BP 22

Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

EUMELIA R. MITRA, G.R. NO. 191404

Petitioner,

Present:

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
NACHURA,
- versus - PERALTA,
ABAD, and
MENDOZA, JJ.

PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINESand
FELICISIMO S. TARCELO, Promulgated:
Respondents. July 5, 2010

X --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------X
DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the July 31, 2009 Decision[1] and the February 11, 2010 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 31740. The subject decision and
resolution affirmed the August 22, 2007 Decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 2, Batangas City (RTC)which, in turn, affirmed the May 21, 2007 Decision
of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2, Batangas City (MTCC).

THE FACTS:

Petitioner Eumelia R. Mitra (Mitra) was the Treasurer, and Florencio L.
Cabrera, Jr. (now deceased) was the President, of Lucky Nine Credit
Corporation (LNCC), a corporation engaged in money lending activities.

Between 1996 and 1999, private respondent Felicisimo S.
Tarcelo (Tarcelo) invested money in LNCC. As the usual practice in money
placement transactions, Tarcelo was issued checks equivalent to the amounts he
invested plus the interest on his investments. The following checks, signed by
Mitra and Cabrera, were issued by LNCC to Tarcelo.[2]

Bank Date Issued Date of Check Amount Check No.
Security Bank September 15, 1998 January 15, 1999 P 3,125.00 0000045804
-do- September 15, 1998 January 15, 1999 125,000.00 0000045805

-do- October 3, 1998 February 3, 1999 2,500.00 0000045875
-do- October 3, 1998 February 3, 1999 100,000.00 0000045876
-do- November 17, 1998 February17, 1999 5,000.00 0000046061
-do- November 17, 1998 March 17, 1999 5,000.00 0000046062
-do- November 19, 1998 January 19, 1999 2,500.00 0000046065
-do- November 19, 1998 February19, 1999 2,500.00 0000046066

-do- November 20, 1998 February 20, 1999 10,000.00 0000046071
-do- November 30, 1998 February 28, 1999 2,500.00 0000046076

When Tarcelo presented these checks for payment, they were dishonored for
the reason account closed. Tarcelo made several oral demands on LNCC for the
payment of these checks but he was frustrated. Constrained, in 2002, he caused the
filing of seven informations for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (BP 22) in the
total amount of P925,000.00 with the MTCC in Batangas City.[3]

After trial on the merits, the MTCC found Mitra and Cabrera guilty of the
charges. The fallo of the May 21, 2007 MTCC Decision[4] reads:

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the
accused FLORENCIO I. CABRERA, JR., and EUMELIA R. MITRA are
hereby found guilty of the offense of violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang
22 and are hereby ORDERED to respectively pay the following fines for
each violation and with subsidiary imprisonment in all cases, in case of
insolvency:

1. Criminal Case No. 43637 - P200,000.00

Said accused, nevertheless, are adjudged civilly liable and are
ordered to pay, in solidum, private complainant Felicisimo S. Tarcelo the
amount of NINE HUNDRED TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS
(P925,000.000).

SO ORDERED.

Mitra and Cabrera appealed to the Batangas RTC contending that: they
signed the seven checks in blank with no name of the payee, no amount stated and
no date of maturity; they did not know when and to whom those checks would be
issued; the seven checks were only among those in one or two booklets of checks
they were made to sign at that time; and that they signed the checks so as not to
delay the transactions of LNCC because they did not regularly hold office there.[5]

The RTC affirmed the MTCC decision and later denied their motion for
reconsideration. Meanwhile, Cabrera died. Mitra alone filed this petition for
review[6] claiming, among others, that there was no proper service of the notice of
dishonor on her. The Court of Appeals dismissed her petition for lack of merit.

Mitra is now before this Court on a petition for review and submits these
issues:

1. WHETHER OR NOT THE ELEMENTS OF VIOLATION OF
BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG 22 MUST BE PROVED BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT AS AGAINST THE CORPORATION WHO
OWNS THE CURRENT ACCOUNT WHERE THE SUBJECT CHECKS
WERE DRAWN BEFORE LIABILITY ATTACHES TO THE
SIGNATORIES.

2. WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS PROPER SERVICE OF
NOTICE OF DISHONOR AND DEMAND TO PAY TO THE
PETITIONER AND THE LATE FLORENCIO CABRERA, JR.

The Court denies the petition.

A check is a negotiable instrument that serves as a substitute for money and
as a convenient form of payment in financial transactions and obligations. The use
of checks as payment allows commercial and banking transactions to proceed
without the actual handling of money, thus, doing away with the need to physically
count bills and coins whenever payment is made. It permits commercial and
banking transactions to be carried out quickly and efficiently. But the convenience
afforded by checks is damaged by unfunded checks that adversely affect
confidence in our commercial and banking activities, and ultimately injure public
interest.

BP 22 or the Bouncing Checks Law was enacted for the specific purpose of
addressing the problem of the continued issuance and circulation of unfunded
checks by irresponsible persons. To stem the harm caused by these bouncing
checks to the community, BP 22 considers the mere act of issuing an unfunded
check as an offense not only against property but also against public order.[7] The
purpose of BP 22 in declaring the mere issuance of a bouncing check as malum
prohibitum is to punish the offender in order to deter him and others from
committing the offense, to isolate him from society, to reform and rehabilitate him,
and to maintain social order.[8] The penalty is stiff. BP 22 imposes the penalty of
imprisonment for at least 30 days or a fine of up to double the amount of the check
or both imprisonment and fine.
Specifically, BP 22 provides:

SECTION 1. Checks Without Sufficient Funds. Any person who
makes or draws and issues any check to apply on account or for value,
knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or
credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its
presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank
for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the
same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the
bank to stop payment, shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than
thirty days but not more than one (1) year or by a fine of not less than but
not more than double the amount of the check which fine shall in no case
exceed Two Hundred Thousand Pesos, or both such fine and
imprisonment at the discretion of the court.

The same penalty shall be imposed upon any person who, having
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank when he makes or draws
and issues a check, shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit
to cover the full amount of the check if presented within a period of ninety
(90) days from the date appearing thereon, for which reason it is
dishonored by the drawee bank.

Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company or entity, the
person or persons who actually signed the check in behalf of such drawer
shall be liable under this Act.

SECTION 2. Evidence of Knowledge of Insufficient Funds. The
making, drawing and issuance of a check payment of which is refused by
the drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when
presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check, shall be
prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit
unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due
thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such
check within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such check
has not been paid by the drawee.

Mitra posits in this petition that before the signatory to a bouncing corporate
check can be held liable, all the elements of the crime of violation of BP 22 must
first be proven against the corporation. The corporation must first be declared to
have committed the violation before the liability attaches to the signatories of the
checks.[9]

The Court finds Itself unable to agree with Mitras posture. The third
paragraph of Section 1 of BP 22 reads: "Where the check is drawn by a
corporation, company or entity, the person or persons who actually signed the
check in behalf of such drawer shall be liable under this Act." This provision
recognizes the reality that a corporation can only act through its officers. Hence, its
wording is unequivocal and mandatory that the person who actually signed the
corporate check shall be held liable for a violation of BP 22. This provision does
not contain any condition, qualification or limitation.

In the case of Llamado v. Court of Appeals,[10] the Court ruled that the
accused was liable on the unfunded corporate check which he signed as treasurer
of the corporation. He could not invoke his lack of involvement in the negotiation
for the transaction as a defense because BP 22 punishes the mere issuance of a
bouncing check, not the purpose for which the check was issued or in
consideration of the terms and conditions relating to its issuance. In this case, Mitra
signed the LNCC checks as treasurer. Following Llamado, she must then be held
liable for violating BP 22.

Another essential element of a violation of BP 22 is the drawers knowledge
that he has insufficient funds or credit with the drawee bank to cover his check.
Because this involves a state of mind that is difficult to establish, BP 22 creates
the prima facie presumption that once the check is dishonored, the drawer of the
check gains knowledge of the insufficiency, unless within five banking days from
receipt of the notice of dishonor, the drawer pays the holder of the check or makes
arrangements with the drawee bank for the payment of the check. The service of
the notice of dishonor gives the drawer the opportunity to make good the check
within those five days to avert his prosecution for violating BP 22.

Mitra alleges that there was no proper service on her of the notice of
dishonor and, so, an essential element of the offense is missing. This contention
raises a factual issue that is not proper for review. It is not the function of the Court
to re-examine the finding of facts of the Court of Appeals. Our review is limited to
errors of law and cannot touch errors of facts unless the petitioner shows that the
trial court overlooked facts or circumstances that warrant a different disposition of
the case[11] or that the findings of fact have no basis on record. Hence, with respect
to the issue of the propriety of service on Mitra of the notice of dishonor, the Court
gives full faith and credit to the consistent findings of the MTCC, the RTC and the
CA.

The defense postulated that there was no demand served upon the
accused, said denial deserves scant consideration. Positive allegation of the
prosecution that a demand letter was served upon the accused prevails
over the denial made by the accused. Though, having denied that there
was no demand letter served on April 10, 2000, however, the prosecution
positively alleged and proved that the questioned demand letter was served upon
the accused on April 10, 2000, that was at the time they were attending Court
hearing before Branch I of this Court. In fact, the prosecution had submitted
a Certification issued by the other Branch of this Court certifying the fact
that the accused were present during the April 10, 2010 hearing. With such
straightforward and categorical testimony of the witness, the Court
believes that the prosecution has achieved what was dismally lacking in
the three (3) cases of Betty King, Victor Ting and Caras evidence of the
receipt by the accused of the demand letter sent to her. The Court accepts
the prosecutions narrative that the accused refused to sign the same to
evidence their receipt thereof. To require the prosecution to produce the
signature of the accused on said demand letter would be imposing an
undue hardship on it. As well, actual receipt acknowledgment is not and
has never been required of the prosecution either by law or jurisprudence.
[12]
[emphasis supplied]

With the notice of dishonor duly served and disregarded, there arose the
presumption that Mitra and Cabrera knew that there were insufficient funds to
cover the checks upon their presentment for payment. In fact, the account was
already closed.

To reiterate the elements of a violation of BP 22 as contained in the above-
quoted provision, a violation exists where:

1. a person makes or draws and issues a check to apply on account or
for value;

2. the person who makes or draws and issues the check knows at the
time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit
with the drawee bank for the full payment of the check upon its
presentment; and

3. the check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit, or would have been dishonored
for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason,
ordered the bank to stop payment. [13]

There is no dispute that Mitra signed the checks and that the bank
dishonored the checks because the account had been closed. Notice of dishonor
was properly given, but Mitra failed to pay the checks or make arrangements for
their payment within five days from notice. With all the above elements duly
proven, Mitra cannot escape the civil and criminal liabilities that BP 22 imposes
for its breach.[14]

WHEREFORE, the July 31, 2009 Decision and the February 11, 2010
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 31740 are
hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes with Associate Justice Isaias P. Dicdican and Associate Justice
Marlene Gonzales-Sison concurring.
[2]
Complaint-Affidavits, Rollo, pp. 109-115.
[3]
Id. at 116-129.
[4]
Id. at 130-134.
[5]
Id. at 143.
[6]
Id. at 75-105.
[7]
Lozano v. Martinez, 230 Phil. 406, 428 (1986).
[8]
Rosario v. Co, G.R. No. 133608, August 26, 2008, 563 SCRA 239, 253.
[9]
Rollo, p. 47.
[10]
337 Phil. 153, 160 (1997).
[11]
American Home Assurance Company v. Chua, 368 Phil. 555, 569 (1999).
[12]
Rollo, p. 133.
[13]
Rigor v. People, 485 Phil. 125, 139 (2004).
[14]
In Gosiaco v. Ching, G.R. No. 173807, April 16, 2009, 585 SCRA 471, 483, we held an accused corporate officer
free from civil liability for the corporate debt after the lower court acquitted the accused of criminal liability under
BP 22. Note that this is a totally different case from the present case as the issue here is both criminal and civil
liability.

Supreme Court
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

ALICIA F. RICAFORTE, G.R. NO. 154438
Petitioner,
Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.

LEON L. JURADO, Promulgated:
Respondent. September 5, 2007
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court seeking to annul and set aside the Decision[1] dated April 26, 2002 and the
Resolution[2]dated July 29, 2002 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
66293.

On February 10, 1997, respondent filed a Complaint[3] for estafa and violation
of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 22 against Alicia
F. Ricaforte (petitioner) with the Quezon City Prosecutors Office. He alleged that
he operates and manages a rice mill in Bulacan; that sometime in June 1996, Ruby
Aguilar (Aguilar) procured rice from him and in payment thereof gave him two Far
East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC) checks, to wit: FEBTC Check No.
08A096028P dated July 25, 1996 and Check No. 08A096029P dated August 25,
1996, in the amount of P431,555.00 each, which were both issued by petitioner and
when presented for payment were dishonored.

In her Counter-Affidavit, petitioner denied the accusation. She alleged that Aguilar
who had lost her Metrobank checkbook borrowed her checks to pay off Aguilars
obligations with Leon Jurado (respondent); that she willingly lent her checks to
Aguilar on condition that these checks will be replaced with Aguilars own checks
once her new checkbook is issued to her by Metrobank; that Aguilar then
used petitioners checks to pay her rice procurement with respondent; that in
accordance with the arrangement, Aguilar issued two replacement checks in favor
of respondent in the amount of P431,555.00 each; that when Aguilar issued the
replacement checks, petitioner demanded from respondent the return of her checks
but respondent refused, thus she was constrained to request her bank to issue an
order of stop payment. Aguilar executed an Affidavit
corroborating petitioners defense.

Respondent filed his Reply denying that petitioners checks were merely
accommodation checks. Petitioner filed her rejoinder as well as supplement to
rejoinder.

In a Resolution[4] dated November 24, 1997, Assistant City Prosecutor
Luis Zenon Q. Maceren dismissed the complaint for estafa and B.P. Blg. 22 for
insufficiency of evidence.The prosecutor found that petitioner did not have any
business transaction with respondent; that the subject checks were issued only to
accommodate Aguilar; that these were delivered to respondent not as payment but
as a guarantee and on condition that Aguilar will replace petitioners checks with
her own, which Aguilar did prior to the maturity of petitioners checks; that upon
maturity of Aguilars replacement checks and after respondent presented them for
payment and were subsequently dishonored, it was then that petitioners checks
were also presented by respondent for encashment; that Aguilars replacement
checks are now subject of another litigation pending in the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Quezon City; that the sequence of events showed that indeed petitioners
checks were not intended as payment to respondent because petitioner had no
obligation to respondent; that the checks were not issued to account or for
value; thus, there can be no finding of prima facie evidence of the charges against
him relying on Magno v. Court of Appeals.[5]

Respondents Motion for Reconsideration was denied in a Resolution[6] dated May
27, 1998. The prosecutor found that although the issuance of a worthless check
is malumprohibitum, B.P. Blg. 22 still requires that the checks should be issued
with consideration, which element was lacking in this case; that even respondent
admitted in his Complaint-Affidavit that petitioner had no transaction with him by
alleging that Aguilar handed to him petitioners two checks in payment of rice
procurement representing these as Aguilars collection checks and with assurance
that they are good; that when Aguilar replaced petitioners checks with her
own, petitioners checks had no more consideration since these were issued upon
agreement that the real debtor, Aguilar, will also issue her own checks.

Respondent appealed the dismissal of his complaint to the Department of
Justice. The Secretary of Justice issued a Resolution[7] dated September 21,
2000 modifying the Resolution of the City Prosecutor and directing him to file an
information against petitioner for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
The Justice Secretary found that while the dismissal of estafa is correct, petitioner
should be indicted for B.P. Blg. 22. In so ruling, the Secretary found that while
petitioner has no business transactions with respondent and merely issued the
checks as a guarantee for Aguilars obligation to respondent, the fact remains that
petitioner issued the subject checks and failed to pay respondent the amount due
thereon or make arrangements for their full payment within five banking days after
receiving a notice of dishonor; that the gravamen of the offense punished
by B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making and issuing worthless checks
or those dishonored upon their presentment for payment; that the thrust of the law
is to prohibit the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation; that
to require the arrangement surrounding the issuance of the checks be first looked
into and thereafter exempt such issuance from the punitive provisions of B.P. Blg.
22 on the basis of that arrangement would frustrate the very purpose for which the
law was enacted, i.e. to stop the proliferation of unfunded checks; that B.P. Blg. 22
applies even when dishonored checks were issued merely in the form of deposit or
guarantee.

The Justice Secretary denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration in a
Resolution[8] dated May 30, 2001.

Petitioner filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the
resolutions of the Secretary of Justice for having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion.

On April 26, 2002, the CA issued its assailed Decision denying the petition for
lack of merit. The CA found no grave abuse of discretion committed by the Justice
Secretary in his assailed Resolutions. It ruled that trial on the merits must ensue
since it is on said occasion that petitioner is granted opportunity for a full and
exhaustive presentation of her evidence and not during the preliminary
investigation phase where the investigating officer acts upon probable cause and
reasonable belief; that in the preliminary investigation phase, it is not yet clear
whether petitioner could be considered as having actually committed the offense
charged and sought to be punished, although petitioner is presumed innocent until
proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt; that the crux of the matter rests upon the
reasons for the drawing of the postdated checks by petitioner; i.e., whether they
were drawn or issued to apply on account or for value as required
under B.P. Blg. 22 which will only be determined during trial.

Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated July 29,
2002. The CA ruled that mere issuance of a bouncing check constitutes a probable
cause for violation of B.P. Blg. 22; that whether or not the accused is guilty thereof
is determined in the trial proper; that preliminary investigation is not a trial and is
not intended to usurp the function of the trial court; that Sales, which is invoked by
petitioner, is not applicable to the instant case, since the issue in that case was
whether or not the Ombudsman followed the proper procedure in conducting a
preliminary investigation and the corollary issue of whether or not petitioner was
afforded an opportunity to be heard and to submit controverting evidence which
are not the issues in this case.

Hence, herein petition on the following grounds:

I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE HONORABLE
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN ISSUING HIS MODIFIED RESOLUTION FINDING
PROBABLE CAUSE AGAINST PETITIONER FOR VIOLATION OF B.P.
BLG. 22, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE HONORABLE SECRETARY HAS
AGREED WITH THE FINDING OF THE QUEZON CITY PROSECUTION
OFFICE DISMISSING THE CHARGE OF ESTAFA AGAINST PETITIONER.

II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A SERIOUS
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO
PETITIONERS CLAIM THAT THE SUBJECT CHECKS WERE NOT ISSUED
TO ACCOUNT OR FOR VALUE BUT SOLELY TO GUARANTEE RUBY
AGUILARS CHECKS, ESPECIALLY CONSIDERING THAT IT IS
UNDISPUTED THAT PETITIONER HAD NO BUSINESS DEALINGS
WHATSOEVER WITH THE RESPONDENT REGARDING RICE
PROCUREMENTS.
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A SERIOUS
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT HOLDING THAT THERE IS NO NEED TO
GO TO TRIAL IN THE INSTANT CASE BECAUSE EVEN DURING THE
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED BY THE QUEZON CITY
PROSECUTION OFFICE, THE SAID PROSECUTION OFFICE HAD FOUND
THAT NO PRIMA FACIE OR PROBABLE CAUSE EXISTS TO WARRANT
THE FILING OF THE COMPLAINTS OF ESTAFA AND VIOLATION OF
B.P. BLG. 22 AGAINST THE PETITIONER.

IV
THE AFFIRMANCE BY THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
MODIFIED RESOLUTION OF THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF
JUSTICE DIRECTING THE FILING OFAN INFORMATION AGAINST
PETITIONER FOR VIOLATION OF B.P. BLG. 22 OVERLOOKED THE
FACT THAT RESPONDENT WOULD BE UNJUSTLY ENRICHED AT THE
EXPENSE OF PETITIONER AND THE DEBTOR, MS RUBY AGUILAR, IN
THE FORM OF IMPOSITION OF A FINE WHICH IS DOUBLE THE
AMOUNT OF THE BOUNCED CHECKS.[9]

The main issue to be resolved is whether the CA erred in ruling that the Secretary
of Justice did not commit grave abuse of discretion in finding that there is probable
cause for the filing of information against petitioner for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.

Petitioner alleges that the CA should not have sustained the modified resolution of
the Secretary of Justice because the Secretary misappreciated her defense, i.e., that
Aguilar lost her Metrobank checkbook and borrowed her check and that she issued
the subject checks on the condition that the same will be replaced when Aguilars
new checkbook is issued, thus the subject checks are merely accommodation or
guarantee checks; that it was Aguilar who tendered them to respondent in payment
of her rice procurements from him; that the subject checks were not intended for
encashment; that Aguilar subsequently issued her own checks dated July 20, 1996
and August 20, 1996, for P431,555.00 each as replacement for the subject checks;
that such substitution was with respondents knowledge, since the arrangement was
brought to his attention through a letter dated July 19, 1996.

Petitioner insists that none of the elements of the offense of B.P. Blg. 22 were
present; the first element is absent, since the subject checks were not intended to
apply on account or for value in favor of respondent, as petitioner had no business
transaction on rice procurements with respondent; the second element is also
absent because it is undisputed that at the time petitioner issued the checks, she
had substantial deposits with FEBTC which can readily fund her checks upon
presentment or maturity; that the reason for the dishonor was stop
payment, because she requested the bank to do so due to a valid reason, i.e., her
checks were already replaced by Aguilars checks dated July 20, 1996 and August
20, 1996. Petitioner cites Tan v. People,[10] in which the petitioner was acquitted of
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 because in ordering the stop payment of her check, there
were sufficient funds in her account.

Petitioner claims that the CA overlooked the fact that the Secretary of Justice
absolved her of estafa; thus, she should also be absolved of violation
of B.P. Blg. 22, since both offenses arose from the same subject checks.

Petitioner contends that the CA misappreciated the importance of a preliminary
investigation when it ruled that the trial on the merits must ensue, and it is on said
occasion whenpetitioner is granted the opportunity for a full and exhaustive display
of her evidence; that it erred in ruling that it is only during trial that the presence
or absence of the first element of B.P. Blg. 22, i.e., whether the subject checks
were issued to apply to account or for value, can be determined; that preliminary
investigation should be given due importance and the determination of whether the
first element of B.P. Blg. 22 is present should not be shifted to the trial court; that
contrary to the CAs finding, Sales is applicable, a case in which it was ruled that at
the preliminary investigation proper, the question whether or not an accused can be
bound over for trial can already be determined;if it was determined at the
preliminary investigation that an accused had not committed the crime
charged, then it is useless to still hold a trial to determine the guilt of the
accused, since it can already be determined at the preliminary investigation.

We are not persuaded.

In a preliminary investigation, the public prosecutor merely determines whether
there is probable cause or sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that
a crime has been committed, and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof and
should be held for trial.[11] Probable cause implies probability of guilt and requires
more than bare suspicion but less than evidence which would justify a conviction.
[12]
A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more
likely than not, a crime has been committed by the suspect.[13] It does not call for
the application of rules and standards of proof that a judgment of conviction
requires after trial on the merits.[14] The complainant need not present at this stage
proof beyond reasonable doubt. A preliminary investigation does not require a full
and exhaustive presentation of the parties evidence.[15] It is enough that in the
absence of a clear showing of arbitrariness, credence is given to the finding and
determination of probable cause by the Secretary of Justice in a preliminary
investigation.[16]
Contrary to petitioners claim, respondent sufficiently established the existence of
probable cause for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Section 1 of B.P. Blg. 22 provides:

SECTION 1. Checks without sufficient funds. - Any person who makes or draws
and issues any check to apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of
issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for
the payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check is
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit
or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without
any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment, shall be punished by
imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not more than one (1) year or by a
fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of the check which fine
shall in no case exceed Two Hundred Thousand Pesos, or both such fine and
imprisonment at the discretion of the court.

The same penalty shall be imposed upon any person who, having sufficient funds
in or credit with the drawee bank when he makes or draws and issues a check,
shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full amount
of the check if presented within a period of ninety (90) days from the date
appearing thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank.

Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company or entity, the person
or persons who actually signed the check in behalf of such drawer shall be liable
under this Act.

To be liable for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, the following elements must be present:

1) The accused makes, draws or issues any check to apply to account or for value;

2) The accused knows at the time of the issuance that he or she does not have
sufficient funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank for the payment of the
check in full upon its presentment; and

3) The check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of
funds or credit or it would have been dishonored for the same reason had not
the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment.
The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making and
issuing a worthless check; that is, a check that is dishonored upon its presentation
for payment.[17]In Lozano v. Martinez,[18] we have declared that it is not the non-
payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or
designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit,
under pain of penal sanctions, the making and circulation of worthless
checks. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is
proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property,
but an offense against public order.[19] In People v. Nitafan,[20] we said that a check
issued as an evidence of debt though not intended to be presented for payment has
the same effect as an ordinary check and would fall within the ambit of B.P. Blg.
22.

In this case, petitioner issued the two subject checks in favor of respondent, and
when respondent presented them for payment, they were dishonored for reason
of the stop payment order issued by petitioner. Notably, a certification[21] from the
bank showed that they returned the checks for that reason. In addition, contrary to
the claim of petitioner,at the time the said checks were presented for
deposit/payment, there were no sufficient funds to cover the same. The mere act of
issuing a worthless check -- whether as a deposit, as a guarantee or even as
evidence of pre-existing debt -- is malum prohibitum.[22]

Petitioner claims that the subject checks were merely accommodation checks in
favor of Aguilar, as they were not issued to account or for value, since she had no
business transactions with respondent-payee. However, petitioner admitted that she
issued the checks for the rice procurement of Aguilar from respondent which was a
valuable consideration. Notably, in respondents complaint-affidavit, he alleged that
the subject checks were given to him by Aguilar in payment of the latters rice
procurements, with the representation that the subject checks were her collection
checks and assuring respondent that they would be good upon presentment.

On record is a letter[23] dated July 31, 1996 of respondents counsel to petitioner on
the matter of petitioners subject FEBTC Check No. 08A096028P dated July 25,
1996, a letter in which the counsel wrote that the check which was in partial
payment of the obligation due from Aguilar, and that in return for petitioners
issuance and delivery of the said check, Aguilar acquired a temporary reprieve on
her obligation.

The validity and merits of a partys defense and accusation, as well as admissibility
of testimonies and evidence, are better ventilated during trial proper than at the
preliminary investigation level.[24] A finding of probable cause does not ensure a
conviction or a conclusive finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The
allegations adduced by the prosecution will be put to test in a full-blown
trial in which evidence shall be analyzed, weighed, given credence or disproved.[25]

In fact, petitioners argument that respondent was aware of the fact that the subject
checks were only accommodation checks in favor of Aguilar is not a
defense against a charge for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. In Ruiz v. People of the
Philippines,[26] where the accused interposed the defense of accommodation party,
we held:

It bears stressing that, whether a person is an accommodation party is a question
of intent. When the intent of the parties does not appear on the face of the check,
it must be ascertained in the light of the surrounding facts and
circumstances. Invariably, the tests applied are the purpose test and the proceeds
test. x x x. And even assuming she was such party, this circumstance is not a
defense to a charge for violation of B.P. 22. What the law punishes is the issuance
itself of a bouncing check and not the purpose for which it was issued or of the
terms and conditions relating to its issuance. The mere act of issuing a worthless
check, whether merely as an accommodation, is covered by B.P. 22. Hence, the
agreement surrounding the issuance of a check is irrelevant to the prosecution and
conviction of the petitioner.[27]
In Meriz v. People of the Philippines,[28] we held:

The Court has consistently declared that the cause or reason for the issuance of
the check is inconsequential in determining criminal culpability under BP 22. The
Court has since said that a "check issued as an evidence of debt, although not
intended for encashment, has the same effect like any other check" and must thus
be held to be "within the contemplation of BP 22." Once a check is presented for
payment, the drawee bank gives it the usual course whether issued in payment of
an obligation or just as a guaranty of an obligation. BP 22 does not appear to
concern itself with what might actually be envisioned by the parties, its primordial
intention being to instead ensure the stability and commercial value of checks as
being virtual substitutes for currency. It is a policy that can easily be eroded if one
has yet to determine the reason for which checks are issued, or the terms and
conditions for their issuance, before an appropriate application of the legislative
enactment can be made. The gravamen of the offense under BP 22 is the act of
making or issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon
presentment for payment. The act effectively declares the offense to be one
of malum prohibitum. The only valid query then is whether the law has been
breached, i.e., by the mere act of issuing a bad check, without so much regard as
to the criminal intent of the issuer.[29]

Also, in Cruz v. Court of Appeals,[30] we held:

It is now settled that Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 applies even in cases where
dishonored checks are issued merely in the form of a deposit or a guarantee. The
enactment in question does not make any distinction as to whether the checks
within its contemplation are issued in payment of an obligation or merely to
guarantee the said obligation. In accordance with the pertinent rule of statutory
construction, inasmuch as the law has not made any distinction in this regard, no
such distinction can be made by means of interpretation or
application. Furthermore, the history of the enactment of subject statute evinces
the definite legislative intent to make the prohibition all-embracing, without
making any exception from the operation thereof in favor of a guarantee. This
intent may be gathered from the statement of the sponsor of the bill (Cabinet Bill
No. 9) which was enacted later into Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, when it was
introduced before the BatasanPambansa, that the bill was introduced to
discourage the issuance of bouncing checks, to prevent checks, from becoming
useless scraps of paper and to restore respectability to checks, all without
distinction as to the purpose of the issuance of the checks. The legislative intent as
above said is made all the more clear when it is considered that while the original
text of Cabinet Bill No. 9, supra, had contained a proviso excluding from the
coverage of the law a check issued as a mere guarantee, the final version of the
bill as approved and enacted by the Committee on the Revision of Laws in
the Batasan deleted the abovementioned qualifying proviso deliberately for the
purpose of making the enforcement of the act more effective (Batasan Record,
First Regular Session, December 4, 1978, Volume II, pp. 1035-1036).
Consequently, what are important are the facts that the accused had deliberately
issued the checks in question to cover accounts and that the checks were
dishonored upon presentment regardless of whether or not the accused merely
issued the checks as a guarantee.[31]

Petitioner invokes our ruling in Magno v. Court of Appeals[32] where the accused
therein was acquitted of B.P. Blg. 22 for issuing checks to collateralize an
accommodation and not to cover the receipt of actual account or for
value. In Magno, the accused, who was in the process of putting up a car repair
shop, was provided with credit facilities by LS Finance and Management
Corporation (LS Finance) to enable him to lease from MANCOR the needed
equipments. As part of their arrangement, LS Finance required a 30% warranty
deposit of the "purchase/lease" value of the equipments to be transacted
upon. Accused then asked the LS Finance Vice President Joey Gomez to look for a
third party who could lend him the equivalent amount of the warranty deposit as he
did not have such amount, however, unknown to the accused, it was
Corazon Teng (Vice President of MANCOR) who advanced the deposit in
question on condition that the same would be paid as a short term loan at 3%
interest. The accused subsequently issued checks to collateralize an
accommodation made by Teng amounting to Twenty Nine Thousand Seven
Hundred Pesos (P29,700.00) as warranty deposit. Subsequently, the said checks
bounced; thus the accused was prosecuted and the lower
courts convicted him of B.P. Blg. 22. On a Petition for Review on Certiorari, we
however acquitted the accused and held that the "cash out" made by Teng was not
used by the accused who was just paying rental on the equipments. To charge him
for the refund of a "warranty deposit" he did not withdraw, because it was not his
own account and it remained with LS Finance, would be to make him pay an
unjust "debt," to say the least, since he did not actually receive the amount
involved. We also held that this is a scheme whereby Teng as the supplier of the
equipment in the name of Mancor, would be able to sell or lease its goods as in this
case, and at the same time privately finance those who desperately needed petty
accommodations as obtaining in said case; that this modus operandi, in so many
instances, victimized unsuspecting businessmen who likewise needed protection
from the law by availing themselves of the deceptively called warranty deposit, not
realizing that they would fall prey to a leasing equipment under the guise of a
lease-purchase agreement, when it was a scheme designed to skim off a business
client.

It bears stressing that Magno was decided after a full-blown trial, and the
proof needed to convict the accused was proof beyond reasonable doubt, which
was not established in that case.

On the other hand, herein case is still in the preliminary investigation stage
which is merely inquisitorial, and it is often the only means of discovering the
persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the fiscal to
prepare his complaint or information.[33] It is not a trial of the case on the merits
and has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been committed
and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty.[34] It is not
the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties evidence; it is for the
presentation of such evidence only as may engender a well-grounded belief that an
offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof.[35] We
are in accord with the Justice Secretarys finding that there is reasonable ground to
believe that a violation of B.P. Blg. 22 has been committed by petitioner, thus, we
refrain from prejudging the applicablity or inapplicability of Magno in this case.

Petitioner alleges that at the time she issued the subject checks, she has substantial
funds in the bank to cover the value thereof. This is evidentiary in nature which
must be presented during trial more so in the light of the bank certification that
there were no sufficient funds to cover the checks when presented for
deposit/payment.

The law itself creates a prima facie presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of
funds. Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 provides:

Section 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. The making, drawing and
issuance of a check payment of which is refused by the drawee bank because of
insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when presented within ninety (90)
days from the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of
such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder
thereof the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by
the drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that
such check has not been paid by the drawee.

Such knowledge is legally presumed from the dishonor of the checks for
insufficiency of funds.[36] If not rebutted, it suffices to sustain a conviction.[37]

We also find no merit in petitioners claim that since the Secretary of Justice
absolved her of estafa, she should also be absolved of violation
of B.P. Blg. 22, since both offenses arose from the same subject checks. While
deceit and damage are essential elements in estafa, they are not required
in B.P. Blg. 22. As already aforestated, under B.P. Blg. 22, mere issuance of a
check that is dishonored gives rise to the presumption of knowledge on the part of
the drawer that he issued the same without sufficient funds and is hence
punishable.

We do not subscribe to petitioners argument that for Aguilars rice
procurements from respondent, Aguilar had made substantial payments to
respondent through cashiers checks totalling P313,255.00; that despite these
substantial payments, respondent still wanted to collect from petitioners subject
checks the total amount of P863,110.00; that respondent wanted to collect from
both petitioner and Aguilar for the latters rice procurement. It is during the trial of
this case that evidence may be introduced to prove petitioners contentions. As of
now, it has been established that when the subject checks were deposited, they
were all dishonored.

Furthermore, the allegation of petitioner that if the information for B.P. Blg. 22
would be filed and in the remote event that petitioner would be found guilty
thereof, then the trial court may impose a fine double the amount of the
checks, which fine may amount to millions of pesos; and that this is unjust
enrichment on respondents part at the expense of petitioner and
Aguilar deserves scant consideration. Suffice it to state that the fine that may be
imposed by the court is not awarded to the private complainant. Fine is imposed as
a penalty and not as payment for a specific loss or injury.[38]

In fine, the CA did not commit any error in upholding the findings of the Secretary
of Justice that probable cause exists that the crime of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 has
been committed by petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated April 26, 2002 and
the Resolution dated July 29, 2002 of the Court of Appeals are
hereby AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairpersons attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

[1]
Penned by Justice Eliezer R. delos Santos, concurred in by Justices Cancio C. Garcia (now Associate Justice of
this Court) and Marina L. Buzon; CA rollo, pp. 155-159.
[2]
Id. at 180-182.
[3]
Docketed as I.S. No. 97-3205.
[4]
CA rollo, pp. 81-82.
[5]
G.R. No. 96132, June 26, 1992, 210 SCRA 471.
[6]
CA rollo, pp. 93-94; per Rosalina R. Datiles, 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor, Quezon City.
[7]
Id. at 17-19; per Secretary Artemio G. Tuquero.
[8]
Id. at 20; per Justice Secretary Hernando B. Perez.
[9]
Rollo, pp. 24-25.
[10]
402 Phil. 833 (2001).
[11]
Ang v. Lucero, G.R. No. 143169, January 21, 2005, 449 SCRA 157, 168, citing People of the Philippines v.
Court of Appeals, 361 Phil. 401, 413 (1999).
[12]
Ching v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 164317, February 6, 2006, 481 SCRA 609, 629.
[13]
Id., citing Nava v. Commission on Audit, 419 Phil 544, 554 (2001).
[14]
Ang v. Lucero, supra note 11, citing Microsoft Corporation v. Maxicorp, Inc., G.R. No. 140946, September 13,
2004, 438 SCRA 224, 236.
[15]
People of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, supra note 11, citing Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, 344 Phil. 207,
226 (1997).
[16]
Drilon v. Court of Appeals, 327 Phil. 916, 927 (1996).
[17]
Ngo v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 155815, July 14, 2004, 434 SCRA 522, 530-531,
citing Recuerdo v. People of the Philippines, 443 Phil. 770, 777 (2003); Lozano v. Martinez, 230 Phil. 406,
421 (1986).
[18]
Id.
[19]
Id. at 421.
[20]
G.R. No. 75954, October 22, 1992, 215 SCRA 79, 82-83.
[21]
CA rollo, p. 24.
[22]
People of the Philippines v. Nitafan, supra note 20, at 84, citing Que v. People of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. L-
75217-18, September 21, 1987, 154 SCRA 160, 165.
[23]
CA rollo, p. 25.
[24]
Drilon v. Court of Appeals, supra note 16, at 923.
[25]
Id. at 927.
[26]
G.R. No. 160893, November 18, 2005, 475 SCRA 476.
[27]
Id. at 491-492.
[28]
420 Phil. 608 (2001).
[29]
Id. at 617.
[30]
G.R. No. 108738, June 17, 1994, 233 SCRA 301.
[31]
Id. at 308.
[32]
Supra note 5.
[33]
Tandoc v. Resultas, G.R. Nos. 59241-44, July 5, 1989, 175 SCRA 37, 43, citing People of the Philippines
v. Badilla, 48 Phil. 718, 731 (1926).
[34]
Id.
[35]
Drilon v. Court of Appeals, supra note 16, at 923.
[36]
Ty v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 149275, September 27, 2004, 439 SCRA 220, 236, citing Meriz v.
People of the Philippines, supra note 28, at 618.
[37]
Id., citing Lim v. People of the Philippines, 394 Phil. 844, 852 (2000).
[38]
People of the Philippines v. Ching Kuan, 74 Phil. 23, 24 (1942).


Supreme Court

Manila
SECOND DIVISION

ELEANOR DE LEON LLENADO, G.R. No. 193279
Petitioner,
Present:

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
- versus - BRION,
PEREZ,
SERENO, and
REYES, JJ.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and

EDITHA VILLAFLORES,
Promulgated:
Respondents.

March 14, 2012
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
Petitioner was convicted by the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of

Valenzuela City, Branch 82 in Criminal Case No. 54905 for violating Batasang
Pambansa Blg. 22 (B.P. 22) or the Bouncing Checks Law.
It appears that petitioner issued checks to secure the loans obtained from
private respondent. Upon presentment, the checks were dishonored, leading to
the filing with the MeTC of criminal cases docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 54905,
54906, 54907, and 54908 for four (4) counts of violation of B.P. 22.
Subsequently, petitioner settled the loans subject of Criminal Case Nos.

54906, 54907 and 54908 using the funds of the Children of Mary Immaculate
College, of which she was president. Private respondent executed an Affidavit of
Desistance for the three cases;[1] thus, only Criminal Case No. 54905 covering a
check worth, ₱1,500,000, proceeded to trial.
The MeTC found that all the following elements of a violation of B.P. 22
were present in the last check subject of the criminal proceedings: (1) the making,
drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value; (2) the
knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he or she does
not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the
check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the drawee banks subsequent
dishonor of the check for insufficiency of funds or credit, or dishonor of the check
for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the
bank to stop payment.[2] In ruling against petitioner, the MeTC took note that
petitioner admitted knowledge of the checks dishonor, and that the demand
letter with Notice of Dishonor mailed to petitioners residence on 10 May 1999
was received by one Alfredo Abierra on 14 May 1999. Thus, petitioner was
sentenced to pay ₱1,500,000, the amount of the dishonored check, and a fine of
₱200,000 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
The MeTC also held the Children of Mary Immaculate College liable for the
value of the check for being the drawer thereof. Finally, the court ordered the
payment of attorneys fees and litigation expenses.
On appeal with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), petitioner alleged that the
receipt of the Notice of Dishonor was not sufficiently proven, and that the notice
received by Abierra should not be held to be binding on her. However, on 26
November 2006, the RTC affirmed the Decision of the MeTC.
Petitioner subsequently filed a Petition for Review with the Court of

Appeals (CA) under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. In her Petition, she alleged that
the trial court erred in ruling that she had received a notice of dishonor and in
holding the school also liable for the value of the check.
The CA ruled that the elements of a violation of B.P. 22 were established.

[3]
However, it held that the trial court erred in holding Children of Mary
Immaculate College civilly liable.
Applying Lunaria v. People,[4] the CA modified the appealed judgment by

imposing legal interest of 12% on the amount of the dishonored check. The
dispositive portion of the CA Decision states:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED in part. The Decision dated November 26,

2006 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 75 of Valenzuela City, is MODIFIED in that
petitioner is SENTENCED to pay a fine of ₱200,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency. Petitioner is ORDERED to indemnify private complainant in the
amount of ₱1,500,000.00, the amount of the dishonored check, with 12% interest per
annum from the date of judicial demand until the finality of this Decision plus attorneys
fees of ₱20,000.00 and litigation expenses of ₱16,860.00. The civil liability adjudged
against Children of Mary Immaculate College is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.[5]

Petitioner thereafter filed a Motion for Reconsideration.[6] Finding no merit
in the motion, it was denied by the CA through its assailed
Resolution[7] promulgated on 10 August 2010.
Hence, this Rule 45 Petition.
Petitioner now alleges that respondent failed to prove that there was
actual receipt of the notice of dishonor. She also alleges, without expounding,
that the ruling of the CA was not in accordance with laws and jurisprudence.
It is an established rule that the remedy of appeal through a Petition for

Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court contemplates only
questions of law and not questions of fact.[8] The issue in the case at bar is clearly
a question of fact that rightfully belonged to the proper determination of the
MeTC, the RTC and the CA. All these lower courts found the elements of a
violation of B.P. 22 present. Petitioner failed to provide any cogent reason for us
to overturn these findings, or to consider this case as an exception to this general
rule.
However, conforming to prevailing jurisprudence, we find the need to

modify the ruling of the CA with regard to the imposition of interest on the
judgment. It has been established that in the absence of stipulation, the rate of
interest shall be 12% per annum to be computed from default, that is, from
judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the provisions of Article
1169 of the Civil Code.[9] In Ongson v. People,[10] we held that interest began to run
from the time of the extrajudicial demand, as duly proved by the creditor. Thus,
petitioner should also be held liable for the amount of the dishonored check,
which is ₱1,500,000, plus 12% legal interest covering the period from the date of
the receipt of the demand letter on 14 May 1999 to the finality of this Decision.
The total amount due in the dispositive portion of the CAs Decision, inclusive of
interest, shall further earn 12% interest per annum from the finality of this
Decision until fully paid.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision dated 27 April 2010 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 31349 is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Petitioner is ordered to
indemnify private respondent the amount of the dishonored check, which is
₱1,500,000, with 12% interest per annum from the date of receipt of the
extrajudicial demand on 14 May 1999 to the finality of this Decision. This total
amount inclusive of interest shall further earn 12% interest per annum from the
finality of the Decision until it is fully paid.
Petitioner is sentenced to pay a fine of ₱200,000 with subsidiary

imprisonment in case of insolvency, plus attorneys fees of ₱20,000 and litigation
expenses of ₱16,860.
SO ORDERED.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

ARTURO D. BRION JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

[1]
CA Decision, rollo, p. 22.
[2]
Tan v. Mendez, 432 Phil. 760 (2002).
[3]
Penned by Associate Justice Portia Alio-Hormachuelos, with Associate Justices Japar B. Dimaampao and Jane
Aurora C. Lantion concurring.
[4]
G.R. No. 160127, 11 November 2008, 570 SCRA 572.
[5]
Rollo, p. 33.
[6]
Id. at 35-45.
[7]
Id. at 55-56.
[8]
Spouses Batingal v. Court of Appeals. G.R. No. 128636, 1 February 2001, 351 SCRA 60.
[9]
Eastern Shipping Lines v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97412, 234 SCRA 78.
[10]
504 Phil. 214 (2005).
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

DREAMWORK G.R. No. 184861
CONSTRUCTION, INC.,
Petitioner, Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.
CLEOFE S. JANIOLA and Promulgated:
HON. ARTHUR A. FAMINI,
Respondents. June 30, 2009
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
Petitioner Dreamwork Construction, Inc. seeks the reversal of the August

26, 2008 Decision[1] in SCA No. 08-0005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
253 in Las Pias City. The Decision affirmed the Orders dated October 16,
2007[2] and March 12, 2008[3] in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61 issued by the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), Branch 79 in Las Pias City.
The Facts
On October 18, 2004, petitioner, through its President, Roberto S.

Concepcion, and Vice-President for Finance and Marketing, Normandy P. Amora,
filed a Complaint Affidavit dated October 5, 2004[4] for violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22) against private respondent Cleofe S. Janiola with the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Pias City. The case was docketed as I.S. No. 04-
2526-33. Correspondingly, petitioner filed a criminal information for violation of
BP 22 against private respondent with the MTC on February 2, 2005 docketed as
Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61, entitled People of the Philippines v. Cleofe S. Janiola.
On September 20, 2006, private respondent, joined by her husband,

instituted a civil complaint against petitioner by filing a Complaint dated August
2006[5] for the rescission of an alleged construction agreement between the
parties, as well as for damages. The case was filed with the RTC, Branch 197 in Las
Pias City and docketed as Civil Case No. LP-06-0197. Notably, the checks, subject
of the criminal cases before the MTC, were issued in consideration of the
construction agreement.
Thereafter, on July 25, 2007, private respondent filed a Motion to Suspend

Proceedings dated July 24, 2007[6] in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61, alleging that
the civil and criminal cases involved facts and issues similar or intimately related
such that in the resolution of the issues in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of
the accused would necessarily be determined. In other words, private respondent
claimed that the civil case posed a prejudicial question as against the criminal
cases.
Petitioner opposed the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal cases

in an undated Comment/Opposition to Accuseds Motion to Suspend Proceedings
based on Prejudicial Question[7] on the grounds that: (1) there is no prejudicial
question in this case as the rescission of the contract upon which the bouncing
checks were issued is a separate and distinct issue from the issue of whether
private respondent violated BP 22; and (2) Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court states that one of the elements of a prejudicial question is that
the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related
to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action; thus, this element is missing
in this case, the criminal case having preceded the civil case.
Later, the MTC issued its Order dated October 16, 2007, granting the
Motion to Suspend Proceedings, and reasoned that:

Should the trial court declare the rescission of contract and the nullification of the
checks issued as the same are without consideration, then the instant criminal cases for
alleged violation of BP 22 must be dismissed. The belated filing of the civil case by the
herein accused did not detract from the correctness of her cause, since a motion for
suspension of a criminal action may be filed at any time before the prosecution rests
(Section 6, Rule 111, Revised Rules of Court).[8]
In an Order dated March 12, 2008,[9] the MTC denied petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration dated November 29, 2007.
Petitioner appealed the Orders to the RTC with a Petition dated May 13,
2008. Thereafter, the RTC issued the assailed decision dated August 26, 2008,
denying the petition. On the issue of the existence of a prejudicial question, the
RTC ruled:

Additionally, it must be stressed that the requirement of a previously filed civil
case is intended merely to obviate delays in the conduct of the criminal proceedings.
Incidentally, no clear evidence of any intent to delay by private respondent was shown.
The criminal proceedings are still in their initial stages when the civil action was
instituted. And, the fact that the civil action was filed after the criminal action was
instituted does not render the issues in the civil action any less prejudicial in character.
[10]

Hence, we have this petition under Rule 45.
The Issue

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT PERCEIVING GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE INFERIOR COURT, WHEN THE LATTER
RULED TO SUSPEND PROCEEDINGS IN CRIM. CASE NOS. 55554-61 ON THE BASIS OF
PREJUDICIAL QUESTION IN CIVIL CASE NO. LP-06-0197.[11]
The Courts Ruling
This petition must be granted.

The Civil Action Must Precede the Filing of the
Criminal Action for a Prejudicial Question to Exist

Under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended by Supreme

Court Resolutions dated June 17, 1988 and July 7, 1988, the elements of a
prejudicial question are contained in Rule 111, Sec. 5, which states:

SEC. 5. Elements of prejudicial question. The two (2) essential elements of a

prejudicial question are: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related
to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines
whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
Thus, the Court has held in numerous cases[12] that the elements of a

prejudicial question, as stated in the above-quoted provision and in Beltran v.
People,[13] are:

The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two
conflicting decisions. It has two essential elements: (a) the civil action involves an issue
similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the
resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
On December 1, 2000, the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure, however,

became effective and the above provision was amended by Sec. 7 of Rule 111,
which applies here and now provides:

SEC. 7. Elements of prejudicial question.The elements of a prejudicial question

are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately
related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of
such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. (Emphasis
supplied.)

Petitioner interprets Sec. 7(a) to mean that in order for a civil case to create a
prejudicial question and, thus, suspend a criminal case, it must first be established
that the civil case was filed previous to the filing of the criminal case. This,
petitioner argues, is specifically to guard against the situation wherein a party
would belatedly file a civil action that is related to a pending criminal action in
order to delay the proceedings in the latter.
On the other hand, private respondent cites Article 36 of the Civil Code which
provides:

Art. 36. Pre-judicial questions which must be decided before any criminal prosecution
may be instituted or may proceed, shall be governed by rules of court which the
Supreme Court shall promulgate and which shall not be in conflict with the provisions of
this Code. (Emphasis supplied.)
Private respondent argues that the phrase before any criminal prosecution
may be instituted or may proceed must be interpreted to mean that a prejudicial
question exists when the civil action is filed either before the institution of the
criminal action or during the pendency of the criminal action. Private respondent
concludes that there is an apparent conflict in the provisions of the Rules of Court
and the Civil Code in that the latter considers a civil case to have presented a
prejudicial question even if the criminal case preceded the filing of the civil case.
We cannot agree with private respondent.
First off, it is a basic precept in statutory construction that a change in

phraseology by amendment of a provision of law indicates a legislative intent to
change the meaning of the provision from that it originally had. [14] In the instant
case, the phrase, previously instituted, was inserted to qualify the nature of the
civil action involved in a prejudicial question in relation to the criminal action. This
interpretation is further buttressed by the insertion of subsequent directly before
the term criminal action. There is no other logical explanation for the
amendments except to qualify the relationship of the civil and criminal actions,
that the civil action must precede the criminal action.
Thus, this Court ruled in Torres v. Garchitorena[15] that:

Even if we ignored petitioners procedural lapse and resolved their petition on
the merits, we hold that Sandiganbayan did not abuse its discretion amounting to excess
or lack of jurisdiction in denying their omnibus motion for the suspension of the
proceedings pending final judgment in Civil Case No. 7160. Section 6, Rule lll of the Rules
of Criminal Procedure, as amended, reads:
Sec. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. - A petition for

suspension of the criminal action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial
question in a civil action may be filed in the office of the prosecutor or the court
conducting the preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has been
filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal
action at any time before the prosecution rests.
Sec. 7. Elements of prejudicial question. - The elements of a prejudicial

question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or
intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b)
the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed.
Under the amendment, a prejudicial question is understood in law as that

which must precede the criminal action and which requires a decision before a final
judgment can be rendered in the criminal action with which said question is closely
connected. The civil action must be instituted prior to the institution of the criminal
action. In this case, the Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan ahead of the
complaint in Civil Case No. 7160 filed by the State with the RTC in Civil Case No. 7160.
Thus, no prejudicial question exists. (Emphasis supplied.)
Additionally, it is a principle in statutory construction that a statute should

be construed not only to be consistent with itself but also to harmonize with
other laws on the same subject matter, as to form a complete, coherent and
intelligible system.[16] This principle is consistent with the maxim, interpretare et
concordare leges legibus est optimus interpretandi modus or every statute must
be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system
of jurisprudence.[17]
In other words, every effort must be made to harmonize seemingly

conflicting laws. It is only when harmonization is impossible that resort must be
made to choosing which law to apply.
In the instant case, Art. 36 of the Civil Code and Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the
Rules of Court are susceptible of an interpretation that would harmonize both
provisions of law. The phrase previously instituted civil action in Sec. 7 of Rule 111
is plainly worded and is not susceptible of alternative interpretations. The clause
before any criminal prosecution may be instituted or may proceed in Art. 36 of
the Civil Code may, however, be interpreted to mean that the motion to suspend
the criminal action may be filed during the preliminary investigation with the
public prosecutor or court conducting the investigation, or during the trial with
the court hearing the case.
This interpretation would harmonize Art. 36 of the Civil Code with Sec. 7 of
Rule 111 of the Rules of Court but also with Sec. 6 of Rule 111 of the Civil Code,
which provides for the situations when the motion to suspend the criminal action
during the preliminary investigation or during the trial may be filed. Sec. 6
provides:

SEC. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question.A petition for suspension of
the criminal action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action
may be filed in the office of the prosecutor or the court conducting the preliminary
investigation. When the criminal action has been filed in court for trial, the petition to
suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action at any time before the prosecution
rests.
Thus, under the principles of statutory construction, it is this interpretation

of Art. 36 of the Civil Code that should govern in order to give effect to all the
relevant provisions of law.
It bears pointing out that the circumstances present in the instant case
indicate that the filing of the civil action and the subsequent move to suspend the
criminal proceedings by reason of the presence of a prejudicial question were a
mere afterthought and instituted to delay the criminal proceedings.
In Sabandal v. Tongco,[18] we found no prejudicial question existed involving

a civil action for specific performance, overpayment, and damages, and a criminal
complaint for BP 22, as the resolution of the civil action would not determine the
guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. In resolving the case, we
said:

Furthermore, the peculiar circumstances of the case clearly indicate that the filing of the
civil case was a ploy to delay the resolution of the criminal cases. Petitioner filed the civil
case three years after the institution of the criminal charges against him. Apparently, the
civil action was instituted as an afterthought to delay the proceedings in the criminal
cases.[19]

Here, the civil case was filed two (2) years after the institution of the criminal
complaint and from the time that private respondent allegedly withdrew its
equipment from the job site. Also, it is worth noting that the civil case was
instituted more than two and a half (2 ) years from the time that private
respondent allegedly stopped construction of the proposed building for no valid
reason. More importantly, the civil case praying for the rescission of the
construction agreement for lack of consideration was filed more than three (3)
years from the execution of the construction agreement.
Evidently, as in Sabandal, the circumstances surrounding the filing of the cases

involved here show that the filing of the civil action was a mere afterthought on
the part of private respondent and interposed for delay. And as correctly argued
by petitioner, it is this scenario that Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court seeks
to prevent. Thus, private respondents positions cannot be left to stand.

The Resolution of the Civil Case Is Not
Determinative of the Prosecution of the Criminal Action
In any event, even if the civil case here was instituted prior to the criminal
action, there is, still, no prejudicial question to speak of that would justify the
suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case.
To reiterate, the elements of a prejudicial question under Sec. 7 of Rule 111

of the Rules of Court are: (1) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue
similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action;
and (2) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action
may proceed.

Petitioner argues that the second element of a prejudicial question, as

provided in Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules, is absent in this case. Thus, such rule
cannot apply to the present controversy.
Private respondent, on the other hand, claims that if the construction

agreement between the parties is declared null and void for want of
consideration, the checks issued in consideration of such contract would become
mere scraps of paper and cannot be the basis of a criminal prosecution.
We find for petitioner.
It must be remembered that the elements of the crime punishable under

BP 22 are as follows:

(1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or for
value;
(2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue there
are no sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check
in full upon its presentment; and
(3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of
funds or credit, or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid
cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.[20]

Undeniably, the fact that there exists a valid contract or agreement to

support the issuance of the check/s or that the checks were issued for valuable
consideration does not make up the elements of the crime. Thus, this Court has
held in a long line of cases[21] that the agreement surrounding the issuance of
dishonored checks is irrelevant to the prosecution for violation of BP 22. In Mejia
v. People,[22] we ruled:

It must be emphasized that the gravamen of the offense charge is the issuance
of a bad check. The purpose for which the check was issued, the terms and conditions
relating to its issuance, or any agreement surrounding such issuance are irrelevant to
the prosecution and conviction of petitioner. To determine the reason for which checks
are issued, or the terms and conditions for their issuance, will greatly erode the faith the
public reposes in the stability and commercial value of checks as currency substitutes,
and bring havoc in trade and in banking communities. The clear intention of the framers
of B.P. 22 is to make the mere act of issuing a worthless check malum prohibitum.
Lee v. Court of Appeals[23] is even more poignant. In that case, we ruled that
the issue of lack of valuable consideration for the issuance of checks which were
later on dishonored for insufficient funds is immaterial to the success of a
prosecution for violation of BP 22, to wit:

Third issue. Whether or not the check was issued on account or for value.
Petitioners claim is not feasible. We have held that upon issuance of a check, in
the absence of evidence to the contrary, it is presumed that the same was issued for
valuable consideration. Valuable consideration, in turn, may consist either in some right,
interest, profit or benefit accruing to the party who makes the contract, or some
forbearance, detriment, loss or some responsibility, to act, or labor, or service given,
suffered or undertaken by the other side. It is an obligation to do, or not to do in favor
of the party who makes the contract, such as the maker or indorser.
In this case, petitioner himself testified that he signed several checks in blank,
the subject check included, in exchange for 2.5% interest from the proceeds of loans
that will be made from said account. This is a valuable consideration for which the check
was issued. That there was neither a pre-existing obligation nor an obligation incurred
on the part of petitioner when the subject check was given by Bautista to private
complainant on July 24, 1993 because petitioner was no longer connected with Unlad or
Bautista starting July 1989, cannot be given merit since, as earlier discussed, petitioner
failed to adequately prove that he has severed his relationship with Bautista or Unlad.
At any rate, we have held that what the law punishes is the mere act of issuing
a bouncing check, not the purpose for which it was issued nor the terms and
conditions relating to its issuance. This is because the thrust of the law is to prohibit
the making of worthless checks and putting them into circulation.[24] (Emphasis
supplied.)
Verily, even if the trial court in the civil case declares that the construction
agreement between the parties is void for lack of consideration, this would not
affect the prosecution of private respondent in the criminal case. The fact of the
matter is that private respondent indeed issued checks which were subsequently
dishonored for insufficient funds. It is this fact that is subject of prosecution under
BP 22.
Therefore, it is clear that the second element required for the existence of
a prejudicial question, that the resolution of the issue in the civil action would
determine whether the criminal action may proceed, is absent in the instant case.
Thus, no prejudicial question exists and the rules on it are inapplicable to the case
before us.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT this petition. We hereby REVERSE and SET

ASIDE the August 26, 2008 Decision in SCA No. 08-0005 of the RTC, Branch 253 in
Las Pias City and the Orders dated October 16, 2007 and March 12, 2008 in
Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61 of the MTC, Branch 79 in Las Pias City. We order the
MTC to continue with the proceedings in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61 with
dispatch.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

Associate Justice
Chairperson

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

Associate Justice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1]
Rollo, pp. 88-90. Penned by Judge Salvador V. Timbang.
[2]
Id. at 65-67.
[3]
Id. at 75-76.
[4]
Id. at 23-27.
[5]
Id. at 28-41.
[6]
Id. at 42-45.
[7]
Id. at 46-48.
[8]
Id. at 67.
[9]
Id. at 75-76.
[10]
Id. at 90.
[11]
Id. at 11.
[12]
Carlos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 109887, February 10, 1997, 268 SCRA 25, 33; Tuanda v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 110544, October 17, 1995, 249 SCRA 342, 351; Apa v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 112381,
March 30, 1995, 242 SCRA 509, 512; Yap v. Paras, G.R. No.101236, January 30, 1994, 205 SCRA 625, 629; Umali
v. IAC, G.R. No. 63198, June 21, 1990, 186 SCRA 680, 685.
[13]
G.R. No. 137567, June 20, 2000, 334 SCRA 106, 110.
[14]
R.E. Agpalo, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 97 (4th ed., 1998).
[15]
G.R. No. 153666, December 27, 2002, 394 SCRA 494, 508-509.
[16]
R.E. Agpalo, supra note 14, at 269-270.
[17]
Algura v. The Local Government Unit of the City of Naga, G.R. No. 150135, October 30, 2006, 506
SCRA 81, 98; Valencia v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122363, April 29, 2003, 401 SCRA 666, 680-81; Baares v.
Balising, G.R. No. 132624, March 13, 2000, 328 SCRA 36, 49; Cabada v. Alunan III, G.R. No. 119645, August 22,
1996, 260 SCRA 838, 848; Republic v. Asuncion, G.R. No. 108208, March 11, 1994, 231 SCRA 211; Corona v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97356, September 30, 1992, 214 SCRA 378, 392.
[18]
G.R. No. 124498, October 5, 2001, 366 SCRA 567.
[19]
Id. at 572.
[20]
Mejia v. People, G.R. No. 149937, June 21, 2007, 525 SCRA 209, 213-214.
[21]
Rigor v. People, G.R. No. 144887, November 17, 2004, 442 SCRA 451, 461; Narte v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 132552, July 14, 2004, 434 SCRA 336, 341; Lazaro v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 105461, November 11,
1993, 227 SCRA 723, 726-727, citing People v. Nitafan, G.R. No. 75954, October 22, 1992, 215 SCRA 79, 84-85
and Que v. People, Nos. L-75217-18, September 21, 1987, 154 SCRA 161, 165.
[22]
Supra note 20, at 214-215.
[23]
G.R. No. 145498, January 17, 2005, 448 SCRA 455.
[24]
Id. at 474-475.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 143375. July 6, 2001]
RUTH D. BAUTISTA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, OFFICE OF

THE REGIONAL STATE PROSECUTOR, REGION IV, and SUSAN
ALOA, respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This petition for certiorari presents a new dimension in the ever controversial Batas

Pambansa Bilang 22 or The Bouncing Checks Law. The question posed is whether the drawer of
a check which is dishonored due to lack of sufficient funds can be prosecuted under BP 22 even
if the check is presented for payment after ninety (90) days from its due date. The burgeoning
jurisprudence on the matter appears silent on this point.
Sometime in April 1998 petitioner Ruth D. Bautista issued to private respondent Susan Aloa
Metrobank Check No. 005014037 dated 8 May 1998 for P1,500,000.00 drawn on Metrobank
Cavite City Branch. According to private respondent, petitioner assured her that the check would
be sufficiently funded on the maturity date.
On 20 October 1998 private respondent presented the check for payment. The drawee bank
dishonored the check because it was drawn against insufficient funds (DAIF).
On 16 March 1999 private respondent filed a complaint-affidavit with the City Prosecutor of
Cavite City.[1] In addition to the details of the issuance and the dishonor of the check, she also
alleged that she made repeated demands on petitioner to make arrangements for the payment of
the check within five (5) working days after receipt of notice of dishonor from the bank, but that
petitioner failed to do so.
Petitioner then submitted her own counter-affidavit asserting in her defense that presentment
of the check within ninety (90) days from due date thereof was an essential element of the
offense of violation of BP 22. Since the check was presented for payment 166 days after its due
date, it was no longer punishable under BP 22 and therefore the complaint should be dismissed
for lack of merit. She also claimed that she already assigned private respondent her
condominium unit at Antel Seaview Condominium, Roxas Boulevard, as full payment for the
bounced checks thus extinguishing her criminal liability.
On 22 April 1999, the investigating prosecutor issued a resolution recommending the filing
of an Information against petitioner for violation of BP 22, which was approved by the City
Prosecutor.
On 13 May 1999 petitioner filed with the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor (ORSP)
for Region IV a petition for review of the 22 April 1999 resolution. The ORSP denied the
petition in a one (1)-page resolution dated 25 June 1999. On 5 July 1999 petitioner filed a motion
for reconsideration, which the ORSP also denied on 31 August 1999. According to the ORSP,
only resolutions of prosecutors dismissing a criminal complaint were cognizable for review by
that office, citing Department Order No. 223.
On 1 October 1999 petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review of the
resolution of the ORSP, Region IV, dated 22 April 1999 as well as the order dated 31 August
1999 denying reconsideration. The appellate court issued the assailed Resolution dated 26
October 1999 denying due course outright and dismissing the petition.[2] According to respondent
appellate court -
A petition for review is appropriate under Rule 42 (1997 Rules of Civil Procedure)
from a decision of the Regional Trial Court rendered in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction, filed in the Court of Appeals. Rule 43 x x x provides for appeal, via a
petition for review x x x from judgment or final orders of the Court of Tax Appeals
and Quasi-Judicial Agencies to the Court of Appeals. Petitioner's "Petition for
Review" of the ORSP resolution does not fall under any of the agencies mentioned in
Rule 43 x x x x It is worth to note that petitioner in her three (3) assigned errors
charged the ORSP of "serious error of law and grave abuse of discretion." The
grounds relied upon by petitioner are proper in a petition for certiorari x x x x Even if
We treat the "Petition for Review" as a petition for certiorari, petitioner failed to
allege the essential requirements of a special civil action. Besides, the remedy of
petitioner is in the Regional Trial Court, following the doctrine of hierarchy of courts
x x x x (italics supplied)
First, some ground rules. This case went to the Court of Appeals by way of petition for
review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 43 applies to "appeals from
judgments or final orders of the Court of Tax Appeals and from awards, judgments, final orders
or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of quasi-judicial
functions."[3]
Petitioner submits that a prosecutor conducting a preliminary investigation performs a quasi-
judicial function, citing Cojuangco v. PCGG,[4] Koh v. Court of Appeals,[5] Andaya v. Provincial
Fiscal of Surigao del Norte[6] and Crespo v. Mogul.[7] In these cases this Court held that the power
to conduct preliminary investigation is quasi-judicial in nature. But this statement holds true only
in the sense that, like quasi-judicial bodies, the prosecutor is an office in the executive
department exercising powers akin to those of a court. Here is where the similarity ends.
A closer scrutiny will show that preliminary investigation is very different from other quasi-
judicial proceedings. A quasi-judicial body has been defined as "an organ of government other
than a court and other than a legislature which affects the rights of private parties through either
adjudication or rule-making."[8]
In Luzon Development Bank v. Luzon Development Bank Employees,[9] we held that a
voluntary arbitrator, whether acting solely or in a panel, enjoys in law the status of a quasi-
judicial agency, hence his decisions and awards are appealable to the Court of Appeals. This is
so because the awards of voluntary arbitrators become final and executory upon the lapse of the
period to appeal;[10] and since their awards determine the rights of parties, their decisions have the
same effect as judgments of a court. Therefore, the proper remedy from an award of a voluntary
arbitrator is a petition for review to the Court of Appeals, following Revised Administrative
Circular No. 1-95, which provided for a uniform procedure for appellate review of all
adjudications of quasi-judicial entities, which is now embodied in Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure.
On the other hand, the prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not determine the guilt
or innocence of the accused. He does not exercise adjudication nor rule-making
functions. Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and is often the only means of
discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime and to enable the fiscal to
prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose
except that of determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable
cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof.[11]While the fiscal makes that determination, he
cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it is the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on
the accused, not the fiscal.[12]
Hence, the Office of the Prosecutor is not a quasi-judicial body; necessarily, its decisions
approving the filing of a criminal complaint are not appealable to the Court of Appeals under
Rule 43. Since the ORSP has the power to resolve appeals with finality only where the penalty
prescribed for the offense does not exceed prision correccional, regardless of the imposable fine,
[13]
the only remedy of petitioner, in the absence of grave abuse of discretion, is to present her
defense in the trial of the case.
Besides, it is well-settled that the courts cannot interfere with the discretion of the fiscal to
determine the specificity and adequacy of the offense charged. He may dismiss the complaint
forthwith if he finds it to be insufficient in form or substance or if he finds no ground to continue
with the inquiry; or, he may otherwise proceed with the investigation if the complaint is, in his
view, in due and proper form.[14]
In the present recourse, notwithstanding the procedural lapses, we give due course to the
petition, in view of the novel legal question involved, to prevent further delay of the prosecution
of the criminal case below, and more importantly, to dispel any notion that procedural
technicalities are being used to defeat the substantive rights of petitioner.
Petitioner is accused of violation of BP 22 the substantive portion of which reads -
Section 1. Checks without sufficient funds. - Any person who makes or draws and
issues any check to apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he
does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of
such in full upon presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee
bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same
reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop
payment, shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but not
more than one (1) year or by a fine of not less than but not more than double the
amount of the check which fine shall in no case exceed Two Hundred Thousand
Pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court.
The same penalty shall be imposed upon any person who, having sufficient funds in or
credit with the drawee bank when he makes or draws and issues a check, shall fail to
keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the check if
presented within a period of ninety (90) days from the date appearing thereon, for
which reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank x x x x (italics supplied).
An analysis of Sec. 1 shows that The Bouncing Checks Law penalizes two (2) distinct
acts: First, making or drawing and issuing any check to apply on account or for value, knowing
at the time of issue that the drawer does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee
bank; and, second, having sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank shall fail to keep
sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the check if presented within a
period of ninety (90) days from the date appearing thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by
the drawee bank.[15]
In the first paragraph, the drawer knows that he does not have sufficient funds to cover the
check at the time of its issuance, while in the second paragraph, the drawer has sufficient funds
at the time of issuance but fails to keep sufficient funds or maintain credit within ninety (90)
days from the date appearing on the check. In both instances, the offense is consummated by the
dishonor of the check for insufficiency of funds or credit.
The check involved in the first offense is worthless at the time of issuance since the drawer
had neither sufficient funds in nor credit with the drawee bank at the time, while that involved in
the second offense is good when issued as drawer had sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank when issued.[16] Under the first offense, the ninety (90)-day presentment period is
not expressly provided, while such period is an express element of the second offense.[17]
From the allegations of the complaint, it is clear that petitioner is being prosecuted for
violation of the first paragraph of the offense.
Petitioner asserts that she could not be prosecuted for violation of BP 22 on the simple
ground that the subject check was presented 166 days after the date stated thereon. She cites Sec.
2 of BP 22 which reads -
Sec. 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. - The making, drawing and

issuance of a check payment which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient
funds in or credit with such bank, when presented within ninety (90) days from the
date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of
funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due
thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check
within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid
by the drawee (italics supplied).
Petitioner interprets this provision to mean that the ninety (90)-day presentment period is an
element of the offenses punished in BP 22. She asseverates that "for a maker or issuer of a check
to be covered by B.P. 22, the check issued by him/her is one that is dishonored when presented
for payment within ninety (90) days from date of the check. If the dishonor occurred after
presentment for payment beyond the ninety (90)-day period, no criminal liability attaches; only a
civil case for collection of sum of money may be filed, if warranted." To bolster this argument,
she relies on the view espoused by Judge David G. Nitafan in his treatise - [18]
Although evidentiary in nature, section 2 of the law must be taken as furnishing an

additional element of the offense defined in the first paragraph of section 1 because it
provides for the evidentiary fact of "knowledge of insufficiency of funds or credit"
which is an element of the offense defined in said paragraph; otherwise said provision
of section 2 would be rendered without meaning and nugatory. The rule of statutory
construction is that the parts of a statute must be read together in such a manner as to
give effect to all of them and that such parts shall not be construed as contradicting
each other. The same section cannot be deemed to supply an additional element for
the offense under the second paragraph of section 1 because the 90-day presentment
period is already a built-in element in the definition of said offense (italics supplied).
We are not convinced. It is fundamental that every element of the offense must be alleged in
the complaint or information, and must be proved beyond reasonable doubt by the
prosecution. What facts and circumstances are necessary to be stated must be determined by
reference to the definitions and the essentials of the specific crimes.[19]
The elements of the offense under BP 22 are (a) the making, drawing and issuance of any
check to apply to account or for value; (b) the maker, drawer or issuer knows at the time of issue
that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such
check in full upon its presentment; and, (c) the check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee
bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had
not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment.[20]
The ninety (90)-day period is not among these elements. Section 2 of BP 22 is clear that a
dishonored check presented within the ninety (90)-day period creates a prima facie presumption
of knowledge of insufficiency of funds, which is an essential element of the offense. Since
knowledge involves a state of mind difficult to establish, the statute itself creates a prima
facie presumption of the existence of this element from the fact of drawing, issuing or making a
check, the payment of which was subsequently refused for insufficiency of funds.[21] The
term prima facie evidence denotes evidence which, if unexplained or uncontradicted, is sufficient
to sustain the proposition it supports or to establish the facts, or to counterbalance the
presumption of innocence to warrant a conviction.[22]
The presumption in Sec. 2 is not a conclusive presumption that forecloses or precludes the
presentation of evidence to the contrary.[23] Neither does the term prima facie evidence preclude
the presentation of other evidence that may sufficiently prove the existence or knowledge of
insufficiency of funds or lack of credit.
Surely, the law is not so circumscribed as to limit proof of knowledge exclusively to the
dishonor of the subject check when presented within the prescribed ninety (90) day period. The
deliberations on the passage of BP 22 (then known as Cabinet Bill No. 9) between the author,
former Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, and Bataan Assemblyman Pablo Roman prove
insightful -
MR. ROMAN: x x x x Under Section 1, who is the person who may be liable under this
Section? Would it be the maker or the drawer? How about the endorser, Mr. Speaker?
MR. MENDOZA: Liable.
MR. ROMAN: The endorser, therefore, under Section 1 is charged with the duty of knowing at the
time he endorses and delivers a check . . . .
MR. MENDOZA: If the endorser is charged for violation of the Act then the fact of knowledge must be
proven by positive evidence because the presumption of knowledge arises only against the maker
or the drawer. It does not arise as against endorser under the following section (italics supplied).
MR. ROMAN: But under Section 1, it says here: "Any person who shall make or draw or utter or
deliver any check." The preposition is disjunctive, so that any person who delivers any check
knowing at the time of such making or such delivery that the maker or drawer has no sufficient
funds would be liable under Section 1.
MR. MENDOZA: That is correct Mr. Speaker. But, as I said, while there is liability even as against
endorser, for example, the presumption of knowledge of insufficient funds arises only against the
maker or drawer under Section 2.
MR. ROMAN: Yes, Mr. Speaker. It is true; however, under Section 1, endorsers of checks or bills of
exchange would find it necessary since they may be charged with the knowledge at the time they
negotiate bills of exchange they have no sufficient funds in the bank or depository.
MR. MENDOZA: In order that an endorser may be held liable, there must be evidence showing that at
the time he endorsed the check he was aware that the drawer would not have sufficient funds to
cover the check upon presentation. That evidence must be presented by the prosecution. However,
if the one changed is the drawer, then that evidence need not be presented by the prosecution
because that fact would be established by presumption under Section 2 (italics supplied).[24]
An endorser who passes a bad check may be held liable under BP 22, even though the
presumption of knowledge does not apply to him, if there is evidence that at the time of
endorsement, he was aware of the insufficiency of funds. It is evident from the foregoing
deliberations that the presumption in Sec. 2 was intended to facilitate proof of knowledge and not
to foreclose admissibility of other evidence that may also prove such knowledge. Thus, the only
consequence of the failure to present the check for payment within ninety (90) days from the date
stated is that there arises no prima facie presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds. But
the prosecution may still prove such knowledge through other evidence. Whether such evidence
is sufficient to sustain probable cause to file the information is addressed to the sound discretion
of the City Prosecutor and is a matter not controllable by certiorari. Certainly, petitioner is not
left in a lurch as the prosecution must prove knowledge without the benefit of the presumption,
and she may present whatever defenses are available to her in the course of the trial.
The distinction between the elements of the offense and the evidence of these elements is
analogous or akin to the difference between ultimate facts and evidentiary facts in civil
cases. Ultimate facts are the essential and substantial facts which either form the basis of the
primary right and duty or which directly make up the wrongful acts or omissions of the
defendant, while evidentiary facts are those which tend to prove or establish said ultimate facts.
[25]
Applying this analogy to the case at bar, knowledge of insufficiency of funds is the ultimate
fact, or element of the offense that needs to be proved, while dishonor of the check presented
within ninety (90) days is merely the evidentiary fact of such knowledge.
It is worth reiterating that courts will not normally interfere with the prosecutor's discretion
to file a criminal case when there is probable cause to do so. Probable cause has been defined as
the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind,
acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of
the crime for which he was prosecuted.[26] The prosecutor has ruled that there is probable cause in
this case, and we see no reason to disturb the finding.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 26 October 1999
which dismissed the petition for review questioning the resolution of the Office of the Regional
State Prosecutor, Region IV, dated 22 April 1999, and its order dated 31 August 1999 denying
reconsideration is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Quisumbing, J., on official leave.
[1]
Docketed as I.S. No. 99-302.
Resolution penned by Associate Justice Mariano M. Umali, concurred in by Associate Justices Quirino D. Abad
[2]
Santos, Jr., and Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., of the Court of Appeals Fourth Division; Rollo, pp. 100-102.
[3]
Sec. 1, Rule 43, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
[4]
G.R. Nos. 92319-20, 2 October 1990, 190 SCRA 226.
[5]
No. L-40428, 17 December 1975, 70 SCRA 298.
[6]
No. L-29826, 30 September 1976, 73 SCRA 131.
[7]
G.R. No. 53373, 30 June 1987, 151 SCRA 462.
Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 83578, 16 March 1989, 171 SCRA
[8]
348.
[9]
G.R. No. 120319, 6 October 1995, 249 SCRA 162.
Citing Volkschel Labor Union v. National Labor Relations Commission, No. L-39686, 25 June 1980, 98 SCRA
[10]
314.
[11]
Tandok v. Resultan, G.R. Nos. 59241-44, 5 July 1989, 175 SCRA 37.
[12]
See Note 8.
[13]
Department of Justice (DOJ) Department Order No. 223, as amended by DOJ DO No. 359.
[14]
Ocampo IV v. Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 103446-47, 30 August 1993, 225 SCRA 725; Crespo v. Mogul, see Note
7.
[15]
People v. Manzanilla, G.R. Nos. 66003-04, 11 December 1987, 156 SCRA 279.
[16]
Nitafan, David G., Notes and Comments on the Bouncing Checks Law (BP Blg. 22), 1993 Ed., p. 39.
[17]
Ibid.
[18]
Ibid.
[19]
Balitaan v. CFI Batangas, Br. II, 201 Phil. 311 (1982).
[20]
People v. Laggui, G.R. Nos. 76262-63, 16 March 1989, 171 SCRA 305.
[21]
Lozano v. Martinez, G.R. No. 63419, 18 December 1986, 146 SCRA 323.
[22]
Salonga v. Cruz Pano, G.R. No. 59524, 18 February 1985, 134 SCRA 438.
[23]
See Note 21.
[24]
Record of the Batasan Plenary Session No. 70, 4 December 1978, p. 1044.
[25]
See Tantuico, Jr. v. Republic, G.R. No. 89114, 2 December 1991, 204 SCRA 428.
Yap v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 68464, 22 March 1993, 220 SCRA 245; Qui v. Intermediate
[26]
Appellate Court, G.R. No. 66865, 13 January 1989, 169 SCRA 137.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. 104238-58. June 3, 2004]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. CORA ABELLA

OJEDA, appellant.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
For review is the decision dated June 21, 1991 of the Regional Trial Court of
[1]
Manila, Branch 38, the dispositive portion of which read:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Cora Abella Ojeda guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Estafa as defined and penalized under paragraph 2(d) of Article
315 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Rep. Act 4885, in Criminal Case No.
88-66228 and hereby sentences her to suffer a penalty of reclusion perpetua, with the
accessories provided by law and with credit for preventive imprisonment undergone,
if any, in accordance with Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code as amended, and to
pay complainant Ruby Chua the amount of Two Hundred Twenty Eight Thousand
Three Hundred Six (P228,306.00) Pesos with interests thereon from the time of
demand until fully paid.
Likewise, the Court also finds the said accused guilty for Violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22 in Criminal Cases Nos. 88-66230, 88-66232, 88-66235 to 88-66240, 88-
66242, 88-66243, 88- 66245 to 88-66248 (14) counts and hereby sentences her to
suffer a penalty of one year of imprisonment for each count. On the other hand, the
other charges docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 88- 66229, 88-66231, 88-66233, 88-
66234, 88-66241 and 88-66244 are hereby dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
Costs against accused in all instances. [2]
Appellant Cora Abella Ojeda was charged in 21 separate Informations for estafa in
Criminal Case No. 88-66228 and for violation of Batas Pambansa (BP) 22 in Criminal
Case Nos. 88-66229 to 88-66248.
The Information charging Ojeda with estafa read:
That on or about the first week of November, 1983, in the City of Manila, Philippines,
the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud
RUBY CHUA in the following manner, to wit: the said accused, well knowing that
she did not have sufficient funds in the bank and without informing the said Ruby
Chua of such fact drew, made out and issued to the latter the following post-dated
Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation checks, to wit:
Check No. Date Amount
1. 033550 Nov. 5, 1983 P17,100.00
2. 041782 Nov. 5, 1983 5,392.34
3. 042935 Nov. 6, 1983 1,840.19
4. 041799 Nov. 9, 1983 11,953.38
5. 033530 Nov. 10, 1983 19,437.34
6. 041714 Nov. 10, 1983 26, 890.00
7. 042942 Nov. 10, 1983 1,941.59
8. 041783 Nov. 12, 1983 5,392.34
9. 041800 Nov. 14, 1983 11,953.39
10. 041788 Nov. 15, 1983 3,081.90
11. 033529 Nov. 15, 1983 19,437.34
12. 041784 Nov. 18, 1983 5,392.34
13. 042901 Nov. 18, 1983 11,953.38
14. 042902 Nov. 23, 1983 11,953.38
15. 041785 Nov. 25, 1983 5,392.34
16. 042903 Nov. 29, 1983 11,953.38
17. 033532 Nov. 29, 1983 13,603.22
18. 041786 Nov. 30, 1983 5,392.34
19. 042905 Dec. 8, 1983 11,953.39
20. 043004 Dec. 10, 1983 2,386.25
21. 042907 Dec. 15, 1983 11,953.38
22. 042906 Dec. 18, 1983 11,953.39
P228,306.60
in payment of various fabrics and textile materials all in the total amount
of P228,306.60 which the said accused ordered or purchased from the said RUBY
CHUA on the same day; that upon presentation of the said checks to the bank for
payment, the same were dishonored and payment thereof refused for the reason
Account Closed, and said accused, notwithstanding due notice to her by the said Ruby
Chua of such dishonor of the said checks, failed and refused and still fails and refuses
to deposit the necessary amount to cover the amount of the checks to the damage and
prejudice of the said RUBY CHUA in the aforesaid amount of P228,306.60,
Philippine currency.
Contrary to law.
The Informations charging Ojeda for violation of BP 22 were similarly worded except
for the amounts of the checks, the check numbers and the dates of the checks:
That on or about the first week of November 1983, in the City of Manila, Philippines,
the said accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or draw
and issue to RUBY CHUA to apply on account or for value Rizal Commercial
Banking Corp. Check No. 041784 dated November 18, 1983 payable to Ruby Chua in
the amount of P5,392.34, said accused well knowing that at the time of issue
he/she/they did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank or payment
of such check in full upon its presentment, which check, when presented for payment
within ninety (90) days from the date thereof was subsequently dishonored by the
drawee bank for insufficiency of funds, and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor,
said accused failed to pay said complainant the amount of said check or to make
arrangement for full payment of the same within five (5) banking days after receiving
said notice.
Contrary to law.
The pertinent facts of the case follow.

Appellant Cora Abella Ojeda used to buy fabrics (telas) from complainant Ruby
Chua. For the three years approximately she transacted business with Chua, appellant
used postdated checks to pay for the fabrics she bought. On November 5, 1983,
appellant purchased from Chua various fabrics and textile materials worth P228,306 for
which she issued 22 postdated checks bearing different dates and amounts.
Chua later presented to the bank for payment check no. 033550 dated November 5,
1983 in the amount of P17,100 but it was dishonored due to Account Closed. On April
[3] [4]
10, 1984, Chua deposited the rest of the checks but all were dishonored for the same
reason. Demands were allegedly made on the appellant to make good the dishonored
[5]
checks, to no avail.
Estafa and BP 22 charges were thereafter filed against appellant. The criminal
cases were consolidated and appellant, on arraignment, pleaded not guilty to each of
the charges.
On the whole, appellants defense was grounded on good faith or absence of deceit,
lack of notice of dishonor and full payment of the total amount of the checks.
With the exception of six checks which did not bear her signature, appellant
[6]
admitted that she issued the postdated checks which were the subject of the criminal
cases against her. She, however, alleged that she told Chua not to deposit the
postdated checks on maturity as they were not yet sufficiently funded. Appellant also
claimed that she made partial payments to Chua in the form of finished garments
worth P50,000. This was not rebutted by the prosecution.
The trial court convicted appellant of the crime of estafa as defined and penalized
under paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), and sentenced
her to reclusion perpetua. The trial court also convicted appellant of violation of BP 22
for issuing bouncing checks. However, the court a quo held her guilty of only 14 counts
out of the 22 bouncing checks issued. The court reasoned:
xxx This is due to the fact that of the 22 checks, two of them are not covered by the
indictment. This refers to Check No. 042935 dated November 6, 1983 in the amount
of P1,840.19 (Exhibit D) and Check No. 042942 dated November 10, 1983 in the
amount of P1,941.59 (Exhibit F). And of the total number of checks, six of them were
not signed by the accused but by the latters husband (Exhibits C,H,J,M,R and O). The
accused should not be liable for the issuance of the 6 checks in the absence of any
showing of conspiracy. [7]
Appellant appealed to this Court, seeking acquittal. Her counsel, however, failed to

file the appellants brief within the prescribed period. Her appeal was thus dismissed in a
resolution of this Court dated October 14, 1992. [8]
In her motion for reconsideration, appellant asked this Court to reverse its order of
dismissal in the interest of substantial justice and equity. We initially found no
[9]
compelling reason to grant her motion and resolved to deny with finality appellants MR
in a resolution dated February 3, 1993. Appellant thereafter filed a Second and Urgent
[10]
Motion for Reconsideration, attaching thereto an Affidavit of Desistance of complainant

Ruby Chua which stated in part:
xxx xxx xxx.
2. that the defendant Mrs. Cora Ojeda has already fully paid her monetary obligation
to me in the amount of P228,306.00 which is the subject of the aforementioned cases;
xxx xxx xxx.
5. That as the private complainant, I am now appealing to the sense of compassion

and humanity of the good justices of the Supreme Court to reconsider the appeal of
Mrs. Cora Ojeda and I solemnly pray that the criminal liability be extinguished with
her civil liability.
[11]
In a resolution dated March 17, 1993, this Court denied the second MR for having
[12]
been filed without leave of court. In the same resolution, this Court ordered the entry of
judgment in due course.
Appellant thereafter filed another motion dated April 21, 1993, praying that she be
recommended to then President Fidel V. Ramos for executive clemency. In support of
such motion, she once more attached the affidavit of desistance of complainant Ruby
[13]
Chua which categorically declared that the defendant, Ms. Cora Ojeda, (had) already
fully paid her monetary obligations to (Chua) in the amount of P228,306 which (was) the
subject of the aforementioned cases. [14]
In view of such special circumstances, this Court issued a resolution dated June 9,
1993 recalling its resolutions dated October 14, 1992, February 3, 1993 and March 17,
[15]
1993 for humanitarian reasons and in the interest of justice, and in order that this Court
may resolve appellants appeal on the merits. [16]
Hence, the instant appeal with the following assignments of error:

I.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT DECEIT WAS EMPLOYED

BY ACCUSED APPELLANT WHEN SHE ISSUED THE CHECKS TO THE
PRIVATE COMPLAINANT.
II.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE ISSUANCE BY

THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CHECKS TO THE PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT WAS MERELY A MODE OF PAYMENT WHICH
ARRANGEMENT HAD BEEN THEIR PRACTICE FOR THREE (3) YEARS.
III.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT GOOD FAITH IS A

VALID DEFENSE AGAINST ESTAFA BY POSTDATING A CHECK
IV.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED OF

FOURTEEN (14) COUNTS OF B.P. 22 WHEN THERE WAS NO PROOF OF
NOTICE OF DISHONOR TO THE ACCUSED.
V.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT SINCE 13 OF THE 14

CHECKS WERE DEPOSITED ONLY AFTER THE LAPSE OF THE 90 DAY
PERIOD, HENCE, THE PRIMA FACIE PRESUMPTION OF KNOWLEDGE
DOES NOT APPLY. [17]
Appellant firmly denies any criminal liability for estafa. She argues there was no
deceit employed when she issued the checks because she never assured Chua that the
checks were funded. Chua allegedly knew all along that the checks were merely
intended to guarantee future payment by appellant.
Appellant further claims good faith in all her transactions with Chua for three
years. She explained that her failure to fund the checks was brought about by the
collapse of the countrys economy in the wake of the Aquino assassination in 1983. The
capital flight and financial chaos at that time caused her own business to shut down
when her customers also failed to pay her. Despite the closure of her business,
appellant maintains that she did her best to continue paying Chua what she owed and,
when she could no longer pay in cash, she instead paid in kind in the form of finished
goods. But these were not enough to cover her debts. Nevertheless, she spared no
effort in complying with her financial obligations to Chua until she was gradually able to
pay all her debts, a fact fully admitted as true by complainant in her affidavit.
From the foregoing, appellant contends that the element of deceit thru abuse of
confidence or false pretenses was not present. Thus, her guilt was not established with
satisfactory proof. Appellant asserts that good faith on her part was a valid defense to
rebut the prima facie presumption of deceit when she issued the checks that
subsequently bounced.
Furthermore, out of the 14 checks cited in the decision of the trial court, only one
check was deposited within 90 days from due date. This was check no. 033550 dated
November 5, 1983. The rest of the checks were deposited only on April 10, 1984 or
more than 90 days from the date of the last check. [18]
Appellant also denies she received any notice of dishonor of the checks, contrary to
the findings of the trial court. She was not even aware that cases had already been filed
against her for violation of BP 22. Since there was allegedly no proof of notice of the
[19]
dishonor of the checks, appellant claims that she cannot be convicted of violation of BP
22.
On the other hand, the Solicitor General contends that appellant was criminally
liable for issuing worthless checks. Complainant Chua accepted the postdated checks
as payment because of appellants good credit standing. She was confident that
appellants checks were good checks. Thus, no assurances from appellant that the
checks were sufficiently funded were needed for Chua to part with her goods. And when
the checks later bounced, appellant betrayed the confidence reposed in her by Chua.
The Solicitor General also argues that there was a simultaneous exchange of textile
materials and checks between complainant and appellant. Complainant Chua would not
have parted with her telas had she known that appellants checks would not
clear. Appellant obtained something in exchange for her worthless checks. When she
issued them, she knew she had no funds to back up those checks because her account
had already been closed. Yet, she did not inform Chua that the checks could not be
cashed upon maturity. She thus deceived Chua into parting with her goods and the
deceit employed constituted estafa.
We grant the appeal.
DECEIT AND DAMAGE AS
ELEMENTS OF ESTAFA
Under paragraph 2 (d) of Article 315 of the RPC, as amended by RA 4885, the [20]
elements of estafa are: (1) a check is postdated or issued in payment of an obligation

contracted at the time it is issued; (2) lack or insufficiency of funds to cover the check;
(3) damage to the payee thereof. Deceit and damage are essential elements of the
offense and must be established by satisfactory proof to warrant conviction. Thus, the
[21]
drawer of the dishonored check is given three days from receipt of the notice of
dishonor to cover the amount of the check. Otherwise a prima facie presumption of
deceit arises.
The prosecution failed to prove deceit in this case. The prima facie presumption of
deceit was successfully rebutted by appellants evidence of good faith, a defense
in estafa by postdating a check. Good faith may be demonstrated, for instance, by a
[22]
debtors offer to arrange a payment scheme with his creditor. In this case, the debtor not
only made arrangements for payment; as complainant herself categorically stated, the
debtor-appellant fully paid the entire amount of the dishonored checks.
It must be noted that our Revised Penal Code was enacted to penalize unlawful
acts accompanied by evil intent denominated as crimes mala in se. The principal
consideration is the existence of malicious intent. There is a concurrence of freedom,
intelligence and intent which together make up the criminal mind behind the criminal act.
Thus, to constitute a crime, the act must, generally and in most cases, be accompanied
by a criminal intent. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea. No crime is committed if the
mind of the person performing the act complained of is innocent. As we held in Tabuena
vs. Sandiganbayan: [23]
The rule was reiterated in People v. Pacana, although this case involved falsification
of public documents and estafa:
Ordinarily, evil intent must unite with an unlawful act for there to be a crime. Actus
non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea. There can be no crime when the criminal mind is
wanting.
American jurisprudence echoes the same principle. It adheres to the view that criminal
intent in embezzlement is not based on technical mistakes as to the legal effect of a
transaction honestly entered into, and there can be no embezzlement if the mind of the
person doing the act is innocent or if there is no wrongful purpose.
The accused may thus prove that he acted in good faith and that he had no
intention to convert the money or goods for his personal benefit. We are convinced
[24]
that appellant was able to prove the absence of criminal intent in her transactions with
Chua. Had her intention been tainted with malice and deceit, appellant would not have
exerted extraordinary effort to pay the complainant, given her own business and
financial reverses.
LACK OF NOTICE OF DISHONOR
We also note that the prosecution presented virtually no evidence to show that the
indispensable notice of dishonor was sent to and received by appellant. Excerpts from
the following testimony of complainant are significant:
ATTY. ANGELES:
Q Now, Mrs. Witness, when these checks from Exhibits A to V have bounced, what
steps, did you do?
A I consulted my lawyer and she wrote a Demand Letter.
COURT:
Q What is the name of that lawyer?
A Atty. Virginia Nabora.
ATTY. ANGELES:
Q Now, you mentioned a Demand Letter sent by Atty. Virginia Nabor, I am showing to
you this Demand Letter dated March 16, 1988, will you kindly examine the same if
this is the same Demand Letter you mentioned a while ago?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, on this second page of this Demand Letter there is a signature above the
printed name Virginia Guevarra Nabor, do you know the signature, Mrs. Witness?
A Yes, that is the signature of my lawyer.
ATTY. ANGELES:
May we request that this Demand Letter dated March 16, 1988 consisting of two (2)
pages, Your Honor, be marked as Exhibit W and that the signature on the second
page of this letter of Virginia Guevarra Nabor be encircled and be marked as
Exhibit W-1 and that the attached Registry Receipt, Your Honor, be marked as
Exhibit W-2.
COURT:
Mark them.
ATTY. ANGELES:
Q Now, Mrs. Witness, why do you know that this is the signature of Virginia Guevarra
Nabor?
A After preparing that I saw her sign the letter.
Q Now, after sending this Demand Letter, do you know If the accused herein made
payments or replaced the checks that were issued to you?
COURT:
Q Of course, you assumed that the accused received that letter, that is his basis on the
premise that the accused received that letter?
ATTY. ANGELES:
A Yes, Your Honor.
COURT:
Q What proof is there to show that accused received the letter because your question
is premises (sic) on the assumption that the accused received the letter?
ATTY. ANGELES:
Q Now, do you know Mrs. Witness if the accused received the letter?
A There is a registry receipt.
COURT:
Q Now, later on after sending that letter, did you have communication with the
accused?
A I kept on calling her but I was not able to get in touch with her.
Q But do you know if that letter of your lawyer was received by the accused?
A I was not informed by my lawyer but I presumed that the same was already received
by the accused.
ATTY. ANGELES:
Q Now, aside from sending this Demand Letter, do you know what your lawyer did?
A We filed a case with the Fiscals.[25]
Aside from the above testimony, no other reference to the demand letter was made
by the prosecution. The prosecution claimed that the demand letter was sent by
registered mail. To prove this, it presented a copy of the demand letter as well as the
registry return receipt bearing a signature which was, however, not even authenticated
or identified. A registry receipt alone is insufficient as proof of mailing. Receipts for
[26]
registered letters and return receipts do not prove themselves; they must be properly
authenticated in order to serve as proof of receipt of the letters. [27]
It is clear from the foregoing that complainant merely presumed that appellant
received the demand letter prepared and sent by her lawyer. She was not certain if
appellant indeed received the notice of dishonor of the checks. All she knew was that a
demand letter was sent by her lawyer to the appellant. In fact, right after complainant
made that presumption, her lawyer filed the criminal cases against appellant at the
Fiscals office without any confirmation that the demand letter supposedly sent through
[28]
registered mail was actually received by appellant.

With the evident lack of notice of dishonor of the checks, appellant cannot be held
guilty of violation of BP 22. The lack of such notice violated appellants right to
procedural due process. It is a general rule that when service of notice is an issue, the
person alleging that the notice was served must prove the fact of service. The burden
[29]
of proving receipt of notice rests upon the party asserting it and the quantum of proof
required for conviction in this criminal case is proof beyond reasonable doubt.
When, during the trial, appellant denied having received the demand letter, it
became incumbent upon the prosecution to prove that the demand letter was indeed
sent through registered mail and that the same was received by appellant. But it did
not. Obviously, it relied merely on the weakness of the evidence of the defense.
This Court therefore cannot, with moral certainty, convict appellant of violation of BP
22. The evident failure of the prosecution to establish that she was given the requisite
notice of dishonor justifies her acquittal.
[30]
As held in Lao vs. Court of Appeals: [31]
It has been observed that the State, under this statute, actually offers the violator a
compromise by allowing him to perform some act which operates to preempt the
criminal action, and if he opts to perform it the action is abated. This was also
compared to certain laws allowing illegal possessors of firearms a certain period of
time to surrender the illegally possessed firearms to the Government, without
incurring any criminal liability. In this light, the full payment of the amount appearing
in the check within five banking days from notice of dishonor is a complete defense.
The absence of a notice of dishonor necessarily deprives an accused an opportunity to
preclude a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, procedural due process clearly enjoins
that a notice of dishonor be actually served on petitioner. Petitioner has a right to
demand and the basic postulates of fairness require -- that the notice of dishonor be
actually sent to and received by her to afford her the opportunity to avert prosecution
under B.P. 22.
Stated otherwise, responsibility under BP 22 was personal to appellant; hence,

personal knowledge of the notice of dishonor was necessary. Consequently, while there
may have been constructive notice to appellant regarding the insufficiency of her funds
in the bank, it was not enough to satisfy the requirements of procedural due process.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that notice of dishonor is required under both par. 2(d)
Art. 315 of the RPC and Sec. 2 of BP 22. While the RPC prescribes that the drawer of
the check must deposit the amount needed to cover his check within three days from
receipt of notice of dishonor, BP 22, on the other hand, requires the maker or drawer to
pay the amount of the check within five days from receipt of notice of dishonor. Under
both laws, notice of dishonor is necessary for prosecution (for estafa and violation of BP
22). Without proof of notice of dishonor, knowledge of insufficiency of funds cannot be
presumed and no crime (whether estafa or violation of BP 22) can be deemed to exist.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Appellant Cora Abella Ojeda is ACQUITTED in Criminal Case No. 88-66228 for
estafa and in Criminal Case Nos. 88-66230, 88-66232, 88-66235 to 88-66240, 88-
66242, 88-66243, 88-66245 to 88-66248 for violation of BP 22.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.
[1]
Penned by Judge Arturo U. Barias, Jr.
[2]
Rollo, p. 40.
[3]
Exhibit A.
[4]
Exhibit Y.
[5]
Exhibits X, Y, AA, BB and CC.
[6]
Exhibits C, H, J, M, O and R.
[7]
Record, p. 139.
[8]
Rollo, p. 47.
[9]
Rollo, p. 49.
[10]
Rollo, p. 52.
[11]
Ibid., p. 61.
[12]
Rollo, p. 62.
[13]
Rollo, p. 70.
[14]
Ibid.
[15]
Rollo, p. 76.
[16]
Rollo, p. 76.
[17]
Rollo, pp. 87-88.
[18]
Section 2 of BP 22 states:
SEC. 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. The making, drawing and issuance of a
check payment of which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with
such bank, when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check, shall be prima
facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiently of funds or credit unless such maker or
drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in
full by the drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such
check has not been paid by the drawee.
[19]
Ibid.
[20]
Art. 315 par. 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code states:
(d) By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender had
no funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the
check. The failure of the drawer of the check to deposit the amount necessary to cover his
check within three (3) days from receipt of notice from the bank and/or the payee or holder
that said check has been dishonored for lack or insufficiency of funds shall
be prima facie evidence of deceit constituting false pretense or fraudulent act.
[21]
People vs. Chua, 315 SCRA 326 [1999].
[22]
People vs. Gulion, 349 SCRA 610 [2001]; Vallarta vs. Court of Appeals, 150 SCRA 336
[1987]; People vs. Villapando, 56 Phil. 31 [1931].
[23]
268 SCRA 332 [1997].
[24]
Lecaroz vs. Sandiganbayan, 305 SCRA 396 [1999].
[25]
TSN, December 7, 1989, pp. 37-43.
[26]
Ting vs. Court of Appeals, 344 SCRA 551 [2000], citing Central Trust Co. vs. City of Des Moines, 218
NW 580.
[27]
Ting vs. Court of Appeals, ibid.
[28]
TSN, December 7, 1989, pp. 42-23.
[29]
Ting vs. Court of Appeals, supra, citing 58 Am Jur 2d, Notice, 45.
[30]
Caras vs. Court of Appeals, 366 SCRA 371 [2001].
[31]
Lao vs. Court of Appeals, 274 SCRA 572 [1997].
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 156169. August 12, 2005]
VICTOR ONGSON, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The instant petition for review seeks to annul and set aside the June 27, 2002
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 18662 which affirmed with
[1]
modification the March 8, 1995 decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
[2]
Branch 97, in Criminal Case Nos. Q-93-43435 to Q-43442, finding petitioner Victor
Ongson guilty beyond reasonable doubt of eight (8) counts of violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 (B.P. 22).
The evidence for the prosecution shows that on separate occasions, private complainant Samson
Uy extended loans to petitioner and as payment therefor, he issued to Uy eight (8) post dated checks.
Upon presentment, the checks were dishonored and despite demands, petitioner failed to make good
the bounced checks. On April 15, 1993, eight (8) separate Informations were filed against petitioner and
docketed as follows:
Criminal Check Date Amount Drawee Reason for the

Case No. No. Bank dishonor
Q-93-43435 [3]
119789[4]
Nov. 23, 1992 P200,000.00 PSB Payment
Stopped/Drawn
Against
Insufficient
Funds (DAIF)
Q-93-43436 [5]
492837[6]
Nov. 4, 1992 24,000.00 FBTC Account Closed
DAIF
Q-93-43437 [7]
492615[8]
Oct. 15, 1992 3,117.00 FBTC
DAIF
Q-93-43438 [9]
492319[10]
Oct. 15, 1992 11,887.10 FBTC
DAIF
Q-93- 492482 [12]
Oct. 15, 1992 50,000.00 FBTC
43439[11]
DAIF
Q-93- 492581 [14]
Oct. 4, 1992 25,500.00 FBTC
43440[13]
DAIF
Q-93- 492666 [16]
Oct. 2, 1992 200,000.00 FBTC
43441[15]
DAIF
Q-93- 492580 [18]
Sept. 28, 1992 68,145.62 FBTC
43442[17]
Except as to the check's drawee bank, number, amount and date of issue, the
Informations were similarly worded in this wise:
That on or about the 23rd day of November, 1992, in Quezon City, Philippines, the
said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or draw
and issue to SAMSON UY to apply on account or for value Philippine Savings Bank
Check No. 119789 dated November 23, 1992 payable to Cash in the amount of
P200,000.00, Philippine Currency, said accused well knowing that at the time of issue
she/he/they did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for
payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check when presented for
payment was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of
funds/Account Closed and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, said accused
failed to pay said Samson Uy the amount of said check or to make arrangement for
full payment of the same within five (5) banking days after receiving said notice.
CONTRARY TO LAW. [19]
Upon arraignment, petitioner entered a plea of not guilty.

At the pre-trial, petitioner admitted the authenticity of his signatures on the checks,
the stamps of dishonored deposit, the dates thereof and reasons for dishonor. [20]
After the prosecution rested its case, the defense presented Rowena Carbon but
since she failed to appear for continuation of the cross-examination, the trial court
[21]
ordered her testimony stricken off the record. The defense also presented Evelyn
[22]
Villareal who testified that Liana's Supermarket, where Uy was sole distributor of
petitioner's beverage products, issued check vouchers to Uy. [23]
On March 8, 1995, the trial court rendered a one-page decision finding petitioner
guilty as charged, the full text of which reads:
The consolidated Informations, above-numbered, for violation of Batas Pambansa

Blg. 22, for eight (8) counts are on record.
Upon arraignment accused pleaded Not Guilty and at the pre-trial, he agreed to and
signed the Pre-trial order on Page 108, dated July 14th, 1993, wherein accused
admitted the authenticity of the signatures on the checks in question, Exh "B", Exh
"C", "D", "E", "F", "G", "H", "I" and submarkings thereon, showing the fact of
dishonor, the reason therefor and the dates thereof, reserving only for trial on the
merits the issue of the correctness of the amounts and the consideration.
The private complainant testified as to the consideration, which is also presumed

under the law, unless rebutted by accused, which he failed to do, convincing the court
beyond reasonable doubt of his guilt as charged herein.
WHEREFORE, accused Victor Ongson is hereby declared GUILTY of Violations of

Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 on eight (8) counts and sentenced to serve 6 months
imprisonment for each of the eight (8) counts and to pay a fine equivalent to the
amount of the said checks mentioned in the above-numbered informations or a total of
P582,149.72, and to indemnify, as actual and compensatory damages, the private
complainant Samson Uy in the same amount of the said checks, or P582,149.72 plus
interest at 12% from the date of this decision.
SO ORDERED. [24]
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals contending he was denied due process
and that the trial court's decision violated the Constitution and the Rules of Court. In the
assailed decision of June 27, 2002, the Court of Appeals found no infirmity in the trial
court's decision and affirmed the conviction of petitioner, but modified the penalty as
follows:
WHEREFORE, with the MODIFICATIONS that the penalty of fine is hereby

DELETED and appellant sentenced to a prison term of thirty (30) days in each of the
eight (8) counts whereof he was found guilty by the lower court, the decision appealed
from is hereby AFFIRMED and this appeal DISMISSED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. [25]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Hence, the instant
petition. The issues for resolution are:
1) Was the decision of the trial court violative of the requirements of the Constitution
and the Rules of Court?
2) Was the conviction of petitioner proper?

Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution, as well as Section 1 of Rule 36 and
Section 1, Rule 120 of the Rules on Civil Procedure, similarly state that a decision,
judgment or final order determining the merits of the case shall state, clearly and
distinctly, the facts and the law on which it is based. Pertinently, the Court issued on
January 28, 1988 Administrative Circular No. 1, which requires judges to make
complete findings of facts in their decision, and scrutinize closely the legal aspects of
the case in the light of the evidence presented, and avoid the tendency to generalize
and to form conclusion without detailing the facts from which such conclusions are
deduced.
We emphasized in Velarde v. Social Justice Society, citing Yao v. Court of
[26]
Appeals, that:
[27]
"Faithful adherence to the requirements of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution
is indisputably a paramount component of due process and fair play. It is likewise
demanded by the due process clause of the Constitution. The parties to a litigation
should be informed of how it was decided, with an explanation of the factual and legal
reasons that led to the conclusions of the court. The court cannot simply say that
judgment is rendered in favor of X and against Y and just leave it at that without any
justification whatsoever for its action. The losing party is entitled to know why he
lost, so he may appeal to the higher court, if permitted, should he believe that the
decision should be reversed. A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the
facts and the law on which it is based leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was
reached and is precisely prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to pinpoint the
possible errors of the court for review by a higher tribunal. More than that, the
requirement is an assurance to the parties that, in reaching judgment, the judge did so
through the processes of legal reasoning. It is, thus, a safeguard against the
impetuosity of the judge, preventing him from deciding ipse dixit. Vouchsafed neither
the sword nor the purse by the Constitution but nonetheless vested with the sovereign
prerogative of passing judgment on the life, liberty or property of his fellowmen, the
judge must ultimately depend on the power of reason for sustained public confidence
in the justness of his decision."
In the present case, it is starkly obvious that the assailed Decision contains no
statement of facts - much less an assessment or analysis thereof - or of the court's
findings as to the probable facts. The assailed Decision begins with a statement of the
nature of the action and the question or issue presented. Then follows a brief
explanation of the constitutional provisions involved, and what the Petition sought to
achieve. Thereafter, the ensuing procedural incidents before the trial court are tracked.
The Decision proceeds to a full-length opinion on the nature and the extent of the
separation of church and state. Without expressly stating the final conclusion she has
reached or specifying the relief granted or denied, the trial judge ends her "Decision"
with the clause "SO ORDERED."
What were the antecedents that necessitated the filing of the Petition? What exactly
were the distinct facts that gave rise to the question sought to be resolved by SJS?
More important, what were the factual findings and analysis on which the trial court
based its legal findings and conclusions? None were stated or implied. Indeed, the
RTC's Decision cannot be upheld for its failure to express clearly and distinctly the
facts on which it was based. Thus, the trial court clearly transgressed the
constitutional directive.
The significance of factual findings lies in the value of the decision as a precedent.
How can it be so if one cannot apply the ruling to similar circumstances, simply
because such circumstances are unknown? Otherwise stated, how will the ruling be
applied in the future, if there is no point of factual comparison?
Based on the foregoing considerations, we find that the trial court's decision in the
case at bar did not state the material facts, i.e., the transaction that led to the issuance
of the checks, their respective amounts, the date and reason for dishonor. The decision
likewise failed to discuss the elements of B.P. 22 and other pertinent facts. Clearly, the
absence of relevant antecedents as well as the lack of evaluation of the evidence
adduced by the parties and justification for its conclusion render the instant decision
void.
The Court would ordinarily remand this case to the court a quo for compliance with
the constitutional requirements. However, we deem it proper to resolve the case on the
merits to avoid further delay.
[28]
Section 1 of B.P. 22, states:
SECTION 1. Checks without sufficient funds. - Any person who makes or draws and
issues any check to apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he
does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of
such check in full upon its presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by
the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored
for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to
stop payment, shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not
more than one (1) year or by a fine of not less than but not more than double the
amount of the check which fine shall in no case exceed Two hundred thousand pesos,
or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court.
The same penalty shall be imposed upon any person who having sufficient funds in or
credit with the drawee bank when he makes or draws and issues a check, shall fail to
keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the check if
presented within a period of ninety (90) days from the date appearing thereon, for
which reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank.
Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company or entity, the person or persons
who actually signed the check in behalf of such drawer shall be liable under this Act.
The elements of violation of B.P. 22 are: (1) making, drawing, and issuance of any
check to apply on account or for value; (2) knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer
that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee
bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and (3) subsequent
dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit, or dishonor
for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to
stop payment. [29]
The first element, i.e., making, drawing, and issuance of any check, requires that
the check be properly described in the Information to inform the accused of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him. Without a sufficient identification of the
dishonored check in the Information, the conviction of the accused should be set aside
for being violative of the constitutional requirement of due process. [30]
In the instant case, petitioner should be acquitted in Criminal Case Nos. Q-93-
43437 and Q-93-43442, because the date of the check and the amount thereof as
stated in the Informations vary with the exhibits submitted by the prosecution, which
inconsistencies violate petitioner's constitutional right to be informed of the nature of the
offense charged.
The Information in Criminal Case No. Q-93-43437, described Check No. 492615
[31]
as dated October 15, 1992, for P3,117.00. The records, however, show that said check
differ from Exhibit "I," because the date and amount stated therein are October 17, 1992
and 3,117.50, respectively. Likewise in Criminal Case No. Q-93-43442, the date of
Check No. 492580 as reflected in the Information is September 28, 1992, while
[32]
Exhibit "D" shows October 2, 1992.

As held in Dico v. Court of Appeals, citing Alonto
[33]
v. People, these
[34]
inconsistencies justify the acquittal of the accused. Thus -
In the information filed by Felipe C. Belcina, Prosecutor II, the check involved is
described as Far East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC) Check No. 364903 dated 12
May 1993 in the amount of P100,000 payable to Equitable Banking Corporation.
However, after going over the records of the case, the parties, including the courts,
overlooked the fact that the check being identified in court was different from that
described in the information. The prosecution marked as its Exhibit "B" FEBTC
Check No. 369403 dated 12 May 1993 in the amount of P100,000 payable to
Equitable Banking Corporation. The issue as to the identity of the check, though not
raised as an error, should be considered in favor of the petitioner.
The variance in the identity of the check nullifies petitioner's conviction. The identity
of the check enters into the first element of the offense under Section 1 of B.P. Blg. 22
- that a person draws or issues a check on account or for value. There being a
discrepancy in the identity of the checks described in the information and that
presented in court, petitioner's constitutional right to be informed of the nature of the
offense charged will be violated if his conviction is upheld.
In the case of Alonto v. People, this Court had this to say when there was a variance
involving the date as regards the check described in the information and that adduced
in evidence:
This Court notes, however, that under the third count, the information alleged that
petitioner issued a check dated 14 May 1992 whereas the documentary evidence
presented and duly marked as Exhibit "I" was BPI Check No. 831258 in the amount
of P25,000 dated 05 April 1992. Prosecution witness Fernando Sardes confirmed
petitioner's issuance of the three BPI checks (Exhibits G, H, and I), but categorically
stated that the third check (BPI Check No. 831258) was dated 14 May 1992, which
was contrary to that testified to by private complainant Violeta Tizon, i.e., BPI check
No. 831258 dated 05 April 1992. In view of this variance, the conviction of petitioner
on the third count (Criminal Case No. Q-93-41751) cannot be sustained. It is on this
ground that petitioner's fourth assignment of error is tenable, in that the prosecution's
exhibit, i.e., Exhibit "I" (BPI Check No. 831258 dated 05 April 1992 in the amount of
P25,000) is excluded by the law and the rules on evidence. Since the identity of the
check enters into the first essential element of the offense under Section 1 of B.P. 22,
that is, that a person makes, draws or issues a check on account or for value, and the
date thereof involves its second element, namely, that at the time of issue the maker,
drawer or issuer knew that he or she did not have sufficient funds to cover the same,
there is a violation of petitioner's constitutional right to be informed of the nature of
the offense charged in view of the aforesaid variance, thereby rendering the
conviction for the third count fatally defective.
With respect to Criminal Case Nos. Q-93-43435, Q-93-43436, Q-93-43438, Q-93-

43439, Q-93-43440 and Q-93-43441, the judgment of conviction should be affirmed.
There is no merit in petitioner's contention that the checks were issued without
valuable consideration. We have held that upon issuance of a check, in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, it is presumed that the same was issued for valuable
consideration, which may consist either in some right, interest, profit or benefit accruing
to the party who makes the contract, or some forbearance, detriment, loss or some
responsibility, to act, or labor, or service given, suffered or undertaken by the other side.
It is an obligation to do, or not to do in favor of the party who makes the contract, such
as the maker or endorser. [35]
In the case at bar, the prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt that
petitioner received money in various amounts from private complainant. Whether the
amounts were loans or investment in the business of petitioner, the checks were issued
for valuable consideration. Either way, petitioner is under obligation to pay private
complainant. Likewise, the prosecution proved that some of the checks were payment
for private complainant's commission from selling the products of petitioner. Hence, the
latter cannot successfully claim that the issuance of the checks were not for a valuable
consideration.
Interestingly, while petitioner denied existence of consideration, he at the same time
admitted that his obligation was P358,872.72 and not P582,149.72. It appears from
[36]
Rowena Carbon's testimony that, as sole distributor of petitioner's product to Liana's

Supermarket, private complainant received from the latter 3 checks in the amounts of
P41,748.00, P78,840.00 and P105,209.00, but were not remitted to petitioner. Hence, [37]
Carbon claimed that the total unremitted amount of the checks should be deducted from
the indebtedness of the latter.
These declarations of Carbon, however, will not warrant the acquittal of petitioner
because Carbon's testimony was stricken off the record by the trial court. Even if
Carbon's testimony was retained, the alleged receipt by private complainant of the
P41,748.00 and P78,840.00 checks will not warrant the acquittal of petitioner because
the same were without documentary basis; and while the amount of P105,209.00 was
[38]
supported with a voucher dated July 29, 1992, petitioner failed to positively show that
[39]
private complainant did not remit said amount. Likewise, Carbon did not specify whether
the check was drawn to cash or to the order of Beverly Food Ventures Corporation. If it
was drawn to cash, then it is petitioner's burden to prove that the payment was intended
for Beverly Food Ventures Corporation and not for private complainant. If it was paid to
the order of the corporation, then the latter must at least establish that private
complainant was able to encash and profit from said check. Moreover, Evelyn Villareal
never validated the alleged receipt by private complainant of the P41,748.00,
P78,840.00 and P105,209.00 checks. While she declared that Liana's Supermarket
issued checks to petitioner, the subject 3 checks were not specified in her testimony.
Then too, the gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. 22 is the act of making and
issuing a worthless check, that is, a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for
payment. The mere act of issuing a worthless check is malum prohibitum. So also, it is
not the nonpayment of the obligation that is being punished, but the making of worthless
checks. What the law punishes is such issuance of a bum check and not the purpose
[40]
for which the check was issued nor the terms or conditions relating to its issuance.
Thus, even if there had been payment through compensation or some other means,
[41]
there could still be prosecution for violation of B.P. 22.[42]
As to the second element, we have held that knowledge involves a state of mind
which is difficult to establish, thus the statute itself creates a prima facie presumption
that the drawer had knowledge of the insufficiency of his funds in or credit with the bank
at the time of the issuance and on the check's presentment for payment if he fails to pay
the amount of the check within five (5) banking days from notice of dishonor. [43]
Sec. 2 of B.P. 22, provides:
SEC. 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. - The making, drawing and

issuance of a check payment of which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient
funds in or credit with such bank, when presented within ninety (90) days from the
date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of
funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due
thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check
within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid
by the drawee.
For this presumption to arise, the prosecution must prove the following: (a) the
check is presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check; (b) the drawer or
maker of the check receives notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee;
and (c) the drawer or maker of the check fails to pay the holder of the check the amount
due thereon, or make arrangements for payment in full within five (5) banking days after
receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee. In other words, the
presumption is brought into existence only after it is proved that the issuer had received
a notice of dishonor and that within five days from receipt thereof, he failed to pay the
amount of the check or to make arrangements for its payment. The presumption
or prima facie evidence as provided in this section cannot arise, if such notice of
nonpayment by the drawee bank is not sent to the maker or drawer, or if there is no
proof as to when such notice was received by the drawer, since there would simply be
no way of reckoning the crucial 5-day period. Furthermore, the notice of dishonor must
[44]
be in writing; a verbal notice is not enough.[45]
In the instant case, petitioner through counsel, admitted receipt of private

complainant's demand letters sent via registered mail, informing him of the dishonor of
the checks and the reason therefor; and demanding that the value of the check be paid
in cash. Pertinent portion of the transcript of stenographic notes, reads:
ATTY. YABUT [private respondent's counsel]:
... Exh. "J" is the demand letter dated November 27, 1992 and the signature of the
counsel therein marked as Exh. "J-1" to prove that a demand letter was sent to the
accused and to his wife, Mrs. Grace Tiu Ongson, demanding therein that the said
dishonored check be encashed or be replaced and the Registry Receipt which is
Exh. "J-2" and Registry Return Receipt which is Exh. "J-3" is being offered to
prove that the said demand letter was sent by registered mail and the same
was sent as per Exh. "J-2" and received [on December 7, 1992] by the
accused thru his representative which is Exh. "J-3"; and Exh. "K" is the same
demand letter dated November 27, 1992 and signed by the counsel which is
marked as Exh. "K-1" addressed to the accused and/or his wife, Mrs. Grace Tiu
Ongson and demanding therein that the said check which is stated in the said
demand letter which bounced be replaced with cash; Exh. "K-2" which is the
Registry Receipt; and Exh. "K-3" which is the Registry Return Receipt is being
offered to prove that the demand letter was sent to the accused by
registered mail and that the same was received [on December 7, 1992] by his
authorized representative; Exh. "L" is the demand letter dated December 3, 1992
addressed to the accused demanding therein that the said check contained in the
demand letter be replaced with cash or be made good and the signature therein of
the lawyer which is Exh. "L-1" is being offered to prove that the demand letter was
sent by the lawyer and that the registry receipt marked as Exh. "L-2" and the
Registry Return Receipt, Exh. "L-3" is being offered to prove that it was sent
by registered mail and that the same was received by the accused [on
December 7, 1992]; Exh. "M" which is a demand letter dated December 15, 1992
sent to the accused demanding therein that the check bounced and that the same
should be replaced with cash or be made good accordingly, and the signature of
the lawyer which is Exh. "M-1" to prove that the said lawyer sent a demand letter
to the accused; and the Registry Receipt marked as Exh. "M-2" and the Registry
Return Receipt Exh. "M-3" to prove that the demand letter was sent to the
accused and received by his representative [on December 18, 1992] ; we are
therefore offering for the admission of this Honorable Court the exhibits from Exh.
"A" to Exh. "M" accordingly and the testimony of the private complainant to this
Honorable Court.
COURT:
Any comments?
ATTY. GIRONELLA [petitioner's counsel]:
With the kind permission of the Honorable Court.
COURT:
Proceed.
ATTY. GIRONELLA:
With respect to the various demand letters marked as Exhs. "H", "J", "K",
"L" and "M", we admit them insofar as we intend to prove that there was
such a demand letter and demand these letters were received by the
accused (sic);[46]
In King v. People, it was held that the accused's admission through counsel, made
[47]
during the trial, binds the client. Similarly, in Rigor v. People, the Court ruled that the
[48]
accused cannot pretend that he did not receive the notice of dishonor of the check
because the transcript of records shows that the accused admitted knowledge of the
dishonor of his check through a demand letter received by him.
Section 4 of Rule 129, states:
SEC. 4. Judicial admissions. - An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the
course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission
may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or
that no such admission was made.
That only a representative of petitioner signed the registry return receipt in the case
at bar is of no consequence because of the unqualified admission by the latter that he
received private complainant's demand letter with notice of dishonor. Said admission
binds him considering that he never denied receipt of the notice of dishonor. Neither did
he contradict said judicial admission of receipt of the notice nor alleged a palpable
mistake in making the same. Thus, petitioner's receipt of the notice of dishonor without
paying the value of the checks or making arrangements for its payment within five (5)
days from receipt of said notice, established the prima facie presumption that he had
knowledge of the insufficiency of his funds in or credit with the bank at the time of the
issuance of the checks. Failing to overcome this legal presumption, the findings of the
courts below must be sustained.
The third element of violation of B.P. 22, i.e., the dishonor of the check by the
drawee bank, is also attendant in the present case as shown by the reason for the
dishonor as stamped in the dorsal portion of the checks which are also prima
facie presumptions of such dishonor and the reasons therefor. In Garcia v. Court of
[49]
Appeals, it was held that while it is true that the presumption is merely prima facie, the
[50]
accused must, nonetheless, present proof to the contrary to overcome this presumption.
Here, other than the bare allegations of petitioner, he presented no well-grounded
defense to prove that the subject checks were not dishonored by the drawee banks.
Likewise, in Recuerdo v. People, the court emphasized that it is not required much
[51]
less indispensable, for the prosecution to present the drawee bank's representative as a
witness to testify on the dishonor of the checks. The prosecution may present, as it did
in this case, only private complainant as a witness to prove all the elements of the
offense charged. Said witness is competent and qualified to testify that upon
presentment for payment, the subject checks were dishonored by the drawee bank.
Furthermore, the dishonor was bolstered by the pre-trial order duly signed by
petitioner where he admitted dishonor of the subject checks. Incidentally, there is no
[52]
merit in petitioner's contention that the pre-trial was irregular because it was held in his
absence and before arraignment. Records show that the May 17, 1993 pre-trial held in
the absence of petitioner was annulled by the trial court. Pre-trial was re-set and
[53]
conducted on July 14, 1993, after arraignment in the presence of petitioner, who [54]
affixed his signature in the pre-trial order with the assistance of counsel.
All told, the Court finds that all the elements of violation of B.P. 22 had been
established beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution. Nevertheless, the penalty
imposed by the Court of Appeals should be modified.
Under Administrative Circular No. 12-2000, imprisonment need not be imposed on
those found guilty of violating B.P. Blg. 22. Administrative Circular No. 13-2001, issued
on February 14, 2001, vests in the courts the discretion to determine, taking into
consideration the peculiar circumstances of each case, whether the imposition of fine
(of not less than but not more than double the amount of the check, but in no case
exceeding P200,000.00), would best serve the interest of justice, or whether forbearing
to impose imprisonment would depreciate the seriousness of the offense, work violence
on the social order, or otherwise contrary to the imperatives of justice. [55]
In Recuerdo v. People, and Young v. Court of Appeals, it was held that where

[56]
there is neither proof nor allegation that the accused is not a first time offender,
imposition of the penalty of fine instead of imprisonment is proper. Likewise, in Lee v.
Court of Appeals, we ruled that the policy laid down in Vaca v. Court of Appeals,
[57]
and Lim v. People, of redeeming valuable human material and preventing

[58] [59]
unnecessary deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness, should be

considered in favor of the accused who is not shown to be a habitual delinquent or a
recidivist. Said doctrines squarely apply in the instant case there being no proof or
allegation that petitioner is not a first time offender.
Finally, petitioner should be ordered to pay interest of 12% per annum pursuant
to Cabrera v. People, that when an obligation is breached, and it consists in the
[60]
payment of a sum of money, the interest due should be that which may have been
stipulated in writing. In the absence of such stipulation, the rate shall be 12% per annum
computed from judicial or extrajudicial demand. In this case, there was no stipulated
interest on petitioner's obligation to pay the value of the dishonored checks. Demand for
payment was made extrajudicially as evidenced by petitioner's receipt of private
complainant's demand letter with notice of dishonor. The applicable interest rate is
therefore 12% per annum from the date of receipt of the demand letter on December 7,
1992 for Check Nos. 492666, 492482, 492581 and 492319; December 10, 1992 for
Check No. 119789; and December 18, 1992 for Check No. 492837 until finality of this
decision. From the finality of this decision, the total amount of the dishonored checks
inclusive of interest shall further earn 12% interest per annum until fully paid.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The June 27, 2002 decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 18662 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS.
In Criminal Case Nos. Q-93-43437 and Q-93-43442, petitioner Victor Ongson is
ACQUITTED of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 on the ground that his guilt has not been proved
beyond reasonable doubt.
In Criminal Case Nos. Q-93-43435, Q-93-43436, Q-93-43438, Q-93-43439, Q-93-
43440 and Q-93-43441 petitioner is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of
B.P. Blg. 22 and is sentenced as follows:
(1) In Criminal Case No. Q-93-43435, petitioner is sentenced to pay a fine of

P200,000.00 and to indemnify private complainant Samson Uy in the amount of
P200,000.00 with 12% interest per annum from the date of receipt of the demand
letter on December 10, 1992, until the finality of this Decision;

P24,000.00 with 12% interest per annum from the date of receipt of the demand letter
on December 18, 1992, until the finality of this Decision;



on December 7, 1992, until the finality of this Decision; and

P200,000.00 with 12% interest per annum from the date of receipt of the demand
letter on December 7, 1992, until the finality of this Decision.
The total amount of the dishonored checks inclusive of interest shall further earn
12% interest per annum from the finality of the decision until fully paid.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Quisumbing, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
[1]
Penned by now Supreme Court Associate Justice Cancio C. Garcia and concurred in by Associate
Justices Marina L. Buzon and Eliezer R. De Los Santos (Rollo, pp. 25-37).
[2]
Penned by Judge Oscar L. Leviste, Rollo, p. 114.
[3]
Records, pp. 2-3.
[4]
Exhibit "B", Folder of Exhibits, p. 1.
[5]
Records, pp. 4-5.
[6]
Exhibit "C", Folder of Exhibits, p. 1.
[7]
Records, pp. 6-7.
[8]
Exhibit "I", Folder of Exhibits, p. 2.
[9]
Records, pp. 8-9.
[10]
Exhibit "H", Folder of Exhibits, p. 2.
[11]
Records, pp. 10-11.
[12]
Exhibit "G", Folder of Exhibits, p. 2.
[13]
Records, pp. 12-13.
[14]
Exhibit "F", Folder of Exhibits, p. 2.
[15]
Records, pp. 14-15.
[16]
Exhibit "E", Folder of Exhibits, p. 1.
[17]
Records, pp. 16-17.
[18]
Exhibit "D", Folder of Exhibits, p. 1.
[19]
Records, p. 2.
[20]
Rollo, p. 49.
[21]
Records, p. 194.
[22]
Id. at 201.
[23]
TSN, 29 November 1993, pp. 9-11.
[24]
Rollo, p. 114.
[25]
Id. at 37.
[26]
G.R. No. 159357, 28 April 2004, 428 SCRA 283, 306-308.
[27]
G.R. No. 132428, 24 October 2000, 344 SCRA 202.
[28]
People v. Lizada, 444 Phil. 67, 80 (2003). See also People v. Bugarin, 339 Phil. 570, 580(1997).
[29]
Dico v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141669, 28 February 2005.
[30]
Id.
[31]
Records, p. 6.
[32]
Id. at 16.
[33]
Supra.
[34]
G.R. No. 140078, 9 December 2004, 445 SCRA 624.
[35]
Lee v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 145498, 17 January 2005.
[36]
TSN, 6 October 1993, p. 30.
[37]
Id. at 14-16.
[38]
Id. at 16-17.
[39]
Id. at 19-22.
[40]
Ngo v. People, G.R. No. 155815, 14 July 2004, 434 SCRA 522, 530-531.
[41]
Sia v. People, G.R. No. 149695, 28 April 2004, 428 SCRA 206, 221.
[42]
Tan v. Mendez, Jr., 432 Phil. 760, 769-770 (2002).
[43]
Lee v. Court of Appeals, supra.
[44]
Dico v. Court of Appeals, supra.
[45]
Marigomen v. People, G.R. No. 153451, 26 May 2005.
[46]
TSN, 13 September 1993, pp. 56-57 (emphasis supplied).
[47]
377 Phil. 692, 705(1999).
[48]
G.R. No. 144887, 17 November 2004, 442 SCRA 450, 462-463.
[49]
King v. People, supra at 708.
[50]
G.R. No. 138197, 27 November 2002, 393 SCRA 79, 86.
[51]
443 Phil. 770, 780 (2003).
[52]
Records, p. 108.
[53]
Id. at 90-91.
[54]
Id. at 106.
[55]
Recuerdo v. People, supra at 781.
[56]
G.R. No. 140425, 10 March 2005.
[57]
G.R. No. 145498, 17 January 2005.
[58]
359 Phil. 187(1998).
[59]
394 Phil. 844 (2000).
[60]
G.R. No. 150618, 24 July 2003, 407 SCRA 247.
[Syllabus]
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 117488. September 5, 1996]
SANTIAGO IBASCO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE

OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
His motion to reconsider the decision [1]
of the Court of Appeals of 11 August 1994 in CA-G.R. CR No. 13300 affirming in
toto the decision of 20 November 1991 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Gumaca,
[2]
Quezon, Branch 62, in Criminal Cases Nos. 2755-G, 2756-G, and 2757-G having been
denied, the petitioner filed this petition for review. The trial court found him guilty of the
[3]
offense punished in B.P. Blg. 22 (Bouncing Checks Law).

The accusatory portion of the information in Criminal Case No. 2755-G dated 31
March 1987 reads as follows:
That on or about the 18th day of April 1984, at Barangay Camohaguin, Municipality
of Gumaca, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously issue and make out Check No. DAT 41911, in the amount of EIGHTEEN
THOUSAND NINETY PESOS and TEN CENTAVOS (P18,090.10), Philippine
currency, drawn against the United Coconut Planters Bank, Daet Branch, and payable
to Manuel Trivinio in payment for feeds purchased from the latter; that the accused
knew fully well at the time of the issuance of said check that he did not have sufficient
funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of said check in full upon
presentment; that upon presentation of said check to the bank for payment, the same
was dishonored and refused payment for the reason that there was no sufficient funds
to cover said check; and that despite notice to the accused by said Manuel Trivinio
that said check was dishonored for lack of funds, said accused failed to deposit the
necessary amount to cover said check, to the damage and prejudice of Manuel
Trivinio, now represented by his heirs, in the aforesaid sum.
Contrary to law. [4]

The informations in Criminal Case No. 2757-G and Criminal Case No. 2-757-G are
similarly worded as in Criminal Case No. 2755-G except as to the date of the violation
of B.P. Blg. 22, the number of the checks, and the amounts thereof. In Criminal Case
No. 2756-G, the violation was committed on 23 March 1984 and involved Check No.
DAT 41910 in the amount of P17,900.00. In Criminal Case No. 2757-G, the violation
[5]
was committed on 24 February 1984 and involved Check No. 41909 in the amount of
P15,576.30. [6]
The cases were consolidated and jointly tried. Upon arraignment, the petitioner
pleaded not guilty to the charges.
The evidence for the prosecution is summarized in the challenged decision of the
Court of Appeals as follows:
The facts are as follow [sic]: The complaining witness Maria Negro Trivinio and her
late husband Manuel Trivinio operate an animal feed mill in Gumaca, Quezon while
accused-appellant Santiago lbasco and his wife operate a piggery in Daet, Camarines
Norte. On or about October 26, 1983, accused-appellant Santiago lbasco and his wife,
came to the residence of the Trivinios at Sitio Seawall, Bgy. Camohaguin, Gumaca,
Quezon and requested credit accommodation for the supply of ingredients in the
manufacture of animal feeds (TSN, March 15, 1988, p. 7). In accordance with the
agreed credit arrangement, the Trivinios made three deliveries of darak with a total
value of P51,566.49 (Id., p. 9) and in payment, accused-appellant issued three (3)
postdated checks, to wit: (1) Check No. 41909, postdated February 24, 1984, for
P15,576.30 (Exh. A- Criminal Case No. 2757-G; Id., p. 9); (2) Check No. 41910,
postdated March 23, 1984 for P17,900.00 (Exh. A-2756-G; Id., p. 5) and (3) Check
No. 41911, postdated April 18, 1984 for P18,090.10 (Exh. A-Criminal Case No.
2755-G; Id., p. 10). All checks were drawn against United Coconut Planters Bank,
Daet Branch. Upon presentment to the Bank for payment of their due dates, the
checks bounced for being drawn against insufficient funds (Exhs. B-2755-G, B-2756-
G and B-2757-G). The Trivinio spouses notified accused-appellant of the dishonor
(TSN, March 13, 1988, p. 11). Accused-appellant replied by telegram offering his real
property in Daet as security. Accused-appellant invited the Trivinios to come to Daet
and inspect the property (Exh. C; Folder of Minutes and Exhibits, p. 13). When the
Trivinios arrived in Daet, the accused told them that the property is across the sea,
and, not wanting to cross the sea, the couple did not anymore inspect the property
(TSN, March 15, 1988, p. 14). For failure of the accused to settle his account with the
Trivinios, the instant case was filed.
[7]
The original records of the aforementioned criminal cases show that after the
presentation of the evidence for both parties had been concluded, the trial court
required the parties to submit their respective memoranda. However, before submitting
his memorandum, the petitioner's new counsel filed a motion to dismiss on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction since, it is claimed, the checks were "prepared, issued and
delivered to the payee ... at the office of the accused in Daet, Camarines Norte." [8]
In its order of 14 November 1991, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss
[9]
considering that the informations alleged that the violations were committed in Barangay
Camohaguin, Gumaca, Quezon, and that pieces of evidence, viz., the affidavits of [10]
Maria Negro, the surviving spouse of Manuel Trivinio who was presented by the
defense as a hostile witness, established that the checks were issued in the said place.
On 17 December 1991, the trial court promulgated its decision dated 20 [11]
November 1991 convicting the petitioner. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court firmly believes and so holds that the prosecution had
equitably proved its case by the evidences [sic] presented, finds the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Cases Nos. 2755-G, 2756-G and 2757-G, and
imposes the penalty in each criminal cases [sic]:
In Criminal Case No. 2755-G, One (1) Year imprisonment and a fine of P36,180.20.
In Criminal Case No 2756-G, One (1) Year imprisonment and a fine of P35,800.00.
In Criminal Case No. 2757-G, One (1) Year imprisonment and a fine of P31,152.60. [12]
The trial court gave full faith and credit to the evidence offered by the prosecution
and, disregarding the theory of the defense, it opined and ruled as follows:
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 was purposely enacted to prevent the proliferation of

worthless checks in the mainstream of daily business and to avert not only the
undermining the Banking System of the country, but also the infliction of damage and
injury upon trade and commerce occasioned by the indiscriminate issuance of such
checks. By its very nature, the offenses defined BP 22 are against public interest while
the crime of Estafa is against property.
Since the act and commission specified in BP Blg. 22 are not necessarily evil or
wrongful from their nature and neither are they inherently illicit and immoral and
considering that the law which penalize [sic] such act or commission is a special
statutory law, the offenses are considered mala prohibita and considering the rule in
cases of mala prohibita, the only inquiry is whether or not the law has been violated
(People vs. KIBLER, 106, NY, 321, cited in U.S. vs. Go Chico, 14 Phil. 132) criminal
intent is not necessary where the acts are prohibited for reasons of public policy
(People vs. Conosa, C.A. 45, O.G. 3953). The defense of good faith and absence of
criminal intent would not prosper in prosecution for violation (Res. No. 447, S.1980,
Tomayo vs. Desederio, Dec. 8, 1980 & Res. No. 624, S.1981. ESCOBAR vs. SY,
Sept. 1, 1981).
xxx
It is of no moment that by the evidence presented by the accused that a pre-existing

obligation took place and that the products delivered by the deceased husband of
complaining witness was [sic] below par; and that his piggery suffered losses. This
situation can be a basis for a civil action which accused actually filed against
complaining witness, but it cannot divest of the glaring fact that the checks he issued
bounced and was [sic] dishonored. [13]
As to the issue of jurisdiction, the trial court held:
. . .The sworn statement of Maria Negro Trivinio which repudiated the allegation of
the accused in questioning the jurisdiction of this Court; between the protestation of
the accused that the place of issuance to be at [sic] Daet, Camarines Norte and the
positive allegation of witness Maria Negro Trivinio that the checks were delivered at
their residence in Gumaca, Quezon by the accused, this Court gives weight and
credence to the testimony of said witness and accused is bound by his own evidence. [14]
The petitioner seasonably appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals which
[15]
docketed the case as CA-G.R. CR No. 13300.

In his Brief in CA-G.R. CR No. 13300, the petitioner contended that the trial court
erred: (a) in not dismissing the cases for lack of Jurisdiction; (b) in not dismissing the
cases for failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt; (c) in not taking into consideration that the liability of the accused should have
been civil in nature and not criminal; and (d) in not disregarding the testimony of Maria
Negro vda. de Trivinio since it is not clear and convincing and is incredible.
[16]
In its challenged decision of 11 August 1994, the Court of Appeals rejected these
[17]
claims of the petitioner and affirmed in toto the trial court's decision. As to the issue of
lack of jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals ruled:
We agree with the lower court. The sworn statement, Exhibit 10, of Maria Trivinio
who was presented by accused-appellant as his last witness, in the words of the lower
court, "repudiated the allegation of the accused in questioning the jurisdiction of this
Court; between the protestation of the accused that the place of issuance to be at [sic]
Daet, Camarines Norte and the positive allegation of witness Maria Negro Trivinio
that the checks were delivered at their residence in Gumaca, Quezon by the accused,
this Court gives weight and credence to the testimony of said witness and accused is
bound by his own evidence" (Decision, pp. 16-17; Rollo, pp. 96-98).
At any rate, as held in the case of People vs. Grospe, 157 SCRA 154, a violation of
BP 22 is an offense that appears to be continuing in nature. The knowledge on the part
of maker or drawer of the check of the insufficiency of his funds, which is an essential
ingredient of the offense is by itself a continuing eventuality, whether the accused be
within one territory or another. Said the Supreme Court:
In respect of the Bouncing checks case, the offense also appears to be continuing in
nature. It is true that the offense is committed by the very fact of its performance
(Colmenares vs. Villar, No. L-27126, May 29, 1970, 33 SCRA 186); and that the
Bouncing Checks Law penalizes not only the fact of dishonor of a check but also the
act of making or drawing and issuance of a bouncing check (People vs. Hon.
Veridiano, II, No. L-62243, 132 SCRA 523). The case, therefore, could have been
filed also in Bulacan. As held in Que vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 75217-
18, September 11, 1987 "the determinative factor (in determining venue) is the place
of the issuance of the check". However, it is likewise true that, knowledge on the part
of the maker or drawer of the check of the insufficiency of his funds, which is an
essential ingredient of the offense is by itself a continuing eventuality, whether the
accused be within one territory or another (People vs. Hon. Manzanilla, G.R. Nos.
66003-04, December 11, 1987). Accordingly, jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
offense also lies in the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga.
And, as pointed out in the Manzanilla case, jurisdiction or venue is determined by the

allegation in the Information, which are controlling (Arches vs. Bellosillo, 81 Phil.
190, 193, cited in Tuzon vs. Cruz, No. L-27410, August 28, 1975, 66 SCRA
235). The Information filed herein specifically alleges that the crime was committed
in San Femando, Pampanga, and, therefore, within the jurisdiction of the Court below.
(at page 164)
This ruling was reiterated in the case of Lim vs. Rodrigo, 167 SCRA 487, where it
was held:
Besides, it was held in People v. Hon. Manzanilla, supra, that as "violation of the bad

checks act is committed when one 'makes or draws and issues any checks [sic] to
apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have
sufficient funds' or having sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank x x x
shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the
check if presented within a period of ninety (90) days from the date appearing
thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank," "knowledge" is an
essential ingredient of the offense charged.As defined by the statute, knowledge, is, by
itself, a continuing eventuality, whether the accused be within one territory or
another. This being the case, the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City has jurisdiction
to try Criminal Case No. 2089-R (688).
Moreover, we ruled in the same case of People v. Hon. Manzanilla, reiterated

in People vs. Grospe, supra, that jurisdiction or venue is determined by the allegations
in the information. The allegation in the information under consideration that the
offense was committed in Baguio City is therefore controlling and sufficient to vest
jurisdiction upon the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City. (at pages 492-493).
In the case at bench it appears that the three (3) checks were deposited in Lucena City.
[18]
As to the second error wherein the petitioner asserted that the checks were issued
"as a guarantee only for the feeds delivered to him" and that there is no estafa if a
check is issued in payment of a pre-existing obligation, the Court of Appeals pointed out
that the petitioner obviously failed to distinguish a violation of B.P. Blg. 22 from estafa
under Article 315 (2) [d] of the Revised Penal Code. It further stressed that B.P. Blg.
[19]
22 applies even in cases where dishonored checks were issued as a guarantee or for
deposit only, for it makes no distinction as to whether the checks within its
contemplation are issued in payment of an obligation or merely to guarantee the said
obligation and the history of its enactment evinces the definite legislative intent to make
the prohibition all-embracing.
[20]
As to the contention that the prosecution failed to prove that at the time of the
drawing and issuance of the checks the petitioner had insufficient funds at the drawee
bank to cover the face value of the checks, the Court of Appeals held that the mere
issuance of a dishonored check gives rise to the presumption of knowledge on the part
of the drawer that he issued the check without sufficient funds.[21]
The Court of Appeals also saw no reason to disregard the testimony of Maria
Negro.
Still unsatisfied with the decision, the petitioner filed this petition for review. In
addition to reiterating the arguments he raised before the Court of Appeals, the
petitioner asserts that the Court of Appeals erred in applying the doctrine that the mere
issuance of a bad check is a crime in itself.
The petitioner admits that the checks he issued were dishonored. His main defense
as to the dishonored checks is that they were issued not for value but for
accommodation or guarantee and invokes our ruling in Magno vs. Court of Appeals,
where we held that there was no violation of B.P. Blg. 22 where the bounced check
[22]
was issued to cover a required warranty deposit. He also cites Ministry Circular No. 4
issued by the Department of Justice (DOJ) on 15 December 1981, the pertinent portion
of which reads:
2.3.4. Where issuance of bouncing check is neither estafa nor violation of B.P. Blg.
22.
Where the check is issued as part of an arrangement to guarantee or secure the

payment of the obligation, whether pre-existing or not, the drawer is not criminally
liable for either estafa or violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
It was subsequently reversed by Ministry Circular No. 12 issued on 8 August 1984,
which admitted its misinterpretation of B.P. Blg. 22. The pertinent portion of the latter
reads:
Henceforth, conforming with the rule that an administrative agency having

interpreting authority may reverse its administrative interpretation of a statute, but that
its new interpretation applies only prospectively (Waterbury Savings Bank vs.
Danaher, 128 Conn. 476; 20 a2d 455 (1941), in all cases involving violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 where the check in question is issued after this date, the claim that
the check is issued as a guarantee or part of an arrangement to secure an obligation or
to facilitate collection will no longer be considered as a valid defense.
The petitioner also urges us to apply our ruling in Co vs. Court of Appeals, where
[23]
we held that dishonored checks issued prior to 8 August 1984 to guarantee or secure
payment of an obligation, whether pre-existing or not, are governed by Circular No. 4 of
15 December 1981 of the DOJ and the drawer thereof cannot be liable for the violation
of B.P. Blg. 22.
In the resolution of 3l May l995, we denied the petition for failure of the petitioner
[24]
to show any reversible error committed by the Court of Appeals. The petitioner sought a
reconsideration primarily on the basis of Co vs. Court of Appeals. In our resolution of 7
[25]
August 1995, we granted the motion for reconsideration, reinstated the petition and
[26]
required the respondents to comment on the petition.

In its comment, the Office of the Solicitor General countered that the trial court had
jurisdiction over the cases in as much as the questioned checks were delivered to
Manuel Trivinio in Gumaca, Quezon, and cited in support thereof People vs. Yabut. It [27]
further argued that all the elements of B.P. Blg. 22 are present in these cases. The
petitioner's knowledge of insufficient funds is legally presumed from the fact of dishonor;
and the defense that the dishonored checks were issued as guarantee to secure a pre-
existing obligation is without merit pursuant to the rule laid down in Que vs. People. [28]
We sustain the petitioner's conviction.

Violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is in the nature of a continuing crime. Venue is determined
by the place where the elements of making, issuing, or drawing of the check and
delivery thereof are committed. Thus, as explained in People vs. Yabut, "[t]he theory is
[29]
that a person indicted with a transitory offense may be validly tried in any Jurisdiction
where the offense was in part committed. x x x The place where the bills were written,
signed, or dated does not necessarily fix or determine the place where they were
executed. What is of decisive importance is the delivery thereof. The delivery of the
instrument is the final act essential to its consummation as an obligation."
In her testimony, Maria Negro categorically stated that the three checks were
delivered by the petitioner to their residence in Gumaca, Quezon.
It is well-settled in criminal jurisprudence that where the issue is one of credibility of
witnesses, the appellate court will generally not disturb the findings of the trial court
considering it was in a better position to settle such issue. Indeed, the trial court has the
advantage of hearing the witness and observing his conduct during trial, circumstances
which carry a great weight in appreciating his credibility. We, see no oversight on the
[30]
part of the trial court in giving credence to the testimony of Maria Negro. Besides, we
have repeatedly ruled that the testimony of a lone witness, when credible and
trustworthy, is sufficient to convict. [31]
Besides, it is not without convincing reason to believe that delivery of the checks
was in fact made at Gumaca, Quezon, it being the place of business of the late Manuel
Trivinio and from where the animal feeds were delivered. Consequently, payment
should be considered effected at Gumaca, Quezon. [32]
The petitioner's defense of accommodation cannot exculpate him from his

wrongdoing. The case of Magno is inapplicable to him. The material operative facts
therein obtaining are different from those established in the instant
petition. In Magno, the bounced checks were issued to cover a "warranty deposit" in a
lease contract, where the lessor-supplier was also the financier of the deposit. It was
a modus operandi whereby the supplier of the goods is also able to sell or lease the
same goods at the same time privately financing those in desperate need so they may
be accommodated. The maker of the check thus becomes an unwilling victim of a lease
agreement under the guise of a lease-purchase agreement. The maker did not benefit
at all from the deposit, since the checks were used as collateral for an accommodation
and not to cover the receipt of an actual account or credit for value. Also, in Magno, the
payee in the former was made aware of the insufficiency of the funds prior to the
issuance of the checks.
Equally untenable is the petitioner's argument that since he issued the checks prior
to 8 August 1984 as accommodation or security, he is similarly situated with Co in
the Co case. In Co, we held that the rubber checks issued prior to 8 August 1984 as a
guarantee or as part of an arrangement to secure an obligation or to facilitate collection
was a valid defense in view of Ministry Circular No. 4 of the Ministry of Justice. In the
case of the petitioner, although he issued the checks prior to such date, they were
issued in payment of his indebtedness, and not for the accommodation of the Trivinios
nor security of their indebtedness.
Accommodation pertains to an arrangement made as a favor to another, not upon a
consideration received. On the other hand, guarantee refers to a promise to answer the
debt of another, in case the latter should fail to do so. Neither occurred in this case.
[33]
The petitioner's theory of accommodation is debunked by the following

circumstances: (1) The checks were issued after all deliveries were made at such time
when the petitioner's obligation was already in existence; (2) The sum of the checks
equalled the petitioner's total obligation in the amount of P51,566.40; (3) The petitioner
prepared a statement of account, where the checks issued were applied to his
[34]
accounts due to Manuel Trivinio; (4) The act of the petitioner in issuing three checks of
different dates is inconsistent to his claim that Manuel Trivinio requested a post-dated
[35]
check to show to his creditors; and (5) After the checks bounced, the petitioner offered
a property for its replacement. All these incidents verily indicate that the checks were
[36]
issued as payment and for value and not for accommodation. Needless to state, the
checks failed to bear any statement "for accommodation" or "for guarantee" to show the
petitioner's intent.
The fact that the object of the contract, the animal feeds, was not of good quality is
irrelevant in the prosecution of a case involving B.P. Blg. 22, for the said law was
enacted to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and
putting them in circulation. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law
punishes, but the act of making and issuing a check that is dishonored upon
presentment for payment. [37]
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED, and the challenged decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 62, Gumaca, Quezon, in Criminal Cases Nos. 2755-G,
2756-G, and 2757-G is hereby AFFIRMED.
Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa C.J. (Chairman), Melo, Francisco, and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
[1]
Rollo, 8-20. Per Montenegro, J., with Gonzaga-Reyes and Vasquez, Jr., JJ., concurring.
[2]
Original Records (OR), Criminal Case No. 2755-G, 541-554.
[3]
Id., 22.
[4]
OR, Criminal Case No. 2755-G, 2.
[5]
Id., Criminal Case No. 2756-G, 2
[6]
Id., Criminal Case No.2757-G, 2.
[7]
Rollo, 9-10
[8]
OR, Criminal Case No. 2755-G, 503.
[9]
Id., 532-533
[10]
Exhibits "10," "10-B" and "10-C."
[11]
OR, Criminal Case No.2755-G, 541-544
[12]
Id., 554.
[13]
OR, Criminal Case No. 2755-G, 552-553
[14]
Id., 553
[15]
Id., 570
[16]
Rollo, 12-13.
[17]
See note no. 1
[18]
Rollo, 13-15
[19]
Citing Nierras vs. Dacuycuy, 181 SCRA 1 [1990]
[20]
Citing Que vs. People, 154 SCRA 160 [1987]
[21]
Citing Nierras vs. Dacuycuy, supra note 19; and People vs. Veridiano, 132 SCRA 523 [1984]
[22]
210 SCRA 471[1992].
[23]
227 SCRA 444 [1993]
[24]
Rollo, 166.
[25]
Supra note 23.
[26]
Rollo, 175.
[27]
76 SCRA 624 [1977].
[28]
154 SCRA 160 [1987].
[29]
Supra, note 27
[30]
People vs. Tranca, 235 SCRA 455 [1994].
[31]
People vs. De Paz, 224 SCRA 468 [1993]; People vs. Hangad, 227 SCRA 244 [1993].
Supra note 27, citing Article 1251 of the Civil Code of the Philippines: "[I]f the undertaking is to deliver a
[32]
determinate thing, the payment shall be made whenever the thing might be at the moment the obligation
was constituted."
FEDIRICO B. MORENO, Philippine Law Dictionary, 16 421[1988 ed.]; see Town Savings and Loan
[33]
Bank Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 223 SCRA 459 [1993].

[34]
Exhibit "3".
[35]
TSN, 31 March 1989, 23.
[36]
Exhibit "C."
[37]
Caram vs. Contreras, 237 SCRA 724 [1994].

BP 22

Uploaded by

BP 22

Uploaded by

EUMELIA R. MITRA, G.R. NO. 191404

Bank Date Issued Date of Check Amount Check No.

Security Bank September 15, 1998 January 15, 1999 P 3,125.00 0000045804

-do- September 15, 1998 January 15, 1999 125,000.00 0000045805

-do- September 20, 1998 January 20, 1999 100,000.00 0000045810

-do- September 30, 1998 January 30, 1999 5,000.00 0000045814

-do- September 30, 1998 January 30, 1999 200,000.00 0000045815

-do- October 3, 1998 February 3, 1999 2,500.00 0000045875

-do- October 3, 1998 February 3, 1999 100,000.00 0000045876

-do- November 17, 1998 February17, 1999 5,000.00 0000046061

-do- November 17, 1998 March 17, 1999 5,000.00 0000046062

-do- November 17, 1998 March 17, 1999 200,000.00 0000046063

-do- November 19, 1998 January 19, 1999 2,500.00 0000046065

-do- November 19, 1998 February19, 1999 2,500.00 0000046066

-do- November 19, 1998 March 19, 1999 2,500.00 0000046067

-do- November 19, 1998 March 19, 1999 100,000.00 0000046068

-do- November 20, 1998 February 20, 1999 10,000.00 0000046071

-do- November 20, 1998 March 20, 1999 10,000.00 0000046072

-do- November 20, 1998 March 20, 1999 10,000.00 0000046073

-do- November 30, 1998 January 30, 1999 2,500.00 0000046075

-do- November 30, 1998 February 28, 1999 2,500.00 0000046076

-do- November 30, 1998 March 30, 1999 2,500.00 0000046077

-do- November 30, 1998 March 30, 1999 100,000.00 0000046078

In Meriz v. People of the Philippines,[28] we held:

Republic of the Philippines

ELEANOR DE LEON LLENADO, G.R. No. 193279

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and

March 14, 2012

Petitioner was convicted by the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of

Subsequently, petitioner settled the loans subject of Criminal Case Nos.

Petitioner subsequently filed a Petition for Review with the Court of

The CA ruled that the elements of a violation of B.P. 22 were established.

Applying Lunaria v. People,[4] the CA modified the appealed judgment by

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED in part. The Decision dated November 26,

Hence, this Rule 45 Petition.

It is an established rule that the remedy of appeal through a Petition for

However, conforming to prevailing jurisprudence, we find the need to

Petitioner is sentenced to pay a fine of ₱200,000 with subsidiary

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

ARTURO D. BRION JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

DREAMWORK G.R. No. 184861

CLEOFE S. JANIOLA and Promulgated:

HON. ARTHUR A. FAMINI,

Respondents. June 30, 2009

Petitioner Dreamwork Construction, Inc. seeks the reversal of the August

On October 18, 2004, petitioner, through its President, Roberto S.

On September 20, 2006, private respondent, joined by her husband,

Thereafter, on July 25, 2007, private respondent filed a Motion to Suspend

Petitioner opposed the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal cases

Hence, we have this petition under Rule 45.

The Courts Ruling

This petition must be granted.

The Civil Action Must Precede the Filing of the

Criminal Action for a Prejudicial Question to Exist

Under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended by Supreme

SEC. 5. Elements of prejudicial question. The two (2) essential elements of a

Thus, the Court has held in numerous cases[12] that the elements of a

On December 1, 2000, the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure, however,

SEC. 7. Elements of prejudicial question.The elements of a prejudicial question

We cannot agree with private respondent.

First off, it is a basic precept in statutory construction that a change in

Thus, this Court ruled in Torres v. Garchitorena[15] that:

Sec. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. - A petition for

Sec. 7. Elements of prejudicial question. - The elements of a prejudicial

Under the amendment, a prejudicial question is understood in law as that

Additionally, it is a principle in statutory construction that a statute should

In other words, every effort must be made to harmonize seemingly

Thus, under the principles of statutory construction, it is this interpretation

In Sabandal v. Tongco,[18] we found no prejudicial question existed involving

Evidently, as in Sabandal, the circumstances surrounding the filing of the cases

Determinative of the Prosecution of the Criminal Action

To reiterate, the elements of a prejudicial question under Sec. 7 of Rule 111

Petitioner argues that the second element of a prejudicial question, as

Private respondent, on the other hand, claims that if the construction

We find for petitioner.