USACAPOC (A)

Operation Enduring Freedom

Lessons Learned In Afghanistan

NATIONAL DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL ASSOCIATION - SO/LIC SYMPOSIUM

11 February 2003 BG Maney 1

Deputy Commander, USACAPOC (A)
 USACAPOC (A)
Operation Enduring Freedom
Lessons Learned In Afghanistan

INTRODUCTION

11 February 2003 BG Maney 2

Deputy Commander, USACAPOC (A)
 USACAPOC (A)
Operation Enduring Freedom
Lessons Learned In Afghanistan

AGENDA
• Communication Equipment Requirements
• C2 Working Relationship with USCENTCOM HQs
• Contract Linguist Support
• Civil Affairs Field Use of the VoxTec Phraselator
• PSYOP Support to Special Forces
• Lack of a MTOE Civil-Military Operations Center
• Interagency integration with CA and PSYOP

11 February 2003 BG Maney 3

Deputy Commander, USACAPOC (A)
 USACAPOC (A)
Operation Enduring Freedom
Lessons Learned In Afghanistan

AGENDA Cont.
• Summary
• Questions

11 February 2003 BG Maney 4

Deputy Commander, USACAPOC (A)
 USACAPOC (A)
Operation Enduring Freedom
Lessons Learned In Afghanistan

COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT
REQUIREMENTS ON MTOEs

11 February 2003 BG Maney 5

Deputy Commander, USACAPOC (A)
 USACAPOC (A)
Operation Enduring Freedom
Lessons Learned In Afghanistan

ISSUE: Communication Equipment Requirements.

DISCUSSION: AARs from deployed soldiers indicate that CA and
PSYOP units entered the theater with inadequate communication
equipment. AN/PRC 148 MBITRs (Multiband Intra-Team Radio) were
invaluable to both the CA and PSYOP tactical missions; however,
PSYOP teams and CAT-As need more radios to provide adequate
communication coverage. This communication equipment is not on
reserve component (RC) CA MTOEs.
RECOMMENDATION: Submit documents to include new
communication equipment on MTOEs. Work to accelerate fielding of
key communication equipment for training and operational
missions.

11 February 2003 BG Maney 6

Deputy Commander, USACAPOC (A)
 USACAPOC (A)
Operation Enduring Freedom
Lessons Learned In Afghanistan

C2 WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH

USCENTCOM HEADQUARTERS

11 February 2003 BG Maney 7

Deputy Commander, USACAPOC (A)
 USACAPOC (A)
Operation Enduring Freedom
Lessons Learned In Afghanistan

ISSUES: C2 Working Relationship with USCENTCOM HQs.

DISCUSSION: PSYOP soldiers reported an excellent relationship
with USCENTCOM HQs. Branch-qualified PSYOP officers filled joint-
level duty positions and NCOs filled J3 Information Operations (IO)
duty positions.
RECOMMENDATION: The PSYOP community should identify and
nominate qualified officers for follow-on assignments to Combatant
Commands to facilitate the seamless integration of Joint PSYOP Task
Forces into theater operations. In addition, selected 39B (PSYOP)
and 39C/38A (Civil Affairs) officers should receive information
operations (IO) training to better understand and integrate into this
growing and important function. Continued participation in Joint
Training Exercises is vital to success in both of these areas.

11 February 2003 BG Maney 8

Deputy Commander, USACAPOC (A)
 USACAPOC (A)
Operation Enduring Freedom
Lessons Learned In Afghanistan

CONTRACT LINGUIST SUPPORT

11 February 2003 BG Maney 9

Deputy Commander, USACAPOC (A)
 USACAPOC (A)
Operation Enduring Freedom
Lessons Learned In Afghanistan

ISSUE: Contract Linguist Support.

DISCUSSION: Once in place, contract linguists provided excellent
support. However, USACAPOC must identify and anticipate linguist
requirements early in the operation to streamline the contracting
process.
RECOMMENDATION: Contract Linguist Statements of Work for
selected languages should be pre-approved and ready for
implementation. For example, an implementing Memorandum of
Agreement between USASOC/SOCOM and USCENTCOM concerning
specific OEF linguist requirements would significantly improve the
quality and timeliness of contract linguist support.

11 February 2003 BG Maney 10

Deputy Commander, USACAPOC (A)
 USACAPOC (A)
Operation Enduring Freedom
Lessons Learned In Afghanistan

CIVIL AFFAIRS USE OF THE VoxTec

PHRASELATOR

11 February 2003 BG Maney 11

Deputy Commander, USACAPOC (A)
 USACAPOC (A)
Operation Enduring Freedom
Lessons Learned In Afghanistan

ISSUE: Initial Civil Affairs use of the VoxTec Phraselator (Human

Voice Translation System) developed under the aegis of the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) Information
Technology Office.
DISCUSSION: USACAPOC soldiers deployed to Afghanistan became
familiarized with the Phraselator manufactured by VoxTec. Initial
feedback from soldiers in the field is positive; however, some
glitches in the voice-recognition software were identified.
RECOMMENDATION: Accelerate the fielding of the new generation
Phraselator for each Civil Affairs CAT-A and CAT-B team as well as
for each Tactical PSYOP Detachment and Tactical PSYOP Team.

11 February 2003 BG Maney 12

Deputy Commander, USACAPOC (A)
 USACAPOC (A)
Operation Enduring Freedom
Lessons Learned In Afghanistan

PSYOP SUPPORT TO SPECIAL FORCES

11 February 2003 BG Maney 13

Deputy Commander, USACAPOC (A)
 USACAPOC (A)
Operation Enduring Freedom
Lessons Learned In Afghanistan

ISSUE: PSYOP Support to Special Forces.

DISCUSSION: Tactical PSYOP Teams and SF ODAs seamlessly

integrated to conduct operations in Afghanistan. The nature of
operations in Afghanistan increased the level of PSYOP support to
the Joint Special Operations Task Force and SF ODAs not seen in
recent operations. The increase in scale and scope of PSYOP
support presented some initial challenges to integrate TTPs.

RECOMMENDATION: PSYOP leaders need to fully brief SF

Commanders on PSYOP capabilities and include PSYOP planners
early in the SF planning process. Future training opportunities
between SF ODAs and PSYOP teams should be identified and
planned to develop enhanced integration/support procedures.

11 February 2003 BG Maney 14

Deputy Commander, USACAPOC (A)
 USACAPOC (A)
Operation Enduring Freedom
Lessons Learned In Afghanistan

LACK OF A DEPLOYABLE MTOE

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATION CENTER

11 February 2003 BG Maney 15

Deputy Commander, USACAPOC (A)
 USACAPOC (A)
Operation Enduring Freedom
Lessons Learned In Afghanistan

ISSUE: Lack of a deployable MTOE Civil-Military Operations Center.

DISCUSSION: OEF in Afghanistan demonstrated a clear need for a
deployable, fully-equipped CMOC that can become fully functional after
entering the theater with little logistical support from the CJSOTF. The
CMOC must be staffed with DMOSQ 38A soldiers that arrive with all the
requisite command, control, communications, and computers (C4)
equipment necessary to manage a CMOC responsible for coordinating
US Governmental agencies, Combined-Joint CMO, Non-Governmental
Organizations (NGOs), and indigenous CMO entities across the civil-
military spectrum.
RECOMMENDATION: SWCS and USACAPOC (A), G7 should coordinate
to develop a CMOC for each CACOM and make the necessary changes
to each CACOM’s MTOE.

11 February 2003 BG Maney 16

Deputy Commander, USACAPOC (A)
 USACAPOC (A)
Operation Enduring Freedom
Lessons Learned In Afghanistan

INTERAGENCY INTEGRATION
PSYOP AND CIVIL AFFAIRS

11 February 2003 BG Maney 17

Deputy Commander, USACAPOC (A)
 USACAPOC (A)
Operation Enduring Freedom
Lessons Learned In Afghanistan

ISSUE: Interagency integration with PSYOP and CA.

DISCUSSION: PSYOP elements in Afghanistan provided support to
Humanitarian Demining operations and to the Interim Afghan
Administration. In addition, Civil Affairs soldiers provided liaison
support to NGOs as part of the State Department’s Overseas
Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDACA) program. However,
specific operational mechanisms to coordinate/direct PSYOP and Civil
Affairs support with USCENTCOM, USSOCOM, and interagency
organizations currently does not exist.
RECOMMENDATION: USSOCOM and Combatant Commands need to
clarify integration mechanisms with the DOD and interagency
organizations to ensure unity of effort. Joint training exercises could
provide opportunities to enhance DOD and interagency integration.

11 February 2003 BG Maney 18

Deputy Commander, USACAPOC (A)
 USACAPOC (A)
Operation Enduring Freedom
Lessons Learned In Afghanistan

SUMMARY
• Civil Affairs and PSYOP operations in Afghanistan continue to
prove force-multiplier capabilities for SOF and conventional forces.
The overall feedback from the CJSOTF-AF and USCENTCOM HQs
has been positive. However, there are several specific areas of
operational support that need to be improved .
• Combined-Joint-Intergovernmental and NGO operations in
Afghanistan created unanticipated command and control (C2)
turbulence for CA and PSYOP forces due to fragmented operational
C2. CA and PSYOP forces will continue to adapt and integrate.
• The CA and PSYOP community needs to emphasize the
necessity of fully integrating SOF training with SF Groups, Infantry
maneuver units, and NGOs to ensure unity of effort.

11 February 2003 BG Maney 19

Deputy Commander, USACAPOC (A)
 USACAPOC (A)
Operation Enduring Freedom
Lessons Learned In Afghanistan

QUESTIONS?

11 February 2003 BG Maney 20

Deputy Commander, USACAPOC (A)