally defend a purely conceptualist interpretation of the essence/existence distinction, as in
Commentary on Pointers, vols. 3‒4, 462‒463. But we saw also that Ṭūsī refers to the natural universals;
that he insists on recognizing the existence of the pure nature and quiddity as a nature in concrete
beings; and that, against Rāzī, he fully embraces the distinction between the absolute oneness, sim-
plicity, and essential being of the First and the compositeness and causedness of the contingent be-
ings, and this, on the very basis of the essence/existence distinction. Exactly how these various doc-
trinal components co-exist in the systems of later thinkers such as Ṭūsī calls for more research.
388 III Quiddity in Itself in the Concrete World

later commentators to articulate such rich and variegated accounts of the master’s
philosophical system.

6 Quiddity in itself and psychological abstraction (tajrīd)

The foregoing discussion has raised an intriguing possibility. Avicenna’s theory of

the existence of pure quiddity in the concrete world seems to lay the ground for
the corollary theory of its abstractability by the mind. Because quiddity in itself ex-
ists in things as a nature (ṭabīʿah) and quidditative meaning (maʿnā), and because
this same nature and quidditative meaning also underlie the universal in the
mind, abstraction represents the link that connects these two aspects of essence.
This hypothesis is reinforced by the fact that pure quiddity in concrete beings is de-
scribed as ‘unconditioned’ (lā bi-sharṭ shayʾ ākhar), meaning that it can be consid-
ered either ‘with’ or ‘without’ conditions attaching to it. This implies that it is not ir-
retrievably bound to its material accidents and itself remains distinct within the
material composite. But how should we understand the transition of essence from
the exterior to the mental context? The difficulty involved here is partly terminolog-
ical—what does Avicenna mean exactly when he describes quiddity as abstract (mu-
jarrad) or suggests that it is the object of abstraction (tajrīd)?—and partly conceptual
—what would be the ontological relation between the abstracted quiddity and the
universal in the mind?
I already discussed the status of quiddity as something separate (mufāriq) in the
context of Avicenna’s refutation of the Platonic Forms. Closely related to the notion of
quiddity’s separateness is its abstraction or immateriality (mujarrad, tajrīd). In this
regard, the terms mufāriq and mujarrad are related in Avicenna’s philosophy, insofar
as they both refer to an object’s being free of matter. However, unlike the term mu-
fāriq, which usually designates extramental, immaterial beings such as the separate
intellects or the Platonic forms, the various terms derived from the root j-r-d also
serve to describe mental objects in Avicenna’s philosophy. In that sense, a separate
intellect and an intelligible object in the human mind can equally be described as
mujarrad, as immaterial or abstracted from matter. In the case of the intelligibles
and, hence, of our mental conception of quiddity, it drives home the point that
these objects are characterized by immateriality and a kind of abstraction from the
corporeal trappings of the concrete world.³¹⁵
One thorny issue in this regard pertains to Avicenna’s views on the abstractness
of quiddity in itself. It should be noted to begin with that the master applies the term

 The distinction between these two terms is conveyed in the Arabic rendition of Porphyry’s Eisa-
goge (Īsāghūjī, 67.10‒11) in the crucial passage where the Greek author discusses the ontological is-
sues related to the universals. He asks whether genus and species are “abstract conceptions in the
mind” (mujarrad taṣawwurāt fī-l-adhhān) and whether, if they exist in concrete reality, they are “sep-
arate” (mufāriqah). This corresponds exactly to how Avicenna applies these terms to quiddity.
 6 Quiddity in itself and psychological abstraction (tajrīd) 389

mujarrad to pure quiddity in order to stress not only its abstraction from matter, but
also, and more specifically, its abstraction from the mental concomitants and acci-
dents, and, hence, its abstraction from other immaterial things. What is more, the
term mujarrad can be taken to refer ambiguously to the process of abstraction in ad-
dition to the resulting object acquired by virtue of that process. In other words, it can
refer either to the state of the mental object when apprehended by the intellect (i. e.,
an abstract, immaterial concept) or to the finality of the process (in its relation to taj-
rīd) through which a concept or quiddity becomes abstracted from matter and sub-
sequently actualized in the mind to form an intellectual concept. While all scholars
agree on the first aspect, i. e., on the abstract and immaterial nature of the intellec-
tual concepts, there is at present a heated debate concerning the role of abstraction
as a cognitive process in Avicenna’s epistemology and whether mental objects are ab-
stracted in addition to being abstract.³¹⁶ Some scholars, such as Étienne Gilson, Fa-
zlur Rahman, H.A. Davidson and Deborah Black, have minimized or altogether de-
nied the role of abstraction as a process involved in the formation of intellectual
concepts, claiming that human intellection arises solely as a result of the emanation
of forms from the Agent Intellect. Other scholars, in contrast, such as Dimitri Gutas,
Dag Nikolaus Hasse, Jon McGinnis, and Tommaso Alpina have claimed that abstrac-
tion is the main process by which Avicenna explains the formation of intelligibles in
the mind, although most of them also ascribe a role to the Agent Intellect in this cog-
nitive process.³¹⁷ In what follows, I engage with this debate only insofar as it con-

 For example, according to Black, Mental Existence, 16: “Rather, Avicenna uses the term abstrac-
tion (tajrīd) to describe, not the process by which intelligibles are acquired, but rather, the mode of
the quiddity’s mental existence in cognitive faculties.”
 The main point of contention revolves around whether it is abstraction as a rational operation of
the human mind or the causation or emanation of the Agent Intellect—or perhaps both—that is re-
sponsible for the actualization of the universal intelligibles in the intellect. The key studies are Da-
vidson, Alfarabi; Nuseibeh, Al-ʿAql al-Qudsī, especially 46‒47; Black, Mental Existence; eadem,
How do we Acquire; Gutas, Avicenna; idem, Intuition; idem, The Empiricism; Hasse, Avicenna on Ab-
straction; idem, Avicenna’s Epistemological Optimism; McGinnis, Making Abstraction; idem, Logic
and Science; Sebti, L’analogie; Alpina, Intellectual Knowledge; see also the discussion in de Libera,
La querelle, 243 ff. Very useful summaries of this debate are provided by Alpina, Intellectual Knowl-
edge, 135‒142, and Taylor, Avicenna, who also offer some fresh insight into the relation between ab-
straction and emanation. In brief, Gilson, Davidson, Nuseibeh, and Black reject abstraction as a proc-
ess leading to the actualization of the universal forms in the mind and emphasize the role of the
Agent Intellect in the human cognition of universals. According to them, the Agent Intellect transmits
the content of universal intellection to the human mind. Gutas, Hasse, McGinnis, and Alpina, for their
part, make abstraction the core feature of Avicenna’s epistemology. A key issue that has occupied
recent scholarship is the nature of the role the Agent Intellect is supposed to fulfill, if one grants
it any agency: either it emanates the intelligibles as such to the human mind; or it merely facilitates
the human abstractive process by bringing the rational mind from potentiality to actuality, from ob-
scurity to light; or, as McGinnis contends, it emanates merely the mental accidents. According to
Gutas, Hasse, and Alpina, the Agent Intellect is a condition of human intellection due to its role
in the actualization of intelligibles. The present analysis focuses specifically on the place of quiddity
390 III Quiddity in Itself in the Concrete World

nects with the issue of abstraction and the nature of quiddity in the extramental
world and in the mind. Of particular relevance are the following questions: first, ex-
actly what is the object of abstraction according to Avicenna? Can that object be
identified with quiddity in itself and, if so, on what grounds? Second, what is the
epistemological link between essence in the concrete world and essence as a concept
in the mind, and how can the theory of pure quiddity help to answer that question?
On my reading of the evidence, Gutas, Hasse, McGinnis, and Alpina are undoubt-
edly right to uphold the validity of abstraction in Avicenna’s epistemology.³¹⁸ Here is
not the place to reiterate their arguments or to rehash the evidence they and others
have adduced. Suffice to say that Avicenna stresses on numerous occasions the ac-
tive, causal role that the internal and intellectual faculties play in the process of ab-
stracting concrete objects and of divesting exterior forms and quiddities from their
material accidents in order to prepare them for contemplative thought.³¹⁹ Moreover,
in spite of what Black contends, the quiddities and forms in the mind are not only
grasped in their abstract (mujarrad) state, but also the end result of a process of ab-
straction (tajrīd). In this connection, Avicenna sometimes describes in some detail
the psychological continuum leading from the sensory perception of physical objects
to the actualization of abstracted forms in the mind without any reference to the
Agent Intellect.³²⁰ Hence, one cannot dispense entirely with a theory of abstraction
and the role of human rationality to explain the actualization of the universals in
the mind. At the same time, it is true that, given its repeated mention in Avicenna’s
writings, the parallel involvement of the Agent Intellect in human cognition also has
to be accounted for. The importance of these two features in Avicenna’s epistemology

in itself in the process of abstraction and seeks to answer the question what is abstracted by the fac-
ulties of the human soul. I return to the issue of the Agent Intellect’s causality in chapter V.
 For a summary of their views and a fresh interpretation of the place of abstraction in Avicenna,
see Taylor, Avicenna. Taylor agrees with the primacy of abstraction as a cognitive process, and in ad-
dition contributes new insight into the role of the Agent Intellect in light of Themistius’s paraphrase
of On the Soul.
 See Avicenna, Demonstration III.5; On the Soul of The Cure II.2; On the Soul of Salvation, 344‒349.
 For example, Avicenna, On the Soul of The Cure II.2, and especially the crucial passage at 61.10‒
14. In Introduction, I.12, 69.7‒9, Avicenna states the following: “Sometimes the intelligible form [al-
ṣūrah al-maʿqūlah] is in some manner a cause [sababan] for the occurrence of the form that exists
in external reality [al-ṣūrah al-mawjūdah fī l-aʿyān]; sometimes the form in external reality is in
some manner a cause of the intelligible form, that is, [the latter] occurs in the mind after it has existed
in external reality.” The fact that the hylomorphic form is described as a cause (sabab) of the intelli-
gible form in the mind leaves little doubt that the acquisition of the latter in some cases occurs
through abstraction. In this regard, one shortcoming of Black’s interpretation is that it ignores
many passages that stress quite explicitly the active role of the mind’s abstractive powers. Her
claim that we should construe terms derived from the root j-r-d as meaning exclusively a state of im-
materiality or abstraction, as opposed to a process of abstraction, does not on my view do justice to
many passages that support the latter interpretation, as well as to the grammatical and semantic dis-
tinctions between the terms mujarrad and tajrīd. The latter term points to a mental activity or process
that results in the acquisition of the abstract intelligibles.
 6 Quiddity in itself and psychological abstraction (tajrīd) 391

explains a recent trend in the scholarship aiming to reconcile them, rather than opt-
ing for one to the exclusion of the other.³²¹
This debate notwithstanding, the questions of what object, or more precisely
what aspect of essence, undergoes abstraction from matter, as well as how that ob-
ject relates to the universal form in the mind, have not received a detailed formula-
tion in the secondary literature.³²² Although it is evidently the forms (ṣuwar) and
quiddities (māhiyyāt) that are abstracted, knowing exactly which aspect of quiddity
is the object of this process is more arduous. In this regard, the place of quiddity in
itself in Avicenna’s discussion of abstraction has not been examined in sufficient
depth in the modern scholarship. This is problematic, because Avicenna appears
to hold the view that it is quiddity in itself that is abstracted and, hence, the object
of the process of tajrīd. This would mean not only that pure quiddity is an immaterial
concept (mujarrad), but also that it can be abstracted from the concrete instantia-
tions existing in the world. Hence, quiddity in itself would be not only abstract,
but also abstracted and abstractable. By implication, this would indicate that it is
conceptually abstractable and separable from the concrete particulars in which it in-
heres. Accordingly, I contended in chapter II that universal quiddity and quiddity in
itself are both distinctly conceivable in the mind. The existing thing—concrete or
mental—is a combination of pure quiddity together with its accidents and concom-
itants, but the mind can conceptually disentangle pure quiddity from these accre-
tions through a process of abstraction in order to arrive at a pristine conception or
consideration of what quiddity in itself really is.
Nevertheless, while it is relatively straightforward to imagine how the mind can
demarcate pure quiddity from universal quiddity—according to Avicenna, the mind
can combine and separate concepts and intentions at will, and hence can separate
quiddity in itself from universality, existence, and its other concomitants³²³—it is
more challenging to grasp how this abstractive process unfolds in the case of the
quiddities of concrete existents. Yet, Avicenna seems to argue for a direct abstractive
operation of the mind, which begins with the sensory perception of quiddity com-
bined with its material accidents, and which culminates in the intellectual apprehen-
sion of quiddity in itself. Consider, for instance, the following passages. At Metaphy-
sics V.1.151.13 and 155.14‒16 Avicenna refers to our ability to “abstract” quiddity in
itself (fa-inna qad jarradnāhā and wa-ammā l-ḥayawān mujarrad)³²⁴; and at

 McGinnis, Logic and Science; idem, Making Abstraction; Hasse, Avicenna’s Epistemological Op-
timism.
 One exception is McGinnis, Logic and Science, who addresses these questions specifically, and
whose conclusions I rely on.
 For the mind’s ability to combine and separate different concepts and to unify and multiply no-
tions, see Avicenna, On the Soul of The Cure, V.5, 236.5 ff.; for its ability to combine and separate quid-
dity and universality as distinct ideas or meanings specifically, see Metaphysics, V.1.
 Admittedly, the second occurrence conveys the ambiguity between abstraction as a process and
a state as highlighted above. However, since it appears shortly after a mention of the verb ‘to ab-
392 III Quiddity in Itself in the Concrete World

156.18‒19 he refers specifically to pure quiddity as “the form of animal abstracted in

the manner of abstraction which we have mentioned” (ṣūrat al-ḥayawān al-mujarrad
ʿalā naḥw alladhī dhakarnāhu min al-tajrīd) and he expressly contrasts that form to
that of the universal. But perhaps a clearer statement to that effect appears later in
Metaphysics V.1, when Avicenna describes the rational soul’s ability to extract the
quidditative meaning from any concrete instances:

Text 22: Whichever of these [concrete] instances you take whose representation is brought to the
imagination [al-khayāl] in any state, the intellect then extracts its pure quidditative meaning
from accidents and this form becomes as such actualized in the mind [thumma intazaʿa l-ʿaql
mujarrad maʿnāhu ʿan al-ʿawāriḍ ḥaṣala fī l-ʿaql hādhihi l-ṣūrah bi-ʿaynihā]. This form [ṣūrah]
is what is realized as a result of abstracting animalness [ʿan tajrīd al-ḥayawāniyyah] from any
individual image [khayāl shakhṣī], taken either from an exterior existent or from something
that takes the role of an exterior existent—and even if it [the individual image] itself does not
exist externally, but [is something] the imagination invents.³²⁵

This excerpt follows a statement—already analyzed above in connection with Text 3—

that explicitly distinguishes the form of quiddity in itself from the form of universal
quiddity in the human mind. The crucial point with regard to this passage is that the
form and nature that are abstracted from the concrete particulars are identified with
quiddity in itself, which represents the aim or end result of the abstractive process.³²⁶
In this passage, pure quiddity is referred to as “an abstracted quidditative meaning”
(mujarrad maʿnāhu) and as “the abstracting of animalness” (tajrīd al-ḥayawāniyyah).
This abstracted form and quiddity are not the mental universal per se, but quiddity in
itself in its pure state, which has been divested of all the material attachments with
which it exists in the concrete world. As such, it has not yet combined with the men-
tal concomitants (universality, oneness, etc.) that will later render it a universal in the
mind.³²⁷

stract,’ Avicenna is presumably referring here to the resulting form that is abstracted from concrete
particulars.
 Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Cure, V.1, 205.9‒13, translation by Marmura in Avicenna, The Met-
aphysics, 156, revised; cf. Notes, 31.12‒13, section 10, where one reads that “the acquisition of knowl-
edge for human beings is by way of the senses; their acquisition of the universals is by way of their
sensation of the particulars” (wa-idrākuhu li-l-kulliyyāt min jihah iḥsāsihi bi-l-juzʾiyyāt).
 In contrast to the previous passage, where Avicenna distinguishes the form of the universal from
the form of pure quiddity in the mind, there is some ambiguity here whether he is referring to the
universal animal or animal in itself. But this issue is secondary, since the main point here is that
it is pure quiddity qua meaning that is abstracted and extracted from concrete existents, and
which subsequently becomes a universal in the mind.
 Another interesting text in this connection is Avicenna’s Commentary on Theology of Aristotle,
40. In this section the master explains that the forms in material things are “imitations of the univer-
sal forms” (muḥākiyyah li-l-ṣuwar al-kulliyyah), which can be fully abstracted by the intellect accord-
ing “to an intellectual mode of abstraction” (al-tajrīd al-ʿaqlī) and “extracted by the rational soul” (al-
nafs al-nāṭiqah tanziʿuhā). The intellect peels away (yaqshiru) the various layers of material attach-
ments and concomitants (lawāḥiq) to arrive at the essential reality (ḥaqīqah) of the thing. This text
 6 Quiddity in itself and psychological abstraction (tajrīd) 393

But is Avicenna really saying that it is quiddity in itself, rather than the universal
as such, which is extracted from concrete beings and first comes to exist in the intel-
lect as a result of this process of abstraction? This view would go against some deep-
ly entrenched interpretations of Avicenna’s epistemology, which make the universal
concepts the main objects of abstraction. Moreover, as we saw earlier, many scholars
point to the Agent Intellect—not the process of abstraction—as the main cause for the
existence of the universal intelligibles in the human mind. Even those scholars, like
Hasse, who emphasize the importance of abstraction in Avicenna’s epistemology, do
not explicitly identify the intelligibles that come to exist as a result of abstraction
with the pure quiddities. Rather, they speak of them as universals, with the implica-
tion that only the universal concepts would play a role in human cognition. The
premise underlying this view is that mental existence for Avicenna is necessarily uni-
versal, so that whatever form is extracted from the concrete individuals and appre-
hended by the mind must be universal in nature. In spite of this, some scholars
have envisaged the possibility that it is essence in itself that is the object of abstrac-
tion, even though they have not developed this view at any length.³²⁸ By building on
their insight, I wish to pursue this line of investigation in order to shed some light on
the nature of the intelligibles that are produced in the mind as a result of abstraction.
The interpretation I advocated thus far leads to the inevitable conclusion that it
is sensu stricto pure quiddity—not the universal—that is the object of psychological
abstraction. This view seems supported by a cluster of points. As I argued in chapter
II, Avicenna believes that pure quiddity exists irreducibly and distinctly in the mind
and in a mode that is different from that of the universal taken as a complex existent.
Moreover, the terminology Avicenna uses when speaking of abstraction puts the em-
phasis on pure quiddity, not the universal taken as this derivative and synthetic con-
cept. This abstractionist terminology spans Avicenna’s psychological, physical, and
metaphysical writings, thereby showing that it does not rest solely on the (admittedly
limited) evidence that can be gleaned from Metaphysics. Before turning to some addi-
tional evidence on this point, we should recall that Avicenna describes quiddity in
the exterior world, or, more precisely, the state of pure quiddity as it exists in each
concrete individuals, by means of a rich and often confusing terminology. When re-
ferring to quiddity in concrete beings, Avicenna often speaks of nature (ṭabīʿah) and
true reality (ḥaqīqah), and he also often describes it as a quidditative meaning
(maʿnā) and a form (ṣūrah). Now, these terms all have a fundamental ambiguity:
they can refer to quiddity as it exists irreducibly in the material concrete existents,
but they can also refer to the same quiddity as an object divested from its material

not only supports the validity of the abstractive process in Avicenna, but also seems to identify pure
quiddity specifically as that which is abstracted, since it describes these forms as neither truly par-
ticular nor universal, and also mentions the object of abstraction as a ḥaqīqah.
 See de Libera, La querelle, 243 ff.; Sebti, Le statut; McGinnis, Logic and Science; and Alpina, In-
tellectual Knowledge, 164‒165.
394 III Quiddity in Itself in the Concrete World

accidents and apprehended by the mind. Hence, the terms maʿnā and ṭabīʿah in par-
ticular bridge the extramental and mental contexts.
This clarification is crucial to the problem at hand, because it suggests that the
quiddity that exists in individual concrete existents and the quiddity that is appre-
hended by the mind are the same thing, namely, pure quiddity. Pure quiddity can
be abstracted from its material accidents and conceived in the mind solely in itself.
In light of this, the terms ṭabīʿah, ḥaqīqah, maʿnā, and ṣūrah have a dual function:
they refer to quiddity in itself existing as a nature, a true reality, and a form in con-
crete things, as well as an object of abstraction that exists in the mind. This explains
why Avicenna resorts to the same cluster of words to identify it and describes it as lā
bi-sharṭ shayʾ: it can be considered with its material concomitants and accidents, or
in abstraction from them. It is therefore fundamentally unconditioned, literally,
taken not with the condition that other things be added to it. Even when it exists
in concrete things, it remains in an irreducible and intelligible state that makes it po-
tentially abstractable and separable by the mind.
Thus, I would contend that when Avicenna describes the object of abstraction in
the exterior world by means of these various terms (nature, form, reality, and quid-
ditative meaning), what he is referring to is really quiddity in itself, which, as an epis-
temic and ontic constant, bridges the concrete and mental spheres. This can be vin-
dicated textually by his tendency to illustrate such terms and notions with instances
of pure quiddity, such as ‘animalness’ or ‘humanness,’ which are the very examples
he uses to discuss quiddity in itself in the seminal passages of Metaphysics V. It is
important to note that these various terms are interchangeable in most cases and
all refer equally—albeit with semantic nuances—to pure quiddity. For example, in
On the Soul of Salvation, in his account of abstraction, Avicenna alternates between
the terms form (ṣūrah), nature (ṭabīʿah), and quiddity (māhiyyah). He explains that
the “form and quiddity of humanness is a nature,” and later on he explicates how
the mind extracts and abstracts this nature from its material accidents.³²⁹ The ‘na-
ture’ Avicenna refers to here is just another name for pure quiddity. This same ten-
dency is also found in Philosophical Compendium, where the form (ṣūrah) is equated
with quiddity (māhiyyah) and idea (maʿnā), as well as with true reality (ḥaqīqah). In
On the Soul II.2 of The Cure, the “form of humanness” (ṣūrat al-insāniyyah), which
can be no other than the quiddity in itself ‘humanness,’ and which is said to be ex-
tracted by the mind, is described as a quiddity (māhiyyah) and nature (ṭabīʿah).³³⁰
Finally, in Demonstration III.5, Avicenna, in emphasizing the gap between sensory
perception and intellectual apprehension, affirms that “the thing that sensory per-
ception encounters is neither the true nature of the common human [i. e., pure quid-
dity as it exists in the concrete] nor [the true nature] that the intellect encounters,
except accidentally.” In this case as well, pure quiddity, e. g., humanness, is de-

 Avicenna, Salvation, 344‒349, especially 344.10‒345.10 and 347.6 ff.

 Avicenna, On the Soul, II.2, 58.11‒13.
 6 Quiddity in itself and psychological abstraction (tajrīd) 395

scribed as a true nature (ṭabīʿah) and true reality (ḥaqīqah) apprehended by the in-
tellect, which Avicenna is keen in this passage to dissociate from sensory percep-
tion.³³¹ Finally, one finds a similar picture sketched in Physics when Avicenna ex-
plains that “individuals are impressed on the internal sense faculty from which
the intellect subsequently learns what things are shared in common [al-mushārakāt]
and what things are not, and so extracts the natures of things common in species [fa-
yantaziʿu ṭabāʾiʿ al-ʿāmmiyyat al-nawʿiyyah].”³³² These texts, as well as the ones I
quoted earlier, especially Text 12 and Text 13, show a remarkable consistency in ter-
minology and doctrine. They unanimously describe the agent of abstraction as the
human intellect, making it the principal cause for the apprehension of quiddity.
Moreover, they identify the object of abstraction as the quidditative nature and mean-
ing that inheres in concrete existents, which has been shown to be identical with
pure quiddity. Finally, they depict the psychological process at play as one of active
extraction and abstraction by the mind and as a transfer of the quidditative meaning
(maʿnā) from the concrete to the mental spheres. This has the effect of somewhat on-
tologizing maʿnā and making it an immanent principle of the concrete individuals.
One idea that appears frequently in those discussions is the common or shared
(mushtarak) quality of nature or pure quiddity.³³³ This term needs to be qualified,
since, if uncritically accepted, it could lead one to the conclusion either that Avicen-
na was deliberately espousing a Platonic theory of participation, or that he regarded
the universals as existing in individual things in a strong sense. In fact, Avicenna in-
tends neither. By using this term, the Persian philosopher wishes only to stress the
sharedness of pure quiddity as a nature existing in the concrete individuals belong-
ing to the same species (e. g., human), but, as it befits pure quiddity, in a manner
that precludes any notion of numerical determination. As the last quotation from
Demonstration above shows, pure quiddity, as it inheres in each concrete individual
existent, is what is “shared by” or “common to” (mushtarak) all of them. For exam-
ple, Avicenna describes the nature, quiddity, form, and meaning ‘humanness’ as
being common to all individual human beings. In those passages, he employs the
term mushtarak idiosyncratically, and in a conscious departure from the Platonic
doctrine of participation in the Forms.³³⁴ He refutes the Platonic position with regard
to the idea that this sharedness of quiddity could be said to refer back to a transcen-

 Avicenna, Demonstration, III.5, 221‒222.

 Avicenna, Physics, I.1, 7.6‒7.
 On this concept, see Galluzzo, Two Senses. Galluzzo defines the commonality of quiddity in the
concrete world in light of the fact that the individuating principles of concrete existents are not “met-
aphysically primitive” and, hence, concern only the actual existence of concrete beings. Galluzzo’s
distinctions between “actually common” and “modally common” and between the commonality of
quiddity and the actuality of the ‘metaphysically non-primitive’ individual qualities of beings bear
some resemblance to my own distinctions. But Galluzzo stresses the mostly epistemic aspect, whereas
I emphasize both the epistemic and ontological aspects.
 For the Platonic connotations of this root, see Lammer, The Elements, 175.
396 III Quiddity in Itself in the Concrete World

dent, archetypal, and autonomously existing Form, while at the same time develop-
ing his own view of how quiddity in itself exists in concrete beings. It is this common
and shared existence of humanness in the particular instances that makes the proc-
ess of abstraction with regard to any one of these individuals possible in the first
place and also equal or level in terms of which individual is selected. Since pure hu-
manness inheres in each and every individual of that species, the abstractive process
can focus on any one of them as its initial subject. The intellect will abstract the true
reality, nature, pure quiddity, and form ‘humanness’ from any concrete instance it
encounters.³³⁵ But it is important to stress that this nature is not yet a universal.
As Marmura writes, “the nature in itself is not a universal, but it has the suitability
(al-ṣulūḥ) to become one when it is conceived as such.”³³⁶ It is only at a later stage
that this nature, pure quiddity, and form will be apprehended as a universal in the
mind, i. e., when the intellect intentionally relates it to its various individual instan-
ces.
We notice that the notion of the commonality of nature or pure quiddity lies at
the core of Avicenna’s theory of abstraction. The nature, which exists commonly in
concrete beings, is the object of mental abstraction, and, hence, also represents
the conceptual and ontological foundation for formation of the universal in the
mind. But common nature and universality are different things: according to Avicen-
na, the former exists in each concrete being, the latter exists only in the human mind.
In a passage of Demonstration III.5, Avicenna proposes to investigate how the “intel-
ligible human” (al-insān al-maʿqūl) is conceptualized (i. e., the intelligible form of
human), and he states that the object of this knowledge is “an intelligible nature”
(ṭabīʿah maʿqūlah).³³⁷ This shows yet again that the notion of ‘nature’ bridges the
states of the extramental and mental existence of pure quiddity, abstraction serving
as the link between the two. But an even stronger statement to that effect appears
shortly thereafter, when Avicenna distinguishes between two classes of existents
(mawjūdāt): those whose essences are intelligible in existence and those whose es-
sences are sensible or perceivable in existence (i. e., the immaterial vs. material exis-
tents). Concerning the former, abstraction is superfluous, since these beings are al-
ready in an intelligible state and, hence, cannot be perceived by the senses.
Regarding the latter, Avicenna writes:

Text 23: As for essences that are sensible in existence, their essences in existence are not intel-
ligible, but rather perceptible [by the senses]. But the intellect makes them [these essences] [ya-
jʿaluhā] such that they become intelligible, because it abstracts their essential reality [yujarridu
ḥaqīqatahā] from their material concomitants … So it [the intellect] turns to these [material] ac-
cidents and extracts them [the forms or quiddities],³³⁸ as if it were shaving off [ka-annahu yaq-

 See Text 11, Text 12, and Text 13.

 Marmura, Avicenna’s Chapter on Universals, 41.
 Avicenna, Demonstration, III.5, 221.8‒16.
 Although the subject of these two verbs is the same (namely, the intellect), one can relate the
object and the pronoun “them” either to the accidents or to the essential natures. Strictly speaking,
 6 Quiddity in itself and psychological abstraction (tajrīd) 397

shiru] these accidents and putting them aside until it reaches the quidditative meaning that is
common to them [al-maʿnā alladhī yashtariku fīhi] [viz., all the concrete individuals possessing
this maʿnā] and by which they do not differ. [Finally, in this manner the intellect] acquires and
conceives them [the quidditative meanings or forms] … . The senses provide the soul with things
mingled [with matter] and not intelligible, and the intellect makes them intelligible [al-ʿaql ya-
jʿaluhā maʿqūlah].³³⁹

This account corroborates the fact that abstraction is an active, deliberate process
carried out by the human soul and responsible for the acquisition of the intelligible
forms. It also accords with many other passages from Avicenna’s corpus that describe
the intellect as the main agent in the acquisition of the intelligibles. Regardless of the
role the Agent Intellect plays, it is the human mind that performs much of the work
underlying the acquisition of the intelligible forms. But for our purposes, what is par-
ticularly significant here is the clarification that what is being abstracted is a nature
or reality (ḥaqīqah), which is in turn identified with the “common meaning” (maʿnā)
shared by the concrete individuals possessing the same definition. As has been es-
tablished, these two terms are roughly synonymous with quiddity in itself, leaving
little doubt that it is pure quiddity that lies at the core of the abstractive operation
performed by the intellect and makes possible the acquisition of the intelligible
form. Mention of the quidditative meaning being abstracted from concrete existents
reappears explicitly in Metaphysics VIII.7 when Avicenna asserts that “the intelligible
meaning [al-maʿnā l-maʿqūl] may be taken from the existing thing, as occurs when
[for example] we apprehend the intelligible form [ṣūratuhu l-maʿqūlah] of the heav-
ens through observation and the senses.”³⁴⁰ Although it is the epistemological and
psychological process that is emphasized here thanks to the term maʿnā, one should
not forget that this term expressly refers to the quiddity in itself, reality, and nature
that exists in concrete beings. Qua maʿnā, this nature, reality, and quiddity is ab-
stracted by the mind and becomes the intelligible conceived by the intellect.
These passages neatly bring together two essential points: the human intellect is
the subject and agent of abstraction, and pure quiddity (also described as an essen-
tial nature and meaning) is the object of abstraction. What is more, there is a homo-
geneous overlap between Avicenna’s doctrines as exposed in his logical and psycho-
logical works and in his metaphysical writings. His views regarding the
abstractability of pure quiddity in concrete beings are articulated consistently
throughout the entire range of his writings, and the terminology he relies on to
carry out this task also shows a remarkable degree of consistency.

however, the intellect does not extract (yanziʿu) the accidents, but rather the forms and quiddities
that inhere in matter.
 Avicenna, Demonstration, III.5, 221.20‒222.14.
 Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Cure, VIII.7, 363.5‒6. This statement is echoed in Pointers, vol. 3‒4,
706.7‒707.1, when Avicenna explains that the “intelligible forms [al-ṣuwar al-ʿaqliyyah] can, in a cer-
tain way, be acquired from the exterior forms [al-ṣuwar al-khārijiyyah], as when the form of the heav-
ens [ṣūrat al-samāʾ] is acquired [directly] from the heavens.”
398 III Quiddity in Itself in the Concrete World

What is the upshot of these various points? The foregoing lends new weight to
the hypothesis briefly put forth by some scholars to the effect that it is pure quiddity
that is the object and focus of the abstractive process.³⁴¹ Quiddity in itself is an on-
tological constant that underlies each concrete and mental thing to which it relates.
With regard to abstraction, it is extracted from material bodies by the faculties of the
soul (with or without the help of the Agent Intellect, a question we shall examine
later on) and subsequently becomes a complex mental concept. By the same
token, pure essence is also an epistemological bridge between the two contexts or
spheres of concrete and mental existence. As McGinnis eloquently explains,
“Through a process of abstraction the scientist strips away these accidental features
and conceptualizes the essences in themselves independent of the accidents that fol-
low upon their ontological location either in concrete particulars or in the intellect… .
Essences in themselves provide the link between the world as it is and the world as
we conceptualize it, guaranteeing that the two in very important ways are identi-
cal.”³⁴² Pure quiddity is the principle that ensures the linkage between these ontolog-
ical and epistemological levels. It exists in the concrete world and in the mind as an
irreducible and underlying nature or true reality. Nature, for all intents and purposes,
is the irreducible essence that can be spoken of alternatively in terms of extramental
and mental existence. As Avicenna explains in Introduction:

Text 24: It is the more fitting for animalness in itself [al-ḥayawāniyyah fī nafsihā] to be called
natural form [ṣūrah ṭabīʿiyyah] at one time, intelligible form [ṣūrah ʿaqliyyah] at another, and,
in being animalness, not to be a genus in any manner whatsoever, either in the mind or exter-

 De Libera, La querelle, 243 ff.; McGinnis, Logic and Science; and Alpina, Intellectual Knowledge,
164‒165. De Libera also integrates Avicenna’s theory of abstraction in a broader emanationist frame-
work where the universals are obtained from the Agent Intellect (224, 252). So on his account Avicen-
na appears to have upheld two theories for the acquisition of the universals whose reconciliation
poses problem according to this author: the capacity of the human mind to apprehend pure quiddity
through a process of abstraction; and the acquisition of the universals from the Agent Intellect. The
former represents Avicenna’s real contribution according to de Libera (254). McGinnis provides a co-
gent picture of the abstractive process based on the notion of pure quiddity. Nevertheless, I disagree
with his claim that the accidents accompanying pure quiddity in the human mind (such as universal-
ity) are derived from the Agent Intellect. As for Alpina, his brief comments on essence serve to dem-
onstrate the continuity between the objects of imagination and the objects of intellect, and he does
not extend his discussion of essence to the external concrete beings: “the imaginative particulars and
the intelligible forms, even though they differ with respect to their way of existence, are not unrelat-
ed; rather, they share the same, common nature which is in itself neither particular nor univer-
sal”(165).
 McGinnis, Logic and Science, 171. Given these statements and the fact that McGinnis recognizes
the validity of the conception of the pure quiddities in the human mind, it is surprising that he does
not also recognize—or at the very least raise the question of—their existence in the human mind. It is
accordingly not clear how McGinnis envisages the relationship between the concept of pure quiddity
and the concept of the universal, a point which is not addressed in his article. This tension is com-
pounded by the fact that he regards universality as a mental accident acquired from the Agent Intel-
lect and hence as something distinct from pure quiddity.
 6 Quiddity in itself and psychological abstraction (tajrīd) 399

nally, but to become a genus only when a consideration, either in the mind or externally, is con-
joined to it.³⁴³

As this passage shows, pure quiddity is both the natural form and the intelligible
form, depending on the focus of analysis. Moreover, because they underlie the con-
crete and mental existents, nature and true reality are potentially a mental universal
as well, if and when they are abstracted by the mind and predicated of many. Once
divested of their material trappings, these natures will then serve as the basis for the
constitution of the universals in the mind. The actualization of this nature in the
mind arises as a result of the abstractive process, which precedes the actualization
of the universals. For example, the pure quiddity ‘horseness’ is apprehended by
the mind as a distinct form as a result of the abstraction of ‘horseness’ from an in-
dividual instance of horse, and it is only subsequently that ‘universal horse’ emerges
in the mind as a further elaboration on this pure quiddity. Quiddity in itself, inas-
much as it exists in concrete particulars, represents an object of human perception
and determines the various levels of psychological apprehension. What is more, in
its dual capacity as maʿnā in the sense of quidditative meaning and intelligible
thing or existent, quiddity in itself also undergirds and even constitutes the psycho-
logical states or intentions associated with the human imaginative, estimative, and
intellectual faculties.³⁴⁴ As both Hall and Sebti have suggested, nature and pure
quiddity need to be posited for the lower psychological and sensual levels of percep-
tion to unfold.³⁴⁵ With that being said, since the quidditative meaning itself is some-

 Avicenna, Introduction, I.12, 68.19‒69.1; transl. Marmura, Avicenna’s Chapter on Universals, 49‒
50, slightly revised.
 As Black, Intentionality, 6, notes, a maʿnā in Avicenna can be an object of perception or a psy-
chological intention; quiddity in itself thrives on this ambiguity.
 Hall, Intellect, 66, argues that nature and quiddity are found already in some partially abstract
state at the level of the estimation and experience, but that the fully abstract quiddities qua intelli-
gibles are acquired from the Agent Intellect; on his account there is therefore a disconnect in Avicen-
na’s epistemology between the levels of estimation and intellection. See also Sebti, Le statut. Sebti
has shown that quiddity is what is common to all levels of psychological representation in Avicenna,
from the perceptual apprehension of images to the imaginative, estimative, and intellectual kinds of
representation. The passages discussed by Sebti in this connection mention the common nature and
are mostly derived from Physics. I take common nature here to be just another appellation for the na-
ture or pure quiddity as it exists in concrete individuals. Sebti, Le statut, 133‒135, writes: “La matière
de toute représentation est la nature commune prise dans son indétermination naturelle sur laquelle
l’intellect n’a pas besoin d’opérer d’abstraction d’abord afin de pouvoir l’universaliser ensuite. L’in-
tellect humain adjoint à la nature commune l’universalité, et la représentation sensible la conçoit
avec une différence individuante qui a pour conséquence de la singulariser” (135). Sebti regards
this common nature as underlying the various acts of apprehension and representation (sensual
as well as intellectual), although she does not connect it with the process of abstraction directly.
In another passage, she makes the Agent Intellect the cause for the existence of the intelligibles in
the human mind (110, note 3; 128). The main point, however, is that, according to Sebti’s exposition,
the common nature is somehow the object of sensual representation and abstraction, so that quiddity
400 III Quiddity in Itself in the Concrete World

thing immaterial and abstractable from the parasitical corporeal accidents in which
it is embedded, it should be primarily connected with the estimative and especially
intellective faculties of the soul. As Black has pointed out, intentions become imma-
terial at the level of the estimative faculty, so that the maʿnā of pure quiddity only
plays a role at the level of the estimative and intellectual forms.³⁴⁶
In light of this, one may conclude that Avicenna’s doctrine of pure quiddity plays
a crucial role in the process of abstraction and in his epistemological theories. The
acquisition of quiddity in itself by the intellect represents the furthermost goal
and highest degree of abstraction, although essence could also underlie all the pre-
vious stages leading to it (sensory perception and the internal faculties). Once it has
been freed of all its corporeal concomitants and attributes, quiddity emerges as a
pure intention and form in the human intellect. From this stage on, it is ready to as-
sume the role of a universal form, if it is combined with universality and other inten-
tions. One common misconception that has been challenged in this regard is that it is
the universal intelligible that is abstracted directly from the concrete particulars. Avi-
cenna’s views on this point are quite clear: it is pure quiddity that, qua nature, form,
meaning, or true reality, is first abstracted from the concrete particulars and envis-
aged by the intellect in its pure and simple state. It is only subsequently, when it
has been combined with mental concomitants, including universality, that the full-
fledged universal aspect of quiddity emerges in the mind. When compared to quid-
dity in itself, the mental universal is therefore a composite or compound of quiddity
in itself and mental attributes. It is also, by the same token, posterior to the appre-
hension of pure quiddity.
I conclude by proposing that (a) pure quiddity as a nature in concrete beings, (b)
pure quiddity as an abstracted object with the potential of being universalized or of
becoming a universal, and (c) the actual universal quiddity, mark the three main
stages of the abstractive process according to Avicenna. These stages presuppose
that quiddity in itself is an ontological and epistemological constant. ³⁴⁷ This special

in itself may already be said to underlie (together with its material accidents) the lower levels of psy-
chological abstraction.
 Black, Intentionality, 15‒16, 22.
 It is possible that Abū l-Faraj b. al-Ṭayyib, who was roughly contemporary with Avicenna, held a
similar theory. In his Introduction, 41.13‒17, he explains that the mind separates the abstracted forms
one from another and isolates their essence. He then states: “In this manner, [the mind] acquires uni-
versal natures inasmuch as they are essences [yuḥaṣṣilu l-ṭabāʾiʿ al-kulliyyah min ḥaythu hiya dhawāt].
It then produces the meaning of generality [maʿnā l-ʿumūm] in order to make it general for this form
that was extracted and for all other similar [forms]. So that in this way the acquisition of the universal
forms can be achieved from a single individual.” Ibn al-Ṭayyib, like Ibn ʿAdī and Avicenna, appears
to separate the pure quiddities from the notion of generality or universality, which is added to them in
the human mind. Moreover, his terminology to the effect that we abstract the universal natures qua
essences seems to imply that what is being abstracted is the pure essence, rather than the universal
as such. In section 99 (42‒43) he again proceeds to distinguish between essence and the universal in
a manner reminiscent of Avicenna.
 6 Quiddity in itself and psychological abstraction (tajrīd) 401

status of essence is expressed in particular by the terms maʿnā and ṭabīʿah, which
Avicenna applies to these three contexts and to the various stages of the abstractive
process. What is more, quiddity in itself exists in these three stages, albeit in a differ-
ent mode: as a part of a composite material being, in the first stage; as a distinct and
abstract intelligible form in the second; and as a synthetic universal form in the
third. Avicenna’s statement that “the nature to which universality occurs exists in
things external to the mind”³⁴⁸ in effect posits the existence of pure quiddity in
each concrete being and suggests that it is this same nature that serves as the foun-
dation of the universal concept in the mind.
Nevertheless, these considerations do not fully solve the persistent problem of
whether the acquisition of pure quiddity in its final, consummated intelligible
state is purely the result of abstraction in an Aristotelian sense or whether it is
also caused to exist in the human mind by the Agent Intellect. In an attempt to alle-
viate this complicated question, two approaches may be put forth. The first is to posit
a paradox in Avicenna’s system, which could have emerged from the development of
his views on the subject. Given the fact that Avicenna tackled emanationism in works
spanning his entire career, the possibility of an evolution in his conceptualization of
this issue is a real one. If this is indeed the case, then scholars would be struggling
with two incompatible models developed during different periods of the master’s life.
On this hypothesis, only a developmentalist approach would be appropriate to ad-
dress this problem.³⁴⁹ The second approach consists in promoting a harmonizing
reading of the evidence, as has recently been attempted by some Avicennian special-
ists. One compelling assumption buttressing this approach is that it would be truly
surprising if the master had not pondered on how abstraction and emanation fit to-
gether in his system and angled toward a solution to this problem. In this regard, one
key feature of recent scholarly interpretations has been to reconcile these two theo-
ries, while maintaining the validity and sometimes the primacy of abstraction as a
cognitive process.³⁵⁰ I shall return to this issue later on in chapter V, which deals
with essence in the divine world. In the meantime, what should be borne in mind
is the crucial body of evidence pointing to the centrality of pure quiddity in Avicen-
na’s theory of abstraction and the elaboration of the universal concepts in the
mind.³⁵¹

 Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Cure, V.2, 211.9‒12.

 This developmentalist hypothesis is envisaged by Gutas, Avicenna, and Hasse, Avicenna on Ab-
straction, 40; see also Wisnovsky, Avicenna’s Metaphysics, 173‒181, 272 ff.
 See notably McGinnis, Making Abstraction; and idem, Logic and Science; Hasse, Avicenna’s
Epistemological Optimism; Alpina, Intellectual Knowledge; and Taylor, Avicenna.
 Accordingly, and anticipating my analysis in chapter V, I agree with Hasse that abstractionism
should represent the default position for any attempt to accommodate the theory of the Agent Intel-
lect within Avicenna’s epistemological system. Given the weight of the evidence dealing with abstrac-
tion, the challenge is how to integrate the Agent Intellect and emanationism in Avicenna’s theory of
abstraction, not vice versa.
402 III Quiddity in Itself in the Concrete World

7 The post-Avicennian tradition on quiddity in concrete beings:

some preliminary remarks
Turning to the post-Avicennian tradition for support of one’s interpretation of Avicen-
na is a highly interesting but risky enterprise. This is because the history of the recep-
tion of Avicenna in the postclassical tradition is one of profound doctrinal adapta-
tion and transformation. In the present case, the textual evidence that can be
gleaned from this tradition appears to lend much weight to the interpretation pro-
posed above. At the same time, there are subtle yet significant departures from the
master that deserve to be fleshed out, but whose degree of faithfulness to Avicenna
is not always easy to assess with precision, due to the complexity of the Avicennian
sources themselves.³⁵²

7.1 Bahmanyār

One thinker who addresses the topic of quiddity in the concrete world is Bahmanyār.
He was one of Avicenna’s most important disciples and an active proponent of Avi-
cennian philosophy in the immediate aftermath of the master’s passing. In The Book
of Validated Knowledge (K. al-Taḥṣīl), Bahmanyār equates quiddity in the concrete
world with nature (ṭabīʿah), and he also distinguishes this nature from universality
in the mind.³⁵³ With Bahmanyār, one also finds to my knowledge the first instance
in the post-Avicennian literature of an author who routinely refers to the concrete as-
pect of quiddity as a kind of universal. In the section of his book devoted to this
topic, Bahmanyār endorses two senses of kullī: (a) the universal that exists in con-
crete things; and (b) the universal that exists in the mind. What is more, Bahmanyār
considers that the universal meaning (al-maʿnā l-kullī) and the quidditative meaning,
in this case, the meaning ‘humanness’ (maʿnā l-insāniyyah), are obtained from the
exterior concrete existents, such as Zayd and ʿAmr. This is a pointed, if not spelled
out, reference to abstraction on the Avicennian model, where quiddity in itself is ex-
tracted in a first step and only subsequently becomes a universal. Later on Bahma-
nyār explains that quiddity in the mind is quiddity in itself, which only subsequently
becomes a universal when the mind adds to it the predication of many.³⁵⁴ Hence,
Bahmanyār appears to endorse the main contours of Avicenna’s position: that
there is a valid conception of pure quiddity in the mind; that the form of pure quid-

 For a recent analysis of Avicenna’s theory of nature and quiddity in the extramental world as
well as of its reception in the postclassical tradition, see Faruque, Mullā Ṣadrā.
 Bahmanyār, The Book of Validated Knowledge, 499.
 Bahmanyār, The Book of Validated Knowledge, 500.12‒501.11. The crucial statement appears at
501.8‒10: “humanness in the mind is nothing else but humanness; as for its being universal, [this
occurs when] the intellect creates [yuḥdithu l-ʿaql fīhā] a predicative link [between it] and [exterior]
multiplicity.”
 7 The post-Avicennian tradition on quiddity in concrete beings 403

dity is abstracted from the exterior world; that quiddity in concrete beings possesses
a special sense of universality, different from the one that applies to concepts in the
mind; and that essence becomes a universal concept when it is related to many
things outside the mind.

7.2 Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī

Following Avicenna, Rāzī in his Commentary on Pointers equates “the foundational

nature” (ṭabīʿah aṣliyyah) with “quiddity” (māhiyyah) and “true reality” (ḥaqīqah),
thereby showing the semantic flexibility and overlap between these terms.³⁵⁵ He fur-
ther argues that this nature and quiddity represent a common determinant or deter-
mination (qadr mushtarak) in concrete existents. This claim harks back to Avicenna’s
description of quiddity as something common to or shared by the individuals that
fall under it.³⁵⁶ Developping this idea, Fakhr al-Dīn equates quiddity in concrete be-
ings with ‘unconditioned quiddity,’ and he relies on the same example of the “uncon-
ditioned (quiddity) human” (insān lā bi-sharṭ shayʾ). According to Rāzī, this aspect of
essence is not sensual or graspable by the senses (ghayr maḥsūs), and yet it exists in
the extramental world, with the obvious implication that it exists in an intelligible
mode. This is true to the extent that quiddity in itself can be regarded as an intelli-
gible existent and, hence, serve as proof, against the corporealists, that immaterial
things do exist. As will be shown shortly, Ṭūsī follows a similar line of reasoning
in his own Commentary on Pointers.
Rāzī’s discussion of the extramental existence of essence unfolds in a metaphy-
sics section of Pointers entitled On Existence and its Causes, in which Avicenna had
originally intended to establish the existence of non-sensual (ghayr maḥsūs)—and,
hence, by implication, immaterial—beings, over and against the thesis of some ma-
terialists or corporealists, who equate ‘the existent’ (al-mawjūd) with ‘the sensual’
(al-maḥsūs). Interestingly, however, in order to establish this thesis, Avicenna does
not resort to a demonstration of the existence of the separate intellects, as one
would expect. Rather, he aims to prove the validity of mental existence and to
show that intelligible entities can exist in the mind. Accordingly, pure quiddity
(e. g., ‘humanness’ in Zayd and ʿAmr) exists in a non-sensual or immaterial mode
as a “quidditative meaning” (maʿnā), a “single reality” (wāḥid al-ḥaqīqah), and a
“foundational reality” (ḥaqīqatuhu l-aṣliyyah).³⁵⁷ It is noteworthy that Avicenna in
this passage does not argue explicitly for the existence of this immaterial reality in
concrete beings, although he does not exclude this possibility either. He focuses in-
stead on the existence of abstract concepts, such as ‘humanness,’ in the human

 Rāzī, Commentary on Pointers, section on Logic, 61.

 Rāzī, Commentary on Pointers, 338.12, and 338.6‒16 for the entire passage discussed above.
 Avicenna, Pointers, vol. 3‒4, 436.1, 437.5‒6.
404 III Quiddity in Itself in the Concrete World

mind. Rāzī, however, believes that Avicenna’s argument is incomplete, since it is lim-
ited to mental existence. He intends his own refutation of the materialists or corpo-
realists to pertain to exterior existence (fī l-khārij) specifically. Thus, following his
own agenda, Rāzī elaborates on Avicenna and maintains the intelligible existence
of the pure reality and quiddity in concrete beings. What strikes us as an ambiguity
in the Avicennian text (i. e., the ontological localization of the essential reality and
meaning) is promptly resolved in Rāzī’s commentary.
Rāzī’s views on quiddity are further unraveled in his two main philosophical
works Eastern Investigations and Exalted Pursuits. In the former work, he equates
quiddity in itself, such as horseness in itself (al-farasiyyah min ḥaythu hiya fara-
siyyah), with true reality (ḥaqīqah). He then raises the thorny questions of whether,
and if so, how, pure quiddity or nature can be said to exist in concrete individuals.³⁵⁸
Here again, Rāzī’s answer to these questions appears to rest on a close reading of
Avicenna’s various comments on the matter as exposed in Metaphysics V.1‒2. Rāzī af-
firms that pure quiddity exists in concrete things as a part (juzʾ) of a composite
whole. Although pure quiddity exists with other aspects and conditions in concrete
beings, it is nonetheless possible to consider it solely in itself. In this connection,
Rāzī quotes a key statement by Avicenna to buttress this point (fa-iʿtibār al-faras
bi-dhātihi jāʾiz wa-in kāna maʿa ghayrihi).³⁵⁹ According to Fakhr al-Dīn, this special
state of quiddity in concrete things is “prior in existence” (muqaddim fī l-wujūd) to
the individual concrete existent and to the mental universal, in the manner in
which the simple precedes the composite and the part precedes the whole. Rāzī
also reiterates the explanation he made in his Commentary on Pointers to the effect
that quiddity in the exterior world is unconditioned (lā bi-sharṭ shayʾ). He states quite
plainly that “the unconditioned animal exists in the exterior [or concrete] world” (al-
ḥayawān lā bi-sharṭ shayʾ mawjūd fī l-khārij).³⁶⁰ Being unconditioned, it can be envis-
aged either with or without its concomitants and attributes. In sum, Fakhr al-Dīn ad-
heres to Avicenna’s doctrine that pure quiddity exists in concrete individuals as a na-
ture and true reality. He also echoes the mereological view that quiddity inheres in
them as a form and principle, which can be described as a part of these existents.³⁶¹
Rāzī later returns to the discussion of quiddity in Eastern Investigations in the
context of psychology and more specifically with regard to the issue of how the
human soul acquires knowledge. Therein Rāzī explains that the quiddity ‘human
in itself’ (min ḥaythu hiya) is a nature (ṭabīʿah) that presupposes and necessitates
neither unity nor multiplicity. It can be said equally of the multiple (i. e., of what ex-
ists in the concrete world) and of the single (i. e., of the universal form that exists in

 Rāzī, Eastern Investigations, vol. 1, 139.5‒6; 141.2 ff.

 Rāzī, Eastern Investigations, vol. 1, 141.10‒11.
 Rāzī, Eastern Investigations, vol. 1, 141.19‒20.
 Horten, Die philosophischen Ansichten, 10, had perceived this clearly: “Rázi ist extremer Realist.
Die Universalia existieren nach ihm sowohl dem Inhalte als auch ihrer universellen Form nach real in
den Dingen.”
 7 The post-Avicennian tradition on quiddity in concrete beings 405

the mind). This same nature can be connected with concrete, material accidents, or it
can be envisaged without them as a universal in the mind. Either way, it is clear that
for Rāzī quiddity in itself underlies the concrete and mental states of quiddity.³⁶²
What is more, intellection of the universal occurs only after pure quiddity has
been extracted (nazʿ) from the concrete individuals and freed from its material con-
comitants and accidents. Rāzī proceeds to describe the various stages that constitute
the process of abstraction, from the senses’ perception of this nature, to the in-
creased abstractive activity performed by the imaginative and estimative faculties,
to, finally, the ultimate act of abstraction performed by the intellect. Rāzī explains
that the intellect extracts the form from its matter (fa-inna l-ʿaql yanziʿu tilka l-
ṣūrah ʿan māddatihā) and renders it abstract (mujarrad).³⁶³ The intellect performs
this process of abstraction until (ḥattā) the form can be envisaged as applying to
many, i. e., until it has become a universal in the mind. But as in Avicenna’s account,
it is important to bear in mind that the abstracted form itself is the nature—Rāzī tell-
ingly alternates between the terms ṭabīʿah and ṣūrah in this passage—and that this
nature, in turn, has been identified with pure quiddity (al-insāniyyah min ḥaythu
hiya insāniyyah) at the beginning of the same passage. For Rāzī, as for Avicenna
and Ṭūsī, there is no doubt that it is the nature or pure quiddity that is the object
of abstraction and that the universal arises in the mind at a subsequent stage (indi-
cated by the Arabic term ḥattā in Rāzī’s account).³⁶⁴
Rāzī’s depiction of quiddity in the exterior concrete world is thoroughly ground-
ed in an Avicennian background. He appears to have read Metaphysics V.1‒2 scruti-
nously, since his interpretation relies on some of the key points, concepts, and terms
Avicenna establishes in this passage. It should be noted that Rāzī’s reading of Avi-
cenna coheres on many counts with the interpretation I advanced in the preceding
sections. What is more, many later thinkers aligned themselves with Rāzī and ex-
pound these same points, sometimes in more detail. Because of this, it is possible
that some of these commentaries take their inspiration from Rāzī, rather than
from Avicenna directly. To recap, the key points are the following: quiddity in itself
or nature exists as a part in concrete beings; more specifically, it exists in them as an
intelligible part; nature, truly reality, and quiddity in itself all refer to the pure exis-
tence of quiddity in concrete beings; this aspect of quiddity is described as uncondi-

 Rāzī, Eastern Investigations, vol. 2, 427.15 ff.

 Rāzī, Eastern Investigations, vol. 2, 428.13‒16.
 However, one should bear in mind that Rāzī in this passage is reporting the view of “the master”
(al-shaykh) Avicenna. At the very least, then, the passage lends support to my interpretation of Avi-
cenna’s theory of abstraction. This explains, I think, why Rāzī stresses the two stages of (a) the ab-
straction of nature or pure quiddity from particular beings, and (b) the formation of the universal
concept in the mind on the basis of this nature/pure quiddity. In Rāzī’s other writings, as I discussed
in the previous chapter, these two moments and stages are unclear, because Rāzī seems to conflate
them in his writings and also to do away with a distinct mental consideration of pure quiddity. But
Eastern Investigations chiefly relate Avicenna’s doctrines, and what Rāzī states in this respect coheres
with my interpretation and also with Ṭūsī’s later account of abstraction.
406 III Quiddity in Itself in the Concrete World

tioned (lā bi-sharṭ shayʾ), because there is no condition attached to its consideration,
with the implication that it may be envisaged together with, or in abstraction from,
its concomitants. Regardless, in itself it remains pure quiddity and nothing else. It is
also this nature or pure quiddity that is extracted by the intellective powers of the
mind and contributes to forming the universal concept. It can hardly be a coinci-
dence that these various points, which were highlighted in the previous analysis
of Avicenna, are precisely the ones Rāzī dwells upon in his paraphrase of the master.
After Rāzī, they reappear regularly in the long exegetical tradition on the theme of
quiddity that developed in the postclassical tradition. Unsurprisingly, one of the
first thinkers after Rāzī to deal with these notions in depth is Ṭūsī, to whose works
we now turn.

7.3 Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī

Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī conveys a relatively lucid account of quiddity in his Commentary
on Pointers, which is further complemented by the insight he provides in Abstract of
Correct Belief. However, due to his compressed style and the format of these works,
his views need to be carefully reconstructed from a variety of discrete assertions and
notes. Ṭūsī, building on Avicenna but probably following Bahmanyār, describes
quiddity existing in the exterior concrete world as the “physical universal” (kullī
ṭabīʿī), although he also refers to it as a “nature” (al-ṭabīʿah). The latter, as should
be clear by now, is another name for quiddity in itself as it exists in the extramental
world.³⁶⁵ As for Avicenna and Rāzī, for Ṭūsī, this nature exists as a part (juzʾ) in each
concrete individual of the same species, and it therefore represents something com-
mon to or shared by all of them. For Ṭūsī, this ṭabīʿah is characterized by sharedness
(ishtirāk) and potentially also by abstractedness (tajrīd), since it can be extracted
(muntaziʿah) from matter by the mind, just as Avicenna had explained.³⁶⁶
According to Ṭūsī, pure quiddity or nature exists as an intelligible principle in
concrete things. Consequently, it is also able to exist in an abstract state in the
mind, thanks to the cognitive technique of abstraction. Ṭūsī’s account here closely
mirrors Avicenna’s exposition of quiddity in Introduction. The universal aspect of
quiddity is formed when the natural universal or nature has combined with the log-
ical universal or the attribute of universality. Accordingly, Ṭūsī calls the “composite”
(al-murakkab) of (a) the physical universal or nature and (b) the logical universal, the
intellectual (al-ʿaqlī). He sums up the previous points when he explains in his com-
mentary that the meanings (maʿānī) that can be conceived of in terms of sharing (or

 Hence, Ṭūsī follows Avicenna in calling pure quiddity a “nature,” but he (like many other post-
Avicennians) goes beyond Avicenna in describing it as a “physical universal”—a term previously used
by Bahmanyār. For all intents and purposes, both terms refer to an irreducible quidditative meaning
and are therefore employed interchangeably in the post-Avicennian literature.
 Ṭūsī, Commentary on Pointers, vol. 2, 345.19‒346.17.
 7 The post-Avicennian tradition on quiddity in concrete beings 407

commonality, wuqūʿ al-sharakah fī-hā) are pure meanings (min ḥaythu hiya, i. e., the
pure quiddities), and that these meanings and pure quiddities are also the natures
(ṭabāʾiʿ) and the physical universals (al-kullī l-ṭabīʿī). Hence, the natures existing in
concrete beings can be abstracted by the intellect, and in turn these abstracted na-
tures—which are no other than the pure quiddities—serve as the foundation for the
mental elaboration of the universals. As Ṭūsī explains, the logical universal (kullī
manṭiqī) is an accident that advenes to the pure natures and quiddities and endows
them with universality and predicability. The intellectual universal is therefore a
combination of these two things (the nature and universality).³⁶⁷ Thus far, Ṭūsī fol-
lows Avicenna faithfully with regard to these various points, although he introduces
certain terms (kullī ṭabīʿī) that are not used by Avicenna.
Furthermore, when he seeks to establish the existence of immaterial beings
(against the materialists or corporealists), Ṭūsī, like Rāzī before him, relies on a dem-
onstration of the existence of the pure quiddities as parts in concrete beings, rather
than on a demonstration of the separate existence of the secondary causes or imma-
terial intellects. As an example of the “intelligible natures” (al-ṭabāʾiʿ al-maʿqūlah),
Ṭūsī mentions “human in itself.”³⁶⁸ Glossing Metaphysics V.1, he argues that this na-
ture exists as a part (juzʾ) in individual existents. This nature is what is common (al-
mushtarak) to all human beings, and it is described as a single nature and reality
(ṭabīʿah wāḥidah and wāḥid al-ḥaqīqah). By this, Ṭūsī does not intend to assert
that humanness is numerically one, but that the humanness of Zayd is not different
from the humanness of ʿAmr. Humanness in itself is just humanness, and so has a
kind of essential oneness proper to it. Significantly, Ṭūsī reiterates later on that
the quiddity in itself that exists as a part in each corporeal being is an “intelligible
nature” (ṭabīʿah maʿqūlah)³⁶⁹; that “in each corporeal being is something non-corpo-
real” (fī kull maḥsūs shayʾ laysa bi-maḥsūs)³⁷⁰; and that the reality of each concrete
thing is an abstract nature (ḥaqq or ḥaqīqatuhu l-mujarradah).³⁷¹ Furthermore, quid-
dity in itself is what makes concrete beings agree (tattafiqu) with one another, and it
is “the constitutive part by virtue of which agreement occurs” (al-juzʾ al-muqawwim
alladhī bi-hi yakūn al-ittifāq).³⁷² Following Avicenna, then, Ṭūsī seems to conceive of
pure quiddity as an intelligible principle existing in concrete beings.
Ṭūsī is particularly conscientious to differentiate between the various consider-
ations of quiddity Avicenna had deployed in Introduction I.2. On the one hand, he
distinguishes between the considerations of pure quiddity as it exists in the concrete
world and as it exists in the mind. The nature of a thing exists with material acci-
dents in the concrete world, but it can also be envisaged without them in the

 Ṭūsī, Commentary on Pointers, vol. 1, 204.13‒22.

 Ṭūsī, Commentary on Pointers, vol. 3‒4, 436‒437.
 Ṭūsī, Commentary on Pointers, vol. 3‒4, 438.19‒20.
 Ṭūsī, Commentary on Pointers, vol. 3‒4, 439.10.
 Ṭūsī, Commentary on Pointers, vol. 3‒4, 440.15‒16.
 Ṭūsī, Commentary on Pointers, vol. 3‒4, 456.16; 457.12.
408 III Quiddity in Itself in the Concrete World

mind. On the other hand, he also distinguishes this last mental consideration of pure
quiddity from the mental consideration of the universal, as Avicenna had. These var-
ious distinctions are invoked to address the objection of an imaginary interlocutor
who argues that Ṭūsī’s comments on the intelligible existence of quiddity apply
only to its existence in the mind, not to its existence in reality (it should be noted
that the interlocutor is not Rāzī, who also embraces the theory of the intelligible ex-
istence of the pure quiddities in the concrete world). Ṭūsī replies:

The objection is solved as follows: by differentiating between the nature of human, to which
commonality or the absence of commonality can apply, and between human posited with com-
monality. The first exists [both] in the concrete world and in the intellect; the latter exists only in
the intellect.³⁷³

This passage establishes a triplex distinction of quiddity along the lines of what Avi-
cenna had achieved in his own works. The basic distinction Ṭūsī stresses is that be-
tween pure quiddity or nature, on the one hand, and quiddity taken with common-
ality, which is a composite, on the other. Elaborating on this basic distinction, he
then proceeds to argue that there are two concepts of human in the intellect: one
is the pure nature taken in itself, with the absence of commonality; the other is
the mental universal, where commonality is necessarily posited. Now, it is notewor-
thy that Ṭūsī posits the existence of pure nature in the concrete world, thereby prov-
ing his interlocutor wrong. As he explains, the intelligible nature (as something un-
conditioned, lā bi-sharṭ shayʾ ākhar) can exist both in concrete things and in the
intellect.³⁷⁴ To conclude, Ṭūsī’s interpretation of Avicenna coheres broadly with
Rāzī’s on these points, in spite of the fact that he has qualms with how Rāzī con-
ceives of the relation between essence and existence. One residual ambiguity in
both Rāzī’s and Ṭūsī’s accounts, however, concerns the relation of pure quiddity
and universal quiddity in the mind. Disappointingly, these two thinkers do not
delve into this important issue. In spite of this, it appears that Ṭūsī believed—per-
haps against Rāzī, and in an attempt to recover the ‘authentic’ doctrine of Avicen-
na—that we can have a distinct conception of pure quiddity, and that this conception
is separate from, and prior to, that of the universal consideration of quiddity.

 Ṭūsī, Commentary on Pointers, vol. 3‒4, 438.9‒13.

 So, there are three aspects of quiddity discussed in this highly condensed passage: (a) nature as
it exists in the concrete world; (b) nature as it exists as a distinct form and consideration in the in-
tellect; and (c) the composite of nature and commonality, which constitutes the universal in the in-
tellect. For increased clarity, this passage should be read in light of the comments Ṭūsī makes in Ab-
stract of Correct Belief, where pure quiddity and the universal composite are also neatly distinguished.
Note that in the passage under scrutiny, Ṭūsī construes commonality as meaning or necessarily im-
plying universality, which explains why he locates it in the human mind. Avicenna in contrast usually
distinguishes these two notions in his analysis.
 7 The post-Avicennian tradition on quiddity in concrete beings 409

7.4 Jurjānī

In his Definitions, the theologian ʿAlī b. Muḥammad al-Jurjānī (d. 1413 CE) follows the
general trend of describing quiddity in the exterior world as a natural universal, a
nature, and a true reality.³⁷⁵ In his definition of al-kullī l-ḥaqīqī, Jurjānī seizes the op-
portunity to digress on the subject of universals. He argues that there are three as-
pects or elements (umūr) in positing animal: (a) quiddity in itself [al-ḥayawān min
ḥaythu huwa huwa]; (b) universality; and (c) the combination of quiddity and univer-
sality. Jurjānī regards the third aspect as “a compound and composite” (al-majmūʿ al-
murakkab). He calls the first element “natural universal” (kullī ṭabīʿī), because it ex-
ists in the concrete, exterior world; the second is “the logical universal” (kullī man-
ṭiqī), which is sought in logic; and the third is “the intellectual universal” (kullī ʿaqlī),
because it exists only in the mind. Like Avicenna and Ṭūsī, then, Jurjānī holds that
“the animal in itself” (al-ḥayawān min ḥaythu huwa huwa) can be said to exist in the
natural, extramental, or concrete world as well as in an abstracted form in the mind.
Universality describes what attaches to the nature in the mind and what can be pre-
dicated of many.

7.5 Ḥillī

In his Unveiling the Intent of the Commentary on Abstract of Correct Belief (Kashf al-
murād fī Sharḥ Tajrīd al-iʿtiqād), the great scholar Jamāl al-Dīn ʿAllāmah al-Ḥillī (d.
1325 CE) provides ample evidence to the effect that he followed Ṭūsī’s interpretation
of quiddity closely. After defining quiddity in itself as a true nature or reality (ḥaqī-
qah) and intelligible thing (amr maʿqūl), he proceeds to explain that humanness in
Zayd and ʿAmr is the same, but that humanness is not numerically one, since one-
ness is a consideration added to quiddity in itself.³⁷⁶ Now, while quiddity bi-sharṭ
lā shayʾ exists only in the mind and in abstraction from all concomitants, quiddity
lā bi-sharṭ shayʾ is, in contrast, not abstracted (i. e., considered only and exclusively
in itself), but together ‘with other things’ that are not itself, namely, concomitants an
accidents. Ḥillī goes on to identify it with the “natural (or physical) universal” (al-
kullī l-ṭabīʿī). Quiddity lā bi-sharṭ shayʾ is “the very natures and true realities of
things” (nafs ṭabāʾiʿ al-ashyāʾ wa-ḥaqāʾiqihā), which exist in the extramental
world. Ḥillī later identifies the natural universal with the quiddity itself (nafs al-mā-
hiyyah), viz., pure quiddity.³⁷⁷ In case there remained any ambiguity that pure quid-
dity exists in things in the exterior world, Ḥillī states that “animal in itself” (al-ḥay-
awān min ḥaythu huwa huwa) exists as a part (juzʾ) in the concrete animals. But,

 Jurjānī, Definitions, 237.11 ff.

 Ḥillī, Unveiling the Intent, 58.19‒20; 59.3; 59.21‒24.
 Ḥillī, Unveiling the Intent, 61.4.
410 III Quiddity in Itself in the Concrete World

since Ḥillī defines quiddity and true nature as an intelligible thing (amr maʿqūl), this
means that pure quiddity exists in things as an intelligible part, which is how Avicen-
na and Ṭūsī also envisaged the existence of quiddity in concrete things. According to
Ḥillī, quiddity in itself, e. g., animalness, is truthfully said of the compound and com-
posite thing that exists (huwa ṣādiq ʿalā l-majmūʿ al-murakkab), since it dwells in it
as an irreducible and constant intelligible. In contrast to the natural universal, which
is identified with the true nature and quiddity in itself that exists as a part in concrete
things, the logical and the intellectual universals exist only in the mind and not in
the concrete world. Nature or pure quiddity, on the other hand, exists in concrete be-
ings and in the mind: this statement directly echoes earlier assertions by Ṭūsī. Final-
ly, Ḥillī explains that there are three considerations that are actualized in each ap-
prehended intelligible in the mind: the natural universal, the logical universal,
and (the resulting) intellectual universal.³⁷⁸

7.6 Jāmī

As Nicholas Heer has shown, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Jāmī (d. 1492 CE) in The Precious
Pearl regards the natural universal (al-kullī l-ṭabīʿī) as synonymous with nature (ṭa-
bīʿah) and, hence, as referring to quiddity in contradistinction to its concomitants,
whether corporeal or mental. This is unconditioned quiddity. As such, it can exist
in the exterior world together with particular accidents and in the mind together
with universality, although it can also be apprehended in itself. In any case, quiddity
qua nature and natural universal exists in the concrete world.³⁷⁹

7.7 Qushjī

Qushjī’s breakdown of the various considerations of quiddity was discussed in detail

in chapter II. There it was shown that this thinker elaborated an idiosyncratic and
highly sophisticated classification of the various considerations of quiddity, intro-
ducing new and more refined distinctions within the set of distinctions he inherited
from Avicenna, Ṭūsī, and others before him. Izutsu pinpointed Qushjī’s works as a
turning point in the postclassical reflection on quiddity, especially in view of the lat-
ter’s differentiation between two senses of negatively-conditioned quiddity.³⁸⁰ In ad-
dition, it should be pointed out that Qushjī argues that ‘mixed quiddity’—or ‘condi-
tioned quiddity’ (bi-sharṭ shayʾ)—and ‘unconditioned quiddity’ (lā bi-sharṭ shayʾ) can
be said to exist in concrete things. Hence, like most of his philosophical predecessors

 Ḥillī, Unveiling the Intent, 61.3‒4.

 Heer, in Jāmī, The Precious Pearl, 38; see also, idem, The Sufi Position.
 Izutsu, Basic Problems.
 7 The post-Avicennian tradition on quiddity in concrete beings 411

in the Arabic tradition, Qushjī posits the extramental existence of quiddity in con-
crete beings. Unlike them, however, he also argues for the existence of negatively-
conditioned quiddity in concrete beings. This is a surprising and new feature of
his argumentation. Qushjī posits all three aspects of quiddity—including negative-
ly-conditioned quiddity—as existing in concrete reality. For Qushjī, it is primarily
negatively-conditioned quiddity that can be said to be a part (juzʾ) of concretely ex-
isting beings, whereas for Avicenna, Ṭūsī, and Rāzī, it was unconditioned quiddity.
To my knowledge, Qushjī is the only thinker to develop this theory in the form in
which it appears in his commentary. Finally, and in spite of this, he identifies ‘the
natural universal’ with ‘unconditioned quiddity’ in line with previous interpreters.³⁸¹
Importantly, Qushjī combines these views with a real distinction between essence
and existence in the concrete world and regards external existence as one of the ac-
cidents of essence (al-wujūd al-khārijī min al-ʿawāriḍ).³⁸² Hence, when it comes to
how quiddity applies to the extramental beings, one finds in Qushjī an intensifica-
tion of the realist trend that characterizes much of the Avicennian tradition, to the
point that Qushjī is willing to make even negatively-conditioned quiddity a feature
of these beings. This perhaps betrays an attempt on his part to emphasize and max-
imize the commensurability of mental notions and concrete features of reality.

7.8 Tahānawī

In his Dictionary, the eighteenth-century scholar Tahānawī devotes an important sec-

tion of his work to the various considerations of quiddity. Therein he informs us that
there are two aspects of quiddity that exist in the concrete world (mawjūdān fī l-khār-
ij): mixed quiddity or conditioned quiddity (bi-sharṭ shayʾ), and absolute or uncondi-
tioned quiddity (yusammā l-muṭlaqah wa-l-māhiyyah bi-lā sharṭ). ³⁸³ The latter, he
tells us, is none other than quiddity in itself (min ḥaythu huwa huwa).

7.9 Ṭabāṭabāʾī

Let us turn to the works of a modern thinker to complete this sketch of the reception
of Avicenna’s theory of extramental quiddity. In his treatise entitled The Elements of
Islamic Metaphysics, Ṭabāṭabāʾī discusses the different aspects of quiddity that Avi-
cenna had outlined in Introduction. According to his account, mixed quiddity, which
is identified with conditioned quiddity, and absolute quiddity, which is identified
with unconditioned quiddity, can both be said to exist in the concrete world.

 Qushjī, Commentary, 417.4

 Qushjī, Commentary, 407.5.
 Tahānawī, Dictionary, 1424.
412 III Quiddity in Itself in the Concrete World

While the former refers necessarily to quiddity taken ‘with other things,’ the latter
indicates quiddity’s autonomy from these things. Interestingly, the Persian scholar
subsumes these two aspects of quiddity, together with the third aspect of abstract
or negatively-conditioned quiddity in the mind, under the natural universal.
Hence, like his predecessors, he identifies quiddity in the concrete world with the
natural universal, but in addition he extends the latter notion to encompass nega-
tively-conditioned quiddity in the mind. He states: “The quiddity of which these
three kinds [viz., conditioned, unconditioned, and negatively-conditioned] are sub-
classes is the natural universal [al-kullī l-ṭabīʿī], which possesses universality in the
mind and is capable of corresponding to a multiplicity of things.”³⁸⁴ While surprising
at first glance, this can be explained by the fact that, as shown previously, the nat-
ural universal is quiddity in itself considered both in concrete beings and in a state of
abstraction in the mind after it has been abstracted from a concrete entity. The nat-
ural universal is also therefore the foundation for the intellectual universal. Here
Ṭabāṭabāʾī provides some evidence to the effect that it is really the same quiddity
that exists as a constant in the mind and in the concrete beings, albeit according
to different ontological modes or aspects. Moreover, his account is solidly grounded
in the key notion of the natural universal, which characterizes and orients much of
the Persian reception of Avicenna’s theories, from Bahmanyār and Rāzī all the way to
Ṭabāṭabāʾī.

7.10 Muḥammad al-Mahdī al-Ḥusaynī al-Shīrāzī

Muḥammad al-Shīrāzī (d. 2001 CE), a theoretician and religious authority (marjaʿ) of
twelver shiism, also wrote a commentary on Ṭūsī’s Abstract of Correct Belief, in which
he puts forth what one may now call the ‘standard interpretation’ of the natural uni-
versal in the post-Avicennian tradition. With regard to the particular issues that con-
cern us, he takes his cue directly from Ṭūsī and construes unconditioned quiddity
(al-māhiyyah lā bi-sharṭ shayʾ) as applying to the natural universal (al-kullī l-ṭabīʿī),
which is pure quiddity (al-ḥayawān bi-mā huwa ḥayawān). Muḥammad al-Shīrāzī ex-
plains that this aspect of quiddity is characterized neither by abstraction from other
considerations (iʿtibārāt) (such as the material accidents), nor by the absence of their
abstraction (ʿadam al-tajarrud ʿanhā). In other words, it may or may not be taken to-
gether with other considerations, but there is no condition that applies to it either
way. Moreover, like Ṭūsī, he endorses the view that this aspect of quiddity exists
as a part (juzʾ) in the individual concrete instances of animal.³⁸⁵ Finally, he goes
on to gloss Ṭūsī’s account of how the intellectual universal is formed in the mind

 Ṭabāṭabāʾī, The Elements, 47.

 Shīrāzī, Commentary on Abstract, 70.15‒21.
 7 The post-Avicennian tradition on quiddity in concrete beings 413

from a compound of the natural and logical universals.³⁸⁶ In brief, al-Shīrāzī’s ac-
count is through and through concurrent with the previous ones surveyed thus far.

7.11 Recapitulation

The body of information on the subject of quiddity that can be retrieved from the
postclassical sources is immense and intricate. Only a partial, schematic, and tenta-
tive picture was provided here. In spite of this, the evidence that can be gleaned from
some of the most representative postclassical sources dealing with the reception of
Avicenna’s theory shows a remarkable degree of homogeneity and consistency, as
well as some important departures from the master’s writings. Although many of
the authors surveyed above did not expressly write commentaries on Avicenna’s
works, they strove to clarify a set of thorny issues that arose from a close reading
of his writings, especially Introduction I.2 and Metaphysics V.1‒2, or from commenta-
ries closely related to these works. These two texts, which must often have been read
side by side given the genuine thematic and doctrinal connections between them,
may be said to have informed virtually the entire post-Avicennian philosophical tra-
dition on essence.
Let us begin with what is clear before moving on to the more sticky points. Many
postclassical philosophers inscribed in the Avicennian lineage argue that quiddity
(māhiyyah)—as well as a special sense of the universal (al-kullī) corresponding to
it—exist in concrete beings. They thus uphold a realist and immanentist interpreta-
tion of essence along the lines advocated by the master. Typically, these thinkers
identify this extramental aspect of quiddity with ‘unconditioned quiddity’ (māhiyyah
lā bi-sharṭ shayʾ) and routinely refer to it as a ‘nature’ (ṭabīʿah), ‘true reality’ (ḥaqī-
qah), and ‘form’ (ṣūrah). In addition, but this time unlike Avicenna, they also system-
atically describe extramental quiddity as ‘absolute quiddity’ (māhiyyah muṭlaqah)
and ‘the natural universal’ (al-kullī l-ṭabīʿī). Hence, for most of these thinkers, the no-
tions that quiddity in concrete beings is unconditioned, absolute, and a kind of uni-
versal all go together. The rationale behind the view that pure quiddity (e. g., animal-
ness) in concrete beings is a kind of universal is that it is an irreducible nature
common to all the individuals that fall under it, and it is also what enables the
mind to attain a universal kind of knowledge of exterior things.
This terminology and the inclination to regard the nature in concrete beings as a
special kind of universal establish an important link between these postclassical au-
thors and the late-antique Greek philosophical discussions of the common things.
Avicenna’s works were one of the major stages in the history of this transmission
and reshaped the ancient legacy in a way that had a drastic effect on later Arabic
authors. More specifically, the shift towards a focus on quiddities rather than on uni-

 Shīrāzī, Commentary on Abstract, 71.

414 III Quiddity in Itself in the Concrete World

versals proper, as well as the ideas that quiddity and universality (as well as the
other attributes) are distinct from one another, that there are various senses of uni-
versality, and that one special sense of universality applies to quiddity in concrete
beings, which are all prevalent ideas in the later Islamic tradition, can be traced di-
rectly to Avicenna’s works. Nevertheless, it should be noted that Avicenna himself
generally refrains from speaking of quiddities in the concrete world as universals
and cautiously reserves this term for a discussion of mental notions, although he
is not entirely consistent with regard to this point. Indeed, for Avicenna, universals,
strictly speaking, exist only in the mind, although there is a qualified sense accord-
ing to which they exist in concrete beings, due to the modulated nature of the notion
of universality. The post-Avicennian authors, for their part, straightforwardly and un-
hesitatingly designate quiddity in the natural or concrete world as a universal, which
they contrast to the logical and intellectual universals, both of which exist only in the
soul. In doing so, they paid heed, but also significantly amplified, Avicenna’s com-
ments in Introduction I.12. Another important feature is that the later Avicennian
commentators conceive of quiddity in the exterior world, and hence of nature,
true reality, and the natural universal, as an intelligible principle or intelligible
form inhering in each individual concrete being. It is this principle that they identify
as the part (juzʾ) Avicenna mentions in Metaphysics V.1. This position seems to have
arisen out of a long exegetical tradition on the Avicennian works, as well as by a
process of elimination: the quiddities exist in the concrete world, but they can be
said to exist neither as material parts nor as separate Forms, so they must inhere
in the material substances as an intelligible form and principle.
Perhaps the two most momentous doctrines these later authors formulate by
building on Avicenna are (a) that the natural universal (al-kullī l-ṭabīʿī) qua nature
(ṭabīʿah) and quiddity in itself (al-māhiyyah min ḥaythu hiya hiya) exists in an uncon-
ditioned state (bi-lā sharṭ) in each concrete individual, and (b) that it is pure quiddity
that is the object of the abstractive process performed by the human mind. By ab-
stracting pure essence, the mind also prepares the form from which the mental uni-
versal subsequently arises (that is, when universality is added as an external inten-
tion and when the condition (sharṭ) of common predicability is attached to it).
Virtually all the post-Avicennian commentators and thinkers surveyed in this section
concur on these two points. This leads me to conclude that a certain consensus had
emerged regarding these doctrines in the centuries after the master’s death. Although
this interpretation may strike one as committal from a modern perspective, due to
what it entails in terms of ontological realism and immanentism, it represents a so-
phisticated attempt to connect the intramental and extramental spheres by means of
a viable epistemological and ontological theory grounded in the notion of pure quid-
dity. It also reflects some of these authors’ unswerving commitment to interpret Avi-
cenna’s epistemology and ontology in a coherent and integrated manner. Like the
master, then, many postclassical thinkers base their brand of metaphysical realism
on the aspect of quiddity they call unconditioned or lā bi-sharṭ shayʾ ākhar. Uncon-
ditioned quiddity is flexible: it need not be considered together with its material ac-
 7 The post-Avicennian tradition on quiddity in concrete beings 415

cidents and concomitants, even though it may also be considered together with
them, in which case it becomes conditioned quiddity (bi-sharṭ shayʾ). In that
sense, unconditioned quiddity, which is irreducible, can be abstracted from its ma-
terial substrate and parasitical attributes, precisely because it exists only qua itself
in those complex beings. Hence, it exists in itself and can be conceived of in itself,
although it is never found by itself in the exterior concrete world.
In hindsight, there are six distinct and significant points with regard to my anal-
ysis of Avicenna’s theory of quiddity that appear to find some corroboration in the
post-Avicennian literature. First, later interpreters defend for the most part a realist,
immanentist, and mereological interpretation of quiddity in the concrete world; sec-
ond, they construe quiddity as an intelligible nature (ṭabīʿah) and true reality (ḥaqī-
qah) that is shared by all material instantiations to which it applies; third, this true
reality or nature exists in the concrete individual (wujūd fī l-aʿyān) in the strong sense
and not merely as a projection or conception of the mind; fourth, these thinkers iden-
tify this nature with unconditioned quiddity or quiddity lā bi-sharṭ shayʾ ākhar inas-
much as it can be apprehended either with its material accidents or in abstraction
from them, but in any case exists irreducibly in the concrete beings; fifth, this uncon-
ditioned aspect of quiddity is also, qua intelligible form and principle, abstractable
by the mind; finally, when it is abstracted and envisaged solely in itself in the mind,
it becomes negatively conditioned or bi-sharṭ lā shayʾ ākhar. The latter refers to the
state of quiddity when it is apprehended as a pure object in the mind in abstraction
from any external concomitants and mental attributes. With regard to this last point,
however, one finds some ambiguity and disagreement in the postclassical literature
as to whether this fully abstract and negatively-conditioned aspect of quiddity is to
be identified with the universal form or represents another, distinct mental object.
While this sketch seems on the whole to accurately reflect some important exe-
getical trends occurring in the postclassical tradition, some points nevertheless re-
main obscure. First, the custom of referring to each aspect of quiddity—including
quiddity in concrete beings—as a universal (kullī) undoubtedly has a point of origin
in Avicenna’s works, but is for the most part a post-Avicennian development. It seems
to be an already well-established practice by the time of Ṭūsī in the thirteenth cen-
tury. Given that Avicenna on the whole avoided this identification (with a few notable
exceptions), but that it became systematic in the works of his successors, shedding
light on this philosophical development is a desideratum.³⁸⁷ Second, even though the
realist dimension of many of these theories is blatant, no extensive and compelling
explanation of its immanentist and especially its mereological aspects are articulated
in the Arabic sources. For example, Ṭūsī in his Commentary on Pointers limits himself
to describing quiddity as an intelligible nature and form in concrete beings and does

 The broad distribution and influence of al-Kātibī’s The Epistle for Shams al-Dīn (al-Risālah al-
Shamsiyyah), which endorses the threefold scheme of natural, logical, and intellectual universals,
may partly explain this development.
416 III Quiddity in Itself in the Concrete World

not proceed to flesh out these points or elucidate them in an adequate manner. The
reluctance to engage in a detailed explanation of these mereological issues harks
back to Avicenna himself, who provides tantalizing comments in Metaphysics V.1,
but no systematic treatment of the topic. In that sense, the shaykh al-raʾīs is directly
responsible for the controversies surrounding these issues in the medieval and mod-
ern historiography. Yet, by far the most obscure issue debated by these thinkers, and
one also that generated many divergences in opinion in the postclassical works, fo-
cuses on the relation between pure quiddity and the universal concept in the human
mind. This challenging issue and its interpretive difficulty nevertheless had a saluta-
ry effect: it encouraged some of these authors to further define mental existence and
its various criteria. Finally, it appears that, in spite of major lines of agreement
among later philosophers, the Avicennian terminology and concepts related to quid-
dity were used quite flexibly and with a whole range of semantic modulations and
philosophical intentions by later authors. There is a gradual shift from Avicenna’s ter-
minology toward more idiosyncratic usages. Thinkers like Rāzī, Ṭūsī, and especially
Qushjī employ these terms in a subjective manner and, it would seem, in order to
promote particular features of their philosophical agenda, making any general at-
tempt at terminological disambiguation extremely taxing for the modern reader. A
case by case investigation of the way in which each individual author understood
and used this matrix of terms and notions seems the only viable course of study.
These departures notwithstanding, and bearing in mind the main doctrinal lines
unveiled above, one can conclude that a certain consensus seems to have arisen
among some of the major interpreters of Avicenna regarding his views on quiddity
and universality. The interpretations they put forth are broadly consistent and
point to a particular way of approaching Avicenna’s doctrine of essence, which is
compatible with the one advocated in this book. With that being said, the later
kalām and ḥikmah works discussed above do not represent the only possible ap-
proach to the philosophical problems introduced and analyzed by Avicenna. As
Heer pointed out, this was the philosophical (falsafiyyah or ḥikmiyyah) interpretation
of Avicenna’s theory of nature and pure quiddity in the concrete world. In contrast,
some theologians and Sufis followed an entirely different path, which often show-
cased a rejection of the doctrine of the extramental existence of the natural univer-
sal, nature, and pure quiddity.³⁸⁸ Furthermore, this interpretive trend flourished vig-
orously in Avicennizing circles and in the works of scholars who broadly endorsed
the master’s metaphysics, but it found little traction in alternative metaphysical sys-
tems, such as those elaborated by the Illuminationists and the followers of Ibn
ʿArabī. Indeed, one of the key effects of regarding quiddity in concrete beings as a
distinct principle is that it strengthens the real distinction between essence and ex-
istence. But this was unacceptable to some thinkers, who jointly rejected the real ex-
istence of quiddity and the reality of the natural universals. This philosophical reac-

 See Heer, The Sufi Position; Jāmī, The Precious Pearl, 38.
 8 Conclusion 417

tion is important for our purposes as well, because it raises the crucial question of
how, or in what ontological mode, quiddity can be said to exist in the concrete
world. This question is picked up again in chapter IV.

8 Conclusion

This chapter focused on a set of intricate problems related to quiddity in the concrete
world: Does quiddity exist in concrete beings, and if so, in what mode or sense?
What would be in that case its relation to universality? How does Avicenna’s position
on this issue relate to the strong realism of the Platonic tradition and to the formal
immanentism of the Aristotelian tradition? How does the late-antique discourse on
the universals and common things feed into Avicenna’s reflection on the matter?
What role does this aspect of quiddity play in the human cognition of universals
and the process of abstraction? Connected to these questions was the challenging
task of having to clarify a set of technical terms that systematically underpins Avicen-
na’s accounts on the subject, especially ‘nature,’ ‘true reality,’ and ‘form,’ as well as
the related notions of ‘commonality’ and ‘universality.’ It emerged that the trend of
ontologizing essence in the concrete world largely hinges, in Avicenna’s works, on a
set of technical terms intended to denote the entitative quality of pure quiddity. Per-
haps the most important ones in this regard are maʿnā and ṭabīʿah. Finally, I exam-
ined how the various conditions of bi-sharṭ shayʾ, lā-bi-sharṭ shayʾ, and bi-sharṭ lā
shayʾ relate to this aspect of quiddity and to the various points raised above.
In order to paint a satisfactory picture of Avicenna’s position, his account needs
to be contextualized in light of the late-antique commentatorial tradition on Plato
and Aristotle, especially with regard to the multifarious discussions about the univer-
sals and common things that unfolded in the late-antique Greek sources. One of Avi-
cenna’s sources for his treatment of this problem is Porphyry’s Eisagoge, which the
shaykh al-raʾīs took as a starting point for his own work bearing the same title
(Madkhal or Introduction). The notorious passage where Porphyry outlines the vari-
ous possible modes of existence of the universals proved particularly influential
on later Greek, Latin, and Arabic thinkers, and Avicenna in this regard was no excep-
tion. In fact, this passage served as a blueprint for his own treatment of quiddity in
Introduction and especially in Metaphysics V.1, where he combines logical and onto-
logical considerations to address the very questions raised by Porphyry in his logical
treatise. Avicenna was also familiar with other works stemming from the Peripatetic
and Neoplatonic backgrounds, notably treatises by Alexander of Aphrodisias, which
he used freely and creatively in his interpretation. In spite of a clear debt to the late-
antique theorizations on the universals, the result is a distinctly Avicennian doctrine
that is thoroughly integrated in his system and connected with other crucial aspects
of his philosophy.
Avicenna’s framework, as well as many of the conceptual distinctions he sketch-
es, can be traced to this late-antique background. This is true in particular of (a) the
418 III Quiddity in Itself in the Concrete World

threefold categorization of the common things/universals/quiddities into concrete

particular things, mental entities, and things in themselves or foundational forms;
(b) the other matrix of distinctions Avicenna endorses in Introduction (‘prior to’,
‘in,’ and ‘after multiplicity’); (c) the idea that universality is mind-dependent and
a mental accident or concomitant; (d) the view that universals in the mind are ab-
stracted from particulars; (e) the priority of certain aspects of quiddity/the universals
over others; (f) the practice of referring to the common thing/quiddity as a nature or
a common nature; and, finally, (g) the correspondence established between these
various aspects of the common things/quiddities and various ontological modes.
These salient features in the Greek commentaries likely informed Avicenna’s treat-
ment of essence. Naturally, it is important to stress that Avicenna was an active par-
ticipant in this philosophical dialogue and that he tackled these issues in a subjec-
tive and creative manner in his works. In that sense, the commentaries provided the
master with some of the main problems to be resolved and with the raw material
with which he elaborated his own system. Yet, this ancient background and the
many terminological, formal, and argumentative parallels between Avicenna’s
works and the Greek commentaries have to be acknowledged and represent an im-
portant component of the master’s method and doctrines.
Turning to Avicenna’s doctrines on quiddity, a brief recap of the results reaped in
chapter III is in order. The foregoing analysis has led to several significant conclu-
sions concerning the textual relationship between key passages in Avicenna’s corpus
and the interpretation of this fundamental feature of his philosophical system. The
master’s threefold distinction of quiddity as outlined in Introduction I.2 rests on
both epistemological and ontological considerations whose implications extend to
the extramental or concrete world. In general, his approach displays a clear intention
to treat these logical categories and notions in an ontological way and to tease out
their ontological entailments. Avicenna accordingly extends the discussion to the
quiddities as they exist in the extramental world and dispenses much effort to clar-
ifying the relationship between the concrete and mental contexts of quiddity. Accord-
ing to the reconstruction I proposed, Avicenna upholds a moderate realist, imma-
nentist, and mereological theory of quiddity in the concrete world that rests on
Aristotelian and Neoplatonic sources transmitted via the Baghdad School. On his
view, quiddity exists in the exterior world in concrete beings (but not outside of
them), and it is to be identified especially with form as a part of the composite. In
this connection, the analysis emphasized the correspondence between the notions
of form (ṣūrah) and essence or quiddity in Avicenna’s works. More specifically, it ex-
plained how form can be regarded as the extramental counterpart of quiddity qua
species, differentia, or genus in the mind. In that manner, it was shown that Avicen-
na’s essentialist, hylomorphic, and mereological theories are interconnected in cru-
cial ways. They participate in the explanation of the extramental existence of pure
quiddity, in the same way that logic and noetics had sought to accommodate pure
quiddity in an intellectualist context.
 8 Conclusion 419

In addition, the hypothesis—suggested by the previous considerations—was put

forth that quiddity qua common nature exists as an intelligible principle and form,
albeit in an unconditioned and non-numerical state, in the concrete being. More spe-
cifically, the maʿnā of pure quiddity exists in the form. The implication of this uncon-
ditioned and undetermined state is that quiddity is an irreducible ontological prin-
ciple of concrete beings, which can be considered either together with its
surrounding accidents and concomitants or solely in itself once it has been abstract-
ed from those other things. Regardless, pure quiddity is part of the ontological and
foundational reality (ḥaqīqah) of an existent. It forms a part of that existent, namely,
its thingness, its quidditative meaning, its true reality, its nature, and its essential
form. Even though Avicenna typically speaks of a nature or quiddity, rather than a
universal, as existing in things, it is clear that his theories correlate with a sense
of the universal as it was broadly understood in ancient and medieval times.
Avicenna’s doctrine rests solidly on Aristotle’s theory of immanent forms, but it
also departs from the Stagirite in certain regards, especially in its novel theorization
of the common nature, which seems to stand midway between Aristotle’s and the Ne-
oplatonists’ conception of the universals. For if Avicenna’s concept of nature is faith-
ful to Aristotle in that it is a principle inhering in concrete individuals and does not
exist in a transcendent and separate realm of its own like the Platonic forms, some of
the characteristics Avicenna ascribes to it on the other hand seem informed by Neo-
platonic ontological and causal theories. Although Avicenna usually resists labelling
the common nature a universal ‘in things’ or ‘in multiplicity,’ it is quite clear none-
theless that it has retained some of the main characteristics associated with this no-
tion as bequeathed by the Neoplatonic tradition. For one thing, quiddity in concrete
beings remains its irreducible and constant intelligible self, although it is also com-
mon to many instantiations and the same in each one of them (albeit not according
to numerical sameness). So there is a sense, albeit a highly qualified one, according
to which nature transcends the mere individual. What is more, these quidditative na-
tures have their epistemic and ontological origin in the supernal intellects, as I will
show in chapter V. There the pure quiddities are reflected as intelligibles in a mode
that precedes their instantiation in matter. Hence, with regard to this theory of es-
sence and nature, Avicenna stands conspicuously at the crossroads of the Aristote-
lian and Neoplatonic legacies. His position reflects and perpetuates the late-antique
trend of interpreting Aristotle through Neoplatonic theories. Avicenna also signifi-
cantly builds on Aristotle’s theory of abstraction through the lens of the notion of
pure essence. Pure quiddity and nature, inasmuch as it is unconditioned, can be ab-
stracted by the mind, in which case it corresponds to the consideration and form of
quiddity in itself in the intellect. The form and meaning extracted from concrete be-
ings is no other than quiddity in itself, and the result of this abstractive process is the
existence of pure quiddity in the rational soul. At this stage, and if it is stripped of
everything else that is not itself, quiddity becomes ‘negatively conditioned.’ The lat-
ter in turn serves as the basis for the universal taken as a complex and synthetic en-
tity in the intellect once it combines with mental concomitants. But the quidditative
420 III Quiddity in Itself in the Concrete World

meaning or maʿnā itself exists both as a common nature in concrete things and as a
pure object in the intellect. It is by virtue of this commonality and undeterminedness
that nature and quidditative meaning bridge extramental and mental existence and
uniformly underlie the existents belonging to these two ontic spheres. As was high-
lighted already by Jon McGinnis, pure quiddity represents the key link between the
concrete existence of essence and its mental existence, as well as between reality and
logic.
This interpretation of Avicenna’s theories elicits intriguing parallels not only
with the late-antique philosophical movements, but also with the Latin scholastic
tradition. The following fact is indeed profoundly thought-provoking and arresting:
a new phase in the discussion of realism in the philosophical tradition of medieval
Europe coincides with the Latin translation and dissemination of Avicenna’s meta-
physical and logical texts. These Latinized versions of Avicenna’s philosophical trea-
tises were assiduously studied in Paris and other urban centers in the late twelfth
and thirteenth centuries and provided the main impetus for a moderate form of met-
aphysical realism to develop, which is now associated chiefly with the great scholas-
tic thinkers of this age, especially William of Champeaux, Albert the Great, Thomas
Aquinas, and Henry of Ghent.³⁸⁹ For our purposes, what is important is not merely
the fact that these philosophers relied heavily on Avicenna’s writings to articulate
their theory of essence and the universals; it is also, and above all, that they typically
interpreted Avicenna as a metaphysical realist. On their view, Avicenna posited a na-
ture in concrete beings that was common and even universal in certain ways; he re-
garded this nature as being distinct from existence, and more specifically from ‘real-
ized’ existence, with the result that he posited a real distinction between essence and
existence; and, according to some of these Christian thinkers, he even believed that
this nature possessed a distinct ontological status due to its correspondence to the
forms in the divine mind. If Avicenna’s disquisitions about quiddity and universality
are a direct continuation of late-antique philosophical culture, the Christian scholas-
tic debates should be regarded as prolonging seminal ideas and doctrines first articu-
lated by the Persian master.
In hindsight, and given Avicenna’s influence in the Latin West, it seems hardly
surprising that many of these prominent Christian philosophers defend a variant of
moderate realism when it comes to the debate about the universals. In this context,
Avicenna’s novel theorization of common nature proved particularly stimulating.
These remarks apply particularly to one of Avicenna’s illustrious Latin counterparts,
the theologian and philosopher Duns Scotus, who appears to have relied heavily on
the Arabic thinker’s account of quiddity. It seems appropriate therefore to take Sco-
tus’s works as a case study to illustrate the wider phenomenon I am referring to. Sim-
ilarities between Avicenna’s and Scotus’s philosophical systems have been highlight-
ed on various occasions in the past. But I believe that the parallels between their

 See Conti, Realism; Wéber, Le thème avicennien; de Libera, L’art.

 8 Conclusion 421

conceptions of common nature specifically have not been sufficiently emphasized,

due to the fact that Avicenna’s own realist theories have hitherto not been fleshed
out in detail.³⁹⁰ Like Avicenna, Scotus discards the term ‘universal’ and uses the
term common nature (natura communis) instead to speak of quiddities in the con-
crete world. This common nature is the ‘nature in itself,’ just as it is, for Avicenna,
quiddity in itself. Like Avicenna, he upholds a version of moderate realism that
strikes a balance between the hard realism of the Platonic forms, which both Avicen-
na and Scotus reject, and the strict nominalism of other philosophers. Moreover,
these common natures can be said to exist in each exemplification in an immanent
mode and to constitute the true reality of that entity. This nature can be said to be
prior, not only logically or conceptually, because it is prior to the complex and com-
posite existent qua its part, but also ontologically, because it has its originative
source in the intelligible domain of thought (where it exists without its material con-
comitants and accidents) and especially in the divine world. Like Avicenna, Scotus
also regards these common natures as being non-numerical (or rather “less than nu-
merical unity,” to use Scotus’s formula). Intriguingly, he also regards the common
nature as a part, although he uses this mereological notion in a different way
than Avicenna. Regardless, the common nature exists in the individual and is constit-
utive of it. These parallels make it amply clear that one of Scotus’s main sources for
his theory of common nature is Avicenna.³⁹¹
From a broader comparative perspective, the fact that prominent philosophers
from the Arabic and Latin traditions writing roughly at the same time and relying
on a shared heritage of Avicennism all attribute to the master a realist interpretation
of the universals/quiddities cannot be coincidental and deserves serious reflection.
In spite of the different cultural contexts, there seems to have been widespread
agreement among these luminaries that the master regarded quiddities in the exte-
rior world as existing irreducibly, immanently, and intelligibly in every concrete in-
stantiation. Whether one consults Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent,
or Duns Scotus, Bahmanyār, Suhrawardī, Rāzī, or Ṭūsī, Ghazālī or Averroes, defend-
ers or detractors of Avicenna, the picture that emerges is relatively consistent. It
points to a dominant interpretation of the master’s writings during the medieval pe-
riod that allows for a real distinction between essence and existence, as well as for
the real existence of quiddity qua nature, and even qua universal (in a qualified
sense), in concrete things. But while this fact has been well known in the Latin con-
text for some time, thanks to the pioneering works of Gilson and others, interpreta-
tions of Avicenna’s metaphysical realism in the Islamic context constitute in compar-
ison a much more recent avenue of research, and one which requires a painstaking
investigation into the postclassical sources.

 On the relationship between these two thinkers, see Tweedale, Duns Scotus’s Doctrine. Twee-
dale’s analysis of Avicenna, however, relies entirely on the Latin translations. My analysis of the Ara-
bic texts concurs generally with his conclusions.
 Cross, Medieval Theories.
422 III Quiddity in Itself in the Concrete World

Part of the difficulty involved in this case is the need to contend with some broad
interpretive trends that find their origin in the postclassical period, but which have
considerably shaped the modern approaches to this thinker. This is true in particular
of the ishrāqī philosophers and, on the opposite end of the spectrum, of Mullā Ṣadrā,
who defend a purely conceptualist interpretation of the essence/existence distinction
and regard pure essence as a mere mental supposition (iʿtibār) disconnected from re-
ality. I would argue that many of the interpretations articulated by modern scholars
and their insistence on a purely mentalist or conceptualist reading of the distinction
and of Avicenna’s theory of essence was informed by the legacy of these traditions.
But one should note that many of the Illuminationists implicitly ascribe to Avicenna
a real distinction and elaborate their views in opposition to him. Hence, given that
much evidence in Avicenna’s writings indicates that he regarded the essence/exis-
tence distinction as a real one; that he also endorsed a realist interpretation of extra-
mental quiddities, natures, and even (in a qualified sense) of universals; and that
this interpretation seems independently confirmed by the works of many Latin
and Arabic commentators on Avicenna in the two centuries following his death, fu-
ture research should give serious consideration to this line of inquiry.
In hindsight, the evidence on quiddity found in Introduction and Metaphysics is
fully commensurate from a doctrinal and terminological standpoint. The outline pro-
vided in the former work is fleshed out in the latter, especially with regard to the on-
tological implications of Avicenna’s theories. Quiddity in itself, while it can be envis-
aged separately from concrete and mental existents, is also said to underlie these
existents: it is constitutive of the mental universal (which Avicenna describes as
quiddity in itself or nature combined with mental attributes, such as universality),
and it also exists in each concrete beings as a common nature (ṭabīʿah), a true reality
(ḥaqīqah), a form (ṣūrah), a quidditative meaning (maʿnā), and sometimes—in a
qualified sense—as a universal (kullī). If the results from chapters II and III are col-
lated, then it appears that Avicenna’s logical, psychological, and metaphysical trea-
tises agree fully in presenting quiddity in itself as a kind of epistemological and on-
tological constant in his philosophy that transcends different ontological contexts,
i. e., the mental and the concrete.
Admittedly, there remains the conundrum of how exactly pure quiddity can be
said to exist in this constant and irreducible mode in two such different contexts
(in the mind and the concrete world). What mode of existence would this amount
to? For, if anything, the previous analysis has intimated that what Avicenna generi-
cally calls al-wujūdayn, literally, ‘the two existences,’ i. e., ‘the two modes or contexts
of concrete and mental existence,’ is not a notion that is precise enough to satisfac-
torily account for his theory of pure quiddity. There remains, therefore, the hypothe-
sis that an additional ontological mode needs to be posited that would correspond to
pure quiddity specifically. Answering this question requires an investigation of a
third context in connection with quiddity that has hitherto not been broached: the
divine world, God’s mind, and the intellection of the separate and immaterial beings.
I have until now focused mostly on the sublunary context—on human psychology
 8 Conclusion 423

and the concrete beings—but will in the next chapters address the query of whether
pure quiddity exists in the divine world and explore the theological and metaphys-
ical ramifications of this hypothesis. This inquiry will complement the previous
chapters and complete the investigation of pure quiddity in Avicenna’s philosophy.
Chapter IV:
The Special Ontological Mode of Quiddity in Itself
1 The simple, irreducible, and prior existence of pure quiddity

The analysis in chapters II and III indicates that pure quiddity should be granted a
special mode of existence and that Avicenna appears to have elaborated a sophisti-
cated and full-blown ontology of essence, whose exact characteristics nevertheless
remain to be elucidated. In the present chapter, my aim is to delineate with more pre-
cision the ontological mode and status of pure quiddity through a reconsideration of
the various senses, aspects, and modes Avicenna ascribes to existence. This calls for
a detailed analysis of his theory of ontological modulation (tashkīk al-wujūd) and the
notions of priority and posteriority (al-taqaddum wa-l-taʾakhkhur). Before moving
forward, however, a brief recap of the results generated thus far is called for.
In chapter II, I argued that quiddity in itself can be apprehended by the human
mind, not only as a distinct consideration, but also as a distinct form and intelligible,
thereby raising the hypothesis of its existence in the human intellect. Following Mar-
mura, I highlighted the differences between quiddity in itself and universal quiddity
not only as objects conceived by the mind, but also as entities endowed with a dis-
tinct ontological status. I argued that Avicenna describes pure quiddity as something
entitative, irreducible, and distinct from the universal forms, but at the same time
constitutive of, and logically prior to, the complex mental universals. In chapter
III, I argued that Avicenna defends a moderate realist, immanentist, and mereolog-
ical account of quiddity in the concrete world that revolves around the notion of com-
mon nature. I showed how, on Avicenna’s view, quiddity in itself underlies not only
mental existents, but also concrete individual existents by dwelling as an immanent
nature and form in these composite entities. This, in effect, amounts to a kind of
compromise between the hard realist position endorsed by the Platonists and
what could be called a purely conceptualist position according to which quiddity ex-
ists only as a logical notion in the mind. Avicenna’s moderate realist theory is direct-
ly indebted to Aristotle’s metaphysics, as is his rebuttal of the Platonic theory of the
forms. But his doctrines are also deeply informed by the late-antique discussions
about the various aspects of the universals that reached him in the commentatorial
works translated into Arabic.
Avicenna’s analysis of essence relies on the māhiyyah-lawāzim model, which en-
ables him to distinguish sharply between pure quiddity and its external concomi-
tants and attributes. This distinction occurs both at the epistemological level—we
can conceive of pure quiddity in abstraction from its external concomitants—and
at the ontological level—pure quiddity and its internal constituents possess a
mode of existence that differs from that of the sunolon taken with its external attrib-
utes. As in the mental context, quiddity in concrete beings can be considered either
with its external accidents or in abstraction from them. These distinctions also lie at

[Link]
 1 The simple, irreducible, and prior existence of pure quiddity 425

the core of Avicenna’s theory of abstraction, which focuses on the quidditative mean-
ing (maʿnā) that bridges the concrete and mental existence of pure quiddity. Couched
in technical terms, this means that the nature—pure quiddity—that exists irreducibly
in concrete things has a pendant in the mind, and it is abstraction that provides the
epistemological link between these two ontological states of nature. The abstracted
state of pure quiddity in the mind—nature or reality conceived of without its material
accidents—in turn serves as the foundation for the elaboration of the universal,
which is nature or pure quiddity combined with mental concomitants and attributes.
In view of this, there is a sense in which pure quiddity—qua quiddity in itself (al-
māhiyyah min ḥaythu hiya hiya), qua nature (ṭabīʿah), qua reality (ḥaqīqah), and qua
quidditative meaning (maʿnā)—can be said to exist both in the mind and in the ex-
tramental world. On the one hand, quiddity in itself exists as a part of the concrete
beings and as their foundational nature and reality. On the other hand, this nature
can be abstracted by the intellect and conceived as such, while at the same time serv-
ing as a basis for the elaboration of the universals in the mind. Nevertheless, pure
quiddity remains an epistemological and ontological constant in all of these con-
texts; it is only ever just itself. As a result, the main distinction that emerges from
Avicenna’s analysis is not between different kinds of quiddity—according to Avicen-
na, quiddity is just quiddity—but rather between quiddity in itself considered with
other things and quiddity in itself considered without other things. This distinction
makes it amply clear that the Arabic expression ‘in itself’ (min ḥaythu hiya hiya)
should be understood in terms of irreducibility in addition (in some cases) to distinct-
ness. Construed in this light, ‘quiddity in itself’ can also be envisaged distinctly or as
a part of a larger and more complex entity.
The manner in which Avicenna qualifies these various aspects of quiddity with
conditions and clauses (shurūṭ) is intricate and also liable to being misconstrued. In-
sofar as it can be regarded either with its material concomitants or without them,
quiddity in the concrete world is ‘without a condition of something else’ (lā bi-
sharṭ shayʾ ākhar), which means that something else can, but need not, be consid-
ered together with it for this aspect of quiddity to be apprehended. In other
words, quiddity in the extramental world can be considered together with its acci-
dents and concomitants, in which case it will be apprehended at the level of the ex-
terior senses and the imagination and ‘with something else’ (bi-sharṭ shayʾ ākhar), or
it can be apprehended without these accidents and concomitants, in which case it
will consist solely of an intellectual cognitive act and will lead ultimately to a con-
ception of quiddity in the mind that is ‘with no other thing’ (bi-sharṭ lā shayʾ
ākhar). It is this flexibility of quiddity in concrete beings that makes it lā bi-sharṭ
shayʾ ākhar with regard to the mode of its cognition; for the mind can attach or ab-
stract its external concomitants at will. To put it differently, quiddity lā bi-sharṭ shayʾ
ākhar can be considered either bi-sharṭ shayʾ ākhar or bi-sharṭ lā shayʾ ākhar. What
426 IV The Special Ontological Mode of Quiddity in Itself

grants it this capacity to be considered as conditioned in either of these two ways is

the fact that it is fundamentally ‘unconditioned.’¹
Thus if quiddity is considered without its accidents and concomitants, thereby
removing it from the specifications and conditions of exterior concrete existence,
it will consist of quiddity in itself and nothing else—min ḥaythu hiya hiya, here con-
strued in the sense of ‘distinct.’ This is negatively-conditioned quiddity (bi-sharṭ lā
shayʾ ākhar), a pure object that exists in the intellect. The upshot of the foregoing
is that the quiddity in itself that exists in each concrete instantiations, and which
can be considered with or without its accidents in its state of being unconditioned
(lā bi-sharṭ), becomes the negatively-conditioned quiddity when apprehended by
the mind in abstraction from all of these concomitants (not only the material and ex-
terior concomitants, but also the mental concomitants). This makes the uncondi-
tioned quiddity in its pure state a kind of absolute that underlies all existents and
represents the foundation for all the other aspects of quiddity.² Regardless of wheth-
er it is associated with concomitants, then, there is a sense in which pure quiddity
exists in mental and concrete beings. In spite of these results, one may still wonder
how the existence of pure quiddity differs from that of other entities, and what sense
and mode of existence can be ascribed to it. The purpose of this chapter is to address
these questions and to elucidate the rather enigmatic set of terms that Avicenna ap-
plies to pure quiddity.

1.1 The enigmas of Metaphysics V.1.

Avicenna writes the following in Metaphysics I.5 of The Cure:

Text 25: We therefore resume and say: It is clear that each thing has a proper reality [ḥaqīqah
khāṣṣah], which is its quiddity [māhiyyah]. And it is known that the proper reality of each
thing is other than the existence designated as established [al-wujūd alladhī yurādifu l-
ithbāt].³ Hence, if you say: Such an essential reality [ḥaqīqah] exists [mawjūdah] either in the

 Izutsu, Basic Problems, 5, also regards unconditioned quiddity as a requisite for, and as somehow
underlying, negatively-conditioned quiddity in the mind: “the absolute purity or transcendence of the
‘quiddity’ [viz., quiddity in itself and unconditioned quiddity] becomes re-established on the ground
prepared by this rational process. The ‘quiddity’ is now in the state of ‘negatively conditioned.’”
 In this connection, it is understandable why later authors, such as Qushjī, Commentary, 400.4‒9,
and Tahānawī, Dictionary, vol. 2, 1424, label the unconditioned quiddity “absolute quiddity” (mā-
hiyyah muṭlaqah). The premise is that pure quiddity is in itself without any determinations, but
can combine with other concomitants to constitute both mental and concrete existents.
 Avicenna’s choice of terms here is interesting. Marmura translates the verb yurādifu as “correspond
to,” which is perfectly acceptable, but it should be noted that the root can also convey a sense of
‘coming after,’ ‘riding after,’ ‘following,’ etc., which adequately captures the concomitant status of re-
alized and affirmed existence relative to quiddity.
 1 The simple, irreducible, and prior existence of pure quiddity 427

concrete extramental world, or in the soul, or absolutely [muṭlaqan] [in a way that] is common to
both [yaʿummuhā jamīʿan], its meaning would be realized and understood.⁴

This statement, which is part of Avicenna’s attempt to elucidate the relationship of

essence and existence and disambiguate the term wujūd, immediately follows a
statement (analyzed below) to the effect that true reality (ḥaqīqah) and quiddity (mā-
hiyyah) correspond to ‘proper existence’ (wujūd khāṣṣ) and should be contrasted to
‘established existence’ (wujūd ithbātī). As Bertolacci has shown, Avicenna’s argu-
mentation in this passage, and more broadly throughout section I.5, relies on a ter-
minological and conceptual argument, on the one hand, and on a propositional ar-
gument, on the other.⁵ Only the latter is of immediate importance here. It consists in
showing that predicating existence of essence qua subject yields new knowledge,
thereby ascertaining the intentional difference between the two notions.
Two points are striking in this connection. The first is Avicenna’s use of the term
ḥaqīqah, which is usually translated as ‘reality’ or ‘true nature.’ Note that the ‘real-
ities’ referred to in this passage are undoubtedly the pure quiddities, since the term
ḥaqīqah is used interchangeably in Avicenna’s metaphysics with nature (ṭabīʿah),
quiddity (māhiyyah), and quidditative meaning (maʿnā). Reality and nature, as
these notions are employed in Introduction and in The Cure—as well as by subse-
quent commentators such as Ṭūsī—are synonyms of pure quiddity (al-māhiyyah
min ḥaythu hiya hiya). Moreover, the notions of nature and reality can be discussed
in connection with both concrete existence and mental existence, since they exist in
complex mental objects and in composite concrete beings, and since the psycholog-
ical process of abstraction bridges these two ontological spheres. Second, Avicenna
describes an ‘absolute’ (muṭlaq) aspect or state of quiddity, which also happens to be
common to these ontological domains. Now, what is common is precisely this essen-
tial reality and nature. In this regard, this passage is to be read side by side with an-
other excerpt from Salvation, where Avicenna makes precisely the same point, albeit
by focusing on the notion of maʿnā, stating that the latter exists both in the mind and
in the concrete world (see Text 11). Given that all the other things that attach to these
existents are external concomitants and accidents (either concrete or mental), reality
and nature are the only common denominator between them.
While this much is clear, Avicenna’s statement also raises a difficult point: does
the absolute existence mentioned here represent a third mode of existence that
would belong to quiddity in itself in a manner distinct from concrete and mental ex-

 Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Cure, I.5, 31.10‒13. To be precise, this statement is placed in the
mouth of a hypothetical interlocutor (“If you say…”). Avicenna often employs this method to refute
specific doctrines, and the interlocutor is sometimes identifiable as one of the master’s disciples. It
acts as a foil against which the master can deploy his own argumentation. Here, however, Avicenna
endorses the point that is being made, and the dialogue form is merely rhetorical and intended for
didactic purposes.
 Bertolacci, The Distinction.
428 IV The Special Ontological Mode of Quiddity in Itself

istents? Or does it characterize merely the dual or combined concrete and mental
states of certain quiddities? In other words, does pure quiddity possess absolute ex-
istence exclusively or cumulatively, because it is common to the two groups that to-
gether constitute the realm of mental and concrete existents?
These questions in turn raise another issue: how does this passage of Metaphy-
sics relate to Avicenna’s discussion of quiddity in Introduction I.2? More specifically,
can the threefold ontological distinction between concrete, mental, and absolute ex-
istence that appears in this passage of Metaphysics I.5 be mapped onto the threefold
scheme mentioned in Introduction I.2, which distinguishes quiddity in the concrete
world, quiddity in the mind, and quiddity taken in itself? If there is such an overlap,
then this would imply that the absolute existence Avicenna mentions in Metaphysics
I.5 would correspond to the consideration of quiddity considered in itself and in ab-
straction from concrete and mental existence mentioned in Introduction I.2. Before
drawing any conclusions, one needs to understand exactly what Avicenna means
by ‘absolute existence’ in this context. Avicenna’s claim that quiddities can be
said to exist ‘absolutely’ (muṭlaqan) is ambiguous. One interpretation is that quiddity
is absolute when it actually exists both in concrete and mental beings. Accordingly,
these essences would possess an ‘absolute’ kind of existence—in the sense of ‘com-
plete,’ ‘exhaustive’ or ‘cumulative’—whenever they are actually instantiated in the
mental and extramental spheres. On this interpretation, Avicenna would not be refer-
ring to a third and distinct mode of existence of quiddity, but rather to the sum of the
other two combined (e. g., the concrete horses in the world and the universal horses
in the human minds). His statement could be understood as being inclusive and cu-
mulative of the two other modes, rather than exclusive of them and an alternative to
them. On this reading, ‘absolute existence’ would mean nothing other than the sum
of mental and concrete existence with regard to quiddity.⁶
At first blush, this interpretation seems vindicated by Avicenna’s pointed remark
that this kind of quidditative existence “combines [or is common] to both of them”
(yaʿummuhā jamīʿan). According to this interpretation, Avicenna’s threefold distinc-
tion of essences could be schematized as follows: a quiddity, say, horseness, can
exist (a) in the concrete world, (b) in the mind, or (c) in both contexts. However,
this breakdown seems somewhat inappropriate, because all of the quiddities of nat-
ural things would fall in the last category, so that the classification would seem re-
dundant and would not add anything meaningful to Avicenna’s far more common
statements to the effect that the quiddity horseness can exist in concrete and mental
existents (al-wujūdayn).
The second interpretation of ‘absolute quiddity’ is that Avicenna intended his
threefold distinction as a classification of different types of quiddities, not of the
same quiddity taken in its various ontological contexts. On this alternate interpreta-
tion, the threefold scheme can be broken down as follows: (a) those quiddities that

 This is the line of interpretation adopted by Menn, Avicenna’s Metaphysics, 155, note 25.
 1 The simple, irreducible, and prior existence of pure quiddity 429

exist in extramental reality, but not necessarily in the mind (i. e., those essences that
are not being actually contemplated by an intellect, or, alternatively, those essences
corresponding to the separate immaterial beings, whose quiddities, according to Avi-
cenna, cannot be truly grasped intellectually by humans); (b) essences that exist in
the mind only and do not (necessarily) have an external counterpart (i. e., fictional
and artificial forms); and, finally, (c) essences that exist both in the extramental
world and in the mind (i. e., those essences whose mental existence also has an ex-
tramental counterpart, a group that includes all the natural forms). An example of
the third kind of essence would be ‘horse’ or ‘horseness,’ which exists both in the
mind and in extramental reality. On this model, all the quiddities alluded to by Avi-
cenna in this passage would exist either in the mind and/or in concrete reality, but
only those that would bridge these two ontological realms would deserve the appel-
lation ‘absolute.’ Unfortunately, given that the master does not provide an example
in this passage, it is difficult to determine precisely the intent of his statement.
In spite of this ambiguity, I believe the former interpretation remains the more
likely, for reasons I expound below. Since the master otherwise stresses the concom-
itance (luzūm) and co-extensionality of ‘thing’ and ‘existent’ in Metaphysics I.5, this
reading makes sense and is consistent with the tenor of the general argument being
unfolded in this chapter. For there is a way in which Avicenna wants to claim that the
same quiddity underlies both mental and extramental instantiations, or else only ei-
ther one of the two would exist. The view that the ‘absolute existence’ of quiddity is
one that includes both mental and extramental existence would also be commensu-
rate with Avicenna’s oft-repeated claim that all things exist either in the mind and/or
in the concrete world, without a third group of things/existents being explicitly pos-
ited by the master. But this conclusion represents only a partial answer and is not
altogether compelling. To begin with, there is no way of ascertaining on the basis
of this passage alone whether this ‘absolute’ existence of quiddity is intended to
be merely cumulative of the mental and extramental instantiations of quiddity, as
opposed to it being a claim for a distinct and autonomous third mode of quidditative
existence, which would also happen to be inclusive of the way quiddity exists in con-
crete and mental existents. One may surmise, for argument’s sake, that quiddity in
itself could possess a distinct mode of existence, which would also belong to it when-
ever it underlies mental and extramental existents qua complex, contingent entities.
More specifically, it could be that the absolute existence of pure quiddity applies
even when quiddity exists in concrete beings together with material or mental acci-
dents and concomitants. In this case, what Avicenna would be differentiating here
is (a) the mode of existence of quiddity together with concrete, material accidents;
(b) the mode of existence of quiddity together with mental accidents; and (c) the ir-
reducible mode of existence of quiddity taken in itself without these concrete and
mental concomitants. Nevertheless, this mode is “common” to the essence in com-
plex mental and extramental beings. After all, it was argued previously that pure
quiddity represents a metaphysical constant and is said to exist as such with its
own ontological mode, even when it is with other things. Avicenna’s claim in that
430 IV The Special Ontological Mode of Quiddity in Itself

case could be interpreted as being simultaneously inclusive and exclusive of the

modes of contingent concrete and mental existence, depending on how one ap-
proaches this passage. It would be inclusive in the sense that quiddity is a part of
these beings and participates in their existence as composite substances. But it
would be exclusive in that there is a third ontological mode that can be connected
with quiddity taken as a distinct intelligible entity. Pure quiddity’s inclusiveness of
complex concrete and mental entities should therefore not be conflated with the no-
tion of its ontological exhaustiveness.
In support of this interpretation, one may adduce evidence taken from Notes to
the effect that God knows things “absolutely” or “in an absolute way” (ʿalā l-iṭlāq).⁷
One may also adduce the following segment (already discussed in chapter II; see
Text 4):

The intelligible that is intellected by the First with regard to this individual [existent] is this very
intelligible form, which is absolute humanness [wa-maʿqūl al-awwal min hādhā l-shakhṣī huwa
nafs al-ṣūrah al-maʿqūlah wa-huwa l-insāniyyah al-muṭlaqah], that is, not a certain individualized
humanness [combined] with accidents and concomitants that can be sensed and pointed to.⁸

Here Avicenna explicitly ascribes knowledge of the pure quiddities to God. While the
full theological implications of this passage will be fleshed out in chapter V, what is
important for the present purposes is the fact that Avicenna describes pure quiddity
—in this particular case humanness—as “absolute” (muṭlaq) in the state in which it
exists in the divine mind. In this case, the ‘absolute quiddity’ contemplated by God is
not identical to the one that exists in, or is connected with, the concrete human
being. Nor is it presumably identical to the complex universal form in the human
mind, although this point is not spelled out in this particular passage. Rather, abso-
lute quiddity encompasses this particular concrete being as one of its instantiations
and at the same time transcends it by being a purely abstract, irreducible, and simple
concept that can be intellected ‘in itself.’ Accordingly, its mode of existence in the
divine mind cannot be the same as in the sublunary world. So the only constant
and common denominator between concrete and mental existents—say, between
this concrete horse and the universal horse in the mind—is quiddity in itself,
which can be apprehended as a distinct object in the human and divine intellects.
This intelligible and distinct object must be the ‘absolute’ aspect of quiddity,
which transcends particulars and complex universals. If the mental and concrete ex-
istents presuppose nature and pure quiddity, the reverse is plainly not true. Nature
and pure quiddity do not in themselves presuppose material or mental accidents,
so that quiddity in itself can also be considered in abstraction from them.
If this interpretation is retained, then the statement in Metaphysics I.5 about ab-
solute quiddity would be making a point similar to the one in Introduction I.2 about

 Avicenna, Notes, 55.10, section 39.

 Avicenna, Notes, 43.10‒12, section 25.
 1 The simple, irreducible, and prior existence of pure quiddity 431

the distinctness of essence, whilst at the same time building on it and placing a new
emphasis on the notion of existence. Like the latter text, it would distinguish be-
tween (a) quiddity in concrete beings, (b) quiddity as complex universal concept,
and (c) quiddity in itself or considered ‘absolutely.’ In these texts, the ability to con-
ceive of quiddity in connection with concrete and mental entities (the epistemic as-
pect), and the fact that quiddity exists in concrete and mental beings (the ontological
and mereological aspect), seem to be predicated on the premise of an absolute and
unconditioned state or mode of quiddity that transcends these contexts of complex
and contingent existence. In this regard, it is noteworthy that later Arabic authors
often refer to quiddity in itself by calling it ‘absolute quiddity’ (al-māhiyyah al-muṭ-
laqah).⁹ There is little doubt that this passage of Metaphysics I.5 lies at the origin of
this exegetical trend and that many of Avicenna’s commentators opted to interpret it
in light of, and as mirroring, Introduction I.2.
To recap, it was shown that what is common to concrete and mental entities are
not the accidents and concomitants characteristic of concrete and mental existence,
but the quiddity in itself, nature, and reality. Avicenna uses these three terms inter-
changeably in Metaphysics I.5 and V.1 to describe pure quiddity. It is the pure es-
sence, nature, or reality that exists ‘absolutely,’ in the sense that it possesses its
own ontological mode and that, thanks to this special mode, it exists as a constant
within these contingent beings. If mental and concrete existents are what they are by
virtue of that nature, and if that nature in addition may be said to exist distinctly and
irreducibly in the intellect, in a mode different from that of the universals, then it
must exist in a way or mode proper to it. This line of interpretation clearly postulates
another mode of existence in Avicennian metaphysics apart from contingent, compo-
site, concrete existence, on the one hand, and complex, universal, mental existence,
on the other; this point remains to be investigated.
In the final analysis, this passage of Metaphysics raises the tantalizing possibility
that the absolute existence of pure quiddity is both inclusive of the composite exis-
tents and something else altogether that is proper to it alone. Again, this would sug-
gest an independent mode of existence of pure quiddity that would also happen to
encompass, somewhat accidentally, the contingent existence of mental and concrete
beings. To delve further into this issue let us once again turn to Metaphysics V.1,
which contains the bulk of the evidence concerning the existence of pure essence.
There Avicenna asserts unambiguously—one might even say boldly—that essence
as such possesses some kind of autonomous existence (wujūd, mawjūd). What is
more, he even alludes to the ‘prior existence’ of pure quiddity. One interpretive chal-
lenge focuses on whether this existence of pure quiddity is the same as that of the
universal being and the concrete being or something else altogether. Historically, it
is worth pointing out that the evidence that can be extracted from Metaphysics V.1

 See sections I.3 and II.8.

432 IV The Special Ontological Mode of Quiddity in Itself

contributed to shaping the Latin scholastic theory of the esse essentiae. In light of
this fact, these passages need to be carefully evaluated.
The claim that quiddity in itself exists or has existence (wujūd) is iterated by Avi-
cenna in Metaphysics V.1 with considerable intent and forcefulness. There one reads,
for instance, that the pure quiddity animalness “is prior in existence [mutaqaddim fī
l-wujūd] to the animal that is either particular … or universal,” and that this priority is
similar to “the way in which the simple is prior to the complex and the part to the
whole”; and Avicenna adds that “in this kind of existence [bi-hādhā l-wujūd], it
[pure animal] is only animal.”¹⁰ Equally interestingly for our purposes, Avicenna
goes on to argue some paragraphs below that quiddity in itself possesses a divine
mode of existence. The key passage reads as follows:

Text 26: Animal, then, taken with its accidents is the natural thing [al-shayʾ al-ṭabīʿī]. What is
taken in itself is the nature [ṭabīʿah, here a synonym of quiddity in itself or pure essence], of
which it is said that its existence [wujūd] is prior to [aqdam min] natural existence [al-wujūd
al-ṭabīʿī] [in the manner of] the priority of the simple to the composite. It is [that] whose exis-
tence is specified as being divine existence [yakhuṣṣu wujūdudu bi-annahu l-wujūd al-ilāhī], be-
cause the cause of its existence [sabab wujūdihi], inasmuch as it is animal, is the providence
[ʿināyah] of God most exalted.¹¹

Avicenna here speaks of the “divine existence” (wujūd ilāhī) that the essential nature
or pure quiddity possesses in itself. He contrasts this kind of existence to “natural
existence,” which is the aspect of quiddity in concrete extramental beings taken to-
gether with its material attributes, and therefore a composite whole made up of quid-
dity, existence, concomitants, and accidents. Finally, he informs us that essential na-
ture or pure quiddity is prior to natural existence.
Quite understandably, these various statements have puzzled scholars, since
they seem to refer to an ontological mode of essence not otherwise discussed in
depth in Avicenna’s works. More precisely, these enigmas of Metaphysics V.1, as I

 Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Cure, V.1, 201.10‒11; see Text 9.

 Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Cure, V.1, 204.16‒205.2, translation by Marmura in Avicenna, The
Metaphysics, 156. This passage has recently been discussed by Benevich, Die ‘göttliche Existenz’;
and Faruque, Mullā Ṣadrā, especially 274‒288. Given the significance of these two passages, it
seems appropriate to point out here that the various manuscripts of Metaphysics V.1 I consulted
(thanks to the gracious help of Amos Bertolacci) all confirm the fundamental sense and intent of
the Cairo edition. There are only minor differences, which, however, do not alter Avicenna’s argumen-
tation regarding the ontology of pure quiddity in these passages. For the record, I include the variants
below and highlight the differences between them and the Cairo edition in bold: MS Leiden Or. 4, p.2,
ll.33‒34: aw kull wujūdī aw ʿaql … bal hādhā l-wujūd huwa ḥayawān faqaṭ wa-insān faqaṭ; p. 3, ll.19‒
20: wa-huwa alladhī yakhuṣṣu wujūduhu bi-annahu l-wujūd ala [alif-lam-alif] [sic] li-anna sabab wu-
jūdihi [bi-?]mā huwa ḥayawān min ʿināyati llāh; Oxford, Pococke 125, p. 328a, ll. 13‒17: wa-kawnuhu
maʿa ghairihi amr ʿāriḍ aw lāzim fa-l-ṭabīʿah al-ḥayawāniyyah aw al-insāniyyah bi-hādhā l-wajh
mutaqaddim fī l-wujūd. The key point is that the notion of a wujūd of pure quiddity that is prior to
the other modes of existence is articulated in all the manuscripts.
 1 The simple, irreducible, and prior existence of pure quiddity 433

have called them, have led to a bifurcation in the modern scholarship. They have
comforted some scholars in the belief that pure essence does after all correspond
to a third mode of existence, an essential and divine existence, which is to be iden-
tified with existence in God or in the divine beings more generally, viz., the separate
intellects.¹² But they have pushed others to doubt that Avicenna genuinely intended
these statements.¹³ However, the issue of whether the quiddities can be situated in
the divine mind should represent the last step of our analysis, since Avicenna says
nothing explicit to that effect in this passage and limits himself merely to connecting
the quiddities with God’s providence and causality. Hence, this passage needs to be
subjected to critical scrutiny. What does Avicenna mean by “divine existence,” and
does it really amount to another, alternative mode of existence, distinct from both
mental and concrete existence? How does this remarkable excerpt fit in the picture
painted by the previous analysis of Avicenna’s theory of quiddity in itself? And
what exactly does Avicenna intend when he refers to the ontological priority of na-
ture or pure quiddity?
Avicenna’s claim that quiddity possesses divine existence is equivocal. There is a
sense in which the existence of quiddity could be divine because it resembles the ex-
istence of divine beings or shares in its qualities. There is also a more literal sense
according to which it could be called divine, namely, because it exists in the divine
beings or separate intellects. Finally, one could argue that quiddity is divine because
it is linked to the causal activity of God. At the very least, then, there are two separate

 Goichon, Gardet, Bäck, and, more recently, Marwan Rashed, have all defended a variant of the
view that the quiddities exist in the divine intellect, although they formulated different interpreta-
tions concerning the ontological status of these divine essences. Moreover, they have not all relied
on this very passage for their interpretation. See Goichon, La distinction, 85‒90 (nevertheless, it
should be noted that in her study, La théorie des formes, 150, Goichon prefers to locate the quiddities
primarily in the Agent Intellect); Bäck, Avicenna’s Conception, 236; idem, Avicenna on Existence,
364‒365; and Rashed, Ibn ʿAdī, 122‒123; see also Porro, Universaux, 44‒47; Benevich, Die ‘göttliche
Existenz,’ who provides a brief summary of this issue; and Faruque, Mullā Ṣadrā, especially 274‒
288. As I explain below, however, the issues of the ontological status of quiddity in itself, and of
where the latter is to be located, are distinct (albeit interrelated). They should accordingly be treated
separately.
 Menn, Avicenna’s Metaphysics, 155, note 25, considers the reference to divine existence as “anom-
alous” and interprets Avicenna as implicitly attributing this view to “Ibn ʿAdī and his school.” Given
that Menn otherwise rejects the notion of a distinct mode of existence of pure quiddity, it makes sense
that he would incline toward this view. However, the reading al-wujūd al-ilāhī is confirmed by all the
manuscripts of Metaphysics V.1 I consulted. Moreover, Metaphysics V.1 contains numerous references
to the existence of pure quiddity, while other texts, such as Introduction and On the Soul, explicitly
connect quiddity with divine intellection and the divine beings and, hence, with a divine mode of
being. Finally, although Menn interprets this passage as referring to the ‘species,’ I think it is quite
clear from the context that Avicenna is referring here to quiddity in itself, which he systematically
differentiates from species or ‘speciesness’ as such. In my eyes, then, the main challenge is to try
to understand what exactly this claim means in the context of Avicenna’s metaphysics and ontology
of essence.
434 IV The Special Ontological Mode of Quiddity in Itself

issues at stake here, which have often been conflated in the secondary literature, but
which need to be disentangled and investigated separately. The first issue is qualita-
tive and definitional and revolves around what exactly is ‘divine’ and ‘prior’ about
the existence of quiddity. What kind of existence and ontological status should be
ascribed to the pure quiddities as they exist in concrete and mental beings, and
how can this immanentist mode of existence be said to be “absolute,” “prior,”
and “divine”? The second issue is one of localization and focuses on whether
these pure quiddities exist in God and/or in the other separate intellects, in the
sense that their “divine existence” would literally mean existence in the divine be-
ings qua objects of their intellection. Although it will become clear that they are con-
nected, they are treated separately in what follows: the former is the object of the
present chapter, while the latter will be examined in detail in chapter V. At any
rate, answering these questions and understanding exactly how existence can be
said to apply to pure quiddity require a detour through Avicenna’s concept of exis-
tence itself. More specifically, I shall address his theory of ontological modulation
(tashkīk al-wujūd), which represents another piece of the puzzle.

1.2 The modulation of existence (tashkīk al-wujūd) and the ontological modes
according to Avicenna

Avicenna’s ontology of essence emerged as a result of the confluence of two key

problematics he inherited from ancient philosophy: Aristotle’s ontology, and more
precisely his theory of a focal meaning of being; and the late-antique discussions
of the universals and common things that grew out of Plato’s and Aristotle’s legacies.
The latter problematic informed Avicenna’s main framework and doctrine of essence
and the universals and was examined in detail in the previous chapters of this book.
The former, in contrast, represents the main model for Avicenna’s theory of ontolog-
ical modulation. It is this aspect that I wish to explore in more depth in the present
chapter. My main argument in what follows is that Avicenna elaborated on Aristotle’s
theory of pros hen homonymy to articulate a systematic theory of ontological modu-
lation that could accommodate essential being and the special ontological status of
pure quiddity.
Aristotle explains in Metaphysics Γ.2 that although being is said in many ways
(τὸ δὲ ὂν λέγεται μὲν πολλαχῶς)—a claim he reiterates elsewhere in the same
work in Δ.7, Ε.2, Ζ.1, and Κ.8—it is not a purely ambiguous or equivocal notion, be-
cause there is a core or focal meaning that ties its various sub-senses together. In
other words, the various senses of being can be predicated in relation to a core,
focal, or central meaning from which they derive and on which they depend. The
Greek expression that Aristotle uses in this passage (πρὸς ἓν καὶ μίαν τινὰ φύσιν)
has been at the center of a lively and apparently endless discussion between schol-
 1 The simple, irreducible, and prior existence of pure quiddity 435

ars.¹⁴ Over the years, it has been translated in many different ways, such as pros hen
homonymy, focal meaning, core-related homonymy, core-dependent homonymy,
equivocity, ambiguity, and multivocity, to name only a few. What is important for
my purposes is to highlight what may have been Aristotle’s original intention in
maintaining this theory. In describing being as neither a strict univocal nor a strict
equivocal notion, Aristotle allows for a certain methodological flexibility in the
way in which metaphysics as a science can be carried out. For the effect of maintain-
ing a core or focal sense of being is that metaphysics can study being in general or
being qua being, and not just one instance or class of beings to the exclusion of oth-
ers, which would unduly limit its scope and relevance. Two key implications that de-
rive from Aristotle’s theory of pros hen homonymy are, first, that it preserves the
unity and coherence of the metaphysical enterprise in the face of the apparent multi-
plicity of the aspects of being (1003b10−12); and, second, that it enables Aristotle at
the same time to hierarchize these various aspects in terms of priority or relevance
for the metaphysician. Aristotle connects the pros hen homonymy of being with
the notions of priority and posteriority at Γ.2, 1003b16−18, and then later at Z.4,
1030a21−22. On this view, substance will be prior and more relevant for the meta-
physical inquiry than accidents, a claim also articulated in Categories. Here we see
that Aristotle’s theory of a core meaning of being was construed in close relation
to his categorial scheme, which defined substance as the primary category and the
real object of the metaphysical investigation.
As I will show below, Avicenna inherits and endorses these basic features of the
metaphysical project as outlined by Aristotle. For him as well, being is said in many
ways, although there is a core meaning that ties its various senses and thus preserves
the status of metaphysics as a single and integrated science. In addition, Avicenna is
an Aristotelian in that he connects the first and core sense of existence with sub-
stance: substance is what exists in a prior and most important or relevant way for
the metaphysician. This means that Avicenna also insists, as we shall see, on inter-
preting the modulation of being in light of the notion of priority. In view of this, the
master’s understanding of ontology appears to be firmly rooted in Aristotle’s work
and more specifically in the Aristotelian theory of pros hen homonymy. Nevertheless,
Aristotle’s theory of focal meaning raised certain crucial questions for medieval
thinkers who were at the receiving end of the Greek philosophical tradition and ap-
proached metaphysics with different aims and intentions in mind. One problem was
how being as an instance of pros hen homonymy relates to the class of paronymous
terms Aristotle discusses in some of his logical works, such as Categories and Topics.
This issue was discussed at length in late antiquity, and these late-antique interpre-
tations in turn shaped the views of Arabic scholars regarding the logical status of

 The literature is massive; the reader will benefit from the overview and references given in Cohen,
Aristotle’s Metaphysics.
436 IV The Special Ontological Mode of Quiddity in Itself

philosophical terms.¹⁵ Another issue, and one of considerable interest to Avicenna

and other medieval thinkers, was how being could be said to have several meanings,
to be said ‘in many ways’ (Γ.2, Δ.7, Ε.2, Ζ.1, and Κ.8), and yet to possess only one core
and overarching meaning. Indeed, Aristotle’s various statements on this topic could
strike one as contradictory, and the difference between sheer equivocity and core-re-
lated homonymy as purely rhetorical. The ambiguity of Aristotle’s position on this
topic was one factor that later resulted in the medieval controversies regarding the
univocity and equivocity of being in Islam and the Latin West. Directly connected
to this topic was the question of the types of objects, and the number of the senses
of being, that pros hen homonymy—and by extension therefore Avicenna’s theory of
ontological modulation—encompassed. Is the core sense of being recognized by Ar-
istotle and Avicenna limited to the categories, or does it include other senses of being
and other types of existents as well? Put differently, what is the relation between Ar-
istotle’s theory of pros hen homonymy in Γ.2 and his description of the various senses
of being in Δ.7? This question can be reformulated in the context of Avicenna’s phi-
losophy: how is his theory of ontological modulation (tashkīk al-wujūd) related to his
recognition of various senses of being in Metaphysics I.5, and what types of existents
does the former include within its purview?
Our understanding of how Avicenna went about to solve these issues is presently
limited and calls for a detailed investigation. With regard to essence specifically, I
would surmise that one factor responsible for impeding a proper appreciation of Avi-
cenna’s ontology of quiddity in the earlier scholarship—exemplified by Marmura’s
unsuccessful attempts at tackling this problem in his articles—is our incomplete un-
derstanding of the shaykh’s theory of ontological modulation (tashkīk al-wujūd).
Quite apart from the fact that this theory has been little studied, there remains con-
siderable confusion over what constitutes modes, aspects, and senses of existence in
Avicenna’s metaphysics.¹⁶ The metaphysical implications of this theory need to be
further fleshed out, particularly in their relation to the Avicennian doctrine of pure
quiddity. Only by focusing on this crucial doctrine can one address the question of
whether Avicenna’s ontological framework accommodates the special status of quid-
dity in any significant way.¹⁷ The following analysis intends to shed light on these

 On this issue and its relevance for Arabic philosophy, see Wolfson, The Amphibolous Terms; and
Treiger, Avicenna’s Notion.
 Surprisingly, many recent contributions on Avicenna’s metaphysics say nothing or very little
about tashkīk; this is the case, for example, of Wisnovsky, Avicenna; Bertolacci, The Reception of Ar-
istotle’s Metaphysics; idem, Il pensiero; Lizzini, Wuǧūd-Mawǧūd; eadem, Fluxus; Koutzarova, Das
Transzendentale; and Menn, Fārābī; and idem, Avicenna. Treiger, Avicenna’s Notion, which builds
on Wolfson, The Amphibolous Terms, should be credited for bringing attention to this crucial aspect
of Avicenna’s metaphysics. This section of my book benefited from discussions with Rosabel Ansari. I
wish to thank her for her valuable comments and feedback on an earlier draft.
 I suspect that the inadequate understanding of Avicenna’s theory of tashkīk al-wujūd can account
also for many of the later critiques levelled against him; for instance, Averroes’s and Thomas Aqui-
nas’s qualms with Avicenna’s treatment of oneness and being (see Menn, Fārābī; and Aertsen, Medi-
 1 The simple, irreducible, and prior existence of pure quiddity 437

points and to clarify the manner in which the various modes and aspects of existence
Avicenna outlines in his works can be said to relate to pure quiddity. More specifical-
ly, I have three main goals: first, I dissect and analyze the various modes or aspects
(anḥāʾ, aḥkām) that together constitute tashkīk al-wujūd according to Avicenna; sec-
ond, I address the issue of whether tashkīk applies to the predicamental or transcen-
dental level or both; third, I explore the way in which this modulationist ontological
theory relates to pure quiddity through the lens of its main aspect, priority (al-taqad-
dum). In addition, I examine the problem of how tashkīk al-wujūd relates to the two
senses of being Avicenna outlines in Metaphysics I.5, ‘proper existence’ (wujūd khāṣṣ)
and ‘established existence’ (wujūd ithbātī). Building on a key study by Alexander
Treiger, I intend to show that Avicenna’s understanding of tashkīk extends well be-
yond the logical sphere and the logical discussion of the modulated terms (asmāʾ
mushakkikah) and into the realm of metaphysics. There is an organic evolution—
which also marks a turning point in the history of early Arabic metaphysics—from
the logical theory of the modulated terms (which Avicenna inherited from the previ-
ous Greek and Arabic philosophical traditions, especially Fārābī) to the metaphysical
theory of the modulation of existence (which is a key Avicennian elaboration).

1.2.1 From the modulated terms (asmāʾ mushakkikah) to ontological modulation

Medieval and modern scholars have approached Avicenna’s concept of being in dif-
ferent ways and provided conflicting interpretations of it, to the extent that it has
been construed alternatively as a univocal and equivocal notion. In spite of this di-
versity of scholarly views, some modern studies have convincingly argued that Avi-
cenna’s notion of existence is, strictly speaking, neither univocal nor equivocal, but
rather rests somewhere between these two poles. As Wolfson and later Treiger
showed, Avicenna endorsed and also elaborated on the works of previous thinkers,
such as Alexander of Aphrodisias, Porphyry, and Fārābī, who had devised an elab-
orate classification of philosophical terms, and some of whom regarded existence as
a notion located midway between univocity and equivocity.¹⁸ In particular, Avicenna
appears to be building on the views of his illustrious predecessor Fārābī, who, as far
as we know, was the first in Islamic intellectual history to recognize an intermediary
class of terms he called al-asmāʾ al-mushakkikah. Like Fārābī, Avicenna believes that
the terms mawjūd and wujūd fall in the category of the asmāʾ mushakkikah, an ex-

eval Philosophy and the Transcendentals, 213‒218 respectively) likely stem from their partial under-
standing—partly due to the limitations imposed by textual transmission and/or translation—of Avi-
cenna’s theory of the modulated terms (asmāʾ mushakkikah) and modulation (tashkīk), which in
his mind apply to both existence (wujūd) and oneness (waḥdah). Hence, this incomplete understand-
ing of Avicenna’s theory of tashkīk has had the effect not only of unduly limiting the scope of his on-
tology and the ontological relevance of his doctrine of pure quiddity, but also of generating profound
misunderstandings about his ontology in the later Islamic and Christian intellectual traditions.
 Wolfson, The Amphibolous Terms; Treiger, Avicenna’s Notion.
438 IV The Special Ontological Mode of Quiddity in Itself

pression which has been translated variably as ‘modulation,’ ‘modulated univocity,’

‘analogy,’ ‘equivocity,’ and ‘ambiguity.’ It should be noted that Avicenna’s treatment
of ‘the modulated terms’—which, following Treiger, is the translation I will adhere to
throughout my analysis—typically unfolds in a logical context and can thus be found
in the logical sections of his philosophical treatises.¹⁹

 The main texts (and the ones most commonly cited) in the modern discussion of modulated terms
are Avicenna, Categories, I.2, 9‒11; Dialectic, II.2, 117‒120; Elements of Philosophy, 53; Philosophical
Compendium, 36‒39, section 11; and Discussions, sections 647‒648, 218‒219. Other texts that discuss
the modulated terms and ontological modulation, but have received much less attention, are Guid-
ance, 71‒72, and 232.9‒12; Categories of Middle Compendium of Logic, for which see Kalbarczyk,
The Kitāb al-Maqūlāt, 326 of the Arabic text (it contains a section on asmāʾ mushakkikah, although
it should be said that there is some overlap between this text and Categories); Notes, 163, section
238; and Physics (Avicenna, Physics, I.3, 31.13‒16; II.2, 128, 132), which describes the principles
used in physics as indicating modulation (dalālat al-tashkīk), in the same way, Avicenna tells us,
that the metaphysical notions of existence, oneness, and principle (mabdaʾ) are modulated. It has
not been sufficiently acknowledged in the secondary literature that the ontological distinctions Avi-
cenna draws in other sections of his works, e. g., in Metaphysics VI.3, regarding priority and posteri-
ority especially, pertain directly to tashkīk and represent some the modes that modulate wujūd, even
though the term tashkīk itself is not mentioned in these passages; more on this below. Since the mod-
ern scholarship on Avicenna’s notion of existence (wujūd) is profuse, I cite here only the most rele-
vant studies that discuss the univocity and equivocity of being in Avicenna and especially the notion
of ism mushakkik (or ism mushakkak): Wolfson, The Amphibolous Terms; Lizzini, Wuǧūd-Mawǧūd;
eadem, Ibn Sīnā’s Metaphysics; De Haan, The Doctrine; Treiger, Avicenna’s Notion, who provides
the most detailed discussion of tashkīk in Avicenna; Bonmariage, Le réel, 54‒61; Menn, Fārābī;
idem, Avicenna’s Metaphysics; Druart, Ibn Sînâ; Kalbarczyk, Predication, 222‒227; and Wisnovsky,
On the Emergence. The ancient philosophical background of the Arabic reception and understanding
of the asmāʾ mushakkikah has been lucidly reconstructed by Wolfson and Treiger, even though nu-
merous thorny questions remain. For example, there is still confusion about the precise translation
and meaning of these terms and of tashkīk. Three main trends in the scholarship can be highlighted
that prioritize (a) ambiguity, (b) analogy, and (c) modulation. Goichon, Lexique, vol. 1, 162, translates
tashkīk as both “ambiguïté” and “analogie,” anticipating Wolfson’s description of the asmāʾ mushak-
kikah as “amphibolous” or “ambiguous.” For Mayer, Faḫr ad-Dīn, 213, as well, tashkīk implies ambi-
guity. That the asmāʾ mushakkikah were seen as fundamentally ambiguous by some authors emerges
from Ghazālī’s Doctrines of the Philosophers, 18. There Ghazālī defines these terms as mushakkikah
“on account of their ambiguity” (li-taraddudihi) (Ghazālī uses the adjectives muttafiqah, mushakki-
kah, and mutaraddidah interchangeably in his description of these terms). To make things more com-
plicated, Marmura in the index to his edition and translation of Metaphysics of The Cure lists the ex-
pressions bi-l-ishtirāk and bi-l-tashkīk under the single entry ‘equivocity,’ thereby emphasizing the
ambiguous nature of these terms (see Avicenna, Metaphysics, Marmura edition, 430). In contrast,
the connection between these words and a sort of analogy is emphasized by Goichon, De Haan, Be-
nevich (Essentialität, 57‒58, 67), and McGinnis (Avicenna, The Physics, I.3, 31.15), as well as by schol-
ars working on the reception of Avicenna’s doctrine in the Latin tradition. It finds traction in some
Arabic sources, e. g., Averroes’s epitome of Metaphysics (see Arnzen’s comments in Averroes, On Ar-
istotle’s “Metaphysics”, 199‒200; for the relation between the Arabic discussion of these terms and
the scholastic theory of analogy, see de Libera, Les sources). Following de Libera, I think it would
be worthwhile studying in more depth the connection between Avicenna’s theory of tashkīk al-
wujūd and medieval Latin theories of analogy. However, and to my knowledge, Avicenna himself
does not explicitly connect tashkīk with a form of analogical reasoning and reserves other technical
 1 The simple, irreducible, and prior existence of pure quiddity 439

In light of these passages, it becomes quite clear that Avicenna does not regard
existence as a perfectly univocal (mutawāṭiʾ) term and notion. In Guidance, for exam-
ple, in the section devoted to his treatment of the categories, Avicenna distinguishes
between terms or enunciations (alfāẓ) that are equivocal (muttafiqah), others that are
univocal (mutawāṭiʾ), and still others that are modulated (mushakkikah).²⁰ These
modulated terms lie between the pure univocals and the pure equivocals and
allow for a variety of semantic nuances or even sub-senses, even though these differ-
ences or variations in meaning are tied together by a single overarching and focal
meaning, bringing them closer to the camp of univocal terms. This characteristic
of the asmāʾ mushakkikah, and the fact that being or wujūd is one of them, perhaps
explains why the master states in Metaphysics I.5 that wujūd is said “according to
various senses” or “in many ways” (kathīr al-maʿānī). In Metaphysics VI.3, he states
that existence “varies according to a variety of modes” (yakhtalifu fī ʿiddat al-aḥkām),
a claim reiterated in Categories and Philosophical Compendium. ²¹ Yet, wujūd is not for

terms for analogy, especially those from the roots n-s-b and q-y-s. Finally, according to Treiger, Avi-
cenna’s Notion, especially 329‒330, 360‒362, tashkīk means something like “modulation” or even
“transcendental modulation”; cf. Lizzini, Ibn Sīnā’s Metaphysics, who describes it as “a nuanced uni-
vocacy or univocity,” and Kalbarczyk, Predication, 222, as “focal homonymy.” Treiger claims that the
notion of existence in Avicenna is neither a pure univocal nor a pure equivocal, but rather a modu-
lated univocal, which is applied both to God and the creatures. According to Treiger, Avicenna is the
first Arabic thinker to have articulated a theory of the transcendental modulation of being. I follow
his lead in translating tashkīk as ‘modulation.’ Building on these previous studies, my aim in what
follows is to show, first, that tashkīk is systematically defined and ‘constituted’ by a variety of
‘modes’ or ‘aspects’ (naḥw, ḥukm), the most important of which is priority and posteriority, and sec-
ond, that the theory of the modulation of being lies at the core of Avicenna’s ontology and that it un-
derscores most of the ontological distinctions the master establishes, even when he does not explic-
itly mention tashkīk, so that this notion should be connected with other key passages that have been
left out from the modern analysis. There is on my view a progression from a purely logical consider-
ation (the asmāʾ mushakkikah) to a full-blown metaphysical theory of ontological modulation (tashkīk
al-wujūd). Finally, it is important to point out that tashkīk serves to qualify many other notions in ad-
dition to wujūd in Avicenna’s philosophy; at the beginning of Metaphysics III.2, for example, Avicen-
na explains that “‘the one’ is said in a modulated way” (al-wāḥid yuqālu bi-l-tashkīk), and the same
can be said of some of the principles of physics (The Physics, I.3, 31.5‒16).
 Avicenna, Guidance, 72.1‒3. To my knowledge, this text has never been discussed in the modern
literature on the asmāʾ mushakkikah. This threefold distinction between univocal, equivocal, and
modulated terms reappears (with a very close phrasing) in Avicenna, Physics, I.3, 31.13‒16. McGinnis
translates muttafiq as meaning “what is agreed upon,” but I think its meaning in this context is closer
to “equivocal.”
 Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Cure, I.5, 31.8; VI.3, 276.14; cf. Categories, I.2, 9‒11; Elements of Phi-
losophy, 53; Philosophical Compendium, 36‒39. Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics, IV.2 and VII.1; and Topics
I.15. In those texts Aristotle examines how some terms can be said to have many meanings; the
Greek term πολλαχῶς clearly corresponds to Avicenna’s kathīr al-maʿānī in the Arabic texts. Neverthe-
less, for Aristotle and Avicenna these terms are tied together by a focal meaning, which deters us from
regarding them as completely equivocal. These Aristotelian passages, together with Alexander’s com-
mentary on them, form the basis for the Arabic understanding of the asmāʾ mushakkikah as terms
lying between equivocals and univocals.
440 IV The Special Ontological Mode of Quiddity in Itself

that matter an absolute equivocal (ism mushtarak or ism muttafiq) either, since the
fundamental and focal meaning of existence remains the same across its various
uses and contexts. As Avicenna explains in Elements of Philosophy, an ism mushakkik
is a term that “falls under a single meaning but not in an equal way (or not without
distinction) [yaqaʿa ʿalā maʿnā wāḥid lā ʿalā l-sawāʾ].”²² As recent commentators
have pointed out, the Avicennian asmāʾ mushakkikah, of which wujūd is a prime ex-
ample, therefore lie somewhere between pure equivocity and pure univocity, which is
why they are described as modulated or ambiguous, although their nature remains
closer to univocity.²³ In brief, wujūd is best regarded as a modulated notion,
which, while it allows for various nuances and even a variety of sub-senses, possess-
es a single focal meaning.²⁴
The discussion has focused thus far on Avicenna’s treatment of the modulated
terms, of which wujūd is the primary and arguably the most important instance.
However, it is striking that these logical discussions have a metaphysical pendant,
namely, the theory of ontological modulation (tashkīk al-wujūd) whose exposition ap-
pears, in contrast, in the metaphysical sections of these same works. Accordingly,
Guidance, Elements of Philosophy, and The Cure, are three works that each allocate
an analysis of the asmāʾ mushakkikah to their logical section and an analysis of tash-
kīk al-wujūd to their metaphysical section. This makes it apparent that Avicenna in-
tended the theory of logical modulation to have a direct application to his ontology
and to extend to the metaphysical investigation, unlike, it would seem, Fārābī, who
limits tashkīk mostly to a logical context. But what exactly are the metaphysical im-
plications that derive from regarding wujūd as an ism mushakkik? How is this notion
modulated and implemented in the metaphysical inquiry? What is its metaphysical
scope and relevance, and to what objects does it apply? Finally, how, if at all, does it
relate to quiddity? In order to answer these questions and contribute to the ongoing
reflection on this topic, it is necessary to examine how Avicenna conceives of the
metaphysical theory of tashkīk al-wujūd that grows out of his logical commitment
of regarding wujūd as a modulated term.

 Avicenna, Elements of Philosophy, 3.13‒14.

 This explains Treiger’s choice (Avicenna’s Notion, 355) to translate ism mushakkik as “modulated
univocal.”
 Building on Treiger, Wisnovsky, On the Emergence, 285‒293, provides a useful summary of the
Greek background of tashkīk. Avicenna’s theory of ontological modulation was apparently accepted
by some of his immediate disciples; Bahmanyār, The Book of Validated Knowledge, 281.10 and
282.1, follows his master in describing wujūd as a term predicated according to modulation (ḥaml
al-tashkīk). It later becomes a central feature of the ontology of some postclassical philosophers in
Islam, such as Ṭūsī, who defended this notion against the attacks of Shahrastānī; see Ṭūsī, Downfalls,
55.17‒62.17.
 1 The simple, irreducible, and prior existence of pure quiddity 441

1.2.2 The various modes or aspects (anḥāʾ, aḥkām) of tashkīk al-wujūd

At this stage we need to explore the inner mechanisms of tashkīk and identify its con-
stitutive elements.²⁵ For Avicenna, what makes the notion of existence subject to
modulation is the fact that it can be qualified by a set of ‘modes’ or ‘aspects’
(sing. ḥukm, naḥw) that establish differences (ikhtilāfāt) in the way it is predicated
of things.²⁶ Now, the list of modes or aspects associated with ontological modulation
that Avicenna provides varies depending on the text in which this topic is addressed.
Some of these aspects appear to have been inherited from the earlier metaphysical
tradition and, in the early Arabic context, are mentioned already in Fārābī, while oth-
ers seem to be an Avicennian innovation. Thus, the ḥukm of priority and posteriority,
for example, goes back centuries and is already hinted at in Aristotle and his com-
mentators, who believed that being is said in a prior and posterior way. In contrast,
Avicenna’s inclusion of the modalities of ‘the possible’ and ‘the necessary’ as aspects
that also modulate wujūd and are integral parts of tashkīk find no precedents in the
earlier Arabic tradition.²⁷

 This task was aptly begun by Treiger. Nevertheless, Treiger’s discussion of the aspects of tashkīk
al-wujūd is incomplete and neglects to incorporate key texts, which would otherwise have strength-
ened it. The most glaring omission in this regard is Avicenna’s discussion of the ‘aspects’ (aḥkām) of
wujūd in Metaphysics VI.3. Although tashkīk is not mentioned by name in that passage, it obviously
pertains to it; more on this below.
 The term ḥukm can mean ‘judgment’ or ‘rule’ and is frequently used in Arabic logic; see, for in-
stance, Jurjānī, Definitions, 125. In Avicenna’s philosophy, it also appears in a metaphysical context.
Marmura translates it as “governing rule,” “value” and “status” (in Avicenna, The Metaphysics, 409,
note 6). But with regard to the topic at hand it should probably be translated as ‘aspect’ or ‘mode.’
Regardless of the translation, the point is that there are various ‘modes’ or ‘aspects’ that affect
tashkīk. It is important to stress that these terms do not refer specifically or exclusively to the modal-
ities (jihāt) of existence (possibility and necessity), but include other notions that modulate existence.
The modalities of ‘the possible’ and ‘the necessary’ are only one of many ways Avicenna devises to
modulate wujūd and establish ontological differences. The aim here is to understand what exactly
‘performs’ the modulation in tashkīk al-wujūd. The key terms listed above are an effective way of de-
termining whether Avicenna is talking about ontological modulation, because they appear in all such
discussions. Thus, the passage of Metaphysics VI.3 would be a prime example of an implicit discus-
sion of tashkīk al-wujūd.
 My point of course is not that earlier philosophers such as Fārābī did not discuss wujūd in con-
nection with possibility and necessity, but rather that they did not systematically and programmati-
cally define these notions as aspects of tashkīk al-wujūd. In fact, one does not find a consummated
theory of tashkīk al-wujūd prior to Avicenna, and the idea of tashkīk seems to have been limited large-
ly to the logical sphere and thus more strictly to the asmāʾ mushakkikah. Thus, in Fārābī, it is asso-
ciated primarily with a theory of intellectual doubt and perplexity and thus with rhetoric and soph-
istry, rather than with the ontological investigation. This emphasizes the etymological connection
between tashkīk and the meaning of the root sh-k-k (‘to doubt,’ ‘be ambiguous’). In contrast, and
while some elements of his doctrine may have been prefigured in Fārābī’s works, Avicenna’s system-
atization of this theory in a metaphysical context strikes me as a key innovation, which also had a
momentous impact on subsequent Islamic intellectual history.
442 IV The Special Ontological Mode of Quiddity in Itself

Avicenna is quite consistent in enumerating the modes of tashkīk in his various

works and in implementing a framework thanks to which existence can be said to
differ when predicated of different things. This textual overlap reflects a sustained
interest in this methodological question on his part and shows that it is not an ex-
aggeration to suggest that we are dealing here with a systematic theory of ontological
modulation. I shall now turn to these texts and examine them individually with the
aim of identifying the main aspects of ontological modulation. In a passage of Cat-
egories, which has already been closely studied by Treiger, Avicenna puts forth a
threefold scheme whereby modulation occurs on account of (1) priority and posteri-
ority; (2) worth and relevance, or ‘the primary and secondary’; and (3) degrees of
strength and weakness. This scheme is represented in the diagram below:

Two of the notions mentioned in Categories I.2 (priority and posteriority, and rele-
vance) also reappear in Physics I.3.²⁸ Moreover, as Treiger noted, this scheme is
close to the one Avicenna articulates in Philosophical Compendium, although there
Avicenna appears to introduce another distinction pertaining to modulation, which
was not discussed by Treiger, and which relies on the apparent distinctions between
general and specific existence and between essential and accidental existence.²⁹
Given the present uncertainty regarding these additional distinctions, however,
and the fact that they will be treated in more detail later on, I include them only ten-
tatively in the following diagram:

 Avicenna, Physics, I.3, 31.14: bi-l-taqdīm wa-l-taʾkhīr wa-bi-l-aḥrā. Oddly, McGinnis’s translation
leaves out the term bi-l-aḥrā.
 Although section 11 of Philosophical Compendium is short and forms a single coherent argument,
Treiger’s translation and analysis focuses only on part of it and omits the last paragraph; no expla-
nation is given for this omission. I discuss the problematic aspect of modulation mentioned above
(existence qua essential and accidental maʿnā) later on, so as not to detract from the present
focus. It should be noted that the tripartite scheme of tashkīk listed above is reproduced faithfully
by Jurjānī in Definitions, 86‒87. There one finds the following three entries: al-tashkīk bi-l-awlawiyyah
(modulation in worthiness, or precedence), al-tashkīk bi-l-taqaddum wa-l-taʾakhkhur (modulation in
priority and posteriority), and al-tashkīk bi-l-shiddah wa-l-ḍuʿf (modulation in strength and weak-
ness). It seems that Jurjānī was relying directly on the Avicennian texts mentioned above when elab-
orating these entries.
 1 The simple, irreducible, and prior existence of pure quiddity 443

Finally, in Metaphysics VI.3, Avicenna provides a slightly divergent breakdown of the

modes (aḥkām) of existence. Because the importance of this passage for a proper ap-
preciation of tashkīk al-wujūd has not been previously recognized, I translate it
below:

Text 27: Existence inasmuch as it is existence does not differ in strength and weakness [lā yakh-
talifu fī l-shiddah wa-l-ḍuʿf], nor does it accept degrees in deficiency. Rather, it differs [yakhtalifu]
according to a number of modes [or aspects, ʿiddat aḥkām], which are: priority and posteriority,
autonomy and need, and necessity and possibility.³⁰

Although the master does not link these modes expressly to tashkīk in that passage,
there is significant overlap with the other texts mentioned above. In view of this, and
given the ontological context in which the passage is found, there can be little doubt
that the purpose of the distinctions listed in Metaphysics VI.3 is similar: they seek to
account for the difference (ikhtilāf) in which existence relates to, and is predicated of,
various things and therefore to substantiate a theory of ontological modulation. On
the basis of this text, we can construct the following diagram:

By discarding the repetitions found in those various passages, one can put forth the
following recapitulatory diagram regarding the various modes of tashkīk al-wujūd:

 Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Cure, VI.3, 276.13‒15.

444 IV The Special Ontological Mode of Quiddity in Itself

As is clear from the foregoing, Avicenna has a quite systematic understanding of

tashkīk al-wujūd. In his logical and metaphysical works, he is keen to outline the var-
ious aspects that qualify existence and on account of which being is predicated dif-
ferently of things. In his view, ontological modulation (tashkīk al-wujūd) consists of
aspects or modes (sing., naḥw, ḥukm) that introduce diversity or differences (ikhtilā-
fāt) in the way that existence (wujūd) is predicated of things. Even though Avicenna
does not always explicitly refer to tashkīk in the texts under discussion, as in the Met-
aphysics passage quoted above, there is little doubt nonetheless that his approach
and concern are identical throughout these works: he strives to enumerate the vari-
ous conditions or aspects involved in the modulation of existence.³¹ These aspects or
criteria constitute the justification for regarding existence neither as a strict equivocal
nor a strict univocal. Avicenna provides a succinct summary of this key point in Cat-
egories I.2: “that in which the intended meaning is the same but which becomes dif-
ferentiated afterwards is like the meaning of existence, for it is one in many things
but is different in them [in another respect], since it is not present in them in a com-
pletely identical way.”³² Thus, existence possesses a focal or core meaning, but can
nevertheless be subjected to certain qualifications that ‘modulate’ or ‘specify’ it.
In this connection, several points are noteworthy. The first one concerns a glar-
ing inconsistency in the various texts presented above. While Avicenna mentions de-
grees of intensity (or degrees of strength and weakness, al-shiddah wa-l-ḍuʿf) as a

 Another instance of an implicit reference to tashkīk al-wujūd appears in Metaphysics I.5, 34.15 ff.
when Avicenna argues that existence has a shared meaning but is not predicated equally (bi-l-tasāwī)
(cf. the expression ʿalā l-sawāʾ that is used in the discussion of the asmāʾ mushakkikah in Elements of
Philosophy); it applies to substance and accident differently according to priority and posteriority.
Here again, although Avicenna does not mention tashkīk explicitly, there can be no doubt that he
is outlining its theory and discussing some of is aḥkām. Likewise, when at the very beginning of Met-
aphysics I.2 (11.6) the master describes metaphysics as a science that studies the mode of existence
that is proper to things (ayy naḥw min al-wujūd yakhuṣṣuhā), the term naḥw must be taken as implic-
itly referring to the modes of tashkīk.
 Treiger, Avicenna’s Notion, 353.
 1 The simple, irreducible, and prior existence of pure quiddity 445

valid mode of tashkīk al-wujūd in Categories and Philosophical Compendium, he re-

jects it in Metaphysics VI.3. We know from other passages that Avicenna was reluc-
tant to endorse this aspect. For example, at Metaphysics 276.13‒15, he cautions ex-
plicitly against using this aspect of tashkīk with regard to existence. So there
appears to be a tension here when all the evidence is collated. Whatever the case
may be, this aspect seems to play a restricted role in the master’s ontology, and he
never delves into this mode of existence in his major writings. On the other hand,
the idea of the intensification of being was picked up and amplified by later philos-
ophers, such as Mullā Ṣadrā, who appropriated this notion and made it the corner-
stone of their ontology.³³ The theory of the intensity of existence was particularly ap-
pealing to postclassical thinkers inscribed in the tradition of the ‘foundationality of
existence’ (aṣālat al-wujūd), but it finds little use in an essentialist metaphysics like
that of Avicenna’s.
Second, one notices that the most important aspect or mode of tashkīk that Avi-
cenna mentions in his works—at least with regard to frequency—seems to be ontolog-
ical priority and posteriority (al-taqaddum wa-l-taʾakhkhur). This aspect is listed in all
the texts dealing with modulation, whether explicitly or implicitly, and Avicenna
never fails to mention it. One pointed formulation of the connection between tashkīk
and priority occurs in the metaphysical part of Guidance, when Avicenna states that
“the existent [al-mawjūd] is said of substance and accident … by way of modulation
[bi-l-tashkīk] and occurs with a single meaning according to priority and posteriori-
ty.”³⁴ As we shall see below, tying the predication of being to priority and posteriority
has a long history that harks back to Aristotle and the commentators, and Avicenna
in that regard is merely following a well-established trend. Nevertheless, this aspect
assumes a new role in his philosophy due to the robust distinction he establishes be-
tween essence and existence, which allows priority and posteriority to apply to met-
aphysical principles in many different ways. Accordingly, in the analysis provided
below, I shall retain in particular the notion that existence can be said of things
‘in a prior and posterior way’ (ʿalā l-taqdīm wa-l-taʾkhīr) and explore what this entails
for his ontology of quiddity.³⁵

 For an extensive discussion of this topic, see Bonmariage, Le réel; and Rizvi, Process Metaphysics.
 Avicenna, Guidance, 232.9‒12.
 Avicenna stresses the correlation between tashkīk al-wujūd and priority/posteriority implicitly in
Metaphysics, I.5, 34.15‒16 and VI.3 276.13‒15; and explicitly in Categories, I.5; Philosophical Compen-
dium, section 11; Categories of Middle Compendium of Logic (Kalbarczyk, The Kitāb al-Maqūlāt, 326 of
the Arabic text); Guidance, 232.9‒12; and Dialectic, II.2, 119.17‒120.1. It is also confirmed by other pas-
sages: see notably Physics, I.3, 31, and II.2, 132, where the tashkīk of wujūd is defined solely in terms of
priority and posteriority. See also Treiger, Avicenna’s Notion, 358 ff. In fact, Wolfson, The Amphibo-
lous Terms, especially 153, had already highlighted the importance of priority in Arabic scholars’ un-
derstanding of the asmāʾ mushakkikah. According to this scholar, the correlation between priority and
posteriority and the problematic class of intermediary terms goes back to Alexander’s interpretation
of certain specific Aristotelian passages and later made its way into the Islamic tradition. In the early
Arabic context, both Fārābī and Ghazālī construe the modulated terms in light of priority and poste-
446 IV The Special Ontological Mode of Quiddity in Itself

Third, the Avicennian theory of ontological modulation is much broader than,

albeit also inclusive of, what is often called Avicenna’s ‘modal ontology,’ or theory
of the modalities. For in reality, the modalities of ‘the possible’ and ‘the necessary’
only constitute a part of tashkīk and amount to only one of its various aspects or
modes. Consequently, and following Avicenna himself, I use the term ‘mode’
(naḥw, ḥukm) in this context in deliberate contrast to the way this term is often
used in the modern scholarship to express the modalities of ‘the possible,’ ‘the nec-
essary,’ and ‘the impossible.’ Again following Avicenna, I will call these instead ‘the
modalities’ (jihāt) in order to distinguish them from the ontological modes that qual-
ify tashkīk. ³⁶ Hence, it is noteworthy that Avicenna himself usually makes a distinc-
tion between ‘the modalities’ (al-jihāt), which are discussed in a logical and meta-
physical context, and ‘the modes of existence’ and ‘senses of existence’ (sing.,
ḥukm or naḥw al-wujūd, maʿānī l-wujūd), which are typically discussed in a meta-
physical context. According to what was shown above, the modalities (jihāt) are
only one mode (ḥukm, naḥw) of tashkīk al-wujūd. ³⁷ Consequently, although the mo-
dalities as applied to existence are highly significant in Avicenna’s philosophy and
have deservedly been the focus of much recent research, they are merely one
among several aspects Avicenna outlines in his works and implements to modulate
existence. Moreover, and with regard to the present purpose, it turns out that they are
somewhat inadequate to characterize or define the mode of existence of pure quid-
dity. This is because, construed from a metaphysical perspective, possibility and ne-
cessity are concomitants of quiddity, and, to boot, concomitants that relate exclusive-
ly to realized or acquired existence, to the kind of existence that is acquired from an
external cause and encompasses essence taken with its concomitants and accidents.
But quiddity in itself, by definition, is devoid of concomitants entirely and can be
conceived of in abstraction from them. Instead, in order to elucidate the ontological
mode of quiddity, it is necessary to turn to the other distinctions and modes of
tashkīk Avicenna outlines in his works, first and foremost the notion of ontological
priority, to which I shall return shortly.

riority; see Answers to Questions Posed, 321‒322, section 15; and Doctrines of the Philosophers, 18.14‒
22, respectively. For the relation of these concepts in Averroes, see Arnzen’s comments in Averroes, On
Aristotle’s “Metaphysics”, 199‒200. According to Arnzen, the asmāʾ mushakkikah in Averroes are con-
strued and employed as a sort of analogical method based on the notions of priority and posteriority.
 See, for instance, Avicenna, Salvation, 29.8 ff., which discusses the three modalities (jihāt) of the
necessary, the impossible, and the possible.
 It should be noted in this connection that Avicenna, in his various analyses of tashkīk, remains
silent about actuality and potentiality, in spite of the fact that Aristotle had made this distinction one
of the four main senses of being. In fact, Avicenna subsumes the investigation of actuality and po-
tentiality under that of necessity and possibility and that of priority and posteriority (see notably Met-
aphysics IV), so that the first distinction is implicitly included in the other two and, hence, in tashkīk.
This suggests also a direct connection between ontological modulation and the various senses
(maʿānī) of existence; but then again, these various senses remain to be clarified and are the
focus of another section.
 1 The simple, irreducible, and prior existence of pure quiddity 447

Fourth, and in light of the foregoing, one may propose a differentiation between
‘senses’ or ‘meanings’ of existence (maʿānī l-wujūd), ‘aspects’ or ‘modes’ of existence
(ḥukm, naḥw al-wujūd), and ‘contexts’ of existence in Avicenna’s philosophy. With
that being said, it remains unclear how the ‘senses’ or ‘meanings’ of existence relate
to the ‘modes.’³⁸ In the meantime, and before addressing this question, I propose the
following tentative scheme to clarify the various ontological distinctions Avicenna
draws in his works:

a. Contexts or domains of existence:

intellectual, intramental, universal ⁓ concrete, extramental, particular
material ⁓ immaterial
human ⁓ divine
b. Senses (maʿānī) of existence:
affirmed (wujūd ithbātī) and realized or acquired (wujūd muḥaṣṣal) ⁓ special or
proper (wujūd khāṣṣ) ⁓ God’s unique existence and maʿnā
c. Aspects or modes (sing., ḥukm, naḥw) of ontological modulation (tashkīk al-wujūd)
priority and posteriority (al-taqaddum wa-l-taʾakhkhur)
autonomy and need (al-istighnāʾ wa-l-ḥājjah)
primary and secondary/relevance and priority (al-awlā wa-l-aḥrā)
modalities (al-wujūb wa-l-imkān)
strength and weakness (al-shiddah wa-l-ḍuʿf)
general and specific existence (hastī ʿāmm/hastī khāṣṣ) (?)/essential and acci-
dental existence (dhātī/ʿaraḍī) (?)

Accordingly, what Avicenna often calls al-wujūdayn, which encompasses intellectual

or intramental existence, on the one hand, and extramental or concrete existence, on
the other, is a broad distinction between different contexts of existence. As such, it
does not seem to impact directly on the notion of tashkīk or even on the senses of
existence.³⁹ Likewise, it is unclear whether the senses (maʿānī) of existence Avicenna

 This issue may be reformulated as follows: how does the passage of Metaphysics I.5 that distin-
guishes between the meanings or senses (maʿānī) of ‘established (or acquired) existence’ and ‘proper
existence’ relate to the passage in Metaphysics VI.3 that distinguishes between the various aspects or
modes (aḥkām) of tashkīk al-wujūd?
 ‘Contexts’ of existence consist broadly of mental existence and concrete or extramental existence.
But the latter needs to be further subdivided into material and immaterial existence, since this group
includes material things like trees, rocks, and humans, as well as immaterial things like souls and
intellects. None of these items or considerations are mentioned in Avicenna’s various breakdowns
of tashkīk al-wujūd as schematized above. As will become clear in chapter V, intellectual existence
also requires a division between human intellectual existence and divine intellectual existence.
Hence, what are sometimes described as modes of existence by other scholars (namely, concrete
and intellectual existence), I here call contexts or domains of existence. It is true that these may
also be regarded as modes of existence in a general or schematic sense, and the way Avicenna him-
self sometimes refers to them (al-wujūdayn, naḥw al-wujūd) would seem to lend weight to this view.
448 IV The Special Ontological Mode of Quiddity in Itself

alludes to in Metaphysics I.5 affect the classification of the modes of existence in

other passages where tashkīk is discussed. That this is the case may be hypothetically
suggested from the evidence of chapter 11 of Philosophical Compendium, but only if
one accepts that the distinction between essential and accidental existence, which
appears to be intimated in this passage, is regarded as an additional aspect of
tashkīk. Put differently, the assumption would be that the implementation of ontolog-
ical modulation goes hand in hand with the recognition of various senses or sub-
senses of existence, which are nevertheless tied by a focal meaning and predicated
in a pros hen manner.⁴⁰
Finally, it is apparent that many of the ontological modes that the master enu-
merates in his works are interrelated and co-implicative. The modalities, for example,
amount to one ontological mode of tashkīk, and in that regard, their importance
should not be underestimated, inasmuch as they can be applied theoretically to
all entities. All of the existents are liable to being qualified by the modalities, regard-
less of what category they fall into and what mode of existence they possess. In other
words, they are all both possible and necessary, according to Avicenna’s theory of the
modalities, with the notable exception of God.⁴¹ This means, in turn, that these en-
tities are all caused, contingent, and intrinsically composite or complex, i. e., they pos-
sess a multiplicity of essential concomitants and attributes, which prevents them

However, this approach is of little help for our inquiry, since such broad categories as ‘existence in
the concrete’ (fī l-aʿyān) can encompass beings as different as a horse and a separate intellect, while
throwing little or no light on how they exist; the same applies to intelligible existence, which can be
that of a concept in the mind or of a separate intellect. Hence, quite confusingly, the expression fī l-
aʿyān can encompass beings possessing either a material or an immaterial existence, the latter having
a kind of intellectual existence which is comparable in some regards to those entities that exist in the
intellect (fī l-ʿaql), which are also immaterial. Hence, it is inaccurate to describe these various entities
as sharing a similar mode of existence simply on account of their being in the extramental concrete
world or fī l-aʿyān. Much more helpful and precise is to approach them through the various modes
and aspects that Avicenna outlines in connection with tashkīk al-wujūd.
 The aḥkām are what enable the fragmentation and modulation of the senses of being, although
these are tied together by a focal meaning and pros hen attribution. This issue as it crystallizes in Avi-
cenna’s works emerges partly from the challenge of having to reconcile Aristotle’s various claims
about the predication of being as well as the various interpretations articulated by later commenta-
tors. For Avicenna, one particularly daunting question appears to have been the following: if being
remains closer to a univocal notion—which it presumably must in order for the metaphysical inves-
tigation to be possible and coherent—then in what way are we justified in speaking of its various
senses (maʿānī), and what can account for them? Although Avicenna inherited some of the key ele-
ments of his interpretation from the earlier Graeco-Arabic tradition, he contributed significantly to
this issue by systematizing a theory of tashkīk al-wujūd, which not only rests on the notion of a
focal meaning and integrates the notion of pros hen predication, but also systematically outlines a
cluster of modes that ‘perform’ and can ‘account for’ the modulation of being.
 The First is the only exception to this rule, since It is absolutely necessary and necessary in Itself.
But the distinction between ‘the possible’ and ‘the necessary’ applies jointly to all the other beings,
and so in itself provides only limited insight into their mode of existence. Other modes or aspects of
tashkīk must be implemented to refine the analysis.
 1 The simple, irreducible, and prior existence of pure quiddity 449

from existing autonomously. Accordingly, each one of these existents requires an ex-
ternal cause. In Avicennian parlance, each one of these existents is ‘possible of ex-
istence in itself’ and ‘necessary of existence through another.’ What is more, each
one will be conditioned, since its very quiddity determines what kind of existence
it can have and also what kind of cause it can have. Thus, the modalities intersect
with some of the other aspects of tashkīk Avicenna outlines in his works, notably pri-
ority and posteriority (al-taqaddum wa-l-taʾakhkhur), autonomy and need (al-istigh-
nāʾ wa-l-ḥājjah), and primary and secondary/relevance and priority. These various
sets of distinctions are to some extent interrelated and mutually dependent on one
another. For example, what is possible and contingent will necessarily be ‘in need’
of a cause, and it may also be ‘secondary’ and ‘posterior’ with regard to that
cause. The various modes of tashkīk are therefore complementary and interconnect-
ed, rather than exclusive and incompatible.

1.2.3 Tashkīk, the theological inquiry, and essential being

There is another issue that calls for attention. As Treiger insightfully suggested in his
article, Avicenna appears to have devised the theory of ontological modulation partly
as a solution to the problem of how God could be said to exist, and, thus, to differ-
entiate between a divine mode of existence and other modes of existence, while at
the same time skirting the pitfalls associated with the strict univocity and equivocity
of being.⁴² This hypothesis had been previously suggested, albeit much more implic-
itly, in an article by Toby Mayer dealing mostly with the reception of Avicenna’s theo-
ry of tashkīk in the later Islamic tradition.⁴³ This would endow tashkīk with a tran-
scendental or theological dimension extending beyond the purely predicamental
or categorial level. But here we need to engage in a bit of additional analysis to con-
firm this hypothesis, all the more so because this issue has recently proven some-
what controversial in the literature.⁴⁴ It is a fact that Avicenna often mentions the

 Treiger, Avicenna’s Notion, especially 329‒330 and 360‒362. This is why Treiger in his article re-
fers to tashkīk al-wujūd as a kind of “transcendental modulation,” in that its range of application tran-
scends the categories and the predicamental level and encompasses the divine beings as well.
 Mayer, Faḫr ad-Dīn, 214 ff., is extremely cautious—and one might add, ambiguous—regarding Avi-
cenna’s endorsement of tashkīk and the issue of its application to his theology. He teases out the con-
tradictions regarding Avicenna’s view of tashkīk in The Cure and in Discussions and interprets the lat-
ter text as a key transitional moment between Avicenna’s interpretation of ontological modulation
and that of later authors, such as Ṭūsī, who explicitly apply it to their theology. Yet, it seems that
Mayer does allow for the possibility that this trend has its incipiency in Avicenna. Mayer, however,
focuses most of his analysis on the aspect of strength and weakness (al-shiddah wa-l-ḍuʿf) of
being, which is arguably the least important of all the modes of tashkīk for Avicenna, although it
does play an important role in the later Islamic tradition.
 See Treiger’s (Avicenna’s Notion, 351‒352) response to Vallat; and Wisnovsky’s (On the Emer-
gence, 293, note 69) response to Treiger. Wisnovsky contests Treiger’s claim of transcendental modu-
lation in Avicenna and makes later thinkers and Avicennian interpreters, notably Ṭūsī and Ḥillī, re-
450 IV The Special Ontological Mode of Quiddity in Itself

modulated terms and ontological modulation in connection with the categories, and
also sometimes in the very context of his commentary on Aristotle’s Categories. In
those passages and others, the master rather tersely indicates that tashkīk applies
to substances (jawāhir) and accidents (aʿrāḍ). In fact, the explanation that being is
said in a modulated way of substances and accidents recurs in numerous passages
of his corpus, surely as an illustration of the kinds of objects tashkīk al-wujūd is sup-
posed to encompass and in order to indicate its most immediate field of application.
Thus, in Elements of Philosophy, in his discussion of the modulated terms, he notes
that “the very term ‘existent’ applies to [both] substance and accident”; in Guidance,
that “the existent [al-mawjūd] is said of substance and accident … by way of modu-
lation [bi-l-tashkīk] and occurs with a single meaning according to priority and pos-
teriority”; and in Philosophical Compendium, that “existence first belongs to sub-
stance, and only through substance, to other things [i. e., accidents] … and this is
called ‘modulated’ [mushakkik].” Now, since most, albeit not all, of these statements
occur in a logical context, and since it is these texts that have received the lion’s
share of the attention when it comes to modulation, it is easy to misconceive that
tashkīk would be limited strictly to the categories and have no real application be-
yond the investigation of concrete primary substances and their accidents.
But this conclusion would be hasty. We saw above that tashkīk undeniably plays
a role in Avicenna’s metaphysical works and in the metaphysical inquiry as he con-
ceives it. I suggested above that it makes an implicit appearance in at least two key

sponsible for transferring tashkīk to the transcendental level. On my view, there is no ground for de-
nying a priori the theological relevance of tashkīk al-wujūd in Avicenna’s works; quite the contrary. By
implication, this means that, in this case as well, later authors such as Ṭūsī and Ḥillī are not so much
elaborating a new doctrine as re-interpreting Avicenna to further their own theological agendas and
to address specific concerns arising from their respective socio-political contexts. In this regard, I
think Shahrastānī was being quite perceptive when he argues in Struggling with the Philosopher
that Avicenna, realizing that existence cannot apply in exactly the same way to God and to the com-
posite and caused existents of his ontology, decided to introduce the category of modulated or am-
biguous terms (asmāʾ mushakkikah) as a way of skirting a rigid univocity and equivocity of being; yet,
on Shahrastānī’s mind, Avicenna’s project ultimately failed, and the latter ended up upholding a kind
of univocity that makes existence a single genus for all things whose species would be ‘possible ex-
istence’ and ‘necessary existence.’ In contrast to Shahrastānī, however, I do not think that the prob-
lem or incentive in Avicenna’s eyes had to do with the modalities. For the idea that God alone is Nec-
essary of Existence in Itself is clear and compelling in the context of Avicenna’s philosophy, and it is a
doctrine that the master defended consistently his entire life. Rather, as I see it, the problem Avicenna
was grappling with pertains to how the generic notion of ‘realized existence’ (wujūd muḥaṣṣal) and
‘established or affirmed existence’ (wujūd ithbātī) mentioned in Metaphysics I.5 could be differenti-
ated when applied to God and to the other beings, and whether they could be applied to God at
all in the first place. It is because this most general and indiscriminate notion of realized existence
does not apply in certain cases that Avicenna, I would surmise, felt the need to introduce further on-
tological distinctions and qualifications and, ultimately, to propose other modes and senses of exis-
tence. As I try to show here, the notion of realized existence ultimately proved inadequate to describe
the ontological mode of pure quiddity, as it did also to describe God’s special mode of existence.
 1 The simple, irreducible, and prior existence of pure quiddity 451

passages of Metaphysics of The Cure, in chapters I.5 and then again (and especially)
in VI.3. This is congruent with Avicenna’s understanding of metaphysics as a science.
Since, on his view, metaphysics is designed to study not only material and concrete
existents and their accidents, but also the fundamental principles of these beings,
which happen to be immaterial beings, it is only sensible that tashkīk should
apply to them as well. There are a few important elements that would seem to con-
firm such a hypothesis. First, recall that, for Avicenna, substance (jawhar) is not lim-
ited to hylomorphic form and matter and their composition, i. e., to the principles of
the concrete primary substances, but also includes intellect or immaterial form or
what Avicenna calls in Elements of Philosophy, “quiddity without matter.” “Quiddity
without matter” (māhiyyah bi-lā māddah) is not only one of the definitions of jawhar
Avicenna provides in that passage, it is also the first and—in the order of existence—
the most important one. In this divine or superlunary context, immaterial form, in-
tellect, and substance refers to one and the same thing. Thus, given that for Avicenna
substance extends beyond the hylomorphic and encompasses the intellectual beings,
such as the separate existents, then it only makes sense that tashkīk would apply to
them as well.⁴⁵
The second element has to do with the various aspects of tashkīk as outlined
above. If I am correct in suggesting that the Avicennian theory of tashkīk rests on
a systematic and distinctive set of modes (sing., ḥukm, naḥw), and if, among these
modes, one finds the notions of priority (taqaddum), deservedness (awlā), necessity
(wujūb, wājib), and autonomy (istighnāʾ), then it would be inconceivable that Avicen-
na had not intended to apply tashkīk al-wujūd to God and to the separate intellects as
well. For God, on Avicenna’s mind, is prior, necessary, most deserving, and autono-
mous vis-à-vis all other existents. In fact, it is precisely on the basis of these anḥāʾ or
aḥkām of ontological modulation that the shaykh is able to differentiate between
God’s mode of existence and that of all the other things, including that of the
other eternal beings of his cosmology. More specifically, the ḥukm of ‘the possible’
and ‘the necessary’ assumes a vital importance in the metaphysical framework Avi-
cenna articulated in order to set the First apart from all other things and to allocate to
God a special and unique mode of existence, since God’s existence is not possible in
any way, but necessary in itself.⁴⁶ Hence, rather than excluding theological consid-

 Kalbarczyk, Predication, 225‒227, on the fact that substance, for Avicenna, includes the immate-
rial beings. Kalbarczyk argues that Avicenna broke away from a “Plotinian-Porphyrian paradigm,” to
which Fārābī before him had adhered, and which consisted in limiting the categories to concrete
things. Avicenna, like many other Arabic philosophers, is sometimes reluctant to call God a sub-
stance or jawhar. But substance, for Avicenna, is also intellect, and God is an intellect, and so, on
one special construal of the term, God must be a substance.
 For Avicenna’s project of elaborating a metaphysical framework that enables him to distinguish
between various classes of eternal beings, i. e., between God and the separate intellects, see Wisnov-
sky, Avicenna. Mayer, Faḫr ad-Dīn, focuses on the least important aspect of tashkīk in his discussion
of Avicenna (strength and weakness of existence). It is also one that Avicenna at times explicitly ex-
cludes from ontological modulation. This probably explains why Mayer is uncertain about whether
452 IV The Special Ontological Mode of Quiddity in Itself

erations, the theory of tashkīk al-wujūd would seem to culminate with them, and
more precisely with Avicenna’s proof of God as the only being that is necessary of
existence in itself. The fact that Avicenna also regards ‘the one’ (al-wāḥid) as a modu-
lated notion strongly supports this view. Otherwise, how could the oneness of God be
affirmed, while at the same time being contrasted to the oneness of all other things?
Existence, necessity, and oneness are all subject to modulation, and it is thanks to
this that they can be applied to both the categorial and supracategorial entities of
Avicenna’s ontology.
While some of the distinctions and notions provided above apply only to contin-
gent beings and seem therefore to pertain chiefly to the predicamental level (e. g.,
possibility, priority in time, causal dependency), others (necessity, essential priority,
autonomy) seem particularly relevant to a discussion of the special ontological mode
of the First. In other words, it appears that some of the ontological notions and as-
pects associated with tashkīk can be applied to God in addition to the caused con-
crete existents of the sublunary world. One of their functions would be to differenti-
ate between different classes of beings and explain how God’s mode of existence is
unique and an exception—or even a metaphysical aberration—when compared to all
the other existents that make up the dual realm of al-wujūdayn. This, after all, is the
alleged purpose of tashkīk as Avicenna enounces it: to help account for and establish
differences (ikhtilāfāt) according to which being is predicated of things.
In the final analysis, tashkīk, far from being devoid of theological or metaphys-
ical relevance, would appear to occupy a central place in Avicenna’s conception of
the metaphysical inquiry, since it enables a wide array of subtle distinctions to be
drawn regarding the state or mode of existence of things. It is foundational in ac-
counting for the various modes of existence in Avicenna’s ontology, not only between
substances and accidents, but also between different kinds of substances. Ultimately,
one primary purpose of tashkīk al-wujūd would be to distinguish God’s unique mode
of existence from the ontological modes of all the other beings. The propositions that
God’s existence is essentially prior; absolutely necessary; autonomous and without a
cause; most deserving of existence, etc., which all correspond to aḥkām or anḥāʾ of
tashkīk, indicate that ontological modulation applies to the transcendental beings in
addition to the beings of the categories. In that sense, tashkīk directly underpins Avi-
cenna’s theological project or special ontology in addition to his general ontology.
There is quite decisive textual evidence to the effect that Avicenna extends tashkīk
al-wujūd to God as well. It can be found in the following passage of Discussions,
which, surprisingly, was cited neither by Mayer nor by Treiger in their articles:

Text 28: As for applying ‘existence’ [wujūd] to the First [al-awwal] and to what comes after It,
[this notion] is not among the equivocal terms [al-alfāẓ al-mushtarakah], but rather among

the Avicennian tashkīk applies to the divine being. But I believe that including the other aspects of
modulation removes this ambiguity entirely.
 1 The simple, irreducible, and prior existence of pure quiddity 453

the modulated terms [al-alfāẓ al-mushakkikah]. And so the referents of the modulated term may
be placed [i. e., studied] in a single science.⁴⁷

 Avicenna, Discussions, section 692, 232; I read tudkhalu instead of yudkhalu, which does not make
sense grammatically. The above passage seems quite decisive in settling the issue of the theological
applicability of tashkīk al-wujūd. But there are two counterarguments that can be submitted and need
to be addressed here. The first is that Discussions should be regarded as an Avicennizing work, or a
work emanating from Avicenna’s circle, rather than an Avicennian work proper, so that the doctrines
it contains cannot forthrightly be ascribed to the master himself. The second point is that Avicenna in
Notes (section 989, 563) appears to say the exact opposite of what is asserted in this passage of Dis-
cussion. This excerpt, as it is edited in the main text, reads as follows: “Since ‘existence not in a sub-
ject’ [al-wujūd lā fī mawḍūʿ] is not predicated of the existence of the Necessary Existent [viz., God] and
the existence of the rest of the existents according to univocity or modulation [lam yakun bi-l-tawāṭuʾ
wa-lā bi-l-tashkīk], the predicate ‘existence not in a subject’ is said neither according to genus nor to
modulation [laysa ḥamlan jinsiyyan wa-lā bi-l-tashkīk]. Likewise, the consideration of modulation
[iʿtibār al-tashkīk] with regard to the existence of accidents and substances is also annulled.” In
fact, neither argument is really tenable upon closer examination. With regard to the first, it is true
that the late works Notes and Discussions display some minor departures from Avicenna, but they
are by and large quite faithful to the main doctrines the master puts forth in his other works.
What does change in these works, one might say, is the emphasis placed on certain questions or
themes under discussion, as well as the mode of exposition. When it comes to tashkīk in particular,
the previous detailed analysis of this theory and the evidence culled from Avicenna’s main philo-
sophical works should make it clear that section 692 of Discussions is fully compatible with, and ex-
plicitly formulates, views and ideas that are articulated more implicitly by the master in his other
works. The onus is therefore on those critics who would challenge the authenticity of this passage
of Discussions, since they would have to ignore, or do away with, much independent evidence that
coheres with it. The second point is more delicate and requires some philological investigation. Al-
though both Badawi and Mousavian—who produced the two main modern editions of Notes—
opted to keep this variant of section 989, it is quite blatantly corrupt and would need to be drastically
revised. I suspect it was tampered with by a later scribe who was hostile to the theory of tashkīk. But
in the critical apparatus of his edition (563, notes 5 and 6), Mousavian lists an alternative reading that
radically changes the meaning of the passage. If these variants are retained, they yield the following
reading, which coheres perfectly with Avicenna’s view on tashkīk as exposed above: “Since ‘existence
not in a subject’ [al-wujūd lā fī mawḍūʿ] is not predicated of the existence of the Necessary Existent
[viz., God] and the existence of the rest of the existents according to univocity, but by modulation [lam
yakun bi-l-tawāṭuʾ bal bi-l-tashkīk], the predicate ‘existence not in a subject’ is not said according to
genus, because predication by genus is not said by modulation [laysa ḥamlan jinsiyyan li-anna ḥaml al-
jins lā bi-l-tashkīk].” As we can see, with this variant the meaning of the passage shifts entirely and
amounts to a vindication of the transcendental scope of tashkīk al-wujūd. The point—which is well
established in Avicenna’s other works—would be that tashkīk is incompatible with regarding exis-
tence as a genus and thus in a strictly univocal way. It should be noted that in Discussions (sections
647 and 648, 218) Avicenna articulates this very argument to substantiate modulation: it is valid pre-
cisely because existence is not predicated as a genus (jins). In spite of this, the reconstruction sug-
gested above still excludes the last sentence of the passage in Notes, for which Mousavian provides
no alternative reading. But it is so plainly at odds with what Avicenna stresses elsewhere—namely,
that existence applies in a modulated way to substances and accidents—that it cannot be retained
either, although more research into the manuscript transmission of Notes is required to amend it.
Overall, then, and given these manuscript variants, this section of Notes has to be regarded as (orig-
454 IV The Special Ontological Mode of Quiddity in Itself

In this section of Discussions Avicenna explicitly applies tashkīk al-wujūd to God, in

addition to the caused entities, thereby showing the theological implication of this
doctrine. The latter’s ontological scope is therefore inclusive not only of sublunary
substances and accidents, but also of the immaterial beings that are the separate in-
tellects, as well as of God as the only being that is necessary of existence in itself.
This move makes perfect sense when placed in the broader context of Avicenna’s
analysis of being and his conception of metaphysics as a science. For being, on his
mind, must be studied by a single science. This is true not only of being qua being, or
of being in its most general or abstract conceptualization, but also of God’s mode of
existence, which falls under the subject matter of metaphysics. Now, since Avicenna,
as we saw earlier, rejects the strict univocity of being, he must either embrace its
equivocity—which would threaten the unity and systematicity of the metaphysical in-
quiry as he conceives it—or—and this is the third option—its modulation (tashkīk).
Only the last option enables him to avoid the pitfalls of univocity and equivocity
and to preserve the unity of metaphysics as a science that studies being qua being
as well as God’s special existence. This process of elimination seems to confirm
the place of tashkīk at the very heart of Avicenna’s metaphysical project. According
to the master, it is the dual ontological and theological scope of tashkīk al-wujūd that
ensures the unity and validity of metaphysics as a single, integrated science.⁴⁸
It should be noted that Avicenna extends this approach to other notions as well.
In his commentary on ‘The Chapter of Pure Faith’ (Sūrat al-Ikhlāṣ) of the Qurʾān, the
master argues that oneness can be predicated of God and of all other things only “in
a modulated way” (bi-l-tashkīk).⁴⁹ Accordingly, God is one in the truest and strongest
sense, since His essence cannot be divided in any way, whereas other things are one
in a lesser sense, because they can be divided either conceptually or physically. As
Daniel De Smet and Meryem Sebti have shown, much of the material that can be
found in this text is commensurate with the philosophical views Avicenna expresses
in his core works.⁵⁰ In this particular case, the idea that oneness applies to God and
the caused entities only through modulation seems perfectly aligned with the evi-
dence I reviewed, especially the passage of Discussions mentioned above. Not only
does ontological modulation encompass the divine being, but it would seem that

inally) endorsing ontological modulation, rather than excluding it. Like the cognate passage in Dis-
cussions, it also explicitly extends tashkīk to God in addition to the caused existents.
 It is because wujūd applies to God and the caused existents not in an equivocal way, but by means
of modulation, that the various instances of being are treated by the single science of metaphysics;
see Discussions, section 690, 232, where the master argues that if existence is equivocal (min al-asmāʾ
al-mushtarakah), then this would mean that the necessary of existence would not fall within the
scope of the metaphysical investigation. As we can see, tashkīk is intimately connected in Avicenna’s
mind with the coherence and unity of the metaphysical enterprise.
 Avicenna, Commentary on ‘The Chapter of Pure Faith,’ 109.13‒110.11.
 De Smet and Sebti, Avicenna’s Philosophical Approach.
 1 The simple, irreducible, and prior existence of pure quiddity 455

the other notions Avicenna ascribes to Him, such as oneness and necessity, should
be equally understood according to this modulationist approach.
In hindsight, Mayer’s intimation and Treiger’s argument regarding the transcen-
dental nature of tashkīk appear to be fully substantiated. Nevertheless, there is one
remarkable upshot from the foregoing, which was picked up neither by Mayer nor
Treiger, and which to my knowledge has not been highlighted in the previous schol-
arship on tashkīk. If ontological modulation applies to God as well, as seems to be
the case, then it would include at least one instance—but a highly significant one
at that—of essential being. In other words, tashkīk would also include God’s special
mode of existence, His proper existence, which is essential being or being per se in
the strictest sense. It is this essential being that would set Him apart from the exis-
tence of all the other quiddities.⁵¹ By further implication, tashkīk would encompass
not only existence construed as an external and non-essential concomitant of es-
sence, a lāzim or lāḥiq, but also essential, intrinsic, and uncaused existence. Return-
ing to the passage of Philosophical Compendium mentioned in the course of the anal-
ysis of the various aspects of tashkīk, one understands better why Avicenna discusses
essential being or being per se (maʿnā-ye dhātī) and per accidens (maʿnā-ye ʿaraḍī) in
his exposition of tashkīk in that passage, and why he also contrasts proper or specific
existence (hastī-ye khāṣṣ) and general existence (hastī-ye ʿāmm). If ontological mod-
ulation encompasses the divine essence, as much evidence seems to indicate, then it
must per force include the essential being of God and His proper existence. Un-
caused, essential existence vs. caused, external, concomitant or accidental existence
thus emerges as a crucial distinction or aspect involved in the modulation of wujūd.
It is remarkable that these various aspects of ontological modulation, as well as
the correlation between ontological modulation and the divine essential being, are
later picked up by Bahmanyār, one of Avicenna’s leading disciples. In his magnum
opus entitled The Book of Validated Knowledge, Bahmanyār argues that wujūd is
not a genus and is not predicated univocally of things; rather, it is a modulated no-
tion.⁵² He then proceeds to enumerate the various aspects that underpin ontological
modulation, which he derives directly from Avicenna’s works, notably ‘being caused’
and ‘being uncaused,’ priority and posteriority, and strength and weakness.⁵³ In an-
other passage of the same work, Bahmanyār modifies this list somewhat and men-

 Treiger, Avicenna’s Notion, 362‒363, comes close to this argument, but does not develop the no-
tion of essential being. Nevertheless, he does implicitly acknowledge the role of quiddity in tashkīk al-
wujūd when he writes: “in Avicenna’s view, existence is differentiated into the Necessarily Existent
and the contingent existents, and further into the ten categories. It is differentiated not as a genus
(or a quasi-genus) by differentiae, but by the very quiddities of the things of which it is predicated;
this becomes possible precisely because it does not form a part, and is not a constituent of, these
quiddities.” But in the unique case of the Necessary Existent, Whom Treiger includes in tashkīk,
and in Whom essence and existence are one, this reasoning implies a kind of essential being.
 Bahmanyār, The Book of Validated Knowledge, 28.9‒11; 281.10‒12; 282.1; 301.13‒302.1.
 Bahmanyār, The Book of Validated Knowledge, 281.10‒13.
456 IV The Special Ontological Mode of Quiddity in Itself

tions instead priority and posteriority, autonomy and need, and necessity and possi-
bility. These aspects are also found in a shorter metaphysical treatise penned by the
same author.⁵⁴ Basing himself directly on the master, Bahmanyār notes that these are
the ‘aspects’ or ‘modes’ (aḥkām) by which wujūd is modulated. Furthermore, it is ap-
parent from these texts that Bahmanyār extends tashkīk al-wujūd to God. In this con-
nection, he states the following in The Book of Validated Knowledge:

Know that existence [wujūd] is predicated of what is under it by way of modulation [tashkīk], not
by way of univocity. The meaning of this is that the existence that does not have a cause [al-
wujūd alladhī lā sababa lahu] is prior in essence [muqaddim bi-l-ṭabʿ] to the existence that
has a cause. Likewise, the existence of substance is prior to the existence of accident.⁵⁵

This passage argues that being caused and being uncaused are modes that modulate
existence. In this connection, “existence that does not have a cause” appears to be a
reference to the First, whose existence is fully and unconditionally autonomous and
uncaused. The hypothesis that Bahmanyār has the First in mind in that passage is
substantiated some pages later, when he defines “the existent that is necessary in
itself,” i. e., God, as “that which has no cause” (al-mawjūd al-wājib bi-dhātihi aʿnī al-
ladhī lā sababa lahu).⁵⁶ What is more, Bahmanyār, following Avicenna, defines on-
tological modulation in terms of priority, and more specifically in this case, in
terms of essential priority. Thus, uncaused existence is prior in essence (muqaddim
bi-l-ṭabʿ) over caused existence. Again, this seems to be a thinly veiled reference to
the priority of God’s essential being over that of the caused and realized existence
of His effects. Bahmanyār further argues that whereas the existence of all the caused
entities is “accidental” (ʿaraḍ) and “a concomitant” (lāzim) of their essence, un-
caused existence is not accidental, nor is it an external concomitant of essence,
with the implication that it is essential.⁵⁷ Only God, the necessary existent, has
this kind of uncaused and essential existence.⁵⁸ In sum, Bahmanyār in these texts
appears to endorse three crucial features of Avicenna’s theory of existence or
wujūd: (a) that it is a modulated notion, and that its modulation depends on various
sets of modes, the most important of which is priority and posteriority; (b) that on-
tological modulation applies to God as well, inasmuch as it encompasses the distinc-
tion between uncaused existence and caused existence (as well as that between ne-
cessity and possibility, and autonomy and need); and that, as a corollary, (c)

 Bahmanyār, The Book of Validated Knowledge, 529.13‒15; idem, Treatise on the Subject Matter of
Metaphysics, 14.8‒11.
 Bahmanyār, The Book of Validated Knowledge, 281.10‒12.
 Bahmanyār, The Book of Validated Knowledge, 284.15.
 Bahmanyār, The Book of Validated Knowledge, 282.2 and 14‒15.
 Bahmanyār, The Book of Validated Knowledge, 283.6; 284.15‒16; and 530.11‒13 where it is said that
“God’s essential [or true] reality is existence” (ḥaqīqatuhu l-wujūd); idem, Treatise on the Subject Mat-
ter of Metaphysics, 15‒16.
 1 The simple, irreducible, and prior existence of pure quiddity 457

ontological modulation also deals with essential and uncaused being and with what
is ‘prior in essence’ taken in an absolute sense.
These doctrinal points were later thoroughly integrated in the theological sys-
tems of the most prominent Muslim thinkers of the following centuries, such as
Jurjānī, Ṭūsī, and Ḥillī. These later commentators mostly retained the theological po-
tential of ontological modulation and did not hesitate to implement it in their discus-
sions of God’s existence. The notion of tashkīk was thus thoroughly ‘theologized’ and
applied specifically to the topic of divine essence and existence. This process can be
observed in Jurjānī’s Definitions, where the three aspects of tashkīk that are outlined
by this author are defined expressly in reference to ‘the necessary’ (al-wājib), viz., the
Necessary of Existence.⁵⁹ A similar, yet amplified, phenomenon occurs in the earlier
works of Ṭūsī. As Mayer, and more recently Wisnovsky, have shown, Ṭūsī extends on-
tological modulation to his theological disquisitions, notably in his Commentary on
Pointers. He also relies on it heavily in his response to Shahrastānī’s critique of Avi-
cennian ontology.⁶⁰ What is remarkable here is that, on Naṣīr al-Dīn’s theological
model, tashkīk comprises God’s proper existence (wujūd khāṣṣ), a notion which con-
stitutes the cornerstone of his account of how God’s existence can be differentiated
from that of the caused entities.⁶¹ Thus, Ṭūsī writes, “according to Avicenna, the ge-
neric existence [al-wujūd al-mushtarak] that can be divided into the necessary and
possible is other than the existence that is necessary in itself [or in its very essence,
li-dhātihi].”⁶² Since tashkīk encompasses God’s being, and since God’s being is proper
being and essential being (as Ṭūsī contends), then tashkīk also includes God’s proper
being.
Now, although both Mayer and Wisnovsky appear to regard the extension of
tashkīk al-wujūd to theology as a deliberate elaboration—and ultimately as an inno-
vation—on Ṭūsī’s part, the foregoing analysis enables us to seriously consider the
possibility that this move had already been anticipated by Avicenna himself. It is
true that Ṭūsī focuses intently on the intensity and weakness (al-shiddah wa-l-ḍuʿf)
aspect of modulation, which plays a negligible role in Avicenna’s philosophy. But
the fundamental ideas that tashkīk extends to the divine being; that it therefore in-
cludes the essential being of God and His proper existence; and that it serves to dif-
ferentiate between this special case of essential being, on the one hand, and the ex-

 Jurjānī, Definitions, 86‒87. Jurjānī bases his account of the aspects of tashkīk directly on the Avi-
cennian texts, although their connection to the notion of ‘the necessary’ appears to be his own elab-
oration.
 See Mayer, Faḫr ad-Dīn; and Wisnovsky, On the Emergence. The key texts in Ṭūsī are Commentary
on Pointers, vols. 3‒4, 458‒461, and Downfalls, 55.17‒62.17. Mayer (202, note 17) makes it a point to
reject the theory of esse essentiae, but it did not occur to him that the theory of ontological modula-
tion the Avicennian thinkers extend to God constitutes a case of essential being. I do not address here
the thorny issue of whether God can truly be said to have an essence; for this issue see section 2.4.
 Ṭūsī, Commentary on Pointers, vols. 3‒4, 461.12‒24.
 Ṭūsī, Downfalls, 70.11‒12.
458 IV The Special Ontological Mode of Quiddity in Itself

ternal, concomitant, and accidental existence of all the other entities, on the other,
seem firmly rooted in Avicenna’s own understanding of ontological modulation.
Without denying philosophical acumen to later commentators such as Jurjānī,
Ṭūsī, and Ḥillī, I would nevertheless argue that this theory was implicitly developed
by Avicenna himself, who, as in many other cases, should be regarded as its origina-
tor. The key point I am trying to make here is that the connection between God’s es-
sential being and ontological modulation, or, put differently, the recognition of the
transcendental and theological potential of tashkīk, which were certainly well estab-
lished by Ṭūsī’s time and formed the cornerstone of his theological argumentation,
can be traced back to Avicenna’s own works. They emerge as a logical outcome of the
previous analysis of tashkīk in the master’s philosophy.
But this in turn raises a tantalizing thought: if ontological modulation encom-
passes the divine existence as something that can be considered purely ‘in itself,’
as something essential, intrinsic, and irreducible, then could it be extended to all
the quiddities regarded solely ‘in themselves’? My hypothesis at this juncture is
that there is the distinct possibility that Avicenna also regarded pure quiddity as an-
other ontological exception, albeit one which, like God’s special existence, would fall
under the various modes posited by the theory of tashkīk. As in the case of God, pure
quiddity does not fit in the basic ontological framework Avicenna applies to all
caused beings, so tashkīk could serve as a way to bypass this problem by enabling
a certain mode and sense of existence to be attributed specifically to pure quiddity,
in contradistinction to the ones ascribed to the caused and composite substances.
Accordingly, there would be a need to postulate an additional mode of existence
in Avicenna’s ontology, which, a priori, would correspond neither to God’s mode,
nor to the ontological mode associated with complex mental and concrete entities.
The methodological justification for asserting this hypothesis is rooted in Avicen-
na’s theory of modulation, which allows for extremely nuanced and tenuously cog-
nate senses of being to be predicated of different things. But, at core, this hypothesis
emerges from what Avicenna himself says about essence and ontological modula-
tion: pure quiddity, he tells us, has existence (wujūd) and is prior (mutaqaddim),
and priority is one of the ways—perhaps the main way—in which existence can be
modulated through the lens of tashkīk. Furthermore, we saw above that there
seems to be a connection, which remains to be fleshed out, between essential
being and tashkīk, at the very least in the special case of God. This would seem to
validate a more general investigation into the issue of whether pure quiddity also
has a kind of essential being that falls within the scope of tashkīk. Finally, additional
doctrinal momentum for this idea can be found in the narrow relationship between
substance and quiddity Avicenna promotes, as is reflected in the passage from Ele-
ments of Philosophy cited above, where jawhar is glossed in terms of māhiyyah. For
recall that, according to the theory of ontological modulation, existence belongs
first and foremost to substance. But if jawhar is primarily māhiyyah, how does this
impact the ontology of quiddity? This requires exploring the interface between sub-
 1 The simple, irreducible, and prior existence of pure quiddity 459

stance and essence in Avicenna’s philosophy, which is another task picked up

below.⁶³
In this connection, one understands why tashkīk may prove such a helpful tool to
qualify quiddity. Quiddity exists in different contexts and under different aspects, de-
pending on whether it is taken ‘in itself’ or ‘with other things.’ Although all of these
ontological aspects and contexts refer back to a single and overarching concept of
existence (wujūd), it would be misleading to speak of them in a strictly univocal man-
ner or, alternatively, to reduce them to the two contexts of complex and contingent
existence Avicenna routinely describes in his works (i. e., intellectual and concrete,
or al-wujūdayn).⁶⁴ This is because (a) universal mental existence, (b) individual con-
crete existence, (c) God’s existence, and (d) the existence of pure quiddity, present
significant differences (ikhtilāfāt), which can be accounted for by modulation, but
not by a purely univocal kind of predication. What is more, the analysis suggests
that these are different ontological modes that can be distinguished according to
the various elements or aspects that make up the modulationist theory. Since exis-
tence is not predicated univocally for Avicenna, and since, as we saw in chapter
II, pure quiddity seems at the very least to possess a distinct mode of intelligible ex-
istence in the mind, the theory of ontological modulation would appear to lead to the
postulation of various distinct modes of existence.
It was argued in previous parts of this book that to the unconditioned and abso-
lute aspect of pure quiddity corresponds a distinct, irreducible, and simple mode of
essential being that transcends the various contexts of existence. I intend in what fol-
lows to pursue this argument in light of tashkīk and its various aspects. It should be
recalled, however, that the problem of how quiddity can be said to exist is com-
pounded by the fact that it is found in different contexts and together with other
things. Essence spans the realm of concrete beings and the sphere of universal
forms in the human intellect. It also coincides (as I shall argue in chapter V) with
God’s perfectly unitary essence and self-intellection. When it is taken ‘with other
things,’ namely, its concomitants, quiddity can be said in a sense to share in the
other modes of conditioned, composite, and contingent existence that constitute
al-wujūdayn, e. g., the mode of existence of the concrete horse and of the universal
horse. Yet, pure quiddity possesses its own distinct mode of existence regardless
of these various contexts. Thus, it should not be collapsed with the other two general
modes or contexts (al-wujūdayn), which Avicenna reserves for composite or complex

 My point here is not that quiddity per se is subject to modulation, for essence in a logical context
is predicated univocally of things; for instance, ‘animalness’ does not apply more to horse than to
human, or vice versa, but is predicated equally of both. Rather, I am suggesting that the being or ex-
istence of essence could fall within the scope of tashkīk and be subjected to some of its aspects.
 As I mentioned above, for many of the later Avicennian commentators as well, such as Ṭūsī, ex-
istence is not strictly a univocal concept, but a modulated one, very much along the lines advocated
by the master himself; see Commentary on Pointers, vol. 3‒4, 462.8‒11; Mayer, Faḫr ad-Dīn; and Wis-
novsky, On the Emergence.
460 IV The Special Ontological Mode of Quiddity in Itself

substances. Now, given his theory of ontological modulation (which prevents wujūd
from being construed in a strictly univocal way), one may say that, in his metaphys-
ical system, things exist according to different modes and, hence, ultimately, in dif-
ferent ways, even though the focal meaning of existence remains fundamentally the
same in these various contexts. One of these ontological differences—and arguably
the most important one, as we saw—revolves around the concepts of priority and
posteriority, which, on Avicenna’s mind, directly inform tashkīk. Because of its cen-
tral position in Avicenna’s ontology, and because Avicenna also explicitly describes
pure quiddity as being prior in existence, the investigation must now turn to this
mode of modulation in order to cast more light on the ontological status of pure
quiddity.

1.3 Tashkīk and ontological and essential priority

In the foregoing we saw that Avicenna conceives of the modulation of being—or of

wujūd considered as a modulated term (ism mushakkik)—as consisting of various on-
tological aspects or modes (anḥāʾ, aḥkām). Together they can account for the differ-
ences (ikhtilāfāt) in the way this notion is predicated of things. Arguably the most
important of these, together with the modalities of ‘the possible’ and ‘the necessary,’
is the dual notion of priority and posteriority (al-taqaddum wa-l-taʾakhkhur).⁶⁵ It is
this aspect that is systematically connected with the ontological investigation into
substances and accidents. For, according to Greek and Arabic Aristotelians, substan-
ces are prior to accidents, and some substances are prior to other substances and
some accidents to other accidents. All of this harks back to some passages in Aris-
totle regarding variations in the way being is predicated, such as Metaphysics
IV.1.1003b16‒18, which establishes the primacy of substance, “on which the other
things depend”; VII.4.1030a21‒22, where existence is said to belong “to one sort of
thing primarily and to others in a secondary way”; and especially V.1.1019a1‒11,
where Aristotle states that “some things are called prior … in respect of nature

 These notions, of course, correspond to the per prius et posterius of the Latin scholastic tradition.
As I explained above, the correlation of priority and posteriority with the special class of ‘ambigu-
ous,’ ‘analogical,’ or ‘modulated’ terms—that is, terms lying between univocal terms and equivocal
terms—harks back to passages in Aristotle and especially to the later commentaries on his works, no-
tably those of Alexander and Porphyry (see Wolfson, The Amphibolous Terms, 153; de Libera, Les
sources; and Treiger, Avicenna’s Notion). In the Arabic tradition, it becomes standard, at least
from the time of Fārābī onward (Answers to Questions Posed, 321‒322, section 15), to construe the
asmāʾ mushakkikah and tashkīk chiefly in terms of priority and posteriority. This becomes true partic-
ularly of tashkīk al-wujūd, ontological modulation, which Avicenna elaborates into a systematic and
sophisticated doctrine that incorporates priority in addition to many other notions. Thus, although
the main building blocks of this Avicennian theory are to be found in the previous Greek and Arabic
traditions, nothing there approximates the use and analysis of tashkīk Avicenna implements in his
works.
 1 The simple, irreducible, and prior existence of pure quiddity 461

and substance,” and that “if we consider the various senses of ‘being,’ firstly the
subject is prior, so that substance is prior.” Thus, the Aristotelian conception of
the priority and primacy of substance was bequeathed to Fārābī, Avicenna, and
the other Arabic philosophers via the long line of commentators that flourished in
the interim. Nevertheless, the systematic manner in which the notions of priority/
posteriority become tied to ontological modulation appears as an Avicennian elabo-
ration.
Now, given that for Avicenna priority and posteriority are a key feature of tashkīk
al-wujūd, and perhaps the most important one; that he refers on several occasions to
the priority of pure quiddity and even to its priority ‘in existence’; and that he oth-
erwise also maintains in Metaphysics V.1 that quiddity exists and has existence; then
it stands to reason to presume that the Avicennian notion of tashkīk al-wujūd also
extends to the pure quiddities. As a corollary, Avicenna’s theory of tashkīk would
contribute directly to an ontology of quiddity. My objective in the following para-
graphs is to explore in what way the various ontological modes and distinctions
he introduces to differentiate wujūd can apply to quiddity. The differences and inter-
relationship between them need to be elucidated, especially with regard to how they
apply to quiddity in itself. Nevertheless, this first calls for an exposition of the var-
ious senses of priority in Avicenna’s philosophy. For not only are priority and poste-
riority rich and complex notions; the master also believes that they themselves are
modulated terms and that they possess multifarious aspects. As he writes in Meta-
physics IV.1, “they are predicated according to many aspects” (maqūl ʿalā wujūh ka-
thīrah) and they are said “according to modulation” (ʿalā sabīl al-tashkīk). So it re-
mains as yet unclear exactly which sense of priority, if any, can be ascribed to
quiddity.⁶⁶ The following analysis seeks to disambiguate this point by adumbrating
the various senses of priority Avicenna discusses in his works and exploring how
they relate to tashkīk al-wujūd. The focus is not on the notion of priority per se—a di-
gression that would take us too far from the present topic—but rather on the aspects
of priority that can most readily be connected with those passages in which Avicenna
expressly refers to pure quiddity as ontologically ‘prior.’ Avicenna conveniently out-
lines and discusses various aspects and senses of priority and ‘the prior’ in his

 Avicenna, Metaphysics, IV.1, 163. For the master, priority and posteriority are notions that are said
“in many ways” or “according to different aspects” (ʿalā wujūh kathīrah), and in I.4, 26.13‒15, he also
states that they possess various kinds (aṣnāf) and species (anwāʿ). These notions are thus themselves
modulated. In spite of this, like existence, they share a focal or overarching meaning that binds their
various senses together, allowing us to describe them more precisely as modulated terms and to im-
part to them the same linguistic status as to the term wujūd (i.e., they are all asmāʾ mushakkikah). It is
of course highly significant that Avicenna regards both existence and priority as notions possessing
various aspects and senses, given their intertwinement in his ontological analysis. This suggests that
specific or qualified senses of priority, like specific or qualified senses of existence, can be ascribed to
quiddity, and others to the realized and complex entity taken as a whole (i. e., with its concomitants
and accidents). We see that modulation plays an absolutely crucial role in the way Avicenna perceives
and understands philosophical terminology and concepts.
462 IV The Special Ontological Mode of Quiddity in Itself

works. Perhaps the most famous Avicennian usage of the notion of priority has to do
with his theory of causality, whereby the cause can be said to essentially precede the
effect, even if the two are synchronous in existence (the hand turning the key) or if
the causal act occurs atemporally (the causation of one separate intellect by anoth-
er). Yet, this is only one among many aspects of priority Avicenna discusses in his
works. Accordingly, the immediate task is to distinguish the various aspects of prior-
ity and to assess their relation to tashkīk al-wujūd. Do the various aspects of priority
all refer to ontological modulation in some way? And how do they relate to the on-
tology of quiddity specifically?
A convenient starting point for this inquiry is a passage of Salvation entirely de-
voted to the various senses and aspects of priority.⁶⁷ For the sake of clarity, I adum-
brate them in diagram form below:

Some of these senses of priority had already been discussed at length in chapter VII.4
of Categories, which puts forth an alternative but quite similar scheme:

Another quite lucid and schematic treatment of the question can also be found in
Guidance ⁶⁸:

 Avicenna, Salvation, 540.7‒542.13.

 Avicenna, Guidance, 239‒242.
 1 The simple, irreducible, and prior existence of pure quiddity 463

It should be noted that Bahmanyār provides a similar scheme in The Book of Validat-
ed Knowledge,⁶⁹ which he models closely on the Avicennian sources:

The accounts provided in Categories, Salvation, and Guidance are no doubt helpful,
thanks chiefly to the clarity of Avicenna’s exposition in these works. However, they
are by no means intended to be exhaustive of all the senses and modes of priority
Avicenna broaches in his philosophical output. In fact, the master refers to many
other aspects of priority in his logical and metaphysical treatises. For instance, in
Metaphysics, he refers to what is “prior in nature” and “prior according to the intel-
lect [i. e., in conception]” (mutaqaddiman fī l-ṭabīʿah wa-mutaqaddiman ʿinda l-
ʿaql),⁷⁰ to what is prior “in conception and definition” (fī l-taṣawwur wa-l-
taḥdīd),⁷¹ as well as to what is “prior in existence” (mutaqaddim al-wujūd, bi-l-
wujūd),⁷² while in Introduction I.12 (Text 21) he mentions what is “before multiplicity”
(qabl al-kathrah), thereby intimating a kind of intelligible or immaterial priority. Fur-
thermore, and of immediate concern here, Avicenna states in Metaphysics V.1 that
pure quiddity is “prior in existence” (mutaqaddim fī l-wujūd), in the manner in

 Bahmanyār, The Book of Validated Knowledge, 467‒471.

 Avicenna, Metaphysics I.4, 26.13‒15; cf. Categories, II.4, 75.14 ff. where Avicenna speaks of what is
prior conceptually (mafhūman).
 Avicenna, Metaphysics, IV.2, 184.12.
 Avicenna, Metaphysics, I.2, 15.15; IV.1, 164.12 ff.; V.1, 201.10‒13 and 204.16‒205.2; VI.3. 276.13 ff.
464 IV The Special Ontological Mode of Quiddity in Itself

which the part (juzʾ) is prior to the whole (kull) and the simple (basīṭ) prior to the
complex (murakkab). On the basis of these additional passages, a more complete
classification can be proposed:

At this juncture, it is important to stress that these various aspects of priority are not
exclusive of one another and can be combined in various ways. In fact, these distinc-
tions are somewhat artificial, and they are based on the raw data that can be collect-
ed from the Avicennian sources. For instance, something may be prior in time and in
essence, and both will represent a kind of priority in existence as well. This is the
case of the celestial bodies relative to the sublunary beings. It is also the case of
the father, who, Avicenna tells us, is “prior in time” (yataqaddum bi-l-zamān) and
“prior in existence” (yataqaddum bi-l-wujūd) relative to the son.⁷³ Thus, many of
these notions can be combined conceptually. Avicenna illustrates this pointedly in
Salvation when, in the midst of a discussion of the soul-body relationship, he
notes that the soul is “prior in existence by essence” (mutaqaddim fī l-wujūd bi-l-
dhāt).⁷⁴ What is more, different aspects or senses of priority can apply to the same
objects. For example, some of the main objects to which these distinctions are ap-
plied are substances and accidents. Avicenna returns time and again in his works
to these objects with the aim of illustrating how priority and posteriority participate
in tashkīk: substances are prior to accidents, and some substances are prior to other
substances, and some accidents to other accidents.⁷⁵ Yet, substances can be said to
be prior to accidents or to other substances in many ways: in existence, in time, in

 For that example, see Avicenna, Categories, II.4, 4‒6.

 Avicenna, Salvation, 378.5‒10.
 See the passages already cited in Categories I.2; Metaphysics I.4, I.5, and VI.3; Philosophical Com-
pendium, section 11.
 1 The simple, irreducible, and prior existence of pure quiddity 465

causality, in essence, in rank, etc. These various distinctions express different as-
pects of modulation and of metaphysical priority.
Finally, it is important to note that there is also much overlap between these var-
ious senses of priority, and that some even appear to be collapsible. This seems to be
the case, notably, of priority with regard to causality (bi-l-ʿilliyyah), to actual essence
(bi-l-dhāt), and to existence (bi-l-wujūd), notions which Avicenna and his disciple
Bahmanyār appear to use interchangeably.⁷⁶ The reason for this is that causal prior-
ity, for these thinkers, necessarily entails a kind of ontological priority and has to do
with the prior thing causing the existence of the posterior thing. Causal priority there-
fore pertains to the efficient cause responsible for the effect’s existence. Furthermore,
these two aspects of priority also relate to priority ‘in realized essence’ (bi-l-dhāt),
which here refers to the actual essence of a thing, and not to its quiddity taken as
an abstract notion. In the case of simultaneous events, such as the motion of the
hand turning the key, the hand is regarded as being causally and essentially prior
to the hand. But this priority amounts also to a kind of ontological priority.
As an upshot, it is apparent that most—if not all—of these modes of priority re-
late directly or indirectly to existence. They all participate in the task of elucidating
the notion of ontological modulation or tashkīk al-wujūd. This explains why the no-
tions of priority and posteriority occupy such an important place in Avicenna’s phi-
losophy and why the master consistently returns to this issue in his various works.
The ontological relevance of priority is obvious in the case of priority ‘in time,’ ‘in
causality,’ and ‘in existence.’ It would appear to apply to priority ‘in perfection,’
‘in honor,’ ‘in rank,’ and ‘in status’ as well.⁷⁷ Arguably the only aspect of priority
that need not relate to existence directly is ‘prior in conception.’ This would seem
to be the case, for instance, of the purely conceptual or logical “priority and poste-
riority in the order of meanings” (taqdīm wa-taʾkhīr fī tartīb al-maʿānī) Avicenna
sometimes mentions in his works, notably when discussing the three notions of ‘in-
tellect,’ ‘object of intellection,’ and ‘intellection’ in relation to God.⁷⁸ Another context
in which the notion of priority appears to be used in a non-ontological way is logic.
Avicenna remarks at Physics I.1 that “the knowledge of the genus must be prior to

 See Bahmanyār, The Book of Validated Knowledge, 467‒471.

 The prior ‘in honor’ and ‘in rank’ presuppose the priority of some actual concrete existents over
others in this particular fashion and so also participate in the modulation of existence. Priority in
rank (fī l-martabah) is a notion that is often applied by Avicenna to his cosmology in order to describe
the various levels of the cosmological hierarchy consisting of intellects, souls, and celestial bodies.
But since Avicenna does not provide concrete or specific examples of all the senses of priority he
mentions—and, for that matter, of all the modes of tashkīk—it is sometimes arduous to differentiate
between them. It should be noted that one of the three sub-senses of prior ‘in rank’ that Avicenna
lists in Salvation (namely, bi-l-aḥrā) is identical to one of the three aspects of modulation he provides
in Categories I.2; except that in the latter work, it is not explicitly connected with priority. At any rate,
this connection makes it clear that al-taqaddum bi-l-aḥrā relates to tashkīk. It also shows that Avicen-
na’s treatment of these various distinctions and notions is relatively fluid, albeit consistent.
 Avicenna, Salvation, 590.4.
466 IV The Special Ontological Mode of Quiddity in Itself

[aqdam min] the knowledge of the species, because the knowledge of the part of the
definition precedes the knowledge of the definition.”⁷⁹ When it comes to logical con-
cepts and their arrangement in the mind, priority need not be construed in a hard,
ontological sense.
Even then, it would be a mistake to detach this sense of priority entirely from
existence, since what is prior in conception is, in some sense, also prior in existence
in the mind. This is because, according to Avicenna, universal concepts exist in the
mind and are thus also subject to considerations of ontological priority and posteri-
ority. One might argue that some concepts are essentially and ontologically prior to
others in the intellect. Thus, the primary intelligibles, such as ‘the existent,’ ‘the
thing,’ and ‘the one,’ can be said to be essentially and ontologically prior to other,
more derivative concepts or propositions in the mind. What is more, mental existence
can also be said more fundamentally to precede material existence, inasmuch as the
intelligible precedes the material in the order of being. Thus, the noetic activity and
thought content of the separate intellects essentially precede the material beings. In
this regard, the ‘prior in conception’ can be connected with priority in causality (with
regard to the final cause in the intellect) as well as with essential priority (see section
IV.3), all of which amount also to a kind of ontological priority (of mental existence
over material existence). The conclusion is that virtually every aspect or mode of pri-
ority Avicenna broaches in his works is directly or indirectly related to existence and
therefore participates in the articulation of tashkīk al-wujūd. This explains why he
rarely fails to mention priority in his various expositions of ontological modulation.
It is a basic criterion that enables us to differentiate between, say, substances and
accidents, as well as between the various eternal entities and all the material and
immaterial existents of his ontology. For the purposes of the present analysis, how-
ever, only three of these sub-senses of ‘the prior’ will be taken into consideration. By
far the most important with regard to quiddity are priority in existence (bi- or fī l-
wujūd), priority in causality (bi-l-ʿilliyyah), and priority ‘in nature’ or ‘in essence’
(bi-l-ṭabʿ), and it is accordingly on these notions that the following analysis will
focus. The objective is to clarify whether priority ‘in nature’ or ‘in essence’ also
amounts to a kind of ontological priority or something completely different, as
well as to address the issue of exactly how this aspect of priority informs Avicenna’s
theory of ontological modulation.
Avicenna formally distinguishes between ‘priority in existence’ (al-taqaddum fī l-
wujūd) and ‘in causality’ (bi-l-ʿilliyyah), on the one hand, and ‘priority in nature’ or
‘in essence’ (al-taqaddum bi-l-ṭabʿ), on the other. In fact, these two basic senses of
‘the prior’ are always distinguished in Avicenna’s and Bahmanyār’s treatises. On a
first and straightforward account, the former deals with existence proper and the
causality associated with it (i. e., the efficient cause), whereas the latter deals with

 Avicenna, Physics, I.1, 5.5‒8.

 1 The simple, irreducible, and prior existence of pure quiddity 467

essence in abstraction from existence.⁸⁰ Because of the narrow link between exis-
tence and causality, Avicenna and later Bahmanyār conceive of ‘priority in existence’
and ‘priority in causality’ in very close terms and even as interchangeable notions.
For Bahmanyār, the ‘prior in causality’ (bi-l-ʿilliyyah), ‘in existence’ (bi-l-wujūd),
and in ‘realized essence’ (bi-l-dhāt) are all interchangeable notions that are contrast-
ed to the prior ‘in nature’ or ‘in essence’ (bi-l-ṭabʿ).⁸¹ In a similar fashion, Avicenna
explains in Metaphysics IV.1 that the prior ‘in causality’ and ‘in existence’ deal with
the “realization of existence” (ḥuṣūl al-wujūd). They imply that the effect acquires its
existence from its cause.⁸² This is true of both temporal and atemporal events. Ac-
cordingly, these thinkers describe the famous case of the atemporal causal priority
of the hand that turns over the key that is turned as an instance of priority ‘in cau-
sality,’ ‘in existence,’ and in ‘realized essence’ (bi-l-dhāt).⁸³ The existence of the mo-
tion of the key is caused by the existence of the motion of the hand. To take another
example, the separate intellect that causes another lower intellect to exist is its atem-
poral efficient cause, and it is also prior ‘in causality,’ ‘in existence,’ and ‘in realized
essence.’ Of course, the same can be applied to the First, given that the relation of
God to the eternal world is the same: God causes the world to exist, and in so
doing He is prior in existence, in causality, and in essence.
This basic differentiation between onto-causal priority (bi-l-wujūd, bi-l-ʿilliyyah,
bi-l-dhāt) and essential priority (bi-l-ṭabʿ) no doubt reflects the more fundamental
distinction in Avicenna’s philosophy between quiddity and existence. More specifi-
cally, since Avicenna believes that we can conceive of pure quiddity in abstraction
from existence, it seems that these two modes of priority overlap neatly with the con-
ception of essence and the conception of existence respectively. On this theory, we
can reckon the essential priority of oneness over twoness in the mind by considering
their quiddities and without engaging in thoughts about their actual existence. Prior-
ity in essence establishes the dependence of one quiddity on another quiddity for its
conceivability to obtain. Thus, oneness is logically and essentially prior to twoness,
and animalness to humanness, because twoness and humanness are not conceivable
without oneness and animalness, but the opposite is not true. In this regard, Avicen-
na’s and Bahmanyār’s understanding of priority in essence appears to hark back to
what Aristotle says in Metaphysics Δ.5.1019a1‒5 concerning the things that are “prior

 Cf. Bahmanyār, The Book of Validated Knowledge, 468.5‒7. Relying heavily on Avicenna, he con-
trasts “the prior in essence” (al-mutaqaddim bi-l-ṭabʿ), which deals with “quiddity in abstraction from
existence” (fī l-māhiyyah dūn al-wujūd), with “priority in causality” (al-taqaddum bi-l-ʿilliyyah), which
pertains to realized existence. In the case of ‘the prior in essence,’ the existence of what is prior is not
a cause for the existence of what is posterior. Bahmanyār regards these two senses of priority (in cau-
sality/existence, and in essence) as being the only two real and essential senses (ḥaqīqī) of ‘the prior’
in the long list he surveys.
 Bahmanyār, The Book of Validated Knowledge, 467.13, 468.9‒17, and 469.7.
 Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Cure, IV.1, 164.18; see also Marmura, Avicenna on Causal Priority.
 Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Cure, IV.1, 164.18‒165.15; Bahmanyār, The Book of Validated Knowl-
edge, 469.3‒7.
468 IV The Special Ontological Mode of Quiddity in Itself

with respect to nature and substance.” They concern “those which can be without
other things, while the other cannot be without them.” Avicenna reproduces a similar
phrasing in Guidance and Salvation. ⁸⁴
One upshot of the foregoing is that it would appear to remove priority in essence
(bi-l-ṭabʿ) completely from the realm of actual existence and causality. Since priority
in essence deals with quiddity, not existence, this seems like a valid conclusion. It
would also explain why, in his long discussion of priority and posteriority in section
IV.1 of Metaphysics, Avicenna dissociates ‘the prior in nature or essence’ completely
from his analysis of the various senses or aspects of causal and ontological priority,
which he tackles only later on.⁸⁵ Moreover, it is also consistent with the master’s
theory of modulation, which pertains only to notions that are not said univocally
of things. So priority, as an aspect of modulation, applies to existence, because ex-
istence, for Avicenna, is modulated and not predicated in a univocal way, unlike,
for instance, the quiddity ‘humanness,’ which does not apply first to Zayd and
then to ʿAmr. Thus, ‘priority in essence,’ inasmuch as it focuses primarily on nature
or essence, would seem at first glance to be excluded from Avicenna’s theory of tash-
kīk al-wujūd.
But this conclusion appears problematic for a number of reasons. As mentioned
above, priority in essence is one of the two fundamental senses of ‘the prior’ that Avi-
cenna and his student Bahmanyār recognize, and it is undoubtedly one of the most
important, since it reappears in all their lists of the various senses of priority. More-
over, Avicenna applies this sense of priority to actual beings, so it is legitimate to
think that it is also narrowly connected with existence as well. This seems substan-
tiated by the fact that he often relies on ontological terms and notions to describe
priority in essence. Accordingly, in the two passages of Guidance and Salvation men-
tioned above, he describes the prior in essence as that which must have existence
(wujūd) for the posterior thing to exist. A careful interpretation of these notions in-
dicates that essential priority, for Avicenna, is in most cases also tantamount to a
kind of ontological priority, or at the very least, coincides with an aspect of priority
in existence. For what is essentially prior for Avicenna is also, usually, and by the
same token, ontologically prior. In many cases, what is essentially prior will also
be ontologically prior simply because it exists as such in the intellect. For example,
when Avicenna discusses the priority of ‘oneness’ over ‘twoness’ in Metaphysics IV.1
and in Salvation, he presents this as illustrating both a kind of ontological prece-
dence, or something related to existence (bi-l-qiyās ilā l-wujūd) (in Metaphysics
IV.1), and an instance of the prior in nature or essence (bi-l-ṭabʿ) (in Salvation). Never-

 Avicenna, Salvation, 240.4‒5: fa-innahu lā yakūn li-l-mutaʾakhkhir minhumā wujūd illā wa-kāna li-
hādhā min ghayr inʿikās; idem, Salvation, 540.8‒10: wa-huwa idhā kāna lā yumkin an yūjada l-ākhar,
illā wa-huwa mawjūd, wa-yūjadu wa-laysa l-ākhar mawjūd.
 There is a natural progression in Avicenna’s discussion of priority in IV.1 from essence to exis-
tence, which culminates with his analysis of causality and the ontological priority of the cause
over the effect.
 1 The simple, irreducible, and prior existence of pure quiddity 469

theless, in these texts he speaks of the existence (wujūd) of oneness preceding the
existence of twoness. In fact, the essential and ontological priority of oneness is re-
garded as a condition (sharṭ) for the existence of twoness. Thus, even when the rela-
tion between these notions is framed chiefly in terms of essence and essential prior-
ity—this is the case especially if these notions are considered abstractly in the mind
and with regard to their pure quiddities (two ‘in itself’ or ‘twoness’ and three ‘in it-
self’ or ‘threeness’)—Avicenna appears to correlate it also with a kind of priority in
existence, which is to be construed in connection with mental existence and the in-
telligible being of these notions. The same conclusion can be reached from a passage
in Categories, which also discusses the relation between numbers, in this case three-
ness (thalāthiyyah) and fourness (rubāʿiyyah). There Avicenna states that “it has be-
come clear, then, that the priority of threeness over fourness is only in existence [fī l-
wujūd].”⁸⁶ Even though threeness is essentially and logically prior to fourness in the
mind, and in that sense can be said to be conceptually prior (bi-l-taṣawwur) and es-
sentially prior (bi-l-ṭabʿ), this priority amounts to a kind of ontological priority as well,
either because this priority of pure quiddity exists intelligibly in the mind or because
whenever instances of fourness exist in the world they are conditioned by and de-
pendent on the essential prior existence of threeness.⁸⁷ So the prior in essence is
what is necessary for the existence of what comes after it, even if no direct efficient
causality is involved. Even though oneness does not literally cause twoness to exist
in the sense implied by efficient causality (bi-l-ʿilliyyah) and realized existence (ḥuṣūl
al-wujūd), the latter remains essentially and ontologically dependent on the former.
Yet, the idea that the prior in essence is entirely devoid of causal or ontological
agency—an assumption that relies on the traditional interpretation of essence in Avi-
cenna—can be challenged on the basis of certain texts. The notion of essential prior-
ity as amounting to a kind of intrinsic causality is developed in a passage of Notes
(Text 35 below). There Avicenna describes “the prior in essence” as that which per-
tains to the internal and essential causality of a thing, that is, the causality respon-
sible for the internal arrangement of an essence’s constituents (muqawwimāt). The
prior in essence is in this text described as a certain “cause” (ʿillah), but one that
is fully intrinsic and limited to the internal constituents of essence, and which
does not extend to its external concomitants and accidents. The latter, in contrast,
are caused by an external cause, which Avicenna, in accordance with what was
said above, describes as ‘the prior in causality’ and ‘the prior in existence,’ and
which is unequivocally to be identified with the efficient cause responsible for a
thing’s realized or acquired existence (recall the expression ḥuṣūl al-wujūd found

 Avicenna, Categories, II.4, 76.3‒12; cf. Guidance, 240.4‒5: “Likewise, the prior in essence [al-mu-
taqaddim bi-l-ṭabʿ]: I mean [for example] like ‘one’ and ‘two.’ For the posterior does not have exis-
tence [wujūd] unless the [prior] does, without the converse being true.”
 It is unclear which sense Avicenna intends here, but since he is referring to threeness in itself and
fourness in itself, I assume he means first and foremost a kind of intelligible existence in the mind. At
any rate, recall that for Avicenna essences exist both in the mind and in the exterior world.
470 IV The Special Ontological Mode of Quiddity in Itself

in Metaphysics IV.1 in connection with priority ‘in causality’ and ‘in existence’). Fun-
damentally, then, the prior ‘in essence’ has to do with the essential or intelligible
being and internal causality of quiddity, and the prior ‘in causality’ or ‘existence’
with the realized existence of its concomitants or of the thing taken as a complete
substance. Nevertheless, essential priority implies a kind of intelligible being and in-
ternal principle of organization, since pure quiddity exists in the intellect and can be
conceived of in abstraction from its external concomitants, and therefore also from
notions of efficient causality and realized existence. This kind of essential priority
has important implications for the notion of essential being as applied to God’s ex-
istence, a point to which I return later on in this chapter.
One noteworthy feature of the passage of Notes mentioned above is that Avicen-
na does not limit essential priority to objects in the mind, but rather extends it to
concrete beings as well. This can be inferred quite plainly from the fact that the pas-
sage ends by stating that priority can be either in concrete reality or in the mind, and
that the example that is used to illustrate the former is that of oneness and twoness,
the very same one Avicenna had earlier used to illustrate ‘the prior in essence.’ This
shows that the relationship between oneness and twoness involves both essential
priority and causal or existential priority, and that this example pertains both to
the conceptual and the concrete spheres. The rationale for this hypothesis is that es-
sential priority has to do with the internal, essential, and constitutive nature of an
essence, which concerns concrete beings in addition to mental beings. These two
kinds of priority—essential priority pertaining to the being of the essence, and causal
or existential priority pertaining to the external concomitants of a thing—extend to
all the entities of the exterior world and in the mind. They point to a different onto-
logical aspect of existing entities.
The upshot is that the mode of the prior ‘in essence’ seems to directly inform Avi-
cenna’s theory of ontological modulation, as well as his account of the ontology of
quiddity, whether it is quiddity in the human mind qua pure concept and final
cause, or quiddity as an ontological principle in concrete individuals. In the frame
of Avicenna’s metaphysics, the notion of priority contributes not only to the discus-
sion of being in general—as it had for various philosophers from Aristotle onward—
but also to the more specific query of the ontological status of quiddity. The various
steps of the analysis conducted thus far can be summed up as follows: ontological
modulation (tashkīk al-wujūd) is made up of various aspects; one key aspect is prior-
ity; Avicenna outlines various aspects and senses of ‘the prior,’ one of which is ‘the
prior in essence’; ‘the prior in essence’ pertains to quiddity as a self-constituted en-
tity that precedes the complex structures or sunola in which it is instantiated, and
which also asserts the priority of essence as an intelligible principle; as such, it con-
nects with the intelligible being of pure quiddity and amounts also to a kind of in-
ternal and reflexive essential causality; this sense of priority applies to mental and
concrete beings inasmuch as they have quiddities, although it emphasizes in partic-
ular the intelligible priority of pure quiddity as an intelligible notion; thus, ‘the prior
in essence’ also marks a distinct mode of ontological priority, one that specifically
 1 The simple, irreducible, and prior existence of pure quiddity 471

pertains to essence in abstraction from its external concomitants and attributes,

which are characterized by other aspects of priority and causality.
These observations notwithstanding, the essential and ontological priority of
pure quiddity vis-à-vis the composite entities calls for additional comments. Recall
that Avicenna claims on two occasions in Metaphysics V.1 that pure quiddity or na-
ture is prior in existence. The first occurrence, at Metaphysics V.1, 201.10‒13, states
that the consideration of animal in itself is “prior in existence” (mutaqaddim fī l-
wujūd) to the particular and universal animal, whereas the second passage at V.1,
204.16‒205.2 states that “the existence of the quidditative nature is prior [wujūduhā
aqdam] to the existence of the natural [thing].” In both instance, Avicenna specifies
that quiddity is prior in the way that “the simple precedes the complex and the part
[precedes] the whole” (taqaddum al-basīṭ ʿalā l-murakkab wa-l-juzʾ ʿalā l-kull). These
statements raise the issue of exactly how quiddity can be said to be prior in the var-
ious contexts in which it is found: in the human mind; in the divine intellects; and in
the concrete beings, where quiddity is a part of the composite individuals.
Perhaps the most literal and straightforward inference to be drawn from the
statements in Metaphysics V.1 is that pure quiddity is prior to complex and composite
beings. Here there can be little doubt that ‘mereological priority’ and ‘priority by sim-
plicity,’ which pertain to the essence specifically, also amount to a kind of ontolog-
ical priority vis-à-vis these sunola. This point is otherwise ascertained by Avicenna’s
use of the formula mutaqaddim fī l-wujūd in those passages. Now, the analysis de-
ployed in the previous chapters has already intimated that pure quiddity, qua meta-
physical principle of complex beings, is irreducible and simple (basīṭ), as well as a
part (juzʾ) of their composite existence. What Avicenna says in those passages of Met-
aphysics V.1 regarding the priority of essence therefore coheres perfectly with his gen-
eral account of pure quiddity as an irreducible and constitutive principle of compo-
site beings. Accordingly, pure quiddity can be said to be ontologically prior to these
existents, because, relative to them, it is simple, constant, and irreducible, and it is
also a principle of their own composite or complex existence. The essential and on-
tological priority of pure quiddity occurs on account of its irreducibility, even when it
is with other things. Avicenna is elaborating here on the māhiyyah-lawāzim model,
which underpins the notion of the priority of essence over its external attributes
and accidents. This idea is further developed in two sections of Notes. In the first,
the master explains that “essence is not constituted by the concomitant; rather, es-
sence necessitates and entails it. Thus, [essence] is the cause [of the concomitant],
whose existence depends solely upon it” (lā tataqawwamu l-dhāt bi-l-lāzim bal al-
dhāt tūjibu l-lāzim wa-taqtaḍīhi fa-hiya ʿillatuhu wa-bihā wujūduhu). In the second,
he states that “the concomitants are not internal to the true essences, but follow
after the constitution of the essences” (al-lawāzim lā tadkhulu fī l-ḥaqāʾiq bal talzamu
baʿd taqawwama [or taqawwum] al-ḥaqāʾiq).⁸⁸ In addition to priority, Avicenna is

 Avicenna, Notes, 362, section 641; and 544, section 959.

472 IV The Special Ontological Mode of Quiddity in Itself

also making an implicit argument for the unity and simplicity of quiddity versus the
compositeness of concrete and mental existents. By juxtaposing these dual sets of
notions—simplicity/complexity, part/whole, and quiddity in itself/composite or com-
plex substance—Avicenna obviously intends the reader to associate or correlate one-
ness, priority, and simplicity with quiddity in itself, and multiplicity, posteriority, and
complexity with quiddity taken with its external attributes.
In addition to this mereological construal of essential priority, Avicenna also im-
plicitly intends to affirm a more drastic kind of essential priority, which has to do
with the status of pure quiddity as an intelligible in the human and divine intellects.
Anticipating the discussion in chapter V, there is a sense in which pure quiddity qua
object of thought of the divine intellects ontologically and essentially precedes the
beings of the sublunary world. In this context, essential priority is to be connected
chiefly with the intelligible being of essence, which is distinct from the kind of prior-
ity attached to realized existence. This intersects with Avicenna’s claim at Introduc-
tion I.12 that some meanings (maʿānī) are “prior to multiplicity” (qabl al-kathrah).
Thingness or quiddity qua final cause and intelligible object in the divine mind pre-
cedes the realization of the thing in existence and, thus, also, the efficient cause as-
sociated with it. Although these comments may apply to the human intellect, they
are true a fortiori of the divine intellects, whose intellection and its content are
prior to the material beings. Thus, the forms (ṣuwar) and intelligibles (maʿqūlāt)
that exist in the separate intellects—including the Agent Intellect, also known as
the Giver of Forms (wāhib al-ṣuwar)—will be prior to matter and multiplicity and
thus to the particular beings as well.
There can be little doubt that this sense of the prior in essence that appears in
Avicenna’s argumentation in Introduction I.12 also underpins the discussion in Meta-
physics V.1.⁸⁹ This is made clear by the claim that pure quiddity or nature (al-ṭabīʿah)
precedes “the natural thing” or “the natural being” (al-ṭabīʿī). It is in this ontological
state of intelligible priority vis-à-vis the sublunary contingent beings that nature or
pure quiddity can be said to have “divine existence” (wujūd ilāhī). It should be
noted that Avicenna’s notion of essential priority as something pertaining strictly
to the essence in a “divine” context finds an important parallel in Yaḥyā b. ʿAdī’s
metaphysics. In some of his treatises, Yaḥyā ascribes a kind of priority in essence
to the “divine forms” and the “divine essences,” arguing that they are “prior in es-
sence to the natural beings” (aqdam bi-l-ṭabʿ min al-mawjūdāt al-ṭabīʿiyyah).⁹⁰ This
statement vividly brings to mind not only Avicenna’s notion of essential priority,

 It should also be noted that, in this intellectual context, priority and posteriority are themselves
intelligible notions or meanings for Avicenna (maʿānī ʿaqliyyah); Avicenna, Metaphysics, III.10,
159.15‒160.9. This allows for subtle distinctions at the purely intelligible level and the possibility of
devising a certain hierarchy of intelligibles (intellection of other vs. self-intellection, etc.).
 Menn and Wisnovsky, Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī On the Four Scientific Questions, 66b12; Yaḥyā b. ʿAdī, On
Clarifying the Existence of the Common Things, in Philosophical Treatises, 165.
 1 The simple, irreducible, and prior existence of pure quiddity 473

but more specifically his own statement in Metaphysics V.1 to the effect that the “di-
vine being” of essence precedes the “natural” existents.
The claim that essence in its purely intelligible state is prior to the composite
substances is partly based on epistemological considerations, which pertain to the
cognitive priority of simplicity over complexity. According to Avicenna, our intellects
are more inclined to apprehend unity and simplicity than multiplicity and complex-
ity. Intellectual unity in fact characterizes the highest state of intellective life, as can
be seen in the case of the separate intellects and especially in the case of God, whose
intellection is perfectly unitary and simple. This suggests that the essence in itself
has an intelligible and conceptual priority over the particular concrete and complex
mental existents, just as the simple has an intelligible and conceptual priority over
the multiple. Accordingly, pure quiddity conceptually and epistemologically pre-
cedes the universal concept in the human mind. Since it is the nature or pure quid-
dity that forms the basis for the elaboration of the universal, quiddity in itself will be
prior and simple when compared to the consummated universal form that derives
from it.⁹¹
However, this point obviously carries an ontological thrust as well, because on
Avicenna’s view concepts exist in the full sense, so that intellectual or essential pri-
ority also implies ontological priority.⁹² I argued previously that quiddity in itself,
qua distinct form and consideration in the mind, is a simple intelligible entity
when compared to the concrete or universal instantiations of quiddity. In the
mind, it is only itself and is free of all the external concomitants and attributes
that qualify the universal. As such, in this state of quidditative simplicity, it possess-
es an existence that precedes the conditioned, concomitant existence of the full-
fledged universal. The universal depends on the ontological priority of pure quiddity,
but the reverse is not true. What is at stake here is not temporal priority, but rather
essential and ontological priority, whereby the intelligibility of what comes after de-
pends on what comes before and on a prior principle (mabdaʾ). Thus, ‘human in it-
self’ is perfectly intelligible as a concept, by and of itself, but apprehending the uni-
versal concept ‘human’ as something predicated of many depends on, and is
essentially posterior to, the quiddity in itself humanness, since it is combined with

 To use the terminology of Introduction, the ‘nature’ or ‘natural genus’ will be prior to the ‘intel-
lectual genus’ (the universal), which is a composite of the ‘natural’ and ‘logical’ genera.
 As was shown above, Avicenna attributes an ontological and essential priority to concepts such
as ‘the one’ and ‘the many’ and ‘oneness’ and ‘twoness’; see Avicenna, Metaphysics, IV.1, 164.12 ff.; cf.
Aristotle, Categories, 12.14a29‒35. Although this point remains implicit throughout the passage, one
may surmise that the master intends the ontological priority of ‘the one in itself’ over ‘the multiple in
itself.’ This is because the latter depends on the former for its intelligibility and essential meaning,
and, hence, also for its existence as a valid concept in the mind, whereas the converse is not true. This
is an observation that applies to the notions of unity and plurality, to ‘the one in itself’ and ‘the many
in itself,’ i. e., to their pure quiddities, and not merely to concrete things that can be said to be one or
many. Quite relevantly, Avicenna describes these things as objects sought in the science of metaphy-
sics.
474 IV The Special Ontological Mode of Quiddity in Itself

other mental intentions and accidents. Whereas the pure quiddity humanness must
exist for the universal concept human (and for concrete human beings) to exist, it, on
the other hand, does not depend on material and mental concomitants and accidents
for its very intelligible existence. Accordingly, Avicenna asserts quite plainly in Met-
aphysics V.1 that the quidditative nature is ontologically prior and simple when com-
pared to the composite, contingent, and concrete natural being, viz., to quiddity
taken with its material accidents. Pure quiddity is therefore epistemologically (or
conceptually) and ontologically prior when compared to the composite and contin-
gent beings it inheres in. As we will see in chapter V, if this is true of human intel-
lection, it is eminently true of the intellection of the divine beings. Hence, according
to Avicenna, oneness and simplicity are intellectually more germane and cognitively
closer to the intellect than multiplicity, since their apprehension represents a unitary
intellective act, whereas apprehending multiplicity does not, since it requires analy-
sis and discursiveness. What is more, simplicity is also prior in the order of existence,
since the First, which is the originative source of all things, is absolutely simple.
Bearing these two aspects in mind, it appears that in Metaphysics V.1, Avicenna is
emphasizing the conceptual and ontological simplicity of quiddity in itself in addi-
tion to its priority, because in his reckoning these notions are intertwined. It is be-
cause quiddity in itself is simple vis-à-vis the composite natural being that it is
prior.⁹³ In contrast, universal concepts and concrete entities, which are composed
of quiddity and adjoining concomitants and accidents (lawāzim, lawāḥiq, ʿawāriḍ),
are complex and thus also posterior and caused.
Avicenna’s insistence on the interrelationship between essential priority and
simplicity recalls Neoplatonic metaphysics, as found for instance in some of the prin-
ciples outlined in Proclus’s (d. 485 CE) Elements of Theology. This work was translat-
ed and adapted in Arabic during the ninth century and was therefore available by the
time Avicenna was writing. According to Proclus’s metaphysics, the simple and the
one always precede the complex and the multiple, and the last two notions derive
essentially and ontologically from the first two. Moreover, the higher one proceeds
along Proclus’s hierarchy of divine intellectual and intelligible beings, the stronger
the notions of oneness and simplicity are manifested in their pristine states, until
one reaches the One (to hen), which is absolute oneness and simplicity, so much
so that it is usually described as lying beyond, and excluding, all other things, in-
cluding being itself. Finally, it is noteworthy that, alongside these notions, Proclus
establishes a threefold classification of the universals—‘before,’ ‘in,’ and ‘after’ mul-
tiplicity—that corresponds in key respects to Avicenna’s own understanding of the
various modes or contexts in which quiddities exist.⁹⁴

 This reasoning intersects with Avicenna’s argument for the priority and unicity of the Necessary
Existent: it is necessary and prior, because it is the only entity that is one and simple.
 Proclus, like Avicenna later on, regards only the common thing in the human mind as constitut-
ing a ‘universal’ proper, whereas the common things ‘before’ multiplicity and ‘in’ multiplicity are not,
sensu stricto, universals. On this point, see Helmig, Proclus and other Neoplatonists. Furthermore,
 1 The simple, irreducible, and prior existence of pure quiddity 475

It is noteworthy that Proclus in his account correlates universality with ontology,

in a manner comparable to how Avicenna discusses the threefold division of quiddity
together with ontological considerations and his scheme of mental and concrete ex-
istence. Proclus ascribes three distinct ontological modes or “three modes of being”
to the various classes of universals, one of which corresponds to the universals in the
divine world that are before multiplicity, and which Proclus identifies with the Pla-
tonic forms. As the Greek philosopher explains in section II.1 of his commentary
on Euclid’s Elements, “according to these three modes of being [tas triplas huposta-
seis], I think we shall find that some universals are prior to their instances, some are
in their instances, and some are constituted by virtue of being related to them as
their predicate.”⁹⁵ Hence, the universals that precede material multiplicity can be
said to have a simple and prior ontological mode in a robust sense.
Even though Avicenna does not adhere to Proclus’s broader Platonic framework,
which is grounded in the theories of the forms and participation, he seems to defend
a sense of priority that is quite close to that of the Greek philosopher. If, on Avicen-
na’s mind, the pure quiddities do not exist in an archetypal realm of their own, they
do exist in the divine intellects, where they assume some of the same characteristics
as Proclus’s forms, especially simplicity and priority, as well as a distinct ontological
mode that corresponds only to them (see chapter V). These parallels between the
Greek and Persian thinkers are reinforced by the central position of the Proclus ara-
bus in Avicenna’s philosophy. The master endorsed the theological model it describes
in its broad outline. Following this work, he describes the First Cause as correspond-
ing to necessary existence, rather than as an entity lying beyond existence, as was
argued by some of the late-antique Neoplatonists. In any case, what is crucial here
is that Avicenna transfers to the divine being many of the qualities that were dis-
cussed extensively in Proclus’s philosophy, especially oneness, simplicity, and prior-
ity.
I believe this Neoplatonic affiliation helps to explain why the Arabic thinker con-
strues the ‘divine existence’ of quiddity in itself as entailing ‘priority’ and ‘simplicity’
when compared to composite and complex mental and concrete existence, all the
more so because, on my interpretation, Avicenna locates the quiddities in the divine
essence Itself. Thus, his position on the ontological priority and simplicity of the pure
quiddities appears to be indebted to a well-established Neoplatonic stance that ex-
plained divinity (theoteta / ilāhiyyah) in terms of simplicity and priority of existence,
substance, or constitution. In this manner, if Avicenna’s mention of ‘divine existence’
is, first and foremost, suggestive of the essential and intelligible simplicity, priority,

what was said above concerning the essential and ontological priority of quiddity as an intelligible
object would seem to locate the pure quiddities and common things ‘before multiplicity’ in the divine
intellects, thereby establishing another parallel with Proclus’s metaphysics, where the forms and uni-
versals ‘before’ matter or multiplicity are contained in the superlunary intellects.
 Proclus, Commentary on Euclid’s Elements, 51.6‒9; Sorabji, The Philosophy, vol. 3, 137; Thomas Tay-
lor’s translation has “modes of subsistence” instead.
476 IV The Special Ontological Mode of Quiddity in Itself

and constancy of quiddity, which are, generally speaking, the qualities of ‘things di-
vine,’ it also allows for the localization of these essences in the divine intellects. This
last point, however, will have to be investigated in more detail. At any rate, the no-
tion of essential and ontological priority applies differently to the various aspects
and contexts of quiddity encountered thus far. When it comes to the intellectual
and intelligible domain, essential priority applies in a strong or primary sense to
the distinct conception of pure quiddity in the divine intellects and, to a lesser ex-
tent, in the human mind. The conception of pure quiddity as a distinct intelligible
object in the mind is prior from an epistemic, essential, and ontological perspective
to the consideration of pure quiddity together with its concomitants. In this connec-
tion, the priority of pure quiddity is also closely tied to the notion of final causality in
Avicenna’s philosophy. According to Avicenna, final causality precedes efficient cau-
sality in the intellect, so that the consideration of quiddity in itself qua final cause
will always be prior to any consideration of realized existence. This in turn should
be connected with Avicenna’s belief that the pure quiddities exist in the Agent Intel-
lect in a manner prior to the way in which they exist in the material world and in the
human mind and, hence, also in a mode of essential priority vis-à-vis their actuali-
zation in the concrete.⁹⁶ Nevertheless, pure quiddity is also in some weaker sense
prior when it is construed mereologically as a part of the complex mental existent
that is the universal. It is essentially and conceptually prior, because it is an irredu-
cible part of the whole and because it is the foundational nature of this complex ex-
istent, to which mental accidents and concomitants are added.
Remarkably, Avicenna believes that this mereological sense of ‘the prior’ can be
extended to the context of concrete extramental existence. This means that quiddity
is also essentially and ontologically prior in composite, material beings vis-à-vis the
existent taken as an existential cluster or a complex of substance and accidents. This
might look more surprising at first reckoning and is by far the most difficult aspect of
priority to tease out, given that Avicenna often insists that nothing precedes exis-
tence and efficient causality in the concrete world. But Avicenna does not intend
this statement in a temporal manner or as implying a sequentiality of metaphysical
stages, whereby, first, quiddity would somehow exist on its own, and then would
begin to exist as a realized or actual being. In that sense, he is not an ‘essentialist’
in the way that Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī is sometimes described, whereby existence
would be “added to” (zāʾid ʿalā) floating essences that precede it in the concrete

 See chapter V for more insight on this point. The priority of the intelligible over the concrete is
well established in Avicenna’s philosophy and has to do with the vertical structure of his ontology,
where the first principles of existence are immaterial. Inevitably, then, one sense of the ontologically
and essentially prior will pertain to the priority of the intelligible over the material. If concepts in the
divine mind are intelligible and exist, this same priority will apply to them as well. Black, Mental Ex-
istence, 12: “So, if there were any order of priority between the two existential modes, it would be
mental being, not concrete being, that would claim priority in the Avicennian system.”
 1 The simple, irreducible, and prior existence of pure quiddity 477

world.⁹⁷ Rather, Avicenna’s claim is more subtle and should be construed in light of
the mereological and essential priority of the part over the composite whole. As in
the case of the complex mental existent, quiddity enjoys an essential and ontological
priority in the concrete composite existent by virtue of being an essential part of it
and, more specifically, an irreducible, constant, simple and foundational principle.
This kind of priority is to be likened to the ontological priority that form has vis-à-
vis the composite whole, or that soul has vis-à-vis animal body. In these cases as
well, Avicenna posits a kind of essential and ontological priority, even though no
temporal priority is involved. So even though one cannot affirm that quiddity already
existed independently in the concrete world prior to the existence of the substance it
constitutes, one equally cannot state that the existence of quiddity in that realized
and complex substance is exactly the same as the existence of that realized and com-
plex substance.
To conclude, the various applications of essential and ontological priority to
pure quiddity in Metaphysics V.1 should be contextualized and construed within
the larger framework of tashkīk al-wujūd, of which priority and posteriority are
only one—but arguably the most important—mode. Drawing on a long Aristotelian
tradition that associated priority and posteriority with the predication of being, Avi-
cenna elaborates on it by systematically weaving these notions into his theory of on-
tological modulation and extending them to all the beings of his ontology. Remark-
ably, he extends these notions to the modulation of the being of quiddity. In the final
analysis, it appears that tashkīk al-wujūd also serves to qualify the ontological mode
of pure quiddity in Avicenna’s philosophy and, more precisely, to clarify its ontolog-
ical status in the various contexts in which it is found. Just as ontological modulation
has a transcendental application and can be extended to God, it should also be ex-
tended to encompass the proper existence of quiddity and thingness. Quite tellingly,
these two ‘special’ cases overlap to some extent: they highlight the centrality of the
notion of priority in Avicenna’s understanding of how tashkīk al-wujūd relates to the
First and essence, since there is nothing prior to God’s quiddity, and since His quid-
dity is also the principle of all the other quiddities. The latter point in turn explains
the essential priority of quiddity vis-à-vis complex entities, multiplicity, and materi-
ality. In terms of Avicenna’s philosophical motivation, the foregoing strongly sug-
gests that his daring and innovative elaboration of tashkīk targeted a special group
of entities—the pure quiddities and God—that a traditional or standard ontological
system could not satisfactorily accommodate.⁹⁸

 For this characterization of Rāzī’s metaphysics, see Mayer, Faḫr ad-Dīn; and Wisnovsky, Essence
and Existence.
 Bäck, The Triplex, 135, also seeks to connect a certain theory of modulation with quiddity. But he
argues that it is quiddity itself—or rather, its three aspects or modes—that is modulated according to
pros hen attribution: “Ibn Sina seems to view the connection between these different senses of quid-
dity as similar to the relation between the different senses of ‘healthy’ or ‘medical’ that Aristotle dis-
cusses in Metaphysics IV.2 … . In effect, Avicenna is now extending this doctrine [of the focal mean-
478 IV The Special Ontological Mode of Quiddity in Itself

1.4 Pure quiddity as ‘divine’ and ‘absolute’

In light of the foregoing, I wish to return briefly to Avicenna’s description of pure

quiddity as “absolute” (muṭlaq) and “divine” (ilāhī). It is easy to see how the latter
epithet could be understood as locating the pure quiddities in the divine beings,
meaning that they would exist in the First Cause and/or the separate intellects. Al-
though I believe this reading is ultimately correct, for Avicenna as well as for the
Greek forebears he is relying on, the term theoteta / ilāhiyyah may be understood
in a more general way as connoting the ‘divine world’ or the ‘divine order’ or even
merely ‘the quality of what is divine,’ of what is endowed with simplicity and priority
in the order of being.⁹⁹ In this connection, it can be construed as implying primarily a
‘divine mode of being’ characterized by notions of simplicity, priority, permanence or
constancy, and immutability, in contradistinction to the notions of complexity, con-
tingency, causedness, and mutability associated with the lower caused existents. Ac-
cording to this reading, then, the “divine existence” of quiddity in itself would refer
to the quidditative meaning’s (maʿnā) being prior relative to its concomitants and ac-
cidents, as well as simple relative to the composite of quiddity and its attributes. It
would adequately describe the constant and unchanging nature of pure quiddity,
which, like divine things, remains eternally identical to itself. Furthermore, and
more generally, it would designate an exalted and intelligible mode of existence
that is prior and simple when compared to that of the composite material beings.
If the term ilāhī is construed in this fashion, then it refers primarily to a mode or
state of existence rather than a locus or place of existence, with the implication
that pure quiddity always exists as such regardless of its context. Pure essence
would enjoy this mode of existence even in a sublunary context, when embedded
in concrete things or as part of an intelligible form in the mind.
This gloss on the notions of quidditative priority, simplicity, and unconditioned-
ness also enable us to return to the statement in Metaphysics I.5 according to which
quiddity in itself possesses an “absolute” (muṭlaq) existence. As in the case of these
other notions, the quality of being “absolute” suggests that a thing cannot alter or
vary in its state. It is that thing in itself that exists as such, regardless of whether
it is posited with other things or not. Accordingly, it is also related to the simple

ing] to essences in general in his threefold distinction of quiddity.” However, according to Avicenna,
it is not quiddity itself that is modulated, but rather existence as it is predicated of quiddity. So it is
not quiddity, but existence, which is subjected to tashkīk and, through this process of modulation,
applied to quiddity. Quiddity in itself is just quiddity in itself and thus not subject to any variation.
Bäck’s mention of various “senses” of quiddity is particularly misleading and attributes to quiddity
statements that Avicenna intends for existence; for Avicenna, there is only one maʿnā of māhiyyah
(which is why quiddity is predicated univocally), but several maʿānī of wujūd, which goes hand in
hand with its status as an ism mushakkik.
 Precedents for this practice in the early Arabic philosophical literature may be found in The Book
of Pure Good (ed. Badawī, 1977, 5‒6), where the action of soul is described as ‘divine’; and in Fārābī,
Acquisition, 63, which mentions “the divine principles” (al-mabādiʾ al-ilāhiyyah).
 1 The simple, irreducible, and prior existence of pure quiddity 479

(basīṭ, haplos), since what is simple does not alter or change. Nevertheless, there is
another crucial consideration at stake here. In Avicennian logic, ‘the absolute’ is
what holds irrespective of modal, temporal, and spatial conditions. Is absolute
what exists at all times and in an indeterminate manner, and hence irrespective of
specific conditions. By extension and in a metaphysical setting, the absolute for Avi-
cenna can refer to what has no determination or specification in existence, to what is
unconditioned and undetermined.¹⁰⁰ It is precisely in this sense, I believe, that the
qualifications “divine” and “absolute” should be construed with regard to quiddity
in itself. Pure essence is such precisely because it is in an absolute state of existence
remote and free from all the conditions and determinations that otherwise apply to
contingent being. It is unconditioned or lā bi-sharṭ shayʾ ākhar. It cannot even be said
to be possible and/or necessary, since these are concomitants that attach to the basic
quidditative meaning subsequently. Avicenna regards this absence of modal condi-
tions to be a characteristic of the absolute, and this is why he may have applied it
to quiddity in itself as well in this passage of The Cure. ¹⁰¹
Avicenna’s description of pure quiddity as something absolute (muṭlaq) should
be compared to other metaphysical usages of this term in his works. He regards
pure existence or existence in itself as being in an absolute state: he refers to abso-
lute being (al-mawjūd al-muṭlaq) in Salvation. ¹⁰² Like pure quiddity, being qua being

 Avicenna discourses on the logical absolute in various works; see, for example, Pointers, vol. 1,
308‒316 and 353 ff. Jurjānī, Definitions, 272.12, defines the absolute (al-muṭlaq) as “what points to a
one [thing] that is not determined [mā yadullu ʿalā wāḥid ghayr muʿayyan].”
 Interestingly, Jurjānī in Definitions, 272.16, defines the “conceptual absolute” as “the quiddity
that the examiner considers even if it is not [ontologically] realized [or verified] in the [sphere of
the] thing itself [al-muṭlaqah al-iʿtibāriyyah: hiya l-māhiyyah iʿtabarahā l-muʿtabir wa-lā taḥaqquqa
la-hā fī nafs al-amr]. This is a reference to an abstracted form of quiddity in the mind, but it could
be one that, on the author’s view, does not entail an ontological status, since by this time the
term iʿtibārī was often used expressly to contrast a mere suppositional object to a ‘mental existent’
(mawjūd dhihnī). The fact that this consideration is not verified by reference to “the thing in itself”
or “the fact of the matter” (nafs al-amr) certainly goes in this direction. For a detailed discussion
of the expression nafs al-amr, see Fazlıoğlu, Between Reality, 24 ff. At any rate, Jurjānī’s connecting
one aspect of quiddity with the absolute is any case relevant here.
 Avicenna describes the subject of metaphysics, being qua being, as ‘absolute’ existence, but he
usually refrains from describing God Himself as an absolute being. Yet the correlation of absoluteness
with divine existence is a leitmotiv in Arabic philosophical literature. It can be convincingly traced
back to Neoplatonic sources via the Arabic Neoplatonic corpus that developed in early Islam as a re-
sult of the translation movement and especially the Kindī circle. Plotinus regards the One as having
an absolute (apolutos) internal activity, and in Theology of Aristotle one reads that God is true, abso-
lute, simple One (Badawi (ed.), Theology of Aristotle, 271). For Fārābī as well, the absolute is connect-
ed with divine existence. In his Commentary on On Interpretation, 90, he outlines three senses of the
term necessity, the third of which he calls unconditional and absolute necessity, a sense he correlates
with divine existence. Before Fārābī, Kindī also refers to the Absolute One (al-Kindī’s Metaphysics,
104, 112). Avicenna, for his part, describes God as a principle of existence who creates “in an absolute
manner” (ʿalā l-iṭlāq), since nothing can qualify or condition the ex nihilo divine creation, emanation,
or causation issuing from Him. But whether the application of absoluteness to God’s existence is
480 IV The Special Ontological Mode of Quiddity in Itself

is unconditioned. Interestingly, in this connection, Avicenna also describes pure po-

tentiality and prime matter as ‘absolute’ notions. Prime matter, which is pure poten-
tiality for form, is in an absolute state of receptivity or potentiality. It is accordingly
absolute matter (al-hayūlā l-muṭlaqah).¹⁰³ Now, most scholars would concur in saying
that according to Avicenna prime matter does not actually exist, and it may be said at
most to possess a kind of absolute potential existence.¹⁰⁴ Yet, this suggests that even
something that is actually nonexistent like prime matter can be described as being in
an “absolute state.” Prime matter and pure existence are a kind of intelligible or con-
ceptual absolute, just as pure quiddity is a kind of intelligible or conceptual absolute.
All these things may be considered or conceived of without any added determina-
tions, conditions, or concomitants, and as such are among the building-blocks of the-
oretical thought. After all, they allow humans a glimpse into pure intelligibility and
conceptualization. The parallel between prime matter, being qua being, and pure
quiddity in this regard is an important one.¹⁰⁵

strictly speaking correct in Avicenna’s metaphysics remains an open question. One of the problematic
implications of such a view would be that ‘absolute being’ or ‘the existent taken absolutely,’ which
Avicenna regards as the general subject matter of metaphysics, would coincide fully with God’s s ex-
istence. At any rate, if the pure quiddities are hypothetically situated in the divine intellect, as they
probably should be (see chapter V), and if there is a sense in which the divine being can be called
absolute (muṭlaq), then this would by extension establish a correlation between these meanings. This
interpretation would have the merit of connecting Avicenna’s claim about the absolute existence of
pure quiddity with his claim concerning its divine existence. The quiddities in themselves would
share God’s divine and absolute existence, to the exclusion of all other things. The conceptual prece-
dence, simplicity, and indeterminacy of quiddity that make it “divine” and “absolute” would mean
that it shares a mode of existence that only the Necessary of Existence possesses. But this requires an
interpretive leap inasmuch as Avicenna does not develop a clear concept of absolute divine existence
in the way that followers of Ibn ʿArabī and other mystics would.
 Avicenna, Definitions 83; idem, Notes, 342.2; idem, Salvation, 497.10‒11.
 In Notes, 342.2, “absolute first matter” (al-māddah al-ūlā al-muṭlaqah) is said to exist and is con-
nected with, or dependent on, divine creation. Interestingly, these ‘absolute modes of existence’ are
always somehow tied to God’s direct causation in Avicenna’s metaphysics.
 The theories of the absolute quiddity (al-māhiyyah al-muṭlaqah) and absolute existence (wujūd
muṭlaq) are discussed in many post-Avicennian works, although they more often than not diverge
from Avicenna’s doctrine of quiddity in itself. The expression al-māhiyyah al-muṭlaqah becomes a
standard way to describe quiddity detached from all other considerations; see, for instance,
Qushjī, Commentary, 400.4‒9; Tahānawī, Dictionary, vol. 2, 1424. In contrast, the concept of ‘absolute
existence’ underwent a rich and ramified development in the Akbarian and Sufi traditions and as-
sumed complex meanings and ramifications proper to these movements. Even then, the discussion
of absolute existence is sometimes related to that of quiddity. For example, in Jāmī’s The Precious
Pearl (al-Durrah al-fārikhah), as well as in the commentaries that were later attached to that work,
one finds references to ‘absolute existence’ (al-wujūd al-muṭlaq), which the author correlates with
God, and which is contrasted to individuated (mutaʿayyin) existence. But the author of this treatise
elaborates these ideas in direct reaction to the position of the primacy of quiddity, which, he says,
others call ‘absolute’ (see Jāmī, The Precious Pearl, 35‒36, 40). It is noteworthy that while for Avicen-
na terms such as ‘absolute reality’ (ḥaqīqah muṭlaqah) are used to describe pure quiddity, they get
 1 The simple, irreducible, and prior existence of pure quiddity 481

1.5 Reassessing the conditions (shurūṭ) of pure quiddity

The foregoing discussion appears to validate the hypothesis that although quiddity
in itself can be considered according to a variety of aspects and conditions, as
well as in different contexts, it nonetheless possesses a special and positive mode
of existence. However, the ontological mode that is proper to pure essence falls with-
in the bounds of ontological modulation and can be qualified by priority, which is a
key aspect of tashkīk al-wujūd. Nevertheless, this mode corresponds neither to mental
existence nor to concrete existence as Avicenna usually describes them, if these are
taken with the condition that accidents or concomitants exist together with quiddity.
For these ontological modes imply, on Avicenna’s doctrine, a composite and contin-
gent existence, an existential cluster made up not only of the constitutive elements of
quiddity, but also of its concomitants and accidents brought together and unified
through causality. In contrast, the evidence adduced above calls for a distinction be-
tween three or even four ontological modes in Avicenna’s philosophy, which would
accommodate the special cases of the First and the pure quiddities.¹⁰⁶ My contention
is that it is crucial to distinguish these various modes of existence in Avicenna’s met-
aphysics, lest his doctrine of quiddity in itself be rendered incoherent either by mak-
ing quiddity an ontological ‘nothing’ or ‘void’ or by collapsing it within the sphere of
contingent and composite existence, to which it does not belong.¹⁰⁷ Being endowed
with simple, irreducible, and unconditioned existence means that quiddity in itself
exists, but not in a manner identical to the composite, contingent existents, even
when it exists in them or as a part of them. This special mode of irreducible and sim-
ple existence in turns explains how quiddity can be said to underlie the various
kinds of contingent existents Avicenna describes in his works, while being reducible
to neither. It is this unconditioned and absolute mode of existence that allows quid-
dity to exist in an intelligible manner in concrete individuals and in the mind and,
hence, to subsist as an irreducible part (juzʾ) of these existents.¹⁰⁸
Accordingly, this special mode of existence characterizes pure quiddity not only
when it exists in composite or complex existents—such as pure quiddity as part of
the universal horse or the concrete particular Bucephalus—but also when it exists

applied instead to God and pure existence in the aṣālat al-wujūd tradition, partly in reaction to Avi-
cenna’s essentialist doctrine.
 See Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Cure, I.2, 16.6, where he mentions “the mode of existence”
(naḥw al-wujūd); cf. VIII.7, 364.16, which refers to the “state of existence” (ḥāl wujūd) of the intelligi-
bles in God.
 This partly explains Wisnovsky’s puzzlement at this issue at Avicenna’s Metaphysics, 159‒160.
 These results overlap partly with Benevich, Die ‘göttliche Existenz.’ I agree with Benevich’s con-
tention that the description of ‘divine existence’ in Metaphysics V.1 can be said to apply to the exis-
tence of pure quiddity in composite beings, that is, to its existing as an irreducible part in those be-
ings, thanks to a mereological interpretation. However, I believe that this expression also refers to the
intrinsic intelligible nature of pure quiddity and points to a divine localization of these pure quiddi-
ties in God’s mind.
482 IV The Special Ontological Mode of Quiddity in Itself

as a distinct intelligible form in the mind. In either case, this special mode of exis-
tence refers to the simple, irreducible, and unqualified state of pure quiddity, regard-
less of whether other things are attached to it. In that sense, one can propose that Met-
aphysics V.1 aims to emphasize not only the epistemic irreducibility and distinctness
of pure quiddity, but also its ontological irreducibility (even when it exists in compo-
site beings) and distinctness (as it exists distinctly in the mind). It is pure quiddity’s
ability to exist as an irreducible principle in composite things, as well as in abstrac-
tion from all other things, that makes it absolute, divine, and unconditioned. The un-
conditioned state of quiddity makes it an ontological constant, regardless of whether
it is considered ‘with other things’ or ‘without them’ and ‘in abstraction from
them.’¹⁰⁹
One important result of the previous analysis is the methodological and concep-
tual need to distinguish between contexts of existence and modes of existence in Avi-
cenna’s philosophy. It is true that Avicenna posits, grosso modo, two contexts of ex-
istence: mental or intellectual, and concrete or extramental. However, these two
contexts of existence do not exhaust all modes of existence. In fact, we saw above
how sophisticated Avicenna’s conception of tashkīk is, and how many distinctions
and aspects he introduces to modulate the notion of existence. For one thing, God
or the Necessary of Existence does not exist in the same mode or way as the rest
of the concrete existents, even though it is an extramental being from the perspective
of human thought. Similarly, simple, intellectual beings, such as the Agent Intellect,
do not exist in the same mode as a horse or a rock. Even with regard to the ontology
of concepts in the human soul specifically, we saw that this single context or sphere
—mental or intellectual existence—calls for a further distinction between two modes
of existence: the composite, contingent, and conditioned existence of the universal,
and the simple, irreducible, and distinct mode of existence of pure quiddity. The ra-
tionale for this distinction is that pure essence exists both as a distinct form in the
intellect and mereologically in the composite, universal concept. Hence, the intelli-
gible existence of essence is not reducible to the universal concept, nor is the exis-
tence of the universal taken as a synthetic entity or whole the same as that of pure
quiddity when it constitutes a part of it. In that manner, the ontological mode of pure
quiddity is always the same, regardless of whether it is taken distinctly or with other
things, as a part of the universal. Clearly, then, contexts of existence are not the same
as modes of existence. It is these matrices of distinctions, which, when taken together
with the theory of tashkīk, form the cornerstone of Avicenna’s ontology.¹¹⁰

 I refer the reader back to my interpretation of the passage at Metaphysics V.1, 196.10‒13, which,
on my view and if properly translated, explicitly aims to distinguish the special mode of existence of
pure quiddity from that of caused, composite, contingent existence, i. e., the existence of the concom-
itants and accidents of quiddity. These various modes and aspects, as was shown earlier, are at the
core of Avicenna’s theory of tashkīk.
 Naturally, these are my categories, and they are not always explicitly reflected in the Arabic ter-
minology Avicenna relies on. Yet, I think he deliberately introduced these matrices of distinctions to
 1 The simple, irreducible, and prior existence of pure quiddity 483

But how do these ontological considerations intersect with Avicenna’s applica-

tion of the various conditions (shurūṭ) to quiddity? This question opens another in-
teresting perspective from which to approach the problem of the special existence
of pure quiddity. Recall that Avicenna in his works draws a distinction between quid-
dity lā bi-sharṭ shayʾ ākhar, quiddity bi-sharṭ shayʾ ākhar, and quiddity bi-sharṭ lā
shayʾ ākhar. I have referred to these distinctions on numerous occasions throughout
my analysis, so there is no need here to describe each one of them in detail. Suffice to
say that, on my interpretation of the evidence, Avicenna uses these various clauses to
refer to quiddity in itself, yet in different contexts (concrete, mental) and with refer-
ence to various ontological aspects or even modes, depending on whether the exter-
nal concomitants and accidents of quiddity are taken into account. These conditions,
to be sure, express epistemic and logical aspects and determine how quiddity can be
conceived of, but they also amount to ontological qualifications about how quiddity
exists in the intellect and in the concrete world. In this regard, one of the main dis-
tinctions that was endorsed in the previous analysis was between an unconditioned
(lā bi-sharṭ shayʾ ākhar) mode of existence proper to pure quiddity, nature, and es-
sential reality taken in themselves and in abstraction from all other things, and a
conditioned (bi-sharṭ shayʾ ākhar) mode of existence, which, I would argue, corre-
sponds to what Avicenna usually calls al-wujūdayn, al-wujūd bi-sharṭ or al-wujūd
al-sharṭī, or even al-wujūd fī l-dhihn and fī l-aʿyān, when these are taken indiscrim-
inately to apply to all composite concrete and mental existents. Pure quiddity is in-
variable, simple, prior, and constant, which explains why it is also described as
being divine, absolute, and unconditioned. We have seen above how, following a
well-established Greek tradition, the notions of simplicity, priority, constancy, and
absoluteness are often reserved to describe the divine world in in the works of Arabic
philosophers. Nevertheless, pure quiddity exists in a distinct or separate state only in
the intellect and, hence, according to an intelligible mode, where it is found ‘on the
condition of no other thing’ (bi-sharṭ lā shayʾ ākhar). In contrast, composite or com-
plex existence (whether as a universal or as a concrete thing) is conditioned, con-
comitant, posterior, caused, and contingent, and is necessarily accompanied by a
cluster of accidents. This is quiddity ‘with something else’ (bi-sharṭ shayʾ).

advance the ontological investigation. But this came at a cost for the later commentators, since all the
nuances of the Avicennian position were not easy to grasp, a fact rendered even more complicated by
the textual transmission of Avicenna’s corpus; hence the debate that harks back to some of the main
postclassical interpreters of Avicenna, notably Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, Shahrastānī, and Ṭūsī, and which
focused on Avicenna’s understanding of wujūd. In this connection, it is appropriate to mention that
Rāzī, a great compiler of previous philosophical views, frequently refers in his works to the propo-
nents of the equivocity of existence or to those who consider existence an equivocal term (ism mush-
tarak). Although he rarely cites thinkers by name in his works, there is little doubt that Rāzī included
Avicenna in this group; see, e. g., Collection, 76.5‒6, 98‒99. It appears that for him, the various Avi-
cennian ontological distinctions and the theory of tashkīk posed some serious interpretive problems,
to the point of making Avicenna a proponent of the equivocity of being.
484 IV The Special Ontological Mode of Quiddity in Itself

Of particular relevance here is the epistemic aspect that most directly corre-
sponds to the irreducible and special ontological mode of pure quiddity. Avicenna,
as well as most of the post-Avicennian thinkers, commonly associate pure quiddity,
quiddity in itself, and absolute quiddity—all three expressions being synonymous—
with unconditioned quiddity or quiddity lā bi-sharṭ shayʾ ākhar. Recall that this is the
aspect of quiddity that Avicenna—and, again, most of his followers—rely on to de-
scribe the mereological existence of quiddity in composite beings and especially
in concrete beings. It is not immediately obvious why Avicenna and the post-Avicen-
nian thinkers would want to connect unconditioned quiddity with the concrete indi-
viduals specifically. This seems counterintuitive, because quiddity in the concrete
world is always ‘with other things.’ One explanation is that by referring to the ‘un-
conditioned’ state of pure quiddity in composite beings (including in the concrete
material beings of the exterior world) Avicenna is allowing for it to be considered ei-
ther ‘with other things’ or abstracted as a pure, negatively-conditioned object in the
intellect. The idea that quiddity somehow exists in concrete beings according to a
qualified sense of universality (and in line with Avicenna’s theory of modulation)
would go some length in supporting his theory of abstraction—of how quiddity
can be abstracted or extracted from the particulars and apprehended in itself.
Hence, when regarded as a nature dwelling in concrete existents, albeit one which
can also be abstracted and conceived of in itself by the mind, pure quiddity is lā
bi-sharṭ shayʾ ākhar. So the latter formula would, so to speak, encompass the
other two forms of condition (bi-sharṭ shayʾ and bi-sharṭ lā shayʾ).
On this interpretation, the expression lā bi-sharṭ shayʾ ākhar would point to pure
quiddity as an irreducible epistemic principle and metaphysical part of composite
concrete existents. In contrast, when considered as a distinct object in the intellect
in abstraction from all material and mental concomitants, essence is bi-sharṭ lā
shayʾ ākhar. Strictly speaking, then, only the latter clause applies to quiddity in itself
when regarded exclusively and in abstraction from all other things, and in this state
of pure autonomy and distinctness it is an object that exists only in the intellect. As
Avicenna and most of his later commentators contend, quiddity bi-sharṭ lā shayʾ
ākhar can exist only as a pure object or concept in the mind, if at all.¹¹¹ It is therefore
important to grasp that the difference between these two expressions, unconditioned
quiddity and negatively-conditioned quiddity, is largely one of context (mental vs. ex-
tramental) and epistemic priority (since its unconditioned state in concreto precedes
its negatively-conditioned state in intellectu, at least when it comes to the process of
abstraction performed by the human minds), but that the ontological mode pertain-
ing to quiddity in itself remains the same, namely, simple, irreducible, and identical
with itself, regardless of whether it is a part of an existent (unconditioned) or distinct

 There are, however, exceptions to this rule in the postclassical tradition. Qushjī posits quiddity
bi-sharṭ lā shayʾ ākhar as existing both in the mind and in the concrete world. This view—unorthodox
when compared to the earlier Avicennian tradition—is to be explained in terms of Qushjī’s idiosyn-
cratic dual interpretation of the condition bi-sharṭ lā; on this point, see Izutsu, Basic Problems.
 1 The simple, irreducible, and prior existence of pure quiddity 485

from all other things (negatively-conditioned). Hence, the immanent mereological (lā
bi-sharṭ shayʾ ākhar) and negatively distinct (bi-sharṭ lā shayʾ ākhar) dimensions of
quiddity do not affect its purely intelligible, irreducible, and constant ontological na-
ture and mode, which remain at all times the same. This explains why the former,
namely, unconditioned quiddity, is related to the latter (through the process of ab-
straction), inasmuch as unconditioned quiddity can be potentially regarded—when
rationally considered in the mind—as essentially and ontologically the same as ‘neg-
atively-conditioned’ quiddity.¹¹²
Yet, an important distinction is to be made between how quiddity in itself exists
in the concrete extramental world and how it exists in the mind. In the exterior
world, quiddity in itself exists only together with its material accidents and concom-
itants. Avicenna is adamant that it cannot exist on its own and autonomously, lest
one end up positing the Platonic forms. Hence, the absolute mode of existence of
quiddity in itself in the concrete world is in or with the particular and conditioned
concomitants that individualize this being, although pure essence remains unaffect-
ed and untouched by these external concomitants, since it exists as an intelligible
part within the existent. This is the first aspect of unconditioned quiddity or quiddity

 In the post-Avicennian tradition, pure quiddity is more commonly and systematically identified
with unconditioned quiddity (lā bi-sharṭ shayʾ ākhar) than with negatively-conditioned quiddity (bi-
sharṭ lā shayʾ ākhar). Unconditioned quiddity is then also frequently identified with ‘absolute quid-
dity’ (māhiyyah muṭlaqah) and nature (ṭabīʿah) or ‘the natural universal’ (kullī ṭabīʿī); see Qushjī,
Commentary, 400.4‒9; Tahānawī, Dictionary, vol. 2, 1424; Izutsu, Basic Problems, 5 and note 2; and
the section below reserved to the post-Avicennian period. How these various terms and notions relate
to one another represents a intricate problem in the postclassical literature. The reason for the strong
connection between pure quiddity and unconditioned quiddity—rather than negatively-conditioned
quiddity—is the importance of the notion of iʿtibār in this later discussion and the designation of
the negative condition as a consideration that is itself added to the consideration of pure quiddity,
with the implication that we are dealing with two distinct and cumulative considerations. Conse-
quently, some thinkers regard negatively-conditioned quiddity as not referring to pure quiddity,
but already to some synthetic or composite quiddity in the mind, and this in spite of the purely neg-
ative nature of the condition attached to it. Avicenna, in contrast, quite lucidly identifies negatively-
conditioned quiddity with pure quiddity in Metaphysics V.1—at least in the context of his discussion
of mental existence and the universal. There is little doubt that the consideration of pure quiddity
mentioned in Introduction I.2 also corresponds to negatively-conditioned quiddity as described in
Metaphysics V.1. Yet, as I explained earlier, it is crucial to realize that pure quiddity for Avicenna is
both negatively-conditioned quiddity and unconditioned quiddity, depending on the context in
which one conceives it: it is negatively conditioned when conceived of in itself in an intellectual con-
text, but unconditioned when conceived of in the context of concrete reality, in which case it can be
viewed either purely in itself (qua pure nature or quiddity) or together with external concomitants
and accidents (in which case it becomes positively conditioned or bi-sharṭ shayʾ ākhar). I surmise
that one major reason why the consideration of unconditioned quiddity takes on such importance
in the later tradition flows from the reluctance of many thinkers to recognize the mental existence
of pure quiddity. This in turn could have led to the demotion of negatively-conditioned quiddity to
signifying merely another, composite, concomitant aspect of quiddity in the mind and not pure quid-
dity.
486 IV The Special Ontological Mode of Quiddity in Itself

lā bi-sharṭ shayʾ ākhar. In addition, pure quiddity exists absolutely in the mind in a
manner distinct from universal quiddity or quiddity combined with intelligible con-
comitants. This is the second aspect of unconditioned quiddity, which results from
the process of abstracting the nature of concrete individuals. This second aspect of
unconditioned quiddity also corresponds to negatively-conditioned quiddity, quiddi-
ty bi-sharṭ lā shayʾ ākhar, if the emphasis is on its pure abstraction and distinctness
from everything else.¹¹³
Furthermore, this second aspect of absolute and unconditioned quiddity also in
turn forms the basis for the universal, since it can combine with mental concomi-
tants. Note that the absolute, unconditioned state of pure quiddity enables it to be-
come conditioned once more, but this time in the mind, and to acquire a new con-
dition linked with the mental attributes. Thus, unconditioned quiddity branches out
into two states of conditioned quiddity, in the concrete and in the mind. In the case
of concrete beings, quiddity can be regarded “with the condition of another thing”
(bi-sharṭ shayʾ ākhar), where “thing” corresponds to the material accidents. In the
case of the universal, it can also be considered “with the condition of another
thing,” where “thing” this time refers to the mental attributes, such as universality,
and to the predicability of multiplicity that characterizes the universal proper. In
brief, there is a sense in which unconditioned quiddity underlies all other instances
and aspects of quiddity. Below is a diagram that recapitulates these various points:

 The same interplay between the epistemic and the ontological applies to Avicenna’s theological
doctrines. For instance, his claims that God is purely one and simple, that He is “with the condition of
no other thing,” that He is at the same time thinker, thought, and object of thought—all of these are
posited from the perspective of human rationality and are therefore conceptual and epistemic in na-
ture, but they are also intended to describe an ontological reality in the extramental world: God is one
and simple, He is thinker, thought, and object of thought, albeit with no multiplicity arising, and He
does exist with no other things attached to Him.
 1 The simple, irreducible, and prior existence of pure quiddity 487

These three cases of condition—the two bi-sharṭ shayʾ ākhar and the single bi-sharṭ lā
shayʾ ākhar—are rendered possible in the first place by the absolute, unconditioned
state of pure quiddity. In all three instances, quiddity in itself remains the same and
exists as an epistemic and ontological constant, even when it is considered with these
conditions and when it underlies the various instantiations of contingent existence
(both mental and extramental).¹¹⁴ All three conditional states therefore presuppose
the fundamental mode of existence of absolute and unconditioned quiddity. Put dif-
ferently, the existence of quiddity in itself qua absolute and unconditioned underlies
the other aspects of quiddity, including those associated with mental and extramen-
tal conditioned existence. By extension, when taken together with its concomitants,
quiddity in itself can be said to exist either concretely or mentally. When considered
purely in itself, it exists separately in the mind alone as a mental or intellectual ex-
istent of a special kind.
One important upshot of the foregoing is that in Avicenna’s metaphysics condi-
tioned existence, i. e., composite concrete and mental existence, should be contrast-
ed not only to nonexistence, but also to simple, absolute, and unconditioned exis-

 Given the terminological evidence and the nature of the conceptual distinctions established by
Avicenna, it is difficult to agree with those scholars who regard the ‘divine existence’ of quiddity in
itself as a purely epistemic, not ontological, state, and one that would not be in any way distinct from
the status of complex universal entities in the mind. As mentioned previously, it seems to me counter-
productive to want to establish strict separations between the ontological and epistemic spheres, in-
asmuch as what can be conceived of intellectually for Avicenna necessarily also somehow exists in-
tellectually or intelligibly. In contrast to this approach, my contention is that the absolute, divine state
of quiddity marks a new epistemic and ontological state or mode in Avicenna’s metaphysics. In this
regard, my results are close to those of Rashed, Ibn ʿAdī, although I depart from Rashed’s intimation
concerning the neutrality of pure quiddity.
488 IV The Special Ontological Mode of Quiddity in Itself

tence. What does not exist in a composite and contingent mode either does not exist
at all or exists in an absolute, simple, and unconditioned mode. Put differently, when
Avicenna discourses on the two modes of existence (mental and extramental)—what
he calls al-wujūdayn—his account should not be taken as an exhaustive description
of existence simpliciter, but rather as a description that is exhaustive only of contin-
gent and composite/complex existence. ¹¹⁵ Avicenna intimates this very idea of contin-
gent complex existence in a passage of Pointers, when he states: “Know that each
thing [shayʾ] has a quiddity [māhiyyah], and that it [the thing] can be verified as ex-
isting either in the concrete world or as [being] conceivable in the mind, inasmuch as
its parts are present together with it [bi-an takūna ajzāʾuhu ḥāḍirah maʿahu].”¹¹⁶ As
this quotation shows, al-wujūdayn encompasses only composite or complex things.
These things consist of quiddities taken together with their accidents and concomi-
tants—referred to in this quotation by the term “parts” (ajzāʾ). In those cases, Avicen-
na notes that “existence is a concomitant notion [or attribute] connected with the es-
sence [of the thing]” (fa-l-wujūd maʿnā muḍāf ilā ḥaqīqatihi lāzim).¹¹⁷ The inference is
that things that do not have parts and are not therefore composite cannot exist ac-
cording to these two contingent modes of existence. By implication, this expression
does not cover certain special cases of existence, such as God’s special existence.
God cannot be described according to the definitions of mental and concrete exis-
tence typically outlined by Avicenna in his works, on account of the fact that the
two classes of existents they presuppose are characterized by a conditioned, contin-
gent, and complex mode of existence. Rather, God possesses His own special mode
of existence.¹¹⁸

 Avicenna uses the formula “the two modes of existence” (al-wujūdayn) in numerous instances:
Pointers, vol. 1, 202.6; Introduction, I.2, 15.3 and 18 (where he mentions the “two aspects of existence,”
naḥwā l-wujūdayn), 34.9. This formula was subsequently picked up by post-Avicennian exegetes in
their commentaries. See, for instance, Ṭūsī, Commentary on Pointers, vol. 1, 202.17 ff., who explains
that by al-wujūdayn, Avicenna means “the exterior and mental [existence]” (al-khārijī wa-l-dhihnī).
Interestingly, Ṭūsī goes on to talk about the “special existence” (al-wujūd al-khāṣṣ), which belongs
to God, and which he therefore contrasts sharply to the two previous modes of existence.
 Avicenna, Pointers, vol. 1, 202.4‒5. The pronoun hu attached to ajzāʾ and the term maʿahu hark
back to shayʾ, not māhiyyah. This indicates that Avicenna is referring to the various parts of the com-
posite whole (essence, concomitants, accidents) according to a mereological analysis, and not to the
intrinsic and constitutive parts of essence, in spite of the section’s title.
 Avicenna, Pointers, vol. 1, 202.8.
 One passage that seems to draw a strong distinction between the mode of being of God and the
mode of being of the other entities is Notes, 180, section 265. In that passage, actual existence (al-
wujūd bi-l-fiʿl) is identified with pure necessity (al-wājibiyyah), and both in turn are identified exclu-
sively with God’s essence. In contrast, existence said in an absolute or general sense (al-wujūd muṭ-
laqan) is ascribed to all the other beings, and it presumably corresponds to the undifferentiated ac-
quired existence that contingent beings receive from their cause. As Lizzini, Ibn Sīnā’s Metaphysics,
explains: “If the uncaused Principle is itself part of being, then It is the principle of only part of being:
of being insofar as it is caused, and not of all being or of being as such. Indeed, if the Principle were
the principle of all being, it would, paradoxically, be Its own principle.” Accordingly, I believe the
 2 Senses of existence in Avicenna’s ontology 489

In light of the foregoing, I would argue that the pure quiddities also represent an
exception to the ontological scope that al-wujūdayn encompasses. It is precisely with
this intent in mind that Avicenna asserts in Metaphysics of The Cure V.1, 201.1 that we
can consider quiddity in itself in abstraction from oneness and multiplicity, of par-
ticularity and universality, and of “whether it is in actuality or with the consideration
of potentiality.” Since these concomitants are associated with conditioned, contin-
gent, and composite existence, even they are inadequate to describe the ontological
mode of quiddity. What Avicenna is saying, in effect, is that quiddity cannot ever
exist in the mode in which the contingent beings exist qua actually existent compo-
sites (e. g., this particular horse). Now that the modes of ontological modulation, and
especially the notion of priority, as well as the conditions, have been addressed in
some detail in connection with quiddity, I wish to turn to the other major aspect
of the problem related with existence in Avicenna, namely, his contention that
wujūd is said according to many “senses” or “meanings” (kathīr al-maʿānī). More
specifically, I wish to discuss how the two main senses he mentions relate to quiddity
and impact on the link between quiddity and substance.

2 Senses of existence in Avicenna’s ontology

2.1 ‘Affirmative’ or ‘established’ existence’ and ‘realized existence’ (wujūd ithbātī,

wujūd muḥaṣṣal)

Avicenna’s claim in Metaphysics I.5 that being has several ‘senses’ or ‘meanings’ (ka-
thīr al-maʿānī) might at first sight strike one as somewhat perplexing, because in
other passages—building on Aristotle and his commentators—he describes existence
as a modulated term and notion, which implies that it possesses a single focal or
overarching meaning.¹¹⁹ As we saw in the section on tashkīk, Avicenna defines
wujūd (or mawjūd) as a modulated term (ism mushakkik), which he contrasts to
the equivocal terms proper (asmāʾ or alfāẓ mushtarakah). Thus, when the master
claims that wujūd has several senses or meanings, he does not intend to say that
it is polysemous and that its various meanings are completely unrelated to one an-

expressions mawjūdāt fī l-aʿyān, al-wujūdayn, wujūd muḥaṣṣal, etc. apply primarily in Avicenna’s
works to the caused, composite, and contingent beings existing in extramental reality, and, hence,
are not usually intended to include the mode of existence of the First Cause. It is even questionable
on my view whether Avicenna in most cases would include the separate intellects in the context he
describes as fī l-aʿyān; this expression seems to refer first and foremost to the contingent beings of the
sublunary world. Yet, since the separate intellects are themselves caused, contingent, and affected by
multiplicity—each one of them possesses intelligible multiplicity—they can also under one aspect be
encompassed by this expression.
 In writing this section of my book, I benefited tremendously from conversations with David
Twetten, to whom I express my gratitude. All errors or misunderstandings of Avicenna’s text are en-
tirely mine.
490 IV The Special Ontological Mode of Quiddity in Itself

other, which would make it a truly equivocal notion, but rather that wujūd has var-
ious sub-senses, all of which are tied together by a focal or core meaning. Avicenna’s
statement in I.5 therefore needs to be read in light of his theory of ontological mod-
ulation, which builds on Aristotle’s theory of core-related homonymy. In attempting
to extricate the various semantic nuances of being and in clarifying its predication,
Avicenna is also following Aristotle directly, for the latter also believed that being is
“said in many ways.”¹²⁰ On the other hand, there is no consensus that has emerged
in the secondary literature regarding the nature and scope of the two senses of exis-
tence Avicenna distinguishes in this passage of Metaphysics I.5 and how they relate
to the various senses of being Aristotle discusses in Δ7 and other passages. Further-
more, their relation to quiddity remains problematic. In what follows, I go over some
of the main interpretations that have been offered and strive to generate new insight
into the difficult task of interpreting this key passage of Metaphysics I.5. According to
my interpretation, and following a brief indication by Marmura, Metaphysics I.5 is to
be connected directly to the discussion of the ontology of quiddity that is articulated
in section V.1 of the same work.¹²¹
Starting with the first sense, most interpreters of Avicenna have construed wujūd
ithbātī as referring to what is ‘established’ or ‘realized’ in existence or in external re-
ality, and thus to what can be ‘affirmed’ as actually existing. Since Avicenna recog-
nizes both concrete and mental beings, the implication is that wujūd ithbātī would
apply to both. Moreover, this sense would be identical to the one conveyed by anoth-
er Avicennian expression, ‘realized existence’ (wujūd muḥaṣṣal). On this interpreta-
tion, al-mawjūd, al-muthbat, and al-muḥaṣṣal all point to an actually existing entity,
primarily in the concrete world, but also in the mind.¹²² If this interpretation is re-

 The key passages in Aristotle’s Metaphysics—surely known to Avicenna—are as follows: Γ2, es-
pecially1003a33‒1003b19, Δ7, and Ε2.1026a33‒1026b5, where it is said that “the unqualified term
‘being’ has several meanings.” It is noteworthy that Usṭāth’s translation (as it appears in Averroes’s
Great Commentary on Metaphysics, vol. 1, 300.13, and vol. 2, 714.15‒16) departs from the Avicennian
terminology. There one reads: fa-l-huwiyyah tuqālu ʿalā anwāʿ kathīrah and tuqālu bi-anwāʿ kathīrah
respectively. Although the term huwiyyah is used instead of mawjūd and wujūd in the translation, the
meaning is the same, i. e., that being is predicated in many ways.
 That Marmura saw V.1 as developing the senses of existence introduced in I.5 is made clear in
Avicenna, Metaphysics, Marmura edition, 404‒405, notes 9 and 10.
 As Goichon, Lexique, 73‒79, notes, the root ḥ-ṣ-l can mean “exist” in Avicenna, and when used in
conjunction with wujūd, it usually means something like “realized in actuality”; for muḥaṣṣal specif-
ically, Goichon has “ce qui est parvenu à l’acte” and “ce qui est réalisé”; Marmura for his part (in
Avicenna, The Metaphysics, 381‒382, note 3; 386, note 6; 405, note 10) translates wujūd ithbātī as “af-
firmative existence,” but seems to construe it in a manner close to that of Goichon. He takes it to refer
to the existents both in concrete reality and in the soul, whereas wujūd khāṣṣ refers to quiddity. More-
over, according to Marmura, affirmative existence is excluded from the description of quiddity in it-
self in Introduction I.2, with the implication that it pertains to ‘actual’ or ‘realized’ beings and that al-
muthbat and al-muḥaṣṣal should be tied with mental universals and concrete existents, which are the
two other aspects attached to quiddity that are exposed in this chapter of Introduction. For Bertolacci,
The Distinction, 266‒267, 273, as well, this first sense of wujūd is to be interpreted as meaning “estab-
 2 Senses of existence in Avicenna’s ontology 491

tained, then the meaning of these terms would be co-extensional with that of ‘thing’
(shayʾ) and also of ‘the thing that can be designated or pointed to’ (al-mushār ilayhi),
since every existent is also a thing. Ultimately, this set of terms would embrace the
two main classes of existents that constitute Avicenna’s ontology (concrete and men-
tal beings), and thus all the things comprised by the expressions al-wujūdayn and al-
mawjūdāt. By further implication, and excluding God from this picture, they would
refer to all the contingent and caused entities of Avicenna’s ontology (al-mumkināt,
al-maʿlūlāt).¹²³
Approaching this topic from another angle, Stephen Menn has proposed to con-
strue this first sense of wujūd in close relation to Fārābī’s sense of ‘being-as-truth.’ In
a series of articles devoted to Fārābī’s, Avicenna’s, and Averroes’s metaphysics, Menn
has delved into these thinkers’ conception of being-as-truth and traced a common
argumentative thread leading from Fārābī to Averroes via Avicenna, which can ac-
count also for an important aspect of the critical reception of Avicenna’s metaphysics
in the works of Averroes. He suggests that the first sense of being in Avicenna’s ex-
position corresponds in part to the theory of being-as-truth Fārābī articulates in some
sections of The Book of Particles, and that both interpretations build on one of the
senses of being Aristotle outlines in Metaphysics Δ7.¹²⁴ In spite of this connection,
Menn warns that the shaykh al-raʾīs elaborates on the legacy of his predecessors,
and that wujūd ithbātī holds a distinct sense in the context of Avicenna’s metaphy-
sics. As he puts it,

unlike al-Fārābī, he does not say that wujūd in the positing sense is a second intention, some-
thing mind-dependent and an object of logic rather than metaphysics. On the contrary, Avicenna
thinks that being in this sense is an objective feature of things, and is (alongside unity) one of

lished in reality” or “realized” in existence; cf. Black, Mental Existence, 26, who takes wujūd ithbātī to
mean “mental and concrete existence”; Lizzini, Wuǧūd-Mawǧūd, 118, according to whom al-muthbat
and al-muḥaṣṣal “can be conceived of as belonging to the level of concrete reality (in re) as well as to
the level of knowledge (in intellectu)”; De Haan, Avicenna’s Healing, 29, who also construes these
terms as meaning “realized” or “established,” and writes that “(mawjūd) directs our attention to
the entity as having an established existence or realized subsistence”; and Kalbarczyk, Predication,
71, 76, 106, 108‒111, who takes these roots to mean ‘realized’ or ‘established in existence.’
 According to this interpretation, God can only very awkwardly be described as muthbat (estab-
lished in reality) and muḥaṣṣal (realized in existence), in the same way that God can only very awk-
wardly be called ‘a thing’ (shayʾ) or a ‘substance’ (jawhar).
 See Menn, al-Fārābī; idem, Fārābī, especially 70 and 82, where the connection between Fārābī
and Avicenna is stressed; and Avicenna’s Metaphysics, 149‒152. Menn provides a fascinating recon-
struction of the critical reception of Avicenna’s metaphysics in Averroes, which he explains mostly
through the lens of being-as-truth. But his analysis does not dwell much on the second sense of
wujūd Avicenna outlines in Metaphysics I.5 and on his theory of ontological modulation (tashkīk
al-wujūd), as well as how the latter relates to these senses of wujūd. For other studies on being-as-
truth in Avicenna approached from a different angle, see Kukkonen, Dividing Being, 56‒58; De
Haan, Avicenna’s Healing; and Lizzini, Ontology and Logic.
492 IV The Special Ontological Mode of Quiddity in Itself

the universal attributes of things that are central objects of metaphysics; if X is other than God,
the wujūd of X is an accident of the quiddity of X.¹²⁵

Menn is probably right to stress a certain connection between wujūd ithbātī and
being-as-truth. In this perspective, wujūd ithbātī would mean something like ‘affir-
mative existence’ (i. e., affirmed in the mind through reasoning or propositional
truth), and the corresponding technical terms Avicenna mentions in this same pas-
sage—namely, al-muthbat and al-muḥaṣṣal—could be glossed respectively as “the af-
firmed” or “the established” and “the intellectually obtained or ascertained (in the
mind),” all of which would ultimately refer to the being-as-truth of propositions in
the mind. This approach seems to find some traction in other Arabic works and is
also etymologically quite compelling.¹²⁶ If construed as such, these technical terms
would bear some relation to the notion of ascertainment or judgment (taṣdīq),
which presupposes propositional truth, and they could also be dissociated from
the status of quiddities regarded in themselves as the objects of conceptualization
(taṣawwur).¹²⁷
Nevertheless, as Menn himself notes, focusing on being-as-truth unduly prioritiz-
es the mental and logical plane over the ontological one and would restrict this sense
of being solely to the mind. In effect, it would limit Avicenna’s argumentation to
merely one of the four senses of being Aristotle had outlined in Metaphysics Δ7,
and, moreover, to a sense that Aristotle himself had not deemed central to the meta-
physical inquiry. Given the nature of Avicenna’s own metaphysical project and its
alignment with Aristotle’s, it would be surprising if he had limited one of the two
main senses of wujūd he discusses in this key chapter solely to being-as-truth.¹²⁸
One may also have reservations regarding this interpretation on terminological
grounds. Neither the Arabic Aristotle—at least in the version by Usṭāth handed

 Menn, Avicenna’s Metaphysics, 153.

 As Menn shows, both Fārābī and Averroes discuss being-as-truth at some length in their works.
There are also some interesting etymological observations regarding the roots th-b-t and ḥ-ṣ-l and
their use in the classical and postclassical texts that would seem to confirm the meaning of being-
as-truth. The root th-b-t is often employed in the sense of ‘establishing’ or ‘proving’ (a doctrine),
such as when it is connected with the proof of the Necessary of Existence in Itself (ithbāt wājib al-
wujūd bi-dhātihi), and thus with something that is proven or established in the mind. As for the
root ḥ-ṣ-l, it can suggest something that is ‘acquired by,’ or ‘realized in,’ the mind through reflection,
and is also associated with syllogistic reasoning, where it describes a particular type of proposition
(see for example Jurjānī’s explanation of al-muḥaṣṣalah in Definitions, 259). On this reading of the
terminology, muthbat and muḥaṣṣal would point to something established and acquired by the
mind, i.e., in the sense of propositional truth and being-as-truth.
 Kalbarczyk, Predication, 30, relevantly translates taṣdīq as “acknowledging the truth.”
 For Avicenna’s metaphysical project, see Bertolacci, The Reception of Aristotle’s Metaphysics;
and Menn, Avicenna’s Metaphysics. Granted, Avicenna’s discussion of the senses of being in Meta-
physics I.5 may not be exhaustive, but I think the point still holds: construing the first sense exclu-
sively as being-as-truth seems too restrictive in the broader frame of Avicenna’s discussion of the sub-
ject matter of metaphysics as being qua being in Book I.
 2 Senses of existence in Avicenna’s ontology 493

down to us in Averroes’s Great Commentary on Metaphysics—nor for that matter

Fārābī and Averroes, who tackle its relevant passages, replicate the Avicennian ter-
minology in their works. Rather, they refer to being-as-truth by means of terms de-
rived from the ḥ-q-q root (ḥaqq, ḥaqīqah) and the ṣ-d-q root (‘being’ said ʿalā l-
ṣādiq), making them the cornerstone of their argumentation.¹²⁹ In addition, there
are numerous instances where Avicenna employs the root ḥ-ṣ-l and its related
terms (ḥuṣūl, muḥaṣṣal) to designate not being-as-truth in the mind, but rather the
being of things outside the mind. In these instances, the root expresses the reality,
actualization, or realization of existence in a substance or an accident, linking it
to the being of the categories. Given that Avicenna tells us that al-muḥaṣṣal and
al-muthbat are synonymous with al-mawjūd, it would be odd indeed if he limited
these terms merely to propositional being in the mind. As we know, al-mawjūd for
Avicenna has a broad extensionality and encompasses both mental and concrete en-
tities. Granted, these points are not decisive, especially given Avicenna’s tendency to
use innovative terms and expand the nomenclature he inherited from his forebears.
But they prompt us to reconsider a potential doctrinal link between Fārābī’s and
Averroes’s theories of being-as-truth, on the one hand, and Metaphysics I.5, on the
other.¹³⁰
These terminological points notwithstanding, limiting Avicenna’s notion of
wujūd ithbātī to being-as-truth alone would be perilous, in view of the slipperiness
of the epistemological and ontological planes in his philosophy. We should bear in
mind that muthbat and muḥaṣṣal can have an epistemological emphasis (what
comes to be affirmed or established in the mind), or, alternatively, but not antinomi-
cally, an ontological one, as pointing to a causal and ontological state, i. e., that
which is ‘established’ in existence (through a cause) and that which ‘acquires’ exis-
tence or is ‘realized’ in existence (again, through a cause). One caveat to that effect
appears in Metaphysics I.8, where the master discourses on the various meanings of
truth in a manner that suggests that he has being-as-truth as a central concern there.
Nevertheless, even in that passage, the epistemological or purely intellectual and log-
ical consideration of being-as-truth is connected with other ontological considera-
tions related to extramental existence, or what one might call objective metaphysical

 For the evidence from Usṭāth’s translation of Metaphysics and Averroes’s commentary, see Aver-
roes, Great Commentary on Metaphysics, vol. 2, 555.8‒13, and for Averroes’s commentary, 559.15 ff.; for
Fārābī, see The Book of Particles, 213.23 ff.
 If anything, and on purely terminological grounds, these passages could support the designa-
tion of Avicenna’s second sense of being, viz., proper being (wujūd khāṣṣ), as corresponding to
being-as-truth. The term ḥaqīqah, for example, appears in Averroes’s account of being-as-truth in
his tafsīr, where it is said that huwiyyah (viz., al-mawjūd) points to the true nature (ḥaqīqah) of the
existent, which is grosso modo what Avicenna says about the second sense of wujūd in Metaphysics
I.5. In light of this terminological overlap, it is not surprising that other scholars, such as De Haan,
Avicenna’s Healing, especially 29‒30, and Lizzini, Ontology and Logic, whose studies also focus on
being-as-truth, have chosen to associate it primarily with the second sense of being Avicenna pro-
vides in Metaphysics I.5, and thus also with essence.
494 IV The Special Ontological Mode of Quiddity in Itself

existence, with the result that the two planes are interlinked and that being-as-truth
emerges ultimately as the mental counterpart of a state of existence in extramental
reality.¹³¹ What is more, the various senses of truth Avicenna provides are grounded
ultimately in a theological model that presumes God as the absolute truth. On this
model, the being-as-truth said of all beings apart from God is relative and corre-
sponds to—and depends directly on—an ontological state of contingency of all be-
ings apart from God as it exists in the real world.¹³²
Given these considerations, it stands to reason to construe Avicenna’s first sense
of wujūd in a more flexible way and as referring broadly to beings that are ‘realized’
or ‘established’ in existence both in the mind and in external reality, a reading which
also coheres well with his terminology. One upshot of this interpretation is that wujūd
ithbātī and wujūd muḥaṣṣal would not be predicated univocally (like being-as-truth),
but rather differently and variably depending on the types of beings under investiga-
tion. Returning to Menn’s qualification, it appears that wujūd ithbātī focuses on ex-
istence as an external concomitant, attribute, or even accident of essence. This state
of externality and accidentality pertains to all the contingent beings of Avicenna’s
ontology, but it applies to them differently, depending on their categorial status.
Here we perceive a connection between wujūd ithbātī and tashkīk al-wujūd, a hypoth-
esis that seems confirmed by a passage in which Avicenna himself specifies the link
between tashkīk and wujūd taken as a non-constitutive concomitant.¹³³ By the same
token, and because tashkīk al-wujūd deals primarily with the categories—it estab-
lishes, for instance, that existence is prior in substances and posterior in accidents,
prior in certain substances over others, etc.—it would seem that wujūd ithbātī per-
tains to the being of the categories or at least invokes a categorial scheme.¹³⁴ But
this leads to a certain interpretive tension. For if we hark back to Aristotle’s Δ7,
the sense of being associated with the categories is described as being per se, a
sense which seems to fit awkwardly with the perception of existence as an external
and accidental attribute of essence. My point is that defining the relationship be-
tween wujūd ithbātī, tashkīk al-wujūd, and Avicenna’s theory of ontological external-
ity, accidentality, and contingency represents a real interpretive challenge. In spite of
an obvious thematic and methodological debt to Δ7, it is not immediately clear that
Avicenna’s wujūd ithbātī corresponds to any of the senses of being outlined by Aris-
totle in that text.

 In fact, in that opening section of I.8, one might even say that being-as-truth in the mind, which
is tied with enunciation and belief (al-qawl wa-l-ʿaqd), is subjected to another sense of truth con-
strued as the external reality and existence of things. On this point, see De Haan, Avicenna’s Healing.
 For a detailed examination of the interface of the epistemological, theological, and ontological
planes of Avicenna’s theory of truth, see De Haan, Avicenna’s Healing.
 Avicenna, Discussions, 218, section 648.
 This is a difficult point. Menn, Avicenna’s Metaphysics, 153, links the sense of wujūd khāṣṣ with
the being of the categories, and I think there are good reasons to do so, as I explain later.
 2 Senses of existence in Avicenna’s ontology 495

In spite of these uncertainties, one detects a neat correspondence between wujūd

ithbātī and wujūd muḥaṣṣal, on the one hand, and other terms that appear in Avicen-
na’s works that designate realized or established beings, such as al-wujūdayn (con-
crete and mental existence), as well as other terms derived from the root ḥ-ṣ-l
(such as ḥuṣūl, ḥāṣil), which he frequently employs to refer to the actual—and so
also caused and contingent—existence of substances and accidents in the concrete
world. After all, Avicenna stresses the synonymity of mawjūd, muḥaṣṣal, and muth-
bat, thereby suggesting that these terms refer to a basic sense of being. On this read-
ing, it is important to note that this entire terminological cluster implies the caused,
contingent, and dependent state of actual existents. Its sense, therefore, would be
primarily metaphysical and causal and mark a state of ontological contingency. It
would designate the state of the existent that is ‘established’ or ‘realized’ in existence
by something else. Understandably, this sense would exclude the First, whom Avi-
cenna to my knowledge never describes as muthbat and muḥaṣṣal, and very rarely
as mawjūd.
In light of these considerations, it appears that the two main approaches out-
lined above (wujūd ithbātī as being partly derived from being-as-truth, and as ex-
pressing a state of ontological contingency) can be fruitfully reconciled to some ex-
tent and in fact presuppose one another. For there is a certain isomorphism between
objects in the mind and their existence in the world according to the Arabic philos-
ophers under discussion, a necessary state for being-as-truth to be predicated. This is
why Fārābī, for one, glosses being-as-truth as “what is in the mind as it is outside the
mind,” or “being outside the soul as it is in the soul,”¹³⁵ and why Avicenna, following
him, maintains a robust parallelism (encapsulated in Metaphysics I.8) between
being-as-truth (or truth in the mind) and ontological truth (truth qua existence in
the real world).¹³⁶ More precisely, in the context of Avicenna’s philosophy, one
could argue, as De Haan has, that the relative truth of things in the mind mirrors
their contingent ontological status in the world. Since truth is relative (in the case
of everything that is not the necessary of existence), being-as-truth will correspond
per force to being-contingent in the world, since any truthful proposition about
something in the mind will be about a being that is in itself contingent and acquires
existence, necessity, and truth from an external cause. As a corollary, the only abso-
lute truth is the Necessary of Existence, which happens to be the only non-contingent
being of Avicenna’s philosophy.¹³⁷ So the truth value derived from taṣdīq will have an
extramental correspondence in reality, thereby cementing the link between proposi-
tional truth and ontological truth in the world, and, thus, between a kind of episte-
mological being in the mind and a kind of real being in the world. As De Haan writes,

 Menn, Fārābī, 73; idem, Avicenna’s Metaphysics, 152.

 Menn, Avicenna’s Metaphysics, 153; De Haan, Avicenna’s Healing.
 De Haan, Avicenna’s Healing, especially 28. In Salvation, 555.5, Avicenna states that the Neces-
sary of Existence is pure truth (fa-huwa ḥaqq maḥḍ), and in Metaphysics I.8 that It is “permanently
true in itself” (huwa l-ḥaqq bi-dhātihi dāʾiman).
496 IV The Special Ontological Mode of Quiddity in Itself

“in Avicenna’s metaphysics the conditions of truth are inextricably tied up with the
conditions of existence, and any being that receives the necessity of its existence
from another must also receive its truth from another.”¹³⁸ In sum, one could argue
that there is an epistemological-ontological isomorphism between being-as-truth
and being-actually-and-contingently that can be extracted from Avicenna’s discus-
sion in Metaphysics I.5 and I.8.¹³⁹ The link between these two dimensions of the
problem is rooted partly in the notion of taṣdīq, which ensures that our mental judg-
ment pertains to something that is actually existing or at least ontologically relevant
and possible in the extramental world, and not simply to a fruitless mental opera-
tion. It thus ensures a certain commensuration between truth in the mind and
truth outside the mind. What is more, the apparent parallelism between ontological
truth and propositional truth in Avicenna may have encouraged Averroes to extend
the theory of the accidentality of being-as-truth to all of Avicenna’s ontology and thus
to both the mental and the concrete spheres.¹⁴⁰
Although pressing for a single and integrated sense of being that would include
these two aspects appears difficult,¹⁴¹ it remains valid that there is a constant feature
that characterizes these various cases: in the case of being-as-truth as well as in the
case of being ascribed to entities that are ‘realized’ or ‘established’ in the world, ex-
istence pertains to them from the outside and as a concomitant. In other words,
being-as-truth qua accidental feature in the mind seems to overlap significantly
with a model of ontological contingency that also applies to the concrete world.
Hence, whether approached from an epistemological or ontological sense, wujūd
here is presumed to be an external and even accidental attribute of a quiddity:
both being-as-truth in the mind and contingent existence in the real world imply

 De Haan, Avicenna’s Healing, 28, and 29: “for Avicenna, the primary sense of truth is not epis-
temological, but metaphysical, since the locus of truth is first found in things. It is the truth of things
that is the foundation for veridical cognition.”
 The main difference, though, is that De Haan does not correlate being-as-truth specifically with
one sense of wujūd in Metaphysics I.5, although his discussion emphasizes the second sense and the
relation between truth and essence.
 This goes in the direction of the reconstruction proposed by Menn regarding Averroes’s critical
reception of Avicenna.
 One problem is that, as Menn explains, being-as-truth is predicated univocally of things in the
mind. In contrast, for Avicenna the existence of extramental entities (the being of the categories) is
predicated not univocally, but according to modulation or tashkīk, as should be clear by now. Another
problem is that although one may draw a general parallelism between truth in the mind and truth
qua existence in the extramental world, there is no strict parallelism between mental existence
and extramental existence in Avicenna, since there are mental objects, such as artificial forms and
even perhaps fictional forms, which can be said to exist in the mind, but not in extramental reality.
By virtue of existing in the mind and being a quiddity in the mind, some forms must possess some
kind of truth, which would nevertheless have no counterpart in the real world, and which would seem
different from the being-as-truth predicated of things that have a direct counterpart in the concrete
world. This poses a threat to the isomorphism between mental and extramental existence and
truth that otherwise seems to apply to Avicenna’s ontology.
 2 Senses of existence in Avicenna’s ontology 497

the externality and accidentality of being for all things that are not the Necessary of
Existence. As an upshot, and regardless how exactly one translates and construes al-
muthbat and al-muḥaṣṣal, the primary sense that emerges here is one of existence as
an external and concomitant attribute and as applying to essence from the outside as
an added intention or meaning (maʿnā) and concomitant (lāzim). Whether one ex-
trapolates the accidentality of being-as-truth to the real world (as Averroes perhaps
does on behalf of Avicenna) or maintains a quasi-isomorphism between the mental
and concrete existents, these options all lead to, or imply, the Avicennian theories of
the distinction between essence and existence and of existence perceived as an ex-
ternal concomitant of essence.¹⁴² In this regard, and from an etymological perspec-
tive, the terms al-muthbat and al-muḥaṣṣal underline the contingent and caused na-
ture of the entities to which they apply, which is why, ultimately, the literal rendition
of these words as meaning ‘what is established’ and ‘what is realized’ in existence
remains perhaps preferable. These notions intersect with the cognate notion of
wujūd muḥaṣṣal, ‘realized’ or ‘acquired existence,’ which Avicenna uses frequently
in his works, and whose purpose is also to stress the extrinsic, concomitant, and
caused nature of existence vis-à-vis essence. As a result, and although their rele-
vance for a potential theory of being-as-truth in Avicenna should not be denied, I
shall in the remainder of this study interpret these various expressions as encapsu-
lating a doctrine of realized or acquired existence, in close relation to the Avicennian
theories of causality and contingency. These notions extend to all the contingent en-
tities in the concrete world and in the mind, but, significantly, they exclude God from
this ontological picture. This sense of being would encompass the categorial beings
and the separate intellects, but not God Himself.
To conclude, it appears that Avicenna’s wujūd muḥaṣṣal and wujūd ithbātī bear
an ambiguous relation to Aristotle’s Δ7 and especially to his notion of being per se,
which encompasses the various categories, and which, in this regard, is linked to his
theory of pros hen predication. For Avicenna, this basic sense of being extends to all
concrete and mental entities, to all substances and accidents, albeit according to a
gradation or modulation of meaning. By virtue of this it is linked to his theory of on-
tological modulation (tashkīk al-wujūd), whose purpose is to explain how existence
applies exactly to each instance as an external concomitant of essence. But this
also entails something in Avicenna’s philosophy that was fully absent from Aristo-
tle’s system: that existence, defined as an external concomitant of essence, is ‘real-
ized’ in each existent by virtue of an exterior cause, thereby making this existent con-

 In that sense, and as I suggested already in chapter III, Averroes’s assessment of Avicenna’s on-
tology according to which being is accidental is not altogether outlandish, if accidendality is con-
strued primarily as meaning ‘external to the essence.’ So it is important to clarify that this acciden-
tality is not that of a true accident, such as ‘musical’ in Socrates, but rather due to the external and
non-constitutive status of the concomitant (lāzim, lāḥiq). Menn, Avicenna’s Metaphysics, 153, 159‒
160, seems to have no qalms with calling existence an accident or accidental in Avicenna’s philoso-
phy.
498 IV The Special Ontological Mode of Quiddity in Itself

tingent, complex, and dependent on an essentially prior existent. In that respect,

Avicenna’s wujūd ithbātī may reflect a rehandling of various senses of being from
Δ7, including being-as-truth (presupposed in the mental dimension of wujūd
ithbātī), actual and potential being (subsumed under tashkīk al-wujūd, and more pre-
cisely under the aspects of possibility and necessity; see section 1.2.2. above), and
even Aristotle’s notion of being per accidens, in the sense that whatever is posited
as being ‘established’ or ‘realized’ (whether in the mind or in concreto) has existence
as an external concomitant, even though its relation to its cause is necessary once
that thing comes to exist in actuality.¹⁴³ As we saw in chapter III, this externality
or extrinsicality of the concomitants vis-à-vis pure quiddity represents one of the
senses of accidentality Avicenna recognizes, in accordance with the māhiyyah-lawā-
zim model he deploys in his works. This would help to explain Averroes’s later
qualms with Avicenna’s doctrine and his critique—warranted or unwarranted, I
leave the question open here—of the accidentality of being in Avicenna.¹⁴⁴ The ap-
plicability of Avicenna’s theory of wujūd ithbātī and wujūd muḥaṣṣal to all composite
and contingent beings (but not to God or pure quiddity) seems to suggest that it is
based on his māhiyyah-lawāzim model, which presupposes externality, complexity,
causality, and ontological dependence. At any rate, one sense of being that Avicenna
does not seem to tackle in earnest here is being per se or essential being, which is the
focus of the second sense disclosed in Metaphysics I.5.

2.2 ‘Proper existence’ (wujūd khāṣṣ)

2.2.1 The evidence from The Cure

Avicenna’s mention of ‘special’ or ‘proper existence’ (wujūd khāṣṣ) in Metaphysics I.5
has received only sporadic attention in the modern scholarship focusing on his Ara-
bic works.¹⁴⁵ This is somewhat surprising, given that it plays an important role in his

 I am aware that accidental being means something very different for Aristotle, but my aim here
is to try to understand how Avicenna interpreted and transformed his doctrine, and how Metaphysics
I.5 relates to such seminal texts as Metaphysics Δ7. For insight into the issue of the accidentality of
being in Avicenna, see III.5.
 Averroes’s interpretation of Avicenna likely rests on a partial understanding of the latter’s aims
in Metaphysics I.5, or even perhaps on his ignoring deliberately the other sense of wujūd developed by
Avicenna in that passage (viz., wujūd khāṣṣ), since he claims that Avicenna recognized only acciden-
tal being and its univocal predication. As Menn, Avicenna’s Metaphysics, 164, explains, “Averroes
thinks that Avicenna has conflated these two senses of being, and that only this conflation leads
him to posit a wujūd which is an accident, existing outside the mind and really superadded to the
quiddity.” As Menn notes, this raises the question of the Avicennian texts Averroes consulted, and
more specifically here the question of whether he was directly acquainted with this passage of Meta-
physics. On Averroes’s interpretation of Avicenna, see also Cerami, A Map.
 The comments in the literature are brief and disparate; see Marmura, Avicenna’s Chapter “On
the Relative,” 91‒92, 95‒96; idem, in Avicenna, The Metaphysics, 386‒387, 400; Wisnovsky, Avicenna’s
 2 Senses of existence in Avicenna’s ontology 499

philosophy and that it also directly influenced the Latin scholastic theories of esse
proprium and esse essentiae. ¹⁴⁶ What is more, this notion also impacted many theo-
logical systems in postclassical Islam, such as those of Ṭūsī and Ḥillī, who adapt it
and deploy it in their accounts of God’s existence. The notion of proper being is one
of two distinct senses of wujūd the master outlines in this famous passage of Meta-
physics I.5, but, of the two, it is the only one he connects directly with essence or
quiddity. As in the case of the first sense, but perhaps even more so, there is no
agreement as to what Avicenna intends by this and how exactly the relationship be-
tween proper existence and essence should be envisaged.
At first blush, the discussion of the second sense of wujūd offered in Metaphysics
I.5 poses a large interpretive problem that arises out of an apparent paradox on Avi-
cenna’s part. On the one hand, Avicenna insists on separating existence and essence,
at the very least conceptually, and in stressing their intentional difference and irre-
ducibility. This distinction lies at the core of his method and metaphysical project. On
the other hand, in the course of his exposition of mawjūd and wujūd in this chapter,
he ascribes a distinct sense (maʿnā) of existence to quiddity, essential reality, and
thingness, thereby apparently blurring the distinction between essence and existence
that he otherwise strives so earnestly to maintain. Needless to say, this has led to
considerable scholarly perplexity and controversy. Why gloss one sense of wujūd
with the very notions that Avicenna typically contrasts to existence? Upon further re-
flection, Avicenna’s approach is not unprecedented. Aristotle himself had also de-
scribed essence as τό τί ἦν εἶναι, which literally means “the what it is” or “the
what it is to be,” a formula which includes within it the Greek verb ‘to be’ (εἶναι).
In the Arabic translations of Aristotle achieved during the eighth, ninth, and tenth
centuries CE, τό τί ἦν εἶναι was rendered by means of a variety of terms and expres-
sions, most of which do not preserve the connection with the verb ‘to be’ found in the
Greek texts.¹⁴⁷ It is this sense of wujūd, Avicenna claims, which can be connected

Metaphysics, 187; Black, Mental Existence, 25‒26; Rashed, Ibn ʿAdī; Lizzini, Wuǧūd-Mawǧūd, 118‒119;
Menn, Avicenna’s Metaphysics, 150, 153; idem, Averroes, 70‒71; and Benevich, Die ‘göttliche Exis-
tenz.’
 Even though these notions may have been based also on other passages of the Avicennian cor-
pus (especially Metaphysics V.1), there is a direct historical connection between the Latin scholastic
interpretation of Avicenna’s wujūd khāṣṣ as defined in Metaphysics I.5 and esse proprium and esse
essentiae. Ultimately, however, the doctrines of essential being articulated in the Latin tradition rep-
resent independent elaborations on Avicenna, whose roots in the Avicennian texts are more or less
strong or tenuous, depending on scholars’ interpretations. For some insight into this topic, see
Owens, Common Nature; idem, The Relevance; Aertsen, Medieval Philosophy as Transcendental
Thought, 87; de Libera, La querelle; idem, L’art, 577‒580; Porro, Universaux; and idem, Henry.
 Among the Arabic expressions used to translate the Aristotelian notion of essence are mā huwa,
mā huwa bi-l-anniyyah, anniyyah, huwiyyah, māʾiyyah, and māhiyyah. See Afnan, Philosophical Termi-
nology, 12‒13, 274‒276, and Endress, Proclus arabus, 79‒109. It is striking that some of these terms
(such as huwiyyah and anniyyah) were used to translate both being and essence, depending on the
translator.
500 IV The Special Ontological Mode of Quiddity in Itself

with quiddity, essential reality, and thingness. Because the connection Avicenna es-
tablishes between the various technical terms expressing quiddity (māhiyyah,
ḥaqīqah, shayʾiyyah) and this sense of existence cannot be overlooked or under-
played, the challenge becomes one of elucidating in what sense this connection
should be interpreted. What the Arabic etymology and the context imply is that
this sense of existence, in contrast to the first, is properly essential and necessary,
since it is connected with the consideration ‘what it is essentially to be that kind
of thing.’ In that regard, it would also seem to correspond to Aristotle’s notion of
being per se as discussed in Δ7 and E1‒2, which, together with actual and potential
being, the Greek philosopher regards as the real and proper subject-matter of the
metaphysical inquiry.¹⁴⁸ In light of this, I wish to adduce the tentative hypothesis
that the two main senses of being Avicenna discusses in this passage have as a direct
model the opening lines of Δ7, where Aristotle asserts that “things are said ‘to be’ in
an accidental sense and by their own nature,” but that Avicenna thoroughly reinter-
preted these senses in connection with his causal and ontological theories. The sug-
gestion that Avicenna modelled his exposition of the senses of being in Metaphysics
I.5 on the opening line of Δ7 and on the basic distinction between being per se and
being per accidens could help to explain why he only provides two basic senses of
being, when Aristotle’s text mentions four and is also amenable to a multiplication
of senses.¹⁴⁹ As we saw above, one can convincingly argue that what is muthbat and
muḥaṣṣal has existence added to it as an external concomitant, so that its being
under this angle does not fully identify with its essence. In contrast, proper being
—regardless how exactly it is to be construed at this point—seems to apply to and
identify with the essence of a thing directly. This second sense, which seems to cor-
respond to a narrow construal of being per se, is conveyed in the Arabic text by
means of a vocabulary of essence. On a purely terminological level, it should be
noted that Avicenna connects special existence with quiddity in itself, which sug-
gests that wujūd khāṣṣ is just another way of referring to the special ontological
mode of nature and pure quiddity. Here is the key excerpt of Metaphysics I.5:

Text 29: To everything there is an essential reality [ḥaqīqah] by virtue of which it is what it is.
Thus, the triangle has an essential reality in that it is a triangle, and whiteness has an essential
reality in that it is whiteness. It is that which we should perhaps call proper existence [al-wujūd
al-khāṣṣ], not intending by this the meaning given to affirmative [or established] existence [al-
wujūd al-ithbātī]. For the expression ‘existence’ is also used to denote many meanings [yadullu
ʿalā maʿānī kathīrah], one of which is the essential reality a thing happens to have. Thus, the
essential reality a thing happens to have is, as it were, its proper existence. In sum, we say
that it is clear that each thing possesses a proper reality [ḥaqīqah khāṣṣah], which is its quiddity

 As mentioned previously, according to Menn it is Avicenna’s wujūd khāṣṣ that points to ‘the
being of the categories,’ that is, to being as predicated of substance and accident. For this interpre-
tation and its relation to Fārābī’s metaphysics, see Menn, Fārābī, 70; idem, Avicenna’s Metaphysics,
150‒153.
 For an example of how theses senses can be multiplied and combined, see Menn, Aristotle, 5‒6.
 2 Senses of existence in Avicenna’s ontology 501

[hiya māhiyyatihi]. And it is known that the essential reality proper to each thing is other than
the [other sense of] existence that is synonymous with ‘what is affirmed’ [or ‘established’].¹⁵⁰

As we can see, proper existence is glossed by means of the terms ḥaqīqah and mā-
hiyyah, which are technical Avicennian terms that refer to pure quiddity. ‘Proper ex-
istence’ here is synonymous with ‘proper essential reality’ and with ‘pure quiddity,’
and these expressions are supposed to amount to a sense of wujūd that is distinct
from ‘the affirmed,’ ‘the established,’ and ‘the realized.’ The special existence of a
triangle, for example, is responsible for its ‘whatness’ as triangle and for its ‘being
a triangle.’ This is another way of saying that the special existence of triangle is
its pure quiddity ‘triangleness,’ since it is the latter that makes a triangle a triangle.
The notion of special existence would depart markedly from the notion of realized
existence conveyed by the term al-muḥaṣṣal, since the latter does not apply to
pure quiddity as such, but posits existence as an external concomitant of essence.
So the two senses of being Avicenna posits in that passage appear to rely on the
māyiyyah-lawāzim distinction, where proper existence corresponds to the māhiyyah
and realized existence to the concomitants of essence (or to māhiyyah and its con-
comitants and accidents taken as a whole). In light of the previous analysis articu-
lated in this book, there is little doubt that proper existence pertains directly, in
some way or other, to the ontological status of pure quiddity, and that the expression
wujūd khāṣṣ is employed in deliberate contradistinction to the formulae ‘affirmed’ or
‘established existence’ (wujūd ithbātī) and ‘realized’ or ‘acquired existence’ (wujūd
muḥaṣṣal). If this hypothesis is correct, then this passage would lend further weight
to the idea that Avicenna regards the term wujūd as a modulated term, for existence
would differ (among other ways) when predicated of the various essences, say, of
‘blackness’ and ‘triangleness,’ which are the two examples mentioned in I.5, and
when predicated of realized concomitants of essence. Accordingly, this passage pre-
supposes the theory of ontological modulation (tashkīk al-wujūd) Avicenna articu-
lates in other parts of his work and coheres with the idea that essential being repre-
sents one of its main aspects, a hypothesis that was raised already in the earlier
section on tashkīk. For the distinction between essential being and non-essential
or realized being goes hand in hand with the idea that existence has several mean-
ings, or rather sub-meanings, which prevent it from being a perfectly univocal no-
tion.
Now, the ideas that existence has several senses (maʿānī), and that one of its key
senses refers to essential being conceived as an ontological mode, had already been
put forth by Avicenna’s predecessor Yaḥyā b. ʿAdī. Yaḥyā, in his treatise entitled On
Clarifying the Existence of the Common Things, distinguishes between “logical,” “nat-

 Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Cure, I.5, 31.5‒10, translation by Marmura in Avicenna, The Meta-
physics, 24, slightly revised. It should be noted that this key passage is found in a close form, if not as
an exact verbatim quotation, in Discussions, sections 802‒803, 279‒280, as well as in one of Bahma-
nyār’s works entitled Treatise on the Subject Matter of Metaphysics, 3‒4.
502 IV The Special Ontological Mode of Quiddity in Itself

ural,” and “essential” being. He describes the latter sense of wujūd alternately as “es-
sential” (dhātī), “real” or “true” (ḥaqīqī), and “divine” (ilāhī).¹⁵¹ In spite of Avicenna’s
emphasis on the connection between essence and proper being in that passage of
Metaphysics I.5 and of a clear precedent in the works of Yaḥyā, there has been a per-
ceptible reluctance in the modern scholarship to construe wujūd khāṣṣ as a kind of
esse essentiae or essential being. In fact, the idea that there could be even a remotely
equivalent theory in Avicenna to the one later articulated by the Latin Scholastics
has been brushed aside or treated cursively in the literature, and this, in the absence
of a detailed study on the Avicennian notion of proper being.¹⁵² This problem is com-
pounded by the ambiguity of this expression and the variety of cases it can poten-
tially cover. To take the Latin tradition as an example, esse essentiae is used with dif-
ferent meanings by different authors and can be applied to different classes of
entities.¹⁵³ But the straightforward and a priori conclusion that proper being bears
no connection whatsoever with essential being and that Avicenna does not recognize
any instances of essential being in his philosophy seems oversimplistic. For there is
at least one case, or rather—on the basis of the analysis articulated in this book—two
cases where this notion can justifiably and quite pertinently be invoked. The first is
the essential being of the First; the second, the essential being of pure quiddity as an
intelligible object. I say a few words about these cases before turning to the compli-
cated issue of proper being as it applies to entities in concreto.
Avicenna’s theology establishes a virtual identity between God’s existence and
His essence. God’s existence is per se and essential in an absolute sense. For

 Yaḥyā b. ʿAdī, On Clarifying the Existence of the Common Things, in Philosophical Treatises,
154.17‒20; for an incisive analysis of this text and of the relation between Yaḥyā and Avicenna, see
Rashed, Ibn ʿAdī. I discuss Yaḥyā’s and Avicenna’s theories of essential being comparatively in sec-
tion 2.2.3.
 See, for example, the various studies by Rahman; Mayer, Faḫr ad-Dīn, 202 and note 17; Black,
Mental Existence 25‒26; Menn, Avicenna’s Metaphysics; Benevich, Die ‘göttliche Existenz’; De
Haan, Avicenna’s Healing, 29‒30; and Özaykal, Deconstruction. The reluctance to recognize any no-
tion of proper being and essential being in Avicenna may have arisen in part out of a reaction to the
Latin scholastic interpretation of this thinker, a trend spearheaded notably by Rahman. At any rate,
and as I have been stressing repeatedly throughout this study, essential being is an ambiguous notion
that can apply to a wide diversity of theories, and so one desideratum is to clarify the various ways in
which it has been used in the past. In the present discussion, I construe it mostly as referring to an
intelligible reality in the mind as well as an irreducible metaphysical principle in concrete beings.
 It may refer to objects in the human mind, to objects in God’s mind, to the relation beween God’s
essence and created essences, etc. For a brief summary of some of these views and their connection
with Avicenna, see Owens, The Relevance. Understandably, one contentious point concerns the
meaning and interpretation of esse essentiae in Avicenna. If by this is meant, for instance, the fact
that quiddity already possesses a special autonomous and transcendent existence in the extramental
world on the model of a Platonic form, then this sense would not apply to Avicenna’s philosophy.
However, if by proper existence is meant a kind of irreducible and intrinsic intelligible reality or
being of quiddity as it presents itself in a pristine state in the mind, then the issue becomes less
clear and calls for a detailed investigation.
 2 Senses of existence in Avicenna’s ontology 503

God’s being does not derive from an external source, but from His own essence and
so is fully identical with His quiddity. So God’s being is by definition essential being.
Now, it is significant that God’s essential being, according to Avicenna, also amounts
to a kind of divine ‘proper being,’ a mode of existence that is proper to Him and that
no other entity shares with Him. At Metaphysics IX.7, Avicenna explains that God’s
essential being and oneness are “proper to Him” or “specify Him” (yakhuṣṣuhā, ta-
khuṣṣuhā), a statement that draws directly on the terminology adumbrated in Meta-
physics I.5. In fact, an understanding of the kind of existence and oneness that are
‘proper to’ the First’s essence is included in the minimum sum of metaphysical
knowledge that a human soul ought to know.¹⁵⁴ In this particular case, it is clear
that the proper being of God is indeed His essential being. Not incidentally, God’s
existence is identical with his māhiyyah and ḥaqīqah, which are the very terms Avi-
cenna uses to gloss wujūd khāṣṣ in Metaphysics I.5. In light of this, the idea that there
is no such thing as essential being in Avicenna is flawed. For there is at least one
important occurrence of essential being, namely, God’s existence, which is being
per se in the strictest and most absolute sense. Thus, the question is not whether Avi-
cenna tolerates such a doctrine of essential being in his metaphysics, but rather
whether he allows for any other iteration of that doctrine in his philosophical sys-
tem.¹⁵⁵
The other instance—discussed in detail in previous sections of this book—con-
cerns the status of pure quiddity as an intelligible object in the mind. I argued
that pure essence has an irreducible intelligible reality and being that is to be distin-
guished from the accidental and complex existence of the universal concept. What is
of interest here is the connection between this intelligible being and proper being,
which Avicenna associates with essence. Given that proper being is identified with
true reality and quiddity; and that quiddity is conceivable and intelligible ‘in itself’;
then it is sensible to conclude that the pure quiddities in the mind have their own
proper existence. In fact, Avicenna’s use of the example of triangleness to illustrate
proper being in I.5—an example that appears in virtually every crucial Avicennian
disquisition on quiddity in itself—seems to cement this view: the ‘triangle in itself’
in the mind has a kind of proper being that is its very intelligible nature. Hence,
in the context of Avicenna’s noetics, proper being appears to stand as a sufficient re-
quirement or criterion of intellectual existence. Since quiddity is conceivable in a di-
rect, prior, and simple way in the mind, and since pure essence or nature is, funda-
mentally, proper existence, it seems that Avicenna allows for a distinct kind of
intellection that focuses directly on this intelligible object, while at the same time ex-
cluding all notions of realized existence, of ontological states (aḥwāl) brought about

 Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Cure, IX.7, 429.11‒12.

 There is a further incentive to tie proper being to quiddity in a strict manner. Earlier in this chap-
ter, I argued that the theory of ontological modulation (tashkīk al-wujūd) encompasses God’s exis-
tence, which, for Avicenna is the paradigmatic case of essential being. Fundamentally, this means
that tashkīk includes God’s proper being or wujūd khāṣṣ, a view later embraced by Ṭūsī as well.
504 IV The Special Ontological Mode of Quiddity in Itself

by concomitants and accidents. This special existence does not cease or vanish when
quiddity is combined with other mental concomitants to form the universal. Rather,
it persists even when it is further conditioned and specified as a mental or concrete
existent. In that case, it continues to intrinsically and permanently characterize quid-
dity in itself and, mereologically and by extension, the complex being as a whole.
But we must recognize that this intelligible being and proper being is pure quiddity,
regardless of its relationship with the external concomitants and the composite na-
ture of contingent things.
But here a difficulty arises. Could the notion of proper existence not be construed
chiefly as a purely intentional and mental notion referring not to a distinct mode or
sense of existence, but rather to the portion of realized existence that is shared by a
certain class of existents (mawjūdāt) that have a common essence, such as human-
ness or horseness, and so, by extension, to the sum of individual humans and horses
taken as a group? Put differently, is proper existence not merely an extensional spec-
ification or constriction of general existence, or of existence taken absolutely, a qual-
ification on it scope, which does not alter its intensional nature and fundamental
meaning? This would make proper existence merely a part or segment of general ex-
istence, both expressions ultimately pointing to the same sense of established or re-
alized existence. On my view, this position does not withstand scrutiny. Avicenna la-
bels proper existence a distinct sense (maʿnā) of existence, and one that he
deliberately contrasts to realized or established existence. Even though these two
‘senses’ of wujūd agree in sharing a fundamental or focal meaning, they are nonethe-
less intensionally distinct, in that one refers to essential being, the other to acciden-
tal being and to the realized concomitants of essence. They are also extensionally in-
commensurate, since proper existence attaches exclusively to the pure quiddities,
which can be abstracted from their external concomitants and accidents, and
hence from the realm of realized and concrete existents. In contrast, realized exis-
tence necessarily implies a complex substantial entity taken as a whole. So that if
realized existence applies primarily to the mawjūdāt of the concrete, exterior
world, special existence is in contrast to be connected chiefly with the conception
of pure quiddity in the mind.¹⁵⁶ In this regard, there can be little doubt that the

 Nevertheless, if quiddity in itself can be said to possess a special kind of wujūd, it on the other
hand cannot really be regarded as a mawjūd on the standard definition of this term. For being a
mawjūd—on a ground of synonymy with muthbat and muḥaṣṣal—implies possessing accidents and
concomitants and, hence, realized or affirmative existence, which is distinct from the quiddity itself.
Hence, ‘this mountain’ or ‘the universal mountain’ is a mawjūd in that sense, but not ‘quiddity in it-
self mountain,’ since the latter cannot be pointed at and is not realized contingently and causally in
the way these beings are; in other words, it is neither a ‘thing’ nor an ‘existent’ in the straightforward
Avicennian sense. Rather, ‘mountain in itself’ has or is its own wujūd khāṣṣ, which amounts to an-
other mode of existence altogether that transcends compositeness and concomitance. This perhaps
explains why al-mawjūd is fully synonymous with al-ḥāṣil, al-muḥaṣṣal and al-muthbat, and also cor-
relates with al-shayʾ, but cannot, on the other hand, be conflated with pure quiddity, thingness, and
special existence.
 2 Senses of existence in Avicenna’s ontology 505

basic distinction established in Metaphysics I.5 announces the ontological disquisi-

tions articulated in V.1 regarding the distinct status of quiddity in the mind, and
that both texts should also be connected with the account of pure quiddity as out-
lined in Introduction I.2.¹⁵⁷
If proper existence can be constructively glossed in terms of the transcendental
status of pure quiddity in the mind, there remains the arduous issue of how it relates
to the existents in concreto. Since proper being pertains to essence, and since all con-
cretely existent ‘things’ have an essence, then it follows that proper being, in some
way or other, applies to them as well. So how is proper existence in the sense of es-
sential existence to be interpreted in relation to the concrete world (fī l-aʿyān)? Does
Avicenna, following Fārābī, intend it primarily as the being of the categories of
things in the real world, the being of actually existing substances and accidents?
And, if so, is this being identical with the essence and the substance as it is realized
in actuality, as Fārābī and Averroes seem to think? Or something other than that?
This in turn raises the sharp issue of the relationship between quiddity and sub-
stance in Avicenna’s philosophy.
In a cluster of interrelated studies, Menn has argued for a direct connection be-
tween Avicenna’s notion of proper being and Fārābī’s notion of ‘being delineated by
a certain quiddity’ (al-munḥāz bi-māhiyyah mā). According to Menn, the latter is to be
construed as the being of the categories of things in the concrete world. On this ac-
count, Fārābī contrasts being-as-truth in the mind, whereby existence is accidental
and applied univocally to things, to the being of real existents, which is identical
with their essence, a distinction that Averroes later picked up and used as a tool
to mount his critique of Avicenna’s ontology. On Menn’s reckoning, Avicenna mod-
eled his notion of proper being on this Fārābīan theory and used it to refer to the
being of the categories outside the soul.¹⁵⁸ In particular, Avicenna’s theory of proper

 Oddly, when it comes to essence, the core connections between chapters I.5 and V.1 of Metaphy-
sics, as well as the link between these texts and Introduction I.2, have almost never been stressed in
the scholarship. One exception is Marmura (Avicenna, Metaphysics, Marmura edition, 404‒405, notes
9 and 10), who connects wujūd khāṣṣ with the discussion of the ontology of essence in V.1. Indeed,
one may wonder: how can the description of a ‘proper existence’ associated with essence in I.5 not
bear any relation to the explicit references to the existence of quiddity in V.I? And how, in turn, can
Avicenna’s remarks regarding the possibility of conceiving quiddity ‘in itself’ in the logical text bear
no relationship to these metaphysical chapters, where he makes the same argument and argues for
the intelligible existence of essence? It is hard to understand why these various accounts have been
treated in a discrete manner in the modern scholarship on Avicenna’s metaphysics, all the more so
given the intertwinement of logic and ontology in this thinker’s method.
 Menn, Fārābī’s Kitāb, 78‒81, 83; idem, Fārābī, 70; idem, Avicenna’s Metaphysics, 152‒153. Menn
believes that the Fārābīan sense of wujūd as ‘being delineated by a certain quiddity,’ which he iden-
tifies also with the being of the categories, refers to entities outside the soul, and he contrasts that
sense of wujūd to being-as-truth, which is intramental and linked to propositions; cf. also Wisnovsky,
Notes, 188, who suggests that, for Fārābī, shayʾ is broader than mawjūd, because it covers things in-
side and outside the mind, whereas mawjūd only strictly applies to the latter. However, it should be
noted that Fārābī in On the One, 51.5‒7 (see also Janos, Al-Fārābī’s On the One, 116‒117), explicitly
506 IV The Special Ontological Mode of Quiddity in Itself

existence may have been informed partly by two important and understudied works
by Fārābī, On the One and Oneness and The Book of Particles, which showcase in
some passages this thinker’s understanding of how essence relates to existence.¹⁵⁹
According to Fārābī, one sense of existence is synonymous with the idea of “being
delineated,” “set apart,” or “distinguished by one’s essence” (al-munḥāz bi-
māhiyyah).¹⁶⁰ Although it is not entirely clear what this means, since Fārābī does
not elaborate much on this notion, and although the extensionality of this sense
of being remains uncertain, its primary function appears to be to designate the on-
tological state of certain classes of concrete entities whose existence is determined by
their quiddity.¹⁶¹ Following Fārābī, Avicenna appears to connect special existence
specifically with the quiddity of a thing, to what makes a thing what it is. In Avicen-
nian parlance, ‘proper existence’ is distinguished from ‘established’ or ‘realized ex-
istence’ and assumes the meaning of ‘being a certain thing’ or ‘existing as a certain
thing,’ or even ‘existing in a way that its quiddity allows it to exist.’ Thus, for Fārābī
as well as for Avicenna, being ‘distinguished by one’s essence’ and ‘special exis-
tence’ respectively qualify all things, whether a human being, a tree, or a stone.
What is more, they also encompass the separate intellects and even God and thus
assume a transcendental scope, since they pertain to all beings (material or imma-
terial) that have a quiddity and an essence.¹⁶² These expressions refer to what
these things are in their essence and, by extension, to the way in which these things

applies the formula ‘being delineated by a certain quiddity’ qua mawjūd to entities in the mind and
outside the mind (kānat mutaṣawwarah aw kānat khārij al-nafs). So I am not sure that the distinction
is as clear-cut as Menn and Wisnovsky present it. Nevertheless, it is true that Fārābī, unlike Avicenna,
prioritizes concrete existence over mental existence in his philosophy, so that whenever he discusses
the status of ‘existents,’ these should be understood first and foremost as extramental beings. In a
similar manner, Menn, Avicenna’s Metaphysics, 153, seems to connect the meaning of proper being
in Avicenna chiefly to things outside the soul, although I would argue that it also applies to pure
quiddities in the mind. Considering that Avicenna ascribes a full-blown ontological status to mental
objects, and that he also allows for a concept of quiddity taken in itself, it is sensible to presume that
proper existence extends to it as well in the mind and, more generally, to intelligible beings—and this,
in a manner that seems to be underdeveloped or even neglected in Fārābī’s treatment of the issue. I
would agree, though, that proper existence, like Fārābī’s ‘being delineated by a certain quiddity,’ is
being per se, which should be contrasted to Fārābī’s being-as-truth and Avicenna’s ‘realized exis-
tence.’ There is another—equally important—issue I discuss below, which has to do with how
these thinkers conceive of substance and its relation to essence.
 On this point and on wujūd khāṣṣ in the works of these two thinkers, see Menn, Fārābī, espe-
cially 70; idem, Avicenna’s Metaphysics; Bertolacci, The Distinction, 267; Rashed, Ibn ʿAdī, 111, 146;
and Janos, Al-Fārābī’s On the One.
 Fārābī, On the One, 51.5‒12; idem, The Book of Particles, 116.7; see Menn, Fārābī’s Kitāb, 78; and
Janos, Al-Fārābī’s On the One, 116‒118.
 As I mention above, this sense of being appears to apply both to mental and concrete entities,
although the latter takes precedence in Fārābī’s analysis.
 Fārābī explicitly ascribes the expression ‘being delineated by one’s essence’ (al-munḥāz bi-mā-
hiyyatihi), to God; see Janos, Al-Fārābī’s On the One, 118‒121. Avicenna’s position on this issue was
discussed previously; see notably sections IV.1 and IV.2.4.
 2 Senses of existence in Avicenna’s ontology 507

exist. Hence, any existent will possess its own special or proper existence that allows
it to exist in the way in which it exists, and this state is due to its quiddity.
Although this account is plausible, and although Avicenna is undeniably engag-
ing with the theories of his predecessor in elaborating his ontology, it still says little
about how these thinkers conceive of proper being, and even about whether a real
textual connection exists between Fārābī’s al-munḥāz bi-māhiyyah mā and Avicen-
na’s wujūd khāṣṣ. Menn highlights a certain symmetry between these views, but I
think their differences are equally important.¹⁶³ More specifically, there are three cru-
cial points that suggest a discrepancy between these two theories. First, Fārābī, in
contrast to Avicenna, does not develop a theory of pure quiddity. If, in the context
of Avicenna’s philosophy, proper being appears to be identifiable with quiddity ‘in
itself’ as an intelligible object, this is not the case in Fārābī’s philosophy, which dis-
plays little interest for the issue of mental existence beyond the sense of being-as-
truth. Second, and as a corollary, whereas Fārābī’s theory of ‘being delineated by
one’s essence’ seems to pertain primarily—if not exclusively—to extramental con-
crete beings, there is no reason to assume that Avicenna’s notion of proper being
does not extend to mental essences as well, which the master places on a par with
their concrete instantiations. Finally, as recent studies have shown, Fārābī and Avi-
cenna differ considerably in their assessment of the place of Aristotle’s Categories in
the philosophical curriculum and, more precisely, of the nature and scope of the cat-
egory of substance. Fārābī, following closely the late-antique commentatorial tradi-
tion on this treatise, identifies the categories squarely with the concrete and material
individuals of the world. Avicenna, in contrast, regards the contents of this work as
ontological in nature and thus as falling within the bounds of the metaphysical in-
quiry. He also extends the notion of substance to encompass the immaterial beings,
above and beyond the composite beings of the sublunary world. Finally, as I will ex-
plain later on, he correlates or even conflates substance and quiddity in a manner
Fārābī does not.¹⁶⁴ This, in turn, directly impacts the way these thinkers conceive
of how existence applies to the categories. In light of this, even if one concedes a for-
mal resemblance between Fārābī’s and Avicenna’s theories, inasmuch as they put
forth a sense of being per se or being associated with the categories, they seem to
diverge importantly with regard to their ontological implications. So there are

 Emphasizing the overlap between Fārābī’s and Avicenna’s treatments of these senses of being
would make Avicenna’s position quasi-identical with that of Fārābī and later with that of Averroes,
who also talks about the being of the categories and regards the existence of a thing as identical with
its essence (although this is not how Averroes himself interpreted Avicenna’s metaphysics). But differ-
ences between these thinkers’ understanding of this sense of being need to be carefully fleshed out,
especially with regard to Avicenna’s theory of quiddity in itself, as well as his groundbreaking re-
thinking of the status of the categories and the ontological scope of tashkīk al-wujūd. Needless to
say, it is this sense of proper being that could have protected Avicenna against the scathing critique
elaborated by Averroes. The latter seems to have been limited to an incomplete picture of the Avicen-
nian position.
 See notably Kukkonen, Dividing Being; and Kalbarczyk, Predication, especially 26, and 225‒227.
508 IV The Special Ontological Mode of Quiddity in Itself

good reasons to stress the differences between Fārābī’s and Avicenna’s views in ad-
dition to their similarities.¹⁶⁵
At this stage the problem bifurcates in two distinct directions. First, there is the
issue of how proper being applies to the pure quiddities in the mind (a topic that
finds a negligible precedent in Fārābī, and which was briefly addressed above),
and how it applies to the essence of concrete existents (with the potential Fārābīan
precedent highlighted by Menn). Second, and with regard to the latter, there is the
issue of how Avicenna conceives of substance and being per se in contradistinction
to the Fārābīan position. In brief, the main question at this juncture is how proper
being applies to the concrete substances and, more specifically in the context of Avi-
cenna’s thought, to the notion of substance or substance taken ‘in itself.’ What does
it mean, for Avicenna, to say that the existence of this concrete horse is just its es-
sence? And how could his approach potentially differ from that of Fārābī and later
Averroes?
Given that pure quiddity somehow exists in concrete beings, as we saw in chap-
ter III, one implication of Avicenna’s ascription of a special sense of existence (viz.,
proper being) to pure quiddity is that this sense of being would extend to all the re-
alized substances of the world. This idea would remain relatively uncontroversial, if
proper being were construed as the essence of actual or existing substances, that is,
if we hypothesize that Avicenna is referring here to the proper existence, reality, or
quiddity of a realized individual substance or sunolon. Accordingly, the proper
being, say, of ‘this triangle’ or of ‘that horse’ would be its essence, what makes it
exist qua triangle or qua horse, and what makes it this particular substance. In
this picture, proper being can be conceived of as co-extensional with the essence
of the primary substance and as an alternative way of regarding the existence of
that substance. That is to say, ‘this triangle’ or ‘that horse’ exists actually (affirmative
or realized existence), and it exists qua triangle or qua horse (proper existence). Ul-
timately, however, we would be talking about the same entity and the same existence
considered from two different angles. This is how thinkers such as Fārābī and Aver-
roes seem to envisage the relationship between essence and existence in concrete be-
ings. Despite being two distinct notions in the mind, essence and existence refer to a

 In his analysis, Menn, Fārābī’s Kitāb, 83, himself raises the question of whether, for Fārābī,
being in the sense of ‘being delineated by one’s quiddity’ should really be connected with the
being of the categories. This tension is reflected in the Fārābīan works themselves: Fārābī usually re-
gards the categories as comprising only the concrete individual beings (see Kalbarczyk, Predication,
225‒227; in On the One, 51.5‒12, Fārābī distinguishes the things ‘in the categories’ and those ‘outside
the categories,’ obviously with the First in mind), and he ties ‘being delineated by a certain quiddity’
with the being of the categories. Yet, in On the One, he extends the sense of ‘being delineated by a
certain quiddity’ to include the First, Who in principle lies outide the categories. But if this sense of
being applies strictly to the categories, then it should not include God on Fārābī’s model. This prob-
lem does not apply to Avicenna, since he includes the immaterial beings (the separate intellects, if
not the First) within the category of substance and extends tashkīk al-wujūd to the transcendental be-
ings.
 2 Senses of existence in Avicenna’s ontology 509

single thing and reality in the concrete world and do not imply a composition of met-
aphysical principles. What is more, this position would intersect somewhat with the
Ashʿarite view that essence and existence are identical in realized beings.
Now, as we saw in the previous analysis, Avicenna’s essentialist framework def-
initely allows for such an interpretation. Accordingly, proper existence would corre-
spond to quiddity or nature as it exists in the realized individual substances together
with their attributes or concomitants, and so, by extension, to the realized substance
taken as a whole. On this approach, proper being would refer to the realized essence
of an existent in the concrete world or in the mind. In Avicennian parlance, this
would also correspond to ‘conditioned quiddity’ or quiddity taken ‘with other things.’
Accordingly, and if this interpretation is retained, then most interpreters would agree
to construe this sense of wujūd as a kind of essential or per se being related to the
category of substance, but only in reference to the complete, actual, and realized
substance and sunolon (σύνολον). Proper existence for Avicenna, like ‘being delineat-
ed by one’s quiddity’ for Fārābī, would refer to the essence of an existing entity, to
what it is to be that thing (a horse, a triangle, something black), and thus, by exten-
sion, to the being of the categories (substances and accidents).
On this account, then, proper existence is primarily being as divided into the cat-
egories, where the existence of a thing is identical with the essence of a thing. But
even though Fārābī, Avicenna, and Averroes might all concur generally on this
point, they might disagree as to what the statement “the wujūd of X will be just
the essence of X”¹⁶⁶ means exactly in the context of their ontology, and this, because
they conceive of quiddity, existence, and substance in significantly different ways. I
will postpone the crucial analysis of substance—and more precisely of the relation-
ship between substance and quiddity—to a later section and limit myself here to a
few remarks. As we saw in chapter III and elsewhere, Avicenna is keen to maintain
a sharp distinction between quiddity in itself and its external concomitants and ac-
cidents within the realized composite substance. So, on his mereological model, it re-
mains conceptually possible to differentiate between the existence of the sunolon
and the irreducible existence of pure quiddity within that complex entity, in a man-
ner that is not methodologically and conceptually viable in Fārābī’s and Averroes’s
ontology. Thus, when Avicenna contends that substance is quiddity or essence, I take
him to mean not that essence is the realized composite substance or sunolon, but
rather that substance is pure quiddity, regardless of whether it is found in the
mind or in the concrete world as inhering in individual beings (see section 4
below). So by implication, and strictly speaking, proper existence is the being of
this very quiddity-substance and not of the sunolon taken with its external attributes
and accidents, which imply realized existence instead. What is more, for Avicenna,

 Menn, Avicenna’s Metaphysics, 152. It should be noted that Menn himself says little about the
second sense of being that Avicenna outlines in Metaphysics I.5, viz., proper being, and focuses al-
most entirely on the first sense in his various articles on Fārābī’s and Avicenna’s ontology.
510 IV The Special Ontological Mode of Quiddity in Itself

substance, and especially substance qua essence, includes not just the material en-
tities, but also the immaterial beings. In that sense, it encompasses the beings that
Fārābī regards as lying beyond or outside the categories (khārij ʿan al-maqūlāt), as he
puts it in On the One. ¹⁶⁷ This is important, because it means that proper being, in
these cases, is to be identified with the immaterial principle and intellectual form.
In brief, if proper being is the being of the categories, and if the category of substance
includes the principle of intellect, then proper being will also include the special ex-
istence of the separate intellects and the First Itself.¹⁶⁸
Because proper existence can be taken as tantamount to thingness or quiddity, it
can, like the latter, be characterized in terms of autonomy and irreducibility and,
hence, also as lacking a relation (iḍāfah) to other things that are not identical to
its very being. Conceiving something in its proper existence means to consider it
‘in itself,’ or ‘with regard to what is proper, peculiar, or unique to it.’¹⁶⁹ In that

 Fārābī, On the One, 51.5‒12. To my knowledge, no comparable assertion can be found in Avicen-
na’s works.
 This hypothesis is, of course, congruent with the various results reached in the other sections of
this book, and especially the idea that tashkīk al-wujūd extends to the immaterial intellects and to
God as well (for a detailed discussion of essence and existence in the First, see section 2.4 below).
Yet, reaching the same conclusion from this route poses a serious problem, for it was said before
that tashkīk al-wujūd is a kind of transcendental modulation (following Treiger’s terminology) precise-
ly because it transcends the categories and can be applied to God. The way out of this problem lies in
resolving the ambiguity surrounding Avicenna’s notion of substance. It is true that the master defines
one sense of substance as intellect and often seems to include the immaterial beings in that defini-
tion. But he is also quite keen to stress that God is not a substance. In Notes, section 981, 560, and
sections 989 and 990, 563‒564, for example, Avicenna argues that God is not a substance on the tra-
ditional definition of ‘being not in a subject,’ although the proposition ‘being not in a subject’ does
apply to Him in another sense, which has to do with “His being Himself” (ʿalā annahu huwa). So it
would seem, on Avicenna’s mind, either that God is a special and unique substance or that He pos-
sesses the properties of substance (being an intellect, being not in a subject), while not strictly being
a substance in the standard sense. Either way, we can infer from this that the Avicennian notion of
substance and its criteria are somewhat ambiguous or modulated. These remarks notwithstanding, a
key point remains unchanged: tashkīk al-wujūd extends to God and to His proper being, regardless of
whether He is regarded as a special substance or a quasi-substance or a non-substance, and regard-
less of whether tashkīk al-wujūd is best translated as ‘transcendental modulation’ (which would in-
clude God qua non-substance) or merely as ‘ontological modulation’ (which would include God
qua special substance). Recent studies have qualified Avicenna’s rehandling of the Categories and
his reinterpretation of their scope as a momentous break with the earlier tradition and an influential
achievement for the later development of ontology in Islam; but its impact on the later theological
tradition and especially on the theological systems of commentators such as Rāzī, Ṭūsī, and Ḥillī de-
serves to be investigated as well.
 This explains why Avicenna in his logical works at times emphasizes the ‘unconnectedness’ of
proper existence and the fact that it need not be conceived of in relation to other things; see in par-
ticular Avicenna, Categories, 224.17‒18. At Metaphysics IV.2, 182.12‒13 (cf., idem, Discussions, section
813, p. 285) Avicenna tells us that “everything that does not subsist in a subject [viz., a substance] has
proper existence [fa-lahu wujūd khāṣṣ], through which it need not be connected with other things.”
Pure quiddity, qua substance, or rather, substance, qua pure quiddity, is that which is not related
 2 Senses of existence in Avicenna’s ontology 511

sense, special existence can be compared to other aspects of quiddity Avicenna dis-
cusses in his works, or other ways of describing quiddity, which stress its autonomy
and irreducibility. Apart from the rich essentialist vocabulary that is implemented to
that effect to describe the self-identity of pure quiddity (see Appendix I), and which
is expressed to some degree in this very passage of Metaphysics I.5, one may mention
here the unconditioned quiddity or quiddity ‘not with the condition of something
else’ (lā bi-sharṭ shayʾ ākhar) and especially quiddity ‘with the condition of no
other thing’ (bi-sharṭ lā shayʾ ākhar). If the latter is considered, then conceiving of
the pure quiddity horseness in the intellect would be tantamount to considering
its special existence only and with no relation to other things whatsoever. It would
exist in the intellect as such, qua the proper existence of horseness, with no consid-
erations of realized existence or other external concomitants being attached to it.
This in part explains why Avicenna establishes a narrow link between mental exis-
tence and proper existence.¹⁷⁰ For my immediate purposes, this linkage reinforces
the contention that the intelligible existence of pure quiddity in the intellect amounts
to no more than its own ‘proper’ or ‘special being’ and that this mode of being should
be demarcated from the one that qualifies complex mental and concrete entities.
Like its quiddity, the proper existence of a concrete being, by its very nature, can
also be considered in connection ‘with other things,’ not least with the external at-
tributes of essence, such as oneness or realized existence, an approach which inter-
sects and overlaps with the essence/existence discourse in Avicenna’s philosophy as
it is traditionally framed by scholars. In this regard, proper existence bears a direct
link to the existent taken as a complex whole or cluster, meaning that the latter has a
quiddity that determines or specifies its existence and gives it the proper existence
associated with its species. Approached from this angle, special existence is linked
to the cluster of accidents and concomitants that together characterize the actual ex-

to another thing. So that the ontological autonomy of substance seems to bear a direct link to the fact
that quiddity can be envisaged in itself, and with no relation to what is outside of it. More specifically,
this statement is to be construed in connection with Avicenna’s belief in the irreducible existence of
quiddity. Even when it is regarded as a part of the composite existent, special existence and pure
quiddity (e. g., humanness) is just itself and nothing else and need not (although it can) be related
to other things; cf. Salvation, 535.18‒20; Dialectic of The Cure, 264.12‒14.
 The tone is set already in Metaphysics I.5, where Avicenna is investigating the primary notions
and foundational cognitive concepts in the mind, one of which is quiddity or the related concept ‘the
thing,’ and where Avicenna then identifies quiddity and proper existence. But this link reappears sa-
liently in other contexts wherein Avicenna discusses mental existence: in his logical discussions on
relation or, rather, ‘relationness,’ which contrast its concrete and intellectual modes of existence (see
Categories 159.9‒10; Metaphysics, 157.12‒15; Marmura, Avicenna’s Chapter “On the Relative,” 91‒92,
95‒96); and of present vs. future contingents, the latter having their quiddity existing only concep-
tually (see Metaphysics, 159.15‒17; cf. Marmura in Avicenna, The Metaphysics, 400.18). The link be-
tween proper existence and mental existence in Avicenna’s philosophy seems important but requires
further examination.
512 IV The Special Ontological Mode of Quiddity in Itself

istence of things.¹⁷¹ Hence, inasmuch as proper existence refers to the existence of

quiddity in an actual or realized being, a composite or sunolon, it does introduce
a relation to something else, and it also refers to the way in which this actual
being exists. Since existence is just existence for Avicenna, or rather, since realized
existence is just realized existence, special existence is what specifies the kind of ex-
istence that a being possesses. This explains why existing qua a horse or a tree or a
spring differs from existing qua a human being. Avicenna’s ontology, and more spe-
cifically, his theories of realized existence and existential modulation (tashkīk al-
wujūd), require such a theory of proper existence, since it is the latter that makes
something exist the way it exists and therefore qualifies or determines existence
from an essentialist standpoint. As Avicenna explains in a passage of Discussions:

because existence is predicated of what is below it by modulation [bi-l-tashkīk], it follows nec-

essarily that every existent must be differentiated from another existent by its essence [bi-dhā-
tihi], as blackness is [differentiated] from extension. For these two [things] do not share a con-
stitutive common notion [ʿāmm muqawwim], although they may share a non-constitutive
concomitant [lāzim ghayr muqawwim].¹⁷²

In other words, it is the proper existence of blackness that differentiates it from ex-
tension, or human from horse and triangle, not wujūd qua wujūd or wujūd taken
merely as an external attribute of the thing. So, for instance, the modalities of ‘the
possible’ and ‘the necessary’ (one key aspect of tashkīk) are limited in their explan-
atory value, since they cannot differentiate between the various composite and con-
tingent existents—given that each one of these beings is ‘possible in itself’ and ‘nec-
essary through its cause.’ Nor by extension can realized existence, regarded here as
an external concomitant (lāzim) of essence—which, as another passage of Notes
seems to suggest, is modulated precisely because it is a concomitant of proper
being or quiddity—suffice to set apart different classes of things in their existence.¹⁷³

 This perhaps is why Avicenna explains in Categories that the state of thingness (shayʾiyyah) and
its special existence are never dissociated from the category of relation (al-muḍāf). Avicenna, Cate-
gories, IV.5, 159‒160; cf. idem, Commentary on Aristotle’s Categories, 242. In addition, it should be
noted that Avicenna sometimes seems to use the expression wujūd khāṣṣ with another intent in
mind, to express the specific or conditioned existence of an entity or essence in the concrete
world; this seems to be the case in his discussion of matter in Metaphysics, II.3, 74‒75, at least accord-
ing to Marmura (in Avicenna, The Metaphysics, 390). But is this really the case? Since quiddity can be
said to exist in the concrete beings under one aspect, it would make sense that specific existence
could also be said of quiddity in concrete beings. In that case, it would also be related, or concep-
tually relatable, to other things. At any rate, Avicenna’s use of wujūd khāṣṣ in the logical works is
complex and requires additional reflection.
 Avicenna, Discussions, 218, section 648; translated by Treiger, Avicenna’s Notion, 362, slightly
revised.
 Avicenna, Notes, 163, section 238: “Oneness, like existence, are counted among the modulated
terms [al-asmāʾ al-mushakkikah], and they are among the concomitants [min al-lawāzim].” I think that
wa here can almost be translated as “because,” as it stands as an explanation of why existence and
oneness are modulated and not predicated in a perfectly univocal way.
 2 Senses of existence in Avicenna’s ontology 513

Rather, Avicenna is alluding here to the proper, irreducible, and idiosyncratic exis-
tence each being has by virtue of its very quiddity. Thus, every existent (mawjūd)
can be said to exist by virtue of its realized existence and by virtue of its proper ex-
istence. The former refers to the substantial being taken as a whole in its state of ac-
tual existence, the latter solely to the quiddity as an ontic principle within that exis-
tent, which in turn qualifies realized existence inasmuch as it determines the kind of
existence this being will ‘acquire’ from the outside. In sum, Avicenna’s theory of the
modulation of being (tashkīk) is deeply interconnected with his theory of pure quid-
dity qua proper existence. The doctrine of proper being—taken as an account of the
special ontological status of pure quiddity as well as an account of how it determines
and specifies the realized existence of the sunolon—is so intricately woven into the
fabric of Avicenna’s ontology that the latter becomes unintelligible without it.
Hence, there is a sense in which proper existence ‘specifies’ or ‘qualifies’ realized
existence. This specifying function of special existence is encapsulated in the Arabic
root kh-ṣ-ṣ, which means ‘to distinguish,’ ‘to set apart,’ or ‘to be specific or peculiar
to,’ with the implication that wujūd khāṣṣ means for a thing to have an existence that
is peculiar or exclusive to it. Accordingly to exist ‘as a horse’ or ‘as fire’ is proper and
exclusive to all the actual existents whose realized existence is qualified by the spe-
cial existence of ‘horseness’ or ‘fireness.’ This implies a relationship or interface be-
tween what is commonly framed (by Avicenna and especially by modern scholars) as
a distinction between māhiyyah and wujūd, but which can be recast in terms of a re-
lationship between proper or essential being and realized, external, and concomitant
existence. This difference in phrasing, however, is not doctrinally insignificant. For it
drives home the point that the relation between quiddity and realized existence can
also be conceptualized, as Avicenna himself suggests, as one between two different
modes or senses of existence. This Avicennian doctrine seems to anticipate the dis-
tinction between esse essentiae and esse existentiae that one finds in some medieval
Latin sources.
In its equal capacity to be considered in a state of connectedness or unconnect-
edness, ‘in itself’ or ‘with other things,’ wujūd khāṣṣ shares some core features with
other aspects of Avicenna’s discussion of quiddity. It brings to mind notably the dif-
ferent considerations (iʿtibārāt) of quiddity in Introduction I.2, which can focus on
quiddity inasmuch as it is quiddity, or on quiddity as it exists in realized concrete
and mental existents. It also brings to mind Avicenna’s distinctions between uncon-
ditioned quiddity (lā bi-sharṭ shayʾ ākhar) and conditioned quiddity (bi-sharṭ shayʾ
ākhar), where the term shayʾ here can be construed as referring to realized existence
taken as a concomitant (lāzim) of quiddity, or, put differently, to the cluster of acci-
dents and concomitants that inevitably accompany the realized existence of quiddity.
However, and unless further conditions or considerations are added to it, special ex-
istence describes quiddity in itself, even in the case of the essence of the concrete or
realized sunolon, and it remains intentionally and extensionally distinct from wujūd
muḥaṣṣal or wujūd ithbātī. Now, since pure quiddity has otherwise been shown in the
present book to possess a distinct kind of simple, prior, unconditioned, absolute, and
514 IV The Special Ontological Mode of Quiddity in Itself

divine existence—and this, quite apart from what Avicenna has to say about proper
existence in Metaphysics I.5—there are solid grounds to argue that the proper exis-
tence of quiddity corresponds expressly to this essential ontological mode. In
other words, Avicenna’s claim that wujūd khāṣṣ represents a distinct sense of
being strengthens the hypothesis that quiddity in itself does possess its own mereo-
logical existence in concrete beings, and that this special ontological status is not
identical with realized existence, but amounts instead to another mode (naḥw,
ḥukm) and sense (maʿnā) of existence (wujūd). These various distinctions form the
core of Avicenna’s groundbreaking theory of ontological modulation.

2.2.2 The evidence from Philosophical Compendium for ʿAlāʾ al-Dawlah

Additional evidence concerning the distinction between realized and proper exis-
tence, or between accidental and essential existence, can be gleaned from another
work of Avicenna’s middle period entitled Dānish-Nāma-i ʿAlāʾī or Philosophical Com-
pendium for ʿAlāʾ al-Dawlah (henceforth abbreviated to Philosophical Compendium).
This treatise was redacted in Persian for a wealthy patron with philosophical aspira-
tions. It has been classed by Gutas as belonging to the middle period of Avicenna’s
philosophical output, with a composition date shortly following that of The Cure and
Salvation. For our purposes, this work is particularly valuable for two main reasons:
first, due to its chronological proximity to, and textual connection with, Metaphysics
of The Cure, and, second, due to the fact that it was written in Persian and, hence,
can shed alternative light on Avicenna’s discussion of existence through its divergent
ontological terminology.
The ontology of quiddity Avicenna articulates in The Cure not only informs his
treatment of the same topic in Philosophical Compendium; it also represents a corner-
stone of his discussion of the notion of existence in that work. In this regard, it is
important to point out that the Persian terminology of existence deployed in the lat-
ter work is richer and more diversified than the one he relies on in his Arabic
works.¹⁷⁴ As Parviz Morewedge has shown, Avicenna in this work relies on an
array of Persian and Arabic terms to articulate his ontological doctrine, hastī and
wujūd being the two key terms that appear most frequently throughout the text.¹⁷⁵
What is significant, over and above these purely linguistic or terminological varia-
tions, is the argumentative and doctrinal differentiation Avicenna establishes be-
tween realized existence, on the one hand, and essential being, on the other. Al-
though—in spite of Morewedge’s claim—there does not seem to be a strict
correlation between the Persian and Arabic terminology Avicenna deploys and the
different aspects and senses of being he discusses, his argumentation nevertheless

 The reasons for this are well known and have been stressed on numerous occasions in the schol-
arship; they have to do chiefly with the linguistic difference between Persian and Arabic and the ab-
sence of the use of a copula in the latter.
 See Morewedge’s commentary in Avicenna, The Metaphysica.
 2 Senses of existence in Avicenna’s ontology 515

teases out the basic ontological distinction between realized existence and essential
being that was emphasized in the previous analysis of Metaphysics of The Cure. ¹⁷⁶
The intimation of a special mode of being of essence is first alluded to at the be-
ginning of the work when Avicenna discourses on the conditions necessary for a
body to exist and on the principles of corporeality. He explains that prime matter
in itself is not sufficient to account for the existence of a body, or even of corporeality,
since these require the corporeal form (ṣūrat-i jismī), which provides inchoate matter
with the essence of bodyness and corporeality, as well as of three-dimensionality. In
this connection, Avicenna explains that this corporeal form always subsists in mat-
ter, that it is a condition for our knowledge of what a body is, and even that it is an
ontological condition for a body to exist once it has acquired the individual accidents
of width, length, and depth. Avicenna goes on to describe this corporeal form as the
substance and essence of a body, and he also equates it with ‘being a body,’ since
“being a body is due to a form.”¹⁷⁷ This form, this essence of corporeality, always
subsists, even when the various accidents of three-dimensionality, i. e., of width
and length and depth, change.¹⁷⁸ It would seem, then, that this form provides incho-
ate prime matter with thingness, i. e., corporeality in itself, with its first essential def-
initeness. So ‘being a body,’ or the essence of corporeality depends, at the very least
potentially and conceptually, on the corporeal form combining with prime matter,
not on a body actually existing in the concrete world. Although this is true primarily
with regard to our thinking about matter and body, Avicenna’s comments in this pas-
sage would seem to apply to the concrete world as well, although this point is not
made explicit in our passage.¹⁷⁹

 Morewedge argues that Avicenna refers to realized existence by using the term wujūd and to es-
sential being by using the term hastī. This terminological distinction represents the main thrust of
Morewedge’s analysis of the notion of existence in his book. This argument, however, does not
seem to be borne out by a close inspection of the textual evidence. But this fact should not detract
from the more important point that Avicenna does seem to distinguish two senses or aspects of ex-
istence, which coincide with the ones discussed earlier.
 Avicenna, Philosophical Compendium, 27.2‒3; Morewedge, The Metaphysica, 25. For the corporeal
form in Avicenna and its relation to matter, see Lammer, The Elements, 120 ff.
 Avicenna, Philosophical Compendium, 13‒14; Morewedge, The Metaphysica, 17.
 Moreover, there is an ambiguity in Avicenna’s argumentation as to whether ‘being a body’
should apply to the essence or form of corporeality alone or to the composite substance of prime mat-
ter and corporeal form. In fact, absolute body, like all the other pure quiddities, does not exist as such
and separately in the concrete world, but exists intelligibly in the mind. Nevertheless, there is also a
sense in which it can be said to exist immanently in all concrete bodies, inasmuch as the corporeal
form is implied by or subsumed under each substantial species-form, as was shown in chapter III,
and as Lammer, The Elements, 165‒179, explains in detail. Interestingly, Avicenna applies the same
essentialist terminology to describe the relation between the essence of body and its determinate ex-
tensions as he does to describe the relation between pure quiddity and its non-constitutive concom-
itants: the determinate extensions are lawāḥiq relative to the māhiyyah of body; see Lammer, The El-
ements, 131‒132.
516 IV The Special Ontological Mode of Quiddity in Itself

Avicenna’s analysis in the following sections of the work delineates with more
precision the notion of a being of quiddity in and of itself. He returns to this point
in passing when he asserts that ‘being a man’ and ‘being water’ is one thing, but
their numerical unity is something else. As he puts it, “[numerical] oneness is exter-
nal to the realities and essences” of these things, a statement which introduces the
distinction between quiddity in itself, or being a certain thing in itself, and its vari-
ous concomitants, in this case numerical oneness.¹⁸⁰ But the master tackles this
issue in earnest in the eleventh chapter of this work, which focuses on the relation
of being (hastī) to the categories (maqūlāt). There Avicenna devotes his attention
to the question of whether being is a univocal or equivocal notion and how it can
be predicated of different things.¹⁸¹ The argument in this chapter of Philosophical
Compendium has a clear structure and can be divided into three main sections: (a)
first, Avicenna reports the view of those who regard existence as a purely equivocal
notion (36.14‒37.37.1); (b) he then retorts by arguing that it is a kind of modulated uni-
vocal notion, because it has a single overarching meaning (37.1‒38.1); and (c) he goes
on to elaborate on (b) by mentioning a set of differences and distinctions in the way
in which being can be predicated of things (38.1‒39.7). Avicenna’s main intention in
this section is therefore to show that being (hastī) is neither a pure equivocal nor a
pure univocal notion, but rather a ‘modulated’ (mushakkik) notion. In section (b), he
argues that existence has an overarching and unified or focal meaning, which is nev-
ertheless subject to qualifications. There he mentions “absolute existence” (hastī-i
muṭlaq) and “general existence” (hastī-i ʿāmm). These expressions convey a single,
fundamental meaning of existence, which applies to all the categories, and which
means for something ‘to exist’ or ‘to be’ (hastī) and is the contrary of nonexistence
or ‘not to be’ (nīstī). Existence or being has, accordingly, a single unifying meaning
(yak maʿnā). What Avicenna states here accords squarely with what he explains in his
other works concerning ontological modulation (tashkīk) and the relative univocity of
wujūd.
Nevertheless, in section (c), he explicates that the notion of being is not by any
means a rigid univocal, since various distinctions and qualifications can be intro-
duced to modulate this notion and to clarify the various cases to which it applies.
What is of particular relevance for my purposes is the set of distinctions Avicenna
introduces in the remainder of the passage in order to justify his differentiating be-
tween various aspects or even sub-senses of being. It is these distinctions that can
account for the difference (ikhtilāf) in the way existence is predicated of things.
The first distinction is that between priority and posteriority: existence applies pri-
marily to substance and secondarily to accident. What is more, it applies primarily
to some substances and secondarily to others, and primarily to some accidents

 Avicenna, Philosophical Compendium, 33.8‒10.

 Avicenna, Philosophical Compendium, chapter 11, 36‒39. This passage has been commented
upon by Morewedge, The Metaphysica, 156‒206; and a large segment of it has been analyzed by Treig-
er, Avicenna’s Notion.
 2 Senses of existence in Avicenna’s ontology 517

and secondarily to others.¹⁸² A second aspect of modulation mentioned in chapter 11

is based on degrees of intensity, or degrees of strength and weakness, which can be
applied to some accidents, such as blackness or whiteness. The rationale underlying
this claim seems to be that although quiddity in itself, e. g., whiteness, is applied in a
purely univocal way to different things—such as snow and ivory, for the whiteness of
snow is not in itself whiter than the whiteness of ivory—it is degrees of strength and
weakness in existence, of being white in actuality, which differentiate them.¹⁸³ These
two aspects or modes of tashkīk, especially priority and posteriority, have already
been discussed in a previous section. Finally, Avicenna introduces a third distinction
between general existence (hastī-i ʿāmm) and existence conceived of in a more prop-
er or specific (khāṣṣ) way, the latter referring to the existence of individual things, or
rather ‘thingness-es,’ and not to being ‘in general.’ Avicenna contends in this con-
nection that “if you make existence proper [chon hastī-rā khāṣṣ konī], then the exis-
tence of each thing [chīz] becomes distinct, so that the proper substance of each
thing is distinct.”¹⁸⁴ So, there is a principle of differentiation and determinedness
that sets a thing apart from all the other things, where ‘thing’ in this context is
meant to refer to quiddity. Furthermore, the reference to proper existence, or “making
existence proper,” obviously corresponds to the Arabic expression wujūd khāṣṣ that

 See Treiger, Avicenna’s Notion, 355‒359. This distinction intersects directly with the broader dis-
tinction between proper and general existence: the proper existence of a thing is what, at a funda-
mental level, differentiates the existence of substance from its accidents, or of one accident from an-
other, or of one substance from another, such as the being of blackness from the being of whiteness,
of humanness from horseness. Regardless of whether it is a substance or an accident, it is the essence
and proper existence of that thing that will set it apart from other things. It is intriguing in this con-
nection that Avicenna attributes pure quiddities to all things, whether substances or accidents, and
that he furthermore correlates quiddity with substance in a forceful manner. The implication would
seem to be that one sense of substance is reducible to quiddity taken in itself. This perspective will be
explored in more detail below.
 This argument is problematic, because it does not square with what Avicenna says on this topic
in some of his other works, where he seems to reject the idea of an intensity of being; cf., for example,
the discussion of modulated terms and existence in Categories, I.2, 10.17‒18. In the latter work, the
reverse of what appears in Philosophical Compendium is stated: whiteness is said not to be predicated
univocally and not to be the subject of greater or lesser intensity. The crux of Avicenna’s arguments
seems to rely on a basic distinction between a quiddity taken in itself and a quiddity taken as some-
thing realized in a concrete being. While the former is constant and irreducible and thus also un-
changing in the way it is predicated of things, the latter is variable and can be predicated differently
of things as they come to exist in actuality. A passage in Notes, 99‒100, section 121, explains this
point in detail: “If one says: ‘This [thing] is blacker than that other [thing],’ one is not referring
here to absolute blackness [al-sawād al-muṭlaq]. For they are one in their definition of blackness,
and the latter is predicated of them equally. Rather, the intention is that this [thing] in its specific
blackness [sawādihi l-mukhaṣṣaṣ] is blacker than that thing in its specific blackness. And this only
occurs through a relation [iḍāfah] to whiteness, in that this [thing] is closer to whiteness than that
[thing].” It is, therefore, not pure quiddity which is liable to degrees of intensity, but rather the acci-
dent as it comes to be realized or exist in a concrete subject.
 Avicenna, Philosophical Compendium, 37.11.
518 IV The Special Ontological Mode of Quiddity in Itself

appears in Metaphysics I.5. This is confirmed by the remainder of the passage, which
associates proper existence with ‘the being’ of individual essences, such as black-
ness, a point to which I return below. In brief, the reference to proper or specific ex-
istence in Philosophical Compendium seems to stem from the same concern regarding
the special being of quiddity that appears in Metaphysics I.5 and later in V.1. As we
saw in the section on tashkīk, it is on these grounds that existence can be modulated
and said differently of things.
At this juncture, let us turn to the last paragraph of chapter 11 of Philosophical
Compendium. There Avicenna develops an argument that seems at first glance awk-
wardly related to the discussion that precedes it, since it concerns the relation be-
tween essence and existence, as well as between ‘the essential’ (dhātī) and ‘the ac-
cidental’ (ʿaraḍī). On a first evaluation, these last points do not seem to directly
inform the analysis of the various senses or modes of existence.¹⁸⁵ Upon careful ex-
amination, however, a crucial link emerges between its contents and the theme of the
chapter. For Avicenna’s point seems to be that existence is said differently of essence
and of the concrete, realized entity taken with its accidents and concomitants. The
aim of this last paragraph would therefore be to further elucidate how a special
sense of being can be attributed to quiddity or thingness, as opposed to the acciden-
tal and composite whole. I quote the relevant passage below:

Text 30: This meaning of [realized] existence is not essential [or intrinsic, dhātī] to the ten cat-
egories, nor is it to be regarded as their quiddity [māhiyyah]. We have stated this argument pre-
viously. It follows from this reasoning that one cannot say that something has made humanness
into an actual substance and blackness into a color. However, one can say that it has made [each
of] them into a [realized] existent [mawjūd]. Accordingly, each of the ten categories has a quid-
dity [māhiyyah] that does not proceed from a [realized] entity. For instance, four is four [chahār
chahār] or it is a number with the attribute of [realized] existence [ṣifat-keh hast], and this exis-
tence is described as realized existence [anniyyah]. Quiddity and realized existence are different
[dīgar], and the realized existence of [these things] is distinct [jodā] from quiddity on the
grounds that the former [i. e., realized existence] is not an essential meaning [maʿnā dhātī],
but an accidental meaning [maʿnā ʿaraḍī]. The accidental condition [or state, ḥāl] pertaining
to these nine [categories] is in such a manner that each one of them has its quiddity by itself
[or for each one of them the quiddity is by virtue of itself] [har yakī-rā māhiyyat-ī bekhūdish
ast], whereas what is accidental [i. e., realized existence] is so [only] in relation to the thing in
it.¹⁸⁶

In this last paragraph of chapter 11, Avicenna introduces his seminal distinction be-
tween essence and existence. At first sight, this seems to have little to do with the

 This, perhaps, explains why Treiger in his article does not quote and analyze this last paragraph
of chapter 11. But I think he overlooked its essential connection to what precedes and the fact that it is
meant to illustrate yet another aspect of the modulation of existence and of the ontological difference
(ikhtilāf) that can be predicated of things.
 Avicenna, Philosophical Compendium, 38.10‒39.4; transl. Morewedge, The Metaphysica, 30‒31,
slightly revised.
 2 Senses of existence in Avicenna’s ontology 519

main theme of chapter 11, which is whether existence is a univocal or equivocal no-
tion, and how it can be said to apply to the ten Aristotelian categories. But scrutiny of
the passage reveals that it is in fact perfectly pertinent to the discussion at hand and
adds to its main argument. For the crucial distinction Avicenna makes here is be-
tween realized existence or anniyyah, which he describes as an accidental meaning
(maʿnā ʿaraḍī) and an attribute or characteristic (ṣifah), and the being of quiddity,
which is essential or intrinsic (dhātī) to essence. Whereas the former is something ex-
trinsic that conditions essence from the outside and endows it with a state or condi-
tion (ḥāl) of realization and concretization—this should be connected with the con-
ditioned state of quiddity (bi-sharṭ shayʾ ākhar) that Avicenna discusses in The Cure—
the being of quiddity is in contrast essential and inherent to it and indistinguishable
from it. It is, for example, what makes fourness fourness, humanness humanness,
and blackness blackness, and what provides each category with its being itself-
qua-itself, and this in complete abstraction from the realization and concretization
of these essences. The fundamental difference teased out by this text, then, is one
between essential being, on the one hand, and accidental being or the realization
or concretization of existence, on the other. This distinction is highly relevant to
the overarching aim of the passage and represents one of the many differences (ikh-
tilāfāt) in terms of which being is predicated and said of things. In bolstering this
point, the passage harks back to an earlier statement that appears in chapter 3 of
the same work, where Avicenna describes substance (jawhar) as that whose being
is not in a subject and is a reality (ḥaqīqah) and quiddity (māhiyyah) whose being
(hastī) is not receptive of another thing.¹⁸⁷ By implicitly distinguishing between
two ontological modes or states—i. e., an essential one belonging to thingness or
quiddity, and an accidental one belonging to the realized whole—this passage ap-
pears to elaborate on the notion of proper existence discussed more explicitly in Avi-
cenna’s other works. In the final analysis, this last paragraph would add a crucial
and distinct point to the overall discussion of chapter 11, and its contents would
overlap significantly with some of the other texts discussed previously. In line

 Avicenna, Philosophical Compendium, 9.13‒15. In this regard, it is quite remarkable, as More-
wedge notes, that this theoretical distinction is to some extent borne out by Avicenna’s Persian ter-
minology: the terms wujūd/mawjūd and anniyyah seem to refer chiefly in this work to realized or con-
cretized existence and to be connected with the notion of accidentality he mentions in this passage,
whereas Avicenna employs terms from the root hastī and ast to describe the being or reality of quid-
dity. Morewedge contends that wujūd signifies “concretion” and “actuality” and differs from the
meaning of essence (dhāt, māhiyyah) and being (hastī). The term wujūd should be associated espe-
cially “with the accidents of an individual substance which has been realized, such as the color
white in Socrates’ skin” (325). But Morewedge’s claim may go too far, and I see no strict correlation
between content and terminology in this work; rather, the crucial point in this passage focuses on the
distinction between the essential reality or being of quiddity (dhātī) and the accidental status of re-
alized or acquired existence (ʿaraḍī).
520 IV The Special Ontological Mode of Quiddity in Itself

with chapters I.5 and V.1 of Metaphysics of The Cure, it implicitly identifies one sense
of existence with the proper existence or reality of quiddity or thingness.¹⁸⁸
The main thrust of Avicenna’s argumentation in these texts is that differences in
the way existence is predicated of things are based on various aspects of tashkīk, as
well as—I would contend—on the distinction between the essential being of quiddity
and the realized, accidental existence of its concomitants. In fact, and all things con-
sidered, it is the notion of essential being that most directly accounts for the differ-
ence (ikhtilāf) between one thing’s existence and another thing’s existence. This is
because it, more than the others, is indistinguishable from the core and essence of
a thing and points to its irreducible difference in thingness, such as the difference
between the being of humanness and the being of horseness, or between the
being of blackness and the being of whiteness. It is this very sense of existence
that Avicenna elucidates and attributes to quiddity in Metaphysics I.5, a hypothesis
that is further borne out by the fact that he even provides similar examples there,
such as whiteness. Hence, even though differences in the way being is predicated
arise from a set of aspects or modes (priority and posteriority, the modalities, etc.),
one could argue that they stem primarily and especially from the irreducible ontolog-
ical distinctness or difference embedded in each quiddity. This may be called a kind
of ‘quidditative modulation of being.’
One element of Avicenna’s discussion that is more implicit in Philosophical Com-
pendium than in The Cure is the fundamentally mental or intellectual context of the
being of quiddity. Avicenna’s comments in the former work are quite succinct and
abstract. Although he contrasts sharply realized or concretized existence and essen-
tial being—the former corresponding extensionally to the concrete beings of the ex-
terior world, as well as possibly to the ‘realized’ existents in the mind, i. e., complex
universal mental concepts—the extensionality of essential being is not clarified in
that passage. However, on the basis of the previous analysis, it is apparent that it
is primarily to the status of pure quiddities in the mind that Avicenna is alluding
and, thus, to a kind of intelligible being. That is to say, this passage would be differ-
entiating between the realized, accidental existence of concrete entities and the es-
sential, intelligible existence of the pure quiddities in the intellect. So there are rea-
sons to think that the essential being of quiddity Avicenna alludes to in Philosophical
Compendium is to be connected directly with the doctrines of the primary notions
and the intelligible existence of quiddity as it is expounded in Metaphysics I.5 and
V.1.¹⁸⁹

 The question of why Avicenna inserts this paragraph in his analysis of the modulation of being
has to be addressed and cannot be simply ignored, as Treiger does in his article. The most convincing
explanation in my eyes is that its contents represent yet another mode or aspect of tashkīk.
 Morewedge, The Metaphysica, 162, reaches the same conclusion, but I think he goes too far in
his construal of essential being, especially with regard to what it encompasses. He makes impossi-
bles, such as “round square” and “2+2=5,” examples of intelligible being. He also claims that “an im-
possible being is a concept” (316). But I think that this, strictly speaking, cannot be correct, because
 2 Senses of existence in Avicenna’s ontology 521

There is a final, intriguing feature about Avicenna’s discussion in Philosophical

Compendium: the distinction between the accidental nature (ʿaraḍī) of realized exis-
tence and the essential nature (dhātī) of the being of essence seems to imply that re-
alized or concretized existence is merely possible (because it is accidental and extrin-
sic), whereas essential being is necessary (because it is essential and intrinsic).
Although Avicenna does not introduce the modalities in his discussion of the various
aspects or modes of existence in Philosophical Compendium, the correlation between
accidentality and possibility, on the one hand, and essentiality and necessity, on the
other, coheres with other Avicennian doctrines. This point needs to be developed fur-
ther and will be addressed in a forthcoming section.

2.2.3 Yaḥyā b. ʿAdī and Avicenna on essential being

As we saw already in chapters II and III, the Christian philosopher Yaḥyā b. ʿAdī ex-
erted a profound influence on Avicenna’s conception of essence. His works foreshad-
ow many of the distinctions that later play a key role in the master’s approach to this
topic and that are often attributed to Avicenna himself. One issue that needs to be
explored in more detail at this juncture concerns the place of essential being in
their ontology. In a groundbreaking study devoted to the metaphysics of Yaḥyā
and Avicenna published in 2004, Marwan Rashed concluded that the Avicennian
theory of proper being (wujūd khāṣṣ) was directly indebted to Yaḥyā’s works and,
more specifically, to his theory of essential being.¹⁹⁰ To my knowledge, Rashed is
the only scholar working with the Arabic sources to have seriously entertained the
possibility that Avicenna articulated a theory of essential being and that this theory
had a direct precedent in the early Islamic context. Although his general hypothesis
of the influence that Yaḥyā had on the shaykh al-raʾīs has been validated by subse-
quent studies, his argument regarding essential being has not been retained in spe-
cialized studies on Avicenna. In what follows, I delve into the line of inquiry opened
by Rashed and try to generate additional insight into how these thinkers perceive the
relationship between essence and existence.

for Avicenna impossible things that cannot exist at all cannot be conceived of and are not real con-
cepts. Only concepts of possible and necessary things can exist. What does perhaps exist in the mind
is the concept of the impossible (mumtaniʿ) in itself as a logical notion, not impossible beings, as Mor-
ewedge would have it, since these do not have a quiddity or essence. But even then, I think one
should distinguish between two senses of impossible, as was proposed already in chapter II: absolute
impossibles, like ‘square circle’ or ‘existent nonexistent,’ which cannot ever exist in the mind even as
concepts; and things that are impossible in the sense that their existence is negated in the present
moment, but are theoretically possible, such as a future contingent. There is a sense in which the
latter can exist in the mind, but not the former. For instance, it is impossible for a childless
woman to have a son in the present moment; but it is not impossible for this to happen at a future
time, and so the mental consideration of this state is also possible, not impossible.
 Rashed, Ibn ʿAdī. Comments on Yaḥyā’s theory of essential or divine being can also be found in
Ehrig-Eggert, Yaḥyā, 59‒60; and Endress, Yaḥyā, 459‒460.
522 IV The Special Ontological Mode of Quiddity in Itself

As I showed earlier, there are strong reasons to construe the second sense of
wujūd outlined by Avicenna in Metaphysics I.5 as referring to a kind of essential
being associated with nature and quiddity. According to the master, this sense of es-
sential being is distinguished from realized existence (wujūd muḥaṣṣal), which per-
tains to the realized substance or sunolon taken as a whole, that is, together with
the external attributes and accidents of essence. Now, the two ideas that wujūd pos-
sesses several senses, and that one of its senses refers to essential being, had already
been articulated by Yaḥyā b. ʿAdī. In his treatise entitled On Clarifying the Existence
of the Common Things, Yaḥyā makes the following statement, which is relevant for
the issue at hand:

Text 31: Likewise, existence is an equivocal term that points to various senses [al-wujūd ism
mushtarak yadullu ʿalā maʿānī mukhtalifah].¹⁹¹ The first is ‘natural existence’ [al-wujūd al-
ṭabīʿī], and this is the existence of the notions [or forms or essences, al-maʿānī] in matter and
together with accidents. The second is ‘logical existence’ [al-wujūd al-manṭiqī], which is the ex-
istence of the notions qua forms [ṣuwar] in the soul. The third is ‘the essential [existence’] [al-
dhātī], which is also called ‘the divine [existence’] [al-ilāhī], and this is the existence of the no-
tions on account of what [or of the thing to which] their definitions point to [in itself] [wa-huwa
wujūd al-maʿānī ʿalā mā tadullu ʿalayhā ḥudūduhā].¹⁹²

To be sure, there are significant differences—to which I shall return later on—in the
way Ibn ʿAdī and Avicenna conceive of the relationship between essence and exis-
tence. With regard to this passage, one obvious difference is that Yaḥyā outlines
three senses of wujūd, as opposed to Avicenna’s two senses in Metaphysics I.5. An-
other key difference is that being, for Yaḥyā, is an equivocal term (ism mushtarak),
whereas for Avicenna it is more appropriately described as a modulated term (ism
mushakkik).¹⁹³ But I wish to begin the analysis by stressing the similarities between
their views. Yaḥyā, like Avicenna later on, distinguishes various senses (maʿānī) of
wujūd, and his statement to that effect (wa-ayḍan fa-inna l-wujūd ism mushtarak ya-
dullu ʿalā maʿānī mukhtalifah), is very close to the one that appears in Metaphysics I.5
(lafẓ al-wujūd yadullu bi-hi ayḍan ʿalā maʿānī kathīrah). What is more, Yaḥyā and Avi-
cenna connect one of these senses directly with quiddity, essence, or nature taken in
itself: for Ibn ʿAdī, this is “essential existence” and “divine existence,” which is also
called “true existence” (wujūd ḥaqīqī) in another treatise,¹⁹⁴ while for Avicenna it is
“proper existence” (wujūd khāṣṣ). However, it is worth recalling that Avicenna at Met-

 Naturally, mushtarak can also be translated as “equivocal,” but I think that Ibn ʿAdī, like most
Aristotelian philosophers, would recognize that being possesses a core or focal meaning; so ‘ambi-
gous’ seems a more appropriate translation.
 Yaḥyā b. ʿAdī, On Clarifying the Existence of the Common Things, in Philosophical Treatises,
154.17‒20.
 Yaḥyā also puts forth the view that existence is equivocal in some comments he made regarding
Categories; see Yaḥyā b. ʿAdī, Philosophical Treatises, 182.15‒183.5. I have not found any references to
the idea of modulation (tashkīk) in his writings.
 Menn and Wisnovsky, Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī On the Four Scientific Questions, 66b15.
 2 Senses of existence in Avicenna’s ontology 523

aphysics V.1 draws a distinction between the concrete composite existent, which he
calls “the natural thing” (al-shayʾ al-ṭabīʿī) and which has “natural existence” (al-
wujūd al-ṭabīʿī), and the nature or essence “taken in itself” (al-maʾkhūd bi-dhātihi),
which has “divine existence” (al-wujūd al-ilāhī).¹⁹⁵ Hence, for the master, divine ex-
istence pertains to the essence taken in itself. In addition, Avicenna frequently refers
to “intellectual existence” (wujūd ʿaqlī) in his works, which amounts unequivocally to
what Yaḥyā for his part describes as “logical existence” (wujūd manṭiqī). Both ex-
pressions pertain to the existence of universal notions in the mind or, as Yaḥyā
puts it, of notions “conceived of or in the soul” (mutaṣawwar aw fī l-nafs).¹⁹⁶ In
brief, both Yaḥyā and Avicenna recognize two broad modes of conditioned exis-
tence—‘natural/concrete’ and ‘intellectual/logical’—and they in addition posit a
third mode that is closely connected with the essence taken in itself: ‘essential/di-
vine/real existence’ for the former, and ‘proper/divine’ existence for the latter.
Now, it is important to stress that Yaḥyā’s threefold ontological distinction cor-
responds directly, as in Avicenna, to three different ways of considering the same es-
sences. In other words, Yaḥyā is not distinguishing between different kinds or sets of
essences (such as the essence of concrete horse vs. the essence of God), but rather
between the three ontological contexts and states that characterize the same es-
sence, such as humanness. This is crucial, because it suggests that the same essence
is characterized by different ontological modes or states depending on where it is lo-
cated and on whether it exists combined with external concomitants and accidents
or solely in itself. One key passage from Yaḥyā’s works that illustrates this appears at
the very end of his treatise On the Four Scientific Questions:

Text 32: I mean only that simple forms, in their essences—which correspond [exactly] to what
their definitions signify—are utterly unclothed in matter and do not need it; they need it only for
their sensible existence. As for their intellectual existence, they do not need matter for it, al-
though they do need the intellect. Now for their divine existence [wujūdihā al-ilāhī], which is their
real existence [wujūduhā al-ḥaqīqī] (I mean [their existing] in their [essential] realities), and in
which they are not clothed with anything else, they need nothing at all apart from them-
selves—even though they do not exist at any given moment in one of the three kinds of existence
without [also existing in] the other two [kinds of existence]. Rather, all of these three existences
must always attach to it, as long as their Creator and Existentiator—hallowed be His names—
wishes it. This is [what we have to say] about proving the existence of divine forms. As for
their general quiddity, it is “forms”; their specific quiddity is “forms stripped of matter and of
all concomitants and free of all things other than themselves.”¹⁹⁷

 Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Cure, V.1, 204.16‒205.2.

 Yaḥyā b. ʿAdī, On Clarifying the Existence of the Common Things, in Philosophical Treatises,
151.22‒23.
 Menn and Wisnovsky, Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī On the Four Scientific Questions, 66b15‒20, and 96 for the
English translation.
524 IV The Special Ontological Mode of Quiddity in Itself

Hence, in Yaḥyā, as in Avicenna, the different ways of conceiving of essence (as a

universal in the mind, as a concrete particular, and in itself) correspond to different
ontological modes, one of which is divine and essential.
On the basis of these passages and doctrinal parallels, it would appear that the
shaykh al-raʾīs is relying directly on Yaḥyā’s treatises in elaborating his terminology
and his distinction between natural, intellectual/logical, and divine existence, as
well as in connecting the last aspect with pure essence specifically. In light of
this, and in spite of the fact that Avicenna does not make this connection himself
explicitly, there can be little doubt that the reference to the “divine existence” of es-
sence in Metaphysics V.1 is an elaboration on the sense of “proper existence” dis-
closed in Metaphysics I.5.¹⁹⁸ One hint that supports this hypothesis comes from the
very phrasing of the key statement in section V.1, where pure quiddity is said to
have “an existence that is specified [yakhuṣṣu wujūduhu] as divine existence”—in
other words, whose “proper existence” (wujūd khāṣṣ) is “divine.”¹⁹⁹ What is more,
if we appeal to section 11 of Philosophical Compendium and to the distinction Avicen-
na makes therein between what is ‘accidental’ (ʿaraḍī) and what is ‘essential’ (dhātī),
and if we accept the hypothesis that this distinction may in this passage refer to dif-
ferent aspects or senses of being, then the overlap with Yaḥyā’s works becomes even
more implicative terminologically: for the proper being and divine being of quiddity
as Avicenna conceives it would also, it appears, be “essential” (dhātī). In that state, it
would have to be distinguished from the accidental ontological state of the external
attributes.
Although these points are arresting, I would argue that the commonalities be-
tween these two thinkers run even deeper. One key feature of Ibn ʿAdī’s argumenta-
tion revolves around the distinction between essence ‘taken in itself’ and essence
‘taken with other things.’ It is this distinction that grounds his postulation of the
three modes or kinds (aṣnāf) of existence of essence. Essence in concrete beings
and essence in the mind is accompanied by certain conditions, attributes, or con-
comitants that preclude considering it simply in itself. In these cases, it is considered
as a part of the composite existent. Accordingly, Yaḥyā describes essence in concrete
beings as “in that it is with matter and with specifying accidents” (bi-annahu fī
hayūlā wa-maʿa aʿrāḍ khāṣṣah), and essence in the mind as “in that it is conceived
or in the soul” (bi-annahu mutaṣawwar aw fī l-nafs). In those statements the Arabic
expression bi-annahu expresses a condition. In contrast, essence taken in itself is
“devoid of its concomitants” (al-ʿariyyah min al-lawāḥiq) and “without anything
else being connected to it” (min ghayr an yuḍāfa ilayhi shayʾ ākhar).²⁰⁰ On Yaḥyā’s

 This was also Marmura’s opinion (Avicenna, The Metaphysics, 404, note 9).
 Note also the similarity in phrasing between Yaḥyā (wa-huwa l-wujūd al-musammā wujūd ilāhī)
and Avicenna (wa-huwa alladhī yakhuṣṣu wujūduhu bi-annahu l-wujūd al-ilāhī). Exactly in what sense
it can be called ‘divine’ is an issue addressed later on.
 Menn and Wisnovsky, Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī On the Four Scientific Questions, 66b9‒10; Yaḥyā b. ʿAdī,
On Clarifying the Existence of the Common Things, in Philosophical Treatises, 153.2.
 2 Senses of existence in Avicenna’s ontology 525

mind, it is this latter aspect of essence that is said to have divine and essential being.
What this means is that the other two aspects imply a mereological and immanent
state of the essence within the concrete or mental existent, which is why Yaḥyā de-
scribes it in this context as a “part” (juzʾ) of a composite. What is more, essence in
itself as well as its divine and essential being are said to be prior and absolute
when compared to the other two states. Yaḥyā explains that “this notion [of the
pure essence] is prior by nature [or by essence]” (hādhā l-maʿnā aqdam bi-l-ṭabʿ).
In other words, it is essentially prior to the concrete and mental instantiations of es-
sence.²⁰¹ Remarkably, this would seem to be the case even when essence is taken as a
part embedded in concrete particulars. The essence humanness of, say, Zayd, is prior
to Zayd taken as a composite and contingent substance, which is why this essence
qua common nature in Zayd can be said to have essential existence.²⁰²
As the analysis of Avicenna’s doctrines carried out in earlier sections has shown,
all of these ʿAdīan features find a direct counterpart in the master’s system. The mas-
ter uses conditions (shurūṭ) to distinguish between a state of essence in itself and a
state of essence with other things, the latter being associated with composite mental
and concrete existence. Avicenna furthermore regards quiddity in itself as being
“prior” to the realized concrete being and as possessing a divine existence on that
account. It is also a “part” of the sunolon according to a mereological interpretation,
while at the same time preceding it in the way that the simple precedes the complex
and the part precedes the whole. Even the title of Metaphysics V.1 where Avicenna
expounds these various points, “On General Things and the Manner [or Mode] of
their Existence” (Fī l-umūr al-ʿāmmah wa-kayfiyyat wujūdihā) directly echoes the
title of Yaḥyā’s treatise (Fī tabyīn wujūd al-umūr al-ʿāmmiyyah). The various termino-
logical and doctrinal parallels between Yaḥyā and Avicenna are summed up in the
comparative table below (Tab. 1).²⁰³
These striking parallels notwithstanding, there are three points that remain to be
clarified. First, the fact remains that Avicenna in chapter I.5 refers to two, not three,
senses of existence, a deviation which seems to undermine any strong parallelism
between his views and those of Yaḥyā. Second, Yaḥyā neatly correlates the three
senses (maʿānī) of existence he lays out with “three kinds of existence” (aṣnāf al-
wujūd al-thalāthah), a symmetric account and conflation that seems absent in Avi-
cenna’s system. Finally, even if one grants a direct connection between these
texts, it remains unclear that Yaḥyā and Avicenna intend “divine existence” in exact-
ly the same way. In fact, it is not entirely obvious how Yaḥyā himself understood this
notion. So apart from a formal similarity between their views one should not hasten

 Yaḥyā b. ʿAdī, On Clarifying the Existence of the Common Things, in Philosophical Treatises, 153.7‒
12; 157.3‒4, 158.3‒7.
 Yaḥyā b. ʿAdī, Treatise on Unity, in Philosophical Treatises, 401.1‒3.
 I have tried as much as possible to include the textual references to the examples given: (C) re-
fers to Yaḥyā’s treatise On Clarifying the Existence of the Common Things, (F) to his treatise On the Four
Scientific Questions. All the Avicennian references are to Metaphysics V.1 of The Cure.
526 IV The Special Ontological Mode of Quiddity in Itself

Table 1 Comparison of Yaḥyā’s and Avicenna’s views on pure essence

Notions and doctrines Yaḥyā b. ʿAdī Avicenna

Designation of pure essence al‐dhawāt al‐maḥdah al‐māhiyyah min ḥaythu hiya

(Fb) hiya
al‐ḥayawān al‐muṭlaq al‐ḥayawān al‐muṭlaq
(C.‒, .‒)
maʿnā (F, C) maʿnā

Conditions linked with the

three states of essence:
in concreto bi‐annahu fī hayūlā wa‐maʿa aʿrāḍ bi‐sharṭ shayʾ ākhar (shayʾ
khāṣṣah (C.‒, .) ākhar=concrete concomitants)
kawnuhu maʿa māddah
wa‐ʿawāriḍ
fī l‐aʿyān
in the mind bi‐annahu mutaṣawwar aw fī l‐nafs bi‐sharṭ shayʾ ākhar (shayʾ
(C.‒, .) ākhar=mental concomitants)
fī l‐ʿaql, fī l‐nafs, fī l‐dhihn
in itself min ghayr an yuḍāfa ilayhi shayʾ lā bi‐sharṭ shayʾ ākhar and
ākhar (C.) bi‐sharṭ lā shayʾ ākhar
al‐ʿariyyah min al‐lawāḥiq khāl ʿan al‐sharāʾiṭ al‐lāḥiqah
(Fb‒)

Mereological state of es- ajzāʾ al‐murakkab (C.‒) al‐juzʾ minhā

sence in composite beings juzʾ min ḥayawān mā
taqaddum al‐juzʾ ʿalā l‐kull

Corresponding ontological wujūd ṭabīʿī wujūd ṭabīʿī

modes wujūd manṭiqī wujūd ʿaqlī
wujūd dhātī/wujūd ilāhī/wujūd wujūd ilāhī
ḥaqīqī wujūd khāṣṣ/ḥaqīqah
(C and F)

Qualities of the divine exis- aqdam bi‐l‐ṭabʿ min al‐mawjūdāt aqdam min al‐wujūd al‐ṭabīʿī
tence of essence al‐ṭabīʿiyyah (Fb)

to the conclusion that Avicenna modelled this feature of his ontology entirely on the
ʿAdīan texts.
The first point amounts to an illusory difference but calls for interesting remarks.
It is true that Metaphysics I.5 mentions only two senses of wujūd, but on the recon-
struction of these two senses provided here, the first sense of wujūd muḥaṣṣal is in
fact a contraction of the two sub-senses of existence that presuppose the external
attributes and accidents of quiddity. Accordingly, it would include wujūd fī l-aʿyān
and wujūd fī l-ʿaql, wujūd ṭabīʿī and wujūd ʿaqlī, as well as the formula al-wujūdayn,
when these are taken to refer to the existence of composite or complex contingent
beings. Realized or established existence combines and collapses these various de-
nominators, because it puts the emphasis on existence as an external concomitant
 2 Senses of existence in Avicenna’s ontology 527

of essence as well as on the various external attributes that are realized in the com-
posite substance, whether in the concrete sunolon or the complex universal concept.
These various expressions designate a single ontological mode or state, albeit in two
different contexts (mental and concrete). This explains Avicenna’s tendency—a real
source of confusion for his readers—to alternate between descriptions of concrete
and mental existence as two separate phenomena—which they truly are in a certain
regard—but which are liable to being classified under a single notion in view of their
identical extraneous and accidental relation to pure quiddity and of their implying a
state of ontological compositeness or complexity. Once this point has been elucidat-
ed, then one of the seeming differences between Yaḥyā’s and Avicenna’s classifica-
tions dissipates. What remains fundamental is not so much the distinction between
intellectual/logical and concrete/natural existence—which these thinkers both up-
hold and which, granted, also plays an important role in their system—but rather
the distinction between the essential being of essence, on the one hand, and exis-
tence construed as a concomitant and external attribute, on the other. Put differently,
the main cleavage in their metaphysics would be between the existence of essence
taken ‘in itself’ and the existence of essence taken ‘with something else.’ The upshot
is that both Yaḥyā and Avicenna appear to have articulated their ontology on the
basis of a fundamental māhiyyah-lawāzim distinction. This fundamental doctrinal
commonality prevails, in spite of a divergent distribution of the various senses of
wujūd in their systems.
The second point is more problematic. To my knowledge, the expression “kinds of
existence” (aṣnāf al-wujūd) does not appear in the Avicennian texts. Here it is possible
to surmise that Yaḥyā opted for this relatively committal and implicative phrasing be-
cause he views existence as an equivocal term (ism mushtarak), which would justify the
claim that there are indeed different “kinds” of existence, which are fundamentally un-
related to one another.²⁰⁴ Avicenna for his part speaks of modes or aspects (anḥāʾ,
aḥkām) of existence, which seems more in line with his position that wujūd is not a
purely equivocal notion, but rather a modulated notion whose modes or aspects can
be deployed around a focal or central meaning. Accordingly, these various ontological
modes are what express modulation without ever resulting in the crystallization of dif-
ferent ‘kinds’ of existence. Furthermore, as mentioned above, Yaḥyā equates the senses
of wujūd with its kinds or modes (maʿanī=aṣnāf), whereas in Avicenna’s ontology the
relation between the senses of being and the ontological aspects or modes remains
much more elusive and, it would appear, also distinctive (partly because it invokes
the complicated theory of tashkīk al-wujūd). Accordingly, for Avicenna, concrete and
mental existence are not presented as two distinct senses of existence, as they are
by Yaḥyā, but rather as two contexts or modes that fall under the single sense of real-
ized or established existence and that are modulated by tashkīk, as explained above.

 Yaḥyā insists on using this term also in his other treatise, On Clarifying the Existence of the Com-
mon Things, in Philosophical Treatises, 148.6.
528 IV The Special Ontological Mode of Quiddity in Itself

This is why Avicenna at times distinguishes them, and at other times speaks of them in
a unified and generic way (al-wujūdayn, wujūd muḥaṣṣal, wujūd ithbātī, etc.). This point
is also reflected in the fact that in Avicenna’s philosophy, the simple term mawjūd or
‘existent’ can refer either to a concrete or a mental being. Even then, and bearing this
point in mind, it appears that for both Yaḥyā and Avicenna, the senses of existence
correspond quite clearly to modes of existence. More precisely, there are two funda-
mental senses of existence recognized by these thinkers that also amount to two dis-
tinct modes of existence: (a) essential being, and (b) the existence of the attributes and
concomitants of essence, or of essence taken with its attributes. In brief, then, even if
Avicenna shuns the notion of ‘kinds’ (aṣnāf) of existence, he still correlates the two
senses of wujūd of Metaphysics I.5 with modes of existence very much along the
lines of Ibn ʿAdī’s position.
The third issue raised above is by far the most intricate. There can be little doubt
at this stage that Yaḥyā’s treatises were a direct source for Avicenna’s doctrine of the
ontology of quiddity. But in what way, if any, did Avicenna depart from his predeces-
sor regarding the notion of essential and divine existence? And did the two thinkers
understand it in exactly the same way? The fact that neither of them elaborates much
on this notion only compounds this problem. In order to address this point, we first
need to get a better grasp of how Yaḥyā conceives of the divine existence of essence.
There is little evidence contained in Yaḥyā’s philosophical treatises that can be used
to illuminate this issue. From a purely terminological angle, attributing a ‘divine ex-
istence’ to the essences or forms would suggest that these exist in God’s mind, as op-
posed to existing separately on the model of the Platonic forms, a theory which
Yaḥyā rejects.²⁰⁵ And indeed, we know from other treatises penned by Ibn ʿAdī
that he attributed knowledge of all things, and, more specifically, knowledge of all
the forms (ṣuwar) to God.²⁰⁶ Moreover, because Yaḥyā’s noetics posits a perfect
unity or unification (ittiḥād) between knower and object of knowledge, the implica-
tion is that these forms are identical with the divine essence, which in turn helps to
explain how they can be described as ‘divine.’²⁰⁷ Beyond these two key points, how-
ever, it is arduous to determine how this divine mode of existence of form relates to
the other two modes Yaḥyā posits. This question is raised quite starkly in Treatise on
Unity when the Christian thinker attributes ‘essential existence’ to the forms or uni-
versals that are in the concrete beings.

 Arnzen, Platonische Ideen, 74, raises this issue but does not address it in detail. For an interpre-
tation that places these essences in God’s mind, see Rashed, Ibn ʿAdī, 119‒122, 142.
 Yaḥyā b. ʿAdī, On the Existence of the Incarnation, 83.1‒4 (in Périer, Petits traités).
 Avicenna agrees with Yaḥyā that intellect and object of intellection are one and identical in God,
but the difference is that Yaḥyā extends this principle to human intellection as well—he regards in-
tellect and its object as forming a cognitive unity or unification (ittiḥād) and a single thing (shayʾ
wāḥid)—whereas Avicenna posits an irreducible distinction between the two in the case of human
thought. For Yaḥyā’s position on this issue, see Yaḥyā b. ʿAdī, On the Existence of the Incarnation,
74‒75, 83 (in Périer, Petits traités); and Périer, Un philosophe, 142.
 2 Senses of existence in Avicenna’s ontology 529

In spite of this ambiguity, it seems possible to proffer the following tentative ac-
count of Yaḥyā’s position. The divine mode of existence of essence or form can be
predicated of any essence or form taken in itself, even when it is otherwise associated
with, or mereologically constitutes, a composite and contingent substance (as in the
case of a concrete particular thing or a universal notion in the mind). This is because
this divine, essential, and true mode of being pertains to the essence or form taken in
itself as well as to the definition and self-identity of a thing, all of which can be pre-
dicated of particulars in addition to universals according to Ibn ʿAdī. Not only do the
universals, the essences or forms, exist immanently in the particulars (see section
III.4.2). On Yaḥyā’s account of divine knowledge, God knows particular things by
knowing the universal things that constitute them.²⁰⁸ And inasmuch as the pure es-
sences underlie both the logical universals in the mind and the individual concrete
beings, they are ontologically and cognitively distinct from them taken as composite
entities. As such, they hark back to God’s essence, whence they originate. Hence, es-
sence or form would be ‘divine’ not only on account of the metaphysical localization
of the pure essences in the divine nous, but also because in that state its existence
essentially precedes that of the composite beings. It is, as Yaḥyā asserts, “prior by
essence” (hādhā l-maʿnā aqdam bi-l-ṭabʿ).²⁰⁹ In existing in that prior and fully ab-
stract state in God’s mind, the essences or forms can be said to cause those in the
concrete world. As Yaḥyā puts it: “It has been made clear that this meaning
[maʿnā, i. e., of the pure essence] is more deserving of existence than the other
two on account of the fact that it is a cause [sabab] of their existence.”²¹⁰ Overall,
Yaḥyā’s account of the ‘divine’ or ‘essential existence’ of the pure form or essence
seems premised on his mereology, which posits that essence exists combined with
either mental or concrete concomitants.²¹¹
With hindsight, it is hard to deny that Avicenna borrowed much from his pred-
ecessor’s conception of pure essence and its special ontological mode, as well as his
mereology and distinction between essence and its external concomitants. In fact,
there are strong reasons to believe that Avicenna’s māhiyyah-lawāzim distinction
owes a major debt to Ibn ʿAdī’s treatises. In spite of this, the two thinkers appear
to have articulated these views with quite different intentions in mind. Yaḥyā’s ap-
proach is profoundly theological, and his theory of essence seems chiefly designed
to establish core theological doctrines, such as God’s creation of both particular and
universal things, as well as the possibility for human beings to know God’s essence

 Périer, Un philosophe, 140‒142, who used unedited manuscripts containing works by Yaḥyā.
 Yaḥyā b. ʿAdī, On Clarifying the Existence of the Common Things, in Philosophical Treatises, 153.7.
 Yaḥyā b. ʿAdī, On Clarifying the Existence of the Common Things, in Philosophical Treatises,
153.4‒5.
 This helps to explain Yaḥyā’s keen interest in mereology, a topic he discusses in many of his
treatises, such as Treatise on Unity; On the Whole and Parts (Philosophical Treatises, 212‒219); On
the Distinction between Genus and Matter (Philosophical Treatises, 280‒298), as well as in the two
philosophical treatises that lie at the heart of this analysis.
530 IV The Special Ontological Mode of Quiddity in Itself

as it is in itself. What is more, Yaḥyā’s move to locate the forms in God reflects his
intention to articulate a theory of plurality-in-oneness, which also characterizes
his theology, and which should be compared especially to his Trinitarian doctrine.
Avicenna’s concern, in contrast, appears to be primarily ontological and epistemo-
logical. One of its main effects is to render the pure quiddities valid objects of
human cognition and to place them at the center of the scientific and logical inquiry.
In this connection, it is possible to highlight a key difference between these two
thinkers, which has to do with pure essence as an object in the mind. Even though
Yaḥyā in one of his treatises hints at the fact that the pure essence can be envisaged
as a distinct and abstract mental object, he nowhere intimates that this object could
be said to possess its own intelligible being.²¹² For Yaḥyā, purely abstract essence or
essence “without anything else being connected with it” does not appear to exist as
such in the human mind. If it does, Yaḥyā says virtually nothing about it. Rather,
pure essence on his view is divine on the grounds that it can exist in a kind of ob-
jective definitional plane of its own and in a mode that is autonomous from human
thought, or because it is thought by God. In line with Yaḥyā’s predominantly theo-
logical approach to philosophy, this special status of essence is therefore to be con-
nected chiefly with God’s thought and God’s creation of the forms and essences.²¹³ In
Avicenna’s treatment of essence, in contrast, pure quiddity not only amounts to a dis-
tinct epistemological object and consideration in the human mind, it also exists as
such in a manner distinct from the existence of the complex universal concept.
Thus, negatively-conditioned quiddity, which is distinct from the universal, has “ex-
istence only in the mind” (wujūduhu fī l-dhihn faqaṭ).²¹⁴ This is in line with Avicen-
na’s own theory of proper being, which, contrary to Yaḥyā’s theory of divine being,
can be extended to—or even primarily applies to—objects in the intellect, inasmuch
as proper being is the being of quiddity and nature, and quiddity and nature are, ac-
cording to the master, eminently conceivable and cognizable, distinctly and ‘in them-
selves.’ By seizing Yaḥyā’s concept of divine and essential existence and modifying it
to fit his ontology, Avicenna endowed the objects existing in human thought with a
hitherto unprecedented importance and status in the Arabic philosophical tradition.
For it is this common intelligibility of the pure quiddities that brings the human in-
tellects one step closer to their divine counterparts. In this regard, Avicenna appears
to have significantly elaborated on Yaḥyā’s doctrines and shifted the emphasis onto
the human mind. While the focus is theological in Yaḥyā, in Avicenna it shifts decid-
edly toward epistemology and intellection, where the intelligibility of essence is con-
strued chiefly in connection with human thought. As intimated previously, this shift

 Yaḥyā b. ʿAdī, On Clarifying the Existence of the Common Things, in Philosophical Treatises, 164‒
165, makes a strong case for the epistemological or logical differentiation between essence ‘in itself’
and essence taken ‘with other things,’ but he does not tease out the ontological implications of this
distinction when it comes to the being of essence ‘in itself’ in the human mind.
 Menn and Wisnovsky, Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī On the Four Scientific Questions, 65b40, 66b15‒20.
 Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Cure, V.1, 204.6‒10.
 2 Senses of existence in Avicenna’s ontology 531

of perspective can be hypothetically attributed to the Bahshamite influence on Avi-

cenna, especially the debates regarding the nature of mental existents and the onto-
logical status of ‘the thing,’ as well as (following Roshdi Rashed) to the progress in
abstract mathematical thinking that had occurred during that period. More generally,
it is attributable to Avicenna’s unprecedented interest in the notion of mental exis-
tence.

2.3 Essence and existence revisited

The previous sections have tackled the relationship of essence and existence in Avi-
cenna’s metaphysics. The crucial inference that can be introduced in the discussion
at this stage is that, whenever Avicenna mentions ‘existence’ in contradistinction to
quiddity or essence, he generally intends one mode or sense of existence, namely, ‘re-
alized’ or ‘established existence’ (wujūd muḥaṣṣal or al-wujūd al-ḥāṣil). This is the
mode of existence he contrasts to, and separates from, essence, and which he re-
gards as an external, non-constitutive, and even—in a qualified sense—accidental
state. But as we saw, realized existence is not exhaustive of all the ontological
modes and senses that are deployed in Avicenna’s metaphysics, for, as he reminds
us, wujūd possesses “many meanings” (maʿānī kathīrah) as well as many “aspects”
or “modes” (anḥāʾ, aḥkām). Another crucial meaning I emphasized earlier is wujūd
khāṣṣ, which represents another ontological mode and sense, and one distinct from
wujūd muḥaṣṣal. Furthermore, there is the notable exception of God, whose existence
should also be regarded as amounting to a distinct and self-contained ontological
mode, not comparable to any other mode. Because ‘realized’ or ‘acquired’ existence
in Avicenna’s works typically encompasses the caused, contingent, composite or
complex, and conditioned beings, it cannot include God, at least not in any straight-
forward way. Hence, realized or acquired existence, for Avicenna, expresses a certain
lack or deficiency. It is necessarily derivative and even defective, since it presupposes
an external agent and therefore involves posteriority, possibility, and multiplicity.
These shortcomings do not apply to the divine being, nor do they apply to pure quid-
dity. Hence, whenever Avicenna distinguishes intensionally between essence and ex-
istence, between wujūd and māhiyyah, he has in mind realized existence specifically,
not existence simpliciter. In this regard, it is quite correct to claim, as has been done
repeatedly in the scholarship, that realized or actual existence and quiddity are co-
extensional, since realized or actual existents will always have a quiddity, and, con-
versely, quiddities are parts of the caused and contingent beings that possess realiz-
ed existence. For instance, the quiddity in itself ‘horseness’ will exist in the universal
concept ‘horse’ and in the concrete entity ‘this horse,’ and in that respect it can be
regarded as in some sense co-extensive with the realized existence of this universal
and particular horse. In short, there is a sense in which not only mawjūd and shayʾ,
but also wujūd and māhiyyah, are indeed co-extensional and co-implicative. This is
an important point Avicenna strives to establish in Metaphysics I.5.
532 IV The Special Ontological Mode of Quiddity in Itself

Nevertheless, it is important to stress that this standard thesis of co-extensional-

ity, premised as it is on the definition of wujūd as wujūd muḥaṣṣal, cohabits in the
master’s philosophy with the equally important thesis of the ontological distinctness
and indifference of quiddity in itself. This means that pure quiddity preserves its ir-
reducible and special mode of existence even when it is a part of a complex or com-
posite being. Moreover, there is at least one exception that threatens to break the
symmetry between realized existence and essence: the simple, abstract, and nega-
tively-conditioned conception of pure quiddity.²¹⁵ In this case, quiddity and wujūd
khāṣṣ are fully dissociated from realized existence, since pure quiddity cannot be
said to exist intellectually with adjoining accidents and concomitants, nor can it
be regarded as existing in a composite or complex entity, or as part of it. I argued
in chapter II that Avicenna allows for this kind of simple and unmediated apprehen-
sion of pure quiddity, and I also argued throughout this study that this concept or
object possesses its own, special mode of intelligible existence in the mind. In this
manner, the concept of pure quiddity appears as a kind of transcendental notion
in the intellect, and one that is distinct and free from the mental accidents and con-
comitants that typically accompany human reflection. In this particular case, it
would seem that the mind focuses exclusively on the proper existence of ‘the
thing,’ or rather of ‘thingness,’ and that thingness, inasmuch as it is contemplated
as such, exists with this proper existence alone and bears no relation to realized
or acquired existence. Now, what is true of human intellection is, a fortiori, true of
divine intellection. This leads me to posit two different modes of intellectual exis-
tence: a complex, posterior, and positively-conditioned one that characterizes the
universal concept, or quiddity taken with its mental accidents; and a prior, simple,
distinct, and negatively-conditioned one that corresponds to the proper existence
of quiddity in itself.²¹⁶ The latter connects with Avicenna’s views on the apprehen-
sion of thingness or quiddity qua final cause in the intellect, which he describes
as being prior to, and as unfolding in abstraction from, efficient causality. This tran-
scendent intelligible mode of being, which belongs to pure quiddity, has nothing to
do with realized existence in the way this notion is described in Metaphysics I.5.
When reading Avicenna’s philosophical works, then, one must determine whether
he intends in each case realized existence or proper existence. In what follows, I
would like to illustrate this hypothesis by means of passages drawn from Avicenna’s
works.
The differentiation between these two modes of existence is hinted at in the fol-
lowing passage of Introduction I.6:

 The other exception, of course, is God’s existence, as mentioned above. Both on my interpreta-
tion are cases of essential being.
 Pure quiddity preserves this special mode of existence even when it is a part of the universal,
although obviously in this case it is no longer negatively-conditioned in the sense of ‘without
other things.’
 2 Senses of existence in Avicenna’s ontology 533

Text 33: It was previously shown to you that things have quiddities, and that these quiddities
may exist in the concrete world [fī l-aʿyān] and may exist in the mind [fī l-awhām], but that it
is not necessary that quiddity [i. e., quiddity in itself] become actualized according to one of
these two [modes of] existence [lā yūjabu la-hā taḥṣīl aḥad al-wujūdayn]. [Furthermore, it was
shown to you] that each one of these [two modes] of existence becomes established [kull
wāḥid min al-wujūdayn yathbutu] only after the establishment of this quiddity [baʿd thubūt
tilka l-māhiyyah], and that each one of these [two modes] of existence derives from the quiddity
properties and accidents that are on account of quiddity [yalḥaqu bi-l-māhiyyah khawāṣṣ wa-
ʿawāriḍ takūn li-l-māhiyyah].²¹⁷

We can observe that, in this passage, “realized existence” is for all intents and pur-
poses interchangeable with what Avicenna generically calls “the two modes of exis-
tence” (al-wujūdayn), i. e., realized concrete existence and realized intellectual exis-
tence. Furthermore, notice that realized existence is said to follow, or be subsequent
to, quiddity. It is also complex and necessarily accompanied and characterized by
the appearance of accidents and concomitants that attach to it. If quiddity is realized
together with its concomitants in al-wujūdayn, then this composite can be described
as possessing realized or established existence, either in the mind or in the concrete.
Clearly, it is this kind or mode of existence that Avicenna in his various works defines
as a ‘concomitant’ (lāzim), as being ‘external to’ (khārij), as a meaning ‘added to’
(zāʾid ʿalā), and even sometimes as being ‘accidental to’ (ʿaraḍa, ʿāriḍ) quiddity.²¹⁸
It is also the realization of these concomitants and accidents that generates the on-
tological states (aḥwāl) studied by the science of metaphysics.²¹⁹ The upshot is that
this mode of realized existence has nothing to do with quiddity taken in itself. What is
more, this text also intimates the ontological precedence and irreducibility of quid-
dity vis-à-vis established or actual existence. True, Avicenna does not explicitly refer
there to the prior existence of pure quiddity, but he does state that “it is not necessary
that quiddity [i. e., quiddity in itself] become actualized according to one of these two
[modes of] existence [lā yūjabu la-hā taḥṣīl aḥad al-wujūdayn].” A weak interpreta-
tion of this assertion would be that Avicenna is merely alluding to the ‘possibility

 Avicenna, Introduction, I.6, 34.5‒10. It is also possible to read the last segment with the verb yul-
ḥiqu bi, with the meaning: “join [or connect] with the quiddity properties and accidents that are on
account of it.” Either way, the point is that the mental and concrete concomitants are external to
quiddity, even though they follow from it once quiddity is realized in existence.
 This is why wujūd muḥaṣṣal can also be cogently translated as ‘acquired existence.’ The empha-
sis here is on the fact that existence is acquired or obtained through an external cause. This connects
with the well-known Avicennian doctrine that in all caused and composite beings there is a distinc-
tion between quiddity and existence as well as between possibility and necessity. The only qualifica-
tion that needs to be added in support of this doctrine is that it rests on the notion of realized exis-
tence, namely, wujūd muḥaṣṣal.
 For the term aḥwāl in Avicenna’s metaphysics, see Bertolacci, The Reception of Aristotle’s Meta-
physics, 615, who notes the connection between the states and the accidents. On my construal, these
states are linked to the realization in existence of the external elements of quiddity, and they at any
rate never refer to quiddity in itself in Avicenna’s writings.
534 IV The Special Ontological Mode of Quiddity in Itself

of realized existence’ of pure quiddity when it does not actually exist. But this inter-
pretation seems unlikely, and this for two reasons. First, because one would expect
quiddity to exist, at the very least in the mind. So it would have intellectual exis-
tence, according to a weak principle of plenitude. Thus, the pure quiddities of fiction-
al and artificial forms can be said to exist in the mind, if not in concreto. Second, as I
will show below, possibility is itself a concomitant of quiddity and something added
to it, and, moreover, it is only meaningful when connected with realized existence.
So this interpretation is not entirely convincing if one intends to elucidate the status
of quiddity in itself. Another, and I think more convincing and comprehensive, inter-
pretation is that quiddity need not always possess realized existence (i. e., contin-
gent, conditioned, and composite existence), but rather can exist with its own
mode of existence in the human and divine intellects. If this interpretation is correct,
then Avicenna would be implicitly referring not only to the priority of quiddity over
realized existence in human thought (and, hence, to an essential and logical kind of
priority in human knowledge), but also to the prior existence of the quiddities in the
divine intellects. In brief, Avicenna would be arguing that the quiddities can be con-
ceived of in a divine context as being prior to the realized existence associated with
multiplicity and matter and, hence, in abstraction from al-wujūdayn.
The interpretation advocated here eases the problem that had preoccupied Mar-
mura in the various studies he devoted to Avicenna’s doctrine of quiddity. Marmura
wondered why Avicenna claims at times that quiddity in itself exists neither in the
mind nor in the concrete world, and states on other occasions that it possesses men-
tal existence, that in itself it exists in the mind in a mode distinct from the universal
(see chapters I and II). I presume that Marmura regarded this discrepancy as a real
paradox, because he placed these statements on the same conceptual and argumen-
tative plane and assumed that they all referred to a single mode of existence.²²⁰ But
adhering to the interpretation expounded above helps us to alleviate this conun-
drum. In those passages where Avicenna apparently denies any existence to pure
quiddity, he really intends by wujūd ‘realized’ or ‘acquired existence,’ or the two
sub-modes of caused, conditioned, contingent, and composite existence that charac-
terize universals and concrete entities (i. e., what is usually referred to in the modern
scholarship as mental and concrete existence). Understandably, Avicenna refrains
from ascribing this contingent mode of existence to quiddity in itself, as the passage
of Introduction above shows. In this regard, it is important to highlight that in two
other instances where Avicenna broaches this point, he adjoins the requisite quali-
fication to the effect that pure quiddity cannot exist in a state of intrinsic complexity:

Introduction I.2: the consideration of quiddity inasmuch as it is that very quiddity unconnected
to either mode [or aspect] of existence and to what follows from it [quiddity] insofar as it

 Marmura, Avicenna’s Chapter on Universals, 38‒39.

 2 Senses of existence in Avicenna’s ontology 535

is like that [i. e., in one of these two modes of existence] [al-wujūdayn wa-mā yalḥaquhā min
ḥaythu hiya ka-dhālika].²²¹

Metaphysics V.1: existing neither in the concrete world nor in the soul nor in a thing from among
these in potentiality or in actuality— in a way that [the concomitants] would become inter-
nal to horseness.²²²

Conversely, Avicenna insists that complex and contingent things exist only through
realized existence:

Pointers: Know that each thing [kull shayʾ] that has a quiddity [lahu māhiyyah] becomes realized
as an existent in concrete reality [yataḥaqqaqu mawjūd fī l-aʿyān] or as a concept in the mind
only inasmuch as its parts [ajzāʾuhu] are present together with it.²²³

Notes: The single quidditative meaning—for example humanness—if it becomes multiple, be-
comes multiple only as a result of concomitant causes [bi-asbāb lāḥiqah]. So in this case
this quidditative meaning is necessarily caused [i. e., in realized existence].²²⁴

Not only are the accidents and concomitants what make the sunolon composite and a
kind of ontological bundle. They also enable a multiplicity of individuals possessing
the same essence to exist, which is another point underlined here. In contrast, in
those passages where he describes the existence of quiddity in itself in a positive
manner, Avicenna omits the notions of multiplicity, complexity, and realization asso-
ciated with the concomitants, and mentions instead the simple, unconditioned, and
irreducible mode of existence proper to it. This mode of essential being excludes the
concomitants and accidents that necessarily accompany realized existence, and
which imply compositeness, causedness, and contingency.
It is noteworthy that Avicenna deploys the distinction between essential exis-
tence and realized, external, and accidental existence in a theological context as
well. Here it is worth quoting at length from an important passage of Discussions
to which I alluded swiftly in other sections of this book:

Text 34: Someone asked: It is said that existence is an accident [al-wujūd ʿaraḍ]. Now, since it is
clear that the Necessary of Existence is neither an accident nor a substance, what is the differ-
ence between these two [modes of] existence? [Avicenna’s reply]: Existence is an accident [only]
in things that have quiddities from which existence follows [fī l-ashyāʾ allatī lahā māhiyyāt ya-

 Avicenna, Introduction I.2, 15.2‒3.

 Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Cure, V.1, 196.10‒13.
 Avicenna, Pointers, vol.1, 202.4‒5. It should be noted that the “parts” mentioned here refer back
to the subject “thing,” and so the term designates the various principles or elements that make up the
composite substance, including its external concomitants.
 Avicenna, Notes, 386, section 684. Notice that Avicenna’s mention of concomitant causes, i. e.,
things outside pure quiddity, could apply just as well to the causedness of the universal in the mind
as to that of the concrete particular, both of which are endowed with multiplicity, albeit in different
ways. The main point here is that multiplicity and the state of causedness are attached to quiddity
only inasmuch as it is combined with external conditions and elements.
536 IV The Special Ontological Mode of Quiddity in Itself

lḥaquhā l-wujūd]. As for that which exists by virtue of its essence [al-mawjūd bi-dhātihi]—and not
from an existence that follows its essence in the way of an external thing [amr gharīb] not com-
prised in the definition—it does not have an existence by which it exists—to say nothing of that
existence being accidental to it [faḍlan ʿan an yakūna ʿāriḍan lahu]—but rather it exists by virtue
of its essence and is so by necessity.²²⁵

This passage starkly contrasts existing “from one’s essence” (bi-dhātihi) with exis-
tence taken as an external concomitant (amr gharīb) and even an accident (ʿaraḍ)
of essence. While the first ontological mode is essential, simple, and irreducible,
the latter entails externality, causality, and complexity. Likewise, when Avicenna
states at Metaphysics VIII.7 that “the Lordly Knower [God] encompasses [in His
knowledge] realized and possible existence [al-wujūd al-ḥāṣil wa-l-mumkin],” and
that “His essence has a relation to [these things] inasmuch as they are intelligible
[maʿqūlah] not inasmuch as they have existence in concrete reality,” it is clear that
he does not include God and His intelligibles either in the category of ‘realized ex-
istence’ (al-wujūd al-ḥāṣil) or in that of ‘possible existence’ (al-mumkin), but only
those things that are external to His essence and come to exist in concrete reality
as a result of the divine causation.²²⁶ Hence, neither God’s quiddity nor any of the
pure quiddities fall in the category of realized, caused, and accidental existence.
The pure quiddities, like God, can have nothing that is ‘realized’ or added to
them, since they are in themselves simple and irreducible and devoid of a cause.
The evidence adduced above and in other parts of this book suggests that Avi-
cenna’s philosophy posits two fundamentally different modes of existence, one of
which pertains to pure quiddity alone, the other of which characterizes the complex
entity that is quiddity and its accidents and concomitants. This would explain why
Avicenna in his works alternates between positive and negative descriptions of the
ontological status of pure quiddity. The differences would depend on whether he in-
cludes or excludes the external concomitants, as well as whether he intends essential
existence or accidental and realized existence. The via negativa applies to the contin-
gent and conditioned status of composite beings that cannot be extended to pure es-
sence, and the via positiva to the simple, irreducible, and essential existence that
quiddity assumes in itself. Avicenna’s seemingly conflicting views concerning the ex-
istence and nonexistence of quiddity in itself, as well as the conundrum first raised
by Marmura, have to be construed in light of these various aspects or modes of ex-
istence, as well as of the relationship of quiddity to its external concomitants and
accidents.²²⁷

 Avicenna, Discussions, 272, section 789. This passage has already been translated and discussed
by Belo, Essence, 413‒414.
 Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Cure VIII.7, 364.13‒15.
 In reaching the above conclusion, I am aware that I am to some extent elaborating on a view
that was once popular in medieval Latin philosophical circles. The scholastic intuition that an addi-
tional mode of (essential) existence was required to make sense of Avicenna’s ontology and metaphy-
sics was, I believe, justified. In effect, the distinction between realized and essential existence in Avi-
 2 Senses of existence in Avicenna’s ontology 537

2.4 Possibility/contingency (imkān) and the ontological status of pure essence

There is a final feature pertaining to the ontological status of pure essence that needs
to be addressed, namely, its relation to possibility or contingency (imkān). Although I
will explore this topic in more detail in a section of chapter V devoted to divine
knowledge and the issue of God’s intellection of ‘possibles’ (mumkināt), some gen-
eral comments are in order here in order to disambiguate this important point.
There is a general tendency in the modern scholarship on Avicenna to describe quid-
dity as being intrinsically or essentially possible or contingent (mumkin), to such an
extent that the two notions of māhiyyah and mumkin are sometimes used inter-
changeably. According to this interpretation, possibility/contingency (imkān) is inter-
nal to and constitutive of essence and always characterizes the essence taken in itself
(regardless of whether or not it actually exists), while necessity is external to essence
and linked to the agent and efficient cause that is responsible for its existence. One of
the implications of this view seems to be that it is impossible to conceive of quiddity
without at the same time conceiving of it as something possible or contingent.²²⁸
In spite of the fact that some of Avicenna’s statements may be used to buttress
such a position, I regard this interpretation as being inconsistent with his doctrine of
essence as well as with some crucial evidence that can be drawn from his corpus.
There are indeed strong reasons to reject such as close identification of essence
and possibility/contingency. The first point to note is that Avicenna states explicitly
that possibility is an external concomitant (lāzim) of quiddity, not one of its constit-
utive elements or essential features. He in fact compares it to a triangle having its
three angles equal two right angles, which is a non-constitutive and external con-
comitant of the pure quiddity ‘triangleness.’²²⁹ Moreover, in Metaphysics V.1, Avicen-
na explains on various occasions that pure quiddity excludes both actuality and po-
tentiality, or the consideration of what is actual (bi-l-fiʿl) and what is potential (bi-l-
quwwah) (see Text 8 and Text 16).²³⁰ Now, we know from Metaphysics IV.2 that the
master conceives of potentiality and possibility very closely and even construes pos-
sibility as a kind of potentiality. In that section, he states: “We call the possibility of
existence the potentiality of existence” (wa-naḥnu nusammā imkān al-wujūd quwwat

cenna corresponds in some ways to the distinction made by some Latin philosophers, such as Henry
of Ghent, between esse essentiae and esse actualis existentiae. Avicenna may not have articulated this
doctrine as clearly as some of his Latin peers, but the seeds of this distinction are on my view unde-
niably present in his works.
 For a recent example of this trend, see Allebban, Conservation, 53, 146, and 188‒189. Allebban
writes (146): “necessity and impossibility apply externally to an essence while contingency is internal
to it.” Contingency is further defined as “the constitutive property of a thing with respect to itself”
(189). I assume this is why Allebban refers to “contingent essences” throughout her dissertation.
 Avicenna, Discussions, 309‒310, sections 867‒868. See also section V.3.3 of this book for more
references and especially the analysis of Text 50.
 The relevant references are Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Cure, V.1, 196.10‒12 and 201.4‒11.
538 IV The Special Ontological Mode of Quiddity in Itself

al-wujūd).²³¹ In another paragraph, he defines possibility/contingency of existence

(imkān al-wujūd) as “an attribute in a subject and something that occurs to a subject”
(maʿnā fī mawḍūʿ wa-ʿāriḍ li-mawḍūʿ), thereby stressing its externality vis-à-vis es-
sence.²³² Hence, when Avicenna says that pure essence, or quiddity taken strictly
‘in itself,’ excludes actuality and potentiality, he means by this that it also excludes
considerations linked to necessity and possibility/contingency. As an upshot, it be-
comes quite clear that possibility/contingency cannot legitimately be regarded as ‘in-
ternal to’ and ‘constitutive of’ quiddity. Like the other modalities, it is, strictly speak-
ing, external and concomitant to essence taken ‘in itself,’ because pure essence
excludes the modalities. Admittedly, however, possibility bears a closer relation to
essence than necessity, given that the latter presupposes an external efficient
cause. In spite of this, both possibility and necessity remain considerations or con-
comitants added to pure quiddity from the outside.
That Avicenna in fact regards possibility/contingency as something external to
pure quiddity goes hand in hand with his claim that we can conceive of pure quid-
dity in complete abstraction from existence and, more specifically, from the modal-
ities that accompany the notion of realized existence (wujūd muḥaṣṣal). When one
intellects ‘triangleness’ or ‘horseness,’ one is embracing in a single cognitive act
the constitutive elements of these quiddities, of which possibility/contingency is
not a part. Possibility, like necessity, only makes sense when it is related conceptu-
ally to realized existence, since we are dealing with a possibility of or for realized ex-
istence (mumkin al-wujūd). In other words, one cannot introduce the notion of pos-
sibility/contingency (imkān) without at the same time introducing the notion of
realized and caused existence (wujūd muḥaṣṣal). Accordingly, in Commentary on The-
ology of Aristotle, Avicenna explains that possibility/contingency is one of the first
things to characterize the state of the created or caused thing (al-mubdaʿ).²³³ His
choice of the term mubdaʿ—‘caused being,’ ‘creature’—stresses the gap between re-
garding possibility as the constituent of a pure essence vs. the external attribute of
a created entity that is inserted within a causal or cosmological account. Finally, it
should be noted that the dissociation of essence and possibility/contingency, and
the association of existence and possibility/contingency, I am advocating here
seems to accord with the results advanced earlier regarding Avicenna’s theory of on-
tological modulation (tashkīk al-wujūd). As we saw, the modalities of necessity and
possibility are described as two of the aspects and features (aḥkām, anḥāʾ) of tashkīk.
In other words, they participate in modulating the notion of existence when they are
applied to things or predicated of things. As such, they are part and parcel of the
structure and functionality of tashkīk al-wujūd. This suggests that these notions are

 Avicenna, Metaphysics IV.2 of The Cure, 182.

 Avicenna, Metaphysics IV.2 of The Cure, 182.
 Avicenna, Commentary on Theology of Aristotle, 60.18‒61.7.
 2 Senses of existence in Avicenna’s ontology 539

implementable and meaningful only in light of a theory of realized existence con-

ceived of as an external attribute of essence.
Given the foregoing remarks, we should be weary to identify or connect possibil-
ity/contingency and essence in a forceful way or provide a simplistic account of how
these notions interconnect in Avicenna’s philosophy. If it is undeniable that possibil-
ity/contingency bears a ‘closer’ relation to essence than either necessity or impossi-
bility, given that the last two directly posit the presence or absence of an external
cause, both possibility and necessity ultimately remain two modalities (jihātān)
and concomitants (lāzimān) external to quiddity considered strictly ‘in itself.’

2.5 Quiddity and existence in God

The foregoing considerations open a new interpretive perspective regarding the rela-
tionship of quiddity and existence in God. More specifically, defining the ontology of
pure quiddity through the notions of essential being and essential entailment ena-
bles us to tackle the difficulty of how God can be said to have existence and a quid-
dity, without this amounting to a duality. Moreover, it throws some light on God’s
special mode of existence, and how this existence compares to that of other beings.
Modern scholars have spilled much ink trying to adjudicate whether Avicenna as-
cribes a quiddity to God and, if so, how it relates to existence.²³⁴ The two most com-
mon interpretive strategies in this regard have been to argue either that God does not
have a quiddity or that God’s quiddity is identical with His existence. Stated as such
and without further qualifications, however, neither argument is particularly con-
vincing. The former is undermined by the numerous (and almost routine) references
in Avicenna’s works to God’s quiddity and essence (māhiyyah or dhāt). Moreover, de-
priving God of a quiddity is odd on conceptual grounds, since everything that exists,
according to Avicenna, has a quiddity, and quiddity is precisely what makes some-
thing exist in a distinct way. Accordingly, to be God is surely to exist qua something
or in a certain and special way or in a way proper to Him to the exclusion of all other
things. So that depriving God of a quiddity and ascribing merely general existence to
Him would deny Him precisely that which sets Him apart from the other existents.
Thus, the need would remain to have to explain exactly what mode of existence be-
longs to God uniquely and in contradistinction to the other beings. But the alterna-
tive interpretation according to which God’s essence is existence suffers from a short-
coming comparable to the last point raised above: if one argues that God has a
quiddity, and that this quiddity is identical with God’s actual existence, then one
still needs to qualify or define what mode of existence could be said to belong to
God that would not entail any distinction or duality in Him. Avicenna is adamant

 See, among many other studies, Macierowski, Does God Have a Quiddity; Lizzini, Ibn Sīnā’s Met-
aphysics; Adamson, From the Necessary; and Özaykal, Deconstruction.
540 IV The Special Ontological Mode of Quiddity in Itself

that God is the only being that is perfectly simple, one, and unitary, and in whom
there is no distinction or separation between essence and existence, even at the
purely conceptual level. In all other beings, there is a duality of quiddity and realized
existence. These two principles remain distinct, at the very least conceptually, and
perhaps also in external reality. But why, if realized or established existence
(wujūd muḥaṣṣal, wujūd ithbātī) is ascribed to God, and if realized existence is by def-
inition distinct from quiddity and an external concomitant, should this not be the
case as well with regard to Him? In sum, regardless of whether one refrains from as-
cribing a quiddity to God or identifies God’s quiddity with His actual or realized ex-
istence, one still needs to explain the special mode of existence that would belong to
Him to the exclusion of all other things and that would account for the complete ab-
sence of a metaphysical duality in Him.
It stands to reason to surmise that when Avicenna says that God is pure exis-
tence, or that God’s quiddity is identical with His existence, or that quiddity and ex-
istence are one in God, he cannot be intending the same mode of ‘acquired’ or ‘re-
alized’ existence that characterizes the other beings of his ontology. This is because,
as we saw, realized or acquired existence (wujūd muḥaṣṣal) is obtained from an ex-
ternal cause, from ‘another’ (ghayr), and therefore indicates that the thing which ac-
quires it is a deficient and complex substance. This kind of existence is by definition
acquired from the outside, external to the essence, and realized by virtue of an inde-
pendent cause that essentially precedes its effect. In Avicennian parlance, the state
of deficiency of the effect is indicated through the expression mumkin al-wujūd: what
is merely possible of existence cannot exist on its own, but depends on an exterior
agent for its actual existence, regardless of its status in the ontological hierarchy. But
God’s existence, by contrast, lacks a cause. It is not caused by or dependent on an-
other being. Rather, God’s existence is from Himself and is pure necessity, making
God the Necessary of Existence in Itself (wājib al-wujūd bi-dhātihi). In his Commen-
tary on ‘The Chapter of Pure Faith,’ relying on some of the same notions that appear
in his core philosophical works, the master says about God that “He is He by His own
essence” (huwa huwa li-dhātihi).²³⁵ And in the passage of Discussions quoted above
(Text 34), Avicenna contrasts God’s essential and necessary existence (bi-dhātihi) to
the kind of accidental and external existence (ʿaraḍ, ʿāriḍ, amr gharīb) proper to con-
tingent beings. God’s existence, then, unlike that of all other things, is quite literally
from His self or from His essence, and it is in fact identical with His essence. This
would seem to make it a primordial case of both essential existence (wujūd dhātī)
and proper existence (wujūd khāṣṣ) in the sense delineated in Metaphysics I.5. It con-
stitutes a case of irreducible and self-identical existence that annuls any relation to
what is other than It or outside of It, very much along the lines of Avicenna’s descrip-
tion of pure quiddity as a perfectly distinct and irreducible object. In this connection

 Avicenna, Commentary on ‘The Chapter of Pure Faith,’ 107. See also De Smet and Sebti, Avicen-
na’s Philosophical Approach.
 2 Senses of existence in Avicenna’s ontology 541

it is noteworthy that some of the expressions Avicenna uses to describe God’s es-
sence, such as huwa huwa li-dhātihi, are close to those that express the self-identity
of pure quiddity, notably al-insān bi-mā huwa insān, bi-mā huwa huwa, ḥaqīqah huwa
bi-hā mā huwa, and min ḥaythu hiya hiya (see Appendix 1), some of which, it would
seem, can be applied to the divine quiddity Itself. In this fashion, God exists through
or by the special existence of His quiddity, which happens in this case to be pure ac-
tuality and pure necessity.
Recall in this connection that special existence is the existence that is proper to
one’s quiddity and not acquired from an external cause. So, in that sense, God’s ex-
isting through His quiddity would not entail any duality of principles. As Avicenna
puts it, “the One [al-wāḥid], inasmuch as It is the Necessary of Existence, is what
It is in terms of Itself, which is Its essence [yakūn mā huwa bi-hi huwa wa-huwa dhātu-
hu].”²³⁶ For God to be truly the Necessary of Existence, Avicenna adds, Its reality (ḥa-
qīqah) and quidditative meaning (maʿnā) must belong to it alone. So that if they were
realized by an external cause, then “Its proper existence would be acquired from an-
other [fa-yakūn wujūduhu l-khāṣṣ mustafād min ghayrihi] and this [existent] would
not be the Necessary of Existence.”²³⁷ Thus, the existence that is proper to the divine
essence is proper to It alone to the exclusion of all other things.²³⁸ Moreover, this
quidditative meaning (maʿnā) of God, which, Avicenna argues, is also God’s true re-
ality (ḥaqīqatuhu) and belongs to His essence in itself (al-maʿnā alladhī li-dhātihi bi-l-
dhāt), is clearly not synonymous with general or absolute existence, or else this di-
vine maʿnā would not be any different from the existence that can be predicated of
any other being. Rather, this divine maʿnā refers to what is essentially different and
unique in God and therefore also to His special existence. It coincides with His being
necessary in Himself.²³⁹ Accordingly, in addition to the terms maʿnā and ḥaqīqah,
Avicenna has no qualms describing God as a māhiyyah in key theological sections
of his works. For example, in Salvation, he states that God is an “abstract quiddity”
(māhiyyah mujarradah), which, incidentally, is also the very formula that the master

 Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Cure, VIII.5, 349.11‒12.

 Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Cure, VIII.5, 350.1‒2.
 Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Cure, IX.7, 429.11‒12, explains that knowing which existence is
proper to the divine essence (ayy wujūd yakhuṣṣuhā) is among the things that the human soul
ought to know in order to reach happiness (saʿādah). Bahmanyār, The Book of Validated Knowledge,
580.1, describes the true reality of the First as an “existential specificity” (khuṣūṣiyyah wujūdiyyah),
which is another way of talking about its proper existence (wujūd khāṣṣ).
 If God is said not to possess a quiddity or essence in any way, then one would have to reckon
with the idea that the terms maʿnā, dhāt, māhiyyah, and ḥaqīqah, which Avicenna employs system-
atically to refer to God, would lose their technical meaning and be merely synonymous with realized
existence. Not only is this highly unlikely; it also does not cohere with Avicenna’s overarching theory
of quiddity and essential entailment, which he applies to the divine case in addition to beings in gen-
eral.
542 IV The Special Ontological Mode of Quiddity in Itself

uses to describe quiddity in itself.²⁴⁰ Hence, not only does God possess a quiddity
according to Avicenna; God’s existence is the special or proper existence of His quid-
dity, which It alone has to the exclusion of all other beings. The fact that Avicenna
explicitly alludes to God’s proper being (wujūd khāṣṣ) in this context is unsurprising,
since we saw that proper being is the being of pure quiddity or essential being. This
special existence has nothing to do with the realized (muḥaṣṣal) or acquired (mus-
tafād) existence of complex and caused entities. Alternatively, another way to put
it would be to say that, uniquely in God, proper existence coincides perfectly with,
and is identical to, actual existence. But even then, the emphasis would remain
on the fact that the mode of existence that God possesses to the exclusion of all
other things is essential and by virtue of His very quiddity. What is fundamentally
at stake here, therefore, is essential existence or essential being, existence coming
from one’s essence or self, as opposed to existence being acquired from an external
source or an external agent. As a result, God’s existence is essential (dhātī) and prop-
er (khāṣṣ) to Him, and it is not an external and accidental meaning or concomitant
(lāzim) of His essence that can be conceptually added to it, as in the case of all other
existents.²⁴¹ Fundamentally, then, it is not the case that God has a quiddity. Rather,

 Avicenna, Salvation, 587.11‒12, 16; and especially 588.2. In fact, it is striking that Avicenna ap-
plies to God terms that are otherwise used to designate quiddity in itself; this is the case notably
of maʿnā, ḥaqīqah, and māhiyyah mujarradah; see chapter II for an analysis of this last term in con-
nection with pure quiddity.
 Avicenna emphasizes the distinction between existence ‘from the essence’ or ‘self’ and ‘from an-
other’ in many passages of his corpus; but he intends to establish different points in those passages.
There are, first of all, the standard distinctions one finds in numerous passages between existence
that is not in a subject and existence that is in a subject, or between autonomous and dependent ex-
istence, which aim to differentiate between the existence of substance and accident. But Avicenna
also seeks to distinguish between entities by separating those that are caused in their existence by
another and those that are uncaused or that derive their existence from their very self; and he
also seeks to distinguish between the existence of quiddity inasmuch as it is quiddity and the exis-
tence of the essential accidents and concomitants. These various aspects are often intertwined, which
makes Avicenna’s analysis sometimes difficult to unpack. On these various distinctions, God possess-
es existence from Itself, in Itself, and through Itself, it is an uncaused cause, and it also exists not in a
subject, although Avicenna is reluctant to describe God as a substance. Moreover, God has existence
from His very essence or quiddity, as opposed to existence coming from an exterior cause, an idea
that also squares with the Arabic expressions min dhātihi and bi-dhātihi. This last feature is teased
out in Metaphysics, I.7, 43.15 ff., which discusses the distinction between the existence of quiddity
and its external concomitants in a theological context, and whose aim is to show that there can
be only one maʿnā that is necessary of existence and that is God. There Avicenna distinguishes be-
tween the existence of the quidditative meaning (maʿnā) and the existence of its accidents and
non-essential concomitants (al-aʿrāḍ wa-l-lawāḥiq al-ghayr al-dhātiyyah), thereby implying that
God’s existence is from this maʿnā alone and that all other existents are, in contrast, distinguished
by their accidents and concomitants. Here again, the notion of a quidditative meaning or entity
(maʿnā) forms the crux of Avicenna’s argumentation.
 2 Senses of existence in Avicenna’s ontology 543

God is His own quiddity and nothing else, making Him the only pure quiddity that
exists separately in the exterior world in Avicenna’s ontological system.²⁴²
This idea of an essential existence that would belong uniquely to God is to be
connected with the technical Arabic term anniyyah, which appears in many of Avi-
cenna’s works. The word anniyyah refers to existence, even to concrete existence,
but with direct reference to quiddity or essence and, hence, ultimately, to the special,
unique, individual existence that each thing has as it becomes realized in concrete
reality as a result of having a specific quiddity. Like special existence, the notion
of anniyyah is therefore related to quiddity, but with regard to its outward manifes-
tation in the real or concrete world and as a result also of its existential individual-
ization. In this connection, it is quite significant that the term anniyyah reflects the
interface between essence and existence and was sometimes used to mean ‘essence’
on a par with māhiyyah in the Arabic philosophical tradition.²⁴³ In the case of God,
quiddity, special existence, and anniyyah are absolutely one and identical. God’s an-
niyyah is the known manifestation of his māhiyyah, which remains, in contrast, for-
ever elusive. As Avicenna states in Metaphysics of The Cure VIII.4, “the Necessary of
Existence has no quiddity except His being Necessary of Existence, and this is al-an-
niyyah.”²⁴⁴ In contrast, in all other beings, there is an ontological discrepancy be-
tween special existence or quiddity and realized existence or anniyyah. In the latter
case, anniyyah is a concept that designates the realization of quiddity and its con-
comitants in real and concrete existence. Accordingly, it becomes intimately tied
with realized existence and even, in the case of contingent beings, with the complex-
ity and causality of realized existence. As such, the term anniyyah is sometimes con-
trasted to quiddity and used interchangeably with wujūd muḥaṣṣal or realized exis-

 The First is the only māhiyyah, maʿnā, and ḥaqīqah that is self-realized and exists in itself in the
exterior world (cf. Notes, 153, sections 217 and 218). This makes it, so to speak, the only separately
existing Platonic idea or form in Avicenna’s metaphysics. Intriguingly in this connection, God is
the only extramental being that is negatively-conditioned (bi-sharṭ lā shayʾ), an expression which Avi-
cenna otherwise reserves for the pure quiddities as intelligibles in the mind. Now, since Avicenna re-
fuses to apply this negative condition to the pure quiddities in the concrete world in the context of his
refutation of the Platonic forms, and yet applies it uniquely to God, it is not farfetched to conclude
that, on his view, God is the only quiddity that exists purely in itself and separately in the concrete
world.
 For insight into the term anniyyah, see Goichon, Lexique, vol. 1, 9‒12 (but the Arabic meaning of
this term is somewhat obscured in Goichon’s discussion as a result of the attention she devotes to the
problem of its Latin translation and reception); Frank, The Origin; Endress, Proclus arabus, 79‒109;
Marmura, in Avicenna, The Metaphysics, 383, note 1; Gutas and Endress, A Greek Arabic Lexicon, 428‒
436; Lizzini, Wuǧūd-Mawǧūd, 112, note 5; and Mayer, Anniyya. In Usṭāth’s early translation of Book
Zeta of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, which has been preserved in the lemmata of Averroes’s great commen-
tary, and which circulated before and during Avicenna’s time, the term anniyyah is used systemati-
cally to express quiddity in place of māhiyyah. Averroes himself in his commentary alternates be-
tween these two terms, but favors māhiyyah; see Averroes, Great Commentary, vol. 2, 767 ff. If
anything, this shows the close connection between these terms and the shifting meaning of anniyyah.
 Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Cure VIII.4, 346.11‒12.
544 IV The Special Ontological Mode of Quiddity in Itself

tence in order to describe contingent beings. Uniquely in the case of God, however,
māhiyyah and anniyyah are fully co-intensional and co-extensional and designate
the absolutely necessary essential being of God.²⁴⁵
God’s existing through or by virtue of His quiddity and special existence ex-
plains why it is the only being that exists necessarily “in itself” or “in virtue of Its
essence” (bi-dhātihi) and why it is absolutely self-existing or self-subsistent (al-
qayyūm).²⁴⁶ God would be counted as “one of the things” (baʿḍ al-ashyāʾ) mentioned
in Categories that have “existence from their self or essence” (al-wujūd min dhātihi),
even though Avicenna is reluctant to call God a substance (jawhar) and a thing
(shayʾ). In any case, it is precisely because God’s existence is from His essence and
in virtue of His essence or self that it is also necessary. For what is essential in
that sense is also, according to Avicenna, necessary. So what makes God’s existence
necessary (wājib) is the fact that it is essential (dhātī) and from or by His essence
(min dhātihi, bi-dhātihi) or, better still, because it is identical with His essence:
God’s quiddity is necessary existence.²⁴⁷ In view of this, it is not surprising that in
Notes and Discussions Avicenna adopts an alternative phrasing and states that
God’s quiddity or true reality (ḥaqīqah) is pure necessity (al-wājibiyyah ʿalā l-
iṭlāq).²⁴⁸ Absolute or pure necessity is God’s quiddity, because existence is essentially
necessary in God. The First is the only being in Avicenna’s ontology whose essence or
self is necessary of existence by virtue of itself.
Defining God’s existence primarily in terms of essential being and necessity ex-
plains why there is no multiplicity emerging from the statement that God has a quid-
dity and existence. God’s existence, however construed, is the essential being of His

 Cf. Avicenna, Notes, 183.1, section 269, where it is said that “the Necessary of Existence does not
have a quiddity other than al-anniyyah”; and Philosophical Compendium, 75‒77, where God’s anniyyah
is said either to come from His māhiyyah or to be identical to His māhiyyah. There is one particularly
interesting feature in this section that deserves to be stressed: God is or has a quiddity, but it is not a
universal (kullī) quiddity, because universal ideas are complex effects and therefore have a cause. This
passage therefore implicitly distinguishes between the intelligible simplicity of pure quiddity and the
intelligible complexity of universal concepts.
 For this Qurʾanic term and its relation to quiddity, see Adamson, From the Necessary, 175.
 Attributing a quiddity to God enables a compelling interpretation of how what is created or
caused by God, namely, the First Effect, can be described as a lāzim of the divine essence. In fact,
Avicenna frequently refers to the objects of God’s knowledge and to all the things caused to exist
by God as lawāzim deriving from His essence (see Notes, 5.9, section 1; 11.4‒5, section 3; 49.4‒6, sec-
tion 30; 51.1‒6, section 32). This term should be taken literally as meaning ‘something entailed essen-
tially by the divine being.’ Everything that exists is, in a real sense, a quidditative or essential con-
comitant of the divine essence. Even Avicenna’s theology seems modelled on the logical relationship
between essence and its non-constitutive concomitants.
 Avicenna, Notes, 77.11, section 73; cf. 121.9, section 161, where God is described as “pure necessity
itself” (nafs al-wājibiyyah); 180, section 265, where it is said again that God’s essence “is pure neces-
sity or actual existence, not existence taken in an absolute [or general] sense”; and Discussions, sec-
tion 476, 168.11. In those passages, one gets the impression that God’s necessity takes precedence over
His existence, although the two notions are obviously inseparable.
 2 Senses of existence in Avicenna’s ontology 545

essence. It also explains how God can be described as the originative source of all
the quiddities, which at this level are identical with His essential being. All of the
pure quiddities would ultimately have their originative source in God himself,
which means that their foundational truth finds its point of origin in God qua abso-
lute Truth or al-ḥaqq, and their own essential necessity also finds its source in the
necessary quiddity of God. In other words, the special mode of existence that is prop-
er to all quiddities is, in this primal stage, identical with the special mode of exis-
tence that is proper to God. This explains why the pure quiddities, when they are
in this state of ontological identity with God, are not affected by multiplicity and pos-
sibility. These notions emerge as metaphysical concomitants and logical considera-
tions only as a result of their causation from God’s essence.²⁴⁹
At this juncture, a tension in some of Avicenna’s writings needs to be addressed.
Remarkably, the master sometimes appears to dissociate God’s pure quiddity from
the notions of existence, oneness, and necessity, which are regarded instead as con-
comitants (lawāzim) and attributes (ṣifāt) of the essence, with the possible implica-
tion that they would not be fully identical or collapsible with It. These passages
are somewhat problematic, because they go against the grain of the well-established
Avicennian thesis that, in God, essence and existence are one and identical. As Treig-
er noted, Avicenna seems to put forth such a view in section 479 of Discussions,
where he rather surprisingly describes existence as entailed by (yalzamu) the neces-
sity of the First (wājibiyyat al-awwal).²⁵⁰ As De Smet and Sebti showed, Avicenna
adopts a similar strategy in his commentary on ‘The Chapter of Pure Faith,’ sūrah
112 of the Qurʾan, also known as ‘The Chapter of Divine Oneness’ (sūrat al-tawḥīd).
There he argues that things like oneness, necessity, and even the name ‘Allāh’ are
really to be regarded as concomitants (lawāzim) and to be distinguished from the di-
vine essence (māhiyyah, ḥaqīqah, dhāt, huwiyyah) Itself. Accordingly, these divine at-
tributes (ṣifāt) are described as concomitants (lawāzim) distinct from the divine es-
sence, and yet they are not readily identifiable with the contingent effects caused
to exist by God, which can also be defined as lawāzim. ²⁵¹ This leads De Smet and
Sebti to distinguish between two senses of lawāzim: qua divine attributes and qua
contingent effects caused to exist by the First. As they remark, this view is also ech-

 The passages discussed here echo an earlier account in Metaphysics I.6, 38.17 ff. wherein Avicen-
na describes quiddities as being in themselves either possible or necessary (wājib al-māhiyyah li-dhā-
tihi). Since the master in this passage is focusing on things that come to exist after not existing, he
rejects the view that there can be things that are necessary by their very quiddity. Yet, the expression
wājib al-māhiyyah li-dhātihi could be (uniquely) applied to the First, and in this regard the equiva-
lence of the expressions wājib al-wujūd and wājib al-māhiyyah is revealing of how Avicenna conceives
of the relationship between essence and existence in God. In fact, the latter is simply a shortcut for
wājib al-wujūd bi-dhātihi or min dhātihi, where dhāt is taken to refer to God’s essence.
 Avicenna, Discussions, section 479, 169.5‒8; Treiger, Avicenna’s Notion, 362 and note 106.
 De Smet and Sebti, Avicenna’s Philosophical Approach. The authors rightly regard this evidence
as problematic, since it seems to clash with other claims by Avicenna regarding the identity of es-
sence, existence, necessity, and oneness in God.
546 IV The Special Ontological Mode of Quiddity in Itself

oed in a passage of Notes, which seems to define necessary existence and oneness as
concomitants proceeding from the divine essence.²⁵²
It should be acknowledged that this view is not limited to the passages pinpoint-
ed by Treiger, De Smet, and Sebti. It appears recurrently in Notes and Discussions, as
well as in the commentary on ‘The Chapter of Pure Faith.’ This poses a series of prob-
lems. Although it is understandable that the master would not want to describe
wujūd as a constituent (muqawwim) of the divine essence, since God has no parts
and constitutive principles, it is on the other hand harder to explain why it should
be regarded as one of Its concomitants. Moreover, the term lawāzim appears to as-
sume a variety of meanings in this theological context, and so it is not entirely
clear to what these lawāzim correspond. Now, since this theological position is not
articulated in the core works of the master, but rather in writings whose authorship
is controversial and may be ultimately the product of his circle, it is possible that
some of these views should be ascribed to the intervention of later scholars, possibly
some of Avicenna’s close students. In fact, the idea that essence and existence are to
be distinguished even in the case of God becomes a hallmark of later Islamic theo-
logical systems, especially that of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, who vigorously combatted
Avicenna on this specific issue. So it would be somewhat surprising to witness Avi-
cenna defend such a view, given his insistence in his main works that essence and
existence are identical in God. Furthermore, the view that the divine attributes
(ṣifāt), qua lawāzim, are really to be distinguished from the divine essence smacks
of certain kalām positions. For these reasons, one may be reluctant to construe
these statements literally or question whether Avicenna is really their author. At
any rate, and on the assumption of their authenticity, these passages have in com-
mon the fact that they are all ambiguous and difficult to interpret, so it would be
wise not to place too much weight on this evidence. Even then, it should be asked
whether—if these texts are correctly interpreted—their intent is really at odds with
an Avicennian position. For instance, it is far from obvious to me that in the passage
of Discussions referred to by Treiger, Avicenna is talking about God’s own existence
as a lāzim proceeding from His essence, as opposed to the existence of the effects
that are caused from His self-intellection. Likewise, De Smet and Sebti in their article
insist on distinguishing between the lawāzim qua God’s effects and qua the divine
attributes, arguing that “all the [divine] attributes are concomitants, but not all the
concomitants are attributes.”²⁵³ This would seem to imply that some attributes are
somehow distinct from God’s essence, but not identical with the caused entities ema-
nated by God. Yet, some of the texts they discuss do not on my view justify such a
distinction. In sum, while it is undeniable that Avicenna in these texts argues that
there are lawāzim proceeding from God that are not identical with the divine essence

 De Smet and Sebti, Avicenna’s Philosophical Approach, 140‒141; the passage of Notes they refer
to corresponds to section 982 in the Mousavian edition.
 De Smet and Sebti, Avicenna’s Philosophical Approach, 142.
 2 Senses of existence in Avicenna’s ontology 547

Itself, the question of exactly what these lawāzim correspond to in the context of the
master’s theology and cosmology remains open.
In this regard, it is my impression that Avicenna is consistent in ascribing one
sense of existence, necessity, and oneness to the divine essence alone and in regard-
ing God’s quiddity as identical with a kind of essential being. He never appears to
dissociate sharply God’s essence from His existence, but rather maintains the doc-
trine of essential being consistently in these various texts. Even in the tafsīr, which
is the main focus of De Smet and Sebti, the master reiterates on various occasions
—in complete agreement with his other works—that the quiddity of the Necessary Ex-
istent is identical with His existence (wujūduhu ʿayn māhiyyatihi).²⁵⁴ Likewise, with
regard to oneness, he contends that a certain sense of oneness belongs exclusively
and essentially to God, which is why it is predicated of God and all other things
“by means of modulation,” the divine sense differing from all the other senses.²⁵⁵
As for the epithet ‘Allāh’ described as a lāzim, it expresses only a relationship be-
tween God and the world, a relational attribute (ṣifah iḍāfiyyah) which can be easily
construed through the standard Avicennian notions of causation and emanation. As
such, the epithet ‘Allāh’ and the relational attribute do not pertain to, or add any-
thing to, the divine essence, but merely express the conceptual link between God
and the world through creation. That the lawāzim Avicenna mentions in those pas-
sages have nothing to do with the divine essence, existence, and oneness per se is
confirmed by a close reading of Notes. One key idea that emerges from this work
is that the lawāzim are associated with the beginning of multiplicity (kathrah) in
the intelligible world. In fact, the concomitants are what ‘individualize,’ or in this
case, ‘specify’ beings and distinguish them one from the other.²⁵⁶ Thus, for example,
the threefold intellection that characterizes the First Effect, which is responsible for
causing a certain multiplicity to exist in it, is described in terms of lawāzim. Now, on
account of this connection between the lawāzim and kathrah, it is quite clear that
these cannot be associated in any way with God’s essence. Accordingly, Avicenna ex-
plains in several passages that the lawāzim proceed from God as effects, that they are
caused to exist by the divine essence, and, hence, that they do not affect It in any
way. He states that “the concomitants of the First proceed from It, but do not exist
in It; for this reason, It does not become multiple on account of them” (lawāzim
al-awwal takūn ṣādirah ʿanhu lā ḥāṣilah fīhi fa-li-dhālika lā yatakaththaru bi-hā).²⁵⁷
The upshot is that whenever Avicenna describes existence, oneness, and neces-
sity as lawāzim in a theological context, he presumably is not referring to God’s es-
sential existence, oneness, and necessity, but rather to these notions in connection
with the divine causation of the other beings, which can be regarded as concomitants

 Avicenna, Commentary on ‘The Chapter of Pure Faith,’ 106.9, 112.3.

 Avicenna, Commentary on ‘The Chapter of Pure Faith,’ 109.13 ff.
 Avicenna, Notes, 276, section 469; 280, section 477; 282, section 481; 490, section 899; and 491,
section 901.
 Avicenna, Notes, 543, section 957.
548 IV The Special Ontological Mode of Quiddity in Itself

of His essence. Put differently, the lawāzim designate not God’s own oneness and ex-
istence regarded as attributes that would be somehow derived from the divine es-
sence and distinct from It, but rather the effects which proceed from Him, starting
with the First Effect.²⁵⁸ This First Effect, qua caused lāzim, does indeed acquire the
necessary existence and oneness that flow from the First, and which can themselves,
by extension, be described as lawāzim. But these lawāzim should by no means be
construed as the very existence, oneness, and necessity of God Himself, even though
they come from Him. Rather, they mark the causal relationship that exists between
God and the First Effect and, by extension, between God and the world. Although
this causal relation and these lawāzim can be framed in terms of attributes (ṣifāt),
notably the ‘relational attributes’ (ṣifāt iḍāfiyyah), they do not pertain to, or add any-
thing to, the divine essence Itself. This explains why, according to Avicenna, God has
no essential attributes (ṣifāt dhātiyyah).²⁵⁹ For like pure quiddity, the divine essence
can be considered in Itself or in relation to other things; but even when approached
from the latter angle, It still remains only Itself. This interpretation seems corroborat-
ed by Avicenna’s claims that the ṣifāt are concomitants that proceed from God’s es-
sence, and that there is no proliferation of attributes (ṣifāt mukhtalifah) in, or pertain-
ing to, God’s essence.²⁶⁰ But if this is the case, then these relational attributes should
be identified with the lawāzim that proceed from God qua effects. Thus, in spite of his
talk of divine ‘attributes’ and ‘concomitants’ in these texts, the master appears to
consistently maintain the doctrine that God’s quiddity is perfectly identical with a
special sense of wujūd and a special sense of waḥdah, that is, with essential being
and essential oneness. These points are confirmed in Notes when Avicenna, in
order to dissipate the kinds of misunderstandings that could arise from his use of
the term lawāzim, states that “the Necessary Existent is He whose existence is inter-
nal to His true essence, for this [existence] is the necessity of existence, not a con-
comitant of His true essence (wājib al-wujūd yakūn al-wujūd bi-l-fiʿl dākhil fī haqīqa-
tihi idh huwa wujūb al-wujūd lā lāzim li-ḥaqīqatihi).²⁶¹ On this interpretation, then, the
lawāzim would overlap neatly with the attributes De Smet and Sebti talk about, as
well as with the notion of causality and the state of being caused (maʿlūl). These
lawāzim and ṣifāt would not amount to entities distinct both from God’s essence
and from the world, as the ṣifāt somehow do in Ashʿarite kalām, for instance. Rather,
they would be co-extensional with the caused beings and with the principles that

 For a description of the First Effect as lāzim, see Avicenna, Notes, 131‒132, section 172; 544, sec-
tion 958; and 545, section 960. Even in those passages that present necessity of existence (wujūb al-
wujūd) as a lāzim (e. g., Notes, 69‒70, section 60), I think that the lāzim is the necessary existence that
proceeds from God and, hence, the necessary relation between the First Cause and the First Effect,
and not God’s own necessity of existence.
 Avicenna, Notes, 568.1, section 994.
 Avicenna, Notes, 543‒544, section 957; 545.10, section 961. The terms ṣifāt and lawāzim are used
interchangeably in these and other passages.
 Avicenna, Notes, 181.8‒9, section 268.
 2 Senses of existence in Avicenna’s ontology 549

underlie them. In brief, I would contend that there is no significant difference be-
tween the lawāzim regarded as divine attributes/concomitants and as caused enti-
ties, since the former imply a relationship between God and the world that entails
necessary causation and implies the sense of lawāzim qua maʿlūlāt. This interpreta-
tion is not only in line with Avicenna’s māhiyyah-lawāzim model and theory of nec-
essary causality. It also preserves the theory of the divine essence as a kind of essen-
tial existence. Finally, it has the advantage also of homogenizing Avicenna’s uses of
the term lawāzim, which on my reading must in all cases refer to something caused,
external to the divine quiddity, and, ultimately, to a contingent effect.
This intricate issue and problematic evidence notwithstanding, it becomes read-
ily apparent that the master articulates his theological position on the basis of the
māhiyyah-lawāzim model, which we already encountered in many different contexts.
God is a pure quiddity possessing its own intrinsic and essential being and unity,
and everything else stands in relation to it qua a lāzim or lāḥiq, as something external
(khārij), caused (maʿlūl), and non-constitutive (ghayr muqawwim). The only differ-
ence in this case relative to other implementations of the māhiyyah-lawāzim para-
digm is that God’s māhiyyah, unlike all the other māhiyyāt, is not constituted by a
plurality of muqawwimāt and maʿānī, but is a single, perfectly unitary, and inscrut-
able maʿnā. Nevertheless, Avicenna proceeds to apply these logical-metaphysical no-
tions to his discussion of God. In his Treatise on the Afterlife, he explains that God
has a unitary essence (dhāt wāḥidah) that is not made up of “existential quantitative
or conceptual parts” (sing, juzʾ wujūdī kammī aw maʿnawī),²⁶² so His essential being
stands in contradistinction to the mereological ontology of the caused existents (see
chapter III). God is a pure māhiyyah that causes all the concomitants (lawāzim) to
proceed from It. The overlap in Avicenna’s logical, ontological, and theological argu-
mentation and the centrality of the māhiyyah-lawāzim model within it is a remarka-
ble feature of his thought. As I discuss in chapter V, it has important implications as
well for our understanding of the issue of God’s knowledge.
Now, there is one conceptual advantage to approaching Avicenna’s theology
from the side of quiddity and special existence, rather than from the side of realized
existence. Recall that quiddity and special existence for Avicenna can be considered
either in themselves or in relation to other things. In other words, they can be con-
ceptually subjected to considerations (iʿtibārāt) that either include or exclude a rela-
tion (nisbah, iḍāfah) to something else. Realized existence, on the other hand, when
construed in the standard Avicennian way, necessarily implies a link or relation to
something else, since it is a condition (sharṭ) and a concomitant (lāzim) brought
about by an external cause. Even in the case of God, then, where no ‘other’
(ghayr) is posited, a negative condition must apply, whereby God is ‘necessarily’ or
‘on the condition of’ no other thing (bi-sharṭ lā shayʾ ākhar), a negative condition
that Avicenna usually ascribes to the pure quiddities, but which seems here appro-

 Avicenna, Epistle on the Afterlife, 45.

550 IV The Special Ontological Mode of Quiddity in Itself

priately applied to God’s special quiddity. Furthermore, God’s quiddity can be con-
ceived of either in itself or in relation to other things (i. e., the caused and contingent
beings), which, again, is reminiscent of how Avicenna frames his analysis of pure
quiddity, which can be envisaged in abstraction from other things or with other
things. Thus, Avicenna has a tendency to discuss God either strictly in terms of
His essence (in itself) or in relation to His causation of the world and the chain of
caused existents, that is, through His relational attributes and concomitants. In
brief, the ‘in itself’/‘with another’ distinction applies equally to the pure quiddities
and to God’s special quiddity.²⁶³
Finally, Avicenna’s doctrine that God exists through or by virtue of His quiddity
and so has a special existence that is entirely His own should be connected with his
theory of final causality and of God as ultimate and universal final cause. As was
shown previously, Avicenna, building on some Neoplatonic precedents, connects
quiddity with final causality and regards the final cause as that which completes
or perfects the potential existence of an essence. In that sense, essence is closely
tied to the Neoplatonic notion of reversion in his works. God’s status as a final
cause for all the caused beings can also be construed in light of His quiddity and es-
sential being, which, as the quiddity of all quiddities, so to speak, contains within
itself all the pure essences of existent things. God’s status as a final cause therefore
implies a moment of reversion (epistrophe) of each quiddity towards its originative
source, of the special existence of each quiddity participating in the ultimate special
existence that is God’s. More specifically, this theory is to be connected with Avicen-
na’s views regarding the intrinsic perfectibility and immortality of the human soul.
Qua final cause of a human being, the rational soul leads one to one’s utmost degree
of perfection and completion by partaking in the ‘divine’ act of intellection and in the
contemplation of the pure quiddities. Thus, when it comes to final causality and Avi-
cenna’s discussion of this notion in relation to God, it seems more fruitful to ap-
proach the master’s theology from the perspective of God having a special quiddity,
rather than God not having any quiddity at all—and this, given the narrow connec-
tion in his philosophy between final causality and essence. In brief, essence or quid-
dity appears to be the cement that ties all of the key notions of Avicenna’s theology
together.

 For a cogent discussion of these two aspects, see Adamson, From the Necessary. Adamson fo-
cuses especially on the notions of negation and relation in Avicenna’s theology. As Adamson, 173,
explains, “there are three kinds of things we can say about the necessary existent. First, that there
is indeed a necessary existent; second, that this existence lacks certain features; third, that this ex-
istence enters into certain relations with its effects.” These points can each be related to different as-
pects of quiddity: the first, to the fact that quiddity possesses its own special existence, which in the
case of God is necessary existence; the second, to the notion of quiddity taken ‘in itself,’ negatively
conditioned, and in abstraction from concomitants and accidents; and the third, to the relation be-
tween quiddity and its external concomitants, effects, accidents, etc. Hence, the various aspects and
conditions of quiddity represent an interesting conceptual tool to interpret Avicenna’s theology.
 2 Senses of existence in Avicenna’s ontology 551

2.6 The problematic case of prime matter

Avicenna’s doctrine of prime matter offers a particularly interesting case study when
it comes to the notion of essential being. The reasons for this are multiple, but they
pertain chiefly to the ambiguous ontological status that matter occupies in Avicen-
na’s metaphysics. For if Avicenna’s theory of matter is discussed chiefly within an
Aristotelian hylomorphic framework, it is also subjected to a drastic metaphysical re-
handling and is connected (in a very un-Aristotelian way) with superlunary causality
and the cosmological theory of emanation (fayḍ). The query I attempt to address here
is how the quiddity of prime matter can be said to exist at all and how it relates to
essential and intelligible existence.²⁶⁴
Avicenna is adamant that matter cannot exist actually without form. This point is
reiterated on numerous occasions throughout his corpus and is premised on the two
ideas that matter is dependent on form for its determinate existence and that form
precedes matter in actuality. If form precedes matter in actuality, and if matter re-
quires form to exist in a determinate way, then matter in itself will not exist in
any true sense in actuality without form. It will not actually exist before it acquires
substantial forms from an exterior cause.²⁶⁵ In this context, the first form to inhere in
matter is the corporeal form, which provides prime matter with three-dimensional ex-
tension. All existent bodies consist of prime matter combined with the corporeal
form and other substantial and accidental forms that endow matter with determined
measurements and a specific nature. As a corollary, prime matter in itself does not
exist separately and as an independent entity in the concrete world. Its actual exis-
tence is reducible to the existence of the various entities or quantities of informed
matter that constitute the various physical beings and that together make up the
realm of nature. In spite of this, Avicenna does not follow the view of some Neopla-
tonists according to which matter is simply nonexistence or lacks positive being. To
begin with, he ascribes one of the senses of substance (jawhar) to prime matter, a
sense which he contrasts to those of substance qua form and of substance qua the
combination of form and matter.²⁶⁶ Thus, in Definitions, for example, matter is de-

 Avicenna’s doctrine of prime matter and its relation to the corporeal form has attracted consid-
erable scholarly attention; see in particular, Buschmann, Untersuchungen; Stone, Simplicius and Avi-
cenna; Shihadeh, Avicenna’s Corporeal Form; and Lammer, The Elements.
 See Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Cure, II.4. Avicenna’s general aim in this chapter is to discuss
the essence (dhāt) of matter and form and their relationship, as well as to establish the priority of
form over matter in actuality. Form renders matter existent in actuality. Prime matter needs the cor-
poreal form (al-ṣūrah al-jismiyyah) and specific dimensions, as well as generic and specific forms, to
exist in actuality.
 See Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Cure, II.2, 67.16 ff. for the substantiality of hayūlā; and Lamm-
er, The Elements, 118‒120. Lammer rejects the interpretation of prime matter as merely a negative sub-
stance or as quasi-substance. Indeed, Avicenna does not routinely associate matter and nonexis-
tence; rather, the latter notion is connected chiefly with the logical modality of the impossible
(mumtaniʿ) and the absence of a cause.
552 IV The Special Ontological Mode of Quiddity in Itself

scribed as a substance that acquires actual existence in or through itself (li-dhātihā).

As befits the definition of substance as that which does not exist in a subject, matter
exists for itself and has its own existence, which is why it can also be regarded as its
own substance. Hence, if its existence in actuality is dependent on the forms, it nev-
ertheless is not the same as, nor is it reducible to, the existence of these very forms.
Furthermore, prime matter also possesses its own quiddity (māhiyyah), which implies
that it is a thing that is readily and distinctly intelligible in the mind and whose def-
inition does not rely on the actual existence of hylomorphic form. Unlike the quiddity
and definition of, say, a horse, which implies form and matter and points to a com-
pound of these two principles in the realized substance, the definition of matter as
pure receptivity and potentiality does not include actual form at all and suggests that
matter ‘in itself’ is a substance and quiddity. The fact that it is not rendered multiple
or composite in reality by its definition explains why Avicenna counts prime matter
as one of the simple entities (al-basāʾiṭ) alongside oneness (al-waḥdah) and ‘the Nec-
essary of Existence.’²⁶⁷
For these reasons, if Avicenna insists that matter itself cannot exist actually (bi-l-
fiʿl) without form, he also sometimes allows for the possibility that matter possesses
potential existence, that is, a purely receptive and passive existence that would be-
long distinctly to it. Matter can be said to exist potentially or in a state of potentiality,
and in that state it may even be said to precede form. Somewhat intriguingly, Avicen-
na refers to this state as “the state [ḥāl] between matter and form inasmuch as the
latter exists [min ḥaythu hiya mawjūdah].”²⁶⁸ This state is the pure disposition (istiʿ-
dād) and pure receptivity (qubūl) of matter as a substrate (maḥall) for forms. It is
these notions that define the thingness of matter: matter is matter because it has
the potentiality of reception and disposition (al-māddah innamā hiya māddah li-
anna lahā quwwat al-qubūl wa-l-istiʿdād).²⁶⁹ And it is this thingness of matter that
may be said to exist according to one qualified sense or aspect. The nuance Avicenna
seeks to tease out, then, is not that matter cannot exist in any way, aspect, or sense
without form, but that its existence in actuality necessarily depends on form. As Avi-
cenna concludes, “there is a difference between these two claims” (bayna l-amrayn
farq).²⁷⁰ These remarks seem to characterize the very essence (dhāt) of matter, which
is what Avicenna intends to focus on in this metaphysical inquiry.²⁷¹ In another pas-

 Avicenna, Notes, 135‒136, section 181. Aristotle stresses the connection between matter and sub-
stance and is Avicenna’s direct source on this issue. Nevertheless, this point is much more ambiguous
in the works of the Greek philosopher, for he also suggests that matter is substance only in a deriv-
ative or secondary sense; for the Aristotelian background on this topic, see Stone, Simplicius and Avi-
cenna.
 Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Cure, II.4, 80.14.
 Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Cure, II.4, 83.5‒6.
 Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Cure, II.4, 83.15‒84.2.
 At Metaphysics of The Cure II.4, 80.11‒13, Avicenna explains that he intends to study the essen-
ces (dhātihimā) of matter and form in abstraction from the relation (iḍāfah) that obtains between
them. In Notes, 84.10, section 81, Avicenna describes prime matter as “a meaning [or entity] that
 2 Senses of existence in Avicenna’s ontology 553

sage, Avicenna further teases out the distinction between these two states of exis-
tence: matter exists potentially in itself and actually through form. As Avicenna ex-
plains, “as for the nature of that which is potential, its receptacle is matter. Thus, it is
matter that is properly said to exist in itself in potentiality [inna-hā fī nafsihā bi-l-
quwwah takūn mawjūdah] and in actuality through form.”²⁷² Again, Avicenna’s con-
tention is not that matter has two simultaneous modes of existence in actuality.
Rather, matter may be said to exist potentially and actually according to two different
ontological aspects or modes, precisely because these two modes or aspects of exis-
tence differ: matter exists according to one sense when taken strictly in itself; and
according to another when taken in relation to form and the composite substance.²⁷³
In other words, whereas the potential existence of matter is ‘in itself’ and, so to
speak, essential, its actual existence is ‘realized’ and ‘acquired,’ and, thus, acciden-
tal. Consequently, Avicenna asserts that “taken in itself and from the consideration of
the existence of its essence, it [prime matter] is in potentiality” (fī nafsihā wa-iʿtibār
wujūd dhātihā bi-l-quwwah).²⁷⁴ This corresponds to the special kind of substantiality
(jawhariyyah) that matter has, a substantiality that is separated from actuality and
belongs exclusively to it.²⁷⁵
These remarks suggest that matter, when taken in itself, is not ‘nothing,’ but
‘something’: prime matter is a ‘thing’ (amr) that is pure receptivity and, qua sub-
stance, subsists not in a subject. More strikingly, Avicenna in Definitions adds on
one occasion that prime matter itself has the ‘form’ (ṣūrah) and differentia (faṣl) of
receptivity and preparedness.²⁷⁶ Two points should be stressed in this connection
in order to shed light on this unusual statement. First, it was probably motivated

is in itself subsistent” (maʿnā qāʾim bi-nafsihi), which befits its definition as substance, but ambigu-
ously locates it midway between an intelligible notion and an entity, on account of the very ambiguity
of the term maʿnā.
 Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Cure, II.4, 88.15‒16.
 This, of course, implies taking the quiddity of matter either inasmuch as it is itself (min ḥaythu
hiya hiya) or in relation to others. It would seem that the various aspects of quiddity lie behind Avi-
cenna’s conceptualization of prime matter.
 Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Cure, II.2, 68.7‒8. Under a certain condition (sharṭ), the potential-
ity of matter can be said to precede the act in particular things; see Metaphysics, IV.2, 183.12 ff. It
should be noted that the same ambiguity that surrounds Avicenna’s theory of prime matter also ap-
plies to the corporeal form: is it purely potential or does it already imply a certain degree of actuality?
In some instances, Avicenna seems to regard corporeality as a “realized nature,” but the problem is
that it, like prime matter, cannot exist on its own and needs other substantial forms in order to exist
actually. Corporeal matter remains, at any rate, something very abstract that is the object of intellec-
tual consideration, if not of concrete, actual existence; see Metaphysics, II.2, 70.1 ff.
 Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Cure, II.2, 67.17: “the substantiality that belongs to matter does not
make it something in actuality.” Yet, this substantiality, Avicenna believes, is something in itself.
 Avicenna, Definitions, 17; cf. Metaphysics, II.2, 68.4‒5: “its [viz., matter’s] differentia is that it is
prepared for all things, and its form [ṣūrah], which is thought to belong to it [in itself], is that it is
prepared and receptive.” However, how exactly Avicenna intends this statement is problematic,
since he rejects a strict identification of prime matter as a kind of essential form in other instances.
554 IV The Special Ontological Mode of Quiddity in Itself

by the desire to shun a potentially problematic conclusion, namely, that if matter is a

substance and a quiddity, and if quiddity and substance are primarily definable in
terms of form, as Avicenna tends to believe, then matter itself would be an oddity
inasmuch as it would amount to a formless quiddity and a formless substance. In-
deed, how could matter have quiddity and substance but no form whatsoever? By
ascribing an essential form to prime matter, one which it would possess irreducibly
and ‘in itself,’ matter would by the same token lend itself to the identification be-
tween quiddity and form that Avicenna regards as normative.²⁷⁷ The second consid-
eration is linked to Avicenna’s doctrine of cosmological emanation, according to
which the substantial forms of natural things (at the very least their species-
forms) are emanated by the Agent Intellect onto the world of nature. Quite remark-
ably, and in a marked departure from the Aristotelian tradition, Avicenna believes
that prime matter is one of the things that proceeds from this superlunary intellect
and, hence, that matter as such is eternally emanated as a result of the intellection
of this immaterial being. In Physics, one reads that “prime matter results from atem-
poral creation [ibdāʿ],” and in Notes that “prime matter is absolutely created” (al-
hayūlā l-ūlā mubdaʿah). ²⁷⁸ Elsewhere in the latter work it is stated that “the being
of absolute prime matter is connected with absolute creation” (al-māddah al-ulā l-
muṭlaqah yataʿallaqu kawnuhā bi-l-ibdāʿ), with the same intent.²⁷⁹ The choice of
the terms ibdāʿ and mubdaʿah in those passages suggests that matter can be made
to exist only by an immaterial cause. These statements describe prime matter as a
metaphysical entity that possesses its own distinct identity and being even before
it acquires the actual forms. Because it is emanated as an entity or form from the
Agent Intellect, matter is ‘something’ that exists distinctly from the other substantial
forms (be it only intelligibly). It possesses its own quiddity and reality, as well as a
kind of essential being, and it is not reducible merely to an idea in the human mind.
Thus, the causality tying prime matter to the Agent Intellect, the Giver of Forms,
lends weight to the hypothesis that it possesses its own essential form.²⁸⁰
To recap, matter cannot exist actually (bi-l-fiʿl) without form and, hence, cannot
exist in itself as a realized existent in the concrete world. There is no Platonic form of
prime matter, so to speak. Yet, it can be said to have a special, potential, and purely

 In theory this essential form is not identical with the form of corporeality, which, Avicenna tells
us, is the first substantial form to inhere in matter (on the latter, see Stone, Simplicius and Avicenna;
Lammer, The Elements, 120 ff.). For the corporeal form inheres in matter from the outside and is thus
not essential to prime matter as such. But Avicenna’s interpreters took issue with this doctrine, per-
haps partly in an effort to avoid the metaphysical consequences that arose from postulating a distinct
notion of prime matter; see Shihadeh, Avicenna’s Corporeal Form.
 Avicenna, Physics, I.3, 30.2‒3, translation McGinnis; idem, Notes, 171.7, section 251.
 Avicenna, Notes, 342.2, section 611.
 On the emanation of prime matter from the Agent Intellect, see Davidson, Alfarabi, 76; and es-
pecially Lammer, The Elements, 193‒196. This feature of Avicenna’s cosmology should, of course, be
connected with Neoplatonic doctrines about the emanation or causation of nature and matter from
the Soul-Principle.
 3 Essential ‘realization’ and ‘subsistence’ and Avicenna’s theory of causality 555

intelligible existence and to possess a unique kind of essential being that endows its
thingness with a degree of ontological positivity. This would apply, at the very least,
to the pure quiddity of prime matter in the human intellects that contemplate it as
well as in the Agent Intellect that emanates it as a result of its intellection. Conse-
quently, the quiddity of prime matter, when taken ‘in itself,’ could be said to corre-
spond to an ontological mode that can only be described as a kind of essential
being. Avicenna’s tendency to tie prime matter to the emanation and causation of
the Agent Intellect seems to validate this interpretation. In the final analysis, howev-
er, whether one decides to interpret the evidence regarding prime matter in Avicen-
na’s philosophy as indicating a kind of essential being or no being at all really boils
down to a question of outlook regarding the notions of existence and potentiality.

3 Essential ‘realization’ and ‘subsistence’ and Avicenna’s theory

of causality
Avicenna’s distinction between the inner constituents (muqawwimāt) of quiddity, on
the one hand, and its external, non-constitutive, and accidental concomitants (lawā-
zim ghayr muqawwimah), on the other, stems initially from a logical outlook. This
distinction is clearly put forth, for example, in the logical section of Pointers,
where the triangle is taken as an example. In that work, Avicenna differentiates be-
tween (a) the essential constituents that are inseparable from quiddity (e. g., shape-
ness for triangle); (b) the concomitants that necessarily follow quiddity (e. g., the tri-
angle has angles that equal two right angles), but are external, non-constitutive, and
posterior; and (c) the accidental concomitants that are accidents (aʿrāḍ) proper, in
the sense that they are fully separable from quiddity (e. g., blackness in the concrete
triangle). Although (b) and (c) are both ‘accidental’ (ʿaraḍī) in the sense that they are
external to quiddity and not constitutive of it, only the elements in (c) amount to real
accidents that may or may not exist in a subject.²⁸¹
These logical distinctions in turn provide the backbone of Avicenna’s ontological
interpretation of quiddity and its concomitants. For just as there is a conceptual dif-
ference in the way these various items relate to quiddity (i. e., by being either internal
or external to it, constitutive or non-constitutive, essential or accidental), so there is
an ontological difference in the way they relate to the various senses and aspects of
existence that Avicenna deploys in his works. One way in which Avicenna stresses
this distinction is by ascribing proper existence to the items in (a) and acquired ex-
istence to the items in (b) and (c). Put differently, he correlates the māhiyyah-lawāzim
distinction with different senses and modes of existence. Thus, in Metaphysics I.5
and V.1, the master modulates the term wujūd to refer to essential being as well as
to realized existence in the mind and in the concrete world. Realized existence refers

 Avicenna, Pointers, vol. 1, 199.

556 IV The Special Ontological Mode of Quiddity in Itself

primarily to concrete individual existents, although it also applies to the complex

universals in the mind. In both cases, what has been ‘realized’ in existence is not
only the constituents of quiddity, but also its accompanying attributes and concom-
itants: it is ‘particular horse’ with its material accidents and ‘universal horse’ with its
mental accidents. This ontological distinction between the constituents and the con-
comitants of quiddity is expressed by means of other terms in the Avicennian vo-
cabulary, notably those derived from the roots ḥ-q-q, ḥ-ṣ-l, and q-w-m. There are
two sets of terms in particular that should arrest our attention, given that they are
frequently applied to quiddity in Avicenna’s works: taḥqīq and taḥaqquq, and
qiwām and qāʾim. These terms convey the notions of ‘ascertainment’ or ‘realization’
and ‘subsistence’ respectively. At first glance, they would seem to be restricted to the
logical and conceptual plane. Thus, the essence ‘human’ could be said to be realized
or to subsist logically by virtue of its constituents, namely, ‘animal’ and ‘rational,’
when these elements are apprehended by the mind and linked together in definition
and conception to form a unitary concept. Yet, there is evidence indicating that these
terms are also put to the service of Avicenna’s ontologization of logic. They partici-
pate directly in the discourse on the being of quiddity by elucidating how quiddity
is self-constituted and self-caused intelligibly. In fact, in the very passage of Pointers
mentioned above, Avicenna makes a basic distinction between “the realization of ex-
istence” (taḥaqquq al-wujūd) and “the realization of quiddity” (taḥaqquq al-
māhiyyah).²⁸² In another section of Pointers, the master contends that essence and
existence have different causes and that a thing is caused and realized with regard
to both its essence and its existence.²⁸³ This suggests that taḥaqquq, when associated
with essence, conveys a certain causative or ontological implication and does not ex-
press merely an epistemological concern. Accordingly, in this context, the term
taḥaqquq does not correspond primarily to an epistemic exercise of ‘ascertaining’
or ‘verification,’ but rather to a kind of essential realization of quiddity that occurs
in the mind and in concreto, albeit in different ways. The basic distinction articulated
here appears to be between the realization of the concomitants (lawāzim) of quiddity
as a result of the external efficient cause that affects it, and the realization of the con-
stituents (muqawwimah) of quiddity, especially to its internal self-constitution in the

 Avicenna, Pointers, vol. 1, 199.6‒10.

 Avicenna, Pointers, vol. 1, 441. The term taḥaqquq is often translated as ‘verification’ or ‘ascer-
tainment’ in order to emphasize its epistemological scope and to bring out the notion of truth asso-
ciated with the root ḥ-q-q. However, this root can also mean ‘reality’ or ‘what is real,’ and, thus, by
extension, ‘realization in existence.’ In fact, the two meanings of ‘truth’ and ‘realization’ or ‘reality’
are connected, inasmuch as one sense of what is true for Avicenna is what has existence in reality
and is the object of assent (taṣdīq). When applied to pure quiddity specifically, the term ḥaqīqah refers
to its intrinsic truth (in being the quiddity that it is) and its reality (in that it exists, at the very least
intelligibly in the mind). In so doing it points to the internal realization of quiddity as something es-
sentially true and real, as opposed to its external realization in the concrete world. Thus, the sense
that should be emphasized here in connection with essential being is intelligible and essential real-
ization, not existence acquired through a cause.
 3 Essential ‘realization’ and ‘subsistence’ and Avicenna’s theory of causality 557

mind, which is to be associated chiefly with quiddity as a formal and final cause.²⁸⁴
That Avicenna in fact conceives of the self-realization of quiddity as implying a kind
of internal, essential causality seems confirmed by the following passage of Notes:

Text 35: What is prior in essence to the thing is what is a cause for the thing in its quiddity [al-
mutaqaddim ʿalā l-shayʾ bi-l-ṭabʿ huwa mā yakūn ʿillah li-l-shayʾ fī māhiyyatihi]. For example,
‘one’ is a cause of ‘two’ in its twoness [fī ithnayniyyatihi], and the lines of the triangle [i. e.,
its being a shape] is a cause of its being a triangle, and the parts [ajzāʾ] of the definition are
the cause of the definition in its being what it is [fī annahu huwa]. As for the prior in causality,
it ought to be a cause for its existence, not for its quiddity [wa-ammā l-mutaqaddim bi-l-ʿilliyyah
fa-huwa an yakūna ʿillah li-wujūdihi lā li-māhiyyatihi], for the quiddity of a thing is other than its
existence [inniyyatihi or anniyyatihi]. For human to be human is other than for it to exist. Priority
may be with regard to existence, such as the priority of ‘one’ over ‘two,’ or it may be in concep-
tion [fī l-mafhūm], such as the priority of substance over accident in predicating existence of
these two [things].²⁸⁵

The use of the term “cause” (ʿillah) in connection with quiddity in this passage lends
weight to the previous hypothesis according to which quiddity possesses a special
kind of internal causality. This special essential and internal causality concerns
the relationships between the various constitutive parts of quiddity and the unity
that is produced by them. The essences of ‘triangle’ and ‘two’—and, for that matter,
of all other things—are essentially constituted by virtue of this internal causality. For
all intents and purposes, this means that these essences qua essences are self-con-
stituted and self-caused.
Avicenna goes on to contrast this internal, essential causality proper to essence
with “the prior in causality” (al-mutaqaddim bi-l-ʿilliyyah) and “the cause of exis-
tence” (ʿillah li-wujūd), which, as should be clear by now, pertain to the external con-
comitants of essence. Although one could presume that only this latter aspect deals
with causality proper and existence proper, this would be to miss the point entirely.
For, as we saw above, the prior by essence is also explicitly called a cause (ʿillah). It is
a cause for the inner constitution of the essence. It is, moreover, a cause of the inter-
nal and constitutive being of quiddity as an intelligible entity, making it conceivable
in abstraction from realized existence. Thus, essence and realized existence have dif-

 On a purely etymological consideration, there is no valid reason to dismiss the root q-w-m as
expressing anything less than existence (wujūd), a meaning which has endured up to the modern pe-
riod (one of the translations in Wehr’s Dictionary for qāma/yaqūmu is “to be, exist, be existent”). Al-
though Avicenna usually opts for qiwām in order to express the mode in which the constitutive parts
of quiddity are realized, he sometimes uses the term wujūd as well; this is the case, for instance, in
Notes, 394, section 698, where it is said that “[the differentia] ‘rational’ makes possible the existence
of animalness” (al-nāṭiq bihi yaṣṣihu wujūd al-ḥayawāniyyah). Why scholars of Avicenna generally
avoid translating words derived from the q-w-m root in an ontological sense, especially when they
are applied to essence, is due, presumably, to the assumption that quiddity has no existence of its
own and bears no direct relation to existence. But, at the very least, the ‘realization’ and ‘subsistence’
of quiddity in the mind should be regarded as implying a kind of intelligible existence.
 Avicenna, Notes, section 773, 426‒427.
558 IV The Special Ontological Mode of Quiddity in Itself

ferent kinds of causality. The former is intrinsic and self-constitutive, the latter exter-
nal, synthetic, and concomitant.²⁸⁶ This self-constitution explains also why the pure
quiddities never undergo variation or difference. As a passage of Notes explains, “an-
imalness does not differ inasmuch as it is animalness, because this quidditative
meaning is realized in itself [or by virtue of its essence]” (fa-l-ḥayawāniyyah lā yakh-
talifu min ḥaythu hiya ḥayawāniyyah li-anna hādhā l-maʿnā yaḥṣulu bi-dhātihi].²⁸⁷
What is more, there is a sense in which pure quiddity is a cause for its external
and non-constitutive concomitants as well. Given that the latter essentially follow
and are posterior to quiddity, they depend on it and are necessitated by it. Avicenna
emphasizes this point in another passage of Notes:

Essence is not constituted by the concomitant [i. e., its external concomitants]; rather, essence
necessitates and entails it. Thus, [essence] is the cause [of the concomitant], whose existence de-
pends solely upon it (lā tataqawwamu l-dhāt bi-l-lāzim bal al-dhāt tūjibu l-lāzim wa-taqtaḍīhi fa-
hiya ʿillatuhu wa-bihā wujūduhu).²⁸⁸

It should be stressed that the master in this passage is not talking merely about log-
ical entailment (luzūm). As the terminology makes amply clear, he is focusing on the
causality of essence and intends this statement to reflect an ontological reality. In
another but closely related passage of the same work, he explains that “the concom-
itants are not internal to the true essences, but follow after the constitution of the
essences” (al-lawāzim lā tadkhulu fī l-ḥaqāʾiq bal talzamu baʿd taqawwama [or ta-
qawwum] al-ḥaqāʾiq).²⁸⁹ In this fashion, Avicenna seems to advocate a fundamental
distinction between two kinds of ontological realization: one pertaining to the mu-
qawwimāt and their proper existence inasmuch as they form a unitary concept
that can be grasped ‘in itself,’ and one pertaining to the lawāzim and the derivative
and acquired existence that characterizes them. Whereas the realization of existence
calls for an external cause, the realization of quiddity is internal, essential, and prior,
which is why Avicenna ascribes a different order of causality to the intrinsic being of
quiddity and to realized existence.²⁹⁰ Quiddity is self-realized, one might say, inas-
much as its constituents are internal to it and not acquired or obtained from the out-
side. The subsistence (qiwām) of quiddity that is achieved through this kind of inter-

 Cf. Bahmanyār, The Book of Validated Knowledge, 11, where he explains that the constituents of
the essence are bound together by an essential (dhātī) and internal (dākhil) principle, but are free of
an external (khārij) cause. This is the case of the relationship between humanness and animalness,
the former necessarily implying the latter. The emphasis here, as in Avicenna’s texts, is on the distinc-
tion between an internal organization of the essential constituents and an external causality that ap-
plies to the concomitants and accidents.
 Avicenna Notes, 394, section 699.
 Avicenna, Notes, 362, section 641.
 Avicenna, Notes, 544, section 959.
 Avicenna agues that quiddity possesses its own, internal, essential causality in Pointers, vol.1,
202.9 ff.
 3 Essential ‘realization’ and ‘subsistence’ and Avicenna’s theory of causality 559

nal realization should be regarded as another way of referring to the special intelli-
gible existence of pure quiddity. What is more, Avicenna also at times ascribes a cer-
tain causal role to quiddity in realizing its external concomitants. This is because
they are entailed and necessitated by essence, even though an external cause is
also required for their realization to occur.
Now, this self-realization and auto-causality of quiddity is first and foremost an
intelligible event, so that the comments made above pertain primarily to mental ex-
istence. Inasmuch as the quiddities can in themselves be conceived by the human
and divine intellects (see chapter V), and inasmuch as the intellectual ontologically
precedes the material, the intrinsic causality associated with pure quiddity will be
closely linked with its intelligible status in the intellect and thus with mental or in-
tellectual existence. One of Avicenna’s favorite examples to illustrate these notions is
the triangle, which he borrows from Aristotle, but adapts to his philosophical argu-
mentation.²⁹¹ The triangle is caused and realized in its essence and in its existence.
But what makes it subsist (qāʾim) or grants it essential subsistence (qiwām), and en-
sures its realization (taḥaqquq) as a pure quiddity, are its constituents (muqawwi-
māt), such as shapeness (shakliyyah), without which its essence cannot be conceived
in the mind and without which it loses its intelligible reality. This phenomenon is
hinted at linguistically by the common root of the terms qiwām and muqawwimāt.
So there are strong reasons to presume that the subsistence (qiwām), realization (ta-
ḥaqquq), and proper existence (wujūd khāṣṣ) of the pure quiddity triangleness in the
mind all refer to the same notions, namely, its essential, intelligible being and self-
causality, which make it an immediately cognizable concept in the intellect and pro-
vide it with its irreducible intelligible reality. This irreducible intelligible reality is ap-
prehended in abstraction from all other considerations and attributes, whether men-
tal or concrete.²⁹²
The hypothesis that essence is ‘realized’ not merely epistemically, but also onto-
logically, in virtue of its inner, essential structure reappears in other parts of the Avi-
cennian corpus. In Metaphysics II.2, Avicenna refers to the actualization or realiza-
tion of the nature of corporeality in itself (hiya fī nafsihā ṭabīʿah muḥaṣṣalah). This
refers to corporeality “with no added meaning” and no relation, which is realized
as such in the mind. Avicenna intends by this, one presumes, the realization of cor-
poreality as a pure essence in the mind, in abstraction from the other meanings or
concomitants that can be connected to it from the outside. He goes on to declare:

For the fact that a thing [al-shayʾ] is not found existing in actuality does not mean that its nature
is not realized. For indeed everything about whiteness and blackness is realized [in its] nature as

 It appears, for instance, in Categories, II.1, 60.17 ff.; and Pointers, vol. 1, 182, 199; vols. 3‒4, 441‒
442. cf. Introduction, I.6, 34.10‒15; and Metaphysics I.5.
 All of these terms are applied to the example of the quiddity ‘triangle,’ which, it should be re-
called, also appears in Metaphysics I.5 in connection with wujūd khāṣṣ.
560 IV The Special Ontological Mode of Quiddity in Itself

a specific quidditative meaning with the utmost degree of specificity, which is itself [mutaḥaṣṣil
al-ṭabīʿah maʿnā mukhaṣṣaṣ atamm takhṣīṣihi alladhī huwa fī dhātihi].²⁹³

It would appear, then, that the pure quiddities and natures are, in their very core,
self-realized by the constituents that underlie them, and that this kind of essential
and intelligible realization, which Avicenna contrasts to the realization of existence
(construed as a concomitant acquired from the outside), is already a mode of exis-
tence in itself in the intellect. In this regard it is also significant that Avicenna applies
the same ontological vocabulary to acquired existence and to the being of quiddity in
the mind: wujūd, taḥaqquq, qiwām, etc. Yet, in those passages where the master ap-
plies these terms to quiddity, he is in general cautious to stress the distinction be-
tween realized existence and quidditative being, or between the realization of
wujūd and the realization of māhiyyah, as in the passage of Pointers mentioned
above. Moreover, one should not conclude that quiddity is necessarily apprehended
as a composite or complex thing on the grounds that it subsists through its constit-
utive parts and is self-realized. Rather, as I showed in chapter II, it is conceived of as
a unified and simple concept, as a kind of transcendental intelligible object.²⁹⁴
How do these considerations relate specifically to Avicenna’s theory of the four
causes? And what are their implications for the causation of mental and concrete en-
tities? Bertolacci warned some time ago that there is probably no exact overlap be-
tween Avicenna’s theory of causality and the essence/existence distinction, a ques-
tion that was explored also by Wisnovsky.²⁹⁵ Nevertheless, the previous points
warrant a fresh, albeit brief, look at how causality relates to essence. Let us begin
with pure quiddity in the mind. Because the realization of quiddity is internal and
proper to it, one may say, in a way, that quiddity is self-caused. When Avicenna men-
tions the causes of quiddity in Pointers and the causes of thingness in Metaphysics
VI.5, he probably intends the causality inherent to essence that is fully internal to
it and attributable to its essential constituents.²⁹⁶ Now, Avicenna considers wujūd
to be a modulated term and notion (ism mushakkik), one of whose implications is
that existence can be said of things in a prior and posterior way. This aspect
would seem to apply to the priority of the pure quiddities in the human mind vis-
à-vis the concrete existents, at least when it comes to the artificial forms, which
find their inception in the mind before they are actualized in external reality. Addi-
tionally, the existence of pure quiddity can be said to be essentially prior to that of

 See Avicenna, Metaphysics, II.2, 70.1 ff.

 Avicenna, Pointers, vol. 1, 203.7‒8 explains: “All of the constitutive parts of quiddity are con-
ceived of together with quiddity, even though they do not come to the attention of the mind individ-
ually.”
 Bertolacci, The Doctrine; Wisnovsky, Towards a History. More precisely, it is doubtful whether
there is a neat correlation between the distinctions of immanent and transcendent causes, on the
one hand, and essence and existence, on the other.
 Avicenna, Metaphysics, VI.5, 292.11 ff.; Pointers, vol.1, 202.9 ff.
 3 Essential ‘realization’ and ‘subsistence’ and Avicenna’s theory of causality 561

the complex universal concept in the mind, as was shown in chapter II. Finally, there
is a sense in which all the forms and quiddities are prior intelligibly in the separate
intellects.²⁹⁷ Some of these aspects of the priority of essence in the mind are brought
together in a passage of Introduction:

Because the relation of all existent things to God and the angels [i. e., the separate intellects] is
[the same as] the relation of [human] artifacts to the productive soul [al-nafs al-ṣāniʿah], that
which is in God’s and the angels’ knowledge of the true nature [ḥaqīqah] of what is known
and apprehended of natural things exists prior to multiplicity.²⁹⁸

This segment compares the status of the artificial forms in the human mind to that of
the natural forms in the divine intellects. In this connection, two points are in order.
First, there can be little doubt that in those various cases the priority of quiddity is to
be identified with its ‘special’ or ‘proper existence’ (wujūd khāṣṣ), which belongs to it
in itself in abstraction from other things and as a purely intelligible object. Quiddity
and proper existence essentially and ontologically precede the essential concomi-
tants and realized existence, Avicenna tells us, in the way that the simple precedes
the complex.
Second, this priority of quiddity in the intellect should be connected with what
Avicenna says about the priority of essence as a final cause. It is precisely because
pure quiddity in the mind is self-realized and self-caused that, qua final cause, it
is prior to the other causes in the exterior world, which, unlike the final cause,
imply an external kind of realization and the postulation of exterior causes and con-
comitants (see section III.5). As Wisnovsky has shown in a detailed fashion, final
causality plays a crucial role in Avicenna’s metaphysics.²⁹⁹ It assumes a vital role
in particular in Avicenna’s explanation of cosmic reversion, the nature of the
human soul, and—crucially for our purposes—the relationship of essence and exis-
tence. What is more, the master also follows in some of his works a Neoplatonic in-
terpretation of Aristotle that defines the material and formal causes as immanent and
the efficient and final causes as extrinsic or transcendent to their object. Finally, in
many of his works, Avicenna correlates efficient causality with the causation of (re-
alized) existence and final causality with essence, with the latter in turn serving as a
linchpin for his doctrines about the substantial perfection and completion of being.
By building on Neoplatonic sources and precedents, Avicenna is able to articulate an
account of ontological reversion and perfection in terms of final causality and the
teleological actualization of potentialities.

 Black, Mental Existence, 21, “natures pre-exist prior to multiplicity in the separate intellects, in
particular the closest of these to us, the Agent Intellect.” I shall discuss this point in detail in chapter
V.
 Avicenna, Introduction, I.12, 69.10‒12; transl. Marmura, Avicenna’s Chapter on Universals, 50.
 Wisnovsky, Towards a History; idem, Avicenna’s Metaphysics.
562 IV The Special Ontological Mode of Quiddity in Itself

Like Aristotle, Avicenna often correlates the formal cause and the final cause,
but he places an increased metaphysical emphasis on the latter notion.³⁰⁰ When it
comes to the artificial forms in the human mind, these should be connected with
both types of causality: the architect has the form and essential structure of the
house in his mind (the formal cause) and his building activity tends towards an
end that coincides with this form in his mind (the final cause). By extension, the
same can be said about all the quiddities of natural things that are located in the
Agent Intellect, the Giver of Forms. Formal and final causality overlap in the mode
of existence of the quiddities in that separate intellect, which fulfils the same role
with regard to nature—analogically speaking—that the architect does with regard
to the artificial form of house.³⁰¹ Hence, Avicenna establishes a crucial correlation
between quiddity/thingness and final causality in the human intellect. He often de-
scribes quiddity (māhiyyah), thingness (shayʾiyyah), and the quidditative meaning
(maʿnā) as a final cause in the human intellect, a claim that rests on the conceiva-
bility of these notions and the fact that their apprehension may occur without
their having a corresponding entity in exterior reality. In this connection, Avicenna
argues that quiddity qua final cause essentially and teleologically precedes the effi-
cient cause. In some passages he describes the final cause as “the cause of the effi-
cient cause” and “the reason why the other causes actually exist as causes.”³⁰² The
master therefore intends these comments to apply with special force to the sphere of
rational thought and intellectuality, where quiddity can be conceived of in itself and
in abstraction from existence. Indeed, in those passages where Avicenna is discus-
sing the priority of final causality, his focus is chiefly on the intellect. The final
cause is essentially prior in the intellect that is thinking it, but it is posterior in
terms of the realization of existence in the concrete world.³⁰³
But how exactly does this fit in Avicenna’s ontology of pure quiddity? Is this pri-
ority of quiddity and thingness qua final cause in the mind itself connected with a
kind of essential intelligible existence? Avicenna appears to answer this question
in the affirmative. In Metaphysics, he explains that:

Text 36: The final cause is prior to the other causes in its existence in the soul [fī wujūdihā fī l-
nafs]. As for [the final cause’s being prior to the other causes] in the agent’s soul, this is because

 For instance, in Physics I.11, Avicenna seems to collapse the formal, final, and efficient causes in
his discussion of natural phenomena; see Bertolacci, The Doctrine, 151.
 For an insightful study of Avicenna’s theory of material and formal causality, see Bertolacci, The
Doctrine.
 Avicenna, Metaphysics, VI.5, 292.6‒7.
 This point is emphasized, and also presented as a problem, in Wisnovsky, Avicenna’s Metaphy-
sics, 175. In certain Avicennian texts, the causality of the final cause seems to be restricted to the
sphere of intentionality and thought. Wisnovsky alleviates this problem by reminding us that Avicen-
na collapses the final and formal causes in natural beings as well, so that the essential forms of nat-
ural things also represent their ends. For me the main point concerns the relation between quiddity
and mental existence.
 3 Essential ‘realization’ and ‘subsistence’ and Avicenna’s theory of causality 563

it [the final cause] comes to exist first and then agency, seeking out a receptive patient, and the
quality of the form come to be represented as images … . In terms of thingness and in terms of
existence in the intellect [fī iʿtibār al-shayʾiyyah wa-iʿtibār al-wujūd fī l-ʿaql], there is no cause
prior to the final [cause]; instead, it is a cause of the rest of the causes’ becoming causes … .
The final cause is a cause not insofar as it is an existent, but insofar as it is a thing.³⁰⁴

Two important points emerge from this passage. First, thingness or quiddity possess-
es its own existence in the intellect qua final cause. Second, this mode of existence
should be distinguished from the realized existence that is associated with the effi-
cient cause, and which is itself a cause of the final cause in concreto. That Avicenna is
referring here to a special intelligible mode of existence proper to thingness and
quiddity cannot be doubted, given that quiddity or thingness is the final cause
that causes the efficient cause to exist in the first place. This efficient cause, which
is entailed by the intelligible final cause, is in turn responsible for endowing beings
with their realized or acquired existence in the concrete world. In sum, those passag-
es in which Avicenna discourses on the final causality of quiddity lend some weight
to the idea that pure quiddity or thingness in the mind is endowed with its own mode
of existence, which has nothing to do with efficient causality and realized existence.
Although the same point holds in the case of the concrete individual beings, where
essence exists inherently as a formal-final cause, it applies with particular strength
to the context of intellectual activity and thought, both human and divine, where
pure quiddity can be apprehended in itself.
In this connection, it is remarkable that Avicenna specifies that the final cause in
the intellect is a cause not qua existent, but qua thing. In other words, it is a cause
qua essence or quiddity. Or, as Avicenna puts it in Metaphysics VI.5, it is a cause
thanks to its thingness (shayʾiyyah).³⁰⁵ Naturally, the master is not saying that the
final cause in the mind does not have, as such, any existence at all, since he states
at the beginning of the passage that “the final cause is prior to the other causes in its
existence in the soul.” Rather, his comments pertain to the proper existence of thing-
ness in the mind, as opposed to the realized existence of concrete existents. Pure
quiddity in the intellect is a final cause for the other causes, whose existence is, in
contrast, realized in the concrete world. The emphasis placed on the intelligibility
of the final cause is strengthened by the latter’s ascription to the divine intellects
as well. In that case, nothing will be prior in existence to the pure quiddities qua
final causes in the divine intellects. This doctrine ultimately culminates in the self-
thinking māhiyyah and maʿnā of God, who is a universal and absolute final cause
for everything else.³⁰⁶ Regardless of whether one studies it in its human or divine

 Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Cure, VI.5, 293.5‒10. The translation is taken from Wisnovsky, Avi-
cenna’s Metaphysics, 162. For an insightful discussion of this passage and the reciprocity of efficient
and final causality in Avicenna, see Wisnovsky, Avicenna’s Metaphysics, 162 ff.
 Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Cure, VI.5, 292.6 ff.
 See Avicenna, Metaphysics, VI.5, 293.12 ff.
564 IV The Special Ontological Mode of Quiddity in Itself

contexts, the final cause qua thingness or quiddity in the intellect, Avicenna argues,
is itself uncaused. By ‘uncaused’ here I mean that quiddity is devoid of external caus-
es, in spite of the fact that Avicenna also at times alludes to the internal causality of
thingness or quiddity, by which he means the relationship of the constitutive ele-
ments of essence, which make it what it is. This unique state of exterior uncaused-
ness and internal self-causedness explains why thingness qua final cause in the in-
tellect is prior to all the other causes. In this intellectual domain, nothing prior can
cause its reality and essential being, and it is, by virtue of itself, a self-constituted
intelligible. This intelligible priority of the final cause in the mind should be connect-
ed with Avicenna’s remarks concerning the priority of pure quiddity as well as, more
generally, the priority of the intellectual over the material. It is on account of these
points that Avicenna intimates that quiddity qua final cause “possesses [its own]
being” (li-annahā dhāt kawn).³⁰⁷
We may therefore conclude that thingness or quiddity amounts to a formal and
final cause in Avicenna’s metaphysics.³⁰⁸ However, its status as a self-constituted,
self-caused, intelligibly existent final cause in the human intellect is primordial.
Quiddity possesses its own internal causality, which is inherent to it, and which
makes the thing that it is and provides it with its thingness. This intelligible reality
is granted by the essential constituents (muqawwimāt) of the thing and is expressed,
for example, in the triangle’s shapeness, or what makes blackness blackness, which

 Avicenna, Metaphysics, VI.5, 293.15. This statement is likely a reference to the special being of the
final cause qua quiddity. Marmura angles in this direction as well in his commentary (see Avicenna,
The Metaphysics, 411, notes 19 and 20). The previous analysis nevertheless requires two clarifications:
first, the final cause qua thingness is not essentially caused by an exterior cause, although its reali-
zation in external reality is due to an efficient cause. Yet, one may wonder, is there not also an effi-
cient cause that causes quiddity to exist as such in the mind? In the passages under discussion, Avi-
cenna limits the sphere of efficient causality to the external, concrete world, his point being that the
final cause can exist as a concept in the mind before being actualized concretely. The position taken
in this study is that, inasmuch as one can ascribe efficient causes to concepts in the mind, they can
only be connected with the complex universal concepts, not with the pure quiddities. Second, thing-
ness can be said to be internally caused, in the sense that it possesses internal constituents that are
bound together to form a certain quidditative unity and meaning (this is reflected in the multiplicity
expressed by the definition of a thing). But it is important to point out that Avicenna regards this kind
of essential causality as fundamentally ungraspable. This is why one can account demonstratively for
the factuality of realized existence, but not for the foundational cause of proper existence and the
inner structure of quiddity. In other words, there cannot be a demonstration of why, say, the defini-
tional elements and quidditative parts of a tree make that thing a tree and not a stone. Ultimately, I
surmise that Avicenna solves this problem by relating the individual realities and quiddities to God’s
absolute reality and quiddity (see chapter V). At any rate, this consideration does not make the final
cause dependent on something exterior for its inner being and reality.
 Making quiddity in itself in the mind the final cause also has the merit of explaining how the
quidditative maʿnā could be said to exist in the mind prior to the other causes, as well as—in a quali-
fied way—in the concrete object together with the other causes. Pure quiddity, qua maʿnā and final
cause, would therefore be both immanent and transcendent to the concrete existent, in a way that the
universal concept could not.
 3 Essential ‘realization’ and ‘subsistence’ and Avicenna’s theory of causality 565

is immediately conceivable in the mind and possesses an irreducible intelligible

being. What is more, it appears that the final causality of quiddity or thingness
vis-à-vis the other causes—what makes it the cause of all the other causes—derives
precisely from this state of internal coherence and essential self-causation. In sum,
a pure quiddity is a final cause in virtue of its essential and intelligible being,
which precedes causality and existence in the concrete world. When applied to the
mental context, this ‘causality of thingness’ (ʿilliyyat al-shayʾiyyah) could also be
used express the causal priority of quiddity with regard to its mental concomitants
(lawāzim), such as oneness and universality, and, hence, its priority vis-à-vis the uni-
versals. Pure quiddity encapsulates triangle in itself or ‘what it is to be a triangle,’
regardless of whether ‘this’ or ‘that’ particular triangle exists or whether one appre-
hends triangle in connection with multiplicity.³⁰⁹
On the basis of these remarks, one can surmise that, if the divine intellects con-
template the quiddities, then the quiddities qua final causes in those intellects would
essentially and ontologically precede the efficient causation of concrete individuals
in the sublunary world. For example, the quiddity humanness in the divine intellects
would essentially precede individual humans and therefore also the efficient and
material causes that give rise to these concrete entities. What would be true of the
divine intellects would be eminently true of God: if God were to intellect the quiddi-
ties, this intellection would essentially precede their actualization in the concrete
world. This hypothesis of a divine intellection that precedes the material instantia-
tion of essence is encapsulated in the notion of the universal ‘prior to multiplicity’
that Avicenna outlines at the beginning of Introduction I.12, as well as in another pas-
sage of this work at I.12, 69.7‒18 (see Text 45). As Bertolacci aptly noted, the status
and activity of the Agent Intellect bring together the formal and efficient causes, in-
asmuch as this Intellect causes forms to exist in the sublunary world through its
demiurgic agency.³¹⁰ But, building on Bertolacci, it may be said in this case that
three, not two, causes are brought together in this being: the formal, efficient, and
final causes, the first two of which stem, in a sense, from the priority of the final
cause in that superlunary intellect.
Moving on to the concrete existents, the questions of the relation between es-
sence and causality in this context and of how exactly quiddity comes to be realized

 Avicenna, however, does not discuss this second plane of final causality in the mind, which
again raises the question already asked earlier: could the universal not already be regarded as requir-
ing an efficient cause for its realization and existence in the mind? If answered in the affirmative,
could the final cause still be said to precede the efficient cause when it comes to mental existents?
After all, complex concepts in the mind (i.e., quiddities together with their mental concomitants)
need a cause for their unification and complex existence.
 Bertolacci, The Doctrine, 152, note 129: “The concept itself of the Giver of Forms as an efficient
cause implies a tight relationship between formal and efficient causality.”
566 IV The Special Ontological Mode of Quiddity in Itself

ontologically and causally in those existents are nebulous.³¹¹ In one passage of Point-
ers, where he is speaking about concrete existence, Avicenna contrasts “the causes of
quiddity” (asbāb al-māhiyyah) and “the causes of existence” (asbāb al-wujūd) and
correlates the former with the material and formal causes and the latter with the ef-
ficient and final causes.³¹² The underlying idea seems to be that whereas the former
pertain to the essential nature of a thing and are immanent in it, the latter pertain to
existence as an added concomitant and therefore refer to an exterior cause. As was
shown previously, connecting formal causality with essence (whether in the mind or
in the concrete) is a key Avicennian move, which is also an elaboration on a well-es-
tablished Aristotelian doctrine. Since essence exists in composite beings primarily as
form, and since Avicenna regards form as one of the four causes of concrete beings,
then essence will amount to a formal cause in the concrete being, e. g., the nature
and form of humanness in Socrates. In that sense, the species-form human is an in-
herent form and an inherent cause and principle of the individual, and it is also a
part (juzʾ) of the composite substance. In conveying the thingness and whatness
of a thing, quiddity encapsulates, so to speak, the material and especially the formal
principles of an existent. In that sense, the pure quiddity humanness suggests ration-
ality and speech as well as corporeality and body. In this particular passage of Point-
ers, Avicenna explains that the quiddity triangle points to the formal and material
causes of triangle. Whereas the formal cause is indistinguishable from the essence
of triangle, even in the mind, the materiality of triangle is only realized in concrete
existence. Nevertheless, figureness or shapeness (shakliyyah), as well as the fact that
the triangle has sides and lines, make it clear that, whenever triangle actually exists
in the concrete, it must be endowed materially with these features; and this material
aspect is accounted for in the very definition of triangle. It is perhaps in this sense
that the material and especially the formal causes can be regarded as being internal
to the thing itself and, in that regard, closely tied with essence or quiddity. This ex-
plains Avicenna’s strong correlation of quiddity and form even with regard to con-
crete realization and existence. Thus, in Physics I.10, he states that “form [ṣūrah]
may be said of quiddity [māhiyyah], which, when it is realized [ḥaṣalat] in matter,

 One helpful study in this connection is Bertolacci, The Doctrine, especially 152‒154. As Bertolac-
ci notes, the formal and material causes can be regarded as causes of existence or of the concrete
realization of the thing in addition to the efficient cause, a view which Avicenna sometimes seems
inclined to adopt. By extension, quiddity in the concrete can be connected with formal, material,
and even efficient causality in Avicenna’s metaphysics, albeit in different ways.
 For a discussion of this passage, see Wisnovsky, Towards a History, 66‒68. Wisnovsky argues
that Avicenna’s framework for discussing causality evolved over the course of his career from one fo-
cusing on the immanence-transcendence distinction (inherited from Neoplatonism) to one focusing
on the essence-existence distinction, which Avicenna devised. Accordingly, the formal and material
causes are immanent in the thing, while the efficient and final causes are transcendent. Although, as
Wisnovsky rightly points out, the emphasis in this passage of Pointers is on the essence-existence
distinction, I think that the two frameworks are compatible and were not designed to be mutually
exclusive.
 3 Essential ‘realization’ and ‘subsistence’ and Avicenna’s theory of causality 567

constitutes it [qawwamathā] as a species.”³¹³ In other words, form and matter are

parts (sing. juzʾ) and principles of the composite existent, although one, namely
form, is actual, whereas the other, namely matter, is potential. Moreover, form is pri-
marily what realizes quiddity in the concrete. Here the link between Avicenna’s mer-
eological construal of essence in concrete reality—already broached in chapter III—
and his theory of causality come together: it was shown previously that form, which
conveys essence, can be regarded as a part of the composite and, it now appears, as
one of the causes (ʿillah) and principles (mabdaʾ) of existence as well. By the same
token, when Avicenna speaks of quiddity and form as a part of the concrete individ-
ual (as in Metaphysics VI.1), this implies their participation in the existentiation of
that thing through formal, final, and even, to some extent, efficient causality.
Thus, to return to Avicenna’s example of triangle, the parts (ajzāʾ) of triangle,
which necessarily accompany and constitute the essence triangle and are responsible
for its subsistence (qiwām), are also in a qualified sense causes (asbāb, ʿilal) of the
existence of triangle through final, formal, material, and even, it seems, efficient cau-
sality. The foregoing hypothesis seems confirmed—at the very least with regard to the
essential formal cause—by this statement taken from Physics I.2:

Text 37: Form is distinct from privation in that the form is, in itself, a certain quiddity [al-ṣūrah
māhiyyah mā bi-nafsihā] that adds existence to the existence that matter possesses [zāʾidat al-
wujūd ʿalā l-wujūd alladhī li-l-hayūlā], whereas privation does not add to the existence that be-
longs to matter.³¹⁴

Here the formal cause is clearly defined as essence or quiddity, and it is moreover
described as being responsible for causing one aspect of the existence of the compo-
site being. There can be little doubt that Avicenna’s comments go beyond a purely
conceptualist framework and point to essence and form as ontological and causal
principles of the natural beings. Since Avicenna closely connects the formal and
final causes in concrete beings, one may proceed to describe quiddity in concrete be-
ings as a formal-final cause.³¹⁵ In some cases, it will not only provide the essential
structure and properties of a thing, but also complete and perfect its substance
(e. g., the rational soul or rationality as the formal-final cause of the human
being). It is in this regard that essence can also be regarded as an immanent final
cause. So that, given their nature, the ultimate ontological perfection of human be-
ings will be to actualize fully their rationality by reflecting on the intelligible forms
and connecting with the Agent Intellect.³¹⁶ It is also in this regard that all the quid-

 Avicenna, Physics, I.10, 70.1‒2.

 Avicenna, Physics, I.2, 21.5‒7.
 Avicenna, Notes, 377, section 670: “the ends in natural things are the very existence of form in
matter.”
 See Wisnovsky, Avicenna’s Metaphysics, 126‒139, especially 132. As Wisnovsky explains, “ends
that are immanent in the patient are forms contained in matter; that is to say, they are natures, es-
568 IV The Special Ontological Mode of Quiddity in Itself

dities and forms in the human mind, and not merely the artificial forms, can be re-
garded as final causes in their own right: they all participate in the gnoseological
and ontological realization and perfection of the soul through the acquisition of in-
tellectual knowledge and the activity of theoretical contemplation.
In this manner, as Wisnovsky showed, Avicenna follows, but also builds on, a
well-established Neoplatonic precedent that regards final causes as both immanent
in and transcendent of their effects. In Avicenna’s system, the final cause cannot be a
transcendent cause in the manner of a Platonic form, since Avicenna adamantly re-
jects that philosophical doctrine. But given that the pure quiddities exist in the di-
vine intellects (this is discussed in chapter V), pure quiddity can be regarded as
the principle that connects the final causality inherent in beings with the final cau-
sality associated with cosmic reversion and the intellectual activity of the Agent In-
tellect. Positing the existence of the pure quiddities in concrete individuals and in
the human and divine intellects helps to explain Avicenna’s dual theorization of
final causality as inhering in and transcending individual things. It is the special ex-
istence of pure quiddity in the human and divine contexts that connects these two
levels of final causality and enables us to regard it as both inherent and transcen-
dent. To conclude, the analysis has shown that quiddity plays a crucial role in Avi-
cenna’s explanation of causality and how it relates to existence: a primary role when
it comes to intellectual existence, where the inherent and essential formal and final
causality of quiddity define it as something self-caused and prior to the complex ex-
istents and, hence, to the other causes in external reality; and an instrumental, but
by no means negligible, role with regard to concrete existence, where quiddity can be
connected with the material and formal causes of a thing, and even, in a qualified
sense, with immanent final causality (e. g., the human soul) and efficient causality
(in the case of the Agent Intellect and the artificial forms in the human intellect).

4 Substance, essence, and the metaphysical inquiry

One upshot of the previous comments is that proper existence is an ontological mode
equally deserving of scrutiny and included, together with realized existence, in the
subject matter of the metaphysical inquiry. What is more, realized existence and
proper existence both fall within the scope of ontological modulation (tashkīk al-
wujūd), which examines not only the states (aḥwāl) of the categorial beings, but
also the mode of existence of the supernal intellects and of the First Itself. This ob-
servation is methodologically relevant, because God’s existence is His quiddity and
so amounts to a kind of essential being. Thus, theology would be based ultimately on

sences, and quiddities.” The best example of a formal-final cause in the patient is the form of human-
ness, which is both the essential form of a human being and also an end and final cause in that it
endows the human being with the intellectuality and rationality it needs to perfect its nature and
connect it with the transcendent final cause that is the Agent Intellect.
 4 Substance, essence, and the metaphysical inquiry 569

the study of the divine proper existence, making this query also one of the main
goals (maṭālib) of metaphysics as a whole. By implication, there is a sense according
to which ontology in general, or general metaphysics, would be based on the study of
quiddities and their mode of existence, not only by derivation from the divine case,
but also on account of the ontological priority, irreducibility, and ubiquity of quiddity
in Avicenna’s philosophy. Yet, in this particular context, the question of how the
proper existence of quiddity relates to substance, and especially to substance
taken as whole or sunolon (together with the external and non-constitutive attributes
of essence), calls for additional comments.
In order to shed light on this topic, the relationship between quiddity and sub-
stance in Avicenna’s philosophy must be tackled, since it bears directly on how ex-
istence relates to quiddity in itself. Avicenna’s views on this issue, however, are any-
thing but simple, as they display different and not immediately reconcilable
elements. At first blush, Avicenna’s conception of substance seems to overlap neatly
with the Stagirite’s theories of ousia and with a standard interpretation of Categories.
Like Aristotle, Avicenna recognizes primary substances (individual concrete beings)
and secondary substances (universal concepts in the mind). Moreover, Avicenna
adopts the basic distinction put forth by Aristotle between ‘present-in’ and ‘not pre-
sent-in,’ which is conveyed in his works by the Arabic expressions fī mawḍūʿ (and al-
mawjūd fī mawḍūʿ) and lā fī mawḍūʿ (al-mawjūd lā fī mawḍūʿ), which serve to under-
score the basic distinction between substances and accidents. Whereas the former
exist ‘not in a subject,’ the latter exist ‘in a subject.’ Thus, for Avicenna, as for Aris-
totle, substance is defined chiefly in relation to extramental existence, with the im-
plication that substances are primarily co-extensive with the individual existents of
the concrete world. According to Avicenna, substance is, first and foremost, that con-
crete being that can be pointed to (al-mushār ilayhi) and that possesses existence ‘in
itself’ or ‘from itself’ (bi-dhātihi, min dhātihi), and which therefore does not rely on
another for its existence and does not exist in a subject. Accordingly, Avicenna’s
standard definition of substance or jawhar is ‘that which exists not in a subject’
(al-mawjūd lā fī mawḍūʿ).³¹⁷ This immediately separates substances from their acci-
dents (aʿrāḍ), which, in contrast, exist only in a subject and are therefore dependent
on that exterior subject for their existence. Note that Avicenna’s conception of sub-

 This is the standard definition of the quiddity of substance, so to speak. Avicenna often refers to
the quiddities (māhiyyāt) of the categories, with the implication that each category, including sub-
stance, has a quiddity by which it is conceived of and defined in the mind; see, e. g., Avicenna, Met-
aphysics, III.1, 93.5 and 11, and III.8, 140.9 ff., where the master refers to the quiddity of substance (mā-
hiyyat al-jawhar) and the quiddities of the categories (māhiyyatihā). In the logical works, as in
Categories, Avicenna’s entire analysis is based on the notion of quiddity, which enables us to conceive
of the category as a thing in itself and its special existence, and also allows us to relate it intellectally
to other things in concrete existence. Framing the discussion of the logical categories in terms of
quiddity seems to be proper to Avicenna and should of course be related to his doctrine of māhiyyah
as something that is eminently conceivable in the mind and can be considered under various aspects,
with or without relations, as existing in the mind or in concrete reality, etc.
570 IV The Special Ontological Mode of Quiddity in Itself

stances and of the fact that they possess existence in or from themselves does not
imply that substances are uncaused or lack a cause. Rather, the point is that the ex-
istence they acquire from their cause can be said to belong to them alone and to
nothing else, making them the unique recipients and subjects of their existence.
Upon closer examination, however, it becomes clear that there are salient fea-
tures that demarcate Avicenna’s approach from previous treatments of substance.
Recent studies on Avicenna’s reception and interpretation of Aristotle’s Categories
have underlined the numerous elaborations the Arabic thinker initiated on the
Greek and early Arabic legacy of this treatise. Perhaps the most fundamental of
these elaborations concerns Avicenna’s conception of the overall scope and nature
of Aristotle’s treatise, which he decisively reorients toward metaphysics and away
from logic. This means that the discussion of the categories, and of substance in par-
ticular, perceived by many as a logical inquiry dealing solely with words and notions
in the mind, is thoroughly ontologized in Avicenna’s system and anchored in a met-
aphysical framework. For Avicenna, the investigation into the categories is primarily
a metaphysical project whose ramifications extend to ontology and even to theolo-
gy.³¹⁸ In light of this quite drastic rehandling of the function and scope of Categories,
it is not surprising that Avicenna’s conception of substance is characterized by sev-
eral original features. For my purposes, the most thought-provoking one concerns the
relation between essence and substance and Avicenna’s tendency to discuss sub-
stance in light of the notion of quiddity. As Benevich remarked in a recent article de-
voted to this issue, “Avicenna lays a strong emphasis on the notions of essence and
quiddity of a thing while he defines substance and accident.”³¹⁹ This is noticeable in
the definitions of substance Avicenna provides in his works. At Metaphysics I.5, for
example, the master attributes the term mawjūd in a primary and eminent way to
“the quiddity of substance”:

Text 38: We say: Although the existent [al-mawjūd], as you learned, is not a genus and is not
predicated equally of what is beneath it, it has a meaning agreed upon with respect to priority
and posteriority [ʿalā l-taqdīm wa-l-taʾkhīr]. The first thing to which it [the notion of ‘the existent’

 For penetrating insight into Avicenna’s conception of the categories and of substance in partic-
ular, see Bäck, Avicenna’s Ontological Pentagon; Kukkonen, Dividing Being; Benevich, Fire and Heat;
and Kalbarczyk, Predication, especially 26. These studies have established two vital points regarding
Avicenna’s interpretation of Aristotle’s Categories, which inform my analysis of substance. First, Avi-
cenna removes the inquiry into the categories from its original logical context and places it squarely
within the frame of the science of metaphysics, thereby breaking with a long Greek tradition that had
defined the main function of this treatise as a propaedeutic to logic alongside Porphyry’s Eisagoge.
Second, Avicenna expands the notion of substance to include the immaterial beings and separate in-
tellects. In doing so, he departs from earlier Arabic thinkers who restrict the categories to the material
primary substances of the world.
 Benevich, Fire and Heat, 257; see also Kalbarczyk, Predication, 61 ff.
 4 Substance, essence, and the metaphysical inquiry 571

or existence] can be applied is the quiddity that is substance, and then to what comes after it
[wa-awwal mā yakūn li-l-māhiyyah allatī hiya l-jawhar thumma yakūn li-mā baʿdahu].³²⁰

In other passages, Avicenna contrasts the quiddity of substance to the quiddity of

accident, and he also at times refers more generally to the quiddities (māhiyyāt) of
the categories. For instance, at Categories I.6, it is said that “the reality of the essence
[ḥaqīqat dhātihi] [of substance] is to exist not in a subject,” while the quiddity of ac-
cident (māhiyyatahu) is to be realized and existent in another thing.³²¹ This habit of
talking of the ‘quiddities’ of the Aristotelian categories, including substance, is typ-
ically Avicennian and establishes from the outset a narrow link between quiddity
and substance. This approach is further amplified by the master’s description of
every true substance as that which, in its very essence or quiddity, exists not in a sub-
ject. Thus, for example, it is in the quiddity or essence of ‘horse’ to exist not in a sub-
ject, where horse refers to the essence horseness. In contrast, accidents have a quid-
dity that prevents them from existing in themselves in an autonomous way and
separately from other beings. Accidents, by essence, need a subject to exist.³²²
I should insist at this juncture that Avicenna conceives of the proposition ‘that
which exists not in a subject’ as referring either exclusively or primarily to the indi-
vidual beings of the external, concrete world. Indeed, the main condition for a thing
to be a substance is for it to exist not in a subject in the concrete world. As Avicenna
puts it in Metaphysics, “the quiddity of substance is substance with the meaning that
it is the existent not in a subject in concrete reality [fī l-aʿyān].”³²³ The essence of sub-
stance, therefore, is, at the very least, a potentially existent individual in extramental
reality. I say ‘potentially,’ because the description of substance can still apply to a
quiddity, which is not actually realized as such in concreto, but which, if it were to
be realized, would be a substance. This formulation, if it corresponds in part to Ar-
istotle’s definition of primary substance, nevertheless shifts the emphasis away from
the actually existing primary substance to the more theoretical aspect of the quiddity
of substance. More precisely, it stresses the fact that it is the quiddity that is poten-
tially realized in external reality qua primary substance. Hence, what seems particu-
larly innovative in Avicenna’s approach is that it identifies quiddity in itself, rather

 Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Cure, I.5, 34.16‒17; translation by Marmura in Avicenna, The Met-
aphysics, 27, slightly revised.
 Avicenna, Categories, 46. 8‒13.
 As Benevich, Fire and Heat, 259, noted, for Avicenna, “being a substance is something non-rela-
tional,” that is to say, it has to do with a thing’s quiddity or essence considered in itself and not in
relation to something else, i. e., an exterior subject. This author elsewhere refers to “the essential
character of being substance or accident” (255) and to Avicenna’s “essentialist approach to defining
the condition of being substance or accident” (266). The strong connection Avicenna establishes be-
tween essence and substance was likely inspired by passages of the Aristotelian corpus, such as Pos-
terior Analytics II.7 and Metaphysics Z, where Aristotle seems to construe substance in terms of es-
sence.
 Avicenna, Metaphysics, III.8, 140.9.
572 IV The Special Ontological Mode of Quiddity in Itself

than form or matter or the composite of the two, as the foundation for substantiality.
This formulation of substance, it should be noted, can apply equally to the material,
composite beings and to the separate, intellectual beings, which Avicenna sometimes
describes as substances and immaterial quiddities.³²⁴
Now, given that quiddity can be regarded in itself and with no relation to other
things, it is not surprising that Avicenna often portrays the ontological autonomy of
substance as corresponding to that of quiddity. For instance, in Metaphysics IV.2, he
remarks that “since it [the contingent existent] is a substance, it has a quiddity [mā-
hiyyah] that includes nothing of relation.”³²⁵ In another passage, he hints that what is
realized in existence is the quiddity of the substance (taḥqīq māhiyyat jawhar min al-
jawāhir).³²⁶ In chapter 3 of Philosophical Compendium, Avicenna describes one aspect
of substance as form (ṣūrah), which is immediately equated with the reality (ḥaqīqah)
and nature (ṭabīʿah) of a thing. Recall that the last two terms are synonyms of pure
quiddity in concrete beings and that Avicenna otherwise equates quiddity and form.
In the same passage, substance is also said to be like the soul (jān) or intellect (ʿaql)
of a human being. In chapter 25 of the same work, Avicenna proceeds to describe
substance as “that which has a true reality [ḥaqīqah] that does not exist in a subject
when the substance exists.” In the same style, he describes substance (jawhar) as
“that whose being is not in a subject and is a reality (ḥaqīqah) and a quiddity (mā-
hiyyah) whose being (hastī) is not receptive of another thing.”³²⁷ In other passages of
his works, Avicenna uses the notions of quiddity (māhiyyah) and substantiality (ja-
whariyyah) virtually to the same effect and with the same meaning in mind. This is
the case, for example, of the issue concerning the quiddity and substantiality of
numbers and quantities in Metaphysics III.1.³²⁸ Finally, at the beginning of the meta-

 See, for instance, Elements of Philosophy, 48.11, where substance is glossed as quiddity. Avicenna
also insists on this point particularly at the beginning of Metaphysics III.8 when he tackles the notion
of substance in connection with human knowledge. As shown below, Aristotle also establishes a nar-
row link between substance and essence, but I argue that Avicenna amplifies this aspect to make it
one of the cornerstones of his doctrine of substance. For various formulations of substance in Avicen-
na’s works, see Kalbarczyk, Predication, 77‒78 and note 197. One passage that brings home the point
that substance is quiddity and that substantiality has to do with the potentiality of quiddity to exist
not in a subject in the concrete world, rather than to actually exist as such in the concrete world, is
found in Pointers: substance “is a quiddity and a true nature whose existence only comes about as
being not in a subject.”
 Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Cure, IV.2, 178.1‒2. It should be noted that this statement appears
in the midst of an argument that Avicenna ultimately refutes. What is important for my purposes,
however, is the correlation between substance and quiddity that Avicenna makes in that passage.
This position is echoed in many other parts of his corpus where substance is expressly equated
with quiddity.
 Avicenna, Metaphysics, III.3, 106.12‒13. I return later to the notion of the realization (taḥqīq) of
quiddity.
 Avicenna, Philosophical Compendium, 9.13‒15.
 The issue of whether numbers exist as ‘pure quiddities’ or as ‘substances’ is virtually the same
and boils down to a matter of phrasing. This explains why Avicenna refers to numbers alternatively in
 4 Substance, essence, and the metaphysical inquiry 573

physics section of Elements of Philosophy, Avicenna explains that there are four kinds
of substances (jawāhir), the first of which is “immaterial quiddity” (al-māhiyyah bi-lā
māddah).³²⁹ The expression “immaterial quiddity” refers in this context to the beings
or forms that are not in matter, i. e., the separate intellects. Nevertheless, the phras-
ing is important, because it shows the synonymy of quiddity, form, and substance
when talking about the immaterial beings.³³⁰ What is more, Avicenna at Metaphysics
II.1 defines substance as that which has existence “in itself” or “essentially” (al-
wujūd alladhī bi-l-dhāt) and what is “self-subsistent” or “self-existent” (qāʾim bi-naf-
sihi).³³¹ In Categories, he employs a formula that is slightly divergent, but which con-
veys a similar intent: substance is what has existence “from itself” (min dhātihi).³³² In
both cases, the formulation takes into consideration the essence or quiddity of the
thing. Thus, to return to the first text, Avicenna explains that one example of sub-
stance is the existence of the human qua human (wujūd al-insān insānan). Now,
we know that for Avicenna what makes the human exist qua human is nothing
other than the pure quiddity humanness taken in itself (min ḥaythu hiya hiya). It is
the quiddity in itself humanness that makes human exist qua human and not qua
triangle or horse, and it is also this pure quiddity that determines human as a sub-
stance in the concrete world. Interestingly, the First, who is a quiddity (māhiyyah),
albeit not a substance (jawhar) in any straightforward sense, is also “self-subsistent”
or qāʾim bi-dhātihi. ³³³
On the basis of these passages one may infer that Avicenna, on one important
level, conceives of substance and substantiality in terms of quiddity. The master rou-
tinely refers in his works to ‘the quiddity of substance’ and to a thing’s existing on its
own and in itself and ‘not in a subject.’ He ties these notions to the very quiddity or
essence of an existent. Now, since all substances are or have quiddities to which this
definition applies, the notion of substance can be extended to all things taken ‘in
themselves’ and considered in terms of their essence alone. For instance, horseness
in itself or the essence of horse would appear to be primarily substance, because

terms of their quidditative natures and their substantiality; the crux of the problem in both cases is
whether number ‘in itself’ exists separately in the exterior world, as some ancient philosophers
would have it. Avicenna rejects the theory of the separate existence of numbers, just as he rejects
the separate existence of the natural quiddities, but he believes that numbers exist in the mind
and in concrete things; on this point, see Tahiri, Mathematics.
 Avicenna, Elements of Philosophy, 48.11‒12. The three others are (1) matter without form; (2) form
in matter; and (3) the composite of matter and form.
 Naturally, “immaterial quiddity” could also refer to the ideas in the mind. This would allow for
an alternative and more expansive interpretation of this sense of substance, which would include the
intellectual concepts as well. Although this hypothesis is ultimately correct, and although Avicenna
reserves a sense of substance for concepts in the intellect, I think the reference in Elements of Philos-
ophy is exclusively to the separate intellects.
 Avicenna, Metaphysics, II.1, 57.
 Avicenna, Categories, I.2, 10.13; see generally 10‒11.
 Avicenna, Notes, 572.11, section 996.
574 IV The Special Ontological Mode of Quiddity in Itself

each individual horse that comes to exist exists ‘not in a subject’ and as a fully au-
tonomous and self-contained entity, a state of affairs which is due to nothing other
than the pure quiddity horseness. In other words, it is determined by the very es-
sence of horseness for horses to exist not in a subject whenever they exist in the con-
crete world. In connecting substance so thoroughly with quiddity, Avicenna seems to
suggest that it is quiddity in itself that is the main criterion and cause of substantial-
ity in an entity, and that it its quiddity also that fulfills the primary sense of sub-
stance.
Avicenna’s move to define substantiality in terms of essence or quiddity is phil-
osophically coherent, given the primacy of the latter notion in his metaphysics. But it
has another implication that needs to be fleshed out with regard to the ontology of
quiddity: the previous interpretation would seem to make both concrete individuals
and intelligible concepts qualify as substances. For quiddities are not just found in
the exterior world; they are also apprehended by the mind and can be said to exist
intellectually as universals in the mind. Now, since concepts in the mind consist,
fundamentally, of pure quiddity, and since being a substance appears to be deter-
mined by the very essence or quiddity of a thing, then it is reasonable to infer
that concepts in the mind are also determined by a state of substantiality brought
about by pure quiddity. What is more, since the quiddities of substances exist in
the concrete world and in the mind, it seems that both concrete entities and mental
entities that have a common quiddity will all somehow qualify as substances. They
will possess their own, irreducible, substantial existence by virtue of this common
quiddity.³³⁴ Avicenna alludes to this line of reasoning in a passage of Categories of
Middle Compendium of Logic, when he writes the following:

Text 39: For the quidditative meaning humanness [maʿnā l-insāniyyah] entails substantiality [ja-
whariyyah] in one way or other. It may accidentally occur to humanness that it be considered
together with generality [ʿumūm], in which case it becomes a species [nawʿ], or that it be con-
sidered together with specificity [khuṣūṣ], in which case it becomes an individual. Indeed, the
substantiality of anything that is substance in itself [jawhar bi-dhātihi] does not cease when con-
sequent accidents are [added] to it, whichever these may be.³³⁵

This passage unequivocally supports the hypothesis that, fundamentally, it is pure

quiddity—in this case humanness—that conveys substantiality to realized entities
in the mind (the species human) and the concrete world (this individual Zayd). Be-

 There is an intriguing parallel in Avicenna’s philosophical system between the relationship of
pure quiddity and its concomitants and the relationship of substance and its accidents. This parallel
might explain why Avicenna sometimes describes the concomitants (sing., lāzim, lāḥiq) of quiddity as
accidents and attributes (sing., ʿaraḍ, ṣifah), a habit which has often proved vexing to his readers. The
previous remarks are all the more relevant, given that the definition of substance as something whose
existence is not related to another thing can only be strictly speaking attributed to pure quiddity,
which is the only thing that can be envisaged solely in itself.
 Avicenna, Categories of Middle Compendium of Logic, 332.5‒7.
 4 Substance, essence, and the metaphysical inquiry 575

yond and above the accidents and concomitants that attach to essence from the out-
side, substance is, for Avicenna, grounded in the quiddity in itself. One implication
of this position is that all the universal concepts of species and genera in the mind
will be substances as well. Although Avicenna is not typically expansive on the sub-
ject of the substantiality of mental entities, in Categories he forthrightly acknowledg-
es that concepts in the mind represent secondary substances and therefore qualify
for the status of substance as well:

Text 40: Individual [things] in concrete reality are substances, and the universal concept [al-
maʿqūl al-kullī] is also a substance. For it is correctly said of it that it is a quiddity [māhiyyah]
whose truth in concrete existence is not to be in a subject, not, [however], because it is the con-
cept of substance—for one may ponder about the concept of substance in itself and deem that it
is knowledge and accident, where the knowledge [of it] is an accidental thing [connected with]
the quiddity, and this is the accident. As for its quiddity, it is the quiddity of substance, and what
participates in substance with its quiddity is substance [wa-l mushārik li-l-jawhar bi-māhiyyatihi
jawhar] … . The universals of substances are substances in their quiddities [kulliyāt al-jawāhir ja-
wāhir fī māhiyyātihā].³³⁶

In this important passage, Avicenna perspicuously describes quiddities in the mind

as substances inasmuch as they are the universal concepts that correspond to the pri-
mary substances in extramental reality. Here the master adopts the common distinc-
tion between primary and secondary substances that characterizes much of the me-
dieval reception of Aristotle’s metaphysics. He follows Aristotle in regarding
universals as intellectual substances that can be predicated of primary substances,
but that are not present in them. Thus, the universal human in the mind is a sub-
stance that is said of individual concrete human beings. It fulfils the two criteria
that Aristotle had set out for these kinds of substances: it is said of (maqūl ʿalā)
and not present-in (lā fī mawḍūʿ) the concrete beings. However, what is remarkable
in this passage is that Avicenna makes pure quiddity the main foundation for the
substantiality of things, to the extent that concrete beings and universal concepts
are both said to be substances in virtue of their quiddities. Concepts are not substan-
ces by virtue of their conceptuality or the fact that they are known, which is acciden-
tal, but because of their quiddities, i. e., pure quiddities, which specify these things in
their very essence. These quiddities are present in the mind, just as they are present
in the concrete individuals.
In other passages, Avicenna proceeds to identify genera and species as likely
candidates for secondary substances, since they are directly predicated of the con-
crete individuals that are the primary substances.³³⁷ As a result, their existence in
the mind seems dependent on the existence of the concrete individuals in exterior

 Avicenna, Categories, III.1, 95.1‒11. At III.2, 100.11, Avicenna describes species and genus as in-
telligible or intellectual substances (jawāhir ʿaqliyyah). It is interesting in this passage that Avicenna
uses this expression to refer both to concepts in the mind and to the separate existents.
 Avicenna, Categories, III.1, 95.5 ff., 98.10 ff.
576 IV The Special Ontological Mode of Quiddity in Itself

reality. What connects the two, however, is quiddity. The concrete individual and the
universal substance share a common quiddity, e. g., horseness, whose nature it is,
whenever it exists in concrete reality, to exist ‘not in a subject’ and therefore be a
substance. In this regard, perhaps the most significant departure one finds in Avicen-
na’s treatment of Aristotle’s categorialism focuses on the notion of substance in the
mind in its connection with pure quiddity. More specifically, it appears that Avicenna
to some extent reshaped the Stagirite’s doctrines in light of his subjective distinction
between the universal and pure quiddity. This Avicennian distinction, which is not
found in Aristotle, requires a reconsideration of how substantiality can apply to es-
sences in the mind when they are apprehended in themselves. For Avicenna, the
state of substance is determined by the lack of a relationship between an essence
and another thing, since substance is an essence that can exist on its own and
thus be conceived of and considered as such in abstraction from other things.
Now, it is noteworthy that this description can accommodate the pure quiddities
in the mind, which, I have argued, exist in a true sense, and which are things that
are considered in themselves in abstraction from other things and external relations
(even if, admittedly, their knowledge or conception always implies an accidental re-
lation between knower and object of knowledge that is exterior to them). Avicenna’s
essentialist account of substance also allows for the quiddities in the mental sphere
to qualify as such. True, in some passages he insists that it is concrete existence (not
in a subject) that is the ultimate criterion for the substantiality of a thing, so that this
thing will necessarily have to exist in this mode in the real, concrete world in order to
qualify as a substance. But this condition is potential, not actual. It applies to the
essence that need not exist as such in actuality, but only potentially, that is, to the
essence that exists solely in the mind. Moreover, given that this condition or criterion
is attached to the quiddity of a thing specifically, and that quiddities also exist in a
mental context, where they can be envisaged solely in themselves and with no para-
sitical relation to what is external to them, the notion of substantiality does not seem
to be absolutely confined to the primary substances in concrete existence. This as-
sumption is vindicated by Avicenna’s recognition of secondary or mental substances
in Categories, as well as by his claim that substantiality proceeds from the quiddity
in itself. In other words, there are some grounds for transferring the autonomy of
‘being a substance’ that Avicenna attributes to concrete substances to the quiddities
in the mind when these are considered solely in themselves. Alternatively, one could
contend that the condition of concrete existence not in a subject is determined by the
very quiddity prior to its realization, so that this mode of existence necessarily occurs
when quiddity becomes realized in concrete existence. Either way, it is quiddity in
itself that appears to encapsulate substantiality. This interpretation, it should be
noted, is partly aligned with one of the senses of substance qua essence Aristotle
provides in Metaphysics Book Zeta, although Avicenna was keen to adapt it to this
doctrine of pure quiddity.
If it is the quiddities in themselves that are fundamentally or primitively substan-
ces, regardless of whether they are found in a concrete or mental context, then one
 4 Substance, essence, and the metaphysical inquiry 577

implication would seem to be that all quiddities that are conceived of in the mind
can be regarded—on one qualified sense—as substances. On this alternative reading,
any quiddity that is apprehended ‘in itself’ in the mind will, on one account, qualify
as substance, even if it does not find a match or correspondence in the concrete
world and amounts to a fictional or artificial form. Thus, the heptagonal house
will be substance, because it is a universal and conceivable essence in the mind,
and because, were it to exist in external reality, it would indeed exist not in a subject
and not qua accident. Considerably more disquieting is the hypothesis that even
those quiddities that are accidents proper in the concrete world could be said—
again, on this qualified sense, and when considered purely in themselves with no
external relations—to be kinds of substances in the mind. Thus, blackness, which al-
ways exists as an accident in concrete things, and which can also be described as a
universal accident in the mind, when construed in the mind qua quiddity in itself,
could in a sense amount to its own substance. This claim, which derives from the
strict correlation Avicenna establishes between essence and substance, might not
be as outlandish as it first looks. For the master does posit the possibility of the
pure conception of blackness in abstraction from its universality and, one surmises,
of its accidental nature as well; in short, in abstraction from its being a universal ac-
cident, since the nature of blackness is other than that of either universality or acci-
dentality. Indeed, the intelligible reality of ‘being blackness’ is other than ‘being an
accident’ or ‘being universal.’ This more inclusive construal of substance would ac-
commodate the presumption that all the forms in the intellect—which, for Avicenna,
exist in a strong sense and not merely by derivation—are also kinds of substances.
Yet, this would undermine the axiom reiterated by Avicenna on several occasions ac-
cording to which the same thing cannot be both accident and substance. So how can
one resolve this tension?
Avicenna himself seems at times to entertain in his works the possibility that all
quiddities are intellectual substances regardless of their categorial status. Again in
Categories he explains that being an accident is something external to and non-con-
stitutive of the essence of a thing, something that is related to its existence or real-
ization in the concrete world:

Text 41: The relation of ‘the accident’ to these nine [categories] is like the relation of ‘the exis-
tent’ to the quiddities [māhiyyāt] of these ten [categories] inasmuch as it is not internal to quid-
dity [i. e., not constitutive of it]. Just as ‘the existent’ is non-constitutive of the quiddity of these
ten [categories], so accidentality [al-ʿaraḍiyyah] is non-constitutive of the quiddity of these nine
[categories]. For this reason, being an accident [ʿaraḍ] is not present in the definition of a
thing.³³⁸

 Avicenna, Categories, II.2, 66.2‒5. Bäck’s more literal translation of the last sentence is perhaps
preferable (in Avicenna, Al-Maqūlāt, 120): “there is not present in the definition of a thing that it is an
accident.” In the same work, Avicenna defines existence as “a concomitant thing or entity” (amr
lāzim) (61.3‒4) and “as something that follows quiddity” (amr yalḥaqu l-māhiyyah) (62.3‒4).
578 IV The Special Ontological Mode of Quiddity in Itself

One finds a similar formulation in Categories of Middle Compendium of Logic:

Text 42: Likewise, if we know whiteness and heat, we know by necessity that they are both qual-
ities, whereas—as long as it has not been proven—it remains unclear to us that they are both
accidents [ʿaraḍān]. ‘Accident’ attaches to the nine and is not essential for them. Likewise, it
[accident] does not make known their essences but only makes known their relations to the sub-
ject; at first their essences exist in the intellect and only subsequently they become related to the
subject. Hence, it has become clear that neither ‘the existent’ nor ‘the accident’ is essential.³³⁹

If this is the case, then the definition and especially the quiddity as it is apprehended
in the mind ‘in itself’ and in abstraction from all other things could amount to an
intelligible substance, even when certain qualities such as blackness, whiteness, or
heat are concerned. Since the state of ‘accidentness’ is external to quiddity itself
and is something non-constitutive of essence, it is to be connected with realized ex-
istence in the concrete world. For existence itself is, like accidentness, external to
and non-constitutive of quiddity. The basic idea seems to be that ‘the accident’
and ‘the existent’ are connected in the realization of the essence in the concrete
world as two non-constitutive concomitants of quiddity. In contrast, pure quiddities
in the mind are essentially intelligible substances.
Avicenna enounces such a sense of jawhar in Definitions, although it remains un-
clear in that text whether he does so chiefly by way of report or whether he himself
would have embraced this definition. There he explains that “substance is said of the
essence of each thing [li-dhāt kull shayʾ], be it humanness or whiteness.”³⁴⁰ The mas-
ter returns to this point toward the end of the passage, where he mentions whiteness,
heat, and movement as examples of this sense of substance. In contrast, in other in-
stances, as in Categories, I.3‒6, Avicenna defines whiteness as an accident, that is to
say, an accident by its very essence, a statement which appears to flatly contradict
the one found in Definitions. This in turn may suggest that the latter is really to be
construed as a report of, say, a Platonic position that grants substantiality to all es-
sences in the concrete world qua eternal paradigms. Alternatively, however, it may be
that, on the interpretation advocated above, Avicenna reserves a specific sense of
substance for all quiddities as they are thought in the mind and another sense for
their status qua realized entities in the concrete world. This would make substance
a somewhat modulated term, like so many other notions of Avicenna’s philosophy.

 Avicenna, Categories of Middle Compendium of Logic, 331.14‒17; translated in Kalbarczyk, Pred-
ication, 191.
 Avicenna, Definitions, 23.8. This is the first of five definitions of jawhar that Avicenna sketches in
this section of the work. There are textual variants of this statement depending on the edition con-
sulted, the most important of which is: bi-l-dhāt li-kull shayʾ, i. e., essentially, or in virtue of the es-
sence of each thing. But the point seems to be the same, namely, that each thing ‘in itself,’ i. e.,
each quiddity in itself, is a substance on one construal of that term. True, this first definition of sub-
stance may be a report of an earlier philosophical position, but I think it also illuminates an impor-
tant aspect of Avicenna’s own understanding of substance in relation with mental existence.
 4 Substance, essence, and the metaphysical inquiry 579

For example, horseness in itself and whiteness in itself, when apprehended intellec-
tually and in pure abstraction from everything else, are intelligible and irreducible
entities and intellectual substances. Nevertheless, when they are considered as con-
crete and realized entities in the world, i. e., in relation to existent subjects and their
concomitants and accidents, then relations are introduced that modify their catego-
rial status: horseness remains a substance in the concrete world, but blackness can
only be considered as existing in relation to a subject, which makes it an accident.³⁴¹
What is more, it would seem that this shift from a pure intelligible substance (black-
ness in itself) to its becoming a universal accident can occur already in the mind,
when accidendality and universality become attached to pure quiddity as external
and added intentions. So, on Avicenna’s mind, just as there is a distinction between
‘humanness in itself’ and ‘universal species human,’ so there is a distinction be-
tween ‘blackness in itself’ and ‘universal accident black.’ On this interpretation,
the things that determine the categorial status of the universals in the mind are really
mental attributes and external concomitants that are not intrinsic to pure quiddity.
As mentioned above, Avicenna regards accidentality or ‘being an accident’ as exter-
nal to the nine categories. In the same fashion, he explicitly dissociates genusness
and speciesness, or ‘being a genus’ and ‘being a species,’ from the pure nature or
quiddity of a thing, for instance, genusness from animalness and speciesness from
humanness. In themselves, the natures ‘animalness’ and ‘humanness’ are neither
genus nor species, just as ‘blackness,’ in itself, is not an accident. Avicenna develops
this idea in his logical works, such as Categories, as well as in Metaphysics:

The nature of animal is not genus … . That of which genusness [al-jinsiyyah] is predicated is the
nature of animal [that is posited] in order that it be considered [as it is] in actuality, and this
consideration is its abstraction in the mind.³⁴²

 Avicenna’s treatment of the notion of accident (ʿaraḍ) in this same work can help us to better
understand this point; see Avicenna, Definitions, 25. It appears that none of the five definitions of ac-
cident he outlines can be applied to quiddity in itself in the mind. An accident, according to this pas-
sage, is (a) what exists in a subject in reality; (b) a universal simple concept (maʿnā) predicated of
many; (c) any meaning or entity (maʿnā) that exists externally of a thing’s nature; (d) a notion pre-
dicated of a thing on account of its existing in another to which it is connected; and (e) a notion or
entity whose existence was not at the beginning (i. e., what comes into existence). Even definition (b),
which refers to the accident as a universal logical notion in the mind, cannot apply strictly to quiddity
in itself (e. g., blackness in itself), which should be distinguished from universality and, hence, the
universal; for universality is itself ‘accidental’ and a concomitant of essence on Avicenna’s account
and does not constitute the quiddity itself. Thus, if the universal concept ‘black’ can be predicated of
many concrete things qua accident, such as ‘this black horse’ and ‘this black chair,’ blackness in it-
self cannot, which undercuts its status as an accident. In brief, just as ‘genusness’ and ‘speciesness’
are something added to pure quiddity, so ‘accidentness’ is, strictly speaking, external and added to it.
 Avicenna, Categories, I.5, 39.3‒5; but see, more generally, 38.17‒40.6.
580 IV The Special Ontological Mode of Quiddity in Itself

This consideration [of pure quiddity] is prior in existence … . With [or in] this existence, it is nei-
ther genus nor species, neither one nor many, but it is with this existence only animal and
human in itself. ³⁴³

Recall in this connection that universality itself (kulliyah)—universality taken as a

mental concomitant or attribute of essence—is also accidental to pure quiddity in
the mind. The implication of all this is that pure nature or quiddity, when apprehend-
ed in itself, is neither universal nor genus, species, or accident; it is just itself and
nothing else.³⁴⁴ But this does not mean that pure quiddity has no substantiality:
rather, as an intelligible and irreducible entity or concept in the mind, it must
amount to its own kind of substance or possess its own special substantiality. If
not, there is nothing to which universality, genusness, speciesness, or accidentness
could connect or be attached, with the result that these would amount merely to
floating mental attributes without any ontological anchor. Rather, the foundation
and ground for these concomitants and attributes is the ‘meta-substance’ of pure
quiddity in the mind. Thus, when Avicenna states that “genusness is an accident
in this nature [animal in itself] existent in it with the existence of the thing in a sub-
ject,”³⁴⁵ he is explicitly designating pure quiddity as a subject and a kind of sub-
stance for the accident genusness in the mind.
On one particular interpretation of Avicenna, then, ‘being a substance’ or having
substantiality (jawhariyyah) would amount to precisely the kind of epistemic and on-
tological irreducibility, distinctness, and autonomy that qualifies pure quiddity in the
mind. The latter would represent a kind of intelligible, quidditative substance in it-
self. After all, there is no significant difference from the point of view of human cog-
nition and intellection between conceiving of ‘humanness in itself’ and ‘blackness in
itself,’ even though these things turn out to be, in the concrete world, either substan-
ces or accidents. From a purely epistemological perspective, the same quidditative
reality, irreducibility, and distinctness attaches to ‘humanness in itself’ and ‘black-
ness in itself,’ and nothing internal makes these pure concepts either substances
or accidents at the level of their transcendental ontological presence in the mind.
It is this ontological and epistemic equivalence that would seem to justify the
equal attribution of a kind of intelligible and irreducible substantiality to both
types of notions. By the same token, and in spite of Avicenna’s caveat regarding
this point, it appears that the same quiddity can be regarded in turn as substance
and accident depending on whether it is considered strictly ‘in itself’ or ‘in connec-
tion with’ its external attributes and realized existence. This evokes the parallel dis-

 Avicenna, Metaphysics, V.1, 201.10‒13: fa-hādhā l-iʿtibār mutaqaddim fī l-wujūd … wa-bi hādhā l-
wujūd lā huwa jins wa-lā nawʿ wa-lā shakhṣ wa-lā wāḥid wa-lā kathīr bal huwa bi-hādhā l-wujūd ḥay-
awān faqaṭ wa-insān faqaṭ.
 In Notes, 60, section 47, Avicenna distinguishes between universality, genusness, and species-
ness, on the one hand, and between these notions and pure quiddity to which they relate acciden-
tally, on the other.
 Avicenna, Categories, I.5, 39.20.
 4 Substance, essence, and the metaphysical inquiry 581

tinction between quiddity considered ‘on the condition of something else’ and ‘on
the condition of nothing else.’ Nevertheless, and in spite of the previous remarks,
any definitive answer to this complex question must remain hypothetical at the pre-
sent, especially given the contradictory elements embedded in Avicenna’s ac-
counts.³⁴⁶ Regardless of the previous intricacies, the analysis has shown that Avicen-
na’s notions of substance and substantiality should in some way or other be
extended to the pure quiddities in the mind. This is not to say, of course, that he re-
jects the definition of substance as concrete primary substance. Although Avicenna
endorses it, I would contend that it does not represent his fundamental position on
substance. Certainly, this individual horse qua compound of form and matter is sub-
stance. But I would argue that for Avicenna its quiddity ‘horseness’ qualifies in a
more direct and primitive way as substance due to its irreducible and constant real-
ity. This irreducible reality of horseness, it so happens, exists also in the mind, which
has the effect of distending the notions of substance and substantiality to these two
domains or contexts. Thus, it is pure quiddity, which, in the final analysis, is the
main criterion for substance and substantiality. Avicenna appears to say as much
himself in the following statement: “the particulars are not first in the reality of sub-
stantiality, for this reality belongs to quiddity and does not differ in it from some-
thing else.”³⁴⁷ It finds additional traction in a cluster of passages from Notes,
which emphasize the equation between substance and essence:

Substance is quiddity [al-jawhar māhiyyah]—such as corporeality, soulness [nafsiyyah], human-

ness, and horseness—whose existence, if it exists [as a realized entity], is not in a subject.³⁴⁸

The true reality of substance is quiddity [or, Substance in its true reality is quiddity, al-jawhar
ḥaqīqatuhu māhiyyah].³⁴⁹

 Avicenna, Categories, I.6, 45‒46, rejects the idea that one and the same thing can be both sub-
stance and accident; cf. Benevich, Fire and Heat, who explores the master’s refutation of this point.
This reading would seem to cohere with the bulk of the evidence and is likely to represent Avicenna’s
principal interpretation of substance. However, it is important to point out that this interpretation re-
lies heavily on the criterion or condition of realized concrete existence in defining substance, which is
one that does not apply to the mental quiddities as such. This, of course, raises the question of the
ontological status and substantiality of the latter, when considered as pure objects in the mind. Con-
cluding that the quiddities in the mind are not substantial in any way seems too easy a solution and
does not pay heed to Avicenna’s belief that they are also substances and that they have intellectual
existence in themselves in the human and divine minds. Since his analysis focuses mostly on the con-
crete or primary substances, Benevich does not envisage this possibility or address this problem in
earnest.
 Avicenna, Categories, III.2, 96.3‒4: wa-l-juzʾiyyāt laysat awwal fī ḥaqīqat al-jawhariyyah idh tilka
l-ḥaqīqah li-l-māhiyyah allatī lahā wa-lā tukhālifu fīhā ghayrahā.
 Avicenna, Notes, 562.4‒5, section 985.
 Avicenna, Notes, 562.7, section 986. In this particular section, Avicenna argues that the First is
not a substance because He does not have a quiddity. This shows the intertwinement of these two
notions in his thought; cf. section 992.
582 IV The Special Ontological Mode of Quiddity in Itself

This helps to explain why Avicenna often interchanges the terms māhiyyah and ja-
whar in his discussions of substance, and why he also frequently refers to the quid-
dities of substances (sing., māhiyyat al-jawhar). Thus, on one reconstruction, the dual
doctrine of the commonality and irreducibility of pure quiddity allows this concrete
horse and the quiddity horse in the mind to be substances. What makes them sub-
stances is their shared quiddity horseness, with the implication that the pure quid-
dity horseness is substance or substantiality in a primary way. This in turn should
be connected with the statement from Definitions quoted above, which suggests
that all quiddities can qualify as substances, regardless of whether they are quiddi-
ties of substantial things (horseness) or of accidents (whiteness) once they become
realized in existence. For the notion of substantiality in this case derives from the
immediate and irreducible ontological and epistemic reality (ḥaqīqah) of the pure
quiddities.³⁵⁰
Avicenna’s attempt to combine and elaborate on a rather straightforward Aristo-
telian theory of concrete primary substance (as exposed in Categories) with a more
abstract Aristotelian theory of substance qua essence (as exposed in Metaphysics
Z) led him to emphasize the status of substance as a concept in the mind and
even to identify it with pure quiddity. But this inevitably led to the formation of ten-
sions in his works. With regard to certain specific points, his arguments seem fraught
with ambiguity. For instance, Avicenna recognizes that the universal concepts in the
mind are kinds of substances. But he claims also that being a concept in the soul is
like being in a subject, which is precisely the definition of an accident.³⁵¹ Addition-
ally, he seems at times to connect the states of being a substance and being an ac-
cident with essence, so that something is in itself an accident or a substance. But on
other occasions, as was shown above, he dissociates these notions from quiddity al-
together and is intent rather on connecting them either with the mental concomitants
(such as genusness and universality in the mind) or with the state of being concretely
realized in existence. Finally, he chastises those who commit the mistake of defining
the same thing simultaneously as substance and accident. But his own views on
mental existence and on the irreducibility, distinctness, and autonomy of pure quid-
dity in the mind appear to lead to a similar conclusion, albeit by a different route. For
when conceived strictly in itself and as a simple and irreducible quidditative mean-

 Goichon, La distinction, 23, perceptively noted the connection between substance and essence in
Avicenna’s philosophy, bringing attention to the fact that both are what they are by virtue of them-
selves (min dhātihi). Thus, quiddity has its special ontological status and essential entailment by vir-
tue of itself (min ḥaythu hiya hiya) and substance has existence from itself (min dhātihi). One apparent
consequence of Avicenna’s theorization of substance in terms of quiddity is that substance can be
attributed to entities that otherwise could not be said to be substances in a direct manner. One salient
example is prime matter, not the matter of a specific concrete being, but the quiddity of pure matter
or matter in itself, which Avicenna seems at times to regard as substance; see Goichon, La distinction,
20‒21.
 Avicenna, Categories, III.1, 92.4 ff.
 4 Substance, essence, and the metaphysical inquiry 583

ing, blackness must have the status of a kind of primitive intelligible substance in the
mind, although it can also be conceived of as a universal accident when combined
with mental concomitants and considered in relation to a subject. Moreover, it
only ever exists qua accident in concrete beings.
Perhaps the solution to these apparent contradictions lies in the distinctions Avi-
cenna draws between essential being and realized existence, on the one hand, and
between quiddity taken ‘in itself’ and ‘with something else,’ on the other. Inasmuch
as all of the pure quiddities in the intellect have their irreducible and essential being,
they qualify as kinds of intelligible or intellectual substances. This sense of intelligi-
ble or intellectual substance is implicitly postulated and latent in many of Avicenna’s
discussions of substance, but it is never fully spelled out and must be reconstructed
piece by piece.³⁵² In contrast, there is also the sense of substance that includes real-
ized or acquired existence, and which pertains primarily to the extramental beings
and the universal concepts that correspond to them in the mind. It is this Aristotelian
sense of substance that Avicenna defines as existence ‘not in a subject in the con-
crete world,’ and it is also this sense that is distinguished from that of the accident,
which inevitably exists ‘in a subject in the concrete world.’ It should be noted, how-
ever, that these senses of substance and accidents are connected with quiddity only
inasmuch as it is a necessary concomitant of the quiddity of a thing for it to exist ‘not
in a subject’ or ‘in a subject’ once it is realized in concrete existence. This is why Avi-
cenna argues that ‘accidentness,’ like ‘genusness’ and even like existence itself, is
external to quiddity. In any case, this definition of substance requires the postulation
of the concomitant of existence, since it is the realization or concretization of quiddity
in the world qua substance or accident that determines its categorical status. It is in
this regard, I believe, that Avicenna rightly insists that the same thing cannot be both
a substance and an accident; that is to say, the same thing cannot have concomitants
or lawāzim that make it both a substance and an accident in concrete reality. Yet, this
full sense and definition of substance, which includes realized existence and, thus,
the realization of the concomitants of essence, is not intrinsic to the quiddity of a
thing. In fact, Avicenna explicitly acknowledges this point in Categories:

You know that whenever a quiddity [of substance] is existent in concrete individuals, it [exists]
not in a subject, and you know that this is the first constituent of its reality, just as you know that
it is a substance. But you do not know whether it is existent in concrete reality not in a subject.
Hence, existence in actuality in concrete reality not in a subject [al-wujūd bi-l-fiʿl fī l-aʿyān lā fī
mawḍūʿ] is not constitutive of the quiddity of Zayd and is not something [essential to] substance.
Rather, it is something that is [inseparably] attached to the existent and that is concomitant to
the quiddity of things [lāḥiq li-māhiyyat al-ashyāʾ], as you have [already] learned.³⁵³

 I mean substance with regard to the pure quiddities in the mind, not with regard to the separate
existents and intellects, whose sense is well established in Avicenna.
 Avicenna, Categories, III.1, 93.1‒2.
584 IV The Special Ontological Mode of Quiddity in Itself

Thus, this sense of substance is not intrinsic to, or constitutive of, quiddity, but de-
pendent on the postulation of realized existence (wujūd muḥaṣṣal) and concrete ex-
istence (wujūd fī l-aʿyān). More precisely, it points to the actual realization of the con-
comitants (lawāzim) of quiddity in the concrete world. Clearly, it has little to do with
the substantiality of the pure quiddities in the mind, which are apprehended in ab-
straction from realized existence and concrete substances. Once again, the ontolog-
ical chasm in Avicenna’s metaphysics between the realm of pure intelligibility and
the domain of caused, realized, and concrete existence becomes apparent. Overall,
it seems coherent with the rest of Avicenna’s metaphysics that, at the very least,
one qualified sense of substance and substantiality should be reserved for the
pure quiddities, and more specifically for the quiddities as intelligible and irreduci-
ble entities, especially if one is to take Avicenna’s theory of mental existence serious-
ly. At any rate, substance proves an elusive and complicated notion in Avicenna’s
philosophy, one which cannot readily be limited to the Aristotelian primary substan-
ces construed as concrete individuals.

4.1 The notion of ‘existing by virtue of one’s self’ or ‘from one’s essence’
(al-wujūd bi-dhātihi, min dhātihi)

What exactly are the ontological implications of these observations when it comes to
pure quiddity? Returning to Text 38, one notices that Avicenna attributes the most
prior sense of ‘the existent’ to the quiddity of substance. This is in line with many
other passages drawn from the logical and metaphysical works of the master
where he makes substances prior vis-à-vis their accidents with regard to existence.
On the most straightforward reading, this ontological priority applies to all the quid-
dities that, in the concrete world, are actualized as individual substances, such as
‘this human’ or ‘this tiger.’ But on the more particular and hypothetical reading ex-
pounded above, this notion of priority could be narrowed down to the pure quiddi-
ties qua substances in the concrete world and in the mind, so that it is really ‘human-
ness’ and ‘tigerness’ that could be said to exist as substance in a prior way. Construed
in this manner, the thrust of Avicenna’s argument would be that it is quiddity qua
substance that is muqaddam or mutaqaddim fī l-wujūd, prior in existence, vis-à-vis
the accidents and concomitants that attach to it, because it is something that pos-
sesses a kind of autonomous and intrinsic ontological reality. It is notable that the
various descriptions of substance Avicenna provides, namely, that it has existence
“from itself” (min dhātihi), “by itself” (bi-l-dhāt and bi-dhātihi), or “with regard to
its essence” (li-dhāt al-shayʾ), can be applied to pure quiddity, which exists “in itself”
(min ḥaythu hiya hiya, bi-dhātihi, etc.) and whose essence belongs only to itself (fa-
dhātuhu lahu bi-dhātihi).³⁵⁴ In Metaphysics V.1, Avicenna proceeds to emphasize that

 Cf. Avicenna, Metaphysics I.5, 34.16‒17; II.1, 57.4‒6, 58.3‒4; Categories, I.2, 10; Definitions, 23‒24.
 4 Substance, essence, and the metaphysical inquiry 585

the existence of pure quiddity is prior to ‘natural existence’ (wujūduhā aqdam min al-
wujūd al-ṭabīʿī), which in this context refers to the concrete existent taken with its
concomitants and accidents. What is said to follow quiddity in this same chapter,
i. e., the various quidditative accidents and concomitants, finds a parallel in Text
38 in Avicenna’s mention of “what comes after” the quiddity of substance, namely,
the accidents that inhere in a subject.³⁵⁵ In brief, one could argue that the ontological
priority that Avicenna attributes to substance is not altogether disconnected from the
ontological priority he attributes to pure quiddity vis-à-vis its concomitants. These
parallels are strengthened by Avicenna’s essentialist construal of substance, which
reduces one sense of substance and substantiality to quiddity and its constitutive el-
ements, including the state in which these exist in the mind. The key idea here is that
what is substantial and essential is prior to what is merely accidental, where ‘acci-
dental’ refers not only to the accidents that attach to substance in the concrete
world, but also to the concomitants that follow quiddity in the mind, i. e., to all
the things that are external to ‘the thing in itself.’ In both cases, the kind of priority
Avicenna has in mind is an essential and ontological one, whereby the quidditative
meaning (maʿnā) precedes all the other meanings that associate with quiddity to
constitute the composite substance or existent, whether the universal in the mind
or the concrete composite. This ontological priority of the maʿnā of pure quiddity ap-
plies to both concrete and intellectual existents.³⁵⁶
If the foregoing hypothesis is correct, then it strengthens the central position of
essence and its special mode of existence in Avicenna’s conception of metaphysics.
For the latter science would consist to a large extent of an investigation of the senses
and modes of existence that pertain to quiddity and its essential concomitants. This
of course is different from saying that metaphysics studies primary substances in a
sense that coincides exclusively with the existent or al-mawjūd in external reality.
Rather, the primary object of the metaphysical inquiry is the quidditative meaning
and entity, maʿnā, as it exists in the mind and in concrete reality, and as it relates
to its external concomitants and accidents. So that whenever Avicenna states that
‘absolute existence’ or ‘existence qua existence’ or ‘the existent inasmuch as it is

 Admittedly, Avicenna in this passage intends to refer primarily to quiddity in complex beings
and substances, i. e., to quiddity in actual concrete beings and mental universals, rather than to quid-
dity in itself as an abstract and distinct form in the mind. This is indicated not only by the connection
between this passage and Posterior Analytics II.7, where the emphasis is on actually existing sub-
stance, but also by Avicenna’s equating māhiyyah with jawhar. In spite of this, recall that quiddity
is always just quiddity, even in complex substances, and remains irreducibly itself with its wujūd
khāṣṣ and its own mode of being. So that the particular phrasing of this passage and the statement
concerning the ontological priority of quiddity remain noteworthy and stand as departures from Ar-
istotle’s text.
 Again, the focus here is on a kind of ontological priority. This is made clear in Metaphysics IV.1,
where Avicenna describes the priority of the one over the multiple as a priority in existence. This case
is also comparable to the priority of the simple over the complex that is mentioned in V.1 in connec-
tion with essence.
586 IV The Special Ontological Mode of Quiddity in Itself

the existent’ is the primary subject of metaphysics, he is implicitly including the on-
tology of quiddity in its scope. What is more, he is also implicitly subsuming the var-
ious modes of tashkīk and the senses of realized and special existence. Finally, he is
implicitly including the special essential mode of existence of God, which lies at the
center of the theological inquiry. For the theological study of God’s existence and the
study of general ontology entail an analysis of how quiddity relates to its concomi-
tants, including realized existence. In many cases, this is another way of saying that
it also studies how substance relates to its accidents. Yet, since proper and realized
existence, since ‘the thing’ and ‘the existent,’ are virtually always co-extensional (at
least when it comes to the composite beings), the subject matter of the metaphysical
inquiry, for all intents and purposes, can be described as focusing on al-mawjūd.
These remarks can account for two important phenomena in the Avicennian
sources: first, Avicenna’s salient self-awareness regarding the task of disambiguating
the various modes and senses of existence that are at the epicenter of the metaphys-
ical project, including that which applies exclusively to quiddity and substance, and
that which applies to its accidents and concomitants. This is why he frequently refers
to the modes of existence (anḥāʾ al-wujūd), the various senses of existence (maʿānī l-
wujūd), the ‘howness’ or manner of existence (kayf al-wujūd and kayfiyyat al-wujūd),
and, of course, to modulation (tashkīk) and the modalities (jihāt). For Avicenna, these
distinctions refer not so much to kinds of existents (ajnās al-mawjūdāt), as they did
for Fārābī and Ibn ʿAdī, but rather to modes and senses of existence as these apply to
substances in concrete reality and in the mind, that is to say, to pure quiddity and its
concomitants in concrete reality and in the mind, and, additionally, to God’s special
maʿnā and māhiyyah. ³⁵⁷ Second, and equally importantly, framing metaphysics as an
investigation into essence sheds light on why Avicenna frequently defines substance
(jawhar) in terms of quiddity (māhiyyah). Following some leads in Aristotle and his
commentators, Avicenna frequently describes substance not primarily as a com-
pound of form and matter, nor even as an individualized and concrete realized es-
sence (one possible meaning of dhāt), but expressly as quiddity and even sometimes
as abstract or intelligible quiddity.³⁵⁸ For the sense of substance qua quiddity is for
him metaphysically primitive and foreshadows these other senses of substance. More
specifically, the upshot with regard to ontology is that the statement that substance
exists ‘in itself’ or ‘from itself’ is in many ways convertible with the statement that

 Thus, at Metaphysics I.2, 16, the master explains that what is investigated in metaphysics is the
quidditative meaning and entity (maʿnā) and its mode of existence (naḥw al-wujūd) with regard to
both material and immaterial beings. One exemplification of this statement appears later on in chap-
ter I.4, where it is said that the essence of number (dhāt al-ʿadad), that is, the quiddity of number ‘in
itself,’ is among the topics explored in metaphysics. But of course, the notion of maʿnā can be extend-
ed to all quiddities, placing them at the heart of the metaphysical project.
 I already mentioned some key examples, but other instances can be found in Categories, 31.8
(substance is that whose thingness (shayʾiyyah) is realized and subsistent in itself); 48.5 ff.; 92.4‒
93.3 (substance is quiddity that is realized in the world); 94.13 ff.
 4 Substance, essence, and the metaphysical inquiry 587

quiddity exists ‘in itself’ or ‘from itself.’ These formulations are equally permissible,
given that substance under one angle is essence. The primacy and priority of sub-
stance in existence is essentially that also of pure quiddity, not only in the concrete
world, but also in the mind, since the quiddities in the intellect are also substances.
Categories I.2 offers additional insight into the relation between substance, quid-
dity, and existence. In that chapter, Avicenna relies on the same framework and set
of arguments than in Philosophical Compendium and Metaphysics to argue for the rel-
ative semantic malleability and modulated nature of the notion of existence. There
too, he refrains from classifying it as either a pure univocal or equivocal term and
discourses on its various predicative distinctions and nuances. As in these other
works, he refers to “modulation in priority and posteriority” and “modulation in
strength and weakness,” but in addition he introduces another aspect, “modulation
in degree of deservingness,” which is of direct relevance to the present analysis.³⁵⁹
The crucial passage reads as follows:

Text 43: It [existence and the way in which it is predicated] can also differ by way of being more
deserved and more appropriate [al-awlā wa-l-aḥrā], since the existence of some things comes in
virtue of themselves [fa-inna l-wujūd li-baʿḍ al-ashyāʾ min dhātihi], and [the existence of] other
things come in virtue of another [existent, min ghayrihi]. Now, that which exists in virtue of itself
[al-mawjūd bi-dhātihi] is more deserving of existence than that which exists in virtue of another
[al-mawjūd bi-ghayrihi].³⁶⁰

How does this distinction between primary and secondary in existence, or more and
less deserving of existence, relate to quiddity/substance? The distinction Avicenna
makes in this passage seems significant, because it focuses again on two aspects
or modes of existence that can be said to pertain to quiddity/substance: “existence
in virtue of oneself” or “in virtue of one’s essence” (al-wujūd min dhātihi), and “ex-
istence in virtue of another” (al-wujūd min ghayrihi). This distinction is correlated
later on in the passage with ‘the existent in or by itself” (al-mawjūd bi-dhātihi)
and “the existent by another” (al-mawjūd bi-ghayrihi) respectively. Recall that the
two notions bi-dhātihi and bi-ghayrihi underpin Avicenna’s proof of God’s necessary
existence and of the contingent existence of all other things. In this context, bi-dhāti-
hi can refer either to God’s being necessary of existence in Itself (wājib al-wujūd bi-
dhātihi), or to all other things’ being contingent of existence in themselves (mumkin
al-wujūd bi-dhātihi). As for the expression bi-ghayrihi, it refers to an existent’s neces-
sary relation to its cause, which makes it necessary of existence by or through anoth-
er (wājib al-wujūd bi-ghayrihi).
In the passage at hand, however, Avicenna associates necessity, not possibility,
with wujūd bi-dhātihi. Not only does he state simply that some things exist or have

 Treiger, Avicenna’s Notion, provides a cogent analysis of the text and its various implications. I
take issue with a small point in his analysis, which I develop below. Bäck (in Avicenna, The Maqūlāt,
43‒44) translates al-awlā wa-l-aḥrā as “primary and secondary.”
 Translation based on Treiger, Avicenna’s Notion, 354, with some modifications.
588 IV The Special Ontological Mode of Quiddity in Itself

existence in virtue of themselves, but he also adds that this mode or aspect or state of
existence is more deserving of (awlā) the term wujūd than “existence in virtue of an-
other” (al-wujūd bi-ghayrihi). Clearly, he would not make this assertion if he were
talking about the possibility of existence that belongs to the self or essence of a
thing. Moreover, nuances in the phrasing seem particularly relevant: in the first
case, existence comes from the essence or self (min dhātihi); in the latter case,
from another (min ghayrihi). The underlying idea is that existence in virtue of oneself
is correlated with self or essence and, hence, with essential necessity, and existence
in virtue of another with the possibility of exterior causation, i. e., the possibility that
another existent can cause existence in the effect. This explains why the former is
more deservingly and more appropriately called an existent than the latter. Thus,
what is striking about this passage is that it turns Avicenna’s standard modal scheme
on its head, where the self or essence is associated with possibility and existence
coming from another with necessity. Furthermore, there is a significant difference
in formulation: whereas the traditional or standard scheme fixes the distinction at
the level of the modalities of ‘the possible’ and ‘the necessary,’ which implies that
the same existent can be perceived from different angles, i. e., the same existent is
both possible and necessary of existence depending on whether it is connected to
its cause, the passage in Categories contrasts the existence associated with the es-
sence or the self to the existence associated with the other, as well as “that which
exists in virtue of itself” (al-mawjūd bi-dhātihi) to “that which exists in virtue of an-
other” (al-mawjūd bi-ghayrihi). This suggests not only different entities or kinds of ex-
istents, but also (possibly) different modes of existence. This hypothesis would be in
line with the tenor of the passage, which, as in Philosophical Compendium, seeks to
disentangle ways in which existence can be predicated differently of different things.
Fundamentally, then, this passage alters the way in which the modalities relate to the
two relata: necessity is here connected with the self or essence, and possibility with
the other.
This in turn raises the question of the objects to which Avicenna’s comments
refer in this passage, which are left unspecified. What being or class of beings
would justify reversing Avicenna’s traditional scheme of mumkin al-wujūd bi-dhātihi
and wājib al-wujūd bi-ghayrihi into the one exposed in Categories, which associates
necessary existence with essence or the self and possible existence with the other? In
his commentary on this passage, Treiger cogently suggests that Avicenna is referring
to causes and effects and especially—or perhaps exclusively—to the relation between
the First and its effects. This, at first glance, makes sense, since God is the ultimate
cause that has existence ‘in virtue of Himself,’ while all the other beings are effects
that have existence ‘in virtue of another.’³⁶¹ However, upon further consideration,

 Treiger, Avicenna’s Notion, 357: “In the latter example [i. e., “modulation in degree of deserving-
ness”], the reference would appear to be to cause and effect in general, or more specifically to the
Necessarily Existent … and the contingent existents.” Treiger relies on this interpretation to further
his claim that the notion of existence is modulated on the transcendental level in addition to the pre-
 4 Substance, essence, and the metaphysical inquiry 589

limiting the interpretation to this aspect alone seems problematic, and this for two
main reasons. First, the argument seems too general to apply to the First specifically
or exclusively. In this connection, Avicenna’s statement that “some things” (baʿḍ al-
ashyāʾ) have their existence in virtue of themselves seems to undermine Treiger’s
contention that the First is to be taken as the main or exclusive referent of the sen-
tence. As for the idea that the passage refers more generally to causes and effects, it
runs into the difficulty that all causes (except the First) are also effects, so that the
qualification ‘from itself’ (min dhātihi) could not literally apply to any of them, if
used to intimate ontological autonomy. So it seems that we are faced with a paradox:
if the First alone is intended, then why does Avicenna mention “some things” (baʿḍ
al-ashyāʾ) as opposed to “the thing”? And if other beings, such as all causes, are in-
tended, then how can the claim that their existence derives from their essence or self
(min dhātihi) be correct?
An alternative, yet potentially complementary, interpretation to that of Treiger is
that Avicenna is referring in this passage to the distinction between the existence of
substances and that of accidents. This would fit squarely with the contents and tenor
of Categories. Substances have their existence ‘in’ or ‘from themselves,’ in the sense
that they exist ‘not in a subject.’ Accidents, in contrast, exist ‘in a subject’ and, thus,
can be said to possess their existence ‘from another’ and, hence, derivatively. This
interpretation seems corroborated by the fact that Avicenna, in the larger section
from which this passage is taken, expressly correlates the state of being more deserv-
ing (awlā) of existence with the state of being prior in existence, so that a substance,
for example, is more deserving of existence than an accident precisely because it is
prior to it. Naturally, these considerations can also be tied to the notion of causality:
a substance qua cause is prior to an accident or to another substance qua effect (ei-
ther temporally or essentially) and is thus more deserving of the notion of existence.
In fact, these notions appear to be interconnected in Avicenna’s mind: what is prior is
usually a cause of some kind, and this causal priority justifies its being more deserv-
ing of existence relative to other things. While all of this might be true, it still does
not provide an adequate gloss on Avicenna’s claim that some things have existence
‘by virtue of’ or ‘from themselves,’ since all causes and substances will themselves,
under another aspect, be posterior entities and effects in need of an exterior and
prior cause. Now, given what has been said previously about the relationship be-
tween substance and quiddity, as well as about the essential being of quiddity,
one can extend the scope of the argumentation here to include the pure quiddities.
This is because the being of pure quiddity can be said to be ‘in virtue of itself’ or
‘from itself,’ in a way not dissimilar to how substance can be said to have existence
‘from itself.’ In fact, given that substance is quiddity on a certain reading of the evi-
dence, it appears that each substance has existence ‘from itself’ precisely because it

dicamental level in Avicenna’s philosophy. Although I think Treiger’s overarching argument is cor-
rect, it does not on my view find traction in this passage.
590 IV The Special Ontological Mode of Quiddity in Itself

has a quiddity that possesses its own essential being. It is not by virtue of its acci-
dents and concomitants that a substance has existence ‘from itself,’ but rather by vir-
tue of its having an irreducible quiddity and essential reality. This, I believe, is in part
what is meant by “some things” in the Categories passage quoted above: these
“things” are the substances construed as irreducible quiddities, at the very least in
the intellect, but also, perhaps, in exterior reality, where substance is really synony-
mous with the realization of quiddity in the concrete world. So Avicenna’s statement
here would be true of both concrete and mental quiddities/substances. On the one
hand, the pure quiddities qua substances in the mind can be said to have existence
‘from themselves’ or ‘in themselves,’ as opposed to things in the exterior world,
which require an efficient cause exterior to them. On the other hand, what makes
the substance exist in itself or from itself in concrete reality is, fundamentally, the
quiddity, the quiddity of substance, e. g., humanness in this concrete human
being.³⁶² In this manner, quiddity can be said to have an essential being that belongs
‘to itself,’ that is realized ‘in itself,’ that is dhātī, as opposed to the realized existence
that accrues to it from the outside, which is, in contrast, ʿaraḍī. In this connection,
one should note that the argumentative similarities and the terminological overlap
between this passage of Categories and other passages of the same work, as well
as the excerpts from Philosophical Compendium and Metaphysics discussed previous-
ly where the master explicitly defines substance in terms of quiddity, are striking.
These texts contrast a sense or mode of existence that is extrinsic, accidental, and
‘from another,’ and which is usually limited to realized existence in the concrete
world, to a sense or mode of existence that is irreducible, essential, and ‘from itself.’
Thus, one could argue that the term dhātī that is used in Philosophical Compendium
to distinguish the mode of quiddity from realized existence can be connected with
the ‘existence from oneself’ (min dhātihi and bi-dhātihi) that is invoked in Categories.
What makes this linkage compelling is the merging of the notions of substance and
quiddity in Avicenna’s metaphysics. This in turn should be connected with the notion
of the ontological priority that Avicenna attributes to pure quiddity in Metaphysics
V.1‒2 and to ‘the quiddity of substance’ in I.5. More generally, the close interface of
the notions of quiddity and substance means that the various distinctions related
to the existence of substances that Avicenna introduces in these works have to be
construed chiefly in light of his doctrine of pure quiddity.

 Bäck (in Avicenna, The Maqūlāt, 44, note 102, and 156, note 301) seems to uphold a similar in-
terpretation. He argues that min dhātihi is similar to bi-dhātihi and means “through its essence” and
that quiddity in itself serves “as a constituent for the substance existing in re.”
 5 Being quiddity: Avicenna’s response to the mutakallimūn 591

5 Being quiddity: Avicenna’s response to the mutakallimūn

5.1 Avicenna and Bahshamite ontology and theology

Some features of Avicenna’s ontology of quiddity find an important precedent in the

works of early Muslim theologians. As Jolivet, Wisnovsky, and others have shown,
Avicenna’s thought should be interpreted not only in light of the Greek sources,
but also of the developments within Islamic theology (kalām) that were taking
place before and during his life.³⁶³ Building on these studies, one contention made
in the present book is that Avicenna’s ontology of quiddity was decisively shaped
by sources emanating from Bahshamite circles. As I argued in chapter II, the theory
of pure quiddity, as well as the epistemological system Avicenna builds around it,
bear many striking resemblances to Abū Hāshim’s and his followers’ theory of the
Attribute of the Essence (ṣifat al-dhāt). In what follows, I explore in more detail
the ontological implications of these theories and assess the extent to which Avicen-
na’s theory of essential being should be regarded as a reaction to Bahshamite onto-
logical theories.
Two key features that characterize the Bahshamite and Avicennian philosophical
systems are the distinction between realized existence and thingness and the restric-
tion of realized existence to a specific domain of their ontology. For the former, ex-
istence refers exclusively to concretely existent things and entities in extramental re-
ality. For the latter, it delineates the realm of composite or complex beings in the
mind (the universals) and in the concrete world (the particulars). Consequently, real-
ized existence represents only one aspect of their ontology and is not exhaustive of
all ontological aspects and modes. For the Bahshamites recognize the reality or sub-
sistence of the nonexistent things (ashyāʾ maʿdūmah) as well as the reality of the
states (aḥwāl), which are located midway between existence and nonexistence.
These two classes of objects possess a special status in their ontology. Avicenna,
for his part, reserves special senses and modes of existence for the First and the
pure quiddities. Since the Bahshamite School precedes Avicenna chronologically, I
argue that this aspect of the shaykh’s system may have arisen out of a dialectical con-
frontation with the Bahshamite sources. Avicenna’s ontology of quiddity was most
likely informed by ideas streaming from this school, either by way of assimilation
or by way of reaction to doctrines that he deemed unacceptable. The aim of the pre-
sent section is to generate some insight into the way in which this process may have
occurred.
Avicenna’s ontological theories are in some important respects comparable to
those formulated by his theological counterparts. For instance, he follows the Ashʿar-
ites in holding that ‘the thing’ and ‘the existent’ are co-extensional, so that there can-
not be nonexistent things (ashyāʾ maʿdumah). On this point, Avicenna diverges from

 Jolivet, Aux origines; Wisnovsky, Notes; idem, Avicenna’s Metaphysics; Belo, Essence.
592 IV The Special Ontological Mode of Quiddity in Itself

the Muʿtazilites, for whom the nonexistent thing can be said to possess a degree of
reality and to be (at the very least) an object of mental consideration inasmuch as it
is defined by the Attribute of the Essence. On the other hand, Avicenna rejects the
Ashʿarite tendency to conflate existence and thingness and to regard them as inten-
sionally identical. In fact, Avicenna is directly indebted to the Muʿtazilites for the dis-
tinction he establishes between thingness (shayʾiyyah) and existence (wujūd) as two
irreducible notions. What is more, he is also indebted to them for the view that men-
tal objects are not mere ‘nothings,’ as some Ashʿarite deniers of mental existence
would claim, but rather ‘things,’ since they can be contemplated and even cognitive-
ly grasped. Hence, from Avicenna’s perspective, the Bahshamites had put their finger
on a crucial realization, namely, that objects in the mind must possess an ontological
status that is distinct from that of objects in the real world.³⁶⁴ Yet, if the Bahshamites
had been perceptive in realizing this, they were on the other hand misguided in the
manner they went about addressing this issue. For, again from Avicenna’s perspec-
tive, mental objects cannot cogently be said to be nonexistent things, as the Muʿta-
zilites contend, since, at the very least, they can be conceived of and, hence, must
possess mental existence. As a corollary, the Ashʿarite position that mental objects
are neither things nor existents could not be correct, for it did not even recognize
the deflated status of ‘a thing’ that the Muʿtazilite position granted to objects in
the mind.
It is at this juncture that the key consideration of realized existence enters the
picture. The Muʿtazilites restrict wujūd to the realized, concrete existence of individ-
ual atoms and their accidents. For the Bahshamites, realized existence, or rather, ‘the
attribute of realized existence’ (ṣifat al-wujūd), is an attribute that does not differ
among existents. It is predicated univocally of all existent things and applies equally
to all the substances and accidents in the exterior world, as well as to the angels and
God Himself.³⁶⁵ The upshot of this is that mental objects, by definition, cannot be re-
garded as existents in any true sense, due to their mental and conceptual status.
Rather, they can only be described as things that can be thought and spoken of, with-
out ever assuming the entitative status and fundamental features of real existence.
Avicenna, in this case as well, follows the Bahshamite tendency to regard realized
existence (wujūd muḥaṣṣal, wujūd ḥāṣil, wujūd ithbātī) as only one aspect of a broad-
er ontology. Neither Abū Hāshim and his followers nor Avicenna limit their ontology
entirely to the notion of realized existence, but recognize other ontological modes.

 References to some of the key Muʿtazilite texts have already been given in previous chapters. For
a discussion of knowledge and the class of nonexistent things, as well as the key role the Attribute of
the Essence plays in this connection, see Mānkdīm Shashdīw, Notes on the Commentary, 108.9‒14,
176.16 ff.; Abū Rashīd, Issues, 31.26 ff., 34.12 ff., 37.11 ff.; idem, Addition, 191.7‒192.3; Ibn Mattawayh, Re-
minder, vol. 1, 13.23 ff., 14.4‒5, 17.4 ff.; Frank, Al-maʿdūm; and Dhanani, The Physical Theory, 17 ff.
 For the attribute of existence and its univocal predication, see Ibn Mattawayh, The Complete Par-
aphrase, 34, 135‒136; idem, Reminder, vol. 1, 13.12 ff., 15.19‒20; Mānkdīm Shashdīw, Notes on the Com-
mentary, 175‒176; and Frank, Beings.
 5 Being quiddity: Avicenna’s response to the mutakallimūn 593

For the former, existence is an attribute that is said of a concrete atom or accident.
For the latter, existence is a concomitant that is entailed by quiddity but remains ex-
ternal to it, to the extent that he sometimes describes existence as the attribute (ṣifah)
of a thing. In so doing, Avicenna comes close to a Bahshamite formulation.³⁶⁶ In spite
of this, he rejects the Bahshamite rationale that mental objects, because they are not
realized existents in the concrete world, cannot in any way be said to exist. For it is
well known that the master regards objects in the mind as mental or intellectual ex-
istents and thus extends wujūd muḥaṣṣal to these entities as well. Thus, whereas for
the Muʿtazilites, ‘the thing’ that is not ‘an existent’ is ‘a nonexistent’ or ‘in a state of
nonexistence,’ but can nevertheless be described and cognized through the Attribute
of the Essence, which, in contrast, possesses subsistence and is real (thābit), for Avi-
cenna, what does not fall under realized existence is not ‘a nonexistent thing.’ It is
pure quiddity, which possesses its own distinct and special mode of existence in the
mind. According to the master, pure quiddity is neither a realized existent, nor a non-
existent entity (maʿdūm), nor a state or attribute that has an intermediary status be-
tween existence and nonexistence. True, it is to be demarcated from ‘the realized’
and ‘the established’ (in concrete existence) in the same way that the thing of the
Muʿtazilite can be demarcated from the realized existent. But it possesses its own
special mode of existence.
To a large extent, then, the Muʿtazilite reflection on ‘the thing’ and its relation to
both the Attribute of the Essence (ṣifat al-dhāt) and the attribute of existence (ṣifat al-
wujūd) oriented Avicenna’s ontological approach. By recognizing that thingness in
the mind is ‘something’ and a valid object of thought that could not, however, be de-
fined in terms of existence, the Muʿtazilites, Avicenna believed, had opened a Pan-
dora’s box regarding the way in which existence relates to thingness. For if thingness
does not exist in any way, then how is it conceivable? And if it does exist, then in
what way is it distinct from realized existence? Indeed, on this point, the Bahshamite
position seems coherent: since ‘the thing’ and ‘the existent’ are distinct, it would
seem that the conception of ‘the thing’ cannot be identified in any way with exis-
tence or ‘the existent,’ lest these two notions not be distinct after all. But in Avicen-
na’s eyes, the Bahshamite position was self-defeating and undermined by an insolu-
ble paradox: either ‘the thing’ always exists, but then thingness and realized
existence are not truly distinct and separate; or they are separate, but then ‘the
thing’ cannot be conceived of in any way, since what exists neither in concrete reality
nor in the mind is not a valid object of conception. Avicenna’s solution to this conun-
drum was not only to recognize mental existence per se, but also to ascribe a special
mode of existence to pure quiddity or thingness, which is identical to its very intelli-
gibility and conceivability in the mind, and which, as such, is distinct from realized
existence. This solution, it should be noted, if it was intended in some ways as a re-
buttal of the Bahshamite position, was directly informed by ideas from this school,

 Avicenna, Discussions, 131, section 350.

594 IV The Special Ontological Mode of Quiddity in Itself

since it restricts realized existence to only a segment of the ontological spectrum and
recognizes a special ontological state that is distinct from both realized existence and
nonexistence.

5.1.1 The Attribute of the Essence and pure quiddity

These general considerations help to better understand the development of Avicen-
na’s thought regarding the ontological status of mental objects and more specifically
of the pure quiddities in the intellect. I would surmise that this development was
made possible only as a result of Avicenna’s exposure to Bahshamite sources. But
in what other and subtle ways was the Bahshamite ontology impactful on the shaykh
al-raʾīs? To explore this issue in more detail I shall focus once more on the parallels
between Abū Hāshim’s theory of the Attribute of the Essence (ṣifat al-dhāt) and Avi-
cenna’s theory of quiddity in itself. These two doctrines encapsulate a basic similar-
ity between these thinkers and underline the limited and well-defined scope they at-
tributed to realized existence in their ontological systems. What is more, the
ontological implications associated with these two theories are in some regards so
close that the question of a textual relation between them naturally arises.
In chapter II, we saw that the Attribute of the Essence is inseparable from the
thing-itself (shayʾ), even though it can be conceived of regardless of whether exis-
tence or nonexistence are attributed to that thing. This special attribute can be de-
scribed as irreducible, constant, absolute, unconditioned, and prior to realized exis-
tence. Even though Abū Hāshim and Avicenna construe these notions differently, it is
remarkable that the latter uses the very same set of notions to describe pure quiddity.
For instance, Abū Hāshim’s claim that this attribute is ‘unconditioned by anything
else’ (ghayr mashrūṭah bi-amr siwāhā) echoes Avicenna’s view that pure quiddity
is ‘without the condition of another thing’ (bi-lā sharṭ shayʾ ākhar).³⁶⁷ For our present
concerns what is important is that for these two thinkers the state of being condi-
tioned or unconditioned is related to the realization of existence: the Attribute of
the Essence as well as pure quiddity are what they are in abstraction from realized
existence, which is external and posterior. For the Bahshamites, existence is posteri-
or because it is an attribute (ṣifah) that follows the Attribute of the Essence, but is not
a requisite for the latter to be intelligible. For Avicenna, existence is posterior logical-
ly and essentially, since it is a non-constitutive concomitant (lāzim) of pure quiddity.
Hence, in these systems, realized existence is defined as something external, extrin-
sic, and posterior to essence taken in itself. The consideration of existence is not re-
quired to attain the knowledge of thingness, of what a thing is in its core and reality.
It represents a condition (sharṭ) that is added to the pure conception of thingness.³⁶⁸

 For the reference to Abū Hāshim, see Frank, Beings, 53.
 Given their special nature, the Attribute of the Essence and pure quiddity are a permanent real-
ity (ḥaqīqah), since they are what enable us to know the core and quiddity of a thing, regardless of its
 5 Being quiddity: Avicenna’s response to the mutakallimūn 595

In light of this, it appears that the Bahshamite and Avicennian positions are similarly
premised on the intrinsic intelligibility of thingness in the mind, although a different
ontological status is ascribed to it. If the Attribute of the Essence and pure quiddity
are essentially prior to realized existence, it is because they can be conceived of in
the mind without taking into account realized extramental particulars. Their intelli-
gibility, irreducible meaning, and reality do not depend on the actual existence of a
concrete being and can be immediately grasped by the mind. But here an important
difference needs to be emphasized. Since the Bahshamites do not recognize mental
existents per se, their notion of realized or actual existence extends only to the con-
crete beings of the exterior world. For Avicenna, in contrast, and as I emphasized in
the preceding sections of this book, realized existence applies to the concrete indi-
vidual beings as well as to complex universal concepts in the mind. So that the prior-
ity of pure quiddity over existence is true not only of concrete extramental beings
that do not yet exist, but whose pure quiddity is intelligible (such as this heptagonal
house or even that individual horse), but also of the universal concepts, which exist
in the mind in a mode that is complex and posterior when compared to the state of
pure quiddity.³⁶⁹
Avicenna therefore fundamentally agrees with the Bahshamites that thingness
has a distinct and irreducible reality and ontological state in the mind. What the Bah-
shamites call a real or subsistent nonexistent thing (shayʾ maʿdūm thābit), that is, a
nonexistent thing that can nevertheless be conceived and spoken of by virtue of its
Attribute of the Essence, corresponds in important ways to the pure intelligible quid-
dities of Avicenna’s ontology, which are apprehended by the intellect in a direct and
simple manner, regardless of whether they have concrete instantiations in the exter-
nal world or are the object of universal conceptualization. Just as nonexistent things
remain intelligible by virtue of the permanent actuality of the Attribute of the Es-
sence, so quiddity in itself is intelligible even in abstraction from realized beings

mode of existence. As Thiele, Abū Hāshim, 371, puts it: “the ‘attribute of the essence’ has an eternal
and necessary reality.” As for Frank, Beings, 54, he explains that “Whereas [for Abū Hāshim] all other
attributes that a thing may have are conditional upon the actuality of the existence of the thing-itself
(dât) of whose being they are states or characteristics, the Attribute of the Essence, since it is uncon-
ditioned (ġayru mašrûṭa) is prior to existence.” By “prior to existence,” Frank means the actual or
realized existence of the individual entity or thing. Hence, as Frank adds, “the atom is an atom
even when it is nonexistent.”
 Ontological priority is therefore a univocal notion for the Bahshamites and refers solely to the
subsistence of the maʿdūmāt and maqdūrāt before they acquire realized existence. But it has a
whole range of meanings for Avicenna, since it is an important aspect of tashkīk al-wujūd and is itself
subject to modulation, as was shown earlier. With regard to quiddity, it can refer either to the priority
of the concept of pure quiddity vis-à-vis the complex universal in the mind; or to the priority of quid-
dity in the mind vis-à-vis individual beings in the concrete world (for instance, in the case of artificial
forms); to the priority of pure quiddity as a principle and maʿnā in the concrete being; finally, in its
strongest metaphysical sense, it refers to the existence of the quidditative forms in the Agent Intellect
and the other divine intellects, which precede individual material instantiations.
596 IV The Special Ontological Mode of Quiddity in Itself

due to its own irreducible intelligible nature.³⁷⁰ Thus, when some of the Bahshamites
refer to the Attribute of the Essence as being “real [or actual] in the states of nonexis-
tence and existence,”³⁷¹ they are stressing the unconditioned, absolute, and special
ontological status of this attribute in a manner reminiscent of how Avicenna de-
scribes pure quiddity. In this manner, the class of subsistent nonexistent things of
the Bahshamites parallels the pure quiddities of Avicenna’s noetics. In spite of
their different ontological status, these groups of entities share striking similarities:
they can be spoken of, intellected, and their thingness known, and this, even though
particulars need not exist actually and be endowed with realized existence in the
concrete world. I would contend, therefore, that Avicenna was profoundly influenced
by the Bahshamite ontological model in elaborating his theory of mental existence
and the place of quiddity within it. The theory of the Attribute of the Essence in par-
ticular lies at the crux of this phenomenon, even though the Bahshamite theory of
realized existence as an external attribute of essence appears to have left an impres-
sion on the master as well, if we are to judge by his terminology and theory of wujūd
muḥaṣṣal. The Bahshamite approach, which made an entire realm of unrealized en-
tities cognizable to the intellect by virtue of their reality and subsistence, lies behind
Avicenna’s theory of pure quiddity as something abstracted from realized existence
but possessing its own intelligible being. His theory of pure quiddity, its special on-
tological mode, and the absolute ontological extension he ascribes to it were all di-
rectly inspired by the Bahshamite theory of the Attribute of the Essence and its spe-
cial ontological mode. Naturally, Avicenna’s outlook and attitude toward these
sources amounted more to a process of critical adaptation and creative doctrinal
transformation than straightforward borrowing, for there were some important fea-
tures of Bahshamite ontology that the master simply could not bring himself to
adopt.
There is in particular a crucial difference regarding these philosophers’ construal
of the special ontological state or mode they posit with regard to the attribute and
essence respectively. The followers of Abū Hāshim construe thingness in connection
with the Attribute of the Essence and, hence, as something intrinsically devoid of
positive existence. This Attribute lies in a state of subsistence or sheer actuality (thu-
būt) and is, strictly speaking, a property that is neither existent nor nonexistent. For

 In the case of Avicenna’s noetics, this intelligible reality can apply to various classes of entities:
first, artificial and fictional things in the mind, which Avicenna regards as quiddities and forms and
even as universals, even though they have no actual concrete instantiations in the actual world; and
second, future contingents, which, even though they are not subsistent things in the way the Muʿta-
zilite conceive them, are still abstract entities that can be spoken of and whose quiddities can be ap-
prehended. What is more, and this is the key point, this claim can be extended to all the quiddities of
natural things, since Avicenna’s claim is precisely that we can think of these pure quiddities in ab-
straction from all considerations of existence and regardless of whether there are actual concrete ex-
istents corresponding to these quiddities.
 Frank, Beings, 56, note 12.
 5 Being quiddity: Avicenna’s response to the mutakallimūn 597

this reason, it encompasses existents and nonexistents alike. Avicenna in contrast

straightforwardly ascribes to pure quiddity a positive mode of existence. This impor-
tant difference stems from the fact that Avicenna regards mental entities and objects
as full-fledged existents, whereas the Muʿtazilite do not uphold a positive notion of
mental existence. So the theory of the intelligible mode of existence of pure quiddity
that Avicenna develops in the context of his noetics can be regarded as a direct reply
to the theory of the intermediary ontological state that the Bahshamites ascribe to the
Attribute of the Essence, both theories otherwise fulfilling quasi-identical epistemo-
logical functions. As a result, whereas the Bahshamites regard the Attribute of the
Essence as being prior to existence,³⁷² for Avicenna, on the other hand, pure quiddity
in the intellect is prior in existence (fī l-wujūd, bi-l-wujūd).
It is with regard to the specific issue of mental existence, then, that Avicenna
parted company with the Bahshamites and dashed ahead to forge one of the most
distinctive and momentous aspects of his philosophy. In spite of this, the philoso-
pher’s indebtedness to this theological tradition is visible in the kinds of issues he
tackles as well as in the notions and terminology he relies on to elaborate his doc-
trine. The main impetus for Avicenna’s theorization of mental existence and especial-
ly for his ontologization of the concept of pure quiddity arose out of a dialectical en-
gagement with Bahshamite epistemology and ontology. This led him to endorse some
features of this tradition and adapt and transform others in light of the Greek phil-
osophical legacy and of his own philosophical priorities and interests. This ‘Bahsha-
mite connection’ represents a key factor in Avicenna’s sustained preoccupation with
mental existence and of the role of essence or thingness in human knowledge.³⁷³ To
conclude, Abū Hāshim and Avicenna regard the Attribute of the Essence and pure
quiddity respectively as irreducible, unconditioned, and prior, even though these no-
tions carry a different meaning in their systems. In addition, the Bahshamite theory
of the Attribute of the Essence is based on a distinction between reality or subsis-
tence (thubūt) and realized existence in the concrete world (wujūd), with the conse-
quence that this attribute can apply to both shayʾ mawjūd and shayʾ maʿdūm. Like-
wise, Avicenna’s ontology of quiddity is based on the distinction between the senses
and modes of realized existence (wujūd muḥaṣṣal) and proper existence (wujūd

 Frank, Beings, 54.

 Strong evidence to the effect that the Bahshamites are constantly in the background of Avicen-
na’s analysis of quiddity and mental existence appears in Metaphysics I.5, a chapter in which Avicen-
na refutes two fundamental Muʿtazilite theses: (a) that it is meaningful to speak of a nonexistent
thing, where ‘the nonexistent,’ taken absolutely, would be nonexistent in concrete reality and in
the mind, and where the notion of the nonexistent in the mind would have an actual counterpart
in concrete reality, i. e., there would be an actual or subsistent ‘nonexistent thing’ in exterior reality
(32.6‒11); and (b) that there is an intermediary ontological state between existence and nonexistence
(34.11 ff.). The terminological and notional overlap between Avicenna and the Bahshamites requires a
separate and in-depth study and would need to encompass the entire Avicennian corpus and espe-
cially certain works, which, on my view, betray a potentially strong Bahshamite influence; this is the
case notably of Philosophical Compendium.
598 IV The Special Ontological Mode of Quiddity in Itself

khāṣṣ), only the latter of which applies to pure quiddity. As a result of this basic dis-
tinction, Abū Hāshim and Avicenna end up positing an additional and distinct onto-
logical status and mode for the Attribute of the Essence and pure quiddity respective-
ly. ‘Realized existence’ therefore does not exhaust all the modes of their ontology.

5.1.2 Essential entailment

The manner in which Abū Hāshim and Avicenna conceive of the relation between
these various ontological modes is also thought-provoking. More specifically, these
thinkers articulate a theory of epistemological and ontological entailment that
finds its source in the Attribute of the Essence and pure quiddity. For the Bahsha-
mites, the various essential attributes (al-ṣifāt al-dhātiyyah) and characteristics or
properties (aḥkām) can be said to follow from, and be derivative of, the Attribute
of the Essence. The prime example in the Bahshamite sources is ‘occupying
space,’ which is literally described as the entailed attribute (ṣifah muqtaḍāt) of the
Attribute of the Essence ‘being an atom.’³⁷⁴ More generally, and by extension, the es-
sential attributes are entailed by the Attribute of the Essence (muqtaḍāt ʿanhā).³⁷⁵ On
the one hand, these attributes and properties are what make a substance existent in
the sense of its having realized, concrete existence and a set of actual properties and
characteristics that can be predicated of it. On the other hand, and from a cognitive
perspective, they are what make a substance perceivable and an object of human ap-
prehension (idrāk). For the Attribute of Essence alone, according to Abū Hāshim, is
conceivable, but not perceptible, and it is at any rate not sufficient to make a thing a
realized existent. According to the Bahshamites, then, the relation between the foun-
dational status of the Attribute of the Essence and the subsequent essential attributes
and characteristics of an existent thing is determined by necessary implication or en-
tailment (iqtiḍāʾ, yaqtaḍī).
In a different context, namely, that of Aristotelian logic, Avicenna also upholds a
theory of necessary entailment that he applies to essence and its concomitants. What
is striking, however, is that—in line with his ontologization of logic—Avicenna ex-
tends this theory to the metaphysical plane in a manner that is reminiscent of the
Bahshamite system. For the shaykh, pure quiddity, which in itself is just itself and
nothing else, possesses a set of concomitants or implicates (lawāḥiq, lawāzim) that
are said to necessarily derive from it. Like the Attribute of the Essence, pure quiddity
can be intellected as such in an abstract way and without these concomitants, but if
an instance of this quiddity comes to exist, whether a concrete horse or the universal
form horse in the mind, then these implicates or concomitants are necessarily actual-
ized or realized alongside quiddity. They are what make quiddity an actual, complex,
realized existent, either concrete or mental. And it is these concomitants also that

 Thiele, Ḥāl, 69.

 Frank, Beings, 58.
 5 Being quiddity: Avicenna’s response to the mutakallimūn 599

make it perceptible to the senses (in the case of the particular concrete being) or con-
ceivable in the mind as a universal (in the case of the universal concepts). Like the
Attribute of the Essence, pure quiddity as such, however, is not cognizable by the
senses, and can only be apprehended intellectually as an abstract consideration. It
is remarkable, therefore, that these thinkers tie essential entailment to the condition
of existence. For the Bahshamites, the Attribute of the Essence of a thing necessarily
implies certain characteristics and attributes that become actual upon the existence
of the substance. As Thiele, explains, “the atom’s very being (kawnuhu jawharan)
—that is, its ‘essential attribute’—necessarily implies (yaqtaḍī) that the atom occu-
pies space whenever it exists.”³⁷⁶ Likewise, for Avicenna, quiddity in itself has nec-
essary concomitants that become actual whenever existence is posited as a condi-
tion, e. g., an actual human being is a substance that is one, corporeal, and
particular whenever it exists in the concrete world. Together with existence, oneness,
and multiplicity, particularity and universality necessarily qualify the two contexts of
existence that are mental existence and concrete existence: whenever a thing has re-
alized existence, it is necessarily existent (mawjūd), one (wāḥid), and either particu-
lar (juzʾī) or universal (kullī), etc., which is to say that it exists with its accidents ei-
ther universally in the mind or individually in the concrete world. In short, the way in
which Abū Hāshim’s ontology describes the relation between the Attribute of the Es-
sence and the entailed essential attributes is reminiscent of the way in which Avicen-
na’s ontology describes the relation between quiddity in itself and its external con-
comitants. In these systems, the ṣifāt and the lawāzim are tied, through a relation of
logical and necessary entailment (iqtiḍāʾ, iltizām), to a foundational reality (ḥaqīqah)
that is eminently intelligible and real.³⁷⁷ These implicates only become actualized
and realized once a thing acquires realized existence and once existence is posited
as a condition (sharṭ) of thingness. Moreover, just as the essential attributes are “on-
tologically distinguished from the Attribute of the Essence”³⁷⁸ according to the Bah-
shamites, so, for Avicenna, the external concomitants of essence are ontologically
distinguished from quiddity in itself.

5.1.3 The attribute of realized existence

This last point regarding the status of realized existence in these systems needs to be
investigated further. For the Bahshamites, realized existence is one of the essential
attributes (al-ṣifāt al-dhātiyyah); it is “the attribute of existence” (ṣifat al-wujūd).
This means that ‘being existent’ is an attribute (ṣifah) or state (ḥāl) that follows

 Thiele, Ḥāl, 69.

 Avicenna shares the technical terms iqtaḍā and muqtadāt with the Bahshamite theologians to
express the notion of essential and necessary entailment. He also occasionally applies it to a theo-
logical context to describe the relationship between God and the created beings, as in Notes, 11.4‒
5, section 3.
 Frank, Beings, 58.
600 IV The Special Ontological Mode of Quiddity in Itself

the Attribute of the Essence and is (conceptually) posterior to it.³⁷⁹ As Ibn Mattawayh,
who flourished in the fifth/eleventh century, and who was therefore a contemporary
of Avicenna, explains, the atom’s “state of being an atom [ḥālatahu bi-kawnihi ja-
wharan] differs from its state of being existent [mawjūdan]. Because there is no
link [taʿalluq] between these two attributes, it is possible to attribute this description
[of the Attribute of the Essence] to what does not have existence.”³⁸⁰ Unlike exis-
tence, therefore, the Attribute of the Essence is never separated from the essence
of a thing. It is both epistemically and ontologically irreducible. In contrast, the at-
tribute of existence, as well as the other essential attributes, such as an atom’s occu-
pying space, are all entailed by the thingness of a thing, by the Attribute of the Es-
sence, which represents the foundation or ground (aṣl) on which these other
attributes can be predicated. The attribute of existence and the various actual char-
acteristics of a thing in existence are what make it a conditioned thing, a thing with a
certain condition (sharṭ) of existence. Recall that the Attribute of the Essence is in
itself unconditioned (ghayr mashrūṭah), so that a condition is an ontological state
that appears together with realized existence (wujūd). The actualization of the essen-
tial attributes changes the state of the thing from that of being ‘unconditioned’ (ghayr
mashrūṭ) to that of being ‘conditioned in existence’ (mashrūṭ bi-l-wujūd).³⁸¹ In that
sense, the attribute of existence is also a ground for the realization of the other es-
sential attributes, since they are realized only when existence is realized. As Frank
succinctly puts it, “existence (sc., the state of being existent) is the condition
(šarṭ) and a ground (aṣl) of the actuality (ḥuṣûl) of the essential attributes.”³⁸² Fur-
thermore, it is through realized existence that the thing-itself becomes manifest to
us through its various special characteristics and accidents, enabling us to distin-
guish one thing from another.
Avicenna for his part also speaks of the unconditioned mode of pure quiddity
and of its epistemological and ontological irreducibility. In addition, he posits a con-
ditioned aspect of quiddity when it is taken together with its concomitants and ac-
cidents or, put differently, when it is taken together with ‘realized’ or ‘acquired exis-
tence.’ Like the Bahshamites, he therefore envisages the states of being conditioned
and unconditioned in close connection with realized existence, since what is condi-
tioned positively (bi-sharṭ shayʾ ākhar) is what is qualified by realized existence and
what constitutes a complex whole composed of quiddity and its accidents and con-
comitants (i. e., a concrete individual being or a complex universal concept). For Avi-
cenna, as for Abū Hāshim before him, then, realized existence implies the presence
of a set of conditions that are superadded to thingness or to the thing itself: ‘states’
and ‘attributes’ for the latter, ‘concomitants’ and ‘accidents’ for the former. By exten-

 For a discussion of the attribute of existence (ṣifat al-wujūd), see Abū Rashīd, Addition, 195.12;
cf. 192.1‒2.
 Frank, Beings, 55, 57, note 21.
 Frank, Beings, 59, and 80, note 3.
 Frank, Beings, 59.
 5 Being quiddity: Avicenna’s response to the mutakallimūn 601

sion, realized existence is always ‘grounded in’ a composite or complex whole. It

points to a bundle of qualities and accidents, which, taken together with essence
and thingness, can be said to be realized and unified in existence. It is these external
states, attributes, concomitants, and accidents that enable us to perceive and distin-
guish various things in realized existence (e. g., Zayd from ʿAmr). Thingness itself
(i. e., the Attribute of the Essence and pure quiddity) cannot, on these accounts, pro-
vide the ground for such a distinction. Just as, for Abū Hāshim, the attribute of ex-
istence (ṣifat al-wujūd) is one of the essential attributes (al-ṣifāt al-dhātiyyah) that are
directly entailed by the Attribute of the Essence, so, for Avicenna, realized existence
is one of the necessary concomitants (lawāḥiq, lawāzim) that is directly entailed by
pure quiddity. I believe that this aspect of Avicenna’s argumentation was borrowed
directly from the Bahshamite works.
According to these Muʿtazilite thinkers, then, it is the Attribute of the Essence
that determines to a high degree the way or mode according to which something ex-
ists and according to which an attribute is actualized in the world. In this context,
the Bahshamites often speak of ‘the mode’ (kayfiyyah) of an attribute and even of
‘the mode of existence’ (kayfiyyat al-wujūd) of a thing.³⁸³ The notion of kayfiyyah re-
fers in this context primarily to possibility and necessity as modes of actuality of an
attribute. For example, as Thiele notes, for the Muʿtazilites life is necessary in God,
but only possible in a human being.³⁸⁴ But since the attributes are grounded in con-
crete entities and necessitated by the attribute of existence, the notion of kayfiyyah
can also mean more generally ‘a mode of existence.’ In that case, it qualifies the ex-
istence of an entity as being possible or necessary, without however adding anything
or any new attribute to existence itself. In its narrow relation to existence, it can be
applied to common things as well as to God. Thus ʿAbd al-Jabbār states that God’s
necessary eternality is a mode of His attribute of existence (kayfiyyah fī ṣifat al-
wujūd).³⁸⁵ Now, since all attributes are posterior to and entailed by the Attribute of
the Essence, it is ultimately the latter that determines the modes of these attributes
by determining some as necessary and others as possible; and this, even though ex-
istence is required to actualize these attributes. For example, whereas it is necessary
for an existent atom to occupy space—an essential attribute entailed by its Attribute
of the Essence—it is only possible for blackness to inhere in it as an accident. With
regard to the theological example given above, it is God’s Attribute of the Essence,
‘His being eternal,’ which determines His mode of being. Nonetheless, occupying
space for an atom and being a unit of blackness arise only in the case of existence
and are thus conditioned and ‘realized’ by the attribute of existence, even though

 For a discussion of this term and its ontological implications, see Frank, Beings, 68‒72; idem, Al-
maʿdūm, 197.
 Thiele, Ḥāl, 69.
 Frank, Beings, 69, and 87, note 63.
602 IV The Special Ontological Mode of Quiddity in Itself

they are entailed by the Attribute of the Essence.³⁸⁶ If possibility and necessity are
determined by the Attribute of the Essence and what it entails, they are nonetheless
meaningful only with regard to actual and realized existence and the attribute of ex-
istence.
Avicenna, probably following this Bahshamite precedent, also refers in his works
to the ‘mode of existence’ (kayfiyyat al-wujūd) of entities and similarly connects it
with the modalities (jihāt) of the possible and the necessary.³⁸⁷ And just as this no-
tion is tied with the Attribute of the Essence and essential entailment in Muʿtazilite
ontology, it is in Avicenna’s philosophy connected with quiddity and the essential
concomitants and accidents entailed by it. Thus, whereas it is in the nature and es-
sence of a horse or a human being to be merely possible of existence and, when these
things do actually exist, always and necessarily to exist in a body and matter, it is
God’s very quiddity to be necessary of existence by virtue of Himself. In beings
other than God, it should be noted, possibility and necessity do not qualify quiddity
simpliciter—just as they do not qualify the Attribute of the Essence simpliciter—but
rather the relation between quiddity and its realized concomitants, including realiz-
ed existence. For Avicenna, the jihāt qualify the way in which quiddity and its con-
comitants become actual and manifested in existence: they are necessary if they are
caused to exist by an exterior cause, but only possible in themselves. It is only loose-
ly that the modalities can be said to qualify the very quiddity of a thing, since quid-
dity in itself and thingness in itself is only that and not envisaged together with ex-
istence. It is truly, then, the relationship between the complex or bundle of quiddity
and its concomitants and the extrinsic efficient cause effecting its existence that can
be said to be necessary or possible. So Avicenna, following the Bahshamites, asso-
ciates the modalities with essence or essential entailment in a manner that connects
these notions with the condition of realized existence: thus, a quiddity and its con-
comitants (lawāzim) are possible of existence in themselves but necessary by virtue
of a cause that provides realized existence. Put differently, the essential concomi-

 As Frank, Beings, 127, puts it, “the essential attributes arise with the existence of the thing … but
are grounded in the Attribute of the Essence.”
 Kayfiyyat al-wujūd is admittedly an ambiguous expression in Avicenna’s works, since it can refer
not only to the modalities (jihāt), but also to different senses, modes, or contexts of existence, such as
mental and concrete existence, or, according to my interpretation, realized and special existence. One
indication of this is the title of Metaphysics V.1 (Fī l-umūr al-ʿāmmah wa-kayfiyyat wujūdihā) and the
fact that this chapter explores mental and concrete existence and especially the existence of quiddity
and its concomitants in detail, but does not discuss possibility and necessity in any meaningful way.
Rather, in this chapter, kayfiyyah refers to the difference between concrete and mental existence, and
especially to the modes of existence of quiddity in itself and of its concomitants in connection with
priority and posteriority, simplicity and complexity, etc. Hence, kayfiyyat al-wujūd is not limited to the
modalities (jihāt) of the possible and the necessary, but encompasses many other modes or aspects
that Avicenna associates with tashkīk al-wujūd. There is therefore a marked difference between the
Bahshamites, for whom existence is univocal, and Avicenna, who upholds a highly sophisticated
theory of the modulation of existence.
 5 Being quiddity: Avicenna’s response to the mutakallimūn 603

tants are dependent on an exterior cause—namely, an efficient cause that provides

existence—in order to become actual and necessary. Beyond the common use of
the expression kayfiyyat al-wujūd, there is therefore an undeniable similarity as
well in the way these thinkers conceive of it: the Bahshamites and Avicenna both
use the modalities to qualify the relationship between essence and its various impli-
cates, on the one hand, and realized existence, on the other.³⁸⁸ Existence is framed in
terms of the necessary realization of essential attributes and concomitants that, with
regard to their source of entailment (the Attribute of the Essence and pure quiddity),
are only possible. In such systems, the granting of existence is the condition (sharṭ)
for the realization and manifestation (ḥuṣūl, ẓuhūr) of the essential attributes, con-
comitants, and characteristics of a thing that proceed necessarily from (iqtaḍāʾ, ilta-
zama, ṣādirah ʿan) the essence.³⁸⁹ Essential entailment is not merely a conceptual or
logical notion, but one subjected to an ontologizing interpretation as well: the Bah-
shamite descriptions (awṣāf) and attributes (ṣifāt) predicated of things have corre-
sponding ontological states (aḥwāl) and entitative accidents (maʿānī) in the concrete
world, just as the Avicennian logical implicates (lawāzim) are at the same time met-
aphysical concomitants (lawāḥiq, lawāzim) that exist in concrete reality or in the
mind.
Nevertheless, in spite of these multifarious parallels, there is also a crucial dif-
ference with regard to how realized existence relates to the broader ontology of
these thinkers: since the Bahshamites restrict wujūd to concrete actual existence,
they argue for a univocal application of the attribute of existence to all existent
things. Hence, wujūd on their mind can be attributed equally to all existent things
(ashyāʾ mawjūdah), regardless of whether that thing is an atom, a unit of blackness,
or God Himself.³⁹⁰ In contrast, Avicenna posits different senses (maʿānī) and modes
(anḥāʾ, aḥkām) of existence: for him, to exist abstractly, immaterially, and universally
in the mind is not the same as to exist individually and concretely in the world; nor is
the existence of God in any way similar to that of a composite, contingent being; nor
is the proper existence of quiddity collapsible with realized existence. Consequently,

 One doubt that underlies much of the modern scholarship on the modalities in Avicenna is
whether these apply chiefly to existence or to essence. As Black, Avicenna, 17, notes, “because of
the very thrust of Avicenna’s distinction between essence and existence in this chapter [Metaphysics
I.5], it remains unclear whether modality is primarily an existential or a quidditative property for Avi-
cenna.” My position in this book is that the modalities fall on the side of essence and should be re-
garded primarily as concomitants of quiddity. Cf. Bäck, Avicenna, 237‒238, for whom the modalities
concern the essences of things: “So, Avicenna seems to say, modalities are determined on the level of
quiddities in themselves, but modal propositions belong to the level of quiddities existing in intellec-
tu.”
 For these terms in Bahshamite kalām, see Frank, Al-maʿdūm, 192. These technical terms are
shared by the mutakallimūn and Avicenna to express the notion of essential entailment. True, in Avi-
cenna’s philosophy, the root ṣ-d-r applies primarily to the emanation of ‘being,’ but since it is exis-
tence that manifests the concomitants of quiddity, the idea is fundamentally the same.
 See Frank, Beings, 60, who focuses on the views of ʿAbd al-Jabbār.
604 IV The Special Ontological Mode of Quiddity in Itself

the mode of realized existence that the Bahshamite speak of is adequate to describe
only the contingent entities that are the atoms and their accidents, and whose coun-
terparts in Avicenna’s system are the concomitants and accidents of essence, but not
the mode of being of pure quiddity itself. Where the Bahshamites understandably re-
frain from ascribing being to the Attribute of the Essence, Avicenna taps into the rich
Greek tradition of construing existence as a polysemous, ambiguous, modulated,
and even equivocal notion, finding in this tradition the conceptual and interpretive
tools he needs to develop his ontology of pure quiddity. Hence, over and against the
univocal interpretation of existence and its homogenous applicability to all existent
things advocated by the Bahshamites, Avicenna maintains an ambiguous or modu-
lated notion of existence based on a diffused construal of this key notion. In the
final analysis, although his conception of kayfiyyat al-wujūd bears many remarkable
parallels with that of the Bahshamites, it is distinct and original in its scope and phil-
osophical application.
There is one additional overlapping feature of the Bahshamite and Avicennian
expositions that deserves attention: the attribute of existence is linked in the Bahsha-
mite system to an ‘autonomous agent’ (bi-l-fāʿil), which grants existence from the out-
side. The act of this autonomous agent and the granting of existence it results in are a
condition (sharṭ) for the actualization of the attributes, even of those that are strictly
speaking grounded in the Attribute of the Essence, e. g., occupying space for an
atom.³⁹¹ There is an obvious parallel to this doctrine in Avicenna’s metaphysics,
namely, the efficient cause, which is an autonomous and exterior agent vis-à-vis
its effect, and which is responsible for causing the actualization and existence of
the various concomitants of quiddity. In this connection, the Muʿtazilites establish
a strong correlation between possibility and the Attribute of the Essence. For Abū
Hāshim, possibility (jawāz or ṣiḥḥat al-wujūd) is closely linked to this attribute,
which determines how a certain thing comes to exist. As Frank explains, “the
thing-itself (al-dhāt) in the ‘Attribute of Essence’ (ṣifat al-dhāt) is prior to the actuality
of its actual existence,” which means, for the Bahshamites, that it is possible of ac-
tually existing even when it is in nonexistence. This priority, it should be noted, is
truly a possibility of existence inherent to the thing (ṣiḥḥat al-wujūd fī nafsihi).³⁹²
The Bahshamite doctrine of ontological possibility, it appears, is closely tied to the
Attribute of the Essence. Because the latter can be intellected even when the thing
to which it corresponds does not exist, it by the same token designates the nonexis-
tent thing as a kind of ontological ‘possible.’ Fundamentally, the nonexistent thing is
‘possible of realized existence’ on account of the very fact that it is conceivable and
has an Attribute of the Essence.³⁹³ This is why a standard definition of the nonexis-

 Frank, Beings, 124‒147; Thiele, Ḥāl, 69.

 Frank, Al-maʿdūm, 203.
 It should be stressed, however, that the Bahshamites locate possibility in the agent as well, so
that possibility also depends on the power of an agent to effect the existence of an act; the possible or
maqdūr is thus defined to some extent by the qudrah of the agent. Nevertheless, the possibility of the
 5 Being quiddity: Avicenna’s response to the mutakallimūn 605

tent or maʿdūm for the Bahshamites is “the object known that is nonexistent” (al-
maʿlūm alladhī laysa bi-mawjūd); it is an intelligible object whose existence is
known to be possible.³⁹⁴
Avicenna must have been profoundly impressed by these ideas, since he ascribes
possibility (imkān) to the notion that most closely resembles the Attribute of the Es-
sence in his metaphysics, namely, pure quiddity. Even though pure quiddity is not
intrinsically characterized by possibility (since possibility does not enter it as a con-
stituent, nor is it part of the essential definition of a thing), it does, however, define
its relationship to realized existence and to the efficient cause. This is why, for Avi-
cenna, the same thing can be said to be both ‘possible of existence in itself’ and ‘nec-
essary of existence through another,’ these two qualifications being co-extensive and
convertible, inasmuch as they express a single thing’s relation to realized existence
from two different angles.³⁹⁵ What is particularly striking, moreover, is that the Bah-
shamites and Avicenna correlate intelligibility and conceivability with the possibility
of existence: all that can be conceived of is possible of existence, whereas the truly
inconceivable and unintelligible, such as a square circle, is not possible of existence,
even in the mind, and thus amounts to an epistemological and ontological impossi-
ble. The only difference—and it is admittedly an important one—concerns the onto-
logical status of the objects that are deemed possible of existence in the mind: they
are ‘nonexistent things’ for the Bahshamites, whereas they are legitimate mental ex-
istents for Avicenna. As a corollary, whereas the formula ‘possible of existence’ for
the Bahshamites pertains exclusively to the concrete world, for Avicenna, in contrast,
it can refer either to existence in the concrete world or in the mind (e. g., fictional and
artificial forms).³⁹⁶
In sum, there are five main points that characterize the relationship between the
Attribute of the Essence and existence in Bahshamite ontology: (a) essential and nec-
essary entailment (iqtiḍāʾ), which concerns more generally the relationship between
the essential attributes and the Attribute of the Essence; (b) the description of exis-
tence as a posterior, external, and derivative attribute and state whose mode (kay-
fiyyah) is to some extent determined by the Attribute of the Essence; (c) the postula-
tion of a condition (sharṭ) linked to realized existence, which signifies the
actualization of the attributes and properties of an existent thing; (d) the linkage be-
tween the Attribute of the Essence—applied to both the existent and nonexistent—
and the possibility of existence in the concrete; and (e) the postulation of an exterior

maqdūr precedes the qudrah of the agent; see Frank, Al-maʿdūm, 197‒198, 200‒209. Inasmuch as it is
a mere possible for realized existence, a thing is a nonexistent or maʿdūm. Naturally, Avicenna rejects
this argument and does not locate possibility in the divine agent but only in the nature or essence of a
thing.
 Frank, Al-maʿdūm, 189.
 For the equivalence of these formulas, see Wisnovsky, Avicenna’s Metaphysics, 197 ff.
 It is true that Avicenna does not elaborate on this point in his works, but it is a corollary of his
theory of mental existence.
606 IV The Special Ontological Mode of Quiddity in Itself

and autonomous agent or cause responsible for the actual concrete existence of a
thing. Remarkably, these five points find direct pendants in Avicenna’s ontology,
even though they are adjusted to his metaphysical framework. For the master, es-
sence entails concomitants and accidents; existence itself is described as a necessary
essential concomitant or lāzim; it introduces a condition alongside quiddity that de-
termines and actualizes the essential concomitants; quiddity and its concomitants
are said to be merely possible with regard to existence and are apprehended as
such by the intellect; and quiddity also calls for an exterior, efficient cause for the
realized existence of an entity to occur. Beyond these numerous formal, terminolog-
ical, and doctrinal parallels, it is remarkable that Abū Hāshim and Avicenna have
integrated the logical modalities of ‘the possible’ and ‘the necessary’ in their onto-
logical schemes and used them to redefine the boundary between thingness and re-
alized existence. This ontological reconfiguration is grounded in essentialist theories,
the Attribute of the Essence and pure quiddity respectively. The conceptual parallels
between the Bahshamite distinction dhāt/ṣifāt—or more specifically ṣifat al-dhāt/
ṣifāt dhātiyyah—and the Avicennian distinction māhiyyah/lawāzim are remarkable
and worthy of investigation.³⁹⁷
Fundamentally, then, the systems of Abū Hāshim and Avicenna are based on
what one might describe as an ontological oddity: the real (but neither existent
nor nonexistent) state and permanent intelligibility of the Attribute of the Essence
in the former case; the special, irreducible, and intelligible mode of existence of
pure quiddity in the latter. As far as I can tell, and in spite of all the parallels outlined
above, these two theories are idiosyncratic and represent daring philosophical inno-
vations on the part of their authors. Within their respective systems, they allow Abū
Hāshim and Avicenna to transcend the limitations associated with a constricted con-
strual of the notion of realized existence and to elaborate a sophisticated and
nuanced ontological model based on the notion of essential entailment and on
the distinction between thingness and realized existence. Both parties furthermore
faced the challenge of defining the mental status of thingness in abstraction from ex-
istence. Whereas the Bahshamites remedied to this situation by expanding their on-
tological categories to recognize ‘nonexistent things’ and ‘states,’ as well as by pos-
tulating an intermediary status between existence and nonexistence, Avicenna
approached this issue from the perspective of the Greek (mostly Aristotelian) ontolog-
ical tradition, which was solidly grounded in the law of the excluded middle, and
which inspired him to reflect on the various senses and modes of existence. Ultimate-

 Nevertheless, important differences between the Bahshamite theory of the Attribute of the Es-
sence and Avicenna’s theory of quiddity remain. For example, the former is an attribute whose exter-
nal correlates and referents are both existent things and nonexistent things. Moreover, although it is
inseparable from the thing-itself, it is not strictly speaking the thing-itself. These points explain why
the Attribute of the Essence does not in itself exist. In contrast, Avicenna’s pure quiddity is not an
attribute, but the thing itself as it is conceived of in the mind, which, as such, possesses its own in-
telligible being.
 5 Being quiddity: Avicenna’s response to the mutakallimūn 607

ly, these thinkers articulated different solutions to a common metaphysical problem

focusing on the ontological and epistemological status of mental objects. Remarka-
bly, the doctrines of the Attribute of the Essence and pure quiddity lie at the core of
the Bahshamite and Avicennian epistemology and ontology respectively. They pro-
vide a coherent explanation and rationale for the essentialist preoccupations of
these thinkers. Finally, these theories also enabled them to solve a similar set of theo-
logical problems revolving around God’s existence and knowledge, to which their Is-
lamic upbringing and their common interest in theology would have naturally intro-
duced them.

5.1.4 Theological implications

Indeed, the similarities between the Bahshamite notion of the Attribute of the Es-
sence and Avicenna’s notion of quiddity extend to their theology as well, and it is
to this aspect that I now wish to turn. These thinkers rely on them to explain
God’s special existence and how it differs from the existence of the other beings.³⁹⁸
According to Abū Hāshim and his disciples, God can be said to possess His own
unique and special Attribute of the Essence, which captures His ontological distinct-
ness or property (khāṣṣiyyah) and sets Him apart from all the other entities. In this
perspective, it is usually God’s eternality (qidam) that is highlighted, ‘His being eter-
nal’ (kawnuhu qadīm), so that the divine Attribute of the Essence is said to corre-
spond primarily to eternality. However, because God is eternally existing and an eter-
nal existent, His Attribute of the Essence by extension reflects the eternal existence
that only He possesses. In that sense it refers to God’s essence as an eternally exis-
tent being. In light of this, an alternative formulation is to say that God’s Attribute of
the Essence is ‘His being existent’ (kawnuhu mawjūdan).³⁹⁹ This in turn explains why,
according to some Bahshamite authors, the Attribute of the Essence expresses an
identity between God’s essence and existence. The Bahshamites identify, uniquely
in God, the Attribute of the Essence with (eternal) existence, with the implication
that God’s Attribute of the Essence is His existence. Unlike other beings, where the
attribute of existence is distinct from, and external to, the Attribute of the Essence,
God has an essential existence that comes only from Himself. ʿAbd al-Jabbār, for ex-
ample, states that God’s “being eternal is identical with [His] existence” (kawnuhu
qadīm nafs al-wujūd),⁴⁰⁰ while Abū Rashīd explains that God’s “being existent is ne-

 A useful comparative study of the theology of Avicenna and some mutakallimūn can be found in
Wisnovsky, Avicenna’s Metaphysics, 227‒243. Wisnovsky’s analysis, however, focuses chiefly on the
role of the modalities of the possible and necessary in the Ashʿarite and Avicennian theologies. It
does not address in earnest the issue of Avicenna’s engagement with Bahshamite theology.
 Frank, Beings, 67; idem, al-Maʿdūm, 197‒202.
 ʿAbd al-Jabbār, Summa, 54.11‒16. Since God’s Attribute of the Essence is His being eternal, it is
also His being eternally existent, both of which are identical with His essence. In another passage, the
theologian writes: “this difference [between what is eternally existent and what is not eternally exis-
608 IV The Special Ontological Mode of Quiddity in Itself

cessitated [or entailed] by this Attribute [of the Essence]” (kawnuhu mawjūd muqtaḍā
li-tilka l-ṣifah).⁴⁰¹ Hence, what God is in Himself, i. e., ‘His being eternal’ and ‘His
being existent,’ is due to His essence and is reflected and referred to by the divine
Attribute of the Essence.⁴⁰² This attribute is eternally and constantly actual in God.
It also eternally (abadan) and unconditionally (min ghayr sharṭ) causes the attribute
of existence.⁴⁰³ Finally, this unique attribute is what differentiates God’s essence and
existence from that of all other things.⁴⁰⁴ Furthermore, the Bahshamites insist on the
fact that God’s existence is necessary by virtue of His very essence. For example, Abū
Rashīd al-Nīshāpūrī states that “the Eternal is the existent whose existence is neces-
sary” (al-qadīm huwa l-mawjūd alladhī yajibu wujūduhu). This necessity, it turns out,
proceeds from God’s very essence. Abū Rashīd adds that the eternally existent, God,
is “He whose existence is necessary by virtue of a thing that refers to His essence”
(huwa mā yajibu wujūduhu li-amr yarjiʿu ilā dhātihi).⁴⁰⁵ Likewise, Mānkdīm Shashdīw
states (on behalf of Abū Hāshim) that “what is necessary in God” or “what should
necessarily be predicated of God” (mā yajibu lahu) are the Attribute of the Essence
and the four essential attributes of ‘His being powerful, knowing, living, and exist-
ing.’⁴⁰⁶ And ʿAbd al-Jabbār to ask: “Can’t you see that His existence is necessary?”
(yajibu wujūduhu)⁴⁰⁷; His difference from other beings lies entirely in His having nec-
essary existence (wa-innamā yastanidu huwa taʿālā bi-wujūb al-wujūd lahu dūn
ghayrihi).⁴⁰⁸
Here again, one witnesses similarities and differences between the Bahshamites
and Avicenna.⁴⁰⁹ As I argued in a preceding section of this book, not only does Avi-

tent] refers to what The Eternal [i. e., God] is in His essence [mā ʿalayhi l-qadīm fī dhātihi]” (ʿAbd al-
Jabbār, Summa, 53.26‒27). Cf. Mānkdīm Shashdīw, Notes on the Commentary, 129, 198‒199.
 Abū Rashīd, Addition, 459.17‒18.
 The Bahshamite reflection on this issue can be framed in a syllogistic form: since God’s Attrib-
ute of the Essence is eternality or ‘His being eternal,’ and since the latter identifies with ‘His being
(eternally) existent,’ then ‘His being (eternally) existent’ is what best defines God’s essence or Attrib-
ute of the Essence. It would seem that these thinkers and Avicenna jointly arrived at the conclusion of
an identity (or quasi-identity in the Bahshamite case) of essence and existence in God, but through a
different reasoning and set of arguments.
 Abū Rashīd, Additions, 195.11‒13.
 ʿAbd al-Jabbār, Summa, 54.19‒22.
 Abū Rashīd, Additions, 197.11‒17.
 Mānkdīm Shashdīw, Notes on the Commentary, 129.14‒15.
 ʿAbd al-Jabbār, Summa, 53.23; cf. 54.24‒26.
 ʿAbd al-Jabbār, Summa, 138.11.
 Among the main differences are the following: Avicenna does not approach the issue of God’s
existence from the angle of God’s eternality, since his objective is to distinguish between the existence
of various eternal beings (i. e., God and the separate intellects). Avicenna’s approach is accordingly
based entirely on how the modalities of the possible and the necessary apply to these various beings
and can be used to distinguish between them in terms of the causality of existence and in light of the
essence/existence distinction; for an insightful and detailed discussion of this issue, see Wisnovsky,
Avicenna’s Metaphysics, chapters II.13 and 14. Moreover, Avicenna’s analysis does not unfold in the
 5 Being quiddity: Avicenna’s response to the mutakallimūn 609

cenna ascribe a quiddity to God, but he identifies this quiddity with God’s proper
mode of existence and with His necessary existence. On my interpretation, this prop-
er existence is identified uniquely and fully in God with His absolute, actual, and
necessary existence. Hence, there is no difference in God between quiddity and ex-
istence. What is more, in line with the Bahshamite position, necessity of existence
is said to proceed from, and is by virtue of, God’s very essence. God alone possesses
necessary existence from His essence, whereas all other beings acquire it from an ex-
terior cause. Although the Bahshamites do not employ Avicenna’s famous formula-
tion of wājib al-wujūd bi-dhātihi, the individual elements that underlie it, namely, (a)
that God’s existence is necessary, (b) that it is identical with His essence, and (c) that
God’s essence amounts to a perfect oneness in existence, are all prefigured in the
Muʿtazilite accounts. What is more, one finds in these accounts the idea that neces-
sity (wājibiyyah) and existence (wujūd) proceed from the very quiddity and essence of
God (dhāt, māhiyyah). To conclude, the parallels between the Bahshamites’ and Avi-
cenna’s ontological systems are outstanding and suggest that the latter relied heavily
on this Muʿtazilite tradition when elaborating his ontology of quiddity and his theol-
ogy. The table below reflects the findings discussed above and insists on the concep-
tual and terminological parallels that exist in the works of these thinkers.

Table 2 Comparison of the Bahshamites’ and Avicenna’s views

Notions and doctrines Bahshamite ‘Attribute of the Essence’ Avicennian ‘quiddity in itself’

min ḥaythu hiya hiya

ʿalā mā huwa ʿalayhi
irreducibility,
mā huwa ʿalayhi fī dhātihi bi‐dhātihi ⁴¹⁰
‘in itselfness’
mā huwa bihi huwa ⁴¹¹
etc. (see Appendix )

al‐jawhar jawhar al‐farasiyyah farasiyyah faqaṭ

identity and thingness kawn al‐sawād sawādan shayʾiyyah
shayʾiyyah etc. (see Appendix )

ghayr mashrūṭ (bi‐amr siwāhā)

unconditionedness lā bi‐sharṭ (shayʾ ākhar)
min ghayr sharṭ

demarcation, specificity yatamayyazu, ikhtaṣṣa, khāṣṣiyyah khāṣṣa, wujūd khāṣṣ

essential similarity,
tamāthul, mushārakah mushārakah, ishtirāk
commonality

context of a discussion of the divine attributes, which are central to the Muʿtazilite project. In spite of
this, the way these thinkers conceptualize the relation between essence, necessity, and existence in
God proceeds from a common concern to posit a necessarily existing eternal being and to avoid pos-
iting a multiplicity of principles within it.
 Avicenna, Philosophy for ʿArūḍī, 35.16.
 Avicenna, Metaphysics, VIII.5, 349.12.
610 IV The Special Ontological Mode of Quiddity in Itself

Table  Comparison of the Bahshamites’ and Avicenna’s views (continued)

Notions and doctrines Bahshamite ‘Attribute of the Essence’ Avicennian ‘quiddity in itself’

essential entailment iqtiḍāʾ luzūm, iltizām, iqtiḍāʾ

muqtaḍāt, al‐lawāzim,
ontological implicates muqtaḍāt, al‐ṣifāt al‐dhātiyyah
al‐lawāḥiq

status of realized al‐wujūd al‐muḥaṣṣal, ṣifah,

ṣifat al‐wujūd
existence lāzim, lāḥiq, amr

condition of existence mashrūṭ bi‐l‐wujūd bi‐sharṭ shayʾ ākhar

kayfiyyat al‐wujūd, al‐wujūd kayfiyyat al‐wujūd, naḥw

ontological modes
wa‐naḥwuhu al‐wujūd, al‐wujūdayn

relation to possibility jāʾiz, thubūt al‐jawāz, ṣiḥḥat al‐wujūd imkān al‐wujūd

kawnuhu qadīm nafs al‐wujūd,

identity with God’s lā māhiyyata lahu ghayr
kawnuhu mawjūd muqtaḍā li‐tilka
existence al‐anniyyah
l‐ṣifah [al‐dhātiyyah]

huwa mā yajibu wujūduhu li‐amr

necessity in God yarjiʿu ilā dhātihi, al‐qadīm huwa huwa wājib al‐wujūd bi‐dhātihi
l‐mawjūd alladhī yajibu wujūduhu

Avicenna, it appears, was profoundly influenced—both positively and negatively—by

a set of Bahshamite doctrines: that the ḥāl and ṣifah of the Attribute of the Essence
are real and actual (thābit) even when they refer to a nonexistent thing (shayʾ
maʿdūm), so that the latter can be said to possess its own ontological status; that
this attribute is consequently permanent, irreducible, absolute, unconditioned,
and ontologically prior with regard to realized existence; and that existence itself
and the various essential attributes that characterize an existent thing are all en-
tailed by the Attribute of the Essence and essentially follow it. Furthermore, the theo-
logical idea that the Attribute of the Essence could be extended to God Himself to
account for His unique eternal and necessary existence deeply impressed Avicenna,
who likewise attributes necessary existence to the divine quiddity and describes it as
proceeding from God’s very self. With that being said, Avicenna significantly modi-
fied the elements he appropriated from Bahshamite ontology and theology and either
adapted them to fit his own set of doctrines or discarded them as incompatible with
his system. For example, (a) he rejects the theory of an intermediary status between
existence and nonexistence and instead proceeds to elaborate on the various senses
and modes of existence, one of which he attributes to quiddity; (b) consequently, he
also rejects the notion of an intelligible and conceivable ‘nonexistent thing’ (taken
absolutely) and replaces it with the theory of pure quiddity in the mind, which
can be intellected even in the absence of concrete instantiations, or more generally
of everything that is external to it; and (c) he reinterprets the notion of essential en-
tailment between the Attribute of the Essence and the essential attributes in the con-
 5 Being quiddity: Avicenna’s response to the mutakallimūn 611

text of an Aristotelian logical framework that focuses on the relationship between es-
sence and its various concomitants and accidents.
One of the main problems from Avicenna’s perspective was that the Bahshamite
theory of the ḥāl conflicts with the law of the excluded middle. Avicenna does not
recognize an intermediary ontological state or mode between existence and nonexis-
tence. As a result, the idea that the Attribute of the Essence can be intellectually
grasped but indicates merely a subsistent state that does not truly exist does not
square with Avicenna’s ontology and especially his ontologization of mental objects.
Given this divergence, the master was obliged to adapt and transform some of these
kalām views to fit his ontological framework. One key departure was to attribute a
distinct, special, but positive mode of existence to pure quiddity in the mind,
which accounts for its intelligibility, and which also conforms with Avicenna’s ten-
dency to ontologize logical notions and concepts. Hence, although Avicenna, follow-
ing the Bahshamites, construes the special ontological mode of essence in close con-
nection with intelligibility, intellectuality, and knowledge, he takes the additional
step of explicitly defining it as a mode of intelligible existence (wujūd ʿaqlī). Instead
of designating it as something real, but neither mawjūd nor maʿdūm, Avicenna com-
mits himself to the view that pure quiddity exists. This key departure from Bahsha-
mite ontology—sketched in Metaphysics I.5—is the starting point for his intricate ar-
ticulation of the ontology of quiddity as exposed in V.1.⁴¹² In the final analysis, what
allows this interpretive leeway in Avicenna’s philosophy is a different approach to
predication and a different construal of existence. For the Bahshamites, the attribute
of existence (ṣifat al-wujūd) is predicated univocally of all existent things. On their
mind, the notion of wujūd refers exhaustively to all things that have realized, con-
crete existence, i. e., the existence of individual and concrete substances and acci-
dents. The atom, a unit of blackness, and God Himself are all uniformly qualified
by the attribute of existence, even though the mode (kayfiyyah) of their existence dif-
fers.⁴¹³ For Avicenna, in contrast, existence is said ‘in many ways’ and is intrinsically
an ambiguous or modulated term located midway between univocity and equivocity.
As he puts it, the notion of wujūd is kathīr al-maʿānī and an ism mushakkik. Conse-

 Although some scholars (e. g., Izutsu, The Fundamental Structure, 65; Nuseibeh, Al-ʿAql al-
Qudsī, 48‒49) have made a case for Avicenna’s endorsement of a neutral ontological mode on the
Bahshamite model focusing on the distinction between the ‘subsistence’ and ‘existence’ of entities,
there are various reasons why one should not ascribe these theories to Avicenna. First, Avicenna’s
ontology of pure quiddity unambiguously posits and describes a positive mode of existence and
never refers to a neutral or intermediary ontological mode or state of quiddity that would lie between
existence and nonexistence; at any rate, there is no terminological evidence for this view in the Avi-
cennian works. Second, Avicenna in Metaphysics I.5 expressly addresses and rebuts the Muʿtazilite
and (partially) Ashʿarite theory of the intermediary states by invoking the law of the excluded middle.
Finally, as I show in chapter V, the mode of existence of the pure quiddities in God collapses entirely
with the mode of existence of the divine essence, which is pure necessary existence.
 For the univocity of being and predication in the Bahshamite tradition, see Frank, Al-maʿdūm,
197‒198.
612 IV The Special Ontological Mode of Quiddity in Itself

quently, wujūd muḥaṣṣal, which corresponds to the single and univocal sense of ex-
istence the Bahshamites recognize, is merely one aspect, mode, or sense of existence
according to the shaykh al-raʾīs. ⁴¹⁴
In general terms, and from an ontological and metaphysical perspective, the
later, post-Avicennian era in Islamic intellectual history can be defined largely as
an attempt to delineate Abū Hāshim’s and Avicenna’s positions regarding these is-
sues and to understand how they relate to one another. Nevertheless, if later thinkers
grappled directly with Avicenna’s works and legacy, their understanding of Abū Hā-
shim’s doctrines was usually mediated through later Bahshamite and Ashʿarite sour-
ces. In spite of this difference, I would argue that the cluster of philosophical prob-
lems (and their related solutions) that these two authors formulated decisively
shaped later Islamic philosophy. One outstanding example of a thinker who engaged
expressly in this task was Shahrastānī. His works proffer a kind of doctrinal synthe-
sis on many philosophical points articulated by these thinkers, but he also felt com-
pelled in many cases to sieve through their ontological systems in order to separate
acceptable ideas from reprehensible ones.⁴¹⁵ More specifically, later philosophers
had to address Abū Hāshim’s and Avicenna’s essentialist approaches and their rele-
gating realized existence to a single facet of their ontological system. Just as Abū Hā-
shim’s theory of the states and conception of the shayʾ maʿdūm thābit proved prob-
lematic, so I contend that Avicenna’s intricate ontology of pure quiddity proved a
quandary, since it could give rise to a variety of cogent, yet ultimately irreconcilable,
interpretations. More specifically, the central notions of the priority and irreducibility
of quiddity vis-à-vis existence could be subjected to a multiplicity of analyses and
interpretations and was anything but conceptually pellucid. The later debate about
the univocity and equivocity of being—which ran parallel to that between essence
and existence—should be approached and studied in light of these circumstances
and of the dialectical legacy of Bahshamite and Avicennian ontology and theology.

 For Avicenna, therefore, quiddity in itself is integrated within the very fabric of his theory of ex-
istence (wujūd) and assigned a distinct sense and mode of being. The Avicennian theory of tashkīk
extends to and encompasses the ontological mode of pure quiddity. This stresses the gap between
these thinkers’ approaches and the significant degree of adaptation and transformation that the Bah-
shamites elements underwent in Avicenna’s system. In this connection, even though, as I believe,
Abū Hāshim’s doctrines proved decisive in the development of Avicenna’s ontology of pure quiddity,
the latter was nonetheless also profoundly influenced by the ontological tradition bequeathed to him
by his Greek and Arabic philosophical forebears, whose focus was on the process of disambiguating
existence and clarifying its predicative scope and function. In the final analysis, then, it is Avicenna’s
dialectical engagement with these two ontological strands, the Aristotelian-Neoplatonic and the Bah-
shamite, which shaped his ontology of pure quiddity and, more generally, his ontological and meta-
physical system.
 See Benevich, The Metaphysics; idem, The Essence-Existence Distinction.
 5 Being quiddity: Avicenna’s response to the mutakallimūn 613

5.2 Avicenna and Ashʿarite ontology

In contrast to his relation to Baṣrian Muʿtazilite doctrine, which is complex, nuanced,

and defined by a dialectical process of adaption and rejection, I would contend that
Avicenna’s opposition to the Ashʿarites is in contrast quite blatant and straightfor-
ward.⁴¹⁶ This is because the Ashʿarites have a more constricted ontology that is
fully reducible to the notion of actual, realized existence in the concrete world.
These theologians regard ‘the existent’ exclusively as a concrete and realized
being, and existence as a notion intensionally and extensionally identical with thing-
ness. Thus, in their system, ‘a thing’ (shayʾ) is always ‘an existent’ (mawjūd), and vice
versa, whereby these notions refer to an exterior concrete entity and exclude mental
objects altogether. These statements are not only co-extensional, they are also inten-
sionally convertible and refer to the same inner reality of the concrete being.⁴¹⁷ Con-
sequently, the essential reality of an existent entity is not pure quiddity or nature or
thingness, but rather realized existence. As the theologian Juwaynī (d. 1085 CE) puts
it, “the essential reality of an entity is existence; and existence is not a meaning su-
peradded to essence” (ḥaqīqat al-dhāt al-wujūd wa-laysa l-wujūd maʿnā zāʾid ʿalā l-
dhāt).⁴¹⁸ In The Ultimate Steps, Shahrastānī asserts that “the Ashʿarites do not distin-
guish between existence, subsistence [or actuality], thingness, [concrete] essence,
and individual being [al-wujūd wa-l-thubūt wa-l-shayʾiyyah wa-l-dhāt wa-l-ʿayn].”⁴¹⁹
The Maturidite thinker Taftāzānī echoes this view in his Commentary on the Creed
of Nasafī: “in our view, the term shayʾ is identical with the term mawjūd, and the
terms thubūt, taḥaqquq, wujūd and kawn are all synonymous [mutarādifah].”⁴²⁰
Hence, there is in their ontological system a perfect overlap between the thing and
the concrete existent, between essence and realized existence.
With regard to these aspects of Ashʿarite doctrine, Avicenna concurs with the
idea that ‘the thing’ (al-shayʾ) always exists and is a mawjūd in concrete reality,
but he would nonetheless disagree with them on at least three counts: (a) their col-
lapsing the meaning and intensionality of ‘the thing’ and ‘the existent’; (b) their re-
stricting the meaning and mode of existence to ‘realized’ or ‘established concrete ex-
istence’ alone; and (c), as a corollary, their denial that mental objects are valid

 The similarities between Avicenna and the Ashʿarites that scholars have been keen to stress stem
mostly from the perceived commonality in the way they regard ‘the thing’ as co-extensional with ‘the
existent’; see, for example, Wisnovsky, Avicenna’s Metaphysics. My interpretation of Avicenna’s ontol-
ogy leads to a different assessment of how it relates to the pre-Avicennian Ashʿarite ontology and pla-
ces the emphasis more squarely on the Bahshamite connection.
 For the Ashʿarites, al-shayʾ and al-mawjūd point to what has actuality and is established and
realized in concrete existence (al-thābit) and ‘what is’ in a straightforward sense (al-kāʾin); see
Frank, The Ashʿarite Ontology, 165, 170‒171.
 Juwaynī, Summa, 129.18 ff.
 Shahrastānī, The Ultimate Steps, 151.1‒2.
 Taftāzānī, Commentary on the Creed of Nasafī, 10.1‒2. Maturidite theology and ontology are in
general close to those of the Ashʿarite tradition.
614 IV The Special Ontological Mode of Quiddity in Itself

existents. Avicenna objects to these doctrines, not because he recognizes the ontolog-
ical validity or reality of nonexistent things—we saw above that he rejects this Muʿ-
tazilite view—but rather because his conception of existence is broader than that of
the Ashʿarites and Maturidites and recognizes various ontological modes and senses
that do not figure in their ontology, one of which belongs to mental objects specifi-
cally. Indeed, the Ashʿarites’ reluctance to recognize mental existents and their insis-
tence on predicating existence exclusively of concrete and extramental entities is far
too limiting for Avicenna. First, on the master’s mind, the Ashʿarites are mistaken in
not recognizing the obvious conceptual distinctness between thingness and exis-
tence and ‘the thing’ and ‘the existent,’ which refer to different notions in the
mind. Second, they sever the link between conceptuality, intelligibility, and exis-
tence, given that for Avicenna what can be conceived of and apprehended intellec-
tually must possess mental existence. Finally, they are misguided in constricting
wujūd to realized existence alone and in applying this concept univocally to all
things. For this approach cannot account for the many differences in the modes
and senses of existence, and it cannot accommodate the special existence of God
and of the simple and pure mental concepts.
The later Ashʿarite appropriation of the Muʿtazilite theory of the states should be
briefly addressed, because it played an important role in the way in which this tra-
dition interpreted Avicenna’s doctrine of quiddity. In effect, some Ashʿarite thinkers
who endorsed the theory of the states proceeded to describe the Avicennian pure or
absolute quiddity by means of this theory. Rāzī and Jurjānī, for example, mention in
their works that pure quiddity is ‘neither existent nor nonexistent’ (lā mawjūd wa-lā
maʿdūm), with the implication that it is a kind of state (ḥāl) that possesses a neutral
or intermediary ontological status located midway between existence and nonexis-
tence.⁴²¹ This trend is criticized quite pointedly by Shahrastānī, who explains in
The Ultimate Steps that the Bahshamite states (aḥwāl) can be reduced to ‘mental con-
siderations’ or ‘aspects’ (iʿtibārāt), which, however, do not designate an alternative
ontological status. The technical term iʿtibārāt, it should be recalled, is the one Avi-
cenna himself uses in Introduction I.2 to differentiate between the various aspects of
essence. Shahrastānī then proceeds to outline the Avicennian threefold distinction of
essence, with the obvious implication that, for this author, these aspects are purely
intellectual distinctions that have no corresponding ontological states in the concrete
world.⁴²²

 This idea that quiddity is neither existent nor nonexistent is an important elaboration on the
Avicennian doctrine, which should be ascribed to the Muʿtazilite and Ashʿarite circles that received
and interpreted Avicenna’s philosophy. It is to be connected with the doctrine of the state (ḥāl), which
according to its Bahshamite and Ashʿarite upholders, is neither existent nor nonexistent and thus
possesses its own ontological status. Avicenna of course rejects this, as is clear from Metaphysics
I.5, 34.11 ff., which rebuts the argument of an intermediary ontological status.
 Shahrastānī, The Ultimate Steps, 133‒134, 139, 147‒148.
 6 The later reception of Avicenna’s ontology of quiddity: some preliminary notes 615

All in all, I would surmise that Avicenna’s assessment of the major kalām ontol-
ogies of his day was informed to a large extent by what they had to say—as well as by
what they did not say—concerning the issue of mental existence. One decisive con-
sideration for the Persian philosopher was how mental objects and quiddities exist
in the intellect, and on this plane, neither the Muʿtazilite nor the Ashʿarite approach
was satisfactory. If Avicenna had qualms with the Muʿtazilite doctrine of subsistent
nonexistent things and with the claim that the Attribute of the Essence—otherwise an
interesting theory for his purposes—held an intermediary status between existence
and nonexistence, he on the other hand objected to the Ashʿarite and Maturidite ten-
dency to conflate these notions and limit ontology strictly to concrete, realized exis-
tence, which left no room for the intelligible existents. In other words, neither the
Bahshamite nor the Ashʿarite ontological model could satisfactorily accommodate
pure quiddity as a distinct intelligible being, either because it recognized the special
ontological status of mental objects (through the Attribute of the Essence), but made
them to correspond to neutral attributes and states, or because it simply did not as-
sign them any positive ontological status at all in the first place. This helps to explain
Avicenna’s decision to distance himself from these intellectual traditions and to de-
vise a sophisticated theory of mental existence based on the relationship between
quiddity and its mental concomitants.

6 The later reception of Avicenna’s ontology of quiddity: some

preliminary notes
Much of the later history concerning the reception of Avicenna’s ontology of quiddity
is characterized by the deflationary and at times even dismissive attitude that later
thinkers showed toward the master’s theory of quiddity and its special existence.
This is definitely the case of Suhrawardī, Rāzī, and Shahrastānī, who all had qualms
with various aspects of Avicenna’s legacy, and who decided either to ignore or to re-
fute this theory. But it is interesting to note that some thinkers, such as Ṭūsī, who
generally defend Avicenna’s metaphysics, also resort to the notions of special exis-
tence and essential being in their own works. Ṭūsī in fact not only endorses, but elab-
orates on, this Avicennian concept and its theological ramifications. In his Commen-
tary on Pointers, he glosses the notion of special existence in close relation to
quiddity and divine essential being. Ṭūsī contrasts al-wujūdayn, the two modes or as-
pects of ‘realized concrete and mental existence,’ which he attributes to all the ef-
fects proceeding from God, with God’s special existence (wujūd khāṣṣ), by explaining
that God is the only quiddity (māhiyyah) and reality (ḥaqīqah) to have essential
being. From the outset, then, Ṭūsī capitalizes on the distinction Avicenna had
made between the two modes of realized and special existence in order to further
his theological agenda. He explicitly stresses the idea that God cannot be subsumed
under the category of realized existence and gives central place to the notion of spe-
616 IV The Special Ontological Mode of Quiddity in Itself

cial existence in his theology.⁴²³ Hence, in God, essence and special existence are one
and the same thing. This view flies in the face of an alternative theological model
championed notably by Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, according to which essence and realiz-
ed existence remain distinct even in the case of God.
In another section of the same work, Ṭūsī again distinguishes between special
existence, which he applies exclusively or primarily to God, and absolute or general
existence (al-wujūd al-muṭlaq), which he applies to all other things.⁴²⁴ Now, for Ṭūsī,
general or absolute existence is a notion that corresponds roughly to Avicenna’s no-
tion of realized existence (wujūd muḥaṣṣal). It is just another appellation for the com-
plex, realized, and conditioned existence that applies to all contingent beings. In this
connection, Ṭūsī further explicates that general existence follows and is a concom-
itant of special existence (lāzim li-dhalika l-wujūd), which is another way of saying
that realized existence follows the divine quiddity or reality. Ṭūsī’s position can be
viewed as echoing Avicenna’s claim that realized existence is posterior to essential
existence. Hence, as in Avicenna, there is a remarkable overlap between the notions
of essential reality (ḥaqīqah), quiddity (māhiyyah), and special existence (wujūd
khāṣṣ) in Ṭūsī’s philosophy.⁴²⁵ And for these two thinkers God’s quiddity is His spe-
cial existence. Special existence is inherent and identical with the divine reality and
quiddity. Nevertheless, Ṭūsī, in contrast to Avicenna, exploits this equivalence to
make what is primarily a theological claim, or at any rate he seems to restrict this
notion to his theology. Whatever the case may be, Ṭūsī’s construal of special exis-
tence is solidly grounded in Avicenna’s works and adapted to fit the theological
focus of his approach to philosophy.
In spite of its doctrinal and historical significance, however, Ṭūsī’s appropriation
and theological interpretation of the Avicennian concept of proper existence appears
to have been somewhat exceptional. By far the more general trend seems to have
been either to ignore or to challenge Avicenna’s ontology of quiddity as formulated
in The Cure. In this connection, one of the central concerns of many later (and mostly
Ashʿarite) thinkers was to forcefully entrench the idea that essence does not precede
existence and so to refute what (on their view) was either a flaw in the Avicennian
system or a misguided interpretation of it. According to these thinkers, it is moot
or even incorrect to claim the priority of essence over existence, either because es-
sence and existence are intensionally and extensionally identical (the Ashʿarite po-
sition) or because there is only a single ontic principle of reality (light for Suhra-
wardī, existence for Mullā Ṣadrā, etc.). Either way, there is absolutely no sense
according to which this can be true. Nevertheless, there are reasons to think that
this critical approach to the reception of Avicenna’s ontology was partly based on
a misunderstanding of his theory of quiddity—or, alternatively, on a decision to ig-

 Ṭūsī, Commentary on Pointers, vol. 1, 202.17‒19.

 Ṭūsī, Commentary on Pointers, vol. 3‒4, 461.12 ff.
 For Ṭūsī, as for Avicenna, ḥaqīqah is another word that is used to refer to pure quiddity.
 6 The later reception of Avicenna’s ontology of quiddity: some preliminary notes 617

nore the more subtle elements that inform it. For Avicenna never intended to argue
that pure quiddity possesses its own actual, established existence in the concrete
world, to which another actual, established existence would occur and be necessary
for the concrete individual to come to existence. The master likewise never asserts
the temporal primacy or priority of essence vis-à-vis realized existence. This, in effect,
would entail a redundancy of the states or modes of realized existence. Finally, Avi-
cenna does not validate the autonomous and separate existence of pure quiddity in
the concrete world on the model of the Platonic Forms. In the works of his middle
(The Cure and Pointers) and late (Notes, Discussions) periods, he is keen to stress
that quiddity is not prior to (realized) existence in the concrete world, and that it
does not precede the existent thing qua realized existent.⁴²⁶
But Avicenna’s point is more subtle and also more ambiguous, since it implies
that qualifications and intradistinctions be applied to the notions of existence and
priority, which, in his system, and alongside other crucial notions, are modulated
(mushakkikah). Now, as I argued, realized existence is only one sense and mode of
wujūd, and it only applies to the realized concomitants of quiddity. ‘Realized exis-
tence’ is just another way of designating the state of the contingent, caused, and
composite existent regarded as a substantial whole or bundle. It presupposes the re-
alization of quiddity and its various external concomitants. It is this mode of exis-
tence pertaining to the substantial whole regarded as a complex thing that can be
said to be essentially and ontologically (but not temporally) posterior vis-à-vis quid-
dity. But this statement of essential priority then calls for additional clarifications. In
a strong sense, it refers to the ontological and essential priority of quiddity qua irre-
ducible metaphysical constant in the human and divine intellects and, hence, to the
priority of the intelligible aspect of quiddity over its concrete aspect. In a weaker
sense, it refers to the mereological priority of quiddity as a principle in complex be-
ings. This latter sense means not that quiddity pre-exists the caused existent in con-
crete reality or in time, but rather that it precedes it as an internal principle in the
way that (to use Avicenna’s words) the simple precedes the composite, or that
forms precedes matter, and in the way that the constituents of essence logically pre-
cede the essential accidents and concomitants. It should be noted that this mereolog-
ical priority applies to complex concrete beings as well as complex concepts in the
mind. In brief, Avicenna’s position is premised on the epistemological and ontolog-
ical priority of the special existence of quiddity over the realized existence of the
complex beings.
These theories and distinctions appear to have engendered much disagreement.
I surmise that the seeds of confusion and discontentment had already bloomed dur-
ing Avicenna’s own lifetime and within his very circle. One remarkable observation

 I surmise that the repetition of this argument in late works such as Discussions can be explained
by the need to clarify this important point, which may have perplexed some of Avicenna’s followers,
who could have been tempted to regard quiddity as existing as a real, realized thing prior to its con-
crete actualization with its accidents and concomitants.
618 IV The Special Ontological Mode of Quiddity in Itself

concerning Avicenna’s theories of quiddity in itself and proper existence is that they
are articulated most clearly and cogently in two of the most important chapters of his
corpus, namely, chapters I.5 and V.1 of Metaphysics of The Cure. It is in these relative-
ly condensed chapters of Metaphysics that one finds Avicenna’s most committal
stance on the existence of pure quiddity. Now, Metaphysics of The Cure is universally
regarded as the apex of Avicenna’s philosophical output, and for good reasons.⁴²⁷
This work encapsulates his mature and, arguably, his most sophisticated and impor-
tant philosophical doctrines. Moreover, much of its substance was adapted, con-
densed, and in some cases elaborated upon in the very last works of the Avicennian
corpus: either those penned by the master himself (Pointers) or those compiled by his
immediate circle (Notes, Discussions). It is largely in this ultimate and revised textual
form that Avicenna’s thought was bequeathed to later generations of Muslim think-
ers.
In spite of the relative doctrinal continuum that emerges from Avicenna’s various
works, one notices that the ontology of pure quiddity as articulated in The Cure as-
sumes an unparalleled and somewhat unique place in the master’s corpus. Further-
more, this feature of his system appears to have been significantly downplayed in the
texts that close the Avicennian corpus, namely, Discussions and Notes. These two
works betray a persistent effort to emphasize the priority of realized existence over
quiddity in the extramental world, as well as God’s causal role and creative agen-
cy.⁴²⁸ In effect, Discussions and Notes return on numerous occasions to the topic of
the priority of existence over essence in the concrete world and assert in somewhat
dogmatic fashion the impossibility for quiddity to act as a cause of realized existence
in concreto. It is true that this point had already been acknowledged in Metaphysics
and was later repeated in Pointers. Yet the regularity and insistence with which the
compilers of Discussions and Notes dwell on it are remarkable and in need of an ex-
planation.
One tentative explanation is that Avicenna’s theory of the ontology of pure quid-
dity in Metaphysics had already proved problematic to some of his disciples. More
specifically, some followers may have been under the impression that Avicenna
had intimated that quiddity was in itself endowed with realized existence and,
hence, competed with the efficient cause as an ontic principle in the concrete
world. In other words, he could be interpreted as saying that quiddity could itself
be a cause of realized existence before the action of the efficient cause. Although Avi-
cenna’s epistemological remarks concerning the essential and logical priority of
quiddity in the intellect could be readily grasped and accepted, the ontological im-
plications of his views on essence seemed more puzzling. In particular, his claims
concerning the mereological and immanent existence of pure quiddity in concrete

 I am talking about Avicenna’s extant corpus here. One can only speculate what his lost works
contained by way of philosophical innovations.
 It is accordingly not a surprise if these works have relatively little to say about mental existence
and essence in the intellect, notions which forms the crux of Avicenna’s ontology of quiddity.
 6 The later reception of Avicenna’s ontology of quiddity: some preliminary notes 619

beings, as well as the relation of that theory to hylomorphism, were more difficult to
apprehend. Accordingly, it may have been challenging for some of his followers to
embrace the view of the ontological priority of quiddity in this extramental context,
given Avicenna’s parallel assertions concerning the priority of realized existence and
efficient causality in the concrete world. It is this state of affairs, I believe, which ei-
ther prompted Avicenna to disambiguate this point in the material that has come
down to us in the form of Discussions and Notes, or which led some of his close col-
laborators to orient his doctrine in this direction and stress this aspect of his teach-
ing. This would explain not only the unusually large number of sections in those
works dealing with the priority of the efficient cause over quiddity in the concrete
world, but also the absence of a protracted discussion of the ontology of pure quid-
dity and of mental existence, at least when compared to that in Metaphysics. This hy-
pothesis acquires additional relevance when one remembers that these two works
are better regarded as ‘school’ productions emanating from the master’s circle,
and, hence, as ‘Avicennizing’ works, rather than as fully ‘authentic’ treatises penned
by the master himself. This allows for the possibility that some of Avicenna’s disci-
ples wished to reorient the master’s doctrines in specific directions that suited their
own philosophical agenda.
But it is not only in Avicenna’s immediate circle that one notices such a doctrinal
tension. The various interpreters who engaged with his legacy in the centuries follow-
ing his death also testify to the difficult reception of his theory of quiddity. One im-
portant case for our purposes is Suhrawardī, who writes the following in his Philos-
ophy of Illumination:

It is erroneous to try to prove that existence is superadded in concrete things by arguing that if
something were not conjoined to the quiddity by a cause, the quiddity would remain in nonexis-
tence. The one who makes this argument posits a quiddity and then joins existence to it, so his
opponent can argue that this concrete quiddity is itself from the efficient cause [i. e., that this
quiddity also possesses existence that is distinct from the existence it acquires].

Suhrawardī in this passage implicitly criticizes Avicenna and his disciples for up-
holding the reality of essence and existence as principles in the concrete world,
and he also addresses some of the implications of this view.⁴²⁹ He objects notably

 Wisnovsky, Essence and Existence, has recently argued that this Suhrawardīan critique was
aimed chiefly at later Avicennizing thinkers—especially Ashʿarite Avicennizing thinkers such as
Rāzī—rather than at Avicenna himself. Although this hypothesis is plausible, I am more inclined
to think that Suhrawardī intended his critique to apply both to Avicenna and to his later followers.
Much of Wisnovsky’s analysis in this regard relies on the premise that the idea that existence is
‘added to’ (zāʾid ʿalā) quiddity in reality is a Rāzīan innovation on, and a departure from, Avicenna’s
doctrine. This would imply that it was not seen by later thinkers (at least by Suhrawardī) as being
truly Avicennian in spirit. On my view, this is not a decisive indicator to conclude that Suhrawardī
was not also levelling his critique at Avicenna. The formula zāʾid ʿalā appears in Notes, and what Avi-
cenna otherwise says about the relationship between quiddity and its external concomitants makes
his position quite consistent on this point (see section III.5, which discusses various key passages).
620 IV The Special Ontological Mode of Quiddity in Itself

to the Avicennian habit of regarding existence as a metaphysical concomitant of

quiddity, since the moment one posits a quiddity in the concrete world, one must as-
sume that it possesses some kind of existence or reality in itself and, hence, that it is
also to be tied to an efficient cause, which would imply a redundancy of states of ex-
istence. This is why the master of illumination regards the Avicennian notions of
quiddity and existence as purely mental concepts with no actual counterparts in
the concrete world. Suhrawardī then pursues his critique:

The followers of the Peripatetics [viz., Avicenna and his followers] argue that we can think of a
human being [al-insān] without existence, but we cannot think of it without a relation to animal-
ness. Yet, the relation of animalness to humanness means nothing except its [animalness] being
existent in it [fīhi, the human being], either in the mind or in concrete reality. Thus, they posit
two [modes of] existence [or, literally, ‘two existences,’ al-wujūdayn] in the relation of animal-
ness to humanness: one belonging to the animalness which is in it [fīhi] [the human being];
and the other, that which is entailed by the existence of humanness inasmuch as a thing
comes to exist in it [mā yalzamu min wujūd al-insāniyyah ḥattā yūjad fīhā shayʾ]. Indeed,
some of the followers of the Peripatetics base their whole system of metaphysics upon existence
[wujūd].⁴³⁰

Suhrawardī begins this passage by referring to the well-known Avicennian claim that
we can conceive of an essence (here ‘humanness’) in abstraction from existence. In a
particularly significant move, he then identifies two distinct modes of existence,
which, he contends, Avicenna and the Avicennians ascribe to this essence. Now, Suh-
rawardī’s argument is not entirely spelled out in this passage, which contains some
obscure parts, particularly the clause “that which is entailed by the existence of hu-

Indeed, this formula is applied to other concomitants of essence in the Avicennian works (for univer-
sality, see Avicenna, Introduction, I.12, 65.18‒19; 66.7‒11; Salvation, 536.11; for oneness, see Metaphy-
sics of The Cure, V.1, 204.12). Moreover, one should not forget that the master also describes existence
as an external concomitant (lāzim, lāḥiq), attribute (ṣifah), and even, albeit more rarely, as something
accidental (ʿāriḍ) vis-à-vis essence. So the view that existence can be regarded as something external
and ‘added to’ essence certainly finds traction in Avicenna’s works. It might not be as outlandish as it
seems also to apply it to Avicenna’s theory of concrete existence. In that case, the idea would be not
that existence is added to an already existent and fully independent essence in the concrete; but
rather, that essence and existence remain distinct and irreducible principles in the composite sub-
stance, thereby mirroring their distinction in the mind. Admittedly, though, this is an obscure feature
of Avicenna’s doctrine, which has baffled scholars. But the important point here is whether Suhra-
wardī himself thought that Avicenna upheld such a view, which I think is likely, given that he was
keen to criticize Avicenna directly in his works and to emphasize his departure from the master’s
teachings. At any rate, I am not primarily concerned with this passage, but with the one that imme-
diately follows, and whose critical thrust, I would surmise, can be extended to encompass Avicenna
himself, inasmuch as it is based on a distinction between essence and existence, and inasmuch as
Suhrawardī refers to his opponents generally as “the followers of the Peripatetics.”
 Suhrawardī, The Philosophy of Illumination, 46.19‒47.6, translation revised. Note that the termi-
nology focusing on ‘the thing itself’ (ḥayawāniyyah, insāniyyah) and the mereological notions under-
pinning this passage (animalness as existing in (fī) the concrete human) are fully consistent with Avi-
cenna’s language and method.
 6 The later reception of Avicenna’s ontology of quiddity: some preliminary notes 621

manness inasmuch as a thing comes to exist in it.” As a result, Suhrawardī’s argu-

ment may be interpreted in two different ways. The first is to say that one mode of
existence is internal to essence and belongs to quiddity (animalness and human-
ness), while the other mode of existence is external and pertains to the various attrib-
utes and concomitants that follow quiddity. In other words, one pertains to quiddity
in itself, or to the way in which the constitutive parts of quiddity relate to one anoth-
er, while the other mode pertains to the extramental accidents and concomitants of
quiddity, to what follows or is entailed by (yalzamu) the actual existence of this quid-
dity. This interpretation is supported by the term lazima that appears in that passage.
The second way to make sense of the argument is to ascribe the two modes of exis-
tence mentioned by Suhrawardī to the different constitutive elements of essence. Ac-
cording to this alternative interpretation, animalness would exist in the human
being, and then the things that are entailed by humanness, such as ‘being rational’
(nāṭiq), would also have their own proper existence in the human being, which
would be distinct from that of animalness. In other words, genus and differentia
would have a distinct existence in the realized human being.⁴³¹
This ambiguity notwithstanding, what is significant in this passage is Suhrawar-
dī’s belief that Avicenna and the Avicennians ascribe various modes or aspects of ex-
istence to essence or to essence and its concomitants. The master of illumination re-
fers to these two modes of existence by using the Avicennian term al-wujūdayn,
which for Avicenna usually means mental and concrete existence, but which Suhra-
wardī here employs to designate the various levels of existence involved in the real-
ization of essence. What is of interest here is not so much the fact that this line of
reasoning represents a philosophical fallacy for Suhrawardī, which he uses in his po-
lemic against the Avicennians. Rather, it is that Suhrawardī expressly ascribes two
modes of existence to Avicenna and the Avicennians, which correspond either to
the modes of ‘proper existence’ and ‘realized existence’ that were discussed previ-
ously (i. e., the existence of pure quiddity and of its external concomitants), or to
the way in which different pure essences (animalness, humanness, rationality) can
be said to exist in the realized substance. Either way, Suhrawardī clearly believes
that the Avicennians ascribe a sense or mode of existence to pure quiddity in the ex-
terior world. In order to reinforce this point, the master of illumination even specifies
a few lines below that, according to these thinkers, one of the senses of existence can
be said of “the reality and essence” (al-ḥaqīqah wa-l-dhāt).⁴³² It is therefore remark-
able that in the midst of his polemical argumentation Suhrawardī recognizes the Avi-

 Support for this second interpretation can be found in Suhrawardī’s work entitled The Paths and
Havens (Kitāb al-Mashāriʿ wa-l-muṭāraḥāt), vol. 1, 365‒376, where he contests that the genus and dif-
ferentia of a thing can have a distinct existence in reality. The argument deployed there appears to be
closely related to the one quoted above, but it is elaborated with more care. I am grateful to Mateus
Dominguez da Silva for bringing this passage to my attention and for an enriching discussion regard-
ing its contents.
 Suhrawardī, The Philosophy of Illumination, 47.9‒11.
622 IV The Special Ontological Mode of Quiddity in Itself

cennian doctrine of the special ontological mode of pure quiddity, albeit not perhaps
in the exact same way Avicenna himself intended it.
Yet, one notices that Suhrawardī shuns the technical vocabulary Avicenna had
devised (such as the senses of proper and realized existence), and he seems to
have either ignored or misunderstood the fact that for Avicenna, proper existence
is a special and distinct mode of existence, and hence not on a par with realized ex-
istence and efficient causality. Perhaps for polemical reasons, Suhrawardī imperfect-
ly conveys the Avicennian doctrine: whereas Avicenna had propounded two distinct
modes and senses of existence, Suhrawardī describes them equally by means of the
generic terms wujūd and al-wujūdayn, with the apparent implication that he regards
them as two states of realized existence that should be placed on a par with one an-
other. This in turn explains why Suhrawardī considers these states to be redundant
and this entire philosophical position to be fallacious. At any rate, Suhrawardī per-
ceptively realized that Avicenna had ascribed existence to quiddity in itself, and this
is in itself an important point worth stressing. But he also misrepresents Avicenna’s
intent to distinguish clearly between different ontological modes. As a result, his ac-
count conveys a rather schematic and modified picture of Avicenna’s ontology.
This passage from Philosophy of Illumination potentially crystallizes the kind of
confusion between realized and special existence I alluded to above. Unfortunately,
Suhrawardī’s interpretation set the pace for—and also perhaps historically influ-
enced—later similar interpretations of Avicenna’s ontology. Like Suhrawardī, these
authors correctly intuited that Avicenna had ascribed existence to pure quiddity.
But they then had to struggle with the intractable implications of a redundancy of
states of existence, as well as with the issue of the ontological priority of quiddity
in a ‘strong’ or ‘concrete’ sense, that is, its presumed realized and actual existence
in the concrete world before the acquisition of existence through the efficient
cause. Thus, we witness Ṭūsī in his Commentary on Pointers rebuking Rāzī for con-
struing Avicenna precisely in this fashion, whereby the essences have a reality or ac-
tuality (thubūt) in concreto prior to their existence.⁴³³ But this view was as unaccept-
able to Avicenna as it was to Ṭūsī and others, and the shaykh al-raʾīs never intended
these kinds of theories in the first place. In this regard, there is a link, I would sur-
mise, between the picture one finds in Discussions and Notes regarding the simplified
relationship between quiddity and existence in the concrete world and the polemical
interpretations Suhrawardī and others made of this doctrine. It is almost as if these
two works had foreshadowed the kind of discontentment and confusion that could
potentially arise from Avicenna’s ontology of quiddity and sought to anticipate
some of its repercussions by simplifying the master’s doctrines. One therefore per-
ceives a certain—and in some ways unfortunate—development from the culmination
of Avicenna’s theory of quiddity in Metaphysics, to the later works Discussions and
Notes that reflect an implicit uneasiness with this doctrine, to, finally, the works of

 Ṭūsī, Commentary on Pointers, vols. 3‒4, 462.24‒463.1.

 6 The later reception of Avicenna’s ontology of quiddity: some preliminary notes 623

later authors like Suhrawardī, Rāzī, and Averroes who polemically engage with and
either willingly or accidentally misrepresent the master’s views. The doctrinal details
and subtle argumentation that are articulated in Metaphysics and reflect Avicenna’s
mature doctrine of quiddity in itself appear to have found a limited and skeptical re-
ception in the works of his later interpreters. The main lesson they would retain—one
also propounded by Avicenna himself—concerned the primacy of realized existence
and the efficient cause in the concrete world, but this happened to the detriment of a
proper understanding of the master’s views on the ontology of pure quiddity. It also
placed an undue emphasis on one aspect of the multifaceted relationship between
essence and existence he had articulated. This approach thus led to an oversimpli-
fied theorization of how pure quiddity relates to concrete existents, which on the
other hand accommodated the Ashʿarite perspective. In brief, it would seem that Avi-
cenna’s immediate followers and later critics downplayed the importance of the no-
tion of pure quiddity in interpreting his metaphysical system. In that sense, they took
their lead from the late works issuing from Avicenna’s circle (Notes, Discussions)
rather than from the key passages of The Cure itself.⁴³⁴
This exegetical trend aimed at establishing the primacy of realized existence
finds its culmination in the works of one of the greatest exponents of ‘the founda-
tionality of existence,’ the outstanding Persian philosopher Mullā Ṣadrā Shīrāzī.
We are fortunate in this regard to possess his commentary on Metaphysics I.5,
which yields insight into how he read and interpreted Avicenna and adapted the
master’s doctrines to suit his own philosophical agenda.⁴³⁵ What is remarkable in
Mullā Ṣadrā’s exegesis of I.5 is that he provides an interpretation of Avicenna’s theo-
ry of quiddity that broadly conforms to the primacy of existence in his own system. In
line with most of his predecessors in the Persian tradition, he accepts Avicenna’s dis-
tinction between quiddity and existence in the mind and emphasizes its purely con-

 This process of simplification of Avicenna’s philosophical doctrines is also apparent in Ghazālī’s
Doctrines of the Philosophers. On the one hand, Ghazālī in this work completely omits to discuss the
ontology of quiddity in itself and related notions such as proper existence and final causality. He em-
phasizes the idea that quiddity cannot exist without realized existence and is therefore posterior to
existence (85, 89). On the other hand, he provides a schematic and slightly distorted picture of the
relationship between essence and existence, describing existence as a mere accident added to es-
sence (85, 89). This process of simplification is also apparent in the works of Avicenna’s immediate
followers, as in Bahmanyār’s The Book of Validated Knowledge, which provides little valuable insight
into Avicenna’s conception of pure quiddity; but then again, Bahmanyār was not a “faithful disciple”
(see Janssens, Bahmanyār). These developments might have been triggered by didactic and pedagog-
ical considerations, in which Avicenna’s complicated theories of ontological modulation and quiddity
held no real place. But it may in addition have been shaped by polemical considerations, or at any
rate disagreements regarding this aspect of his philosophical legacy. Finally, it could be due to the
fact that the post-Avicennian tradition based itself (sometimes primarily, and for reasons that are
not altogether clear) on other works of Avicenna’s corpus, such as Pointers and, significantly,
Notes and Discussions, rather than directly on the central books of Metaphysics of The Cure.
 The relevant section for my analysis is found in Mullā Ṣadrā, Commentary on Metaphysics I.5,
144‒185.
624 IV The Special Ontological Mode of Quiddity in Itself

ceptual and mental nature. For Mullā Ṣadrā, this distinction is purely conceptual
(dhihnī, iʿtibārī), and both essence and existence are concepts (sing., mafhūm) in
the mind.⁴³⁶ Nevertheless, even on this purely conceptual plane, existence enjoys pri-
ority over essence, because it is an absolutely primary and intuitively grasped con-
cept.⁴³⁷ As for extramental existence, there is no real distinction between existence
and essence, and essence merely serves to designate the specific or specified exis-
tence of an entity. Accordingly, the expressions “specific existents” (al-wujūdāt al-
khāṣṣah), “specified things or entities” (al-umūr al-makhṣūṣah), and “specified quid-
dities” (al-māhiyyāt al-makhṣūṣah) are all interchangeable and refer to the specific
existence of individual and concrete entities. In brief, they all refer to existence,
not to quiddity or essence. As a corollary, the notion of modulation (tashkīk) in
Mullā Ṣadrā’s system serves to describe the various ontological aspects and nuances
attached to these specific concrete existents and bears no connection whatsoever to
quiddity or essential being.⁴³⁸
In this regard, one particularly interesting feature of Mullā Ṣadrā’s exegesis fo-
cuses on the expression wujūd khāṣṣ, which Avicenna had used to designate quiddity
explicitly in Metaphysics I.5 in contradistinction to realized existence. According to
Mullā Ṣadrā, however, wujūd khāṣṣ or proper existence merely refers to the individ-
ual realized existence of a specific entity in the concrete world. As such, it designates
the “specific existents” or al-wujūdāt al-khāṣṣah mentioned above, and thus serves to
qualify and classify the kind of realized existence that can be predicated of different
individual things. Quiddity, in contrast, is universal and thus purely mental, and is
classified and studied by means of a set of notions (genus, differentia, etc.) that per-
tain to it only in the mind. In view of this, Mullā Ṣadrā concludes that “the distinc-
tion between existence and thingness is among the things concerning which the
master [al-shaykh, viz., Avicenna] occupied himself in his exposition, but for which
there is no real need [lā ḥājata fīhi].”⁴³⁹ This assertion may seem surprising at first
glance, given that Mullā Ṣadrā to some extent endorses the conceptual distinction
between essence and existence. However, it should be related to, and read in light
of, his belief that, in the exterior world, essence and existence do not amount to a
real distinction and that existence is the only fundamental and true principle of re-
ality. One witnesses here a marked departure from the philosophical status and role
Avicenna had granted quiddity and, more specifically, from the way in which the
master had intended wujūd khāṣṣ. For on Mullā Ṣadrā’s account, proper existence
cannot even be understood as referring to the nature or intelligible being of quiddity
in the mind. Rather, it serves to qualify and strengthen his doctrine of the founda-

 Mullā Ṣadrā, Commentary on Metaphysics I.5, 153 and 155.

 Mullā Ṣadrā, Commentary on Metaphysics I.5, 145 and 147.
 Mullā Ṣadrā, Commentary on Metaphysics I.5, 153.
 Mullā Ṣadrā, Commentary on Metaphysics I.5, 153.
 7 Conclusion 625

tionality of existence and his theory of ontological modulation in the concrete

world.⁴⁴⁰

7 Conclusion

This chapter provided a detailed analysis of the theory of ontological modulation

(tashkīk al-wujūd), of its various aspects and features, as well as of how this theory
relates to the various senses (maʿānī) of being Avicenna recognizes in his works. The
terminology of being Avicenna deploys in order to discuss quiddity in itself, com-
bined with the analysis of his theory of ontological modulation and especially the
notion of priority, as well as the relation of his doctrines to the Bahshamites and
Ibn ʿAdī, make it extremely difficult to avoid the conclusion that the shaykh al-
raʾīs ascribed a positive and distinct ontological status to quiddity in itself. Neverthe-
less, this does not imply that quiddity exists separately and autonomously in the con-
crete world on the model of a Platonic form. The latter is a doctrine that Avicenna
adamantly and consistently rejects in his works. Nor can quiddity in itself be said
to possess a neutral ontological status and to reside in a state between existence
and nonexistence along the lines of the Bahshamite theory of the attributes. Rather,
pure quiddity possesses a unique and special mode of existence that does not fall
under the category of realized and established existence (wujūd muḥaṣṣal, wujūd
ithbātī, al-wujūdayn). Although most of Avicenna’s comments regarding the special
ontology of quiddity appear in Introduction and Metaphysics, other relevant elements
need to be collected from a variety of sources and analyzed in a systematic manner
for the contours of his position to emerge with more clarity.
In order to briefly recapitulate the various results reached in this chapter, let us
resort to the set of distinctions that was outlined in the introduction between ‘con-
text,’ ‘aspect,’ and ‘mode’ of existence. Thus far, the analysis has focused primarily
on two ontological contexts, the context of concrete extramental existence and the
context of intellectual and intramental existence. With regard to the latter, it was
shown that quiddity can be regarded according to two different aspects, which, as

 In fact, Mullā Ṣadrā explicitly contrasts proper existence and quiddity in a very un-Avicennian
way. The complete relevant passage reads as follows: “The distinction between existence and thing-
ness is among the things concerning which the master [al-shaykh, viz., Avicenna] occupied himself in
his exposition, but for which there is no real need [lā ḥājata fīhi]. This is because the individual en-
tities in existence are simple beings [afrād al-wujūd huwwiyyāt basīṭah] devoid of genera and differ-
entiae, nor are they universal essential or accidental concepts, as opposed to the divisions of thing-
ness [in the mind], as was made clear earlier. Just as the distinction obtains between the quiddity of
triangle [in the mind] and the proper existence [of triangle in the concrete], so the distinction obtains
between absolute quiddity [in the mind] and absolute existence.” As can be observed, the Persian
philosopher here contrasts expressly quiddity with special existence, and he also connects the latter
with the realized existence of individual entities in the concrete. This marks a significant departure
from the intent of Metaphysics I.5.
626 IV The Special Ontological Mode of Quiddity in Itself

we saw in this chapter, also amount to two different modes, if its relation to the com-
plex substance is taken into account: ‘in itself’ as a distinct intelligible object and as
a ‘part’ of the complex universal concept. In contrast, quiddity in the concrete world
is only ever considered as inhering in composite, contingent beings, since Avicenna
vigorously rebuts Platonic metaphysics and the theory of the Forms. Nevertheless,
the crucial point that was highlighted in the analysis is that regardless of these var-
ious contexts and aspects, pure quiddity possesses only a single and unique mode of
existence. This is because pure quiddity is in itself unconditioned, irreducible, and
intelligible, and is therefore an ontological constant. That is to say, regardless of
whether it is conceived of distinctly and in itself in the mind or is posited as a
part of a larger, composite whole, its mode of existence remains the same. In fact,
quiddity’s ontological ubiquity hinges on its ontological irreducibility and constancy.
Following Greek and Bahshamite sources, Avicenna describes this mode of exis-
tence alternately as simple (basīṭ), ‘in itself’ and irreducible (min ḥaythu hiya hiya),
unconditioned (lā bi-sharṭ shayʾ), divine (ilāhī), absolute (muṭlaq), and prior in exis-
tence (mutaqaddim fī l-wujūd). It also corresponds to what Avicenna describes as
special or proper existence (wujūd khāṣṣ), which means something along the lines
of existing qua this quiddity or by virtue of the way it is in itself. Remarkably,
many of these terms and notions appear in the Bahshamite sources, where they
are used to describe the Attribute of the Essence. This kalām precedent likely repre-
sents one of the main sources consulted by Avicenna to elaborate his doctrine. Yet, in
Metaphysics I.5 Avicenna also qualifies special existence as one of the meanings of
existence (maʿānī l-wujūd), which is in line with his tendency to regard existence as
an ambiguous or modulated term and notion (ism mushakkik), thereby marking his
departure from Muʿtazilite ontology, which defines existence as a univocal notion.
Avicenna relies on the distinction between two ontological modes (proper existence
and realized existence) to articulate an intricate theory of essential entailment and
derivation and, ultimately, his māhiyyah-lawāzim logico-metaphysical model (for
the Bahshamites, essential entailment is achieved on the basis of their distinction
between the Attribute of the Essence (ṣifat al-dhāt), on the one hand, and the essen-
tial attributes and especially the attribute of existence (ṣifat al-wujūd), on the other).
He thus follows the Bahshamites in grounding his theory of essential entailment in
an ontological framework that goes beyond the mere notion of ‘realized’ existence,
or existence regarded as an external attribute of thingness. But this process is signif-
icantly complexified in Avicenna’s ontology because of the recognition, and the stark
differentiation between, intellectual existence and concrete existence as well as his
theory of ontological modulation.
In this connection, it is because pure quiddity is fundamentally unconditioned,
undetermined, and irreducible that it can be intellectually apprehended either as a
distinct intelligible or as part of a complex whole. It is this fundamental ontological
‘indifference’ of pure quiddity to realized and conditioned existence that allows it to
be present in these different contexts and under these different aspects. Put different-
ly, it is because pure quiddity is intrinsically unconditioned (bi-lā sharṭ) that it can be
 7 Conclusion 627

regarded either as positively-conditioned (bi-sharṭ) or negatively-conditioned (bi-

sharṭ lā). In this regard, it should be stressed that these logical and epistemic condi-
tions or considerations refer to the various contexts and aspects of quiddity (and by
implication to its relation to the concomitants and accidents), but not to its ontolog-
ical mode, which cuts across these various distinctions and stands as a metaphysical
constant. These results necessarily call for a reconfiguration of Avicenna’s ontology,
since the ‘standard’ ontological category of ‘realized’ or ‘acquired’ existence does not
apply to pure quiddity and turns out to be only one of several modes that character-
ize Avicenna’s theory of wujūd. Neither God nor pure essence can be adequately de-
scribed by it. It is only by extension, and through an improper manner of speech,
that quiddity can be said to possess realized existence, i. e., when it is taken with
its material or mental concomitants and regarded as an ontological cluster or com-
plex. This is when ‘the thing’ and ‘the existent’ coincide, as per Avicenna’s comments
in Metaphysics I.5.
Nevertheless, this ‘traditional’ or ‘standard’ ontological framework, which has
often been made the fulcrum of modern analyses, appears too primitive to accommo-
date the ontological exception that pure quiddity represents in Avicenna’s philosoph-
ical system, just as it appears inadequate to account for the other ontological excep-
tion that is the First Cause. Just as the notion of ‘realized’ or ‘acquired’ existence,
which also translates into existence taken as an external concomitant of essence,
cannot apply to the First Cause, so it does not fit in an ontology of quiddity consid-
ered purely in itself. Consequently, it appears necessary to posit a special ontological
mode for pure quiddity and yet another for God. In this context, if the modality of
‘pure necessity’ or ‘necessity in itself’ proved useful for describing the First’s exis-
tence, which is ‘necessary of existence in itself’ (wājib al-wujūd bi-nafsihi or bi-dhā-
tihi), it was moot in the case of quiddity, which, when taken strictly in itself, excludes
the modalities. If the notion of realized existence (wujūd muḥaṣṣal) and the modal-
ities (jihāt) are unhelpful in this case, it is precisely because they are directly con-
nected in Avicenna’s general ontology: something has realized existence because it
is ‘possible in itself’ and ‘necessary through its cause’; and, vice versa, its being ‘pos-
sible in itself’ and ‘necessary by another’ means that it ‘acquires’ existence from the
outside and becomes ‘realized’ as a result of it. Interestingly, then, God and pure
quiddity appear to possess the only two modes of existence that evade the standard
application of the modalities in Avicenna’s ontology: whereas God is the only being
that is necessary of existence in itself (and, hence, an ontological exception in this
regard), none of the modalities can be applied to pure essence, since, strictly speak-
ing, they are concomitants that are posterior to quiddity and are therefore external to
it.
The previous comments raise two thorny questions, the first of which has been
frequently invoked by scholars to undermine the theory of esse essentiae in the Is-
lamic and Christian traditions: is quiddity in itself, in its special mode of existence,
not already to be regarded as a compound of essence and existence? In other words,
can it not be argued that there is an existence that attaches to quiddity before its in-
628 IV The Special Ontological Mode of Quiddity in Itself

stantiation either as a mental or concrete realized existent, with the result that exis-
tence would be predicated of it twice, or that existence would be superadded to ex-
istence? The second objection runs as follows: does the fact that we can have a con-
ception of pure quiddity in our mind, that we can actually contemplate pure
quiddity, not indicate that it need have ‘realized’ existence, at the very least in our
intellect? Regarding the latter question, one notable result of the analysis that was
carried out previously was the necessity to recognize two modes of intellectual exis-
tence in Avicenna: one mode for the complex universals, and one mode for pure
quiddity. Only the former would coincide with realized existence and bear its
marks (multiplicity, complexity, contingency, causedness, etc.). The latter corre-
sponds to the proper existence of quiddity in the intellect, which is its ‘primitive’
or ‘original’ existential mode. Pure quiddity appears in this light as a kind of unique
transcendental concept or object in the intellect that is devoid of all the concomitants
attached with complex and positively-conditioned mental universal existence.
I can see only two truly compelling approaches to the first conundrum: either
one must deny any real existence to quiddity in the exterior world and regard the es-
sence/existence distinction as a purely conceptual one; or one must postulate two
different senses and modes of existence, so that there is no redundancy and infinite
regress of actual, realized existence. The first approach was historically articulated
by a line of thinkers who are most often associated with the ishrāqī tradition in
Islam. Starting with Suhrawardī, the Illuminationists contested the real existence
of quiddity in concrete beings and argued that existence and quiddity are purely
mental notions (iʿtibārāt) that find no counterpart in reality. As a result, they regard-
ed the essence/existence distinction in things as a purely conceptual one. Signifi-
cantly, however, these same thinkers ascribed to ‘the Avicennians,’ and, it is likely,
to Avicenna himself, the theory of a real distinction and proceeded to criticize it
under a variety of angles. According to them, it failed especially on two counts:
first, the reification of essence and the tendency to view it as a real principle or some-
thing foundational (aṣlī); and second, the redundancy of existence, which was ascri-
bed to both essence and the complete, realized substance, or, alternatively, the idea
of an infinite regress of existence, whereby each thing exists by an existence that in
turn requires existence, and so on. But the bold claim that essence in no way exists
in the real world is not a tenable position for Avicenna, who devotes much energy to
explaining how it can be said to exist.
This brings us to the second position sketched above. There can be little doubt
that Avicenna was keenly aware of these ontological pitfalls regarding quiddity in the
concrete world. He repeatedly reminds his readers that essence does not pre-exist in
the concrete world and does not precede existence in the way that, say, a Platonic
form precedes its individual instantiations as a separate existent. However, Avicenna
does elaborate a theory of the ontological distinctness and priority of quiddity in con-
crete things, whereby quiddity or nature is a mereological principle that is essentially
and ontologically (albeit not temporally) prior to the composite substantial whole. It
is also prior according to a second, stronger sense that will be fleshed out in chapter
 7 Conclusion 629

V, namely, because the quiddities or natures dwell in the Agent Intellect and in God’s
mind, so that they are essentially and intellectually prior to the concrete instantia-
tions and the individuals (albeit not to the species as such, which are eternal in Avi-
cenna’s cosmology). Fundamentally, and in all cases, then, the ontological priority of
pure quiddity has to do with its intelligible being: it is prior in a strong sense qua
form in the intellect, and in a weaker sense as a principle in concrete things (in
the way in which the part precedes the whole and, perhaps, in which the soul,
qua formal and final cause and immaterial principle, can be said to be prior to
the body). Special existence, as it has been defined previously, is therefore not some-
thing superadded and extrinsic to quiddity. It is the very reality of quiddity itself, in
the same way that, in God, divine existence is identical with the divine essence. As
Avicenna explains in Metaphysics I.5, “the reality [quiddity] a thing happens to have
is, as it were, its proper existence” (Text 29). No external condition qualifies quiddity
in addition to its own nature, which provides a thing with its ontological reality and
distinctness. Because it possesses special existence, and because special existence is
intrinsic to the nature of quiddity, as opposed to attaching to it as an external con-
comitant, quiddity in itself remains simple and unconditioned in its mode of exis-
tence in a manner comparable to the way in which essence and existence are one
and the same thing in God, or in the way in which God’s quiddity is existence. In
contrast, the existence that can be mentally separated from quiddity is a metaphys-
ical concomitant or attribute and a logical predicate. According to the māhiyyah-
lawāzim paradigm Avicenna champions, it is essentially posterior and extraneous
to quiddity and not constitutive of it. This mode of existence ultimately implies the
sum of the mental or concrete concomitants and attributes that attach to quiddity
from the outside. It has nothing to do with the intrinsic, special existence of essence
taken in itself. On this point as well, Avicenna found one of his main sources of in-
spiration in earlier and contemporary Bahshamite works, especially these thinkers’
theory of the necessary entailment of the essential attributes from the Attribute of
the Essence.
The theory of the special existence of quiddity in itself and the fact that its de-
scription bears striking parallels to God’s special mode of existence suggests that
Avicenna conceptualized these two metaphysical cases in close relation to one an-
other. One may go further and surmise that it is because quiddity’s origin and reality
lie within the divine essence itself that it can be said to share certain qualities with
God. According to this hypothesis, pure quiddity would have a mode of existence
proper to it, unique, and different from the realized existence of the composite
and contingent beings, precisely because it would derive from Him. Hence, the pecu-
liar features Avicenna ascribes to nature and pure quiddity in his metaphysics could
be interpreted in light of his theology. This would explain why he sometimes applies
the same technical notions exclusively to God and pure quiddity, such as the nega-
630 IV The Special Ontological Mode of Quiddity in Itself

tive condition of bi-sharṭ lā shayʾ ākhar. ⁴⁴¹ This intriguing consideration leads us to
the last section of this book, which explores the connection between quiddity in it-
self, God, and divine causality.

 As noticed by Menn, Avicenna’s Metaphysics, 158, Avicenna applies the clause bi-sharṭ lā shayʾ
ākhar to God in addition to pure quiddity. Menn, however, denies pure quiddity any special existence.
But Porro, Universaux, 40‒46, and Rashed, Ibn ʿAdī, 146, insist on the parallel between wujūd khāṣṣ
and wujūd ilāhī in Avicenna’s philosophy and connect quiddity in itself with God’s existence.
Chapter V:
The Divine Origin of Pure Quiddity
1 The existence of the pure quiddities in God

In the foregoing chapters, I argued that the pure quiddities possess a special mode of
existence characterized by simplicity, irreducibility, and priority. With regard to the
issue of their localization, I concluded that they can be said to exist in the human
mind and in the concrete world. On the one hand, they underlie the complex con-
crete and mental existents and constitute an ontological principle of these existents.
On the other hand, they also exist as distinct entities and pure or transcendental ob-
jects of thought in the human mind. Pure quiddity is consequently an epistemic and
ontological constant, a principle found in every composite being, whether mental or
concrete. It is a logical or epistemic absolute to which various conditions can be at-
tached through mental operations and reflection, but it also signals a distinct onto-
logical mode or state that belongs to it purely ‘in itself.’ Yet, while pure quiddity ex-
ists in those entities according to an unconditioned and indeterminate mode, it can
also be considered in each case with conditions and qualifications that apply to it,
thereby changing the way in which we perceive its relation to its external concomi-
tants and to realized existence. In this connection, it was shown that Avicenna artic-
ulates a theory of ontological modulation (tashkīk al-wujūd) that can accommodate
an essential mode of existence restricted to God and to the pure quiddities, as
well as a contingent and realized mode of existence pertaining to the quidditative
concomitants and accidents. In this section, the former aspect will be explored fur-
ther through the lens of the relation between divine knowledge, divine causality, and
quiddity in itself.

1.1 The pure quiddities and divine knowledge and intellection

Having addressed the problem of the special ontological status of quiddity in itself, I
now turn to the corollary issue of whether the pure quiddities can be located else-
where than in the human mind and in the concrete beings. More specifically, I intend
to investigate the question whether Avicenna also situates these pure quiddities in
the mind of God and in the separate intellects. Modern scholars have tended to dis-
cuss the quiddities in connection either with God’s mind or with the human mind,
but few attempts have been made to connect these two domains. Thus, the challenge
becomes not only to explain how the essences relate to God, but also—if they do
somehow exist in God—what relationship obtains between their divine and human
states, and what is the nature of the causality bridging these two spheres. In this con-
nection, the issue of how quiddity in itself comes to exist in the human mind also
calls for some clarification. Tackling these questions requires a consideration not

[Link]
632 V The Divine Origin of Pure Quiddity

only of what God knows, but of how God creates things, including, possibly, the pure
quiddities. It should be noted that these problematics—whether God contemplates
the quiddities, how they exist in His essence, and how they come to exist in the con-
tingent world—are of direct importance for our understanding of the reception of Avi-
cenna’s philosophy in the later Arabic philosophical tradition, and thus constitute an
important part of the history of Avicennism. For it is likely that later theories that as-
cribe a distinct class of objects to God’s intellection (whether meanings/maʿānī, es-
sences/māhiyyāt, things/ashyāʾ, or even fixed entities/aʿyān thābitah) owe a debt to
Avicenna’s theorization of this theological problem, and this regardless of the kind of
ontological status that is attributed to these objects.¹
The view according to which the essences can be located in the divine mind is an
old one in the literature on Avicenna, even though it does not by any means amount
to a consensus. Already in the first half of the twentieth century, Goichon addressed
this hypothesis in her monograph on Avicenna. She pointedly asked whether the ob-
jects thought by the First Cause have their own māhiyyah, since, according to Avicen-
na, intelligibles, qua universal mental existents, possess their own quiddity or
māhiyyah. ² Goichon concluded that Avicenna does indeed locate the quiddities in
the divine mind. However, she opined that although Avicenna managed to solve
the ensuing problem of the multiplicity of God’s epistemic objects convincingly, he
failed to solve the other corollary problem of the ontological multiplicity these ob-
jects entailed in His essence.³ The issue was subsequently picked up and discussed
by a number of more recent studies on Avicenna, such as those by Bäck, Rashed,
Porro, and Black, who also one way or another locate the quiddities directly in the
divine mind.⁴ Before exploring this issue in more depth, it is important to acknowl-

 For recent discussions of divine knowledge in the works of later authors that take into account the
Avicennian heritage, see Domingues da Silva, La métaphysique, for Suhrawardī; and Dumairieh, In-
tellectual Life, especially 284‒287, for the seventeenth-century thinker Kūrānī.
 Goichon, La distinction, 32.
 Goichon, La distinction, 89.
 Let us briefly sum up the recent scholarship on this issue. In his article on essence in Avicenna,
Bäck hypothesized the existence of the pure essences in the divine mind. To be precise, Bäck ascribes
to Avicenna the view that ‘the pure possibles’ exist in the mind of the Necessary of Existence; see
Avicenna’s Conception, 236; idem, Avicenna on Existence, 364‒365 (I discuss the relation between
quiddity and possibility below). For Porro, Universaux, there is a divine intellectual existence of
the quiddities, although he is not clear in which ‘divine’ intellect the quiddities should be located.
Nevertheless, according to Porro, 38‒39, 44, there would be two modes of intellectual existence, di-
vine and human, since, for Avicenna, as later for Henry of Ghent, essences exist originally in the di-
vine intellect and only subsequently can be said to exist in the human intellect. Rashed, Ibn ʿAdī,
also allows for this possibility in an explicit way. As Rashed explains, for Ibn ʿAdī, the pure essences
have existence, and they are identified with forms in the divine intellect (142); and Ibn ʿAdī’s wujūd
dhātī corresponds to Avicenna’s wujūd khāṣṣ, in that both are a kind of wujūd ilāhī (146). In addition,
as underlined by Rashed (157, note 94), Avicenna in Epistle on the Vain Intelligibles suggests that the
forms (ṣuwar) emanate from God’s intellect to the human intellect, although the human soul will pre-
serve only the true forms after death, not the fictional forms. But in this connection, it is interesting
 1 The existence of the pure quiddities in God 633

edge a terminological difficulty. It concerns what Avicenna construes as ‘intellectual’

or ‘mental’ existence. As mentioned above, there are historical precedents in the me-
dieval and modern literature for describing the pure quiddities as intelligible exis-
tents in God. While this view might ultimately prove to be correct in the case of Avi-
cenna, it should be noted that when the master speaks of quiddity in itself in
connection with the intellect, he is usually referring to them qua objects of
human, not divine, intellection. This is definitely the case for the majority of the
key passages that appear in Introduction and Metaphysics of The Cure. Furthermore,
when the master speaks more specifically of ‘mental’ or ‘intellectual existents’ in a
psychological or metaphysical context, he is again usually focusing on the concepts
in the human mind. Avicenna’s terminology offers a first vindication of this fact: con-
sider the expressions existence ‘in the intellect’ (fī l-ʿaql), ‘in the mind’ (fī l-dhihn),
‘in the soul’ (fī l-nafs), and ‘in the estimation’ (fī l-awhām), which all appear fre-
quently in the Avicennian sources. The last three expressions refer to the human
soul, since neither God nor the separate intellects have a soul, a mind, or an estima-
tive faculty. Rather, they have pure intellects (sing., ʿaql). As for the reference to ex-
istence ‘in the intellect,’ it is admittedly more ambiguous, since it could, on sheer
terminological grounds, be construed as applying to God and the separate intellects
in addition to the human intellects. However, the contexts in which these expressions
appear make it clear that in most cases Avicenna is describing the human mind and
its psychological operations. Hence, it is undeniable that the bulk of the evidence in
Avicenna’s works pertaining to quiddity and its intellectual existence (whether in In-
troduction I.2, I.12 or Metaphysics I.5 and V.1‒2) has the human soul as its focus and
not the divine intellects.
In view of this fact, the various hints Avicenna provides concerning the localiza-
tion of the quiddities in themselves as being ‘in the mind’ or ‘in the intellect’ are to be
connected with human thought first and foremost and only secondarily with divine
noetics. The only explicit connection Avicenna makes between the pure quiddities
and God in the whole of Metaphysics I.5 and V.1 is his mention of their “divine exis-
tence” and their being related to the “divine providence” (ʿināyah) (V.1, 205.1‒2), two
admittedly obscure statements that require serious unpacking and which, in any
case, shed little light on the mode in which these quiddities could be said to exist
in God Himself—if at all. The upshot of this is that there would seem to be little tex-
tual ground for regarding the divine mode or existence of the pure quiddities as a
kind of intellectual existence proper, especially if human noetics is taken as a default
explanatory model. This makes sense, of course, given that what Avicenna routinely

that Avicenna appears to intimate that the vain forms also emanate from God, as long as the imag-
inative faculty is active. This would seem to lend some weight to the view that even the fictional quid-
dities somehow exist in God. At any rate, this piece of evidence should be handled with caution,
given that no similar statement can be found in Avicenna’s major philosophical works. It is, more-
over, noteworthy that in this treatise Avicenna connects the fictional forms with the imaginative fac-
ulty and not with the intellect proper.
634 V The Divine Origin of Pure Quiddity

defines as a ‘mental existent’ concerns a composite or cluster made up of quiddity in

itself together with its various mental concomitants, and, hence, a synthesis of inten-
tions (maʿānī) whose coalescing takes place in the human mind. These universals are
complex existents. As such, they are understandably confined to the human mind
and cannot be regarded as valid objects of divine intellection, since they would in-
troduce a kind of accidental multiplicity in the divine nous. Hence, if the quiddities
exist in God or in a divine intellect, it is clear that they cannot exist in the same in-
tellectual state or mode in which they exist as universals in the human mind; that is,
‘on the condition of something else’ (bi-sharṭ shayʾ ākhar), as being predicated of
many things, and as intentionally complex objects. Rather, if ever they exist in the
divine mind, they would exist in themselves qua quidditative meanings and special
objects enjoying a kind of abstracted existence, in a mode comparable to that of pure
quiddity in the human mind (which excludes mental concomitants). Since Avicenna
goes to great lengths to distinguish the consideration of pure quiddity from that of
universality and of the universal concept in the human mind, it would seem, a for-
tiori, that the same would apply in the case of God. In brief, God—and by extension
the separate intellects—cannot possibly intellect the universals as these are defined
in human psychology.⁵
Compounding this terminological ambiguity is a set of delicate conceptual prob-
lems associated with the topic of divine knowledge. First, there is the famous and
‘classic’ problem of divine multiplicity. If one posits that the quiddities exist in
God’s mind as distinct objects of knowledge, then the theory of the oneness and sim-
plicity of the divine knowledge and essence would collapse or, at the very least,

 One perceives here the limitations of the Avicennian terminology and its underlying ambiguity. For
the term ‘intellectual’ (ʿaqlī) conveys different meanings when applied to divine and human noetics,
and, in the latter case, I would argue, between different aspects of universal intellectual existence
(the complex mental universal vs. the essential universality of pure quiddity). These various cases
need to be systematically clarified. One additional consideration concerns the distinction between
discursive vs. non-discursive thought. For insightful reflection on this topic, see Adamson, Non-Dis-
cursive Thought. But Avicenna is keen also to remind us that if we can conventionally describe God’s
activity as intellectual and the divine being as an intellect, these descriptions should not be taken
literally and in any case bear no resemblance to human thought and intellection. The notion of a di-
vine intellectual existence is therefore problematic, insofar as Avicenna’s description of God as an in-
tellect (ʿaql) is itself not always intended as a literal or positive description of the divine reality, but as
an apophatic tactic intended to express God’s immateriality. Following Fārābī’s lead (Walzer, On the
Perfect State, 71‒77) Avicenna expounds on God’s ‘negative attributes’ in Metaphysics VIII.7, and he
even argues that the term ‘intellect’ can be construed strictly negatively as meaning immateriality
(368.1‒2). But these points notwithstanding, the main issue at stake here centers on how pure quid-
dity relates to its mental concomitants—including universality—and how this applies to divine intel-
lection. Even if the pure quiddities may in a sense be located in God, can they be said to dwell there
as universal mental objects on a par with those located in the human mind? Here again, there may be
a gap between a conventional discourse on divine knowledge and a technical or analytical one. Con-
ventionally, we may speak of a divine intellect, of divine intellection, and of God knowing ‘univer-
sals,’ but to what extent does Avicenna actually uphold these views literally?
 1 The existence of the pure quiddities in God 635

would be seriously compromised. Likewise, if they are considered as existents or as

existing in any strong sense, the claim of the perfectly unitary existence of God
would be invalidated. Since God is shown to be one, simple, and unique, positing
other existents alongside or within Him would render Him multiple and complex
and would thereby undermine the doctrine of tawḥīd. This problem, which runs
through the late-antique Neoplatonic and medieval Jewish, Christian, and Islamic
traditions, assumes a distinct form in the context of Avicenna’s metaphysics and the-
ology, given his strong advocacy of absolute divine oneness and simplicity.⁶ In addi-
tion to this ‘classic’ theological problem related to multiplicity, there is another issue
that is more properly ‘Avicennian’ and that has to my knowledge not been accounted
for by the modern scholars who, following Goichon, tentatively locate the quiddities
in the divine mind. Put succinctly, the question is what kind of quiddities God
knows, and what kind of universality is attached to these quiddities. If ‘regular’ or
‘standard’ mental universals are identified as the objects of God’s knowledge,
then, on Avicenna’s account, this would mean that God apprehends not only the
pure quiddities but also mental concomitants such as universality and oneness,
which are external to the essence as such. This, of course, would lead to the emer-
gence of a certain intelligible multiplicity in the divine essence, and we would
then revert back to the first problem highlighted above. The alternative is to identify
these divine objects with the pure quiddities. But here a new problem arises, because
Avicenna insists that God’s knowledge is universal. The master is explicit with regard
to the fact that God’s knowledge consists in a universal (kullī) kind of knowledge. He
frequently states in his works that God knows things “in a universal way” (min wajh
kullī or ʿalā naḥw kullī),⁷ and he also sometimes claims more committedly that God
apprehends universal things (umūr kulliyyah) or the universals (al-kulliyāt).⁸ Conse-
quently, it would seem that the quiddities in themselves could not provide the
basis for this universal kind of knowledge, since as such they are not universals
and exist in abstraction from the attribute of universality. To claim that pure quiddity,
when considered by the divine essence, would amount to a universal or form the

 Scholars who locate the pure quiddities in the divine mind have to address these points. See Goi-
chon, La distinction, 85‒90; Porro, Universaux, does not address this crucial point in his discussion of
mental existence in Avicenna. Nevertheless, he seems to locate the quiddities in the separate intel-
lects or at the very least in the Agent Intellect. This point is less critical, albeit also not fully ad-
dressed, in Rashed, Ibn ʿAdī. Rashed’s hypothesis of the neutral ontological status of the quiddities
in themselves to some extent exonerates him of having to tackle these issues: qua neutral entities, the
quiddities could be said to exist in the divine mind without, however, interfering with, or being super-
added to, the divine essence. However, the hypothesis of neutral existence is in itself problematic, as I
underlined earlier. If any ontological mode is to be ascribed to quiddity, it is not a neutral one, but a
positive intelligible one.
 Avicenna, Salvation, 595‒599; Metaphysics of The Cure, VIII.6, 359.12‒13; 360.12; 361.8; cf. Notes, 3‒
11, section 1.
 See Avicenna, Commentary on Theology of Aristotle, 48.6‒18, where he explains that the divine
world has knowledge of universals as well as particulars in a universal way; cf. Salvation, 595‒599.
636 V The Divine Origin of Pure Quiddity

basis for universal knowledge in God’s intellect, or even that it could be considered
in a universal way—and this when Avicenna describes universality as an external
concomitant of pure quiddity that occurs to it in the human mind—is an interpretive
stretch that appears unwarranted on Avicenna’s part and in some of the modern
studies dealing with this issue. Upholders of the view that God knows the pure quid-
dities would therefore have to account for how God’s knowledge of these quiddities
can be simultaneously described as ‘universal.’ Indeed, on this line of reasoning a
discrepancy or paradox seems to arise between the simple and irreducible existence
of the pure quiddities in God, and God’s knowledge of these quiddities qua complex
and conditioned universals. Put differently, given that Avicenna defines the universal
chiefly or primarily as an object in the human mind and that it is by nature compo-
site and synthetic—it is also ‘after multiplicity’ according to the threefold scheme out-
lined in Introduction I.12—on what grounds can Avicenna ascribe universal knowl-
edge to God?
Finally, there is the issue of the correspondence between the pure quiddities as
they are present in the divine essence and as they occur in the human mind. As I
mentioned earlier, Avicenna is quite keen on locating the pure quiddities in the
human mind. In fact, virtually all of his comments in Introduction and Metaphysics
concerning the pure quiddities define them as logical considerations and as intellec-
tual existents in the human mind, and not specifically as objects of the divine mind.
As a result, the method adopted in this study began with an inquiry of the pure quid-
dities in the human mind. This suggests that intellection of the pure quiddities is not
the exclusive privilege of the divine beings, but that it is, at the very least, common to
divine and human intellects. This in turn raises the thorny questions of how the quid-
dities come to be in the human mind and what exactly is the causal relationship be-
tween their divine and human states. In view of the foregoing, the move to situate the
pure quiddities in God and to make them valid objects of the divine intellection runs
into major interpretive difficulties and calls for detailed examination. These points
notwithstanding, there appears to be ample evidence indicating that Avicenna lo-
cates the pure quiddities in the divine mind. What makes the study of this issue in-
tricate, however, is the rich and variegated vocabulary he relies on to approach this
theological topic, in particular to describe the objects of God’s knowledge. What fol-
lows is an attempt to tackle the aforementioned terminological and doctrinal difficul-
ties and to show the coherence and consistency of Avicenna’s theory of quiddity in its
theological context or dimension.
Avicenna relies on a wide array of technical terms to describe the objects of di-
vine knowledge, whose relation to pure quiddity requires elucidation. The most com-
mon terms he uses in his works are ‘meanings’ or ‘ideas’ (maʿānī), ‘intelligibles’
(maʿqūlāt), ‘forms’ (ṣuwar), ‘concomitants’ (lawāzim), and ‘things’ (ashyāʾ).⁹ When

 It should be pointed out that whereas the first four terms are technical, the last one, ‘things’
(ashyāʾ), is often used in a theological context in a non-technical sense and to refer broadly to the
 1 The existence of the pure quiddities in God 637

discussing God’s intellection in The Cure, Salvation, and Pointers, which are his
major extant philosophical works, Avicenna frequently refers to the meanings,
things, forms, and intelligibles lying at the core of divine intellection. In Metaphysics
of The Cure, he affirms that God knows “things” (ashyāʾ) by intellecting them all at
once.¹⁰ In his Commentary on Book Lambda, he states that “God’s self-intellection is
an intellection of the whole (al-kull),” and that when God intellects Himself, He also
intellects things as “a concomitant [lāzim]” of His essence.¹¹ A similar point is reiter-
ated in Philosophy for ʿArūḍī, where God’s intelligibles are described in terms of “con-
comitants.”¹² In Notes, one learns that “God thinks the forms [ṣuwar] as a simple
[thing] and together, not in differentiated orders,” and that “He does not intellect
them as something external to Him (min khārij).”¹³ In fact, this work contains numer-
ous and detailed descriptions of God’s objects of knowledge, which rely on a rich
array of technical terms, notably maʿqūlāt, ṣuwar, ashyāʾ, and lawāzim. ¹⁴ One should
also consider the following striking passage from On the Soul of The Cure:

Text 44: We say that the quidditative meanings of all past, present, and future things that come
to be in the world [maʿānī jamīʿ al-umūr al-kāʾinah] exist in the knowledge of the Creator and the
intellectual angels under a certain aspect [mawjūdah fī ʿilm al-bāriʾ wa-l-malāʾikah al-ʿaqliyyah
min jihah] and exist in the celestial heavenly souls under [another] aspect. We will elucidate
these two aspects [al-jihatān] in another place.¹⁵

In Pointers, Avicenna further explains that the intelligible forms (al-ṣuwar al-ʿaq-
liyyah) pre-exist in God’s knowledge before they are actualized in the concrete
world.¹⁶ Now, one can infer from these examples that the master uses the Arabic
words maʿānī, lawāzim, maʿqūlāt, ṣuwar, and ashyāʾ interchangeably when discus-
sing the objects of divine knowledge and intellection.¹⁷ Many of these terms also ap-

objects of divine knowledge. This usage contrasts with the more technical meaning of thing as quid-
dity, which appears in Avicenna’s discussion of the primary notions in The Metaphysics.
 Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Cure, VIII.7, 363.1.
 Avicenna, Commentary on Book Lambda, 71.261‒266; for information on this work, see Janssens,
Avicenne.
 Avicenna, Philosophy for ʿArūḍī, 161.1.
 Avicenna, Notes, 352.7, section 627.
 Avicenna, Notes, 350‒351, section 625; 352, sections 626 and 627; 572, section 1000.
 Avicenna, On the Soul of The Cure, IV.2, 178.14‒17.
 Avicenna, Pointers, vol.3‒4, 706.7‒707.5
 Note that this problem extends to the other separate intellects as well. Although they are not per-
fectly or absolutely simple and one, like the First Cause, they are nonetheless simple intellectual ex-
istents. Hence, positing a plurality of intelligibles within them would pose a problem in that it would
undermine their simple nature. In this connection, it is important to stress that Avicenna’s arguments
to establish the intelligible multiplicity of the separate intellects does not rely primarily on their con-
templation of the quiddities or the forms of things, but rather on the distinctions between self-intel-
lection and intellection of the First, and between the modes of the possible and the necessary (i. e.,
knowing themselves as possible with regard to their essence and necessary with regard to their rela-
638 V The Divine Origin of Pure Quiddity

pear in the context of his psychology and more specifically in connection with his
discussion of quiddity as an object of the human intellect.¹⁸ Regardless of the
term that is used, the key point Avicenna puts forth is that these objects are not out-
side of the divine essence, but contained within it. These objects are not external to
God, but internal to Him, since His intellection is fundamentally an intellection of
His essence. In his Commentary on Book Lambda, Avicenna praises Themistius for
glossing God’s intellection of Himself as an intellection of “the intelligible world
all at once” (al-ʿālam al-ʿaqlī dafʿatan).¹⁹ Moreover, Avicenna’s qualification that
God and the separate intellects know these things “before their existence in multi-
plicity” indicates that they are known as the result of an internal and reflexive intel-
lective act that essentially precedes the causation of contingent beings. So Avicenna
in his various works firmly defends the theological position according to which God
knows all things/meanings/quiddities/forms by knowing His essence. At the same
time, he strives to avoid the two pitfalls consisting in the views that God knows
only His essence (to the exclusion of other things), and that He knows things as ob-
jects external to His essence.²⁰
Now, there can be little doubt that the terms maʿānī, ṣuwar, maʿqūlāt, and ashyāʾ
ultimately serve to designate the quiddities as objects of the divine intellection. As
was shown on various occasions, Avicenna often employs the term maʿānī as a syn-
onym of māhiyyah, and the other terms maʿqūlāt, ṣuwar, and ashyāʾ also bear a close
relation to it. The term maʿānī in particular plays a key role in Avicenna’s theory of
quiddity and appears in his psychological, logical, and metaphysical writings. In
these various instances, it designates primarily the quidditative meanings that are
apprehended by an intellect, whether human or divine. It is not surprising therefore
that this technical term would also refer to quiddity in a theological context and con-
tribute to describing the objects of the divine intellection. The only term mentioned
above that poses a real interpretive problem is lawāzim. For, according to the
māhiyyah-lawāzim model, the concomitants are external to the quiddities themselves
or—according to another interpretation—to the quiddity that is God. So if God intel-
lects the lawāzim (however construed), it would seem that a certain externality and
multiplicity would affect His intellection. Moreover, it is not immediately clear what

tion to the First). In fact, as in the case of the First, Avicenna seems to believe that the separate in-
tellects apprehend all the quiddities, but that this intellective act does not yield plurality.
 It is striking in this connection that Avicenna resorts to a similar terminology, notably the term
maʿānī, to describe the quiddities in themselves as these are apprehended by God and the separate
intellects and as they are known in the human soul. Avicenna also frequently uses the term iʿtibār
when talking about the intellection of the separate intellects, as when he refers to the intellection
of the First Effect, which thinks the First Cause and its own essence. These are two distinct objects
of thought and intelligibles (maʿqūl), which also correspond to two different considerations (iʿtibārāt)
in that intellect. Cf. the previous analysis of iʿtibār in Ṭūsī and other thinkers.
 Avicenna, Commentary on Book Lambda, 57.135‒136.
 That Avicenna was aware of the first pitfall as a possible interpretation of Aristotle’s Book Lamb-
da 9 is shown in his Commentary on Book Lambda, 71.261‒262.
 1 The existence of the pure quiddities in God 639

this term refers to, since it covers a wide range of objects. These points require scru-
tiny and are picked up in a later section.
If the objects in God’s mind are broadly identified with the quiddities, then one
may proceed to ask the following pointed questions: does God know the pure quid-
dities or the universal quiddities? That is to say, are the divine intellectual objects
described in the various passages above to be identified with the quiddities in them-
selves or with the universals that Avicenna defines in the context of his psychological
and metaphysical works? Similarly, are the forms posited in the Agent Intellect the
universals or the pure essences? The traditional approach to these questions consists
in assuming that the objects contemplated by God and/or the Agent Intellect must be
the universals, because (a) Avicenna refers explicitly to God’s knowledge of univer-
sals or His universal knowledge, and because (b) there are, on the standard account,
only two modes of existence of quiddity, intellectual and universal, on the one hand,
and concrete and particular, on the other. But true and certain knowledge according
to Avicenna consists in apprehending the universal forms abstracted from matter.
Consequently, and by process of elimination, pure quiddity can be said to exist in
the divine intellect only in a universal mode. In a recent study devoted to quiddity
in Avicenna, Benevich has argued precisely along those lines and claimed that the
pure quiddities cannot be situated in the Agent Intellect, and by extension, in all
of the other divine intellects, since Avicenna recognizes only one class of mental ex-
istents, the universals. Accordingly, Benevich construes the expression ‘divine exis-
tence’ that appears in Metaphysics (V.1, 205.1‒2) along mereological lines and as re-
ferring only to the existence of pure quiddity as an irreducible part of the universals
in the human mind, and not to the existence of pure quiddities as distinct objects in
the divine intellects. According to Benevich, there cannot for the same reason be a
state of pure quiddity that is distinct from the universal in the human mind. In
brief, on his view, intellectual existence is always universal in nature. He therefore
restricts the objects present in the Agent Intellect and in the human mind to the uni-
versals alone.²¹ However, this approach, based as it is on the premise that there are
only two spheres of existence in Avicenna, the mental and the concrete, is problem-
atic on numerous counts. To begin with, it does not account for a considerable vol-
ume of textual evidence that was surveyed in the previous chapters of this book. But

 See Benevich, Die ‘göttliche Existenz,’ 113‒115. Benevich argues that only universals exist in the
Agent Intellect and in the human mind, since on his view mental existence for Avicenna is necessa-
rily universal existence (note that Benevich does not account for the difference between the objects of
human and divine knowledge and how both can equally be called ‘universals’). But as the present
study has shown, universality is an ambiguous or modulated notion for Avicenna, which he uses
in different ways in his works, so that additional qualifications are called for to adequately explain
these differences. Clearly, God’s, the Agent Intellect’s, and a human being’s intellection cannot be
‘universal’ in exactly the same way. Furthermore, it appears that the relationship between the univer-
sal and pure quiddity in the mind was the subject of an intense debate in the postclassical tradition—
and one that unfolded within the larger problematic of mental existence—with thinkers defending
different positions on the issue.
640 V The Divine Origin of Pure Quiddity

more pointedly in the present context, ascribing universals to the divine intellects
only compounds the problem at hand. For Avicenna, the universal—as it is defined
in the context of human psychology—is a synthetic, composite, and logically deriv-
ative concept that implies mental concomitants, accidents, and intentions being
added to the core quidditative meaning. This means that the universals, although
they can be regarded as simple concepts according to one consideration, can be en-
visaged according to another consideration as composite or complex entities. As Be-
nevich himself reckons, Avicenna develops a mereological theory whereby pure
quiddity exists irreducibly in this universal entity, without ever losing its simplicity
and identity. But positing such complex universal entities in the context of divine in-
tellection is problematic, since it would entail a kind of accidental multiplicity. On
the very definition of universality qua mental concomitant that Avicenna provides
in his works, quiddity qua universal object would exist in these superlunary intel-
lects with the same accidents and concomitants with which they exist in human dis-
cursive thought. In other words, if one locates the universals in God and/or in the
Agent Intellect, then this would mean that the same complex intellectual entities
would exist in human minds and in those simple beings. Furthermore, it was argued
in chapter II that Avicenna vindicates the human ability to intellect quiddity in itself
and that, as such, it represents a distinct and simple form and concept in the mind.
Given this conclusion, it would be odd if the separate intellects—whose perfections
and degree of nobleness exceed by far those of the human intellects—were incapable
of such an intellective act. Rather, it would seem, a fortiori, that these intellects
should know the pure quiddities. In view of these points, it is not surprising that
some scholars have preferred to identify the objects of the divine knowledge with
the pure quiddities rather than with the mental universals.
In what follows I contend that, according to Avicenna, God’s knowledge encom-
passes, strictly speaking, only the pure quiddities and not the universals as these are
typically described in the master’s psychology and epistemology. Concurring with
Marwan Rashed on this point, I think it is preferable to resort to the special, irredu-
cible, and absolute ontological mode of pure quiddity as a means of explaining how
the quiddities could exist in God (and perhaps also in the Agent Intellect), if one is to
solve the enduring problems that have plagued the interpretation of Avicenna’s the-
ology. This interpretive option allows one to address the rich textual evidence de-
scribing the divine intellectual objects, while at the same time bypassing some of
the major difficulties that the traditional interpretation of the universals engenders.
Undeniably, it is this non-universal and simple ontological mode of pure quiddity
that best suits the divine world. This interpretation, which flows naturally from the
analysis articulated in the previous chapters of this book, seems further supported
by specific passages drawn from the Avicennian corpus. One quite relevant piece
of evidence to this effect can be gleaned from Notes. It was already mentioned in
chapter II (Text 4), and I cite here only the most relevant segment:
 1 The existence of the pure quiddities in God 641

The intelligible that is intellected by the First with regard to this individual [existent] is this very
intelligible form, which is absolute humanness [nafs al-ṣūrah al-maʿqūlah wa-huwa l-insāniyyah
al-muṭlaqah], that is, not a certain individualized humanness [combined] with accidents and
concomitants that can be sensed and pointed to.²²

In these lines Avicenna quite literally ascribes knowledge of the pure quiddities to
God. The First knows and intellects the pure quiddities of things—in this particular
case, the pure quiddity ‘humanness’—as opposed to quiddity combined with its ex-
ternal concomitants and accidents. The kind of quiddity God knows is completely
abstract (mujarrad, a term Avicenna uses earlier in the passage to describe pure quid-
dity) and absolute (muṭlaqah), and, consequently, also prior to any sort of multiplic-
ity. It is, in other words, a kind of knowledge that is prior to the māhiyyah-lawāzim
complex.²³
To this excerpt one may collate another passage from Introduction in which Avi-
cenna describes the mode in which the divine beings come to know the natures and
quiddities of things. The context in which this passage appears is particularly signif-
icant and leaves no doubt as to the kinds of objects that constitute God’s knowledge.
Prior to the passage in question, Avicenna had discussed the “natures” (sing. ṭa-
bīʿah) that exist in concrete individuals and also form the basis for the intelligibles
in the divine mind. These natures are tantamount to the true realities (sing. ḥaqīqah)
of things and the quiddities in themselves (sing. al-māhiyyah min ḥaythu hiya hiya).
Having explained how human beings can extract these natures from the particulars
and, hence, from the world of sensible multiplicity that surrounds them, Avicenna
proceeds to clarify their relationship to the divine intellects, which know them before
they are embedded in material individuals. God and “the angels”—that is, the sepa-
rate intellects—know the truths or quiddities of the natural things by apprehending
them directly and in a mode that precedes their existence in multiplicity. This implies
that these forms and the conception of the natures/pure quiddities in the intellect
can either precede (in the case of God) or follow (in the case of human beings)
the existence of the concrete particulars. This passage merits our full attention
and should be cited in its entirety:

 Avicenna, Notes, 43, section 25.

 This passage from Notes is echoed in the earlier work Salvation, 594.6‒10, where Avicenna ex-
plains (with regard to God’s knowledge) that if the corruptible things (al-fāsidāt) are intellected
with regard to their abstract or pure quiddities (in ʿuqilat bi-l-māhiyyah al-mujarradah), then this
would entail no change in the divine essence, since they would not be intellected qua corruptible
things. It is clear that the argument in these two texts is fundamentally the same. Its thrust is that
God knows the pure quiddities of all things, and that by knowing these pure quiddities, he can
also know all of their concomitants, without this knowledge entailing change or deficiency in the di-
vine essence. As I explained in chapter II, and as Text 3, Text 4, and Text 6 also indicate, the expres-
sion māhiyyah mujarradah usually refers in Avicenna’s works to quiddity in itself in the intellect.
642 V The Divine Origin of Pure Quiddity

Text 45: Sometimes the intelligible form [al-ṣūrah al-maʿqūlah] is in some manner a cause for
the occurrence of the form that exists in external reality [al-ṣūrah al-mawjūdah fī l-aʿyān]; some-
times the form in external reality is in some manner a cause of the intelligible form, that is, [the
latter] occurs in the mind after it has existed in external reality. Now, because the relation of all
existing things to God and the angels is [the same as] the relation of [human] artifacts to the
productive soul, that which is in God’s and the angels’ knowledge of the true nature [ḥaqīqah]
of what is known and apprehended of natural things exists prior to multiplicity [qabl al-ka-
thrah]. Each one of these intelligibles is a single and simple meaning [maʿnā wāḥid]; only sub-
sequently is the existence proper to multiplicity realized [yaḥṣulu l-wujūd] in those meanings
[maʿānī]. [The existence] then occurs in reality, but does not unite with [them] in any manner
whatsoever, for in external things there is no one common thing, but only dispersion. They
[the meanings] then become once more intelligible to us after their actualization in multiplicity
[thanks to abstraction]. As for the manner of their being prior to multiplicity—whether they are
objects of knowledge of one [divine] essence that does or does not become multiple because of
them, or whether they are self-subsistent exemplars—[these are questions that] our present in-
vestigation will not deal with. For these [issues] there is another theoretical discipline.²⁴

Avicenna makes several important points in this passage that should be contextual-
ized in terms of the late-antique Neoplatonic background and kalām discussions
about God’s knowledge. More specifically, they pertain to the theological question
of whether God’s knowledge relates to things inside or outside His essence, the latter
option potentially conjuring the theory of the Platonic forms, if these external objects
are identified with separately existing essences or forms. Moreover, Avicenna’s argu-
mentation is also informed by efforts to address the various ontological questions
pertaining to the universals that Porphyry formulated in Eisagoge. This is indicated
notably by the set of notions ‘before,’ ‘in,’ and ‘after multiplicity,’ which reflects
and builds on a long Neoplatonic tradition.²⁵ Analyzed in this light, this passage
of Introduction is highly relevant for my purposes, but requires cautious unpacking
due to its compressed style. Notice to begin with the terminology Avicenna deploys

 Avicenna, Introduction, I.12, 69.7‒18; translation by Marmura, Avicenna’s Chapter on Universals,

50, revised. This passage is discussed in Black, Avicenna, 11. My interpretation of the text concurs
broadly with her analysis, but Black does not make clear whether she identifies the objects of the
divine knowledge with the pure quiddities specifically. Nevertheless, her claim that “Avicenna recog-
nizes that those quiddities which become universals in our minds have a prior existence in the pure
intellects of God and the separate intelligences” (my emphasis) strongly suggests that she does.
 Avicenna’s position that the forms exist in the divine intellect is of course inscribed in a long and
variegated Greek philosophical tradition. For our purposes, it is the doctrines of the Middle- and Neo-
platonists that concern us here. These thinkers held that the universals or forms exist in a divine mind
—identified with the Demiurge or the Intellectual Principle—before multiplicity and matter. The fact
that Avicenna mentions the threefold scheme ‘before, in, and after multiplicity’ that appears at the
beginning of Introduction I.12 and that he himself relies on this theoretical template indicate that
his approach should be regarded as a continuation of the Neoplatonic reflection on this topic. For
these thinkers, the expressions ‘before matter’ or ‘before multiplicity’ refer to the existence of the uni-
versals in the divine world. Some of the main proponents of this view included Simplicius, Proclus,
and Ammonius. Simplicius in particular dwells on this point in several passages of his commentary
on Categories, such as 82.35‒83.20 (in CAG).
 1 The existence of the pure quiddities in God 643

to describe the objects of the divine knowledge. These objects are defined as forms
(ṣuwar), true natures (ṭabāʾiʿ), true realities (sing. ḥaqīqah), intelligibles (maʿqūlāt),
and meanings (maʿānī). These are the very same words that were previously encoun-
tered in Avicenna’s theological descriptions in Metaphysics, and, more generally, in
his psychological disquisitions on pure quiddity. In this theological or divine con-
text, they serve the additional purpose of stressing the intelligible nature of these ob-
jects. Hence, one notices a considerable terminological overlap between this passage
and the various other texts in which Avicenna discusses the ontological state of pure
quiddity, leaving little doubt that the objects under consideration here in connection
with God’s knowledge are the pure natures and essences of things. This hypothesis
seems further substantiated by the pointed remark that each one of the intelligibles
in the divine intellects is a single and simple quidditative meaning (maʿnā wāḥid)
and true nature (ḥaqīqah), which acquires multiplicity only after its instantiation
in concrete reality.
One additional aim of the passage is to distinguish human and divine intellec-
tion, and more specifically the manner in which these intellects grasp the pure quid-
dities. While the divine intellects—here explicitly identified as God’s intellect and the
separate intellects—know the pure quiddities before, and in abstraction from, their
instantiation in concrete beings and, hence, in multiplicity, the human intellects ap-
prehend the natures only after these have been embodied in concrete individuals and
abstracted by the mind. The posteriority of the human cognitive process relative to
the exterior existence of these natures is not surprising, given Avicenna’s views on
the role of abstraction in our knowledge of the pure quiddities, a topic covered in
the previous chapter. In most cases, human beings must perform a process of ab-
straction in order to cognize the quiddities of things, a requisite that makes
human cognition posterior to the existence of natures in multiplicity and in matter.
By implication, while the knowledge possessed by the superlunary intellects is im-
mediate, non-discursive, and permanent or eternal (in the sense that their knowledge
is constant and unchanging), the human apprehension of the pure quiddities is the
result of a discursive and gradual process involving the various external and internal
senses, as well as the various faculties of the intellect having to do with concept for-
mation. In spite of these differences, Avicenna exploits the well-known ancient Greek
analogy between the forms in the soul of the craftsman and the forms in the intellect
of God in order to stress their essential and ontological priority over matter and mul-
tiplicity. The analogy between builder and Creator reappears in a passage of Notes,
whose main intent is to show that God’s self-knowledge is the cause of the existence
of the forms in the world.²⁶
Avicenna’s argument—and especially the distinction he draws between a divine,
non-discursive intellection that precedes matter and multiplicity, and a human, dis-
cursive intellection that follows matter and multiplicity—is, in his system, directly re-

 Avicenna, Notes, 580, section 1008.

644 V The Divine Origin of Pure Quiddity

lated to the issue of the ontological status of pure quiddity. The divine intellect op-
erates before matter and multiplicity precisely because it can apprehend quiddity in
itself in its pure and simple state, whereas the human intellect must extract it from
concrete beings in the first stage and initiate a logical thought process to produce a
universal out of it in the second stage. Even the human apprehension of pure quid-
dity, which, on my reconstruction of the evidence, is substantiated in Avicenna’s
works, can hardly be called prior to multiplicity, given the embeddedness of
human beings in the world of matter and of particulars, even though it does establish
a privileged connection between the human intellect and its divine counterpart.
Hence, if it is true that Avicenna’s approach is broadly indebted to late-antique dis-
cussions on the universals and common things, it is nonetheless adapted to a specif-
ically Avicennian metaphysical context focusing on the status of pure quiddity. One
crucial point in this regard is that Avicenna’s argument hinges not on the nature of
the objects contemplated by the divine and human intellects, but on the ways or
modes through which these objects come to be contemplated. In other words, it is
not so much an argument about what is thought, as opposed to how it is thought.
The objects contemplated by God, the separate intellects, and human beings are
the same, viz., the natures and pure quiddities, but it is the cognitive mode that dif-
fers in each case. Recall that pure essence is only itself and nothing else, and that it
is intellected ‘with the condition that nothing else be added to it,’ so that there can-
not be different kinds of pure quiddities according to Avicenna. Rather, the pure
quiddities that human beings apprehend are fundamentally the same as those
known by the superlunary intellects, but in the case of human psychology they
are acquired and known through a psychological process that does not apply to
these immaterial beings. The thrust of Text 45, therefore, deals with the mode of in-
tellection of the pure quiddities, in addition to the issue of their localization. Avicen-
na does refer to the latter problem toward the end of the excerpt, but without resolv-
ing it, since, as he explains, it should constitute the focus of another discipline,
namely, metaphysics and theology. Notice, however, that he puts forth two main pos-
sibilities when it comes to addressing this issue: either (a) these quiddities amount to
forms or “self-subsisting exemplars” that exist autonomously; or (b) they are con-
tained and intellected by a divine intellect, which, as a result, (b1) becomes multiple
or (b2) preserves its fundamental unity. Hypothesis (a) may be discarded at once,
since it is obviously an allusion to the theory of the Platonic forms, which Avicenna
rejects. One can deduce, therefore, that Avicenna aligns himself with hypothesis (b),
which, it should be stressed, entails the existence of the pure quiddities in God qua
intelligible objects, albeit in a way that does not interfere with God’s absolute unity.
This makes the pure quiddities in God’s mind ‘prior’ to their actualization in concrete
substances. This process of elimination provides further corroboration to the effect
that Avicenna locates the pure quiddities in the divine mind, even though the
issue of whether these quiddities entail multiplicity in God still needs to be ad-
dressed in earnest; I tackle this point below. Hence, although this passage provides
solid evidence to the effect that God and the separate intellects know the pure quid-
 1 The existence of the pure quiddities in God 645

dities and natures, in comparing and contrasting human and divine intellection it
also makes the equally important point that these natures are the same in the
case of human and divine knowledge. They differ only with regard to the mode of
their acquisition and to how they relate to the concrete existents, a state Avicenna
refers to as existence ‘in multiplicity’ or ‘in matter.’ What is more, there can be little
doubt that the divine knowledge of the pure quiddities that is described in this pas-
sage, which is prior, simple, non-discursive, unchanging, and disconnected from
matter, corresponds to the “divine existence” of quiddity that Avicenna mentions
in Metaphysics (V.1, 205.1‒2). For this “divine existence,” as it is defined in the latter
passage, is also “prior” and “simple,” and it is explicitly ascribed to pure quiddity.
This is what “divine” means in a generic sense, although it is also used more precise-
ly in this passage of Introduction to signify God’s reflexive knowledge of the quiddi-
ties. It is also “divine” in that it points to God’s simple, immediate, and unchanging
knowledge of the pure quiddities.
The most compelling hypothesis, then—supported as it is by a wealth of textual
evidence drawn from Avicenna’s logical and metaphysical works and by a process of
elimination of the kinds of objects God can know—is that God knows the quiddities
of things and that only the pure quiddities can constitute suitable objects of this di-
vine knowledge, not the universals of human thought. In other words, the things
(ashyāʾ), intelligibles (maʿqūlāt), meanings (maʿānī), and forms (ṣuwar) contemplat-
ed by the divine intellect are none other than the true natures and pure quiddities of
things. When Avicenna refers to God’s knowledge and to His thinking intelligibles,
things, realities, forms, and meanings, he most likely means the pure essences. All
of these terms are interchangeable with essence or quiddity, and they are also tech-
nical terms used to identify quiddity in itself in those passages of Avicenna’s works
that deal expressly with this topic. Attributing the mental universals—as these are
defined in texts such as Introduction I.12 and Metaphysics V.1‒2—rather than the
pure quiddities to God is a thesis that ultimately appears untenable. The hypothesis
put forward here can in turn help to explain what would otherwise remain a prob-
lematic feature of Avicenna’s theological argumentation, namely, his apparent
claim that God knows possible things. Avicenna makes this statement in a passage
of Metaphysics VIII.7 that has been partly responsible for fueling the controversy
among scholars concerning the existence of possible things in God:²⁷

Text 46: Its [the First’s] apprehension of [Itself], inasmuch as it is of such [a nature], necessitates
its apprehension of ‘the other’ [al-ākhar], even if it does not [yet] exist [contingently]. Hence, the
Lordly Knower knows [both] realized and possible existence [al-wujūd al-ḥāṣil wa-l-mumkin]. His

 See notably Zedler, Why are the Possibles Possible; eadem, Saint Thomas and Avicenna; and the
response in Lizzini, A Mysterious Order.
646 V The Divine Origin of Pure Quiddity

essence would have a relation to [the intelligibles] inasmuch as they are intellectually appre-
hended, not inasmuch as they have existence in external reality.²⁸

One should not read this excerpt as literally attributing to God a knowledge of ‘pos-
sibles’ or ‘possible things’ (mumkināt), where these possibles would somehow exist
in the divine essence. Rather, on my interpretation, Avicenna is intimating that by
knowing the pure quiddities of things as being identical with His essence, God
knows these quiddities as both possible of existence and as actually existing in
the world. As I explain below, Avicenna regards possibility as a concomitant of quid-
dity, so that it is external and posterior to the pure quidditative meaning apprehend-
ed as such. What this means is that the states of ‘being possible’ and ‘being actual’
relate to the ontological mode that characterizes caused, contingent, and composite
beings. They both refer to wujūd muḥaṣṣal, ‘acquired’ or ‘realized existence,’ which is
external to essence as such. Put differently, they relate exclusively to the caused ex-
istents, to quiddities taken with their accidents and concomitants, and not to the
pure quiddities in God, which in themselves are qualified not by acquired or realized
existence, but only by essential being or their ‘proper existence’ (wujūd khāṣṣ), and,
more specifically in this case, by God’s own special and essential existence. In itself,
possibility is a modal consideration and aspect of tashkīk al-wujūd that has nothing
to do with pure quiddity and is meaningful only in relation to actual and caused ex-
istence, or existence taken as an external concomitant. Accordingly, in the Avicenni-
an model, every caused entity is both possible in itself and necessary by virtue of
another. But God’s apprehension focuses exclusively on the pure quiddities that un-
derlie these existents without being affected by these modal considerations.²⁹
These considerations enable us to securely locate the pure quiddities in God’s
mind, while at the same hinting at a new solution to a set of old theological prob-
lems, which will be examined in more detail below. In addition to agreeing with Goi-
chon and Rashed, my interpretation in effect rehabilitates a traditional position in
the history of Avicennism, which had been expounded in particular by the medieval
Latin Scholastics and commentators on Avicenna.³⁰ According to my analysis, the

 Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Cure, VIII.7, 364.12‒15, translation by Marmura in Avicenna, The
Metaphysics, 293, slightly revised.
 This appears to be the most satisfactory explanation of the above passage. The alternatives, i. e.,
claiming either that God knows the possibles directly as such or that He does not apprehend the pure
quiddities at all, create major interpretive problems. The former proposition entails multiplicity and
possibility in the divine essence. The latter fails to explain how God can know ‘the other,’ that is, all
other entities, without this knowledge being affected by possibility. The solution proposed here ad-
dresses these difficulties, since pure quiddity is a simple essential meaning that by definition ex-
cludes any modal considerations and concomitants.
 Goichon, La distinction, especially 211, 222, 276‒284. Although Goichon locates the quiddities in
God, she does not systematically distinguish between their different aspects (pure quiddities, univer-
sals, etc.). Rashed, Ibn ʿAdī, on the other hand, makes the specific claim that it is the pure quiddities
that should be located in the divine mind. I follow his lead and propose additional arguments.
 1 The existence of the pure quiddities in God 647

pure quiddities exist as objects in the divine intellect in addition to their existing as
distinct mental forms in the human mind and as an intelligible part in concrete and
universal existents. This means that the pure quiddities have three contexts of exis-
tence: in the human mind, in concrete, extramental beings, and in the divine intel-
lect. Regardless of the context, however, pure quiddity possesses a single, special,
and absolute mode of existence. The foregoing discussion nevertheless raises three
obdurate questions: first, why the pure quiddities, since they somehow exist in
God, do not introduce multiplicity in His essence or being; second, why they should
not introduce also possibility in the divine essence itself; and third, how they can be
said to amount to what Avicenna describes as a kind of ‘universal’ knowledge, while
not being universals proper. Indeed, scholars have repeatedly referred to Avicenna’s
doctrine of God’s knowledge of universals or of His knowing ‘in a universal way.’ But
what exactly does this mean? These three problems are addressed in detail below.

1.2 The problem of the multiplicity of the quiddities in God

It is clear that anyone who posits quiddities in the divine intellect must address at
some stage or other the issue of intelligible multiplicity. In her classic work on Avi-
cenna, Goichon ascribes knowledge of the quiddities to God, although she does not
elaborate on the important question of whether these divine quiddities are the quid-
dities in themselves or universal quiddities similar to the ones found in the human
mind. In addition, Goichon was perplexed by the implications that such a view en-
tailed. In her eyes, Avicenna’s theology was fraught with an irremediable flaw, name-
ly, that by situating the quiddities in God, he had allowed an apparent multiplicity to
creep into the divine being—a multiplicity regarded either in terms of God’s knowl-
edge or existence or both.³¹ Rashed, for his part, tried to solve this problem by de-
scribing the pure quiddities in God as lying beyond existence, or between existence
and nonexistence and, hence, as possessing a neutral ontological status. As such,
these neutral objects would not entail multiplicity, since they are not sensu stricto
existents (mawjūdāt).³² By building on these accounts, I will articulate a fresh expla-

 Goichon, La distinction, 85‒90. In Goichon’s defense, it should be recognized that this difficulty
arises regardless of whether one postulates universal quiddities, pure quiddities, or any other objects
of thought in God. Yet, for a work entirely devoted to Avicenna’s metaphysics, Goichon provides sur-
prisingly little information about the relationship between pure quiddity and the universals, as well
as how these two notions relate to existence; this is a key shortcoming of her framework, and a gap
that was later filled by Marmura’s studies. As I argue here, Avicenna’s approach to the question of
divine unity and multiplicity should be studied in connection with his theory of pure quiddity. Goi-
chon’s failure to highlight this connection accounts for her perplexity and dissatisfaction with this
aspect of Avicenna’s theology, although it was also informed to some degree by her ‘Thomistic’
bias and scholastic formation; in Goichon’s eyes, Thomas had succeeded theologically where Avicen-
na had faltered.
 I have already shared in the Introduction what I believe are the main difficulties with this view.
648 V The Divine Origin of Pure Quiddity

nation of how Avicenna may have envisaged the existence of the quiddities in the
divine intellect. In this section, the main challenge is to understand how the pure
quiddities can be said to constitute the objects of the divine knowledge and yet
not result in any kind of multiplicity in the divine essence.
But before tackling this issue, it should be noted that Avicenna himself broaches
this conundrum in several places in his corpus. In Metaphysics of The Cure VIII.6‒7,
two chapters devoted (among other things) to the issue of how the intelligibles relate
to the divine essence, Avicenna raises the question of how we can ascribe various
objects of knowledge to God while avoiding introducing multiplicity within the di-
vine essence.³³ He lists different possible approaches to this problem: either the ob-
jects of God’s knowledge are “possible concomitants of His essence”; or they exist
separately like the Platonic Forms; or they exist in other intellects and souls. But Avi-
cenna regards these options as unpalatable, because each one entails its own diffi-
culties and shortcomings. This is either because they introduce a relationship of pos-
sibility between God and these entities or because they conflict with other postulates
of his philosophy (such as the impossibility for the Platonic Forms to exist). This
theological question is then echoed in the passage of Introduction discussed above
(Text 45), where Avicenna asks whether positing the quiddities in God as opposed
to endorsing the Platonic forms leads one to a position of divine multiplicity. The
master further discusses the problem of multiplicity in connection with the divine in-
telligibles in Pointers, where he asks (on behalf of a disciple): “If the intelligibles do
not unite with the knower and with one another, as you [Avicenna] have mentioned,
and if, in addition, we assume that the Necessary Existent intellects all things, then
He is not in truth one, but there is here a multiplicity.”³⁴
These passages show that Avicenna was eminently aware of the problems of
where to locate the divine intelligibles and, if they are posited to exist in God, of
some of the main consequences that arise from this theological move. Moreover,
he was presumably cognizant of some of the historical solutions formulated by his
predecessors, especially the Neoplatonists, even though he does not mention any
thinker explicitly by name. In this regard, it appears that Avicenna was not satisfied
with two philosophical formulations already put forth to address this problem: first,
locating the quiddities outside of God entirely, as some Platonists had; and second,
locating them within God in a manner that would entail multiplicity, or making them
co-existents alongside God’s essence, as was the case with the theology of many mu-
takallimūn. The remaining option, and the one that appears to have been endorsed
by Avicenna himself, is to regard the quiddities as somehow existing in God, but
not in a mode distinct from His essence, lest there should result a plurality within
the divine being. At first glance, this proposition might strike us as paradoxical,
since by upholding it Avicenna appears to make two irreconcilable claims: first,

 Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Cure, VIII.7, 365.14 ff.

 Avicenna, Pointers, vol. 3‒4, 712.4‒714.1.
 1 The existence of the pure quiddities in God 649

he rejects the idea that God can know things by apprehending them externally as en-
tities distinct from His own essence (see VIII.6‒7). This can be called the thesis of
‘internality.’ Second, and at the same time, Avicenna argues that the intelligibles, in-
asmuch as they correspond to things and concomitants caused by God, do not co-
exist with the divine essence and are somehow posterior to God’s thinking His es-
sence. This means that God’s intellection and knowledge must be absolutely reflexive
and focus on His essence alone. This is the thesis of ‘exclusivity.’ According to these
two claims, the pure quiddities would be neither outside of God nor in God in any
real sense; neither internal nor external to His self-knowledge.
So how do the pure quiddities qua divine intelligibles fit in this picture? That is
to say, what place do they have in this internalist and exclusivist account of divine
knowledge? How can the intelligibles be essentially posterior to the divine essence
and at the same time not exist outside of the divine essence or merely alongside
It? I shall argue that the answer to these questions lies in the special nature of
pure quiddity. It also calls for a clarification of what Avicenna means by ‘posterior’
in this context. Having rejected the possibility that the quiddities can exist in God
qua parts (ajzāʾ) or as an assemblage (jumlah)—a position that would entail compo-
siteness and multiplicity (kathrah) and, hence, undermine the perfect oneness and
simplicity of the divine essence—Avicenna argues that God knows all things by
knowing Himself. This argument is reiterated many times in the Avicennian corpus.
Since the divine intelligibles are not external to the divine essence, the implication is
clearly that they are somehow identical with It and indistinguishable from It. In other
words, God’s knowing His essence is identical with His knowing the pure quiddities,
which later derive from his essence as concomitants as a result of His self-intellec-
tion. From an analytical viewpoint, the divine intellection may therefore be said to
consist of two distinct stages. First, there is a ‘stage’ or ‘moment’ in the divine intel-
lection when God’s knowledge of His essence is absolutely identical to His knowl-
edge of the pure quiddities.³⁵ In Pointers, Avicenna writes: “The First’s apprehension
of [all] things is from His essence and in His essence” (idrāk al-awwal li-l-ashyāʾ min
dhātihi fī dhātihi).³⁶ At this stage, the reality and existence of these intelligibles or
forms are identical with God’s being. This point is made clear also in a passage of
Notes:

Text 47: Everything that proceeds from the Necessary of Existence proceeds only through the
mediation of His intellection of it. The very existence of the intelligible forms [al-ṣuwar al-maʿ-
qūlah] with regard to Him [lahu]³⁷ is identical with His intellection of them [ʿaqliyyatihi lahā].

 In spite of the terminology employed, the following explanation is not intended as a temporal
one. God is above time and, hence, no movement or chronological development can be attributed
to Him or His actions.
 Avicenna, Pointers, vol. 3‒4, 710.3.
 It is difficult to provide a satisfactory translation of the expression lahu in this context, since lin-
guistically it introduces a relation between God and something else. However, since nothing, strictly
speaking, is exterior to God’s intellection, i. e., since God’s intellection is purely internal and reflex-
650 V The Divine Origin of Pure Quiddity

There is no distinction between these two states [al-ḥālayn] and no hierarchy between one and
the other, lest His intellection of them be distinct from their existence from Him. Rather, His in-
tellection of them is not different from their very existence from Him. Hence, inasmuch as they
are existent, they are intelligible; and inasmuch as they are intelligible, they are existent.³⁸

In this primal stage, then, there is no distinction between God’s intellection of the
forms or quiddities and their unitary existence in God. They are perfectly identical
with the divine thought. Since God, strictly speaking, does not think or intellect any-
thing outside of His essence, the necessary implication is that these forms and quid-
dities are one with the divine essence Itself. It is this perfect noetical unity and iden-
tity between thinker (ʿāqil) and object of thought (maʿqūl) that warrants describing
the ontological status of the pure quiddities as a kind of “divine existence” (wujūd
ilāhī), as Avicenna does in Metaphysics V.1.
Following this stage of perfect identity between the quiddities and God, between
God’s self-intellection and His intellection of the intelligibles, there is a second
‘stage’ or ‘moment’ that marks a certain conceptual distantiation from the divine es-
sence. This is when God’s self-knowledge results in the subsequent or ‘posterior’ ex-
istence of the pure quiddities and where the intelligibles are therefore describable in
their own terms. At this point, God’s self-knowledge has also become a knowledge of
the pure quiddities as they exist in themselves. In a certain sense, these intelligibles
may be said to be posterior to the divine essence the very instant that they are regard-
ed as concomitants (lawāzim) of the divine intellection.³⁹ From a cosmological per-
spective, this second stage coincides with the causation of the First Effect and of
all the intelligible forms—the ṣuwar maʿqūlah mentioned in Text 47 above—in the
First Effect, which is Itself a separate intellect thinking the pure intelligibles and
quiddities. At this stage, conceptual distinctions and differences start to appear: in
the intellection that the First Effect has of itself and of the First Cause, and between
the various quiddities as distinct intelligibles in the intellect of the First Effect.

ive, even though it encompasses all things, one option is to render lahu simply as “in Him” or “in His
essence,” which, although it is not literal, would not be erroneous.
 Avicenna, Notes, 114.8‒115.2, section 147.
 The general parallels between this aspect of Avicenna’s theology and Neoplatonic—especially
Plotinian—noetics are perspicuous. This connection is all the more justified given that Arabic thinkers
applied some of the Neoplatonic theories that reached them in the Arabic translations and adapta-
tions of Plotinus to God rather than to the Intellectual Principle described in Enneads, thereby follow-
ing a trend that is already visible in those translations. This tendency consisted in shifting the focus
of some passages of Enneads from the Intellectual Principle to God, perhaps in an attempt to provide
a seamless reading of Aristotelian and Neoplatonic theology. Thus, many of the things Plotinus says
about the Intellectual Principle, such as his descriptions of the various moments or stages character-
izing the relationship of the intelligibles to the divine intellect, can be applied to Avicenna’s theology.
Perhaps even more striking in this regard are the parallels between Avicenna and Duns Scotus, in
whose theology different ‘moments’ or ‘stages’ can also be identified to describe God’s intellection
and its demiurgic consequences, which correspond in striking ways to the Avicennian model delineat-
ed in this study. On this issue, see Porro, Universaux, and idem, Henry of Ghent.
 1 The existence of the pure quiddities in God 651

In this context, Avicenna sometimes speaks of a relation (iḍāfah) between God

and the intelligibles. This serves to stress the posteriority of the quiddities vis-à-vis
His essence considered strictly in Itself, in spite of the fact that they themselves
exist on an intelligible plane and in the divine being. As Avicenna puts it, “His es-
sence has a relation [iḍāfah] to the intelligibles inasmuch as they are intelligible
[maʿqūlah], not inasmuch as they possess concrete existence.”⁴⁰ This statement fur-
ther emphasizes the idea that the pure quiddities exist in God qua intelligibles before
they acquire external concrete and composite existence, although there is a sense in
which they can be spoken of as being subsequent to the divine essence itself. Never-
theless, from God’s perspective the intelligibles as such remain within the divine es-
sence and are indistinguishable from It. It is only human discursive reasoning and
language that can artificially differentiate between these stages or moments in the
divine intellection, which remain a single reality within God. The propositions
‘God’s thinking His essence’ and ‘God’s thinking the pure quiddities and intelligi-
bles’ are interchangeable, even though they reflect a sequentiality that is ingrained
in the very process of human discursive thought and that is metaphorically applied
to the First. One can find a passage that aptly and compactly summarizes these
points in Avicenna’s late work entitled Pointers:

Text 48: Since He [God] intellects Himself through His essence [bi-dhātihi], then it follows—His
being an intellect in permanence through His essence and on account of His essence [bi-dhātihi
wa-li-dhātihi]—that He intellects multiplicity [al-kathrah]. [However,] multiplicity appears as a
posterior concomitant [lāzimah mutaʾakhkhirah], which does not enter [His] essence and does
not constitute It.⁴¹

This passage alludes to the multiplicity consisting of the intelligibles and pure quid-
dities that eventually come to be actualized as concrete existents in the world. These
quiddities and intelligibles are, in a first stage, identical with the divine essence and,
in a second stage, conceivable as concomitants emerging from the divine essence.
Avicenna identifies and discusses these stages from the perspective of human ratioc-
inative thought, but it is clear that there is no actual temporality, sequentiality, or
multiplicity in the intellective activity of God. Nor can any meaningful temporal dis-

 Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Cure, VIII.7, 364.14‒15. See Acar, Talking about God, 173 ff.
 Avicenna, Pointers, vol. 3‒4, 714.3‒715.1. This passage is to be compared to a similar statement in
Notes, 523.1‒4, where one finds the remarkable claim that “relational multiplicity [takaththuran iḍā-
fiyyan] is the only kind [of multiplicity] to exist in God, but it does not entail multiplicity of His quid-
dity or His true reality.” This statement may appear at first glance un-Avicennian and could be regard-
ed as a spurious addition by a later exegete or compiler of Notes. However, it raises the interesting
point that if the pure quiddities exist in the divine essence according to ‘the prior and posterior,’
then a relational multiplicity between these meanings may arise, even if no substantial, entitative,
or ontological multiplicity can be posited. There is therefore a way to account for its meaning that
does not subvert Avicenna’s theological position. Moreover, it bears a striking resemblance to the pas-
sage in Pointers discussed above, which argues that God, in a sense, does intellect multiplicity.
652 V The Divine Origin of Pure Quiddity

tinction be established between God’s knowledge of these quiddities qua intelligibles

and qua concrete existents.⁴²
At this point, and in order to shed additional light on the issue of how the pure
quiddities can be said to exist in the divine essence without entailing multiplicity,
one needs to return to the previous section on the proper existence of quiddity
and examine how it applies to the case of God. Indeed, the challenge is to under-
stand how this divine intellective act that is inclusive of the pure quiddities can
take place without resulting in the unitary divine essence being affected by it.
Now, it is clear that Avicenna would not want to argue that the maʿānī comprised
by God’s knowledge amount to distinct intellectual existents in the divine essence
in the way in which these entities are distinct in the human mind and establish a
relation between the intellect and the object of intellection. For this would under-
mine God’s oneness on ontological and cognitive grounds. If these objects were
truly numerically distinct, they would cause a multiplicity of things to exist within
the divine essence and would imply that God be both self-caused and composite,
which is untenable. Rather, when discussing exactly how these maʿānī and intelligi-
bles relate to the divine essence and how they come to exist, Avicenna explains that
God’s thinking them is identical with His own essence. Now, the only entities in his
metaphysical system that can fulfil these criteria are the quiddities in themselves, be-
cause they are not conditioned and numerically determined. Recall in this connec-
tion that quiddity in itself is neither one nor multiple, neither actual nor potential,
and fundamentally unconditioned, so that its existence in God would entail neither
multiplicity nor contingency. In itself, pure essence does not possess any of the con-
comitants and attributes that produce multiplicity and compositeness. Hence, its
mode of existence in God would be perfectly identical with the divine existence itself.
Like the Necessary of Existence, it would possess a simple, constant, and essential
mode of existence that excludes external concomitants. In fact, it may be argued
that it possesses this ontological mode because it dwells in the divine essence and
is identical to it. Hence, the maʿānī Avicenna mentions in a theological context, in-
sofar as they are regarded as objects of the divine intellection, are not to be identified

 Avicenna’s conceptualization of this issue shares many obvious parallels with the debate about
the divine attributes in Islam. Muʿtazilites, Ashʿarites, Hanbalites, and Maturidites clashed on the
issue of exactly how the attributes relate to God’s essence, formulating many competing theories
in the process. Avicenna’s position is of course closer to Muʿtazilite doctrine according to which
the attributes are identical with the divine essence and do not constitute autonomous or co-existing
entities. The Muʿtazilites consequently situate the debate at the level of speech and grammatical at-
tribution and address the question of how human language relates to the divine reality. As Wolfson
would have it, this problem can be described as a philosophical avatar or reformulation of a funda-
mental question inherited from Plato, namely, how multiplicity relates to oneness and how a single
being can be said to be both one and multiple. Avicenna’s approach is nevertheless proper to him in
that it resorts to the theory of the pure quiddities, while the theologians locate the debate at the level
of the divine attributes. In either case, however, the same conundrum about how unity relates multi-
plicity still applies.
 1 The existence of the pure quiddities in God 653

with the conditioned and complex universal existents dwelling in the human mind.
Rather, the divine essence and thought comprise all the pure quiddities in a unitary
and simple existential mode.⁴³ The fact that the pure quiddities possess an undeter-
mined, non-numerical, and unconditioned ontological mode enables one to posit
their existence in God, where they would be indistinguishable from His essence.
This absence of numerical determinism is a crucial feature that helps explain how
the quiddities may dwell within the divine essence without causing multiplicity. In
brief, making the pure quiddities the objects of the divine intellection leaves Avicen-
na’s core tenet of divine oneness and simplicity unscathed.
The previous contention should be further evaluated in light of Avicenna’s belief
that intelligible multiplicity is constituted not by essence or quiddity per se, but by
the concomitants (lawāzim) that attach to it. As the master explains in Commentary
on Theology of Aristotle, “multiplicity in the supernal world consists not in parts of
the essence, but in concomitants of the essence.”⁴⁴ This point is also developed in
Notes: it is the lawāzim that lead to the appearance of multiplicity (kathrah) in the
separate intellects and in all the effects proceeding from God.⁴⁵ Fundamentally, it
is the presence of lawāzim in the First Effect (at the very least in the form of its three-
fold intellection) that sets it apart from God’s perfect unity. But since the pure quid-
dities as such possess no concomitants, accidents, or properties, they do not gener-
ate any multiplicity in the divine essence. It is only when they are caused to exist qua
caused and contingent things that they acquire their corresponding concomitants.
Thus, the quidditative meanings (maʿānī) are divine in that their essential and simple
existential mode coincides with the divine essence, and in that their truth (ḥaqq)—or
each quiddity itself considered qua ḥaqīqah—find their originative source in the Ab-
solute Truth (al-ḥaqq and al-ḥaqīqah al-muṭlaqah) of the divine essence. Avicenna’s
position here is reminiscent of the way in which the Muʿtazilites considered the di-
vine attributes to be indistinguishable from the divine essence. Furthermore, it is
also comparable to the way in which some of the late-antique Neoplatonists talk
about the forms in the Intellectual-Principle. In some sections of Enneads, such as
III.9 and V.9, Plotinus (d. 270 CE) argues that the intelligibles are present in the In-
tellectual-Principle in a unitary way. The later Neoplatonist Syrianus (d. 437 CE)
also conceives of the relation between the forms and this divine being as one that
does not entail multiplicity or deficiency in its intellect. In his commentary on Meta-
physics, the Greek philosopher explains that the divine intellect is full of the forms;
that it creates whatever it intellects; that the forms “are not different in it and in its
essence, but complete its being and bring to everything the productive, paradigmatic,

 This interpretation establishes an interesting parallel between the Avicennian conception of how
the pure quiddities relate to the divine essence and the Muʿtazilite conception of how the divine at-
tributes relate to the divine essence.
 Avicenna, Commentary on Theology of Aristotle, 58.6‒9; cf. Notes, 112.18‒20.
 Avicenna, Notes, 276, section 469; 282, section 481; 491‒492, section 901.
654 V The Divine Origin of Pure Quiddity

and final cause.”⁴⁶ Syrianus’s Neoplatonic division of the causes notwithstanding, he

regards the forms as being contained in, yet undifferentiated, in the divine being. The
theses of a plurality of forms (ṣuwar) existing in the supernal intellectual principles
and of multiplicity-in-unity are also salient features of the Proclus arabus material.⁴⁷
It is precisely this tradition of undifferentiated forms and essences in the divine
intellect(s) that, on my reading, Avicenna is articulating in his works, and in a man-
ner that makes the quiddities describable in terms of a special and divine ontological
mode. As Avicenna puts it in Notes, “the reason [or cause, sabab] for the existence of
each thing is [God’s] knowledge of it and the fact that it is impressed in His essence
[wa-irtisāmuhu fī dhātihi].”⁴⁸ In like manner, he states elsewhere that “the forms of
the existents are impressed in the essence of the Creator [murtasimah fī dhāt al-
bāriʾ], for they are the objects of His knowledge, and it is His knowledge of them
that is the cause of their existence.”⁴⁹ I would surmise that the idea that the quiddi-
ties of things are “impressed” in God’s essence and yet somehow identical with It is
to be traced to these Neoplatonic noetical theories, although they are thoroughly
adapted to Avicenna’s cosmological and theological model. It is in this Avicennian
garb that the theory that God knows the forms or quiddities of things may have per-
colated to late classical and postclassical authors.⁵⁰
There is another aspect of the problem that should be taken into account, and
which harks back yet again to the conditions (shurūṭ) Avicenna applies to quiddity.
As Stephen Menn aptly noticed, there is another important case in Avicenna’s philos-
ophy (in addition to quiddity) where the negative clause bi-sharṭ lā shayʾ ākhar is
used, namely, to refer to God’s special existence.⁵¹ In Metaphysics of The Cure, Avi-
cenna argues that God’s necessary existence is bi-sharṭ lā shayʾ. What he means by
this is that God’s existence is devoid of anything extraneous to it and can only be
conceived ‘on the condition of nothing else.’ God’s special existence is therefore con-
ceivable only when it is negatively conditioned, when all other things are negated of

 Syrianus, Commentary on Metaphysics, 106.26‒107.1; Sorabji, The Philosophy, vol. 3, 146.

 See, for instance, Proclus arabus, The Book of Pure Good, propositions 4, 6, 7, and 9.
 Avicenna, Notes, 53.10, section 35.
 Avicenna, Notes, 220, section 348. It is significant that Avicenna also relies on the root r-s-m to
describe the way in which the primary notions are “impressed” on the human mind in Metaphysics
I.5: they are “impressed in the soul in a primary manner” (tartasimu fī l-nafs irtisāman awwaliyyan).
 For example, Bahmanyār, The Book of Validated Knowledge, 576.2, states that God knows “the
forms of known things together with their multiplicity according to a simple mode” (wa-ṣuwar
tilka l-maʿlūmāt maʿa kathratihā ʿindahu ʿalā wajh basīṭ). He adds (576.5) that God’s objects of thought
are “identical with His existence” (huwa nafs wujūdihi). According to Frank, Creation, 38, 63, Ghazālī
perceives a certain ontological continuum between the forms that are in God, those that are in con-
crete beings, and those that are in the human mind. This is why, according to Frank, Ghazālī defends
not creation ex nihilo, but creation ex possibili. The latter formula is of course inacceptable to Avicen-
na, but the theory that the forms are in God seems traceable to his works. In fact, I surmise that the
widespread view in the later ḥikmah and kalām traditions that God knows all the forms and essences
of things was due partly to Avicenna’s theological legacy.
 Menn, Avicenna’s Metaphysics, 158.
 1 The existence of the pure quiddities in God 655

it in the mind. This approach accords with the streak of negative theology that under-
pins the works of many Arabic philosophers, from Kindī and Fārābī to Avicenna, and
which occupies an important place in the master’s theology.⁵² The crucial point here
is that the only two objects that are negatively conditioned in Avicenna’s metaphysics
are God and quiddity in itself (more specifically, quiddity in itself when it is con-
ceived of in the human intellect). This cannot be a mere coincidence. In light of
the previous analysis of quiddity proffered in this study, it may point to a crucial in-
terconnection between these two metaphysical doctrines. More specifically, it could
indicate that the pure quiddities and the divine essence in some sense possess an
identical mode of existence, which, from the perspective of the human intellect
thinking about it, is completely abstract and negatively conditioned. For only the
pure quiddities and God’s quiddity are bi-sharṭ lā shayʾ ākhar. This can be explained
by the fact that, in God, they are one and identical, according to the model of undif-
ferentiated forms exposed above. This point would thus strengthen the view that the
pure quiddities, qua objects of God’s knowledge, can be said somehow to exist in
God, in a manner indistinguishable from His essence, and without any multiplicity
or contingency arising. In brief, Avicenna’s description of God and the pure quiddi-
ties as things that are negatively conditioned imply that they could be one and the
same thing considered under a particular intelligible aspect.
In retrospect, it is striking that two of the terms Avicenna employs the most fre-
quently to describe the objects of God’s intellection, namely, maʿānī and lawāzim,
are also used to describe the quidditative meanings and their various aspects in a
logical and epistemological context. These two terms figure prominently in Avicen-
na’s discussions of logic and human epistemology as well as in his theology and
theory of divine knowledge. Maʿnā is a generic term Avicenna employs to describe
the quidditative meaning itself, as well as the internal or constitutive elements
that compose it and, finally, to the concomitants that are entailed by it. As for the
term lawāzim, it designates the external concomitants, i. e., things that are non-con-
stitutive and, hence, extrinsic to quiddity, but follow it necessarily. In the context of
Avicenna’s cosmology and theology, the term lawāzim usually refers to the actual be-
ings that, qua caused and contingent entities, proceed from God as a result of His
intellection. In that sense, for instance, the First Effect, i. e., the first separate intellect
caused by God, is a lāzim. This implies that all the caused entities are lawāzim with
regard to the māhiyyah of God. As such, they are necessitated or entailed by His es-

 This explains Ṭūsī’s claim (Commentary on Pointers, vols. 3‒4, 461.12‒23) to the effect that the
human intellect cannot know the divine truth (ḥaqīqah), which Ṭūsī identifies with God’s special ex-
istence (wujūd khāṣṣ). This would amount to knowing God’s quiddity. According to this philosopher,
“absolute existence” (wujūd muṭlaq) or “common existence” (wujūd ʿāmm) is a concomitant of, and
follows, God’s special existence. The last two expressions presumably correspond to the realized or
acquired existence in Avicenna’s system. Given Ṭūsī’s recognition of these various ontological modes,
and his general adherence to the Avicennian position on quiddity, it is not surprising that he does not
regard wujūd as univocal (462.8‒11).
656 V The Divine Origin of Pure Quiddity

sence (muqtaḍā dhātihi).⁵³ Because the term lawāzim more generally refers to the var-
ious external concomitants of each quiddity (not just God’s essence), one can also
speak of the lawāzim of the essence of the First Effect, of the first celestial orb, of
horseness, etc. So there are various levels of discourse at play here: qua effects of
God, the caused entities are lawāzim relative to His essence; but qua essences them-
selves, they also have their own lawāzim. So Avicenna’s application of the terms
maʿānī and lawāzim is complex and dictated by subtle considerations of emphasis
and perspective. At any rate, the fact that the quidditative meanings can be located
in God; that they are objects of the divine knowledge; and that it is God ultimately
who is causally responsible for the essential relationships of their constituents, for
their existence in reality, as well as for the realization of their external concomitants,
makes this terminological connection even stronger. Whereas the term maʿānī stress-
es the relation of the essences to God’s essence and connects them with God’s own
originative maʿnā, the term lawāzim underpins their status as effects of God. Here the
māhiyyah-lawāzim model is constructively applied to a theological context in order to
explain divine causation and God’s relation to the world.
The foregoing enables us to tentatively tackle the arduous question of how these
quiddities can be epistemically differentiated if they all possess a single and undif-
ferentiated mode of existence that is furthermore identical with the divine essence.
For one may legitimately ask: does God know each one of these quiddities distinctly
and individually, and, if so, does this not entail an epistemic or cognitive multiplicity
in His knowledge? According to Avicenna, it is quite apparent that God knows all of
the quiddities, although He knows them by intellecting His own essence. Since the
pure quiddities are identical with God’s essence, He knows them merely through re-
flexive contemplation. In other words, by knowing His maʿnā, God knows all the
maʿānī at once. This means that His knowledge of all the quiddities is unitary and
essentially identical with His self-knowledge, while at the same time embracing
them in their diversity. Here a certain notion of multiplicity-in-unity emerges from
the analysis, which, yet again, seems a distant echo of Neoplatonic noetical theories.
Inasmuch as they are the maʿānī of a single, absolute maʿnā, the quiddities are
known in a unitary way. But God’s self-intellection immediately leads to their
being lawāzim vis-à-vis this same essence. Identifying these two ‘moments’ or
‘stages’ in the reflexive divine noesis can help toward a resolution of this intricate
issue in Avicenna. Yet, of all the difficult aspects Avicenna broaches in connection
with God’s knowledge, the threat of a residual epistemic or cognitive multiplicity
is palpable and remains unsuccessfully integrated in his account. To conclude:
given that Avicenna uses the term maʿnā to describe quiddity in itself, there can
be little doubt that the maʿānī he speaks of in the context of God’s knowledge cor-
respond to the quidditative meanings. There is another good reason to believe this,

 Avicenna, Notes, 11.4‒7, section 3. As we saw previously, the master shares the term muqtaḍā and
its sense of necessary entailment and causation with his Muʿtazilite counterparts.
 1 The existence of the pure quiddities in God 657

in addition to the terminological evidence: these pure quiddities possess a rarefied

and non-numerical nature that allows them to exist in God without entailing multi-
plicity. In contrast, ascribing complex universal forms, rather than the pure quiddi-
ties, to God’s thought would not fulfil these criteria and lead to serious interpretive
difficulties.

1.3 The problem of the universality of the quiddities in God

The foregoing remarks have shed light on the ‘divine’ localization of the pure quid-
dities. They also explained how their being in God does not entail any intelligible
multiplicity—the quiddities identify with God’s essential existence and are them-
selves devoid of accidents and concomitants; they are neither one nor many, nor con-
tingent, complex, or composite. Nevertheless, the analysis has still not dispelled the
other two conceptual difficulties outlined at the outset of the inquiry, the first regard-
ing the universality of the objects in God’s mind, the second regarding their status as
‘possible’ things. Let us start with the first issue. Avicenna’s claim that God knows all
things, including the particulars, in a universal way has baffled scholars and given
rise to a diversity of interpretations in the specialized literature.⁵⁴ For my purposes,
the problem concerns how God’s knowledge may be said to be universal in spite of
being a knowledge of the pure quiddities and therefore not of the universals as Avi-
cenna typically defines them in his logical and metaphysical works. It should be
clear by now that, according to Avicenna, God cannot intellect the very same univer-
sal concepts that we as humans intellect, because the universal concept is, on Avi-
cenna’s definition, a compound of a core quidditative meaning or nature together
with various mental accidents and concomitants that attach to it externally,
among which are universality, oneness, multiplicity, and actuality. Hence, according
to the master, universal mental existence is always accompanied by an intelligible
multiplicity that is caused by a set of concomitants. As a result, the universal is syn-
thetic, composite or complex, and contingent. Moreover, when compared to pure
quiddity, it is a concept that is essentially and ontologically posterior.
There is an additional problem with ascribing universals to God. On Avicenna’s
account, universals result at least partially from a process of abstraction of the forms
of concrete beings, and, hence, from the apprehension of particular instances corre-
sponding to that universal. This process of abstraction, even though it may not be
single-handedly responsible for generating the final state of the universal in the
mind,⁵⁵ presupposes an abstractive process that focuses on the concrete entities.

 Here are some notable attempts at explaining Avicenna’s theory of divine knowledge: Marmura,
Some Aspects; Nuseibeh, Avicenna: Providence; Acar, Talking about God; idem, Reconsidering;
Zghal, La connaissance des singuliers.
 I refer the reader to the previous discussion concerning abstraction and emanation in Avicenna’s
epistemology and to the pertinent bibliographic references.
658 V The Divine Origin of Pure Quiddity

This means that the universals arise in the human intellect after—taken even in a ru-
dimentary temporal sense—the sense perception of individual things has taken place
and the various levels of abstraction have been effected. As Avicenna explains in In-
troduction I.12 by resorting to a threefold scheme he inherited from late antiquity,
human beings acquire the universals only after their contemplation of the quiddities
(or universals) in matter or in multiplicity. This is why the mental or logical universals
come after matter or multiplicity. But God precedes these concrete individual things
in the way that a cause precedes its effects, so it is clear that such universals and
such a universal knowledge cannot be ascribed to the divine being. Here the analogy
between human and divine universal knowledge falls apart.
Paradoxically, though, Avicenna insists that God knows things in a universal
way. It is understandable that he would wish to defend such a claim. After all,
true science and knowledge must, on his view, be based on the cognition of univer-
sals. It is the universals that correspond to the abstract definitions and the very es-
sence of things and answer the question ‘what is it?’ (mā huwa). Moreover, were God
to know the particulars qua particulars, then change, motion, or potentiality would
inevitably enter the divine essence. These points seem valid enough. Yet, if we sur-
mise that God knows only the pure, irreducible, and unchanging quiddities, then
why does Avicenna claim that this divine knowledge is universal, if it does not in-
clude an intentionality or attribute of universality, as in the case of human thought?
Avicenna’s position regarding this point is difficult to delineate with precision. Nev-
ertheless, and according to my interpretation, it likely rests on the implicit recogni-
tion of various aspects or senses of universality, i. e., regarding universality as a kind
of modulated notion. One approach, envisaged previously in chapters II and III, is to
regard the pure quiddities as a special kind of universals, that is, as pure natures
possessing an intrinsic and essential kind of universality. In their case, universality
would not be an external mental concomitant added to them, but a property of their
very intelligible reality. This approach, at any rate, finds support in Avicenna’s three-
fold classification of the universals in Introduction I.12. Even on this assumption,
however, it is important to understand exactly what the philosopher means by
“knowing in a universal way” (min wajh kullī), the formula on which he most
often relies to qualify God’s special knowledge of things. Evidence taken from
Notes enables us to sketch a solution to this problem. There one learns that ‘universal
knowledge’ consists (a) of what can be predicated of many things,⁵⁶ and (b) of what
constitutes knowledge of the reasons and causes of something.⁵⁷ The first point cor-
responds to the standard definition of universality Avicenna provides in his logical
works and was discussed in detail in chapter II, so it can be set aside for the time
being. The second point is more interesting for the present issue, because it introdu-

 Avicenna, Notes, 43.7‒8, section 25.

 Avicenna, Notes, 52.5‒6, section, 33; 334, section 595, among other passages. The argument ac-
cording to which God’s knowledge is universal because it includes the asbāb and ʿilal of all things
returns frequently in Notes.
 1 The existence of the pure quiddities in God 659

ces an element of causality, which seems particularly relevant in the case of God’s
knowledge. If universal knowledge is a kind of knowledge that includes the reasons
or principles (asbāb) and causes (ʿilal) of things, then it could be easily applied to the
apprehension of pure quiddity. For, as was shown previously, there is such a thing as
quidditative or essential causality for Avicenna, which is closely tied to the notions of
the formal and final causes. What is more, since quiddity in itself represents a con-
stitutive ontological principle of the universals in the mind and of the extramental
beings, its essential causality is one that would extend to all existents or things in
the world, to all the mawjūdāt, irrespective of their specific nature. Essence is a con-
stant and irreducible meaning and principle of all contingently existing things,
which makes these things what they are. It would seem, therefore, to qualify as
something universal—at the very least in God’s mind—according to the sense articu-
lated in Notes. On Avicenna’s own account, then, there is an aspect according to
which quiddity in itself qua quidditative meaning or maʿnā could render God’s
knowledge universal in the sense of Its being a knowledge of the reasons and causal-
ity underlying all the contingent things.⁵⁸
Moreover, the quidditative meaning can also be said to participate substantially
in the causative process that results in the actual existence of concrete and mental
existents, insofar as these existents may be defined in terms of a core quidditative
meaning to which various external concomitants, attributes, and accidents have
been superadded through causality, making the final product a composite, contin-
gent, and causally dependent entity. The quidditative meaning represents the core
around which concomitants combine to individualize or particularize it. This is
true even of mental universals relative to pure quiddity, and it explains how the
same universal concept (e. g., universal triangle) can be thought by different minds
at the same time. It is perhaps in light of these considerations that one should inter-
pret Avicenna’s claim in Notes that the particular (al-juzʾī) is entailed by (lazima ʿan)
and is a concomitant of (lāzim) the universal, a claim he relies on to justify God’s
omniscience.⁵⁹ But in this case, it is the quidditative meaning as an essential univer-
sal, and not the composite universal concept (which is numerically many, since it ex-
ists in various human minds), which is intended in this passage. Hence, there is a
sense according to which knowledge of pure quiddity is a causal kind of knowledge
with regard to the mental and extramental existents, since knowing the quidditative

 One passage in Notes (39‒40, section 20) seems to lend further weight to this hypothesis: Avicen-
na contrasts there the human way of knowing things, which is through, or by virtue of, their concrete
existence (min jihah wujūdihi), to God’s way of knowing things, which is through their reasons or prin-
ciples (min jihah asbābihi). But if what God knows about things is not their existence per se, then it
must be first and foremost their essence and thingness, which could very well be what is intended
here by asbāb (account, explanation, etc.). One, however, does not exclude the other: by knowing
their thingness, God would also know their existence, inasmuch as existence is a concomitant of
thingness.
 Avicenna, Notes, 53, section 34.
660 V The Divine Origin of Pure Quiddity

meanings of these things would in a sense represent knowledge of the cause of these
things. This applies to human beings, but it would be true a fortiori of God. By know-
ing the pure quiddities, the divine intellect would, by the same token, know all of the
particularizing, concomitant, and even accidental features of realized beings, since
these things are all derivative of the essence. God’s knowledge and omniscience,
then, would be predicated on the Avicennian law of essential entailment.
Approached from this angle, there is a strong case to be made to the effect that
God’s mode of knowing ‘in a universal way,’ as Avicenna puts it, has as its main ob-
ject quiddity in itself, even if the latter is not, strictly speaking, universal in the same
way as the universals that make up the contents of human thought. In the case of
God, His knowing all things would be premised on His intellection of the irreducible
quidditative meanings (maʿānī) of all things and their true natures (ṭabīʿah), which
are not only essentially universal (according to a qualified or modulated meaning
of universality), but which would also indirectly include all of the concomitants of
quiddity. It is this special unitary divine intellection of all the pure quiddities and
their intricate web of essential entailment that legitimates the view that God
knows not only the universals, but also the particular existents in a universal way.
Moreover, knowing the essential and necessary concomitants of things would
imply a knowledge of causal relations between things. For the external concomitants
of quiddity are caused to exist by an agent. For instance, it is an exterior cause that
determines the essence ‘horseness’ to be one, existent, particular, etc. This means
that God knows the entire concatenation of causes and effects pertaining to essences
and their external concomitants.
This line of interpretation could in turn help alleviate another vexed point of Avi-
cennian doctrine, namely, why the master sometimes appears to defend the view that
God is cognizant not only of universals, but also of particulars. In most cases, Avicen-
na contends that God knows particulars in a universal way, which implies that God
does not know particulars qua particulars. In Salvation, for example, the master quite
typically states that God knows “particular things inasmuch as they are universal”
(al-umūr al-juzʾiyyah min ḥaythu hiya kulliyyah).⁶⁰ However, in Notes, Avicenna—or
one of his disciples—quite committedly describes the divine knowledge as one of par-
ticulars qua particulars, or at least one that encompasses the details and minutiae of
things in addition to their universal features.⁶¹ One can also make a case for this in-
terpretation by drawing on evidence from Avicenna’s other works, such as his Com-
mentary on Theology of Aristotle. ⁶² Moreover, one should not overlook the fact that in

 Avicenna, Salvation, 595.11‒12.

 Such an apparently un-Avicennian view is found notably in Notes, 272.8‒9: God intellects “perish-
able things inasmuch as they are perishable [al-ashyāʾ al-fāsidah annahā fāsidah] … and temporal
things and time [al-ashyāʾ al-zamāniyyah wa-l-zamān].” Cf. 18, section 3; 42.3 ff., section 24.
 Avicenna, Commentary on Theology of Aristotle, 48.6‒18, where he explains that in the supernal
intellectual world, knowledge of universals and particulars is simultaneous and occurs without tem-
 1 The existence of the pure quiddities in God 661

Metaphysics of The Cure, Avicenna claims that God knows “individual things” (sing.
shayʾ shakhṣ), and he also alludes to Qurʾan 10:61 to the effect that “not even the
weight of an atom in the heavens and the earth escapes Him.”⁶³ Regardless of the
questions of how ‘Avicennian’ such a view appears to be at first sight, and whether
Avicenna intended this Qurʾanic quote literally or only metaphorically,⁶⁴ this asser-
tion is definitely germane to those other passages where Avicenna appears to en-
dorse God’s knowledge of particular things. The belief in a divine omniscience
that would include the particulars should also be connected with the issue of
God’s knowledge of future contingents, which is another aspect of the problem to
which Avicenna sometimes alludes. At one point in Metaphysics, he mentions that
God has knowledge of both “realized and possible existence” (al-wujūd al-ḥāṣil
wa-l-mumkin),⁶⁵ which seems to necessarily include the knowledge of possible partic-
ular things before they become actualized. It is undeniable that these passages pose
a serious interpretive challenge and that they cannot be easily or straightforwardly
reconciled with the idea of universal knowledge. Moreover, even if one brings
them within the fold of a more mainstream interpretation that emphasizes the uni-
versal knowledge of God, understanding exactly what Avicenna means by a universal
knowledge of particulars remains puzzling.
The interpretation of pure quiddity defended in this study enables us to address
this conundrum and to propose a new solution that resolves the problem of the uni-
versality of God’s knowledge. The hypothesis that God knows the pure quiddities of
all things has two important implications. First, and on a mereological interpreta-
tion, it would mean that God knows the pure quiddities in universal and particular
things and that He knows them as the main formal, essential, and substantial prin-
ciple of these things. Since every entity—whether an individual hylomorphic being, a

poral sequentiality. In this same text, however, and as in The Cure, Avicenna appears to regard
knowledge of particulars as a kind of universal knowledge, without elaborating on the reason.
 Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Cure, VIII.6, 359.13‒14. The verse Q10:61 reads (trans. Yusuf Ali):
“Nor is hidden from thy Lord (so much as) the weight of an atom on the earth or in heaven.” Similar
committal statements regarding God’s knowledge of particular and individual things can be found in
Notes, 272‒273, section 463; 446, section 820.
 Avicenna could not have failed to realize that many theologians would have construed this state-
ment literally. Even with regard to his own doctrines, he must have been aware of the ease with which
it could have been misinterpreted by his followers, for the Qurʾanic passage seeks to establish God’s
omniscience and His knowledge of even minute particulars; such as ‘this mustard seed,’ and not
mustards seeds in general or the universal mustard seed. So that, if it was truly Avicenna’s intention
to use this quotation to support his view of God’s universal knowledge of the particulars, the effect
may have proven counter-productive when it comes to the reception of his works. Conversely, if it was
merely an effort on Avicenna’s part to philosophize the Islamic scripture, his attempt strikes us as
equally lukewarm and unconvincing. The problem with the textual evidence is in fact dual, since Avi-
cenna maintains that God knows in a universal way and that He knows particular things (i. e., both
propositions have to be explained). As explained above, I believe that anchoring the solution in Avi-
cenna’s theory of pure quiddity is the most convincing way of addressing this dual difficulty.
 Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Cure, VIII.7, 364.13‒14.
662 V The Divine Origin of Pure Quiddity

separate intellect, or an intelligible concept in the human mind—is provided its es-
sential reality (ḥaqīqah) by virtue of pure quiddity, God’s knowing the pure quiddi-
ties would entail His knowing the inner meaning and principle (maʿnā) of these
things. Pure quiddity or nature underlies all concrete existents and is ontologically
irreducible. So by knowing the quidditative natures of all the existents in the
world, and, hence, by knowing what is irreducible, constitutive, and permanent in
them, God’s knowledge could truly be said to be ‘of all things’ or ‘all-encompassing.’
It would include the particular beings and the universal ideas, all of which have pure
quiddity as their basis and true reality. It should be noted that Yaḥyā b. ʿAdī appears
to have articulated such an account in some of his treatises, which, in this case as
well, anticipates some of the striking features of Avicenna’s argumentation. Yaḥyā ar-
gues that because universals are parts of the definitions of particular things, knowl-
edge of universals can account for a type of knowledge that includes the particulars
as well.⁶⁶ What is more, Yaḥyā quite explicitly ascribes knowledge of particulars to
God in addition to knowledge of all the forms (ṣuwar) and intelligibles (maʿqūlāt)
in a manner reminiscent of Avicenna’s own views. According to Yaḥyā, God, by con-
templating His own essence, apprehends all the forms and essences of things, which
are foundationally imprinted or informed in Him and only subsequently come to
exist in the exterior world. Ibn ʿAdī even mentions the example of the eclipse in
one of his treatises, which later becomes Avicenna’s stock example to discuss
God’s universal knowledge of particulars.⁶⁷
Second, the hypothesis that God knows the pure quiddities of universal and par-
ticular things would suggest that He also knows the full external entailment of these
quiddities, i. e., the realization of all the subsequent concomitants (lawāzim) that
necessarily flow from and attach to these quiddities in existence. This is what Avicen-
na in Salvation refers to as the essential attributes (ṣifāt) of things.⁶⁸ We saw above
that the term lawāzim is ambiguous, because it can refer to the caused beings (in
their relation to God’s māhiyyah) or, alternatively, to the external concomitants of
these caused beings. At this juncture, I would like to propose that the hypothesis
that knowledge of the pure quiddities entails knowledge of the concomitants of
the pure quiddities (even though the former may be conceived of without the latter)
has deep implications for Avicenna’s theology, for it helps explain how God can be
said to know essential concomitants and even, perhaps, derivative accidents, in ad-
dition to the pure essences themselves. In other words, by knowing humanness or
human in itself, God would also know all the concomitants and attributes that essen-
tially attach to it, such as realized existence, oneness, multiplicity, universality, par-
ticularity, corporeality etc., which follow the pure quiddity humanness when it be-
comes realized as a composite substance in the mind or in the concrete world.

 See Périer, Yaḥyâ, 97‒98, 140‒142, with explicit references to the manuscripts.
 Périer, Yaḥyâ, 142.
 Avicenna, Salvation, 595.12.
 1 The existence of the pure quiddities in God 663

This implies a kind of knowledge that focuses not only on the thing per se, on pure
essence, but also on the realization of its concomitants, as well as on the reasons
(asbāb) and causes (ʿilal) responsible for their realization. These reasons and causes,
it should be recalled, participate in the definition of universal knowledge that Avi-
cenna provides in Notes. There can be little doubt that they should be tied with quid-
dity, with a thing’s essential principle, and thus also with its foundational reason or
sabab, which makes it what it is and grants it its inner reality. By extension, essence
qua principle, cause, and reason would also lead to a knowledge of the concomi-
tants, due to the law of entailment that tightly binds them. As Avicenna explains
in Notes: “essence is not constituted by the concomitant; rather, essence necessitates
and entails it. Thus, [essence] is the cause [of the concomitant], whose existence de-
pends solely upon it” (lā tataqawwamu l-dhāt bi-l-lāzim bal al-dhāt tūjibu l-lāzim wa-
taqtaḍīhi fa-hiya ʿillatuhu wa-bihā wujūduhu).⁶⁹ The main point here is that knowl-
edge of the pure quiddities can be said to entail to a certain extent knowledge of
the essential concomitants, and this on account of the causality linking the two to-
gether. This idea is strengthened by another passage of Notes: “what intellects some-
thing in its essence also inevitably intellects its concomitants” (mā yaʿqilu shayʾ bi-l-
ḥaqīqah fa-innahu yaʿqilu—lā ghayr—lawāzimahu).⁷⁰ It is even possible that, if this
notion of luzūm is amplified to include not only the essential concomitants, but
also the accidental concomitants, then there could be a sense according to which
knowledge of the pure quiddities could encompass the latter things as well. This
point, however, remains uncertain.⁷¹ At any rate, the basic idea here is that by know-
ing the pure quiddities, God would know all the essential concomitants that are en-
tailed by it. God would know not just the māhiyyah, but rather the māhiyyah-lawāzim
complex. It is, I believe, in light of these remarks that we should interpret Avicenna’s
claims that God knows the particular eclipse not with regard to its existence (wujūd),
but with regard to its essential reason (sabab), and that there is, after all, such a
thing as the intelligible (maʿqūl) of the particular thing (al-juzʾī), if that particular
thing is known by way of its essential reasons and causes.⁷²

 Avicenna, Notes, 362, section 641.

 Avicenna, Notes, 576.12, section 1000. The master is alluding to divine intellection in this passage,
and so the term lawāzim refers primarily to the caused beings as effects from God. But what is enun-
ciated here would seem to amount to a cognitive rule, which can be applied to the divine and human
knowledge of the concomitants of the quiddities.
 This might be pushing the interpretation too far, though. In Notes, Avicenna repeats on various
occasions that God knows the particulars in a universal way, but he also cautions that God does
not intellect the material accidents of things and also that he does not know a particular as “some-
thing that can be pointed to” qua particular (al-mushār ilayhi); see Notes, 5.11‒13, section 1.
 See Avicenna, Notes, 39‒40, section 20, and especially 40.1: “The First does not know it [the par-
ticular eclipse] by way of its existence [min jihati wujūdihi], but by way of its reasons [or causes, min
jihati asbābihi]”; Notes, 120‒121, section 160, especially 121.5‒7: “There can be an intelligible [qad
yakūn lahu maʿqūl] of the particular [al-juzʾī] if it is known by way of its reasons and causes [min
664 V The Divine Origin of Pure Quiddity

It is likely this kind of solution to the conundrum of divine knowledge that Avi-
cenna has in mind when he states in Salvation that “if the corruptible things [al-fā-
sidāt] are intellected with regard to their pure quiddity [bi-l-māhiyyah al-mujarradah]
and to what follows it that does not become individualized [i. e., with its essential
concomitants, not its accidents], then they are not intellected inasmuch as they
are corruptible things.”⁷³ One may go even further and connect this argument with
the ontological irreducibility and constancy of pure quiddity in individual concrete
beings, which Avicenna describes in Metaphysics V.1. Recall that in this section, Avi-
cenna connects the divine existence of pure quiddity with God’s causality and prov-
idence, which seems to establish a link between God’s knowing the pure quiddities
and God’s causing them to exist in the world. On this reading, the existence of the
pure quiddities in concrete beings is ‘divine,’ because it is so to speak an extension
of the divine knowledge of these essences and of their existence in God. By the same
token, this could explain how God’s knowledge can be said to encompass all the par-
ticular beings of this world, all of which subsist thanks to this divine nature and es-
sence, which ultimately derives from God. In brief, it is not so much perhaps that God
knows particulars in a universal way, but rather that He knows all things by virtue of
knowing the pure essences and essential concomitants that are common to both uni-
versal and particular existents. In light of this interpretation, Avicenna’s apparently
inconsistent comments concerning divine knowledge can be harmonized. A compel-
ling explanation of how God can be said to know universals and particulars equally,
without this knowledge affecting His being, can be articulated on the basis of his
theory of pure quiddity, which is intrinsically indifferent to particularity and univer-
sality, but which exists in universal and particular existents.⁷⁴ What is more, since, as
was shown previously in chapters II and III, pure quiddity possesses its own essen-
tial universality or commonness, which is distinct from the universality of concepts in
the human mind, the previous interpretation would also allow for a kind of univer-
sality to be ascribed specifically to the objects of God’s knowledge. This interpreta-
tion would have the additional merit of countenancing Avicenna’s repeated claims
to the effect that God’s knowledge is truly universal. The idea that the First knows
things ‘in a universal way’ would be validated by the essential universality or com-
monness of pure quiddity. It would not be the result of a discursive, intentional, and

jihah asbābihi wa-ʿilalihi], and not by way of the senses pointing to it, as in the case of the particular
eclipse and the particular human being.”
 Avicenna, Salvation, 594.6‒7.
 Adamson, Knowledge of Universals, 156‒157, ascribes a similar theory to Ibn ʿAdī, which is of di-
rect relevance here, given that the Christian thinker anticipates many of Avicenna’s core theories.
Adamson also appears at one point in the article to ascribe this theory to Avicenna as well. He asserts
that, for the shaykh, “God knows the absolute essence” of each thing, although he does not elaborate
on this point. Since the author also claims that human and divine intellectual knowledge is neces-
sarily universal for Avicenna, I am not sure how he would go about reconciling these two claims
in the case of God.
 1 The existence of the pure quiddities in God 665

synthetic mental process, as in the case of the human apprehension of the univer-
sals.
It is intriguing to surmise that the divine essence is the ultimate constitutive
cause of the quidditative meanings contemplated by the First. God is the absolute
cause for the very existence of the pure quiddities, for their foundational truth
and reality (ḥaqīqah), which entails that He is the cause of how the constitutive or
internal elements of essence relate to one another. Positing the absolute existence
of the quiddities in God appears to be the only way to account for what makes a tri-
angle a triangle, for example, as opposed to a stone or a river. As Avicenna explains,
no posterior and retrospective human aetiological reasoning is able to account for
this fact.⁷⁵ Rather, human beings can apprehend quiddities and seek to establish
their existence. But it is God who is the source of the truth and reality of the quid-
ditative meanings and of the relationship between their constitutive parts. These
truths and realities exist in an absolutely simple mode within the divine essence,
thereby justifying God’s name as the Ultimate Truth or Reality (al-ḥaqq). Further-
more, it is their existence in God, the absolute Truth, which is the source of the rel-
ative truth or truthfulness these quidditative meanings possess, a truthfulness that
extends to their irreducible existence in the concrete entities outside of God. The
pure quiddity triangleness is real and true, because it finds its ultimate origin and
meaning in the absolute reality of God. Since the pure quiddities underlie the con-
crete particulars and the universals in the human mind, their reality and truth
also extend to these two ontic realms.

1.4 Knowing quiddity: Avicenna’s response to the mutakallimūn

In the decades prior to Avicenna’s appearance on the philosophical scene, the Muʿ-
tazilites had intensely debated the issues of how God could know things (ashyāʾ)
without these things entailing multiplicity in His essence, and whether God knew
them qua existent or nonexistent things. According to most Muʿtazilites, God
knows all things eternally before their actual existence, with the implication that
He knows nonexistent things (maʿdūmāt) or, according to some Muʿtazilites, things
that lie in a state of nonexistence (ḥāl al-ʿadam).⁷⁶ This position is predicated on a
sharp distinction between ‘the thing’ (al-shayʾ), ‘the existent’ (al-mawjūd), and ‘the
nonexistent’ (al-maʿdūm), as well as on the greater extensionality of the first notion,
which comprises the other two. This ontological model was endorsed by many pro-
ponents of Muʿtazilism during the classical period of Islam, including Abū Hāshim

 Cf. Pointers, vols. 3‒4, 440‒442.

 Recall that the issue of whether nonexistence is a state (ḥāl) was assiduously debated within the
Bahshamite School. ʿAbd al-Jabbār and Abū Rashīd seem to think that the nonexistent has no state or
attribute of nonexistence, but others seem to have disagreed; see Abū Rashīd, Addition, 228.10 ff.,
276.; Ibn Mattawayh, Reminder, 13.20 ff.
666 V The Divine Origin of Pure Quiddity

and his followers. In this connection, the main challenge for these Bahshamite think-
ers was to elucidate the status of these nonexistent things in relation to the divine
knowledge. Since the Bahshamites regard existence as a univocal attribute referring
exclusively to realized, actual existence in the concrete world, it was of no use to de-
scribe future contingents. They had to resort instead to an alternative concept in
order to describe the objects of God’s knowledge qua nonexistent things.⁷⁷ The key
to understanding the Bahshamite theological position on this issue revolves once
again around the concept of the Attribute of the Essence.
In a preceding section, I touched on the question of whether God possesses His
own Attribute of the Essence and concluded in the affirmative. According to the Bah-
shamite theologians, God has His own special ṣifat al-dhāt, which most thinkers of
this school identify with ‘God’s being eternal’ (kawnuhu qadīman). An additional
issue that was of importance to these theologians was how God could be said to
know things and especially in what capacity He could be said to know nonexistent
things, such as future contingents. In this case as well, the theory of the Attribute of
the Essence proved useful. One could cogently assert that God knows nonexistent
things, because He knows their Attribute of the Essence. God’s knowledge of the At-
tribute of the Essence of a thing occurs in abstraction from its actual, realized, and
temporal existence, with the implication that the divine knowledge is independent of
the consideration of whether that thing lies in a state of existence or nonexistence.
Thus, God knows all existent and nonexistent atoms, because He knows the Attribute
of the Essence of atom or ‘atomness in itself,’ which characterizes every single atom,
even in its state of nonexistence. This kind of divine knowledge is also described as
one of possibilities (maqdūrāt, mumkināt) in the Muʿtazilite sources. The nonexistent
that is possible comes to exist in the concrete world as a result of God’s creative will
and act. As long as it does not actually exist, it remains in itself a possible entity. The
Bahshamites therefore establish a narrow relationship between the Attribute of the
Essence and possibility, since, in itself, a thing that is cognized through the Attribute
of the Essence remains possible of existence and in need of an exterior cause to exist
concretely. Put differently, knowing the Attribute of the Essence of a thing implies
knowing that thing as possible of realized existence and of acquiring the attribute
of existence (ṣifat al-wujūd), which, on this model, essentially follows the Attribute
of the Essence. A thing’s possibility (of existence) is therefore grounded, so to
speak, in this Attribute. Now, since God’s knowledge encompasses all things, includ-

 According to Jolivet, Aux origines, 235, Bahshamite thinkers working on this topic sometimes
sought to distinguish between various ontological aspects (such as realized existence, ‘being
known,’ and ‘being enunciated’), possibly in an attempt to bypass the pitfall of having to ascribe ab-
solutely nonexistent things as objects of knowledge to human beings and especially to God. Although
this is true, these considerations can hardly be reconciled with the doctrine of the univocal nature of
existence and of existence as an attribute that applies equally to all existent entities. At any rate,
‘being known’ or ‘enunciated’ for the Bahshamites would be an instance of kawn, which is not tan-
tamount to wujūd.
 1 The existence of the pure quiddities in God 667

ing all possibles and future contingents (maqdūrāt), it by the same token encompass-
es all the Attributes of the Essence of these things.⁷⁸ In brief, this Attribute appears as
the key concept that accounts for God’s knowledge of all existent and nonexistent
things alike.
Avicenna addresses similar theological problems in his works, and the responses
he provides vividly bring to mind this Bahshamite background. To begin with, the
Attribute of the Essence and pure quiddity are extended from the human context
to the divine context to explain God’s knowledge, although this move is, admittedly,
one that is not fully and explicitly articulated in the master’s works. Avicenna and
the Bahshamites regard God’s intellection and knowledge as resting on the intellec-
tion and knowledge of these Attributes and quiddities, as opposed to a knowledge
that would encompass solely particular things that exist actually in concrete reality.
Remarkably, both the Attribute of the Essence and pure quiddity have an irreducible
and permanent ontological and epistemological reality that does not depend on the
realized existence of individual beings. They possess a perfect intelligibility whose
reality does not depend on the concretization of existence, which is an attribute
(ṣifah) for the Bahshamites and a necessary concomitant (lāzim) for Avicenna. This
explains why human beings and God can know things even when these things do
not actually exist in the concrete world. For the Bahshamites, these nonexistent
and unrealized things are equated with the possibles (maqdūrāt, mumkināt) in
God’s mind, whose reality is grounded in the Attributes of the Essence. For Avicenna
as well, the quiddities are sometimes described as possibles, not inasmuch as they
are intellected by God and qua objects of God’s knowledge, but simply because,
under one logical consideration, they are in themselves only possible of existence.
According to the Baṣrian Muʿtazilites, then, not only can we speak and conceive
of ‘the thing’ in abstraction from ‘the existent.’ In a more committal way, we can posit
‘nonexistent things’ (maʿdūmāt) that can be known and, hence, be said to subsist in
God’s mind. This is tenable, because on their view the Attribute of the Essence, which
designates the thing as it is in itself, has a mode that is unrelated and prior to the
actual, realized existence of a thing. What is particularly noteworthy is that Abū Hā-
shim and Avicenna both articulate their respective doctrines on an intellectualist
plane and around the notion of pure intelligibility: the Attribute of the Essence

 Abū Rashīd, Addition, 271; Frank, Al-maʿdūm, 207‒208. This doctrine in turn engenders a new
problem: how do the various Attributes of the Essence of things relate to God? In particular, how
do the maqdūrāt or mumkināt, known solely through their Attributes of the Essence, relate to the di-
vine essence, which is said to be one? This is an issue that the Bahshamites do not address in as
much detail as one would expect. Presumably, in order to eschew the pitfall of multiplicity, the Muʿ-
tazilites would proceed to equate the various Attributes of the Essence with God’s own essence or
rather with ‘His being knowing.’ But this move would in turn conflict with the idea that the possibility
of the nonexistent thing is independent of God’s power to act over it and create it in existence and
belongs to the nonexistent in itself; this seems implied, for instance, in Abū Rashīd, Addition, 194.6‒
11. This question deserves further reflection.
668 V The Divine Origin of Pure Quiddity

and pure quiddity are what enable us and—in an eminent and primordial way—God
to know all things as they truly are, irrespective of whether they exist as concrete par-
ticulars. Thus, the Attributes of the Essence and the pure quiddities are eternally real
in God, which explains how God can know future contingents and possible things
that do not yet actually exist. Consequently, God can know a multiplicity of entities
(both mawjūdāt and maʿdūmāt) without their amounting to a multiplicity of existent
or nonexistent things in Him. Instead, God’s knowledge consists only of a multiplic-
ity of states, relations, and attributes—namely, the Attributes of the Essence. Yet, in
spite of these parallels, there seems to be a crucial difference between the positions
of Abū Hāshim and Avicenna. The Bahshamites do not take the extra step of fully
identifying the Attributes of the Essence with God’s own essence (and the divine At-
tribute of the Essence), regarding the former as semi-autonomous attributes possess-
ing a kind of objective reality. Avicenna, for his part, duly identifies all the objects of
the divine intellection (i. e., the pure quiddities) with the divine essence itself. Ac-
cording to the master, ‘the things,’ ‘forms,’ ‘quiddities,’ etc., contemplated by God
are, in the final analysis, conflated with the divine essence and lead to the postula-
tion of a perfectly simple and unitary mode of being. Moreover, Avicenna’s position
remains unique when compared to the Muʿtazilite doctrines, since it is based on the
theory of pure quiddity he articulates in his works, a theory, which, while deeply in-
formed by Bahshamite sources in addition to Greek sources, remains idiosyncratic.⁷⁹
This point notwithstanding, it would seem that Avicenna’s approach was shaped to
some degree by the theories that Muslim theologians had formulated prior to his
time, some of which he may have inherited as part of a general Islamic education
or even perhaps due to direct exposure to Muʿtazilite teaching. These topics focused
especially on how God could know a plurality of things, while at the same time re-
main one and unchanging, and how He could be said to know things that do not yet
exist. In this sense, Avicenna’s theory of quiddity in relation to God and the divine
intellects should be regarded as a direct reply—and an alternative theological solu-
tion—to the various doctrines of God’s knowledge that had been elaborated in the
Muʿtazilite tradition. At any rate, these thinkers embrace an essentialist approach
that allows them to ascribe a plurality of objects of knowledge to God. These objects
are not ontologically nil, but rather possess their own special ontological status. This
approach bypasses the problem of divine multiplicity that arises from positing real-
ized existents or eternal co-existents alongside God’s essence, as in the case of
Ashʿarite theology.

 Hence, the similarities between Avicennian and Muʿtazilite theology should not obscure the pres-
ence of significant differences as well. Another important divergence is that the mutakallimūn would
state that God knows the substances and accidents of all future things, a view based partly on their
atomistic conception of matter and reality. In contrast, in Avicenna’s system, pure quiddity by defi-
nition excludes all accidents, which implies that God knows things only ‘in themselves,’ which, I
would argue, would be for Him to know them as identical to His own essence.
 2 The pure quiddities and the Agent Intellect 669

2 The pure quiddities and the Agent Intellect

There is broad agreement in the scholarship on Avicenna that the Agent Intellect par-
ticipates in human cognition and intellective thought.⁸⁰ What is a subject of debate is
whether it does so by emanating the intelligibles directly to the human intellect or
merely by assisting its transition from potentiality to actuality, without actually pro-
viding it with the universal forms as such. This issue represents a point of cleavage
among scholars and has given rise to abstractionist and emanationist interpretations
of Avicenna’s epistemology.⁸¹ Another point of contention concerns the role of the
Agent Intellect with regard to sublunary ontology, especially the question of the
kind of forms this intellect causes that allow the sublunary processes to occur. I
had the occasion to touch on these two questions in earlier sections of this book,
and will focus here on a third issue that has been largely neglected in the scholar-
ship, but which is intimately tied to these questions: what kind of objects or intelli-
gibles does the Agent Intellect contemplate? My main argument in what follows is
that only the pure quiddities, and not the ‘universals’ as these are commonly defined
by Avicenna, can be said to exist in the Agent Intellect. This in turn has an impact on
the topics of abstractionism and emanationism.
The hypothesis that the pure quiddities exist in the Agent Intellect and the other
separate intellects in addition to God appears likely on doctrinal and textual
grounds. It should be noted to begin with that Avicenna at Metaphysics V.1 does
not state specifically that the pure quiddities exist in God’s essence exclusively,
but merely that they possess “divine existence.” This vague statement of course
leaves open the possibility that these essences can be located in another ‘divine’ su-
perlunary intellect in addition to God’s.⁸² This hypothesis finds solid support in var-
ious passages that can be gleaned from Avicenna’s writings, which locate the quid-
dities and forms in the separate intellects. The master does not specify in those
passages whether these forms consist of the universal quiddities or the pure quiddi-
ties, and in this regard modern scholars have for the most part assumed that these
forms correspond to the universal forms that exist in the human intellect. But, as I
shall argue below, and building on my analysis of God’s knowledge in the previous
section, it is preferable to differentiate more strictly in this case as well between the
pure quiddities and the universal forms and ascribe the former—not the latter—to the
separate intellects.

 There are numerous studies dealing with the Agent Intellect in Avicenna, all of which cannot be
mentioned. For some valuable insight, see Davidson, Alfarabi; Janssens, The Notions; Lizzini, Fluxus;
Acar, Intellect; and Allebban, Conservation.
 For a survey of the previous scholarship and of these two interpretive paradigms, see Alpino, In-
tellectual Knowledge, 135‒143; and Taylor, Avicenna.
 Some modern scholars locate the pure quiddities in the Agent Intellect in addition to God Him-
self; see Porro, Universaux; and Black, Avicenna, 11, who mentions “God and the angelic intelligen-
ces.”
670 V The Divine Origin of Pure Quiddity

Let me first review some of the relevant evidence for locating the forms in the
separate intellects. In Introduction (Text 45), Avicenna alludes to the fact that the im-
material intellects have knowledge of the quidditative meanings (maʿānī). This pas-
sage accords with another statement to that effect in On the Soul (Text 44), which in
addition mentions the planetary souls, and which intimates that there is an impor-
tant difference concerning how these different beings know the quiddities.⁸³ In On
the Soul of both The Cure and Salvation, as well as in The Lesser Destination, he states
that when a human being has perfected his intellect and reached the highest kind of
intuition, “the forms of all things contained in the Agent Intellect are imprinted on
him either at once or nearly so.”⁸⁴ In On the Rational Soul, the master states that “all
the truths [ḥaqāʾiq] are revealed to these [separate] intellects.”⁸⁵ In his Commentary
on Theology of Aristotle, Avicenna makes repeated assertions to the effect that the
separate intellects know their essence, their principles, and their effects, and that
they have a science of universals and particulars—in fact, in this work, the entire su-
pernal and intellectual world is said to know the principles and concomitants that
derive from it. In addition, he at times explicitly refers to the separate intellects’
knowledge of the quiddities (māhiyyāt). In one revealing passage, he explains that
these immaterial principles know the quiddities not as separate and archetypal Pla-
tonic forms (al-ṣuwar al-aflāṭūniyyah), but in a non-discursive mode, all at once, and
as related to one another with regard to logical entailment.⁸⁶ Finally, in Notes, one
reads that all of the existents are “extracted from the forms in the [separate] intel-
lects” (muntaqishat al-ṣuwar fī l-ʿuqūl) and that these forms are “in them like the ex-
istent patterns” of things (al-hayʾāt al-mawjūdah).⁸⁷
Overall, then, it appears that there is sufficient evidence contained in the Avicen-
nian corpus to conclude that the forms or quiddities exist not only in God’s mind, but

 The difference would stem from the important distinction Avicenna establishes between the pure
noetical nature of the separate intellects and the psychological nature of the celestial souls, which,
according to the master, are not pure intellects and are somehow connected with their corporeal na-
ture. For more information on these points, see Janos, Moving the Orbs.
 Gutas, Avicenna, 183‒184 (translation slightly revised), with the relevant references to the Arabic
texts.
 Avicenna, On the Rational Soul, 198.16; translated in Gutas, Avicenna, 74.
 Avicenna, Commentary on Theology of Aristotle, 37‒38, 48; and especially 50.15‒19 and 62.7‒15. As
in the case of God’s intellection, Avicenna is not asserting, I reckon, that the intellects know partic-
ulars qua particulars, or even that they know universals qua universals. Rather, it is by knowing the
quiddities in themselves (see below) that these intellects can by extension be said to know both par-
ticulars and universals, insofar as the sublunary existents are constituted of pure quiddities. As in the
case of God’s knowledge, then, this claim should be interpreted in light of the intellects’ knowledge of
the pure quiddities as objects that are essentially universal. Quiddity in itself is the core, the under-
lying reality of all existents, and it is by knowing it that the intellects can know these various classes
of existents.
 Avicenna, Notes, 353, section 629; cf. 381, section 676: “the first intellectual principles possess
only pure intelligibles; the intelligibles are present in them, and they do not require discursive
thought.”
 2 The pure quiddities and the Agent Intellect 671

also in the Agent Intellect (and by extension in the other separate intellects), which
follow the First Cause. Avicenna routinely locates the various intelligible forms
(ṣuwar) in the separate intellects and/or the Agent Intellect in his works on psychol-
ogy and cosmology.⁸⁸ This Agent Intellect, which is identified with the Giver of Forms
(wāhib al-ṣuwar), is responsible for emanating the substantial forms to the sublunary
beings and the intelligibles to the human intellects, where they are apprehended in a
universal way.⁸⁹
One crucial issue that remains to be settled, however, is whether the Agent In-
tellect contemplates the quiddities qua complex universal forms or qua pure quiddi-
ties. This point requires our immediate attention. In a brief but important passage at
the end of Metaphysics V.1, Avicenna intimates that the universal quiddity (e. g., the
universal concept ‘horse’) is a single and numerically one concept with regard to the
mind of an individual human being thinking it, but that it is also numerically many
in the sense that there can be several human intellects thinking this concept simul-
taneously and, hence, several instances of a universal quiddity existing actually at
the same time.⁹⁰ In this connection, the master explicates that these multiple univer-
sal quiddities in human minds must stand in equal relation to another single and
overarching notion of quiddity, in a manner similar to the way in which the concrete
particulars relate to universal quiddity in the human mind. Now, since Avicenna ada-
mantly rejects the theory of the Platonic forms, it is clear that he is unwilling to lo-
cate this higher or meta-universal essence in a realm of independently existent
forms. Avicenna’s solution should therefore be sought elsewhere. Even though the

 This feature of Avicenna’s metaphysics can be traced back to some of the Neoplatonic sources in
Arabic, such as The Book of Pure Good. One finds in that work the idea that the separate intellects
know what is ‘above’ and ‘below’ them (proposition 7), as well as frequent assertions regarding
the existence of a plurality of forms (ṣuwar) in these intellects (propositions 4, 6, and 9).
 Allebban’s, Conservation, interpretation of the Agent Intellect seems to exclude the possibility of
locating the forms or essences in that intellect in a strong sense. She rejects the view that “forms have
some separate existence (in the Active Intellect), i. e. a separate existence from the things they are
forms of.” She adds: “And it seems Avicenna’s wording of the sentence, taking care to distinguish
the different manners in which the rasm is in things, might be his way of making clear that the
forms are only in the Active Intellect in this loose sense of being what the Active Intellect impresses
into matter” (98). As discussed in this book, I think there is strong evidence to locate the essences or
forms in the Agent Intellect (as well as in the other separate intellects) and to make them the primary
object of these beings’ intellection. On this point, see also Gutas, Avicenna, 198 and 371; and Black,
Mental Existence, 21. It should be noted, however, that unlike Allebban, I do not consider this sce-
nario to be an instance of separate (mufāriq) existence, strictly speaking, since the forms or essences
would be contained within the Agent Intellect. Rather, I construe the state of separateness with regard
to the forms in a Platonic sense, i. e., as existing in themselves in separation from matter and all other
things. This seems to be Avicenna’s position as well, who distinguishes between a Platonic view
(which he rejects) and a theological-metaphysical view that locates forms, essences, intelligibles,
etc., in the divine intellects. Avicenna never uses the term mufāriq to describe the forms qua intelli-
gibles in the intellects, but only to describe the separate intellects themselves.
 Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Cure, 205.14‒206.3.
672 V The Divine Origin of Pure Quiddity

master is laconic on this point and does not expressly answer the question he raises
in that passage, it would seem from this and other textual hints that he locates this
overarching or meta-form in the Agent Intellect. This would mean that the quiddities
in the Agent Intellect would be ‘universal’ relative to their actualization in individual
human intellects. On the analogy Avicenna suggests in Metaphysics, the concrete par-
ticular form is to the universal in the human mind what the latter is to the form in the
Agent Intellect.
One thought-provoking question is whether the foregoing entails a distinction
between the intellection of pure quiddity and of universal quiddity in the Agent In-
tellect, and which aspect of quiddity should be ascribed to this superlunary being.
Does the Agent Intellect contemplate both the universals and the pure quiddities
or only one class of objects? And is the situation in this case comparable to how
this issue plays out in the contexts of human intellection and God’s intellection?
One interpretive option is to argue that Avicenna is using the analogy in Metaphysics
rather loosely and that he does not literally intend to say that the quiddities in the
Agent Intellect are, strictly speaking, universals. On the basis of what was argued ear-
lier in connection with the First, the quiddities in the Agent Intellect need not be re-
garded as universals, but merely as assuming a universal relation to those forms in
the human intellects. This would imply that the quiddities in the Agent Intellect are
like what the universals in the human mind are to concrete instantiations, but not
actually so. Given that Avicenna ascribes universality to the quiddities in the First
as well, which, however, cannot literally be complex universal concepts, it is likely
that he is adopting a similar approach in this passage of Metaphysics. Accordingly,
the pure quiddities in the Agent Intellect could fulfil the role of universal forms in
the way I described earlier, without actually being the kind of universal forms that
characterize human thought. Now, in order to serve as a ‘universal of universals,’
that is, if this overarching concept of quiddity in the Agent Intellect is the archetype
for the various universal concepts that correspond to it in the human intellects, it
cannot be universal in the sense in which this term applies to objects in the
human mind. In other words, the quiddity in the Agent Intellect cannot have the
same kind of universal ontological mode as the universal in the human mind,
first, because each universal concept in each human mind is numerically one, and
second, because it is complex and synthetic and therefore requires a cause for its
constitution. What is more, the universal in the human mind is accompanied by
an intention of universality and predicability of many, which has to do with the
human apprehension of the concrete world, and which is absent from the pure
and simple intellection of the separate intellects, which essentially precedes the sub-
lunary particulars. Thus, if this kind of universal were ascribed to the Agent Intellect,
the entire analogy Avicenna establishes between these various levels of universality
would collapse.
One alluring solution to this problem is to posit that it is pure quiddity (e. g.,
horseness) devoid of its parasitical accidents and concomitants, rather than the men-
tal universal as such, which exists in the Agent Intellect, and that it is in this capacity
 2 The pure quiddities and the Agent Intellect 673

that it acts as a model or archetype for all the individual universal forms in the
human mind (e. g., ‘universal horse,’ which exists numerically in several human
minds). The pure quiddity horseness in the Agent Intellect can become an indetermi-
nate number of universal forms ‘horse’ in the human intellects. Thus, when Avicenna
explains in his Commentary on Theology of Aristotle that the intellection of the super-
nal intellects is simple, non-discursive, and immediate, and that “the intelligible
form of each thing [ṣūrah kull shayʾ maʿqūlah] is present in it, divested of its parasit-
ical trappings,”⁹¹ this statement should be construed as referring to the absence of
not only the material accidents of quiddity—this is obvious given that he is talking
about intelligible forms—but also of its mental concomitants and accidents. In
other words, it is the pristine and negatively-conditioned aspect of quiddity that
these intellects contemplate, not mental universals as these exist in human discur-
sive thought. This hypothesis has the by-effect of solving the problem of how various
human minds can think of the same universal form, say ‘universal horse,’ without
this form being identical or shared by these various minds. In sum, the key feature
of my interpretation is that it is the pure quiddities, and not the universal quiddities,
which are to be located in the Agent Intellect and, by extension, in all the divine in-
tellects. The universals are, strictly speaking, intentional objects and complex con-
cepts that are to be located in the human minds exclusively and that exist only
‘after matter’ or ‘after multiplicity.’ They are generated in the human mind only
once the pure quiddities have been extracted from the world of matter and multiplic-
ity or received from the Agent Intellect and combined with mental concomitants. Ei-
ther way, the pure forms and essences exist as such in the Agent Intellect and serve
as archetypes for the forms of the sublunary world, both in an epistemological and
ontological sense. As Gutas notes, what Avicenna in On the Rational Soul calls “the
forms of things as they are in themselves [ṣuwar al-ashyāʾ ka-mā hiya ʿalayhā]” are
found in God and in the separate intellects, including the Agent Intellect.⁹²
In spite of this, the putative role the Agent Intellect plays in human cognition
and intellection still needs to be elucidated. More specifically, at this juncture I
wish to address the vexed question of how abstraction relates to the emanation of
the forms from the Agent Intellect. Modern scholars have come up with at least
three main interpretations concerning the role of the Agent Intellect in the acquisi-
tion of universals in the human mind. It is worthwhile rehearsing these interpreta-
tions in order to get a clearer picture of the problem: (a) the universals are acquired
exclusively from the Agent Intellect, which is responsible for emanating the intelligi-
bles to the human mind; (b) the Agent Intellect emanates only mental accidents,

 Avicenna, Commentary on Theology of Aristotle, 62.14‒15.

 Gutas, Avicenna, 198, 371. This expression appears in On the Rational Soul (Risālah fī l-kalām ʿalā
l-nafs al-nāṭiqah) to describe the perfection of the theoretical faculty: “The soul then becomes like a
polished mirror upon which are reflected the forms of things as they are in themselves [ṣuwar al-
ashyāʾ ka-mā hiya ʿalayhā] without any distortion” (Avicenna, On the Rational Soul, 196.20‒21; trans-
lated in Gutas, Avicenna, 71).
674 V The Divine Origin of Pure Quiddity

such as universality, to the human mind, and it is the process of abstraction that re-
mains primarily responsible for the acquisition of the pure quiddities (note that this
approach presupposes a sharp distinction between pure quiddity, universality, and
the universal concept); (c) the human mind acquires the universal forms thanks to
abstraction as well as to the causality of the Agent Intellect, even though the
Agent Intellect emanates, strictly speaking, neither the pure quiddities nor the men-
tal accidents that accompany them, but merely facilitates or enables the process by
which the forms are abstracted and actualized in the human mind. Proponents of
epistemological emanationism in Avicenna, such as Gilson, Davidson, Nuseibeh,
Black, Hall, and D’Ancona, have defended position (a),⁹³ while upholders of abstrac-
tionism, such as Gutas and Hasse in some of his works, have defended variants of
position (c).⁹⁴ From a historiographic point of view, these two positions (the emana-
tionist and the abstractionist) have been the most influential in shaping the dis-
course on Avicennian epistemology. Nevertheless, a recent trend aiming at a recon-
ciliation of these two stances ascribes a role to both the Agent Intellect and human
abstraction. Accordingly, McGinnis has suggested interpretation (b),⁹⁵ while Hasse,
Sebti, Alpina, and Taylor in recent papers have argued for variations of interpretation
(c), which grant more significance to the Agent Intellect.⁹⁶ Let us examine in more
detail how these various interpretations fit with the findings I have adduced thus far.
The results reached in the foregoing analysis regarding the doctrinal centrality of
pure quiddity in Avicenna’s philosophy are incompatible with some of these interpre-
tations, which considerably narrows the scope of my investigation. Interpretation (a)
above is contradicted by many of the conclusions I reached and also ignores the con-
siderable evidence in the Avicennian texts according to which it is the human intel-
lect that abstracts the pure quiddities (and by extension the universals) from the ex-
terior objects of the world. But perhaps the main problem with this view is that the
Agent Intellect cannot emanate the universals as such, simply because it does not
contain the universals, but only the pure quiddities. For these reasons, I deem this
position to be no longer tenable. Interpretation (b), which is the one recently put
forth by McGinnis, is undermined on the same grounds. Although McGinnis made
a crucial contribution to the debate by insisting that it is pure quiddity, not the uni-
versal as such, that is abstracted from concrete particulars by the human intellect,

 Nuseibeh, Al-ʿAql al-Qudsī; Davidson, Alfarabi; Black, Mental Existence; eadem, How Do We Ac-
quire Concepts?; Hall, Intellect; and D’Ancona, Degrees of Abstraction.
 Gutas, Avicenna; idem, The Empiricism, especially 412 ; Hasse, Avicenna’s De anima; idem, Avi-
cenna on Abstraction.
 McGinnis, Logic and Science; idem, Making Abstraction.
 Hasse, Avicenna’s Epistemological Optimism; Sebti, L’analogie; Alpina, Intellectual Knowledge;
Taylor, Avicenna. There is a comparable debate in Thomistic studies regarding the acquisition of
the primary notions, for which see Aertsen, Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals, 171‒177.
As is recently the case with Avicenna, scholars have attempted to reconcile various aspects of Thomas
Aquinas’s account of how the primary notions are acquired by the intellect.
 2 The pure quiddities and the Agent Intellect 675

his contention that what emanates from the Agent Intellect are the “intelligible acci-
dents,” such as universality, is on the other hand much more problematic. For the
complex mental universals as such exist, according to Avicenna, only in the
human mind and post rem, so that the concomitant or accident of universality cannot
possibly be transmitted by the Agent Intellect to the human intellect.⁹⁷ In fact, uni-
versality as Avicenna defines it in this context is the hallmark of human cognition. It
is defined as the concomitant of a quiddity that is being actually considered in the
human mind, and which arises due to a cluster of logical, intentional, and discursive
considerations (and, one might also say, the psychological limitations) that are prop-
er to human ratiocination. Moreover, McGinnis’s interpretation is not supported by
any strong evidence in the Avicennian sources, which would show unambiguously
that it is the concomitants and accidents, rather than the quiddities, which are ema-
nated from the Agent Intellect to the human minds. Finally, given that the mental
concomitants and attributes of essence, such as universality, are non-constitutive
of (ghayr muqawwimah) and external to (khārij) essence (and thus also essentially
posterior to, and dependent on, the presence of the constitutive elements of quiddi-
ty), it is hard to imagine that they could exist separately and autonomously from
quiddity as such in a divine intellect. As I showed in chapter II, the human mind
has the ability to artificially separate the concomitants, say, genusness (jinsiyyah),
oneness (waḥdah), and universality (kulliyyah), from the nature horseness (fara-
siyyah). But this ability is inextricably tied to human logical and discursive thought.
So these concomitants emerge as by-products of the conception of essence in the
human mind. Finally, if “intelligible accidents” were ascribed to the Agent Intellect,
this would create a certain multiplicity that would render its intellection complex in
the very same way that the human intellection of universals is complex. But Avicenna
is keen in his writings to distinguish between these modes of intellection, and there
is, at any rate, no indication that he attributes complex concepts and mental con-
comitants to the separate intellects.⁹⁸

 The view that the universals are located in the Agent Intellect and that the divine intellects can
only apprehend universals or in a universal way is widespread in the literature, even though an ex-
planation of what is meant by the term ‘universal’ is rarely given in this context. For example, Hasse,
Avicenna’s Epistemological Optimism, 111, writes: “the same essences exist both in the active intellect
as universal forms and in the sublunary substances as particular forms.” Adamson, On Knowledge of
Particulars; and idem, Knowledge of Universals, also argues that God knows only universals. But
given the ambiguity and shifting nature of this notion in the late-antique discussions, of which Avi-
cenna is a direct heir, it seems necessary in my eyes to elucidate exactly what he means by universal-
ity in this context, especially given that he attributes it primarily to human intellectual concepts. My
contention that the pure quiddities possess a special and essential universality that should be distin-
guished from the mental universality of complex universals in the mind strongly connects Avicenna
to this late-antique background in that it presupposes a multifaceted or modulated construal of this
notion, which was initiated already in the Greek philosophical sources.
 As Hasse, Avicenna’s Epistemological Optimism, 112‒113, sharply noted in his reply to McGinnis,
McGinnis’s argument faces a textual problem: “the distinction between abstract forms (or essences)
676 V The Divine Origin of Pure Quiddity

As for interpretation (c), which corresponds historiographically to the strict ab-

stractionism advocated by Gutas and others, it runs into the same kind of difficulty
as some of the other interpretations, namely, having to account for incompatible tex-
tual evidence. For there are numerous passages in which Avicenna does appear to
ascribe a causal emanationist role to the Agent Intellect when it comes to human cog-
nition. In light of this, some new variants on interpretation (c), which recognize but
limit the role of epistemological emanationism, and which tread a middle course in
an attempt to accommodate this complex body of evidence, seems the more con-
structive option. Incidentally, it is also the one that coheres with the bulk of the evi-
dence collected in this study. Hasse, Alpina, and Taylor, who ascribe a role both to
abstraction and the Agent Intellect, deploy what is by far the most promising ap-
proach, since it puts forth an interpretive framework that integrates the multifarious
textual evidence and also successfully brings together the Aristotelian and Neopla-
tonic components of Avicenna’s doctrine.⁹⁹
In what follows, I embrace some of their conclusions, but also qualify their in-
terpretation in light of the results gathered previously. One crucial element that is
on my view misrepresented in Hasse’s analysis is the role of pure quiddity and the
fundamental distinction between pure quiddity and universal quiddity. Hasse, fol-
lowing more traditional interpretations of the Agent Intellect, insists that the
forms present in the Agent Intellect are universals, without providing any qualifica-
tions of this notion. He argues that “the forms which are in the active intellect al-
ready have the two components: essence and the mode of conceptual existence.”
This leads Hasse to conclude that “they cannot but exist in the way of conceptuali-
zation, that is, as universals.”¹⁰⁰ Although McGinnis, for his part, sharply distin-
guishes between pure quiddity and the universal aspect of quiddity, his argument ul-
timately makes the Agent Intellect responsible for the emanation of universality and
of the other accidents that accompany the apprehension of quiddity in the human
mind. On my view, then, Hasse’s and McGinnis’s interpretations are equally problem-
atic in this regard, because they introduce a multiplicity and accidentality in the di-

and intellectualizing forms (or accidents) does not have a textual basis in Avicenna’s psychological
works—nor does the idea of a “mixing” of emanated intellectualizing forms and abstracted forms.”
For another critical reply to McGinnis, see Taylor, Avicenna, 59‒60.
 Hasse’s thesis may be summarized as follows: the forms of abstract beings, such as the First and
the separate intellects, are grasped directly, while those of material beings (e. g., human and horse)
are grasped through abstraction. Nevertheless, even with regard to the latter, the intelligibles are orig-
inally derived from the Agent Intellect, so that, in the final analysis, it would seem that both abstrac-
tion and emanation play a role in the acquisition of the natural forms. Hasse argues that the reason
why Avicenna ultimately relies on a theory of epistemological emanation is to solve the problem of
human memory, that is, of where the abstracted forms would be stored or subsist when they are not
being actually thought. I rely considerably on Hasse’s insight to tackle the problem of the Agent In-
tellect in Avicenna, although I have some qualms with his description of universality, as I explain
below.
 Hasse, Avicenna’s Epistemological Optimism, 113.
 2 The pure quiddities and the Agent Intellect 677

vine intellection that has no place there (at any rate, not this kind of multiplicity). To
attribute the same kind of complex universals to the human intellects and to the di-
vine intellects does not pay heed to Avicenna’s explanations that universality is an
accident of human thought. Moreover, it would be odd indeed if the Agent Intellect
emanated the accidents of quiddities, but not the actual quiddities themselves, as
McGinnis contends. This would assign a somewhat demeaning role to this separate
intellect and also undermine its status as a ‘Giver of Forms.’
A more promising approach, I would propose, is to maintain a sharper distinc-
tion between the intellection of the universals and the intellection of the pure quid-
dities. This implies allowing for an exception to the widely held rule of universal in-
tellection—the assumption that intellection can only be universal in nature—in
Avicenna’s noetics and epistemology. This exception consists in the apprehension
of quiddity in itself as a pure and distinct concept in the human and divine intellects.
Alternatively, the results gathered in this book caution against recognizing only a sin-
gle sense of universality, instead of regarding this notion as being modulated in na-
ture and applying differently to different objects. If this hypothesis is retained, it
would mean that the human intellects in addition to the supernal intellects can con-
ceive of the pure quiddities in abstraction from their universality—at any rate, if uni-
versality is construed as a mental intention and concomitant. If such an intellective
act is possible for the human intellect, it is a fortiori possible for the Agent Intel-
lect.¹⁰¹ Again, this does not preclude the intellection of pure quiddity from being es-

 On my view, the shortcoming of Hasse’s argumentation concerning this point is encapsulated in
the following statement: “This [the emanation of the intelligibles to the human soul after it has en-
gaged in the process of abstracting the forms in concrete beings] is possible since the essences of ma-
terial forms exist both as universals in the active intellect and as particulars in the sublunary world”
(Hasse, Avicenna’s Epistemological Optimism, 117). This statement and the ascription of universals to
the Agent Intellect raises serious difficulties, which Hasse does not address. One may wonder how the
Agent Intellect can be said at the same time to comprise universals and emanate forms to particular
concrete beings. In other words, how can the universal conceptual forms be identical with the imma-
nent forms in natural bodies, which are clearly not universal, at least in the same sense or according
to the same definition of universality? How, then, can the Agent Intellect be described as the provider
(wāhib) of the substantial forms in bodies as well as the universals in the human mind? (On this
issue, and for a different interpretation of the Agent Intellect, see Allebban, Conservation). Further-
more, why should one assume in the first place that the Agent Intellect and the human mind appre-
hend the same kinds of ‘universals’ or that universality means the same thing in both contexts? In
fact, for Avicenna, the forms qua natures in concrete bodies are not identical to the complex universal
ideas as these exist in the human mind or, on Hasse’s view, as these exist in the Agent Intellect, so
that ascribing universals simpliciter to the Agent Intellect seems misleading on these counts. On the
other hand, confining complex universals to the human mind and replacing them with the pure quid-
dities in the Agent Intellect alleviates these difficulties. As Avicenna contends, pure quiddity is indif-
ferent with regard to its contexts of existence, and it is also not numerically determined and free of
the accidents of universality and particularity; these various concomitants attach to quiddity ‘after’
pure quiddity has been emanated by the Agent Intellect. This greatly facilitates the explanation of
how the Agent Intellect can be called the Provider of Forms and emanate both the substantial
forms of concrete things and the intelligible forms of the human mind.
678 V The Divine Origin of Pure Quiddity

sentially universal in a certain qualified or modulated sense. But it prompts us to

contrast it to the mental and intentional universality that Avicenna usually stresses
in the context of human psychology.
Consequently, if both abstraction and emanation are regarded as valid cognitive
modes, as Hasse and McGinnis convincingly suggest, or, at the very least, if we fol-
low Alpina and Taylor in granting an increased importance to the Agent Intellect
when it comes to the actualization of the intelligibles, while stopping short of posit-
ing a real emanation coming from it; if, moreover, we postulate that it is the pure
quiddities that are acquired by the rational soul, and not complex universal concepts
as such or mental accidents (as suggested by McGinnis); then new avenues of inter-
pretation regarding the relation between abstraction and the causality of the Agent
Intellect can be explored. On one, rather shy, reading, one could argue, elaborating
on some brief remarks by Alpina, that the Agent Intellect actualizes the pure quiddi-
ties in the human soul that are acquired through abstraction.¹⁰² In this scenario, the
maʿnā of the pure quiddity is acquired through abstraction but actualized as an in-
tellectual object by the Agent Intellect. This maʿnā, or quidditative object, ensures an
epistemic and ontological continuum from the concrete beings, to the sensual, imag-
inative, and estimative forms, to, finally, the intelligibles that are apprehended by the
intellect. It also warrants that a certain commensurate relation exists between the
forms in concrete beings, the forms abstracted by the human soul, and the forms
contained in the Agent Intellect that serve as epistemic paradigms. Finally, it
would also explain how the Agent Intellect can actualize and illuminate the objects
in the human mind without actually emanating them.
Nevertheless, it is not completely outlandish to surmise that both abstraction
and emanation could result in the acquisition of the intelligibles, if these intelligibles
are identified with the pure quiddities. For on this interpretation, the quiddities ac-
quired through abstraction and contemplated in the human mind would coincide
epistemically and ontologically with the forms in the Agent Intellect. After all,
‘horseness in itself’ is just ‘horseness in itself,’ regardless of whether it is intellected
by the Agent Intellect or a human rational soul. Given that they possess their own
irreducible and intelligible mode of existence, the pure quiddities in the human
mind become epistemically and ontologically interchangeable with the forms in the
Agent Intellect, even though a difference remains with regard to how the divine in-
tellects and the human intellects apprehend these forms, or, rather, the totality of
these forms in their various interrelationships.¹⁰³ The notion of their epistemic and
ontological interchangeability is premised on their being fully intelligible and irredu-
cible and also free of all concomitants.

 Alpina, Intellectual Knowledge, 164‒165.

 Namely, discursive vs. non-discursive intellection, when the totality of the forms and quiddities
are regarded as objects of thought. Gutas, Avicenna, 198, 371, seems to reach the same conclusion.
 2 The pure quiddities and the Agent Intellect 679

More specifically, the hypothesis entertained here is that although the acquisi-
tion of the forms would generally or customarily occur as a result of psychological
abstraction (with the aid of the Agent Intellect), direct emanation of the pure quid-
dities from the Agent Intellect to the human rational soul would be an acceptable
alternative in some exceptional cases. These exceptional cases would occur when
a human being has reached the peak of intuition (ḥads) and has developed his or
her theoretical faculty to its uttermost point. In those cases, Avicenna speaks of a
heightened level of intuition and describes this aptitude in terms of a ‘saintly faculty’
(quwwah qudsiyyah), a ‘sanctified spirit’ (rūḥ muqaddas), a ‘sacred intellect’ (ʿaql
qudsī), and a ‘sacred spirit’ (rūḥ qudsī), apparently with the same intent.¹⁰⁴ As
Gutas has shown, Avicenna’s understanding of this faculty and of the kinds of ob-
jects to which it pertains seems to have undergone a certain development over the
span of his career.¹⁰⁵ What is important here is that in the works of his middle period
the master holds that this exalted faculty and intellect enable human beings to ac-
quire the forms all at once and, presumably, in their entirety, that is, all the forms
contained in the Agent Intellect. As he puts it,

there might be a person whose soul has been rendered so powerful through extreme purity and
intense contact with intellective principles that he blazes with Correct Guessing/intuition (i. e.,
with the ability to receive them in all matters from the Agent Intellect), and the forms of all
things contained in the Agent Intellect are imprinted on him either at once or nearly so.¹⁰⁶

If the previous hypothesis is correct, it would explain quite convincingly why Avicen-
na sometimes describes a process of emanation of the forms from the Agent Intellect
to the human intellect, and at other times a process of abstraction of these same
forms from material beings, and why he seems to regard these two accounts as equal-
ly valid. The hypothesis of the equal validity of these two accounts relies on the ubiq-
uitous ontological and epistemological status of pure quiddity in his philosophy,
which bridges these various ontological contexts and gnoseological levels, as well
as on the theory of the saintly faculty, which gives some human beings a privileged
access to intellectual knowledge by connecting directly with the Agent Intellect. The
main differentiator therefore between abstraction and emanation is not the object of
intellection, which is always the pure quiddity, but rather the circumstances in
which, and the mode by which, it is acquired. Abstraction is a discursive process
that focuses on one form at a time, whereas the saintly faculty enables a direct, un-
mediated, and comprehensive access to the forms contained in the Agent Intellect.

 For these terms and an English translation of the various passages where they appear, see
Gutas, Avicenna, 182‒187.
 Gutas, Avicenna, 179‒201; idem, Intuition.
 This statement appears almost verbatim in three works by Avicenna: The Lesser Destination; On
the Soul of The Cure and of Salvation. For the references to these texts and an English translation
(slightly revised), see Gutas, Avicenna, 183‒184.
680 V The Divine Origin of Pure Quiddity

From a cognitive perspective, the human mind and the divine intellects can know
pure quiddity as such and in abstraction from universality construed as a post rem
mental accident. This, it turns out, is one of the few intellectual abilities or powers
shared by the human and divine intellects. The possibility for the human mind to
think ‘essence in itself’ indicates that this pure essence can be acquired either by en-
gaging in a process of abstraction of the forms from concrete particulars, or by turn-
ing directly to the Agent Intellect, which is the storehouse of the pure quiddities vis-
à-vis the sublunary world. I would argue, then, that the main reason why Avicenna
maintains these interpretations as equally valid has to do with his doctrine of the
ubiquity of pure quiddity. The latter establishes a direct gnoseological and ontolog-
ical correspondence and transference between the quiddities in the human intellects
and the divine intellects.¹⁰⁷
Anchoring pure quiddity at the epicenter of the debate regarding abstraction and
emanation also helps to alleviate the problem of universality. Since pure essence is
ubiquitous to these contexts of existence (extramental, mental, and supernal or di-
vine), it is clear that, in none of these cases, what is acquired by the human mind is
the universal as such. More specifically, one should abandon the long-held belief
that it is the synthetic, mental universals as such that are emanated from the
Agent Intellect to the human mind. If anything is emanated from this supernal
being, it is the pure quiddities, “the forms of things as they are in themselves
[ṣuwar al-ashyāʾ ka-mā hiya ʿalayhā],” as Avicenna himself puts it, which are the
forms that dwell in the Agent Intellect, and which can be directly apprehended by
the human mind. My contention is that whenever Avicenna refers to the intelligible
forms in the Agent Intellect, as in On the Soul V.5‒7, and even when he is seemingly
referring to ‘universals’ in this being, he does not in fact intend those universals that
dwell in the human mind, but rather the pure forms or quiddities.¹⁰⁸ It is only after
these pure quiddities have been conveyed to the human intellect that they can be
conceived of literally as complex mental universals, when the various mental acci-
dents that accompany realized existence are attached to them.¹⁰⁹ The reason why

 Avicenna sometimes uses the technical term muṭābaqah to express this notion of epistemolog-
ical and ontological correspondence between quiddities in the intellect and in the concrete world. In-
terestingly, this term occupies an important place in the post-Avicennian discussion about quiddity,
universality, the ‘thing in itself’ (nafs al-amr), and the rational ability of the mind to distinguish truth
from falsehood.
 Avicenna’s terminology in On the Soul V.5‒7 to describe the forms in the Agent Intellect, such as
ṣuwar ʿaqliyyah, is also implemented in Introduction I.12 and Metaphysics V.1‒2 to describe pure quid-
dity in the human mind; see chapter II for its description as a ṣūrah ʿaqliyyah. From a terminological
perspective, then, the pure quiddities are just as likely candidates as the universals for being identi-
fied with the forms in the Agent Intellect.
 This point can be approached from another angle: why would the Agent Intellect need to con-
template the quiddities in a universal way at all? What intellectual or ontological benefit could it de-
rive from that? After all, and contrary to the human mind, it does not engage in the process of ab-
stracting forms, and it knows all the intelligibles at once and in a non-discursive way. Moreover,
 2 The pure quiddities and the Agent Intellect 681

Avicenna sometimes loosely refers to the forms or intelligibles in the Agent Intellect
as ‘universals’ can easily be accounted for: the universal is only one step removed
from pure quiddity in the human mind, and it is, so to speak, its logical conceptual
extension. What is more, as I argued in chapters II and III, there is a sense in which
pure quiddity is ‘universal,’ because it is, by its very indeterminacy and uncondi-
tionedness, also intrinsically shareable and common; it is in itself essentially univer-
sal.¹¹⁰ By knowing the pure quiddity ‘triangleness,’ we also, in a sense, know the uni-
versal ‘triangle,’ as well as all the individual instantiations to which the latter refers,
for all of these things require the pure essence ‘triangleness.’ As I proposed earlier,
this could explain how God and the Agent Intellect can be said to have a knowledge
of all things (including the particulars) ‘in a universal way,’ without this divine
knowledge being a knowledge ‘of universals.’ Alternatively, it may be argued that
God and the separate intellects contemplate universals of a different kind than the
universals that are formed and apprehended in the human mind. For, unlike the for-
mer, the latter are synthetic and complex, formed after multiplicity (baʿd al-kathrah),
and related to logical predication and thus also to human language (al-maqūl ʿalā
kathīrīn). This approach, of course, rests on Avicenna’s contention that universality
is modulated. Under one aspect, it is a mental concomitant proper to human intel-
lection, which is also why he describes the universal in the mind as ‘conditioned’
(bi-sharṭ). Under another aspect, pure quiddity is essentially universal, but that
sense of universality has nothing to do with linguistic predication and human inten-
tionality. Furthermore, the foregoing helps to explain why Avicenna metaphorically
or analogically describes the pure quiddities in the Agent Intellect as universals
vis-à-vis their corresponding forms in the human intellect: since the pure quiddities
located in the Agent Intellect are neither one nor many, they stand as principles or
archetypes to the corresponding universal forms that flourish in the human intel-
lects. Just as the quiddities in the concrete beings are only potentially universals
when reflected upon by the human mind, so the pure quiddities in the Agent Intel-
lect are only potentially universals with regard to the various human minds to which

positing universals in the Agent Intellect would introduce a kind of intellectual accidentality and
complexity in that being, which are nowhere mentioned by Avicenna, at least not in this regard
(rather, the multiplicity in the separate intellects stems from their thinking their essence and their
cause). Thus, the account of conceptual synthesis and complexity Avicenna deploys in Introduction
I.12 with regard to the universal is limited to human cogitation. In that same text, Avicenna contrasts
human intellection to the intellection of the angels (viz., separate intellects) and God, whose knowl-
edge precedes the embodiment of forms in matter and multiplicity. The inference seems to be that the
mental universality associated with these forms in the human mind appears only post rem and does
not affect the intellective mode of the supernal intellects.
 As I stressed on repeated occasions, this ambiguity is not idiosyncratic to Avicenna, but affects
many of the late-antique Greek and postclassical Arabic discussions about the universals.
682 V The Divine Origin of Pure Quiddity

they relate. In either case, true mental universality is actualized only as a result of
human rational thought.¹¹¹
There is an additional argument, grounded in Avicenna’s cosmology and mete-
orology, to the effect that the pure essences are located in the Agent Intellect and that
these essences must possess a third mode of existence in this context. This argument
might appear marginal at first glance, but it is in fact firmly supported by evidence
derived from his works. As Gad Freudenthal has shown, Avicenna believes that the
sublunary world, although temporally eternal, passes through different cosmic cycles
during which its surface is either entirely covered by water or partly exposed as a
mass of dry land.¹¹² This theory presumably entails a complete, albeit temporary, dis-
appearance of all species on earth, which reappear only once these universal floods
have receded. As Freudenthal explains, “this theory obviously implies that all the
flora and fauna are regularly destroyed, and then come to be again. Avicenna posited
that this regeneration of the species is brought about by natural necessities, includ-
ing the assistance of the agent intellect.”¹¹³ Now, if this is the case, then it is quite
clear that there are historical periods—quite literally—during which the essence ‘hu-
manness’ exists neither in concrete individuals nor, for that matter, as a universal in
the human intellects, for the simple reason that there are no concrete human beings
in existence in the world. Yet, on Avicenna’s theory of cosmic flooding, human beings
and the species ‘human’ return to existence through the agency of the Agent Intel-
lect. This, on the master’s reckoning, constitutes an exceptional case of ‘spontaneous
generation.’¹¹⁴ So there can be little doubt that the essence ‘humanness’ continues to
exist as a pure form in the Agent Intellect, and this regardless of the existence of con-
crete instantiations corresponding to that archetypal form. Moreover, this intellect’s
emanation, when the circumstances allow it, enables the substantial forms to be ac-
tualized—or rather, re-actualized—in the sublunary world. The implication is that the
pure essences of all natural things are eternally embedded in the intellect of the Giver
of Forms according to an ontological mode that is distinct from that of concrete es-
sence and from that of universal essence in the human mind.¹¹⁵

 It is true that Avicenna sometimes suggests that it is the universals that are received by the
human soul, as in the following passages from On the Soul I.5, 48.1: “the theoretical faculty receives
an impression of universal forms.” In those instances, however, as in several others, Avicenna ap-
pears to be using the notion of universality in a loose or ambiguous fashion, which is justified on
account of the fact that the universals do eventually arise in the human mind out of the pure quid-
dities, but are not directly received as such. While not incorrect, of course, Avicenna’s phrasing is un-
fortunate, in that it obscures some points of doctrine that he is in other passages—such as in Intro-
duction I.2 and 12 and Metaphysics V.1‒2—very keen to distinguish and clarify.
 Freudenthal, The Medieval Hebrew Reception.
 Freudenthal, The Medieval Hebrew Reception, 272; on this topic, see also Bertolacci, Averroes,
who focuses more on the issue of spontaneous generation.
 Bertolacci, Averroes, 42.
 Granted, this argument establishes first and foremost that the essences exist in the Agent Intel-
lect, rather than that they exist as pure quiddities in a mode distinct from the universals in the
 2 The pure quiddities and the Agent Intellect 683

My adaptation of some of Hasse’s, McGinnis’s, and Alpina’s ideas on abstraction

and emanation to articulate a new theory of the epistemological status of pure quid-
dity has the corollary effect of underlining the Neoplatonic sources that likely shaped
the master’s doctrines. Hasse himself relies heavily on D’Ancona’s analysis of the
Plotinian sources in order to elaborate his theory, and more recently Taylor has ar-
gued that Themistius’s paraphrase of On the Soul likely influenced Avicenna’s
views.¹¹⁶ The role played by Plotinian noetical and emanatonist theories in Avicen-
na’s doctrine of quiddity is also a feature that emerges from the previous analysis.
For not only is there a vital gnoseological link between the human and divine intel-
lects (the fact that the pure quiddities exist in the human intellect and the Agent In-
tellect ensures an epistemological and ontological continuum between these two in-
tellectual spheres).¹¹⁷ It also suggests that the human intellect can know certain
things, i. e., the pure quiddities, in the very same manner as the Agent Intellect, ac-
cording to a simple and unmediated intellective mode, and in abstraction from all
mental accidents, even though the human mind cannot know the essences in this
manner all at once. The main difference between the two types of intellect, therefore,
is that the Agent Intellect knows the pure quiddities in this simple mode all at once,
whereas the human intellect can acquire and apprehend only one form at a time—
with the possible exception of persons endowed with the saintly faculty, as we
saw above.¹¹⁸ And indeed, the potential connection with Neoplatonic noetics should
be further considered in light of Avicenna’s theory of the sacred intellect. In this case,
it is possible that the pure quiddities are contemplated all at once and in a non-dis-
cursive manner. According to the master, the soul of the person who has perfected
his or her intuition “becomes like a polished mirror upon which are reflected the
forms of things as they are in themselves [ṣuwar al-ashyāʾ ka-mā hiya ʿalayhā] with-
out any distortion.”¹¹⁹ If Avicenna’s theory of the acquired intellect and especially of
the sacred intellect is construed in light of his theory of quiddity in itself, it would

human mind. But the crux of the analysis in this section suggests that the latter proposition must
derive from the former. In brief, if there are no human minds thinking the essences in a universal
way during some periods of history, it seems safe to affirm also that there is no such thing as a uni-
versal mental mode of existence for these essences.
 Taylor, Avicenna, 72‒75.
 In their dual epistemic and ontological role, the pure quiddities in Avicenna’s philosophy can be
compared to the logoi of Proclus’s philosophy. The logoi exist both in the soul (as “essential reason-
principles”) and in nature in the forms that are immanent in matter. Hence, as Helmig explains, the
forms in Proclus’s system exist “on all levels of reality” (Helmig, Proclus). The same can be said of the
pure quiddities in Avicenna’s philosophy.
 This indeed appears to be the main difference between divine and human intellection: the for-
mer encompasses all the forms at once in a single, non-discursive act of intellection, whereas the lat-
ter is discursive and must proceed from one object to the other. On this issue, see Adamson, Non-Dis-
cursive Thought; and D’Ancona, Divine and Human Knowledge.
 Avicenna, On the Rational Soul, 196.20‒21; translated in Gutas, Avicenna, 71. According to Gutas,
Avicenna, 198‒199, 371, “the forms of things as they are in themselves” are found in the supernal in-
tellects in addition to the human intellects that have reached the peak of intuition.
684 V The Divine Origin of Pure Quiddity

essentially prove to be a vindication of the Neoplatonic and especially Plotinian na-

ture of his noetics, where the human intellect can become like the divine intellect in
apprehending the pure forms in a simple and unmediated mode.
These considerations are to be connected with yet other aspects of Avicenna’s
epistemology. One of them is his theory of conceptualization (taṣawwur), which Avi-
cenna describes as “the first science” or “the first means of science” (wa-l-taṣawwur
huwa l-ʿilm al-awwal), and which, it appears, must focus on the pure quiddities spe-
cifically. Another pertains to his comments in Metaphysics I.5 regarding epistemically
prior and irreducible concepts in the mind, among which is ‘the thing,’ and, by ex-
tension, ‘thingness.’ Finally, the previous results also have some bearing on the dif-
ferentiation between simple and complex intellection, which is particularly relevant
when it comes to Avicenna’s Neoplatonic affiliations. Avicenna’s views on simple in-
tellection or simple knowledge (al-ʿilm al-basīṭ) in particular presupposes the theory
of the pure quiddities, which are free of numerical and accidental multiplicity, and
hence can exist in the Agent Intellect in a state of non-multiplicity.¹²⁰ The non-nu-
merical, non-accidental, and non-complex nature of the pure quiddities suggests
that they do not lend themselves to division and combination, which characterizes
regular human discursive intellection. Instead, they are well-suited to a kind of di-
vine non-discursive and immediate intellection. The ‘divine’ quality of pure quiddity
therefore appears to be invested with a gnoseological dimension as well. Avicenna
seems to have adapted Neoplatonic theories on simple and non-discursive intellec-
tion to fit his theory of pure quiddity, making the latter the stepping stone of his epis-
temological doctrine of divine and human intellection. My contention, then, is that
these various arguments and theories, while inspired by remote Neoplatonic ele-
ments, appear to be grounded in the distinctly Avicennian concept of pure quiddity.
If the foregoing interpretation of pure quiddity is correct, then it enables us to
better grasp some of the Plotinian roots of Avicenna’s epistemology and metaphysics.
This indebtedness to his Neoplatonic predecessor would be based, among other
things, on the premise of human beings’ direct access to the intellectual contents
of the divine intellects, in this case the Agent Intellect. This establishes an epistemo-
logical bridge between the human intellects and the supernal intellects. The forego-
ing also clarifies Avicenna’s theory of non-discursive knowledge by situating the pure
quiddities at the center of this theory and describing them as the main objects of di-
vine intellection. Furthermore, my contention facilitates an explanation of how the
Agent Intellect can impact both the concrete world and the human intellects, by hy-
pothesizing that it is the pure quiddities that are emanated to each one of these con-
texts, not universal forms as such. The interpretation articulated here relies on the
postulate that pure quiddity is an epistemological and ontological constant in Avicen-

 On this issue, see Adamson, Non-Discursive Thought; D’Ancona, Divine and Human Knowledge.
These authors, however, do not resort to the doctrine of pure quiddity to explain this aspect of Avi-
cenna’s noetics.
 2 The pure quiddities and the Agent Intellect 685

na’s metaphysics, which, moreover, assumes a distinct mode of existence in the

human and divine intellects. The unique gnoseological status of pure quiddity is de-
rived from its abstract and intelligible mode of existence, which precedes realized ex-
istence and the set of concomitants that accompany it. This notion enables us to con-
nect the supernal world and the concrete world, the separate intellects and the
human intellect, in a manner that few other notions can in Avicenna’s philosophy.
For example, earlier interpretations had struggled to account for how the Agent In-
tellect could convey forms to the sublunary world of nature as well as to the
human mind, when the former are forms in matter and the latter universals in the
mind. The attribution of universals simpliciter to the Agent Intellect only compound-
ed this problem. But if one hypothesizes that the Agent Intellect contains and ema-
nates only the pure quiddities, then the various difficulties plaguing this topic recede
significantly. For quiddity in itself is just quiddity in itself, regardless of whether it
exists immanently in concrete beings or as a distinct concept in the human mind,
and regardless of whether we are dealing with intellectual forms or hylomorphic
forms. In each case, it is the very same intelligible meaning and essence that under-
lies these forms and that, qua maʿnā, is emanated from the Agent Intellect. This on-
tological unconditionedness or undeterminedness means that pure quiddity can
exist with other things (e. g., in concrete beings or in the complex universal concept)
or distinctly in the mind; intellectually or extramentally; in a sublunary context or in
a divine context.
Furthermore, as was shown above, this interpretation considerably alleviates the
tension between abstraction and emanation that is encountered in many accounts of
Avicenna’s epistemology, since, in either case, it is pure quiddity alone that is ac-
quired by the human mind. In other words, the human intellect acquires the same
pure quiddities that ultimately exist in the Agent Intellect by engaging in psycholog-
ical abstraction and by extracting quidditative meanings from the concrete beings,
which themselves acquired their immanent quidditative forms from the Agent Intel-
lect. So the same maʿnā can be said to underlie these three planes of existence. By
virtue of a theory of ontological correspondence or equivalence (muqāyasah, muṭā-
baqah), the pure quiddities in the human mind coincide with those in concrete be-
ings as well as with those in the Agent Intellect. Emphasizing the role of pure quid-
dity leads to a unifying and systematic interpretation of the master’s philosophical
system.
With these considerations, the discussion has reverted to its starting point,
namely, with the human conception of pure quiddity in chapter II. Quiddity in itself,
it appears from the foregoing analysis, exists in all intellects and in all noetical
spheres: in God’s intellect, in the separate intellects, in the Agent Intellect, and in
the human intellect. However, it exists in those intellects not qua contingent and
complex mental existent, but rather in a manner that transcends the various con-
comitants and attributes associated with realized mental existence, including univer-
sality. This is true primarily, of course, of the various divine intellects, whose appre-
hension is simple, immediate, and non-discursive. But it is also true of the human
686 V The Divine Origin of Pure Quiddity

intellect inasmuch as the concept of pure quiddity in the human mind is simple,
prior, and distinct when compared to that of the universal or the data of sense-per-
ception. Moreover, it would seem that the pure quiddities are emanated from God to
the separate intellects, and from these intellects to the human minds through a proc-
ess of cosmic causality that connects all noetic and ontic levels with one another. The
main principles that tie together this hierarchical transfer of pure quiddity are the
Avicennian theories of efficient, formal, and final causality.
According to the interpretation advocated here, all the separate intellectual exis-
tents from the First to the Agent Intellect would contemplate the pure quiddities.
However, the mode of intellection would differ from one intellect to the next. Where-
as the First apprehends them as fully identical with Its essence, the other separate
intellects contemplate them as distinct from their essence and as part of their com-
plex intellectual makeup, even though this kind of intellection would still be simple
and non-discursive when compared to human discursive thought.¹²¹ As for human
beings, they can also have an immediate and simple apprehension of pure quiddity.
It dwells in the human mind as a transcendent, irreducible, and simple intelligible
notion. Acquisition of the pure essences and forms can arise from abstraction
and/or be obtained by emanation from the Agent Intellect (in people endowed
with the sacred faculty), these being two ways ultimately of describing the same cog-
nitive phenomenon rooted in pure quiddity. Avicenna’s apparently contradictory
statements regarding abstraction and emanation stem from different ways of relating
pure quiddity to the human mind, not from some inconsistent doctrinal position on
his part.

 Avicenna locates multiplicity in the separate intellects at the level of their fragmented intellec-
tion. The various objects of thought of these intellects lead to the emergence of certain intelligible
concomitants (lawāzim) and thus to intelligible multiplicity (kathrah), which in turn explains why
they require a cause (i. e., they are not absolutely simple beings). Thus, they know the First and
their own essence, and they know the latter according to the modalities of the possible and the nec-
essary. What is more, it is clear on the basis of what Avicenna says that they also contemplate the
quiddities as a result of their self-intellection. But here again, one may wonder whether these quid-
dities would be perfectly identical to their essence in the way in which this ontological and epistemic
unity applies in the case of God. In light of this, one should be weary of the statement in Black, Men-
tal Existence, 20, to the effect that “in God and the separate substances there is a complete identity of
knower and known.” Beyond these general remarks, not much can be said about the state of quiddity
in the separate intellects, given that Avicenna says little about this topic. Yet, there is a real need to
account for the scattered evidence in the Avicennian sources that points to the separate intellects’
knowledge of the quiddities and the forms. Avicenna is, of course, primarily interested in the First
Intellect, which is God, and in the Agent Intellect, given the latter’s influence on the sublunary
world. He is also relatively interested in the First Effect (the intellect immediately caused to exist
by God), given its unique status as the being in which multiplicity starts to exist. But the numerous
intellects lying between the First Effect and the Agent Intellect hardly get a detailed mention in the
entire Avicennian corpus. Their role beyond celestial motion is secondary, and none of them stands
out in a particular way. There is also the consideration that Avicenna may have been ultimately un-
decided about their number; see Janos, Moving the Orbs.
 3 The pure quiddities and divine causation 687

3 The pure quiddities and divine causation

3.1 Intellection and causation

If the previous interpretation articulated in chapter V is correct, then it would mean

(a) that God thinks the quidditative meanings (maʿānī) and the pure quiddities and
natures in themselves, albeit by thinking His own essence; (b) that these non-numer-
ical quidditative meanings possess a mode of existence that is collapsible with God’s
perfectly unitary existence, which explains why they do not amount to a multiplicity
in the divine essence; and (c) that their originative source in God’s essence, which is
the absolute Truth (al-ḥaqq), accounts for their real and true nature as quiddities,
their ḥaqīqah. What is more, the implications of such an interpretation would be
(d) that God causes these quiddities to exist in the exterior world as a result of His
intellection of them, and (e) that these notions become epistemically and ontologi-
cally distinct only as a result of the divine intellection and causation. In spite of
its sophistication, or perhaps because of it, Avicenna’s account is not free of inherent
tensions. There are three residual issues in particular I wish to address in the follow-
ing paragraphs. First, how can God cause things to exist that can already be said to
exist within Him? Second, how can God think all the quiddities at once and yet cause
only one specific being to exist (i. e., the First Effect)? And third, given that Avicenna
establishes a narrow connection between essence and possibility, can the quiddities
be said to be possible while dwelling in the divine essence? I tackle the first two
questions below and devote a specific section to the third one due to its complexity.
In Avicenna’s theology, there is a direct connection between divine thought and
divine creation. God’s thinking the quiddities and His creating them is an identical
act. In fact, one may say that the divine demiurgy is fundamentally noetical in na-
ture, since creation is the outward or exterior manifestation of God’s intellective ac-
tivity. In Metaphysics VIII.7, the master explains that with regard to the First, “the
very object of His apprehension—namely, that which He intellectually apprehends
of the whole—is the cause of the whole.” And he adds: “hence, apprehension
[i. e., intellection] and bringing into existence is a single meaning [maʿnā] in
Him.”¹²² In Notes, Avicenna explains that the divine knowledge and conception of
each existent is the rationale for its existence.¹²³ As can be observed, there is a direct
connection between the objects of God’s knowledge and the effects of God’s creation.
What God thinks necessarily comes into existence. Strikingly, Avicenna resorts to the
term maʿnā to express this interface, which yet again testifies to the ontological im-
plications of this term.¹²⁴ I argued in the previous section that the objects of God’s

 See Metaphysics of The Cure, VIII.7, 366.14‒16: fa-maʿnā wāḥid minhu huwa idrāk wa-sabīl ilā l-
ījād.
 Avicenna, Notes, 53, section 35.
 This holds, even if the term maʿnā is not used in a technical sense in this passage; here it could
just mean something like “the meaning” of intellection and creation is one in God. Nevertheless, I
688 V The Divine Origin of Pure Quiddity

knowledge are none other than the pure quiddities (māhiyyāt) and true natures (ḥa-
qāʾiq), even though Avicenna describes them by resorting to a rich and varied termi-
nology (depending on which aspect of his doctrine he intends to emphasize), which
might not make this immediately apparent. At any rate, his statements regarding the
divine causation of quiddity are numerous and explicit. In Metaphysics of The Cure,
he argues that the quiddities (al-māhiyyāt) are in themselves possible of existence
(mumkinat al-wujūd), that existence occurs to them from the outside (yuʿraḍu lahā
wujūd min khārij), and that they have existence emanated upon them by the First
Cause (yufīḍu ʿalayhā l-wujūd minhu).¹²⁵ Avicenna also states elsewhere that “the
forms [of things] emanate from God as intelligibles” (tafīḍu ʿanhu ṣuwaruhā maʿqū-
lah). This statement is mirrored in Notes: “the intelligible forms emanate from Him
[God].”¹²⁶ Finally, in his Commentary on Book Lambda, he states that God is “the
principle of the essence of each substance” (huwa mabdaʾ dhāt kull jawhar).¹²⁷ In
this fashion, there is an intelligible identity between (a) the things that are entailed
or necessitated (muqtaḍā) by God and the concomitants (lawāzim) that arise from His
self-intellection, (b) the intelligibles (maʿqūlāt, maʿlūmāt) that God knows, and (c)
the quidditative meanings (maʿānī), which are identical with His essence.
The actual existence of the quiddities as forms in concrete beings is essentially
preceded by God’s intellection of them. Recall, however, that according to Avicenna’s
theological model, God does not contemplate things outside His essence. The logical
implication is that He first contemplates the intelligibles and forms within It, and
that they subsequently come to exist in the exterior world. Crucially, however,
these intelligibles and forms, insofar as they are identical with the absolute, divine
existence of God, are not individualized in God. They become distinguishable and in-
dividualized only when they proceed from the divine essence and are actualized in
exterior reality. In spite of this, I pinpointed two ‘moments’ in God’s intellection: first,
there is God’s contemplation of Himself simpliciter; second, there is God’s intellec-
tion of all the forms and intelligibles through His own self-intellection, as an exten-
sion, so to speak, of his own intellection. As such, these intelligibles are logically and
essentially posterior entities vis-à-vis God’s contemplation of Himself.¹²⁸ Finally, at
this juncture, a third, distinct ‘moment’ or ‘stage’ can be added to the demiurgic
act, which focuses on the actualization of these intellectual objects as exterior con-
crete entities as a result of divine causation. Their creation and actualization occur on

believe it is not a coincidence that Avicenna selects this term to express the identity of divine thought
and causation. It also establishes a connection with the quiddities qua divine maʿānī, on which the
divine intellection and causation focus.
 Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Cure, VIII.4, 346.13‒347.12.
 Avicenna, Notes, 350.10‒351.1. At 14.5, the lawāzim are identified with the maʿlūmāt.
 Avicenna, Commentary on Book Lambda, 55.123.
 These first two ‘moments’ can be said to correspond to the distinction between God taken ‘in
Himself’ and God taken ‘in relation to’ the external and caused beings; on this point, see Adamson,
From the Necessary Existent, especially 174‒175.
 3 The pure quiddities and divine causation 689

account of the divine intellective act, but in a mode fully detached from the divine
intellection itself, which is purely reflexive. This is when, on Avicenna’s account,
the pure quidditative meanings and entities (maʿānī) that were perfectly identical
with God’s essence become differentiated one from the other and hierarchized
through causation, “according to the order of cause and being caused” (ʿalā l-tartīb
al-sababī wa-l-musabbabī).¹²⁹ This model of divine causation sheds light on those
textual passages in which the pure quiddities are said to be created or caused abso-
lutely (mubdaʿah).¹³⁰ An inclusivist or maximalist treatment of Avicenna’s account in
Metaphysics V.1 therefore suggests that the ‘divine existence’ of pure quiddity alluded
to in this passage means not only that the quiddities exist in God (as was shown in
the previous sections), but that they may also exist outside of God as a direct effect of
the divine intellection. The previous interpretation accounts for the distinction be-
tween the existence of quiddity ‘before matter’ or ‘before multiplicity’ and its exis-
tence ‘in matter’ or ‘in multiplicity,’ as well as to Avicenna’s reference in that passage
to God’s providence (ʿināyah). Divine intellection and causation are the link between
these two orders or ‘contexts.’ In brief, the epithet ‘divine’ when applied to the pure
quiddities covers a plurality of meanings: (1) they exist in God; (2) they are directly
related to the divine intellection and causation, through which they exist in the con-
crete world; and (3) by virtue of their divine origin, they possess an unconditioned,
constant, and simple mode of existence. It is their divine origin, (1) and (2), which
explains (3) the special mode in which they exist in the concrete world as a result
of the divine causative act.
Locating the pure quiddities in God and tying them to the intellective process
that causes the existence of concrete beings has one additional advantage, which
should not be underestimated. It provides a convenient exegetical solution to Avicen-
na’s problematic tendency to describe the result of God’s causation sometimes in
terms of a plurality—God causes all things—and other times in terms of a singulari-
ty—God causes only a single effect, the ‘First Effect’ (al-maʿlūl al-awwal). In holding
these views, it appears at first sight that Avicenna is seeking to maintain two ulti-
mately incompatible theses: that—as the only being that is necessary of existence
—God is the only true cause of all contingent beings, and yet that He directly causes
only one intellectual being to exist, since an absolutely simple and unitary being can
only produce a single effect. However, if one surmises that the pure quiddities are in
God and, as a consequence, also in the First Effect, then these various assertions can

 Avicenna, Metaphysics, VIII.7, 365.7.

 In Avicenna, Notes, 139, section 185, the pure nature humanness is said to be “neither generated,
nor corruptible, but rather created absolutely” (ṭabīʿat al-insān bi-mā hiya tilka l-ṭabīʿah ghayr kāʾinah
wa-lā fāsidah bal mubdaʿah). Likewise, the quiddity of prime matter is “created absolutely” (171, sec-
tion 251). Those references to absolute creation necessarily imply the agency of an intellectual prin-
ciple, at the very least the Agent Intellect. But since the existence of the intelligibles in the Agent In-
tellect is to be traced back in turn to its cause, the ultimate origin for the creation of these pure
quiddities must be the First Itself.
690 V The Divine Origin of Pure Quiddity

be reconciled with one another. The master’s dual claims according to which God
knows and causes all things, and yet that these various things are contained, at
this initial level of causation, within the First Effect—where they amount to the
pure quiddities as intellected by this being—strike one as philosophically coherent
and as reflecting the various faces of a single prism. Technically speaking, God caus-
es only one lāzim, identified with the First Effect. But since this lāzim is itself the
cause of the various lawāzim that come after it, due to the fact that it comprises
all the forms or essences, God by extension can be said to be the originative cause
of all the lawāzim. This presumably is why Avicenna alternates between these two
descriptions. The quiddities or intelligibles would represent a multiplicity-in-unity
in the First Effect along the lines of the forms contained in Plotinus’s Intellectual-
Principle. Consequently, and in light of this purely intelligible multiplicity inherent
in the First Effect, it would be correct to say that God causes one single thing and,
through that thing, and thanks to all the maʿānī contained in the First Effect, that
He is the cause of all the other quiddities and existents of the world. This seems
to be precisely how Avicenna conceives of the notion of divine providence.¹³¹
At this juncture, let us return to Avicenna’s rather vivid assertion at Metaphysics
V.1 that the pure quiddities possess a divine existence and that they are caused by
God’s providence (ʿināyah).¹³² Given what was said above, pure quiddity can be
called “divine,” not only because it exists in the divine essence, but also because
(li-anna) it is linked to God’s providence and causation of the world. These claims,
however, are interconnected. It is because they originally exist in God that the quid-
dities present in the world can be traced back to the First. In this regard, Avicenna
contrasts the causation of pure quiddity or nature (ṭabīʿah)—which occurs exclusive-
ly through God’s benevolent intellection—to the causation of quiddity taken together
with its extraneous concomitants and embedded in particular concrete things, which
is the result also of natural phenomena and processes. The latter is the outcome of
divine causality acting through the “particularizing nature” (al-ṭabīʿah al-juzʾiyyah).
Again in this case, Avicenna seeks to distinguish pure quiddity (nature, ṭabīʿah) from
quiddity taken with its concomitants and material accidents (particularizing nature),
linking the former with God, His causality and providence, and the latter with the
processes of realization and concretization. A passage of Notes underlines these
points:

Providence [al-ʿināyah] is that the Necessary Existent intellects [for example] the arrangement of
the organs of a human being, or the movement of the heaven, in a way that [these things] be-

 Avicenna’s theory of providence (ʿināyah) seems premised on the ideas that God knows the
forms, intelligibles, etc. of all things in a perfectly unitary way and that He causes these intelligible
forms to exist in the intellectual principles from the First Effect onward.
 For a brief discussion of this term in connection with quiddity, see Benevich, Die ‘göttliche Ex-
istenz’; and Faruque, Mullā Ṣadrā, 283‒285.
 3 The pure quiddities and divine causation 691

come optimal [fāḍilayn] and that a sound order [niẓām al-khayr] come to exist in them, without
desire, pursuit, and intent following from this knowledge.¹³³

We may infer from this definition of providence that God not only intellects the pure
quiddities (such as ‘human’ and ‘heaven’), but also their concomitants (such as the
circular motion of the heaven) in order to create an optimal universal order. Hence, in
spite of its obvious religious connotation, the term ʿināyah is to be connected here
with the theory of divine intellection and causation that was outlined above. Later
on in the same section of Notes, Avicenna explains that the divine providence is
identical with the divine knowledge (ʿilm).¹³⁴ The notion of providence is merely an-
other way of conveying the doctrine of the actualization of the pure quiddities in the
exterior world after their intelligible existence in the First—their originative source is
God’s reflexive intellection. However, since the pure quiddities dwell at every intel-
lective stage of the divine emanation, from the First to the Agent Intellect, and
then from the latter to the realm of the sublunary beings, the term ʿināyah encom-
passes this hierarchy and the various ontic levels of Avicenna’s cosmology. It brings
home the point that pure quiddity, qua reality, truth, and foundational meaning,
finds its origin in God as the ultimate purveyor of truth (see Text 49 below).
If the pure quiddities are identified with the maʿānī that Avicenna mentions in
his discussions of divine knowledge—and I believe they ought to be—then they
would also play a decisive role in this thinker’s account of divine causation or crea-
tion. For this would mean that God, in a sense, contemplates within His very essence
the various meanings and forms that will subsequently acquire actual existence in
the concrete world. This reflexive intellectual act would mirror in a perfectly unitary
way the actual order of the universe and the hierarchy of causes and effects issuing
from God. Yet, the idea that God could create or cause these quiddities to exist in the
exterior world as a result of His intellection is baffling and raises complications that
must be addressed. When existing in God in an absolute state, the pure quiddities are
not to be dissociated ontologically from the divine essence. It is only subsequently
that they are caused to exist in an individuated manner in the exterior world as a
result of God’s demiurgic intellection. We are therefore dealing here with two entirely
different modes of existence, and not with a single mode that could be duplicated
and, hence, produce redundancy. When they are in the divine essence prior to
their actualization in reality, the quiddities possess an ontological mode that tran-
scends the one associated with the conditioned and caused beings and their concrete

 Avicenna, Notes, 18.1‒4, section 3. Cf. Avicenna, Notes, 109‒110, section 141, where the existence
of genera and species, and by implication of the individuals, as well as the differences between these
things (al-ikhtilāfāt) are explained in terms of “the order of the whole” (niẓām al-kull) and “entailed
by the order of the good in the whole, which points to [lit., which leads to] an intelligible order” (muq-
taḍīhā niẓām al-khayr fī l-kull wa-huwa yuʾaddī ilā niẓām ʿaqlī). One finds here the same notion of
divine providence as the cause for the existence of the eternal genera and species.
 Avicenna, Notes, 19.8‒9, section 3.
692 V The Divine Origin of Pure Quiddity

accidents and concomitants. Their state is also, accordingly, to be demarcated from

‘actual’ or ‘realized’ existence, as these terms are usually construed in the frame of
Avicenna’s metaphysics of causation to refer to the contingent created beings. These
pure quiddities do not exist in God qua actual, contingent, and complex beings, but
only according to a special ontological state that Avicenna describes as ‘simple,’ ‘ab-
solute,’ and ‘divine’ and that precludes all the attributes and concomitants associat-
ed with actual, contingent existence, including oneness and multiplicity. It is in this
regard perhaps that one can speak most pertinently of the esse essentiae of the pure
quiddities, insofar as they are identified with the divine being. But this does not sig-
nify that the quiddities receive actual existence twice. Rather, it means that they exist
in two different modes, one being the divine mode, the other the actual or realized
mode pertaining to contingent entities; hence Avicenna’s distinction between ‘na-
ture’ (ṭabīʿah) and ‘particularizing nature’ (al-ṭabīʿah al-juzʾiyyah). Regarding this
point, I believe that some of the medieval Latin interpreters of Avicenna were
right to distinguish between these various ontological modes and to insist on the
fact that the quiddities in God have a special status distinct from the one of contin-
gent beings.¹³⁵
Two technical terms that appear in Avicenna’s argumentation of divine causation
are liable to cast additional light on this issue: maʿānī and lawāzim. The master fre-
quently uses the term maʿānī to refer not only to the objects of divine thought, but
also and by extension to the kinds of things that are caused by the divine intellec-
tion. Recall that this is one of the words Avicenna relies on to describe the pure quid-
dities—in this case, the term may be translated as ‘quidditative meanings.’ Avicenna
is adamant that these meanings do not constitute a multiplicity in God and that God
knows them by knowing Himself. God knows all these meanings by knowing His
own meaning (maʿnā), which encompasses all the others and provides them with
their reality and truth. However, these quidditative meanings do not, by virtue of
being objects of God’s intellection, serve as a kind of template through which the di-
vine causation would occur, in a manner comparable to some of the cosmological
theories found in Middle Platonism and Neoplatonism, where the Forms serve as ar-
chetypes for divine creation. According to an interpretation of Plato’s Demiurge that
became widespread in Platonic circles, creation occurs when the Demiurge contem-
plates the Forms and then models the physical universe according to this ideal blue-
print. Avicenna defends a different thesis insofar as God does not think the quiddi-
ties as distinct entities or as something other than Himself, which He would follow as
a model for creation. Rather, He knows them by thinking Himself, and causation re-
sults from this reflexive act of intellection. With that being said, if these quidditative
meanings exist in God and can be identified with His quiddity and intellection, and if

 See especially the works of Henry of Ghent. On my account of Avicenna’s metaphysics, there are
intriguing metaphysical parallels between these two thinkers’ doctrines of quiddity and their theol-
ogy, some of which have already been aptly discussed by Porro, Universaux; Counet, Avicenne; and
Aertsen, Avicenna’s Doctrine.
 3 The pure quiddities and divine causation 693

His intellection is what causes them to exist in the exterior world qua actual, contin-
gent beings, then the pure quiddities would be in a relation to the exterior concrete
existents as a cause is to its effect, insofar as they would essentially and ontological-
ly precede them. In brief, then, even though the pure quiddities do not precede the
divine intellection, since they are for all intents and purposes identical with it, they
essentially and logically precede the causation of contingent existents. It is signifi-
cant in this respect that Avicenna applies the same term maʿānī to the quiddities em-
bedded in concrete individuals, to the reality and foundational nature of each con-
crete existent, as well as to the objects of divine intellection. This aptly indicates that
the term maʿānī establishes a link between the quiddities in God and those in the
concrete world. It points to the semantic and ontological continuity between these
two realms, recalling in the process some kalām uses of this term. It is perhaps
also primarily in this respect that a parallel can be observed between Avicenna’s doc-
trine and the Platonic doctrine of the forms. In the latter case as well, there is a cor-
respondence, through the theory of participation, between the forms used by the
Demiurge to create the world and the forms inhering in concrete beings.
In a second stage, these quidditative meanings emerge out of the divine being
qua ‘concomitants’ (lawāzim) as a result of the causative act triggered by God’s
self-intellection.¹³⁶ Generally speaking, the term lawāzim conveys a notion of logical
and conceptual entailment, as in the contexts of Avicenna’s logic and psychology
and more specifically of his discussion of quiddity and its mental attributes (see
chapter II). Avicenna frequently uses this term in an epistemological context to
refer to the concomitant meanings or predicates of quiddity (e. g., universality and
oneness are lawāzim of horseness). In this case, however, and unlike the term
maʿānī, the term lawāzim emphasizes (in addition to logical entailment) the causa-
tive, derivative, and entitative aspects of quiddity, as well as the status of the essen-
ces as effects or concomitants of the divine essence Itself. In a metaphysical context,
the lawāzim are the by-products and effects of the divine intellective process (e. g.,
the First Effect is a lāzim, and, in turn, the effects of the First Effect and of the
other separate intellects can also be called lawāzim). In both cases, epistemological
and metaphysical, the term lawāzim emphasizes externality or extrinsicality relative
to the source or cause that produces them. This term’s dual epistemic and ontological
connotations explain why Avicenna repeatedly states in his works that God appre-
hends the lawāzim emerging out of His essence: it refers epistemically to the objects

 For a discussion of the term lāzim/lawāzim in the context of Avicenna’s theology, see De Smet
and Sebti, Avicenna’s Philosophical Approach. In their article, the authors insist on distinguishing
between the divine attributes (ṣifāt) qua lawāzim and the effects caused to exist by God qua lawāzim,
even though they are fully aware that such a distinction poses problem. For a discussion of this issue,
see section IV.2.5 above. For my purposes, and because I am not convinced of the validity of this dual
reading of the term, I treat the lawāzim as referring exclusively to the effects proceeding from God, as
well as to the knowledge God has of these effects. Accordingly, the lawāzim overlap with the maʿlūlāt,
but they also coincide with God’s maʿqūlāt.
694 V The Divine Origin of Pure Quiddity

of the divine contemplation and ontologically to their status as derivative effects.

Given that thought and existence are intertwined in the intelligible world, the term
lawāzim covers these two aspects. In fact, Avicenna stresses the point that the exis-
tence of the lawāzim is identical to their being intellected by God, or that their exis-
tence is their intelligibility in God (wujūd lawāzimahu ayḍan huwa maʿqūliyyatuhā;
ʿillat wujūd lawāzimahu ʿaqliyyatuhu lahā; tilka l-lawāzim maʿlūmiyyatuhā hiya nafs
wujūdihā, etc.).¹³⁷ However, whereas the pure essences qua maʿānī are fully identical
with God, the lawāzim refer technically to things outside of God, or at least to things
that are not strictly identical with His essence, inasmuch as they are caused by It. In
that sense, the term lawāzim is connected with notions of multiplicity (kathrah) and
causality (ʿilliyyah), which need not affect the maʿānī regarded purely as objects of
God’s thought. It is this terminological nuance and emphasis on causality that justify
the claim that, while God knows the lawāzim, these do not exist in Him, but proceed
from Him.¹³⁸ Yet, the key idea remains that God considers these external concomi-
tants not as things outside of His own essence, but rather as indistinguishable
from His essence qua maʿānī. This fully unitary act of self-intellection in turn results
in the causation of concomitants that are different from and external to the divine
essence. In this respect, it is noteworthy that the terms maʿānī and lawāzim bridge
the internal, reflexive, and intellective aspect and the external, causative, and rela-
tional aspect that together characterize Avicenna’s account of God’s causation of
other beings. These theories represent yet another instance of the implementation
of the māhiyyah-lawāzim model, adapted this time to Avicenna’s theology.

3.2 The Neoplatonic tripartite division and other Avicennian distinctions

It is with these various considerations in mind that Avicenna outlines the threefold
distinction before, in, and after multiplicity in Introduction I.12 (Text 21). Indeed, hav-
ing introduced these notions at the beginning of this chapter, he proceeds later on in
the same work to apply the first one, ‘before multiplicity’ (qabl al-kathrah), to the
topic of divine intellection and demiurgy (Text 44 and especially Text 45). More gen-
erally, however, if there is a way in which this scheme may be said to square with
Avicenna’s metaphysics, it is with regard to the issue of quiddity in itself and divine
knowledge. If God and the separate intellects think the pure quiddities by thinking
their own essence, this knowledge would be before multiplicity (as well as before mat-
ter). This, at the very least, is the case of the First, who is beyond any kind of multi-
plicity, but it can also be extended presumably to all the separate intellects, if one
intends the kind of multiplicity associated with the sublunary beings. Thus, the di-

 Avicenna, Notes, 576.12‒577.1, section 1000; 577, section 1001; 578, section 1003; cf. 573, section
998.
 Avicenna, Notes, 543, section 957.
 3 The pure quiddities and divine causation 695

vine knowledge and existence of the quiddities would be prior vis-à-vis the complex
and contingent existents of the sublunary world. This classification establishes the
causal and ontological priority of quiddity in itself as an intelligible object in the di-
vine beings over the quiddity that is embodied in particular existents (in multiplicity
or matter) or produced as a universal in the mind (after multiplicity or matter).
Although one could argue that the threefold distinction that appears in Introduc-
tion I.12 should be construed primarily along epistemic and cognitive lines, there can
be little doubt that on Avicenna’s mind it possesses an ontological thrust as well.
This is equally true of quiddity before multiplicity, since this aspect of quiddity
can refer only to its state in God’s mind or in all the separate intellects, where
thought is existence, and where each intelligible object must possess being in
some sense. In Avicenna’s model, this simple mode of intelligible being is not affect-
ed by material multiplicity, and, at the very least in the case of God, it is also devoid
of immaterial multiplicity.¹³⁹ The mode of existence before matter and multiplicity,
which is divine and intellectual, is obviously devoid of concomitants and accidents,
whether of a mental or concrete kind. This pristine mode of existence corresponds
precisely to the status of pure quiddity as an intelligible object in God’s essence.
In contrast, quiddity in matter/multiplicity and after matter/multiplicity corresponds
to quiddity combined with concrete and mental concomitants respectively. This
makes the state of quiddity before multiplicity, in its ontological priority, a kind of
blueprint or paradigm for those states ‘in’ and ‘after multiplicity.’¹⁴⁰ The notions of
priority and posteriority I have been employing throughout my analysis are, of
course, to be taken in a nontemporal sense. They point to an ontological and essen-
tial priority of the quidditative meanings in God and the separate intellects over men-
tal and concrete existents, and this in a realm where the notions of time, discursive-
ness, and sequentiality do not apply. In the case, say, of horseness, the divine,
concrete, and universal instances of quiddity can be temporally synchronous, in
that they can be said to exist at the same time, given that Avicenna believes in an
eternal universe and eternal time, as well as in the eternality of species.¹⁴¹ But the
priority of pure essence over materiality and multiplicity, which corresponds to the
divine state of quiddity in God, will always remain essentially and causally prior,

 Avicenna does not always clearly distinguish between the intellection of God and that of the
other separate intellects. In this particular case, the question of whether the contemplation of the
quiddities would amount to a certain kind of intelligible multiplicity in the separate intellects
other than God (as opposed, say, to the multiplicity arising from the subject-object distinction)
must be left unaddressed. I intend to examine these issues in depth in another study. In any case,
my point here concerns primarily God’s knowledge.
 Avicenna, Commentary on Theology of Aristotle, 40 and 46, describes the forms in matter as “imi-
tations of the true intelligible forms” (muḥākiyyāt li-l-ṣuwar al-ʿaqliyyah al-ḥaqqah), which adequately
stresses the hierarchical relation between these two planes.
 Recall in this connection that Avicenna adheres to the doctrine of an eternal universe, so that
there is no temporal precedence or priority of the intelligible over the material, but only an essential,
causative, and ontological priority.
696 V The Divine Origin of Pure Quiddity

since the other two aspects depend on it, and since they are complex vis-à-vis the
intelligible simplicity of pure quiddity. This forcefully brings home the point that
quiddity, in its being a pure quidditative meaning in the divine intellect, is prior
and fully unconnected to the complex physical and intellectual existents. It enjoys
an absolute status of its own in the divine being that precedes its instantiation in
both concrete and mental things. In other words, the māhiyyah in God is prior to
the māhiyyah-lawāzim complex that unfolds in the external world as a result of
the divine causation.
Retrospectively, it seems that Avicenna adapted crucial aspects of his metaphy-
sics and theology to fit the threefold scheme he inherited from the Neoplatonists. His
ascription of forms and quiddities to God and the separate intellects, including the
Agent Intellect, accords with the aspect of the universal ‘before multiplicity’ he out-
lines in Introduction, which can be traced directly to various Greek Neoplatonic and
Christian Syriac texts. As already mentioned, Ibn ʿAdī, in a quite Platonic vein, also
situates the forms in God’s mind.¹⁴² What is more, Ibn al-Ṭayyib, who was roughly
contemporary with the shaykh al-raʾīs, conveys a similar picture in his Introduction,
which he attributes to Plato:

As for Plato, he held that genera and species have three modes of existence [wujūdāt thalāthah],
[the first one being] existence before multiplicity. He held that there were existing forms in God
before He created that which He created, that is, that the forms ’human being,’ ’donkey,’ and
’gold’ [for example] were in God and that Nature used these paradigms to produce [tafʿalu]
what it produced.¹⁴³

Ibn al-Ṭayyib goes on to gloss Plato’s concept of form as the power of God (qudrat
Allah), thereby providing an interpretation that fits with his own theological inter-
ests. But what is important for our purposes is, first, the fact that this thinker, who
was Avicenna’s contemporary, was also cognizant of the triplex distinction Avicenna
reports in Introduction, and, second and more importantly, his report to the effect
that Plato located the forms or universals expressly in God’s mind. Although Ibn
al-Ṭayyib’s comments pertain chiefly to some of the Middle Platonists and Neopla-
tonists who held such a position, rather than to Plato himself, they reflect a common
understanding in Islam according to which the ancient philosophers had described
one aspect of the universals as paradigms in the divine intellect(s). Avicenna was
thus consciously building on a common Greco-Syriac perception regarding the onto-
logical modes of the universals, and he adapted this theory to his metaphysics of
pure quiddity. Even with regard to early Arabic philosophy, Avicenna was not an in-
novator in locating one aspect of essence or the universal in the divine minds. Pre-

 Rashed, Ibn ʿAdī; Adamson, Knowledge of Universals, 150‒159.

 Ibn al-Ṭayyib, Introduction, 54.1‒4; Adamson, Knowledge of Universals, 159‒163. Ibn al-Ṭayyib’s
remarks rely historically on some Middle Platonic and Neoplatonic interpretations of the forms as in-
hering in the Demiurge. As is well known, this interpretation, mediated through the works of Augus-
tine, exercised a deep and lasting influence on the Latin west.
 3 The pure quiddities and divine causation 697

vious reconstructions of Fārābī’s theory of the universals show that this thinker also
located them in the divine intellects, at the very least in the Agent Intellect, but also
perhaps in God’s mind.¹⁴⁴
Nevertheless, and in spite of this shared heritage, Avicenna’s contribution
proved innovative on some crucial counts. If my interpretation is correct, he was ap-
parently the first thinker to argue for a single mode of existence on behalf of pure
quiddity regardless of the various contexts in which it is to be found, thereby making
it an ontological constant in his system, and introducing other ontological distinc-
tions only with regard to the relations and conditions that attach to quiddity and
its external concomitants. Even Fārābī and Ibn ʿAdī, to whose ontological schemes
Avicenna’s doctrines are closely related, did not articulate an ontology of pure quid-
dity in the manner achieved by Avicenna. Their ontology focuses primarily on kinds
of existence (ajnās al-wujūd) and especially kinds of existents (ajnās al-mawjūdāt),¹⁴⁵
whereas Avicenna delves into the various modes and senses of existence through the
lens of his theory of ontological modulation (tashkīk al-wujūd). In addition, he tack-
les the specific question of how they relate to the various aspects, considerations,
and conditions of essence. His approach strikes one as much more conceptual and
theoretical than that of his predecessors, a development that was made possible
by his thorough distinction between essence and existence, his modulated approach
to the notion of existence and other key philosophical notions, as well as his recog-
nition of the distinct and transcendental concept of pure quiddity.
This threefold Neoplatonic scheme of universals is only one of many conceptual
matrices Avicenna taps into in order to articulate his account of quiddity. Of equal
importance to the Persian master are the conceptual schemes conveying (a) the var-
ious considerations (iʿtibārāt) of quiddity, (b) the distinction between ‘the natural,’
‘the logical,’ and ‘the intellectual,’ (c) the conditions (shurūṭ) as these apply to quid-
dity, and (d) the crucial distinction between essential distinctness and irreducibility
(conveyed by the expressions min ḥaythu hiya hiya, fī nafsihā, etc.). The first appears
in Introduction I.2 and outlines the three considerations (iʿtibārāt) of quiddity (‘in it-
self,’ ‘in the mind,’ and ‘in concrete beings’); the second is described in Introduction
I.12 and appears alongside the threefold distinction ‘before,’ ‘in,’ and ‘after multiplic-
ity.’ As for sets (c) and (d), they underpin Avicenna’s account of essence in both his
metaphysical and logical works. While some of these distinctions were bequeathed to
Avicenna from late antiquity—this is the case notably of (b) and of the distinction
‘before,’ ‘in,’ and ‘after multiplicity’—others seem to have been devised by the master
himself. These various matrices of distinctions should be regarded as key Avicennian
elaborations, and they play out in a unique manner in his metaphysics, culminating
in an innovative theory of quiddity in itself and its special mode of existence.¹⁴⁶ Later

 Madkour, L’organon, 146‒148; Vallat, Du possible au nécessaire, 91, 98‒99 and note 30, 116‒121.
 This expression appears, for example, in Fārābī’s Selected Aphorisms, 78.12 ff.
 For a tentative schematic representation of how these matrices of distinctions relate to one an-
other, see Appendix III.
698 V The Divine Origin of Pure Quiddity

thinkers and luminaries, such as the Scholastics of medieval Europe and Avicenna’s
Arabic commentators, intuited his daring initiative in this regard and had no qualms
adopting these various distinctions. At this juncture, it seems worthwhile to try to
better understand how these matrices of distinctions interrelate in the master’s phi-
losophy. To what extent are they interconnected, and what kind of overlap can be
detected?¹⁴⁷
It appears that there is only a relative or partial correspondence between these
various matrices of distinctions. However, the parallels are convincing enough to
merit discussion, and in at least two cases, there is a neat overlap of various notions.
As was pointed out in chapter III, quiddity in concrete beings intersects with exis-
tence in multiplicity, and both notions in turn have a direct relation to the notion
of nature and the natural, which Avicenna employs to designate quiddity in the con-
crete beings. Likewise, what is in conception or in the mind corresponds to both the
logical and the intellectual. These in turn interconnect with existence after multiplic-
ity, at any rate when it comes to the universals and human intellection.¹⁴⁸ Further-
more, it was shown that quiddity ‘in itself’ can also be said to apply to these two
contexts, albeit in different ways. If pure quiddity is regarded as a principle or
part of these various existents, then it can be said to exist in them according to
one sense of ‘in itself,’ i. e., irreducibly, but not separately. Alternatively, if it is con-
ceived of as a distinct form in the mind, then it exists in the mind according to an-
other sense of ‘in itself,’ which implies not only irreducibility, but also distinctness.
According to this last aspect, however, quiddity ‘in itself’ is not necessarily after mul-
tiplicity, because it can also coincide with the intelligibles of God and of the supernal

 Some scholars have attempted to answer this question, but they limited their analysis to the two
sets of distinctions described in Introduction I.12, thereby providing only a partial account. According
to Madkour, L’organon, 151‒152, ‘the natural’ corresponds to what exists ‘before multiplicity,’ ‘the in-
tellectual’ to what is ‘in multiplicity,’ and ‘the logical’ to what is ‘after multiplicity’ (cf. Madkour in
Avicenna, Introduction, Preface, 64). This, however, cannot be correct, nor is Madkour’s rather crude
ascription to Avicenna of a Platonic doctrine of forms (presumably on the basis of the theory of the
Agent Intellect). Ahwānī (apud Marmura) identifies ‘the intellectual’ with what is prior, ‘the natural’
with what is in the multiple, and ‘the logical’ with what exists in the mind. Marmura, Avicenna’s
Chapter on Universals, 39‒41, recognizes the complexity of this question, but he opines that “the
two tripartite modes, though related, represent two different classifications.” As for Rashed, Ibn
ʿAdī, he claims that Avicenna adopted and transformed Ibn ʿAdī’s threefold scheme of existents
and cites this passage in support for this ontological division. But it is important to note that the
threefold distinction that Avicenna makes here does not overlap strictly with kinds or groups of ex-
istents (mawjūdāt), as it does in Ibn ʿAdī’s treatise. Rather, Avicenna uses these terms flexibly to de-
scribe different aspects of quiddity and different contexts in which it can be said to exist.
 Madkour’s suggestion that ‘the intellectual’ for Avicenna exists in concrete beings is somewhat
outlandish, except if we take it to mean ‘potentially intellectual.’ In fact, I myself argued in chapter III
that pure quiddity qua maʿnā exists in concrete beings in an intelligible mode. Even then, I do not
follow Madkour’s lead here, since this would result in a disruption in the order of distinctions estab-
lished by Avicenna, which seems to correlate quite clearly the universal ‘in matter’ with ‘the natural’
or ṭabīʿī.
 3 The pure quiddities and divine causation 699

intellects, which are prior to multiplicity (in the case of the latter, their multiplicity
does not derive from the plurality of the quiddities, but rather from their dual intel-
lection of God and of their own essence). As far as the human mind is concerned,
what would distinguish pure quiddity from the universal would be its purely simple,
concomitant- and accident-free, and transcendent mode of intelligible existence.
But what about the divine world? Insofar as the divine context of quiddity is also
intellectual and noetic, there is a connection with the intellectual or ʿaqlī. Even
though Avicenna applies the notion ʿaqlī chiefly to the aspect of quiddity in
human intellection in the course of his analysis in Introduction, and especially in
chapter I.12 (where he introduces these various notions), it would seem to be the cat-
egory that is best suited to describe the state of pure quiddity in the divine intellects.
In fact, Avicenna does discuss the divine beings’ intellectual knowledge of quiddity
in another section of this logical work (see Text 45). Now, as I showed in chapter II,
there are various considerations (iʿtibārāt) of quiddity that can be called ‘mental’ or
‘intellectual’ in a certain loose or general way (ʿaqlī¹) on account of the fact that they
are all subject to human logical thought and ratiocination, but only one aspect of
quiddity (viz., the complex universal concept) corresponds unambiguously in Avi-
cenna’s works to an intellectual existent proper (ʿaqlī²). As for quiddity in itself, it
can certainly be said to be ʿaqlī¹, in the sense that it is considered as a logical aspect
in the human mind. Additionally, in light of the analysis deployed in this book, it can
quite convincingly be endowed with an ontological and entitative status of its own,
since it possesses intelligible being in the mind. In order to differentiate it from the
complex universal (ʿaqlī²), it shall be designated as ʿaqlī³. What is more, we can fur-
ther distinguish between ʿaqlī³, which refers to the pure quiddities in the human
mind, and ʿaqlī⁴, which refers to their mode of existence in the separate intellects
and in God’s intellect. In sum, the aspect of quiddity ‘in itself’ outlined in Introduc-
tion I.2 would amount not only to a mere logical notion (ʿaqlī¹), but also to the mode
of existence of pure quiddity as a simple, irreducible, and distinct object of thought
in the human and divine intellects (ʿaqlī³ and ʿaqlī⁴), where, at least according to the
last sense, it is fundamentally prior to multiplicity (qabl al-kathrah).

3.3 Pure quiddity, possibility, and divine causation

There remain the complex issues of how possibility/contingency (imkān) relates to

pure quiddity and whether the quiddities exist as ‘possible’ objects in God’s mind
before their actualization in the concrete world.¹⁴⁹ Some scholars have argued that
locating the quiddities in the divine mind would result in the existence of possibility

 This section is an elaboration on section IV.2.4 in light of Avicenna’s theories of divine knowl-
edge and causation. Although imkān can be translated as meaning both possibility and contingency, I
opt for the former translation in this section and address the issue of whether God can be said to
intellect ‘possible things’ or mumkināt.
700 V The Divine Origin of Pure Quiddity

in the divine essence or would allow one to posit other entities alongside God that
are possible of existence. This smacks of the Muʿtazilite theory of the nonexistent
things (ashyāʾ maʿdūmah). This point seems all the more problematic, given that Avi-
cenna often correlates essence and possibility—as exemplified in his famous formula
that a thing is ‘possible of existence in itself [or in its essence]’ (mumkin al-wujūd bi-
dhātihi). The assumption would be that, prior to their creation, the quiddities dwell
as possible things in God’s essence or exist qua unrealized possibles in Him. As Olga
Lizzini remarked, this would also make divine creation a creation ex possibili:

And although the meaning of “possible” seems at times to coincide with the meaning of the ex-
istent in intellectu—as some passages appear to suggest—this does not solve the problem: if the
possible is what exists in the divine intellect—or what exists in the intellectual dimension of the
celestial world, intelligence after intelligence, as Avicenna describes the emanation in Ilah. IX, 4
—“creation” becomes nothing but a transition from the possible (or intellectual existence) to the
real (i. e. concrete existence), a transition that does not suffice to explain the origin of the pos-
sible itself in so far as, properly speaking, creation is no longer a creatio ex nihilo but a creatio ex
possibili. ¹⁵⁰

So, if the pure quiddities constitute objects for the divine intellection, and if these
quiddities in addition are intrinsically possible of existence (sing., mumkin al-
wujūd)—or are, at the very least, associated with the modality of possibility
(imkān)—and, finally, if God causes them to exist actually in the concrete word as
a result of His intellecting them, then the conclusion seems to be that these quiddi-
ties introduce possibility in the divine being Itself. This point emerges starkly the mo-
ment one posits the existence of the pure quiddities in God.
In spite of the difficulty of this theological problem, one may gesture toward its
resolution by examining how Avicenna conceives of the relationship between quid-
dity and possibility. Recall that for Avicenna pure quiddity is itself and only itself and
can be considered in abstraction from all its external concomitants and other inten-
tions added to it. Now, it is these external and added concomitants, attributes, and
intentions that generate multiplicity, especially in the cases of the intellect and of im-
material beings, where the multiplication of intelligible concomitants is the only kind
of multiplicity that can be posited, given that these beings are free of matter. In fact,
intelligible multiplicity, Avicenna explicates, arises out of the plurality of the con-
comitants of essence. In his Commentary on Theology of Aristotle, he states:

It is not the case as some assert that there is no multiplicity there [in the intelligible world], nor
[is it the case] that multiplicity there consists of parts of the essence. It rather consists of con-
comitants of the essence, whereby some things are concomitants of other things in the intelligi-
ble world, as was shown in detail in The Eastern Philosophy in particular.¹⁵¹

 Lizzini, A Mysterious Order, 125. Thus, according to Bäck, Avicenna, 236, Avicenna believes that
all the possibles are in God’s mind. But this position is not tenable, strictly speaking, since it intro-
duces possibility in the divine mind.
 Avicenna, Commentary on Theology of Aristotle, 58.7‒9.
 3 The pure quiddities and divine causation 701

Avicenna writes something quite similar in a passage of Notes, when discussing the
multiplicity that can be found within the First Effect:

There is no multiplicity in the [first caused] intellect, except in its [already] mentioned trinality
[al-tathlīth], that is, that its possibility comes from its essence, its necessity comes from the First,
and that it thinks the First. These [aspects] are the cause of multiplicity, and the cause of the
possibility of the existence of multiplicity in them [the separate intellects], for there is no multi-
plicity in this realm apart from these [already] mentioned concomitants [al-lawāzim al-madhkū-
rah].¹⁵²

Two important points may be emphasized here. First, for Avicenna, it is the concom-
itants (lawāzim) of quiddity or essence that cause multiplicity in the immaterial be-
ings, not quiddity itself. Given that these beings have a simple nature or quiddity that
is pure intellect (ʿaql), no multiplicity is attached to it. Rather, multiplicity derives
from the external concomitants of their quiddity. Second, as we saw already in sec-
tion IV.2.4, possibility appears to be one of the external concomitants of essence, and
so it is in this capacity that it contributes to the production of intelligible multiplicity.
As a concomitant, it prevents perfect oneness or unity from existing in those beings.
Regarding the latter point, Avicenna adds in his Commentary on Theology of Aristotle
that possibility is “a concomitant state of this quiddity [ḥāl lāzimah li-tilka l-
māhiyyah],” and in Discussions he states in a similar vein that “possibility is
among the necessary concomitants of quiddity that are necessitated by quiddity.”¹⁵³
Possibility, however, is not just any concomitant. Rather, on Avicenna’s mind, it may
justifiably be called ‘the first concomitant’ of quiddity, and this is in fact how he re-
fers to it in some of his writings.¹⁵⁴ Furthermore, possibility is a requisite for the other

 Avicenna, Notes, 112.18‒21.

 Avicenna, Commentary on Theology of Aristotle, 61.19; idem, Discussions, 309, section 867.
 See, for instance, Avicenna, Commentary on Theology of Aristotle, 60.18‒61.24. The priority of
possibility, of course, goes hand in hand with Avicenna’s frequent association of possibility and es-
sence, to the extent that both notions are sometimes treated interchangeably and appear inextricably
linked in his metaphysical account (as in Metaphysics VIII.4). Strictly speaking, however, they remain
distinct notions, and quiddity in itself is unaffected by the modalities. The point here is, first, that
possibility is a concomitant of essence that does not enter into its constitutive core and definition,
and second, that possibility is a special concomitant of quiddity that holds a unique status, inasmuch
as it essentially and logically precedes the other concomitants, including necessity and existence.
This is because, for a thing to be necessary of existence through another or even simply existent
(mawjūd) in any real sense, it must be (in a way that is at least logically and essentially prior) possible
of existence. In that sense, it is true to say that possibility is a mode that directly qualifies quiddity,
albeit in relation to realized existence. If a thing is not possible of existence, it will forever remain
impossible and a nonexistent. Hence, the possible needs an exterior cause to exist or else it remains
a pure possibility. In brief, possibility is only meaningful as an ontological modality as expressing a
state of relation to actual, realized, and concrete existence (wujūd muḥaṣṣal or ḥāṣil). This, in turn,
means that this modality is extrinsic to pure quiddity, which is envisaged in abstraction from all con-
siderations of realized existence. Consequently, as I explain below, these points do not apply to the
pure quiddities in God.
702 V The Divine Origin of Pure Quiddity

concomitants to arise—indeed, a quiddity needs to be ‘possible’ for anything else

meaningful to be said of it, and for it to actually exist together with other things.
As we saw in chapter II, nothing can be said of something that is inherently or log-
ically impossible, that is, absolutely impossible in every regard. Such a ‘thing’—if it
can be called that at all—is not even conceivable. These remarks seem particularly
pregnant in view of the fact that pure quiddity, for Avicenna, is an intelligible prin-
ciple that also exists in the beings of the concrete world, so that this essential pos-
sibility will apply to these beings as well.¹⁵⁵ Accordingly, the concomitants of quid-
dity, such as oneness and plurality, particularity and universality, etc., are
responsible for causing multiplicity in material and immaterial beings, the latter of
which are otherwise devoid of composition. The difficulty, at this point in the anal-
ysis, is to understand at which ‘moment’ possibility as a concomitant of essence en-
ters this metaphysical picture. Furthermore, is possibility merely a mental concomi-
tant, a logical or conceptual notion added to quiddity in the human mind? Or is it,
rather, a metaphysical or ontological concomitant in the strong sense, in which case
it would exist both in the mind and in the concrete world?
One important observation is that Avicenna usually discusses the status of pos-
sibility as a concomitant of quiddity in the context of cosmological and metaphysical
causation. In this context, it refers to a being whose actual and concrete existence is,
in itself, merely possible, but necessarily caused by an external agent. In other
words, the possibility associated with quiddity and regarded as one of its concomi-
tants is defined in terms of the causation of realized existence in the concrete world.
In contrast, possibility plays no role in Avicenna’s treatment of the ontology of pure
quiddity or when he discusses pure quiddity as a concept in the human mind. Thus,
possibility remains, strictly speaking, distinct from quiddity in itself, when envisaged
both as a notion in the mind as well as a metaphysical concomitant in reality (as it
seems to be described in the passages cited above). From a conceptual perspective, it
remains something extrinsic to the constituents of pure quiddity and is a meaning
added to it in the mind, especially when it is correlated with the notions of efficient
causation, realized existence, and necessity, which are also external to quiddity.¹⁵⁶ In
fact, Avicenna himself appears to have been perfectly aware of the link between pos-
sibility qua concomitant of quiddity and realized existence, or, to put it another way,
between possibility and divine creation, since he explicitly refers to this issue in his
Commentary on Theology of Aristotle. He writes:

 Admittedly, there is an important difference in that the concrete beings also have a possibility
qua potentiality that derives from their matter, and which can, in a qualified sense, be said to precede
their actualization. But what is at stake here is the metaphysical possibility associated with essence,
which applies to both material and immaterial beings indiscriminately.
 Thus, Avicenna’s claim that quiddity in itself excludes all other things should be extended to its
exclusion of possibility as well. After all, possibility does not enter the definition of ‘horse’ or ‘trian-
gle,’ and the pure quiddities of these things also exclude any consideration of actual existence and,
hence, the modalities of ‘possible’ and ‘necessary of existence.’
 3 The pure quiddities and divine causation 703

As for the questions [A] of how possibility can be one of the concomitants of the quiddities, and
[B] whether it is subsumed under creation [ibdāʿ] in spite of this or not, and [C] how it should be
defined if it is subsumed under creation or if it is not connected with creation, but is a thing
coming after the First—these have been clarified in the The Eastern Philosophy. ¹⁵⁷

In this passage, Avicenna raises the very issues that are at the heart of the present
inquiry, namely, how the concomitant of possibility relates to quiddity and how
both in turn are connected with divine causation. The key questions here are [B]
and [C], whether possibility should be “subsumed under [God’s absolute] creation”
or separated from it, and whether, as a corollary, it be regarded as “a thing coming
after the First.” Although Avicenna in this passage does not explicitly take sides and
refers to the lost metaphysics section of The Eastern Philosophy for a fuller treatment
of this topic, it is possible, on the grounds of the preceding analysis, to advance some
compelling hypotheses. First, it is quite evident that the master thoroughly separates
possibility from God and from divine causation, since multiplicity and complexity
would result, if one posited possible things in or alongside the First. Consequently,
possibility is definitely to be defined as a thing “coming after the First” and as a con-
comitant of quiddity that is intelligible only after the divine creative act has occurred.
These views cohere with the evidence that has been drawn from the master’s other
works to the effect that God does not intellect the intelligibles and quiddities qua
possibles (mumkināt).
In view of this, it is important to stress that quiddity and possibility ultimately
remain two different and distinct notions in Avicenna’s philosophy. In spite of the
fact that there is a close relationship between them and that modern scholars
often conflate the two and speak inaccurately of ‘possible essences,’ possibility
does not enter into the maʿnā of pure quiddity, nor does it enter into its special ex-
istence (wujūd khāṣṣ) and inner reality (ḥaqīqah). In turn, this suggests that one can
sensibly posit pure quiddities in the divine essence while refraining from ascribing
possibility to them.¹⁵⁸ Accordingly, the pure quiddities in the divine essence do not
entail any concomitants, which would include the concomitant of possibility. If
human beings are able to conceive of pure quiddity in abstraction from its concom-
itants and, thus, of possibility, this would be a fortiori true of the divine intellection.
This applies particularly to the theological context under discussion, because possi-
bility is meaningful only in relation to the notion of realized, conditioned, contingent,
and concrete existence, which is external to God and different from the ontological
mode of the essences in the First.

 Avicenna, Commentary on Theology of Aristotle, 61.22‒24.

 In this regard, Bäck’s claim (Avicenna’s Conception, 236) that the Avicennian view that all the
possibles are in the mind of the Necessary Existent threatens the notion of His immutability, seems
unwarranted, since, according to Avicenna, we may conceive of quiddity in abstraction from its con-
comitants, which would include also the concomitant of possibility itself.
704 V The Divine Origin of Pure Quiddity

The upshot of the foregoing is that possibility is a concomitant of quiddity inas-

much as the latter exists in concrete, contingent beings, that is, in beings that have
already been caused to exist in the actual world or will exist in the future, or, alter-
natively, inasmuch as the human intellect apprehends quiddities as being possible of
existence. Either way, it pertains to the actual or potential realization of existence in
the concrete world. On the other hand, it is meaningless to discuss possibility in con-
nection with the pure quiddities in God, since in this case they exist in a mode free of
all concomitants and accidents. They are not realized existents, but possess an un-
conditioned ontological mode. This is precisely how God Himself apprehends
them: in a perfectly unitary way and identically with His own essence. Possibility en-
ters the picture only when quiddity is predicated of contingent and caused entities,
starting with the separate intellects, whose essence is ‘possible in itself.’ In brief, pos-
sibility, and by extension, ‘the possible of existence’ (mumkin al-wujūd), as Avicenna
puts it, relate exclusively to wujūd muḥaṣṣal, acquired or realized existence, and,
therefore, to the mode of existence of composite, contingent beings, in contradistinc-
tion to the ‘special existence’ (wujūd khāṣṣ) that intrinsically qualifies pure quiddity.
Imkān is possibility for wujūd muḥaṣṣal, but not for wujūd khāṣṣ.
By defining possibility as an external concomitant of quiddity in a metaphysical
context, Avicenna is able, as he was also in a psychological context, to thoroughly
distinguish quiddity in itself from all other things. This in turn enables him to locate
only the pure essences in God. This abstraction includes even the concomitant that is
arguably most closely related to essence, namely, possibility. So if possibility quali-
fies the quiddities that exist in the concrete world from the First Effect onward, it by
no means qualifies the state of the quiddities as these exist in the divine being.¹⁵⁹ For
Avicenna, possibility expresses a relation to ‘realized’ or ‘acquired’ existence, to an
efficient cause, and thus to something extrinsic to quiddity. Realized and caused ex-
istence pertain to the concomitants of quiddity, but not to the special being of quid-
dity itself. In this picture, possibility appears inextricably linked to creation or cau-
sation, where the distinctions between cause and effect, and between ‘self’ and
‘other,’ become paramount. Avicenna elaborates on these points in his Commentary
on Theology of Aristotle ¹⁶⁰:

 Vallat, Du possible au nécessaire, 98‒99 and note 30, 116‒121, develops an interesting argument
regarding Fārābī’s theory of divine knowledge that in some ways overlaps with mine above. Accord-
ing to him, Fārābī posits the forms and universals as existing in God in a mode prior to multiplicity,
and as entities devoid of possibility and necessity. It is only subsequently to their emanation that they
can be qualified as such. If Vallat’s interpretation is correct, then Fārābī’s works would, as in so many
other cases, represent an important precedent for Avicenna’s views on this issue. Nevertheless, it
should be recognized that the evidence in Fārābī is quite ambiguous. Moreover, Fārābī does not de-
velop a theory of pure quiddity along the lines advocated by the shaykh al-raʾīs.
 The interpretation of these texts is difficult, and this for two distinct reasons. First, we do not
possess a good edition of Avicenna’s commentary. Second, Discussions, like Notes, is perhaps
more appropriately and constructively regarded as the product of Avicenna’s circle, rather than as
a treatise penned by Avicenna himself.
 3 The pure quiddities and divine causation 705

Text 49: The first [kind of] duality in what is created [al-mubdaʿ]—whichever created thing that
may be—is that possibility [al-imkān] belongs to it by virtue of itself and existence [or necessi-
ty]¹⁶¹ belongs to it by virtue of the First Truth [al-ḥaqq al-awwal] … . Quiddity [in itself] is not
composite with regard to these two relations [min jihat al-nisbatayn],¹⁶² and it is not created
qua quiddity, but only inasmuch as it is connected with [realized] existence. If it is conceived
only in itself and in abstraction from all other things, quiddity is not a combination of quiddity
and existence granted by the First that makes it necessary; rather, existence is related to it as a
thing occurring to it [bal al-wujūd muḍāf ilayhā ka-shaʾy ṭārin ʿalāyhā]. Quiddity does not, there-
fore, entail duality in itself insofar as it is a quiddity, but this may nevertheless occur when the
quiddity is a thing composed in its true reality.¹⁶³

On the basis of this passage, it can be inferred that multiplicity is not intrinsic to
quiddity in itself, but rather arises from the external connections of quiddity with
possibility and realized existence (or necessity), once, and only once, it has come
to exist in concrete reality. In other words, God does not create first a quiddity
that would be intrinsically possible of existence or that would itself already possess
existence, only to endow it afterwards with realized existence and external attrib-
utes. Rather, these concomitants become attached to quiddity only as a result of cau-
sation unfolding in the exterior world. This kind of multiplicity in existence is sub-
sequent or comes ‘after’ the intellection of the divine mind. Avicenna reiterates some
of these points, while also elaborating on them, in two sections of Discussions that
partly mirror the one in Commentary. ¹⁶⁴ The first section is particularly important
for our purposes, because it tackles the issue of how possibility fits in an account
of metaphysical causation in a more pointed way:

Text 50: Problem [masʾalah]: It is said: ‘The first [kind of] duality in what is created [al-mubdaʿ]
is that possibility [al-imkān] belongs to it by virtue of itself and necessity [or existence] belongs
to it by virtue of the True First [al-ḥaqq al-awwal]. From these two things the existence of its
inner being is constituted.’ But if this is so, then where is the reality of its essence [ḥaqīqatu dhā-

 One can read either wujūd or wujūb here, although the fact that a quasi-similar passage in Dis-
cussions (see Text 50 below) proposes the latter makes that reading more likely.
 This is presumably a reference to quiddity’s relation to possibility and necessity, and, through
them, to nonexistence and existence.
 Avicenna, Commentary on Theology of Aristotle, 60.18‒61.11. As mentioned above, it is plausible
on my view that the term ‘existence’ (wujūd) that appears in the first sentence of this excerpt should
be read instead as ‘necessity’ (wujūb). Since Avicenna begins by mentioning ‘possibility,’ one expects
him to mention ‘necessity’ to maintain the argumentative symmetry. At any rate, this issue does not
impact on the main point here, which is that Avicenna is discussing a metaphysical duality with re-
gard to concrete, realized beings.
 Avicenna, Discussions, 309‒310, sections 867‒868, which raise the same questions regarding
quiddity and possibility as in Commentary, and which even quote verbatim from that work. The
exact textual and authorial relationship between these two works is an important issue that remains
to be elucidated, but is a task that cannot be taken up in the present study. The fact that the same set
of questions regarding essence and possibility appears in these late works suggests that this topic
preoccupied Avicenna acutely toward the end of his life. This is not surprising, given that these
are intricate questions he did not fully address in The Cure and Salvation.
706 V The Divine Origin of Pure Quiddity

tihi] from which possibility and necessity emerge, regardless of whether this essence is an intel-
lect or a reality from which it follows that it would be an intellect? So there must necessarily be
[in this case] a trinality [al-tathlīth]. Here is the reply by his hand [bi-khaṭṭihi]: Possibility is
among the concomitants [lawāzim] of quiddity that are entailed by quiddity, just as quiddity en-
tails many [other] things—for example, what the triangle entails with regard to its angles being
equal to two right angles, or what quiddity entails with regard to its parts. If there is a quiddity
that is not preceded by its possibility [e. g., the separate intellects], then this possibility exists
together with it [or is present to it, wujida lahā dhālika l-imkān], in the sense of it [possibility]
being existent [mawjūd], not in the sense of its being entailed by quiddity; for the thing, inas-
much as it is existent, is other than the aspect under which it is entailed by quiddity. But if
there is a possibility that precedes it [i. e., the possibility of contingent beings linked with mat-
ter], then its existence [in the concrete world] would [still] be with [or through] its quiddity [bi-
māhiyyatihā]. But this is a mystery [wa-hādhā sirr]. For this would be as good as having two
[states of] possibility characterizing [the thing] that is preceded by its quiddity.¹⁶⁵ What we
mean by the term ‘existence’ [wujūd] [here] is concrete [realized] existence, not [the notion of]
existence that encompasses the two states of individual and intellectual existence. This [intellec-
tual mode of] existence is also always constantly a concomitant of quiddity, for its [the quiddity]
being [kawnuhā] a thing and a quiddity is not its being this existence. This is inferred from the
difference between these two concepts [essence and existence] and the fact that one of them
[quiddity] is a subject [mawḍūʿ] for the other [existence].¹⁶⁶

Unlike in the related passage from Commentary on Theology of Aristotle, the interloc-
utor in Discussions has explicitly framed the relation between essence, possibility,
and necessity (or, alternatively, between essence, possibility, and existence) in
terms of a philosophical ‘problem’ or ‘issue’ (masʾalah). The issue that is raised is
whether these elements amount to a metaphysical trinality or merely to a duality.
Avicenna’s answer to this important question as preserved in this passage of Discus-

 This entire passage is very difficult and highly elliptical. Exactly what Avicenna considers a mys-
tery is not immediately clear. One interpretation is that he is contrasting here two distinct senses of
imkān: first, possibility as the potentiality connected with matter, which would apply only to material
beings, and which would be a sense of possibility that precedes the realization of the thing in exis-
tence; and second, a ‘metaphysical’ sense of possibility, which applies to all beings irrespective of
their relation to matter, and which has to do with a state of contingency and being caused. This met-
aphysical sense is the one that Avicenna regards as a necessary concomitant of quiddity in this pas-
sage, in the sense that anything that exists or can theoretically exist is essentially possible or mumkin
al-wujūd. These two senses of possibility are jointly discussed in other parts of the Avicennian corpus;
see especially Notes, 50, section 31. So perhaps the ‘mystery’ alluded to in this passage pertains to
how various senses of possibility relate to essence prior to its actualization and what ontological sta-
tus it may be said to have.
 That is, a subject of predication, but the point assumes a metaphysical dimension as well. The
‘being’ of quiddity has nothing to do with realized existence and even with the possibility of realized
existence. Quite relevantly, the expression Avicenna uses in this passage (kawnuhā) mirrors the Bah-
shamite use of this term to express the state of an attribute, which is not that of realized existence.
Hence, for example, blackness’s being blackness (kawn al-sawād sawādan) designates the Attribute
of the Essence of blackness and is distinct from its existing or being an existent (mawjūd) in the
strong sense in the concrete world.
 3 The pure quiddities and divine causation 707

sions is not as clearly articulated as one would wish.¹⁶⁷ Regardless, what is important
for the present purposes is that his argument apparently relies on the distinction be-
tween quiddity and its concomitants and, hence, on the māhiyyah-lawāzim model. In
this regard, like the previous excerpts taken from Notes and Commentary on Theology
of Aristotle, the passage from Discussions explicitly defines possibility as one of the
concomitants (lawāzim) of quiddity.
At this juncture, there are two questions I wish to address in more detail. The first
is: what kind of lāzim is possibility relative to quiddity? Since Avicenna applies the
term lāzim to various different items—to the non-constitutive but essential predicates
of essence, as well as to its accidents—it is important to clarify exactly what kind of
concomitant possibility amounts to. Second, does Avicenna regard possibility merely
as a mental concomitant or attribute, as a consideration or intention added to quid-
dity in the mind as a result of reflection? Or is possibility somehow reified and con-
ceived of as a real metaphysical feature, concomitant, or entity? Put differently, does
possibility represent an ontological state or mode that characterizes the quiddity in
existence?
Avicenna himself provides a relatively clear answer to the first question. He com-
pares the relation between quiddity and possibility to that between the quiddity of
triangle and the fact that the three angles of the triangle equal two right angles.
Now, the latter proposition, for Avicenna, is a non-constitutive concomitant (lāzim
ghayr muqawwim) of the quiddity of triangle, which, however, is not an accident
(ʿaraḍ) proper. This means that it is something that necessarily follows from the es-
sence of triangle without however being internal to it and without being a requisite
for the definition and conception of triangle to obtain. A non-constitutive concomi-
tant is different from the internal, essential constituents of the essence (muqawwi-
māt), on the one hand, as well as from the true accidents (aʿrāḍ) that may or may
not come to be realized in concrete existence, on the other. Implying that possibility
is a non-constitutive concomitant of essence has two important upshots. First, it con-
firms the idea, already put forth earlier, that possibility is in no way inherent to and
constitutive of pure quiddity. Thus, when Avicenna loosely asserts that essence is
possible, what he means is that possibility is entailed by essence, in the same man-
ner that oneness, multiplicity, universality, and particularity, for example, are en-

 This question should be regarded as a dialectical opportunity to explore the relations between
quiddity and its concomitants, and not as an issue requesting a clear-cut or definitive answer. Recall
that in the passage of Notes quoted above, Avicenna actually refers to the trinality (tathlīth) of the
First Effect. So one can perceive the first created thing either as a duality or a trinality (or, perhaps,
under even more aspects if one persists in this conceptual analysis), depending on how many con-
siderations (iʿtibārāt) of it are elaborated in the mind and also, importantly, how many concomitants
of quiddity are posited. Avicenna does not provide a clear answer to the question posed (this, of
course, might have something to do with the editing of Notes, where bits and pieces of Avicenna’s
writings were artificially collated, probably for didactic purposes). What is significant here is Avicen-
na’s treatment of how the concomitant of possibility relates to quiddity, which is the focus of the dis-
cussion.
708 V The Divine Origin of Pure Quiddity

tailed by essence. More specifically, what he means is that essence has a possibility
for ‘realized existence,’ which is also a concomitant and external to it. The implica-
tion is that the pure quiddities are not in themselves possible, but are so only as a re-
sult of an additional consideration or concomitant being added to them. This is an
important proviso to the commonly held view in the modern scholarship on Avicen-
na that essence and possibility are somehow interchangeable notions. Instead, the
foregoing suggests that quiddity is not in itself possible. Rather, it is its possible re-
lation to realized existence and to a potential efficient cause that makes it possible.
Consequently, and as a second upshot, God’s conceiving the pure quiddities need not
be a conception of them qua possibles (mumkināt), but only in themselves, which, in
this case, excludes possibility qua concomitant altogether and makes the essences
fully identical with His necessary essence. So defining imkān as a non-constitutive
concomitant of quiddity allows Avicenna to separate the divine intellection and cau-
sation entirely from possibility, which appears only at a posterior stage, once the
quiddities themselves become realized and acquire existence as a result of the divine
causation.
The second problem mentioned above is more intricate, because it intersects
with the broader issue of the real vs. conceptual distinction of essence and existence.
It would appear that Avicenna, even though he would define possibility primarily as
a mental notion and logical predicate, does not intend his comments on the relation
between possibility and essence to be limited to the logical and conceptual planes
alone. The cosmological context and the notions of divine creation and causation
that underpin these passages suggest that he ascribes a real ontological state or sta-
tus to this concomitant as it pertains to the concrete beings. This would go hand in
hand with his mereological and realist descriptions of quiddity and its concomitants
in concrete beings, as we saw in chapter III. This hypothesis seems to cohere also
with other statements encountered previously, such as when Avicenna asserts in Sal-
vation that “thingness is something other than existence in concrete reality [fī l-
aʿyān].”¹⁶⁸ In fact, toward the end of the passage of Discussions quoted above, Avi-
cenna explains that he is dealing expressly with realized, concrete existence and,
hence, with the relationship between quiddity and its concomitants in realized exis-
tence. This qualification is reiterated in the next section of Discussions:

Text 51: ‘Exactly how is possibility one of the concomitants [lawāzim] of the quiddities? Is it sub-
sumed under creation [al-ibdāʿ] or not? And is there a thing after the First that is not connected
with creation?’ The answer from his hand: The consideration [iʿtibār] that quiddity is possible is
other than the consideration that its possibility is existent as a concrete entity [mawjūd ʿaynan].
Likewise, the consideration that the triangle has angles that equal two right angles is other than
the consideration of whether this [concomitant or description] is actualized [or realized, ḥāṣil]
with the nonexistence [or privation] of the triangle. For this [concomitant or description] is en-
tailed by quiddity, and it is other than the existence in actuality that belongs to quiddity. Like-

 Avicenna, Salvation, 520.1‒2; transl. Wisnovsky, Avicenna’s Metaphysics, 163; see Text 11 above
for a discussion of this passage.
 3 The pure quiddities and divine causation 709

wise, the quiddity that is not an existent in actuality is a quiddity in the concrete world [by vir-
tue of its being] a meaning and essential entailment [ka-mā anna l-māhiyyah ghayr al-mawjūd bi-
l-fiʿl māhiyyah fī l-aʿyān mafhūman wa-luzūman].¹⁶⁹

In this—admittedly obscure and difficult—passage, Avicenna differentiates between

the considerations (iʿtibārāt) that pertain to quiddity taken in abstraction from exis-
tence and those that apply strictly to realized existence. Although this is standard
Avicennian practice, what makes this excerpt particularly interesting for my analysis
is its focus on the modality of possibility and its relation to quiddity in the mind and
in concrete reality. In this connection, although Avicenna describes possibility pri-
marily as a predicate or concomitant that derives from the very essence of a thing
and that would, consequently, appear to be limited to a consideration or to a notion-
al or conceptual act in the mind, he ends the passage by suggesting that quiddity
(and its concomitants) are also present in the concrete world qua meaning and es-
sential entailment (mafhūman wa-luzūman), be it only potentially. In other words,
Avicenna appears to extend to the concrete world the scope of essential entailment
he attributes to quiddity in the mind, in the very same way that he describes pure
quiddity, nature, true reality, and even sometimes the universals, as somehow ex-
tending to the exterior world and existing in concrete beings. The subtlety, however,
is that possibility in itself (al-imkān) cannot be said to exist as a separate concrete
thing in the world (mawjūd ʿaynan), for this would be an instance of reifying a con-
cept in a quite drastic and erroneous way. Yet, inasmuch as quiddity has an intelli-
gible reality and causality in the world, and inasmuch as the essential concomitants
of quiddity are entailed by it and come to be realized in existence through an exter-
nal cause, the concomitant of possibility can be said to possess a certain reality or
even existence that is attached to the concrete being and qualifies it in a real way.
Like the other non-constitutive concomitants of quiddity, such as oneness, particu-
larity, or universality, possibility would therefore possess a certain ontological reality
in those entities that possess realized existence. In that sense, it appears that Avicen-
na’s comments sometimes verge on a tendency to ontologize or reify logical notions,
or at least that he attributes a certain ontological entailment to these notions in the
exterior world.¹⁷⁰
Returning to Text 50, one observes that possibility can either be permanently at-
tached to quiddity, as in the case of eternal beings such as the separate intellects, or
it can precede the realization of quiddity in the concrete world, as in the case of per-
ishable material beings, where the possibility and potentiality of matter can be said,

 Avicenna, Discussions, section 868, p. 310. The beginning of the text in the form of questions
replicates a passage in Commentary on Theology of Aristotle (61.22‒24) with a slightly different phras-
ing.
 For another passage that seems to reify possibility to some extent, see Avicenna, Notes, 222, sec-
tion 354, where the master speaks of “the existence of the possible in the thing” (al-mumkin wujūduhu
fī l-shayʾ).
710 V The Divine Origin of Pure Quiddity

in a qualified sense, to precede the actualization of the concrete thing. In either case,
possibility concerns the realization and concretization of quiddity and, by implica-
tion, its connection to realized existence. Or rather, it implies the realization of the
external concomitants of quiddity. Avicenna makes it clear, however, that it is quid-
dity that entails possibility, not possibility that entails quiddity. The māhiyyah is al-
ways essentially prior to its lawāzim. Moreover, Avicenna’s distinction between intel-
lectual and concrete existence toward the end of Text 50 and his qualification that he
is discussing concrete existence specifically suggest that quiddity can exist in the in-
tellect without being attached in any way to possibility. To conclude, then, one sig-
nificant implication of the master’s argumentation in the passages discussed above
seems to be that, in the intellect, quiddity can be conceived of in abstraction from
possibility and existence. Both, in fact, are concomitants of quiddity and are entailed
by quiddity, but they do not entail quiddity. The ‘being’ of quiddity in the intellect is
thus distinct from the possibility of realized, concrete existence.
How do these remarks concerning possibility inform the discussion of God’s ob-
jects of knowledge? Let us return briefly to the main issue raised by Text 46 above.
There Avicenna writes that God knows “‘the other’ [al-ākhar], even if it does not [yet]
exist [contingently],” and that God knows both “realized and possible existence” (al-
wujūd al-ḥāṣil wa-l-mumkin). In making these claims, the master is obviously not re-
ferring to intelligibles that would exist in the First according to the mode of realized
existence that characterizes the contingent beings. Furthermore, Avicenna is also not
claiming that God knows them by turning His intellection outside of His own essence
toward these realized beings. In order to fully dispel these erroneous options, the
master adds that God knows these things “inasmuch as they are intellectually appre-
hended, not inasmuch as they have existence in external reality.” At the same time,
however, it would be absurd to presume that God knows these things qua devoid of
all existence, qua nonexistents, since the absolute nonexistent for Avicenna is im-
possible and is not, at any rate, ‘a thing.’ Nor can God be said to know them qua pos-
sibles (mumkināt), since this would introduce possibility in the divine essence. More-
over, on the standard modern interpretation of Avicenna, the ‘possible essence’ can
in no sense be said to exist in itself, and it is also irreversibly contaminated with pos-
sibility. What interpretive option remains? Given that the intelligibles in God are char-
acterized neither by nonexistence (ʿadam), nor by realized existence (wujūd muḥaṣ-
ṣal), nor even by possibility (imkān) construed as a concomitant of essence, then they
must exist in some other mode. The most compelling solution to this conundrum is to
identify these divine intelligibles with the pure quiddities. In themselves, the latter
exclude realized existence and possibility, and exist identically with the divine es-
sence. In that state or mode, the true quiddities, natures, and realities merge with
God’s absolute māhiyyah and ḥaqīqah and exclude possibility altogether. Avicenna’s
approach implies a sharp and uncompromising separation between quiddity and its
constitutive parts, on the one hand, and everything else that is external to it, namely,
the lawāzim, on the other. The master is here proposing a new elaboration on the
 4 Conclusion 711

māhiyyah-lawāzim model in his theological writings, building on what he had al-

ready achieved in his psychological and logical writings.

4 Conclusion

This chapter showed that there is substantial and crucial evidence in Avicenna’s
works that warrants the view that the separate intellects, including God Himself,
contemplate the pure quiddities. God knows the pure quiddities by knowing His
own essence. Moreover, the demiurgic or causative outcome entailed by His self-
knowledge consists in the intellection and causation of the pure quiddities. Divine
self-knowledge, knowledge of the pure essences, and causation of the essences in
the external world represent different stages or ‘moments’ (metaphorically speaking)
in the divine intellection. This implies that Avicenna defended the view of a multi-
plicity-in-unity along Neoplatonic lines, although he adapted this ancient philosoph-
ical view to fit his theory of essence. In parallel to this account, I articulated a new
interpretation regarding the thorny issue of how God’s ‘universal’ knowledge should
be understood, stressing the modulated nature of the notion of ‘universality’ (kul-
liyyah) in Avicenna’s philosophy, while also presenting the Avicennian theory of
pure quiddity as a useful tool to overcome a cluster of well-known interpretive pit-
falls linked to this topic. Due to their being intrinsically deprived of concomitants
and attributes, including oneness and multiplicity, as well as actuality and potential-
ity, the pure quiddities emerge as serious candidates for the objects of the divine in-
tellection. Taken as a whole, they constitute a valid intelligible content without en-
tailing numerical multiplicity, potentiality, or possibility in the divine essence. This
remarkable fact suggests that they, unlike many other classes of objects, are ideally
suited for a theory of divine, simple, and non-discursive intellection, such as the one
Avicenna advocates in his works. In addition, the māhiyyah-lawāzim distinction also
helps to explain how God, by knowing the pure quiddities, can know all the things
they entail, including, perhaps, particular things.
This new approach to divine knowledge in Avicenna—or rather, the new ration-
ale I provide for upholding this interpretation—opens new avenues of research for
the history of postclassical thought in Islam. Many post-Avicennian thinkers routine-
ly ascribe a plurality of intellectual objects to God, which they describe alternatively
as ‘things’ (ashyāʾ), ‘quiddities’ (māhiyyāt), ‘meanings’ (maʿānī), or ‘fixed entities’
(aʿyān thābitah). Far from being alien to Avicenna’s cosmological and theological
outlook, I tried to show that this common interpretation articulated in the postclass-
ical sources—from Rāzī in the twelfth century to Kūrānī in the seventeenth century
CE—finds support and a direct source of inspiration in the master’s works.¹⁷¹ On

 For Kūrānī’s position, see the detailed and enlightening study by Dumairieh, Intellectual Life.
712 V The Divine Origin of Pure Quiddity

my mind, this also calls for a re-evaluation of the Akbarian tradition and its relation
to Avicennism, all the more so given the intertwinement of philosophical, theologi-
cal, and mystical ideas in later Islamic intellectual history. What changes in the
works of these later authors is the explanation put forth regarding the ontological sta-
tus of these divine objects, i. e., whether they should be described as existent (maw-
jūd), as non-existent (maʿdūm), or as occupying an intermediary status between the
two (lā mawjūd wa-lā maʿdūm). But the basic presumption that God knows all things
and essences (by knowing Himself) and that His creation of the world relies on this
cognition of the many-in-the-one seems to have one of its roots in the Avicennian
texts. Whatever the case may be, what enables Avicenna to articulate this view of di-
vine self-knowledge and insert it within a strict philosophical formulation of tawḥīd
is the theory of pure quiddity and especially his māhiyyah-lawāzim model.
These results enable us to contextualize the theological aspect of Avicenna’s doc-
trine within his broader ontology. The question of the ontological status of quiddity
in itself has typically been framed in the modern scholarship in terms of its existence
or nonexistence, where existence is taken to correspond necessarily to one of the two
aspects of realized or acquired existence Avicenna frequently refers to in his works:
complex and caused concrete and mental existence (al-wujūdayn). This dual theory
of realized existence dictates that entities that fall under it be composite or complex,
conditioned, caused, and contingent. In other words, this kind of existence presup-
poses a proliferation of concrete or intellectual accidents and concomitants that are
necessarily entailed by a quiddity. These concomitants of quiddity, which are onto-
logically external to it, are the condition sine qua non of realized and acquired exis-
tence in Avicenna’s ontology, which is why the master refers to this aspect of quiddity
as conditioned by other things (bi-sharṭ shayʾ ākhar). Although this ontological
model holds true for most beings of Avicenna’s ontology, quiddity in itself, like
the First, represents an exception and cannot be straightforwardly included in al-
wujūdayn. In contrast to these contingent and conditioned beings, quiddity in itself
possesses a distinct mode of existence, which can be described as prior, absolute,
simple, and unconditioned. Moreover, I argued that this special mode of existence
is also different from what one might call ‘neutral existence’ or ‘subsistence’ as con-
strued by some medieval and modern scholars. Hence, one of the fundamental the-
ses put forth by this study is nothing short of the claim that Avicenna posited a spe-
cial mode of existence that belongs exclusively and irreducibly to pure quiddity. As
this chapter has shown, the reason why the First and the pure quiddities are excep-
tions in Avicenna’s ontology is because they share a common source, or, more pre-
cisely, because the pure quiddities find their originative source in God’s special ex-
istence.

Dumairieh’s analysis shows the debt that a later thinker such as Kūrānī owes to Avicennism in ad-
dition to kalām sources and the Akbarian tradition.
 4 Conclusion 713

In this connection, the present study also made a series of claims regarding the
problem of the localization of pure quiddity. I tried to show that the medieval scho-
lastic and modern interpretations—notably that of Marwan Rashed—that locate the
pure quiddities in God and Marmura’s tentative hypothesis of a distinct (human)
mental existence of the pure quiddities are equally valid and have to be unified
into a common theory of the ontology of quiddity. These contexts of quidditative exis-
tence jointly depend on the postulation of this special and unconditioned existential
mode that characterizes quiddity. It is because pure quiddity belongs to neither as-
pect of realized existence and is free of all the concomitants associated with them
that it is possible for it to exist in God, in concrete individuals, and in the human
mind as an epistemic and ontological constant. Fundamentally, however, the
mode of existence of pure quiddity is intellectual or rather intelligible, and so
pure quiddity should be regarded primarily as a distinct and irreducible entity in
the intellect. In this regard, Avicenna’s debt to the late-antique discussions about
the universals or common things as existing before multiplicity (in the divine
world), in multiplicity (in concrete individuals), and after multiplicity (in human
minds) was emphasized and incorporated into the analysis. In spite of significant di-
vergences in terminology and doctrine, Avicenna maintained and thoroughly adapt-
ed this basic scheme in his metaphysics. These various levels of discourse and his
views regarding the ontological localization of pure quiddity are underpinned by
this Neoplatonic heritage. Grafted onto this scheme is the idiosyncratic Avicennian
theory of proper existence, as well as ideas co-opted from the Bahshamite ontolog-
ical tradition, which are deftly unified into a single essentialist doctrine. In brief, it
seems that Avicenna inherited wholesale, but also transformed considerably, the
late-antique philosophical template for interpreting the ontological problem of the
universals. He adapted it thoroughly to his metaphysical and theological system
by combining it with new sets of conceptual distinctions he devised as well as
with elements taken from kalām. The result is a unique and highly intricate doctrine
that finds no exact parallel in the previous Greek and Arabic sources.
If one adopts this line of interpretation, some of the protracted textual and doc-
trinal paradoxes that arise from the scrutiny of Avicenna’s writings—that quiddity in
itself somehow exists, but that it exists neither in the mind nor in the concrete world;
that pure quiddity exists both in things and distinctly from them; that pure quiddity
can exist in different ontological contexts, etc.—turn out not to be paradoxes at all,
but differences in formulation that depend entirely on context and emphasis. Avicen-
na is sometimes keen to rely on negative formulations and to stress what pure quid-
dity is not, especially when he contrasts its mode of being to that of the realized con-
comitants. At other times, he is intent on depicting it in positive terms. Hence, when
it comes to pure quiddity, just as when it comes to the First, Avicenna’s speech os-
cillates between apophatic and kataphatic statements, which are not in any way in-
tended to be paradoxical, but rather complementary. In this light, the dilemma of
having to relate quiddity in itself either to acquired existence or to nonexistence
strikes one as artificial. The problem should be recast in terms of distinguishing be-
714 V The Divine Origin of Pure Quiddity

tween various contexts, aspects, and modes of existence, as well as engaging in a

process of disambiguation of the various senses of wujūd that Avicenna outlines in
his works. This approach yields questions that are more intricate but also more
nuanced and relevant, since the ontological judgments emitted by the human
mind regarding quiddity will vary depending on whether relations are introduced be-
tween it and other things or whether it is considered purely in itself. Here again, an
intriguing parallel between pure quiddity and what is, in Avicenna’s eyes, the correct
way of talking about the First can be highlighted: the First can be conceived of either
‘in itself’ and with ‘a negative condition’ (the divine essence), or together ‘with other
things’ and through ‘relations’ or ‘relational attributes,’ i. e., in relation to the created
world.
Another crucial point that emerges from this chapter is that mental existence is
not reducible to complex universal mental existence, where universality is construed
as one of many external and posterior concomitants of quiddity connected with in-
tentionality in the human mind. Rather, pure quiddity exists in the human and di-
vine intellects without being strictly speaking a universal construed in the traditional
sense and, hence, without assuming the mental concomitants that affect the complex
and conditioned universal concepts present in the human mind. The alternative view
held by some scholars of Avicenna to the effect that existence in the mind necessarily
implies a set of mental concomitants and accidents—with the consequence that pure
quiddity cannot exist intellectually as a distinct entity, although it may be an object
of epistemic or logical consideration—creates unsurmountable problems when it
comes to divine intellection and also leaves unanswered crucial passages in Meta-
physics, such as the one where Avicenna states unambiguously that ‘negatively-con-
ditioned’ quiddity exists in the mind (and where the proposition ‘negatively-condi-
tioned quiddity’ clearly cannot correspond to the complex universal). Not only is
pure quiddity epistemically distinct in the human mind, but it is also ontologically
distinct. In contrast, in God’s intellect it is for all intents and purposes indistinguish-
able from His essence. The latter point is tenable thanks to Avicenna’s special de-
scription of pure quiddity as something that is neither one nor many, neither actual
nor potential, etc. This point in turn enables the formulation of new solutions to old
theological problems affecting Avicenna’s theories of God’s knowledge and exis-
tence. In teasing out Avicenna’s often implicit position regarding these issues, I
had the opportunity to insist on the importance and relevance of the late-antique
Greek Neoplatonic sources as well as the Arabic kalām sources for understanding
Avicenna’s approach. Plotinus’s theory of the Intellectual-Principle, the Neoplatonic
tripartition of the universals and especially the recognition of a class of universals
‘before multiplicity’ unlinked to human thought, as well as the narrow connection
in Neoplatonism between intellection and causation, are all aspects that came to in-
form Avicenna’s theory of pure quiddity in a divine context. Likewise, the Bahsha-
mite theory of the intrinsic epistemic and ontological irreducibility of the Attribute
of the Essence, which is known by God irrespective of its realization in existence, pro-
foundly informed Avicenna’s ontology and theology of quiddity. Ultimately, then, the
 4 Conclusion 715

divine origin of pure quiddity in Avicenna’s system should be regarded as his re-
sponse to both the Greek Neoplatonists and the mutakallimūn. It is also what
lends doctrinal cohesiveness and gnoseological depth to his doctrine of quiddity,
since it enables him to elaborate sophisticated theories regarding reversion and
final causality, human beings’ intellectual perfection and self-fulfillment, and the
symmetry between the divine and human realms. All of these theories rest on the
premise of the ontological and epistemic irreducibility, constancy, and ubiquity of
the pure quiddities and on the archetypal and primitive existence of these quiddities
in the divine intellects. In this regard, the overlap of Avicenna’s technical vocabulary
of nature and pure quiddity in a psychological, metaphysical and theological context
is remarkable and certainly not coincidental. To take but one example, God’s unique
and essential maʿnā is by extension the maʿnā of all the pure quiddities, which find
their ultimate source, truth, and ontological grounding in God, where they exist iden-
tically with His essence. These quiddities themselves are in turn frequently described
as maʿānī, a term which, when traced back to their divine origin, should be taken in
its semantic and epistemic dimension—God provides the foundational meaning and
truth for all quiddities—as well as in its ontological and entitative sense—these quid-
dities exist in God, but without producing any multiplicity.
Conclusion
The aim of this study was to provide a systematic and comprehensive analysis of Avi-
cenna’s theory of pure quiddity in three different philosophical contexts—the human
mind, the concrete world, and the divine world. The results adduced in this book en-
able us to conclude that the theory of quiddity in itself represents a central feature of
Avicenna’s ontology, theology, and epistemology and underlies virtually every major
metaphysical doctrine articulated by the master. Furthermore, it displays a high de-
gree of doctrinal coherence and serves to bridge Avicenna’s logical, psychological,
and metaphysical expositions, thereby also enabling a unifying interpretation of
his philosophy. In its broad lines, Avicenna’s ontology of quiddity marks a crucial
departure from earlier ontological systems and opens new avenues of abstract think-
ing and conceptualization that were to profoundly mark subsequent intellectual his-
tory. This is true especially of his discussions of quiddity in the mind and its rele-
vance to the issue of mental existence; his elucidation of the epistemic and
ontological relations between the constituents of quiddity and its external concom-
itants, or what I called the māhiyyah-lawāzim model or distinction; his sophisticated
classification of the extramental and mental conditions (shurūṭ) of quiddity; and his
reconfiguration of ontology by means of a theory of modulation (tashkīk), which he
applies to various key notions (such as universality, unity, form, priority), but espe-
cially to existence or wujūd. These innovations enabled him to develop a full-fledged
theory of the intelligible being of quiddity, and they also decisively influenced, albeit
in different forms and through different means, the later development of Latin and
Hebrew scholastic thought as well as the postclassical Islamic discourses on essence
and existence.
In this book I argued that one of Avicenna’s main contributions to the history of
philosophy was his ascription of a distinct ontological and epistemological status to
pure quiddity, or quiddity ‘in itself,’ in the human mind and in the divine intellects.
This doctrine not only had major metaphysical and theological implications in his
works and those of his successors; it also greatly expanded the horizon of theoretical
reflection and eventually transformed the field of Arabic epistemology as a whole.
For, in the Arabic philosophical tradition prior to Avicenna, the only entity that
could be considered or conceived of strictly or absolutely ‘in itself,’ i. e., as not entail-
ing any accidents, attributes, or concomitants, was the First Cause or God, which, as
many thinkers were intent on stressing, is multiple neither in concrete reality nor in
the mind. To this theological constant or absolute, Avicenna added the conceptual-
ization of a pristine, irreducible, transcendent, and essentially intelligible object:
quiddity in itself, which can be considered in abstraction from all other things, of ev-
erything else that is not strictly itself. By expanding the scope of conceptual thought
to include the pure quiddities and pure natures, Avicenna not only complexified and
deepened the notion of mental existence, but also granted the mind a heightened

[Link]
 Conclusion 717

and unique ability to know abstract objects and the inner realities of things in a sim-
ple and unmediated way.
In this fashion, Avicenna accomplished in metaphysics what he had also striven
to achieve in mathematics by placing algebra on a special theoretical and undeter-
mined epistemic plane and defining it as a pure object of conceptual thought.¹ In
both cases, his innovative outlook hinged on the postulation of an abstract, irredu-
cible, autonomous, and, ultimately, intelligibly transcendent realm of mental enti-
ties, which enabled a degree of theoretical reflection not attained by previous epis-
temological systems.²
In conjunction with these claims, I argued that Avicenna’s theory of pure quid-
dity emerged out of a dialectical encounter with two major historic ontological tradi-
tions—the late-antique Greek tradition and the Muʿtazilite, especially Bahshamite,
tradition. More specifically, it is the convergence of the late-antique debate about
the universals and the kalām debate about the ontology of the thing (shayʾ) and
the states (aḥwāl) that decisively shaped his views on the epistemology and ontology
of pure quiddity, either by way of direct appropriation, or, most often, by way of crit-
ical adaptation and transformation of the material Avicenna found in those sources.
If the Neoplatonic sources provided the main theoretical framework for his treatment
of universals, and if the Bahshamite theory of the Attribute of the Essence was a di-
rect model for his discussion of quiddity in itself, Avicenna added to this inherited
philosophical substrate his own ontological innovations and concerns. On the one
hand, he devises new sets of distinctions to better conceptualize the relation be-
tween quiddity and its concomitants, as well as quiddity and existence. On the
other, he prioritizes certain issues, e. g., mental existence and its various criteria,
which were only touched upon or relegated to a secondary position by his predeces-
sors.

 See Roshdi Rashed, Mathématiques, 34‒35. As Rashed explains, “Aussi l’objet des algébristes, ‘la
chose’, doit-il être suffisamment général pour recevoir des contenus divers ; mais il doit en outre ex-
ister indépendamment de ses propres déterminations … . Du statut ontologique d’un tel objet, la thé-
orie aristotélicienne ne peut, à l’évidence, rendre compte. Il faut donc faire intervenir une nouvelle
ontologie, qui autorise à parler d’un objet dépourvu des caractères qui, pourtant, auraient seuls per-
mis de discerner de quoi il est l’abstraction.” The parallels between Avicenna’s mathematical and
metaphysical theories are indeed striking, as Roshdi Rashed notes, and may have proceeded from
a common methodological concern. Nevertheless, the causality underlying this development, as
well as Rashed’s claim that Avicenna applied to his metaphysics a framework that had already
been devised in his mathematical works and in the larger mathematical culture of his day, remain
on my view questionable. I would be more inclined to trace the origin of the Avicennian doctrine
of pure quiddity primarily to the set of Greek and Arabic theological and philosophical sources he
consulted, rather than to mathematical sources, without denying that the latter may have played a
role as well.
 The rich array of terms and expressions in Appendix 1 referring to this pristine and abstracted as-
pect of pure quiddity testifies to the importance of this phenomenon in Avicenna’s methodology.
718 Conclusion

In my view, the outstanding features of Avicenna’s approach to what was, at

root, an old problem in both the Greek and Muʿtazilite traditions—namely, how we
can conceive of the essence of things and how this concept in our mind relates to
reality—amount to two in particular: first, he deliberately and decisively reoriented
the discussion to focus on mental existence specifically and proceeded to elucidate
the various conditions and criteria surrounding the conception and existence of
quiddity in the mind. This is what eventually led him to his original theory of pure
quiddity as a distinct and unique intellectual object. Second, and as a direct corol-
lary of this, he was forced to reconfigure the ontological models and interpretations
of existence he inherited from these traditions in order to address these new con-
cerns, many of which were derived from his immersion in the Bahshamite sources.
The study showed that Avicenna was deeply influenced by Bahshamite ontology, es-
pecially their theory of the Attribute of the Essence (ṣifat al-dhāt) and how it relates
to the other essential attributes (al-ṣifāt al-dhātiyyah), especially the attribute of ex-
istence (ṣifat al-wujūd). Avicenna’s sharp distinction between the ontology of pure
quiddity or essence taken in itself (i. e., its essential intelligible being) and the ontol-
ogy of the concomitants of quiddity, and by extension, of the māhiyyah-lawāzim com-
pound (i. e., realized, contingent, and complex existence), can be partly traced to
these Muʿtazilite texts, although it was also informed by the Greek ontological tradi-
tion and more specifically by Aristotle’s ideas regarding the predication of being as
articulated in Metaphysics.
These Muʿtazilite sources, it should be noted, provided many of the key issues,
terms, and notions Avicenna relies upon in his own investigation. However, they
could not satisfactorily tackle the problem of mental existence, which was naturally
raised by these theologians’ postulation of intrinsically conceivable and intelligible
nonexistent things (through the Attribute of the Essence). It is this state of affairs that
prompted Avicenna to creatively elaborate on and amplify his ontology in an attempt
to accommodate the new ontological status of pure quiddity. Hence, Avicenna’s doc-
trine of the special ontological mode of pure quiddity can be defined as a direct re-
sponse to (what he regarded as) an inappropriate Muʿtazilite solution (the interme-
diary ontological status of the states) to a valid Muʿtazilite problem (the
ontological status of mental objects and especially of the Attribute of the Essence).
Avicenna solved this conundrum by engaging in a process of disambiguation of
the notion of existence in light of the Greek sources and expanding the senses
and modes of existence (through modulation or tashkīk) to include the special intel-
ligible status of pure quiddity and the notion of essential being. It is, I believe, the
unique confluence of these various sources in the master’s works that was responsi-
ble for shaping his idiosyncratic doctrine of essence as articulated in The Cure. In
light of the foregoing, it is unclear whether Avicenna’s ontology is best described
as an elaboration on late-antique Aristotelian-Neoplatonic ontology or as an elabo-
ration on Bahshamite ontology. But this is a moot question, and, ultimately, a poorly
formulated one. It is more precise to say that Avicenna creatively adapted some fea-
 Conclusion 719

tures of both Aristotelian-Neoplatonic and Bahshamite ontology to fashion his own,

distinct, and fundamentally unique system.
Arguably, however, the main framework through which Avicenna approaches
these philosophical problems remains the late-antique Greek theorizations of the
universals. The reason for this is that the analysis of quiddity interfaces in Avicenna’s
works with that of the universals and universality. In this regard, the Neoplatonic leg-
acy supplied the threefold distinction of universality in the human mind, in concrete
reality, and in the divine intellects, a framework which could be conveniently applied
to the notion of quiddity. Avicenna appears to have been highly indebted to the late-
antique Greek discourse on the common things and universals, as well as highly cre-
ative in his own treatment of the problem. At any rate, he played a key role in reshap-
ing this ancient legacy, and his views on quiddity—supported as they were by tradi-
tional and new distinctions, concepts, and theories of the universals—deeply
influenced later philosophical and theological disquisitions in the Islamic world
and the Latin West.
One reason why Avicenna’s views proved so influential on the later philosophi-
cal traditions of postclassical Islam and medieval Europe was that their sophistica-
tion and, at times, ambiguity, enabled and even encouraged a wide range of interpre-
tations. For example, Avicenna’s outlook on how universality relates to pure essence
is intricate and cannot be framed in simplistic terms. On the one hand, he sharply
distinguishes between the two notions and articulates his theory of pure quiddity
largely on the basis of this distinction. On the other hand, there are philosophical
residues scattered throughout his writings that inextricably connect pure quiddity
with universality in an essential way, suggesting a highly flexible and modulated
handling of this notion. For one thing, Avicenna frequently talks about God’s univer-
sal knowledge of things or His knowledge of universals, a position to be connected
historically with the view that God knows the universals ante rem, as he himself in-
timates in Introduction I.12. What is more, he at times refers to the quiddities or na-
tures in the concrete world as (potential) universals, and he is also inclined to regard
the concept of pure quiddity in the mind as being essentially (as opposed to acciden-
tally) universal, or as possessing its own special sense of universality. Finally, and
perhaps most importantly, the fact that Avicenna mentions and applies a wide
range of terms and conceptual tools to his inquiry into quiddity, which are immedi-
ately derived from the Greek sources —such as the threefold scheme before, in, and
after multiplicity, the concepts of nature and of the commonality of nature in concrete
individuals, of abstraction, etc.—indicates that he was thoroughly inscribed in the
continuation of this philosophical trend and could not extricate himself fully from
this tradition. This, of course, makes Avicenna a Neoplatonist in ways that have
not hitherto been fully acknowledged. Nonetheless, whereas the Neoplatonists had
devised these tools expressly to address the set of questions pertaining to the univer-
sals that was formulated in Porphyry’s Eisagoge, and which concerned especially
how Aristotle’s theory of universals as mental concepts related to Plato’s theory of
universals as archetypal forms, Avicenna, while also addressing these queries, put
720 Conclusion

them at the service of a personal investigation of the intrinsic nature of pure quiddity
and its ontological and epistemological status. Universality as such, redefined merely
as one of the many external concomitants of pure quiddity, becomes for him a cor-
ollary issue and part of a much larger and multifaceted philosophical project focus-
ing on the ontology and knowability of quiddity.
The various results generated in this book have alternatively corroborated older
interpretations of Avicenna’s philosophy, questioned or challenged the majority opin-
ion regarding some specific aspects of his thought, and provided fresh attempts at
solving the most daunting problems associated with essence. The study showed
that the question of the ontological status of pure quiddity is not reducible to a single
issue, but is complex and multifaceted: it is made up of several interconnected issues
and unfolds in various philosophical contexts, each one of them calling for a de-
tailed case study. Part of this complexity arises from the variety of the philosophical
and kalām sources Avicenna taps into and synthesizes in his works. Another has to
do with his conceptual framework. At the heart of his approach is a subtle matrix of
logical distinctions, which are carried over into the metaphysical arena and adapted
to his ontological, noetical, and causal theories.
One of the master’s most radical departures from the earlier tradition, albeit one
that was to some extent anticipated by his predecessor Yaḥyā b. ʿAdī, was to exploit
the ontologization of logical notions, and more specifically of the logical relation-
ships between the internal constituents and external concomitants of quiddity. Pur-
suing the trail opened by Marwan Rashed, the study showed that Yaḥyā’s metaphy-
sics decisively influenced Avicenna’s reflection on essence and the universals, as well
as their relation to existence. Nevertheless, the Persian thinker elaborated on his
predecessor by devising a sophisticated theory of ontological modulation (tashkīk
al-wujūd). This theory, which relied on a set of well-thought-out modes or aspects de-
signed to modulate existence, enabled him to distinguish what is ontologically in-
trinsic, constant, simple, and uncaused, from what is extrinsic, contingent, complex,
and caused, and (by implication) to extend ontological modulation to cases of essen-
tial being, namely, God and pure quiddity. Avicenna’s rigor and analytical depth in
this regard surpass the more succinct metaphysical treatment one finds in Yaḥyā’s
treatises. Nevertheless, the philosophical connection between these two thinkers re-
mains a highly significant one, which deserves further scrutiny.
It is as a result of these major shifts in ontological perspective that pure quiddity
emerges in Avicenna’s philosophy as an epistemic and ontological constant, which is
characterized by a single, special ontological mode, but which can nonetheless be
said to exist in various different contexts and under different aspects. This ensures
that the epistemology of quiddity is to some extent commensurate with the ontology
of quiddity. Put differently, to every conceptualization of quiddity, there is a corre-
sponding ontological context, aspect, or mode of quiddity. In this regard, it was ar-
gued that quiddity in itself and the universal exist distinctly in the mind, albeit in a
different mode, and that quiddity also exists in the extramental context in concrete
beings as a nature, a reality, and a quidditative meaning. However, in each case, it is
 Conclusion 721

quiddity in itself that exists, either alone, or together with material or mental con-
comitants. This means that there is a constancy of pure quiddity across the ontolog-
ical spectrum. The quiddity that exists in concrete beings is just quiddity, and is
hence no other than the quiddity that exists in the mind. In every case, then, quid-
dity in itself exists either as a part of concrete or mental existents or simply as a dis-
tinct object in the mind. In this regard, one crucial distinction that was established in
the analysis was between irreducibility and distinctness. Pure essence, regardless of
its context or the aspect of existence with which it is associated, is always in itself
irreducible, but it is not always distinct, in the sense that it may be combined
with external attributes or accidents and exist together with them. It is only ever
both irreducible and distinct when contemplated in itself as a pure concept in the
mind. In contrast, one position Avicenna consistently rejects is that pure quiddity
can be said to exist separately (mufāriqah, mufradah) in the concrete world, a
view he associates with Platonism. So whereas Avicenna posits a special intelligible
being of quiddity, he rejects its separate and independent existence in the concrete
world.
In hindsight, I believe that the Latin scholastic tradition—as well as some mod-
ern scholars stemming from this tradition—were right to speak of esse essentiae in
Avicenna’s philosophy, even though they might originally have intended something
quite different by it.³ On the basis of their exegesis of the Avicennian writings, some
of the medieval Latin philosophers proceeded to adapt such a theory to specific as-
pects of their system and were especially keen to tease out the theological implica-
tions of such a view. In addition, they paid heed to the emphasis Avicenna laid on
mental existence and especially on the possibility of a purely intelligible and tran-
scendent mode of being characterizing pure quiddity in the mind. On my reconstruc-
tion of the evidence, there is undeniably a certain intellectual affiliation that stretch-
es from Avicenna to thinkers such as Duns Scotus, Gabriel Vasquez, Francisco
Suárez, and even some idealist philosophers of early modern Europe. A rich com-
mentatorial literature also flourished in the Arabic tradition in the wake of Avicen-
na’s philosophical legacy. These Muslim authors programmatically and intensively
discussed the māhiyyah-lawāzim distinction Avicenna devised and the hypothesis
of the mental and concrete existence of pure quiddity. What is more, they often im-
plicitly endorsed a realist ontological position, although more research on this issue
is called for.
Regardless of these later developments, which, as fascinating as they are, should
be regarded as transformative interpretations of Avicenna, this study has made a

 As mentioned in the Introduction, this interpretive tradition stretches from Henry of Ghent and
Duns Scotus to some modern scholars, even though it underwent several permutations in the interim.
Although the Latin Scholastics were justified in implicitly ascribing to Avicenna a theory of essential
being, the sources and ramifications of his ontology of quiddity are more complex than they could
have fathomed. This is understandable, given that they did not have access to the entirety of the Avi-
cennian corpus and were reading Latin translations of the master’s works.
722 Conclusion

case for the idea that the ontology of quiddity underscores the master’s entire epis-
temology, metaphysics, and theology. It ultimately allows for a unifying and integrat-
ed interpretation of these disciplines in his philosophy. Furthermore, it proposes en-
gaging solutions to traditional and persistent Avicennian conundrums, such as the
theory of psychological abstraction vs. emanation, God’s knowledge of universals
and particulars, the relationship between essence and existence in God, how a plu-
rality of intelligibles can be said to exist in God without causing multiplicity and pos-
sibility, and how quiddity can be said to exist ubiquitously in human minds and in
concrete beings without this entailing absurd metaphysical consequences.
In retrospect, it seems that two of the most recognizable theories proffered by
interpreters on behalf of the master, namely, the theory of essential being and the
theory of the co-extensionality of essence and existence, can be daringly but fruitful-
ly reconciled. The ontology of essence does not contradict the thesis of the co-exten-
sionality of essence and existence. Rather, it strengthens it and compels us to re-
frame the relationship between these notions in light of Avicenna’s highly
elaborate theory of modulation. The results of this study suggest that the relation be-
tween ‘the thing’ and ‘the existent,’ between ‘thingness’ and ‘existence,’ needs to be
subjected to various qualifications and does not allow for a simple answer. Avicenna,
contra the Muʿtazilites, does not recognize nonexistent things (ashyāʾ maʿdūmah).
Nor does he recognize attributes (ṣifāt) and states (aḥwāl) that occupy an intermedi-
ary position between existence and nonexistence, or which could in any way qualify
a nonexistent thing. The thing, for Avicenna, is always an existent, and vice versa.
This holds both for the concrete existents of the extramental world and for mental
existents, such as the universal concept horse. At the very least, then, a thing is al-
ways a mental existent for Avicenna, a mawjūd fī l-dhihn or fī l-ʿaql.
But this problematic increases in difficulty with regard to ‘thingness’ itself, i. e.,
the very essential reality of the thing, since a conception of thingness in complete
abstraction from existence, which is possible according to Avicenna, would seem
to entail a dissociation between these notions. In effect, this was the Muʿtazilite po-
sition, which recognizes and validates the status of the nonexistent thing, while at
the same time positing that thingness subsists in the Attribute of the Essence. The
latter, qua attribute, occupies an intermediary state (ḥāl) between existence and non-
existence and remains intelligible to the mind. On this point, however, Avicenna de-
parts from the Muʿtazilites and refuses to conceive of thingness in the mind as merely
a subsistent or actual state divested of existence. Rather, thingness possesses its own
irreducible, special or proper existence, which can be defined as its intelligible and
irreducible being what it is. This, of course, implies in a sense the co-extensionality
of thingness and existence in a way precluded by Bahshamite ontology. What is
more, it even implies, in the case of the intellection of pure quiddity, an identity be-
tween the two, and, as a result, a certain co-intensionality as well between these no-
tions. Here drawing a parallel between pure quiddity and the strict identity and co-
intensionality of essence and existence in God is inevitable and in fact required to
make sense of the former case, given the divine origin of the pure quiddities.
Appendix 1:
The Avicennian terminology of pure quiddity
Introduction of The Cure

-al-māhiyyah bi-mā hiya tilka l-māhiyyah (I.2, 15.2)

-al-ḥayawāniyyah (I.12, 65.13)
-al-ḥayawān fī nafsihi (I.12, 65.16‒17)

Categories of The Cure

-ṭabīʿat al-ḥayawān (I.5, 38.18‒39.1)

-al-ḥayawān bi-mā huwa ḥayawān faqaṭ (I.5, 39.6)
-al-insāniyyah (II.4, 75.7‒8)
-al-bayāḍ … li-dhātihi (II.4, 75.13)
-al-thalāthiyyah … wa-l-rubāʿiyyah (II.4, 76.3‒6)
-al-shayʾiyyah (IV.5, 159.19 ff.)

On the Soul of The Cure

-māhiyyat al-insāniyyah ṭabīʿah (58.12)

-ṭabīʿat al-insāniyyah (58.15)

Physics of The Cure

-māhiyyat al-insān min ḥaythu huwa insān (I.3, 29.14‒15)

-al-insāniyyah māhiyyah (I.4, 34.5)
-al-insān bi-mā huwa insān (I.4, 34.9‒10)
-al-sawād al-muṭlaq (II.2, 131.10)
-al-ḥarakah al-muṭlaqah (II.2, 134.1)
-ṭabāʾiʿ al-umūr wa-dhawātihā mujarradat al-māhiyyāt (II.2, 134.11)

Metaphysics of The Cure

-ḥaqīqah huwa bi-hā mā huwa (I.5, 31.6)

-ḥaqīqah khāṣṣah hiya māhiyyah (I.5, 31.10)
-al-ḥaqīqah allatī ʿalayhā l-shayʾ (I.5, 31.8‒9)
-al-farasiyyah, al-ḥayawāniyyah (V.1, 196.8; 203.8, 17)
-al-farasiyyah fī nafsihā farasiyyah faqaṭ (V.1, 196.16)
-huwwiyat al-insāniyyah (V.1, 197.10‒11)
-al-insāniyyah min ḥaythu hiya insāniyyah (V.1, 197.13)
-min ḥaythu huwa/hiya insāniyyah faqaṭ (V.1, 198.7; 198.12‒13; 200.9)
-bi-mā huwa huwa (V.1, 198.8)
-insāniyyah faqaṭ (V.1, 198.13, 16; 199.6)
-al-insāniyyah allatī hiya min ḥaythu hiya insāniyyah (V.1, 200.3‒5)
-al-ḥayawān bi-mā huwa ḥayawān, al-insān bi-mā huwa insān (V.1, 201.1‒2; 202.3‒4)

[Link]
724 Appendix 1: The Avicennian terminology of pure quiddity

-ḥayawān manẓūr ilayhi waḥdahu (V.1, 201.6)

-al-ḥayawān bi-dhātihi (V.1, 201.8)
-dhātuhu lahu bi-dhātihi (V.1, 201.9)
-ḥayawān faqaṭ wa-insān faqaṭ (V.1, 201.13)
-ṭabīʿat al-ḥayawāniyyah (V.1, 203.2)
-al-ḥayawān fī annahu ḥayawān (V.1, 203.6)
-al-ḥayawān bi-mujarrad al-ḥayawāniyyah (V.1, 204.8)
-huwa alladhī huwa fī nafsihi (V.1, 204.9‒10)
-al-maʾkhūdh bi-dhātihi hiya l-ṭabīʿah (V.1, 204.17)
-al-ḥayawān al-mujarrad (V.1, 205.5)
-ṭabīʿat al-insān min ḥaythu huwa insān (V.2, 207.10)

Salvation

-al-māhiyyah al-insāniyyah ṭabīʿah (344.10)

-ṭabīʿat al-insāniyyah (344.13‒14)
-amr mushtarak … huwa l-shayʾiyyah (520.1‒2)
-al-insān bi-mā huwa insān (536.8)
-al-insāniyyah bi-mā hiya insāniyyah (536.16)
-al-lawniyyah fī annahā lawniyyah (563.12)

Pointers

-ḥaqīqat al-muthallath (vol. 1, 189.1‒2)

-al-ṭabīʿah al-aṣliyyah … mithl al-insāniyyah (vol. 1, 204.5)
-al-insāniyyah (vol. 1, 202.9)
-ḥaqīqatuhu l-dhātiyyah (vols. 3‒4, 440.3)
-ḥaqīqat al-muthallathiyyah (vols. 3‒4, 441.5)

Notes

-al-insāniyyah al-muṭlaqah (43.11, section 25)

-al-insāniyyah al-mujarradah (44.4‒5, section 26)
-huwa bi-mā huwa ḥayawān (61.6, section 49)
-huwa min ḥaythu huwa ḥayawān (61.7, section 49)
-al-sawād al-muṭlaq (99.12‒13, section 121)
-ṭabīʿat al-insān bi-mā hiya tilka l-ṭabīʿah (139.1, section 185)
-kawn al-ḥayawān ḥayawān (394.5, section 699)
-al-ḥayawāniyyah … min ḥaythu hiya ḥayawāniyyah (394.4‒5, section 699)
Appendix 2:
The existence of pure quiddity: A list of textual
references
Introduction of The Cure
I.2, 15.1: wa-māhiyyāt al-ashyāʾ qad takūn fī aʿyān al-ashyāʾ wa-qad takūn fī l-taṣawwur

I.12, 69.11‒12: fa-yakūnu mā huwa fī ʿilm Allāh wa-l-malāʾikah min ḥaqīqat al-maʿlūm wa-l-mudrak min
al-umūr al-ṭabīʿiyyah mawjūd qabl al-kathrah

On the Soul of The Cure

IV.2, 178.14‒17: fa-naqūlu inna maʿānī jamīʿ al-umūr al-kāʾinah fī l-ʿālam mimmā salafa wa-mimmā
ḥaḍara wa-mimmā yurīdu an yakūna mawjūdah f ī ʿilm al-bāriʾ wa-l-malāʾikah al-ʿaqliyyah min ji-
hatin wa-mawjūdah fī anfus al-malāʾikah al-samāwiyyah min jihatin

II.2, 58.11‒14: al-ṣūrat al-insāniyyah wa-l-māhiyyah al-insāniyyah ṭabīʿah … qad ʿaraḍa lahā an wuji-
dat fī hādhā l-shakhṣ wa-dhālika l-shakhṣ

Physics of The Cure

I.2, 21.5‒6: al-ṣūrah māhiyyah mā bi-nafsihā zāʾidat al-wujūd ʿalā l-wujūd alladhī li-l-hayūlā

Metaphysics of The Cure

I.5, 31.7‒8: wa-dhālika huwa alladhī rubbamā sammaynā l-wujūd al-khāṣṣ wa-lam nurid bi-hi maʿnā l-
wujūd al-ithbātī

I.5, 31.12‒13: ḥaqīqah kadhā mawjūdah immā fī l-aʿyān aw fī l-anfus aw muṭlaqan yaʿummuhā
jamīʿan

I.5, 34.16‒17: al-mawjūd … fa-innahu maʿnā muttafiq fīhi ʿalā l-taqdīm wa-l-taʾkhīr wa-awwal mā
yakūn yakūn li-l-māhiyyah allatī hiya l-jawhar thumma yakūn li-mā baʿdahu

V.1, 196.12‒13: bal [mawjūd] min ḥaythu huwa farasiyyah faqaṭ ¹

V.1, 197.10‒198.2: fa-innahu laysa idhā kāna l-insān wāḥid aw abyaḍ kānat huwiyyat al-insāniyyah
hiya huwiyyat al-waḥdah aw al-bayāḍ … huwiyyat al-insāniyyah shayʾ ghayr kull wāḥid minhumā
wa-lā yūjad fī ḥadd dhālika l-shayʾ illā l-insāniyyah faqaṭ

V.1, 201.10‒13: fa-hādhā l-iʿtibār mutaqaddim f ī l-wujūd … wa-bi hādhā l-wujūd lā huwa jins wa-lā
nawʿ wa-lā shakhṣ wa-lā wāḥid wa-lā kathīr bal huwa bi-hādhā l-wujūd ḥayawān faqaṭ wa-insān faqaṭ

V.1, 204.6‒10: bal al-ḥayawān bi-sharṭ lā shayʾ ākhar wujūduhu f ī l-dhihn faqaṭ … wa-ammā l-
ḥayawān mujarrad lā bi-sharṭ shayʾ ākhar fa-lahu wujūd f ī l-aʿyān … fa-l-ḥayawān mujarrad al-
ḥayawāniyyah mawjūd f ī l-aʿyān … bal huwa alladhī huwa fī nafsihi khāl ʿan al-sharāʾiṭ al-lāḥiqah
mawjūd f ī l-aʿyān

 For an explanation and justification of this reading as well as a full interpretation of the passage,
see chapter II.

[Link]
726 Appendix 2: The existence of pure quiddity: Textual references

V.1, 204.16‒205.2: yuqālu inna wujūdahā aqdam min al-wujūd al-ṭabīʿī … wa-huwa alladhī yakhuṣṣu
wujūduhu bi-annahu l-wujūd al-ilāhī

Salvation
520.1‒2: fa-inna l-maʿnā lahu wujūd fī l-aʿyān wa-wujūd f ī l-nafs wa-amr mushtarak fa-dhālika l-
mushtarak huwa l-shayʾiyyah

537.13: wa-l-kullī bi-l-iʿtibār al-awwal mawjūd bi-l-fiʿl f ī l-ashyāʾ

Notes
43, section 25: wa-maʿqūl al-awwal … huwa nafs al-ṣūrah al-maʿqūlah wa-hiya l-insāniyyah al-
muṭlaqah

394, section 699: hādhā l-maʿnā [al-ḥayawāniyyah min ḥaythu hiya ḥayawāniyyah] yaḥṣulu bi-dhātihi
 Appendix 3: Quiddity and Avicenna’s matrices of distinctions
Context Considerations or mental aspects Temporal and/or essential sta- Conditions Logical descrip- Mode of existence
(iʿtibārāt) tus (shurūṭ) tor
(Introduction I. / Metaphysics V.) (Introduction I.) (Metaphysics V., (Introduction (Metaphysics V. and VIII)
Salvation) I.
Metaphysics V.)

First/God in itself (min ḥaythu hiya hiya) prior to multiplicity (qabl negatively condi- intellectual, di- identical with God’s mode of ex-
al‐kathrah) tioned vine (ʿaqlī⁴, istence and special essential
(in an absolute sense) (bi‐sharṭ lā shayʾ) ilāhī) being

[Link]
separate in itself (min ḥaythu hiya hiya) prior to multiplicity (qabl negatively condi- intellectual, di- irreducible and distinct, but not
intellects al‐kathrah) tioned vine (ʿaqlī⁴, identical with the intellects’ exis-
(bi‐sharṭ lā shayʾ) ilāhī) tence

concrete in the concrete (fī l‐aʿyān) in multiplicity (fī l‐kathrah) unconditioned natural (ṭabīʿī) pure quiddity is irreducible, im-
existents (lā bi‐sharṭ shayʾ) manent, and a part of the concrete
or existent
conditioned
(bi‐sharṭ shayʾ)

human
mind:
– univer- in conception, in the mind, in the intellect, after multiplicity (baʿd conditioned logical and in- pure quiddity is irreducible and a
sal con- in the soul (fī l‐taṣawwur, fī l‐dhihn, fī al‐kathrah) (bi‐sharṭ shayʾ) tellectual part of the complex universal
cept l‐ʿaql, fī l‐nafs) (manṭiqī and concept in the intellect
ʿaqlī²)
– concept ‘in itself’ in conception, in the mind or the after multiplicity (baʿd negatively condi- intellectual irreducible and distinct concept in
of pure intellect (min ḥaythu hiya hiya fī al‐kathrah) (but connected to tioned (bi‐sharṭ (ʿaqlī³) the intellect
quiddity l‐taṣawwur, fī l‐dhihn, fī l‐ʿaql) quiddity prior to multiplicity) lā shayʾ)
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Index of Names and Places

ʿAbd al-Jabbār 12 f., 222, 227, 232 f., 601, 603, 455 f., 463, 465 – 468, 501, 541, 558, 623,
607 f., 665 654
Abū Bishr Mattā b. Yūnus 287 Bahshamiyyah, Bahshamites 5, 8, 12 f., 38 f.,
Abū Hāshim al-Jubbāʾī 8, 12, 85, 130, 221 – 114, 119, 221 – 233, 365 – 374, 377, 386 f.,
233, 591 – 592, 594 – 601, 604, 606 – 608, 531, 591 – 615, 625 f., 629, 665 – 668, 706,
612, 665, 667 – 668 713 f., 717 – 719, 722
Abū l-Barakāt al-Baghdādī 86, 116, 237 Boethius 90
Abū l-Faraj b. al-Ṭayyib 350, 400 Boethius of Dacia 52
Abū l-Qāsim al-Kirmānī 296 – 297
Abū Rashīd al-Nīshāpūrī (al-Nīsābūrī) 12, 222, David 358
225 – 229, 232, 368, 370 – 371, 592, 600, Duns Scotus 8, 15, 32, 43, 52, 84, 161, 283,
607 – 608, 665, 667 320, 352, 355, 420 f., 650, 721
Albert the Great (Albertus Magnus) 43, 51 – 53,
281, 341, 349, 378, 420 f. Elias 358
Alexander of Aphrodisias 16, 24, 37, 46 – 47,
83 – 84, 159 – 162, 272, 283, 305 – 307, 313, Fārābī, Abū Naṣr 77, 86, 94, 112, 130, 132,
315 – 317, 325 – 326, 337, 349, 351 – 352, 158, 168, 275 f., 349, 360, 436 – 438,
354 – 358, 417, 437, 439, 445, 460 440 f., 445, 451, 460 f., 478 f., 491 – 493,
Alexandria, Alexandrian 338 495, 500, 505 – 510, 586, 634, 655, 697,
Ammonius Hermiae 81, 349, 352, 358, 642 704
Aristotle 6, 11, 21, 24, 39, 59, 67, 81, 84, 88, Francisco Suárez 8, 52 – 53, 721
95, 103, 112, 124, 132, 158 – 161, 261, 265,
302, 305, 313, 315 – 317, 334, 338, 341, Ghazālī, Abū Ḥāmid 1, 54, 105, 129, 233, 386,
346, 348, 352, 357 f., 382, 417, 419, 434 – 421, 438, 445, 623, 654
436, 438 f., 441, 445 f., 448, 450, 460, 467,
470, 473, 477, 489 – 492, 494, 497 – 500, Hanbalites 652
507, 512, 543, 552, 559, 561 f., 569 – 572, Henry of Ghent 15, 43, 52, 378, 420 f., 537,
575 f., 585 f., 718 f. 632, 650, 692, 721
Pseudo-Aristotle 9, 24, 48, 332 f., 380 f., 538, Ḥillī, Jamāl al-Dīn al-ʿAllāmah 64, 409 f.,
635, 653, 660, 670, 673, 695, 700 – 709 449 f., 457 f., 499, 510
Ashʿarī, Abū l-Ḥasan 13, 25, 119, 153, 222,
229, 234, 369 Ibn Mattawayh 12, 222, 226, 232, 592, 600,
Ashʿarites 3, 11, 25, 39, 54, 119 – 120, 130, 665
141, 153 – 154, 202, 221 f., 229, 231 f., 234, Iṣfahānī, Maḥmūd 115
239 – 242, 245, 278, 367, 509, 548, 591 f.,
607, 611 – 616, 619, 623, 668 Jāmī, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 410, 416, 480
Augustine 696 John Capreolus 52
Averroes (Ibn Rushd) 1, 112, 279, 316, 348, John Wyclif 52
378, 382, 385 f., 421, 436, 438, 446, 490 – Jurjānī, ʿAlī b. Muḥammad 93, 99, 119 f., 129,
493, 496 – 499, 505, 507 – 509, 543, 623, 132, 146, 168, 240, 409, 441 f., 457 f., 479,
682 492, 614
ʿAyn al-Quḍāt al-Hamadānī 95 Juwaynī, ʿAbd al-Malik (Imām al-Ḥaramayn)
141, 222, 613
Baghdad 287, 296, 306, 326, 418
Baghdad School 287, 306, 418 Kātibī, Najm al-Dīn 157, 415
Bahmanyār 54, 59, 86, 98, 141, 177, 237, 264, Kindī 53, 86, 124, 479, 655
375, 383 f., 402 f., 406, 412, 421, 440,

[Link]
748 Index of Names and Places

Maimonides 14 Rāzī, Fakhr al-Dīn 1, 14, 38, 58, 64, 66,

Mānkdīm Shashdīw 12, 226 f., 230, 232, 368, 86 – 88, 106, 110, 113, 115 – 118, 165, 169 f.,
592, 608 176, 183, 212, 221, 234, 237, 239 – 254,
Martin of Dacia 52 263, 286, 375, 378, 384 f., 387, 403 – 408,
Maturidites 613 – 615, 652 411 f., 416, 421, 476 f., 483, 510, 546, 614 –
Meinong, Alexius 37, 46 f., 54 616, 619, 622 f., 711
Miskawayh 53 Richard of Clive 52
Muʿammar b. ʿAbbād al-Sulamī 130
Muḥāsibī, al-Ḥārith b. Asad 86 Sergius of Reshʿaynā 353
Mullā Ṣadrā 59, 104, 114, 116, 235, 378, 422, Shahrastānī 58, 100, 102, 110, 114, 119, 221,
445, 616, 623 – 625 374, 440, 450, 457, 483, 612 – 615
Muʿtazilah (Muʿtazilites) 5, 8, 11 – 13, 25, 38 f., Shīrāzī, Muḥammad al-Mahdī al-Ḥusaynī
46, 53 f., 85, 119 f., 131, 138, 153, 221 f., 412 – 413
224 – 227, 229 f., 232 f., 240, 245, 278 f., Shīrāzī, Quṭb al-Dīn 86
342, 348, 367 f., 370, 372, 374, 592 f., Siger of Brabant 52
596 f., 601 f., 604, 609, 611, 613 – 615, 626, Simplicius 81, 84, 320, 349, 352 – 354, 358,
652 f., 656, 665 – 667, 700, 717 f., 722 551 f., 554, 642
Suhrawardī 86 f., 100, 113 f., 116 – 118, 202,
Neoplatonists 5, 11 f., 15 – 18, 24, 47, 59, 81 f., 378, 385, 387, 421, 615 f., 619 – 623, 628,
84, 160, 216, 233, 265, 322, 328, 330, 332, 632
334, 341 f., 349, 351 – 353, 355 – 363, 418 f., Syrianus 653 f.
474 f., 550 f., 561, 566, 568, 635, 642, 648,
650, 653 f., 656, 676, 683 f., 692, 694 – Ṭabāṭabāʾī, Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn 86,
699, 711, 713 – 715, 717 – 719 116, 121 – 123, 237, 258 f., 411 f.
Taftāzānī, Saʿd al-Dīn Masʿūd b. ʿUmar 54, 92,
Omar Khayyam 114 110, 115, 185 f., 235, 250 – 252, 258, 613
Tahānawī, Muḥammad Aʿlā b. ʿAlī 19, 92 f.,
Philoponus 81, 349 101, 110, 115, 257 f., 411, 426, 480, 485
Plato, Platonists 31, 34, 41, 46, 52, 81, 84, Themistius 37, 390, 638, 683
134, 160, 171 – 176, 179, 185, 198 f., 214, Thomas Aquinas 15, 26, 52, 199, 313 f., 320,
242, 257, 265, 268, 272, 274, 279, 283 f., 378, 420 f., 436, 674
295 – 301, 305, 307, 313, 320, 326, 337, Thomas Cajetan 52
339, 341, 345, 348, 350, 353 f., 356, 358 – Ṭūsī, Naṣīr al-Dīn 15, 38, 58, 64, 66, 86, 88,
363, 365 f., 374, 377, 382, 386, 388, 395, 93 – 95, 98, 100, 105, 110, 115 – 117, 155,
417, 421, 434, 528, 543, 554, 578, 617, 169 – 171, 177 f., 187 f., 237 – 239, 246 – 257,
625, 628, 644, 648, 652, 670 f., 692 f., 263, 299, 308, 338, 372, 378, 384, 387,
696, 719, 721 403, 405 – 412, 415 f., 421, 427, 440, 449 f.,
Plotinus 356, 479, 650, 653, 690, 714 457 – 459, 483, 488, 499, 503, 510, 615 f.,
Porphyry 5, 12, 35, 67, 80, 82 – 85, 90, 103, 622, 638, 655
134, 158, 261, 341 f., 352, 354, 356, 388,
417, 437, 460, 570, 642, 719 Usṭāth 316, 490, 492 f., 543
Proclus 81, 349, 474 f., 642, 683
Proclus arabus 21, 316, 475, 499, 543, 654 William of Champeaux 420

Qushjī 64, 66, 86, 88, 92, 97, 115, 177 f., 183, Yaḥyā b. ʿAdī 12, 32, 37, 53, 72, 81 – 85, 91,
235, 237 – 239, 242, 250, 252 – 256, 258 f., 140, 160, 272, 283, 287, 306, 351, 359 –
286, 410 f., 416, 426, 480, 484 f. 366, 472, 501 f., 521 – 531, 662, 720

Rāzī, Abū Bakr 86

Index of Technical Terms

abstract (mujarrad) 8, 22, 25 f., 54, 75, 79, 88, 540, 542, 550, 555 – 558, 569 – 571, 574 f.,
90, 97 f., 100, 105, 108, 116 f., 121 – 123, 577 – 586, 589 f., 592 f., 599 – 604, 606,
125 f., 137, 148, 166 f., 170 – 173, 175 – 180, 611, 617, 621, 623, 627, 631, 640 f., 646,
182 f., 185, 187 f., 199, 201, 203, 206, 211 f., 653, 657, 659, 662 – 664, 668, 672 – 678,
216, 223, 234 – 238, 241 – 247, 249 – 261, 680, 683, 690, 692, 695, 699, 704, 707,
263 f., 268 f., 273, 279 f., 293, 296, 298 f., 712, 714, 716, 721
304, 327 f., 332, 338, 373, 381, 388 – 392, – accidental (ʿaraḍī, ʿāriḍ) 22, 53, 56, 81, 95,
394, 396, 399 – 401, 403, 405 – 409, 412 f., 159, 212, 215 – 217, 219, 242, 247, 249,
415, 425, 430, 454, 465, 520, 529 – 532, 269, 276, 282, 286, 290, 292, 306, 309,
541, 553, 582, 585 f., 596, 598 f., 641, 655, 314, 317, 382 – 385, 398, 432, 442, 447,
658, 674 – 676, 685, 716 f. 455 f., 494, 496 – 498, 500, 503 – 505, 514,
– abstraction (tajrīd, jarrada) 2, 5, 16 f., 19, 518 f., 521, 524, 527, 531, 533, 536, 538,
23 f., 27 – 29, 32 f., 37, 40, 52, 55 f., 61, 63, 540, 542, 551, 553, 555, 575 – 577, 579 f.,
67, 69, 73, 79 f., 85, 90 f., 96, 98 f., 110 – 585, 590, 620, 625, 634, 640, 660, 663,
113, 120 f., 123, 125, 128, 132, 137 – 139, 684
142, 144, 148, 151 f., 155, 158 f., 164 – 178, added to (zāʾidah ʿalā) 19, 82, 88, 128, 132,
180, 185, 187 – 189, 192, 195, 200, 203, 135, 138 – 141, 143, 147, 164, 177, 180, 186,
206, 211, 213 – 215, 223, 227 – 229, 235 f., 190, 202, 216, 234, 242 f., 247, 250, 255,
239, 242 – 244, 246, 248, 253 f., 256, 288, 313 f., 321, 324, 343 f., 355, 364, 380,
260 f., 264, 266, 268, 270 – 272, 276 – 278, 383 – 386, 394, 400, 409, 476, 485, 500,
292, 295 f., 299 f., 314, 327 f., 330 – 332, 513, 533 f., 536, 538, 542, 579, 594, 619 f.,
334 f., 340, 347, 352 – 354, 357, 370 f., 373, 623, 640, 644, 658, 688, 700, 702, 707 f.,
382, 388 – 402, 405 f., 409, 412, 415, 417, 717
419, 424 – 428, 430, 446, 467, 470 f., 482 – Agent Intellect, see intellect
486, 489, 519, 532, 534, 538, 550, 552, analogy (tanāsub) 76, 140, 197, 311, 318,
557, 559, 561 f., 576 – 579, 584, 594 – 596, 438 f., 643, 658, 672
606, 620, 635, 642 f., 657 f., 666 f., 673 f., ascertainment, verification, realization (ta-
676 – 680, 683, 685 f., 700 f., 703 – 705, ḥaqquq) 8, 21, 24, 56, 97, 102, 138, 157,
709 f., 716 f., 719, 722 192, 197 f., 201, 220, 229, 272, 290, 307 f.,
accident (ʿaraḍ) 16 f., 20, 22, 53, 56, 62, 68, 311 f., 315, 318, 320 – 324, 347, 373, 467,
70, 80, 84 f., 88, 90 – 92, 96 f., 99, 110, 472, 492 f., 519, 533, 535, 543, 555 – 562,
112, 114, 126 f., 130, 132, 135, 140, 148, 564 – 566, 568, 572, 576 – 578, 583 f., 590,
152, 154 – 156, 158 f., 162 – 166, 169, 173, 592, 594, 600, 603, 613, 617, 621, 656,
177, 179 f., 182 – 185, 187 – 190, 203, 205, 662 f., 690, 704, 706, 709 f., 714
208 f., 211 f., 217 – 220, 223, 228 f., 233 f., atom (al-juzʾ alladhī lā yatajazzaʾu, jawhar)
236, 238 f., 241 f., 251 – 253, 255, 257 f., 13, 25, 76, 138, 224 – 228, 230, 295, 319,
260, 263, 265 f., 268 – 270, 276, 278, 286, 368 – 371, 373 f., 451, 458, 491, 592 f., 595,
289 f., 292 – 294, 296, 307, 317, 319, 323, 598 – 601, 603 f., 609, 611, 661, 666
327, 329, 331 f., 334, 336, 340, 342, 345, attributes (ṣifāt) 5, 13, 17, 20, 38, 53, 60, 63,
347, 349 f., 354 f., 359, 362 – 364, 367, 86 – 88, 95, 112, 114, 118 f., 130 f., 139, 141,
371 – 374, 376 f., 382 – 386, 388 – 392, 394, 148, 164 f., 167, 177, 180 f., 183 f., 186,
396 – 398, 400, 405, 407, 409 – 412, 415, 189 f., 192, 197, 204, 215, 219, 221 – 229,
418 f., 421, 424 – 427, 429 – 432, 435, 444 – 232, 234, 244, 247, 259 – 261, 268 f., 276,
446, 450 – 454, 456, 460 f., 464, 466, 469, 288, 294 f., 330, 332, 342, 353, 366 – 371,
471, 474, 476, 478, 481 – 483, 485 f., 488, 373 – 376, 381, 383 f., 400, 404, 414 f.,
492 – 495, 497 f., 500 f., 504 f., 509, 511, 422, 424 f., 432, 448, 471 – 473, 478, 486,
513, 515 – 519, 522 – 524, 526, 532 f., 535 f., 492, 509, 511, 517, 520, 522, 524, 526 –

[Link]
750 Index of Technical Terms

528, 545 f., 548 f., 556, 559, 569 f., 574, – final cause 220, 466, 470, 472, 476, 532,
576, 579 f., 584 f., 590, 595, 598 – 601, 550, 557, 561 – 568, 629, 654, 659
603 – 606, 609 f., 615, 621, 625, 629, 634, – formal cause 312, 561 f., 566 – 568
652 f., 659, 662, 667 f., 675, 685, 692 f., – material cause 294, 325, 565 f.
696, 700, 705, 709, 711, 716, 718, 721 f. commentary (sharḥ), commentatorial tradition
– attribute of existence (ṣifat al-wujūd) 229, 9, 11 f., 38, 48, 54, 81, 84, 86, 88, 92, 94,
369 f., 386 f., 592 f., 599 – 604, 607 f., 97 f., 100, 104 f., 110, 113, 117, 128, 130,
610 f., 626, 666, 718 169, 177 f., 183, 185, 187 f., 227, 230, 237,
– Attribute of the Essence (ṣifat al-dhāt) 5, 13, 240, 246 – 254, 256, 259, 267, 276, 299,
85, 138, 222 – 233, 368 – 374, 386, 591 – 306, 308, 316, 332 f., 349, 352 – 354, 368,
611, 615, 626, 629, 666 – 668, 706, 714, 372, 380 f., 384, 387, 392, 403 f., 406 –
717 f., 722 409, 411 – 413, 415, 417, 426, 439, 450,
– essential attributes (ṣifāt dhātiyyah) 222 f., 454, 457, 459, 475, 479 f., 485, 488, 490,
229, 368 – 370, 372, 548, 598 – 603, 605 f., 493, 507, 512, 514, 538, 540, 543, 545 –
608, 610, 626, 629, 662, 718 547, 564, 588, 592, 608, 613, 615 f., 622 –
– negative attributes (ṣifāt salbiyyah) 186, 624, 635, 637 f., 642, 653 – 655, 660, 670,
634, 673, 688, 695, 700 – 707, 709
– relational attributes (ṣifāt iḍāfiyyah) 548, commonality (ishtirāk), common (mushtarak)
550, 714 1, 7, 14 f., 19, 41 – 43, 46, 48, 51 f., 56, 81,
89, 111, 133, 135, 140, 145, 157 – 159, 161,
categories 27, 35, 77, 260, 305, 384, 418, 165 f., 180, 191, 196, 198, 204, 207, 214,
436, 439, 449 – 452, 455, 493 f., 496 f., 216 – 219, 223, 225, 228, 241, 248, 252,
500, 505, 507 – 510, 516, 518 f., 569 – 571, 270 – 273, 275 – 277, 280 – 283, 287, 295 f.,
577, 579 300 f., 304, 306 f., 311 f., 315, 317, 319,
cause (sabab, ʿillah) 22, 33, 43, 45, 65, 71, 325 f., 331, 334 – 336, 338, 342 – 344,
75, 94, 109, 130 f., 136, 160, 174, 186, 346 – 353, 355 – 357, 359, 366 – 374, 376 f.,
194 – 197, 243, 273, 289, 299, 304, 306, 394 – 400, 403, 406 – 408, 413 f., 417 –
308, 312, 314 – 317, 321 f., 325 f., 328, 333, 422, 427 – 431, 440, 457, 483, 491, 499,
335, 352, 356, 361, 366, 379 f., 382, 386, 504, 512, 522, 525, 527, 530, 539, 546, 559,
390, 393, 395, 399, 403, 407, 432, 446, 574 – 576, 582, 603, 607, 609, 613, 636,
449, 452, 456, 462, 467 – 469, 471, 475, 655, 664, 681, 696, 711 – 713, 717, 719
478, 488 f., 493, 495, 497 f., 512, 529, 533, composite, complex (murakkab) 26 f., 41, 49,
535 f., 539 – 542, 544, 548 f., 551, 554, 556 – 57, 70 – 72, 75, 78, 94, 96, 112, 127, 142 –
568, 570, 574, 587 – 589, 602 f., 606, 144, 147, 164 – 167, 169, 177, 179, 182,
608 f., 618 f., 627, 632, 637 f., 642 f., 650, 187 f., 190 f., 197, 203, 205 f., 210 f., 221,
652, 654, 658 – 660, 663, 665 f., 669, 223, 229, 231, 240, 243, 247, 249, 255 f.,
671 f., 681, 686 – 691, 693, 700 f., 704, 265, 269, 278, 284 – 287, 289 – 294, 296,
709, 716 301 f., 305 – 311, 314 – 316, 319, 322 – 325,
– causality (ʿilliyyah) 2, 7, 33, 69, 151, 163, 329, 332, 334 f., 338 – 340, 347, 361, 363 –
195 f., 221, 235, 284, 322, 354, 375, 379 – 366, 377, 379, 383 f., 388, 400 f., 404,
381, 384, 387, 390, 433, 462, 465 – 471, 406, 408 – 410, 418, 421, 427, 430 – 432,
476, 481, 497 f., 532, 536, 543, 548 f., 551, 448, 450, 458 f., 464, 471 – 478, 481 – 485,
554 f., 557 – 568, 589, 608, 619, 622, 487 – 489, 498, 504, 507, 509, 511 f., 515,
630 f., 659, 663 f., 674, 678, 686, 690, 518, 523 – 527, 529, 531 – 536, 552 f., 560,
694, 709, 717 566 f., 572 f., 585 f., 591, 601, 603, 617,
– efficient cause 194, 220, 322, 339, 465 – 620, 626, 628 f., 631, 634, 636, 640, 646,
467, 469, 472, 537 f., 556, 562 – 566, 590, 651 f., 657, 659, 662, 704 f., 712
602 – 606, 618 – 620, 622 f., 704, 708 – sunolon 125, 209, 284, 376 f., 384, 424,
– essential cause, essential causality 194 f., 508 – 513, 522, 525, 527, 535, 569
469 f., 557 f., 564, 659, 695
 Index of Technical Terms 751

conceivability 36, 63, 67, 75, 101 f., 104 – 106, 163, 165 f., 169, 171 – 186, 192 f., 197 – 199,
108, 110 f., 129, 149 f., 199, 216, 230 f., 247, 202 f., 205, 208 – 220, 223 – 225, 228 – 230,
253, 256, 258, 262 f., 376, 467, 562, 593, 234, 238 – 252, 254 – 260, 262, 264 – 305,
605 307 – 350, 352 – 367, 371 – 378, 381 – 388,
conception, conceptualization (taṣawwur) 7, 390 – 432, 434, 447 f., 450 – 452, 458 f.,
15, 19, 21 f., 27, 36, 39 f., 43, 46, 51, 64 f., 465, 470 – 474, 476 – 478, 481 – 488,
69, 80, 84, 86, 90, 102 – 104, 107 – 110, 490 f., 493, 495 – 497, 502, 504 – 515, 517 f.,
112, 115, 117 f., 129, 133 f., 137, 148, 159 f., 520, 523 – 529, 531, 533 – 536, 543, 547,
162, 164, 166, 189, 191 f., 197, 199, 214 f., 549, 551, 553 – 556, 558 – 560, 562 – 569,
228, 230 – 232, 240 f., 243, 245, 250 – 256, 571 – 587, 590 f., 593, 595 – 603, 605, 610 f.,
258, 260, 262 – 264, 268 f., 273, 276, 285, 613 – 615, 617 – 620, 622 – 626, 628 f., 631,
304, 306, 319, 342, 345, 354, 359, 361 f., 637, 639, 641, 643 – 645, 647, 651 f., 654,
371, 376, 386, 388, 391, 398, 401 f., 408, 657 – 659, 662, 664 – 668, 671 f., 674 f.,
415, 419, 421, 425, 433, 452, 454, 461, 677 f., 680 – 682, 684 f., 688 – 691, 693,
467, 469, 476, 480, 482, 491 f., 504, 521, 695 – 700, 702, 704 – 706, 708 – 710, 712 f.,
529, 532, 553, 556, 569 f., 576 f., 585, 593 – 716, 719 – 722
595, 604, 612, 614, 623, 628, 632, 641, conditions (shurūṭ) 13, 62, 65 – 68, 73, 79,
652 f., 668, 675 f., 684 f., 687, 703, 707 f., 108 f., 111, 154, 163 f., 167 – 172, 174, 176,
716, 718, 720, 722 179 – 182, 185, 200, 202, 209, 211, 229,
– in conception, in the mind (fī l-taṣawwur) 231, 236, 242 – 244, 246, 252, 255, 257,
61, 89 f., 109, 111, 166, 189, 191, 273, 289, 263, 265, 273, 288 f., 293 f., 346 f., 388,
345, 359, 463, 465 f., 557, 698 404, 417, 425 f., 444, 479 – 481, 483, 487,
concomitants (lawāzim) 5, 7 – 9, 16 f., 20 – 22, 489, 496, 513, 515, 519, 524 – 526, 535,
56, 62, 70, 80, 84 f., 88 – 93, 96 f., 99, 108, 550, 600, 627, 631, 654, 697, 716, 718
110, 126, 134, 137 – 144, 146 – 148, 150, – negatively-conditioned (bi-sharṭ lā (shayʾ
152, 154 – 156, 162 – 170, 172 – 174, 176 – ākhar)) 54, 65, 171 – 179, 182 – 190, 203,
178, 180 – 191, 193 – 195, 197 – 199, 202 – 205 f., 209, 211 – 213, 215 f., 235 – 238,
206, 208 – 213, 215, 218 – 220, 228 f., 231 – 241 – 247, 251 – 260, 264, 270, 293, 296,
234, 236 – 239, 242 – 249, 251 – 258, 260 – 299 f., 409 – 412, 415, 417, 425 f., 483 –
266, 268 – 271, 277, 282 f., 285 f., 288 – 487, 511, 526, 530, 532, 543, 549, 627,
294, 304, 319, 323, 331 f., 336 f., 340, 342, 630, 654 f., 673, 714
346 f., 350 f., 354, 361 – 364, 366, 372 – – positively-conditioned (bi-sharṭ (shayʾ
374, 380, 382 – 384, 389, 391 f., 394, 396, ākhar)) 65, 97, 174, 178 – 184, 188, 205 f.,
400, 404 – 406, 409 f., 415, 419, 421, 424 – 209, 211, 213, 229, 241 f., 253, 258, 260,
427, 429 – 432, 446, 448, 459, 461, 469 – 269, 293 f., 364, 384, 410 f., 415, 417, 425,
471, 473 f., 476, 478 – 489, 498, 501, 504, 483 – 487, 513, 519, 526, 532, 600, 610,
509, 511 – 513, 515 f., 518, 520, 523 f., 526 – 627 f., 634, 681, 712
529, 532 f., 535 f., 538 f., 542 – 550, 555 – – unconditioned (bi-lā sharṭ (shayʾ ākhar)) (lā
559, 561, 565, 574 f., 578 – 580, 582 – 586, bi-sharṭ (shayʾ ākhar)) 65, 171 – 174, 176,
590, 598 – 604, 606, 610 f., 615, 617, 619 – 179 – 181, 186, 200, 215, 225, 229 f., 233,
621, 626 – 629, 631, 634 – 638, 640 f., 646, 235, 241 f., 244, 248, 253 f., 258, 269,
648 – 653, 655 – 657, 659 f., 662 – 664, 670, 273 f., 292 – 294, 296, 338, 340 f., 346 f.,
672 f., 675, 677 f., 685 f., 688, 690 – 697, 358, 364, 375, 388, 394, 403 f., 406, 408 –
700 – 714, 716 – 718, 720 f. 415, 419, 425 f., 431, 459, 479 – 488, 511,
concrete (khārij, fī l-khārij, ʿayn) 2, 4 – 7, 10, 513, 526, 535, 594 – 597, 600, 609 f., 626,
14 – 17, 20 – 22, 24, 26 – 34, 36 – 38, 629, 631, 652 f., 689, 704, 712 f.
40 – 42, 44 – 46, 48, 51 f., 54 – 56, 65 – 75, consideration (iʿtibār) 2, 9 f., 14, 21 f., 26,
77 – 82, 84, 86, 90, 93 – 99, 101 f., 105 – 28 – 36, 39 – 41, 48, 50, 55 – 57, 60 f., 64 f.,
115, 117 – 119, 121 – 123, 125 – 127, 129 – 131, 67 – 69, 71, 73 – 75, 78 – 80, 84 – 126, 128,
133 – 135, 137, 139 – 149, 152 – 154, 156 – 132 – 134, 137 – 139, 142 – 145, 147 – 152,
752 Index of Technical Terms

154 f., 162, 165 – 167, 169 f., 175 f., 180, 184, 382, 427, 432, 436, 439, 441, 443 f., 452,
186 – 192, 198 f., 203, 207 f., 213, 216, 220, 459 – 461, 484, 496, 499, 507 f., 513 f., 516,
224, 227 f., 232 – 237, 239 – 253, 255 – 257, 518 – 520, 522, 526 – 528, 530, 535 f., 549,
259 – 261, 264, 266 – 271, 274 f., 284 – 286, 552, 555, 558, 580, 588, 595 – 597, 602 f.,
294 – 296, 299, 304, 313, 319 f., 327 f., 330, 605 – 609, 612, 614, 639, 643, 650, 668,
338 f., 343, 345 f., 350 – 352, 358 f., 364, 670, 678, 683, 691, 702, 706, 713
370, 373 – 376, 378, 380, 382, 391, 399, distinct, distinctness (min ḥaythu hiya hiya)
401, 404 – 412, 417 – 419, 422, 428, 439, 2, 5, 7, 16 f., 21 – 24, 27, 29 – 35, 37 – 42,
447, 452 f., 466, 471, 473, 475 f., 479 f., 44, 48 f., 52, 55 – 57, 62 – 64, 67 f., 70 – 73,
483, 485, 489, 493 – 495, 500, 511, 513, 75 – 77, 79, 88, 91 – 93, 98, 100, 103 f.,
521, 530, 534, 537 – 539, 545, 549, 553 f., 108 – 111, 113, 117, 120, 122, 125 – 127,
557, 559 f., 563 f., 573, 579 f., 588 f., 592, 130 f., 135, 140 – 145, 147 – 149, 151, 155 –
594, 596, 599, 614 f., 623, 627, 630 f., 634, 157, 160 f., 164 – 166, 168 – 171, 174 – 176,
636, 638, 640, 643, 646, 656, 659, 666 f., 178, 182 – 190, 193, 195, 202 f., 205, 209,
675, 684 – 686, 694, 697, 699, 701 f., 707 – 211 – 213, 217 – 219, 221 f., 224 f., 227 f.,
709, 714 230 f., 233 – 236, 240 – 245, 247, 249 f.,
– intellectual considerations (iʿtibārāt ʿaq- 252 – 256, 258 – 264, 266 f., 271, 274, 282 –
liyyah) 16, 90, 92, 96, 100, 102, 105, 113, 285, 287 f., 292, 297 – 300, 305, 311, 319 –
117 f., 123 f., 154 f., 252, 553 321, 323 f., 327, 330, 339 f., 344 f., 350,
constitutive, constituent (muqawwim) 7, 354, 356 f., 361, 374, 377, 379, 382, 384 –
19 – 22, 81, 102, 111 f., 128, 134, 136, 138 f., 388, 391, 398 f., 401, 405, 408, 414 – 416,
147, 164, 177, 183, 185, 189, 191 – 199, 206, 420, 425 – 430, 433, 458 f., 470, 472 f.,
217, 223 f., 238, 247, 254 f., 279 f., 284 – 475 f., 482 – 487, 491, 499, 501, 503 – 505,
290, 292, 294 f., 302, 313, 320, 322, 324, 508, 513 f., 517 – 519, 526 – 532, 534, 539 –
366, 380, 382, 407, 421 f., 424, 441, 455, 541, 545 f., 548, 553 f., 567, 573, 582,
469 – 471, 481, 488, 512, 537 f., 546, 555 – 584 f., 592 – 595, 598, 604, 607, 609, 611 f.,
560, 564, 577, 583 – 585, 590, 605, 617, 615 f., 619 – 622, 625 f., 631 f., 634 f., 638 –
621, 629, 655 f., 659, 662, 665, 675, 701 f., 641, 647 – 650, 652, 664, 677, 682, 685 –
707, 710, 716, 720 688, 692, 697 – 699, 701 – 704, 706, 710,
– non-constitutive (ghayr muqawwim) 7, 20, 22, 712 – 714, 716, 718 f., 721
128, 138 f., 165, 183, 185, 188 f., 202, 239,
271, 286, 288 – 290, 323, 382 f., 386 f., emanation, flux (fayḍ) 17, 68, 309, 322, 331,
494, 497, 512, 515, 531, 537, 544, 549, 555, 389, 401, 479, 547, 551, 554 f., 603, 657,
558, 569, 577 f., 594, 655, 675, 707 – 709 673, 676 – 680, 682 f., 685 f., 691, 700,
corporeality, corporealness, corporeal 282, 704, 722
313 f., 515, 553 f., 559, 566, 581, 662 equivocity, equivocal (muttafiqah, mushtarakah,
creation (ibdāʿ) 1, 10, 44 f., 48, 196, 328, bi-l-ishtirāk) 5, 45, 58 f., 158, 217 f., 228,
479 f., 529 f., 547, 554, 654, 687 – 689, 281 f., 298, 315, 318 f., 343, 346, 359, 365,
691 f., 700, 702 – 704, 708, 712 367 f., 371 f., 433 – 440, 444, 449 f., 452,
– creator 52, 523, 637, 643, 654 454, 460, 483, 489 f., 516, 519, 522, 527,
– creature, created thing 355, 360, 380 f., 538, 587, 604, 611 f.
705, 707 essential entailment (luzūm, iltizām, iqtiḍāʾ)
233, 429, 539, 541, 558, 582, 598 f., 602 f.,
difference (ikhtilāf) 26, 33, 40, 44, 49, 55, 605 f., 610, 626, 660, 663, 709
61 f., 66, 71, 74, 79 – 84, 89, 107, 116, 135, essential nature (ṭabīʿah) 7, 10, 13 – 16, 19 f.,
140, 153, 160, 167, 171 f., 185, 189, 192, 23, 25, 29, 33, 36, 42, 46, 51 f., 54 – 56, 59,
198, 202, 208, 215, 226 – 228, 231, 233, 61, 64, 67 – 70, 73, 76 – 81, 83 f., 86, 88,
241, 246, 249, 253 f., 256, 276, 282, 289, 90, 92, 94 f., 97 f., 101 f., 105 f., 108, 110 –
293, 298, 305 f., 308, 314 f., 335, 341, 351 – 112, 116 – 119, 125, 127 f., 134 – 137, 140 –
354, 361, 364 f., 367 – 370, 372 – 374, 376, 143, 145 – 147, 149, 152, 154 – 162, 165 –
 Index of Technical Terms 753

168, 171, 173, 179 – 182, 184, 188 f., 193 f., 138 – 141, 145 – 148, 150 – 152, 154 – 158,
196 – 200, 202, 211, 213 – 219, 232, 234, 160 – 164, 166 – 177, 179 – 181, 184 – 189,
237 f., 240, 242, 245, 247 – 250, 262, 270, 191 – 195, 197 f., 200 – 203, 205 – 212, 214 f.,
273, 275 – 278, 280 – 297, 299, 301 – 305, 218 – 223, 226 – 234, 239 f., 242, 244 f.,
310 – 319, 321 – 323, 325 – 359, 361 f., 365 – 248 f., 251, 254, 256 – 259, 261 – 268, 270,
367, 371 – 378, 382 – 384, 387 – 390, 392 – 272 – 277, 280, 283 f., 286 – 292, 294 – 301,
410, 413 – 422, 425, 427, 431 – 433, 438, 306, 308, 311 – 314, 316 – 324, 326 f., 329 –
440, 455, 460, 463, 466 – 468, 470 – 474, 332, 334 – 342, 345 – 347, 349 f., 355 f.,
476, 478, 481, 483 – 487, 490, 492 f., 497, 358 – 366, 368 – 373, 375 – 388, 391, 393,
499 f., 503 f., 507, 509, 511, 521 – 523, 525, 395 f., 398 f., 401, 403 – 405, 407 f., 410 f.,
530 f., 551, 553 f., 559 – 562, 566 – 568, 570, 415 – 422, 424, 426 – 485, 487 – 548, 550 –
572 f., 576 f., 579 f., 587, 594, 596, 602, 553, 555 – 563, 565 – 597, 599 – 636, 638 f.,
605, 613, 624, 628 f., 631, 636 f., 639, 641 – 656, 659, 661 – 667, 671, 676 – 678,
641 – 645, 649, 657 – 660, 662, 664, 666, 680, 682 f., 685, 687 – 689, 691 f., 694 –
670, 675, 677, 683 – 685, 687 – 690, 692 f., 702, 704 – 710, 712 – 718, 720 – 722
696, 698, 701, 709 – 711, 716, 719 f. – accidental (ʿaraḍī, ʿāriḍ) 22, 53, 56, 258,
– and pure quiddity 214, 219, 277, 333, 350, 276 – 278, 290, 304, 382 – 387, 442, 447 f.,
357, 366, 399, 416, 430, 500, 629, 715 455 – 458, 505, 518 – 521, 524, 535 f., 555,
essential reality (ḥaqīqah) 7 f., 20, 22, 25, 27, 590
35 f., 38, 40 f., 47, 52, 57, 60 f., 64 f., 70, – and anniyyah 316, 384, 499, 518 f., 543 f.,
79, 83, 87, 93 f., 100 – 102, 104, 106 f., 112, 610
114 f., 117 – 119, 121, 123, 129 – 131, 136 f., – and being-as-truth (wujūd ithbātī, ʿalā l-
141, 145 f., 153, 156 – 164, 171, 178 f., 181 f., ṣādiq) 77, 491 – 498, 505 f.
184, 186, 190, 192 f., 196 – 201, 214, 217, – contexts of 66, 76, 82 f., 111, 266, 329, 362,
220, 223 – 228, 230, 237 f., 240, 243, 250, 418, 422, 431, 447, 459, 476, 482, 599,
252, 256, 262, 266, 272 – 275, 278, 280 f., 602, 647, 672, 677, 680, 693, 713
283, 286, 288, 291 – 297, 301, 304 f., 308 – – divine (wujūd ilāhī) 7, 31, 33, 42, 44 f., 49,
314, 317 – 319, 323, 325 f., 329, 332, 334 – 51, 53 f., 57, 68, 72, 77, 148, 187, 319, 340,
340, 342 f., 345 f., 352, 360 – 362, 365 – 363, 432 – 434, 458, 472, 475, 478 – 481,
367, 371 – 373, 375, 377 f., 381 f., 384, 386, 487, 514, 522 – 526, 528, 629 f., 632 f., 639,
388, 390, 392 – 400, 403 – 405, 407 – 409, 645, 650, 652, 664, 669, 688 – 690
411, 413 – 417, 419 – 422, 425 – 427, 429, – and essential being (wujūd dhātī, esse essen-
431, 446, 456, 470, 479 f., 483, 485 f., tiae) 6, 12, 17, 32, 41 – 47, 50 – 55, 72 f., 217,
489 – 491, 493 – 496, 499 – 503, 508 f., 360, 363, 387, 432, 434, 449, 455 – 459,
519 f., 526, 535 f., 540 f., 543 f., 552, 554, 470, 498 f., 501 – 504, 513 – 515, 519 – 522,
556, 558 – 562, 564, 567 – 569, 571 f., 575 – 525, 527 f., 532, 535, 537, 539, 542, 544 f.,
577, 579 – 586, 590 – 597, 599, 603, 613 – 547 – 551, 554 – 556, 564, 568, 583, 589 –
617, 619 – 622, 624, 628 f., 634, 641 – 643, 591, 615, 624, 627, 646, 692, 718, 720 –
646, 649, 651 – 656, 658, 662 f., 665, 722
667 f., 670, 683, 687 f., 691 – 693, 702 f., – and essential (dhātī) 6, 12, 53 f., 71, 135,
705 f., 708 – 710, 716, 718 – 720, 722 276, 290, 360 f., 363, 447, 455 f., 502, 505,
estimation (wahm, awhām, tawahhum) 28, 514, 518 f., 521 f., 524 – 526, 528 – 530,
33, 36, 61, 63, 89, 100, 110 f., 124, 128 f., 535 f., 540, 542 – 544, 547, 549, 558, 590,
148 f., 157 – 159, 268 f., 278, 399, 533, 633 607, 616, 632, 646, 657
eternal, eternity, eternality (qadīm, qidam) – established, realized (muthbat, muḥaṣṣal)
43, 70, 130, 451, 466 f., 601, 607 – 610, 17, 60, 75 – 77, 110, 188, 193, 220, 223,
629, 643, 666, 668, 682, 691, 695, 709 225, 228 – 231, 233, 292, 299, 339, 370,
existence (wujūd) 1 – 45, 47 – 55, 57 – 64, 373, 376 f., 383, 427, 437, 447, 450, 456,
66 – 80, 83 f., 87 – 91, 93 – 95, 97 – 105, 467, 469 f., 472, 476, 489 – 495, 497 f.,
107 – 109, 111 – 124, 126 f., 131, 133 – 136, 500 f., 503 f., 506, 508 f., 511 – 515, 518 f.,
754 Index of Technical Terms

521 f., 526 – 528, 531 – 536, 538 – 544, 549, 476, 481, 483, 485, 487, 491, 495 f., 499,
555, 557 f., 560 f., 563 f., 568, 578, 580, 502, 506 f., 511, 527, 531, 534, 559, 561 f.,
583 f., 586, 590 – 606, 610, 612 – 619, 621 – 578, 582, 584, 592 f., 596 f., 599, 602, 605,
629, 631, 646, 662, 666 f., 680, 685, 614 f., 618 f., 635, 639, 657, 671, 674,
701 f., 704 – 706, 708 – 710, 712 f., 732 685 f., 712 – 714, 716 – 718, 721
– and exterior, concrete (khārijī, fī l-khārij, fī l- – modes of (naḥw, ḥukm, kayfiyyah) 11,
aʿyān) 2, 4 – 7, 10, 14 – 17, 19 – 22, 24, 69 – 78, 80, 83, 99, 102, 145, 159, 243,
26 – 34, 36 – 38, 40 – 42, 44 – 48, 51 f., 301, 336, 392, 439, 441, 444, 446 f., 451,
54 – 56, 65 – 82, 84, 86, 89 f., 93 – 99, 101 – 481, 514, 525, 586, 601 – 605, 610 f., 635
103, 105 – 115, 117 – 119, 121 – 123, 125 – 127, – natural (wujūd ṭabīʿī) 362 f., 432, 522 f.,
129 – 131, 133 – 135, 137, 139 – 149, 152 – 526 f., 585
154, 157 – 163, 165 – 167, 169, 171 – 186, – necessity of (wājibiyyah) 488, 544, 548,
192 f., 197 – 199, 202 – 205, 208 – 220, 609
223 – 225, 228 – 230, 234, 238 – 252, 254 – – neutral status (thubūt, lā mawjūd wa-lā
260, 262, 264 – 305, 307 – 350, 352 – 367, maʿdūm) 37 – 39, 119, 121, 223, 225, 373,
371 – 379, 381 – 388, 390 – 432, 434, 447 f., 384, 533, 596 f., 610, 613 f., 622, 712
450 – 452, 458 f., 465, 469 – 474, 476 – 478, – and realization (taḥaqquq, ḥuṣūl) 8, 21, 24,
481 – 488, 490 f., 493, 495 – 497, 502, 56, 97, 102, 138, 157, 192, 197 f., 201, 220,
504 – 509, 511 – 515, 517 f., 520, 523 – 529, 229, 272, 290, 307 f., 311 f., 315, 318, 320 –
531, 533 – 536, 540, 543, 551, 553 – 556, 324, 347, 373, 467, 469, 472, 493, 495,
559 f., 561 – 569, 571 – 590, 592 f., 595 – 519, 533, 535, 543, 555 – 562, 564 – 566,
606, 610 f., 613 – 615, 617 – 620, 622 – 626, 568, 572, 576 – 578, 583 f., 590, 592, 594,
628 f., 631, 637, 639, 641 – 645, 647, 649, 600, 603, 613, 617, 621, 656, 662 f., 690,
651 f., 654, 657 – 660, 662, 664 – 668, 704, 706, 709 f., 714
671 f., 674, 677 f., 680 – 682, 684 f., 687 – – and special existence, proper existence
691, 693, 695 – 702, 704 – 706, 708 – 710, (wujūd khāṣṣ) (esse proprium) 25, 42,
712 f., 716, 719 – 722 51 f., 76 f., 185, 210, 218, 220 f., 231 f., 336,
– intellectual, intelligible (wujūd ʿaqlī) 6, 8, 427, 437, 447, 455, 457, 477, 490, 493 f.,
13, 15, 17, 37, 43 f., 54, 62 f., 67 f., 71 f., 75, 498 – 514, 517 – 522, 524, 526, 531 f., 540 –
100 f., 110, 112 f., 118, 124, 131, 138, 142, 542, 555, 558 f., 561, 563 f., 568 f., 585,
150, 154, 163, 201, 230, 248, 257, 262, 597 f., 603, 609, 615 f., 618, 621 – 626,
299, 332, 334, 404, 408, 447 f., 459, 469, 628 f., 630, 632, 646, 652, 655, 703 f., 713,
474, 482, 503, 505, 511, 520, 523, 526, 722
532 – 534, 551, 555, 557, 559, 562, 568, – senses of (maʿānī) 17, 53, 58, 69 – 78, 231,
581, 611, 626, 628, 632 – 634, 639, 691, 434, 436 f., 446 – 448, 450, 458, 461,
699 f., 706 489 – 531, 586, 614, 621 f., 697
– logical (wujūd manṭiqī) 522 f., 526 external, extrinsic (non-constitutive) (khārij)
– mental existence (wujūd dhihnī, wujūd fī l- 5 – 7, 17, 20 – 22, 40, 44, 62, 75, 83, 85, 88,
dhihn) 7 f., 10, 16, 22, 24 f., 27, 29 – 37, 90, 94 – 96, 103, 112 – 114, 118, 121 – 124,
39 f., 42 – 44, 47 – 49, 51 – 55, 60 – 70, 72, 127 – 129, 133, 137 – 139, 141, 143, 146,
74 f., 77 – 80, 86 – 89, 91 – 93, 98 – 103, 148, 156, 158, 160, 163, 165, 171, 177,
105 f., 108, 110, 113, 115 – 118, 120 – 124, 182 f., 185, 187 – 189, 191 – 195, 197, 202,
127, 130 – 132, 134 f., 137 – 140, 144, 147, 204, 206, 209 – 213, 217, 219 f., 239, 242,
149 – 156, 160, 163 f., 167 – 169, 177 f., 244, 247, 251, 253 – 255, 257, 260, 263,
183 – 188, 193, 197, 199, 202 f., 211 f., 265, 270 f., 278, 283 – 286, 288 – 294, 305,
225 f., 230, 233 – 242, 244 f., 251 – 253, 308, 312, 323, 325, 332, 337, 341, 343 –
256 – 259, 261 – 264, 266, 276, 285, 288, 346, 348, 362, 366 f., 379, 381 – 387, 390,
299, 303, 308, 319, 336, 338, 340, 371, 398, 401, 411, 414 f., 424 f., 427, 429, 446,
376, 389, 393, 396, 398, 403 f., 416, 420, 449, 455 f., 458, 469 – 473, 483, 485, 490,
422, 425, 427 – 431, 447, 459, 466, 469, 494 – 498, 500 f., 503 f., 506, 509 – 513,
 Index of Technical Terms 755

515 f., 522 – 524, 526 f., 529, 531, 533, 535 – 287 f., 290, 292, 295, 302 f., 305 – 307,
542, 549 f., 555 – 561, 564, 568 f., 571, 576 – 309 – 320, 322 – 326, 329, 331 – 339, 341 –
580, 583, 585, 593 – 596, 599, 601, 605 – 343, 345 – 347, 355 f., 366, 371 – 374, 377,
607, 610, 617, 619 – 621, 626 f., 629, 631, 382, 392, 396 f., 404, 407, 419, 426 f.,
635 – 638, 641 – 643, 646, 649, 651 f., 432 f., 442, 447 f., 452, 455 – 458, 460,
655 f., 658 – 660, 662, 675, 688, 694, 466 – 477, 483, 499 – 502, 509, 514 f., 518 –
696 f., 700 – 705, 707 – 712, 714, 716, 720 f. 524, 528 f., 534, 536 f., 540, 542, 544 f.,
548, 551, 553 – 562, 564 – 568, 571, 578,
faculty 61, 96, 100, 111, 128 f., 154, 279, 395, 583, 585 f., 588, 590, 599, 601 f., 605 f.,
400, 633, 673, 679, 682 f., 686 609, 613, 616 – 618, 625, 631, 634, 643,
First Effect 134, 328, 380 f., 544, 547 f., 638, 646, 652 f., 656, 658 – 664, 675, 683, 695,
650, 653, 655 f., 687, 689 f., 693, 701, 704, 697, 702, 707, 709, 715, 718 f., 722
707 – fictional 43, 61, 89, 95, 97, 102, 104 – 108,
form (ṣūrah) 2 – 5, 15 f., 21, 25, 27 f., 31 – 36, 111, 157, 160, 162 f., 214, 262 f., 429, 496,
39, 41, 43, 47, 52 – 54, 56, 58, 60 f., 64 f., 534, 577, 596, 605, 632 f.
68, 70 f., 74 f., 80 – 82, 84, 87, 89 f., 95, – intellectual, intelligible (ṣūrah ʿaqliyyah,
97 – 99, 102 – 111, 114, 119, 121, 124 – 127, ṣūrah maʿqūlah) 1 f., 7 f., 11 – 16, 20 f., 25,
129, 131 – 133, 138, 140 f., 146 – 148, 150 f., 27, 31 – 33, 35 f., 54 f., 61 – 63, 65, 67 f.,
156 – 158, 160 – 166, 168, 170, 172 – 176, 75 – 77, 80, 82, 87, 89 f., 92 f., 96 – 99,
178 – 183, 185, 188 f., 191 f., 194, 198 f., 101 – 104, 106, 109 – 112, 117 f., 120, 123 –
202 f., 205, 207, 213 f., 216 – 218, 223, 127, 129 – 134, 137 f., 140 – 144, 147 – 152,
226 f., 235 f., 240 f., 245, 247 – 251, 255 – 154 – 157, 163, 165, 167 – 170, 172 f., 175 f.,
257, 259 f., 262 f., 267 – 271, 277 – 279, 183 – 185, 190, 192, 194, 203, 208, 220 f.,
282 – 285, 287, 289 – 339, 341 – 343, 345 – 224, 231, 233 f., 236 – 238, 244 f., 247 –
366, 369, 371 – 373, 376 f., 381, 384 f., 249, 251, 259 f., 268 – 270, 281 f., 299,
389 – 402, 404 f., 408 f., 411, 413 – 415, 303 f., 318, 321 f., 324, 327 – 331, 333, 335,
417 – 420, 422, 427, 429 f., 433 f., 436, 341, 343 f., 349 – 352, 359, 361 – 363, 374 –
438 f., 442, 451, 455, 459, 462, 466, 469 f., 377, 381, 389 – 394, 398 – 401, 406 f.,
472 f., 475, 477 – 480, 482, 484 – 486, 496, 409 f., 412, 414 f., 425, 437, 441, 447, 451,
501 f., 504, 510, 513 – 515, 517 – 523, 528 – 459, 472 – 474, 476, 482, 485, 487, 493,
530, 534, 539, 542 f., 549, 551 – 554, 556, 510 f., 520, 523 f., 527, 559, 563 f., 568,
558, 560 – 569, 572 f., 577, 581, 585 f., 588, 572 f., 575, 577, 579, 583, 585, 593, 612,
591, 593, 595 f., 598, 600, 605 f., 608, 614 f., 625, 632 – 634, 636 f., 639 f., 642,
617 – 619, 625 f., 628 f., 631 – 633, 635 – 650, 652 – 654, 660, 664, 669 f., 674 f.,
647, 649 f., 653 – 655, 657, 662, 668 – 686, 678 – 681, 683 – 686, 688 – 691, 695 – 700,
688, 690 – 693, 695 f., 698 f., 704, 709, 706, 710 – 716, 718, 721
716, 719, 722 – Platonic forms (ṣuwar, muthul) 16, 31, 34,
– artificial 27, 61, 90, 97 f., 102, 105, 108, 43, 46, 52, 84, 104, 124 f., 129, 134, 171,
110 f., 157 f., 160, 162 f., 191, 214, 263, 272, 175 f., 216, 257, 272, 279, 295 – 297, 299,
319, 429, 464, 496, 534, 560 – 562, 568, 309, 312, 319 – 321, 326, 332 – 334, 336 f.,
577, 595 f., 605, 713 345, 351 – 353, 361, 382, 386, 388, 391 f.,
– corporeal 82, 88, 97, 178, 180, 263, 268, 397, 419, 421, 472, 475, 485, 522, 528,
308 – 310, 314, 316, 320 f., 324, 328, 333, 543, 617, 632, 636 – 638, 642, 643 – 645,
342, 388, 400, 407, 410, 515, 551, 553 f., 648 – 650, 654, 662, 670 f., 673, 680, 683,
599, 670 695
– essential 19 – 21, 29, 53, 55, 57, 81, 88, – substantial 9, 46, 72, 110, 113, 123, 125,
107 f., 110 – 112, 126, 132, 135 f., 138, 141, 137, 146 f., 184, 211, 218, 260, 267, 277 f.,
145 f., 149, 164 f., 184, 189 – 195, 197, 199 – 302 f., 305, 307 – 316, 318 – 327, 329 f.,
202, 206, 212, 215 – 219, 221, 224, 226, 332, 334 – 338, 347, 352, 356, 387, 504,
228, 231 f., 235, 255, 272 f., 276, 278, 282,
756 Index of Technical Terms

513, 515, 551, 553 f., 561, 574, 581 f., 585, 454 f., 458, 488, 539 – 550, 586, 607 – 612,
617, 628, 651, 661, 671, 677, 682, 711 615, 629, 654 f., 658, 712

genus (jins) 5, 19, 83, 94, 112, 121 f., 126 f., Hylomorphism, hylomorphic 16, 69, 125, 277,
135, 139 – 143, 158 f., 167, 182, 195, 201, 281, 292 f., 301 – 309, 312, 314, 317 f., 321,
208, 218 f., 270, 273 f., 283 – 286, 288 – 324 – 329, 333 – 339, 347, 375, 390, 418,
291, 303 – 315, 318 – 324, 326, 334, 343 f., 451, 551 f., 619, 661, 685
349 f., 353, 355, 369, 388, 398 f., 418, 450,
453, 455, 465, 473, 529, 570, 575, 579 f., imagination (takhayyul, khayāl) 33, 36, 61,
621, 624 92, 96 f., 100, 111 f., 124, 148 f., 165, 268 f.,
– genusness (jinsiyyah) 5, 19 f., 83, 140 – 143, 392, 398, 425
182, 189 f., 201, 219, 260, 312, 315, 326, individual (shakhṣ, shakhṣī) 7, 16 f., 20, 24,
342, 579 f., 582 f., 675 26, 30, 32, 45, 48, 68 f., 73, 88, 90,
– subsistence/existence of (qiwām) 192, 556 – 95 – 97, 102, 111 f., 121, 123, 126, 130, 133,
560, 567 137, 142 f., 145 f., 148, 152, 154, 156 – 158,
God 4 – 7, 10, 15, 17 f., 20, 22, 27, 33, 42 – 45, 163, 172 – 174, 178, 180 f., 192, 195, 198,
47, 49, 53 – 55, 60, 62 f., 70 f., 74 – 77, 208, 217 – 219, 223 – 226, 229, 233, 236,
93 – 95, 104, 106, 109, 115, 126, 128 – 131, 238, 240 f., 265, 267 – 275, 277, 282 – 287,
134, 136 f., 147 f., 157, 172, 186 f., 190 f., 289 – 296, 300 – 305, 308 – 310, 312 f., 315,
195 – 197, 201 f., 215, 218, 222, 224 f., 278, 317, 319 – 326, 328, 330 – 333, 335, 337 f.,
299, 337, 353, 360, 362 f., 365, 368, 378 f., 341 – 344, 346 – 348, 350, 352, 355 f.,
384, 422, 430, 432 – 434, 439, 447 – 459, 359 f., 362 – 365, 372 f., 377, 381, 392 – 397,
465, 467, 470, 473, 477, 479 – 482, 486, 399 f., 403 – 407, 412 – 416, 419, 421, 430,
488, 491 f., 494, 497 – 499, 502 f., 506, 459, 470 f., 481, 484, 486, 504, 507 – 509,
508, 510, 523, 528 – 532, 536 f., 539 – 550, 515, 517 – 519, 529, 535, 543, 556, 563 –
561, 563 – 565, 568, 586 – 588, 592, 599, 569, 571, 574 – 576, 580 f., 583 f., 592, 595,
601 – 603, 607 – 611, 614 – 616, 618, 627, 600, 609, 611, 613, 617, 624 f., 628 f., 641,
629 – 670, 672 f., 675, 681, 685 – 701, 703 – 643, 658, 661, 664, 667, 671 – 673, 681 f.,
705, 708, 710 – 716, 719 f., 722 691, 693, 706, 713, 719
– divine essential being 6, 71, 456, 458, 503, – vague individual 97, 268, 293
539 – 550, 657 intellect (ʿaql) 5, 7 f., 13, 16 f., 28, 36, 40,
– and final causality 220 f., 339, 476, 550, 42 – 44, 52, 57, 61 – 63, 68, 70 f., 73 – 76,
561 – 563, 565, 568, 623, 686, 715 87, 89, 92, 94 – 98, 100 f., 103 – 106, 110 f.,
– ideas, intelligibles in divine mind (maʿqūlāt, 114, 118, 120, 124 – 129, 134, 137 f., 142,
maʿlūmāt, ashyāʾ, ṣuwar) 26, 43, 54, 60, 144, 149 – 151, 154, 162 – 164, 167 f., 173,
83, 90, 111, 104, 124 f., 129, 134, 149 f., 176, 184 f., 187 – 192, 195, 198, 201 – 203,
157, 180, 183, 200, 204, 222 f., 273 f., 279, 218, 220 f., 228, 231, 244, 247 f., 251 – 253,
288 f., 291 f., 309, 312, 319 – 321, 332 – 261 f., 269, 276, 280, 298 – 300, 304,
334, 336, 350, 361, 383, 391 f., 397, 409, 312 f., 321 f., 325, 327 – 337, 341 – 344, 348,
472, 522, 528, 535, 544, 583, 587, 589, 351, 353 f., 359, 361, 365, 388 f., 392 – 400,
591, 603, 632, 636 – 638, 643, 645, 649 f., 402, 405, 407 f., 419 f., 425 f., 429 – 433,
654, 660, 662, 665, 670 f., 673, 680, 683, 447 f., 451, 459, 462 f., 465 – 468, 470 –
688, 693, 695, 700, 711, 722 476, 480, 482 – 484, 510 f., 520, 523, 526,
– and necessity (wujūb) 45, 54, 71, 76, 136, 528, 530, 532, 534, 538, 554 f., 559 – 565,
148, 378 f., 449 – 452, 454, 457, 480, 482, 568, 572 f., 577 f., 583, 587, 590, 594 – 597,
492, 495, 497, 535, 540 – 544, 552, 587 f., 606, 615, 617 f., 628 f., 632 – 634, 636 –
601 f., 605, 627, 632, 649, 652, 654, 689, 645, 647 f., 650 – 655, 657 f., 660, 662 f.,
701 f. 668 – 686, 690 f., 696 f., 699 – 701, 703 f.,
– and special existence, proper existence 706, 710, 713 – 716, 719, 722
(wujūd khāṣṣ) (esse proprium) 17, 450, – acquired 683
 Index of Technical Terms 757

– Agent Intellect (al-ʿaql al-faʿʿāl) 17, 43 – 45, 122 f., 125, 133 f., 145 f., 159, 163, 165, 172 –
47, 49, 63, 68, 89, 125, 163, 173, 203, 266, 176, 185, 192, 201, 234, 236 – 239, 252 –
302 f., 309, 314, 320 – 322, 331 – 334, 254, 256 – 259, 261, 276 f., 284 – 286,
337 f., 341, 389 f., 393, 397 – 399, 401, 433, 289 – 291, 293 – 295, 298, 302 f., 305 – 316,
472, 476, 482, 554 f., 561 f., 565, 567 f., 318 – 322, 324 – 327, 329, 331 – 335, 337 –
595, 629, 635, 639 f., 669 – 686, 689, 691, 339, 344, 346 f., 353, 355, 357, 359 f., 362 –
696 – 698 364, 377, 385, 388 f., 391, 397, 404 – 406,
– reflexive intellection, self-intellection 94, 417, 419, 440, 451, 454, 456, 465, 472,
459, 472, 546, 637, 649 f., 656, 686, 688, 475, 479 f., 492 f., 500 f., 512, 515, 522 –
691, 693 f. 524, 526, 529, 534, 551 – 554, 557, 566 –
– separate intellects (ʿuqūl mufāriqah) 7, 10, 568, 572 f., 581 f., 586, 602, 617, 639,
15, 17, 33, 43, 45, 47, 63, 68, 70 f., 75, 77, 642 – 645, 658, 668, 671, 673, 679, 681 –
87, 134, 136, 144, 172, 174 f., 187, 191, 215, 683, 685, 689, 694 f., 698, 700, 702, 706,
278, 298 f., 327 f., 337, 342, 365, 388, 403, 709, 730
433 f., 451, 454, 466, 472 f., 478, 489, 497, – prime matter (al-hayūlā l-ūlā) 33 f., 97 f.,
506, 508, 510, 561, 570, 573, 608, 631, 102 f., 105, 107 – 110, 294, 302, 309, 313 f.,
633 – 635, 637 f., 640 f., 643 f., 653, 669 – 319, 321, 324, 480, 515, 551 – 555, 582, 689
673, 675 f., 681, 685 f., 693 – 696, 699, meaning, idea, entity (maʿnā) 1 f., 5, 10 f., 15 f.,
701, 704, 706, 709, 711 19 – 23, 26, 28, 34 – 36, 39 – 41, 43 f., 48,
intensity (shiddah) 444 f., 457, 517 53, 55 – 57, 59, 61, 63, 66, 71, 76, 79 f., 82,
internal (dākhil) 7, 20 – 22, 75, 113, 125, 128, 84 – 87, 89 – 91, 93 f., 98 – 100, 102, 104 f.,
131, 138 f., 157, 189, 191 – 195, 197, 202, 107, 110 – 114, 116, 118 f., 121 – 151, 154, 157,
204 – 206, 209 f., 255, 278, 288, 290, 159 – 166, 168 – 170, 172, 177, 179, 181,
378 f., 382, 390, 395, 400, 424, 469 – 471, 183 – 185, 189 – 207, 210 f., 213 – 221, 223 –
479, 535, 537 f., 548, 555 – 560, 564 – 566, 227, 231, 233 f., 237 – 240, 244 – 247, 251,
577, 580, 617, 621, 638, 643, 649, 655, 255 f., 262 f., 269 – 283, 285, 287 f., 290,
665, 694, 707, 720 292, 294, 296, 298 – 301, 303 – 306, 308 –
irreducibility, irreducible (min ḥaythu hiya 314, 316 f., 319 – 323, 325 – 338, 340 – 344,
hiya) 5, 7, 16, 55, 57, 76, 79, 96, 108, 347 f., 350 f., 353, 355 – 358, 361, 366 f.,
138, 156, 165 f., 168, 170, 173, 184, 187 – 371 – 374, 377 – 379, 383 f., 388, 390 – 395,
190, 193, 199, 202, 207, 209, 221, 224, 397, 399 – 404, 406 – 408, 412, 414, 417 –
230 f., 243, 256, 260 f., 266, 269, 293 f., 422, 425, 427, 430, 434 – 436, 438 – 442,
307, 315, 325, 330 f., 335, 338 – 340, 365, 444 f., 447 f., 450, 453 – 458, 460 f., 465,
384, 414, 425 – 427, 471, 482, 499, 510 f., 469 – 475, 478 – 480, 482, 484, 488 – 493,
526, 533, 541, 553, 569, 573, 580, 582, 497, 499 – 504, 506, 508 – 512, 514, 516 –
584, 600, 609, 612, 626, 631, 641, 664, 519, 522, 525 – 527, 529, 531 – 533, 535 f.,
697 f., 714 f., 721 538, 541 – 544, 546 f., 549, 551 – 554, 556 –
560, 562 – 564, 566, 570 – 574, 577 – 581,
logic 1, 3 f., 7 – 9, 19, 32, 35, 46, 50, 54, 583, 585 f., 588 f., 591, 593, 595, 597, 601,
57 – 59, 63, 67, 80, 82, 90 f., 99, 112, 130, 603, 605 f., 609 – 616, 619 f., 623 f., 626,
132 – 134, 138, 157 f., 161, 169, 196 f., 628, 632, 634, 636 – 638, 640, 642 f.,
203 f., 219, 228, 261, 270, 273, 280, 285, 645 f., 649, 651, 653 – 657, 659 – 667,
288, 291, 303 – 307, 313 f., 318 f., 321, 325, 670 f., 676 – 678, 683, 685, 687 – 696,
330, 340, 349, 371, 389, 391, 393, 398, 698 – 700, 702 f., 707 – 709, 711 – 716, 718,
401, 403, 409, 418, 420, 438, 441, 445, 720 f.
465, 479, 491, 493, 505, 556, 570, 574, mereology 2, 10, 16 f., 29, 31, 33, 40 f., 48 f.,
578, 598, 655, 674, 693 51 – 53, 56 f., 59, 68, 71 f., 76, 84, 86, 90,
102, 109, 118, 120, 123 f., 129, 131, 134,
matter (māddah) 5, 10, 16, 33, 54, 58, 61 f., 139, 148 f., 165, 168, 170, 174 f., 178, 184,
68, 72, 77, 86, 93 f., 102, 107, 115 f., 120, 187 f., 191 – 193, 197, 205 f., 208, 211, 213,
758 Index of Technical Terms

220 f., 224, 229, 235, 237 f., 240 f., 245 – 150, 157, 188, 194, 216, 230, 240, 253,
247, 254 – 256, 262, 265, 267, 272, 274, 262 f., 328, 446, 520 f., 537, 551, 605,
284 – 295, 300 – 303, 305 – 308, 310 – 313, 701 f., 710
316, 318 f., 322 – 326, 328 f., 332, 335, – necessary (wājib), necessity (wujūb) 3, 5, 11,
338 – 340, 345, 352, 356, 359, 361 – 366, 15 f., 20, 22, 32 f., 44 f., 53 f., 58 f., 71, 74,
375, 384, 389, 401, 404 – 407, 409 – 412, 76, 93 f., 102, 105 f., 108 f., 117, 122, 136,
414 f., 418 f., 421 f., 425, 427, 430, 432, 139 f., 148, 156, 168, 172, 183, 194 f., 199,
441 f., 445 f., 455, 457, 459, 464, 466, 211, 219, 224 f., 233, 240, 252, 273, 311,
471 f., 476 – 479, 481 f., 484 f., 488, 490 f., 327, 373, 378 – 380, 440 f., 443, 446 – 457,
499, 501 f., 504, 511, 523 – 525, 527, 529, 460, 469, 474 f., 479 f., 482, 488, 492,
531 f., 535 f., 538, 546, 549, 557, 559 f., 564, 495 – 498, 500, 512, 515, 521, 533, 535 –
566 f., 571 f., 590 f., 600, 605 f., 620 f., 626, 550, 552, 578, 583, 587 f., 595, 598 f., 601 –
629, 632, 636, 639, 647, 649, 653, 661 f., 603, 605 – 611, 617, 627 – 629, 632, 637,
665, 668 f., 676, 686, 698, 700, 706, 710, 646, 648 – 650, 652, 654, 656, 660, 667,
720 f. 675, 686, 688 – 690, 701 – 706, 708
– part (juzʾ) 2, 10, 16 f., 29, 31, 33, 40 f., 48 f., – possible (mumkin), possibility (imkān) 3 f.,
51 – 53, 56 f., 59, 68, 71 f., 76, 84, 86, 90, 7 f., 11, 13 f., 17, 19, 22, 31 f., 44 – 46, 48,
102, 109, 118, 120, 123 f., 129, 131, 134, 50, 56, 59, 65 – 67, 71 f., 74, 6, 84, 87, 89,
139, 148 f., 165, 168, 170, 174 f., 178, 184, 91 f., 94, 97, 101 f., 105 – 109, 111 f., 117, 127,
187 f., 191 – 193, 197, 205 f., 208, 211, 213, 133, 136, 138, 145 f., 148, 150, 155, 157,
220 f., 224, 229, 235, 237 f., 240 f., 245 – 163, 165, 167, 171 f., 181, 184, 186 f., 191,
247, 254 – 256, 262, 265, 267, 272, 274, 194, 199, 201, 210 f., 222, 226 – 228, 230,
284 – 295, 300 – 303, 305 – 308, 310 – 313, 232 f., 240 f., 244, 248, 251, 256, 262, 271,
316, 318 f., 322 – 326, 328 f., 332, 335, 274, 277, 286, 288, 292, 296, 299 f., 309,
338 – 340, 345, 352, 356, 359, 361 – 366, 311, 314, 321, 323, 325, 327 f., 330 f., 334 f.,
375, 384, 389, 401, 404 – 407, 409 – 412, 337, 349, 357, 366, 373, 379 f., 382, 387 f.,
414 f., 418 f., 421 f., 425, 427, 430, 432, 393, 396 f., 400 f., 403 – 405, 416 f., 431,
441 f., 445 f., 455, 457, 459, 464, 466, 441, 443, 446 – 452, 455 – 458, 460, 472,
471 f., 476 – 479, 481 f., 484 f., 488, 490 f., 479, 487, 496, 498, 505, 509, 512, 521,
499, 501 f., 504, 511, 523 – 525, 527, 529, 525, 527, 529 f., 531, 533, 536 – 540, 545 f.,
531 f., 535 f., 538, 546, 549, 557, 559 f., 564, 552, 557, 586, 577, 581, 587 f., 594, 600 –
566 f., 571 f., 590 f., 600, 605 f., 620 f., 626, 608, 610, 619, 627, 632, 637 f., 645 – 649,
629, 632, 636, 639, 647, 649, 653, 661 f., 657, 661, 663, 666 – 668, 671, 677, 683,
665, 668 f., 676, 686, 698, 700, 706, 710, 686 – 688, 697, 699 – 711, 713, 722
720 f. modulation (tashkīk) 5 – 8, 11 f., 17, 19, 21,
– whole (kull) 4, 8, 49, 56 f., 74, 80, 89, 102, 26 – 32, 34, 36 – 38, 40 – 45, 48 f., 56,
130, 164, 184, 188, 205, 207 f., 223, 245, 58 – 60, 62 f., 67 – 78, 80, 83, 88, 90 – 92,
247, 256, 276, 283 f., 286, 289 f., 292, 102 f., 105, 109, 111 – 113, 116, 120, 123 –
305 f., 315, 323, 332, 334 f., 339, 352, 356, 125, 131, 145 f., 148, 150, 152, 164 f., 167 –
366, 377, 382, 404, 415 f., 432, 461, 464, 169, 172 – 174, 178 f., 185 f., 188, 201 – 203,
471 f., 476 f., 482, 488, 501, 504, 509, 511, 205 f., 209 – 212, 214 – 216, 218 – 222, 225 –
513, 518 f., 522, 525, 529, 569, 595, 600 f., 227, 229 – 231, 236 f., 241, 245, 251, 261 f.,
617, 620, 626, 628 f., 633, 637, 687, 691, 264, 266 f., 272, 276, 279 f., 284, 291, 294,
711, 716 299, 301, 304, 319 f., 326, 328, 330 f., 333,
modalities (jihāt) 3, 74 – 76, 105 f., 109, 117, 336, 339 – 341, 343 f., 347, 350, 355, 357,
375, 379 f., 441, 446 – 450, 460, 512, 520 f., 361 – 363, 365, 373, 376 f., 381, 384, 389,
538 f., 586, 588, 602 f., 606 – 608, 627, 392 f., 401, 403, 416 – 419, 421 f., 424 –
686, 701 f. 461, 463 – 468, 470, 474 – 478, 480 – 485,
– impossible (mumtaniʿ), impossibility 487 – 489, 494, 496 f., 500 f., 503 f., 510 –
(imtināʿ) 3, 9, 74, 97 f., 102, 104 – 113, 536, 538 – 540, 542, 545, 547, 553, 555,
 Index of Technical Terms 759

557, 560, 562 f., 568 f., 576, 585 – 588, nonexistence (ʿadam) 11, 33 f., 36 f., 49, 58,
590 – 593, 595 – 598, 600 – 606, 609 – 615, 94, 96, 98, 101, 105 – 108, 116, 120, 160,
617, 620 – 622, 624 – 629, 631 – 635, 637, 162, 169, 171, 187, 203, 216, 222 f., 226,
639 – 641, 644 – 648, 652 – 656, 660, 665, 230 – 233, 240, 248, 251, 253, 258, 369 f.,
667 f., 670, 672, 675 f., 678 f., 681 – 687, 373, 412, 487, 516, 536, 551, 591, 593 f.,
689, 691 f., 695 – 699, 701, 703 f., 706 f., 596 f., 604, 606, 610 f., 614 f., 619, 625,
710, 712 – 714, 716, 718, 720 – 722 647, 665 f., 705, 708, 710, 712 f., 722
– and form 58 – 60, 214, 318 f. number(s) 166, 201, 260, 275, 283, 326, 467 –
– and oneness (waḥdah) 58 – 60, 163, 214, 470, 557, 572 f., 586
318, 384, 437 f., 452, 454 f., 512, 548, 552,
675 oneness, numerical oneness (waḥdah) 5, 10,
– and necessity 58 – 60, 454 17, 20, 22, 43, 53, 58 f., 92, 94, 108, 121 f.,
– and priority and posteriority 58 – 60, 461, 132, 139 f., 143, 148, 152, 154, 156, 163 f.,
468, 617 167 f., 177, 184, 186, 191, 193 f., 197 – 199,
– and simplicity 215 201, 204, 214, 217, 220, 229, 244, 260,
– and substance 510, 578 270 f., 282 – 284, 289, 292, 314, 318,
– and universality (kulliyyah) 58 – 61, 63, 98, 345 f., 357, 374, 383 f., 387, 392, 407, 409,
134, 155, 163, 167, 183, 214, 217, 280 – 436 – 438, 452, 454 f., 467 – 470, 472 – 475,
282, 318, 330 f., 342 – 349, 360, 374, 392, 489, 503, 506, 511 f., 516, 530, 545 – 548,
400, 414, 635, 639, 658, 660, 675, 677 f., 552, 565, 599, 609, 620, 634 f., 649, 652 f.,
681, 711, 719 657, 662, 675, 692 f., 701 f., 707, 709, 711
– modes or aspects (anḥāʾ, aḥkām) 59, 98,
242 f., 365, 412, 437, 439, 441, 443 f., particular, particulars (juzʾī, juzʾiyyāt) 4 – 6, 9,
447 f., 451 f., 456, 460, 527, 531, 538, 553, 11, 13 f., 17 f., 21, 23 f., 27 f., 30, 32 – 35, 43,
586, 598, 602 f., 615, 621, 720 46, 49, 58, 71 – 73, 76 – 78, 80 – 84, 91, 97,
– modulated term (ism mushakkik) 58 f., 318, 99, 103, 110, 115 f., 118, 120 – 122, 124,
437 – 440, 445, 450, 453, 460 f., 478, 489, 126 f., 129 – 132, 134, 140, 146, 151, 153,
501, 512, 517, 522, 560, 578, 611, 626 156 – 159, 162, 168, 182, 186, 194 f., 198 f.,
– ontological modulation (tashkīk al-wujūd) 210 f., 218, 223, 225, 230, 235 f., 241, 249,
5 f., 17, 58 – 60, 71, 73 – 78, 318, 365, 373, 256, 261, 265 – 270, 273, 276 f., 279 f.,
380, 386, 434, 436 – 462, 465 f., 468, 470, 283 f., 286 f., 289 – 292, 296 f., 299 – 301,
477, 481, 489 – 491, 494, 497 f., 501, 503, 303, 309, 311, 313, 315, 322, 328, 333,
507 f., 510, 512, 514, 516, 527, 538, 568, 335, 337, 340 – 346, 350, 352 – 355, 357,
595, 602, 623, 625 f., 631, 646, 697, 720 360, 363, 365, 368, 371, 374, 385, 390 –
multiplicity (kathrah) 15 – 17, 20, 22, 42, 44, 394, 396, 398 – 401, 405, 410, 412, 416 –
47 f., 51 f., 70, 72, 81 f., 90, 93 – 96, 103, 418, 422, 430, 432, 437, 445, 447, 453 f.,
126, 130, 134, 139 f., 144, 156, 161, 163 f., 465, 470 – 473, 481, 484 f., 489, 492, 503,
177, 181 f., 186, 189, 191 f., 202, 204, 215, 505, 508, 510, 516, 524 f., 529, 531 f., 535,
221 f., 243, 265, 277, 283, 304, 320, 322, 551, 553, 556, 561, 563, 565 f., 569 f., 580 f.,
324, 332 – 334, 343, 349 f., 353, 357 – 359, 584 f., 591, 595 f., 599, 618, 635 f., 638 f.,
363, 379 – 381, 402, 404, 412, 418 f., 435, 641 f., 644, 646, 655, 657 – 665, 667 f.,
448, 463, 472 – 475, 477, 486, 489, 531, 670 – 672, 674 f., 677, 680 f., 684, 686 f.,
534 f., 544 f., 547, 561, 564 f., 599, 609, 690, 695, 700, 711, 718, 722
612, 628, 632, 634 – 638, 640 – 649, 651 – planets 90, 156 f., 158, 160, 214, 283
658, 662, 665, 667 f., 673, 675 – 677, 681, possible (mumkin)/possibility (imkān); see mo-
684, 686 f., 689 f., 692, 694 – 705, 707, dalities (jihāt)
711, 713 – 715, 719, 722 posteriority; see priority and posteriority
predication 4, 20, 81, 103, 112, 129, 180,
necessary, necessity; see modalities (jihāt) 214 – 217, 288, 315, 318, 347, 366 f., 402,
438 f., 445, 448, 451, 453, 459, 477, 490 –
760 Index of Technical Terms

492, 497 f., 507 f., 570, 572, 578, 592, 611, 344 f., 347, 354 f., 357, 364, 384 f., 390 –
681, 706, 718 392, 394, 397 f., 400, 404, 409, 414, 419,
primary notions 15, 26, 122, 199 – 202, 220, 427, 430, 433, 447, 464 f., 477 – 479, 482,
231, 376, 511, 520, 637, 654, 674 490, 495, 503, 505 f., 522 – 524, 526, 535,
priority and posteriority (taqaddum wa-taʾakhk- 541, 544, 550, 554, 561 – 563, 567 f., 572,
hur) 5, 10, 29 f., 33, 58 f., 65, 68, 74 f., 582, 607, 610, 629, 632 f., 637 f., 641 –
78, 109 f., 114, 164, 188, 201, 204, 220 f., 643, 648, 654, 670, 673, 677 – 680, 682 f.,
242, 294, 305 f., 313, 318 f., 332, 334 f., 694
337, 339, 381, 418, 432 f., 435, 437 – 439, – in the soul (fī l-nafs) 34, 63, 89, 204 f., 210,
441 – 447, 449 – 452, 455 f., 458, 460 – 478, 344, 364, 523 f., 633, 654
481, 483 f., 489, 516 f., 520, 531, 534, 551, species (nawʿ) 5, 19, 68, 83, 90, 94 f., 102,
557, 560 – 562, 564 f., 569 f., 584 f., 587, 107, 119, 121, 125, 127, 135, 140 f., 156 –
589 f., 595, 602, 604, 612, 616 – 619, 622, 158, 167, 195, 201, 208, 217 – 219, 268,
624 f., 628 f., 631, 643, 651, 695, 701, 716 270 f., 273 f., 277, 280, 282 – 285, 288 –
291, 293, 295, 302 – 305, 307 – 315, 318 –
self-awareness 62, 100, 103, 586 324, 326, 334 f., 342, 345 f., 349 f., 352 f.,
separate (mufāriq, mufrad) 11, 20, 28, 31, 39, 356, 372, 388, 395 f., 406, 418, 433, 450,
43, 55 – 57, 62 f., 66 f., 77, 83 f., 123 f., 133, 461, 466, 511, 515, 554, 566 f., 574 f., 579 f.,
145 f., 148, 152, 155 f., 159 f., 162 f., 169, 629, 682, 691, 695 f.
172 – 175, 179, 185, 194, 203 f., 212 f., 230, – speciesness (nawʿiyyah) 5, 19 f., 83, 141 –
247, 273 – 275, 283 f., 295 – 301, 305, 319 f., 143, 182, 190, 260, 280, 315, 326, 342,
326, 337 f., 340, 342, 345, 352 f., 358, 395, 433, 579 f.
360 f., 366, 381 f., 386, 388, 391, 400, state (ḥāl) 9, 11 – 13, 15, 17, 20, 27, 29, 31,
407 f., 414, 419, 422, 429, 433, 448, 451, 38 – 40, 42 – 44, 49, 55 – 57, 63, 65, 67,
462, 467, 483, 527, 531, 562, 569, 572 f., 70 f., 78, 83, 85, 90, 94, 96, 99 – 101, 105,
575, 583, 593, 597, 612, 617, 628, 642, 108, 110 f., 114, 118 f., 123 f., 126, 128 – 131,
650, 655, 662, 670 f., 675, 677, 686, 703, 136, 140, 144, 148 f., 151 f., 158, 166, 169 f.,
708 f., 721 172 – 174, 178 – 183, 187, 191, 193, 196,
similarity (tamāthul) 149, 228, 348, 366 – 374, 198, 203 f., 206 f., 211 – 215, 217, 220 – 223,
524 f., 594, 603, 609 225 – 227, 229 – 232, 234 – 236, 240 f.,
simple (basīṭ) 17, 33, 56, 60, 70, 94 f., 100, 243 f., 247, 249, 252 f., 255 – 260, 262,
111, 127, 139, 143 f., 147, 166, 183 – 185, 266 – 270, 273 f., 277, 282, 284, 288,
188 – 192, 197, 201 – 203, 208, 211, 215, 295 f., 299 – 301, 308 – 310, 312 f., 316,
231, 240, 243, 257 f., 261 f., 271, 286, 320, 322 f., 326 f., 330 – 332, 334, 338,
308 f., 317 f., 332, 339 f., 344, 346, 361 – 341, 343, 345 – 347, 355, 357 f., 360, 362 –
363, 365, 378, 380 f., 400, 404, 430, 432, 365, 367 – 371, 373 – 377, 382 f., 385 f.,
459, 464, 471, 473 – 475, 477 – 479, 481 – 389 – 394, 396, 399 – 401, 404 – 406, 409,
484, 486 – 488, 503, 513, 523, 525, 528, 412, 414 f., 419, 425 – 428, 430 f., 439, 445,
532, 535 f., 540, 552, 560 f., 569, 579, 582, 452, 456, 460 f., 463, 469, 471 – 474, 477 –
585, 595, 614, 617, 625 f., 629, 635 – 637, 484, 486 – 488, 493 – 495, 502 f., 506 f.,
640, 642 – 646, 652 – 654, 665, 668, 672 f., 512 f., 516, 518 f., 521, 523 – 527, 529, 531,
682 – 686, 689, 692, 695, 699, 701, 711 f., 533 – 538, 540 f., 543 – 545, 547 f., 552 f.,
717, 720, 722 563 – 566, 568, 574, 576, 578, 580, 582,
soul (nafs) 22, 34, 36, 40, 61 – 63, 75, 83, 85, 585, 587 – 589, 591, 593 – 597, 599 – 601,
87, 89, 93, 96 f., 100, 103, 111, 115, 122 – 603, 605 – 608, 610 – 612, 614 f., 617,
127, 129 – 132, 134 f., 144 f., 149, 151, 154, 619 f., 622, 625, 631, 634 – 637, 639, 643 –
157, 164, 166, 190, 198, 204 f., 208 – 210, 646, 650, 654, 657, 660, 664 – 666, 668 –
216, 223, 234, 238, 252 f., 257 f., 269, 275 – 671, 684, 686, 688, 691 – 693, 695, 699 –
278, 280, 286, 291, 301, 304 f., 310 – 312, 701, 704, 706 – 708, 710, 714, 717 f., 722
319, 321, 327, 330, 333, 335 f., 339 f.,
 Index of Technical Terms 761

subsistence (thubūt, qiwām) 36 – 38, 95, 413, 415, 419, 422, 425 – 427, 480, 491 –
121 f., 147, 192, 223, 225, 229, 276, 289 f., 498, 500 f., 503, 505 – 507, 519, 526, 541 –
323 f., 360, 373, 384, 475, 491, 555 – 559, 545, 556, 561, 572, 575, 581 f., 594, 599,
567, 591, 593, 595 – 597, 611, 613, 712 615 f., 621, 641 – 643, 648, 653, 655, 662 f.,
substance (jawhar) 19, 25, 49, 62, 75, 104, 665, 670, 687, 691 f., 703, 705, 710, 715
122, 138, 146, 172, 185, 190 f., 202, 223 f., – God as Truth (al-ḥaqq) 195, 494 f., 545, 653,
227, 229, 271, 275 f., 278, 283 – 287, 289 f., 665, 687
294 – 296, 301 f., 305 – 309, 313 – 319, 324,
327, 329 f., 333 – 336, 338 f., 345, 364, 367, unity; see oneness
370, 374, 377, 382, 384, 386, 414, 430, universal (kullī) 2, 4 f., 7, 9 – 22, 27 f., 30 – 36,
435, 444 f., 450 – 454, 456, 458 – 461, 464, 39 – 49, 51 f., 57, 60 – 63, 65 f., 69 – 77,
466, 468, 470, 472 f., 475 – 477, 489, 491, 80 – 85, 89 f., 96 – 99, 101 – 113, 116, 119 –
493 – 495, 497, 500, 505 – 511, 515 – 519, 129, 131 – 135, 137, 139 – 144, 147 – 170,
522, 525, 527, 529, 535, 540, 542, 544, 175 – 185, 187 – 189, 192 – 194, 197 – 199,
551 – 554, 557, 566 – 587, 589 f., 592, 598 f., 202 – 204, 206, 208 f., 211 – 220, 228, 230,
609, 611, 618, 620 f., 626, 628, 644, 662, 235 – 237, 240 – 250, 253, 255 f., 259 – 274,
668, 675, 686, 688 276 – 278, 280 – 283, 285 – 294, 296 – 298,
– substantiality (jawhariyyah) 19, 35, 127, 151, 302 – 305, 307 – 315, 318 f., 321, 324 – 326,
260, 303, 305 f., 315 – 318, 325, 336, 371, 328 – 335, 338, 340 – 366, 372 – 378, 384,
551, 553, 572 – 576, 578, 580 – 582, 584 f. 387 – 393, 395 f., 398 – 410, 412 – 422,
424 f., 428, 430 – 432, 434, 447, 459, 466,
theology (kalām) 2 f., 5, 9 – 13, 17, 24 f., 39, 471 – 476, 481 – 483, 485 – 487, 490, 492,
43 – 45, 48, 53 f., 69, 82 f., 85 – 87, 95, 501 – 504, 520, 522 – 525, 527 – 532, 534 f.,
119 f., 128, 130 f., 134, 137, 141, 146 f., 153, 544, 550, 556, 561, 563 – 565, 569, 574 –
160, 186 f., 196 f., 221, 226, 233 f., 244, 577, 579 f., 582 f., 585, 591, 595 f., 598 –
250, 276 – 279, 325, 332 f., 366 f., 373 – 601, 624 – 626, 628, 632, 634 – 636, 639 f.,
375, 380 f., 383, 386 f., 392, 416, 449, 457, 642, 644 – 647, 653, 657 – 665, 669 – 678,
474, 479, 502, 530, 538, 544, 546 – 550, 680 – 686, 691, 695 – 699, 704, 709, 711,
568, 570, 591, 603, 607, 609 – 613, 615 f., 713 f., 717, 719 f., 722
626, 629, 635, 640, 642, 644, 647 f., 650, – logical (manṭiqī)/logical universal (kullī
653 – 655, 660, 662, 665, 668, 670, 673, manṭiqī) 4 f., 7, 9, 15 f., 19 f., 22, 30 – 33,
687, 692 – 696, 700 – 707, 709, 712 – 717, 35, 37 – 40, 46 – 48, 57, 64, 66 f., 69, 73,
720 f. 75, 78 – 80, 82, 84 f., 87 f., 90 f., 93,
thing (shayʾ) 12 – 15, 20, 25 – 28, 32, 83, 85, 97 – 99, 105 f., 108 f., 116, 125 – 128, 130,
93, 109, 115, 120, 144 f., 153, 160, 162, 194, 132 – 135, 137 f., 140 – 143, 145, 149 – 152,
196, 199, 223 f., 317, 359, 376, 383, 386, 154, 157 – 159, 161 f., 164, 167, 169, 171 f.,
432, 466, 504, 523, 559, 584, 613 – 615, 175, 181 f., 185 – 187, 189 – 191, 196 – 199,
665 214, 216 – 219, 237, 242, 247, 249, 260 –
– thingness (shayʾiyyah) 19 – 21, 25 – 27, 79, 263, 266 – 268, 270 – 273, 276, 281, 285 –
118, 162, 196, 199, 220, 223 – 228, 230 – 288, 290 – 292, 300, 302 – 305, 307 – 315,
232, 260, 270, 275 f., 368, 373, 376, 419, 317 – 319, 321, 326, 334, 338 f., 341, 343 f.,
472, 477, 499 f., 504, 510, 512, 515, 517 – 347, 349 – 351, 359, 361 – 365, 372, 375 –
520, 532, 552, 555, 560, 562 – 566, 586, 377, 385, 397, 406 f., 409 f., 413 – 415,
591 – 597, 599 – 602, 606, 609, 613 f., 417 f., 420, 422, 435, 437 – 441, 444, 446,
624 – 626, 659, 684, 708, 722 450, 458 f., 463, 465 f., 473, 479, 483,
truth (ḥaqq, ḥaqīqah) 20, 25, 77, 79, 93, 95, 492 f., 501, 505, 510 – 512, 521, 523 f., 527,
136 f., 141, 145 f., 159, 190, 192, 195 f., 529 f., 534, 544 f., 549, 551, 555 f., 558,
200 f., 237, 243, 250, 273, 280, 286, 288, 569 f., 579, 584, 599, 603, 606, 611, 618,
297, 304, 332, 336, 338, 367, 372, 377, 627, 629, 631, 636, 638, 644 f., 655, 657 f.,
380, 384, 392 – 395, 397, 403 f., 407, 409,
762 Index of Technical Terms

667, 670, 675, 681, 688, 693, 697 – 699, 119, 126, 128, 131 f., 134 f., 139 – 144, 148 –
702, 708 f., 711, 714, 716, 720 152, 154 – 165, 163, 167 f., 170, 177, 179 –
– mental/intellectual (ʿaqlī)/mental/intellectual 183, 185, 187, 189 – 191, 193 f., 197 f., 203 f.,
universal (kullī ʿaqlī) 175, 409 209, 211 – 220, 237, 239, 244, 247 – 249,
– natural (ṭabīʿī)/natural universal (kullī ṭabīʿī) 252, 259, 262 f., 271 f., 280 – 283, 285, 292,
37, 82, 90, 102, 107 f., 110, 126 f., 140 – 303, 305 – 307, 309, 315, 318, 326, 328 –
143, 156, 162 f., 167, 173, 181, 191, 202, 331, 334, 339, 343 – 351, 354 f., 357, 360,
214, 237, 247, 249 f., 259 f., 275, 281, 304, 374 f., 377, 391 f., 396, 398, 400 – 403,
314, 321, 326, 330, 333, 335, 341, 343, 406 – 410, 412, 414, 416 – 418, 420, 422,
349 – 351, 358 f., 361 f., 374, 387, 398 f., 475, 484, 486, 489, 565, 577, 579 f., 582,
406, 409 – 416, 428 f., 432, 468, 471 – 474, 599, 620, 634 – 636, 639 f., 657 f., 660 –
485, 502, 523 f., 554, 561 f., 567, 573, 596, 662, 664, 672, 674 – 678, 680 – 682, 685,
641 f., 676 f., 682, 690, 697 f. 693, 702, 707, 709, 711, 714, 716, 719
– natural universal (kullī ṭabīʿī) 343, 406 f., univocity, univocal (mutawāṭin) 5, 58 f., 139,
409, 485 215, 435 – 440, 444, 448 – 450, 453 f., 456,
– universality (kulliyyah) 4 f., 10, 12, 16, 20, 459 f., 468, 498, 501, 512, 516 f., 519, 587,
22, 31, 39 f., 42 – 45, 47, 59, 61, 63 f., 592, 595, 602 – 604, 611 f., 626, 655, 666
81 – 84, 88 – 90, 92, 98 f., 104, 108, 111,