HEIRS OF MARGARITA PRODON v.

HEIRS OF MAXIMO ALVAREZ

Facts:
Heirs of Maximo Alvarez, (the respondents herein) in their Complaint for Quieting of
Title and Damages against Margarita Prodon averred the following:

1. that their parents, the late spouses Maximo S. Alvarez, Sr. and Valentina Clave, were
the registered owners of that parcel of land;
2. that their parents had been in possession of the property during their lifetime;
3. that upon their parents’ deaths, they had continued the possession of the property as
heirs, paying the real property taxes due thereon;
4. that they could not locate the owner’s duplicate copy but original copy on file with the
Register of Deeds of Manila was intact;
5. that the original copy contained an entry stating that the property had been sold to
defendant Prodon subject to the right of repurchase; and
6. that the entry had been maliciously done by Prodon because the deed of sale with
right to repurchase covering the property did not exist.

Consequently, they prayed that the entry be cancelled, and that Prodon be adjudged
liable for damages.

Prodon’s Answer claimed that the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr. had executed on September
9, 1975 the deed of sale with right to repurchase; that the deed had been registered
with the Register of Deeds and duly annotated on the title; that the late Maximo Alvarez,
Sr. had been granted six months from September 9, 1975 within which to repurchase
the property; and that she had then become the absolute owner of the property due to
its non-repurchase within the given 6-month period.

During the trial, the custodian of the records of the property attested that the copy of the
deed of sale with right to repurchase could not be found in the files of the Register of
Deeds of Manila.

The RTC rendered judgment, finding untenable the plaintiffs’ contention that the deed of
sale with right to repurchase did not exist, concluded that the original copy of the deed
of sale with right to repurchase had been lost, and that earnest efforts had been exerted
to produce it before the court, and found that the defendant had established the
execution and existence of the deed. It allow the presentation of secondary evidence.

On appeal, CA reversed the RTC decision and finds that the secondary evidence
should not have been admitted because Margarita Prodon failed to prove the existence
of the original deed of sale and to establish its loss.

Issue:

Whether or not best evidence rule is applicable in the case at bar?

No. Best Evidence Rule was not applicable, because the terms of the Deed of Sale
were not the issue. The Best Evidence Rule applies only when the terms of a written
document are the subject of the inquiry. In action for quieting of title based on the
existence of a deed of sale with right to repurchase that purportedly cast a cloud on the
title of a property, the Best Evidence Rule does not apply, and the defendant is not
precluded from presenting evidence other than the original document.

However, in the case at bar, Prodon failed to establish the existence and due execution
of the deed. The Best Evidence Rule stipulates that in proving the terms of a written
document the original of the document must be produced in court. The rule excludes
any evidence other than the original writing to prove the contents thereof, unless the
offeror proves: (a) the existence or due execution of the original; (b) the loss and
destruction of the original, or the reason for its non-production in court; and (c) the
absence of bad faith on the part of the offeror to which the unavailability of the original
can be attributed. A view of the records reveals that Prodon did not adduce proof
sufficient to show the lossor explain the unavailability of the original as to justify the
presentation of secondary, hence, the Supreme Court finds that the respondents (heirs
of Alvarez), preponderantly proved that the deed of sale with right to repurchase
executed by the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr. did not exist in fact and rendered a decision in
favor of the respondents.
SPOUSES RAMON and FELICISIMA DIOSO vs. SPOUSES TOMAS and LEONORA
CARDEÑOG.R. No. 150155 September 1, 2004FACTS:

Petitioners filed a complaint for specific performance and/or easement of right of way
withdamages and prayed that the respondents be directed to comply with or perform
their obligationunder the Pinanumpaang Salaysay and grant the petitioners a right of
way, and to pay themdamages. The respondents specifically denied the genuineness
and due execution of the
Pinanumpaang Salaysay, alleging that it was falsified. The trial court held that the
petitioners’
evidence did not support their claim and noted that the petitioners presented only a
photocopy or machine copy of the purported document, and, during the trial, failed to lay
the foundation or prepare the basis for the admission of secondary evidence to prove
the contents thereof.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioners were able to establish the existence of the Pinanumpaang
Salaysay by secondary evidence?

RULING:

Yes. Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, indeed, provides that when the subject
of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the
original document itself. This rule, however, admits of exceptions, as Section 5 thereof
further states that
“When the original document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in
court, the
offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability
without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its
contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order
stated.” Admittedly, in this case, the original document of the Pinanumpaang Salaysay
was not presented during trial. However, the petitioners presented a photocopy thereof,
as well as testimonial evidence to prove its due execution and the loss or unavailability
of the original document. Specifically, the existence and due execution of the
Pinanumpaang Salaysay was established. Clearly then, since there was proof of the
due execution of the Pinanumpaang Salaysay, and that, despite earnest efforts on their
part, the petitioners could not produce the original thereof, the presentation of
secondary evidence to prove the contents of the said document was justified.
Furthermore, contrary to the trial court’s findings, the petitioners had sufficiently laid
down the basis for the introduction of secondary evidence.