17 Arun Pandit
17 Arun Pandit
INTRODUCTION
*Sr. Scientist, Central Rice Research Institute, Cuttack – 753 006 (Orissa), **Principal Scientist and Sr.
Scientist, Central Potato Research Institute, Shimla and †Scientist, Sr. Scale, Central Potato Research Station, Patna.
The authors thankfully acknowledge the services and help rendered by T.K. Sinha, Arjun Sharma, Dist.
Agricultural Offices of West Bengal, Rahul Chaturvedi, Pratap Bose and all the officers and officials of FritoLays
who helped in the field survey work. Further, the authors also thank the anonymous referee for his valuable
suggestions and S.K. Pandey, Director-CPRI for guidance and financial assistance.
498 INDIAN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS
Majority of their agricultural supply will come through the backward linkage by
contract farming. The National Agricultural Policy (2000) announced by the
Government of India sought to promote contract farming by involving the private
sector in order to accelerate technology transfer, capital inflow and assured marketing
of crop production (Asokan, 2005).
Contract farming has a major role to play in the potato processing sector in India
(Pandit and Pandey, 2007). Prior to nineties, potato processing sector in India was
very poorly developed. One of the major reasons was the lack of sufficient processing
grade potatoes due to unavailability of suitable varieties. With the introduction of
indigenous processing varieties like Chipsona I, II, III and foreign varieties like
Atlantic and Kennebec, significantly more potato area is now become suitable for
growing potato for processing. A number of big potato processing companies set up
their plants, the raw materials for which are mainly collected through contract
farming. Pepsi foods is one of the earliest entrants in the food processing sector in
India. Its Frito-Lays division makes popular ‘Lays potato chips’. It established
processing plants in Maharashtra, Punjab and West Bengal.
However, notwithstanding the theoretical benefits, contract farming has been
controversial and has been criticised for being exploitative. Farmers have little
bargaining power against the giant corporation. Sometimes growers encountered the
problems of manipulation of quality standards, poor technical assistance, and
sometimes plain cheating and deliberate default (Glover, 1989). On the other hand,
the companies also face the problem of selling of the produce in the open market by
the farmers, if the market price rules higher than the contract price. Against this
backdrop, it is imperative to study the performance of contract farming at the field
level. However, most of the literature discussed the general issues of contract farming
in India. Some studies like Asokan and Singh (2003) Kumar et al., (2007) dealt with
some specific issues like conduct, performance and constraints of contract farming.
But it will be important to know how farmers benefited from the contract farming.
Therefore, this paper empirically analyses the gains from contract farming from the
farmers point of view. Besides, the technical efficiency was also estimated using Data
Envelopment Analysis technique for both the contract farmers as well as non-contract
(ordinary) farmers in the present study.
II
METHODOLOGY
The contract farmers in the present study were the potato farmers who were under
contract with the Frito Lays of Pepsi. The factory is located in Sankrail of Howrah
district. The primary data were collected through survey work conducted during
March-April, 2008. Four districts of West Bengal, viz., Hooghly, Bankura, Burdwan
and Howrah were selected purposively due to the presence of higher concentration of
contract farmers. A total of 13 blocks, minimum 3 from each district were selected
AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF GAINS FROM POTATO CONTRACT FARMING 499
purposively depending upon the concentration of the contract farmers from each
district. Data were collected from the 144 contract potato growers and 139 ordinary
or non-contract potato growers spread over 76 villages. The samples of contract and
non-contract growers were drawn randomly preferably from the same location.
Analytical Framework
Max μ,ν (μ ′i Yi /ν ′i X i )
Subject to
μ ′ Yj / ν ′ X j ≤ 1 , j = 1, …, n
μ, ν ≥ 0
500 INDIAN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS
III
Frito Lays is undertaking contract farming in several states of India. The quantity
under Pepsico contract farming programme has grown almost five times since 2003.
The number of farmers contracted has jumped from 800 in 2003 to almost 11000 in
2007. Acreages under contract has grown from 2000 acres to 11600 acres in 2007
(Mukkavilli, 2008).
The potato contract of Frito-Lays in West Bengal is an instance of a “production
management” contract where the company supplies inputs and extension, advances
credit (in kind), provides price insurance and monitors grower effort through frequent
inspections. During 2007-08 about 1650 acres were under direct contract in 7 districts
of West Bengal, viz., Hooghly, Bankura, Burdwan, Birbhum, Paschim Medinipur and
Howrah. The farmers had been provided seed largely on credit. The company also
provided insecticide and pesticide at cost, but this was optional for the farmers. The
contract growers supplied land, labour and other variable inputs. It has been seen that
the contract agreement was largely verbal. No Government functionary was involved
in the contract farming programme. In some places the agreement was not very clear
to the farmers and hence, disputes arise. Vendor was appointed by the company who
manages the total affair for a group of villages. He is generally an influential person
in the society. The big farmer, potato trader, co-operative society etc. were some of
the vendors. Technical aspects were looked after by the field agents. He sorts out
AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF GAINS FROM POTATO CONTRACT FARMING 501
problems especially regarding disease/pest, cultural practices and visits the farmer
frequently. The whole production process was closely monitored to ensure the quality
production. Monitoring was also helpful for maintaining good relationship. The price
was fixed well before planting. In the open market price fluctuates vigorously. Thus,
a farmer received considerable price insurance in the contract farming. However, the
price fixed was not uniform across the state. Depending upon the vendor, it was fixed
for whole produce or graded produce. In some places some incentive was provided
with the base price. Incentive was given on the basis of ‘pay for performance’, i.e. for
quality produce and good cultural practices. Farmers’ responsibility ended at heap
making in the field or in some cases he had to bring the produce upto the road head.
The seed of the variety Atlantic was supplied @ Rs. 2000/q to the farmers. The
technical help was provided free of cost.
The analysis of socio-economic profiles is very important since they provide the
status of society in which farmers operate. Moreover, they exert profound influence
on the farmer’s decision making pattern. Table 1 presents the potato farmers socio-
economic profiles and it could be seen that the contract farmers were more
experienced and have more years of schooling. The social participation was
significantly more in case of contract farmers. Social participation, i.e., member or
office bearer of co-operative societies, religious bodies, political parties, etc. helps
farmers to venture out for new scheme of production like contract farming.
Table 1 also shows that in addition to the larger operational holding, the contract
farmers got comparatively higher share of their total income from the non-farm
sources. However, except social participation the difference in other parameters was
not very much acute. In fact the company does not discriminate the farmers to include
them in the contract farming scheme. But comparatively small and poor farmers
hesitate to join the programme.
502 INDIAN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS
Varietal Performance
The price fixed in the contract system was not uniform across the state.
However, the average price of Atlantic was much higher than the K. Jyoti. It is also to
be noted that the contract farmers could fetch higher prices even for K. Jyoti than the
ordinary farmers. This may be due to their higher social influences. The yield of
Atlantic was comparatively less as compared to the next most popular variety Kufri
Jyoti. The yield difference may be due to the genetic potential and altered crop
geometry. Traditional geometry cannot give processed grade potatoes. Replacing the
traditional geometry with advanced geometry increase the process grade yields, while
the total yield may drop (Mukkavilli, 2008). In some places farmers complained
about the poor quality of supplied seed which may also be one of the reasons. When
vendors do not purchase the whole produce, farmers faced the problem of disposing
off the rejected potatoes. Due to the bad taste of Atlantic for table purposes, its
consumption at home is minimal. Therefore, farmers require a good processing
variety which will be of short duration (85-90 days), good yielder (at least at par with
AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF GAINS FROM POTATO CONTRACT FARMING 503
K. Jyoti) and having good taste for table purpose. However, by and large, farmers
were happy about the return of contract farming as market price plummeted to a very
low level for K. Jyoti in that year.
The details of economic analysis are presented in Table 3. The table shows that
farmers had to spend Rs. 70,705 and Rs. 74,909 per hectare for cultivation of K. Jyoti
and Atlantic, respectively. For same variety K. Jyoti, the contract farmers spent about
Rs.4000 less per ha for cultivation as compared to non-contract farmers. This
difference was mainly due to the higher seed price and higher dose of fertiliser
applied by the non-contract farmers. Higher seed prices in case of non-contract
farmers were due to purchase of more percentage of seed coming from the external
sources. When K. Jyoti in all farmers and Atlantic was compared it could be seen
from the table that the contract farmers spent Rs. 4000 more for cultivation of
Atlantic as compared to K. Jyoti. The components for which farmers had to spend
more are land preparation, earthingup and plant protection. Deep ploughing and thick
ridge make land preparation and earthingup to cost more. The field agents of contract
farming recommended expensive plant protection chemicals like Acrobat, Curzate,
Crocide, etc. Although the purchase of plant protection chemical was optional, but
many farmers purchased those to protect their crops. The higher plant protection cost
for K. Jyoti for contract farmers is due to the same reason as compared to ordinary
farmers. The percentage share of different cost components have been presented in
Figure 1.
Fertilizers+micro- Fertilizers+micro-
nutrients nutrients
17.52% 14.41%
Earthing up
5.56%
Earthing up
5.60% Planting
47.35% Planting
49.42%
Irrigation
Irrigation 9.98%
10.30%
Figure 1 indicates that the major cost components were cost of planting,
fertilisers and micronutrients, irrigation and land preparation both for K. Jyoti and
Atlantic. The share of planting and plant protection was more in Atlantic as compared
to K. Jyoti. Though the yield level of Atlantic was lower but the net return was much
higher than that of K. Jyoti. Both the categories of farmers incurred losses in
cultivating K. Jyoti but Atlantic gave handsome return of around Rs.15000 per
hectare. This was due to the higher prices received by the contract farmers for
Atlantic. Tripathy et al., (2005) also found significant better profitability of potato
production in Haryana contract farming system. Similarly Singh (2002) also observed
that contracting has led to higher farm incomes and more employment for labor in
Punjab. Hence, the above discussion concludes that the contract farming is an
economically viable enterprise for the farmers. However, it is required to study the
long term impact of contract farming by taking multiple years data.
Technical Efficiency
was primarily responsible for the overall technical inefficiency as compared to the
technical inefficiency (14 per cent and 11 per cent). The analysis indicates contract
and non-contract potato farms can, on an average, reduce their inputs by 60 per cent
and 32 per cent, respectively by operating at an optimal scale and by eliminating pure
technical inefficiencies through the adoption of best practices of the efficient farms of
the farms.
TABLE 4. EFFICIENCY MEASURES OF POTATO GROWING FARMS
The scale efficiency of the contract and non-contract growers are summarised in
Figure 2. The figure depicts that only 1 per cent of the non-contract farmers were
operating under optimal scale. The figure is much higher for contract growers which
stood at 12 per cent. Almost all the non-contract farmers and a sizeable population
(87 per cent) of contract farmers were operating under sub-optimal scale. No non-
contract farmer was operating under above optimal scale whereas, the same for
contract growers was 1 per cent. Hence, the study indicated that the largest of overall
technical inefficiency can be tackled by solving the problem of increasing returns to
scale.
When the pure technical efficiency is considered it was found that none of the
farmers were below the efficiency level of 50 per cent. Further, around 43 per cent of
non-contract farmers and 55 per cent of contract farmers were found to be in the
efficiency group of more than 90 per cent.
IV
The study analyses the data collected from 139 non-contract and 144 contract
potato growers from four districts of West Bengal in the year 2008. It was found that
the contract farmers were more experienced and had more years of schooling and
social participation. The average farm harvest price of Atlantic (contract variety) was
much higher than the K. Jyoti. Cost of cultivation was higher in Atlantic
(Rs.74,909/ha) as compared to K. Jyoti (Rs. 70,705/ha). Contract farming gave good
returns of around Rs.15,000 per hectare when non-contract farmers as well as K.
Jyoti cultivator of contract farmers incurred losses. The Data Envelopment Analysis
for technical efficiency estimation indicates that the contract method of production
was more efficient than non-contract production. Further the scale inefficiency was
primarily responsible for overall technical inefficiency as compared to the technical
inefficiency. Majority of the non-contract as well as contract farmers were operating
under sub-optimal scale.
Technical inefficiencies could be improved through the adoption of best practices
of the efficient farms and the problem of overall technical inefficiency can be tackled
by solving the problem of increasing returns to scale. For successful running of
contract farming in the long run the agreement should be written documents and
AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF GAINS FROM POTATO CONTRACT FARMING 507
legally binding. Further, the agreement should be for long term, so that farmers can
realise its full potential. Keeping in view the two asymmetrical parties, written
contract and involvement of Government Departments of Agriculture or local
panchayats are necessary as it will help in settling the disputes. Price fixation should
be uniform across the state and other terms and conditions should be clearly spelt out.
Very often farmers face the problem of disposing off the rejected Atlantic potatoes.
Home consumption of this variety as table purpose is minimal due to bad taste.
Therefore, a good processing variety with short duration (80-85 days), good yielder
(at least at par with K. Jyoti) and having good taste for table purpose may be
developed.
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