54 ON TIME AND BEING

-and nevertheless is. Then something similar would occur to the

thinking that as preparatory thinking looks ahead to Appropriation
and can only point-that is, give directives which are to make the
direction of the entry to the site of Appropriation possible, some-
what similar to HOJderlin's poetry which was not there for a century
The End of Philosophy
and the Task of Thinking
-and nevertheless was. On the other hand, the limit of thinking lies'
in that the preparation for thinking can only be accomplished in a
special respect. It is accomplished in a different way in poetry, too,
in art, etc., in which a thinking and speaking also Occur.
Afterward "The Turn," taken from the lecture series "Insight into
that which is," was read as a conclusion. This was done in order that
what was discussed during the seminar might be heard again, so to
speak, from another perspective as it were and in a more unified way.
Then some questions were raised which were briefly answered.
The denial of world about which "The Turn" speaks is related to
the denial and withholding of the present in "Time and Being." For be tide designates the attempt at a reflection which persists in
one can also speak about denial and withholding in Appropriation, questioning. The questions are paths to an answer. If the answer
since they have to do with the manner in which It gives time. The could be given, the answer would consist in a transformation of
discussion of Appropriation is indeed the site of the farewell from thinking, not in a propositional statement about a matter at stake.
Being and time, but Being and time remain, so to speak, as the gift The following text belongs to a larger context. It is the attempt
of Appropriation. undertaken again and again ever since 1930 to shape the question
The finitude of Being was first spoken of in the book on Kant. The of Being and Time in a more primal way. This means: to subject the
finitude of Appropriation, of Being, of the fourfold hinted at during point of departure of the question in Being and Time to an immanent
the seminar is nevertheless different from the finitude spoken of in criticism. Thus it must become dear to what extent the critical ques-
the book on Kant,4 in that it is no longer thought in terms of the tion of what the matter of thinking is, necessarily ~d continually
relation to infinity, but rather as finitude in itself: finitude, end, limit, belongs to thinking. Accordingly, the name of the task of Being and
one's own-to be secure in one's own. The new concept of finitude Time will change.
is thought in this manner-that is, in terms of Appropriation itself, We are asking:
in terms of the concept of one's own. I. What does it mean that philosophy in the present 3je has

But the accused made a sign of refusal. One had to be there, he said, if one entered its final stage?
was called, but to call oneself was the greatest error that one could make. 2. What task is reserved for thinking at the end of philosophy?
(Hans Erich Nassack, ImpoJSible Trial)
I. What does it mean that philasophy in the present age has entered its final
4. Kant and the Problem ofMetaphysics (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1962).
Even in "Being and Time" Heidegger thinks temporality as finite. (Tr.)
stage?
Philosophy is metaphysics. Metaphysics thinks being as a whole-

55

~
 · ~.' or ~;~iv";']"~"'h}Z;h);:£,_ZA=

56 ON TIME AND BEING THE END OF PHILOSOPHY 57

the world, man, God-with respect to Being, with respect to the The old meaning of the word "end" means the same as place:
belonging together of beings in Being. Metaphysics thinks beings as "from one end to the other" means: from one place to the other. The
being in the manner of representational thinking which gives rea- end of philosophy is the place, that place in which the whole of
sons. For since the beginning of philosophy and with that beginning, philosophy's history is gathered in its most extreme possibility. End
the Being of beings has showed itself as the ground (arche, aition). as completion means this gathering.
The ground is from where beings as such are what they are in their Throughout the whole history of philosophy, Plato's thinking
becoming, perishing and persisting as something that can be known, remains decisive in changing forms. Metaphysics is Platonism.
handled and worked upon. As the ground, Being brings beings to Niets:zche characterizes his philosophy as reversed Platonism. With
their actual presencing. The ground shows itself as presence. The the reversal of metaphysics which was already accomplished by Karl
present of presence consists in the fact that it brings what is present Marx, the most extreme possibility of philosophy is attained. It has
each in its own way to presence. In accordance with the actual kind entered its final stage. To the extent that philosophical thinking is
of presence, the ground has the character of grounding as the ontic still attempted, it manages only to attain an epigonal renaissance and
causation of the real, as the transcendental making possible of the variations of that renaissance. Is not then the end of philosophy after
objectivity of objects, as the dialectical mediation of the movement all a cessation of its way of thinking? To conclude this would be
of the absolute Spirit, of the historical process of production, as the premature.
will to power positing values. As a completion, an end is the gathering into the most extreme
What characterizes metaphysical thinking which grounds the possibilities. We think in too limited a fashion as long as we expect
ground for beings is the fact that metaphysical thinking departs from only a development of recent philosophies of the previous style. We
what is present in its presence, and thus represents it in terms of its forget that already in the age of Greek philosophy a decisive charac-
ground as something grounded. teristic of philosophy appears: the development of sciences within
What is meant by the talk about the end of philosophy? We the field which philosophy opened up. The development of the
understand the end ofsomething all too easily in the negative sense as sciences is at the same time their separation from philosophy and the
a mere stopping, as the lack of continuation, perhaps even as decline establishment of their independence. This process belongs to the
and impotence. In contrast, what we say about the end of philosophy completion of philosophy. Its development is in full swing today in
means the completion of metaphysics. However, completion does _all regions of beings. This development looks like the mere dissolu-
not mean perfection as a consequence of which philosophy would tion of philosophy, and is in truth its completion.
have to have attained the highest perfection at its end. Not only do we It suffices to refer to the independence of psychology, sociology,
lack any criterion which would permit us to evaluate the perfection of anthropology as cultural anthropology, to the role of logic as logis-
an epoch of metaphysics as compared with any other epoch. The right tics and semantics. Philosophy turns into the empirical science of
to this kind of evaluation does not exist. Plato's thinking is no more man, of all of what can become the experiential object of his tech-
perfect than Parmenides'. Hegel's philosophy is no more perfect than nology for man, the technology by which he establishes himself in
Kant's. Each epoch of philosophy has its own necessity. We simply the world by working on it in the manifold modes of making and
have to acknowledge the fact that a philosophy is the way it is. It is not shaping. All of this happens everywhere on the basis and according
our business to prefer one to the other, as can be the case with regard to the criterion of the scientific discovery of the individual areas of
to various Weltanschauungen. beings.
 .-.... r~:'~~{,"~f&¥":'8,&A,L .1=

58 ON TIME AND BEING THE END OF PHILOSOPHY 59

No prophecy is necessary to recognize that the sciences now estab- character of representational-calculative thinking becomes domi-
lishing themselves will soon be determined and guided by the new nant.
fundamental science which is called cybernetics. However, the sciences still speak about the Being of beings in the
This science corresponds to the determination of man as an accing unavoidable supposition of their regional categories. They just don't
social being. For it is the theory of the steering of the possible say so. They can deny their origin from philosophy, but never dis-
planning and arrangement of human labor. Cybernetics transforms pense with it. For in the scientific attitude of the sciences, the docu-
language. into an exchange of news. The arcs become regulated- ment of their birch from philosophy still speaks.
regulating instruments of information. The end of philosophy proves to be the triumph of the manipula-
The development of philosophy into the independent sciences ble arrangement of a scientific-technological world and of the.social
which, however, interdependendy communicate among themselves order proper to this world. The end of philosophy means: the begin-
ever more markedly, is the legitimate completion of philosophy. ning of the world civilization based upon Western European think-
Philosophy is ending in the present age. Ie has found its place in the ing.
scientific auicude of socially active humanity. But the fundamental But is the end of philosophy in the sense of its development to the
characteristic of this scientific auitude is its cybernetic, that is, tech- sciences also already the complete realization of all the possibilities
nological character. The need co ask about modern technology is in which the thinking of philosophy was posited? Or is there a first
presumably dying out to the same extent that technology more possibility for thinking apart from the last possibility which we char-
definitely characterizes and regulates the appearance of the totality acterized (the dissolution of philosophy in the technologized
sciences), a possibility from which the thinking of philosophy would
of the world and the position of man in it.
The sciences will interpret everything in their struC(ure that is still
reminiscent of the origin from philosophy in accordance with the
have to start out, but which as philosophy it could nevertheless not
experience and adopt?
If this were the case, then a task would still have to be reserved
I
f;~
rules·of science, that is, technologically. Every science understands
for thinking in a concealed way in the history of philosophy from its
;.'-~
the categories upon which it remains dependent for the articulation
beginning to its end, a task accessible neither to philosophy as meta-
and delineation of its area of investigation as working hypotheses.
physics nor, and even less so, to the sciences stemming from philoso-
Their truth is measured not only by the effect which their application
phy. Therefore we ask:
brings about within the progress of research.
Scientific truth is equated with the efficiency of these effects. 2. What task is reserved for thinking at the end of philosophy?
The sciences are now taking over as their own task what philoso- The mere thought of such a task of thinking must sound strange
phy in the course of its history tried to present in part, and even there to us. A thinking which can be neither metaphysics nor science?
only inadequately, that is, the ontologies of the various regions of A task which has concealed itself from philosophy since its very
beings (nature, history, law, arc). The interest of the sciences is beginning, even in virtue of that beginQing, and thus has withdrawn
directed toward the theory of the necessary structural concepts of the itself continually and increasingly in the time to come?
coordinated areas of investigation. "Theory" means now: supposi- A task of thinking which-so it seems-includes the assertion that
tion of the categories which are allowed only a cybernetical function, philosophy has not been up to the matter of thinking and has thus
but denied any ontological meaning. The operational and model become a hiscory of mere decline?
 '~,"'<A3,;:;,A <tAL!2Jti

60 ON TIME AND BEING

THE END OF PHILOSOPHY 61
Is there not an arrogance in these assertions which desires to put thought. For the time being, it must be sufficient to refer to this with
itself above the greatness of the thinkers of philosophy? the brevity required. We shall take a directive which philosophy
This suspicion easily suggests itself. But it can as easily be
offers as an aid in our undertaking.
removed. For every attempt to gain insight into the supposed task When we ask about the task of thinking, this means in the scope
of thinking finds itself moved to review the whole of the history of of philosophy: to determine that which concerns thinking, which is
philosophy. Not only this, but it is even forced to think the his- still controversial for thinking, which is the controversy. This is what
toricity of that which grants a possible history to philosophy. the word "matter" means in the German language. It designates that
Because of this, that supposed thinking necessarily falls short of with which thinking has to do in the case at hand, in Plato's language
the greatness of the philosophers. It is less than philosophy. Less to pragma auto (ef. "The Seventh Letter" 34 1 C7)·
also because the direct or indirect effect of this thinking on the In recent times, philosophy has of its own accord expressly called
public in the industrial age, formed by technology and science, is thinking "to the things themselves." Let us mention two cases which
decisively less possible to this thinking than it was in the case of receive particular attention today. We hear this call "to the things
philosophy. themselves" in the "Preface" which Hegel has placed before his
But above all, the thinking in question remains slight because its work which was published in 1807, System 0/ Science, 1 first part: "The
task is only of a preparatory, not of a founding character. It is content Phenomenology of Spirit." This preface is not the preface to the
with awakening a readiness in man for a possibility whose COntour Phenomenology, but to the System o/Science, to the whole of philosophy.
remains obscure, whose coming remains uncertain. The call "to the things themselves" refers ultimately-and that
Thinking must first learn what remains reserved and in store for means: according to the matter, primarily-to the Science 0/ Logic.
thinking to get involved in. It prepares its own transformation in this In the call "to the things themselves," the emphasis lies on the
learning. "themselves." Heard superficially, the call has the sense of a rejec-
We are thinking of the possibility that the world civilization which tion. The inadequate relations to the matter of philosophy are re-
is just now beginning might one day overcome the technological- jected. Mere talk about the purpose of philosophy belongs to these
scientific-industrial character as the sale criterion of man's world relations, but so does mere reporting about the results of philosoph-
sojourn. This may happen not of and through itself, but in virtue of ical thinking. Both are never the real totality of philosophy. The
the readiness of man for a determination which, whether listened to totality shows itself only in its becoming. This occurs in the develop-
or not, always speaks in the destiny of man which has not yet been mental presentation of the matter. In the presentation, theme and
decided. It is just as uncertain whether world civilization will soon method coincide. For Hegel, this identity is called: the idea. With
be abruptly destroyed or whether it will be stabilized for a long time, the idea, the matter of philosophy "itself' comes to appear. How-
in a stabilization, however, which will not rest in something endur- ever, this matter is historically determined: subjectivity. With Des-
ing, but rather establish itself in a sequence of changes, each of which cartes' ego cogito, says Hegel, philosophy steps on firm ground for the
presenting the latest fashion. first time where it can be at home. If the /undamentum absolutum is
The preparatory thinking in question does not wish and is not able attained with the ego cogito as the distinctive wbiectum, this means:
to predict the future. It only attempts to say something to the present The subject is the hypokeimenon which is transferred to consciousness,
which was already said a long time ago precisely at the beginning
I. WiJSenrcbajt, scientia. body of knowledge, not "science" in the present use of that
of philosophy and for that beginning, but has not been explicitly word. For German Idealism, science is the name for philosophy. (Tr.)
 """,~"",,,i4j"*·····4M:;·.·¥42.

62 ON TIME AND BEING THE END OF PHILOSOPHY 63

what is truly present, what is unclearly enough called "substance" thing itself' determines the securing and development of method.
in traditional language. It also determines the procedure of philosophy by means of which
When Hegel explains in the Preface (ed. Hoffmeister, p. 19), the matter itself can be demonstrated as a datum. For Husserl, "the
"The true (in philosophy) is to be understood and expressed not as principle of all principles" is first of all not a principle of content, but
substance, but just as much as subject," then this means: The Being one of method. In his work published in 1913,2 Husserl devoted a
of beings, the presence of what is present, is only manifest and thus special section (section 24) to the determination of "the principle of
complete presence when it becomes present as such for itself in the all principles." "No conceivable theory can upset this principle,"
absolute Idea. But since Descartes, idea means: perceptio. Being's says Husserl (ibid., p. 44)·
coming to itself occurs in speculative dialectic. Only the movement "The principle of all principles" reads:
of the idea, the method, is the matter itself. The call "to the thing that very primordial dator Intuition is a source of authority (Rechtsquelle) for
itself" requires a philosophical method appropriate in it. knowledge, that whatever presents itself in "Intuition" in primordialform (as it were
However, what the matter of philosophy should be is presumed in its bodily reality), is simply to be accepted as it git'es itself out to be, though only
to be decided from the outset. The matter of philosophy as metaphy- within the limits in which it then presents itself.
sics is the Being of beings, their presence in the form of substantiality "The principle of all principles" contains the thesis of the prece-
and subjectivity.
dence of method. This principle decides what matter alone can
A hundred years later, the call "to the thing itself' again is uttered suffice for the method. "The principle of principles" requires reduc-
in Husserl's treatise Philosophy as Exact Science. It was published in the tion to absolute subjectivity as the matter of philosophy. The tran·
first volume of the journal Logos in 1910-11 (pp. 289 ff.). Again, the scendental reduction to absolute subjectivity gives and secures the
call has at first the sense of a rejection. But here it aims in another possibility of grounding the objectivity of all objects (the Being of
direction than Hegel's. It concerns naturalistic psychology which this being) in its valid structure and consistency, that is, in its consti-
claims to be the genuine scientific method of investigating conscious- tution, in and through subjectivity. Thus transcendental subjectivity
ness. For this method blocks access to the phenomena of intentional proves to be "the sole absolute being" (Formal and Transcendental
consciousness from the very beginning. But the call "to the thing Logic, 1929, p. 240). At the same time, transcendental reduction as
itself' is at the same time directed against historicism which gets lost the method of "universal science" of the constitution of the Being
in treatises about the standpoints of philosophy and in the ordering of beings has the same mode of being as this absolute being, that is,
of types of philosophical Weltanschauungen. About this Husserl says the manner of the matter most native to philosophy. The method is
in italics ( ibid. , p. 340): "The stimulusfor investigation must start not with not only directed toward the matter of philosophy. It does not just
philosophies, but with issues and problems. " belong to the matter as a key belongs to a lock. Rather, it belongs
And what is at stake in philosophical investigation? In accordance to the matter because it is "the matter itself." If one wanted to ask:
with the same tradition, it is for Husserl as for Hegel the subjectivity Where does "the principle of all principles" get its unshakable right,
of consciousness. For Husserl, the Cartesian Meditations were not the answer would have to be: from transcendental subjectivity which
only the topic of the Parisian lectures in February, 1920. Rather, is already presupposed as the matter of philosophy.
since the time following the Logical Investigations, their spirit accom- We have chosen a discussion of the call "to the thing itself' as our
panied the impassioned course of his philosophical investigations to
the end. In its negative and also in its positive sense, the call "to the 2. English edition: Ideal (New York: Collier Books, 1962). (Tr.)
 '_0" T"-~"i':",~t t. . ~J: ..U a

62 ON TIME AND BEING THE END OF PHILOSOPHY 63

what is truly present, what is unclearly enough called "substance" thing itself' determines the securing and development of method.
in traditional language. It also determines the procedure of philosophy by means of which
When Hegel explains in the Preface (ed. Hoffmeister, p. 19), the matter itself can be demonstrated as a datum. For Husserl, "the
"The true (in philosophy) is to be understood and expressed not as principle of all principles" is first of all not a principle of content, but
substance, but just as much as subject," then this means: The Being one of method. In his work published in 1913,2 Husserl devoted a
of beings, the presence of what is present, is only manifest and thus special section (section 24) to the determination of "the principle of
complete presence when it becomes present as such for itself in the all principles." "No conceivable theory can upset this principle,"
absolute Idea. But since Descartes, idea means; perceptio. Being's says Husser! (ibid., p. 44)·
coming to itself occurs in speculative dialectic. Only the movement "The principle of all principles" reads:
of die idea, the method, is the matter itself. The call "to the thing that very primordial dator Intuition is a source of authority (RechtJqueliei for
itself" requires a philosophical method appropriate in it. knowledge, that whatever presents itselfin "Intuition" in primordial form (as it were
However, what the matter of philosophy should be is presumed in its bodily reality), is simply to be accepted as it gives itself out to be, though only
to be decided from the outset. The matter of philosophy as metaphy- within the limits in which it then presentJ itself.
sics is the Being of beings, their presence in the form of substantiality "The principle of all principles" contains the thesis of the prece-
and subjectivity.
dence of method. This principle decides what matter alone can
A hundred years later, the call "to the thing itself' again is uttered suffice for the method. "The principle of principles" requires reduc-
in Husserl's treatise Philosophy as Exact Science. It was published in the tion to absolute subjectivity as the matter of philosophy. The tran-
first volume of the journal Logos in 1910-1 1 (pp. 289 ff.). Again, the scendental reduction to absolute subjectivity gives and secures the
call has at first the sense of a rejection. But here it aims in another possibility of grounding the objectivity of all objects (the Being of
direction than Hegel's. It concerns naturalistic psychology which this being) in its valid structure and consistency, that is, in its consti-
claims to be the genuine scientific method of investigating conscious- tution, in and through subjectivity. Thus transcendental subjectivity
ness. For this method blocks access to the phenomena of intentional proves to be "the sole absolute being" (Formal and Transcendental
consciousness from the very beginning. But the call "to the thing Logic, 1929, p. 240). At the same time, transcendental reduction as
itself' is at the same time directed against historicism which gets lost the method of "universal science" of the constitution of the Being
in treatises about the standpoints of philosophy and in the ordering of beings has the same mode of being as this absolute being, that is,
of types of philosophical Weltanschauungen. About this Husserl says the manner of the matter most native to philosophy. The method is
in italics ( ibid. , P·340): "The stimulusfor investigation must start not with not only directed toward the matter of philosophy. It does not just
philosophies, but with issues and problems. " belong to the matter as a key belongs to a lock. Rather, it belongs
And what is at stake in philosophical investigation? In accordance to the matter because it is "the matter itself." If one wanted to ask:
with the same tradition, it is for Husserl as for Hegel the subjectivity Where does "the principle of all principles" get its unshakable right,
of consciousness. For Husserl, the Cartesian Meditations were not the answer would have to be: from transcendental subjectivity which
only the topic of the Parisian lectures in February, 1920. Rather, is already presupposed as the matter of philosophy.
since the time following the Logical Investigations, their spirit accom- We have chosen a discussion of the call "to the thing itself' as our
panied the impassioned course of his philosophical investigations to
the end. In its negative and also in its positive sense, the call "to the 2. English edition: Ideas (New York: Collier Books, 1962). (Tr.)
 "::(";;';7 .""'''7'''''#iI$:;;::::*,,' iL;4AKC

64 THE END OF PHILOSOPHY 65

ON TIME AND BEING

guideline. It was to bring us to the path which leads us to a determi- grants to the movement of speculative thinking the passage through
nation of the task of thinking at the end of philosophy. Where are that which it thinks.
we now? We have arrived at the insight that for the call "to the thing We call this openness which grants a possible letting-appear and
itself," what concerns philosophy as its matter is established from the show "opening." In the history of language, the German word
outset. From the perspective of Hegel and Husserl-and not only "opening" is a borrowed translation of the French clairiere. It is
from their perspective-the matter of philosophy is subjectivity. It formed in accordance with the older words WaLdung (foresting) and
is not the matter as such that is controversial for the call, but rather Feldung (fielding).
its presentation by which the matter itself becomes present. Hegel's The forest dearing (opening) is experienced in contrast to dense
speculative dialectic is the movement in which the matter as such forest, called "density" (Dickung) in older language. The substan-
comes to itself, comes to its own presence. Husserl's method is tive'''opening'' goes back to the verb "to open." The adjective Licht
"open" is the same word as "light." To open something means: To
supposed to bring the matter of philosophy to its ultimately originary
givenness, that means: to its own presence. make something light, free and open, e.g., to make the forest free
of trees at one place. The openness thus originating is the dearing.
The two methods are as different as they could possibly be. But
What is light in the sense of being free and open has nothing in
the matter as such which they are to present is the same, although
it is experienced in different ways. common with the adjective "light," meaning "bright"-neither lin-
guistically nor factually.3 This is to be observed for the difference
But of what help are these discoveries to us in our attempt to bring
between openness and light. Still, it is possible that a factual relation
the task of thinking to view? They don't help us at all as long as we
between the twO exists. Light can stream into the dearing, into its
do not go beyond a mere discussion of the call and ask what remains
openness, and let brightness play with darkness in it. But light never
unthought in the call "to the thing itself." Questioning in this way,
first creates openness. Rather, light presupposes openness. How-
we can become aware how something which it is no longer the
ever, the dearing, the opening, is not only free for brightness and
matter of philosophy to think conceals itself precisely where philoso-
darkness, but also for resonance and echo, for sounding and dimin-
phy has brought its matter to absolute knowledge and to ultimate ishing of sound. The dearing is the open for everything that is
evidence.
present and absent.
But what remains unthought in the matter of philosophy as well It is necessary for thinking to become explicitly aware of the
as in its method? Speculative dialectic is a mode in which the matter matter called opening here. We are not extracting mere notions
of philosophy comes to appeal of itself and for itself, and thus from mere words, e.g., "opening," as it might easily appear on the
becomes presence. Such appearance necessarily occurs in some light. surface. Rather, we must observe the unique matter which is ade-
Only by virtue of light, i.e., through brightness, can what shines quately named with the name "opening." What the word designates
show itself, that is, radiate. But brightness in its turn rests upon in the connection we are now thinking, free openness, is a "primal
something open, something free which might illuminate it here and phenomenon," to use a word of Goethe's. We would have to say a
there, now and then. Brightness plays in the open and wars there primal matter. Goethe notes (Maxims and Reflections. n. 993): "Look
with darkness. Wherever a present being encounters another pre- for nothing behind phenomena: they themselves are what is to be
sent being or even only lingers near it-but also where, as with
Hegel, one being mirrors itself in another speculatively-there 3. Bmh meanings exist in English for light. The meaning He1degger intends is
related to lever (i.-::., alleviate, lighten a burden), (Tr.)
openness already rules, open region is in play. Only this openness
 ''t.:''l'::;';''?''¥,.@, (I( "aaa

66 ON TIME AND BEING 67

THE END OF PHILOSOPHY
learned." This means: The phenomenon itself, in the present case We are concerned now with something else. Whether or not what
the opening, sets us the task of learning from it while questioning is present is experienced, comprehended or presented, presence as
it, that is, of letting it say something to us. lingering in openness always remains dependent upon the prevalent
Accordingly, we may suggest that the day will come when we will opening. What is absent, tOO, cannot be as such unless it presences
not shun the question whether the opening, the free open, may not in the free space of the opening.
be that within which alone pure space and ecstatic time and every- All metaphysics including its opponent positivism speaks the lan-
thing present and absent in them have the place which gathers and guage of Plato. The basic word of its thinking, that is, of his'presenta-
protects everything.
tion of the Being of beings, is eidos, idea: the outward appearance in
In the same way as speculative dialectical thinking, originary intui- which beings as such show themselves. Outward appearance, how-
tion and its evidence remain dependent upon openness which al- ever, is a manner of presence. No outward appearance without light
ready dominates, upon the opening. What is evident is what can be -Plato already knew this. But there is no light and no brightness
immediately intuited. Evidentia is the word which Cicero uses to without the opening. Even darkness needs it. How else could we
translate the Greek enargeia, that is, to transform it into the Roman. happen into darkness and wander through it? Still, the opening as
Enargeia, which has the same root as argentum (silver), means that such as it prevails through Being, through presence, remains un-
which in itself and of itself radiates and brings itself to light. In the thought in philosophy, although the opening is spoken about in
Greek language, one is not speaking about the action of seeing, philosophy's beginning. How does this occur and with which
about videre, but about that which gleams and radiates. But it can names? Answer:
only radiate if openness has already been granted. The beam of light In Parmenides' reflective poem which, as far as we know, was the
does not first create the opening, openness, it only traverses it. It is first to reflect explicitly upon the Being of beings, which still today,
only such openness that grants to giving and receiving at all what is although unheard, speaks in the sciences into which philosophy
free, that in which they can remain and must move. dissolves. Parmenides listens to the claim:
All philosophical thinking which explicitly or inexplicitly follows
the caU "to the thing itself' i's already admitted to the free space of ... kreo de se panta puthestha
emen alethe;es eukukleos atremes etor
the opening in its movement and with its method. But philosophy
ede broton doxas, tais ouk em; pistis alethes.
knows nothing of the opening. Philosophy does speak about the
Fragment I, 28 ff.
light of reason, but does not heed the opening of Being. The lumen
... but you should learn all:
naturale, the light of reason, throws light only on openness. It does the untrembling heart of unconcealment, well-rounded
concern the opening, but so little does it form it that it needs it in
and also the opinions of mortals,
order to be able to illuminate what is present in the opening. This
lacking the ability to trust what is unconcealed. 4
is tcue not only of philosophy's method, but also and primarily of its
matter, that is, of the presence of what is present. To what extent the Aletheia, unconcealment, is named here. It is called well-rounded
subiectum, the hyPokeimenon, that which already lies present, thus because it is turned in the pure sphere of the circle in which begin-
what is present in its presence is constantly thought also in subjec-
4. Standard translation: "It is needful that you should learn of all matters-both
tivity cannot be shown here in detail. Refer to Heidegger, Nietzsche, the unshaken heart of well-rounded truth and the opinions of mortals which
vol. 2 ( 1961), pages 4 2 9 if.
lack true belief." (Tr.)
 ''''''i-,':j1r~

68 THE END 0 F PHI LOS 0 P H Y 69

ON TIME AND BEING
considered when we think that which is called Being and thinking
ning and end are everywhere the same. In this turning, there is no
adequately. Unconcealment is, so to speak, the element in which
possibility of twisting, deceit and closure. The meditative man is to
Being and thinking and their belonging together exist. Aletheia is
experience the untrembling heart of unconcealment. What does the
named at the beginning of philosophy, but afterward it is not explic-
word about the untrembling heart of unconcealment mean? It means
itly thought as such by philosophy. For since Aristotle it became the
unconcealment itself in what is most its own, means the place of
task of philosophy as metaphysics to think beings as such onto-
stillness which gathers in itself what grants unconcealment to begin
with. That is the opening of what is open, We ask: openness for theologically.
what? We have already reRected upon the fact that the path of If this is so, we have no right to sit in judgment overphiloso-
thinking, speculative and intuitive, qeeds the traversable opening. phy, as though it left something unheeded, neglected it and was
But in that opening rests possible radiance, that is, the possible thus marred by some essential deficiency. The reference to what
presencing of presence itself. is unthought in philosophy is not a criticism of philosophy. If a
What prior to everything else first grants unconcealment in the criticism is necessary now, then it rather concerns the attempt
path on which thinking pursues one thing and perceives it: hotos estin which is becoming more and more urgent ever since Being and
... einai: that presence presences. The opening grants first of all the Time to ask about a possible task of thinking at the end of philos-
possibility of the path to presence, and grants the possible presencing ophy. For the question now arises, late enough: Why is aletheia
of that presence itself. We must think aletheia, unconcealment, as the nllt translated with the usual name, with the word "truth"? The
opening which first grants Being and thinking and their presencing answer must be:
to and for each other. The quiet heart of the opening is the place Insofar as truth is understood in the traditional "natural" sense as
of stillness from which alone the possibility of the belonging to- the correspondence of knowledge with beings demonstrated in be-
gether of Being and thinking, that is, presence and perceiving, can ings, but also insofar as truth is interpreted as the certainty of the
arise at all. knowledge of Being, aletheia, unconcealment in the sense of the
The possible claim to a binding character or commitment of think- opening may not be equated with truth. Rather, aletheia, unconceal-
ing is grounded in this bond. Without the preceding experience of ment thought as opening, first grants the possibility of truth. For
aletheia as the opening, all talk about committed and non-committed truth itself, just as Being and thinking, can only be what it is in the
thinking remains without foundation. Where does Plato's determi- element of the opening. Evidence, certainty in every degree, every
nation of presence as idea have its binding character from? With kind of verification of veritas already move with that veritas in the
regard to what is Aristotle's interpretation of presencing as energeia
binding? realm of the prevalent opening.
Aletheia. unconcealment thought as the opening of presence, is not
Strangely enough, we cannot even ask these questions always ne- yet truth. Is aletheia then less than truth? Or is it more because it first
glected in philosophy as long as we have not experienced what Par- grants truth as adequatio and certitudo, because there can be no pres-
menides had to experience: aletheia, unconcealment. The path to it is ence and presenting outside of the realm of the opening?
distinguished from the streecon which the opinion of mortals must This question we leave to thinking as a task. Thinking must
wander around. Aletheia is nothing mortal, just as little as death itself. consider whether it can even raise this question at all as long as it
It is not for the sake of etymology that I stubbornly translate the thinks philosophically, that is, in the strict sense of metaphysics
name aletheia as unconcealment, but for the matter which must be
 70
ON TIME AND BEING
THE END OF PHILOSOPHY 71
which questions what is present only with regard to its presence.
In any case, one thing becomes clear: To raise the question of Instead we must say: Aletheia, as opening of presence and presenting
aletheia, of unconcealment as such, is not the same as raising the in thinking and saying, originally comes under the perspective of
question of truth. For this reason, it was inadequate and misleading homoiosis and adaequatio, that is, the perspective of adequation in the
to caU aletheia in the sense of opening, truth.5 The talk about the sense of the correspondence of representing with what is present.
"truth of Being" has a justified meaning in Hegel's Science of Logic, But this process inevitably provokes another question: How is it
because here truth means the certainty of absolute knowledge. But that aletheia, unconcealment, appears to man's natural experience
Hegel also, as little as Husserl, as little as all metaphysics, does not and speaking only as correctness and dependability? Is it because
ask about Being as Being, that is, does not raise the question how man's ecstatic sojourn in the openness of presencing is turned only
there can be presence as such. There is presence only when opening toward what is present and the existent presenting of what is pre-
is dominant. Opening is named with aletheia, unconcealment, but sent? But what else does this mean than that presence as such, and
not thought as such. together with it the opening granting it, remain unheeded? Only
The natural concept of truth does not mean unconcealment, not what aletheia as opening grants is experienced and thought, not what
in the philosophy of the Greeks either. It is often and justifiably it is as such.
pointed out that the word alethes is already used by Homer only in This remains concealed. Does this happen by chance? Does it
the verba dicendi, in statement and thus in the sense of correctness and happen only as a consequence of the carelessness of human thinking?
reliability, not in the sense of unconcealment. But this reference Or does it happen because self-concealing, concealment, lethe be-
means only that neither the poets nor everyday language usage, not longs to a-Letheia, not just as an addition, not as shadow to light, but
even philosophy see themselves confronted with the task of asking rather as the heart of aletheia? And does not even a keeping and
how truth, that is, the correctness of statements, is granted only in preserving rule in this self-concealing of the opening of presence
the element of the opening of presence. from which unconcealment can be granted to begin with, and thus
In the SCope of this question, we must acknowledge the fact that what is present can appear in its presence?
aletheia, unconcealment in the sense of the opening of presence, was If this were so, then the opening would not be the mere opening
originally only experienced as orthotes, as the correctness of represen- of presence, but the opening of presence concealing itself, the open-
tations and statements. But then the assertion about the essential ing of a self-concealing sheltering.
transformation of truth, that is, from unconcealment to correctness, If this were so, then with these questions we would reach the path
is also Untenable. 6 to the task of thinking at the end of philosophy.
But isn't this all unfounded mysticism or even bad mythology, in
S. How the attempt to think a matter can at times stray from that which a decisive any case a ruinous irrationalism, the denial of ratio?
insight has already shown, is demonstrated by a passage from Being and Time (192])
(p. 262, New York: Harper & Row, 1962). To translate this word (aletheial as
I return to the question: What does ratio, nous, noein, perceiving
"truth," and, above all, to define this expression conceptually in theoretical ways, is (Vernunft-Vernehmen) mean? What does ground and principle and
to cover up the meaning of what the Greeks made "self-evidently" basic for the especially principle of all principles mean? Can this ever be suffi-
terminological use of aletheia as a prephilosophical way of understanding it.
6. This ciently determined unless we experience aletheia in a Greek manner
der statement
Wahrheil. has profound implications for Heidegger's book Pia/om Lehre von
(Tr.)
as unconcealment and then, above and beyond the Greek, think it
as the opening of self-concealing? As long as ratio and the rational

I
 72 ON TIME AND BEING 73
THE END OF PHILOSOPHY
still remain questionable in what is their own, talk about irrational- Does the name for the task of thinking then read instead of Being
ism is unfounded. The technological scientific rationalization ruling and Time: Opening and Presence?
the present age justifies itself every day more surprisingly by its But where does the opening come from and how is it given? What
immense results. But these results say nothing about what the possi-
speaks in the "It gives"?
bility of the rational and the irrationaal first grants. The effect proves The task of thinking would then be the surrender of previous
the correctness of technological scientific rationalization. But is the thinking to the determination of the matter of thinking.
manifest character of what-is exhausted by what is demonstrable?
Doesn't the insistence on what is demonstrable block the way to
what-is?
Perhaps there is a thinking which is more sober than the irresist-
ible race of rationalization and the sweeping character of cybernet-
ics. Presumably it is precisely this sweeping quality which is ex-
tremely irrational.
Perhaps there is a thinking Outside of the distinction of rational
and irrational still more sober than scientific technology, more sober
and thus removed, without effect and yet having its own necessity.
When we ask about the task of this thinking, then not only this
thinking, but also the question about it is first made questionable. In
view of the whole philosophical tradition, this means:
We all still need an education in thinking, and before that first a
knowledge of what being educated and uneducated in thinking
means. In this respect, Aristotle gives us a hint in Book IV of his
Metaphysics (1006a ff.). It reads: esti gar apaideusia to me gignoskein
tinon dei zetein apodeixin kai tinon ou dei. "For it is uneducated not to
have an eye for when it is necessary to look for a proof, and when
this is not necessary."
This sentence demands careful reflection. For it is not yet decided
in what way that which needs no proof in order to become accessible
to thinking is to be experienced. Is it dialectical mediation or origi-
nary intuition or neither of the two? Only the peculiar quality of that
which demands of us above all else to be admitted can decide about
that. But how is this to make the decision possible for us before we
have not admitted it? In what circle are we moving here, inevitably?
Is it the eukukleoJ alethein, well-founded unconcealment itself,
thought as the opening?