POLITICAL & INTERNATIONAL LAW

Selected Recent Jurisprudence (2010-December 2017)1

By Atty. Alexis F. Medina2

PART II:

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

STATE POWERS AND

INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES

STATE POWERS

POLICE POWER

Police power is the power of the state to promote public welfare by restraining
and regulating the use of liberty and property. It is in the exercise of its police power
that the Congress enacted R.A. Nos. 9257 and 9442, the laws mandating a 20%
discount on purchases of medicines made by senior citizens and PWDs. The 20%
discount is a regulation affecting the ability of private establishments to price their
products and services relative senior citizens. Unlike in the exercise of the power of
eminent domain, just compensation is not required in wielding police power. This is
precisely because there is no taking involved, but only an imposition of burden.

In Gerochi v. Department of Energy, the Court passed upon one of the inherent powers
of the state, the police power, where it emphasized, thus:

[P]olice power is the power of the state to promote public welfare by

restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property. It is the most pervasive,
the least limitable, and the most demanding of the three fundamental powers of
the State. The justification is found in the Latin maxim salus populi est suprema
lex (the welfare of the people is the supreme law) and sic utere tuo ut alienum non
laedas (so use your property as not to injure the property of others). As an inherent
attribute of sovereignty which virtually extends to all public needs, police power
grants a wide panoply of instruments through which the State, as parens
patriae, gives effect to a host of its regulatory powers. We have held that the power
to "regulate" means the power to protect, foster, promote, preserve, and control,
with due regard for the interests, first and foremost, of the public, then of the utility
and of its patrons. (Citations omitted)

1 This is a working draft of excerpts from recent jurisprudence, selected and organized under common subjects. The
author wrote the prefatory capsules (bold-faced) to capture the essence of each excerpt, and underscored selected
parts to highlight doctrinal statements, operative words, or case-defining facts. This material is subject to revision,
modification or updating. Reproduction for purely academic purposes with due attribution to the author is permitted.

2 AB Political Science, University of the Philippines (UP), Diliman; Order of the Purple Feather (OPF), UP, College of
Law; Valedictorian, San Sebastian College-Recoletos, Manila, College of Law; Philippine Representative to the World
Trade Organization (WTO) Trade Facilitation Preparatory Committee Meeting for Legal Review (Geneva, Switzerland,
2014); Philippine Representative, Senior Officials’ Meeting, Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), 2015;
Transaction adviser on Public Private Partnerships (PPPS); Litigation lawyer; formerly with the Ponce Enrile Reyes &
Manlastas Law Offices (Pecabar); Professor of Constitutional Law, San Sebastian College-Recoletos, Manila, College of
Law, and Polytechnic University of the Philippines (PUP), Manila, College of Law; former professor of Constitutional
Law, New Ear University, College of Law, Quezon City; Partner, Libra Law
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 It is in the exercise of its police power that the Congress enacted R.A. Nos. 9257 and 9442,
the laws mandating a 20% discount on purchases of medicines made by senior citizens and PWDs.
It is also in further exercise of this power that the legislature opted that the said discount be
claimed as tax deduction, rather than tax credit, by covered establishments.

The petitioner, however, claims that the change in the tax treatment of the discount is
illegal as it constitutes taking without just compensation. It even submitted financial statements
for the years 2006 and 2007 to support its claim of declining profits when the change in the policy
was implemented.

The Court is not swayed.

To begin with, the issue of just compensation finds no relevance in the instant case as it
had already been made clear in Carlos Superdrug that the power being exercised by the State in
the imposition of senior citizen discount was its police power. Unlike in the exercise of the power
of eminent domain, just compensation is not required in wielding police power. This is precisely
because there is no taking involved, but only an imposition of burden.

In Manila Memorial Park, Inc., et al. v. Secretary of the DSWD, et al., the Court ruled
that by examining the nature and the effects of R.A. No. 9257, it becomes apparent that the
challenged governmental act was an exercise of police power. It was held, thus:

[W]e now look at the nature and effects of the 20% discount to determine
if it constitutes an exercise of police power or eminent domain.

The 20% discount is intended to improve the welfare of senior citizens who,
at their age, are less likely to be gainfully employed, more prone to illnesses and
other disabilities, and, thus, in need of subsidy in purchasing basic commodities.
It may not be amiss to mention also that the discount serves to honor senior
citizens who presumably spent the productive years of their lives on contributing
to the development and progress of the nation. This distinct cultural Filipino
practice of honoring the elderly is an integral part of this law.

As to its nature and effects, the 20% discount is a regulation affecting the
ability of private establishments to price their products and services relative to a
special class of individuals, senior citizens, for which the Constitution affords
preferential concern. xxxxx However, it does not purport to appropriate or burden
specific properties, used in the operation or conduct of the business of private
establishments, for the use or benefit of the public, or senior citizens for that
matter, but merely regulates the pricing of goods and services relative to, and the
amount of profits or income/gross sales that such private establishments may
derive from, senior citizens.

The subject regulation may be said to be similar to, but with substantial
distinctions from, price control or rate of 'return on investment control laws which
are traditionally regarded as police power measures. x x x. (Citations omitted)

(Southern Luzon Drug v. Department of Social Welfare and Development, G.R. No.
199669, April 25, 2017) (Underscoring supplied)

Requisites for the valid exercise of police power: (a) the interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference
of the State; and (b) the means employed are reasonably necessary to the: attainment
of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
In other words, the proper exercise of the police power requires the concurrence of a
lawful subject and a lawful method.

In the exercise of police power, "property rights of private individuals are subjected to
restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the
State." Even then, the State's claim of police power cannot be arbitrary or unreasonable. xxxx To
warrant such interference, two requisites must concur: (a) the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State; and (b) the
means employed are reasonably necessary to the: attainment of the object sought to be
accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. In other words, the proper exercise of
the police power requires the concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method. Xxx

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 xxx

The subjects of R.A. Nos. 9257 and 9442, i.e., senior citizens and PWDs, are individuals
whose well-being is a recognized public duty. As a public duty, the responsibility for their care
devolves upon the concerted efforts of the State, the family and the community.

xxxx

The Court also entertains no doubt on the legality of the method taken by the legislature
to implement the declared policies of the subject laws, that is, to impose discounts on the medical
services and purchases of senior citizens and PWDs and to treat the said discounts as tax
deduction rather than tax credit. (Southern Luzon Drug v. Department of Social Welfare and
Development, G.R. No. 199669, April 25, 2017)

Discounts for senior citizens: Not confiscatory as there is no taking of property

without just compensation. Five circumstances must be present in order to qualify
"taking" as an exercise of eminent domain. First, the expropriator must enter a
private property. Second, the entrance into private property must be for more than a
momentary period. Third, the entry into the property should be under warrant or
color of legal authority. Fourth, the property must be devoted to a public use or
otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected. Fifth, the utilization of the
property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him
of all beneficial enjoyment of the property.

The measure is fair and reasonable and no credible proof was presented to prove the claim
that it was confiscatory. To be considered confiscatory, there must be taking of property without
just compensation.

Illuminating on this point is the discussion of the Court on the concept of taking in City of
Manila v. Hon. Laguio, Jr., viz.:

There are two different types of taking that can be identified. A "possessory"
taking occurs when the government confiscates or physically occupies property. A
"regulatory" taking occurs when the government's regulation leaves no reasonable
economically viable use of the property.

xxxx

What is crucial in judicial consideration of regulatory takings is that

government regulation is a taking if it leaves no reasonable economically viable use
of property in a manner that interferes with reasonable expectations for use. A
regulation that permanently denies all economically beneficial or productive use
of land is, from the owner's point of view, equivalent to a "taking" unless principles
of nuisance or property law that existed when the owner acquired the land make
the use prohibitable. When the owner of real property has been called upon to
sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good, that is,
to leave his property economically idle, he has suffered a taking.

xxxx

A restriction on use of property may also constitute a "taking" if not

reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a substantial public purpose or if it has
an unduly harsh impact on the distinct investment-backed expectations of the
owner. (Citations omitted)

The petitioner herein attempts to prove its claim that the pertinent provisions of R.A. Nos.
9257 and 9442 amount to taking by presenting financial statements purportedly showing
financial losses incurred by them due to the adoption of the tax deduction scheme.

For the petitioner's clarification, the presentation of the financial statement is not of
compelling significance in justifying its claim for just compensation. What is imperative is for it
to establish that there was taking in the constitutional sense or that, in the imposition of the
mandatory discount, the power exercised by the state was eminent domain.

According to Republic of the Philippines v. Vda. de Castellvi, five circumstances must be

present in order to qualify "taking" as an exercise of eminent domain. First, the expropriator must
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enter a private property. Second, the entrance into private property must be for more than a
momentary period. Third, the entry into the property should be under warrant or color of legal
authority. Fourth, the property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally
appropriated or injuriously affected. Fifth, the utilization of the property for public use must be
in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property.

The first requirement speaks of entry into a private property which clearly does not obtain
in this case. There is no private property that is; invaded or appropriated by the State. As it is, the
petitioner precipitately deemed future profits as private property and then proceeded to argue
that the State took it away without full compensation. This seemed preposterous considering that
the subject of what the petitioner supposed as taking was not even earned profits but merely an
expectation of profits, which may not even occur. For obvious reasons, there cannot be taking of
a contingency or of a mere possibility because it lacks physical existence that is necessary before
there could be any taking. Further, it is impossible to quantify the compensation for the loss of
supposed profits before it is earned.

The supposed taking also lacked the characteristics of permanence and consistency. xxxx
The reason is that the impact on the establishments varies depending on their response to the
changes brought about by the subject provisions. To be clear, establishments, are not prevented
from adjusting their prices to accommodate the effects of the granting of the discount and retain
their profitability while being fully compliant to the laws. It follows that losses are not inevitable
because establishments are free to take business measures to accommodate the contingency.
Lacking in permanence and consistency, there can be no taking in the constitutional sense. xxxx
Simply told, there is no taking to justify compensation; there is only poor business decision to
blame.

There is also no ousting of the owner or deprivation of ownership. Establishments are

neither divested of ownership of any of their properties nor is anything forcibly taken from them.
They remain the owner of their goods and their profit or loss still depends on the performance of
their sales.

Apart from the foregoing, covered establishments are also provided with a mechanism to
recoup the amount of discounts they grant the senior citizens and PWDs. It is provided in Section
4(a) of R.A. No. 9257 and Section 32 of R.A. No. 9442 that establishments may claim the discounts
as "tax deduction based on the net cost of the goods sold or services rendered." Basically, whatever
amount was given as discount, covered establishments may claim an equal amount as an expense
or tax deduction. xxx

xxx

The effect of the subject laws in the financial standing of covered companies depends
largely on how they respond and forge a balance between profitability and their sense of social
responsibility. (Southern Luzon Drug v. Department of Social Welfare and Development, G.R.
No. 199669, April 25, 2017)

The discounts to senior citizens imposed on private businesses is not

confiscatory. First, the subject provisions only affect the petitioner's right to profit,
and not earned profits. Unfortunately for the petitioner, the right to profit is not a
vested right but an inchoate right, a mere expectation, which may or may not come
into existence.

Still, the petitioner argues that the law is confiscatory in the sense that the State takes away
a portion of its supposed profits which could have gone into its coffers and utilizes it for public
purpose. The petitioner claims that the action of the State amounts to taking for which it should
be compensated.

To reiterate, the subject provisions only affect the petitioner's right to profit, and not
earned profits. Unfortunately for the petitioner, the right to profit is not a vested right or an
entitlement that has accrued on the person or entity such that its invasion or deprivation warrants
compensation. Vested rights are "fixed, unalterable, or irrevocable." xxx

Right to profits does not give the petitioner the cause of action to ask for just
compensation, it being only an inchoate right or one that has not fully developed and therefore
cannot be claimed as one's own. An inchoate right is a mere expectation, which may or may not
come into existence. xxxx Certainly, the petitioner cannot claim confiscation or taking of

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something that has yet to exist. It cannot claim deprivation of profit before the consummation of
a sale and the purchase by a senior citizen or PWD.

Right to profit is not an accrued right; it is not fixed, absolute nor indefeasible. It does not
come into being until the occurrence or realization of a condition precedent. It is a mere
"contingency that might never eventuate into a right. It stands for a mere possibility of profit but
nothing might ever be payable under it."

The inchoate nature of the right to profit precludes the possibility of compensation
because it lacks the quality or characteristic which is necessary before any act of taking or
expropriation can be effected. xxxx Certainly, "taking" presupposes the existence of a subject that
has a quantifiable or determinable value, characteristics which a mere contingency does not
possess. (Southern Luzon Drug v. Department of Social Welfare and Development, G.R. No.
199669, April 25, 2017)

The legislature, which is the constitutional repository of police power, is the

judge of necessity, adequacy or reasonableness and wisdom, of any law promulgated
in the exercise of the police power.

Anent the question regarding the shift from tax credit to tax deduction, suffice it is to say
that it is within the province of Congress to do so in the exercise of its legislative power. It has the
authority to choose the subject of legislation, outline the effective measures to achieve its declared
policies and even impose penalties in case of non-compliance. It has the sole discretion to decide
which policies to pursue and devise means to achieve them, and courts often do not interfere in
this exercise for as long as it does not transcend constitutional limitations. " xxxx

xxx

Corollary, whether to treat the discount as a tax deduction or tax credit is a matter
addressed to the wisdom of the legislature. Xxxx Thus, in lchong, etc., et al. v. Hernandez) etc.,
and Sarmiento, the Court emphasized, thus:

It must not be overlooked, in the first place, that the legislature, which is
the constitutional repository of police power and exercises the prerogative of
determining the policy of the State, is by force of circumstances primarily the
judge of necessity, adequacy or reasonableness and wisdom, of any law
promulgated in the exercise of the police power, or of the measures
adopted to implement the public policy or to achieve public interest.x x
x. (Emphasis ours)

(Southern Luzon Drug v. Department of Social Welfare and Development, G.R. No.
199669, April 25, 2017)

In the exercise of police power, the legislature may grant rights and impose
additional burdens. It may also regulate industries for the protection of the public.
The laws requiring businesses to grant discounts to senior citizens are akin to
regulatory laws within the ambit of police power such as the minimum wage law,
zoning ordinances, price control laws, laws regulating the operation of motels and
hotels, laws limiting the working hours to eight, and the like.

The legislature may also grant rights and impose additional burdens: It may also regulate
industries, in the exercise of police power, for the protection of the public. R.A. Nos. 9257 and
9442 are akin to regulatory laws, the issuance of which is within the ambit of police power. The
minimum wage law, zoning ordinances, price control laws, laws regulating the operation of motels
and hotels, laws limiting the working hours to eight, and the like fall under this category.

Indeed, regulatory laws are within the category of police power measures from which
affected persons or entities cannot claim exclusion or compensation. For instance, private
establishments cannot protest that the imposition of the minimum wage is confiscatory since it
eats up a considerable chunk of its profits or that the mandated remuneration is not
commensurate for the work done. The compulsory nature of the provision for minimum wages
underlies the effort of the State; as R.A. No. 6727 expresses it, to promote productivity-
improvement and gain-sharing measures to ensure a decent standard of living for the workers
and their families; to guarantee the rights of labor to its just share in the fruits of production;
xxxxx

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 Similarly, the imposition of price control on staple goods in R.A. No. 7581 is likewise a
valid exercise of police power and affected establishments cannot argue that the law was depriving
them of supposed gains. The law seeks to ensure the availability of basic necessities and prime
commodities at reasonable prices at all times without denying legitimate business a fair return on
investment. xxx

More relevantly, in Manila Memorial Park, Inc., it was ruled that it is within the bounds
of the police power of the state to impose burden on private entities, even if it may affect their
profits, such as in the imposition of price control measures. There is no compensable taking but
only a recognition of the fact that they are subject to the regulation of the State and that all
personal or private interests must bow down to the more paramount interest of the State.
(Southern Luzon Drug v. Department of Social Welfare and Development, G.R. No. 199669,
April 25, 2017)

Regulation does not authorize the destruction of business. A lawful business or

calling may not, under the guise of regulation, be unreasonably interfered with even
by the exercise of police power. After all, regulation only signifies control or restraint,
it does not mean suppression or absolute prohibition

This notwithstanding, the regulatory power of the State does not authorize the destruction
of the business. While a business may be regulated, such regulation must be within the bounds of
reason, i.e., the regulatory ordinance must be reasonable, and its provision cannot be oppressive
amounting to an arbitrary interference with the business or calling subject of regulation. A lawful
business or calling may not, under the guise of regulation, be unreasonably interfered with even
by the exercise of police power. After all, regulation only signifies control or restraint, it does not
mean suppression or absolute prohibition. xxx

Here, the petitioner failed to show that R.A. Nos. 9257 and 9442, under the guise of
regulation, allow undue interference in an otherwise legitimate business. On the contrary, it was
shown that the questioned laws do not meddle in the business or take anything from it but only
regulate its realization of profits. (Southern Luzon Drug v. Department of Social Welfare and
Development, G.R. No. 199669, April 25, 2017)

Property rights must bow to the primacy of police power because property
rights, though sheltered by due process, must yield to general welfare. The regulation
of a profession, calling, business or trade has always been upheld as a legitimate
exercise of police power.

Petitioners contend that the assailed provisions of R.A. No. 9646 are unduly oppressive
and infringe the constitutional rule against deprivation of property without due process of law.
They stress that real estate developers are now burdened by law to employ licensed real estate
brokers to sell, market and dispose of their properties. x x x

The contention has no basis. There is no deprivation of property as no restriction on their

use and enjoyment of property is caused by the implementation of R.A. No. 9646. xxx

Indeed, no right is absolute, and the proper regulation of a profession, calling, business or
trade has always been upheld as a legitimate subject of a valid exercise of the police power of the
State particularly when their conduct affects the execution of legitimate governmental functions,
the preservation of the State, public health and welfare and public morals. x x x [U]nder the
mantle of police power, of regulating entry to the practice of various trades or professions.

Here, the legislature recognized the importance of professionalizing the ranks of real
estate practitioners x x x.

We thus find R.A. No. 9646 a valid exercise of the State’s police power. x x x

x x x Police power x x x is "[t]he power vested in the legislature by the constitution to

make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and
ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge
to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same."

For this reason, when the conditions so demand as determined by the legislature, property
rights must bow to the primacy of police power because property rights, though sheltered by due
process, must yield to general welfare. (Remman Enterprises v. Professional Regulatory Board
of Real Estate Service, G.R. No. 197676, February 4, 2014)
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 The rational relationship test for a valid exercise of police power: (1) the
interests of the public generally require its exercise and (2) the means employed are
reasonably necessary for the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
Lacking these two requisites, the police power measure shall be struck down as an
arbitrary intrusion into private rights and a violation of the due process clause.

Ordinance No. 192 was passed by the City Council of Marikina in the apparent exercise of
its police power. To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the
enactment of an ordinance and to free it from the imputation of constitutional infirmity, two tests
have been used by the Court – the rational relationship test and the strict scrutiny test:

We ourselves have often applied the rational basis test mainly in analysis of equal
protection challenges. Using the rational basis examination, laws or ordinances are upheld if they
rationally further a legitimate governmental interest. Under intermediate review, governmental
interest is extensively examined and the availability of less restrictive measures is considered.
Applying strict scrutiny, the focus is on the presence of compelling, rather than substantial,
governmental interest and on the absence of less restrictive means for achieving that interest.

Even without going to a discussion of the strict scrutiny test, Ordinance No. 192, series of
1994 must be struck down for not being reasonably necessary to accomplish the City’s purpose.
More importantly, it is oppressive of private rights.

Under the rational relationship test, an ordinance must pass the following requisites as
discussed in Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Atienza, Jr.:

As with the State, local governments may be considered as having properly exercised
their police power only if the following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require its exercise and (2) the
means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not
unduly oppressive upon individuals. In short, there must be a concurrence of a lawful subject
and lawful method.

Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the police power measure shall be struck
down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights and a violation of the due process clause.
(Fernando v. St. Scholastica’s College, G.R. No. 161107, March 12, 2013)

The State may not, under the guise of police power, permanently divest owners
of the beneficial use of their property solely to preserve or enhance the aesthetic
appearance of the community. The requirement under the ordinance for owners of
educational institutions to build their fences six meters back for beautification
purposes is invalid.

Section 3.1 and 5 of the assailed ordinance are pertinent to the issue at hand, to wit:
Section 3. The standard height of fences of walls allowed under this ordinance are as follows:

(1) Fences on the front yard – shall be no more than one (1) meter in height. Fences in excess
of one (1) meter shall be an open fence type, at least eighty percent (80%) see-thru;

xxx xxx xxx

Section 5. In no case shall walls and fences be built within the five (5) meter parking area
allowance located between the front monument line and the building line of commercial and industrial
establishments and educational and religious institutions.

The respondents, thus, sought to prohibit the petitioners from requiring them to (1)
demolish their existing concrete wall, (2) build a fence (in excess of one meter) which must be
80% see-thru, and (3) build the said fence six meters back in order to provide a parking area.

xxx

Anent the objectives of prevention of concealment of unlawful acts and "un-

neighborliness," it is obvious that providing for a parking area has no logical connection to, and
is not reasonably necessary for, the accomplishment of these goals.

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 Regarding the beautification purpose of the setback requirement, it has long been settled
that the State may not, under the guise of police power, permanently divest owners of the
beneficial use of their property solely to preserve or enhance the aesthetic appearance of the
community. The Court, thus, finds Section 5 to be unreasonable and oppressive as it will
substantially divest the respondents of the beneficial use of their property solely for aesthetic
purposes. Accordingly, Section 5 of Ordinance No. 192 is invalid. (Fernando v. St. Scholastica’s
College, G.R. No. 161107, March 12, 2013)

There must be reasonable relation between the purpose of the police power
measure and the means employed for its accomplishment. The means employed must
be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the government purpose. Limiting
the height of fences of private properties to one meter and requiring fences in excess
of one meter to be at least 80% see-thru has no reasonable relation to its purpose of
ensuring public safety and security. The ordinance is thus an invalid exercise of police
power.

The petitioners argue that x x x Section 3.1 [of Ordinance No. 192] limiting the height of
fences to one meter and requiring fences in excess of one meter to be at least 80% see-thru, should
remain valid and enforceable against the respondents.

The Court cannot accommodate the petitioner.

For Section 3.1 to pass the rational relationship test, the petitioners must show the
reasonable relation between the purpose of the police power measure and the means employed
for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights
and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.

The principal purpose of Section 3.1 is "to discourage, suppress or prevent the
concealment of prohibited or unlawful acts." The ultimate goal of this objective is clearly the
prevention of crime to ensure public safety and security. The means employed by the petitioners,
however, is not reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of this purpose and is unduly
oppressive to private rights. The petitioners have not adequately shown, and it does not appear
obvious to this Court, that an 80% see-thru fence would provide better protection and a higher
level of security, or serve as a more satisfactory criminal deterrent, than a tall solid concrete wall.
It may even be argued that such exposed premises could entice and tempt would-be criminals to
the property, and that a see-thru fence would be easier to bypass and breach. It also appears that
the respondents’ concrete wall has served as more than sufficient protection over the last 40 years.
`

As to the beautification purpose of the assailed ordinance, as previously discussed, the

State may not, under the guise of police power, infringe on private rights solely for the sake of the
aesthetic appearance of the community. Similarly, the Court cannot perceive how a see-thru fence
will foster "neighborliness" between members of a community.

Compelling the respondents to construct their fence in accordance with the assailed
ordinance is, thus, a clear encroachment on their right to property, which necessarily includes
their right to decide how best to protect their property. (Fernando v. St. Scholastica’s College,
G.R. No. 161107, March 12, 2013)

The constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of contracts is limited by the

exercise of the police power. The law is deemed written into the contract between
the parties. Thus, survey firms may be compelled by the Comelec, through regulation,
to reveal the identities of subscribers to election surveys, despite the confidentiality
clause in their contracts.

Petitioners argue that Resolution No. 9674 violates Article III, Section 10 of the 1987
Constitution. They claim that it "unduly interferes with [their] existing contracts . . . by forcing
[them] to disclose information that, under the contracts, is confidential or privileged."

xxx

It is settled that "the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment . . . is limited by the

exercise of the police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, morals and general
welfare." "It is a basic rule in contracts that the law is deemed written into the contract between

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the parties." The incorporation of regulations into contracts is "a postulate of the police power of
the State."

The relation of the state’s police power with the principle of non-impairment of contracts
was thoroughly explained in Ortigas and Co. V. Feati Bank:

[W]hile non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not

absolute, since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power, i.e., "the power
to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and
general welfare of the people. x x x We do not see why public welfare when clashing with the
individual right to property should not be made to prevail through the state's exercise of its police
power.

This case does not involve a "capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable" regulation.
We have demonstrated that not only an important or substantial state interest, but even a
compelling one anchors Resolution No. 9674’s requirement of disclosing subscribers to election
surveys. It effects the constitutional policy of "guarantee[ing] equal access to opportunities for
public service" and is impelled by the imperative of "fair" elections.

As a valid exercise of COMELEC’s regulatory powers, Resolution No. 9674 is correctly

deemed written into petitioners’ existing contracts. (Social Weather Station v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 208062, April 27, 2015)

EMINENT DOMAIN

Meaning of “taking”: "Taking" of property takes place when: (1) the owner is
actually deprived or dispossessed of his property;(2) there is a practical destruction
or a material impairment of the value of his property; (3) the owner is deprived of the
ordinary use of the property, or (4) when he is deprived of the jurisdiction,
supervision and control of his property.

[T]he full payment of just compensation is not a prerequisite for the Government's
effective taking of the property. x x x RA 8974 allows the Government to enter the property and
implement national infrastructure projects upon the issuance of the writ of possession. When the
taking of the property precedes the payment of just compensation, the Government shall
indemnify the property owner by way of interest.

"Taking" under the power of eminent domain means entering upon private property for
more than a momentary period, and under the warrant or color of legal authority, devoting it to
public use, or otherwise informally appropriating or injuriously affecting it in such a way as
substantially to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof.

"Taking" of property takes place when: (1) the owner is actually deprived or dispossessed
of his property;(2) there is a practical destruction or a material impairment of the value of his
property; (3) the owner is deprived of the ordinary use of the property, or (4) when he is deprived
of the jurisdiction, supervision and control of his property.

The taking of property is different from the transfer of the property title from the private
owner to the Government. Under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, there are two phases of
expropriation: (a) the condemnation of the property after it is determined that its acquisition will
be for a public purpose or public use; and (b) the determination of just compensation to be paid
for the taking of private property to be made by the court with the assistance of not more than
three commissioners.

The first phase is concerned with the determination of the Government's authority to
exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts
involved in the suit. The court declares that the Government has a lawful right to take the property
sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint.

The second phase relates to the just amount that the Government shall compensate the
property owner.

Whenever the court affirms the condemnation of private property in the first phase of the
proceedings, it merely confirms the Government's lawful right to take the private property for
public purpose or public use. The court does not necessarily rule that the title to the private
property likewise vests on the Government.

9|Page
 The transfer of property title from the property owner to the Government is not a condition
precedent to the taking of property. The State may take private property prior to the eventual
transfer of title of the expropriated property to the State.

In fact, there are instances when the State takes the property prior to the filing of the
complaint for expropriation or without involving the transfer of title. In People v. Fajardo, the
Court ruled that the municipal mayor's refusal to give the property owner the permission to build
a house on his own land on the ground that the structure would destroy the beauty of the public
plaza amounts to the taking of the property requiring just compensation.

In National Power Corporation (NPC) v. Spouses Malit, the NPC's transmission lines had
to pass the Spouses Malit's property. The Court ruled that the NPC's easement of right-of-way on
the land was equivalent to the taking of property. The limitation imposed by the NPC against the
use of the land for an indefinite period deprived the Spouses Malit of the lot's ordinary use.
Consequently, the NPC shall give the Spouses Malit just compensation.

The reckoning period, however, of the valuation of just compensation is the date of taking
or the filing of the complaint for expropriation, whichever is earlier. In either case, it is only after
the finality of the second stage and after the payment of just compensation that the title shall pass
to the Government. As we have ruled in Gingoyon, the title to the property does not pass to the
condemnor until just compensation is paid.

Under Section 4 of RA 8974, the Government is only entitled to a writ of possession upon
initial payment of just compensation to the defendant, and upon presentment to the court of a
certificate of availability of funds.

A writ of possession does not transfer title to the Government; it is "a writ of execution
employed to enforce a judgment to recover the possession of land. It commands the sheriff to
enter the land and give its possession to the person entitled under the judgment." Section 4 of RA
8974 further states that the writ of possession is an order to take possession of the property and
to start the implementation of the project, to wit: xxx

The State's taking of the property is not based on trust or contract, but is founded on its
inherent power to appropriate private property for public use. It is also for this reason - to
compensate the property owner for the deprivation of his right to enjoy the ordinary use of his
property until the naked title to the property passed to the State - that the State pays interest from
the time of the taking of the property until full payment of just compensation. (Republic of the
Philippines v. Mupas, et al. G.R. No. 181892, 209917, 209696, 8 September 2015)

Just compensation: The full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its
owner by the expropriator.

2.b. Just compensation is the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from the
owner by the condemnor.

The 1987 Constitution embodies two constitutional safeguards against the arbitrary
exercise of eminent domain: first, private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation; and second, no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law.

Just compensation is defined as "the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its
owner by the expropriator." The word "just" is used to qualify the meaning of the word
"compensation" and to convey the idea that the amount to be tendered for the property to be taken
shall be real, substantial, full and ample. On the other hand, the word "compensation" means "a
full indemnity or remuneration for the loss or damage sustained by the owner of property taken
or injured for public use."

Simply stated, just compensation means that the former owner must be returned to the
monetary equivalent of the position that the owner had when the taking occurred. To achieve this
monetary equivalent, we use the standard value of "fair market value" of the property at the time
of the filing of the complaint for expropriation or at the time of the taking of property, whichever
is earlier.

2.b.1. Fair market value is the general standard of value in determining just
compensation.

10 | P a g e
 Jurisprudence broadly defines "fair market value" as the sum of money that a person
desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner willing but not compelled to sell, would agree
on as a price to be given and received for a property.

Fair market value is not limited to the assessed value of the property or to the schedule of
market values determined by the provincial or city appraisal committee. However, these values
may serve as factors to be considered in the judicial valuation of the property.

Among the factors to be considered in arriving at the fair market value of the property are
the cost of acquisition, the current value of like properties, its actual or potential uses, and in the
particular case of lands, their size, shape, location, and the tax declarations. The measure is not
the taker's gain but the owner's loss. To be just, the compensation must be fair not only to the
owner but also to the taker.

While jurisprudence requires the "fair market value" to be the measure of recovery in
expropriation cases, it is not an absolute and exclusive standard or method of valuation. There are
exceptional cases where the property has no fair market value or where the fair market value of
the property is difficult to determine.

Examples of properties with no or with scant data of their fair market values are
specialized properties or buildings designed for unique purposes. These specialized properties
bear these characteristics because they are "rarely x x x sold in the market, except by way of sale
of the business or entity of which it is part, due to the uniqueness arising from its specialized
nature and design, its configuration, size, location, or otherwise."

Examples of specialized properties are churches, colleges, cemeteries, and clubhouses.

These also include airport terminals that are specifically built as "a place where aircrafts land and
take off and where there are buildings for passengers to wait in and for aircraft to be
sheltered." They are all specialized properties because they are not usually sold in the ordinary
course of trade or business. (Republic of the Philippines v. Mupas, et al. G.R. No. 181892, 209917,
209696, 8 September 2015)

In cases where the fair market value of the property is difficult to ascertain,
the court may use other just and equitable market methods of valuation in order to
estimate the fair market value of a property.

2.b.2. Replacement cost is a different standard of value from fair market value.

In Gingoyon, we held that the construction of the NAIA-IPT III involves the
implementation of a national infrastructure project. Thus, for purposes of determining the just
compensation of the NAIA-IPT III, RA 8974 and its implementing rules shall be the governing
law.
xxx

Replacement cost is a different standard of valuation from the fair market value. As we
previously stated, fair market value is the price at which a property may be sold by a seller who is
not compelled to sell and bought by a buyer who is not compelled to buy. In contrast, replacement
cost is "the amount necessary to replace the improvements/structures, based on the current
market prices for materials, equipment, labor, contractor's profit and overhead, and all other
attendant costs associated with the acquisition and installation in place of the affected
improvements/structures." We use the replacement cost method to determine just compensation
if the expropriated property has no market based evidence of its value.

2.b.3. Replacement cost is only one of the standards that the Court shall consider in
appraising the NAIA-IPT III.
xxx

The Court explained in Agan and Gingoyon that the replacement cost method is only one
of the factors to be considered in determining the just compensation of the NAIA-IPT III. The
Court added that the payment of just compensation should be in accordance with equity as well.
(Republic of the Philippines v. Mupas, et al. G.R. No. 181892, 209917, 209696, 8 September 2015)

A city ordinance requiring land owners to setback their fences by five meters
to provide for parking space is tantamount to a taking of private property for public

11 | P a g e
use without just compensation. The total destruction of value of the property is not
required for a taking to be compensable.

The respondents, thus, sought to prohibit the petitioners [city officials] from requiring
them to (1) demolish their existing concrete wall, (2) build a fence (in excess of one meter) which
must be 80% see-thru, and (3) build the said fence six meters back in order to provide a parking
area.

The Court first turns its attention to Section 5 [of City Ordinance No. 192] which requires
the five-meter setback of the fence to provide for a parking area. The petitioners initially argued
that the ownership of the parking area to be created would remain with the respondents as it
would primarily be for the use of its students and faculty, and that its use by the public on non-
school days would only be incidental. x x x

xxx

The Court joins the CA in finding that the real intent of the setback requirement was to
make the parking space free for use by the public, considering that it would no longer be for the
exclusive use of the respondents as it would also be available for use by the general public. Section
9 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution, a provision on eminent domain, provides that private
property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.

The petitioners cannot justify the setback by arguing that the ownership of the property
will continue to remain with the respondents. It is a settled rule that neither the acquisition of
title nor the total destruction of value is essential to taking. In fact, it is usually in cases where the
title remains with the private owner that inquiry should be made to determine whether the
impairment of a property is merely regulated or amounts to a compensable taking. The Court is
of the view that the implementation of the setback requirement would be tantamount to a taking
of a total of 3,762.36 square meters of the respondents’ private property for public use without
just compensation, in contravention to the Constitution. (Fernando v. St. Scholastica’s College,
G.R. No. 161107, March 12, 2013)

Reckoning point for determination of just compensation: "Fair market value"

of the property at the time of the filing of the complaint for expropriation or at the
time of the taking of property, whichever is earlier.

The 1987 Constitution embodies two constitutional safeguards against the arbitrary
exercise of eminent domain: first, private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation; and second, no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law.

Just compensation is defined as "the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its
owner by the expropriator." The word "just" is used to qualify the meaning of the word
"compensation" and to convey the idea that the amount to be tendered for the property to be taken
shall be real, substantial, full and ample. On the other hand, the word "compensation" means "a
full indemnity or remuneration for the loss or damage sustained by the owner of property taken
or injured for public use."

Simply stated, just compensation means that the former owner must be returned to the
monetary equivalent of the position that the owner had when the taking occurred. To achieve this
monetary equivalent, we use the standard value of "fair market value" of the property at the time
of the filing of the complaint for expropriation or at the time of the taking of property, whichever
is earlier. (Republic v. Mupas, G.R. No. 181892, September 8, 2015)

Computation of interest as part of just compensation: When the taking of the

property precedes the filing of the complaint for expropriation, the Court orders the
condemnor to pay the full amount of just compensation from the date of taking whose
interest shall likewise commence on the same date.

Under Section 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the property sought to be expropriated
shall be appraised as of the date of taking of the property or the filing of the complaint for
expropriation, whichever is earlier xxx.

12 | P a g e
 On the other hand, Section 9, Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution provides that "[n]o private
property shall be taken for public use without just compensation." The 1987 Constitution thus
commands the condemnor to pay the property owner the full and fair equivalent of the property
from the date of taking. This provision likewise presupposes that the condemnor incurs delay if it
does not pay the property owner the full amount of just compensation on the date of taking.

The reason is that just compensation would not be "just" if the State does not pay the
property owner interest on the just compensation from the date of the taking of the property.
Without prompt payment, the property owner suffers the immediate deprivation of both his land
and its fruits or income. The owner's loss, of course, is not only his property but also its income-
generating potential.

Ideally, just compensation should be immediately made available to the property owner
so that he may derive income from this compensation, in the same manner that he would have
derived income from his expropriated property.

However, if full compensation is not paid for the property taken, then the State must pay
for the shortfall in the earning potential immediately lost due to the taking, and the absence of
replacement property from which income can be derived. Interest on the unpaid compensation
becomes due as compliance with the constitutional mandate on eminent domain and as a basic
measure of fairness.

Thus, interest in eminent domain cases "runs as a matter of law and follows as a matter of
course from the right of the landowner to be placed in as good a position as money can accomplish,
as of the date of taking."

xxx

The Government's initial payment of just compensation does not excuse it from avoiding
payment of interest on the difference between the adjudged amount of just compensation and the
initial payment.

The initial payment scheme as a prerequisite for the issuance of the writ of possession
under RA 8974 only provides the Government flexibility to immediately take the property for
public purpose or public use pending the court's final determination of just compensation. Section
4 (a) of RA 8974 only addresses the Government's need to immediately enter the privately owned
property in order to avoid delay in the implementation of national infrastructure projects.

Otherwise, Section 4 of RA 8974 would be repugnant to Section 9, Article 3 of the 1987

Constitution which mandates that private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation. To reiterate, the Constitution commands the Government to pay the property
owner no less than the full and fair equivalent of the property from the date of taking.

In the present case, the Government avers that PIATCO is not entitled to recover interest.
According to the Government, PIATCO should not be allowed to profit from the void contracts.
This contention, however, stems from a mistaken understanding of interest in expropriation
cases.

Contrary to the Government's opinion, the interest award is not anchored either on the
law of contracts or damages; it is based on the owner's constitutional right to just compensation.
The difference in the amount between the final payment and the initial payment - in the interim
or before the judgment on just compensation becomes final and executory - is not unliquidated
damages which do not earn interest until the amount of damages is established with reasonable
certainty. The difference between final and initial payments forms part of the just compensation
that the property owner is entitled from the date of taking of the property.

Thus, when the taking of the property precedes the filing of the complaint for
expropriation, the Court orders the condemnor to pay the full amount of just compensation from
the date of taking whose interest shall likewise commence on the same date. The Court does not
rule that the interest on just compensation shall commence the date when the amount of just
compensation becomes certain, e.g., from the promulgation of the Court's decision or the finality
of the eminent domain case.

With respect to the amount of interest on just compensation, we decisively ruled in

Republic v. Court of Appeals that the just compensation due to the property owner is effectively a
forbearance of money, and not indemnity for damages. Citing Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v.

13 | P a g e
Court of Appeals,we awarded a legal interest of 12% per annum on just compensation. The Court
upheld the imposition of the 12% interest rate in just compensation cases xxx.

On June 21, 2013, the BSP issued Circular No. 799,355 pursuant to MB Resolution No.
796 dated May 16,2013, reducing the legal interest on loans and forbearance of money from 12%
to 6% per annum. BSP Circular No. 799 took effect on July 1, 2013. (Republic v. Mupas, G.R. No.
181892, September 8, 2015)

Agrarian Reform

The basic law allows two (2) modes of land distribution: direct and indirect
ownership. Direct transfer to individual farmers is the most commonly used method
by DAR and widely accepted. Indirect transfer through collective ownership of the
agricultural land is the alternative. By using the word collectively, the Constitution
allows for indirect ownership of land and not just outright agricultural land transfer.
Thus, allowing corporations or associations to own agricultural land with the farmers
becoming stockholders or members does not violate the agrarian reform policy under
the Constitution.

Sec. 4, Article XIII of the Constitution reads:

The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the
right of the farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to OWN directly or
COLLECTIVELY THE LANDS THEY TILL or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive
a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the
just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention
limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into account ecological, developmental, or
equity considerations, and subject to the payment of just compensation. In determining
retention limits, the State shall respect the right of small landowners. The State shall
further provide incentives for voluntary land-sharing. (Emphasis supplied.)

The wording of the provision is unequivocal the farmers and regular farmworkers have a
right TO OWN DIRECTLY OR COLLECTIVELY THE LANDS THEY TILL. The basic law allows
two (2) modes of land distribution direct and indirect ownership. x x x Indirect transfer through
collective ownership of the agricultural land is the alternative to direct ownership of agricultural
land by individual farmers. The aforequoted Sec. 4 EXPRESSLY authorizes collective ownership
by farmers. x x x By using the word collectively, the Constitution allows for indirect ownership of
land and not just outright agricultural land transfer. x x x

Collective ownership is permitted in two (2) provisions of RA 6657. Its Sec. 29 allows
workers’ cooperatives or associations to collectively own the land, while the second paragraph of
Sec. 31 allows corporations or associations to own agricultural land with the farmers becoming
stockholders or members.

x x x Sec. 31 is constitutional as it simply implements Sec. 4 of Art. XIII of the Constitution

that land can be owned COLLECTIVELY by farmers. Even the framers of the l987 Constitution
are in unison with respect to the two (2) modes of ownership of agricultural lands tilled by farmers
DIRECT and COLLECTIVE x x x.

xxx

[T]he stock distribution option devised under Sec. 31 of RA 6657 hews with the agrarian
reform policy, as instrument of social justice under Sec. 4 of Article XIII of the Constitution.
(Hacienda Luisita Incorporated v. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council, G.R. No. 171101, July
5, 2011)

Just Compensation: An action for payment of just compensation is not barred

by laches. Laches as a doctrine of equity does not apply because law and equity
dictate payment of just compensation. Thus, even after the lapse of more than 50
years, a property owner may still file a claim to demand just compensation for the
taking of his property without the benefit of expropriations proceedings.

14 | P a g e
 It is undisputed that the subject property was taken by petitioners without the benefit of
expropriation proceedings for the construction of the MacArthur Highway. After the lapse of more
than fifty years, the property owners sought recovery of the possession of their property. Is the
action barred by prescription or laches? If not, are the property owners entitled to recover
possession or just compensation?

xxx

Even if we squarely deal with the issues of laches and prescription, the same must still fail.
Laches is principally a doctrine of equity which is applied to avoid recognizing a right when to do
so would result in a clearly inequitable situation or in an injustice. This doctrine finds no
application in this case, since there is nothing inequitable in giving due course to respondents’
claim. Both equity and the law direct that a property owner should be compensated if his property
is taken for public use. Neither shall prescription bar respondents’ claim following the long-
standing rule “that where private property is taken by the Government for public use without first
acquiring title thereto either through expropriation or negotiated sale, the owner’s action to
recover the land or the value thereof does not prescribe.”

When a property is taken by the government for public use, jurisprudence clearly provides
for the remedies available to a landowner. The owner may recover his property if its return is
feasible or, if it is not, the aggrieved owner may demand payment of just compensation for the
land taken. For failure of respondents to question the lack of expropriation proceedings for a long
period of time, they are deemed to have waived and are estopped from assailing the power of the
government to expropriate or the public use for which the power was exercised. What is left to
respondents is the right of compensation. (Secretary of the Department of Public Works and
Highways v. Spouses Tecson, G.R. No. 179334, July 1, 2013)

An action for payment of just compensation does not prescribe. If private

property is taken by the Government for public use without expropriation proceedings
or negotiated sale, the owner’s action to recover the land or the value thereof does
not prescribe.

Neither shall prescription bar respondents’ claim following the long-standing rule "that
where private property is taken by the Government for public use without first acquiring title
thereto either through expropriation or negotiated sale, the owner’s action to recover the land or
the value thereof does not prescribe."

When a property is taken by the government for public use, jurisprudence clearly provides
for the remedies available to a landowner. The owner may recover his property if its return is
feasible or, if it is not, the aggrieved owner may demand payment of just compensation for the
land taken. For failure of respondents to question the lack of expropriation proceedings for a long
period of time, they are deemed to have waived and are estopped from assailing the power of the
government to expropriate or the public use for which the power was exercised. What is left to
respondents is the right of compensation. (Secretary of the Department of Public Works and
Highways v. Spouses Tecson, G.R. No. 179334, July 1, 2013)

The reckoning point for determining just compensation is the value of the
property at the time of taking.

Just compensation must be valued at the time of taking, or the time when the landowner
was deprived of the use and benefit of his property, such as when title is transferred in the name
of the Republic of the Philippines. (Department of Agrarian Reform v. Spouses Sta. Romana,
G.R. No. 183290, July 9, 2014)

Even if the government taking was in 1940, and the action for payment of just
compensation was only filed in 1995, the reckoning point for determining just
compensation is still the value of the property at the time of taking. Thus, just
compensation should be fixed not as of the time of payment but at the time of taking,
that is, in 1940, even though this valuation appears outdated.

Just compensation is "the fair value of the property as between one who receives, and one
who desires to sell, x x x fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government." This rule holds
true when the property is taken before the filing of an expropriation suit, and even if it is the
property owner who brings the action for compensation.

15 | P a g e
 xxx

The Court in the [Forfom Development Corporation [Forfom] v. Philippine National

Railways [PNR], Eusebio v. Luis, Manila International Airport Authority v. Rodriguez, and
Republic v. Sarabia] cases was confronted with common factual circumstances where the
government took control and possession of the subject properties for public use without initiating
expropriation proceedings and without payment of just compensation, while the landowners
failed for a long period of time to question such government act and later instituted actions for
recovery of possession with damages. The Court thus determined the landowners’ right to the
payment of just compensation and, more importantly, the amount of just compensation. The
Court has uniformly ruled that just compensation is the value of the property at the time of taking
that is controlling for purposes of compensation. x x x As in said cases, just compensation due
respondents in this case should, therefore, be fixed not as of the time of payment but at the time
of taking, that is, in 1940.

The reason for the rule has been clearly explained in Republic v. Lara, et al., and
repeatedly held by the Court in recent cases, thus:

x x x "The value of the property should be fixed as of the date when it was taken and
not the date of the filing of the proceedings." x x x The owner of private property should be
compensated only for what he actually loses; it is not intended that his compensation shall
extend beyond his loss or injury. And what he loses is only the actual value of his property at
the time it is taken x x x.

Both the RTC and the CA recognized that the fair market value of the subject property in
1940 was P0.70/sq m. Hence, it should, therefore, be used in determining the amount due
respondents instead of the higher value which is P1,500.00. While disparity in the above amounts
is obvious and may appear inequitable to respondents as they would be receiving such outdated
valuation after a very long period, it is equally true that they too are remiss in guarding against
the cruel effects of belated claim. The concept of just compensation does not imply fairness to the
property owner alone. Compensation must be just not only to the property owner, but also to the
public which ultimately bears the cost of expropriation.

x x x For said illegal taking, respondents are entitled to adequate compensation in the form
of actual or compensatory damages which in this case should be the legal interest of six percent
(6%) per annum on the value of the land at the time of taking in 1940 until full payment. This is
based on the principle that interest runs as a matter of law and follows from the right of the
landowner to be placed in as good position as money can accomplish, as of the date of taking.
(Secretary of the Department of Public Works and Highways v. Spouses Tecson, G.R. No.
179334, July 1, 2013)

(AUTHOR’S NOTE: In his Dissenting Opinion, Justice Velasco wrote:

“[I]t is highly unjust and inequitable, as aptly observed by the CA, to pay
respondents just compensation at the rate of PhP 0.70 per square meter, which was then
the value of the subject property in 1940 when the illegal taking was committed. This
injustice and inequity is emphasized by the measly award respondents will receive now,
as the ponencia so rules, after having been deprived of their right to procedural due
process for 55 years with the DPWH disregarding and violating practically all
constitutional, statutory and procedural rules relative to the condemnation of the subject
lot for public use. In effect, despite what respondents have been through, they are still
penalized by the government considering that after 72 years from the time of the illegal
taking of their property, they will only receive a measly amount of just compensation”

Please also note that the ruling in DPWH v. Tecson runs counter to an earlier ruling of the
Supreme Court in Heirs of Pidacan v. Air Transport Authority [G.R. No. 162779, June 15, 2007],
wherein the High Tribunal noted that it would be iniquitous to reckon the value of the property
at the time of the taking in 1948. It ruled that justice and fairness dictate that the appropriate
reckoning point for the valuation of petitioners’ property was when the trial court made its order
of expropriation in 2001.

The determination of just compensation is a judicial function. Statutes and

executive issuances fixing or providing for the method of computing just
compensation are not binding on courts and, at best, are treated as mere guidelines
in ascertaining the amount thereof.

16 | P a g e
 While a court should take into account the different formula created by the DAR in arriving
at its just compensation valuation, it is not strictly bound thereto. The determination of just
compensation is a judicial function. (Department of Agrarian Reform v. Spouses Sta. Romana,
G.R. No. 183290, July 9, 2014)

In insisting that the just compensation cannot exceed 10% of the market value of the
affected property, Napocor relies heavily on Section 3A of RA No. 6395 x x x.

xxxx

Just compensation has been defined as "the full and fair equivalent of the property taken
from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the taker's gain, but the owner’s loss. The
word ‘just’ is used to qualify the meaning of the word ‘compensation’ and to convey thereby the
idea that the amount to be tendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and
ample." The payment of just compensation for private property taken for public use is guaranteed
no less by our Constitution and is included in the Bill of Rights. As such, no legislative enactments
or executive issuances can prevent the courts from determining whether the right of the property
owners to just compensation has been violated. It is a judicial function that cannot "be usurped
by any other branch or official of the government." Thus, we have consistently ruled that statutes
and executive issuances fixing or providing for the method of computing just compensation are
not binding on courts and, at best, are treated as mere guidelines in ascertaining the amount
thereof. In National Power Corporation v. Bagui, where the same petitioner also invoked the
provisions of Section 3A of RA No. 6395, we held that:

Moreover, Section 3A-(b) of R.A. No. 6395, as amended, is not binding on the Court.
It has been repeatedly emphasized that the determination of just compensation in eminent
domain cases is a judicial function and that any valuation for just compensation laid down
in the statutes may serve only as a guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just
compensation but it may not substitute the court’s own judgment as to what amount should
be awarded and how to arrive at such amount.

This ruling was reiterated in Republic v. Lubinao, National Power Corporation v. Tuazon
and National Power Corporation v. Saludares and continues to be the controlling doctrine.
Notably, in all these cases, Napocor likewise argued that it is liable to pay the property owners for
the easement of right-of-way only and not the full market value of the land traversed by its
transmission lines. But we uniformly held in those cases that since the high-tension electric
current passing through the transmission lines will perpetually deprive the property owners of
the normal use of their land, it is only just and proper to require Napocor to recompense them for
the full market value of their property. (National Power Corporation v. Spouses Zabala, G.R. No.
173520, January 30, 2013)

Just compensation: Interest must be paid in case of delay, to be computed from

the time the property is taken to the time when compensation is actually paid or
deposited with the court.

Constitutionally, "just compensation" is the sum equivalent to the market value of the
property. However, compensation, to be "just," must also be made without delay. The owner’s loss
is not only his property but also its income-generating potential. Thus, if property is taken for
public use before compensation is deposited with the court having jurisdiction over the case, the
final compensation must include interest[s] on its just value to be computed from the time the
property is taken to the time when compensation is actually paid or deposited with the court.
(Land Bank of the Philippines v. Santiago, G.R. No. 182209, October 3, 2012)

The Court has allowed the grant of legal interest in expropriation cases where there is delay
in the payment since the just compensation due to the landowners was deemed to be an effective
forbearance on the part of the State. Legal interest shall be pegged at the rate of 12% interest per
annum (p.a.). from the time of taking until June 30, 2013 only. Thereafter, or beginning July 1,
2013, until fully paid, the just compensation due the landowners shall earn interest at the new
legal rate of 6% interest p.a. in line with the amendment introduced by BSP-MB Circular No.
799,58 series of 2013.59. (Department of Agrarian Reform v. Spouses Sta. Romana, G.R. No.
183290, July 9, 2014)

TAXATION

17 | P a g e
 A tax has three elements, namely: a) it is an enforced proportional contribution
from persons and properties; b) it is imposed by the State by virtue of its sovereignty;
and c) it is levied for the support of the government. Thus, the coconut levy funds are
in the nature of taxes.

The coconut levy funds are in the nature of taxes and can only be used for public purpose.
Consequently, they cannot be used to purchase shares of stocks to be given for free to private
individuals.

Indeed, We have hitherto discussed, the coconut levy was imposed in the exercise of the
States inherent power of taxation. As We wrote in Republic v. COCOFED:

Indeed, coconut levy funds partake of the nature of taxes, which, in

general, are enforced proportional contributions from persons and properties,
exacted by the State by virtue of its sovereignty for the support of government and
for all public needs.

Based on its definition, a tax has three elements, namely: a) it is an enforced

proportional contribution from persons and properties; b) it is imposed by the
State by virtue of its sovereignty; and c) it is levied for the support of the
government. The coconut levy funds fall squarely into these elements for the
following reasons:

(a) They were generated by virtue of statutory enactments imposed on the

coconut farmers requiring the payment of prescribed amounts. Thus, PD No. 276,
which created the Coconut Consumer[s] Stabilization Fund (CCSF), mandated the
following:

a. A levy, initially, of P15.00 per 100 kilograms of copra resecada

or its equivalent in other coconut products, shall be imposed on every first
sale, in accordance with the mechanics established under RA 6260,
effective at the start of business hours on August 10, 1973.

The proceeds from the levy shall be deposited with the Philippine
National Bank or any other government bank to the account of the Coconut
Consumers Stabilization Fund, as a separate trust fund which shall not
form part of the general fund of the government.

xxx

Like other tax measures, they were not voluntary payments or donations by
the people. They were enforced contributions exacted on pain of penal sanctions,
as provided under PD No. 276:

xxx.

(b) The coconut levies were imposed pursuant to the laws enacted by the
proper legislative authorities of the State. Indeed, the CCSF was collected under PD
No. 276.

(c) They were clearly imposed for a public purpose. There is

absolutely no question that they were collected to advance the
government’s avowed policy of protecting the coconut industry. x x x

Taxation is done not merely to raise revenues to support the government,

but also to provide means for the rehabilitation and the stabilization of a
threatened industry, which is so affected with public interest as to be within
the police power of the State.

Even if the money is allocated for a special purpose and raised by special
means, it is still public in character. x x x It cannot be denied that the
coconut industry is one of the major industries supporting the national
economy. x x x (Emphasis Ours)

(Cocofed v. Republic, G.R. Nos. 177857-58, January 24, 2012)

18 | P a g e
 Taxes are imposed only for a public purpose and cannot be used for purely
private purposes or for the exclusive benefit of private persons. The coconut levy
funds are in the nature of taxes and can only be used for public purposes.
Consequently, they cannot be used to purchase shares of stocks to be given for free
to private individuals.

[T]axes are imposed only for a public purpose. They cannot be used for purely private
purposes or for the exclusive benefit of private persons. When a law imposes taxes or levies from
the public, with the intent to give undue benefit or advantage to private persons, or the promotion
of private enterprises, that law cannot be said to satisfy the requirement of public purpose. x x x

x x x [T]he coconut levy funds were sourced from forced exactions decreed under P.D. Nos.
232, 276 and 582, among others, with the end-goal of developing the entire coconut
industry. Clearly, to hold therefore, even by law, that the revenues received from the imposition
of the coconut levies be used purely for private purposes to be owned by private individuals in
their private capacity and for their benefit, would contravene the rationale behind the imposition
of taxes or levies.

Needless to stress, courts do not, as they cannot, allow by judicial fiat the conversion of
special funds into a private fund for the benefit of private individuals. In the same vein, We cannot
subscribe to the idea of what appears to be an indirect if not exactly direct conversion of special
funds into private funds, i.e., by using special funds to purchase shares of stocks, which in turn
would be distributed for free to private individuals. Even if these private individuals belong to, or
are a part of the coconut industry, the free distribution of shares of stocks purchased with special
public funds to them, nevertheless cannot be justified. x x x

xxx

In this case, the coconut levy funds were being exacted from copra exporters, oil millers,
desiccators and other end-users of copra or its equivalent in other coconut products. Likewise so,
the funds here were channeled to the purchase of the shares of stock in UCPB. Drawing a clear
parallelism between Gaston and this case, the fact that the coconut levy funds were collected from
the persons or entities in the coconut industry, among others, does not and cannot entitle them
to be beneficial owners of the subject funds or more bluntly, owners thereof in their private
capacity. Parenthetically, the said private individuals cannot own the UCPB shares of stocks so
purchased using the said special funds of the government. (Cocofed v. Republic, G.R. Nos. 177857-
58, January 24, 2012)

INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES

The Bill of Rights: Protection against actions of the State. Thus, it cannot be
invoked in private controversies involving private parties.

The Bill of Rights, which guarantees against the taking of life, property, or liberty without
due process under Section 1 is generally a limitation on the states powers in relation to the rights
of its citizens. The right to due process is meant to protect ordinary citizens against arbitrary
government action, but not from acts committed by private individuals or entities. In the latter
case, the specific statutes that provide reliefs from such private acts apply. The right to due process
guards against unwarranted encroachment by the state into the fundamental rights of its citizens
and cannot be invoked in private controversies involving private parties.

Although political parties play an important role in our democratic set-up as an

intermediary between the state and its citizens, it is still a private organization, not a state
instrument. The discipline of members by a political party does not involve the right to life, liberty
or property within the meaning of the due process clause. x x x

(Atienza v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 188920, February 16, 2010)

RIGHT TO LIFE

An ordinance to promote the constituents’ general welfare in terms of

economic benefits cannot override the very basic rights to life, security and safety of
19 | P a g e
the people. In the absence of any convincing reason that the life, security and safety
of the inhabitants of Manila are no longer put at risk by the presence of the oil depots
in Pandacan, Ordinance No. 8187 in favor of the retention of the oil depots is invalid
and unconstitutional.

These petitions are a sequel to the case of Social Justice Society v. Mayor Atienza, Jr.
(hereinafter referred to as G.R. No. 156052), where the Court found: (1) that the ordinance
subject thereof – Ordinance No. 8027 – was enacted "to safeguard the rights to life, security and
safety of the inhabitants of Manila;" (2) that it had passed the tests of a valid ordinance; and (3)
that it is not superseded by Ordinance No. 8119. Declaring that it is constitutional and valid, the
Court accordingly ordered its immediate enforcement with a specific directive on the relocation
and transfer of the Pandacan oil terminals.

Highlighting that the Court has so ruled that the Pandacan oil depots should leave, herein
petitioners now seek the nullification of Ordinance No. 8187, which contains provisions contrary
to those embodied in Ordinance No. 8027. xxx

xxx

The petitioners’ arguments are primarily anchored on the ruling of the Court in G. R. No.
156052 declaring Ordinance No. 8027 constitutional and valid after finding that the presence of
the oil terminals in Pandacan is a threat to the life and security of the people of Manila. xxx

xxx

We see no reason why Ordinance No. 8187 should not be stricken down insofar as the
presence of the oil depots in Pandacan is concerned.

xxx

In G.R. No. 156052, the validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No. 8027 was declared
as a guarantee for the protection of the constitutional right to life of the residents of Manila. There,
the Court said that the enactment of the said ordinance was a valid exercise of police power with
the concurrence of the two requisites: a lawful subject – "to safeguard the rights to life, security
and safety of all the inhabitants of Manila;" and a lawful method – the enactment of Ordinance
No. 8027 reclassifying the land use from industrial to commercial, which effectively ends the
continued stay of the oil depots in Pandacan.

In the present petitions, the respondents and the oil companies plead that the Pandacan
Terminal has never been one of the targets of terrorist attacks; that the petitions were based on
unfounded fears and mere conjectures; and that the possibility that it would be picked by the
terrorists is nil given the security measures installed thereat.

The intervenors went on to identify the measures taken to ensure the safety of the people
even with the presence of the Pandacan Terminals. xxx

xxx

Even assuming that the respondents and intervenors were correct, the very nature of the
depots where millions of liters of highly flammable and highly volatile products, regardless of
whether or not the composition may cause explosions, has no place in a densely populated area.
xxx

xxx

It is the removal of the danger to life not the mere subdual of risk of catastrophe, that we
saw in and made us favor Ordinance No. 8027. That reason, unaffected by Ordinance No. 8187,
compels the affirmance of our Decision in G.R. No. 156052.

In striking down the contrary provisions of the assailed Ordinance relative to the
continued stay of the oil depots, we follow the same line of reasoning used in G.R. No. 156052, to
wit: Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted "for the purpose of promoting sound urban planning,
ensuring health, public safety and general welfare" of the residents of Manila. The Sanggunian
was impelled to take measures to protect the residents of Manila from catastrophic devastation in
case of a terrorist attack on the Pandacan Terminals. Towards this objective, the Sanggunian
reclassified the area defined in the ordinance from industrial to commercial.

xxx

20 | P a g e
 The ordinance was intended to safeguard the rights to life, security and safety of all the
inhabitants of Manila and not just of a particular class. xxx

xxx

In the absence of any convincing reason to persuade this Court that the life, security and
safety of the inhabitants of Manila are no longer put at risk by the presence of the oil depots, we
hold that Ordinance No. 8187 in relation to the Pandacan Terminals is invalid and
unconstitutional.

xxx

Neither is it necessary to discuss at length the test of police power against the assailed
ordinance. Suffice it to state that the objective adopted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod to
promote the constituents’ general welfare in terms of economic benefits cannot override the very
basic rights to life, security and safety of the people. (Social Justice Society Officers v. Lim, G.R.
No. 187836, November 25, 2014)

DUE PROCESS

The right to due process guards against unwarranted encroachment by the

state into the fundamental rights of its citizens. It cannot be invoked in private
controversies involving private parties. A political party is still a private organization,
not a state instrument. The discipline of members by a political party does not involve
the right to life, liberty or property within the meaning of the due process clause.

Petitioners Atienza, et al. argue that their expulsion from the party is not a simple issue of
party membership or discipline; it involves a violation of their constitutionally-protected right to
due process of law. They claim that the NAPOLCO and the NECO should have first summoned
them to a hearing before summarily expelling them from the party. According to Atienza, et al.,
proceedings on party discipline are the equivalent of administrative proceedings and are,
therefore, covered by the due process requirements laid down in Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial
Relations.

But the requirements of administrative due process do not apply to the internal affairs of
political parties. The due process standards set in Ang Tibay cover only administrative bodies
created by the state and through which certain governmental acts or functions are performed. An
administrative agency or instrumentality contemplates an authority to which the state delegates
governmental power for the performance of a state function. The constitutional limitations that
generally apply to the exercise of the states powers thus, apply too, to administrative bodies.

x x x The Bill of Rights, which guarantees against the taking of life, property, or liberty
without due process under Section 1 is generally a limitation on the states powers in relation to
the rights of its citizens. The right to due process is meant to protect ordinary citizens against
arbitrary government action, but not from acts committed by private individuals or entities. In
the latter case, the specific statutes that provide reliefs from such private acts apply. The right to
due process guards against unwarranted encroachment by the state into the fundamental rights
of its citizens and cannot be invoked in private controversies involving private parties.

Although political parties play an important role in our democratic set-up as an

intermediary between the state and its citizens, it is still a private organization, not a state
instrument. The discipline of members by a political party does not involve the right to life, liberty
or property within the meaning of the due process clause. x x x

But even when recourse to courts of law may be made, courts will ordinarily not interfere
in membership and disciplinary matters within a political party. A political party is free to conduct
its internal affairs, pursuant to its constitutionally-protected right to free association. (Atienza v.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 188920, February 16, 2010)

Due process as a protection against Government arbitrariness: The guaranty of

due process of law is a constitutional safeguard against any arbitrariness on the part
of the Government, whether committed by the Legislature, the Executive, or the
Judiciary. This clause has been interpreted as imposing two separate limits on
government, usually called "procedural due process" and "substantive due process."

21 | P a g e
 The guaranty [of due process] is embedded in Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution,
which ordains:

Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without

due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

The guaranty of due process of law is a constitutional safeguard against any arbitrariness
on the part of the Government, whether committed by the Legislature, the Executive, or the
Judiciary. xxx

xxx

In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., the Court expounded on the aspects of the guaranty of
due process of law as a limitation on the acts of government, viz:

This clause has been interpreted as imposing two separate limits on

government, usually called "procedural due process" and "substantive due
process."

Procedural due process, as the phrase implies, refers to the procedures that
the government must follow before it deprives a person of life, liberty, or property.
Classic procedural due process issues are concerned with that kind of notice and
what form of hearing the government must provide when it takes a particular
action.

Substantive due process, as that phrase connotes, asks whether the

government has an adequate reason for taking away a person’s life, liberty, or
property. In other words, substantive due process looks to whether there is
sufficient justification for the government’s action. Case law in the United States
(U.S.) tells us that whether there is such a justification depends very much on the
level of scrutiny used. For example, if a law is in an area where only rational basis
review is applied, substantive due process is met so long as the law is rationally
related to a legitimate government purpose. But if it is an area where strict scrutiny
is used, such as for protecting fundamental rights, then the government will meet
substantive due process only if it can prove that the law is necessary to achieve a
compelling government purpose.

The police power granted to local government units must always be

exercised with utmost observance of the rights of the people to due process and
equal protection of the law. Such power cannot be exercised whimsically,
arbitrarily or despotically as its exercise is subject to a qualification, limitation or
restriction demanded by the respect and regard due to the prescription of the
fundamental law, particularly those forming part of the Bill of Rights. Individual
rights, it bears emphasis, may be adversely affected only to the extent that may
fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare.
Due process requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights
of the person to his life, liberty and property.

(Legaspi v. City of Cebu, G.R. No. 159110, December 10, 2013)

Immobilization of illegally parked vehicles by clamping the tires is not a

violation of due process. First, this was done when transgressors were not around at
the time of apprehension, making notice and hearing superfluous. Nor should the lack
of a trial-type hearing prior to the clamping constitute a breach of procedural due
process, because the transgressors have the chance to reverse the apprehensions
through a timely protest which procedure equally satisfies the need for a hearing. In
other words, the prior intervention of a court of law was not indispensable to ensure
a compliance with the guaranty of due process.

To reiterate, the clamping of the illegally parked vehicles was a fair and reasonable way to
enforce the ordinance against its transgressors; otherwise, the transgressors would evade liability
by simply driving away.

The Jabans contend that Ordinance No. 1664, by leaving the confiscation and
immobilization of the motor vehicles to the traffic enforcers or the regular personnel of the
Philippine National Police (PNP) instead of to officials exercising judicial authority, was violative
22 | P a g e
of the constitutional guaranty of due process; that such confiscation and immobilization should
only be after a hearing on the merits by courts of law; and that the immobilization and the
clamping of the cars and motor vehicles by the police or traffic enforcers could be subject to abuse.

On his part, Legaspi likewise contends that Ordinance No. 1664 violated the constitutional
guaranty of due process for being arbitrary and oppressive; and that its provisions conferring
upon the traffic enforcers the absolute discretion to be the enforcers, prosecutors, judges and
collectors all at the same time were vague and ambiguous. xxx

Judged according to the foregoing enunciation of the guaranty of due process of law, the
contentions of the petitioners cannot be sustained. Even under strict scrutiny review, Ordinance
No. 1664 met the substantive tests of validity and constitutionality by its conformity with the
limitations under the Constitution and the statutes, as well as with the requirements of fairness
and reason, and its consistency with public policy.

To us, the terms encroachment and obstacles used in Section 458 of the LGC, supra, were
broad enough to include illegally parked vehicles or whatever else obstructed the streets, alleys
and sidewalks, which were precisely the subject of Ordinance No. 1664 in a vowedly aiming to
ensure "a smooth flow of vehicular traffic in all the streets in the City of Cebu at all times" (Section
1). xxx
Considering that traffic congestions were already retarding the growth and progress in the
population and economic centers of the country xxx. Its adoption was, therefore, in order to fulfill
the compelling government purpose of immediately addressing the burgeoning traffic congestions
caused by illegally parked vehicles obstructing the streets of the City of Cebu.

xxx
The petitioners further assert that drivers or vehicle owners affected by Ordinance No.
1664 like themselves were not accorded the opportunity to protest the clamping, towing, and
impounding of the vehicles, or even to be heard and to explain their side prior to the
immobilization of their vehicles; and that the ordinance was oppressive and arbitrary for that
reason.

The adverse assertions against Ordinance No. 1664 are unwarranted.

Firstly, Ordinance No. 1664 was far from oppressive and arbitrary. Any driver or vehicle
owner whose vehicle was immobilized by clamping could protest such action of a traffic enforcer
or PNP personnel enforcing the ordinance. Section 3 of Ordinance No. 1664, supra, textually
afforded an administrative escape in the form of permitting the release of the immobilized vehicle
upon a protest directly made to the Chairman of CITOM; or to the Chairman of the Committee on
Police, Fire and Penology of the City of Cebu; or to Asst. City Prosecutor Felipe Belciña–officials
named in the ordinance itself. The release could be ordered by any of such officials even without
the payment of the stipulated fine. xxxx Secondly, the immobilization of a vehicle by clamping
pursuant to the ordinance was not necessary if the driver or vehicle owner was around at the time
of the apprehension for illegal parking or obstruction. In that situation, the enforcer would simply
either require the driver to move the vehicle or issue a traffic citation should the latter persist in
his violation. The clamping would happen only to prevent the transgress or from using the vehicle
itself to escape the due sanctions. And, lastly, the towing away of the immobilized vehicle was not
equivalent to a summary impounding, but designed to prevent the immobilized vehicle from
obstructing traffic in the vicinity of the apprehension and thereby ensure the smooth flow of
traffic. The owner of the towed vehicle would not be deprived of his property.

In fine, the circumstances set forth herein indicate that Ordinance No. 1664 complied with
the elements of fairness and reasonableness.

Did Ordinance No. 1664 meet the requirements of procedural due process?

Notice and hearing are the essential requirements of procedural due process. Yet, there
are many instances under our laws in which the absence of one or both of such requirements is
not necessarily a denial or deprivation of due process. Among the instances are the cancellation
of the passport of a person being sought for the commission of a crime, the preventive suspension
of a civil servant facing administrative charges, the distraint of properties to answer for tax
delinquencies, the padlocking of restaurants found to be unsanitary or of theaters showing
obscene movies, and the abatement of nuisance per se. Add to them the arrest of a person in
flagrante delicto.

The clamping of the petitioners’ vehicles pursuant to Ordinance No. 1664 (and of the
vehicles of others similarly situated) was of the same character as the aforecited established

23 | P a g e
exceptions dispensing with notice and hearing. As already said, the immobilization of illegally
parked vehicles by clamping the tires was necessary because the transgressors were not around at
the time of apprehension. Under such circumstance, notice and hearing would be superfluous.
Nor should the lack of a trial-type hearing prior to the clamping constitute a breach of procedural
due process, forgiving the transgressors the chance to reverse the apprehensions through a timely
protest could equally satisfy the need for a hearing. In other words, the prior intervention of a
court of law was not indispensable to ensure a compliance with the guaranty of due process.

To reiterate, the clamping of the illegally parked vehicles was a fair and reasonable way to
enforce the ordinance against its transgressors; otherwise, the transgressors would evade liability
by simply driving away. (Legaspi v. City of Cebu, G.R. No. 159110, December 10, 2013)

In order that a particular act may not be impugned as violative of the due
process clause, there must be compliance with both the substantive and the
procedural requirements thereof. Substantive due process refers to the intrinsic
validity of a law that interferes with the rights of a person to his property. Procedural
due process means conformity with the standard of fair play and without arbitrariness
on the part of those who are called upon to administer it. Administrative proceedings
are not exempt from basic and fundamental procedural principles, such as the right
to due process.

Now, one of the guarantees sacrosanct in this jurisdiction is that no person shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law. An essential component of the Bill
of Rights, the Due Process Clause, undoubtedly occupies a position of primacy in the fundamental
law.

Due process of law has two aspects: substantive and procedural due process. In order that
a particular act may not be impugned as violative of the due process clause, there must be
compliance with both the substantive and the procedural requirements thereof.

Substantive due process refers to the intrinsic validity of a law that interferes with the
rights of a person to his property. Procedural due process, on the other hand, means compliance
with the procedures or steps, even periods, prescribed by the statute, in conformity with the
standard of fair play and without arbitrariness on the part of those who are called upon to
administer it.

Although administrative procedural rules are less stringent and often applied more
liberally, administrative proceedings are not exempt from basic and fundamental procedural
principles, such as the right to due process in investigations and hearings.

In Ang Tibay v. CIR, the Court laid down the cardinal rights of parties in administrative
proceedings, as follows:

1) The right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one's case and submit
evidence in support thereof;

2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;

3) The decision must have something to support itself;

4) The evidence must be substantial;

5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected;

6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its or his own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy and not simply accept the views of a
subordinate in arriving at a decision; and

7) The board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a
manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reason
for the decision rendered. (Alliance for the Family v. Garin, G.R. No. 217872, August 24, 2016)

24 | P a g e
 Although the FDA is the primary agency that determines whether a
contraceptive drug or certain device has no abortifacient effects, the FDA should allow
its findings and conclusion to be questioned and those who oppose the same must be
given a genuine opportunity to be heard.

After an assessment of the undisputed facts, the Court finds that the FDA certified,
procured and administered such contraceptive drugs and devices, without the observance of the
basic tenets of due process, without notice and without public hearing, despite the constant
opposition from the petitioners. From the records, it appears that other than the notice inviting
stakeholders to apply for certification/re-certification of their reproductive health products, there
was no showing that the respondents notified the oppositors and conducted a hearing on the
applications and oppositions submitted.

Rather than provide concrete evidence to meet the petitioners' opposition, the
respondents simply relied on their challenge questioning the propriety of the subject petition on
technical and procedural grounds. The Court notes that even the letters submitted by the
petitioners to the FDA and the DOH seeking information on the actions taken by the agencies
regarding their opposition were left unanswered as if they did not exist at all. xxxx

Indeed, although the law tasks the FDA as the primary agency to determine whether a
contraceptive drug or certain device has no abortifacient effects, its findings and conclusion
should be allowed to be questioned and those who oppose the same must be given a genuine
opportunity to be heard in their stance. After all, under Section 4(k)56 of R.A. No. 3720, as
amended by R.A. No. 9711, the FDA is mandated to order the ban, recall and/or withdrawal of any
health product found to have caused death, serious illness or serious injury to a consumer or
patient, or found to be imminently injurious, unsafe, dangerous, or grossly deceptive, after due
process. (Alliance for the Family v. Garin, G.R. No. 217872, August 24, 2016)

A decision rendered in disregard of the right to due process is void for lack of
jurisdiction.

Due to the failure of the respondents to observe and comply with the basic requirements
of due process, the Court is of the view that the certifications/re-certifications and the distribution
of the questioned contraceptive drugs by the respondents should be struck down as violative of
the constitutional right to due process.

Verily, it is a cardinal precept that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights,
the courts are ousted from their jurisdiction. The violation of a party's right to due process raises
a serious jurisdictional issue which cannot be glossed over or disregarded at will. Where the denial
of the fundamental right to due process is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of
that right is void for lack of jurisdiction. This rule is equally true in quasi-judicial and
administrative proceedings, for the constitutional guarantee that no man shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process is unqualified by the type of proceedings (whether judicial
or administrative) where he stands to lose the same. (Alliance for the Family v. Garin, G.R. No.
217872, August 24, 2016)

In administrative proceedings, due process is satisfied when a person is

notified of the charge against him and given an opportunity to explain or defend
oneself. The essence of due process, therefore, as applied to administrative
proceedings, is an opportunity to explain one's side, or an opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.

Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution guarantees that:

No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due

process of law nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the law.

Procedural due process is that which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon
inquiry and renders judgment only after trial. It contemplates notice and opportunity to be heard
before judgment is rendered affecting one's person or property.

In administrative proceedings, due process is satisfied when a person is notified of the

charge against him and given an opportunity to explain or defend oneself. In such proceedings,
the filing of charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to answer the
accusations against him constitute the minimum requirements of due process. In Ang Tibay v.
Court of Industrial Relations, the Court stated that one of the requisites for due process
25 | P a g e
compliance was that the decision must be rendered on the basis of the evidence presented at the
hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected.

The essence of due process, therefore, as applied to administrative proceedings, is an

opportunity to explain one's side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of. Thus, a violation of that right occurs when a court or tribunal rules against
a party without giving the person the opportunity to be heard.

In this case, Conti was never given an opportunity to air his side. He was not furnished
with a copy of the Ombudsman order requiring him to file a counter-affidavit. This was admitted
by the Ombudsman as the records bore that the notices were sent to the PCGG when he was no
longer a Commissioner and to Conti's previous address in Araneta Avenue, Quezon City, which
were returned unserved with a notation that the addressee moved and left with no forwarding
address. This suffices as proof that Conti was not properly apprised of the cases against him.

The Court disagrees with the Ombudsman in citing the case of Ruivivar as Conti's
situation was not similar to the cited case. In Ruivivar, the petitioner filed her motion for
reconsideration and the Ombudsman acted on it, albeit belatedly, by issuing an Order that she be
furnished with all the pleadings and other pertinent documents and allowing her to file, within
ten (10) days from receipt, such pleading which she deemed fit under the circumstances. In the
said case, however, the petitioner still failed to refute the charges against her. (Office of the
Ombudsman v. Conti, G.R. No. 221296, February 22, 2017)

A decision rendered without due process is void ab initio and may be attacked
directly or collaterally.

The doctrine consistently adhered to by this Court is that a decision rendered without due
process is void ab initio and may be attacked directly or collaterally. A decision is void for lack of
due process if, as a result, a party is deprived of the opportunity to be heard. "The cardinal precept
is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are ousted of their
jurisdiction. xxxx

Consequently, such nullity not only applies to the entire judgment rendered by the
Ombudsman but likewise nullifies the judgment rendered by the CA reversing the findings of the
Ombudsman as to Conti' s liability. With the violation of Conti's right to due process, it is therefore
plain, that any judgment arising from it is void, whether the same be favorable to him or
otherwise. (Office of the Ombudsman v. Conti, G.R. No. 221296, February 22, 2017)

Due process and the void-for-vagueness doctrine: A statute or act suffers from
the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It
is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects: (1) it violates due process for
failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the
conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out
its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle."
Petitioners must properly identify a) any provision in the law, which, because of its
vague terminology, fails to provide fair warning and notice to the public of what is
prohibited or required so that one may act accordingly; or b) an ambiguous provision
in the law that allows enforcement authorities to second-guess if a particular conduct
is prohibited or not prohibited.

[P]etitioners submit that the Curfew Ordinances are void for not containing sufficient
enforcement parameters, which leaves the enforcing authorities with unbridled discretion to carry
out their provisions. They claim that the lack of procedural guidelines in these issuances led to the
questioning of petitioners Ronel and Mark Leo, even though they were already of legal age. They
maintain that the enforcing authorities apprehended the suspected curfew offenders based only
on their physical appearances and, thus, acted arbitrarily. Meanwhile, although they conceded
that the Quezon City Ordinance requires enforcers to determine the age of the child, they submit
that nowhere does the said ordinance require the law enforcers to ask for proof or identification
of the child to show his age.

The arguments are untenable.

"A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible
standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to

26 | P a g e
its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects: (1) it violates due
process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice
of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in
carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government
muscle."

In this case, petitioners' invocation of the void for vagueness doctrine is improper,
considering that they do not properly identify any provision in any of the Curfew Ordinances,
which, because of its vague terminology, fails to provide fair warning and notice to the public of
what is prohibited or required so that one may act accordingly. The void for vagueness
doctrine is premised on due process considerations, which are absent from this
particular claim. xxx

Essentially, petitioners only bewail the lack of enforcement parameters to guide the local
authorities in the proper apprehension of suspected curfew offenders. They do not assert any
confusion as to what conduct the subject ordinances prohibit or not prohibit but
only point to the ordinances' lack of enforcement guidelines. The mechanisms related
to the implementation of the Curfew Ordinances are, however, matters of policy that are best left
for the political branches of government to resolve. Verily, the objective of curbing unbridled
enforcement is not the sole consideration in a void for vagueness analysis; rather, petitioners must
show that this perceived danger of unbridled enforcement stems from an ambiguous provision in
the law that allows enforcement authorities to second-guess if a particular conduct is prohibited
or not prohibited. In this regard, that ambiguous provision of law contravenes due process
because agents of the government cannot reasonably decipher what conduct the law permits
and/or forbids. In Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, it was ratiocinated that:

A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries
for resolution on ad hoc and subjective basis, and vague standards result in erratic and arbitrary
application based on individual impressions and personal predilections.

As above-mentioned, petitioners fail to point out any ambiguous standard in any of the
provisions of the Curfew Ordinances, but rather, lament the lack of detail on how the age of a
suspected minor would be determined. Thus, without any correlation to any vague legal provision,
the Curfew Ordinances cannot be stricken down under the void for vagueness doctrine. (Samahan
ng mga Progresibong Kabataan v. Quezon City, G.R. No. 225442, August 8, 2017)

The opportunity to be heard through motion for reconsideration is sufficient

compliance with due process.

The essence of due process is simply the opportunity to be heard. What the law prohibits
is not the absence of previous notice but its absolute absence and lack of opportunity to be heard.
Sufficient compliance with the requirements of due process exists when a party is given a chance
to be heard through his motion for reconsideration.

In the present case, we do not find it disputed that the respondents filed with the Secretary
of Justice a motion for reconsideration of her resolution. Therefore, any initial defect in due
process, if any, was cured by the remedy the respondents availed of. (Shu v. Dee, G.R. No. 182573,
April 23, 2014)

There is no violation of due process in an NBI investigation if the respondents

are not given an opportunity to file an answer or submit counter-evidence. The NBI
does not exercise judicial or quasi-judicial powers and its findings are merely
recommendatory.

[I]n the proceedings before the NBI, the respondents were not furnished a copy of the
complaint and were not likewise required to file their answer or to present countervailing
evidence. All the evidence at the NBI level were solely provided by the petitioner.

xxx

The respondents’ Comment and Memorandum, they reiterated their argument that they
were prevented from participating in the proceedings before the NBI and the Secretary of Justice,
resulting in the denial of their right to due process.

xxx
27 | P a g e
 On the respondents’ allegation that they were denied due process during the NBI
investigation, we stress that the functions of this agency are merely investigatory and
informational in nature. It has no judicial or quasi-judicial powers and is incapable of granting
any relief to any party. It cannot even determine probable cause. The NBI is an investigative
agency whose findings are merely recommendatory. It undertakes investigation of crimes upon
its own initiative or as public welfare may require in accordance with its mandate. It also renders
assistance when requested in the investigation or detection of crimes in order to prosecute the
persons responsible.

Since the NBI’s findings were merely recommendatory, we find that no denial of the
respondents’ due process right could have taken place; the NBI’s findings were still subject to the
prosecutor’s and the Secretary of Justice’s actions for purposes of finding the existence of probable
cause. x x x

The respondents were not likewise denied their right to due process when the NBI issued
the questioned documents report. We note that this report merely stated that the signatures
appearing on the two deeds and in the petitioner’s submitted sample signatures were not written
by one and the same person. Notably, there was no categorical finding in the questioned
documents report that the respondents falsified the documents. This report, too, was procured
during the conduct of the NBI’s investigation at the petitioner’s request for assistance in the
investigation of the alleged crime of falsification. The report is inconclusive and does not prevent
the respondents from securing a separate documents examination by handwriting experts
based on their own evidence. (Shu v. Dee, G.R. No. 182573, April 23, 2014)

The requirements for due process in administrative cases set in the Ang Tibay
case do not apply to preliminary investigations. The purpose of the Office of the
Ombudsman in conducting a preliminary investigation is to determine probable cause
for filing an information, and not to make a final adjudication of the rights and
obligations of the parties. The Ombudsman and the prosecution service are inherently
the fact-finder, investigator, hearing officer, judge and jury of the respondent in
preliminary investigations. There is nothing unconstitutional with this procedure
because this is merely an Executive function, a part of the law enforcement process
leading to trial in court.

We likewise take exception to Justice Brion’s assertion that "the due process standards
that at the very least should be considered in the conduct of a preliminary investigation are those
that this Court first articulated in Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations [Ang Tibay]." Simply
put, the Ang Tibay guidelines for administrative cases do not apply to preliminary investigations
in criminal cases. An application of the Ang Tibay guidelines to preliminary investigations will
have absurd and disastrous consequences.

Ang Tibay enumerated the constitutional requirements of due process, which Ang Tibay
described as the "fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and
investigations of an administrative character." These requirements are "fundamental and
essential" because without these, there is no due process as mandated by the Constitution. These
"fundamental and essential requirements" cannot be taken away by legislation because they are
part of constitutional due process. These "fundamental and essential requirements" are:
(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the
party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof.
x x x.

(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and adduce
evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the
evidence presented. x x x.

(3) "While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does
imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support
its decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, x x x."

(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but the
evidence must be "substantial." "Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion." x x x.

(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. x x x.

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 (6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or
his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply
accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. x x x.

(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its
decision in sucha manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues
involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is
inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.

The guidelines set forth in Ang Tibay are further clarified in GSIS v. CA (GSIS): "what Ang
Tibay failed to explicitly state was, prescinding from the general principles governing due process,
the requirement of an impartial tribunal which, needless to say, dictates that one called upon to
resolve a dispute may not sit as judge and jury simultaneously, neither may he review his decision
on appeal." The GSIS clarification affirms the non applicability of the Ang Tibay guidelines to
preliminary investigations in criminal cases: The investigating officer, which is the role that the
Office of the Ombudsman plays in the investigation and prosecution of government personnel,
will never be the impartial tribunal required in Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS. The purpose of
the Office of the Ombudsman in conducting a preliminary investigation, after conducting its own
fact finding investigation, is to determine probable cause for filing an information, and not to m
ake a final adjudication of the rights and obligations of the parties under the law, which is the
purpose of the guidelines in Ang Tibay. The investigating officer investigates, determines
probable cause, and prosecutes the criminal case after filing the corresponding information.

x x x The Ombudsman and the prosecution service under the control and supervision of
the Secretary of the Department of Justice are inherently the fact-finder, investigator, hearing
officer, judge and jury of the respondent in preliminary investigations. Obviously, this procedure
cannot comply with Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS. However, there is nothing unconstitutional
with this procedure because this is merely an Executive function, a part of the law enforcement
process leading to trial in court where the requirements mandated in Ang Tibay, as amplified in
GSIS, will apply. This has been the procedure under the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. To
now rule that Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, should apply to preliminary investigations will
mean that all past and present preliminary investigations are in gross violation of constitutional
due process. (Estrada v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 212140-41, January 21, 2015)

The ex-parte issuance of temporary protection order (TPO) - before notice and
hearing - is valid because time is of the essence to prevent further violence. Moreover,
after a TPO is issued, the respondent is afforded an opportunity to present his side.

R.A. 9262 is not violative of the due process clause of the Constitution. Petitioner bewails
the disregard of R.A. 9262, specifically in the issuance of [Protection Orders], of all protections
afforded by the due process clause of the Constitution. x x x

A protection order is an order issued to prevent further acts of violence against women
and their children, their family or household members, and to grant other necessary reliefs. Its
purpose is to safeguard the offended parties from further harm, minimize any disruption in their
daily life and facilitate the opportunity and ability to regain control of their life.

“The scope of reliefs in protection orders is broadened to ensure that the victim or offended
party is afforded all the remedies necessary to curtail access by a perpetrator to the victim. This
serves to safeguard the victim from greater risk of violence; to accord the victim and any
designated family or household member safety in the family residence, and to prevent the
perpetrator from committing acts that jeopardize the employment and support of the victim. x x
x”

The rules require that petitions for protection order be in writing, signed and verified by
the petitioner thereby undertaking full responsibility, criminal or civil, for every allegation
therein. Since “time is of the essence in cases of VAWC if further violence is to be prevented,” the
court is authorized to issue ex parte a TPO after raffle but before notice and hearing when the life,
limb or property of the victim is in jeopardy and there is reasonable ground to believe that the
order is necessary to protect the victim from the immediate and imminent danger of VAWC or to
prevent such violence, which is about to recur.

There need not be any fear that the judge may have no rational basis to issue an ex parte
order. The victim is required not only to verify the allegations in the petition, but also to attach
her witnesses' affidavits to the petition.

The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be challenged as violative of the right to due
process. x x x [T]he victim of VAWC may already have suffered harrowing experiences in the
hands of her tormentor, and possibly even death, if notice and hearing were required before such
29 | P a g e
acts could be prevented. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of
procedural due process must yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests, among
which is protection of women and children from violence and threats to their personal safety and
security.

It should be pointed out that when the TPO is issued ex parte, the court shall likewise
order that notice be immediately given to the respondent directing him to file an opposition within
five (5) days from service. x x x The opposition to the petition which the respondent himself shall
verify, must be accompanied by the affidavits of witnesses and shall show cause why a temporary
or permanent protection order should not be issued. x x x [T]he respondent of a petition for
protection order should be apprised of the charges imputed to him and afforded an opportunity
to present his side. x x x The essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity
to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of one's defense. (Garcia v. Drilon,
G.R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013)

“To be heard" does not only mean verbal arguments in court; one may be heard
also through pleadings.

"To be heard" does not only mean verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also
through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings,
is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process. (Garcia v. Drilon, G.R. No. 179267, June
25, 2013)

Void for vagueness doctrine: Vague laws are void because first, these violate
due process for failure to accord persons fair notice of the conduct to avoid; second,
these leave law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions.

The petitioners contend that the RH Law suffers from vagueness and, thus violates the due
process clause of the Constitution. According to them, Section 23 (a)(l) mentions a "private health
service provider" among those who may be held punishable but does not define who is a "private
health care service provider." They argue that confusion further results since Section 7 only makes
reference to a "private health care institution."

xxx

The arguments fail to persuade.

A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible
standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess its meaning and differ as to its
application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for
failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid;
and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an
arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. Moreover, in determining whether the words used in
a statute are vague, words must not only be taken in accordance with their plain meaning alone,
but also in relation to other parts of the statute. It is a rule that every part of the statute must be
interpreted with reference to the context, that is, every part of it must be construed together with
the other parts and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment.

As correctly noted by the OSG, in determining the definition of "private health care service
provider," reference must be made to Section 4(n) of the RH Law which defines a "public health
service provider," xxx

Further, the use of the term "private health care institution" in Section 7 of the law, instead
of "private health care service provider," should not be a cause of confusion for the obvious reason
that they are used synonymously. (Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014)

The JBC policy requiring five years of service as judges of first-level courts
before they can qualify as applicants to second-level courts should have been
published, because it seeks to implement a constitutional provision requiring proven
competence from members of the judiciary.

The petitioner averred that the assailed policy [requiring five years of service as judges of
first-level courts before they can qualify as applicants to second-level courts] violates procedural
due process for lack of publication and non-submission to the University of the Philippines Law
Center Office of the National Administrative Register (ONAR). x x x

30 | P a g e
 Contrary to the petitioner’s contention, the assailed JBC policy need not be filed in the
ONAR because the publication requirement in the ONAR is confined to issuances of
administrative agencies under the Executive branch of the government. Since the JBC is a body
under the supervision of the Supreme Court, it is not covered by the publication requirements of
the Administrative Code.

Nevertheless, the assailed JBC policy requiring five years of service as judges of first-level
courts before they can qualify as applicants to second-level courts should have been published. As
a general rule, publication is indispensable in order that all statutes, including administrative
rules that are intended to enforce or implement existing laws, attain binding force and effect.
There are, however, several exceptions to the requirement of publication, such as interpretative
regulations and those merely internal in nature, which regulate only the personnel of the
administrative agency and not the public. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters
of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be
followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.

Here, the assailed JBC policy does not fall within the administrative rules and regulations
exempted from the publication requirement. The assailed policy involves a qualification standard
by which the JBC shall determine proven competence of an applicant. It is not an internal
regulation, because if it were, it would regulate and affect only the members of the JBC and their
staff. Notably, the selection process involves a call to lawyers who meet the qualifications in the
Constitution and are willing to serve in the Judiciary to apply to these vacant positions. Thus, it is
but a natural consequence thereof that potential applicants be informed of the requirements to
the judicial positions, so that they would be able to prepare for and comply with them.

The Court also noted the fact that in JBC-009, otherwise known as the Rules of the Judicial
and Bar Council, the JBC had put its criteria in writing and listed the guidelines in determining
competence, independence, integrity and probity. x x x

The express declaration of these guidelines in JBC-009, which have been duly published
on the website of the JBC and in a newspaper of general circulation suggests that the JBC is aware
that these are not mere internal rules, but are rules implementing the Constitution that should be
published. Thus, if the JBC were so-minded to add special guidelines for determining competence
of applicants for RTC judges, then it could and should have amended its rules and published the
same. This, the JBC did not do as JBC-009 and its amendatory rule do not have special guidelines
for applicants to the RTC.

Moreover, jurisprudence has held that rules implementing a statute should be published.
Thus, by analogy, publication is also required for the five-year requirement because it seeks to
implement a constitutional provision requiring proven competence from members of the
judiciary. (Villanueva v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 211833, April 7, 2015)

Counsel’s mistake and due process: The general rule is that a client is bound by
the acts, even mistakes, of his counsel in the realm of procedural technique, unless
the reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law.
The negligence of counsel must be so gross that the client is deprived of his day in
court. To properly claim gross negligence on the part of the counsel, the petitioner
must show that the counsel was guilty of nothing short of a clear abandonment of the
client’s cause.

As to petitioner’s claim that his right to due process was denied due to his former counsel’s
error, abuse of discretion or gross incompetence, We find no merit in this claim. Time and again,
this Court has ruled that a client is bound by his counsel’s conduct, negligence and mistake in
handling a case, and to allow a client to disown his counsel’s conduct would render proceedings
indefinite, tentative, and subject to reopening by the mere subterfuge of replacing counsel. While
this rule has recognized exceptions, We find that there is no reason for this Court to deviate from
the findings of the Sandiganbayan. We held in Gotesco Properties, Inc. v. Moral:
The general rule is that a client is bound by the acts, even mistakes, of his counsel in
the realm of procedural technique. The basis is the tenet that an act performed by counsel
within the scope of a "general or implied authority" is regarded as an act of the client. While
the application of this general rule certainly depends upon the surrounding circumstances of
a given case, there are exceptions recognized by this Court: "(1) where reckless or gross
negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law; (2) when its application will
result in outright deprivation of the client’s liberty or property; or (3) where the interests of
justice so require."

The present case does not fall under the said exceptions. In Amil v. Court of Appeals,
the Court held that "to fall within the exceptional circumstance relied upon x x x, it must be
31 | P a g e
 shown that the negligence of counsel must be so gross that the client is deprived of his day in
court. Thus, where a party was given the opportunity to defend its interests in due course, it
cannot be said to have been denied due process of law, for this opportunity to be heard is the
very essence of due process." To properly claim gross negligence on the part of the counsel,
the petitioner must show that the counsel was guilty of nothing short of a clear abandonment
of the client’s cause.

In the present case, the Sandiganbayan correctly denied petitioner’s motion to re-open the
proceedings on the ground of violation of his due process, to wit:
x x x Accused-movant Uyboco cannot attribute any serious misjudgment or fault or
gross incompetence on his counsel alone as the decision not to present further evidence in
his defense bears his conformity as shown by his signature in the said manifestation.

x x x While petitioner claims that he was incorrectly advised by his former counsel that the
presentation of evidence is no longer necessary, this unfortunate mistake cannot qualify as gross
negligence or incompetence that would necessitate a reopening of the proceedings. (Uyboco v.
People, G.R. No. 211703, December 10, 2014)

The failure of the government to produce the semen specimen from a rape
victim does not entitle the accused in a rape case to outright acquittal on the ground
of violation of his right to due process. Due process does not require the State to
preserve the semen specimen from a rape victim although it might be useful to the
accused, unless the latter is able to show bad faith on the part of the prosecution or
the police.

Webb claims, citing Brady v. Maryland, that he is entitled to outright acquittal on the
ground of violation of his right to due process given the States failure to produce on order of the
Court either by negligence or willful suppression the semen specimen taken from Carmela.

The medical evidence clearly established that Carmela was raped and, consistent with this,
semen specimen was found in her. It is true that Alfaro identified Webb in her testimony as
Carmelas rapist and killer but serious questions had been raised about her credibility. At the very
least, there exists a possibility that Alfaro had lied. On the other hand, the semen specimen taken
from Carmela cannot possibly lie. x x x

Still, Webb is not entitled to acquittal for the failure of the State to produce the semen
specimen at this late stage. For one thing, the ruling in Brady v. Maryland that he cites has long
be overtaken by the decision in Arizona v. Youngblood, where the U.S. Supreme Court held that
due process does not require the State to preserve the semen specimen although it might be useful
to the accused unless the latter is able to show bad faith on the part of the prosecution or the
police. Here, the State presented a medical expert who testified on the existence of the specimen
and Webb in fact sought to have the same subjected to DNA test.

For, another, when Webb raised the DNA issue, the rule governing DNA evidence did not
yet exist, the country did not yet have the technology for conducting the test, and no Philippine
precedent had as yet recognized its admissibility as evidence. Consequently, the idea of keeping
the specimen secure even after the trial court rejected the motion for DNA testing did not come
up. Indeed, neither Webb nor his co-accused brought up the matter of preserving the specimen in
the meantime. (Alejano v. People, G.R. No. 176389, December 14, 2010)

Due process for military academy cadets: A cadet facing dismissal from the
military academy for misconduct has constitutionally protected private interests (life,
liberty, or property). Hence, disciplinary proceedings conducted within the bounds of
procedural due process is a must. The PMA is not immune from the strictures of due
process.

To say that a PMA cadet surrenders his fundamental human rights, including the right
to due process, is, for petitioners, contrary to the provisions of Section 3, Article II of the 1987
Constitution, Executive Order (E.O.) No. 178 (as amended by E.O. No. 1005), AFP Code of Ethics,
Oath of Cadet Corps to the Honor Code and the Honor System, military professionalism, and, in
general, military culture. x x x Further, under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, they can
never overpower or defy the 1987 Constitution since the former should yield to the latter.
Petitioners stress that the statement that "a cadet can be compelled to surrender some civil rights
and liberties in order for the Code and System to be implemented" simply pertains to what cadets
have to sacrifice in order to prove that they are men or women of integrity and honor, such as the
32 | P a g e
right to entertain vices and the right to freely choose what they want to say or do. In the context
of disciplinary investigation, it does not contemplate a surrender of the right to due process but,
at most, refers to the cadets' rights to privacy and to remain silent.

We concur with the stand of petitioners.

Of course, a student at a military academy must be prepared to subordinate his private

interests for the proper functioning of the educational institution he attends to, one that is with a
greater degree than a student at a civilian public school. x x x

x x x [A] cadet facing dismissal from the military academy for misconduct has
constitutionally protected private interests (life, liberty, or property); hence, disciplinary
proceedings conducted within the bounds of procedural due process is a must. For that reason,
the PMA is not immune from the strictures of due process. Where a person's good name,
reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the government is doing to him, the
minimal requirements of the due process clause must be satisfied. Likewise, the cadet faces far
more severe sanctions of being expelled from a course of college instruction which he or she has
pursued with a view to becoming a career officer and of probably being forever denied that career.

The cases of Gudani and Kapunan, Jr. are inapplicable as they do not specifically pertain
to dismissal proceedings of a cadet in a military academy due to honor violation. In Gudani, the
Court denied the petition that sought to annul the directive from then President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, which' enjoined petitioners from testifying before the Congress without her
consent. We ruled that petitioners may be subjected to military discipline for their defiance of a
direct order of the AFP Chief of Staff. On the other hand, in Kapunan, Jr., this Court upheld the
restriction imposed on petitioner since the conditions for his "house arrest" (particularly, that he
may not issue any press statements or give any press conference during the period of his
detention) are justified by the requirements of military discipline. In these two cases, the
constitutional rights to information, transparency in matters of public concern, and to free speech
- not to due process clause - were restricted to better serve the greater military purpose. (Cudia v.
The Superintendent of the Philippine Military Academy, G.R. No. 211362, February 24, 2015)

Procedural safeguards in student disciplinary cases: Due process in disciplinary

cases involving students does not entail proceedings and hearings similar to those in
courts of justice. Proceedings may be summary; cross-examination is not an essential
part of the investigation or hearing; and the required proof in a student disciplinary
action is only substantial evidence. Official action must meet minimum standards of
fairness to the individual, which generally encompass the right of adequate notice
and a meaningful opportunity to be heard.

Ateneo de Manila University v. Capulong x x x held that although both Ang Tibay and
Guzman essentially deal with the requirements of due process, the latter case is more apropos
since it specifically deals with the minimum standards to be satisfied in the imposition of
disciplinary sanctions in academic institutions. That Guzman is the authority on the procedural
rights of students in disciplinary cases was reaffirmed by the Court in the fairly recent case of Go
v. Colegio De San Juan De Letran.

In Guzman, the Court held that there are minimum standards which must be met to satisfy
the demands of procedural due process, to wit:

(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation
against them; (2) they shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance
of counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them; ( 4) they shall have
the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by
the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the
case.

We have been consistent in reminding that due process in disciplinary cases involving
students does not entail proceedings and hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and
proceedings in courts of justice; that the proceedings may be summary; that cross-examination is
not an essential part of the investigation or hearing; and that the required proof in a student
disciplinary action, which is an administrative case, is neither proof beyond reasonable doubt nor
preponderance of evidence but only substantial evidence or "such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."

33 | P a g e
 What is crucial is that official action must meet minimum standards of fairness to the
individual, which generally encompass the right of adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity
to be heard. As held in De La Salle University, Inc. v. Court of Appeals:
Notice and hearing is the bulwark of administrative due process, the right to which
is among the primary rights that must be respected even in administrative proceedings. The
essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration
of the action or ruling complained of. So long as the party is given the opportunity to advocate
her cause or defend her interest in due course, it cannot be said that there was denial of due
process.

A formal trial-type hearing is not, at all times and in all instances, essential to due
process - it is enough that the parties are given a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain
their respective sides of the controversy and to present supporting evidence on which a fair
decision can be based. "To be heard" does not only mean presentation of testimonial evidence
in court - one may also be heard through pleadings and where the opportunity to be heard
through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of due process.

The PMA Honor Code explicitly recognizes that an administrative proceeding conducted
to investigate a cadet's honor violation need not be clothed with the attributes of a judicial
proceeding.

xxx

In Andrews, the U.S. Court of Appeals held that Wasson and Hagopian are equally
controlling in cases where cadets were separated from the military academy for violation of the
Honor Code. Following the two previous cases, it was ruled that in order to be proper and immune
from constitutional infirmity, a cadet who is sought to be dismissed or separated from the
academy must be afforded a hearing, be apprised of the specific charges against him, and be given
an adequate opportunity to present his or her defense both from the point of view of time and the
use of witnesses and other evidence. Conspicuously, these vital conditions are not too far from
what We have already set in Guzman and the subsequent rulings in Alcuaz v. Philippine School
of Business Administration and De La Salle University, Inc. v. Court of Appeals.

In this case, the investigation of Cadet 1 CL Cudia' s Honor Code violation followed the
prescribed procedure and existing practices in the PMA. He was notified of the Honor Report
from Maj. Hindang. He was then given the opportunity to explain the report against him. He was
informed about his options and the entire process that the case would undergo. The preliminary
investigation immediately followed after he replied and submitted a written explanation. Upon its
completion, the investigating team submitted a written report together with its recommendation
to the HC Chairman. The HC thereafter reviewed the findings and recommendations. When the
honor case was submitted for formal investigation, a new team was assigned to conduct the
hearing. During the formal investigation/hearing, he was informed of the charge against him and
given the right to enter his plea. He had the chance to explain his side, confront the witnesses
against him, and present evidence in his behalf. After a thorough discussion of the HC voting
members, he was found to have violated the ' Honor Code. Thereafter, the guilty verdict
underwent the review process at the Academy level - from the OIC of the HC, to the SJA, to the
Commandant of Cadets, and to the PMA Superintendent. A separate investigation was also
conducted by the HTG. Then, upon the directive of the AFP-GHQ to reinvestigate the case, a
review was conducted by the CRAB. Further, a Fact-Finding Board/Investigation Body composed
of the CRAB members and the PMA senior officers was constituted to conduct a deliberate
investigation of the case. Finally, he had the opportunity to appeal to the President. Sadly for him,
all had issued unfavorable rulings. (Cudia v. The Superintendent of the Philippine Military
Academy, G.R. No. 211362, February 24, 2015)

EQUAL PROTECTION

The requirements for a valid and reasonable classification are: (1) it must rest
on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it
must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all
members of the same class. For the purpose of urban development and housing
program, the disparities between a real property owner and an informal settler as
two distinct classes are too obvious. Thus, a socialized housing tax on real property
owners to provide funds for the housing of informal settler is a not class legislation
that violates the equal protection clause.

34 | P a g e
 In this case, petitioner argues that the [Socialized Housing Tax] is a penalty imposed on
real property owners because it burdens them with expenses to provide funds for the housing of
informal settlers, and that it is a class legislation since it favors the latter who occupy properties
which is not their own and pay no taxes.

We disagree.

Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated
alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. The guarantee means that no
person or class of persons shall be denied the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other
persons or other classes in like circumstances.114 Similar subjects should not be treated differently
so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others. The law may, therefore,
treat and regulate one class differently from another class provided there are real and substantial
differences to distinguish one class from another

An ordinance based on reasonable classification does not violate the constitutional

guaranty of the equal protection of the law. The requirements for a valid and reasonable
classification are: (1) it must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purpose
of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to
all members of the same class. For the purpose of undertaking a comprehensive and continuing
urban development and housing program, the disparities between a real property owner and an
informal settler as two distinct classes are too obvious and need not be discussed at length. The
differentiation conforms to the practical dictates of justice and equity and is not discriminatory
within the meaning of the Constitution. Notably, the public purpose of a tax may legally exist even
if the motive which impelled the legislature to impose the tax was to favor one over another. It is
inherent in the power to tax that a State is free to select the subjects of taxation. Inequities which
result from a singling out of one particular class for taxation or exemption infringe no
constitutional limitation. (Ferrer v. Bautista, G.R. No. 210551, June 30, 2015)

Favoring women over men as victims of violence and abuse is not a violation
of the equal protection clause. The unequal power relationship between women and
men, the fact that women are more likely than men to be victims of violence, and the
widespread gender bias and prejudice against women -- all make for real differences
justifying the classification under the law. These substantial distinctions are germane
to the purpose of preventing violence and abuse against women and children.

Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be
treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. The oft-repeated
disquisition in the early case of Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union is instructive:
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the
application of the laws upon all citizens of the state. x x x The equal protection clause does
not forbid discrimination as to things that are different. x x x

The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. x x
x All that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the
classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences;
that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to
existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the
class. This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is
based on a reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary. (Emphasis
supplied)

x x x R.A. 9262 x x x did not violate the equal protection clause by favoring women over
men as victims of violence and abuse to whom the State extends its protection.

I. R.A. 9262 rests on substantial distinctions.

The unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact that women are more
likely than men to be victims of violence; and the widespread gender bias and prejudice against
women all make for real differences justifying the classification under the law. x x x

xxx

II. The classification is germane to the purpose of the law.

The distinction between men and women is germane to the purpose of R.A. 9262, which
is to address violence committed against women and children x x x.

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 xxx

III. The classification is not limited to existing conditions only, and apply equally to all
members.

Moreover, the application of R.A. 9262 is not limited to the existing conditions when it
was promulgated, but to future conditions as well, for as long as the safety and security of women
and their children are threatened by violence and abuse.

R.A. 9262 applies equally to all women and children who suffer violence and abuse.

(Garcia v. Drilon, G.R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013)

The lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender have the same interest in
participating in the party-list system as other political parties similarly situated.
Hence, laws of general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs; COMELEC’s
act of differentiating LGBTs from heterosexuals insofar as the party-list system
violates the equal protection clause.

Despite the absolutism of Article III, Section 1 of our Constitution, which provides "nor
shall any person be denied equal protection of the laws," courts have never interpreted the
provision as an absolute prohibition on classification. x x x

Recent jurisprudence has affirmed that if a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor
targets a suspect class, we will uphold the classification as long as it bears a rational relationship
to some legitimate government end. In Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. Banko
Sentral ng Pilipinas, we declared that "[i]n our jurisdiction, the standard of analysis of equal
protection challenges x x x have followed the ‘rational basis’ test, coupled with a deferential
attitude to legislative classifications and a reluctance to invalidate a law unless there is a showing
of a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution."

The COMELEC posits that the majority of the Philippine population considers homosexual
conduct as immoral and unacceptable, and this constitutes sufficient reason to disqualify the
petitioner. Unfortunately for the respondent, the Philippine electorate has expressed no such
belief. No law exists to criminalize homosexual behavior or expressions or parties about
homosexual behavior. x x x

From the standpoint of the political process, the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender
have the same interest in participating in the party-list system on the same basis as other political
parties similarly situated. State intrusion in this case is equally burdensome. Hence, laws of
general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs, and they deserve to participate in the
party-list system on the same basis as other marginalized and under-represented sectors.

It bears stressing that our finding that COMELEC’s act of differentiating LGBTs from
heterosexuals insofar as the party-list system is concerned does not imply that any other law
distinguishing between heterosexuals and homosexuals under different circumstances would
similarly fail. We disagree with the OSG’s position that homosexuals are a class in themselves for
the purposes of the equal protection clause. We are not prepared to single out homosexuals as a
separate class meriting special or differentiated treatment. We have not received sufficient
evidence to this effect, and it is simply unnecessary to make such a ruling today. Petitioner itself
has merely demanded that it be recognized under the same basis as all other groups similarly
situated, and that the COMELEC made "an unwarranted and impermissible classification not
justified by the circumstances of the case." (Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. Commission on Elections,
G.R. No. 190582, April 8, 2010)

The policy of JBC requiring 5 years of service as judges of first-level courts

before they can qualify as applicant to second-level courts does not violate the equal
protection clause. There is a substantial distinction between judges with 5 year
experience and those with less than 5 five years. The classification is reasonable and
relevant to its legitimate purpose of selecting those with proven competence.

The crux of this petition is whether or not the policy of JBC requiring five years of service
as judges of first-level courts before they can qualify as applicant to second-level courts is
constitutional.

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 There is no question that JBC employs standards to have a rational basis to screen
applicants who cannot be all accommodated and appointed to a vacancy in the judiciary, to
determine who is best qualified among the applicants, and not to discriminate against any
particular individual or class.

The equal protection clause of the Constitution does not require the universal application
of the laws to all persons or things without distinction; what it requires is simply equality among
equals as determined according to a valid classification. Hence, the Court has affirmed that if a
law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, the classification stands as
long as it bears a rational relationship to some legitimate government end.

"The equal protection clause, therefore, does not preclude classification of individuals who
may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as the classification is reasonable and
not arbitrary." "The mere fact that the legislative classification may result in actual inequality is
not violative of the right to equal protection, for every classification of persons or things for
regulation by law produces inequality in some degree, but the law is not thereby rendered invalid."

That is the situation here. In issuing the assailed policy, the JBC merely exercised its
discretion in accordance with the constitutional requirement and its rules that a member of the
Judiciary must be of proven competence, integrity, probity and independence. x x x The difference
in treatment between lower court judges who have served at least five years and those who have
served less than five years, on the other hand, was rationalized by JBC as follows:

x x x The assailed criterion or consideration for promotion to a second-level court, which

is five years experience as judge of a first-level court, is a direct adherence to the qualities
prescribed by the Constitution. Placing a premium on many years of judicial experience, the JBC
is merely applying one of the stringent constitutional standards requiring that a member of the
judiciary be of "proven competence." In determining competence, the JBC considers, among other
qualifications, experience and performance.

Based on the JBC’s collective judgment, those who have been judges of first-level courts
for five (5) years are better qualified for promotion to second-level courts. It deems length of
experience as a judge as indicative of conversance with the law and court procedure. x x x

xxx

Clearly, the classification created by the challenged policy satisfies the rational basis test.
The foregoing shows that substantial distinctions do exist between lower court judges with five
year experience and those with less than five years of experience, like the petitioner, and the
classification enshrined in the assailed policy is reasonable and relevant to its legitimate purpose.
The Court, thus, rules that the questioned policy does not infringe on the equal protection clause
as it is based on reasonable classification intended to gauge the proven competence of the
applicants. Therefore, the said policy is valid and constitutional. (Villanueva v. Judicial and Bar
Council, G.R. No. 211833, April 7, 2015)

Imposing an annual garbage fee on all domestic households based on rates

that depend on land or floor area and whether the payee is an occupant of a lot,
condominium, social housing project or apartment – violates the equal protection
clause. For the purpose of garbage collection, there is no substantial distinction
between an occupant of a lot, on one hand, and an occupant of a unit in a
condominium, socialized housing project or apartment, on the other hand. Most likely,
garbage output produced by these types of occupants is uniform and does not vary to
a large degree; thus, a similar schedule of fee is both just and equitable.

We cannot sustain the validity of Ordinance No. S-2235. It violates the equal protection
clause of the Constitution and the provisions of the LGC that an ordinance must be equitable and
based as far as practicable on the taxpayer’s ability to pay, and not unjust, excessive, oppressive,
confiscatory.

In the subject ordinance, the rates of the imposable fee depend on land or floor area and
whether the payee is an occupant of a lot, condominium, social housing project or apartment. xxx

xxx

For the purpose of garbage collection, there is, in fact, no substantial distinction between
an occupant of a lot, on one hand, and an occupant of a unit in a condominium, socialized housing
project or apartment, on the other hand. Most likely, garbage output produced by these types of

37 | P a g e
occupants is uniform and does not vary to a large degree; thus, a similar schedule of fee is both
just and equitable.

The rates being charged by the ordinance are unjust and inequitable: a resident of a 200
sq. m. unit in a condominium or socialized housing project has to pay twice the amount than a
resident of a lot similar in size; unlike unit occupants, all occupants of a lot with an area of 200
sq. m. and less have to pay a fixed rate of Php100.00; and the same amount of garbage fee is
imposed regardless of whether the resident is from a condominium or from a socialized housing
project.

Indeed, the classifications under Ordinance No. S-2235 are not germane to its declared
purpose of "promoting shared responsibility with the residents to attack their common mindless
attitude in over-consuming the present resources and in generating waste. Instead of
simplistically categorizing the payee into land or floor occupant of a lot or unit of a condominium,
socialized housing project or apartment, respondent City Council should have considered factors
that could truly measure the amount of wastes generated and the appropriate fee for its collection.
Factors include, among others, household age and size, accessibility to waste collection,
population density of the barangay or district, capacity to pay, and actual occupancy of the
property. xxx A lack of uniformity in the rate charged is not necessarily unlawful discrimination.
The establishment of classifications and the charging of different rates for the several classes is
not unreasonable and does not violate the requirements of equality and uniformity.
Discrimination to be unlawful must draw an unfair line or strike an unfair balance between those
in like circumstances having equal rights and privileges. Discrimination with respect to rates
charged does not vitiate unless it is arbitrary and without a reasonable fact basis or justification.

xxx

xxx Ordinance No. SP-2235, S-2013, which collects an annual garbage fee on all domestic
households in Quezon City, is hereby declared as UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND ILLEGAL. (Ferrer
v. Bautista, G.R. No. 210551, June 30, 2015)

Prohibiting owners of Public Utility Vehicles (PUVs) and transport terminals

from posting election campaign materials violates the equal protection clause. If
owners of private vehicles and other properties are allowed to express their political
ideas and opinion by posting election campaign materials on their properties, there is
no cogent reason to deny the same preferred right to owners of PUVs and transport
terminals.

One of the basic principles on which this government was founded is that of the equality
of right, which is embodied in Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. "Equal protection
requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed. Similar subjects, in other words, should not be treated
differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others."

xxx

Nevertheless, the guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in
the application of the laws to all citizens of the state. Equality of operation of statutes does not
mean their indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but on persons according to the
circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution
does not require that things, which are different in fact, be treated in law as though they were the
same. The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that are different.

In order that there can be valid classification so that a discriminatory governmental act
may pass the constitutional norm of equal protection, it is necessary that the four requisites of
valid classification be complied with, namely: (1) it must be based upon substantial distinctions;
(2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions
only; and (4) it must apply equally to all members of the class.

xxx

As regards ownership, there is no substantial distinction between owners of PUVs and

transport terminals and owners of private vehicles and other properties. As already explained, the
ownership of PUVs and transport terminals, though made available for use by the public, remains
private. If owners of private vehicles and other properties are allowed to express their political
ideas and opinion by posting election campaign materials on their properties, there is no cogent
reason to deny the same preferred right to owners of PUVs and transport terminals. In terms of
ownership, the distinction between owners of PUVs and transport terminals and owners of private
38 | P a g e
vehicles and properties is merely superficial. Superficial differences do not make for a valid
classification.

xxx

Further, classifying owners of PUVs and transport terminals apart from owners of private
vehicles and other properties bears no relation to the stated purpose of Section 7(g) items(5) and
(6) of Resolution No. 9615, i.e., to provide equal time, space and opportunity to candidates in
elections. (1-United Transport Koalisyon [1-Utak] v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 206020,
April 14, 2015)

UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

A proclamation of a state of emergency by a provincial governor cannot serve

as legal basis for general searches and seizures, including warrantless arrests. Even
a declaration of martial law by the President does not suspend the operation of the
Constitution.

On 31 March 2009, Governor Tan issued Proclamation 1-09, declaring a state of

emergency in the province of Sulu. It cited the kidnapping incident [of three members from the
International Committee of the Red Cross] as a ground for the said declaration, describing it as a
terrorist act pursuant to the Human Security Act (R.A. 9372). x x x

In the same Proclamation, respondent Tan called upon the PNP and the CEF to set up
checkpoints and chokepoints, conduct general search and seizures including arrests, and other
actions necessary to ensure public safety. The pertinent portion of the proclamation states:
NOW, THEREFORE, BY VIRTUE OF THE POWERS VESTED IN ME BY LAW, I,
ABDUSAKUR MAHAIL TAN, GOVERNOR OF THE PROVINCE OF SULU, DO HEREBY
DECLARE A STATE OF EMERGENCY IN THE PROVINCE OF SULU, AND CALL ON THE
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF THE ARMED FORCES OF
THE PHILIPPINES AND THE CIVILIAN EMERGENCY FORCE TO IMPLEMENT THE
FOLLOWING:

1. The setting-up of checkpoints and chokepoints in the province;

2. The imposition of curfew for the entire province subject to such Guidelines as may
be issued by proper authorities;

3. The conduct of General Search and Seizure including arrests in the pursuit of the
kidnappers and their supporters; and

4. To conduct such other actions or police operations as may be necessary to ensure

public safety.

xxx

On 1 April 2009, SPO1 Sattal Jadjuli was instructed by his superior to report to respondent
P/SUPT. Julasirim Kasim. Upon arriving at the police station, he was booked, and interviewed
about his relationship to Musin, Jaiton, and Julamin, who were all his deceased relatives. Upon
admitting that he was indeed related to the three, he was detained. After a few hours, former
Punong Barangay Juljahan Awadi, Hadji Hadjirul Bambra, Abdugajir Hadjirul, as well as PO2
Marcial Hajan, SPO3 Muhilmi Ismula, Punong Barangay Alano Mohammad and jeepney driver
Abduhadi Sabdani, were also arrested. The affidavit of the apprehending officer alleged that they
were suspected ASG supporters and were being arrested under Proclamation 1-09. x x x

xxx

Petitioners cite the implementation of "General Search and Seizure including arrests in
the pursuit of the kidnappers and their supporters," as being violative of the constitutional
proscription on general search warrants and general seizures. Petitioners rightly assert that this
alone would be sufficient to render the proclamation void, as general searches and seizures are
proscribed, for being violative of the rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights, particularly:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause
to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the

39 | P a g e
 complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.

In fact, respondent governor has arrogated unto himself powers exceeding even the
martial law powers of the President, because as the Constitution itself declares, "A state of martial
law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil
courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of the jurisdiction on military courts
and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the
privilege of the writ." (Kulayan v. Tan, G.R. No. 187298, July 03, 2012)

Search warrants: Requirements for validity

The right of a person against unreasonable searches and seizure is recognized and
protected by no less than the Constitution, particularly, Sections 2 and 3(2) of Article III which
provide:
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
SEC. 3. x x x
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible
for any purpose in any proceeding.

Accordingly, Sections 4 and 5, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure laid
down the following requisites for the issuance of a valid search warrant:
SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. – A search warrant shall not issue except upon
probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in
the Philippines.
SEC. 5. Examination of complainant; record. – The judge must, before issuing the warrant,
personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the
record their sworn statements, together with the affidavits submitted.

Therefore, the validity of the issuance of a search warrant rests upon the following factors:
(1) it must be issued upon probable cause; (2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge
himself and not by the applicant or any other person; (3) in the determination of probable cause,
the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the
latter may produce; and (4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched
and persons or things to be seized. (People v. Tuan, G.R. No. 176066, August 11, 2010)

Search warrants: There must be probable cause – the existence of such facts
and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe
that an offense has been committed and that the item(s), article(s) or object(s)
sought in connection with said offense is in the place to be searched.
In People v. Aruta, the Court defined probable cause as follows:
Although probable cause eludes exact and concrete definition, it generally signifies a
reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to
warrant a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is
charged. It likewise refers to the existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the
item(s), article(s) or object(s) sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and
destruction by law is in the place to be searched. (People v. Tuan, G.R. No. 176066, August 11,
2010)

Search warrant warrants must be based on substantial evidence that the items
are seizable.
Before a search warrant can be issued, it must be shown by substantial evidence that the
items sought are in fact seizable by virtue of being connected with criminal activity, and that the
items will be found in the place to be searched.

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 A magistrate’s determination of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is paid
great deference by a reviewing court, as long as there was substantial basis for that determination.
Substantial basis means that the questions of the examining judge brought out such facts and
circumstances as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has
been committed, and the objects in connection with the offense sought to be seized are in the place
sought to be searched. (People v. Tuan, G.R. No. 176066, August 11, 2010)

Search warrants: The judge must personally and thoroughly examine the
applicant and his witnesses.
Under Section 2, Article III of the Constitution, the existence of probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant is central to the right, and its existence largely depends on the finding of the
judge conducting the examination.
xxx
[W]hat the Constitution requires is for the judge to conduct an “examination under oath
or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,” after which he determines
the existence of probable cause for the issuance of the warrant. The examination requirement
was originally a procedural rule found in Section 98 of General Order No. 58,30 but was elevated
as part of the guarantee of the right under the 1935 Constitution. The intent was to ensure that a
warrant is issued not merely on the basis of the affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses,
but only after examination by the judge of the complainant and his witnesses. As the same
examination requirement was adopted in the present Constitution, we declared that affidavits of
the complainant and his witnesses are insufficient to establish the factual basis for probable cause.
Personal examination by the judge of the applicant and his witnesses is indispensable, and the
examination should be probing and exhaustive, not merely routinary or a rehash of the affidavits.
xxx
Ideally, compliance with the examination requirement is shown by the depositions and
the transcript. In their absence, however, a warrant may still be upheld if there is evidence in the
records that the requisite examination was made and probable cause was based thereon. There
must be, in the records, particular facts and circumstances that were considered by the judge as
sufficient to make an independent evaluation of the existence of probable cause to justify the
issuance of the search warrant.
xxx
Apart from the statement in the search warrant itself, we find nothing in the records of
this case indicating that the issuing judge personally and thoroughly examined the applicant and
his witnesses. The absence of depositions and transcripts of the examination was already
admitted; the application for the search warrant and the affidavits, although acknowledged by
Ogayon himself, could not be found in the records. xxx
The records, therefore, bear no evidence from which we can infer that the requisite
examination was made, and from which the factual basis for probable cause to issue the search
warrant was derived. A search warrant must conform strictly to the constitutional requirements
for its issuance; otherwise, it is void. Based on the lack of substantial evidence that the search
warrant was issued after the requisite examination of the complainant and his witnesses was
made, the Court declares Search Warrant No. AEK 29-2003 a nullity. (Ogayon v. People,
September 2, 2015)

Search warrants: A description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the

officer serving the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the
place intended and distinguish it from other places in the community. The specific
room in the house to be searched need not be identified.
Equally without merit is accused-appellant’s assertion that the Search Warrant did not
describe with particularity the place to be searched.
A description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer serving the warrant can,
with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended and distinguish it from other
places in the community. A designation or description that points out the place to be searched to
the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry unerringly leads the peace officers to it, satisfies the
constitutional requirement of definiteness. In the case at bar, the address and description of the
place to be searched in the Search Warrant was specific enough. There was only one house located
at the stated address, which was accused-appellant’s residence, consisting of a structure with two
floors and composed of several rooms. (People v. Tuan, G.R. No. 176066, August 11, 2010)
41 | P a g e
 The search must be at the place described in the warrant.

The items were seized by a barangay tanod in a nipa hut, 20 meters away from the
residence of the petitioner. The confiscated items, having been found in a place other than the one
described in the search warrant, can be considered as fruits of an invalid warrantless search, the
presentation of which as an evidence is a violation of petitioner's constitutional guaranty against
unreasonable searches and seizure. (Castillo v. People, G.R. No. 185128, January 30, 2012)

Warrantless search: In a search incident to a lawful arrest, the law requires

that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made -- the process cannot
be reversed.
In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of
the incidental search, the legality of the arrest is questioned in a large majority of these cases, e.g.,
whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for conducting a search. In this instance, the law
requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made -- the process cannot be
reversed. x x x

xxx

A search as an incident to a lawful arrest is sanctioned by the Rules of Court. It bears

emphasis that the law requires that the search be incidental to a lawful arrest. Therefore it is
beyond cavil that a lawful arrest must precede the search of a person and his belongings; the
process cannot be reversed.

Here, the search preceded the arrest of Sanchez. There was no arrest prior to the conduct
of the search. Arrest is defined under Section 1, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court as the taking of a
person into custody that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense. Under
Section 2, of the same rule, an arrest is effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested
or by his voluntary submission to the custody of the person making the arrest. x x x Evidently,
what happened in this case was that a search was first undertaken and then later an arrest was
effected based on the evidence produced by the search. (Sanchez v. People, G.R. No. 204589,
November 19, 2014)

Warrantless search: Search incident to a lawful arrest: A search incidental to a

lawful arrest requires that there must first be a lawful arrest before a search is made.
Otherwise stated, a lawful arrest must precede the search; the process cannot be
reversed.

The police officers at the checkpoint personally knew Veridiano.

They allowed some vehicles to pass through after checking that he was not on board. At
around 10:00 a.m., they chanced upon Veridiano inside a passenger jeepney coming from San
Pablo, Laguna. 13 They flagged down the jeepney and asked the passengers to disembark. The
police officers instructed the passengers to raise their t-shirts to check for possible concealed
weapons and to remove the contents of their pockets.

The police officers recovered from Veridiano "a tea bag containing what appeared to be
marijuana." POI Cabello confiscated the tea bag and marked it with his initials. Veridiano was
arrested and apprised of his constitutional rights. xxxx

xxxx The contents of the tea bag tested positive for marijuana.

xxxv Veridiano guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of illegal possession of
marijuana.

xxx Veridiano appealed the decision of the trial court asserting that "he was illegally
arrested." He argued that the tea bag containing marijuana is "inadmissible in evidence [for] being
the 'fruit of a poisonous tree. "xxxx

xxxx

Petitioner's warrantless arrest was unlawful.

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 A search incidental to a lawful arrest requires that there must first be a lawful arrest before
a search is made. Otherwise stated, a lawful arrest must precede the search; "the process cannot
be reversed." For there to be a lawful arrest, law enforcers must be armed with a valid warrant.
Nevertheless, an arrest may also be effected without a warrant. (Veridiano v. People, G.R. No.
200370, 07 June 2017)

Warrantless search: Search incident to a lawful arrest: Requirements for a valid

in flagrante delicto arrest to justify a subsequent search: (1) the person to be arrested
must execute an overt act indicating that he [or she] has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the
presence or within the view of the arresting officer.

There are three (3) grounds that will justify a warrantless arrest. Rule 113, Section 5 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

Section 5. Arrest Without Warrant; When Lawful. -A peace officer or a private

person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement
to another.

The first kind of warrantless arrest is known as an in flagrante delicto arrest. The validity
of this warrantless arrest requires compliance with the overt act test as explained in Cogaed:

[F]or a warrantless arrest of in flagrante delicto to be affected, "two elements must concur:
(1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he [or she] has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is
done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer."

Failure to comply with the overt act test renders an inflagrante delicto arrest
constitutionally infirm. In Cogaed, the warrantless arrest was invalidated as an in flagrante delicto
arrest because the accused did not exhibit an overt act within the view of the police officers
suggesting that he was in possession of illegal drugs at the time he was apprehended.

The warrantless search in People v. Racho was also considered unlawful. The police
officers received information that a man was in possession of illegal drugs and was on board a
Genesis bus bound for Baler, Aurora. The informant added that the man was "wearing a red and
white striped [t]-shirt." The police officers waited for the bus along the national highway. When
the bus arrived, Jack Racho (Racho) disembarked and waited along the highway for a tricycle.
Suddenly, the police officers approached him and invited him to the police station since he was
suspected of having shabu in his possession. As Racho pulled out his hands from his pocket, a
white envelope fell yielding a sachet of shabu.

In holding that the warrantless search was invalid, this Court observed that Racho was not
"committing a crime in the presence of the police officers" at the time he was apprehended.
Moreover, Racho's arrest was solely based on a tip. Although there are cases stating that reliable
information is sufficient to justify a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest, they were
covered under the other exceptions to the rule on warrantless searches. (Veridiano v. People, G.R.
No. 200370, 07 June 2017)

Warrantless search: Search incident to a lawful arrest: Requirements for a valid

in hot pursuit arrest: Law enforcers need not personally witness the commission of a
crime. However, they must have personal knowledge of facts and circumstances
indicating that the person sought to be arrested committed it. A hearsay tip by itself
does not justify a warrantless arrest. Law enforcers must have personal knowledge
of facts, based on their observation, that the person sought to be arrested has just
committed a crime

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 Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Rules of Court pertains to a hot pursuit arrest. The rule
requires that an offense has just been committed. It connotes "immediacy in point of time." That
a crime was in fact committed does not automatically bring the case under this rule. An arrest
under Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Rules of Court entails a time element from the moment the
crime is committed up to the point of arrest.

Law enforcers need not personally witness the commission of a crime.

However, they must have personal knowledge of facts and circumstances indicating
that the person sought to be arrested committed it.

People v. Gerente illustrates a valid arrest under Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Rules of
Court. In Gerente, the accused was convicted for murder and for violation of Republic Act No.
6425. He assailed the admissibility of dried marijuana leaves as evidence on the ground that they
were allegedly seized from him pursuant to a warrantless arrest. On appeal, the accused's
conviction was affirmed. This Court ruled that the warrantless arrest was justified under Rule 113,
Section 5(b) of the Rules of Court. The police officers had personal knowledge of facts and
circumstances indicating that the accused killed the victim:

The policemen arrested Gerente only some three (3) hours after Gerente
and his companions had killed Blace. They saw Blace dead in the hospital and when
they inspected the scene of the crime, they found the instruments of death: a piece
of wood and a concrete hollow block which the killers had used to bludgeon him to
death. The eye-witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, reported the happening to the
policemen and pinpointed her neighbor, Gerente, as one of the killers. Under those
circumstances, since the policemen had personal knowledge of the violent death of
Blace and of facts indicating that Gerente and two others had killed him, they could
lawfully arrest Gerente without a warrant. If they had postponed his arrest until
they could obtain a warrant, he would have fled the law as his two companions
did.

The requirement that law enforcers must have personal knowledge of facts surrounding
the commission of an offense was underscored in In Re Saliba v. Warden.

In Re Saliba involved a petition for habeas corpus. The police officers suspected Datukan
Salibo (Salibo) as one (1) of the accused in the Maguindano Massacre. Salibo presented himself
before the authorities to clear his name. Despite his explanation, Salibo was apprehended and
detained. In granting the petition, this Court pointed out that Salibo was not restrained under a
lawful court process or order. Furthermore, he was not arrested pursuant to a valid warrantless
arrest:

It is undisputed that petitioner Salibo presented himself before the Datu Hofer Police
Station to clear his name and to prove that he is not the accused Butukan S. Malang. When
petitioner Salibo was in the presence of the police officers of Datu Hofer Police Station, he was
neither committing nor attempting to commit an offense. The police officers had no personal
knowledge of any offense that he might have committed. Petitioner Salibo was also not an escapee
prisoner.

In this case, petitioner's arrest could not be justified as an inflagrante delicta arrest under
Rule 113, Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court. He was not committing a crime at the checkpoint.
Petitioner was merely a passenger who did not exhibit any unusual conduct in the presence of the
law enforcers that would incite suspicion. In effecting the warrantless arrest, the police officers
relied solely on the tip they received. Reliable information alone is insufficient to support a
warrantless arrest absent any overt act from the person to be arrested indicating that a crime has
just been committed, was being committed, or is about to be committed.

The warrantless arrest cannot likewise be justified under Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The law enforcers had no personal knowledge of any fact or
circumstance indicating that petitioner had just committed an offense.

A hearsay tip by itself does not justify a warrantless arrest. Law enforcers must have
personal knowledge of facts, based on their observation, that the person sought to be arrested has
just committed a crime. This is what gives rise to probable cause that would justify a warrantless
search under Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. (Veridiano v.
People, G.R. No. 200370, 07 June 2017)

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 Warrantless search: Search incident to a lawful arrest: An informant’s tip that
a pot session is going on inside a house is not sufficient justification for police officers
to enter such house to effect an arrest and seizure without a warrant. Personal
knowledge of facts in arrests without warrant must be based upon probable cause,
which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion.

As culled from the testimonies of prosecution witnesses, x x x it appears that on September

2, 2006, at around 12:45 o’clock in the afternoon, PO1 Azardon was on duty at the Police
Community Precinct II along Arellano Street, Dagupan City, when a concerned citizen entered the
precinct and reported that a pot session was going on in the house of accused Rafael Gonzales
(Gonzales) in Trinidad Subdivision, Dagupan City. Upon receipt of the report, PO1 Azardon, PO1
Alejandro Dela Cruz (PO1 Dela Cruz), and members of the Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT)
team hied to Trinidad Subdivision, Dagupan City. Upon inquiry from people in the area, the house
of Gonzales was located.

As the police officers entered the gate of the house, they saw accused Orlando Doria
(Doria) coming out of the side door and immediately arrested him. Inside the house, they saw
accused Gonzales, Arnold Martinez (A. Martinez), Edgar Dizon (Dizon), and Rezin Martinez (R.
Martinez) in a room. The four were surprised by the presence of the police. In front of them were
open plastic sachets (containing shabu residue), pieces of rolled used aluminum foil and pieces of
used aluminum foil.

xxx

A review of the facts reveal that the arrest of the accused was illegal and the subject items
were confiscated as an incident thereof. According to the testimony of PO1 Azardon and his Joint
Affidavit13 with PO1 Dela Cruz, they proceeded to, and entered, the house of accused Gonzales
based solely on the report of a concerned citizen that a pot session was going on in said house.

Although this Court has ruled in several dangerous drugs cases that tipped information is
sufficient probable cause to effect a warrantless search, such rulings cannot be applied in the case
at bench because said cases involve either a buy-bust operation or drugs in transit, basically,
circumstances other than the sole tip of an informer as basis for the arrest. None of these drug
cases involve police officers entering a house without warrant to effect arrest and seizure based
solely on an informer’s tip. The case of People v. Bolasa is informative on this matter.

In People v. Bolasa, an anonymous caller tipped off the police that a man and a woman
were repacking prohibited drugs at a certain house. The police immediately proceeded to the
house of the suspects. They walked towards the house accompanied by their informer. When they
reached the house, they peeped inside through a small window and saw a man and woman
repacking marijuana. They then entered the house, introduced themselves as police officers,
confiscated the drug paraphernalia, and arrested the suspects. This Court ruled:

The manner by which accused-appellants were apprehended does not fall under any
of the above-enumerated categories. Perforce, their arrest is illegal. First, the arresting
officers had no personal knowledge that at the time of their arrest, accused-appellants had
just committed, were committing, or were about to commit a crime. Second, the arresting
officers had no personal knowledge that a crime was committed nor did they have any
reasonable ground to believe that accused-appellants committed it. Third, accused-
appellants were not prisoners who have escaped from a penal establishment.

Neither can it be said that the objects were seized in plain view. First, there was no
valid intrusion. As already discussed, accused-appellants were illegally arrested. Second, the
evidence, i.e., the tea bags later on found to contain marijuana, was not inadvertently
discovered. The police officers intentionally peeped first through the window before they saw
and ascertained the activities of accused-appellants inside the room. In like manner, the
search cannot be categorized as a search of a moving vehicle, a consented warrantless search,
a customs search, or a stop and frisk; it cannot even fall under exigent and emergency
circumstances, for the evidence at hand is bereft of any such showing.

On the contrary, it indicates that the apprehending officers should have conducted
first a surveillance considering that the identities and address of the suspected culprits were
already ascertained. After conducting the surveillance and determining the existence of
probable cause for arresting accused-appellants, they should have secured a search warrant
prior to effecting a valid arrest and seizure. The arrest being illegal ab initio, the
accompanying search was likewise illegal. Every evidence thus obtained during the illegal
search cannot be used against accused-appellants; hence, their acquittal must follow in
faithful obeisance to the fundamental law.

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 It has been held that personal knowledge of facts in arrests without warrant must be based
upon probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The
grounds of suspicion are reasonable when the suspicion, that the person to be arrested is probably
guilty of committing an offense, is based on actual facts, that is, supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested.
(People v. Martinez, G.R. No. 191366, December 13, 2010)

Warrantless search: Search incident to a lawful arrest: Roadside questioning

of a motorist pursuant to a routine traffic stop is not necessarily an arrest that
justifies a warrantless search. Also, a warrantless arrest cannot be made for an
offense penalized by a fine only. Hence, no valid search incident to a lawful arrest can
be made under such circumstances.

At the time that he was waiting for PO3 Alteza to write his citation ticket, petitioner could
not be said to have been "under arrest." There was no intention on the part of PO3 Alteza to arrest
him, deprive him of his liberty, or take him into custody. Prior to the issuance of the ticket, the
period during which petitioner was at the police station may be characterized merely as waiting
time. In fact, as found by the trial court, PO3 Alteza himself testified that the only reason they
went to the police sub-station was that petitioner had been flagged down "almost in front" of that
place. Hence, it was only for the sake of convenience that they were waiting there. There was no
intention to take petitioner into custody.

In Berkemer v. McCarty, the United States (U.S.) Supreme Court discussed at length
whether the roadside questioning of a motorist detained pursuant to a routine traffic stop should
be considered custodial interrogation. The Court held that, such questioning does not fall under
custodial interrogation, nor can it be considered a formal arrest, by virtue of the nature of the
questioning, the expectations of the motorist and the officer, and the length of time the procedure
is conducted.

It also appears that, according to City Ordinance No. 98-012, which was violated by
petitioner, the failure to wear a crash helmet while riding a motorcycle is penalized by a fine only.
Under the Rules of Court, a warrant of arrest need not be issued if the information or charge was
filed for an offense penalized by a fine only. It may be stated as a corollary that neither can a
warrantless arrest be made for such an offense.

This ruling does not imply that there can be no arrest for a traffic violation. Certainly, when
there is an intent on the part of the police officer to deprive the motorist of liberty, or to take the
latter into custody, the former may be deemed to have arrested the motorist. In this case, however,
the officer’s issuance (or intent to issue) a traffic citation ticket negates the possibility of an arrest
for the same violation.

xxx

[T]here being no valid arrest, the warrantless search that resulted from it was likewise
illegal. (Luz v. People, G.R. No. 197788, February 29, 2012)

Warrantless search: Search of a moving vehicle: Checkpoints are allowed.

Another instance of a valid warrantless search is a search of a moving vehicle. The rules
governing searches and seizures have been liberalized when the object of a search is a vehicle for
practical purposes. Police officers cannot be expected to appear before a judge and apply for a
search warrant when time is of the essence considering the efficiency of vehicles in facilitating
transactions involving contraband or dangerous articles. However, the inherent mobility of
vehicles cannot justify all kinds of searches. Law enforcers must act on the basis of probable cause.
A checkpoint search is a variant of a search of a moving vehicle. Due to the number of
cases involving warrantless ·searches in checkpoints and for the guidance of law enforcers, it is
imperative to discuss the parameters by which searches in checkpoints should be conducted.

Checkpoints per se are not invalid. They are allowed in exceptional circumstances to
protect the lives of individuals and ensure their safety. They are also sanctioned in cases where
the government's survival is in danger. (Veridiano v. People, G.R. No. 200370, 07 June 2017)

Warrantless search: Search of a moving vehicle: Routine checkpoint searches

are valid for as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to
a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search.

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 Considering that routine checkpoints intrude "on [a] motorist'sright to 'free passage'" to a
certain extent, they must be "conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists." The extent of
routine inspections must be limited to a visual search. Routine inspections do not give law
enforcers carte blanche to perform warrantless searches.

In Valmonte v. De Villa, this Court clarified that "[f]or as long as the vehicle is neither
searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is limited
to a visual search, said routine checks cannot be regarded as violative of an individual's right
against unreasonable search[es]." Thus, a search where an "officer merely draws aside the curtain
of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds, or simply looks into a vehicle, or
flashes a light therein" is not unreasonable. (Veridiano v. People, G.R. No. 200370, 07 June 2017)

Warrantless search: Search of a moving vehicle: Extensive checkpoint searches

are valid when law enforcers have probable cause to believe that the vehicle's
passengers committed a crime or when the vehicle contains instruments of an
offense. Moreover, law enforcers cannot act solely on the basis of confidential or
tipped information. A tip is still hearsay no matter how reliable it may be. It is not
sufficient to constitute probable cause in the absence of any other circumstance that
will arouse suspicion.

However, an extensive search may be conducted on a vehicle at a checkpoint when law

enforcers have probable cause to believe that the vehicle's passengers committed a crime or when
the vehicle contains instruments of an offense.

Thus, routinary and indiscriminate searches of moving vehicles are allowed if they are
limited to a visual search. This holds especially true when the object of the search is a public
vehicle where individuals have a reasonably reduced expectation of privacy. On the other hand,
extensive searches are permissible only when they are founded upon probable cause. Any
evidence obtained will be subject to the exclusionary principle under the Constitution.

That the object of a warrantless search is allegedly inside a moving vehicle does not justify
an extensive search absent probable cause. Moreover, law enforcers cannot act solely on the basis
of confidential or tipped information. A tip is still hearsay no matter how reliable it may be. It is
not sufficient to constitute probable cause in the absence of any other circumstance that will
arouse suspicion.

Although this Court has upheld warrantless searches of moving vehicles based on tipped
information, there have been other circumstances that justified warrantless searches conducted
by the authorities.

In People v. Breis, apart from the tipped information they received, the law enforcement
agents observed suspicious behavior on the part of the accused that gave them reasonable ground
to believe that a crime was being committed. The accused attempted to alight from the bus after
the law enforcers introduced themselves and inquired about the ownership of a box which the
accused had in their possession. In their attempt to leave the bus, one (1) of the accused physically
pushed a law enforcer out of the way. Immediately alighting from a bus that had just left the
terminal and leaving one's belongings behind is unusual conduct.

In People v. Mariacos, a police officer received information that a bag containing illegal
drugs was about to be transported on a passenger jeepney. The bag was marked with "O.K." On
the basis of the tip, a police officer conducted surveillance operations on board a jeepney. Upon
seeing the bag described to him, he peeked inside and smelled the distinct odor of marijuana
emanating from the bag. The tipped information and the police officer's personal observations
gave rise to probable cause that rendered the warrantless search valid.

The police officers in People v. Ayangao, and People v. Libnao likewise received tipped
information regarding the transport of illegal drugs. In Libnao, the police officers had probable
cause to arrest the accused based on their three (3)-month long surveillance operation in the area
where the accused was arrested. On the other hand, in Ayangao, the police officers noticed
marijuana leaves protruding through a hole in one (1) of the sacks carried by the accused.

In the present case, the extensive search conducted by the police officers exceeded the
allowable limits of warrantless searches. They had no probable cause to believe that the accused
violated any law except for the tip they received. They did not observe any peculiar activity from
the accused that may either arouse their suspicion or verify the tip. Moreover, the search was
flawed at its inception. The checkpoint was set up to target the arrest of the accused.

47 | P a g e
 There are different hybrids of reasonable warrantless searches. There are searches based
on reasonable suspicion as in Posadas v. Court of Appeals where this Court justified the
warrantless search of the accused who attempted to flee with a buri bag after the police officers
identified themselves. (Veridiano v. People, G.R. No. 200370, 07 June 2017)

Warrantless search: Port authorities are state agents for purposes of the
application of the right against unreasonable searches and seizures.

In People v. Marti, [involving a search by private forwarding company of a package] xxx

[the] court held that there was no unreasonable search or seizure. The evidence obtained against
the accused was not procured by the state acting through its police officers or authorized
government agencies. The Bill of Rights does not govern relationships between individuals; it
cannot be invoked against the acts of private individuals:

If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first
secured if it is to pass the test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the behest or
initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment for its own and private purposes, as in the
case at bar, and without the intervention of police authorities, the right against unreasonable
search and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private individual, not the law enforcers,
is involved. In sum, the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended
to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful
intrusion by the government.

Hence, by virtue of Marti, items seized pursuant to a reasonable search conducted by

private persons are not covered by the exclusionary rule.

xxxx

In People v. Malngan, barangay tanod and the Barangay Chairman were deemed as law
enforcement officers for purposes of applying Article III of the Constitution. In People v.
Lauga, this court held that a "bantay bayan," in relation to the authority to conduct a custodial
investigation under Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution, "has the color of a state-related
function and objective insofar as the entitlement of a suspect to his constitutional rights[.]"

Thus, with port security personnel’s functions having the color of state-related functions
and deemed agents of government, Marti is inapplicable in the present case. (Dela Cruz v. People,
G.R. No. 209387, January 11, 2016)

Warrantless search: Routine x-ray scanning of baggage at ports by port

authorities: The security measures of x-ray scanning and inspection in domestic ports
-- akin to routine security procedures in airports – are reasonable. The reason behind
it is that there is a reasonable reduced expectation of privacy when coming into
airports or ports of travel.

The first point of intrusion occurred when petitioner presented his bag for inspection to port
personnel—the x-ray machine operator and baggage inspector manning the x-ray machine
station. With regard to searches and seizures, the standard imposed on private persons is different
from that imposed on state agents or authorized government authorities.

xxxx

Nevertheless, searches pursuant to port security measures are not unreasonable per se. The
security measures of x-ray scanning and inspection in domestic ports are akin to routine security
procedures in airports.

xxxx

This court in Suzuki found that the search conducted on the accused was a valid exception
to the prohibition against warrantless searches as it was pursuant to a routine airport security
procedure: xxxx

xxxx

The reason behind it is that there is a reasonable reduced expectation of privacy when
coming into airports or ports of travel:

48 | P a g e
 Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of their
persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of
privacy, which expectation society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such recognition is
implicit in airport security procedures. With increased concern over airplane hijacking and
terrorism has come increased security at the nation’s airports. Passengers attempting to board
an aircraft routinely pass through metal detectors; their carry-on baggage as well as checked
luggage are routinely subjected to x-ray scans. Should these procedures suggest the presence of
suspicious objects, physical searches are conducted to determine what the objects are. There is
little question that such searches are reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity
of the safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy expectations associated with airline
travel. Indeed, travelers are often notified through airport public address systems, signs and
notices in their airline tickets that they are subject to search and, if any prohibited materials
or substances are found, such would be subject to seizure. These announcements place
passengers on notice that ordinary constitutional protections against warrantless searches
and seizures do not apply to routine airport procedures. (Emphasis supplied, citations
omitted)

This rationale was reiterated more recently in Sales v. People. This court in Sales upheld the
validity of the search conducted as part of the routine security check at the old Manila Domestic
Airport—now Terminal 1 of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport.

Port authorities were acting within their duties and functions when it used x-ray scanning
machines for inspection of passengers’ bags. When the results of the x-ray scan revealed the
existence of firearms in the bag, the port authorities had probable cause to conduct a search of
petitioner’s bag. (Dela Cruz v. People, G.R. No. 209387, January 11, 2016)

Warrantless search: Routine baggage inspections at ports by port authorities:

Opening of baggage by port inspector is reasonable. The port personnel’s actions
proceed from the authority and policy to ensure the safety of travelers and vehicles
within the port. It is a permissible intrusion to privacy when measured against the
possible harm to society caused by lawless persons.

Was the search rendered unreasonable at the second point of intrusion—when the baggage
inspector opened petitioner’s bag and called the attention of the port police officer?

We rule in the negative.

The port personnel’s actions proceed from the authority and policy to ensure the safety of
travelers and vehicles within the port. At this point, petitioner already submitted himself and his
belongings to inspection by placing his bag in the x-ray scanning machine.

The presentation of petitioner’s bag for x-ray scanning was voluntary. Petitioner had the
choice of whether to present the bag or not. He had the option not to travel if he did not want his
bag scanned or inspected. X-ray machine scanning and actual inspection upon showing of
probable cause that a crime is being or has been committed are part of reasonable security
regulations to safeguard the passengers passing through ports or terminals. xxxx

It is not too burdensome to be considered as an affront to an ordinary person’s right to travel

if weighed against the safety of all passengers and the security in the port facility.

As one philosopher said, the balance between authority and an individual’s liberty may be
confined within the harm that the individual may cause others.

xxxx

Any perceived curtailment of liberty due to the presentation of person and effects for port
security measures is a permissible intrusion to privacy when measured against the possible harm
to society caused by lawless persons. (Dela Cruz v. People, G.R. No. 209387, January 11, 2016)

Warrantless search: Stop-and-Frisk search: Probable cause is not required but

a genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer's experience and surrounding
conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed
about him.

We now proceed to the justification for and allowable scope of a "stop-and-frisk" as a

"limited protective search of outer clothing for weapons," as laid down in Terry, thus:

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 We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads
him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that
the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course
of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries,
and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his
own or others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct
a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons
which might be used to assault him. Such a search is a reasonable search under the Fourth
Amendment x x x x.

Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not required to conduct a
"stop-and-frisk," it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop-
and-frisk." A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer's experience and surrounding
conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him.
(Sanchez v. People, G.R. No. 204589, November 19, 2014)

Police officers cannot justify unbridled searches and be shielded by this exception, unless
there is compliance with the "genuine reason" requirement and that the search serves the purpose
of protecting the public. (People v. Cogaed, G.R. No. 200334, July 30, 2014)

[T]here could be no valid "stop-and-frisk" search in the case at bench. Elucidating on what
constitutes "stop-and-frisk" operation and how it is to be carried out, the Court in People v. Chua
wrote:

A stop and frisk was defined as the act of a police officer to stop a citizen on the
street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s) or contraband. The police officer
should properly introduce himself and make initial inquiries, approach and restrain a
person who manifests unusual and suspicious conduct, in order to check the latter’s
outer clothing for possibly concealed weapons. The apprehending police officer must
have a genuine reason, in accordance with the police officer’s experience and the
surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person to be held has weapons (or
contraband) concealed about him. It should therefore be emphasized that a search and
seizure should precede the arrest for this principle to apply.

In this jurisdiction, what may be regarded as a genuine reason or a reasonable suspicion

justifying a Terry stop-and-frisk search had been sufficiently illustrated in two cases. In Manalili
v. Court of Appeals and People, a policeman chanced upon Manalili in front of the cemetery who
appeared to be "high" on drugs as he was observed to have reddish eyes and to be walking in a
swaying manner. Moreover, he appeared to be trying to avoid the policemen and when
approached and asked what he was holding in his hands, he tried to resist. When he showed his
wallet, it contained marijuana. The Court held that the policeman had sufficient reason to accost
Manalili to determine if he was actually "high" on drugs due to his suspicious actuations, coupled
with the fact that the area was a haven for drug addicts.

In People v. Solayao, the Court also found justifiable reason for the police to stop and frisk
the accused after considering the following circumstances: the drunken actuations of the accused
and his companions; the fact that his companions fled when they saw the policemen; and the fact
that the peace officers were precisely on an intelligence mission to verify reports that armed
persons where roaming the vicinity. Seemingly, the common thread of these examples is the
presence of more than one seemingly innocent activity, which, taken together, warranted a
reasonable inference of criminal activity. It was not so in the case at bench.

The Court does not find the totality of the circumstances described by SPO1 Amposta as
sufficient to incite a reasonable suspicion that would justify a stop-and-frisk search on Sanchez.
Coming out from the house of a drug pusher and boarding a tricycle, without more, were
innocuous movements, and by themselves alone could not give rise in the mind of an experienced
and prudent police officer of any belief that he had shabu in his possession, or that he was
probably committing a crime in the presence of the officer. There was even no allegation that
Sanchez left the house of the drug dealer in haste or that he acted in any other suspicious manner.
There was no showing either that he tried to evade or outmaneuver his pursuers or that he
attempted to flee when the police officers approached him. Truly, his acts and the surrounding
circumstances could not have engendered any reasonable suspicion on the part of the police
officers that a criminal activity had taken place or was afoot.

A stop and frisk was defined as the act of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street,
interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s) or contraband. The police officer should properly
introduce himself and make initial inquiries, approach and restrain a person who manifests
unusual and suspicious conduct, in order to check the latter’s outer clothing for possibly concealed

50 | P a g e
weapons. The apprehending police officer must have a genuine reason, in accordance with the
police officer’s experience and the surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person
to be held has weapons concealed about him. It should therefore be emphasized that a search and
seizure should precede the arrest for this principle to apply.

Coming out from the house of a drug pusher and boarding a tricycle, without more, were
innocuous movements, and by themselves alone could not give rise in the mind of an experienced
and prudent police officer of any belief that he had shabu in his possession, or that he was
probably committing a crime in the presence of the officer. (Sanchez v. People, G.R. No. 204589,
November 19, 2014)

Warrantless search: Plain view doctrine: Requirements: 1) prior justification

for an intrusion; 2) discovery is inadvertent; and 3) object is immediately apparent.
Contraband inside a match box being held by the person unlawfully arrested, and
which was not readily apparent to the police officers cannot be validly seized under
the plain view doctrine.

Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right
to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence.
The plain view doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (1) the law enforcement
officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from
which he can view a particular area; (2) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent;
and (3) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a
crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.

Measured against the foregoing standards, it is readily apparent that the seizure of the
subject shabu does not fall within the plain view exception. First, there was no valid intrusion. As
already discussed, Sanchez was illegally arrested. Second, subject shabu was not inadvertently
discovered, and third, it was not plainly exposed to sight. Here, the subject shabu was allegedly
inside a match box being then held by Sanchez and was not readily apparent or transparent to the
police officers. (Sanchez v. People, G.R. No. 204589, November 19, 2014)

Warrantless search: Plain view doctrine: Contraband lying outside of a

suspect’s house and exposed to the sight of police officers serving a search warrant
can be seized under the plain view doctrine.

The constitutional prohibition against warrantless searches and seizures admits of certain
exceptions, one of which is seizure of evidence in plain view. Under the plain view doctrine, objects
falling in the "plain view" of an officer, who has a right to be in the position to have that view, are
subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence.

There is no question that the DENR personnel were not armed with a search warrant when
they went to the house of the petitioner. When the DENR personnel arrived at the petitioner’s
house, the lumbers were lying under the latter’s house and at the shoreline about two meters away
from the house of the petitioner. It is clear, therefore, that the said lumber is plainly exposed to
sight. Hence, the seizure of the lumber outside the petitioner’s house falls within the purview of
the plain view doctrine. (Crescencio v People, G.R. No. 205015, November 19, 2014)

Warrantless search: Consented search: Silence is not necessarily a consent to

a search but mere passive conformity given under intimidating or coercive
circumstances. The police carry the burden of showing that the waiver of a
constitutional right is one which is knowing, intelligent, and free from any coercion.

Appellant’s silence should not be lightly taken as consent to such search. The implied
acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could not have been more than mere passive
conformity given under intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus considered no consent
at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee. The prosecution and the police carry the
burden of showing that the waiver of a constitutional right is one which is knowing, intelligent,
and free from any coercion. In all cases, such waivers are not to be presumed. (People v. Cogaed,
G.R. No. 200334, July 30, 2014)

Warrantless arrest: Plain view doctrine: Evidence cannot be considered

“inadvertently discovered” for purposes of seizure of evidence in plain view if the

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police officers intentionally entered the house with no prior surveillance or
investigation.

Neither can it be said that the subject items were seized in plain view. The elements of
plain view are: (a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police
are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently
discovered by the police who have the right to be where they are; (c) the evidence must be
immediately apparent; and, (d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further
search.

The evidence was not inadvertently discovered as the police officers intentionally entered
the house with no prior surveillance or investigation before they discovered the accused with the
subject items. If the prior peeking of the police officers in Bolasa was held to be insufficient to
constitute plain view, then more so should the warrantless search in this case be struck down.
Neither can the search be considered as a search of a moving vehicle, a consented warrantless
search, a customs search, a stop and frisk, or one under exigent and emergency circumstances.

The apprehending officers should have first conducted a surveillance considering that the
identity and address of one of the accused were already ascertained. After conducting the
surveillance and determining the existence of probable cause, then a search warrant should have
been secured prior to effecting arrest and seizure. The arrest being illegal, the ensuing search as a
result thereof is likewise illegal. Evidence procured on the occasion of an unreasonable search and
seizure is deemed tainted for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree and should be excluded.
(People v. Martinez, G.R. No. 191366, December 13, 2010)

Airport security searches are valid even without a warrant, because of their
minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety interests involved, and the reduced
privacy expectations associated with airline travel.

[T]he prosecution has satisfactorily established that airport security officers found in the
person of petitioner the marijuana fruiting tops contained in rolled paper sticks during the final
security check at the airport’s pre-departure area. Petitioner at first refused to show the contents
of his short pants pocket to Soriano who became suspicious when his hand felt the "slightly
bulging" item while frisking petitioner.

In People v. Johnson, which also involved seizure of a dangerous drug from a passenger
during a routine frisk at the airport, this Court ruled that such evidence obtained in a warrantless
search was acquired legitimately pursuant to airport security procedures, thus:

Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of their
persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of privacy,
which expectation society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such recognition is implicit in
airport security procedures. With increased concern over airplane hijacking and terrorism has
come increased security at the nation’s airports. Passengers attempting to board an aircraft
routinely pass through metal detectors; their carry-on baggage as well as checked luggage are
routinely subjected to x-ray scans. Should these procedures suggest the presence of suspicious
objects, physical searches are conducted to determine what the objects are. There is little question
that such searches are reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety
interests involved, and the reduced privacy expectations associated with airline travel. Indeed,
travelers are often notified through airport public address systems, signs, and notices in their
airline tickets that they are subject to search and, if any prohibited materials or substances are
found, such would be subject to seizure. These announcements place passengers on notice that
ordinary constitutional protections against warrantless searches and seizures do not apply to
routine airport procedures.

xxx

We find no irregularity in the search conducted on petitioner who was asked to empty the
contents of his pockets upon the frisker’s reasonable belief that what he felt in his hand while
frisking petitioner’s short pants was a prohibited or illegal substance.

Such search was made pursuant to routine airport security procedure, which is allowed
under Section 9 of R.A. No. 6235. Said provision reads:

SEC. 9. Every ticket issued to a passenger by the airline or air carrier concerned shall contain
among others the following condition printed thereon: "Holder hereof and his hand-carried luggage(s)
52 | P a g e
 are subject to search for, and seizure of, prohibited materials or substances. Holder refusing to be
searched shall not be allowed to board the aircraft," which shall constitute a part of the contract
between the passenger and the air carrier. (Italics in the original)

The ruling in People v. Johnson was applied in People v. Canton where the accused, a
female passenger was frisked at the NAIA after passing through the metal detector booth that
emitted a beeping sound. Since the frisker noticed something bulging at accused’s abdomen,
thighs and genital area, which felt like packages containing rice granules, accused was subjected
to a thorough physical examination inside the ladies’ room. Three sealed packages were taken
from accused’s body which when submitted for laboratory examination yielded positive results
for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. Accused was forthwith arrested and prosecuted
for illegal possession of a regulated drug.

Affirming accused Canton’s conviction for the crime of illegal possession of shabu, we
ruled that accused-appellant was lawfully arrested without a warrant after being caught in
flagrante delicto. We further held that the scope of a search pursuant to airport security procedure
is not confined only to search for weapons under the "Terry search" doctrine. The more extensive
search conducted on accused Canton was necessitated by the discovery of packages on her body,
her apprehensiveness and false statements which aroused the suspicion of the frisker that she was
hiding something illegal. Thus:

x x x. It must be repeated that R.A. No. 6235 authorizes search for prohibited
materials or substances. To limit the action of the airport security personnel to simply
refusing her entry into the aircraft and sending her home (as suggested by appellant), and
thereby depriving them of "the ability and facility to act accordingly, including to further
search without warrant, in light of such circumstances, would be to sanction impotence and
ineffectivity in law enforcement, to the detriment of society." Thus, the strip search in the
ladies’ room was justified under the circumstances. (Emphasis supplied)

The search of the contents of petitioner’s short pants pockets being a valid search pursuant
to routine airport security procedure, the illegal substance (marijuana) seized from him was
therefore admissible in evidence. Petitioner’s reluctance to show the contents of his short pants
pocket after the frisker’s hand felt the rolled papers containing marijuana, and his nervous
demeanor aroused the suspicion of the arresting officers that he was indeed carrying an item or
material subject to confiscation by the said authorities. (Sales v. People, G.R. No. 191023,
February 06, 2013)

To establish a violation of one’s right against unreasonable searches and

seizures, one must first prove that he has exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation
of privacy in the place searched or the item seized; and second, his subjective
expectation is one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable (objective).

The right to privacy has been accorded recognition in this jurisdiction as a facet of the right
protected by the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure under Section 2, Article III
of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:

SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose
shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

The constitutional guarantee is not a prohibition of all searches and seizures but only of
unreasonable searches and seizures. x x x

The constitutional guarantee is not a prohibition of all searches and seizures but only of
unreasonable searches and seizures. But to fully understand this concept and application for the
purpose of resolving the issue at hand, it is essential that we examine the doctrine in the light of
pronouncements in another jurisdiction. As the Court declared in People v. Marti:

Our present constitutional provision on the guarantee against unreasonable search

and seizure had its origin in the 1935 Charter which, x x x was in turn derived almost
verbatim from the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. As such, the
Court may turn to the pronouncements of the United States Federal Supreme Court and
State Appellate Courts which are considered doctrinal in this jurisdiction .

53 | P a g e
 In the 1967 case of Katz v. United States, the US Supreme Court held that the act of FBI
agents in electronically recording a conversation made by petitioner in an enclosed public
telephone booth violated his right to privacy and constituted a search and seizure. Because the
petitioner had a reasonable expectation of privacy in using the enclosed booth to make a personal
telephone call, the protection of the Fourth Amendment extends to such area. In the concurring
opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan, it was further noted that the existence of privacy right under prior
decisions involved a two-fold requirement: first, that a person has exhibited an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy; and second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to
recognize as reasonable (objective). (Pollo v. Constantino-David, G.R. No. 181881, October 18,
2011)

A government employee’s expectation of privacy in a regulated office

environment is reduced. The employee’s privacy interest in an office is to a large
extent limited by the company’s work policies, the collective bargaining agreement,
if any, and the inherent right of the employer to maintain discipline and efficiency in
the workplace.

In Mancusi v. DeForte which addressed the reasonable expectations of private employees

in the workplace, the US Supreme Court held that a union employee had Fourth Amendment
rights with regard to an office at union headquarters that he shared with other union officials,
even as the latter or their guests could enter the office. The Court thus recognized that employees
may have a reasonable expectation of privacy against intrusions by police.

That the Fourth Amendment equally applies to a government workplace was addressed in
the 1987 case of OConnor v. Ortega where a physician, Dr. Magno Ortega, who was employed by
a state hospital, claimed a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights when hospital officials
investigating charges of mismanagement of the psychiatric residency program, sexual harassment
of female hospital employees and other irregularities involving his private patients under the state
medical aid program, searched his office and seized personal items from his desk and filing
cabinets. In that case, the Court categorically declared that [i]ndividuals do not lose Fourth
Amendment rights merely because they work for the government instead of a private employer. A
plurality of four Justices concurred that the correct analysis has two steps: first, because some
government offices may be so open to fellow employees or the public that no expectation of
privacy is reasonable, a court must consider [t]he operational realities of the workplace in order
to determine whether an employees Fourth Amendment rights are implicated; and next, where
an employee has a legitimate privacy expectation, an employers intrusion on that expectation for
noninvestigatory, work-related purposes, as well as for investigations of work-related misconduct,
should be judged by the standard of reasonableness under all the circumstances.

On the matter of government employees’ reasonable expectations of privacy in their

workplace, OConnor teaches:

x x x Public employees expectations of privacy in their offices, desks, and file

cabinets, like similar expectations of employees in the private sector, may be reduced by
virtue of actual office practices and procedures, or by legitimate regulation. x x x The
employees expectation of privacy must be assessed in the context of the employment
relation. x x x Simply put, it is the nature of government offices that others such as fellow
employees, supervisors, consensual visitors, and the general public may have frequent
access to an individuals office. We agree with JUSTICE SCALIA that [c]onstitutional
protection against unreasonable searches by the government does not disappear merely
because the government has the right to make reasonable intrusions in its capacity as
employer, x x x but some government offices may be so open to fellow employees
or the public that no expectation of privacy is reasonable. x x x Given the great
variety of work environments in the public sector, the question of whether an
employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy must be addressed on a
case-by-case basis. (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)

On the basis of the established rule in previous cases, the US Supreme Court declared that
Dr. Ortegas Fourth Amendment rights are implicated only if the conduct of the hospital officials
infringed an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider as reasonable. Given the
undisputed evidence that respondent Dr. Ortega did not share his desk or file cabinets with any
other employees, kept personal correspondence and other private items in his own office while
those work-related files (on physicians in residency training) were stored outside his office, and
there being no evidence that the hospital had established any reasonable regulation or policy
discouraging employees from storing personal papers and effects in their desks or file cabinets
54 | P a g e
(although the absence of such a policy does not create any expectation of privacy where it would
not otherwise exist), the Court concluded that Dr. Ortega has a reasonable expectation of privacy
at least in his desk and file cabinets.

Proceeding to the next inquiry as to whether the search conducted by hospital officials was
reasonable, the OConnor plurality decision discussed the following principles:

Having determined that Dr. Ortega had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his
office, the Court of Appeals simply concluded without discussion that the search was not a
reasonable search under the fourth amendment. x x x [t]o hold that the Fourth Amendment
applies to searches conducted by [public employers] is only to begin the inquiry into the
standards governing such searches[W]hat is reasonable depends on the context within
which a search takes place. x x x Thus, we must determine the appropriate standard of
reasonableness applicable to the search. A determination of the standard of reasonableness
applicable to a particular class of searches requires balanc[ing] the nature and quality of
the intrusion on the individuals Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the
governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion. x x x In the case of searches
conducted by a public employer, we must balance the invasion of the
employees legitimate expectations of privacy against the governments need
for supervision, control, and the efficient operation of the workplace.

xxxx

In our view, requiring an employer to obtain a warrant whenever the employer

wished to enter an employee’s office, desk, or file cabinets for a work-related purpose would
seriously disrupt the routine conduct of business and would be unduly
burdensome. Imposing unwieldy warrant procedures in such cases upon supervisors, who
would otherwise have no reason to be familiar with such procedures, is simply
unreasonable. In contrast to other circumstances in which we have required warrants,
supervisors in offices such as at the Hospital are hardly in the business of investigating the
violation of criminal laws. Rather, work-related searches are merely incident to the primary
business of the agency. Under these circumstances, the imposition of a warrant
requirement would conflict with the common-sense realization that government offices
could not function if every employment decision became a constitutional matter. x x x

xxxx

The governmental interest justifying work-related intrusions by public employers

is the efficient and proper operation of the workplace. Government agencies provide
myriad services to the public, and the work of these agencies would suffer if employers were
required to have probable cause before they entered an employees’ desk for the purpose of
finding a file or piece of office correspondence. Indeed, it is difficult to give the concept of
probable cause, rooted as it is in the criminal investigatory context, much meaning when
the purpose of a search is to retrieve a file for work-related reasons. Similarly, the concept
of probable cause has little meaning for a routine inventory conducted by public employers
for the purpose of securing state property. x x x To ensure the efficient and proper operation
of the agency, therefore, public employers must be given wide latitude to enter employee
offices for work-related, noninvestigatory reasons.

We come to a similar conclusion for searches conducted pursuant to an

investigation of work-related employee misconduct. Even when employers conduct an
investigation, they have an interest substantially different from the normal need for law
enforcement. x x x Public employers have an interest in ensuring that their agencies
operate in an effective and efficient manner, and the work of these agencies inevitably
suffers from the inefficiency, incompetence, mismanagement, or other work-related
misfeasance of its employees. Indeed, in many cases, public employees are entrusted with
tremendous responsibility, and the consequences of their misconduct or incompetence to
both the agency and the public interest can be severe. In contrast to law enforcement
officials, therefore, public employers are not enforcers of the criminal law; instead, public
employers have a direct and overriding interest in ensuring that the work of the agency is
conducted in a proper and efficient manner. In our view, therefore, a probable cause
requirement for searches of the type at issue here would impose intolerable
burdens on public employers. The delay in correcting the employee
misconduct caused by the need for probable cause rather than reasonable
suspicion will be translated into tangible and often irreparable damage to the
agency’s work, and ultimately to the public interest. x x x

xxxx

In sum, we conclude that the special needs, beyond the normal need for
law enforcement make the probable-cause requirement impracticable, x x x
for legitimate, work-related noninvestigatory intrusions as well as
investigations of work-related misconduct. A standard of reasonableness will
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 neither unduly burden the efforts of government employers to ensure the efficient and
proper operation of the workplace, nor authorize arbitrary intrusions upon the privacy of
public employees. We hold, therefore, that public employer intrusions on the
constitutionally protected privacy interests of government employees for
noninvestigatory, work-related purposes, as well as for investigations of
work-related misconduct, should be judged by the standard of
reasonableness under all the circumstances. Under this reasonableness
standard, both the inception and the scope of the intrusion must be reasonable:

Determining the reasonableness of any search involves a twofold inquiry:

first, one must consider whether the action was justified at its inception, x
x x ; second, one must determine whether the search as actually conducted
was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the
interference in the first place, x x x

Ordinarily, a search of an employee’s office by a supervisor will be

justified at its inception when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting
that the search will turn up evidence that the employee is guilty of work-
related misconduct, or that the search is necessary for a noninvestigatory
work-related purpose such as to retrieve a needed file. x x x The search will be
permissible in its scope when the measures adopted are reasonably related to
the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the nature
of the [misconduct]. x x x (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)

xxx

In OConnor the Court recognized that special needs authorize warrantless searches
involving public employees for work-related reasons. The Court thus laid down a balancing test
under which government interests are weighed against the employee’s reasonable expectation of
privacy. This reasonableness test implicates neither probable cause nor the warrant requirement,
which are related to law enforcement.

xxx

This Court, in Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Dangerous Drugs Board which involved the
constitutionality of a provision in R.A. No. 9165 requiring mandatory drug testing of candidates
for public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and
private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutor’s office with certain offenses, have
also recognized the fact that there may be such legitimate intrusion of privacy in the workplace.

The first factor to consider in the matter of reasonableness is the nature of

the privacy interest upon which the drug testing, which effects a search within the
meaning of Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution, intrudes. x x x The employees
privacy interest in an office is to a large extent circumscribed by the
company’s work policies, the collective bargaining agreement, if any,
entered into by management and the bargaining unit, and the inherent
right of the employer to maintain discipline and efficiency in the
workplace. Their privacy expectation in a regulated office environment is, in fine,
reduced; and a degree of impingement upon such privacy has been upheld.
(Emphasis supplied.)

(Pollo v. Constantino-David, G.R. No. 181881, October 18, 2011)

A government employee cannot have a subjective expectation of privacy in his

government-issued computer containing his personal files, if the government office
implemented a policy that put its employees on notice that they have no expectation
of privacy in anything they create, store, send or receive on the office computers.

Applying the analysis and principles announced in OConnor and Simons to the case at
bar, we now address the following questions: (1) Did petitioner have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in his office and computer files?; and (2) Was the search authorized by the CSC Chair, the
copying of the contents of the hard drive on petitioners computer reasonable in its inception and
scope?

In this inquiry, the relevant surrounding circumstances to consider include (1) the
employee’s relationship to the item seized; (2) whether the item was in the immediate control of
the employee when it was seized; and (3) whether the employee took actions to maintain his
56 | P a g e
privacy in the item. These factors are relevant to both the subjective and objective prongs of the
reasonableness inquiry, and we consider the two questions together. Thus, where the employee
used a password on his computer, did not share his office with co-workers and kept the same
locked, he had a legitimate expectation of privacy and any search of that space and items located
therein must comply with the Fourth Amendment.

We answer the first in the negative. Petitioner failed to prove that he had an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy either in his office or government-issued computer which
contained his personal files. Petitioner did not allege that he had a separate enclosed office which
he did not share with anyone, or that his office was always locked and not open to other employees
or visitors. Neither did he allege that he used passwords or adopted any means to prevent other
employees from accessing his computer files. On the contrary, he submits that being in the public
assistance office of the CSC-ROIV, he normally would have visitors in his office like friends,
associates and even unknown people, whom he even allowed to use his computer which to him
seemed a trivial request. He described his office as full of people, his friends, unknown people and
that in the past 22 years he had been discharging his functions at the PALD, he x x x hardly had
any time for himself alone, that in fact he stays in the office as a paying customer. Under this
scenario, it can hardly be deduced that petitioner had such expectation of privacy that society
would recognize as reasonable.

Moreover, even assuming arguendo, in the absence of allegation or proof of the

aforementioned factual circumstances, that petitioner had at least a subjective expectation of
privacy in his computer as he claims, such is negated by the presence of policy regulating the use
of office computers, as in Simons.

Office Memorandum No. 10, S. 2002 Computer Use Policy (CUP) explicitly provides:

POLICY

1. The Computer Resources are the property of the Civil Service

Commission and may be used only for legitimate business purposes.
2. Users shall be permitted access to Computer Resources to assist them in
the performance of their respective jobs.
3. Use of the Computer Resources is a privilege that may be revoked at any
given time.

xxxx

No Expectation of Privacy

4. No expectation of privacy. Users except the Members of the Commission

shall not have an expectation of privacy in anything they create, store, send, or
receive on the computer system.

The Head of the Office for Recruitment, Examination and Placement shall
select and assign Users to handle the confidential examination data and processes.

5. Waiver of privacy rights. Users expressly waive any right to privacy

in anything they create, store, send, or receive on the computer through the Internet
or any other computer network. Usersunderstand that the CSC may use human
or automated means to monitor the use of its Computer Resources.

6. Non-exclusivity of Computer Resources. A computer resource is not a

personal property or for the exclusive use of a User to whom a memorandum of
receipt (MR) has been issued. It can be shared or operated by other users. However,
he is accountable therefor and must insure its care and maintenance.

xxxx

Passwords

xxx

13. Passwords do not imply privacy. Use of passwords to gain access to the
computer system or to encode particular files or messages does not imply
that Users have an expectation of privacy in the material they create or receive on
the computer system. xxx

x x x x (Emphasis supplied.)

57 | P a g e
 The CSC in this case had implemented a policy that put its employees on notice that they
have no expectation of privacy in anything they create, store, send or receive on the office
computers, and that the CSC may monitor the use of the computer resources using both
automated or human means. This implies that on-the-spot inspections may be done to ensure
that the computer resources were used only for such legitimate business purposes. (Pollo v.
Constantino-David, G.R. No. 181881, October 18, 2011)

A warrantless search by a government employer of an employees’ office is

justified at inception when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that it will
turn up evidence that the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct. Thus, a
search of a government employee’s files in the government-issued computer,
conducted in connection with investigation of work-related misconduct prompted by
an anonymous letter-complaint -- is reasonable.

As to the second point of inquiry on the reasonableness of the search conducted on

petitioner’s computer, we answer in the affirmative.

The search of petitioners’ computer files was conducted in connection with investigation
of work-related misconduct prompted by an anonymous letter-complaint addressed to
Chairperson David regarding anomalies in the CSC-ROIV where the head of the Mamamayan
Muna Hindi Mamaya Na division is supposedly lawyering for individuals with pending cases in
the CSC. x x x

xxxx

A search by a government employer of an employee’s office is justified at inception when

there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that it will turn up evidence that the employee is
guilty of work-related misconduct. x x x

Under the facts obtaining, the search conducted on petitioners computer was justified at
its inception and scope. We quote with approval the CSCs discussion on the reasonableness of its
actions, consistent as it were with the guidelines established by OConnor:

Even conceding for a moment that there is no such administrative policy, there is
no doubt in the mind of the Commission that the search of Pollos computer has successfully
passed the test of reasonableness for warrantless searches in the workplace as enunciated
in the above-discussed American authorities. It bears emphasis that the Commission
pursued the search in its capacity as a government employer and that it was
undertaken in connection with an investigation involving a work-related
misconduct, one of the circumstances exempted from the warrant requirement. At the
inception of the search, a complaint was received recounting that a certain division chief in
the CSCRO No. IV was lawyering for parties having pending cases with the said regional
office or in the Commission. The nature of the imputation was serious, as it was
grievously disturbing. If, indeed, a CSC employee was found to be furtively engaged in
the practice of lawyering for parties with pending cases before the Commission x x x [i]t
would undeniably cast clouds of doubt upon the institutional integrity of the Commission
as a quasi-judicial agency x x x.

Considering the damaging nature of the accusation, the Commission

had to act fast, if only to arrest or limit any possible adverse consequence or fall-
out. Thus, on the same date that the complaint was received, a search was forthwith
conducted involving the computer resources in the concerned regional office. That it was
the computers that were subjected to the search was justified since these
furnished the easiest means for an employee to encode and store
documents. Indeed, the computers would be a likely starting point in ferreting
out incriminating evidence. Concomitantly, the ephemeral nature of
computer files, that is, they could easily be destroyed at a click of a button,
necessitated drastic and immediate action. Pointedly, to impose the need to comply
with the probable cause requirement would invariably defeat the purpose of the wok-
related investigation.

xxx

All in all, the Commission is convinced that the warrantless search done on
computer assigned to Pollo was not, in any way, vitiated with unconstitutionality. It was a
reasonable exercise of the managerial prerogative of the Commission as an employer aimed

58 | P a g e
 at ensuring its operational effectiveness and efficiency by going after the work-related
misfeasance of its employees. Consequently, the evidence derived from the questioned
search are deemed admissible.

Petitioner’s claim of violation of his constitutional right to privacy must necessarily

fail. His other argument invoking the privacy of communication and correspondence under
Section 3(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution is also untenable considering the recognition
accorded to certain legitimate intrusions into the privacy of employees in the government
workplace under the aforecited authorities. x x x As already mentioned, the search of petitioners
computer was justified there being reasonable ground for suspecting that the files stored therein
would yield incriminating evidence relevant to the investigation being conducted by CSC as
government employer of such misconduct subject of the anonymous complaint. This situation
clearly falls under the exception to the warrantless requirement in administrative searches
defined in OConnor.

The Court is not unaware of our decision in Anonymous Letter-Complaint against Atty.
Miguel Morales, Clerk of Court, Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila involving a branch clerk
(Atty. Morales) who was investigated on the basis of an anonymous letter alleging that he was
consuming his working hours filing and attending to personal cases, using office supplies,
equipment and utilities. The OCA conducted a spot investigation aided by NBI agents. The team
was able to access Atty. Morales personal computer and print two documents stored in its hard
drive, which turned out to be two pleadings, one filed in the CA and another in the RTC of Manila,
both in the name of another lawyer. Atty. Morales computer was seized and taken in custody of
the OCA but was later ordered released on his motion, but with order to the MISO to first retrieve
the files stored therein. The OCA disagreed with the report of the Investigating Judge that there
was no evidence to support the charge against Atty. Morales as no one from the OCC personnel
who were interviewed would give a categorical and positive statement affirming the charges
against Atty. Morales, along with other court personnel also charged in the same case. The OCA
recommended that Atty. Morales should be found guilty of gross misconduct. The Court En
Banc held that while Atty. Morales may have fallen short of the exacting standards required of
every court employee, the Court cannot use the evidence obtained from his personal computer
against him for it violated his constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures. The
Court found no evidence to support the claim of OCA that they were able to obtain the subject
pleadings with the consent of Atty. Morales, as in fact the latter immediately filed an
administrative case against the persons who conducted the spot investigation, questioning the
validity of the investigation and specifically invoking his constitutional right against unreasonable
search and seizure. And as there is no other evidence, apart from the pleadings, retrieved from
the unduly confiscated personal computer of Atty. Morales, to hold him administratively liable,
the Court had no choice but to dismiss the charges against him for insufficiency of evidence.

The above case is to be distinguished from the case at bar because, unlike the former which
involved a personal computer of a court employee, the computer from which the personal files
of herein petitioner were retrieved is a government-issued computer, hence government property
the use of which the CSC has absolute right to regulate and monitor. Such relationship of the
petitioner with the item seized (office computer) and other relevant factors and circumstances
under American Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, notably the existence of CSC MO 10, S. 2007
on Computer Use Policy, failed to establish that petitioner had a reasonable expectation of privacy
in the office computer assigned to him. (Pollo v. Constantino-David, G.R. No. 181881, October
18, 2011)

For a warrantless arrest of an accused caught in flagrante delicto to be valid,

two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act
indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of
the arresting officer." Trying to run away when no crime has been overtly committed,
and without more, cannot be evidence of guilt. Flight per se is not synonymous with
guilt.

Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a peace officer or
a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. This is
known an arrest in flagrante delicto.

59 | P a g e
 "For a warrantless arrest of an accused caught in flagrante delicto to be valid, two
requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he
has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt
act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer."

In the present case, there was no overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise that could
be properly attributed to the appellant to rouse suspicion in the mind of PO3 Corbe that he
(appellant) had just committed, was actually committing, or was attempting to commit a crime.
In fact, PO3 Corbe testified that the appellant and the informant were just talking with each other
when he approached them. x x x

As testified to by PO3 Corbe himself, the appellant and the informant were just talking to
each other; there was no exchange of money and drugs when he approached the car. Notably,
while it is true that the informant waved at PO3 Corbe, the latter admitted that this was not the
pre-arranged signal to signify that the sale of drugs had been consummated. PO3 Corbe also
admitted on cross-examination that he had no personal knowledge on whether there was a
prohibited drug and gun inside the space wagon when he approached it.

That the appellant attempted to run away when PO3 Corbe approached him is irrelevant
and cannot by itself be construed as adequate to charge the police officer with personal knowledge
that the appellant had just engaged in, was actually engaging in or was attempting to engage in
criminal activity.

As the Court explained in People v. Villareal:

Furthermore, appellant’s act of darting away when PO3 de Leon approached him
should not be construed against him. Flight per se is not synonymous with guilt and must
not always be attributed to one’s consciousness of guilt. It is not a reliable indicator of guilt
without other circumstances, for even in high crime areas there are many innocent reasons
for flight, including fear of retribution for speaking to officers, unwillingness to appear as
witnesses, and fear of being wrongfully apprehended as a guilty party. Thus, appellant’s
attempt to run away from PO3 de Leon is susceptible of various explanations; it could easily
have meant guilt just as it could likewise signify innocence.

In other words, trying to run away when no crime has been overtly committed, and without
more, cannot be evidence of guilt.

Considering that the appellant’s warrantless arrest was unlawful, the search and seizure
that resulted from it was likewise illegal. Thus, the alleged plastic bag containing white crystalline
substances seized from him is inadmissible in evidence, having come from an invalid search and
seizure. (People v. Edano, G.R. No. 188133, July 7, 2014)

Reliable information alone is not enough to justify a warrantless arrest. The

accused must perform some overt act that would indicate that he has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.

The long standing rule in this jurisdiction is that "reliable information" alone is not
sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest. The rule requires, in addition, that the accused perform
some overt act that would indicate that he has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit an offense. (People v. Racho, G.R. No. 186529, August 3, 2010)

“Overt act” requirement in in flagrante delicto arrest: The mere act of leaving
a residence of a known drug peddler is not sufficient for a valid arrest, unless there is
an overt manifestation that the person had just engaged in, was actually engaging in
or was attempting to engage in the criminal activity of illegal possession of shabu.

Even granting arguendo that Sanchez was arrested before the search, still the warrantless
search and seizure must be struck down as illegal because the warrantless arrest was unlawful.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure lays down the basic rules on lawful
warrantless arrests, either by a peace officer or a private person, as follows:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actuallly
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
60 | P a g e
 (b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while
his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.

xxx

For warrantless arrest under paragraph (a) of Section 5 (in flagrante delicto arrest) to
operate, two elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act
indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime;
and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. On the
other hand, paragraph (b) of Section 5 (arrest effected in hot pursuit) requires for its application
that at the time of the arrest, an offense has in fact just been committed and the arresting officer
has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be apprehended has committed it.
These elements would be lacking in the case at bench.

The evidence on record reveals that no overt physical act could be properly attributed to
Sanchez as to rouse suspicion in the minds of the police operatives that he had just committed,
was committing, or was about to commit a crime. Sanchez was merely seen by the police
operatives leaving the residence of a known drug peddler, and boarding a tricycle that proceeded
towards the direction of Kawit, Cavite. Such acts cannot in any way be considered criminal acts.
In fact, even if Sanchez had exhibited unusual or strange acts, or at the very least appeared
suspicious, the same would not have been considered overt acts in order for the police officers to
effect a lawful warrantless arrest under paragraph (a) of Section 5, Rule 113.

It has not been established either that the rigorous conditions set forth in paragraph (b)
of Section 5 have been complied with in this warrantless arrest. When the police officers chased
the tricycle, they had no personal knowledge to believe that Sanchez bought shabu from the
notorious drug dealer and actually possessed the illegal drug when he boarded the tricycle. x x x
The police officers in this case had no inkling whatsoever as to what Sanchez did inside the house
of the known drug dealer. Besides, nowhere in the prosecution evidence does it show that the drug
dealer was conducting her nefarious drug activities inside her house so as to warrant the police
officers to draw a reasonable suspicion that Sanchez must have gotten shabu from her and
possessed the illegal drug when he came out of the house. In other words, there was no overt
manifestation on the part of Sanchez that he had just engaged in, was actually engaging in or was
attempting to engage in the criminal activity of illegal possession of shabu. (Sanchez v. People,
G.R. No. 204589, November 19, 2014)

In a hot pursuit arrest, police presence at the scene while the crime was being
committed is not required. It is enough that evidence of the recent commission of the
crime is patent and the police officer has probable cause to believe, based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances, that the person to be arrested has recently
committed the crime.

To summarize, the arresting officers went to the scene of the crime upon the complaint of
Atty. Generoso of his alleged mauling; the police officers responded to the scene of the crime less
than one (1) hour after the alleged mauling; the alleged crime transpired in a community where
Atty. Generoso and the petitioners reside; Atty. Generoso positively identified the petitioners as
those responsible for his mauling and, notably, the petitioners and Atty. Generoso lived almost in
the same neighborhood; more importantly, when the petitioners were confronted by the arresting
officers, they did not deny their participation in the incident with Atty. Generoso, although they
narrated a different version of what transpired.

With these facts and circumstances that the police officers gathered and which they have
personally observed less than one hour from the time that they have arrived at the scene of the
crime until the time of the arrest of the petitioners, we deem it reasonable to conclude that the
police officers had personal knowledge of facts or circumstances justifying the petitioners'
warrantless arrests. These circumstances were well within the police officers' observation,
perception and evaluation at the time of the arrest. These circumstances qualify as the police
officers' personal observation, which are within their personal knowledge, prompting them to
make the warrantless arrests.

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 Similar to the factual antecedents in Jayson, the police officers in the present case saw
Atty. Generoso in his sorry bloodied state. As the victim, he positively identified the petitioners as
the persons who mauled him; however, instead of fleeing like what happened in Jayson, the
petitioners agreed to go with the police officers.

In determining the reasonableness of the warrantless arrests, it is incumbent upon the

courts to consider if the police officers have complied with the requirements set under Section
5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, specifically, the requirement of
immediacy; the police officer's personal knowledge of facts or circumstances; and lastly, the
propriety of the determination of probable cause that the person sought to be arrested committed
the crime.

The records show that soon after the report of the incident occurred, SPOl Monsalve
immediately dispatched the arresting officer, SP02 Javier, to render personal assistance to the
victim. This fact alone negates the petitioners' argument that the police officers did not have
personal knowledge that a crime had been committed -the police immediately responded and had
personal knowledge that a crime had been committed.

To reiterate, personal knowledge of a crime just committed under the terms of the above-
cited provision, does not require actual presence at the scene while a crime was being committed;
it is enough that evidence of the recent commission of the crime is patent (as in this case) and the
police officer has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances,
that the person to be arrested has recently committed the crime. (Pestilos v. Generoso, G.R. No.
182601, November 10, 2014)

The arrest of a person who has presented himself before the police station to
clear his name and prove that he is not the accused -- is not valid, as he was neither
committing nor attempting to commit an offense, and the police officers had no
personal knowledge of any offense that he might have committed.

It is undisputed that petitioner Salibo presented himself before the Datu Hofer Police
Station to clear his name and to prove that he is not the accused Butukan S. Malang

[P]etitioner Salibo was not validly arrested without a warrant. Rule 113, Section 5 of the
Rules of Court enumerates the instances when a warrantless arrest may be made:

SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.—A peace officer or a private person may, without
a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment
or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

xxx

It is undisputed that petitioner Salibo presented himself before the Datu Hofer Police
Station to clear his name and to prove that he is not the accused Butukan S. Malang. When
petitioner Salibo was in the presence of the police officers of Datu Hofer Police Station, he was
neither committing nor attempting to commit an offense. The police officers had no personal
knowledge of any offense that he might have committed. Petitioner Salibo was also not an escapee
prisoner.

The police officers, therefore, had no probable cause to arrest petitioner Salibo without a
warrant. They deprived him of his right to liberty without due process of law, for which a petition
for habeas corpus may be issued. (In the Matter of Petition for Habeas Corpus of Datukan
Malang Salibo, v. Warden, Quezon City Jail, G.R. No. 197597, April 8, 2015)

FREE SPEECH

62 | P a g e
 When a penal statute encroaches upon the freedom of speech, a facial
challenge grounded on the void-for-vagueness doctrine is acceptable. This is to
counter the "chilling effect" on protected speech. A person who does not know
whether his speech constitutes a crime under an overbroad or vague law may simply
restrain himself from speaking to avoid being charged of a crime.

When a penal statute encroaches upon the freedom of speech, a facial challenge grounded
on the void-for-vagueness doctrine is acceptable. x x x

In an "as applied" challenge, the petitioner who claims a violation of his constitutional
right can raise any constitutional ground – absence of due process, lack of fair notice, lack of
ascertainable standards, overbreadth, or vagueness. Here, one can challenge the constitutionality
of a statute only if he asserts a violation of his own rights. It prohibits one from assailing the
constitutionality of the statute based solely on the violation of the rights of third persons not
before the court. This rule is also known as the prohibition against third-party standing.

But this rule admits of exceptions. A petitioner may for instance mount a "facial" challenge
to the constitutionality of a statute even if he claims no violation of his own rights under the
assailed statute where it involves free speech on grounds of overbreadth or vagueness of the
statute.

The rationale for this exception is to counter the "chilling effect" on protected speech that
comes from statutes violating free speech. A person who does not know whether his speech
constitutes a crime under an overbroad or vague law may simply restrain himself from speaking
in order to avoid being charged of a crime. The overbroad or vague law thus chills him into silence.
(Disini v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 203335, February 18, 2014)

A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad
because of possible "chilling effect" upon protected speech. x x x The possible harm to society in
permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the
protected speech of others may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of
possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes. (Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network
v. Anti-Terrorism Council, G.R. No. 178552, October 5, 2010)

Overbreadth and vagueness doctrines, as facial challenges, apply only to free

speech cases, not for testing the validity of penal statutes.

The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to free speech
cases. They are inapt for testing the validity of penal statutes. As the U.S. Supreme Court put it, in
an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, "we have not recognized an 'overbreadth' doctrine outside
the limited context of the First Amendment." In Broadrick v. Oklahoma, the Court ruled that
"claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their
terms, seek to regulate only spoken words" and, again, that "overbreadth claims, if entertained at
all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied
to protected conduct." x x x

In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools
developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in
American law, First Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do service when what is involved
is a criminal statute. (Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network v. Anti-Terrorism Council,
G.R. No. 178552, October 5, 2010; Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148560, November 19,
2001)

As Justice Antonio T. Carpio explained in his dissent in Romualdez v. Commission on

Elections, "we must view these statements of the Court on the inapplicability of the overbreadth
and vagueness doctrines to penal statutes as appropriate only insofar as these doctrines are used
to mount ‘facial’ challenges to penal statutes not involving free speech." (Disini v. Secretary of
Justice, G.R. No. 203335, February 18, 2014)

Facial challenges can be launched to assail the validity of statutes concerning

not only protected speech, but also all other rights in the First Amendment – which
include religious freedom, freedom of the press, and the right of the people to
peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.

63 | P a g e
 In United States (US) constitutional law, a facial challenge, also known as a First
Amendment Challenge, is one that is launched to assail the validity of statutes concerning not
only protected speech, but also all other rights in the First Amendment. These include religious
freedom, freedom of the press, and the right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition
the Government for a redress of grievances. After all, the fundamental right to religious freedom,
freedom of the press and peaceful assembly are but component rights of the right to one's freedom
of expression, as they are modes which one's thoughts are externalized.

In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been
generally maintained, albeit with some modifications. While this Court has withheld the
application of facial challenges to strictly penal statues, it has expanded its scope to cover statutes
not only regulating free speech, but also those involving religious freedom, and other fundamental
rights. The underlying reason for this modification is simple. For unlike its counterpart in the
U.S., this Court, under its expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental Law not only
to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but
also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. Verily, the
framers of Our Constitution envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever vigilant with its duty to
maintain the supremacy of the Constitution.

Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that the
constitutional human rights to life, speech and religion and other fundamental rights mentioned
above have been violated by the assailed legislation, the Court has authority to take cognizance of
these kindred petitions and to determine if the RH Law can indeed pass constitutional scrutiny.
(Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014)

The prohibition on the sending of internet “spam” under Republic Act (R.A.)
10175 (the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012) is a violation of freedom of
expression. To prohibit the transmission of unsolicited ads would deny a person the
right to read his emails, even unsolicited commercial ads addressed to him;
commercial speech is also entitled to protection.
Sec. 4. Cybercrime Offenses. – The following acts constitute the offense of
cybercrime punishable under this Act:

xxxx

(c) Content-related Offenses:

xxxx

(3) Unsolicited Commercial Communications. – The transmission of commercial

electronic communication with the use of computer system which seeks to advertise, sell, or
offer for sale products and services are prohibited unless:

(i) There is prior affirmative consent from the recipient; or

xxx

The above penalizes the transmission of unsolicited commercial communications, also

known as "spam." x x x

The Government, represented by the Solicitor General, points out that unsolicited
commercial communications or spams are a nuisance that wastes the storage and network
capacities of internet service providers, reduces the efficiency of commerce and technology, and
interferes with the owner’s peaceful enjoyment of his property. Transmitting spams amounts to
trespass to one’s privacy since the person sending out spams enters the recipient’s domain without
prior permission. The OSG contends that commercial speech enjoys less protection in law.

But, firstly, the government presents no basis for holding that unsolicited electronic ads
reduce the "efficiency of computers." Secondly, people, before the arrival of the age of computers,
have already been receiving such unsolicited ads by mail. These have never been outlawed as
nuisance since people might have interest in such ads. What matters is that the recipient has the
option of not opening or reading these mail ads. That is true with spams. Their recipients always
have the option to delete or not to read them.

To prohibit the transmission of unsolicited ads would deny a person the right to read his
emails, even unsolicited commercial ads addressed to him. Commercial speech is a separate
64 | P a g e
category of speech which is not accorded the same level of protection as that given to other
constitutionally guaranteed forms of expression but is nonetheless entitled to protection.The
State cannot rob him of this right without violating the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of
expression. Unsolicited advertisements are legitimate forms of expression. (Disini v. Secretary of
Justice, G.R. No. 203335, February 18, 2014)

Libel is unprotected speech and may be penalized. The government has an

obligation to protect private individuals from defamation. The cybercrime law
penalizing the author of a libelous online statement or article is valid.

The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that libel is not a constitutionally protected
speech and that the government has an obligation to protect private individuals from defamation.
Indeed, cyberlibel is actually not a new crime since Article 353, in relation to Article 355 of the
penal code, already punishes it. In effect, Section 4(c)(4) above merely affirms that online
defamation constitutes "similar means" for committing libel.

But the Court’s acquiescence goes only insofar as the cybercrime law penalizes the author
of the libelous statement or article. (Disini v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 203335, February 18,
2014)

The law penalizing “aiding and abetting” the commission of internet libel is
void for being vague and overbroad. The terms "aiding or abetting" unnecessarily
sweep broadly, thereby invading the area of protected freedoms, generating a chilling
effect on those who express themselves in cyberspace. Also, netizens are not given
"fair notice" or warning as to what is criminal conduct and what is lawful conduct. Its
vagueness also causes a chilling effect on the freedom of expression.

Under the overbreadth doctrine, a proper governmental purpose, constitutionally subject

to state regulation, may not be achieved by means that unnecessarily sweep its subject broadly,
thereby invading the area of protected freedoms.

xxx

Libel in the cyberspace can of course stain a person’s image with just one click of the
mouse. x x x Still, a governmental purpose, which seeks to regulate the use of this cyberspace
communication technology to protect a person’s reputation and peace of mind, cannot adopt
means that will unnecessarily and broadly sweep, invading the area of protected freedoms.

If such means are adopted, self-inhibition borne of fear of what sinister predicaments
await internet users will suppress otherwise robust discussion of public issues. Democracy will be
threatened and with it, all liberties. Penal laws should provide reasonably clear guidelines for law
enforcement officials and triers of facts to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. The
terms "aiding or abetting" constitute broad sweep that generates chilling effect on those who
express themselves through cyberspace posts, comments, and other messages. Hence, Section 5
of the cybercrime law that punishes "aiding or abetting" libel on the cyberspace is a nullity.

xxx

Who is to decide when to prosecute persons who boost the visibility of a posting on the
internet by liking it? Netizens are not given "fair notice" or warning as to what is criminal conduct
and what is lawful conduct. When a case is filed, how will the court ascertain whether or not one
netizen’s comment aided and abetted a cybercrime while another comment did not?

xxx

x x x Section 5 with respect to Section 4(c)(4) is unconstitutional. Its vagueness raises

apprehension on the part of internet users because of its obvious chilling effect on the freedom of
expression, especially since the crime of aiding or abetting ensnares all the actors in the
cyberspace front in a fuzzy way. (Disini v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 203335, February 18,
2014)

Expressions concerning one’s homosexuality and the activity of forming a

political association that supports LGBT individuals are protected. The Comelec

65 | P a g e
cannot interfere with speech to promote an approved message or discourage a
disfavored one.

Under our system of laws, every group has the right to promote its agenda and attempt
to persuade society of the validity of its position through normal democratic means. It is in the
public square that deeply held convictions and differing opinions should be distilled and
deliberated upon.

xxx

Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic

society, and this freedom applies not only to those that are favorably received but also to those
that offend, shock, or disturb. Any restriction imposed in this sphere must be proportionate to
the legitimate aim pursued. Absent any compelling state interest, it is not for the COMELEC or
this Court to impose its views on the populace. Otherwise stated, the COMELEC is certainly not
free to interfere with speech for no better reason than promoting an approved message or
discouraging a disfavored one.

This position gains even more force if one considers that homosexual conduct is not illegal
in this country. It follows that both expressions concerning one’s homosexuality and the activity
of forming a political association that supports LGBT individuals are protected as well.

xxx

We do not doubt that a number of our citizens may believe that homosexual conduct is
distasteful, offensive, or even defiant. They are entitled to hold and express that view. On the
other hand, LGBTs and their supporters, in all likelihood, believe with equal fervor that
relationships between individuals of the same sex are morally equivalent to heterosexual
relationships. They, too, are entitled to hold and express that view. However, as far as this Court
is concerned, our democracy precludes using the religious or moral views of one part of the
community to exclude from consideration the values of other members of the community. (Ang
Ladlad LGBT Party v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 190582, April 8, 2010)

Why Comelec regulation of political speech on oversized tarpaulins posted on

private property by non-candidates during elections is void

Speech with political consequences enjoys a high degree of protection.

Tarpaulins put up by private individuals that contain statements of their approval or
criticisms of public officials’ vote on the RH Law, as part of these private individuals’
advocacy campaign against the RH Law, and not paid for by any candidate or political
party – are not election propaganda subject to Comelec regulation.

Every citizen’s expression with political consequences enjoys a high degree of protection.
Respondents argue that the tarpaulin is election propaganda, being petitioners’ way of endorsing
candidates who voted against the RH Law and rejecting those who voted for it. As such, it is
subject to regulation by COMELEC under its constitutional mandate. x x x

xxx

On the other hand, petitioners invoke their "constitutional right to communicate their
opinions, views and beliefs about issues and candidates." They argue that the tarpaulin was their
statement of approval and appreciation of the named public officials’ act of voting against the RH
Law, and their criticism toward those who voted in its favor. It was "part of their advocacy
campaign against the RH Law," which was not paid for by any candidate or political party. Thus,
"the questioned orders which . . . effectively restrain[ed] and curtail[ed] [their] freedom of
expression should be declared unconstitutional and void."

x x x In Philippine Blooming Mills, this court discussed the preferred position occupied by
freedom of expression:
xxx

In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly occupy
a preferred position as they are essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil and
66 | P a g e
 political institutions; and such priority "gives these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not
permitting dubious intrusions." (Citations omitted)

xxx

While the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of the named candidates and
political parties, this does not necessarily mean it is election propaganda. The tarpaulin was not
paid for or posted "in return for consideration" by any candidate, political party, or party-list
group.

xxx

Speech with political consequences is at the core of the freedom of expression and must
be protected by this court. (The Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 205728,
January 21, 2015)

Prohibiting non-candidates from posting on their private property tarpaulins

containing their opinions that may affect elections is a content-based regulation that
is presumed invalid. A content-based prior restraint will only be valid it if passes the
clear and present danger test.

COMELEC contends that the order for removal of the tarpaulin is a content-neutral
regulation. The order was made simply because petitioners failed to comply with the maximum
size limitation for lawful election propaganda.

On the other hand, petitioners argue that the present size regulation is content-based as it
applies only to political speech and not to other forms of speech such as commercial speech.

xxx

The regulation may reasonably be considered as either content-neutral or content-based.

Regardless, the disposition of this case will be the same. Generally, compared with other forms of
speech, the proposed speech is content-based.

As pointed out by petitioners, the interpretation of COMELEC contained in the questioned

order applies only to posters and tarpaulins that may affect the elections because they deliver
opinions that shape both their choices. x x x

xxx

Content-based regulation bears a heavy presumption of invalidity, and this court has used
the clear and present danger rule as measure. Thus, in Chavez v. Gonzales:
A content-based regulation, however, bears a heavy presumption of invalidity and is
measured against the clear and present danger rule. The latter will pass constitutional muster
only if justified by a compelling reason, and the restrictions impose dare neither overbroad
nor vague.

Under this rule, "the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive,
‘extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high.’" "Only when the challenged act
has overcome the clear and present danger rule will it pass constitutional muster, with the
government having the burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality."

Even with the clear and present danger test, respondents failed to justify the regulation.
There is no compelling and substantial state interest endangered by the posting of the tarpaulin
as to justify curtailment of the right of freedom of expression. xxx

Content-based restraint or censorship refers to restrictions "based on the subject matter

of the utterance or speech."

xxx

We reiterate that the regulation involved at bar is content-based. The tarpaulin content is
not easily divorced from the size of its medium. (The Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015)

Regulation of speech in the context of electoral campaigns made by non-

candidates or who do not speak as members of a political party which are principally
67 | P a g e
advocacies of a social issue during elections -- is unconstitutional. Regulation of
election paraphernalia involving speech of persons who are not candidates is valid, if
what is regulated is declarative speech that, taken as a whole, has for its principal
object the endorsement of a candidate only. The regulation (a) should be provided
by law, (b) reasonable, (c) narrowly tailored to meet the objective of enhancing the
opportunity of all candidates to be heard and considering the primacy of the
guarantee of free expression, and (d) demonstrably the least restrictive means to
achieve that object. The regulation must only be with respect to the time, place, and
manner of the rendition of the message.

The message of petitioner, taken as a whole, is an advocacy of a social issue that it deeply
believes. x x x It primarily advocates a stand on a social issue; only secondarily — even almost
incidentally — will cause the election or non-election of a candidate.

The twin tarpaulins consist of satire of political parties. x x x It seeks to effectively

communicate a greater purpose, often used for "political and social criticism" "because it tears
down facades, deflates stuffed shirts, and unmasks hypocrisy. x x x

x x x The tarpaulin caricatures political parties and parodies the intention of those in the
list. Furthermore, the list of "Team Patay" is juxtaposed with the list of "Team Buhay" that further
emphasizes the theme of its author: Reproductive health is an important marker for the church
of petitioners to endorse.

The messages in the tarpaulins are different from the usual messages of candidates.
Election paraphernalia from candidates and political parties are more declarative and descriptive
and contain no sophisticated literary allusion to any social objective. Thus, they usually simply
exhort the public to vote for a person with a brief description of the attributes of the candidate.
For example "Vote for [x], Sipag at Tiyaga," "Vote for [y], Mr. Palengke," or "Vote for [z], Iba kami
sa Makati."

xxx

However, the requirements of the Constitution regarding equality in opportunity must

provide limits to some expression during electoral campaigns.

Thus clearly, regulation of speech in the context of electoral campaigns made by

candidates or the members of their political parties or their political parties may be regulated as
to time, place, and manner. x x x

Regulation of speech in the context of electoral campaigns made by persons who are not
candidates or who do not speak as members of a political party which are, taken as a whole,
principally advocacies of a social issue that the public must consider during elections is
unconstitutional. Such regulation is inconsistent with the guarantee of according the fullest
possible range of opinions coming from the electorate including those that can catalyze candid,
uninhibited, and robust debate in the criteria for the choice of a candidate.

This does not mean that there cannot be a specie of speech by a private citizen which will
not amount to an election paraphernalia to be validly regulated by law.

Regulation of election paraphernalia will still be constitutionally valid if it reaches into

speech of persons who are not candidates or who do not speak as members of a political party if
they are not candidates, only if what is regulated is declarative speech that, taken as a whole, has
for its principal object the endorsement of a candidate only. The regulation (a) should be provided
by law, (b) reasonable, (c) narrowly tailored to meet the objective of enhancing the opportunity of
all candidates to be heard and considering the primacy of the guarantee of free expression, and
(d) demonstrably the least restrictive means to achieve that object. The regulation must only be
with respect to the time, place, and manner of the rendition of the message. In no situation may
the speech be prohibited or censored on the basis of its content. For this purpose, it will not matter
whether the speech is made with or on private property.

This is not the situation, however, in this case for two reasons. First, as discussed, the
principal message in the twin tarpaulins of petitioners consists of a social advocacy.

Second, x x x the present law x x x if applied to this case, will not pass the test of
reasonability. A fixed size for election posters or tarpaulins without any relation to the distance
from the intended average audience will be arbitrary. At certain distances, posters measuring 2
by 3 feet could no longer be read by the general public and, hence, would render speech

68 | P a g e
meaningless. It will amount to the abridgement of speech with political consequences. (The
Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015)

The act of the Comelec in restraining private individuals from posting

tarpaulins expressing political views in their own private property is an impermissible
encroachment on the right to property. The Comelec prohibition is a deprivation of
property without due process.

Even though the tarpaulin is readily seen by the public, the tarpaulin remains the private
property of petitioners. Their right to use their property is likewise protected by the Constitution.

xxx

This court in Adiong held that a restriction that regulates where decals and stickers should
be posted is "so broad that it encompasses even the citizen’s private property." Consequently, it
violates Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution which provides that no person shall be deprived
of his property without due process of law. This court explained:
Property is more than the mere thing which a person owns, it includes the right to
acquire, use, and dispose of it; and the Constitution, in the 14th Amendment, protects these
essential attributes.

xxx

This court ruled that the regulation in Adiong violates private property rights:
The right to property may be subject to a greater degree of regulation but when this
right is joined by a "liberty" interest, the burden of justification on the part of the Government
must be exceptionally convincing and irrefutable. The burden is not met in this case.

Section 11 of Rep. Act 6646 is so encompassing and invasive that it prohibits the
posting or display of election propaganda in any place, whether public or private, except in
the common poster areas sanctioned by COMELEC. This means that a private person cannot
post his own crudely prepared personal poster on his own front door or on a post in his yard.
While the COMELEC will certainly never require the absurd, there are no limits to what
overzealous and partisan police officers, armed with a copy of the statute or regulation, may
do.

Respondents ordered petitioners, who are private citizens, to remove the tarpaulin from
their own property. The absurdity of the situation is in itself an indication of the
unconstitutionality of COMELEC’s interpretation of its powers.

Freedom of expression can be intimately related with the right to property. There may be
no expression when there is no place where the expression may be made. COMELEC’s
infringement upon petitioners’ property rights as in the present case also reaches out to
infringement on their fundamental right to speech.

Respondents have not demonstrated that the present state interest they seek to promote
justifies the intrusion into petitioners’ property rights. Election laws and regulations must be
reasonable. It must also acknowledge a private individual’s right to exercise property rights.
Otherwise, the due process clause will be violated.

x x x Consistent with our ruling in Adiong, we find that the act of respondents in seeking
to restrain petitioners from posting the tarpaulin in their own private property is an impermissible
encroachments on the right to property. (The Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections,
G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015)

The Comelec’s general role includes ensuring equal opportunities and reduce
spending among candidates and their registered political parties. It is not to regulate
or limit the speech of the electorate in the electoral exercise. Expression by the
electorate on contemporary issues is a form of speech protected as a fundamental
and primordial right by our Constitution.

COMELEC’s general role includes a mandate to ensure equal opportunities and reduce
spending among candidates and their registered political parties. It is not to regulate or limit the
speech of the electorate as it strives to participate in the electoral exercise.

69 | P a g e
 The tarpaulin in question may be viewed as producing a caricature of those who are
running for public office. Their message may be construed generalizations of very complex
individuals and party-list organizations.

They are classified into black and white: as belonging to "Team Patay" or "Team Buhay."

But this caricature, though not agreeable to some, is still protected speech.

xxx

Embedded in the tarpaulin, however, are opinions expressed by petitioners. It is a specie

of expression protected by our fundamental law. It is an expression designed to invite attention,
cause debate, and hopefully, persuade. x x x

What is involved in this case is the most sacred of speech forms: expression by the
electorate that tends to rouse the public to debate contemporary issues. This is not speech by
candidates or political parties to entice votes. It is a portion of the electorate telling candidates the
conditions for their election. It is the substantive content of the right to suffrage.

This is a form of speech x x x is protected as a fundamental and primordial right by our

Constitution. (The Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 205728, January 21,
2015)

Why the aggregate-based time air-time limits on campaign advertising is

invalid

Restriction on freedom of speech and of the press: The Comelec’s rule --

limiting the broadcast and radio advertisements of candidates and political parties for
national election positions to an aggregate total of one hundred twenty (120) minutes
and one hundred eighty (180) minutes for political campaigns or advertisements -- is
unreasonable and arbitrary, as it unreasonably restricts the freedom of speech and of
the press. It unduly restricts and constrains the ability of candidates and political
parties to reach out and communicate with the people.

Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 on airtime limits also goes against the
constitutional guaranty of freedom of expression, of speech and of the press.

The guaranty of freedom to speak is useless without the ability to communicate and
disseminate what is said. And where there is a need to reach a large audience, the need to access
the means and media for such dissemination becomes critical. This is where the press and
broadcast media come along. At the same time, the right to speak and to reach out would not be
meaningful if it is just a token ability to be heard by a few. It must be coupled with substantially
reasonable means by which the communicator and the audience could effectively interact. Section
9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615, with its adoption of the "aggregate-based" airtime limits
unreasonably restricts the guaranteed freedom of speech and of the press.

Political speech is one of the most important expressions protected by the Fundamental
Law. "[F]reedom of speech, of expression, and of the press are at the core of civil liberties and
have to be protected at all costs for the sake of democracy." Accordingly, the same must remain
unfettered unless otherwise justified by a compelling state interest.

xxx

Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 comes up with what is challenged as being
an unreasonable basis for determining the allowable air time that candidates and political parties
may avail of. Petitioner GMA came up with its analysis of the practical effects of such a regulation:

5.8. Given the reduction of a candidate's airtime minutes in the New Rules,
petitioner GMA estimates that a national candidate will only have 120 minutes to utilize for
his political advertisements in television during the whole campaign period of 88 days, or
will only have 81.81 seconds per day TV exposure allotment. If he chooses to place his
political advertisements in the 3 major TV networks in equal allocation, he will only have
27.27 seconds of airtime per network per day. This barely translates to 1 advertisement spot
on a 30-second spot basis in television.

5.9. With a 20-hour programming per day and considering the limits of a station's
coverage, it will be difficult for 1 advertising spot to make a sensible and feasible
70 | P a g e
 communication to the public, or in political propaganda, to "make known [a candidate's]
qualifications and stand on public issues".

xxx

The Court agrees. The assailed rule on "aggregate-based" airtime limits is unreasonable
and arbitrary as it unduly restricts and constrains the ability of candidates and political parties to
reach out and communicate with the people. Here, the adverted reason for imposing the
"aggregate-based" airtime limits - leveling the playing field - does not constitute a compelling state
interest which would justify such a substantial restriction on the freedom of candidates and
political parties to communicate their ideas, philosophies, platforms and programs of
government. x x x

It is also particularly unreasonable and whimsical to adopt the aggregate-based time limits
on broadcast time when we consider that the Philippines is not only composed of so many islands.
There are also a lot of languages and dialects spoken among the citizens across the country.
Accordingly, for a national candidate to really reach out to as many of the electorates as possible,
then it might also be necessary that he conveys his message through his advertisements in
languages and dialects that the people may more readily understand and relate to. To add all of
these airtimes in different dialects would greatly hamper the ability of such candidate to express
himself - a form of suppression of his political speech.

Respondent itself states that "[t]elevision is arguably the most cost effective medium of
dissemination. Even a slight increase in television exposure can significantly boost a candidate's
popularity, name recall and electability." If that be so, then drastically curtailing the ability of a
candidate to effectively reach out to the electorate would unjustifiably curtail his freedom to speak
as a means of connecting with the people. (GMA Network v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
205357, September 2, 2014)

Violation of the right to suffrage: The COMELEC’s aggregate time-limit rule

[rule limiting the broadcast and radio advertisements of candidates and political
parties for national election positions to an aggregate total of one hundred twenty
(120) minutes and one hundred eighty (180) minutes for political campaigns or
advertisements] violate the people’s right to suffrage by restricting the right of the
people to be adequately informed for the intelligent exercise of their right to
determine their own destiny.

Section 9 (a) of Resolution 9615 is violative of the people's right to suffrage.

Fundamental to the idea of a democratic and republican state is the right of the people to
determine their own destiny through the choice of leaders they may have in government. Thus,
the primordial importance of suffrage and the concomitant right of the people to be adequately
informed for the intelligent exercise of such birthright. (GMA Network v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 205357, September 2, 2014)

Why the Comelec prohibition on posting of an election campaign material

during an election period in Public Utility Vehicles (PUVs) and transport terminals is
void

The Comelec prohibition on posting of an election campaign material during an

election period in Public Utility Vehicles (PUVs) and transport terminals --constitutes
a prior restraint on the right to free expression. Prior restraints are presumed invalid.

Free speech may be identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter
of public concern without prior restraint or censorship and subsequent punishment. Prior
restraint refers to official governmental restrictions on the press or other forms of expression in
advance of actual publication or dissemination. Freedom from prior restraint is largely freedom
from government censorship of publications, whatever the form of censorship, and regardless of
whether it is wielded by the executive, legislative or judicial branch of the government. Any system
of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its
validity.

Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615 unduly
infringe on the fundamental right of the people to freedom of speech. Central to the prohibition
is the freedom of individuals, i.e., the owners of PUVs and private transport terminals, to express

71 | P a g e
their preference, through the posting of election campaign material in their property, and
convince others to agree with them.

Pursuant to the assailed provisions of Resolution No. 9615, posting an election campaign
material during an election period in PUVs and transport terminals carries with it the penalty of
revocation of the public utility franchise and shall make the owner thereof liable for an election
offense.

The prohibition constitutes a clear prior restraint on the right to free expression of the
owners of PUVs and transport terminals. As a result of the prohibition, owners of PUVs and
transport terminals are forcefully and effectively inhibited from expressing their preferences
under the pain of indictment for an election offense and the revocation of their franchise or permit
to operate.

It is now deeply embedded in our jurisprudence that freedom of speech and of the press
enjoys a preferred status in our hierarchy of rights. The rationale is that the preservation of other
rights depends on how well we protect our freedom of speech and of the press. x x x

Thus, in Adiong v. COMELEC, the Court struck down the COMELEC’s prohibition against
the posting of decals and stickers on "mobile places." The Court ratiocinated that:

Significantly, the freedom of expression curtailed by the questioned prohibition is

not so much that of the candidate or the political party. The regulation strikes at the freedom
of an individual to express his preference and, by displaying it on his car, to convince others
to agree with him. A sticker may be furnished by a candidate but once the car owner agrees
to have it placed on his private vehicle, the expression becomes a statement by the owner,
primarily his own and not of anybody else.

(1-United Transport Koalisyon [1-Utak] v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 206020,

April 14, 2015)

A content-neutral regulation, which merely controls the time, place or manner

of speech, is valid if the following requisites concur: first, the government regulation
is within the constitutional power of the Government; second, it furthers an important
or substantial governmental interest; third, the governmental interest is unrelated to
the suppression of free expression; and fourth, the incidental restriction on freedom
of expression is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
Prohibiting owners of PUVs and transport terminals from posting election campaign
materials is an invalid content-neutral regulation because, first, it is not within the
constitutionally delegated power of the Comelec, and second, there is no necessity to
restrict the right to free speech of the owners of PUVs and transport terminals.

The COMELEC claims that while Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615
may incidentally restrict the right to free speech of owners of PUVs and transport terminals, the
same is nevertheless constitutionally permissible since it is a valid content-neutral regulation.

The Court does not agree.

A content-neutral regulation, i.e., which is merely concerned with the incidents of the
speech, or one that merely controls the time, place or manner, and under well-defined standards,
is constitutionally permissible, even if it restricts the right to free speech, provided that the
following requisites concur: first, the government regulation is within the constitutional power of
the Government; second, it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; third, the
governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and fourth, the
incidental restriction on freedom of expression is no greater than is essential to the furtherance
of that interest.

Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 are content-neutral regulations since
they merely control the place where election campaign materials may be posted. However, the
prohibition is still repugnant to the free speech clause as it fails to satisfy all of the requisites for
a valid content-neutral regulation.

It is conceded that Resolution No. 9615, including the herein assailed provisions, furthers
an important and substantial governmental interest, i.e., ensuring equal opportunity, time and
space among candidates aimed at the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible
elections. It is further conceded that the governmental interest in imposing the said prohibition
is unrelated to the suppression of free expression. However, Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in

72 | P a g e
relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615, are not within the constitutionally delegated
power of the COMELEC under Section 4, Article IX-C of the Constitution. Also, there is absolutely
no necessity to restrict the right to free speech of the owners of PUVs and transport terminals. (1-
United Transport Koalisyon v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 206020, April 14, 2015)

Prohibiting owners of PUVs and transport terminals from posting election

campaign materials cannot be justified under the captive-audience doctrine. The
commuters are not forced or compelled to read the election campaign materials
posted on PUVs and transport terminals, nor are they incapable of declining to receive
the messages contained therein.

The COMELEC further points out that PUVs [Public Utility Vehicles] and transport
terminals hold a "captive audience" – commuters who have no choice but be subjected to the blare
of political propaganda. The COMELEC further claims that while owners of privately owned PUVs
and transport terminals have a right to express their views to those who wish to listen, they have
no right to force their message upon an audience incapable of declining to receive it.

The COMELEC’s claim is untenable.

The captive-audience doctrine states that when a listener cannot, as a practical matter,
escape from intrusive speech, the speech can be restricted. The "captive-audience" doctrine
recognizes that a listener has a right not to be exposed to an unwanted message in circumstances
in which the communication cannot be avoided.

A regulation based on the captive-audience doctrine is in the guise of censorship, which

undertakes selectively to shield the public from some kinds of speech on the ground that they are
more offensive than others. Such selective restrictions have been upheld only when the speaker
intrudes on the privacy of the home or the degree of captivity makes it either impossible or
impractical for the unwilling viewer or auditor to avoid exposure.

In Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Commission, the Supreme Court of the
United States of America (U.S. Supreme Court) struck down the order of New York Public Service
Commission, which prohibits public utility companies from including inserts in monthly bills
discussing controversial issues of public policy. The U.S. Supreme Court held that "[t]he
prohibition cannot be justified as being necessary to avoid forcing appellant’s views on a captive
audience, since customers may escape exposure to objectionable material simply by throwing the
bill insert into a wastebasket."

Similarly, in Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, the U.S. Supreme Court nullified a city
ordinance, which made it a public nuisance and a punishable offense for a drive-in movie theater
to exhibit films containing nudity, when the screen is visible from a public street or place. The
U.S. Supreme Court opined that the degree of captivity is not so great as to make it impracticable
for an unwilling viewer to avoid exposure x x x.

Thus, a government regulation based on the captive-audience doctrine may not be

justified if the supposed "captive audience" may avoid exposure to the otherwise intrusive speech.
The prohibition under Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 is not justified under
the captive-audience doctrine; the commuters are not forced or compelled to read the election
campaign materials posted on PUVs and transport terminals. Nor are they incapable of declining
to receive the messages contained in the posted election campaign materials since they may
simply avert their eyes if they find the same unbearably intrusive. (1-United Transport Koalisyon
v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 206020, April 14, 2015)

Why the Comelec’s regulation requiring disclosure of names of those who

commission or pay for election surveys, including subscribers of survey firms -- is
valid

Election surveys may influence voter preferences. When left unregulated,

election surveys can undermine the holding of "fair" elections, which is the purpose
of the Fair Election act. The Fair Election Act aims to realize the policy under the 1987
Constitution to guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, and reduce
political inequalities.

We sustain the validity of Resolution No. 9674. The names of those who commission or
pay for election surveys, including subscribers of survey firms, must be disclosed pursuant to
Section 5.2(a) of the Fair Election Act. This requirement is a valid regulation in the exercise of
police power and effects the constitutional policy of "guarantee[ing] equal access to opportunities
73 | P a g e
for public service[.]" Section 5.2(a)’s requirement of disclosing subscribers neither curtails
petitioners’ free speech rights nor violates the constitutional proscription against the impairment
of contracts.

xxx

Republic Act No. 9006 was adopted with the end in mind of "guarantee[ing] or ensur[ing]
equal opportunity for public service" x x x.

[T]he Fair Election Act provides means to realize the policy articulated in Article II,
Section 26 of the 1987 Constitution to "guarantee equal access to opportunities for public
service[.]" x x x

Apart from making real Article II, Section 26’s constitutional policy, the Fair Election Act
represents the legislature’s compliance with the requirement of Article XIII, Section 1: "Congress
. . . give[s] highest priority to the enactment of measures that . . . reduce . . . political inequalities
. . . by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common good."

xxx

x x x [T]he inclusion of published election surveys in a statute that regulates election

propaganda and other means through which candidates may shape voter preferences is itself
telling of the recognition that published election surveys, too, may influence voter preferences.
This inclusion is similarly telling of a recognition that, left unregulated, election surveys can
undermine the purposes of ensuring "fair" elections. x x x (Social Weather Station v. Commission
on Elections, G.R. No. 208062, April 27, 2015)

Election surveys may tend to shape voter preferences. When published,

election surveys partake of the nature of election propaganda subject to Comelec
regulation. The requirement of disclosing the names of subscribers to election surveys
is valid regulation of declarative speech by private entities in the context of an
election campaign because 1) it has basis in a statute, 2) it furthers not just an
important or substantial state interest but even a compelling one, which is to
guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, and 3) narrowly tailored
to meet the objective and is least restrictive means to achieve that objective.

Concededly, what are involved here are not election propaganda per se. Election surveys,
on their face, do not state or allude to preferred candidates. x x x When published, however, the
tendency to shape voter preferences comes into play. In this respect, published election surveys
partake of the nature of election propaganda. x x x Hence, Section 5.2 of the Fair Election Act’s
regulation of published surveys.

We thus proceed to evaluate Resolution No. 9674’s requirement of disclosing the names
of subscribers to election surveys in light of the requisites for valid regulation of declarative speech
by private entities in the context of an election campaign:

First, the text of Section 5.2(a) of the Fair Election Act supports the inclusion of
subscribers among those persons who "paid for the survey[.]" Thus, Resolution No. 9674 is a
regulation finding basis in statute.

COMELEC correctly points out that in Section 5.2(a) of the Fair Election Act, those who
"commissioned" and those who "paid for" the published survey are separated by the disjunctive
term "or." x x x

The second class makes no distinction between those who pay for a specific survey and
those who pay for election surveys in general. Indeed, subscribers do not escape the burden
ofpaying for the component articles comprising a subscription. x x x

Second, not only an important or substantial state interest but even a compelling one
reasonably grounds Resolution No. 9674’s inclusion of subscribers to election surveys. Thus,
regardless of whether an intermediate or strict standard is used, Resolution No. 9674 passes
scrutiny.

It is settled that constitutionally declared principles are a compelling state interest:

Compelling governmental interest would include constitutionally declared principles. xxx

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 [T]he regulation of election surveys effects the constitutional policy, articulated in Article
II, Section 26, and reiterated and affirmed in Article IX-C, Section 4 and Article XIII, Section 26
of the 1987 Constitution, of "guarantee[ing] equal access to opportunities for public service[.]"

Resolution No. 9674 addresses the reality that an election survey x x x can be a means to
shape the preference of voters and, thus, the outcome of elections. x x x Accordingly, the
imperative of "fair" elections impels their regulation.

Lastly, Resolution No. 9674 is "narrowly tailored to meet the objective of enhancing the
opportunity of all candidates to be heard and considering the primacy of the guarantee of free
expression" and is "demonstrably the least restrictive means to achieve that object."

While it does regulate expression (i.e., petitioners’ publication of election surveys), it does
not go so far as to suppress desired expression. There is neither prohibition nor censorship
specifically aimed at election surveys. The freedom to publish election surveys remains. All
Resolution No. 9674 does is articulate a regulation as regards the manner of publication, that is,
that the disclosure of those who commissioned and/or paid for, including those subscribed to,
published election surveys must be made. (Social Weather Station v. Commission on Elections,
G.R. No. 208062, April 7, 2015)

The Comelec’s regulation requiring disclosure of names of those who

commission or pay for election surveys is not a prior restraint as the disclosure
requirement kicks in only upon, not prior to, publication.

Prior restraint refers to official governmental restrictions on the press or other forms of
expression in advance of actual publication or dissemination. Freedom from prior restraint is
largely freedom from government censorship of publications, whatever the form of censorship,
and regardless of whether it is wielded by the executive, legislative or judicial branch of the
government. Thus, it precludes governmental acts that required approval of a proposal to publish;
licensing or permits as prerequisites to publication including the payment of license taxes for the
privilege to publish; and even injunctions against publication. Even the closure of the business
and printing offices of certain newspapers, resulting in the discontinuation of their printing and
publication, are deemed as previous restraint or censorship. Any law or official that requires some
form of permission to be had before publication can be made, commits an infringement of the
constitutional right, and remedy can be had at the courts.

The very definition of "prior restraint" negates petitioner’s assertions. Resolution No. 9674
poses no prohibition or censorship specifically aimed at election surveys. Apart from regulating
the manner of publication, petitioners remain free to publish election surveys. COMELEC
correctly points out that "[t]he disclosure requirement kicks in only upon, not prior to,
publication."

In any case, the requirement of disclosing subscribers is neither unduly burdensome nor
onerous. Prior to the promulgation of Resolution No. 9674, survey firms are already understood
to be bound by the requirement to disclose those who commission or pay for published election
surveys. Petitioners have been complying with this without incident since the Fair Election Act
was enacted in 2001. After more than a decade of compliance, it is odd for petitioners to suddenly
assail the disclosure requirement as unduly burdensome or onerous. (Social Weather Station v.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 208062, April 7, 2015)

The Comelec rule on mandatory right to reply is valid: The Constitution itself
mandates the right to reply. Moreover, radio and TV broadcasting companies do not
own the airwaves but are merely given the temporary privilege of using them. The
exercise of the privilege may reasonably be burdened with the performance by the
grantee of some form of public service.

Section 14 of Resolution No. 9615, as revised by Resolution No. 9631, provides:

SECTION 14. Right to Reply. - All registered political parties, party-list groups or
coalitions and bona fide candidates shall have the right to reply to charges published or aired
against them. The reply shall be given publicity by the newspaper, television, and/or radio
station which first printed or aired the charges with the same prominence or in the same
page or section or in the same time slot as the first statement. x x x

The Constitution itself provides as part of the means to ensure free, orderly, honest, fair
and credible elections, a task addressed to the COMELEC to provide for a right to reply. Given

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that express constitutional mandate, it could be seen that the Fundamental Law itself has weighed
in on the balance to be struck between the freedom of the press and the right to reply.

Moreover, as already discussed by the Court in Telecommunications and Broadcast

Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. v. Commission on Elections.
In truth, radio and television broadcasting companies, which are given franchises,
do not own the airwaves and frequencies through which they transmit broadcast signals and
images. They are merely given the temporary privilege of using them. Since a franchise is a
mere privilege, the exercise of the privilege may reasonably be burdened with the
performance by the grantee of some form of public service.

(GMA Network v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 205357, September 2, 2014)

RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

Under the Establishment Clause, the State is prohibited from sponsoring any
religion or favoring any religion as against other religions.

[T]he constitutional assurance of religious freedom provides two guarantees: the

Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause.

The establishment clause "principally prohibits the State from sponsoring any religion or
favoring any religion as against other religions. It mandates a strict neutrality in affairs among
religious groups." Essentially, it prohibits the establishment of a state religion and the use of
public resources for the support or prohibition of a religion. (Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819,
8 April 2014)

Non-Establishment Clause: The constitutional mandate that "no law shall be

made respecting an establishment of religion," is known as the non-establishment
clause. It simply means that the State cannot set up a Church; nor pass laws which
aid one religion, aid all religion, or prefer one religion over another nor force nor
influence a person to go to or remain away from church against his will or force him
to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. What non-establishment calls for is
government neutrality in religious matters.

On the opposite side of the spectrum is the constitutional mandate that "no law shall be
made respecting an establishment of religion," otherwise known as the non-establishment clause.
xxx

The non-establishment clause reinforces the wall of separation between Church and State.
It simply means that the State cannot set up a Church; nor pass laws which aid one religion, aid
all religion, or prefer one religion over another nor force nor influence a person to go to or remain
away from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion; that
the state cannot punish a person for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for
church attendance or nonattendance; that no tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to
support any religious activity or institution whatever they may be called or whatever form they
may adopt or teach or practice religion; that the state cannot openly or secretly participate in the
affairs of any religious organization or group and vice versa. Its minimal sense is that the state
cannot establish or sponsor an official religion.

In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the government can do
with religion, it also limits what religious sects can or cannot do. They can neither cause the
government to adopt their particular doctrines as policy for everyone, nor can they cause the
government to restrict other groups. To do so, in simple terms, would cause the State to adhere to
a particular religion and, thus, establish a state religion.

Father Bernas further elaborated on this matter, as follows:

"In effect, what non-establishment calls for is government neutrality in

religious matters. Such government neutrality may be summarized in four general
propositions: (1) Government must not prefer one religion over another or religion
over irreligion because such preference would violate voluntarism and breed
dissension; (2) Government funds must not be applied to religious purposes
because this too would violate voluntarism and breed interfaith dissension; (3)
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 Government action must not aid religion because this too can violate voluntarism
and breed interfaith dissension; [and] (4) Government action must not result in
excessive entanglement with religion because this too can violate voluntarism and
breed interfaith dissension."

(In re: Holding of Religious Rituals at the Hall of Justice Building in Quezon City, A.M.
No. 10-4-19-SC, March 7, 2017)

The Non-Establishment Clause calls for government neutrality in religious

matters. It is a grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to
utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of a party list registration. The
government must act for secular purposes.

Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as
lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs). Incorporated in 2003, Ang
Ladlad first applied for registration with the COMELEC in 2006. The application for accreditation
was denied x x x. On August 17, 2009, Ang Ladlad again filed a Petition for registration with the
COMELEC.

xxx

On November 11, 2009, after admitting the petitioner’s evidence, the COMELEC (Second
Division) dismissed the Petition on moral grounds, stating that:
x x x This Petition is dismissible on moral grounds.

xxx

x x x [P]etitioner tolerates immorality which offends religious beliefs.

xxx

Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that "[n]o law shall be made respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." At bottom, what our non-
establishment clause calls for is "government neutrality in religious matters." Clearly,
"governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality." We
thus find that it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize
the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad [party].

Rather than relying on religious belief, the legitimacy of the Assailed Resolutions should
depend, instead, on whether the COMELEC is able to advance some justification for its rulings
beyond mere conformity to religious doctrine. Otherwise stated, government must act for secular
purposes and in ways that have primarily secular effects. (Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. Commission
on Elections, G.R. No. 190582, April 8, 2010)

The free exercise clause prohibits government from inhibiting religious beliefs
with penalties for religious beliefs and practice, while the establishment clause
prohibits government from inhibiting religious belief with rewards for religious beliefs
and practices.

The establishment clause "principally prohibits the State from sponsoring any religion or
favoring any religion as against other religions. It mandates a strict neutrality in affairs among
religious groups." Essentially, it prohibits the establishment of a state religion and the use of
public resources for the support or prohibition of a religion.

On the other hand, the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability
of the human conscience. Under this part of religious freedom guarantee, the State is prohibited
from unduly interfering with the outside manifestations of one's belief and faith. Explaining the
concept of religious freedom, the Court, in Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union wrote:

The constitutional provisions not only prohibits legislation for the support of any
religious tenets or the modes of worship of any sect, thus forestalling compulsion by law of
the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship (U.S. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78,
88 L. ed. 1148, 1153), but also assures the free exercise of one's chosen form of
religion within limits of utmost amplitude. It has been said that the religion clauses
of the Constitution are all designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to
allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he
believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good.

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 Any legislation whose effect or purpose is to impede the observance of one or
all religions, or to discriminate invidiously between the religions, is invalid,
even though the burden may be characterized as being only indirect. (Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 10 L.ed.2d 965, 83 S. Ct. 1970) But if the state regulates conduct by
enacting, within its power, a general law which has for its purpose and effect to advance the
state's secular goals, the statute is valid despite its indirect burden on religious observance,
unless the state can accomplish its purpose without imposing such burden. (Braunfeld v.
Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 6 Led. 2d. 563, 81 S. Ct. 144; McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420,
444-5 and 449).

As expounded in Escritor,

The establishment and free exercise clauses were not designed to serve contradictory
purposes. They have a single goal-to promote freedom of individual religious beliefs and practices.
In simplest terms, the free exercise clause prohibits government from inhibiting religious beliefs
with penalties for religious beliefs and practice, while the establishment clause prohibits
government from inhibiting religious belief with rewards for religious beliefs and practices. In
other words, the two religion clauses were intended to deny government the power to use either
the carrot or the stick to influence individual religious beliefs and practices. (Imbong v. Ochoa,
G.R. No. 204819, 8 April 2014)

The Free Exercise Clause of the Constitution protects the freedom to believe
and the freedom to act on one’s beliefs. The individual is free to believe (or disbelieve)
as he pleases concerning the hereafter. But where the individual externalizes his
beliefs in acts or omissions that affect the public, his freedom to do so becomes
subject to the authority of the State.

[T]he right to believe or not to believe has again been enshrined in Section 5, Article III of
the 1987 Constitution:

Section 5. xxx. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and
worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. xxx.

Free Exercise Clause

Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental law.
xxx

"The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect - freedom to believe
and freedom to act on one's beliefs. The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined within the
realm of thought. The second is subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external
acts that affect the public welfare." Justice Isagani A. Cruz explained these two (2) concepts in this
wise:

(1) Freedom to Believe

The individual is free to believe (or disbelieve) as he pleases concerning the

hereafter. xxxx

(2) Freedom to Act on One's Beliefs

But where the individual externalizes his beliefs in acts or omissions that
affect the public, his freedom to do so becomes subject to the authority of the
State. As great as this liberty may be, religious freedom, like all other rights
guaranteed in the Constitution, can be enjoyed only with a proper regard for the
rights of others.

It is error to think that the mere invocation of religious freedom will

stalemate the State and render it impotent in protecting the general welfare. The
inherent police power can be exercised to prevent religious practices inimical to
society. And this is true even if such practices are pursued out of sincere religious
conviction and not merely for the purpose of evading the reasonable requirements
or prohibitions of the law.

(In re: Holding of Religious Rituals at the Hall of Justice Building in Quezon City, A.M.
No. 10-4-19-SC, March 7, 2017)

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 The guarantee of religious freedom is comprised of two parts: the freedom to
believe and the freedom to act on one's belief; the first part is absolute; the second
part is limited and subject to regulation where the external acts affect the public
welfare. In case of conflict, the court adheres to the doctrine of benevolent neutrality.

Corollary to the guarantee of free exercise of one's religion is the principle that the
guarantee of religious freedom is comprised of two parts: the freedom to believe, and the freedom
to act on one's belief. The first part is absolute. As explained in Gerona v. Secretary of Education:

The realm of belief and creed is infinite and limitless bounded only by one's
imagination and thought. So is the freedom of belief, including religious belief, limitless and
without bounds. One may believe in most anything, however strange, bizarre and
unreasonable the same may appear to others, even heretical when weighed in the scales of
orthodoxy or doctrinal standards. x x x

The second part however, is limited and subject to the awesome power of the State
and can be enjoyed only with proper regard to the rights of others. It is "subject to regulation
where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare."

Thus, in case of conflict between the free exercise clause and the State, the Court adheres
to the doctrine of benevolent neutrality. This has been clearly decided by the Court in Estrada v.
Escritor, (Escritor) where it was stated "that benevolent neutrality-accommodation, whether
mandatory or permissive, is the spirit, intent and framework underlying the Philippine
Constitution." (Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, 8 April 2014)

Meaning of benevolent neutrality: Government accommodation of religion may

be allowed, not to promote the government's favored form of religion, but to allow
individuals and groups to exercise their religion without hindrance. The purpose of
accommodation is to remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person's or
institution's religion.

The benevolent neutrality theory believes that with respect to these governmental actions,
accommodation of religion may be allowed, not to promote the government's favored form of
religion, but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion without hindrance. "The
purpose of accommodation is to remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person's or
institution's religion." "What is sought under the theory of accommodation is not a declaration of
unconstitutionality of a facially neutral law, but an exemption from its application or its
'burdensome effect,' whether by the legislature or the courts. (Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819,
8 April 2014)

Pursuant to the Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality, the conscientious objector's

claim to religious freedom would warrant an exemption from obligations under the
RH Law, unless the government succeeds in demonstrating a more compelling state
interest in the accomplishment of an important secular objective. To compel a
conscientious objector to act contrary to his religious belief and conviction would be
violate "the principle of non-coercion" enshrined in the right to free exercise of
religion.

While the RH Law, in espousing state policy to promote reproductive health manifestly
respects diverse religious beliefs in line with the Non-Establishment Clause, the same conclusion
cannot be reached with respect to Sections 7, 23 and 24 thereof. The said provisions commonly
mandate that a hospital or a medical practitioner to immediately refer a person seeking health
care and services under the law to another accessible healthcare provider despite their
conscientious objections based on religious or ethical beliefs.

In a situation where the free exercise of religion is allegedly burdened by government

legislation or practice, the compelling state interest test in line with the Court's espousal of the
Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality in Escritor, finds application. In this case, the conscientious
objector's claim to religious freedom would warrant an exemption from obligations under the RH
Law, unless the government succeeds in demonstrating a more compelling state interest in the
accomplishment of an important secular objective. Necessarily so, the plea of conscientious
objectors for exemption from the RH Law deserves no less than strict scrutiny.

In applying the test, the first inquiry is whether a conscientious objector's right to religious
freedom has been burdened. x x x

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 The Court is of the view that the obligation to refer imposed by the RH Law violates the
religious belief and conviction of a conscientious objector. Once the medical practitioner, against
his will, refers a patient seeking information on modem reproductive health products, services,
procedures and methods, his conscience is immediately burdened as he has been compelled to
perform an act against his beliefs. As Commissioner Joaquin A. Bernas (Commissioner Bernas)
has written, "at the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability of the human
conscience.”

xxx

Moreover, the guarantee of religious freedom is necessarily intertwined with the right to
free speech, it being an externalization of one's thought and conscience. This in turn includes the
right to be silent. With the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom follows the protection
that should be afforded to individuals in communicating their beliefs to others as well as the
protection for simply being silent. The Bill of Rights guarantees the liberty of the individual to
utter what is in his mind and the liberty not to utter what is not in his mind. While the RH Law
seeks to provide freedom of choice through informed consent, freedom of choice guarantees the
liberty of the religious conscience and prohibits any degree of compulsion or burden, whether
direct or indirect, in the practice of one's religion.

In case of conflict between the religious beliefs and moral convictions of individuals, on
one hand, and the interest of the State, on the other, to provide access and information on
reproductive health products, services, procedures and methods to enable the people to determine
the timing, number and spacing of the birth of their children, the Court is of the strong view that
the religious freedom of health providers, whether public or private, should be accorded primacy.
Accordingly, a conscientious objector should be exempt from compliance with the mandates of
the RH Law. If he would be compelled to act contrary to his religious belief and conviction, it
would be violative of "the principle of non-coercion" enshrined in the constitutional right to free
exercise of religion.

xxx

The same holds true with respect to non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned
and operated by a religious group and health care service providers. Considering that Section 24
of the RH Law penalizes such institutions should they fail or refuse to comply with their duty to
refer under Section 7 and Section 23(a)(3), the Court deems that it must be struck down for being
violative of the freedom of religion. The same applies to Section 23(a)(l) and (a)(2) in relation to
Section 24, considering that in the dissemination of information regarding programs and services
and in the performance of reproductive health procedures, the religious freedom of health care
service providers should be respected.

x x x The punishment of a healthcare service provider, who fails and/or refuses to refer a
patient to another, or who declines to perform reproductive health procedure on a patient because
incompatible religious beliefs, is a clear inhibition of a constitutional guarantee which the Court
cannot allow. (Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, 8 April 2014)

Exception: Life threatening cases: The government may compel healthcare

providers to give reproductive health care, because the right to life of the mother
should be given preference. If it is necessary to save the life of a mother, procedures
endangering the life of the child may be resorted to even if is against the religious
sentiments of the medical practitioner.

All this notwithstanding, the Court properly recognizes a valid exception set forth in the
law. While generally healthcare service providers cannot be forced to render reproductive health
care procedures if doing it would contravene their religious beliefs, an exception must be made in
life-threatening cases that require the performance of emergency procedures. In these situations,
the right to life of the mother should be given preference, considering that a referral by a medical
practitioner would amount to a denial of service, resulting to unnecessarily placing the life of a
mother in grave danger. x x x

In a conflict situation between the life of the mother and the life of a child, the doctor is
morally obliged always to try to save both lives. If, however, it is impossible, the resulting death
to one should not be deliberate.

xxx

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 Accordingly, if it is necessary to save the life of a mother, procedures endangering the life
of the child may be resorted to even if is against the religious sentiments of the medical
practitioner. As quoted above, whatever burden imposed upon a medical practitioner in this case
would have been more than justified considering the life he would be able to save. (Imbong v.
Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, 8 April 2014)

Mandatory family planning seminars: No violation of religious freedom because

attendees are not compelled to accept the information given to them.

Anent the requirement imposed under Section 152 as a condition for the issuance of a
marriage license, the Court finds the same to be a reasonable exercise of police power by the
government. A cursory reading of the assailed provision bares that the religious freedom of the
petitioners is not at all violated. All the law requires is for would-be spouses to attend a seminar
on parenthood, family planning breastfeeding and infant nutrition. It does not even mandate the
type of family planning methods to be included in the seminar, whether they be natural or
artificial. As correctly noted by the OSG, those who receive any information during their
attendance in the required seminars are not compelled to accept the information given to them,
are completely free to reject the information they find unacceptable, and retain the freedom to
decide on matters of family life without the intervention of the State. (Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No.
204819, 8 April 2014)

Why the holding of religious rituals such as Catholic masses at the basement
of any hall of justice may be allowed

Allowing the practice does not violate the principle of separation of Church and
State. The State recognizes the inherent right of the people to freely exercise their
religion. Our very own Constitution recognizes the religiosity of our people. Allowing
religion to flourish is not contrary to the principle of separation of Church and State.

The Court agrees with the findings and recommendation of the OCA and denies the prayer
of Valenciano that the holding of religious rituals of any of the world's religions in the QC Hall of
Justice or any halls of justice all over the country be prohibited.

The Holding of Religious Rituals in the Halls of Justice does not Amount to a Union of
Church and State

xxx Valenciano is against the holding of religious rituals in the halls of justice on the
ground that it violates the constitutional provision on the separation of Church and State and the
constitutional prohibition against the appropriation of public money or property for the benefit
of a sect, church, denomination, or any other system of religion. Indeed, Section 6, Article II of
the 1987 Constitution provides:

The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.

The Court once pronounced that "our history, not to speak of the history of mankind, has
taught us that the union of church and state is prejudicial to both, for occasions might arise when
the state will use the church, and the church the state, as a weapon in the furtherance of their
respective ends and aims."

xxx

This, notwithstanding, the State still recognizes the inherent right of the people to have
some form of belief system, whether such may be belief in a Supreme Being, a certain way of life,
or even an outright rejection of religion. Our very own Constitution recognizes the heterogeneity
and religiosity of our people as reflected in lmbong v. Ochoa, as follows:

xxx The undisputed fact is that our people generally believe in a deity, whatever they
conceived Him to be, and to Whom they called for guidance and enlightenment in crafting our
fundamental law. xxx Thus, the preamble of the present Constitution reads:

We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order to build a
just and humane society, xxx

The Filipino people in "imploring the aid of Almighty God" manifested their spirituality
innate in our nature and consciousness as a people, shaped by tradition and historical experience.
As this is embodied in the preamble, it means that the State recognizes with respect the influence
of religion in so far as it instills into the mind the purest principles of morality. Moreover, in

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recognition of the contributions of religion to society, the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions
contain benevolent and accommodating provisions towards religions such as tax exemption of
church property, salary of religious officers in government institutions, and optional religious
instructions in public schools. [Emphases supplied]

In Aglipay v. Ruiz (Aglipay), the Court acknowledged how religion could serve as a
motivating force behind each person's actions:

xxx

Thus, the right to believe or not to believe has again been enshrined in Section 5, Article
III of the 1987 Constitution:

Section 5. xxx. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship,
without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. xxx.

xxxx

Allowing religion to flourish is not contrary to the principle of separation of Church and
State. In fact, these two principles are in perfect harmony with each other.

The State is aware of the existence of religious movements whose members believe in the
divinity of Jose Rizal. Yet, it does not implement measures to suppress the said religious sects.
xxx

As pointed out by Judge Lutero, "the Roman Catholics express their worship through the
holy mass and to stop these would be tantamount to repressing the right to the free exercise of
their religion. Our Muslim brethren, who are government employees, are allowed to worship their
Allah even during office hours inside their own offices. The Seventh Day Adventists are exempted
from rendering Saturday duty because their religion prohibits them from working on a Saturday.
Even Christians have been allowed to conduct their own bible studies in their own offices. All
these have been allowed in respect of the workers' right to the free exercise of their religion. xxx"

Clearly, allowing the citizens to practice their religion is not equivalent to a fusion of
Church and State. (In re: Holding of Religious Rituals at the Hall of Justice Building in Quezon
City, A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC, March 7, 2017)

Although religious freedom is not absolute, a compelling interest of the state

can prevail over the fundamental right to religious liberty. To successfully invoke
compelling state interest, it must be demonstrated that the masses in the QC Hall of
Justice unduly disrupt the delivery of public services or affect the judges and
employees in the performance of their official functions. In this case, there is no state
interest compelling enough to prohibit the exercise of religious freedom in the halls
of justice.

Religious freedom, however, is not absolute. It cannot have its way if there is a compelling
state interest. To successfully invoke compelling state interest, it must be demonstrated that the
masses in the QC Hall of Justice unduly disrupt the delivery of public services or affect the judges
and employees in the performance of their official functions. In Estrada v. Escritor, the Court
expounded on the test as follows:

The "compelling state interest" test is proper where conduct is involved for
the whole gamut of human conduct has different effects on the state's interests:
some effects may be immediate and short-term while others delayed and far-
reaching. A test that would protect the interests of the state in preventing a
substantive evil, whether immediate or delayed, is therefore necessary. However,
not any interest of the state would suffice to prevail over the right to religious
freedom as this is a fundamental. right that enjoys a preferred position in the
hierarchy of rights - "the most inalienable and sacred of all human rights", in the
words of Jefferson. This right is sacred for an invocation of the Free Exercise
Clause is an appeal to a higher sovereignty. The entire constitutional order of
limited government is premised upon an acknowledgment of such higher
sovereignty, thus the Filipinos implore the "aid of Almighty God in order to build
a just and humane society and establish a government." As held in Sherbert, only
the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests can limit this fundamental
right. A mere balancing of interests which balances a right with just a colorable
state interest is therefore not appropriate. Instead, only a compelling interest of

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 the state can prevail over the fundamental right to religious liberty. The test
requires the state to carry a heavy burden, a compelling one, for to do otherwise
would allow the state to batter religion, especially the less powerful ones until they
are destroyed. xxxx The "compelling state interest" serves the purpose of revering
religious liberty while at the same time affording protection to the paramount
interests of the state. This was the test used in Sherbert which involved conduct,
i.e. refusal to work on Saturdays. In the end, the "compelling state interest" test,
by upholding the paramount interests of the state, seeks to protect the very state,
without which, religious liberty will not be preserved.xxx

As reported by the Executive Judges of Quezon City, the masses were being conducted
only during noon breaks and were not disruptive of public services. The court proceedings were
not being distracted or interrupted and that the performance of the judiciary employees were not
being adversely affected. Moreover, no Civil Service rules were being violated. As there has been
no detrimental effect on the public service or prejudice to the State, there is simply no state
interest compelling enough to prohibit the exercise of religious freedom in the halls of justice. (In
re: Holding of Religious Rituals at the Hall of Justice Building in Quezon City, A.M. No. 10-4-19-
SC, March 7, 2017)

Allowing the holding of Catholic masses at the basement of the QC Hall of

Justice is not a case of establishment, but merely accommodation. To give life to the
constitutional right of freedom of religion, the State adopts a policy of
accommodation. Benevolent neutrality allows accommodation of religion under
certain circumstances. Accommodations are government policies that take religion
specifically into account, not to promote the government's favored form of religion,
but to allow individuals to exercise their religion without hindrance. Their purpose or
effect therefore is to remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person's or
institution's religion.

In order to give life to the constitutional right of freedom of religion, the State adopts a
policy of accommodation. Accommodation is a recognition of the reality that some governmental
measures may not be imposed on a certain portion of the population for the reason that these
measures are contrary to their religious beliefs. As long as it can be shown that the exercise of the
right does not impair the public welfare, the attempt of the State to regulate or prohibit such right
would be an unconstitutional encroachment.

In Estrada v. Escritor, the Court adopted a policy of benevolent neutrality:

With religion looked upon with benevolence and not hostility, benevolent
neutrality allows accommodation of religion under certain circumstances.
Accommodations are government policies that take religion specifically into
account not to promote the government's favored form of religion, but to allow
individuals and groups to exercise their religion without hindrance. Their purpose
or effect therefore is to remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person's
or institution's religion. As Justice Brennan explained, the "government [may] take
religion into account ... to exempt, when possible, from generally applicable
governmental regulation individuals whose religious beliefs and practices would
otherwise thereby be infringed, or to create without state involvement an
atmosphere in which voluntary religious exercise may flourish." [Emphases
supplied]

In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union, the Court upheld the exemption of
members of Iglesia ni Cristo from the coverage of a closed shop agreement between their
employer and a union, because it would violate the teaching of their church not to affiliate with a
labor organization.

In Ebralinag v. Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu, the petitioners, who were

members of the Jehovah 's Witnesses, refused to salute the flag, sing the national anthem, and
recite the patriotic pledge for it is their belief that those were acts of worship or religious devotion,
which they could not conscientiously give to anyone or anything except God. The Court
accommodated them and granted them an exemption from observing the flag ceremony out of
respect for their religious beliefs.

Further, several laws have been enacted to accommodate religion. The Revised
Administrative Code of 1987 has declared Maundy Thursday, Good Friday, and Christmas Day as
regular holidays. Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9177 proclaimed the FIRST Day of Shawwal, the tenth
month of the Islamic Calendar, a national holiday for the observance of Eidul Fitr (the end of
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Ramadan). R.A. No. 9849 declared the tenth day of Zhu/ Hijja, the twelfth month of the Islamic
Calendar, a national holiday for the observance of Eidul Adha. Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
1083, otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, expressly allows
a Filipino Muslim to have more than one (1) wife and exempts him from the crime of bigamy
punishable under Revised Penal Code (RPC). The same Code allows Muslims to have divorce.

As to Muslims in government offices, Section 3 of P.D. No. 291, as amended by P.D. No.
322, provides:

Sec. 3. (a) During the fasting season on the month of Ramadan, all Muslim
employees in the national government, government-owned or controlled
corporations, provinces, cities, municipalities and other instrumentalities shall
observe office hours from seven-thirty in the morning (7:30 a.m.) to three-thirty
in the afternoon (3:30 p.m.) without lunch break or coffee breaks, and that there
shall be no diminution of salary or wages, provided, that the employee who is not
fasting is not entitled to the benefit of this provision.

Pursuant thereto, the CSC promulgated Resolution No. 81-1277, dated November 13, 1981,
which reads in part:

2. During "Ramadan" the Fasting month (30 days) of the Muslims, the Civil Service official
time of 8 o'clock to 12 o'clock and 1 o'clock to 5 o'clock is hereby modified to 7:30 AM. to 3:30
P.M. without noon break and the difference of 2 hours is not counted as undertime.

Following the decree, in Re: Request of Muslim Employees in the Different Courts in
Iligan City (Re: Office Hours), the Court recognized that the observance of Ramadan as integral
to the Islamic faith and allowed Muslim employees in the Judiciary to hold flexible office hours
from 7:30 o'clock in the morning to 3:30 o'clock in the afternoon without any break during the
period. This is a clear case of accommodation because Section 5, Rule XVII of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing Book V of E.0. No. 292, enjoins all civil servants, of whatever religious
denomination, to render public service of no less than eight (8) hours a day or forty (40) hours a
week.

xxx

Establishment entails a positive action on the part of the State. Accommodation, on the
other hand, is passive. In the former, the State becomes involved through the use of government
resources with the primary intention of setting up a state religion. In the latter, the State, without
being entangled, merely gives consideration to its citizens who want to freely exercise their
religion.

In a September 12, 2003 Memorandum for Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., the Office
of the Chief Attorney recommended to deny, on constitutional grounds, the request of Rev. Fr.
Carlo M. Ilagan to hold a oneday vigil in honor of the Our Lady of Caysasay within the premises
of the Court. Such controversy must be distinguished from the present issue in that with respect
to the former, a Catholic priest was the one who requested for the vigil. Moreover, in that case,
the vigil would take one (1) whole working day; whereas in this case, the masses are held at the
initiative of Catholic employees and only during the thirty-minute lunch break. (In re: Holding of
Religious Rituals at the Hall of Justice Building in Quezon City, A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC, March 7,
2017)

Guided by the foregoing, it is our considered view that the holding of Catholic masses at
the basement of the QC Hall of Justice is not a case of establishment, but merely accommodation.
First, there is no law, ordinance or circular issued by any duly constitutive authorities expressly
mandating that judiciary employees attend the Catholic masses at the basement. Second, when
judiciary employees attend the masses to profess their faith, it is at their own initiative as they are
there on their own free will and volition, without any coercion from the judges or administrative
officers. Third, no government funds are being spent because the lightings and airconditioning
continue to be operational even if there are no religious rituals there. Fourth, the basement has
neither been converted into a Roman Catholic chapel nor has it been permanently appropriated
for the exclusive use of its faithful. Fifth, the allowance of the masses has not prejudiced other
religions.

xxx

That the holding of masses at the basement of the QC Hall of Justice may offend non-
Catholics is no reason to proscribe it. Our Constitution ensures and mandates an unconditional
tolerance, without regard to whether those who seek to profess their faith belong to the majority
or to the minority. It is emphatic in saying that "the free exercise and enjoyment of religious

84 | P a g e
profession and worship shall be without discrimination or preference." Otherwise,
accommodation or tolerance would just be mere lip service.

One cannot espouse that the constitutional freedom of religion ensures tolerance, but, in
reality, refuses to practice what he preaches. One cannot ask for tolerance when he refuses to do
the same for others.

In fine, the Court denies the plea that the holding of Catholic masses at the basement of
the QC Hall of Justice be prohibited because the said practice does not violate the constitutional
principle of separation of Church and State. (In re: Holding of Religious Rituals at the Hall of
Justice Building in Quezon City, A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC, March 7, 2017)

RIGHT TO PRIVACY

The right to privacy is the right to be let alone.

The right to privacy is enshrined in our Constitution and in our laws. It is defined as "the
right to be free from unwarranted exploitation of one’s person or from intrusion into one’s private
activities in such a way as to cause humiliation to a person’s ordinary sensibilities." It is the right
of an individual "to be free from unwarranted publicity, or to live without unwarranted
interference by the public in matters in which the public is not necessarily concerned." Simply
put, the right to privacy is "the right to be let alone." (Spouses Hing v. Choachuy, G.R. No. 179736,
June 26, 2013)

Right to privacy may extend to places where one has the right to exclude the
public or deny them access, such as a business office.

An individual’s right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code should not be confined
to his house or residence as it may extend to places where he has the right to exclude the public
or deny them access. The phrase "prying into the privacy of another’s residence," therefore, covers
places, locations, or even situations which an individual considers as private. And as long as his
right is recognized by society, other individuals may not infringe on his right to privacy. (Spouses
Hing v. Choachuy, G.R. No. 179736, June 26, 2013)

The "reasonable expectation of privacy" test should be used to determine

whether there is a violation of the right to privacy. The reasonableness of a person’s
expectation of privacy depends on a two-part test: (1) whether, by his conduct, the
individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy; and (2) this expectation is one that
society recognizes as reasonable.

In ascertaining whether there is a violation of the right to privacy, courts use the
"reasonable expectation of privacy" test. This test determines whether a person has a reasonable
expectation of privacy and whether the expectation has been violated. In Ople v. Torres, we
enunciated that "the reasonableness of a person’s expectation of privacy depends on a two-part
test: (1) whether, by his conduct, the individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy; and (2)
this expectation is one that society recognizes as reasonable." Customs, community norms, and
practices may, therefore, limit or extend an individual’s "reasonable expectation of
privacy." Hence, the reasonableness of a person’s expectation of privacy must be determined on a
case-to-case basis since it depends on the factual circumstances surrounding the case. (Spouses
Hing v. Choachuy, G.R. No. 179736, June 26, 2013)

Surveillance cameras should not pry into or cover places where there is
reasonable expectation of privacy.

In this day and age, video surveillance cameras are installed practically everywhere for the
protection and safety of everyone. The installation of these cameras, however, should not cover
places where there is reasonable expectation of privacy, unless the consent of the individual,
whose right to privacy would be affected, was obtained. Nor should these cameras be used to pry
into the privacy of another’s residence or business office as it would be no different from
eavesdropping, which is a crime under Republic Act No. 4200 or the Anti-Wiretapping Law.

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 xxx

x x x [P]etitioners have a "reasonable expectation of privacy" in their property, whether

they use it as a business office or as a residence and that the installation of video surveillance
cameras directly facing petitioners’ property or covering a significant portion thereof, without
their consent, is a clear violation of their right to privacy. As we see then, the issuance of a
preliminary injunction was justified. (Spouses Hing v. Choachuy, G.R. No. 179736, June 26,
2013)

To have an expectation of privacy in Facebook posts, a user must show

intention to keep certain posts private through the use of privacy tools. A Facebook
user who opts to make use of a privacy tool to grant or deny access to his or her post
or profile detail should not be denied the informational privacy right which necessarily
accompanies said choice.

The concept of privacy has, through time, greatly evolved, with technological
advancements having an influential part therein. This evolution was briefly recounted in former
Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno’s speech, The Common Right to Privacy, where he explained the
three strands of the right to privacy, viz: (1) locational or situational privacy; (2) informational
privacy; and (3) decisional privacy. Of the three, what is relevant to the case at bar is the right to
informational privacy––usually defined as the right of individuals to control information about
themselves.

With the availability of numerous avenues for information gathering and data sharing
nowadays, not to mention each system’s inherent vulnerability to attacks and intrusions, there is
more reason that every individual’s right to control said flow of information should be protected
and that each individual should have at least a reasonable expectation of privacy in cyberspace. x
xx

xxx

The question now though is up to what extent is the right to privacy protected in [online
social network] OSNs? x x x

xxx

To address concerns about privacy, but without defeating its purpose, Facebook was
armed with different privacy tools designed to regulate the accessibility of a user’s profile as well
as information uploaded by the user. x x x

xxx

The foregoing are privacy tools, available to Facebook users, designed to set up barriers to
broaden or limit the visibility of his or her specific profile content, statuses, and photos, among
others, from another user’s point of view. x x x

x x x It is through the availability of said privacy tools that many OSN users are said to
have a subjective expectation that only those to whom they grant access to their profile will view
the information they post or upload thereto.

This, however, does not mean that any Facebook user automatically has a protected
expectation of privacy in all of his or her Facebook activities.

Before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or her OSN activity, it is first necessary
that said user, in this case the children of petitioners, manifest the intention to keep certain posts
private, through the employment of measures to prevent access thereto or to limit its visibility.
And this intention can materialize in cyberspace through the utilization of the OSN’s privacy tools.
In other words, utilization of these privacy tools is the manifestation, in cyber world, of the user’s
invocation of his or her right to informational privacy.

Therefore, a Facebook user who opts to make use of a privacy tool to grant or deny access
to his or her post or profile detail should not be denied the informational privacy right which
necessarily accompanies said choice. x x x

xxx

It is well to note that not one of petitioners disputed Escudero’s sworn account that her
students, who are the minors’ Facebook "friends," showed her the photos using their own

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Facebook accounts. This only goes to show that no special means to be able to view the allegedly
private posts were ever resorted to by Escudero’s students, and that it is reasonable to assume,
therefore, that the photos were, in reality, viewable either by (1) their Facebook friends, or (2) by
the public at large.

Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is "Public," it can be surmised that
the photographs in question were viewable to everyone on Facebook, absent any proof that
petitioners’ children positively limited the disclosure of the photograph. If such were the case,
they cannot invoke the protection attached to the right to informational privacy. The ensuing
pronouncement in US v. Gines-Perez is most instructive:
[A] person who places a photograph on the Internet precisely intends to forsake and
renounce all privacy rights to such imagery, particularly under circumstances such as here,
where the Defendant did not employ protective measures or devices that would have
controlled access to the Web page or the photograph itself.

xxx

In sum, there can be no quibbling that the images in question, or to be more precise, the
photos of minor students scantily clad, are personal in nature, likely to affect, if indiscriminately
circulated, the reputation of the minors enrolled in a conservative institution. However, the
records are bereft of any evidence, other than bare assertions that they utilized Facebook’s privacy
settings to make the photos visible only to them or to a select few. Without proof that they placed
the photographs subject of this case within the ambit of their protected zone of privacy, they
cannot now insist that they have an expectation of privacy with respect to the photographs in
question. (Vivares v. St. Theresa’s College, G.R. No. 202666, September 29, 2014)

An ordinance requiring property owners to expose their property by limiting

the height of fences to one meter and requiring fences in excess of one meter to be
at least 80% see-thru is a violation of the right to privacy of the property owners.

The petitioners argue that x x x Section 3.1 [of Ordinance No. 192] limiting the height of
fences to one meter and requiring fences in excess of one meter to be at least 80% see-thru, should
remain valid and enforceable against the respondents.

xxx

It also appears that requiring the exposure of their property via a see-thru fence is violative
of their right to privacy, considering that the residence of the Benedictine nuns is also located
within the property. The right to privacy has long been considered a fundamental right guaranteed
by the Constitution that must be protected from intrusion or constraint. The right to privacy is
essentially the right to be let alone, as governmental powers should stop short of certain intrusions
into the personal life of its citizens. It is inherent in the concept of liberty, enshrined in the Bill of
Rights (Article III) in Sections 1, 2, 3(1), 6, 8, and 17, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.

The enforcement of Section 3.1 would, therefore, result in an undue interference with the
respondents’ rights to property and privacy. Section 3.1 of Ordinance No. 192 is, thus, also invalid
and cannot be enforced against the respondents. (Fernando v. St. Scholastica’s College, G.R. No.
161107, March 12, 2013)

RIGHT TO PEACEABLY ASSEMBLE

Freedom of assembly is not to be limited or denied, except on a showing of a

clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the state has a right to prevent. If
the mayor is to refuse or modify (the venue for example) of an application for a permit
to a rally, such refusal or modification must be based on the clear and present danger
test; also the mayor must immediately inform the applicant who should be heard first
on the perceived imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil that may warrant
the change of venue.

In Bayan, Karapatan, Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP) v. Ermita, the Court

reiterated:

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 x x x Freedom of assembly connotes the right of the people to meet peaceably
for consultation and discussion of matters of public concern. It is entitled to be
accorded the utmost deference and respect. It is not to be limited, much less
denied, except on a showing, as is the case with freedom of expression,
of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the state has a
right to prevent. x x x The sole justification for a limitation on the
exercise of this right, so fundamental to the maintenance of democratic
institutions, is the danger, of a character both grave and imminent, of a
serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health, or any other
legitimate public interest. (emphasis supplied)

The Court in Bayan stated that the provisions of the Public Assembly Act of 1985
practically codified the 1983 ruling in Reyes v. Bagatsing. In juxtaposing Sections 4 to 6 of the
Public Assembly Act with the pertinent portion of the Reyes case, the Court elucidated as follows:

x x x [The public official concerned shall] appraise whether there may be

valid objections to the grant of the permit or to its grant but at another public
place. It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear
and present danger test be the standard for the decision reached. If he is of the view
that there is such an imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, the applicants
must be heard on the matter. Thereafter, his decision, whether favorable or adverse,
must be transmitted to them at the earliest opportunity. Thus if so minded, they can
have recourse to the proper judicial authority. (italics and underscoring supplied)

In modifying the permit outright, respondent gravely abused his discretion when he did
not immediately inform the IBP who should have been heard first on the matter of his perceived
imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil that may warrant the changing of the venue. The
opportunity to be heard precedes the action on the permit, since the applicant may directly go to
court after an unfavorable action on the permit.

Respondent failed to indicate how he had arrived at modifying the terms of the permit
against the standard of a clear and present danger test which, it bears repeating, is an
indispensable condition to such modification. Nothing in the issued permit adverts to an
imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, which blank denial or modification would, when
granted imprimatur as the appellate court would have it, render illusory any judicial scrutiny
thereof. (Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Atienza, G.R. No. 175241, February 24, 2010)

RIGHT TO LIBERTY:

THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

The waiver by the detainee or arrested person of his right to be delivered to

the proper judicial authorities within the periods provided in Article 125 of the RPC
does not vest upon the DOJ, PPO, BJMP, and PNP the unbridled right to indefinitely
incarcerate him. The waiver of Article 125 must coincide with the prescribed period
for preliminary investigation. Detention beyond this period violates the accused's
constitutional right to liberty. Stated differently, the waiver of the effects of Article
125 of the RPC is not a license to detain a person ad infinitum and does not trump
his constitutional right in cases where probable cause was initially found wanting by
reason of the dismissal of the complaint filed before the prosecutor's office even if
such dismissal is on appeal, reconsideration, reinvestigation or on automatic review.

This is a petition for the issuance of writ of habeas corpus with a petition for declaratory
relief filed by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Pangasinan Chapter Legal Aid, xxx.

The petition claims that as a result of jail visitations participated in by the IBP Legal Aid
Program, as well as a series of consultations with the Philippine National Police (PNP) on the
extant condition of detention prisoners, it was discovered that several detention prisoners had
been languishing in jail for years without a case being filed in court by the prosecutor's office and
without definite findings as to the existence or nonexistence of probable cause.

xxxx

The rule is that a person subject of a warrantless arrest must be delivered to the proper
judicial authorities within the periods provided in Article 125 of the RPC, otherwise, the public
88 | P a g e
official or employee could be held liable for the failure to deliver except if grounded on reasonable
and allowable delays. Article 125 of the RPC is intended to prevent any abuse resulting from
confining a person without informing him of his offense and without allowing him to post bail. It
punishes public officials or employees who shall detain any person for some legal ground but fail
to deliver such person to the proper judicial authorities within the periods prescribed by law. In
case the detention is without legal ground, the person arrested can charge the arresting officer
with arbitrary detention under Article 124 of the RPC. This is without prejudice to the possible
filing of an action for damages under Article 32 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines.

Article 125 of the RPC, however, can be waived if the detainee who was validly arrested
without a warrant opts for the conduct of preliminary investigation. The question to be addressed
here, therefore, is whether such waiver gives the State the right to detain a person indefinitely.

The Court answers in the negative.

The waiver of Article 125 of the RPC does not vest upon the DOJ, PPO, BJMP, and PNP
the unbridled right to indefinitely incarcerate an arrested person and subject him to the whims
and caprices of the reviewing prosecutor of the DOJ. The waiver of Article 125 must coincide with
the prescribed period for preliminary investigation as mandated by Section 7, Rule 112 of the
Rules of Court. Detention beyond this period violates the accused's constitutional right to liberty.

Stated differently, the waiver of the effects of Article 125 of the RPC is not a license to
detain a person ad infinitum. Waiver of a detainee's right to be delivered to proper judicial
authorities as prescribed by Article 125 of the RPC does not trump his constitutional right in cases
where probable cause was initially found wanting by reason of the dismissal of the complaint
filed before the prosecutor's office even if such dismissal is on appeal, reconsideration,
reinvestigation or on automatic review. Every person's basic right to liberty is not to be construed
as waived by mere operation of Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. The fundamental law
provides limits and this must be all the more followed especially so that detention is proscribed
absent probable cause.

Accordingly, the Court rules that a detainee under such circumstances must be promptly
released to avoid violation of the constitutional right to liberty, despite a waiver of Article 125, if
the 15-day period (or the thirty 30- day period in cases of violation of R.A. No. 91659 ) for the
conduct of the preliminary investigation lapses. This rule also applies in cases where the
investigating prosecutor resolves to dismiss the case, even if such dismissal was appealed to the
DOJ or made the subject of a motion for reconsideration, reinvestigation or automatic review.
The reason is that such dismissal automatically results in a prima facie finding of lack of probable
cause to file an information in court and to detain a person.

The Court is aware that this decision may raise discomfort to some, especially at this time
when the present administration aggressively wages its "indisputably popular war on illegal
drugs." As Justice Diosdado Peralta puts it, that the security of the public and the interest of the
State would be jeopardized is not a justification to trample upon the constitutional rights of the
detainees against deprivation of liberty without due process of law, to be presumed innocent until
the contrary is proved and to a speedy disposition of the case.

WHEREFORE, it is hereby declared, and ruled, that all detainees whose pending cases
have gone beyond the mandated periods for the conduct of preliminary investigation, or whose
cases have already been dismissed on inquest or preliminary investigation, despite pending
appeal, reconsideration, reinvestigation or automatic review by the Secretary of Justice, are
entitled to be released pursuant to their constitutional right to liberty and their constitutional
right against unreasonable seizures, unless detained for some other lawful cause. (Integrated
Bar of the Philippines v. Department of Justice, G.R. No. 232413, July 25, 2017)

A person is illegally arrested and detained because of a mistaken identity can

avail himself of a Petition for Habeas Corpus.

Petitioner Salibo was not arrested by virtue of any warrant charging him of an offense. He
was not restrained under a lawful process or an order of a court. He was illegally deprived of his
liberty, and, therefore, correctly availed himself of a Petition for Habeas Corpus.

The Information and Alias Warrant of Arrest issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch
221, Quezon City in People of the Philippines v. Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr., et al. charged and
accused Butukan S. Malang, not Datukan Malang Salibo, of 57 counts of murder in connection
with the Maguindanao Massacre.
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 Furthermore, petitioner Salibo was not validly arrested without a warrant. x x x

It is undisputed that petitioner Salibo presented himself before the Datu Hofer Police
Station to clear his name and to prove that he is not the accused Butukan S. Malang. When
petitioner Salibo was in the presence of the police officers of Datu Hofer Police Station, he was
neither committing nor attempting to commit an offense. The police officers had no personal
knowledge of any offense that he might have committed. Petitioner Salibo was also not an escapee
prisoner.

The police officers, therefore, had no probable cause to arrest petitioner Salibo without a
warrant. They deprived him of his right to liberty without due process of law, for which a petition
for habeas corpus may be issued.

xxx

A motion for reinvestigation will not cure the defect of lack of preliminary investigation.
The Information and Alias Warrant of Arrest were issued on the premise that Butukan S. Malang
and Datukan Malang Salibo are the same person. There is evidence, however, that the person
detained by virtue of these processes is not Butukan S. Malang but another person named
Datukan Malang Salibo. (In the Matter of Petition for Habeas Corpus of Datukan Malang Salibo,
v. Warden, Quezon City Jail, G.R. No. 197597, April 8, 2015)

PROTECTING THE RIGHT TO LIFE, LIBERTY & SECURITY:

THE WRIT OF AMPARO

Nature of the Writ of Amparo: The protective writ of amparo is a judicial

remedy to expeditiously provide relief to violations of a person's constitutional right
to life, liberty, and security, and more specifically, to address the problem of
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.

The protective writ of amparo is a judicial remedy to expeditiously provide relief to

violations of a person's constitutional right to life, liberty, and security, and more specifically, to
address the problem of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. Section
1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC provides:

Sec. 1. Petition. - The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to

any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with
violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a
private individual or entity.

The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced

disappearances or threats thereof. (Emphasis supplied)

(Callo v. Commissioner Morente, G.R. No. 230324, September 19, 2017)

Meaning of enforced disappearance: The arrest, detention, or abduction of

persons by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of a State or a political
organization followed by a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to
give information on the fate or whereabouts of those persons, with the intention of
removing from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.

It is clear from the above-quoted provision that the writ of amparo covers extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. Enforced disappearance is defined under
Republic Act (RA) No. 9851, Section 3(g) of which provides:

(g) "Enforced or involuntary disappearance of persons" means the arrest, detention, or

abduction of persons by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of a State or a political
organization followed by a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give
information on the fate or whereabouts of those persons, with the intention of removing from the
protection of the law for a prolonged period of time. (Callo v. Commissioner Morente, G.R. No.
230324, September 19, 2017)
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 Meaning of extralegal killings: Killings committed without due process of law,
i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings.

This Court also had the opportunity to define extralegal killings and enforced
disappearance:

Extralegal killings are killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal
safeguards or judicial proceedings. On the other hand, enforced disappearance has been defined
by the Court as the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by
agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or
acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by
concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place such a person
outside the protection of the law. (Callo v. Commissioner Morente, G.R. No. 230324, September
19, 2017)

Elements of Enforced Disappearance: (a) that there be an arrest, detention,

abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty; (b) that it be carried out by, or with
the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a political organization;
(c) that it be followed by the State or political organization's refusal to acknowledge
or give information on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo
petition; and, (d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from
the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.

In Navia v. Pardico, this Court clarified that with the enactment of RANo. 9851, the Rule
on the Writ of Amparo is now a procedural law anchored, not only on the constitutional right to
life, liberty, and security, but also on a concrete statutory definition of "enforced or involuntary
disappearance." Further, elements constituting enforced disappearance as defined under RA No.
9851 were clearly laid down by this Court, viz:

(a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty; ·

(b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State
or a political organization;

(c) that it be followed by the State or political organization's refusal to acknowledge or give
information on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo petition; and,

(d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the protection of
the law for a prolonged period oftime.

It is clear that the elements of enforced disappearance are not attendant in this case. There
is also no threat of such enforced disappearance.While there is indeed a detention carried out by
the State through the Bureau of Immigration, the third and fourth elements are not present. There
is no refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of freedom or refusal to give information on the
whereabouts of Parker because as Callo admits, Parker is detained in the Immigration Detention
Facility of the Bureau of Immigration. The Bureau of Immigration also does not deny this. In fact,
the Bureau of Immigration had produced the body of Parker before the RTC in the proceedings
for the writ of habeas corpus previously initiated by Parker herself. 9 Similarly, there is no
intention to remove Parker from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time. As the
Bureau of Immigration explained, Parker has a pending criminal case against her in Davao City,
which prevents the Bureau of Immigration from deporting her from the country. (Callo v.
Commissioner Morente, G.R. No. 230324, September 19, 2017)

Writ of amparo proceedings do not determine criminal, civil or administrative

liability. The principal objective of its proceedings is the initial determination of
whether an enforced disappearance, extralegal killing or threats thereof had
transpired.

The writ of amparo is a protective remedy aimed at providing judicial relief consisting of
the appropriate remedial measures and directives that may be crafted by the court, in order to
address specific violations or threats of violation of the constitutional rights to life, liberty or
security. While the principal objective of its proceedings is the initial determination
of whether an enforced disappearance, extralegal killing or threats thereof had
transpired the writ does not, by so doing, fix liability for such disappearance, killing
or threats, whether that may be criminal, civil or administrative under the
applicable substantive law. The rationale underpinning this peculiar nature of

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an amparo writ has been, in turn, clearly set forth in the landmark case of The Secretary of
National Defense v. Manalo:

x x x The remedy provides rapid judicial relief as it partakes of a summary

proceeding that requires only substantial evidence to make the appropriate reliefs
available to the petitioner; it is not an action to determine criminal guilt
requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages
requiring preponderance of evidence, or administrative responsibility
requiring substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive
proceedings.

(Roxas v. Macapagl Arroyo, G.R. No. 189155, September 7, 2010)

Responsibility and/or accountability: The legal basis or bases for impleading

military commanders in amparo cases. Responsibility refers to the extent the actors
have participated in an enforced disappearance. Accountability refers to the measure
of remedies that should be addressed to those who exhibited involvement in the
enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of
responsibility, or who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced
disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure, or those who carry, but have
failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the
enforced disappearance.

The inapplicability of the doctrine of command responsibility in an amparo proceeding

does not, by any measure, preclude impleading military or police commanders on the ground that
the complained acts in the petition were committed with their direct or indirect acquiescence. In
which case, commanders may be impleaded—not actually on the basis of command
responsibility—but rather on the ground of their responsibility, or at least accountability. (Roxas
v. Macapagl Arroyo, G.R. No. 189155, September 7, 2010)

[T]he inapplicability of the doctrine of command responsibility in an amparo proceeding

does not, by any measure, preclude impleading military or police commanders on the ground that
the complained acts in the petition were committed with their direct or indirect acquiescence.
Commanders may therefore be impleaded not actually on the basis of command responsibility
but rather on the ground of their responsibility, or at least accountability.

In Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis, the Court defined responsibility and accountability as these
terms are applied to amparo proceedings, as follows:

x x x Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by

substantial evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an
enforced disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this Court shall craft, among them,
the directive to file the appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties
in the proper courts. Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the measure of
remedies that should be addressed to those who exhibited involvement in the
enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of
responsibility defined above; or who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced
disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have
failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation
of the enforced disappearance. x x x (Emphasis supplied.)

Assessing the evidence on record, we find that the participation in any manner of military
and police authorities in the abduction of James has not been adequately proven. The identities
of the abductors have not been established, much less their link to any military or police
unit. There is likewise no concrete evidence indicating that James is being held or detained upon
orders of or with acquiescence of government agents. Consequently, the trial court erred in
granting amparo reliefs by ordering the respondent officials (1) to disclose where James Balao is
detained or confined, (2) to release him from such detention or confinement, and (3) to cease and
desist from further inflicting harm upon his person. Such pronouncement of responsibility on the
part of public respondents cannot be made given the insufficiency of evidence. (Balao v. Arroyo,
G.R. No. 186050, December 13, 2011)

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 Writ of amparo: Command responsibility may be loosely applied in amparo
cases in order to identify those accountable individuals who have the power to
effectively implement whatever processes an amparo court would issue.

[A]mparo proceedings determine (a) responsibility, or the extent the actors have been
established by substantial evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or omission,
in an enforced disappearance, and (b) accountability, or the measure of remedies that should be
addressed to those (i) who exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing
the level of their complicity to the level of responsibility defined above; or (ii) who are imputed
with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure;
or (iii) those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the
investigation of the enforced disappearance. Thus, although there is no determination of criminal,
civil or administrative liabilities, the doctrine of command responsibility may nevertheless be
applied to ascertain responsibility and accountability within these foregoing definitions.

a. Command responsibility of the President

Having established the applicability of the doctrine of command responsibility

in amparo proceedings, it must now be resolved whether the president, as commander-in-chief
of the military, can be held responsible or accountable for extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances. We rule in the affirmative.

To hold someone liable under the doctrine of command responsibility, the following
elements must obtain:

a. the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship between the accused as superior

and the perpetrator of the crime as his subordinate;

b. the superior knew or had reason to know that the crime was about to be or had been
committed; and

c. the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the
criminal acts or punish the perpetrators thereof.

The president, being the commander-in-chief of all armed forces, necessarily possesses
control over the military that qualifies him as a superior within the purview of the command
responsibility doctrine.

On the issue of knowledge, it must be pointed out that although international tribunals
apply a strict standard of knowledge, i.e., actual knowledge, such may nonetheless be established
through circumstantial evidence.] In the Philippines, a more liberal view is adopted and superiors
may be charged with constructive knowledge. x x x Under E.O. 226, a government official may be
held liable for neglect of duty under the doctrine of command responsibility if he has knowledge
that a crime or offense shall be committed, is being committed, or has been committed by his
subordinates, or by others within his area of responsibility and, despite such knowledge, he did
not take preventive or corrective action either before, during, or immediately after its
commission. Knowledge of the commission of irregularities, crimes or offenses is presumed when
(a) the acts are widespread within the government officials area of jurisdiction; (b) the acts have
been repeatedly or regularly committed within his area of responsibility; or (c) members of his
immediate staff or office personnel are involved.

Meanwhile, as to the issue of failure to prevent or punish, it is important to note that as the
commander-in-chief of the armed forces, the president has the power to effectively command, control
and discipline the military. (Rodriguez v. Macapagal Arroyo, G.R. No. 191805, November 15,
2011)

In amparo proceedings, responsibility or accountability for extrajudicial killing

must be established by substantial evidence

The next question that must be tackled is whether Rodriguez has proven through
substantial evidence that former President Arroyo is responsible or accountable for his abduction.
We rule in the negative. Aside from Rodriguez’s general averments, there is no piece of evidence
that could establish her responsibility or accountability for his abduction. Neither was there even
a clear attempt to show that she should have known about the violation of his right to life, liberty
or security, or that she had failed to investigate, punish or prevent it. (Rodriguez v. Macapagal
Arroyo, G.R. No. 191805, November 15, 2011)

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 There is no determination of administrative, civil or criminal liability
in amparo and habeas data proceedings, courts can only go as far as ascertaining
responsibility or accountability for the enforced disappearance or extrajudicial killing.

[T]here is no determination of administrative, civil or criminal liability

in amparo and habeas data proceedings, courts can only go as far as ascertaining responsibility
or accountability for the enforced disappearance or extrajudicial killing. As we held in Razon v.
Tagitis:

It does not determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the disappearance;
rather, it determines responsibility, or at least accountability, for the enforced
disappearance for purposes of imposing the appropriate remedies to address the
disappearance. Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by
substantial evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an
enforced disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this Court shall craft, among them,
the directive to file the appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties
in the proper courts. Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the measure of
remedies that should be addressed to those who exhibited involvement in the enforced
disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of
responsibility defined above; or who are imputed with knowledge relating to the
enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but
have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the
investigation of the enforced disappearance. In all these cases, the issuance of the Writ
of Amparo is justified by our primary goal of addressing the disappearance, so that the life
of the victim is preserved and his liberty and security are restored. (Emphasis supplied.)

(Rodriguez v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 193160, November 15, 2011)

THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA

The writ of habeas data is a remedy in case a person’s right to privacy in life,
liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public
official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering,
collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and
correspondence of the aggrieved party. It is designed to protect the image, privacy,
honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual or a person’s right to
control information regarding oneself.

The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life,
liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data
or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party. It
is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy, honor,
information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce one’s
right to the truth and to informational privacy. It seeks to protect a person’s right to control
information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which such information is being
collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends. (Vivares v. St. Theresa’s
College, G.R. No. 202666, September 29, 2014)

The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the
image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to provide
a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy.

It seeks to protect a person’s right to control information regarding oneself, particularly in

instances in which such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve
unlawful ends. (Gamboa v. Chan, G.R. No. 193636, July 24, 2012)

Writ of habeas data: There must be a nexus between the right to privacy on
the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other for the writ to be
granted.

It must be emphasized that in order for the privilege of the writ to be granted, there must
exist a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security
on the other. Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data reads:

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 Habeas data – The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to
privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a
public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting
or storing of data information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the
aggrieved party. (Gamboa v. Chan, G.R. No. 193636, July 24, 2012)

In developing the writ of habeas data, the Court aimed to protect an individual’s right to
informational privacy, among others. A comparative law scholar has, in fact, defined habeas
dataas "a procedure designed to safeguard individual freedom from abuse in the information age."
The writ, however, will not issue on the basis merely of an alleged unauthorized access to
information about a person. Availment of the writ requires the existence of a nexus between the
right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other. Thus, the
existence of a person’s right to informational privacy and a showing, at least by substantial
evidence, of an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of
the victim are indispensable before the privilege of the writ may be extended. (Vivares v. St.
Theresa’s College, G.R. No. 202666, September 29, 2014)

The right to privacy is not absolute. It may succumb to an opposing or

overriding state interest deemed legitimate and compelling.

Clearly, the right to privacy is considered a fundamental right that must be protected from
intrusion or constraint. However, in Standard Chartered Bank v. Senate Committee on Banks,
this Court underscored that the right to privacy is not absolute, viz:

With respect to the right of privacy which petitioners claim respondent has violated,
suffice it to state that privacy is not an absolute right. While it is true that Section 21, Article
VI of the Constitution, guarantees respect for the rights of persons affected by the legislative
investigation, not every invocation of the right to privacy should be allowed to thwart a
legitimate congressional inquiry. In Sabio v. Gordon, we have held that the right of the
people to access information on matters of public concern generally prevails over the right
to privacy of ordinary financial transactions. In that case, we declared that the right to privacy
is not absolute where there is an overriding compelling state interest. Employing the rational
basis relationship test, as laid down in Morfe v. Mutuc, there is no infringement of the
individual’s right to privacy as the requirement to disclosure information is for a valid
purpose, in this case, to ensure that the government agencies involved in regulating banking
transactions adequately protect the public who invest in foreign securities. Suffice it to state
that this purpose constitutes a reason compelling enough to proceed with the assailed
legislative investigation.

Therefore, when the right to privacy finds tension with a competing state objective, the
courts are required to weigh both notions. In these cases, although considered a fundamental
right, the right to privacy may nevertheless succumb to an opposing or overriding state interest
deemed legitimate and compelling. (Gamboa v. Chan, G.R. No. 193636, July 24, 2012)

An application for a writ of habeas data may be denied if the right to privacy in
life, liberty or security must yield to an overriding legitimate state interest, such as
dismantling of private armed groups (PAGs). The state interest of dismantling PAGs
far outweighs the alleged intrusion on the private life of Gamboa. Thus, the act of the
police in collecting information on individuals suspected of maintaining PAGs, such as
Gamboa, and in sharing and forwarding such information to a government body
tasked to investigate PAGs was not an unlawful act that violated or threatened her
right to privacy in life, liberty or security. The fact that the PNP released information
to the government investigating commission without prior communication to Gamboa
and without affording her the opportunity to refute the same cannot be interpreted
as a violation or threat to her right to privacy since that act is an inherent and crucial
component of intelligence-gathering and investigation.

On 8 December 2009, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Administrative

Order No. 275 (A.O. 275), "Creating an Independent Commission to Address the Alleged
Existence of Private Armies in the Country." The body, which was later on referred to as the
Zeñarosa Commission, was formed to investigate the existence of private army groups (PAGs) in
the country with a view to eliminating them before the 10 May 2010 elections and dismantling

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them permanently in the future. Upon the conclusion of its investigation, the Zeñarosa
Commission released and submitted to the Office of the President a confidential report x x x.

Gamboa [Mayor of Dingras, Ilocos Norte] alleged that the Philippine National Police in
Ilocos Norte (PNP–Ilocos Norte) conducted a series of surveillance operations against her and
her aides,and classified her as someone who keeps a PAG. Purportedly without the benefit of data
verification, PNP–Ilocos Norte forwarded the information gathered on her to the Zeñarosa
Commission, thereby causing her inclusion in the Report’s enumeration of individuals
maintaining PAGs.

xxx

On 6 and 7 July 2010, ABS-CBN broadcasted on its evening news program the portion of
the Report naming Gamboa as one of the politicians alleged to be maintaining a PAG. Gamboa
averred that her association with a PAG also appeared on print media. Thus, she was publicly
tagged as someone who maintains a PAG on the basis of the unverified information that the PNP-
Ilocos Norte gathered and forwarded to the Zeñarosa Commission. As a result, she claimed that
her malicious or reckless inclusion in the enumeration of personalities maintaining a PAG as
published in the Report also made her, as well as her supporters and other people identified with
her, susceptible to harassment and police surveillance operations.

Contending that her right to privacy was violated and her reputation maligned and
destroyed, Gamboa filed a Petition dated 9 July 2010 for the issuance of a writ of habeas data
against respondents in their capacities as officials of the PNP-Ilocos Norte. In her Petition, she
prayed for the following reliefs: (a) destruction of the unverified reports from the PNP-Ilocos
Norte database; (b) withdrawal of all information forwarded to higher PNP officials; (c)
rectification of the damage done to her honor; (d) ordering respondents to refrain from
forwarding unverified reports against her; and (e) restraining respondents from making baseless
reports.

xxx

The Constitution explicitly mandates the dismantling of private armies and other armed
groups not recognized by the duly constituted authority. x x x

Taking into account these constitutional fiats, it is clear that the issuance of A.O. 275
articulates a legitimate state aim, which is to investigate the existence of PAGs with the ultimate
objective of dismantling them permanently.

To enable the Zeñarosa Commission to achieve its goals, A.O. 275 clothed it with the
powers of an investigative body, including the power to summon witnesses, administer oaths, take
testimony or evidence relevant to the investigation and use compulsory processes to produce
documents, books, and records. A.O. 275 likewise authorized the Zeñarosa Commission to
deputize the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the National Bureau of Investigation, the
Department of Justice, the PNP, and any other law enforcement agency to assist the commission
in the performance of its functions.

xxx

[T]he right to informational privacy, as a specific component of the right to privacy, may
yield to an overriding legitimate state interest. In similar fashion, the determination of whether
the privilege of the writ of habeas data, being an extraordinary remedy, may be granted in this
case entails a delicate balancing of the alleged intrusion upon the private life of Gamboa and the
relevant state interest involved.

xxx

The Constitution explicitly mandates the dismantling of private armies and other armed
groups not recognized by the duly constituted authority. x x x

Taking into account these constitutional fiats, it is clear that the issuance of A.O. 275
articulates a legitimate state aim, which is to investigate the existence of [private armed groups]
PAGs with the ultimate objective of dismantling them permanently.

To enable the Zeñarosa Commission to achieve its goals, A.O. 275 clothed it with the
powers of an investigative body, including the power to summon witnesses, administer oaths, take
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testimony or evidence relevant to the investigation and use compulsory processes to produce
documents, books, and records. A.O. 275 likewise authorized the Zeñarosa Commission to
deputize the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the National Bureau of Investigation, the
Department of Justice, the PNP, and any other law enforcement agency to assist the commission
in the performance of its functions.

xxx

Pursuant to the state interest of dismantling PAGs, as well as the foregoing powers and
functions accorded to the Zeñarosa Commission and the PNP, the latter collected information on
individuals suspected of maintaining PAGs, monitored them and counteracted their activities.
One of those individuals is herein petitioner Gamboa.

x x x Contrary to the ruling of the trial court, however, the forwarding of information by
the PNP to the Zeñarosa Commission was not an unlawful act that violated or threatened her right
to privacy in life, liberty or security.

The PNP was rationally expected to forward and share intelligence regarding PAGs with
the body specifically created for the purpose of investigating the existence of these notorious
groups. Moreover, the Zeñarosa Commission was explicitly authorized to deputize the police force
in the fulfillment of the former’s mandate, and thus had the power to request assistance from the
latter.

x x x [T]he fact that the PNP released information to the Zeñarosa Commission without
prior communication to Gamboa and without affording her the opportunity to refute the same
cannot be interpreted as a violation or threat to her right to privacy since that act is an inherent
and crucial component of intelligence-gathering and investigation. x x x

xxx

[T]he state interest of dismantling PAGs far outweighs the alleged intrusion on the private
life of Gamboa, especially when the collection and forwarding by the PNP of information against
her was pursuant to a lawful mandate. Therefore, the privilege of the writ of habeas data must be
denied. (Gamboa v. Chan, G.R. No. 193636, July 24, 2012)

LIBERTY OF ABODE

The Constitution provides that urban or rural poor dwellers shall not be evicted
nor their dwelling demolished, except in accordance with law and in a just and
humane manner. RA 7279 allows summary evictions and demolition in cases where
persons or entities occupy danger areas and when persons occupy areas where
government infrastructure projects with available funding are about to be
implemented. To ensure that evictions and demolitions are conducted in a just and
humane manner, RA 7279 commands requires compliance with a prescribed
procedure in executing eviction and/or demolition orders, including prior 30-day
notice and adequate consultation. Evictions and demolitions without any court order
under RA 7279 are valid.

This is a petition for prohibition and mandamus to enjoin the public respondents from
evicting the individual petitioners as well as the petitioner associations’ members from their
dwellings in the cities of San Juan, Navotas and Quezon without any court order, and to compel
the respondents to afford them judicial process prior to evictions and demolitions. The petition
primarily seeks to declare as unconstitutional Section 28 (a) and (b) of Republic Act No. 7279 (RA
7279), otherwise known as Urban Development Housing Act, which authorizes evictions and
demolitions under certain circumstances without any court order.

xxx

We carefully read the petitions and we conclude that they fail to compellingly show the
necessity of examining the constitutionality of Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279 in the light of
Sections 1 [due process] and 6 [liberty of abode and of changing the same], Article 3 of the 1987
Constitution. In Magkalas v. NHA, this Court had already ruled on the validity of evictions and
demolitions without any court order. In that case, we affirmed the validity of Section 2 of

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Presidential Decree No. 1472 which authorizes the NHA to summarily eject all informal settlers’
colonies on government resettlement projects as well as any illegal occupant in any homelot,
apartment or dwelling unit owned or administered by the NHA. x x x We further stated that
demolitions and evictions may be validly carried out even without a judicial order in the following
instances: x x x

We note that Section 10, Article13 of the 1987 Constitution provides that urban or rural
poor dwellers shall not be evicted nor their dwelling demolished, except in accordance with law
and in a just and humane manner. Paragraph 1, Section 28 of RA 7279 allows summary evictions
and demolition in cases where persons or entities occupy danger areas and when persons or
entities occupy areas where government infrastructure projects with available funding are about
to be implemented.

To ensure that evictions and demolitions are conducted in a just and humane manner,
paragraph 2, Section 28 of RA 7279 commands the public respondents to comply with the
following prescribed procedure in executing eviction and/or demolition orders:
In the execution of eviction or demolition orders involving underprivileged and
homeless citizens, the following shall be mandatory:

(1) Notice upon the effected persons or entities at least thirty (30) days prior to the
date of eviction or demolition;

(2) Adequate consultations on the matter of settlement with the duly designated
representatives of the families to be resettled and the affected communities in the areas
where they are to be relocated;

(3) Presence of local government officials or their representatives during eviction or

demolition;

(4) Proper identification of all persons taking part in the demolition;

(5) Execution of eviction or demolition only during regular office hours from
Mondays to Fridays and during good weather, unless the affected families consent otherwise;

(6) No use of heavy equipment for demolition except for structures that are
permanent and of concrete materials;

(7) Proper uniforms for members of the Philippine National Police who shall occupy
the first line of law enforcement and observe proper disturbance control procedures; and

(8) Adequate relocation, whether temporary or permanent: Provided, however, That

in cases of eviction and demolition pursuant to a court order involving underprivileged and
homeless citizens, relocation shall be undertaken by the local government unit concerned
and the National Housing Authority with the assistance of other government agencies within
forty-five (45) days from service of notice of final judgment by the court, after which period
the said order shall be executed: Provided, further, That should relocation not be possible
within the said period, financial assistance in the amount equivalent to the prevailing
minimum daily wage multiplied by sixty (60) days shall be extended to the affected families
by the local government unit concerned.

(Kalipunan Ang Damay Ang Mahihirap v. Robredo, G.R. No. 200903, July 22, 2014)

RIGHT TO TRAVEL

How restricting travel may constitute a violation of freedom of religion, speech,

assembly, and association. Whenever the freedom of religion, speech, assembly, and
association require one to move about, such movement must necessarily be protected
under the First Amendment. Restricting movement in those circumstances to the
extent that these rights cannot be exercised without violating the law is equivalent
to a denial of those rights.

Petitioners further assail the constitutionality of the Curfew Ordinances based on the
minors' right to travel. They claim that the liberty to travel is a fundamental right, which,
therefore, necessitates the application of the strict scrutiny test. Further, they submit that even if
there exists a compelling State interest, such as the prevention of juvenile crime and the protection
of minors from crime, there are other less restrictive means for achieving the government's
interest. xxx

98 | P a g e
 Petitioner's submissions are partly meritorious.

xxx

The right to travel is recognized and guaranteed as a fundamental right88 under Section
6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, to wit:

Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits
prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court.
Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national
security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law. (Emphases
and underscoring supplied)

Jurisprudence provides that this right refers to the right to move freely from the
Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. It is a right embraced within the general
concept of liberty. Liberty - a birthright of every person - includes the power of locomotion and
the right of citizens to be free to use their faculties in lawful ways and to live and work where they
desire or where they can best pursue the ends of life.

The right to travel is essential as it enables individuals to access and exercise their other
rights, such as the rights to education, free expression, assembly, association, and religion. The
inter-relation of the right to travel with other fundamental rights was briefly rationalized in City
of Maquoketa v. Russell, as follows:

Whenever the First Amendment rights of freedom of religion, speech,

assembly, and association require one to move about, such movement must
necessarily be protected under the First Amendment.

Restricting movement in those circumstances to the extent that First

Amendment Rights cannot be exercised without violating the law is equivalent to
a denial of those rights. One court has eloquently pointed this out:

We would not deny the relatedness of the rights guaranteed by the First
Amendment to freedom of travel and movement. If, for any reason, people cannot
walk or drive to their church, their freedom to worship is impaired. If, for any
reason, people cannot walk or drive to the meeting hall, freedom of assembly is
effectively blocked. If, for any reason, people cannot safely walk the sidewalks or
drive the streets of a community, opportunities for freedom of speech are sharply
limited. Freedom of movement is inextricably involved with freedoms set forth in
the First Amendment. (Emphases supplied)

(Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan v. Quezon City, G.R. No. 225442, August 8,
2017)

The right to travel is not absolute. As the 1987 Constitution itself reads, the
State may impose limitations on the exercise of this right, provided that they: (1)
serve the interest of national security, public safety, or public health; and (2) are
provided by law.

Nevertheless, grave and overriding considerations of public interest justify restrictions

even if made against fundamental rights. Specifically, on the freedom to move from one place to
another, jurisprudence provides that this right is not absolute. As the 1987 Constitution itself
reads, the State may impose limitations on the exercise of this right, provided that they: (1) serve
the interest of national security, public safety, or public health; and (2) are provided by law.

The stated purposes of the Curfew Ordinances, specifically the promotion of juvenile
safety and prevention of juvenile crime, inarguably serve the interest of public safety. The
restriction on the minor's movement and activities within the confines of their residences and
their immediate vicinity during the curfew period is perceived to reduce the probability of the
minor becoming victims of or getting involved in crimes and criminal activities. As to the second
requirement, i.e., that the limitation "be provided by law," our legal system is replete with laws
emphasizing the State's duty to afford special protection to children, i.e., RA 7610,98 as amended,
RA 977599 RA 9262100 RA 9851101RA 9344102 RA 10364103 RA 9211104 RA8980,105
RA9288,106 and Presidential Decree (PD) 603,107 as amended.

Particularly relevant to this case is Article 139 of PD 603, which explicitly authorizes local
government units, through their city or municipal councils, to set curfew hours for children. xxx

99 | P a g e
 xxx

As explicitly worded, city councils are authorized to enact curfew ordinances (as what
respondents have done in this case) and enforce the same through their local officials. In other
words, PD 603 provides sufficient statutory basis - as required by the Constitution - to restrict the
minors' exercise of the right to travel. (Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan v. Quezon City,
G.R. No. 225442, August 8, 2017)

Limitations on the fundamental right to travel of minors are permissible if these

pass the strict scrutiny test. Under the strict scrutiny test, a legislative classification
that interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the
disadvantage of a suspect class is presumed unconstitutional. Thus, the government
has the burden of proving that the classification (1) is necessary to achieve a
compelling State interest, and (i1) is the least restrictive means to protect such
interest or the means chosen is narrowly tailored to accomplish the interest.

The restrictions set by the Curfew Ordinances that apply solely to minors are likewise
constitutionally permissible. In this relation, this Court recognizes that minors do possess and
enjoy constitutional rights, but the exercise of these rights is not co-extensive as those of adults.
They are always subject to the authority or custody of another, such as their parent/s and/or
guardian/s, and the State. As parens patriae, the State regulates and, to a certain extent, restricts
the minors' exercise of their rights, such as in their affairs concerning the right to vote, the right
to execute contracts, and the right to engage in gainful employment. With respect to the right to
travel, minors are required by law to obtain a clearance from the Department of Social Welfare
and Development before they can travel to a foreign country by themselves or with a person other
than their parents. These limitations demonstrate that the State has broader authority over the
minors' activities than over similar actions of adults, and overall, reflect the State's general
interest in the well-being of minors. Thus, the State may impose limitations on the minors'
exercise of rights even though these limitations do not generally apply to adults.

In Bellotti, the US Supreme Court identified three (3) justifications for the differential
treatment of the minors' constitutional rights. These are: first, the peculiar vulnerability of
children; second, their inability to make critical decisions in an informed and mature manner;
and third, the importance of the parental role in child rearing:

xxx

Moreover, in Prince v. Massachusetts, the US Supreme Court acknowledged the

heightened dangers on the streets to minors, as compared to adults:

xxx

For these reasons, the State is justified in setting restrictions on the minors' exercise of
their travel rights, provided, they are singled out on reasonable grounds.

Philippine jurisprudence has developed three (3) tests of judicial scrutiny to determine the
reasonableness of classifications. The strict scrutiny test applies when a classification either (i)
interferes with the exercise of fundamental rights, including the basic liberties guaranteed under
the Constitution, or (ii) burdens suspect classes. The intermediate scrutiny test applies when a
classification does not involve suspect classes or fundamental rights, but requires heightened
scrutiny, such as in classifications based on gender and legitimacy. Lastly, the rational basis test
applies to all other subjects not covered by the first two tests.

Considering that the right to travel is a fundamental right in our legal system guaranteed
no less by our Constitution, the strict scrutiny test is the applicable test. At this juncture, it should
be emphasized that minors enjoy the same constitutional rights as adults; the fact that the State
has broader authority over minors than over adults does not trigger the application of a lower
level of scrutiny.

xxx

The strict scrutiny test as applied to minors entails a consideration of the peculiar
circumstances of minors as enumerated in Bellotti vis-a-vis the State's duty as parens patriae to
protect and preserve their well-being with the compelling State interests justifying the assailed
government act. Under the strict scrutiny test, a legislative classification that interferes with the
exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the disadvantage of a suspect class is presumed

100 | P a g e
unconstitutional. Thus, the government has the burden of proving that the classification (1) is
necessary to achieve a compelling State interest, and (i1) is the least restrictive means to protect
such interest or the means chosen is narrowly tailored to accomplish the interest. (Samahan ng
mga Progresibong Kabataan v. Quezon City, G.R. No. 225442, August 8, 2017)

The compelling state interest requirement of the strict scrutiny test:

Compelling State interests include constitutionally declared policies. that children's
welfare and the State's mandate to protect and care for them as parens patriae
constitute compelling interests to justify regulations by the State. In this case,
respondents have sufficiently established that the ultimate objective of the Curfew
Ordinances is to keep unsupervised minors during the late hours of night time off of
public areas, so as to reduce - if not totally eliminate - their exposure to potential
harm, and to insulate them against criminal pressure and influences.

a. Compelling State Interest.

Jurisprudence holds that compelling State interests include constitutionally declared

policies. This Court has ruled that children's welfare and the State's mandate to protect and care
for them as parens patriae constitute compelling interests to justify regulations by the State. It is
akin to the paramount interest of the state for which some individual liberties must give way. As
explained in Nunez, the Bellotti framework shows that the State has a compelling interest in
imposing greater restrictions on minors than on adults. The limitations on minors under
Philippine laws also highlight this compelling interest of the State to protect and care for their
welfare.

In this case, respondents have sufficiently established that the ultimate objective of the
Curfew Ordinances is to keep unsupervised minors during the late hours of night time off of public
areas, so as to reduce - if not totally eliminate - their exposure to potential harm, and to insulate
them against criminal pressure and influences which may even include themselves. xxx

xxxx

With the first requirement of the strict scrutiny test satisfied, the Court now proceeds to
determine if the restrictions set forth in· the Curfew Ordinances are narrowly tailored or provide
the least restrictive means to address the cited compelling State interest - the second requirement
of the strict scrutiny test. (Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan v. Quezon City, G.R. No.
225442, August 8, 2017)

The least restrictive means requirement of the strict scrutiny test: While
fundamental rights may be restricted, the restrictions must be minimal or only to the
extent necessary to achieve the purpose or to address the State's compelling interest.
When it is possible for governmental regulations to be more narrowly drawn to avoid
conflicts with constitutional rights, then they must be so narrowly drawn. The curfew
ordinances, in restricting the right to travel, must also sufficiently protect the minors'
rights of association, free exercise of religion, travel, to peaceably assemble, and of
free expression.

b. Least Restrictive Means/ Narrowly Drawn.

The second requirement of the strict scrutiny test stems from the fundamental premise
that citizens should not be hampered from pursuing legitimate activities in the exercise of their
constitutional rights. While rights may be restricted, the restrictions must be minimal or only to
the extent necessary to achieve the purpose or to address the State's compelling interest. When it
is possible for governmental regulations to be more narrowly drawn to avoid conflicts with
constitutional rights, then they must be so narrowly drawn.

Although treated differently from adults, the foregoing standard applies to regulations on
minors as they are still accorded the freedom to participate in any legitimate activity, whether it
be social, religious, or civic. Thus, in the present case, each of the ordinances must be narrowly
tailored as to ensure minimal constraint not only on the minors' right to travel but also on their
other constitutional rights.

xxx

101 | P a g e
 After a thorough evaluation of the ordinances' respective provisions, this Court finds that
only the Quezon City Ordinance meets the above-discussed requirement, while the Manila and
Navotas Ordinances do not.

The Manila Ordinance cites only four (4) exemptions from the coverage of the curfew,
namely: (a) minors accompanied by their parents, family members of legal age, or guardian; (b)
those running lawful errands such as buying of medicines, using of telecommunication facilities
for emergency purposes and the like; (c) night school students and those who, by virtue of their
employment, are required in the streets or outside their residence after 10:00 p.m.; and (d) those
working at night.

For its part, the Navotas Ordinance provides more exceptions, to wit: (a) minors with night
classes; (b) those working at night; (c) those who attended a school or church activity, in
coordination with a specific barangay office; (d) those traveling towards home during the curfew
hours; (e) those running errands under the supervision of their parents, guardians, or persons of
legal age having authority over them; (j) those involved in accidents, calamities, and the like. It
also exempts minors from the curfew during these specific occasions: Christmas eve, Christmas
day, New Year's eve, New Year's day, the night before the barangay fiesta, the day of the fiesta, All
Saints' and All Souls' Day, Holy Thursday, Good Friday, Black Saturday, and Easter Sunday.

This Court observes that these two ordinances are not narrowly drawn in that their
exceptions are inadequate and therefore, run the risk of overly restricting the minors'
fundamental freedoms. To be fair, both ordinances protect the rights to education, to gainful
employment, and to travel at night from school or work. However, even with those safeguards,
the Navotas Ordinance and, to a greater extent, the Manila Ordinance still do not account for the
reasonable exercise of the minors' rights of association, free exercise of religion, rights to
peaceably assemble, and of free expression, among others.

The exceptions under the Manila Ordinance are too limited, and thus, unduly trample
upon protected liberties. The Navotas Ordinance is apparently more protective of constitutional
rights than the Manila Ordinance; nonetheless, it still provides insufficient safeguards as
discussed in detail below:

First, although it allows minors to engage in school or church activities, it hinders them
from engaging in legitimate non-school or nonchurch activities in the streets or going to and from
such activities; thus, their freedom of association is effectively curtailed. It bears stressing that
participation in legitimate activities of organizations, other than school or church, also contributes
to the minors' social, emotional, and intellectual development, yet, such participation is not
exempted under the Navotas Ordinance.

Second, although the Navotas Ordinance does not impose the curfew during Christmas
Eve and Christmas day, it effectively prohibits minors from attending traditional religious
activities (such as simbang gabi) at night without accompanying adults, similar to the scenario
depicted in Mosier. This legitimate activity done pursuant to the minors' right to freely exercise
their religion is therefore effectively curtailed.

Third, the Navotas Ordinance does not accommodate avenues for minors to engage in
political rallies or attend city council meetings to voice out their concerns in line with their right
to peaceably assemble and to free expression.

Certainly, minors are allowed under the Navotas Ordinance to engage in these activities
outside curfew hours, but the Court finds no reason to prohibit them from participating in these
legitimate activities during curfew hours. Such proscription does not advance the State's
compelling interest to protect minors from the dangers of the streets at night, such as becoming
prey or instruments of criminal activity. These legitimate activities are merely hindered without
any reasonable relation to the State's interest; hence, the Navotas Ordinance is not narrowly
drawn. More so, the Manila Ordinance, with its limited exceptions, is also not narrowly drawn.

In sum, the Manila and Navotas Ordinances should be completely stricken down since
their exceptions, which are essentially determinative of the scope and breadth of the curfew
regulations, are inadequate to ensure protection of the above-mentioned fundamental rights.
While some provisions may be valid, the same are merely ancillary thereto; as such, they cannot
subsist independently despite the presence150 of any separability clause.

The Quezon City Ordinance stands in stark contrast to the first two (2) ordinances as it
sufficiently safeguards the minors' constitutional rights. It provides the following exceptions:

xxx

102 | P a g e
 Section 4. EXEMPTIONS - Minor children under the following circumstances shall
not be covered by the provisions of this ordinance;

(a) Those accompanied by their parents or guardian;

(b) Those on their way to or from a party, graduation ceremony, religious mass,
and/or other extra-curricular activities of their school or organization wherein their
attendance are required or otherwise indispensable, or when such minors are out and
unable to go home early due to circumstances beyond their control as verified by the proper
authorities concerned; and

(c) Those attending to, or in experience of, an emergency situation such as

conflagration, earthquake, hospitalization, road accident, law enforcers encounter, and
similar incidents[;]

(d) When the minor is engaged in an authorized employment activity, or going to

or returning home from the same place of employment activity without any detour or stop;

(e) When the minor is in [a] motor vehicle or other travel accompanied by an adult
in no violation of this Ordinance;

(f) When the minor is involved in an emergency;

(g) When the minor is out of his/her residence attending an official school,
religious, recreational, educational, social, community or other similar private activity
sponsored by the city, barangay, school, or other similar private civic/religious
organization/group (recognized by the community) that supervises the activity or when the
minor is going to or returning home from such activity, without any detour or stop; and

(h) When the minor can present papers certifying that he/she is a student and was
dismissed from his/her class/es in the evening or that he/she is a working student.
(Emphases and underscoring supplied)

As compared to the first two (2) ordinances, the list of exceptions under the Quezon City
Ordinance is more narrowly drawn to sufficiently protect the minors' rights of association, free
exercise of religion, travel, to peaceably assemble, and of free expression.

xxx. Thus, with these numerous exceptions, the Quezon City Ordinance, in truth, only
prohibits unsupervised activities that hardly contribute to the well-being of minors who publicly
loaf and loiter within the locality at a time where danger is perceivably more prominent.

xxx

Under our legal system's own recognition of a minor's inherent lack of full rational
capacity, and balancing the same against the State's compelling interest to promote juvenile safety
and prevent juvenile crime, this Court finds that the curfew imposed under the Quezon City
Ordinance is reasonably justified with its narrowly drawn exceptions and hence, constitutional.
Needless to say, these exceptions are in no way limited or restricted, as the State, in accordance
with the lawful exercise of its police power, is not precluded from crafting, adding, or modifying
exceptions in similar laws/ordinances for as long as the regulation, overall, passes the parameters
of scrutiny as applied in this case. (Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan v. Quezon City,
G.R. No. 225442, August 8, 2017)

RIGHTS UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION

Custodial investigation commences when a person is taken into custody and is

singled out as a suspect in the commission of a crime under investigation and the
police officers begin to ask questions on the suspect's participation therein and which
tend to elicit an admission. If a person, before he is arrested and placed under
custodial investigation, voluntarily confesses to the police his commission of a crime,
such confession, even if done without the assistance of a lawyer, is not in violation of
his constitutional right, and is admissible as evidence.

POI Macusi narrated that accused-appellant suddenly appeared before them at the Police
Station, all wet and holding a knife. Accused-appellant proclaimed that his father was already
dead. Unsuspecting, PO I Macusi asked who killed accused-appellant's father. Accused-appellant
answered, "Sinaksak ko po yang tatay ko! Napatay ko na po!" POI Torre then got the knife from
accused-appellant and gave it to POI Macusi. POI Macusi placed the knife in the custodian cabinet
in the Police Station. Xxx
103 | P a g e
 xxxx

Accused-appellant argues that his oral confession to POI Torre and PO 1 Macusi, without
the assistance of counsel, is inadmissible in evidence for having been made in blatant violation of
his constitutional right under Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution.

Section 12, paragraphs 1 and 3, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution mandate
that:
SEC. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services
of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing
and in the presence of counsel.
xxxx

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof

shall be inadJ!lissible in evidence against him.

The "investigation" in Section I 2, paragraph I, Article III of the I 987 Constitution pertains
to "custodial investigation." Custodial investigation commences when a person is taken into
custody and is singled out as a suspect in the commission of a crime under investigation and the
police officers begin to ask questions on the suspect's participation therein and which tend to elicit
an admission. As we expounded in People v. Marra:

Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by law

enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. It is only after the
investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and begins to
focus on a particular suspect, the suspect is taken into custody, and the police
carries out a process of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating
statements that the rule begins to operate.

Applying the foregoing definitions, accused-appellant was not under custodial

investigation when he admitted, without assistance of counsel, to POI Torre and POI Macusi that
he stabbed his father to death. Accused-appellant's verbal confession was so spontaneously and
voluntarily given and was not elicited through questioning by the police authorities. It may be true
that POI Macusi asked accused-appellant who killed his father, but POI Macusi only did so in
response to accused-appellant's initial declaration that his father was already dead. At that point,
PO I Macusi still had no idea who actually committed the crime and did not consider accused-
appellant as the suspect in his father's killing. Accused-appellant was also merely standing before
POI Torre and POI Macusi in front of the Camiling Police Station and was not yet in police
custody.

xxxx

Accused-appellant was arrested and subjected to custodial investigation by

the police officers only after his confession. Hence, herein accused-appellant's confession,
even if done without the assistance of a lawyer, is not in violation of his constitutional right under
Section I2, paragraph I, Article III of the I987 Constitution. (People v. Guting, G.R. No. 205412,
September 9, 2015)

Rights in custodial interrogation apply only to admissions made in a criminal

investigation but not to those made in an administrative investigation. Thus, an
employee’s written statement given during an administrative inquiry conducted by
an employer in connection with an anomaly/irregularity he allegedly committed in
the course of his employment -- is admissible as evidence against the employee, even
if he was not assisted by a lawyer when he signed the written statement.

The constitutional proscription against the admissibility of admission or confession of

guilt obtained in violation of Section 12, Article III of the Constitution, is applicable only in
custodial interrogation.

Custodial interrogation means any questioning initiated by law enforcement authorities

after a person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant manner. Indeed, a person under custodial investigation is guaranteed certain rights
which attach upon the commencement thereof, viz: (1) to remain silent, (2) to have competent
104 | P a g e
and independent counsel preferably of his own choice, and (3) to be informed of the two other
rights above. In the present case, while it is undisputed that petitioner gave an uncounseled
written statement regarding an anomaly discovered in the branch he managed, the following are
clear: (1) the questioning was not initiated by a law enforcement authority but merely by an
internal affairs manager of the bank; and, (2) petitioner was neither arrested nor restrained of his
liberty in any significant manner during the questioning. Clearly, petitioner cannot be said to be
under custodial investigation and to have been deprived of the constitutional prerogative during
the taking of his written statement.

Moreover, in Remolona v. Civil Service Commission, we declared that the right to counsel
"applies only to admissions made in a criminal investigation but not to those made in an
administrative investigation."

xxx

Here, petitioner’s written statement was given during an administrative inquiry conducted
by his employer in connection with an anomaly/irregularity he allegedly committed in the course
of his employment. No error can therefore be attributed to the courts below in admitting in
evidence and in giving due consideration to petitioner’s written statement as there is no
constitutional impediment to its admissibility. (Tanenggee v. People, G.R. No. 179448, June 26,
2013)

The constitutional right to counsel is available only during custodial investigation. If the
investigation is merely administrative conducted by the employer and not a criminal
investigation, the admission made during such investigation may be used as evidence to justify
dismissal. (Manila Water Company v. Rosario, G.R. No. 188747, January 29, 2014)

There is no constitutional right to counsel for resource persons in a

congressional inquiry.

The right to be assisted by counsel can only be invoked by a person under custodial
investigation suspected for the commission of a crime, and therefore attaches only during such
custodial investigation. Since petitioners Locsin and Andal were invited to the public hearings as
resource persons, they cannot therefore validly invoke their right to counsel. (Philcomsat v.
Senate, G.R. No. 180308, June 19, 2012)

Miranda rights apply even to suspects who voluntarily surrender to the police
and are subjected to questioning.

The right to counsel upon being questioned for the commission of a crime is part of the
Miranda rights, which require that:
. . . (a) any person under custodial investigation has the right to remain silent; (b)
anything he says can and will be used against him in a court of law; (c) he has the right to
talk to an attorney before being questioned and to have his counsel present when being
questioned; and (d) if he cannot afford an attorney, one will be provided before any
questioning if he so desires.

The Miranda rights were incorporated in our Constitution but were modified to include
the statement that any waiver of the right to counsel must be made "in writing and in the presence
of counsel."

The invocation of these rights applies during custodial investigation, which begins "when
the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to
focus on a particular suspect taken into custody by the police who starts the interrogation and
propounds questions to the person to elicit incriminating statements."

It may appear that the Miranda rights only apply when one is "taken into custody by the
police," such as during an arrest. These rights are intended to protect ordinary citizens from the
pressures of a custodial setting:
The purposes of the safeguards prescribed by Miranda are to ensure that the
police do not coerce or trick captive suspects into confessing, to relieve the "inherently
compelling pressures" "generated by the custodial setting itself," "which work to
undermine the individual’s will to resist," and as much as possible to free courts from the
task of scrutinizing individual cases to try to determine, after the fact, whether particular
confessions were voluntary. Those purposes are implicated as much by in-custody

105 | P a g e
 questioning of persons suspected of misdemeanours as they are by questioning of persons
suspected of felonies. (Emphasis supplied)

Republic Act No. 743896 expanded the definition of custodial investigation to "include the
practice of issuing an ‘invitation’ to a person who is investigated in connection with an offense he
is suspected to have committed, without prejudice to the liability of the ‘inviting’ officer for any
violation of law."

This means that even those who voluntarily surrendered before a police officer must be
apprised of their Miranda rights. (Emphasis supplied) (People v. Chavez, G.R. No. 207950,
September 22, 2014)

RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION

Paraffin test without a lawyer is valid: The right against self-incrimination

extends only to testimonial compulsion, and not the use of the body of the accused is
examined.

As to the paraffin test to which the appellant was subjected to he raises the question, under
the sixth assigned error, that it was not conducted in the presence of his lawyer. This right is
afforded to any person under investigation for the commission of an offense whose confession or
admission may not be taken unless he is informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel of his own choice. His right against self-incrimination is not
violated by the taking of the paraffin test of his hands. This constitutional right extends only to
testimonial compulsion and not when the body of the accused is proposed to be examined as in
this case. Indeed, the paraffin test proved positively that he just recently fired a gun. Again, this
kind of evidence buttresses the case of the prosecution. (People v. Fieldad, G.R. No. 196005,
October 1, 2014)

Mandatory drug testing of a person arrested for a non-drug-related offense

violates a person’s right to privacy guaranteed under the right against unreasonable
searches and seizures and the right against self-incrimination. The constitutional
right against self-incrimination proscribes the use of physical or moral compulsion to
extort communications from the accused and not the inclusion of his body in evidence
when it may be material. However, a drug test result is immaterial evidence in the
prosecution for non-drug offenses. Moreover, to impose mandatory drug testing for
all persons arrested regardless of the crime or offense for which the arrest was made
is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution. We
cannot condone drug testing of all arrested persons regardless of the crime or offense
for which the arrest is being made.

The drug test in Section 15 does not cover persons apprehended or arrested for any
unlawful act, but only for unlawful acts listed under Article II of R.A. 9165.

First, "[a] person apprehended or arrested" cannot literally mean any person apprehended
or arrested for any crime. The phrase must be read in context and understood in consonance with
R.A. 9165 [Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002]. Section 15 comprehends persons
arrested or apprehended for unlawful acts listed under Article II of the law.

Hence, a drug test can be made upon persons who are apprehended or arrested for, among
others, the "importation," "sale, trading, administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution and
transportation", "manufacture" and "possession" of dangerous drugs and/or controlled
precursors and essential chemicals; x x x. To make the provision applicable to all persons arrested
or apprehended for any crime not listed under Article II is tantamount to unduly expanding its
meaning. Note that accused appellant here was arrested in the alleged act of extortion.

A charge for violation of Section 15 of R.A. 9165 is seen as expressive of the intent of the
law to rehabilitate persons apprehended or arrested for the unlawful acts enumerated above
instead of charging and convicting them of other crimes with heavier penalties.

xxx

Furthermore, making the phrase "a person apprehended or arrested" in Section 15

applicable to all persons arrested or apprehended for unlawful acts, not only under R.A. 9165 but
for all other crimes, is tantamount to a mandatory drug testing of all persons apprehended or
106 | P a g e
arrested for any crime. To overextend the application of this provision would run counter to our
pronouncement in Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board and Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency, to wit:

x x x [M]andatory drug testing can never be random and suspicionless. The

ideas of randomness and being suspicionless are antithetical to their being made
defendants in a criminal complaint. They are not randomly picked; neither are they
beyond suspicion. When persons suspected of committing a crime are charged, they
are singled out and are impleaded against their will. The persons thus charged, by
the bare fact of being haled before the prosecutor’s office and peaceably submitting
themselves to drug testing, if that be the case, do not necessarily consent to the
procedure, let alone waive their right to privacy. To impose mandatory drug
testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a
tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA
6195. Drug testing in this case would violate a person’s right to privacy
guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the
accused persons are veritably forced to incriminate themselves.
(Emphasis supplied)

(Dela Cruz v. People, G.R. No. 200748, July 23, 2014)

xxx

We are aware of the prohibition against testimonial compulsion and the allowable
exceptions to such proscription. Cases where non-testimonial compulsion has been allowed
reveal, however, that the pieces of evidence obtained were all material to the principal cause
of the arrest.
The constitutional right of an accused against self-incrimination proscribes the use
of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from the accused and not the
inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be material. Purely mechanical acts are not
included in the prohibition as the accused does not thereby speak his guilt, hence the
assistance and guiding hand of counsel is not required. (People vs. Olvis, 238 Phil. 513
[1987]) The essence of the right against self-incrimination is testimonial compulsion, that is,
the giving of evidence against himself through a testimonial act. (People vs. Casinillo, 213
SCRA 777 [1992]; People vs. Tranca, 235 SCRA 455 [1994]; People vs. Rondero, 378 Phil. 123
[1999]) Hence ,it has been held that a woman charged with adultery may be compelled to
submit to physical examination to determine her pregnancy; (Villaflor vs. Summers, 41 Phil.
62 [1920]) and an accused may be compelled to submit to physical examination and to have
a substance taken from his body for medical determination as to whether he was suffering
from gonorrhea which was contracted by his victim;(U.S. vs. Tan Teng, 23 Phil. 145 [1912])
to expel morphine from his mouth; (U.S. vs. Ong Siu Hong, 36 Phil. 735 [1917]) to have the
outline of his foot traced to determine its identity with bloody footprints; (U.S. vs. Salas, 25
Phil. 337 [1913]; U.S. vs. Zara, 42 Phil. 308 [1921]) and to be photographed or measured, or
his garments or shoes removed or replaced, or to move his body to enable the foregoing
things to be done.(People vs. Otadora, 86 Phil. 244 [1950])28 (Emphasis supplied)

In the instant case, we fail to see how a urine sample could be material to the charge of
extortion. x x x

xxx

In the Gutang et al. case, the Court clarified that "what the Constitution prohibits is the
use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communication from the accused, but not an
inclusion of his body in evidence, when it may be material." x x x

We emphasize that the circumstances in Gutang are clearly different from the
circumstances of petitioner in the instant case. First, Gutang was arrested in relation to a drug
case. Second, he volunteered to give his urine. Third, there were other pieces of evidence that
point to his culpability for the crimes charged. In the present case, though, petitioner was arrested
for extortion; he resisted having his urine sample taken; and finally, his urine sample was the only
available evidence that was used as basis for his conviction for the use of illegal drugs.

The drug test was a violation of petitioner’s right to privacy and right against self-
incrimination.

xxx

x x x We cannot condone drug testing of all arrested persons regardless of the crime or
offense for which the arrest is being made. (Dela Cruz v. People, G.R. No. 200748, July 23, 2014)

107 | P a g e
 RIGHT TO BAIL

Bail protects the right of the accused to due process and to be presumed
innocent

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved. The presumption of innocence is rooted in the guarantee of due process, and is
safeguarded by the constitutional right to be released on bail, and further binds the court to wait
until after trial to impose any punishment on the accused.

It is worthy to note that bail is not granted to prevent the accused from committing
additional crimes. The purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial,
or whenever so required by the trial court. The amount of bail should be high enough to assure
the presence of the accused when so required, but it should be no higher than is reasonably
calculated to fulfill this purpose. Thus, bail acts as a reconciling mechanism to accommodate both
the accused’s interest in his provisional liberty before or during the trial, and the society’s interest
in assuring the accused’s presence at trial. (Enrile v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 213847, August
18, 2015)

The general rule is, therefore, that any person, before being convicted of any
criminal offense, shall be bailable, unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with
an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence
of his guilt is strong.

The right to bail is expressly afforded by Section 13, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the
Constitution, viz.:

x x x All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired
even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not
be required.

This constitutional provision is repeated in Section 7, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, xxx.

The general rule is, therefore, that any person, before being convicted of any criminal
offense, shall be bailable, unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with an offense punishable
with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong. Hence, from
the moment he is placed under arrest, or is detained or restrained by the officers of the law, he
can claim the guarantee of his provisional liberty under the Bill of Rights, and he retains his right
to bail unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with an offense punishable with reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong. Once it has been established
that the evidence of guilt is strong, no right to bail shall be recognized.

As a result, all criminal cases within the competence of the Metropolitan Trial Court,
Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court are
bailable as matter of right because these courts have no jurisdiction to try capital offenses, or
offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Likewise, bail is a matter of
right prior to conviction by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for any offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, or even prior to conviction for an offense
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment when evidence of guilt is not
strong.

On the other hand, the granting of bail is discretionary: (1) upon conviction by the RTC of
an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment; or (2) if the RTC
has imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six years, provided none of the circumstances
enumerated under paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present, xxxx.

For purposes of admission to bail, the determination of whether or not evidence of guilt is
strong in criminal cases involving capital offenses, or offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua
or life imprisonment lies within the discretion of the trial court. But, as the Court has held in
Concerned Citizens v. Elma, “such discretion may be exercised only after the hearing called to
ascertain the degree of guilt of the accused for the purpose of whether or not he should be granted

108 | P a g e
provisional liberty.” It is axiomatic, therefore, that bail cannot be allowed when its grant is a
matter of discretion on the part of the trial court unless there has been a hearing with notice to
the Prosecution. (Enrile v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 213847, August 18, 2015)

Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime charged,
should be allowed independently of the merits of the charge, provided his continued
incarceration is clearly shown to be injurious to his health or to endanger his life. The
objective of bail is to ensure the appearance of the accused during the trial.

We first note that Enrile has averred in his Motion to Fix Bail the presence of two
mitigating circumstances that should be appreciated in his favor, namely: that he was already over
70 years at the time of the alleged commission of the offense, and that he voluntarily surrendered.

Nonetheless, in now granting Enrile’s petition for certiorari, the Court is guided by the
earlier mentioned principal purpose of bail, which is to guarantee the appearance of the
accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the court. The Court is further mindful
of the Philippines’ responsibility in the international community arising from the national
commitment under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to:

x x x uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every
person. This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution which
provides: “The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect
for human rights.” The Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of
protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process,
ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate in the proceedings
before a court, to enable it to decide without delay on the legality of the
detention and order their release if justified. In other words, the Philippine
authorities are under obligation to make available to every person under
detention such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty.
These remedies include the right to be admitted to bail.

This national commitment to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the
worth and dignity of every person has authorized the grant of bail not only to those charged in
criminal proceedings but also to extraditees upon a clear and convincing showing: (1) that the
detainee will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and (2) that there
exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances.

In our view, his social and political standing and his having immediately surrendered to
the authorities upon his being charged in court indicate that the risk of his flight or escape from
this jurisdiction is highly unlikely. His personal disposition from the onset of his indictment for
plunder, formal or otherwise, has demonstrated his utter respect for the legal processes of this
country. We also do not ignore that at an earlier time many years ago when he had been charged
with rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder, he already evinced a similar personal
disposition of respect for the legal processes, and was granted bail during the pendency of his trial
because he was not seen as a flight risk. With his solid reputation in both his public and his private
lives, his long years of public service, and history’s judgment of him being at stake, he should be
granted bail.

The currently fragile state of Enrile’s health presents another compelling justification for
his admission to bail, but which the Sandiganbayan did not recognize.

xxxx

Based on foregoing, there is no question at all that Enrile’s advanced age and ill health
required special medical attention.

xxxx

Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime charged, should be
allowed independently of the merits of the charge, provided his continued incarceration is clearly
shown to be injurious to his health or to endanger his life. Indeed, denying him bail despite
imperiling his health and life would not serve the true objective of preventive incarceration during
the trial.

Granting bail to Enrile on the foregoing reasons is not unprecedented. The Court has
already held in Dela Rama v. The People’s Court:

109 | P a g e
 x x x This court, in disposing of the first petition for certiorari, held the following:

x x x [U]nless allowance of bail is forbidden by law in the particular case, the

illness of the prisoner, independently of the merits of the case, is a
circumstance, and the humanity of the law makes it a consideration which
should, regardless of the charge and the stage of the proceeding, influence the
court to exercise its discretion to admit the prisoner to bail; x x x

xxxx

It is relevant to observe that granting provisional liberty to Enrile will then enable him to
have his medical condition be properly addressed and better attended to by competent physicians
in the hospitals of his choice. This will not only aid in his adequate preparation of his defense but,
more importantly, will guarantee his appearance in court for the trial.

xxx

Accordingly, we conclude that the Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored the objective of bail
to ensure the appearance of the accused during the trial; and unwarrantedly disregarded the clear
showing of the fragile health and advanced age of Enrile. As such, the Sandiganbayan gravely
abused its discretion in denying Enrile’s Motion To Fix Bail. (Enrile v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.
213847, August 18, 2015)

DOUBLE JEOPARDY

The first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a
competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered; and
(e) when the accused was acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent. Since the preliminary
investigation stage is not part of the trial, the dismissal of a case during preliminary
investigation would not put the accused in danger of double jeopardy in the event of
a re-investigation or the filing of a similar case.

[F]or a claim of double jeopardy to prosper, petitioner has to prove that a first jeopardy
has attached prior to the second. As stated in Braza v. Sandiganbayan, "[t]he first jeopardy
attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d)
when a valid plea has been entered; and (e) when the accused was acquitted or convicted, or the
case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent." In this case, the
complaint before the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military was dismissed as early as
the preliminary investigation stage, thus, there was as yet, no indictment to speak of. No
complaint or Information has been brought before a competent court. Hence, none of the
aforementioned events has transpired for the first jeopardy to have attached.

In Vincoy v. Court of Appeals, which is closely analogous to the present case, the private
complainant therein initially filed a complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasay City,
but said office dismissed the complaint. Private complainant then re-filed the complaint with the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City. The Office of the Prosecutor of Pasig City found
probable cause and filed the Information against the accused therein. In said case, the Court
categorically held that:

The dismissal of a similar complaint x x x filed by [private complainant] before the

City Prosecutor's Office of Pasay City will not exculpate the petitioner. The case cannot bar
petitioner's prosecution. It is settled that the dismissal of a case during its preliminary
investigation does not constitute double jeopardy since a preliminary investigation is not
part of the trial and is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties'
evidence but only such as may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been
committed and accused is probably guilty thereof. For this reason, it cannot be considered
equivalent to a judicial pronouncement of acquital.

The fore going ruling was reiterated in Trinidad v. Office of the Ombudsman, where the
Court has categorically ruled that since the preliminary investigation stage is not part of the trial,
the dismissal of a case during preliminary investigation would not put the accused in danger of
double jeopardy in the event of a re-investigation or the filing of a similar case. An investigating
body is not bound by the findings or resolution of another such office, tribunal or agency which
may have had before it a different or incomplete set of evidence than what had been presented
during the previous investigation. Therefore, petitioner's indictment pursuant to the findings of
110 | P a g e
the Office of the City Prosecutor, and his eventual conviction for the crime of grave threats, has
not placed him in double jeopardy. (Jamaca v. People, G.R. No. 183681, July 27, 2015)

If the accused were never arraigned in lower court, and the criminal case was
dismissed upon the order of the Supreme Court, a first jeopardy never attached.

Double jeopardy only applies when: (1) a first jeopardy attached; (2) it has been validly
terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first.

A first jeopardy attaches only after the accused has been acquitted or convicted, or the case
has been dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent, by a competent court in
a valid indictment for which the accused has entered a valid plea during arraignment.

To recall, on 12 May 2006, an Information for the crime of rebellion, as defined and
penalized under Article 134 in relation to Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 06-944 was filed before the RTC Makati against petitioners and several others.

However, petitioners were never arraigned in Criminal Case No. 06-944. Even before the
indictment for rebellion was filed before the RTC Makati, petitioners Ocampo, Echanis and
Ladlad had already filed a petition before this Court to seek the nullification of the Orders of the
DOJ denying their motion for the inhibition of the members of the prosecution panel due to lack
of impartiality and independence. When the indictment was filed, petitioners Ocampo, Echanis
and Ladlad filed supplemental petitions to enjoin the prosecution of Criminal Case No. 06-944.
We eventually ordered the dismissal of the rebellion case. It is clear then that a first jeopardy never
had a chance to attach. (Ocampo v. Abando, G.R. No. 176830, February 11, 2014)

The protection against double jeopardy may be invoked only for the same
offense or identical offenses. Where two different laws (or articles of the same code)
defines two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to a prosecution
of the other, although both offenses arise from the same fact, if each crime involves
some important act which is not an essential element of the other.

Section 730 of Rule 117 lays down the requisites in order that the defense of double
jeopardy may prosper. There is double jeopardy when the following requisites are present: (1) a
first jeopardy attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and
(3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first. As to the first requisite, the first
jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after
arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered; and (e) when the accused was acquitted or
convicted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. In this
case, there is no dispute that the first and second requisites of double jeopardy are present in view
of the MeTC Resolution dated August 13, 2012 which granted petitioner's demurrer to evidence
and acquitted her in a criminal case for falsification of private document in Criminal Case No.
370119-20-CR. Petitioner's argument dwells on whether the third requisite of double jeopardy —
a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first — is present. x x x

Thus, the remaining question to be resolved is whether the offense charged in the
information for Section 46 of RA 6938 necessarily includes or is necessarily included in a crime
for falsification of private document under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
(RPC). The test to determine whether an offense necessarily includes or is necessarily included in
the other is provided under Section 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court:
An offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the
essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or information,
constitute the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved,
when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting the
latter.

xxx

Verily, there is nothing common or similar between the essential elements of the crimes
of falsification of private document under Article 172 (2) of the RPC and that of violation of Section
46 of RA 6938, as alleged in the Informations filed against petitioner. As neither of the said crimes
can be said to necessarily include or is necessarily included in the other, the third requisite for
double jeopardy to attach—a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first—is, therefore,
absent. Not only are their elements different, they also have a distinct nature, i.e., the former is

111 | P a g e
malum in se, as what makes it a felony is criminal intent on the part of the offender, while the
latter is malum prohibitum, as what makes it a crime is the special law enacting it.

Moreover, in People v. Doriguez, the Court held:

It is a cardinal rule that the protection against double jeopardy may be invoked only for
the same offense or identical offenses. A simple act may offend against two (or more) entirely
distinct and unrelated provisions of law, and if one provision requires proof of an additional fact
or element which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction or a dismissal of the information
under one does not bar prosecution under the other. Phrased else wise, where two different laws
(or articles of the same code) defines two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle
to a prosecution of the other, although both offenses arise from the same fact, if each crime
involves some important act which is not an essential element of the other.

Since the Informations filed against petitioner were for separate and distinct offenses as
discussed above—the first against Article 172 (2) of the Revised Penal Code and the second against
Section 46 of the Cooperative Code (RA 6938)—one cannot be pleaded as a bar to the other under
the rule on double jeopardy. Besides, it is basic in criminal procedure that an accused may be
charged with as many crimes as defined in our penal laws even if these arose from one incident.
Thus, where a single act is directed against one person but said act constitutes a violation of two
or more entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law, or by a special law and the Revised Penal
Code, as in this case, the prosecution against one is not an obstacle to the prosecution of the other.
(Assistio v. People, G.R. No. 200465, April 20, 2015)

The provisional dismissal of the case does not operate as an acquittal since its
dismissal is made with the express consent of the accused; thus, double jeopardy
does not attach.

The proscription against double jeopardy presupposes that an accused has been previously
charged with an offense, and the case against him is terminated either by his acquittal or
conviction, or dismissed in any other manner without his consent. As a general rule, the following
requisites must be present for double jeopardy to attach: (1) a valid indictment, (2) before a court
of competent jurisdiction, (3) the arraignment of the accused, (4) a valid plea entered by him, and
(5) the acquittal or conviction of the accused, or the dismissal or termination of the case against
him without his express consent. However, there are two (2) exceptions to the foregoing rule, and
double jeopardy may attach even if the dismissal of the case was with the consent of the accused:
first, when there is insufficiency of evidence to support the charge against him; and second, where
there has been an unreasonable delay in the proceedings, in violation of the accused’s right to
speedy trial.

In the instant case, while the first four requisites are present, the last requisite is lacking,
considering that here the dismissal was merely provisional and it was done with the express
consent of the accused-petitioner. Petitioner is not in danger of being twice put in jeopardy with
the reopening of the case against her as it is clear that the case was only provisionally dismissed
by the trial court. The requirement that the dismissal of the case must be without the consent of
the accused is not present in this case. Neither does the case fall under any of the aforementioned
exceptions because, in fact, the prosecution had failed to continue the presentation of evidence
due to the absence of the witnesses, thus, the fact of insufficiency of evidence cannot be
established. Likewise, we find no unreasonable delay in the proceedings that would be
tantamount to violation of the accused's right to speedy trial. (Saldariega v. Panganiban, G.R.
Nos. 211933 & 211960, April 15, 2015)

RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION

Preliminary investigation is not a part of trial and it is only in a trial where an

accused can demand the full exercise of his rights, such as the right to confront and
cross-examine his accusers to establish his innocence.

Moreover, a person under preliminary investigation, as Sen. Estrada is in the present case
when he filed his Request, is not yet an accused person, and hence cannot demand the full exercise
of the rights of an accused person:

112 | P a g e
 A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than
not a crime has been committed and was committed by the suspects. x x x A finding of probable
cause merely binds over the suspect to stand trial. It is not a pronouncement of guilt.

Considering the low quantum and quality of evidence needed to support a finding of
probable cause, we also hold that the DOJ Panel did not gravely abuse its discretion in refusing to
call the NBI witnesses for clarificatory questions. The decision to call witnesses for clarificatory
questions is addressed to the sound discretion of the investigator and the investigator alone. If the
evidence on hand already yields a probable cause, the investigator need not hold a clarificatory
hearing. To repeat, probable cause merely implies probability of guilt and should be determined
in a summary manner. Preliminary investigation is not a part of trial and it is only in a trial where
an accused can demand the full exercise of his rights, such as the right to confront and cross-
examine his accusers to establish his innocence. In the case at bar, the DOJ Panel correctly
adjudged that enough evidence had been adduced to establish probable cause and clarificatory
hearing was unnecessary.

x x x [T]he right to a preliminary investigation is merely a statutory right, not part of the
"fundamental and essential requirements" of due process as prescribed in Ang Tibay and
amplified in GSIS. Thus, a preliminary investigation can be taken away by legislation. The
constitutional right of an accused to confront the witnesses against him does not apply in
preliminary investigations; nor will the absence of a preliminary investigation be an infringement
of his right to confront the witnesses against him. A preliminary investigation may be done away
with entirely without infringing the constitutional right of an accused under the due process
clause to a fair trial. (Estrada v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 212140-41, January 21,
2015)

RIGHT TO INFORMATION

The people’s constitutional right to information is intertwined with the

government’s constitutional duty of full public disclosure of all transactions involving
public interest. The people have the right to access the papers and documents relating
to the company profile and legal capacity of the winning bidder for a government
project.

The people’s right to information is provided in Section 7, Article III of the Constitution,
which reads:
Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall
be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to
official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as
basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as
may be provided by law. (Underscoring supplied.)

The people’s constitutional right to information is intertwined with the government’s

constitutional duty of full public disclosure of all transactions involving public interest. Section
28, Article II of the Constitution declares the State policy of full transparency in all transactions
involving public interest, to wit:
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and
implements apolicy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public
interest. (Italics supplied.)

The foregoing constitutional provisions seek to promote transparency in policy-making

and in the operations of the government, as well as provide the people sufficient information to
exercise effectively other constitutional rights. They are also essential to hold public officials "at
all times x xx accountable to the people," for unless citizens have the proper information, they
cannot hold public officials accountable for anything. Armed with the right information, citizens
can participate in public discussions leading to the formulation of government policies and their
effective implementation. An informed citizenry is essential to the existence and proper
functioning of any democracy.

xxx

In Chavez v. Public Estates Authority involving the execution of an Amended Joint

Venture Agreement on the disposition of reclaimed lands without public bidding, the Court held:

113 | P a g e
 “Information, however, on on-going evaluation or review of bids or proposals being
undertaken by the bidding or review committee is not immediately accessible under the right to
information. While the evaluation or review is still on-going, there are no "official acts,
transactions, or decisions" on the bids or proposals. However, once the committee makes its
official recommendation, there arises a "definite proposition" on the part of the government. From
this moment, the public’s right to information attaches, and any citizen can access all the non-
proprietary information leading to such definite proposition.” x x x

Chavez v. Public Estates Authority thus laid down the rule that the constitutional right to
information includes official information on on-going negotiations before a final contract. The
information, however, must constitute definite propositions by the government and should not
cover recognized exceptions like privileged information, military and diplomatic secrets and
similar matters affecting national security and public order. In addition, Congress has prescribed
other limitations on the right to information in several legislations.

In this case, petitioners’ first letter dated April 20, 2010 requested for documents such as
Terms of Reference and proposed bids submitted by the bidders. At that time, the bids were yet
to be submitted at the bidding scheduled on April 28, 2010. It is also to be noted that PSALM’s
website carried news and updates on the sale of AHEPP, providing important information on
bidding activities and clarifications regarding the terms and conditions of the Asset Purchase
Agreement (APA) to be signed by PSALM and the winning bidder (Buyer).

In Chavez v. National Housing Authority, the Court held that pending the enactment of
an enabling law, the release of information through postings in public bulletin boards and
government websites satisfies the constitutional requirement, thus:

xxx

The Court, however, distinguished the duty to disclose information from the duty to
permit access to information on matters of public concern under Sec. 7, Art. III of the
Constitution. Unlike the disclosure of information which is mandatory under the Constitution,
the other aspect of the people’s right to know requires a demand or request for one to gain access
to documents and paper of the particular agency. Moreover, the duty to disclose covers only
transactions involving public interest, while the duty to allow access has a broader scope of
information which embraces not only transactions involving public interest, but any matter
contained in official communications and public documents of the government agency. Such relief
must be granted to the party requesting access to official records, documents and papers relating
to official acts, transactions, and decisions that are relevant to a government contract.

Here, petitioners’ second letter dated May 14, 2010 specifically requested for detailed
information regarding the winning bidder, such as company profile, contact person or responsible
officer, office address and Philippine registration. But before PSALM could respond to the said
letter, petitioners filed the present suit on May 19, 2010. PSALM’s letter-reply dated May 21, 2010
advised petitioners that their letter-re quest was referred to the counsel of K-Water. We find such
action insufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement and inconsistent with the
policy under EPIRA to implement the privatization of NPC assets in an "open and transparent"
manner. PSALM’s evasive response to the request for information was unjustified because all
bidders were required to deliver documents such as company profile, names of authorized
officers/representatives, financial and technical experience.

Consequently, this relief must be granted to petitioners by directing PSALM to allow

petitioners access to the papers and documents relating to the company profile and legal capacity
of the winning bidder. (Initiatives For Dialogue And Empowerment Through Alternative Legal
Services, Inc. v. Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation, G.R. No. 192088,
October 9, 2012)

Information on on-going evaluation or review of bids or proposals being

undertaken by the bidding or review committee is not immediately accessible under
the right to information. While the evaluation or review is still on-going, there are no
"official acts, transactions, or decisions" on the bids or proposals. However, once the
committee makes its official recommendation, there arises a "definite proposition" on
the part of the government. From this moment, the public's right to information
attaches. The constitutional right to information includes official information on on-
going negotiations before a final contract.

DFA insists that we determine whether the evidence sought to be subpoenaed is covered
by the deliberative process privilege. DFA contends that the RTC erred in holding that the
deliberative process privilege is no longer applicable in this case. According to the RTC, based on
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Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, "acts, transactions or decisions are privileged only before a
definite proposition is reached by the agency," and since, in this case, DFA not only made "a
definite proposition" but already entered into a contract then the evidence sought to be produced
is no longer privileged.

We have held in Chavez v. Public Estates Authority that:

Information, however, on on-going evaluation or review of bids or proposals being
undertaken by the bidding or review committee is not immediately accessible under the
right to information. While the evaluation or review is still on-going, there are no "official
acts, transactions, or decisions" on the bids or proposals. However, once the committee
makes its official recommendation, there arises a "definite proposition" on the part of the
government. From this moment, the public's right to information attaches, and any citizen
can access all the non-proprietary information leading to such definite proposition.

xxxx

The right to information, however, does not extend to matters recognized as

privileged information under the separation of powers. The right does not also apply to
information on military and diplomatic secrets, information affecting national security,
and information on investigations of crimes by law enforcement agencies before the
prosecution of the accused, which courts have long recognized as confidential. The right
may also be subject to other limitations that Congress may impose by law.

There is no claim by PEA that the information demanded by petitioner is privileged

information rooted in the separation of powers. The information does not cover
Presidential conversations, correspondences, or discussions during closed-door Cabinet
meetings which, like internal deliberations of the Supreme Court and other collegiate
courts, or executive sessions of either house of Congress, are recognized as confidential.
This kind of information cannot be pried open by a co-equal branch of government. A frank
exchange of exploratory ideas and assessments, free from the glare of publicity and
pressure by interested parties, is essential to protect the independence of decision-making
of those tasked to exercise Presidential, Legislative and Judicial power. This is not the
situation in the instant case.

We rule, therefore, that the constitutional right to information includes official

information on on-going negotiations before a final contract. The information, however,
must constitute definite propositions by the government and should not cover recognized
exceptions like privileged information, military and diplomatic secrets and similar matters
affecting national security and public order. Congress has also prescribed other limitations
on the right to information in several legislations. (Emphasis supplied)

(Department of Foreign Affairs v. BCA International, June 29, 2016, G.R. No. 210858)

Privileged information is outside the scope of the constitutional right to

information, just like military and diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting
national security and public order. One such privileged information that is within the
exception of the right to information is the deliberative process privilege, involving
as it does the deliberative process of reaching a decision. Deliberative process
privilege protects from disclosure advisory opinions, recommendations, and
deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and
policies are formulated.

Contrary to the RTC's ruling, there is nothing in our Chavez v. Public Estates Authority,
ruling which states that once a "definite proposition" is reached by an agency, the privileged
character of a document no longer exists. On the other hand, we hold that before a "definite
proposition" is reached by an agency, there are no "official acts, transactions, or decisions" yet
which can be accessed by the public under the right to information. Only when there is an official
recommendation can a "definite proposition" arise and, accordingly, the public's right to
information attaches. However, this right to information has certain limitations and does not
cover privileged information to protect the independence of decision-making by the government.

Chavez v. Public Estates Authority expressly and unequivocally states that the right to
information "should not cover recognized exceptions like privileged information, military and
diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting national security and public order." Clearly,
Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, expressly mandates that "privileged information" should be
outside the scope of the constitutional right to information, just like military and diplomatic
secrets and similar matters affecting national security and public order. In these exceptional
cases, even the occurrence of a "definite proposition" will not give rise to the public's right to
information.

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 Deliberative process privilege is one kind of privileged information, which is within the
exceptions of the constitutional right to information. In In Re: Production of Court Records and
Documents and the Attendance of Court Officials and Employees as Witnesses, we held that:
Court deliberations are traditionally recognized as privileged communication.
Section 2, Rule 10 of the IRSC provides:

Section 2. Confidentiality of court sessions. - Court sessions are executive in

character, with only the Members of the Court present. Court deliberations are confidential
and shall not be disclosed to outside parties, except as may be provided herein or as
authorized by the Court.

Justice Abad discussed the rationale for the rule in his concurring opinion to the
Court Resolution in Arroyo v. De Lima (TRO on Watch List Order case): the rules on
confidentiality will enable the Members of the Court to "freely discuss the issues without
fear of criticism for holding unpopular positions" or fear of humiliation for one's
comments. The privilege against disclosure of these kinds of information/communication
is known as deliberative process privilege, involving as it does the deliberative process of
reaching a decision. xxxx

The privilege is not exclusive to the Judiciary. We have in passing recognized the
claim of this privilege by the two other branches of government in Chavez v. Public Estates
Authority (speaking through J. Carpio) when the Court declared that -

[t]he information x x x like internal deliberations of the Supreme Court and other
collegiate courts, or executive sessions of either house of Congress, are recognized as
confidential. This kind of information cannot be pried open by a co-equal branch of
government. A frank exchange of exploratory ideas and assessments, free from the glare of
publicity and pressure by interested parties, is essential to protect the independence of
decision-making of those tasked to exercise Presidential, Legislative and Judicial power.
(Emphasis supplied)

In Akbayan v. Aquino, we adopted the ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court in NLRB v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co, which stated that the deliberative process privilege protects from disclosure
"advisory opinions, recommendations, and deliberations comprising part of a process by which
governmental decisions and policies are formulated." We explained that "[w]ritten advice from a
variety of individuals is an important element of the government's decision-making process and
that the interchange of advice could be stifled if courts forced the government to disclose those
recommendations"; thus, the privilege is intended "to prevent the 'chilling' of deliberative
communications."

The privileged character of the information does not end when an agency has adopted a
definite proposition or when a contract has been perfected or consummated; otherwise, the
purpose of the privilege will be defeated.

The deliberative process privilege applies if its purpose is served, that is, "to protect the
frank exchange of ideas and opinions critical to the government's decision[-]making process
where disclosure would discourage such discussion in the future." xxxx In Gwich 'in Steering
Comm. v. Office of the Governor, the Supreme Court of Alaska held that communications have
not lost the privilege even when the decision that the documents preceded is finally made.
(Department of Foreign Affairs v. BCA International, June 29, 2016, G.R. No. 210858)

Two fundamental requirements for the deliberative process privilege to be

invoked: First, the communication must be pre-decisional, i.e., "antecedent to the
adoption of an agency policy." Second, the communication must be deliberative, i.e.,
"a direct part of the deliberative process in that it makes recommendations or
expresses opinions on legal or policy matters." The deliberative process privilege
typically covers recommendations, advisory opinions, draft documents, proposals,
suggestions, and other subjective documents that reflect the personal opinions of the
writer rather than the policy of the agency.

Traditionally, U.S. courts have established two fundamental requirements, both of which
must be met, for the deliberative process privilege to be invoked. First, the communication must
be predecisional, i.e., "antecedent to the adoption of an agency policy." Second, the
communication must be deliberative, i.e., "a direct part of the deliberative process in that it makes
recommendations or expresses opinions on legal or policy matters." It must reflect the "give-and-
take of the consultative process." xxxx

Finally, in addition to assessing whether the material is predecisional and deliberative,

and in order to determine if disclosure of the material is likely to adversely affect the purposes of
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the privilege, courts inquire whether "the document is so candid or personal in nature that public
disclosure is likely in the future to stifle honest and frank communication within the agency." As
a consequence, the deliberative process privilege typically covers recommendations, advisory
opinions, draft documents, proposals, suggestions, and other subjective documents that reflect
the personal opinions of the writer rather than the policy of the agency.

Thus, "[t]he deliberative process privilege exempts materials that are 'predecisional' and
'deliberative,' but requires disclosure of policy statements and final opinions 'that have the force
of law or explain actions that an agency has already taken."’

xxx In Strang v. Collyer, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia held that the
meeting notes that reflect the exchange of opinions between agency personnel or divisions of
agency are covered by the deliberative process privilege because they "reflect the agency's group
thinking in the process of working out its policy" and are part of the deliberative process in
arriving at the final position. xxx

This Court applied the deliberative process privilege in In Re: Production of Court Records
and Documents and the Attendance of Court Officials and Employees as Wltnesses and found that
court records which are "predecisional" and "deliberative" in nature - in particular, documents
and other communications which are part of or related to the deliberative process, i.e., notes,
drafts, research papers, internal discussions, internal memoranda, records of internal
deliberations, and similar papers - are protected and cannot be the subject of a subpoena if judicial
privilege is to be preserved. We further held that this privilege is not exclusive to the Judiciary
and cited our ruling in Chavez v. Public Estates Authority.

The deliberative process privilege can also be invoked in arbitration proceedings under RA
9285. (Department of Foreign Affairs v. BCA International, June 29, 2016, G.R. No. 210858)

The reasons or bases for the deliberative process privilege: first, the privilege
protects candid discussions within an agency; second, it prevents public confusion
from premature disclosure of agency opinions before the agency establishes final
policy; and third, it protects the integrity of an agency's decision; the public should
not judge officials based on information they considered prior to issuing their final
decisions.

"Deliberative process privilege contains three policy bases: first, the privilege protects
candid discussions within an agency; second, it prevents public confusion from premature
disclosure of agency opinions before the agency establishes final policy; and third, it protects the
integrity of an agency's decision; the public should not judge officials based on information they
considered prior to issuing their final decisions." Stated differently, the privilege serves "to assure
that subordinates within an agency will feel free to provide the decision[-]maker with their
uninhibited opinions and recommendations without fear of later being subject to public ridicule
or criticism; to protect against premature disclosure of proposed policies before they have been
finally formulated or adopted; and to protect against confusing the issues and misleading the
public by dissemination of documents suggesting reasons and rationales for a course of action
which were not in fact the ultimate reasons for the agency's action." (Department of Foreign
Affairs v. BCA International, June 29, 2016, G.R. No. 210858)

RIGHT AGAINST CRUEL AND DEGRADINIG PUNISHMENT

The prohibition against cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment extends only

to situations of extreme corporeal or psychological punishment that strips the
individual of his humanity. It applies only to a punishment that is flagrantly and
plainly oppressive and wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to
shock the moral sense of the community. Perpetual disqualification from public office
for the repeated failure to file the SOCE and does not constitute cruel, degrading and
inhuman punishment.

In a final attempt to evade liability, the petitioner describes the penalty of perpetual
disqualification as excessive, harsh and cruel, and, consequently, unconstitutional pursuant to
Section 19(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution, which pertinently provides:

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 Section 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading
or inhuman punishment inflicted. x x x .

He contends that the failure to file the SOCE is an offense far less grave than the serious
crimes under the Revised Penal Code and the grave offenses under the civil service laws.
Accordingly, equating the non-filing of the SOCE with the latter offenses is irrational and
unwarranted.

The petitioner's contention does not impress.

We have always deferred to the wisdom of Congress in enacting a law. We can only enforce
a statute like R.A. No. 7166 unless there is a clear showing that it contravenes the Constitution.
The petitioner has not demonstrated herein how R.A. No. 7166 could have transgressed the
Constitution. On the contrary, a review of R.A. No. 7166 convincingly indicates that perpetual
disqualification from public office has been prescribed as a penalty for the repeated failure to file
the SOCE and does not constitute cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment.

We have already settled that the constitutional proscription under the Bill of Rights
extends only to situations of extreme corporeal or psychological punishment that strips the
individual of his humanity. The proscription is aimed more at the form or character of the
punishment rather than at its severity, as the Court has elucidated in Lim v. People, to wit:

Settled is the rule that a punishment authorized by statute is not cruel,

degrading or disproportionate to the nature of the offense unless it is flagrantly
and plainly oppressive and wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as
to shock the moral sense of the community. It takes more than merely being harsh,
excessive, out of proportion or severe for a penalty to be obnoxious to the
Constitution. Based on this principle, the Court has consistently overruled
contentions of the defense that the penalty of fine or imprisonment authorized by
the statute involved is cruel and degrading.

In People vs. Tongko, this Court held that the prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment is generally aimed at the form or character of the punishment
rather than its severity in respect of its duration or amount, and applies to
punishments which never existed in America or which public sentiment regards as
cruel or obsolete. This refers, for instance, to those inflicted at the whipping post
or in the pillory, to burning at the stake, breaking on the wheel, disemboweling and
the like. The fact that the penalty is severe provides insufficient basis to declare a
law unconstitutional and does not, by that circumstance alone, make it cruel and
inhuman. (Bold underscoring is supplied for emphasis)

Moreover, that Congress has deemed fit to impose the penalty of perpetual disqualification
on candidates who repeatedly failed to file their SOCEs cannot be the subject of judicial inquiry.
Congress has the absolute discretion to penalize by law with perpetual disqualification from
holding public office in addition to administrative fines the seekers of public office who fail more
than once to file their SOCEs. Such penalty is intended to underscore the need to file the SOCE as
another means of ensuring the sanctity of the electoral process. (Maturan v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 227155, March 28, 2017)

ACADEMIC FREEDOM

Academic freedom gives institutions of higher learning the right to impose

disciplinary sanctions, which includes the power to dismiss or expel students who
violate disciplinary rules. The power to discipline students is subsumed in the
academic freedom to determine what may be taught, how it shall be taught and who
may be admitted to study.

Respondents likewise contend that, as an academic institution, the PMA has the inherent
right to promulgate reasonable norms, rules and regulations that it may deem necessary for the
maintenance of school discipline, which is specifically mandated by Section 3 (2), Article XIV of
the 1987 Constitution. As the premiere military educational institution of the AFP in accordance
with Section 30, Article III of C.A. No. 1 and Sections 58 and 59, Chapter 9, Subtitle II, Title VIII,
Book IV of E.O. No. 292 ("Administrative Code of 1987"), the PMA is an institution that enjoys
academic freedom guaranteed by Section 5 (2), Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution. In Miriam
College Foundation, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, it was held that concomitant with such freedom is
the right and duty to instill and impose discipline upon its students. Also, consistent with lsabelo,
Jr. v. Perpetual Help College of Rizal, Inc. and Ateneo de Manila University v. Capulong, the

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PMA has the freedom on who to admit (and, conversely, to expel) given the high degree of
discipline and honor expected from its students who are to form part of the AFP.

xxx

In their Reply, petitioners counter that, as shown in lsabelo, Jr. and Ateneo, academic
freedom is not absolute and cannot be exercised in blatant disregard of the right to due process
and the 1987 Constitution. x x x

While both parties have valid points to consider, the arguments of respondents are more
in line with the facts of this case. x x x

xxx

Academic freedom or, to be precise, the institutional autonomy of universities and

institutions of higher learning, has been enshrined in our Constitutions of 1935, 1973, and 1987.
In Garcia, this Court espoused the concurring opinion of U.S. Supreme Court Justice Felix
Frankfurter in Sweezy v. New Hampshire, which enumerated "the four essential freedoms" of a
university: To determine for itself on academic grounds (1) who may teach, (2) what may be
taught, (3) how it shall be taught, and (4) who may be admitted to study. An educational
institution has the power to adopt and enforce such rules as may be deemed expedient for its
government, this being incident to the very object of incorporation, and indispensable to the
successful management of the college. x x x

The schools' power to instill discipline in their students is subsumed in their academic
freedom and that "the establishment of rules governing university-student relations, particularly
those pertaining to student discipline, may be regarded as vital, not merely to the smooth and
efficient operation of the institution, but to its very survival." x x x In this regard, the Court has
always recognized the right of schools to impose disciplinary sanctions, which includes the power
to dismiss or expel, on students who violate disciplinary rules. In Miriam College Foundation,
Inc. v. Court of Appeals, this Court elucidated:
The right of the school to discipline its students is at once apparent in the third
freedom, i.e., "how it shall be taught." A school certainly cannot function in an atmosphere
of anarchy.

Thus, there can be no doubt that the establishment of an educational institution

requires rules and regulations necessary for the maintenance of an orderly educational
program and the creation of an educational environment conducive to learning. Such rules
and regulations are equally necessary for the protection of the students, faculty, and
property.

Moreover, the school has an interest in teaching the student discipline, a necessary,
if not indispensable, value in any field of learning. By instilling discipline, the school teaches
discipline. Accordingly, the right to discipline the student likewise finds basis in the freedom
"what to teach." Incidentally, the school not only has the right but the duty to develop
discipline in its students. The Constitution no less imposes such duty.

[All educational institutions] shall inculcate patriotism and nationalism, foster love
of humanity, respect for human rights, appreciation of the role of national heroes in the
historical development of the country, teach the rights and duties of citizenship, strengthen
ethical and spiritual values, develop moral character and personal discipline, encourage
critical and creative thinking, broaden scientific and technological knowledge, and promote
vocational efficiency.

In Angeles vs. Sison, we also said that discipline was a means for the school to carry
out its responsibility to help its students "grow and develop into mature, responsible,
effective and worthy citizens of the community."

Finally, nowhere in the above formulation is the right to discipline more evident than
in "who may be admitted to study." If a school has the freedom to determine whom to admit,
logic dictates that it also has the right to determine whom to exclude or expel, as well as upon
whom to impose lesser sanctions such as suspension and the withholding of graduation
privileges.

The power of the school to impose disciplinary measures extends even after graduation for
any act done by the student prior thereto. In University of the Phils. Board of Regents v. Court of
Appeals, We upheld the university's withdrawal of a doctorate degree already conferred on a
student who was found to have committed intellectual dishonesty in her dissertation. Thus:
Art. XIV, §5 (2) of the Constitution provides that "[a]cademic freedom shall be
enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning." This is nothing new. The 1935 Constitution
and the 1973 Constitution likewise provided for the academic freedom or, more precisely,
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 for the institutional autonomy of universities and institutions of higher learning. As pointed
out by this Court in Garcia v. Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology,
it is a freedom granted to "institutions of higher learning" which is thus given "a wide
sphere of authority certainly extending to the choice of students." If such institution of
higher learning can decide who can and who cannot study in it, it certainly can also
determine on whom it can confer the honor and distinction of being its graduates.

Where it is shown that the conferment of an honor or distinction was obtained

through fraud, a university has the right to revoke or withdraw the honor or distinction it
has thus conferred. This freedom of a university does not terminate upon the "graduation"
of a student, as the Court of Appeals held. For it is precisely the "graduation" of such a
student that is in question. xxx

Wide indeed is the sphere of autonomy granted to institutions of higher learning,

xxx.

Under the U.P. Charter, the Board of Regents is the highest governing body of the
University of the Philippines. It has the power to confer degrees upon the recommendation
of the University Council. It follows that if the conferment of a degree is founded on error
or fraud, the Board of Regents is also empowered, subject to the observance of due process,
to withdraw what it has granted without violating a student's rights. An institution of higher
learning cannot be powerless if it discovers that an academic degree it has conferred is not
rightfully deserved. xxx It should be empowered, as an act of self-defense, to take measures
to protect itself from serious threats to its integrity.

xxx

x x x As the primary training and educational institution of the AFP, [PMA] certainly has
the right to invoke academic freedom in the enforcement of its internal rules and regulations,
which are the Honor Code and the Honor System in particular.

The Honor Code is a set of basic and fundamental ethical and moral principle. It is the
minimum standard for cadet behavior and serves as the guiding spirit behind each cadet's action.
It is the cadet's responsibility to maintain the highest standard of honor. (Cudia v. The
Superintendent of the Philippine Military Academy, G.R. No. 211362, February 24, 2015)

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