(53)

JOSEFINA F. INGLES, JOSE F. INGLES, JR., HECTOR F. INGLES, JOSEFINA I. ESTRADA, AND
TERESITA I. BIRON, petitioners, VS. HON. ESTRELLA T. ESTRADA, IN HER CAPACITY AS
FORMER EXECUTIVE JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY, AND CHARLES J.
ESTEBAN, respondents.
G.R. No. 141809. April 8, 2013, SECOND DIVISION, PEREZ.
FACTS
Respondent Charles petitioned Executive Judge Estrada of RTC Quezon City for the extrajudicial
foreclosure of the mortgage on the 10 lots entered into by petitioners Jose and Josefina, as a
collateral to a loan they obtained from Charles.

Executive Judge Estrada issued an order (1997 order) directing the Clerk of Court to proceed
with the extrajudicial sale of the 10 lots, which thereafter, at the public auction, Charles was
declared the highest bidder for all of the 10 lots and the corresponding Certificate of Sale was
issued to Charles.

Petitioners then filed before the CA a petition for Annulment of Final Orders pursuant to Rule 47
of the Rules of Court and sought the nullification of the 1997 order of Executive Judge Estrada.
CA issued a resolution dismissing the petition for Annulment of Final Order on the ground of
non-compliance with Sec. 4, Rule 47 and Sec. 3, Rule 46.

On motion for reconsideration before the CA, the later resolution of CA maintain the dismissal
but with a different rationale. CA dismissed the petition on the ground of lack of jurisdiction for
it cannot take original cognizance of the petition as the same does not qualify either as an action
under Rule 47 or as any other case that would fall within its original jurisdiction under Rule 46.

The Court of Appeals pointed out that the petition for Annulment of Final Orders assails orders
issued by an executive judge in a proceeding merely for the extrajudicial foreclosure of a
mortgage whereas the Rules of Court 48 clearly prescribes that only judgments, final orders and
resolutions issued by a "Regional Trial Court" in "civil actions" may be the subject of annulment
under Rule 47. The Court of Appeals further added that, at any rate, the principle of hierarchy of
courts dictates that the Ingleses should have first challenged the validity of the Orders of
Executive Judge Estrada in an appropriate case before the RTC instead of resorting to a

Hence, present appeal by certiorari with the Supreme Court. In the present case, the Ingleses
argued that their petition for Annulment of Final Orders is an action validly instituted under
Rule 47 of the Rules of Court. They argue that the Court of Appeals could have still taken
cognizance of their petition even though the orders assailed therein were issued merely by an
executive judge in an extrajudicial foreclosure proceeding. The Ingleses posit that the assailed
Orders of Executive Judge Estrada may, in view of their peculiar nature, be treated as final
orders issued in a "civil action" by a "Regional Trial Court" itself because the orders are not the
usual orders issued in proceedings for extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgages. According to the
Ingleses, Executive Judge Estrada had to practically assume and exercise powers otherwise
reserved only to an RTC judge presiding over a civil action when she issued the assailed Orders.

ISSUE
WON CA erred in dismissing the petition for Annulment of Final Orders.

RULING
Section 9 (2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, vests the
Court of Appeals with exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for "annulment of judgments
of Regional Trial Courts." The remedy by which such jurisdiction may be invoked is provided
under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court.
Conformably, Rule 47 sanctions the filing of a petition for the Annulment of Judgments, Final
Orders and Resolutions before the Court of Appeals. Section 1 of Rule 47, however, defines the
scope and nature of this petition:

RULE 47
ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENTS OR FINAL ORDERS AND RESOLUTIONS
SECTION 1. Coverage. — This Rule shall govern the annulment by the Court of Appeals
of judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts for
which the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate
remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner.

The above-quoted section sets forth in no unclear terms that only judgments, final orders and
resolutions in "civil actions" of "Regional Trial Courts" may be the subject of a petition for
annulment before the Court of Appeals.

In the present case, the subject of the petition for Annulment of Final Orders are not the proper
subjects of a petition for annulment before the Court of Appeals. The assailed Orders are not the
final orders in "civil actions" of "Regional Trial Courts" that may be the subject of annulment by
the Court of Appeals under Rule 47. There is a clear-cut difference between issuances made in a
"civil action" on one hand and orders rendered in a proceeding for the extrajudicial foreclosure
of a mortgage on the other.

"Civil actions" are suits filed in court involving either the enforcement or protection of a right,
or the prevention or redress of a wrong. They are commenced by the filing of an original
complaint before an appropriate court and their proceedings are governed by the provisions of
the Rules of Court on ordinary or special civil actions. Issuances made therein, including and
most especially judgments, final orders or resolutions, are therefore rendered by courts in the
exercise of their judicial function.

In contrast, proceedings for the extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgages, as the name already
suggests, are not suits filed in a court. They are commenced not by the filing of a complaint, but
by submitting an application before an executive judge who, in turn, receives the same neither
in a judicial capacity nor on behalf of the court. The conduct of such proceedings is not
governed by the rules on ordinary or special civil actions, but by Act No. 3135, as amended, and
by special administrative orders issued by this Court. Necessarily, the orders of the executive
judge in such proceedings, whether they be to allow or disallow the extrajudicial foreclosure of
the mortgage, are not issued in the exercise of a judicial function but issued by the RTC
Executive Judge in the exercise of his administrative function to supervise the ministerial duty
of the Clerk of Court as Ex Officio Sheriff in the conduct of an extrajudicial foreclosure sale.

Verily, the assailed Orders of Executive Judge Estrada cannot be the subject of a petition for
annulment before the Court of Appeals. Such orders, issued as they were by an executive judge
in connection with a proceeding for the extrajudicial foreclosure of a mortgage, evidently do not
fall within the type of issuances so carefully identified under Section 1 of Rule 47. The Court of
Appeals was, therefore, correct in postulating that the annulment of the assailed Orders is not
within their exclusive original jurisdiction per Section 9 (2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.

On the other hand, the allegation of the Ingleses that Executive Judge Estrada overstepped her
jurisdiction in issuing the assailed Orders is immaterial to the issue of whether the Court of
Appeals may assume jurisdiction over their petition. Assuming arguendo that Executive Judge
Estrada did exceed her jurisdiction in issuing the assailed Orders, the nature of such orders and
the circumstances under which they were issued would still remain the same. The mere fact,
nay, the mere allegation, that the assailed Orders have been issued without jurisdiction do not
make them, even by the limits of either the strongest reasoning or the most colourful
imagination, final orders in a "civil action" by a "Regional Trial Court." Clearly, a petition under
Rule 47 even then would still not be a viable remedy.

In fine, therefore, the court see no reversible error on the part of the Court of Appeals in
dismissing the petition for Annulment of Final Orders.