IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COUNTY, TENNESSEE

AT

beneficiary
Claimant at Law

vs.
) Case No(s).

STATE OF TENNESSEE
Trespasser,

COMMON LAW WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS/WRIT OF ERROR/WRIT OF INJUNCTION

BY A PERSON IN STATE CUSTODY
"in a court of law" WITH AN Article Ill of the Constitution for the
United States of America Judge whose "Compensation has not been
Diminished during their Continuance in Office."

COMMON LAW CONTRACT #

beneficiary and sovereign sui juris in propria

persona in special appearance never generally or voluntarily hereby challenge the

Jurisdiction of the Court. Further, I, beneficiary and

sovereign am incompunious.

l, beneficiary, and sovereign notify the court as the

claimant at law, "hereby elect to move according to the course of common law and only

common law invoking the state and federal Bill of Rights rejecting any presumed statutory

jurisdiction." That as sui juris in propria persona in special appearance never generally or

voluntarily am not an expert at law, nor have I been to any formal schools teaching law,

that any statutes, codes, regulations, laws or laws cited or referred to in this COMMON
1
[Latin "of one's own right; independent"] 1. Of full age and capacity. 2. Possessing full and social rights.
2
In his own person.
LAW WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS/WRIT OF INJUNCTION BY A PERSON IN STATE

CUSTODY "in a court of law" WITH AN Article Ill of the Constitution for the
United

States of America Judge whose "Compensation has not been Diminished during

their Continuance in Office." "Conditional Acceptance" "Affidavit of Criminal

Complaint" are the restrictions of the trespassers, court clerk, court at hand, the

State of Tennessee

District Attorney's Office, Judge lawfully residing over this proceeding as well as any future
Attorney General's, Clerks and Judges and not the Claimant at Law as Claimant at Law

proceeds under common law. That the common-law contract contained herein applies to all
entities, corporations, and actors to this proceeding.
l, the human, beneficiary and sovereign was

illegally detained, and brought in front of an Admiralty/Maritime/Military Tribunal in a

succession of times, which violated his Due Process and Constitutional rights under the

Tennessee and United States Constitution. That a security instrument was supposedly

generated stating that a trust was convicted of

which are fraudulent charges.

That I am not the Trust I am in fact

beneficiary. That the filing should indicate as

such. The trespassers in a fraudulently manner are attempting to make/have made

me the pseudo Trustee for the Trust knowing full well

2
that I cannot be both beneficiary and Trustee of the same Trust at the same time, in order

for them to fraudulently access its corpus/assets and inflict punishment on me fraudulently

making me its fiduciary, knowing full well that all public officials, including the

Every taxpayer is a Cestui que trust having sufficient interest in preventing abuse of the trust to be
recognized in the field of this court's prerogative jurisdiction as a realtor in the proceedings to set sovereign
authority in motion by action..." In re Bolens 135 N.W. Rep. 164 (1912) Supreme Court of Wisconsin.
urts, are the Trustees then this document is witness to their fra ud and the fraud of the court as
co

this document is a contract and I am forced to address this commercial transaction by this

avenue with no other recourse. The trespasser's scheme w

ould create a Trust with no

beneficiary; thereby they could fraudulently use me to gain access to the corpus/assets of

the Trust and conspire to trick me into an additional payment of your ransom

receiving more than twice the payment. This would appear to be a logical conclusion in

relation to their actions in this matter.

This is a Common Law Habeas Corpus/Writ Of Error/Writ of Injunction and

Affidavit of Complaint I am the Claimant at Law not the Defendant and I am unclear or

unsure as to who the real parties are, there needs to be clarification in any ()RDER issued

by this jurisdiction.

That this Habeas Corpus/Writ of Injunction is an Affidavit of Criminal Complaint

(AOCC) without prejudice.

That this Habeas Corpus/Writ of Injunction and Affidavit of Complaint is filed in

County because it is the place closest to the instillation

where I am illegally detained although County is where the

State of Tennessee committed fraud, treason and obstructed justice. That I state that
County also is a Maritime Admiralty Jurisdiction and therefore is

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 not proper in accordance with your T.C.A. ss 29-21-105 to file said habeas corpus/writ of
injunction in County because it will allow an additional tribunal to
commit the same crime that the Knox County tribunal committed, however; I have no

other recourse. Thus sufficient reason is shown to file this habeas corpus in this court in

accordance with your T.C.A. 5 29-21-105. I assert that the sentence imposed on the Trust

and not the beneficiary of the

Trust beneficiary was illegal, void on its face, and that

the

County sentencing court possesses all relevant records and

retains the authority to correct the illegal sentence at any time constitutes a sufficient

reason for me to file my habeas corpus/writ of injunction common law filing in the county

that sentenced me, rather than in county nearest to me, as required by statute. See your

T.C.A. 529-21-105. (That these are yours statutes and not mine). (Emphasis added by me).
I assert that I did file in said court and said court failed to adjudicate this matter and thus
violated their oath of office, committed treason, obstructed justice as well as many other
crimes.
This is the Claimant at Law's application for the writ application

of the issues has been made. I am illegally detained and no legality of restraint has

not already been adjudged upon a prior proceeding.

This is a Common Law Writ of Habeas Corpus "in a court of law" and I stipulate

this is to be in a court of law in accordance with Article Ill of the Constitution for the

United States of America Judge whose "Compensation has not been diminished during

their continuance in office." Or if not, A Conditional Acceptance of your offer to have

kidnapped me, imprisoned me, hold me for ransom (Penal Bonds), conspired against my

rights, stolen my property, engage in criminal fraud, assault, menace, duress, extortion and

4
slander, amongst other crimes and tort actions against me in violation of the

TennesseeConstitution Article I, sec. 25."

"The postal rule (also known as the mailbox rule "deposited acceptance
rule") is a term of common law-contracts which determines the timing of
acceptance of an offer when mail is contemplated as the medium of
acceptance. The general principle is that a contract is formed when
acceptance is actually communicated to the offeror. The mailbox rule is an
exception to the general principle. The mailbox rule provides that the
contract is formed when a properly prepaid and properly addressed letter of
acceptance is posted. One rationale given for the rule is that the offeror
nominates the post office as implied agent and thus receipt of the acceptance
by the post office is regarded as that of the offeree. The main effect of the
mailbox rule is that the risk of acceptance being delivered late or lost in the
post is placed upon the offeror. If the offeror is reluctant to accept this risk;
he can always require actual receipt before being legally bound."

You are the Circuit Court Clerk for

County and County General Session and Circuit Courts only have

courts-martial's and therefore if this court or tribunal does not institute a "Court of Law"

WITH AN Article Ill of the Constitution for the United States of America Judge whose
"Compensation has not been Diminished during their Continuance in Office." within ten
days then you give witness that there are no Courts of Law giving witness that "not only
have I never had my day in Court but by your witness that there are no courts of law in this
state." Also, that after I was kidnapped for ransom (bond) all relevant parties willfully,
knowingly and maliciously engaged in psychological, emotional, physiological and
financial warfare tactics in order to breakdown my resistance while forcing one of the law
merchants titled attorney into my camp in order to brainwash me into losing all hope of
lawful right-ruling. If you need an additional ten (10) days please make your request to me
in writing and the exact number of days within reason that you need. If you do not request
an extension then you acquiesce that you do not need any additional days, that this is not
an Article Ill Court, that this court is unlawful, and that there are no lawful courts of law in
Tennessee. That you additionally witness that the public officials have declared martial law
in Tennessee in violation of Tennessee Constitution Article I Sec. 25. If it is proven that
there are no Courts of Law then my intention with no other recourse is to file with the
Supreme Court of the United States charges of treason under the original jurisdiction of
said Supreme Court.
For further clarification, I, beneficiary of the Social

Security Cestui Qui Trustattest that I am not a

5
lawyer or an attorney, I have never attended any law school or took a paralegal course, and

law was not taught in any of the formal educational institutes I attended, therefore I am not

an expert in the law. I say this as I have studied the constitution of both the Tennessee and

United States. This being a common law filing I ascertain that it is Governed by
CommonLaw. I need clarification from you. Is your governing contract under the U.C.C.? I
stumbled across U.C.C. 5 If I read this correctly, the common law is above
statutes. My rights are secured in the common law and in the respective constitution.
Additionally I reiterate the postal rule establishes a common law contract between you and

I. Under the rule my contract is with you and not a judge. You assign the proper judge who

is an administrative officer in relation to our specific contract. I file this common law writ of

habeas corpus/writ of injunction "in a Court of Law" which makes my conditions in

accordance to the common law. If you assign me a non-Article Ill judge you are in criminal

breach of contract and/or are declaring there are no "Courts of Law" thus denying me my day

in court. Therefore "this filing is to be in a Court of Law with an Article Ill of the

Constitution for the United States of America Judge whose 'Compensation has not been

diminished during their Continuance in Office."'

4
A statute should be construed in harmony with the common law. unless there is a clear legislative
intent to abrogate the common law. (Abrogate = abolish) The legislative cannot abolish the contract
of your
rights or a statute would not apply to me. "The Code cannot be read to preclude a common law
action." Anderson on the Uniform Commercial Code (1981).

l, beneficiary of the Social Security Cestui Qui Trust

hereby notifies this tribunal that as the Claimant at

Law, and plaintiff in this commercial action, "hereby elect to move according to the

course of common law invoking the state and federal Bill of Rights rejecting any presumed

6
 statutory jurisdiction." "The courts have no right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction

which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be treason

on the constitution" See U.S. v. Will, 449, U.S. 200, 101 S.Ct. 471 (U.S. Ill., 1980).

FOR THE RECORD: 1, am making a special

appearance, not general or voluntarily, in propria persona sui juris, not to be confused or
substituted by pro se by the unauthorized hand of another and absolutely in no way waive
any rights and only waive the privileges and benefits offered by the court.

JUDGMENT IS VOID

As the record will show, on l,

beneficiary of the Social Security Cestui Qui Trust

filed the federal tax form 1099 OID and 1040 on
the eligible issue(s) regarding all penal bonds/ in order to effect the return to the source

for full settlement. On the closing of escrow in exchange for the

eligible issue(s) was settled by return to the "source" beneficiary.

Claimant at Law attest that one who is convicted of so-called crime(s) pursuant to the

Tennessee's criminal codes, (that are essentially and in fact strictly commercial crimes as

stated in 27 CFR 72.11), can no longer hold the Claimant at Law in custody for a

criminal

5
Penal Bonds with OMB No.: 9000-0045, standard forms 24, 25, 25A, 273, 274, and 275 (bid,
performance, payment, Reinsurance Agreement for A Miller Act Performance, payment in Favor of The
United States Bonds).

7
 conviction as collateral for the commercial value of the penal bonds once these penal bonds
are officially settled and returned to the source. Furthermore, the criminal conviction(s) can
no longer stand because the criminal conviction(s) is totally dependant upon the benefiting of
the value from the credit/commercial energy and without it there can be no valid conviction.
Because the eligible issue(s) (1099 OID) regarding all penal bonds were returned to the
source and the closing of escrow was fully settled, the judgment(s) are void on its face and is
without any legal effect or authority to hold the Claimant at Law in further

custody.

FRAUDULENT/NON EXISTENCE OF INDICTMENT

Claimant at Law received from theCounty Criminal Court

Clerk on a copy of the alleged

Indictment case # against the Trust

(plaintiffs name beneficiary is not on indictment thus

making

this a trust action). The so-called indictment is a presentment. This security instrument is
fraudulent and not binding. All violations of the criminal laws may be prosecuted by
indictment or presentment of a grand jury, and a presentment may be made upon the
information of any one (1) of the grand jury.

United States Constitution Amendment V. Grand Jury

Indictment for Capital Crimes; Double Jeopardy;
SelfIncrimination; Due Process of Law; Just Compensation
for Property:

8
 No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a
Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval
forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of
War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the
same offence to

9
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation.

Tennessee Constitution 5 12. Writs and other process:

All writs and other process shall run in the name of the Slate
of Tennessee and bear test and be signed by the respective
clerks. Indictments shall conclude, "against the peace and
dignity of the State." A presentment need not be indorsed "A
true bill"; Shannon's Code, 5 6949, referring to presentments
not requiring it. See e.g. Martin v. State, 1913, 155 SW. 129,
127 Tenn. 324.
An indictment must be indorsed "A true bill," followed by the
signature of the grand jury foreman. See e.g. Martin v. State,
1913, 155 SW. 129, 127 Tenn. 324.

Indictments and Charging Instruments 474:

"The argument in behalf of plaintiff in error is that there is no
difference between a presentment and an indictment in respect
of the necessity for an endorsement of "A true bill" thereon,
and that such endorsement is requisite on indictments.
Numerous cases hold that indictments, in order to their
validity, must be so indorsed, followed by the signature of the
foreman of the grand jury. See e.g. Gunkle v. State, 6 Baxt.
626; Bird v. State, 103 Tenn. 343, 52 S.W. 1076, and cases
cited. Indeed, the rule thus laid down in our early cases was
codified; Shannon's Code, 7055, providing: "An indictment
cannot be found without the concurrence of at least twelve
jurors, and when so found shall be indorsed 'A true bill' and
the endorsement signed by the foreman." See See e.g. Martin
v. state, 1913, 155 SW. 129, 127 Tenn. 324.

Witnesses; names; endorsement: It is the duty of the foreman

of the grand jury to endorse on the indictment or, if it is a
presentment, on the subpoena the names of the witnesses so
sworn by the foreman and sign same officially, but the
omission to endorse the names of those witnesses on the
indictment or subpoena shall in no case invalidate the finding
of the indictment or presentment, if the witnesses were, in
point of fact, sworn by the foreman according to law. T.C.A. 5
40-17-106 540-17-106.

Witnesses; names; endorsement Correctness:

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 It is the duty of the district attorney general to endorse on each
indictment or presentment, at the term at which the indictment
or presentment is found, the names of the witnesses as the
district attorney general intends shall be summoned in the
cause, and sign each indictment or presentment name thereto.
Formal requisites of indictment, generally The official
signature of the District Attorney General, to an endorsement
on an indictment directing what witnesses shall be summoned,
does not cure the want of a signature to the indictment itself.
See e.g. State v. Lockett, 1871, 50 Tenn. 274.

Indictments and Charging Instruments 1145: The want of the

attorney generals official signature to an indictment is not
cured by his signature to an endorsement thereon. See e.g.
State v. Lockett, 1871, 50 Tenn. 274. Indictments and
Charging Instruments 470(1)

In the matter at hand the security instrumenty called an indictmenti by the

County Criminal Court Clerk is fraudulent. An indictment must

be indorsed "A true bill," followed by the signature of the grand jury foreman. See e.g.
Martin v. State, 1913, 155 SW. 129, 127 Tenn. 324. Your restrictions, not mine as I am
under common-law. The security instrument lacks both an endorsement stating "True

Bill" and a signature of the Grand Jury Foreman. Thus plain and simple the trespassers

lacked jurisdiction over both the Social Security Cestui Que Trust

or the beneficiary of the Social Security Cestui Que

Trust beneficiary.

6
The indictment shall be referred to "Security Instrument" throughout this writ and any other security
instruments will also be referred to as such but with clarification to distinguish between any and all
subsequent security instruments.
7
The fraudulent security instrument does not indicate whether it is an "Indictment" or "Presentment"
other than theCounty Criminal Court Clerk's Deputy attaching a sticky note
indicating it is an indictment. In any event it lacks a signature of the Grand Jury Foreman.
Additionally there is no indication that any witnesses testified before the Grand

Jury as the security instrument does not denote summons for witnesses or endorsed by the

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 Grand Jury Foreman.

REMEDIES IN COURTS, SUITS AGAINST STATE

WEST'S TENNESSEE CODE ANNOTATED CONSTITUTION OF THE

STATE OF TENNESSEE-ARTICLE l. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS 17.

Remedies in courts, suits against state; states in full: "That all courts shall be open;

and every man, for an injury done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation,

shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and justice administered without

saleg, denial, or delay. Suits may be brought against the State in such manner and in

such courts as the Legislature may by law direct." (Emphasis added).

Claimant at Law attests that the Court upon accepting the WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS AND AFFIDAVIT OF CRIMINAL COMPLAINT (AOCC) which is a contract

and the fact that all of the public officials have taken an Oath to uphold both the Tennessee

and

United States Constitution you agree to the language of Article 1 Section 17 of the

Tennessee Constitution, and that under this contract and Article 1 5 17 of the Tennessee

Constitution that I shall not be accessed any monetary amount from any party or entity.

CHALLENGING JURISDICTION BY HABEAS CORPUS

Jurisdiction of the court may be challenged at any stage of the proceeding, and also

may be challenged after conviction and execution of judgment by way of Writ of Habeas

Corpus. See e.g. U.S. v. Anderson, 60 F. Supp 649 (D.C. Wash. 1945). The Court and its

fiduciaries committed fraud by not informing Claimant at Law/Plaintiff that plaintiff was

8
Therefore I do not expect to be levied any monetary damage especially since the constitution does not
demand or allow it.

12
appearing in front of an admiralty/military tribunal, and by not informing the Claimant at
Law/Plaintiff it was entering a contract for the trespasser's to gain access to the Cestui Que
Trust, by the use of penal bonds.

THAT THE CLAIMANT AT LAW IS SUBJECTED TO RULES. CODES AND REGULATION

"All Codes, Rules and Regulations are applicable to the Government Authorities
only, NOT HUMAN/CREATORS IN Accordance with Godls_Laws. All codes, Rules and
regulations are unconstitutional and lacking in Due Process. . . See e.g. "Rodriquez v. Ray
Donovan (U.s. Department ofLabor), 769 F. 2d. 1344, 1358 (1985).

TO PROCEED WHEN JURISDICTION IS CHALLENGED:

"...[Hlowever late this objection [To Jurisdiction] has been made, or may be made in

any cause, in any inferior or appellate Court can move ONE FURTHER STEP IN THE

CAUSE: AS ANY MOVEMENT IN NECESSARILY THE EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION." Rhode

Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.s. 657, 718, 9 L.ED. 1233 (1838). Also see ... [O]nce

Jurisdiction is challenged, the Court cannot proceed when it clearly appears that the Court

lacks Jurisdiction. The Court has no authority to reach the merits, but, rather should dismiss

the action" Melo v. U.S., 505 F.2d. 1026.

TO NOT STATE AND PROVE THE !URISDICTION TAKEN:

The question of Jurisdiction is the Court either over The Person, The Subject Matter
or The Place where the crime was committed can be raised at any stage of a criminal
proceeding; it is never presumed, but must always be proved; and it is "NEVER" waived by
the accused? [See e.g. US. u Rogers, 23 F. 658 (D.C. Ark. 1885)]

9
Plaintiff was not the defendant as the Trust was charged and plaintiff did not waive his right to know who
the real parties and interests are.

13
 TO INTERFACE WITH OTHER THAN CORPORATE ENTITIES:

"No Court can concern itself with anything other than CORPORATE ARTIFICIAL

PERSONS AND THE CONTRACTS between them." [S.L.R. Penhollow v. Danes Administrators, 3
U.s. (3 DALL) 54, 1 L. ED. 57 (1795)].
"...Every taxpayer is a CESTUI QUE TRUST@ having sufficient interest in
preventing

abuse of the TRUST to be recognized in the field of this Court's PREROGATIVE

JURISDICTION as a relater in the proceedings to set 'SOVEREIGN AUTHORITY IN MOTION

BY ACTION ...' see e.g. In RE: Bolens, 135 N.W. Rep. 164 (1912) Supreme Court of

Wisconsin.

"A PUBLIC OFFICIAL is a FIDUCIARYb

YOU DISPLAY A MILITARY FLAG AS YOUR JURISDICTION: see Title 4 United

States Code Services, 'Lawyer's Edition 1 Interpretive Notes and Decisions' "Placing of

FRINGE on NATIONAL FLAG... Within Discretion of President as Commander-In-Chief

of ARMY and NAVY." (1925) 34 Op Atty. Gen. 483. In addition, "A Military Flag is a

flag that resembles the regular flag of the United States, except that it has a YELLOW

FRINGE Bordering on three sides. The PRESIDENT of the UNITED STATES designates

this deviation from the regular flag, By EXECUTIVE ORDER, AND IN his Capacity as

COMMANDER-IN-

CHIEF of the ARMED FORCES" PURSUANT TO U.S.C. CHAPTERS 1, 2, AND 3; EXECUTIVE

ORDER NO. 10834, AUGUST 21, 1959, 24 F.R. 6865.

That the GRAND JURY that returned the indictmentg against the TRUST entity

14
 in this cause were in fact Admiralty/Military Grand

10
One who possesses equitable rights in property, usu. receiving the rents, issues, and profits from it;
Beneficiary.
11
A person who is required to act for the benefit of another person on all matters within the scope of their
relationship; one who owes to another the duties of good faith, trust, confidence, and candor.

15
and Petite Juries prospectively because they were sworn in front of and under a Gold
Fringed Flag thus making the whole process and proceeding fraudulent violating the Due
Process Clause of the Tennessee and United States Constitution.

PAGAN HOUSE OF WORSHIP

That the Jurisdiction of a Military Admiralty Jurisdiction in Maritime Law in

Hickman County is a "Pagan Templeg of Worship." In your Military Tribunal, which is a

Pagan House of Worship, the judge is a Minister who serves Lady Justice. Lady Justice is a

ROMAN PAGAN GODDESS! Justitia's counter part was a GREEK GODDESS named

"DIKE" and her Temple was on the Greek Island of LESBO. The Priests burn offerings

24/7 and had 'WHITE' ROBES that stayed 'BLACK' with soot. After some time the priest

changed to Black to hide the soot. The Judges use to wear white robes but later switched to

black robes. Hence, Black Robes, with White Justice.

The Goddess with the scale goes even farther back than DIKE. In the Egyptian

Book of the Dead, there is a Human/Goddess by the name of MA'AT. She weighed the

HEART against a PEACOCK FEATHER and if the heart was heavier then the feather a

half man/half crocodile would eat your heart and you wculd not go into the AFTERLIFE.

Tennessee-Constitution, Article 1, Section 3.

12 There is no proof that the Grand Jury returned an indictment against the TRUST, the beneficiary has
never been indicted or charged by Presentment as this is a trust action and all cases are commercial which is
civil.
13 Temple- la A building dedicated to religious ceremonies or worship. b. Either of two successive
buildings in ancient Jerusalem serving as the primary center for Jewish worship. 2. Something as having
within it a divine presence. 3. A building used for meetings by a fraternal order. 4. A building reserved for a
highly valued function. 5. Either of two groups of buildings in London, the Inner Temple and the Middle
Temple, that house two of the four Inns of Court and occupy the site of the medieval Knights Templar's
establishment. 6. a building of imposing size, etc., serving the public or an organization in some special way [
a temple of art, a Masonic Temple/. Also relevant is "INNS OF COURT" 1. The four legal societies in
London having the exclusive right to admit persons to practice at the bar. 2. The four groups of buildings
(Gray's Inn, Lincoln's Inn, Inner Temple, and Middle Temple) belonging to these societies.

16
 FREEDOM OF WORSHIP

"That all men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty God

according to the dictates of their own conscience; that no man can of right be compelled to

attend. erect. or support any place of worship. or to maintain any MINISTER against his

consent; that no human authority can, in any case whatever, control or interfere with the

RIGHTS OF CONSCIENCE; and that no preference shall ever be given, by law, to any

RELIGIOUS ESTABLISHMENT or mode of worship." Any judge that administers Justice

is an Administrator. If one looks up Administrator in Webster's Dictionary it will say, See

Minister.

Many cases define the courts as Temples of Justice. "Our Justice System will

crumble should those whose hands are entrusted its preservation and sanctity, betray its

fundamental values and principles." Morrow v. California, 30 Cal. App. 4th 1252, 1261

(Cal. Ct. App. 1995), citing Section 6068 and Referring to Courts as "TEMPLES OF

JUSTICE." see also (550 F. Supp. 1317) which states in part: The Citizenry in rising up to

destroy the

"TEMPLES OF JUSTICE"

THE ACT OF 1833

"In every point of view, in which this question has been presented to my mind, my
clear convictions are, that the Act of 1833 is not inconsistent with any obligation which
Tennessee is under to the Federal Government. Tennessee, by its passage, has violated no
right ever recognized in the Indian Tribes. There Right of Property, both real and personal,
and their full ample enjoyment, is secured and protected. No pledge on the part of the state
has been forfeited. Tennessee only asserts the privilege of punishing for the Commission of

Crimes the most shocking to our nature, when committed with sight of "HER TEMPLES
OF JUSTICE; SHE cannot consent to see HER CITIZENS and others robbed and
murdered, whilst the robber and murderer laugh to scorn the power of HER LAWS

17
 l, attest that I was not afforded the opportunity to be

brought forth into an Article Ill Court. Article. Ill. Section. 1. States: "The judicial Power

of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as

the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme

and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behavior, and shall, at stated

Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be "diminished" during

their Continuance in Office " Only the United States Supreme Court is an Article Ill Court,

which by the Constitution is the only Court that is lawful. What makes the Justices of the

United States Supreme Court lawful according to the United States Constitution is that they

are tax exempt. They do not pay taxes. Their heirs are even exempt from paying

inheritance taxes. The Circuit, Chancery, and Criminal Courts in Tennessee are not Article

Ill Courts as the Judges are taxpayers, which mean that their pay is diminished. WEST'S

TENNESSEE CODE ANNOTATED CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF

TENNESSEE ARTICLE 1. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS. The inferior court which is a
Military (Admiralty) Tribunal did not have jurisdiction as your military court and pagan
house of worship violated my rights
under Article 1, 1!4, and 1549 of the TENNESSEE CODE ANNOTATED

14
That all power is inherent in the people, and all free governments are founded on their authority, and
instituted for their peace, safety, and happiness; for the advancement of those ends they have at all times, an
unalienable and indefeasible right to alter, reform, or abolish the government in such manner as they may
think proper.
CONSTITUTION OF THE state ofTennessee.

SOVEREIGNTY ESTABLISHED

Sovereignty defined: The Sovereign is a nonjuristic human being that is a member

of "We the People." All the Sovereign's Rights come from GOD, not the State. The

18
Sovereign does not qualify as a "person" as defined by statutes law. The Sovereign is

independent, self-governing, and lawful.

The term "sovereign," and to this particular extent, means "property" herein, being

the the human, beneficiary and sovereign's body,

mind, and all of his material possessions and ownership thereof and further illustrates that:

The people of the state are entitled to all rights which formerly
belonged to the king at his prerogative. See e.g. Langing v. Smith,
21 D. 89 (New York S.C. 1829).

Under our system, the people, who are there [in England] called
subjects, are here the sovereign. Their Rights, whether collective or
individual, are not bound to give way to sentiment of loyalty to the
person of monarch. The Citizen* here [in America] knows no
person, however, near those in power, or however powerful himself
to whom the need yield their Rights which the Law secures to him.

15
Doctrine of non-resistance. That government being instituted for the common benefit, the doctrine of
non-resistance against arbitrary power and oppression is absurd, slavish, and destructive of the good and
happiness of mankind.
16
Freedom of worship. That all men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty God
according to the dictates of their own conscience; that no man can of right be compelled to attend, erect, or
support any place of worship, or maintain any minister against his consent; that no human authority can, in
any case whatever, control or interfere with the rights of conscience; and that no preference shall ever be
given, by law, to any religious establishment or mode of worship.
17
Trial by jury; jurors. That the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, and no religious or political
test shall ever be required as a qualification for jurors.
18
58. Deprivation of life, liberty or property under law; due process. That no man shall be taken or
imprisoned, or disseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or in any manner
destroyed or deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by the judgment of his peers or the law of the land. 19
5 10. Double jeopardy. That no person shall, for the same offense, be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.
20
5 15. Bail; habeas corpus. That all prisoners shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, unless for capital
offences, when the proof is evident, or the presumption great. And the privilege of the writ of Habeas Corpus
shall not be suspended, unless when in case of rebellion or invasion, the General Assembly shall declare the
public safety requires it.
See U.S. v. Lee, 106 U.S. 204 (1959)(* Meaning "American Citizens upon the Soil").

Furtherance, the United State Supreme Court recognized three different sovereign's (1) the
United States, as the Federal Government; (2) the State Government(s); and (3) "We The
People," and stated that: "While sovereign powers are delegated to . . . the government,
while sovereignty itself remains with the people." See Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46
(1909); Yick wo v. Bapkins, 118 U.s. 356, 376 (1836).
Claimant at Law attests that the Sovereign "We The People" cannot be named
merely as a "person," or "any person" in a statute, but must be specifically specified within
the language of the statute. In addressing this issue, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that:

19
 The term "person" does not include the "sovereign" and for the
sovereign to be bound to the statute, the sovereign must be
specifically named.

In common usage, the term "person" does not include the sovereign,
[and] statutes employing the [word] are ordinarily construed to
exclude it.

Will v. Michigan State Department ofState Police, 491 U.s. 58, 109 s.ct. 2304, 2308

(1989), citing Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, 442 U.s. 653 (1979); US. v. Cooper corp.

312 U.s. 600,

602 (1941); US. v. United Mine Workers ofAmerica, 330 U.s. 258 (1947)4.

SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION INVOKED

This Claimant at Law, a Sovereign, invokes the subject-matter jurisdiction of the

Constitution of the United States, for the united States of America. 1789 C.E., by My
Private

21
Your copyright T.C.A. defines "Person" as: "any individual or entity holding or capable of holding a legal
of beneficial interest in property" T.C.A. 5 39-12-203(7); "any individual, nonhuman entity or governmental
agency" TC.A. 5 34-1-101(13); T.C.A. 5 47-1-201(27); It is also used to denote a corporation which is an
artificial person. Bouvier's Law Dictionary (1856).
Authority, in accord with Article Ten (10) of the Bill of Rights 1791 C.E. For example, in

John H. Alden et al. Petitioners v. Maine, 715 A.2d 172 (1999), the court stated that:

In view of the Tenth Amendment's reminder that powers not

delegated to the Federal Government, nor prohibited to the States are
reserved to the States or to the people. The existence of the express
limitations on State Sovereignty may equally imply that caution
should be exercised before concluding that unstated limitations on
State power were intended by the framers.

See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.s. 506, 507 (1997); US. v. Lopez, 514 U.s. 549, 552

(1995); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat 304, 326 (1816). Claimant at Law invokes

"Sovereign Immunity" in accordance with the "Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act" of

October

20
21, 1976 C.E. [H.B. 11315] Public Law 94-583, 94th Congress, 90 Statutes at Large 1 and

15, Statues at Large, Ch. 149-25, pp. 223-224 1, R.s. 1999. Title 8 US.C 5 1481 is still in

full force and effect to this date. See e.g. Briehl v. Dulles. 248 F.2d 561, 583 fn. 21 (D.C.

Cir 1957), judgment reversed Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958).

Nothing in the "International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights" (hereafter

"ICCPR"), 102 nd Congress, 2 nd Session, Exec. Rept. 103-23, January 23, 1992, requires
legislation, or other action, by the United States of America, prohibited by the Constitution
for the united States of America as interpreted by the United States. See ICCPR, page 24.
This means that the restrictions of the Constitution will come into effect when they are
applied by the Sovereign American of one of the several compact States of the union, and
everything that State Agent's, Actors, Officers, Employees, or Elected Officials attempt to
do to a Sovereign American with presentments, i.e., attached "Information (initial);
Affidavit of Probable Cause; Statement of Facts; Amended Information (primary and
secondary);
Judgment & Sentence; and Warrant Commitment," is NULL and VOID.
DUTY OF THE COURT

It is the duty of this Court to act upon this "Common Law Writ of habeas

Corpus/VVrit of Injunction" BY A PERSON IN STATE CUSTODY "in a court of law"

WITH AN Article Ill of the Constitution for the United States of America Judge whose

"Compensation has not been Diminished during their Continuance in Office, since it

originated in this Court and it should have recognized the State and Federal Constitutional

violations that occurred, and that have been presented herein, and were allowed to occur,

either through neglect, mistake, or inadvertence, to this Sovereign Claimant at Law's

detriment. Furthermore, it is well within this Court's authority to make right that which is

wrong.

All judges are bound to comply with the Tennessee State Constitution, as well as the

Constitution for the united State of America and all of its Treaties entered into, which

states as follows:

21
 This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all the authority of the United
States, shall be the Supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in
every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing is the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.

See U.S. Const, Article VI, cl [2]. Therefore; the "State may not, in the name of local
control over local laws and practice, give state courcs the power to violate the supreme law
of the land. See Kalb v. Feuerstein 308 U.S. 433, 439 (1940); 41 Am. Reptr. N.S. 501
(Wis. 1940).

1. THE JUDGMENT(S) OF CONVICTION ARE/IS VOID AB INITIo.e

Claimant at Law attest that on l,

beneficiary of the Social Security Cestui Qui Trust

22
(See Attachment "K").
filed the federal tax form 1099 011), 1096, and

1040 on the eligible issue(s) regarding all penal bondsg in order to effect the return to the

source for full settlement. On the closing of escrow in exchange for

the eligible issue(s) was settled by return to the "source" beneficiary.

Let it be known that because the penal bonds are security instruments that were used to

secure a conviction, the law in this action is governed by common-law and the Uniform

Commercial Code.

Specifically, on Claimant at Law sent by certified

mail return receipt Common-Law Contract #

under the Postal Rule to the County Clerk's Office requesting records

regarding the original bonds; the OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT BUGET (OMB) number

for all charges; the appearance Bond Set on the Trust at arraignment on all counts set forth

in Case No. with the contract agreement that the documents will be

22
provided within 10 business days. (See Attachment "A"). On

the County Clerk's Office responded claiming that it did not have any

knowledge of what the OMB number is, but sent a copy of the original appearance bond
set

in the amount of $ (See Attachment "B"). Even though

the Clerk sent a copy of the appearance bond does not relieve the Clerk from its contractual

obligation to provide the OMB number, is now in Dishonor for failing to fulfill the terms

of

the contract. Or [CThe contracted records request was "returned to sender as 'REFUSED"'
by

Clerk which is now in Dishonor).l

23
Penal Bonds with OMB No.: 9000-0045, standard forms 24, 25, 25A, 273, 274, and 275 (bid, performance,
payment, Reinsurance Agreement for A Miller Act Performance, payment in Favor of The United States
Bonds).

23
 Claimant at

On Law sent by certified mail return receipt Common-

Law Contract # under the

Postal Rule to District Attorney General (hereafter DAG)

In this common-law contract, it was agreed that DAG was to

direct his accountant to prepare, file, and provide a copy of the Federal Tax Form 1099 OID

(Original Issue Discount) to cover the eligible issues (product of statutes) in Case No.

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. regarding

the Appearance Bond in the approximate amount of $ ; all

other Bonds subsequent to the True Bill Indictments; as well as the forensic accounting,

corresponding to FinCEN form 101, "Suspicious Activity Report." It was also agreed that by

his, DAG Oath when he took office, he would be taking on the

responsibility of the previous attorney general, which means that he would be obligated to

perform the requested acts as if he were the previous attorney general. DAG

defaulted in dishonor by failing to fulfill his agreed contractual

obligation within the 10 days from the date herein to have your accountant prepare and file

Federal Tax Form 1099 OID and provide me with verification of such filing. The trespasser

ignored and otherwise REFUSED to timely respond to said terms of the contract. (See

Attachment "C").

On Claimant at Law sent a second contract letter by

certified mail return receipt Common-Law Contract #

under the Postal Rule to the DAG In this common-law contract, it was

agreed that DAG was to file the federal tax form 1099

24
OID on certain eligible issue(s) in order to effect the return to the source for full settlement

and closing of escrow in exchange, Treasury Direct SS # xxx-xx-xxxx that identifies the

Trespasser therein, who used the funds from the source to create the product from which

the eligible issue(s) derived from. DAG was warned that : (1)
if he chose to refuse to file the said tax form or otherwise fail to file it (willful failure to

file), It would make him, DAG , the recipient of the payer,

who is

identified in the eligible issue/bill/bond etc., and that he has knowledge/access to the value

and other information to report/file the federal tax form and you are now holding a tax

liability until you make settlement, by return to the "source" (which is what the filing of the

1099 OID does), and that the source is eligible for a tax refund; (2) that the trespasser,
DAG

is the holder-in-due-course of the eligible issue(s) for

the value stated herein and that the value being a federal tax liability, and that he is in

possession of tax revenue that you get rid of by effecting the refund to the source

Treasury Direct Social Security Number that the eligible issue(s) was intended. Once

you "dishonor," you can't go backwards!; and (3) Since the trespasser, DAG

have persisted in refusing (dishonoring) to make the

requested filings as agreed upon the contract, Claimant at Law requested the trespasser

to provide his federal tax ID No. for inclusion as a Recipient on the 1099 OID, and if

he i'efuse to provide Claimant at Law this information, then Claimant at Law shall

designate this information as having been "REFUSED" on the federal tax form 1099

OID. Claimant at Law provided trespasser five (5) working days to respond or

otherwise comply with the terms of the contract. The trespasser ignored and otherwise

REFUSED to timely respond to said terms of the contract.

25
 Claimant at

(See Attachment "C").

On Law sent a third contract letter by

certified mail return receipt Common-Law Contract

# under the Postal Rule to the DAG In this common-law contract, it

was agreed that DAG was to direct his accountant to prepare

and file Federal Tax Form 1096/1099 OID (Original Issue Discount) to cover the eligible

issues (product) in this matter. The products in question constitute eligible issues relating

to Case No. at the Maritime Admiralty disguised as Criminal

Court of County Tennessee, STATE OF TENNESSEE v.

described as: 1) Appearance Bond in the amount of

• 2) The penal Bonds with ()MB No.: 9000-0045, standard forms 24, 25,

25A, 273, 274, and 275 (bid, performance, payment, Reinsurance Agreement for A Miller Act

Performance, payment in Favor of The United States Bonds) (estimate amount shown on 1099

OID forms enclosed); and 3) Any other Bonds subsequent to the True Bill Indictments that are

being withheld.

Claimant at Law further stated that all these products at issue are prepaid, and is in

need of the information of trespasser's business plan to process prepayment in order to

facilitate the tax report of the federal withholding to the IRS taxable income. Trespasser was

also reminded that if he did not provide Claimant at Law with a check or money order in order

to pay for the product of his withholding, it would constitute a "dishonor" in itself, as well as

any "dishonor/denial" in this matter on his part admits to this settlement to being a tax

recovery issue, and the IRS will want to know why the funds are being withheld, therefore,

informing Claimant at Law how to proceed in order to make settlement.

26
 The Claimant at Law further stated the tax in question is the original issue discount,

and the filing of the 1099 OID is to enable the tax change to return to the source for

settlement and closing of escrow in exchange, Treasury Direct, SS# xxx-xx-xxxx. That all

such corresponding property that belongs to Claimant at Law is to be return to his possession,

and if trespasser does not intend to comply with said request, then provide Claimant at Law

with your tax identification number.

Claimant at Law warned that any refusal would make the trespasser a participant in an

international contract (a small claim), and his name becomes eligible to appear in the tax

report as a recipient of the payer, who is identified in the eligible issue/bill/bond/etc., and

presumed to have knowledge/access to the value and other information to report/file the

federal tax form and you are now holding a tax liability until you make settlement, by return

to the source (which is what the filing of the 1099 OID does), and that source is eligible for a

tax refund. The trespasser would then become the holder-in-due-course of the eligible issue(s)

for the value stated herein, that value being a federal tax liability giving trespasser five (5)

working days of receipt of this letter to respond and enclosed 1099 OID tax forms will be

deemed correct for filing with the IRS or it would be presumed to be

Attachment "D"),

Finally, on Claimant at Law sent a fourth contract letter

by certified mail return receipt Common-Law Contract
under the Postal Rule to the DAG

In this common-law contract, it was agreed that DAG

24
1) Appearance Bond, Case No. STATE OF TENNESSEE v.
County, Tennessee
2) All OMB No's.: 9000-0045, Bonds, case No. STATE OF TENNESSEE v.
.00
Total: $ .00

27
 Claimant at

was to determine if Law's name and Social Security No. xxx-

xx-xxxx is on the roll of that residential Unit and if this be not the case, then where is it listed

to comply with the Cemetery Laws that are overseen by the U.S.

Marshall Service, making it a federal matter? This information is needed to determine the

State, Federal, and Municipal taxes for Claimant at Law's account. It was further agreed upon

that if the trespasser so choose to withhold this information from the Claimant at

Law, then the trespasser's name would be eligible to appear of the 1099 OID Federal Tax

Form as the recipient of the Appearance Bond Set on me at arraignment as well as all the

other Bonds mentioned, and the enclosed 1099 OID will be deemed correct for filing if the

Claimant at Law do not hear from you in 10 business days. (See Attachment "E").

Each Common-Law Contract letter quoted above was attached with the Postal Rule

that binds the trespasser, including the Court clerk, under common-law contract and

imposes a total legal obligation of good faith in its performance. See UCC 1-304. This
security instrument that establishes a Common-Law Contract between the Parties under the
Postal rule, states as follows:

"The postal rule (also known as the mailbox rule "deposited acceptance rule") is the
term of Common-Law contracts which determines the timing of acceptance of an offer
when mail is contemplated and the medium of acceptance. The general rule is that a
contract is formed when acceptance is actually communicated to the offeror. The
mailbox rule is an exception to the general principle. The mailbox rule provides that
the contract is formed when a properly prepaid and properly addressed letter of
acceptance is posted. One rationale given for the rule is that the offeror nominates the
post office as implied agent and thus receipt of the acceptance by the post office is
regarded as that of the offeree. The main effect of the mailbox rule is that the risk of
acceptance being delivered late or lost in the post is placed upon the offeror. If the
offer or is reluctant to accept this risk, he can always require actual receipt before
being legally bound."

See American Jurisprudence (2nd Ed.) 17A Am. Jur. 2d Contracts 5 98 (2022) (Acceptance by

mail; "mailbox rule"); Republic of Sudan v. Harrison, et al., 139 S.Ct. 1048, 1057 (2019)

28
citing Rosenthal v. Walker, 11 U.S. 185, 193 (1884); Hagnerv. US., 285 U.S. 427 (1932). see

also e.g. Morrison v. Thoelke, 155 So.2d 889 (Fla.2d DCA 1963); Cochran v. Norkunas, 398

Md. 1, 919 A.2d 700 (2007); Echavarria v. National Grange Mut Ins. co., 880 A.2d 882

(2005); Stang v. MCVaney, 44 P.3d 41 (Wyo. 2002); Pope v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 426

S.W.3d 557 (2013); Kass v. Grais, 66 A.D.3d 587 (1 st

Dep't 2009); Anderson Marketing, Inc. v.

Maple Chase co., 241 F.3d 1063 (8th Cir. 2001).

Claimant at Law attests that he properly mailed each offer by certified mail return

receipt accomplishing the acceptance of the offer, thus, a contract was formed binding the

trespasser to its terms. In each instances, the trespasser failed to perform its total obligation in

good faith, UCC 1-304, but more importantly failed to verify and file the federal tax form

1099 OID on the above described eligible issue(s) in order to effect the return to the source

for full settlement and closing of escrow exchange.

On Claimant at Law prepared and filed the federal tax

form 1099 OID, 1096, and 1040 tax forms listing the payer (trespasser) as being the

originator of the eligible issue(s), the Payer tax ID No. as being "REFUSED" (by virtue of

your refusal to file said form), the Recipient as being the trespasser, Recipient Tax ID

Number as being "REFUSED," and the address and phone number as shown on your mailing

if provided, and the value(s) of the eligible issue(s) will be designated on the issues(s) as

being the Claimant at Law's best guessed estimate. On

Claimant at Law received confirmation that the value(s) of the eligible issue(s) were returned

to the source and fully settlement, thus closing the escrow account. (See

Attached "F").

29
 A void judgment is one which has no legal force or effect; which is an absolute

nullity; one which, from its inception is and forever continues to be an absolute nullity,

without legal efficacy, ineffectual to bind parties or support a right, of no legal force and

effect whatsoever, and incapable of confirmation, ratification, or enforcement in any

manner or to any degree. See Black's Law Dictionary (4 th and 6th Ed.). A judgment which

because of want of jurisdiction is entitled to no respect what ever, but may be entirely

disregarded to declared inoperative by any court in which effect is sought to be given to it.

A judgment which is an absolute nullity, so that its invalidity may be asserted upon either

direct or collateral attack by any person whose rights are affected, at any time and at any

place. See Ballentien's Law Dictionary (3rd Ed.). A judgment would be nullity, if the judge

had no jurisdiction of the matter, or having such jurisdiction . . . Bouvier's Law Dictionary

(1856).

Claimant at Law attest that one who is convicted of so-called crime(s) pursuant to

the Tennessee's criminal statutes & codes, (that are essentially and in fact strictly

commercial crimes as stated in 27 CFR 72.11), can no longer hold the Claimant at Law in

custody for a criminal conviction as collateral for the commercial value of the penal bonds

once these penal bonds are officially settled and returned to the source. Furthermore, the

criminal conviction(s) can no longer stand because the criminal conviction(s) is totally

dependant upon the benefiting of the value from the credit/commercial energy and without

it there can be no valid conviction. Because the eligible issue(s) (1099 OID) regarding all

penal bonds were returned to the source and the closing of escrow was fully settled, the

judgment(s) are void on its face and is without any legal effect or authority to hold the

Claimant at Law in further custody.

For The Record. Be It Known: that there is a presumption with respect of the facts
and facts relating to the Penal Bonds, which provides that such fact(s) is/are "presumed"

30
and before the "trier of fact" can find the existence of this/these fact(s), i.e., the Penal
Bonds, the trespasser has the burden to introduce evidence that supports a finding of its
nonexistence. See UCC 1-206.

11. THE STATE OF TENNESSEE HAS NO SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION TO

FURTHER HOLD THE CLAIMANT AT LAW IN CUSTODY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF

CORRECTIONS.

Claimant at Law attest that because he eligible issue(s) (1099 OID) regarding all

penal bonds were returned to the source and the closing of escrow exchange was fully

settled, the judgment(s) are void on its face and is without any legal effect or authority, has

no jurisdiction of the subject-matter to further hold the Claimant at Law in custody of the

Department of Corrections and must issue an immediate court Order release from custody.

Subject-Matter]urisdiction: over the nature of the case and type of relief sought and
to the extent in which a court can rule on the conduct of persons or the status of things. See
Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004); A judgment: would be a nullity, if the judge had no
jurisdiction of the matter, (referring to subject-matter jurisdiction); Subject-Matter: the
cause, the object, the thing in dispute. It is a fatal objection to the jurisdiction of the court
when it has no cognizance of the subject-matter of the action; if a cause exclusively of
admiralty jurisdiction were brought in a court of common law (or vice versa), or a criminal
proceeding in a court having jurisdiction of civil cases only (or vice versa); In such case,
neither a plea to the jurisdiction, nor any other plea would be required to oust the court of
subject- matter jurisdiction, therefore, the cause can be dismissed upon motion (in this
cause, Common Law Article Ill Writ of Habeas Corpus) by the court, ex officio. See
Bouvier's Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1856). It is apparent here by its definition of "subject-
matter," such jurisdiction limits the court's authority of the subject-matter that of a criminal
nature to the criminal court and the subject-matter that is civil in nature to the circuit and
chancery courts.
Claimant at Law attest that the generating of these prepaid Penal Bonds, [forms 24,

25, 25A, 273, 274, and 275 (bid, performance, payment, Reinsurance Agreement for A

Miller Act Performance, etc.)], are a product of the criminal statutes in exchange for a

conviction of the legal artificial/fiction trust entity (all capital letters designation) Cestui

que Trust that was convicted of

in which the living

31
human being and Sovereign, Claimant at Law, is illegally imprisoned as the fiction/artificial

Cestui que Trust named above. Furthermore, the TENNESSEE COURTS have declared and

acknowledged the existence of the fiction/artificial entity in your own case law in NBMA

AMERICA, N.A. v. Michael J. DAROCHIA, 2007 WL 2323399 at *5 (Tenn.Ct.App. Nov.

19,

2007); BANK OF AMERICA, N.A. v. Michael J. DAROCFIIA, 241 S.W.3d 510, 512

(Tenn.Ct.App. 2007), where the court's found that Michael J. Darochia and MICHAEL J.

DAROCHIA are separate entities.

Claimant at Law also attest that the use of Penal Bonds/bills (or True
Bill/lndictment), essentially commercial instruments, that is being generated off the credit
of the accused/convicted, i.e., his fiction/artificial Cestui que Trust, are products of the
criminal statutes that in reality are commercial crimesg making this a civil matter rather

25
see 27 CFR 5 72.11 (Federal or state).
than criminal. Based on the above facts, this case is entirely a civil matter, i.e., under

commercial crimes, in that the County Criminal Court had no

subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate and render judgment of a civil matter in the

criminal court jurisdiction.

For The Record Be It Known: that there is a presumption with respect of the facts

relating to subject-matter jurisdiction and the Penal Bonds, which provides that such fact(s)

is "presumed" and before the "trier of fact" can find the existence of this/these fact(s), i.e.,

the Penal Bonds, the trespasser has the burden to introduce evidence that supports a finding

of its nonexistence. See UCC 1-206.

Because all these prepaid Penal Bonds are a product of the criminal statutes that

were returned to the source, and the closing of escrow exchange were fully settled, the

judgment(s) are void on its face and is without any legal effect or authority, and because

the State of Tennessee no longer has subject-matter jurisdiction to further hold the claimant

32
at law in custody of the department of corrections for the crimes that are alleged in the

indictment (that is essentially a commercial instrument), which are "commercial crimes,"

that must be adjudicated in the civil court jurisdiction, therefore, the judgment of

conviction must be VACATED and DISMISSED, and the Clamant at Law be immediately

RELEASED/DISCHARGED from TDOC custody.

THE COURT MUST VACATE VOID JUDGMENT(s)

"THE COURT SHALL TAKE NOTICE"

A. THE COURT MUST AFFIRMATIVELRY SHOW PROOF OF

JURISDICTION AND SERVE PROPER PROCESS UPON THE PROPER
PARTIES TO MAINTAIN JURISDICTION OVER THE ACTION.

Jurisdiction over the subject matter, the proper parties, and territorial limits of the

court cannot be assumed, or presumed, and must be proven. The decision regarding this

issue of law has been ruled on many times, with the same results, and is still the

jurisprudence of today states as follows:

Criminal jurisdiction involves concepts of subject matter jurisdiction

and personal jurisdiction. Indeed, to try a person for the commission
of a crime, the trial court must have both personal jurisdiction over
the defendant and subject matter jurisdiction encompasses those
matters upon which a court has power to act, and refers to the courts
authority to determine a particular kind of case, not merely the
particular case then occupying the court's attention, while personal
jurisdiction deals with the authority of a court to bind the party's to
the action. See 21 Am.Jur.2d, "Criminal Law" 5 480 (Emphasis
added).

The term "jurisdiction over the subject matter" means authority of

the court to hear and determine the class of action to which the one
adjudicated belongs and authority to hear and determine a particular
question which it assumes to determine. See e.g. Washington
Optometric Ass'n v. Peirce County, City of Tacoma, 438 P.2d 861
(Wash. 1968).

[J]urisdiction cannot be presumed in any court, even in

preliminary stages." See e.g. United States v. Chiarito, 69 F.Supp.
317 (D.Or. 1946)(Emphasis added).

33
 The State court, whether Criminal, Civil, Commercial, or otherwise, is mandated by

the legislature and the State and Federal Constitution to follow this rule. To presume

jurisdiction (power and authority) over a thing, a or even who geographical

boundary that it is limited to, is in error, which is abhorrent to the law. It is a fact that is not

being argued, that the "STATE OF TENNESSEE" is a corporate franchise granted by the

legislative (congressional) authority. Corporate capacity is a franchise and each of the

counties is incorporated within the State (Municipal corporations). The business of the

court is commercial in nature and only under the color of law can it operate to its ends.

26
"Person," as it is used in this context, refers to the corporate/non-existent/fictitious entity, in its strictest
sense. And cannot be construed to mean "real man," "Sovereign," or "human," as it is used, and the purposes
herein, it is to be defined as only existing in the contemplation of law. See also other definitions on page 18
and 35.
However, the procedural errors that have been made whether Criminal, Civil, Commercial,

or otherwise, still dealt with a corporate fiction. Even if the court had served the Claimant

at Law properly, it failed to serve proper Notice and Service of process. See Bank of

Augusta v. Earie, 38 U.S. 519, 526, 13 Pet. 274, 278 (1839); Tennessee Constitution

Article

VI, 512.

No sanction can be imposed absent proof of jurisdiction. Standard v.

Olesen, 74 S.Ct. 768 (1954); Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471
jurisdiction); See also e.g. 5 U.S.C. 55 556 & 5581b).

Any act repugnant to the Constitution is null and void. Marbury v.

Madison, 5 U.S. 147 (1803).

Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be

no rule making or legislation which abrogates them. Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 116 (1966).

Whether the error is one that is procedural, or one caused by the lack of one or more
of the officers of the court, misappropriation of time, or mere oversight, is not the issue.
Whatever the cause of the error, the assumption was made. The assumption is challenged,
and has been rebutted. And, the assertion of the Claimant at Law's Right in demanding
34
proof of, not only subject-matter, but more importantly, proof that the court had criminal
jurisdiction over the party in the case of action, cannot be met with documentary evidence,
and allows only for relief from erroneous judgment(s).
Where jurisdiction is challenged, it must be proven . . . The law
requires proof of jurisdiction to appear on the record of the
administrative agency and all administrative proceedings
Jurisdiction may never be assumed, it must be proven. Hagen v.
Lavine, 415 U.S. 528 (1974)(Emphasis added).

Jurisdiction may never be assumed, but must be substantially proven

by plaintiff claimant. MCNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp. of
Indiana Inc., 248 U.S. 178 (1936)(Emphasis added).

It is a fact that the charged document that was served upon the Claimant at Law was

insufficient and did not meet those minimum prerequisites of proper process afforded,

demanded, and mandated by law. The information/instrument/presentment did not meet

the required "PROCESS" set forth in the Tennessee State Constitution Article V/ 512
which

reads: "All writs and other process shall run in the name of the state of Tennessee and bear

test and be signed by the respective clerks. Indictments shall conclude 'against the peace

and dignity of the state."'

The same Constitution contains a mandate as well, too, and governed and supported

by the United States Constitution Article VI states as follows:

CONSTITUTION MANDATORY: The provision of this

Constitution are mandatory, unless by express words they are
declared to be otherwise. (Emphasis added).

SUPREME LAW OF THE LAND: The Constitution of the United States

is the Supreme Law of the Land.

Furthermore, if the court, an administrative agency, would have noticed this error, it

would have noted that the "party" (Defendant/Debtor) was not the corpus that had been

detained. The information/instrument/presentment failed to issue the proper party with

the proper Service of Process. As the U.S. Supreme Court stated:

35
 "The established general rule is that any personal judgment which a
State court may render against one who did not voluntarily submit to
its jurisdiction, with process within its boarders, no matter what the
mode of service, is void because the court had no jurisdiction over
his or her person." New York Life Inc. Co. v. Dunlevy, 241 U.S. 518
, 522-523 (1916).9 (Emphasis added to original).

The question of jurisdiction in the court either over the person, the
subject-matter, the place where the crime was committed, or the
court's authority of the subject-matter, (See definition of subject-

27
It is construed by the Claimant at law that the term "Citizen of the State" is defined as "Commercial" and
not a "Common Law Sovereign," not a member of the "forum contract-us" is the Claimant at Law. See also,
"Sovereignty Established," above.
matter above), can be raised at any time or stage of a judicial
proceeding and such challenge is never waived by the Claimant at
Law. See e.g. US. v. Rogers, 23 F. 658 (W.D. Ark. added).

Once "Jurisdiction" is challenged, it cannot be assumed and must be

decided. See Main v. Thibontot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980).

Moreover, if the court presupposing that it is duly constituted by charging this

Sovereign, non-juristic man or artificial entity Cestui que Trust

should have either served notice that it intended to do so, or served this Sovereign with

"proper service of process." The "human living being,"

beneficiary, named in the court's charging Instrument/document is just what it presumes

to be, i.e., a "State/Federal Government Creation/fiction entity existing only in

contemplation of law. There is no fact that can rebut that claim, nor does the Claimant at

Law propose to ignore his Birth, Life, nor his future. However, it must be made clear that
as a Sovereign, the State court, if it were a Court of Law, other than a "de facto,"
Admiralty/Military Tribunal, should have served this Sovereign within the mandates, rules,

and procedures of law. is a fiction/artificial

entity, however, that entity does, and is, the sole personal property of

beneficiary. As the U.S. Supreme Court stated:

36
 In common usage, the term "person," does not include the Sovereign,
and statutes employing it will not be construed to do so. See U.S. v.
United Workers ofAmerica, 330 U.S. 258 (1947).

The word "person," in legal terminology is perceived as a general

word normally in the scope of a variety of entities other than human
beings. See e.g. Church of Scientology of California v. U.S.
Department of Justice, 612 F.2d 417, 425 (9 th Cir. 1979)(Emphasis
added).

See also your copyright T.C.A. that defines "Person" as: "any individual or entity holding
or capable of holding a legal of beneficial interest in property" T.C.A. 39-12-203(7); "any
individual, nonhuman entity or governmental agency" T.C.A. 5 34-1-101(13); T.C.A. 5 47-
1201(27); It is also used to denote a corporation which is an artificial person. Bouvier's
Law Dictionary (1856).
No act of Congress, Treaty, Statute, or Legal Doctrine exists that can allow the

disregard of a Claim of an injustice of a Constitutional Nature. This Sovereign,

beneficiary of the Cestui que Trust

claims all Allodial Rights contained within the State

and Federal Constitutions, National and/or International Treaties, and, ultimately, GOD

Almighty. See Tennessee and U.S. Constitutions, Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

International Covenant of Civil and Political right, and the Holy Bible.

To be more clearer, Claimant at Law attest that the faulty instrument that this

Sovereign had been served with, was an unintelligentible reference to a non enacted State

statute, constituting a Bill of Attainder or Bül of Pains and Penalties, as to the criminal

offense(s) alleged in the commercial instrument, is ambiguous, to say the least. See United
States Constitution Article 15 9 cl 3; and applies to the States in 10 cl. 1.
A statute/code is a difficult thing to decipher and determine what is "Law" and what

is not. When comparing the State Constitution with the statute/code in question, for the

lack of proper enactment clauses expressed at the beginning of the Titles, within the

copyrighted "Revised Code of Tennessee." Whether one knows the law, or is completely

37
ignorant of it, is not the issue. What is the issue, however, is that when attempting to

decipher this non-law, one is confronted with difficulties.

For example, in the case of Parosa v. Tacoma, 357 P.2d 873, 876 fn. 6 (Wash.

1960), it has been said that, "It is believed by the undersigned Committee members that the

code, if it is passed in its present form, will lead to much confusion and mistake, and will

vastly increase the amount of work involved in the examination of any legal problem,

because the changes in the language are so numerous that no Section in the new code can

be accepted as correctly stating the law as enacted, unless the section is carefully proofread

against the original session law, as passed by the legislature." The Parosa court further

stated that "In this respect, the 1951 legislature was following its own unconstitutional

device for amending a section of an act in disregard of the specific constitutional mandate."

Id. at 415.

See Tennessee Constitution, Article Il, 5517 and 20.

It is critical to the public confidence in the (confidence) of the courts that
judges be seen enforcing the law and obeying it themselves.

See e.g., U.S. v. Muiz, 49 F.3d 36, 43 (1 st Cir. 1995). A law must be in existence/enacted

in order for one to be charged with the act of committing a crime. The issue is not that the

"Revised Code of Tennessee" is not law; the issue is that the non-existence of the law

relative to the offense to have allegedly been committed was not on the face of the charging

(commercial) instrument. The individual named in the (commercial) instrument was not

charged with an enacted criminal statute, When attempting to define the precise language

of the statute involved, it is extremely difficult to properly defend one's self due to the

confusion that the "Revised Code of Tennessee" create.

Here, the court failed to file the Information (charging [commercial] instrument)

with the Grand Jury. Under Tennessee law, the accused can be served by information,

38
although it has been held that whatever method of service is used, it is necessary that the

Grand Jury must be convened in order to determine the facts, based on the information that

was supplied to the prosecution, so that the Grand Jury may determine whether or not there

is probable cause. The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states, in pertinent part,

that:

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, of otherwise

infamous crime, unless on presentment (information) or indictment
of a grand jury . . . nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law.

An indictment or presentment is an essential ingredient of the "due

process of law" required by the United States Constitution. Wong
Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896).

A court has no jurisdiction over a party not properly indicted by the

grand jury. Slump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355-356 (1978)
(Emphasis added).

There can be no action, or prosecution, or even a criminal

proceeding, until someone has been formally accused of acts
constituting a criminal offense, by indictment duly returned by the
grand jury, or at least by information lodged before a magistrate. See
Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906); 41 Am.Jur. Indictments &
Information 6.

In Beavers v. Henkel, 194 U.S. 73 (1903), the U.S. Supreme Court stated that "it is

elementary that an affidavit or complaint entirely upon information and belief, without

properly setting forth the sources of the Affiant's knowledge and the grounds for his belief,

is insufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the magistrate to cause the apprehension of the

accused. The magistrate, before issuing the warrant, should have before him the oath of the

real accuser to the facts on which the charges is based and on which the belief or suspicion

of guilt is founded. See Grave v. U.S., 150 U.S. 118, 121 (1893). For example, in

U.S. v. Armored Transport, Inc., 629 F.2d 1313 (1980), the court stated, in part, that:

The test is whether the crime is one for which the statutes authorize
the court to award an infamous punishment, not whether the
punishment ultimately awarded is an infamous one; when the accused

39
 is in danger of being subjected to an infamous punishment if
convicted, he has the right to insist that he shall not be upon his trial,
except on the accusation of the grand jury.

See Mackin v. us., 117 U.S. 348, 350-351 (1886). This Sovereign,

beneficiary of the Cestui que Trust

has never been informed of the Nature or Cause of
the accusation . . . guaranteed under the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which
states that; 'fin all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation . . ." See also the Tennessee Constitution Article I,
5 9.
The underlying record in this cause shows that the prosecution failed to present an

affidavit or complaint properly setting forth the sources of the Affiant's knowledge, and the

oath of the real accuser to the facts on which the charges is based and on which the belief

or suspicion of guilt is founded before the magistrate issues an arrest warrant to cause the

apprehension of the accused. Instead, the prosecution skipped over or ignored its

constitutional mandate by seeking an indictment without any probable cause determination

by the magistrate to establish a proper service of process.

Without the proper service of process by, and upon, the proper party?!, that they

exist and are present, and convention of a Grand Jury to determine, beyond a reasonable

doubt, that the Nature and Cause has been established, and that sufficient evidence exists to

proceed to trial or plea negotiations, as alleged in the Information . the Judgment is

VOID for Want of Subject matter Jurisdiction and is contrary or in direct contravention of

the State and federal Constitutions.

For The Record, Be It Known: that there is a presumption with respect of the facts
relating to the failure serve proper process upon the proper parties to maintain jurisdiction
over the action, which provides that such fact(s) is "presumed" and before the "trier of fact"

40
28
The underlying record also shows that the service of process was improperly made upon the Cestui que
Trust fiction/artificial entity rather than the human/living being, thus, in direct contravention of the its
Constitutional mandate rendering all proceedings thereafter null, void, and illegal.
can find the existence of this/these fact(s), i.e., charging/indicting the Cestui que Trust

rather than the Living, Breathing, Natural Human

Being and Sovereign, the trespasser has the

burden to introduce evidence that supports a finding of its nonexistence. See UCC 1-206.

This Court failed to apply these constitutionally mandated procedures, creating

constitutional defects, thereby, DIVESTING this Court of any jurisdictional authority to act

upon this, or any other party, therefore, the Judgment(s) must be VACATED and the

Indictment/Charges DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

B. THE U.S. CONSTITUTION IS DESIGNED TO PROTECT THE

COMMERCIAL INTEREST OF ITS SOVEREIGN'S AND CORPORATE
"PERSON'S" PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 1, 8.

The Constitution of the Unites States was formed to establish a National

government, and the Court is the most important part of the government thus formed. One

of the essential objectives of the Constitution was to erect a government for commercial

purposes, for mutual dealing. See Bank ofAugusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. 519 (1839); U.S.
Const.
Art. 1,58.

As stated above, the 'person" accused named in the complaint, information, or

indictment is not and was not the Claimant at Law,

beneficiary and, therefore, the criminal court

was/is in error. See Uniform Commercial Code 5 1-201(27)("Person" means an individual,

corporation, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, limited liability company, association,

41
joint venture, government, governmental subdivision, agency, or instrumentally, public

corporation, or any other legal or commercial entity.), (hereafter, "UCC"), also states that:

Applicability of Supplemental Principles of Law: Unless displaced

by the particular provisions of [the Uniform Commercial Code], the
principle of law and equity, including the law merchant and the law
relative to capacity to contract, principal and agent, estoppel, fraud,
misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, and other
validating cause supplement its provisions.

See UCC 1-103(b); 5 1-105. Because the Court dealt with a artificial/fictitious-corporate
entity, [see "Debtor" as defined in UCC 5 9-103(a)(2)], and not the Sovereign, the natural
human living being, beneficiary, and failed to

serve NOTICE that it was doing so, [see UCC f 1-201(26) and (27)(1994)], and that it

would be placed on the "record," [see UCC 5 5-102(a)(14)], it has effectively created a

"fault," and a breach of "good faith," [see UCC 551-201(17) and (20)], therefore, any

contract cannot be binding. See UCC 51-201(3) and (12). No sanction can be imposed

upon the natural human

living being, beneficiary. However, the STATE

OF TENNESSEE" Cause does leave this "aggrieved party" an opportunity for

remedy/relief and the rights afforded by the UCC 55 1-106(1), (2); 1-201(32), (34); and the

State and

Federal Constitutions.

In this Cause, the "STATE OF TENNESSEE" court completely rely on the Federal

Rules of Civil and Criminal Procedure, which are structured for the use in Federal

Admiralty/Maritime and Statutory jurisdictions. See the "Enabling Ace' Article V/ 58 of

the Tennessee Constitution. Whether Criminal, Civil, or Commercial, based on this

structure, and following these Rules and Regulations, in order for the "STATE OF

TENNESSEE" Court to bind a party to any action, and in order to obtain and sustain

42
jurisdiction, the court must supply a contract bearing the true name and bona fide signature

of this Sovereign, requiring specific performance, or in the alternative, a valid Complaint

submitted to the court, signed by an Injured Party/Victim and entered on the court record.

The Criminal

43
Court for the "STATE OF TENNESSEE" has failed to comply. If a court fails to do so,
then a court cannot enforce its demands, as stated by the United State Supreme Court:
Entity cannot compel specific performance upon its corporate
statutes or corporate rules unless it, like any other corporation, is the
holder-in-due-course of some contract or commercial agreement
between it and the one whom demands for performance are made,
and is willing to produce said document and place it into evidence
before trying to enforce its demands called statutes. (Emphasis
added).

Clearfield Trust Co. v. U.S., 318 U.S. 363 (1943); Empire Healthchoice Assur., Inc. v.
MCVeigh, 547 U.S. 677 (2006). The Uniform Commercial Code makes clear of its
intensions in 5 1 which states: . . . "[t]o make uniform the law among the various
jurisdiction." It is clear that this Aggrieved Claimant at Law/Sovereign, the natural human

living being, beneficiary, of the Cestui que Trust

is not in any way responsible for any alleged acts,

requiring specific performance, or any other obligations created by the Accused/debtor

Cestui que Trust states, in pertinent part, as

follows:
Secured party not obligated on contract of debtor. The existence of a
security interest . . . or authority given to the debtor to dispose of or
use collateral, without more, does not subject a secured party to
liability in contract or tort for the debtor's acts or omissions.

See UCC 9-402. It is a documentary fact that the Cestui que Trust

is a Transmitting Utility and the fiction/artificial entity other than

the Sovereign, the

natural human living being, beneficiary and

Sovereign. As a Sovereign/Claimant at Law with a Security Interest with the Debtor, and
record Owner of the Documents in this action, there can be no law that can supersede the
Holder-in-Due-Course's Priority Claim (Sovereign). The documents that purport to hold
the Debtor, Cestui que Trust to any particular obligation have
been accepted for value by this Secured Party/Sovereign/Claimant at Law, thereby,

discharging the Public Debt.

 The alleged obligations (documentary) that the STATE OF TENNESSEE Court held

over Cestui que Trust (Debtor) have been obtained and

SECURED as the Personal Property of the Sovereign/ Claimant at Law and by my

Authority,

the Debtor Cestui que Trust is RELEASED/DISCHARGED

from any and all, alleged OBLIGATIONS to the STATE OF TENNESSEE.

For The Record. Be It Known: that there is a presumption with respect of the facts

relating to the U.S. Constitution that is designed to protect the commercial interest of its

sovereign's and corporate "person's" pursuant to Article I, 8, which provides that such

fact(s) is "presumed" and before the "trier of fact" can find the existence of this/these

fact(s), the trespasser has the burden to introduce evidence that supports a finding of its

nonexistence. See UCC 1-206.

111.

FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT.

Claimant at Law attests that the district attorney's office perpetrated a fraud by the

use of tricky or artifice to not only bring the Claimant at Law into its Admiralty/Maritime

and Statutory jurisdiction disguised as a criminal court, but also to secure multiple penal

bonds in exchange for a conviction of the charged offense(s) or an agreement to some of

the charged offense(s). FRAUD is defined as:

Any trick or artifice employed by one person to induce another to fall

into error or to detain him in it, so that he may make an agreement
contrary to his interest. The fraud may consist of either, first, in the
misrepresentation, or secondly, in the concealment of a material fact.

Frauds may be also divided into actual or positive and constructive frauds.
 An actual or positive fraud is the intentional and successful employment of any
cunning, deception, or artifice, used to circumvent, cheat, or deceive another.

By constructive fraud is meant such a contract or act, which, though not originating
in any actual evil design or contrivance to perpetrate a positive fraud or injury upon
other persons, yet, by its tendency to deceive or mislead them, or to violate private
or public confidence, or to impair or injure the public interests, is deemed equally
reprehensible with positive fraud, and, therefore, is prohibited by law, as within the
same reason and mischief as contracts and acts done malo animo. Constructive
frauds are such as are either against public policy, in violation of some special
confidence or trust, or operate substantially as a fraud upon private right's, interests,
duties, or intentions of third persons; or unconscientiously compromit, or injuriously
affect, the private interests, rights or duties of the parties themselves.

See Bouvier's Law Dictionary at p. 751 (6th ed. 1856).

An intentional perversion of truth for the purpose of inducing another in reliance upon it
to part with some valuable thing belonging to him or to surrender a legal right; a false
representation of a matter of fact, whether by words or by conduct, by false or
misleading allegations, or by concealment of that which should have been disclosed,
which deceives and is intended to deceive another so that he shall act upon it to his legal
injury. Any kind of artifice employed by one person to deceive another. A generic term,
embracing all multifarious means which human ingenuity can devise, and which are
resorted to by one individual to get advantage over another by false suggestions or by
suppression of truth, and includes all surprise, trick, cunning, dissembling, and any
unfair way by which another is cheated. "Bad faith" and "fraud" are synonymous, and
also synonyms of dishonesty, infidelity, faithlessness, perfidy, unfairness, etc. It consists
of some deceitful practice or willful device, resorted to with intent to deprive another of
his right, or some manner to do him an injury. As distinguished from negligence, it is
always positive, intentional. It comprises all acts, omissions, and
concealments involving a breach of a legal or equitable duty and resulting in damage to
another. And includes anything calculated to deceive, whether it be a single act or
combination of circumstances, whether the suppression of truth or the suggestion of
what is false, whether it be by direct falsehood or by innuendo, by speech or by silence,
by word of mouth, or by look or gesture.

See Black's Law Dictionary at 788-789 (4th Ed.).

46
FRAUD: A knowing misrepresentation of the truth or concealment of a material fact to induce
another to act to his or her detriment. • Fraud is usu. a tort, but in some cases (esp. when the
conduct is willful) it may be a crime. — Also termed intentional fraud. 2. A misrepresentation
made recklessly without belief in its truth to induce another person to act. 3. A tort arising from a
knowing misrepresentation, concealment of material fact, or reckless misrepresentation made to
induce another to act to his or her detriment. 4. Unconscionable dealing; esp., in contract law, the
unfair use of the power arising out of the parties' relative positions and resulting in an
unconscionable bargain. [Cases: Contracts 1. c.J.s. Contracts 55 2-3, 9, 12 . ] — fraudulent, adj.
"[T]he use of the term fraud has been wider and less precise in the chancery than in the common-
law courts. This followed necessarily from the remedies which they respectively administered.
Common law gave damages for a wrong, and was compelled to define with care the wrong which
furnished a cause of action. Equity refused specific performance of a contract, or set aside a
transaction, or gave compensation where one party had acted unfairly by the other. Thus 'fraud' at
common law is a false statement •fraud in equity has often been used as meaning unconscientious
dealing — 'although, I think, unfortunately,' a great equity lawyer has said." William R. Anson,
Principles of the Law of Contract 263 (Arthur L. Corbin ed., 3d Am. ed. 1919).

ACTUAL FRAUD: A concealment or false representation through a statement or conduct that

injures another who relies on it in acting. — Also termed fraud iri fact; positive fraud; moral fraud.
[Cases: Fraud 3.]

BANK FRAUD: The criminal offense of knowingly executing, or attempting to execute, a scheme
or artifice to defraud a financial institution, or to obtain property owned by or under the control of
a financial institution, by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises.

FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT. The affirmative suppression or hiding, with the intent to

deceive or defraud, of a material fact or circumstance that one is legally (or, sometimes, morally)
bound to reveal. — Also termed hidden fraud. [Cases: Fraud 16.]

PASSIVE CONCEALMENT. The act of maintaining silence when one has a duty to speak. [Cases:
Fraud 16.]

CONCEALMENT RULE. The principle that a defendant's conduct that hinders or prevents a
plaintiff from discovering the existence of a claim tolls the statute of limitations until the plaintiff
discovers or should have discovered the claim. — Also termed fraudulent concealment rule.

FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT. The hiding or suppression of a

material fact or circumstance which the party is legally or morally
bound to disclose. Magee v. Insurance Co., 92 U.S. 93, 23 L.Ed.
699. The test of whether failure to disclose material facts constitutes
fraud is the existence of a duty, legal or equitable, arising from the
relation of the parties; failure to disclose a material fact with intent to
mislead or defraud under such circumstances being equivalent to an
actual "fraudulent concealment." Fraudulent concealment justifying
a rescission of a contract is the intentional concealment of some fact
known to the party charged, which is material for the party injured to
know to prevent being defrauded; the concealment of a fact which
one is bound to disclose being the equivalent of an indirect
representation that such fact does not exist. To suspend running of
limitations, it means employment of artifice, planned to prevent
inquiry or escape investigation and mislead or hinder acquirement of

47
 information disclosing a right of action, and acts relied on must be of
an affirmative character and fraudulent.

Black's Law Dictionary ( 4th and 8th Ed.). And finally:

FRAUD. Deceit, deception, artifice, of trickery operating

prejudicially on the rights of another, and so intended, by inducing
him to part with property or surrender some legal right. Anything
calculated to deceive another to his prejudice and accomplishing the
purpose.

FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT. The suppression of, or silence

concerning, a fact material to be known and which the party is
under a duty to communicate because of a confidential relationship
between the parties or the particular circumstances of the case.

See Ballentien's Law Dictionary (3 rd

Ed.). Claimant at Law and Sovereign attests that the

district attorney's office, clerk's office, judge, and public defenders office knowingly

misrepresented the truth by concealing a material fact to induce my response at

arraignment in order bring the Claimant at Law into its Admiralty/Maritime and Statutory

jurisdiction for the purpose of gaining access to the fiction/artificial entity Cestui que Trust

as well as through the use of penal bondsg

Standard forms 24, 25, 25A, 273, 274, and 275 (bid, performance, payment, Reinsurance Agreement for A
29

Miller Act Performance, payment in Favor of The United States Bonds).

without the Claimant at Law's consent, notice, or knowledge to access such
fiction/artificial

entity Cestui que Trust See UCC 1-202.

Here, the trespasser STATE OF TENNESSEE committed fraud when it hid their

true intent, which was to first to charge the artificial/fiction entity Cestui que Trust

then to obtain the Admiralty/Maritime and

Statutory jurisdiction, and finally to obtain access Cestui que Trust

in order to secure a conviction and hold the

48
Claimant at Law in custody for a criminal conviction on nothing more than a commercial

crime(s) as collateral for the commercial value of the penal bonds. Such silence by the

district attorney's office as to their commercial activities constitutes a fraudulent violation

of the trust.

The district attorney's office knowingly, deliberately, and intentionally perverted the

truth for the purpose of inducing the Claimant at Law into error by submitting himself to

the Admiralty/Maritime and Statutory jurisdiction by falsely misrepresenting and

concealing the material fact of the true nature and jurisdiction of the court, which was for

the purpose of deceit, deception, artifice, of trickery in order to use the commercial energy

from the artificial/fiction entity Cestui que Trustto

secure a conviction(s) as collateral for the commercial value of the penal bonds. See
Above

Definitions of Fraud, Fraudulent Concealment, etc.

SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION

Mandatory Requirements of an
Enacting Clause

The question has often been raised as to whether constitutional provisions that call
for a particular form and style of laws, or procedure for their enactment, are to be regarded
as directory or mandatory. The question is critical since its use will have an affect on the
validity of a statute or law. If such provisions are directory, then they are to be treated as
legal advice which those in government can decide whether or not to follow. But, if
mandatory, such provisions must be strictly followed or the resulting act or law is
unconstitutional and invalid.
While few courts at an early period held that such provisions were merely directory,

the great weight of authority has deemed them to be mandatory. In speaking on the

mandatory character of the enacting clause provisions one legal textbook states:

[T]he view that this provision is merely directory seems to conflict with the
fundamental principle of constitutional construction that whatever is
prohibited by the constitution, if in fact done, is ineffectual. And the vast

49
 preponderance of authority holds such provisions to be mandatory and that a
failure to comply with them renders a statute void.

See Ruling Case Law, Vol. 25, "Statutes," 5 84, p, 836. When something is "directory" its

usage is only an advisable guide, and can be ignored. But, the requirement of an enacting

clause is based upon its ancient usage in legislative acts. A declaration of the enacting

authority in laws is a usage and custom of great antiquity, * * * and a compulsory

observance of it is found in sound reason. See e.g. Cain v. Robbins, 131 P.2d 616, 518

(Nev. 1942). The following are "examples" from other States, as like Tennessee, declare

that "the style of the laws shall recite," "be it enacted by the General Assembly of the

State of . . ." is mandatory not merely directory and must be complied with. See
Article Il, 5 20 Tennessee Constitution.
The Supreme Court of Illinois had under consideration an ordinance with no

enacting clauses. The Court expounded upon an ordinance with no enacting clause

invalidated the law stated:

Upon looking into the constitution, it will be observed that "the style of the
laws of this State shall: 'Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois,
represented in the General Assembly."' Article 4 5 11. * * * The foregoing
sections of articles 3, 4, and 5, of the Constitution, are the only ones in that
instrument proscribing the mode in which the will of the people, acting
through the legislative and executive departments of the government, can
become law. * * * That these provisions, giving the form and mode by
which, * * * valid and binding laws are enacted, are, in the highest sense
mandatory, and cannot be doubted. * * * Then it follows that this resolution
cannot be held to be a law. It is not the will of the people, constitutionally
expressed, in the only mode and manner by which that will can acquire the
force and validity, under the constitution, of law for this legislative act is
without a title, has no enacting clause, * * * and is sufficient to deprive this
expression of the legislative will of the force and effect of law; and the same
did not become, therefore, and is not legally binding and obligatory upon the
respondents.

See e.g. City of Carlyle v. Nicolay, 165 N.E. 211, 215-216 (Ill. 1929) affirmed; Liberty

National Bank of Chicago v. Metrick, 102 N.E. 308, 310 (Ill. 1951. The court concluded

50
that the constitutional provision regulating the form and mode of laws, such as the enacting

clause and title, are "essential and indispensable parts" of the process of making laws.

The Supreme Court of Arkansas, on several occasions, ruled on the necessity of the

enacting clause stated:

A long ago as 1871, this court, in Vinsont v. Knox, 27 Ark. 266, held that
the constitutional provision that the style of all bills should be, "Be it
enacted by the General Assembly of the state of Arkansas," was mandatory,
and that a bill without this style was void, although otherwise regularly
passed and approved.

See e.g. Ferrill v. Keel, 151 S.W. 269, 273 (Ark. 1912). In a case in Nevada a law was

passed by the legislature without a proper enacting clause, raising the question of whether

the constitutional enacting clause was a requisite to a valid law. The Court said it was

because the provision was mandatory held that:

[T]he said section of the Constitution is imperative and mandatory, and a

law contravening its provisions is null and void. If one or more of the
positive provisions of the Constitution may be disregarded as being
directory, why not all? And if all, it certainly requires no argument to show
what the result would be. The Constitution, which is the paramount law,
would soon be looked upon the treated by the legislature as devoid of all
moral obligations; without any binding force or effect; a mere "rope of
sand," to be held together or pulled to pieces at its will and pleasure. We
think the provisions under consideration must be treated as mandatory.

Every person at all familiar with the practice of legislative bodies is aware
that one of the most common methods adopted to kill a bill and prevent its
becoming a law, is for a member to move to strike out the enacting clause. If
such a motion is carried, the bill is lost. Can it be seriously contended that
such a bill, with its head cut off, could thereafter by any legislative action
become a law? Certainly not.

See e.g. Nevada v. Rogers, 10 Nev. 250, 255 (1875); Caine v. Robbins, 131 P.2d 516, 518

(Nev. 1942). In the State of Michigan, the Michigan Supreme Court with approval, stated

that:

It will be an unfortunate day for constitutional rights when courts begin the
insidious process of undermining constitutions by holding unambiguous
provisions and limitations to be directory merely to be disregarded at
pleasure.

51
See e.g. People v. Dettenhaler, 77 N.W. 450, 453 (Mich. 1898). In Montana, a case arose

that involved a statute with a "defective enacting clause." The Montana Supreme Court,

after quoting the constitutional section relating to the enacting clause, held that:

These provisions are to be construed a mandatory, because there is no

exception to their requirements expressed anywhere in the constitution are
so plainly and clearly expressed and are so entirely free from ambiguity that
there can be no substantial ground for any other conclusion than that
Chapter 199 was not enacted in accordance with the mandatory provisions
of that instrument, and that the Act must be declared invalid.

See e.g. Vaughn & Ragsdale co. v. State Bd. Of Equalization, 96 P.2d 420, 423-424
(Mont.

1939). In affirming this decision in a later case, the same Court said that "the enacting

clause of a bill goes to the substance of the bill; it is not merely procedural." See e.g.

Morgan v. Murray, 328 P.2d 644, 654 (Mont. 1958). The Court further said that a

resolution could not be regarded as a law because, "It has no enacting clause without which

it never could become law." See e.g. State v. Highway Patrol Board, 372 P.2d 930, 944

(Mont. 1962).

In the State of Kentucky, the Kentucky Court of Appeals held a statute void for not

having an enacting clause and stated that all constitutional provisions are mandatory

stating that:

Certainly there is no longer room for doubt as to the affect of all provisions
of the constitution of this state. By common consent they are deemed
mandatory. * * * No creature of the constitution has power to question its
authority or uphold inoperative any section or provision of it. * * * bill in
question is not complete, it does not meet the plain constitutional demand.
Without an enacting clause it is void.

See e.g. Commonwealth v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 170 S.W. 171, 175 (Ky. 1918); Louisville
Trust

Co. v, Morgan, 203 S.W. 555 (Ky. 1918). In the State New Jersey, the New Jersey
Superior
Court stated that:

52
 The provision of these solemn instruments (constitutions) are not advisory,
or mere suggestions of what would be fit and proper, but commands which
must be obeyed.

See e.g. Village of Ridgefield Park v. Bergen Co. Bd. of Tax., 162 A.2d 132, 134 (N.J.
Super.

1960). In the State of Minnesota, in a number of landmark cases on this subject, the

Minnesota Supreme Court held the following regarding the enacting clause provision in its

State Constitution stated that:

Upon both principle and authority, we hold that Article IV SS 13, of our
constitution, which provides that "the style of all laws of this state shall be,
'Be it enacted by the legislature of the state of Minnesota,"' is mandatory,
and that a statute without any enacting clause is void. Strict conformity with
the constitution ought to be an axiom in the science of government.

See e.g. Sjoberg v. Security Savings & Loan Assn., 75 N.W. 1116, 73 Minn. 203, 212

(1898); affirmed in Freeman v. Goff, 287 N.W. 238, 241 (Minn. 1939); State v. Naftalin,

74 N.W.2d 249, 262 (Minn. 1956); state v. Zimmerman, 204 N.W. 803, 812 (Wis. 1925).

Section 45 on the Alabama Constitution prescribes that "the style of laws if this

state shall be, 'Be it enacted by the Legislature of Alabama."' In determining the nature and

purpose of this section the Federal Circuit Court of Alabama stated that:

Complainant correctly urges that this section is mandatory, and not

directory; that not equivalent words will suffice; and that any departure from
the mode prescribed is fatal to the enactment, since, if one departure in style,
however slight, is permitted, another must be, and the constitutional policy
embodied in the section would soon become without any force whatever.

See e.g. Montgomery Amusement Co. v. Montgomery Traction Co., 139 Fed. 353, 358

(1905), affirmed, 140 Fed. 988. In the State of Georgia, the Georgia Supreme Court held

that the use of an enacting clause is "essential," and that without it the Act they had under

consideration was "a nullity and of no force and affect as law." See e.g. Joiner v. State, 155

S.E.2d 8, 10 (Ga. 1967). This decision was based upon the traditional use of an enacting
clause by Georgia's General Assembly. In an earlier decision, the Court held that a

53
measure containing no enacting clause had no effect as intended in a legal sense. See e.g.
Walden v.
Town ofWhigham, 48 S.E. 159 (Ga. 1904).

In the State of North Carolina, the North Carolina Supreme Court held that an act

prohibiting the sale of spirituous liquors is inoperative and void for want of an enacting

clause as prescribed by the Constitution further stated that:

The very great importance of the constitution, as the organic law of the state
and people, cannot be overstated. * * * It is not to be disregarded, ignored,
suspended, or broken, in whole or in part. * * * When it prescribed that a
particular act or thing shall be done in a way and manner specified, such
direction must be treated as a command, and an observance of it essential to
the effectiveness of the act or thing to be done. Such act cannot be complete,
such thing is not effectual, until done in the way and manner so prescribed.

See e.g. State v. Patterson, 4 S.E. 350, 351 (N.C. 1887). The case was later approved by

the Court held that an enacting clause is "mandatory," and thus the act under consideration

which had no enacting clause "must be regarded as inoperative and void." The North

Carolina Supreme Court has further held that, "To be valid and effective the Acts of the

general Assembly must be enacted in conformity with the Constitution." See e.g. Advisory

Opinion In Re House Bill No. 65, 43 DE.2d 73, 76-77 (N.C. 1947).

In the State of Missouri, the Missouri Supreme Court held that constitutional

requirements, such as the enacting clause, "are mandatory and not directory." The case

involved an initiative measure by the people which was without an enacting clause as

required by the constitution. The Missouri Supreme Court said that "under such a

requirement the omission of an enacting clause in a proposed initiative measure renders it

void." See e.g. State ex rel Scott v. Kilpatrick, 484 S.W.2d 161, 163 (Mo. 1972). In an

earlier case, the Missouri Supreme Court held that where a law fails to conform to such

provisions "there is no other alternative, but to pronounce it invalid. See e.g. State v.

Miller, 45 Mo.

54
495, 498 (1870).

In a similar case in Arkansas, the Arkansas Supreme Court held that a legislative

initiative under the state constitution required to have a specific enacting clause, but the

initiative involved had no such clause. The Court held that:

This constitutional requirement, that the measure sought to be initiated shall

have an enacting clause, is mandatory. There is absolutely no enacting
clause in the measure here involved; and therefore, the petition is not legally
sufficient.

See e.g. Hailey v. Carter, 251 S.W.2d 826, 828 (Ark. 1952). The dangers of not treating

such provisions mandatory have been noted in the following statement:

It seems to us that the rule which gives to the courts and other departments
of the government a discretionary power to treat a constitutional provision
as directory, and to obey it or not, at their pleasure, is fraught with great
danger to the government, and to the rights and liberties of the people, than
the doctrine which permits a loose, latitudinous discretionary construction of
the organic law.

See e.g. Hunt v. State, 3 S.W. 233, 235 (Tex.App. 1886). In the State of South Carolina,

the South Carolina Supreme Court held that an enacting clause provision is mandatory and

not directory, e.g. Smith v. Jennings, 45 S.E. 821 (S.C. 1903), and Indiana Supreme Court

in e.g.

May v. Rice, 91 Ind. 546 (1883). These provisions relating to the mode of enacting law

"have been repeatedly held to be mandatory, and that any legislation in disregard thereof is

unconstitutional rendering such law null and void." See e.g. State v. Burlington & M.R.R.

Co.,

84 N.W. 254, 255 (Neb. 1900)

Finally, in the State of Tennessee, the Tennessee Supreme Court held that an

enacting clause provision is mandatory and not directory. See e.g. State v. Burrow, 104

S.W.

55
526 (Tenn. 1907); Kefauver et al. v. Spurling, 290 S.W. 14 (Tenn. 1926); Article 11, 5 20
(Style of Laws of this state shall be, "Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of

Tennessee . . ."). The Tennessee Supreme Court reviewed many other cases and concluded

that:

The provision we are here called upon to construe is in plain and

unambiguous words. The meaning of it is clear and indisputable, and no
ground for construction can be found. The language is: "The Style of Laws
of this state shall be," etc. The word "shall," as used here, is equivalent to
"must." We know of no case in which a provision of the Constitution thus
expressed has been held to be directory. We think this one clearly
mandatory, and must be complied with by the Legislature in all Legislation,
important and unimportant, enacted by it; otherwise it will be invalid.

See e.g. Burrow, 104 S.W. at 529; Kefauver, 290 S.W. at 14; Biggs v. Beeler, 173 S.W.2d
144,

146 (Tenn. 1943). In Tennessee, it is undisputed and clearly shown that the publication

56
 T.C.A. Code Statute laws used as supposed authority lack the mandatory enacting clauses
required by Article Il, 520 are void as laws.
The conclusion to be drawn here would dictate that laws which fail to adhere
to the fundamental concept of containing an enacting clause lose their authority as law
and would seem quite clear that the lack of enacting clauses on the laws used in
Revised Statute, (as will be addressed below), or U.S. Code have no sign of authority
and are void as laws. It was not a choice of Congress or the Legislature to approve of
laws which have no enacting style. The use of such form and style for all laws is
mandatory, and any failure to comply with such provision for any reason, such as for
convenience, renders the measure null and void.

The Absence of an Enacting Clause

Provision in a Constitution

While the United States Constitution and a few State constitutions do not
specifically prescribe that all laws use an enacting clause style, its use is nonetheless
required by our written constitution. The use of an enacting clause and even a title exists
by fundamental law; they are common law concepts.
Like many old and well established concepts of law and procedures, the framers

on the United States Constitution did not feel it necessary to write into the requirement of

the enacting clause or titles on all laws. There are so many of these fundamental concepts

that it would be impractical to list all in a constitution. But that does not mean they don't

exist, just like the rights enumerated in the Bill of rights were not originally written into

the Constitution because they were recognized to be so fundamental it would be

superfluous to list them.

57
 Furtherance, the use of an enacting clause is necessary or required despite its failure

to be prescribed in a constitution has been often recognized. Several legal authorities have

sited with the approval of Mr. Cushing in his Law & Practice of Legislative Assemblies

(1819)

52102, where he states:

(1)Where enacting words are prescribed, nothing can be a law which is not
introduced by those very words, even though others which are equivalent
are at the same time used.

(2)Where the enacting words are not prescribed by a constitutional

provision, the enacting authority must notwithstanding be stated.
And any words which do this to a common understanding are
doubtless sufficient, or the words may be prescribed by rule. In this
respect much must depend upon its usage.

See e.g. Smith v. Jennings, 45 S.E. at 824-825; Illinois Cent. R. Co. 170 S.W. at 173;
Rogers, 10 Nev. 250, 257; Sjoberg v. Security Savings & Loan Assn., 73 Minn. 203,
211.
The usage of an enacting clause is thousands of years old, and every state and the
United States have followed this custom from the beginning. Thus, for something to be
regarded as a true and valid law it is logical that one would expect to see an enacting
clause on its face.
One of the leading cases on this issue was from the Supreme Court for the
Territory of Washington. The validity of an act of the Territorial Legislature that would
move the seat of the government was in question. The act had no enacting clause, and the
territory had no constitution of its own requiring one, as it was generally governed by the
United
States Constitution. The Court held the law invalid stated that:

Strip this act of its outside appendages, leave it "solitary and alone," is it
possible for any human being to tell by what authority the seat of

58
government of Washington Territory was to be removed from Olympia to
Vancouver?

The staring fact that the constitutions of so many states, made and
perfected by the wisdom of their greatest legal lights, contain a statement
of an enacting clause, in which the power of the enacting authority is

59
 incorporated, is to our minds a strong, and powerful argument of its necessity. It
is fortified and strengthened by the further fact that Congress, and the other
states, to say nothing of the English Parliament, have, by almost unbroken
custom and usage, prefaced all their laws with some set form of words, in which
is contained the enacting authority. Guided by the authority of such eminent
Jurist as Blackstone, Kent, and Cushing, and the precedents of national and state
legislation, the Court arrives with satisfaction and consciousness of right in
declaring, that where an act like the one now under consideration, is wanting in
the essential formalities and solemnities which have been mentioned, it is
inoperative and void, and of no binding force or effect.

See e.g. In re Seat ofgovernment, 1 Wash, Ter. 115, 123 (1851). The court here judges the

validity of the law based upon fundamental law, rather than any specific constitutional

provision. This case has been cited quite frequently by various legal texts and courts that is

always in a favorable or approving manner.

Various law textbooks in the discussion of statutes having clearly stated the need for an

enacting clause despite the lack of a constitutional provision for one stated that:

Although there is no constitutional provision requiring and enacting clause, such

a clause has been held to be requisite to the validity of the legislative enactment.
82 Corpus Juris Secundum, "Statutes," 65, p. 104.

In recognition of this custom [of using an enacting clause], it has sometimes

been declared that an acting clause is necessary to the validity of a statute,
although there is no provision in the fundamental law requiring such a clause.

See e.g. Ruling Case Law, Vol. 25, "Statutes," 22, p, 776. In 1967, the Supreme Court of

Georgia held that a law without an enacting clause was null and void, even though their State

constitution had no provision requiring one. They based their decision on the long standing

custom of its usage. See e.g. Joiner v. State, 155, S.E.2d 8, 10 (Ga. 1967).

The requirement that all laws contain an enacting style or clause is deeply rooted in

precedent and the common law. Thus, there need not be any constitutional provision for an

enacting clause to make its usage mandatory. If it is not used the law in question is not valid

and carries no obligation to be followed.

Enacting Clauses in the Publication

Of Statute Books

60
 While it has been decided that the passage of a bill in the legislature without an enacting
clause on the bill renders it null and void as a law, we need to consider the result of not using
an enacting clause after it leaves the legislature. This is the the important question today in
light of the fact that the state "codes" and "Revised Statutes" and the "U.S. Code" are
publications which purport to be law, but which use no enacting clauses. It is a publication of a
law without an enacting clause a valid and lawful law?
If laws are only required to have an enacting clause while in the legislative system, only

to be thereafter removed, then what is the value and purpose to the public? If they are to serve

as evidence of the law's legislative nature, and as identification of its source and authority as

law, what good does that function do only for the legislators? The vast majority of the public

never sees the bill under consideration until it passes and is printed in public records and statute

books. The public generally only see the finished "law."

When we read the provisions which require an enacting clause, they say that "all laws
shall . . . ," or "the laws of this State shall . . They do not say "all bills shall . . ." The terms
"bill" and "law" are clearly distinguishable from one another in most constitutions in
prescribing the procedure of the legislative process, such as:
"No law shall be passed except by bill"

"No bill shall become a law except by a vote of a majority."

"Every bill which shall pass both houses shall be presented to the governor of the
State; and every bill he approves shall become a law."

Tennessee Constitution Article Il, 5 17. A bill is a form or draft of a law presented to a

legislature. "A bill does not become a law until the constitutional prerequisites have been met."

See e.g. State v. Naftalin, 74 N.W.2d 249, 261 (Minn. 1956). Thus, a bill is something that

becomes a law. Laws do not exist in the legislature, only bills do. Law exist only when the

legislature's process is followed and completed as prescribed in the constitution as stated below

that:

Clearly, the legislature cannot enact a law. It merely has the power to pass
bills which may become laws when signed by the presiding officer of each
house and are approve and signed by the Governor.

61
 See e.g. Vaughn & Ragsdale Co., 96 P.2d at 423. Since all constitutional provisions place the

requirement of an acting clause on "laws" it includes the statute as it exists outside the

legislative process, that is, as it is published in statute books. We have to also regard the

fundamental maxim which states, "A law in not obligatory unless it be promulgated." See

Black's Law Dictionary, p. 826 (2nd Ed.). An act is not even regarded as law, or enforceable as

law, unless it be made publicly known. This is usually done through a publication by the

proper public authority such as the Secretary of State. But, a law is not properly or lawfully

promulgated without an enacting clause or title published with the law.

Since the constitution requires "all laws" to have an enacting clause, it makes it a
requirement on published law as well as on the bills in the legislature. If the constitution said
"all bills" shall have an enacting clause, then their use in publications would be required.
That published laws as to have an enacting clause is made clear by the statement

commonly used by legal authorities that an enacting clause of the law is to be "on its face."

To be on its face means to be in the same plain of view that:

Face has been defined as the surface of anything; especially the front, upper,
or outer part or surface; that which particularly offers itself to the view of
spectator.

The face of an instrument is that which is shown by the language employed

without any explanation, modification or addition from extrinsic facts or
evidence.

See e.g. Cunningham v. Great Southern Life Ins. Co., 66 S.W.2d 765, 773 (Tex.Civ.App.

1933); In re Stoneman, 146 N.Y.S. 172, 174 (1914). For the enacting clause to be of any use it

must appear with a law, that is, on its face, so that all who look at the law know that it came

from the legislature authority designated by the Constitution. The enacting clause would not

serve its intended purpose if not printed in the statute book on the face of the law, and further

stated that:

The purpose of the enacting clause in legislation is to express on its face of the
legislation itself the authority behind the act and identify it as an act of
legislation. see e.g. Preckel v. Byrne, 243 N.W. 823, 826 (N.D. 1932).

62
 The purpose of the provisions of this chapter [enacting clauses] is that all statutes
may bear upon their faces a declaration of the sovereign authority by which they
are enacted and declared to be law, and to promote and preserve uniformity in
legislation. Such clauses also import a command of obedience and clothe the
statute with a certain dignity in all times command respect and aid in the
enforcement of laws. See e.g. State v. Burrow, 104 S.W. 526, 529 (Tenn. 1907).

It is necessary that every law should show on its face the authority by which it is
adopted and promulgated, and that it should clearly appear that it is intended by
the legislative power that enacts it that it should take effect as a law. See e.g.
People v. Dettentha!er, 77 N.W. 450, 451 (Mich. 1898), citing Swan v. Black, 40
Miss. 268 (1866).

The enacting clause, sometimes referred to as the commencement or style of the

act, is used to indicate the authority from which the statute emanates. Indeed, it is
a custom of long standing to cause legislative enactments to express on their face
the authority by which they were enacted or promulgated. Earl T. Crawford, The
Construction of Statutes, St. Louis, 1940, 89, p. 125.

A law is "promulgated" by its being printed and published that is made available or
accessible by a public document such as an official statute bookÅ9 When this promulgation

30
To publish; to announce officially; to make public as important or obligatory. See e.g. Price v. Supreme Home of
the Ancient Order of Pilgrims, Tex.Com.App., 285 S.W. 310, 312. PROMULGATION. The order given to cause a
law to be executed and to make it public; it differs from publication. 1 Bl.Comm. 45; Stat. 6 Hen. VI. c.
occurs, the enacting clause is to appear "on the face" of that law, thus being printed in that

statute book along with the law.

Enacting clauses traditionally appear right after the title and before the body of the

law. It cannot be in some other record of book, as stated by the Minnesota Supreme Court that:

If an enacting clause is useful and important, if it is desirable that laws shall bear
upon their face the authority by which they are enacted, so that the people who
are to obey them need not search legislative and other records to ascertain the
authority, then it is not beneath the dignity of the framers of the constitution, or
unworthy of such an instrument, to prescribe a uniform style for such enacting
clause.

See e.g. Sjoberg, 75 N.W. 1116, 73 Minn. at 212. This case dealt with "the validity of Laws

1897, c. 250," and it was held that "Law 1897, c. 250, is void." While the court mainly

decided this because the law had no enacting clause when signed by the Governor, it clearly

63
expressed that if laws are to be regarded as valid laws of the state, they "must express upon

their face the authority by which they are promulgated or enacted." The law was thus

challenged as being "unconstitutional" because it contains no enacting clause.

The enacting clause must be readily visible on the face of the statute so that the public

don't have to search through the legislative journals or other records or books to see

if one exists. Therefore, a statute book without the enacting clause is not a valid

publication of the laws. As in the State of Nevada, the Nevada Supreme Court held that:

Our constitution expressly provided that the enacting clause of every law shall
be, "The people of this state of Nevada, represented in the senate and assembly,
do enact as follows." This language is susceptible of but one interpretation. There
is no doubtful meaning as to the intention. It is, in our judgment, an imperative
mandate of the people, in their sovereign capacity,

4. In modern practice, it is usually by publishing one or more volumes of the laws and circulating them among
public officials and selling them. As to the practice in England at various times, see Record Com. in 7 Sel. Essays
in Anglo-Amer. L. H. 168. As to the rules of a railway company it means made known; brought to the attention of
the service affected thereby, so that a servant is bound to take notice. See e.g. Wooden v. R. Co., Super., 18 N.Y.S.
768. Formerly promulgation meant introducing a bill to the senate; Aust. Jur. Lect, 28
to the legislature, requiring that all laws, to be binding upon them, shall upon
their face, express the authority by which they were enacted; and since this act
comes to us without such authority appearing upon its face, it is not a law.

See e.g. Nevada v. Rogers, 10 Nev. at 261; Dettenhaler, 77 N.W. at 452; Spurling, 290 S.W. at

15. The manner in which the law came to the court was by the way it was found in the statute

book, cited by the court as "Stat. 1875, 66," and that is how they judge the validity of the law.

Since they saw that the act, as it was printed in the statute book, had an insufficient enacting

clause on its face, it was deemed to be "not a law." It is only by inspecting the publicly printed

statute book that the people can determine the source, authority, and authenticity of the law

they are to follow.

In the state of Arkansas, the Arkansas Supreme Court, in construing what are the

essentials of law making, and what constitutes a valid law, the Court stated that:

[A] legislative act, when made, should be a written expression of the legislative
will, in evidence, not only of the passage, but of the authority of the law-making

64
 power, is nearly or quite a self-evident proposition. Likewise, we regard it as
necessary that every act, thus expressed, should show on its face the authority by
which it was enacted and promulgated, in order that it should clearly appear,
upon simple inspection of the written law, that it was intended by the legislative
power which enacted it, that it should take effect as law. These relate to the
authenticity of the legislative will. These are features by which courts of justice
and the public are to judge of its authenticity and validity. These, then, are
essentials of the weightiest importance, and the requirements of their observance,
in the enacting and promulgation of laws, are absolutely imperative. Not the least
important of these essentials is the style or enacting clause.

See e.g. VinsantAdm'x v. Knox, 27 Ark. 266, 284-285 (1871). The common mode by which a

law is "promulgated" is by it being printed and published in some authorized public statute

book. Thus, that mode of promulgation must show the enacting clause of each law therein on

its face, that is, on the face of the law as it is printed in the statute book. This is the only way

that the "courts of justice and the public are to judge of its authenticity and validity.

The decision in the Vinsant case was later approved by the Court in a case where a man

was convicted of failing to follow and animal health law, "The Tick Eradication Law." He

appealed by demurrer on the basis that the law claimed violated in the indictment did not have

an enacting clause as found in the statute book. The Vinsant Court further stated that:

The appellant demurred to the indictment on the ground that the facts stated do
not charge a public offense. The appellant contends that Act 200 of the Acts of
1915, p. 804, providing a method of putting in operation the tick eradication law
in Pike County, was void because it has no enacting clause. Appellant is correct
in this contention. The act contains no enacting clause, and under the decisions of
this court, such defect renders it a nullity.

See Article 5, 19, and Article 29, amend. 10 of the Constitution 1874; e.g. Vinsant, 27 Ark. at

284-285; Palmer v. State, 208 S.W. 436 (Ark. 1919). The section of the state of Arkansas's

Constitution cited by the Vinsant Court, Article 5, 5 19, states that: "Style of Laws of the state

of Arkansas shall be, Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas." The

laws of the State are to bear this enacting style; otherwise they are not valid laws. The law in

this case was missing this constitutional prerequisite of an enacting clause as printed in the

statute book. As such it carried no force and effect as a law. Thus, laws as they are taken or

65
cited from statute bocks that have no enacting clause cannot be used to charge someone with a

public offense because they are not valid laws.

In a case out of Kansas, a man was indicted for violating a law making it unlawful to

print and circulate scandals, assignations, and immoral conduct of persons. He was arrested

upon an indictment and applied for his discharge upon habeas corpus alleging that the act of

legislature was not properly published. The act had been published several weeks before the

indictment, "which publication omitted an essential part of said act, to wit, the enacting clause."

The Court held that the act was not properly and legally published at the time the indictment

was found, therefore, the act was not in force as the time the indictment was brought against

accused. In addressing this issue, the Kansas

Supreme Court held that:

The publication of an act of the legislature, omitted the enacting clause or any
other essential part thereof, is no publication in law. The law not being in force
when the indictment was found against the petitioner, nor when the acts
complained of therein were done, the petitioner could not have been guilty of any
crime under its provisions, and is therefore, so far as this indictment is concerned,
is entitled to his discharge.

See e.g. In re Swartz, 27 Pac. 839, 840 (Kan. 1891). There was no question involved here of

whether an enacting clause was used on the bill in the legislature. The fact that the law was

published without an enacting clause was sufficient to render the law null and void or invalid.

Therefore, a publication of an act omitting the enacting clause is not a valid publication of the

act. If the required statement of authority is not on the face of the law, it is not a law that has

any force and effect. Such a published law cannot be used on indictments or complaints to

charge the accused with a crime for its violation. This decision was upheld and affirmed by the

court in 1981, which stated that:

In [the case of] Swartz, 27 Pac. at 840, this court found the act in question was
invalid because it had been mistakenly published without an enacting clause. We
again adhere to the dictates of that opinion.

66
See e.g. State v. Kearns, 623 P.2d 507, 509 (Kan. 1981). Based on the holding of the Kansas

Supreme Court, whatever is published without and enacting clause is void, as it lacks the

required evidence or statement of authority. Such a law lacks proof that it came from the

authorized source spelled out in the constitution, and is therefore, not a valid publication to

which the public is subject or obligated to give credence.

In the law text, Ruling Case Law, is a section that deals with the requirements of

statutes, and under the subheading, "Publication of Statute," it states that: The publication of a

statute without the enacting clause is no publication. Ruling Case Law, Vol. 25, "Statutes," S

133, p. 884; citing L.R.A. 1915B. p. 1065. A publication of a statute book without the title and

enacting clause on the laws is an incomplete or invalid publication, just like a publication of a

book or magazine article is incomplete without the title and author's name is just a nameless

body of words.

In the State of Kentucky, when a law was claimed to be void because it was found to

have no enacting clause, the I<entucky Court of appeals read the entire law (Chapter 68) from

the statute book and then stated that:

It will be noticed that the act does not contain and enacting clause. * * * The
alleged act or law in question is unnamed; it shows no sign of authority; it carries
with it no evidence that the general Assembly or any other lawmaking power is
responsible or answerable for it.

See e.g. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 170 S.W. at 175. The law was therefore, declared "void' because

of the fact that the act appeared in the statute book without an enacting clause. Likewise, the

alleged law in the U.S. Code or the state Revised Statutes are "unnamed," they show "no sign

of authority" on their face; there is no evidence that they came from Congress or a State

Legislature. The enacting clause has been deliberately removed from these "laws" and

therefore, is only nameless decrees without authority. The South Carolina Supreme Court

stated that in order for bills to "have the force of law," they "must have an enacting clause

67
showing the authority by which they are promulgated." See e.g. Jennings, 45 S.E. at 824.

Therefore, the publication of a law must display its enacting authority in its published statute

books.

In the Kentucky case above was later cited by the same Court when it was found that an
enacting clause was missing from "chapter 129, p. 540, of the Sessions Acts" for 1934.
Regarding this omission the Court stated that: "By oversight and mistake the constitutionally
required enacting clause was omitted from the act, thereby rendering it illegal and invalid." See
e.g. Sticker v. Higgins, 106 S.W.2d 1008, 1009 (Ky. 1937). The law in question, which was to
"consolidate the county offices of sheriff and jailer," was deemed to be "ineffectual" in
accomplishing its objective because it was published without an enacting clause for some
unknown reason.
In a case in the State of Montana, the validity of a statute in its statute book (Chapter

199, Laws of 1937) was being questioned because it had a faulty or insufficient enacting

clause. The Montana Supreme Court held the law invalid stating that:

The measure comes before this court in the condition we find it in the duly
authorized volume of the Session law of 1937, and in determining whether
Chapter 199 is valid or not we are confronted with a factual situation. It is
entirely immaterial how the defective enacting clause happens to be part of the
measure.

See e.g. Vaughn & Ragsdale co. v. State Bd. Of Equalization, 96 P.2d at 422. Here again, the
invalidity of the law, due to its "defective" enacting clause, was judged by its condition as it
was published in the statute books of the State. The law had the enacting clause, "Be it enacted
by the people of Montana." However, this style was only to be used for measures initiated by
the people. Laws passed by the legislature were to have a different enacting clause - "Be it
enacted by the legislative Assembly of the State of Montana." As this was a legislative
enactment, it was void for having the wrong enacting clause.
In North Carolina, a legislative enactment for the incorporation of a town and the

regulation of spirituous liquors therein was challenged because it had no enacting clause. The

law cited from the statute book a "Private Acts 1887, c. 113, 8. A man was indicted with the

offense of selling spirituous liquors in the town and there was a verdict of guilty. On appeal the

State Supreme Court held that there was "error in the judgment because the law charged against

the man was void, stated that:

In the case before us, what purports to be the statute in question has no enacting
clause, and nothing appears as a substitute for it.

68
 constitution, in Article 2, in prescribing how statutes shall be enacted, provides as
follow:

"Section 23. The style of the acts shall be: 'The General Assembly of North
Carolina do enact."'

It thus appears that its framer, and the people who ratified it, deem such
provisions wise and important; the purpose being to require every legislative act
of the legislature to purport and import upon its face to have been enacted by the
general assembly.

We are therefore of the opinion that the supposed statute in the question has not
been perfected, and is not such in contemplation of the constitution; that it is
wholly inoperative and void.

See e.g. Patterson, 4 S.E. at 352. This alleged law could not be called a law pursuant to the

constitution, because it existed in the statute books without an enacting clause on its face.

In a case in the State of Louisiana, a law was claimed to be unconstitutional based on

the fact that it had no enacting clause as it existed in the statute book. The main evidence that

the court used in holding the act unconstitutional was its status as found within the printed book

recognized that:

The contention that the statute of 1944 is unconstitutional is based upon the fact
that it contains no enacting clause. The State Constitution of 1921, in Section 7
ofArticle 3, provides that:

The style of laws of this State shall be: 'Be it enacted by the Legislature of
Louisiana."'

A mere glance at an official volume of the acts of 1944, discloses that the statute
in question, Act 303 of 1944, contains no such enacting clause nor any part
thereof. * * * And from the fact that it does not appear in the printed volume of
acts, we conclude that the act was originally and finally defective.

See e.g. O'Rourke v. O'Rourke, 69 So.2d 567, 572-575 (La.App. 1954). It could not be
deducted exactly how the law came to be with no enacting clause. An examination of the
original journal of the proceedings of each house could not disclose whether the enacting
clause was present when the act was passed. The Court thus relied upon the status of the law in
the printed statute book as proof of the overall status of the law. Therefore, the law was said to
be "originally" defective because it was deducted that there was no enacting clause when the
act was passed, and it was "finally" defective because it was printed in the volume of the acts
without an enacting clause.

69
 In a later case, this same court upheld this decision in declaring that a law was void

because it too was recorded or printed in the statute books without an enacting clause. In

upholding its decision, the court stated that:

The state statute on which both plaintiff and defendant rely cannot be given
effect. What is reported in La. Acts 1968, Ex. Session, as Act No. 24 is not law
because it does not contain the enacting clause which La. Const. Art. 3, 5 7
requires to distinguish legislative action as law rather than mere resolution or
some other act. Complete absence of the enacting clause renders the statute
invalid.

See e.g. First National Bank of Commerce, New Orleans v. Eaves, 282 So.2d 741, 743-744

(La.App. 1973). Again, the invalidity of the law was deduced by the manner in which it was

published. This decision raises another reason why the enacting clause must be printed in the

public law book. It is so that the ordinary person can identify it as a public law as opposed to a

resolution, proclamation, executive order, or and administrative rule. The enacting clause

distinguishes a true public law from all other types of acts.

An enacting style of a law generally reads, "Be it enacted." While the style of a

resolution usually reads, "be it resolved," or "Resolved, that." Most state constitutions make a

distinction between a law and a resolution. The Constitution for the United States distinguishes

a "resolution" and "order' from a "bill" which can "become a law." Article I,

7. They each go through the same basic formalities with respect to vote and procedure in
congress, but they are not the same thing.
When we look at the "laws" in the "United States Code," how do we know that they are

public laws passed by Congress? For all we know they could be "more resolutions," which

carry no force and effect as laws. When we are charged with a violation of a law from the

"Oregon Revised Statutes," how do we know that this is a law from the legislature of Oregon?

There is no enacting clause on the face of the law to indicate whether it is a law, a resolution,

an order, or an administrative rule. What then is a resolution?

RESOLUTION. The term is usually employed to denote the adoption of a

motion, the subject-matter of which would not properly constitute a statute; such

70
 as a mere expression of opinion; and alteration of the rules; a vote of thanks or of
censure, etc. Black's Law Dictionary, p. 1027 (2 nd ed.).

A resolution or order is not a law, but merely the form in which the legislative
body expresses an opinion.

The general rule is that a joint or concurrent resolution adopted by the legislature
is not a statute, does not have the force or effect of law, and cannot be used for
any purpose for which an exercise of legislative power is necessary.

See e.g. Chicago & N.P.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 51 N.E. 576, 598 (Ill. 1898); Village of
Altamont v. Baltimore & O.S.W. Ry. Co., 56 N.E. 340, 341 (Ill. 1900); Van Hovenberg v.
Holaman, 144 S.W.2d 718, 721 (Ark, 1040); 73 American Jurisprudence (2 nd ed.), "Statutes," S

3, p. 270. In Indiana, a joint resolution was passed for the appropriation of money, which used

the enacting clause style: "Be it Resolved by the General Assembly of the State of Indiana."

The State Constitution allows for the appropriation of funds to be made only by law. The State

Supreme Court said "the resolution is not law," as laws for appropriation of money "cannot be

enacted by joint resolution." See e.g. May v. Rice, 91 Ind.Rep. 546 (1883).

That which is printed in the revised Statute books and the U.S. Code could just as well
be resolutions, which carry no force of law. If these statutes had enacting clauses, all would
know what they were, the authority for their existence, and how they affect their rights and
obligations. However, they have no enacting clauses, and thus, these publications in law which
can be used to charge the accused with a crime. No enacting clause has been published with
these "laws." They are only words of some committee, therefore, are not constitutionally
authorized laws which the people are not obligated to follow or obey. A law exist not only in
the manner in which it is enacted, but also in the manner in which it is promulgated or
published. A law cannot validly exist in printed form without the constitutionally required
enacting clause.

PROCEDURE. JURISDICTION. & ARGUMENTS

Criminal Jurisdiction

Jurisdiction, in terms of the authority of the court, is of two main types, and Judge

Cooley stated:

The proceedings in any court are void if it wants jurisdiction of the case in which
it has assumed to act. Jurisdiction is, first, of the subject-matter; and second, of
the persons whose rights are to be passed upon.

71
 Both types of jurisdiction are required in criminal matters. To try a person for the
commission of a crime, the trial court must have jurisdiction of both the subject-
matter and the person of the accused.

Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations, Little, Brown, & Co.,

Boston, 1883 p. 493; 21 American Jurisprudence "Criminal Law," 338, p. 588. Personal

Jurisdiction (in personum Jurisdiction).

Jurisdictional arguments, to be of any merit, even in the present day de facto

admiralty/military courts, have to be based upon some concept of law that would have had

merit 150 years ago. All of the popular jurisdictional arguments used today fail this test.

However, by divine Providence a flaw has been placed within the current legal system, one

which causes it to exist and operate without any actual jurisdiction to which sovereigns are

subjected too. This flaw relates to subject-matter jurisdiction, not personal jurisdiction. The

system that has grown up around us has a defect which causes a lack of subject-matter

jurisdiction in the courts, which means that no criminal case can be lawfully tried.

It is important, however, that one knew of this defect so it can be asserted against
officials or in court, for if it is not, then it is as though the defect doesn't exist. The key then lies
in understanding subject-matter jurisdiction.

Subject-Matter Jurisdiction

Jurisdiction of the subject matter involves the actual thing involved in the controversy.

In civil matters it is usually some property or money in dispute, or it might be the tort or wrong

one has committed against another, or it might be a contract, marriage, bankruptcy, lien, or will

that is in dispute. If the property or thing in dispute never existed there would be no subject-

matter jurisdiction.

In criminal proceedings, the thing that forms the subject matter is the crime or public

offense that is allegedly committed and as the Kansas Supreme Court stated that:

72
 The subject-matter ofa crimina) offense is the crime itself. Subject-matter in its
broadest sense means the cause; object; the thing in dispute.

See e.g. Stilwell v. Markham, 10 P.2d 15, 16 (Kan. 1932). Most cases in which there would be

a want of subject-matter jurisdiction are self evident. If the subject-matter or crime is outside

the territorial jurisdiction of the court, then the court would not have jurisdiction over the thing

or crime involved. Also, certain types of courts are given the authority, either by constitutional

grant or statute, to hear certain types of cases. A federal tax court has subject-matter

jurisdiction over federal tax matters, not over state tax matters of bankruptcy cases. A probate

court has jurisdiction over a will, but has no subject-matter jurisdiction over the crime of

burglary. A Justice of the Peace who is given authority to hear misdemeanor cases, has no

subject-matter jurisdiction to hear felony cases.

It is said in a general sense that subject-matter jurisdiction refers to the power of the

court to hear and decide a case, or a particular class of cases; this is because jurisdiction of a

court is derived from law (constitution or statute), and cannot be conferred by consent.

As the Kentucky Supreme Court stated:

The law creates courts and defines their powers. Consent cannot authorize a
judge to do what the law has not given him the power to do.

See e.g. Singleton v. v. Commonwealth, 208 S.W.2d 325, 327 (Ky. 1948). Because

subjectmatter jurisdiction is a matter of law and authority of the court to hear a matter, the

accused can not waive the lack of it, or even give his consent to it if it does not exist.

Therefore, the issue of subject-matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time during the case,

even after a plea has been entered is further explained below in the follow text:

Jurisdiction of the subject matter is derived from the law. It can neither be
waived nor conferred by consent of the accused. Objection to the court over the
subject matter may be urged at any stage of the proceedings, and the right to
make such objection is never waived. However, jurisdiction of person of the
defendant may be acquired by consent of the accused or by waiver of objections.
21 American Jurisprudence, 2 nd ed., "Criminal Law," S 338, p. 589.

73
 [I]t is held everywhere that jurisdiction of subject matter or cause of action
cannot be conferred upon the Court by consent or waiver, but may be questioned
at any stage of the proceedings.

See e.g. Harris v. State, 82 A.2d 3778, 389 (Ill. 1950). Even if on fails to raise the issue of lack
of subject matter jurisdiction at trial, he can still raise such issue on appeal as several
State appellate case state that:
It is elementary that the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the
action is most critical aspect of the court's authority to act. Without it the court
lacks any power to proceed; therefore, a defense based upon this lack of subject
matter jurisdiction cannot be waive and may be raised the issue of jurisdiction of
the matter for the fist time on appeal although they initially failed to raise the
issue before the trial court.

A reviewing court is required to consider the issue of subject matter jurisdiction

even where it was raised below in order to avoid an unwarranted exercise of
judicial authority.

see e.g. Matter of Green, 313 S.E.2d 193, 195 (N.C.App. 1983); Honomichl v. state, 333

N.W.2d 797, 799 (S.D. 1983). See also US. v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002), citing

Louisville Nashville R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908)(subject-matter jurisdiction that

involves a court's power to adjudicate a case can never be forfeited or waive . . . defects in

subject-matter jurisdiction require correction regardless of whether the error was raised in the

district court). There is nothing that one can do, or fail to do, that would cause the issue of

subject matter jurisdiction to be lost. In a case where a person pleads guilty, he or she can raise

such issue later if the subject matter jurisdiction never existed. The Illinois

Supreme Court held in a case of a guilty plea state that:

Subject matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred by a guilty plea if it does not

otherwise exist.

The guilty plea must confess some punishable offense to form the basis of a
sentence. The effect of the plea of gai!ty is a record admission of whatever is
well alleged in the indictment. If the later is insufficient the plea confesses
nothing.

People v. MCC-arty, 445 N.E.2d 298, 304 (Ill. 1983). In that case, a man was charged with a
"felony theft charge" to which he entered into a plea bargain to plead guilty to the theft charge.
However, the facts alleged in the indictment did not constitute the offense charged where there
was no subject matter jurisdiction of the theft charge, therefore, the conviction is null and void.

74
 Subject matter jurisdiction involves more than having the right offense for the right

court. Even if the court has jurisdiction over the type, class or grade of crime committed, it will

still lack subject matter jurisdiction if the law which the crime is based upon is invalid, null and

void, unconstitutional, or nonexistent as one Indiana case held that, "jurisdiction over the

subject matter of an action is essential to the power of the court to act, and is conferred only by

the constitution or by a valid statute." See e.g. Brown v. State, 37 N.W.2d 73, 77 (Ind. 1941).

The court must be authorized to hear a crime, and have a valid law that creates a crime.

Therefore, the crux of the subject matter jurisdiction is always the crime or offense. If the law

is invalid there is no crime, and if there is no crime, there is no subject matter jurisdiction. "If a

criminal statute is unconstitutional, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and cannot

proceed to try the case." 22 Corpus Juris Secundum, "Criminal Law," S 157, p. 189; citing e.g.

People v. Katrinak, 185 Cal.Rptr. 869 (Cal.App. 1982).

In a case where a man was convicted of violating certain sections of some law, he later

claimed that the laws were unconstitutional that deprived the county court of jurisdiction to try

him for those offenses. The Oregon Supreme Court held that:

If these sections are unconstitutional, the law is void and the offense created by
them is not a crime and a conviction under them cannot be a legal cause of
imprisonment, for no court can acquire jurisdiction to try a person for acts which
are made criminal only by an unconstitutional law.

See e.g. Kelly v. Mryers, 263 P. 903, 905 (Ore. 1928). Without a valid law there can be no

crime charged under that law, and where there is crime or offense there is no controversy or

cause of action, and without a cause of action there can be no subject matter jurisdiction to try a

person accused of violating said law. The court then has no power or right to hear and decide a

particular case involving such invalid or nonexistent laws.

In Wisconsin, there is a case that involves a charge for violating a law that had actually

been repealed. There was a motion hearing on the issue of whether the court had subject matter

75
jurisdiction. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that: "Where the offense charged does not

exist, the trial court lacks jurisdiction." See e.g. State v. Christensen, 329

N.W.2d 382, 383 (Wis. 1983).

In a case in Minnesota, a man was charged with the offense of "being a habitual

offender," but the statute did not make this a crime. Minnesota Supreme Court stated that the

man could not be convicted of a crime because the statute used did not state an offense, which

meant that the "court was without subject matter jurisdiction." See e.g. State ex rel.

Hansen v. Rigg, 104 N.W.2d 553 (Minn. 1960).

An invalid, unconstitutional, or non-existent statute also affects the validity of the

"charging document," that is, the complaint, indictment, or information. If these documents are

void or fatally defective, there is no subject matter jurisdiction since they are the basis of the

court's jurisdiction. See e.g. State v. Dungan, 718 P.2d 1010, 1014 (Ariz. 1985)(when a

criminal defendant is indicted under a not-yet effective statute, the charging document is void).

The indictment or complaint can be invalid if it is not constructed in the particular

mod or form prescribed by the constitution or statute, 24 C.J.S., "Indictments and Information,"

1, p. 833. However, it can also be defective and void when it charges a violation of the law, and

that the law is void, unconstitutional, or nonexistent. If the charging document is void, the

subject matter jurisdiction of the court does not exist. 22 Corpus Juris Secundum, "Criminal

Law," 324, p. 390(the want of a sufficient affidavit, complaint, or information goes to the

jurisdiction of the court, * * * and renders all proceedings prior to the filing of a proper

instrument void ab initio).

Jurisdiction then is brought to a court by way of a complaint, information, or indictment.

If these instruments fail to charge a crime, there can be no subject matter jurisdiction, and as

several State court have held:

76
 The allegations in the indictment or information determines the jurisdiction of the
court. See e.g. Ex parte Waldock, 286 Pac. 765, 766 (Okla. 1930)

Where an information charges no crime, the court lacks jurisdiction to try the
accused, and a motion to quash the information or charge is always timely. See
e.g. People v. Hardiman, 347 N.W.2d 460, 462 (Mich.App. 1984); 22 Corpus
Juris Secundum, "Criminal Law," S 157, p. 188, citing MCCarty, 445 N.E.2d 298.

One way in which a complaint or indictment fails to charge a crime, is by its failure to

have the charge based upon a valid or existing law. Complaints or indictments which cite

invalid, incomplete, or nonexistent laws are regarded as being invalid on their face. Therefore,

they are said to be "fatally defective" or "fatally bad" laws rendering all proceedings thereafter

null and void ab initio. Usually when such matters arise or occurs, the accused would have the

complaint or indictment set aside either by a "motion to quash," or "demurrer." However, with

today's legal system, if such challenge is not based on a jurisdictional question or defect, such

motion can be easily, and is generally denied.

The jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter has been said to be essential,

necessary, indispensable, and an elementary prerequisite to the exercise of judicial power. 21

C.J.S., "Courts," 5 18, p. 25. As mentioned above, subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be

conferred by waiver or consent, and may be raised at any time. See e.g. Rodrigues v. State, 441

So.2d 1129 (Fla.App. 1984). Subject-matter jurisdiction of a criminal case is related to the

cause of action in general, and more specifically to the alleged crime or offense which creates

the action. See e.g. Stillwell v. Markham, 10 P.2d 15, 16 (Kan. 1932)(The subjectmatter of a

criminal offense is the crime itself. Subject-matter in its broadest sense means the cause; the

object; the thing in dispute).

An indictment or complaint in a criminal case is the means by which a court obtains

subject-matter jurisdiction, and is "the jurisdictional instrument upon which the accused stands

trial." See e.g. State v. Chatmon, 671 P.2d 531, 538 (Kan. 1983). The complaint is the

77
foundation of the jurisdiction of the magistrate or court. Thus, if these charging instruments are

invalid, there is a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Several jurisdictions have stated that:

Without a formal and sufficient indictment or information, a court does not

acquire subject-matter jurisdiction and thus an accused may not be punished for a
crime.

A formal accusation is essential for every trial or a crime. Without it a court

acquires no jurisdiction to proceed, even with the consent of the parties, and
where the indictment or information is invalid the court is without jurisdiction.

See e.g. Honomichl, 333 N.W.2d at 798; Ex parte Carlson, 186 N.W. 722, 725 (Wis. 1922).

Without a valid complaint any judgment or sentence rendered is "void ab initio." See e.g. Ralph

v. Police ofEl Cerrito, 190 So.2d 632, 634 (Cal. 1948)(Jurisdiction to try and punish

for a crime cannot be acquired by the mere assertion of it, or invoke otherwise than in the mode
prescribed by law, and if it is not so acquired or invoked any judgment is a nullity. 22 c.J.s.,
"Criminal p. 202.
The charging instrument must not only be in the particular mode or form prescribed by

the constitution and statute to be valid, but it also must contain references to valid laws.

Without a valid law, the charging instrument is insufficient as no subject-matter jurisdiction

exists for the matter to be tried or proceed. See e.g. People v. Hardiman, 347

N.W.2d 460, 462 (Mich.App. 1984)(held that where an information charges no crime. The

court lacks jurisdiction to try the accused); Carlson, 186 N.W. at 725 (held that whether or not

the complaint charges an offense is a jurisdictional matter).

An invalid law charged against one in a criminal matter also negates subject-matter

jurisdiction by the sheer fact that it fails to create a cause of action. "Subject matter is the thing

in controversy." See e.g. Holmes v. Mason, 115 N.W. 770 (Neb. 1908); Black's Law

Dictionary. Without a valid law, there is no issue or controversy for a court to decide upon.

Therefore, where a law does not exist or does not constitutionally exist, or where the law is

invalid, void or unconstitutional, there is no subject-matter jurisdiction to try the accused for an

offense alleged under such law. See e.g. Katrinak, 185 Cal.Rptr. 869 (held that if a criminal

78
statute is unconstitutional, the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction and cannot proceed to try

the case); State v. Christensen, 329 N.W.2d 382, 383 (Wis. 1983)(held that where the offense

charged does not exist, the trial court lacks jurisdiction); 22 Corpus Juris Secundum, "Criminal

Law," S 157, p. 189.

Not all statutes create a criminal offense. For example, there was a man charged with "a

statute which does not create a criminal offense," such person was never legally charged with

any crime or lawfully convicted because the trial court did not have "jurisdiction of the subject

matter," see e.g. Rigg, 104 N.W.2d 553, where there must be a

valid law in order for subject matter to exist.

These authorities and others make it clear that if there are no valid laws charged against

an accused, there is nothing that can be deemed a crime, and without a crime there can be no

subject matter jurisdiction. Furthermore, invalid or unlawful laws make the complaint fatally

defective, and without a valid complaint there is a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

The crux of this whole issue of jurisdiction revolves around the law claimed to be

violated or invalid. If the accused is subject to a law, they are then under the jurisdiction of

some authority. For example, if a king passes a law then those who are subject to the law are

under his jurisdiction, and they can be judged for the violation of the law by the king or one of

his ministers. When an accused is outside the king's jurisdiction, there is no law he or she is

subject too. However, the reverse of this is also true, in that if there is no law of the king, then

there is no jurisdiction or authority to judge the accused, even if he is the true king's subject.

If the crime is alleged but there is no law to form the basis of that crime, there is no

jurisdiction to try and sentence the accused even though they are subject to legislative body and

the court. There has to be a valid law for subject matter jurisdiction to exist. Our current

admiralty/maritime military court legal system has shown its own seeds of destruction by

arbitrarily forming codes and revised statutes. All complaints and indictments today cite from
79
these codes or revised statute books as their authority to charge and prosecute the accused that

contain no enacting clauses. Laws that lack an enacting clause are in reality not laws of the

legislative body to which we are constitutionally subject and bound too. Therefore, if a

complaint or information charges the accused with violating a law with no enacting clause,

then no valid law is cited. If it cites no valid law then the complaint or indictment charges no

crime and therefore, the court has no subject matter jurisdiction to try the accused.

When common law crimes were prosecuted in state courts, there were many cases that

arose where the accused claimed the act was not a crime at common law. When the accused

was issued a complaint or indictment before trial, the accused would demurrer to the complaint

or file a motion to quash the complaint based on the fact that the complaint failed to cite or

state anything that was a crime. It could then be held that the act was not a crime at common

law, and since there was no law, the court had no jurisdiction of the subject matter.

The Nature of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction in Tennessee.

The Claimant at Law/Accused asserts that the laws charged against him are not valid,

nor do they constitutionally exist as they do not conform to the mandatory constitutional

prerequisites of Article Il, 20 of the Tennessee Constitution subject matter jurisdiction to the

convicting court.

Because the current admiralty/maritime military court legal system of today regarding

crimes is controlled by codes/statutes, where there are no statutes or laws because of no

enacting clauses with these codes/statute, for the crimes alleged, there can be no crime, if there

is no crime, there is no subject matter jurisdiction. Therefore, if the law does not exist, or is

unconstitutional, the complaint is void and it cannot give subject matter jurisdiction to the

convicting court.

80
 The complaint(s)/indictment(s) in question alleges that the Claimant at Law/Accused

has committed (a) criminal offense(s) by violation of (a) certain law(s) that are listed in the

following complaint(s)/indictment(s) to wit:

(See Attachment "G"). Claimant at Law attest that the Tennessee Code Annotated (T.C.A.

statute books) that contains all Tennessee's public laws that are relied upon by every court in

the State are published by THE MICHIE C()MPANY and NEXIS-LEXIS and were used in the

complaint(s)/indictment(s) against the Claimant at Law/Accused. These printed published

statute books fail to contain the enacting clauses within each of these public printed laws

mandated by the Tennessee Constitution Article Il, 5 20 (The style of the laws of this state shall

81
be, "Be enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Tennessee"). Although the Secretary

of State certified each statute book with its State Seal, that a true and correct copy of the

acts/laws were passed by the legislature have been transmitted to the T.C.A. public statute

books, the enacting clause as noted above does not appear with any of the acts/laws in the

public statute books specifically the statute(s) that were used by the STATE OF TENNESSEE

to charge and obtain a conviction and imprisonment, therefore, such certification was

fraudulently made.

By Article Il of the Tennessee Constitution (1870), all lawmaking for the State is vested
in the Legislature of Tennessee. This Article also prescribes certain forms, modes, and
procedure that must be followed in order for a valid law that is not enacted by the Legislature
prescribed in the constitution and which fails to conform to the Constitutional forms,
prerequisites, or prohibitions. These are the grounds for challenging the subject matter
jurisdiction of the convicting court, since the validity of a law on a complaint/indictment goes
to the jurisdiction of the convicting court. The following explains in authoritative detail why
the laws cited in the complaint/indictment against the

Claimant at Law/Accused are not constitutionally valid laws.

By Constitutional Mandate all Laws Must Have an Enacting Clause.

One of the forms that all laws are required to follow by the Tennessee Constitution

(1870), is that they contain an enacting style or clause. This provision is mandatory and

unambiguous, which states that:

Article Il, S 20 clearly states that, "The style of the laws of this state shall be,
'Be enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Tennessee."'

None of these laws sited in the complaint(s)/indictment(s) against the Claimant at

Law/Accused, as found in the T.C.A.," contains any enacting clause. Specifically, the

Claimant at Law attests that he was charged/indicted and convicted of violating

T.C.A. 5

(See
82
Attachment "H"). When reviewing these specific statutes, no enacting clause appears on any of

these published statutes. The constitutional provision which prescribes an enacting clause for

all laws is not directory, but mandatory. This provision is to be strictly adhered to and has not

changed since; where the Tennessee Supreme court has asserted stating that:

The provision we are here called upon to construe is in plain and unambiguous
words. The meaning of it is clear and undisputable, and no ground for
construction can be found. The language is: "The style of the laws of this state
shall be The word "shall" as used here, is equivalent to "must." We know of no
case in which a provision of the Constitution thus expressed has been held to be a
directory. We think this is clearly mandatory, and must be complied with by the
Legislature in all legislation, important or unimportant, enacted by it otherwise it
will be invalid

See e.g. Burrow, 104 S.W. at 529; Kefauver, 290 S.W. at 14; Biggs v. Beeler, 173 S.W.2d 144,

146 (Tenn. 1943). In Tennessee, it is undisputed and clearly shown that the publication

T.C.A. Code Statute laws used as supposed authority lack the mandatory enacting clauses
required by Article Il, 520 are void as laws.
This is evident in the T.C.A. that the laws were not "promulgated" showing that the

enacting clause fails to appear "on the face" of the law, as being the printed T.C.A. public

statute books. In the state of Tennessee, the Tennessee Supreme Court, in construing what are

the essentials of law making, and what constitutes a valid law, further held that the enacting

clause must appear in all written statute laws stated the following:

Written laws, in all times and all countries, whether the edicts of absolute
monarchs, decrees of King and Council, or the enactments of representative
bodies, have most invariably, in some form, expressed upon their face the
authority by which they are promulgated or enacted. The propriety of an enacting
clause in conformity to the ancient usage was recognized by the several state of
the Union after the American Revolution, when they came to adopt Constitutions
for their government, and without exception, so far as we can ascertain, express
provision was made for the form to be used by the legislative department of the
state in enacting laws. This was done when it adopted a Constitution in 1796, and
the same provision then is to be found in our present Constitution, adopted in
1870. The purpose of provisions of this character is that all statutes may hear
upon theirfaces a declaration of the sovereign authority by which they are
enacted and declared to be the law, and to promote and preserve uniformity in
legislation. Such clauses also import a command of obedience and clothe the
statute with a certain dignity, believed in all times to command respect and aid in
the enforcement of laws. These are the sole purposes of an enacting clause. It is
83
 not the essence of the law, adds nothing to its meaning, and furnishes no aid in its
construction. It is a form, but one that is necessary to be used in legislation.

See e.g. Burrow, 104 S.W. at 520; Kefauver et al., 290 S.W. at 14-15, citing Dettenthaler, 77

N.W. at 451(. an imperative mandate of the people in their sovereign capacity to the legislature,
requiring that all laws be binding upon them shall, on their face, express the authority by which
they are enacted, and this act comes to us without such authority appearing upon its face, it is
not a law). When comparing the enacting clause requirement in Article Il, s s 20 of the original
Constitution of 1870 to the present version, it remains the same as was in 1870. Since the
Tennessee Constitution requires "all laws" to have an enacting clause, it makes it a requirement
on published law as well as on the bills in the legislature. If the constitution said "all bills" shall
have an enacting clause, then their use in publications would be required. It is made clear by
the Tennessee Constitution and in the case of Gouge above that published laws are to have an
enacting clause of the law is to be on its face." When reviewing all current and past 39 volumes
of published statutes laws, none of these published statutes laws have an enacting clause with
each law bearing "Be enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Tennessee" after the title
mandated by Article Il, ss 20 of the Tennessee Constitution.
Since the constitution requires "all laws" to have an enacting clause, it makes it a
requirement on published law as well as on the bills in the legislature. Since the constitution
said "all laws" shall have an enacting clause, then their use in publications would be
mandatorily required. For the enacting clause to have any force and effect, it must appear with
a law, that is, on its face, so that all who look at the law know that it came from the legislative
authority designated by the Constitution. The enacting clause would not serve its intended
purpose if not printed in the statute book on the face of the law.

What is the Purpose of the Constitutional Provision for an Enacting Clause.

To determine the validity of using laws without an enacting clause against the accused,

there must be a determination of the purpose and function of an enacting clause; and also to see

what problems or evils were intended to be avoided by including such a provision in the

Tennessee state Constitution. One object of the constitutional mandate for an enacting clause is

to show that the law is one enacted by the legislative body which has been given the

lawmaking authority under the constitution. As explained by several courts in other

jurisdictions stated that:

The purpose of thus prescribing an enacting clause - "the style of the acts" is to
establish it; to give it permanence, uniformity, and certainty; to identify that act
of legislation as the general assembly; to afford evidence of its legislative
statutory nature; and to secure uniformity of identification, and thus prevent

84
 inadvertence, possibly mistake and fraud. See e.g. Patterson, 4 S.E. at 352; 82
J.C.S. "Statute," 5 65, p. 104; Joiner, 155 S.E.2d at 10.
What is the object of a style of a bill or enacting clause anyway? To show the
authority by which the bill is enacted into law; to show that the act comes from a
place pointed out by the Constitution as the source oflegislation.

See e.g. Ferrill v. Keel, 151 S.W. at 272. To fulfill the purpose of identifying the law making

authority of the law, it has been repeatedly declared by the courts of this land that an enacting

clause is to appear on the face of every law which the people are expected to follow and obey,

as stated below that:

The almost unbroken custom of centuries has been to preface laws with a
statement in some form declaring the enacting authority. The purpose of an
enacting clause of a statute is to identify it as an act of legislation by expressing
on itsface the authority behind the act.

See e.g. Preckel v. Byrne, 243 N.W. at 826; 73 Am.Jur.2d "Statute," 5 93, p. 320. For an

enacting clause to appear on the face of the law, it must be recorded or published with the law

so the public can readily identify the authority for that particular law which they are expected

to follow.

Claimant at Law attest that the "codes," T.C.A.

used in the complaint(s)/information/indictment(s)

against the Claimant at Law/Accused have no enacting clauses. Because these "codes" fail to

have enacting clauses, they cannot be identified as acts of legislation of the State of Tennessee

pursuant to the law making authority of Article Il, 5 20 of the Tennessee Constitution of 1870,

seeing that the law is mainly identified as a true and constitutional law by way of its enacting

clause.

For example, the Georgia Supreme Court said that the statute must have a enacting

clause, even though their State Constitution had no provision for the measure. The Court stated

that an enacting clause establishes a law as being a true and authentic law of the State. See e.g.

85
Joiner, 155 S.E.2d 8, 10 (held that the enacting clause is that portion of a statute which gives it

jurisdictional identity and constitutional authenticity). The failure of a law to display on its face

an enacting clause deprives it of its essential legality, and renders the statute that the

constitutional provision requiring an enacting clause is a basic concept omits such clauses as "a

nullity and of no force of law. See e.g. Id. The statutes cited in the

complaint(s)/information/indictment(s) have no jurisdictional identity and are

not authentic law under the Tennessee Constitution.

Another example from the Kentucky Court of Appeals held that the constitutional

provision requiring an enacting clause is a basic concept which has a direct affect upon the

validity of the law. The Court, in dealing with a law that had contained no enacting clause

stated that:

The alleged act or law in question is unnamed; it shows no sign of authority; it

carries with it no evidence that the General Assembly or any other lawmaking
power is responsible or answerable for it. * * * By an enacting clause, the makers
of the Constitution intended that the General Assembly should make its impress
seal, as it were, upon each enactment for the sake of identity, and to assume and
show responsibility. * * * While the Constitution makes this a necessity, it did
not originate it. The custom is in use practically everywhere, and is as old as
parliamentary government, as old as king's decrees, and even they barrowed it.
The decrees of Cyrus, King of Persia, which Holy Writ records, were not the first
prefaced with a statement of authority. The law was delivered to Moses in the
name of the great I Am, and the prologue to the Great Commandments is no less
majestic and impelling. But, whether these edicts and commands be promulgated
by the Supreme Ruler or by petty kings, or by the sovereign people themselves,
they have always begun with some such from as a evidence ofpower and
authority.
See e.g. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 170 S.W. 171, 175. The "laws" used against the Claimant at

Law/Accused are unnamed. They carry with them no evidence that the Legislature of

Tennessee, pursuant to Article Il, 520 of the Tennessee Constitution of 1870, is responsible for

these law. Without an enacting clause the law referenced to the

complaint(s)/information/indictment(s) has no official evidence that they are from an authority

which Claimant at Law/Accused is subject to or required to obey.

86
 When the question of the "objects intended to be secured by the enacting clause

provision" was before the Minnesota Supreme Court, the Court held that such a clause was

necessary to show the people who are to obey the law, the authority for obedience, and the use

of an enacting clause is a fundamental concept of law. The Court further state that:

All written law, in all times and in all countries, whether in the form of decrees
issued by absolute monarchs, or statutes enacted by king or council, or by a
representative body, have, as a rule, expressed upon their face the authority by
which they are promulgated or enacted. The almost broken custom of centuries
has been to preface laws with a statement in some form declaring the enacting
authority. If such an enacting clause is a mere matter of form, a relic of antiquity,
serving no useful purpose, why should the constitutions of so many of our states
require that all laws must have an enacting clause is useful and important, it it is
desirable that laws shall bear upon their face the authority by which they are
enacted, so that the people who are to obey them need not search legislative and
other records to ascertain the authority, then it is beneath the dignity of the
framers of a constitution, or unworthy of such an instrument, to prescribe a
uniform style for such enacting clause.

The words of the constitution, that the style of all laws if this state shall be, "Be
it enacted by the legislature of the state of Minnesota," imply that all laws must
be so expressed or declared, to the end that they my expressed upon their face
the authority by which they were enacted; and, if they do not so declare, they are
not laws of this state.

See e.g. Sjoberg, 73 Minn. at 212-214. This case was initiated when it was discovered that the

law relating to "building, loan, and savings associations," had no enacting clause as it was

printing in the statute book, "Laws 1897, c. 250." The Court made it clear that a law existing in

that manner is "void." See e.g. Sjoberg, 73 Minn. at 214.

The purported laws in the complaint(s)/information/indictment(s), T.C.A.

which the Claimant at

Law/Accused is said to have violated, are referenced to various law found printed in the

"T.C.A." statute book. After a review of the T.C.A.

located in Volume 7, Title 39, (after or before

1989) regarding the charged offenses against the Claimant at Law/Accused in the T.C.A. book,

there are no enacting clauses for any of these laws. (See Attachment "H"). A person accused of
87
a crime is not expected or required to search through other records of book for the enacting

authority. Furthermore, if such enacting authority is not "on the face" of the laws which are

referenced above, then "they are not laws of this state" and thus, are, not laws to which

Claimant at Law/Accused is subjected too. Because the T.C.A. Statute books are not laws of

this state, the convicting court has no subject matter jurisdiction, as there can be no crime

which can exist from failing to follow laws that do not constitutionally exist.

In speaking on the necessity and purpose regarding each law being prefaced with the

enacting clause, the Tennessee Supreme Court quoted the first part of Sjoberg, supra, further

stated:

The purpose of the provisions of this chapter is that all statutes may bear upon
their faces a declaration of sovereign authority by which they are enacted and
declared to be the law, and to promote and preserve uniformity in legislation.
Such clauses also import a command of obedience and clothe the statute with a
certain dignity, believed in all times to command respect and aid in the
enforcement of laws.
Burrow, 104 S.W. at 529. The use of an enacting clause does not merely serve as a "flag' under

which bills run the course through the legislature machinery. See e.g. Vaughn & Ragsdale co.

v. State Bd. of Equalization, 96 P.2d at 424. The enacting clause of the law goes to its

substance, and is not merely procedural. See e.g. Morgan v. Murray, 328 P.2d at 654.

Any purported statute which has no enacting clause on its fact, is not legally binding and

obligatory upon the people, as it is not constitutionally a law at all. For example, the Michigan

Supreme Court, in citing numerous authorities, said that an enacting clause was a requisite to a

valid law since the enacting provision was mandatory, stated that:

It is necessary that every law should show on its face the authority by which it is
adopted and promulgated, and that it should clearly appear that it is intended by
the legislative power that enacts it that it should take effect as a law.

Dettenthaler, 77 N.W. at 451, citing Swan v. Buck, 40 Miss. 270. The laws in the "T.C.A." do

not show on their face the authority by which they are adopted and promulgated. There is

88
nothing on their face which declares they should be law, or that they are of proper legislative

authority in this State.

These and other authorities then all hold that the enacting clause of the law is to be "on

its face." It must appear directly above the content or body of the law to be a valid law. To be

on the face of the law does not and cannot mean that the enacting clause can be

buried away in some other volume or some other book or records. As defined in law, Face is
defined as:
The surface of anything, especially the front, upper, or outer part or surface. That
which particularly offers itself to the view of a spectator. That which is shown by
the language employed, without any explanation, modification, or addition from
extrinsic facts of evidence.

Black's Law Dictionary (4th at p. 704 and 5th ed.); See e.g. Cunningham v. Great Southern Life

Ins. Co., 66 S.W.2d 765, 773 (Tex.Civ.App. 1933). The enacting clause must be intrinsic to the
law, and not "extrinsic" to it, that is, it cannot be hidden away in some other records or books.
Thus, the enacting clause is regarded as part of the law, and has to appear directly with the law,
on its face, so that the accused charged with a criminal offense with said law knows what
specific authority by which it exists.

Laws Must be Published and recorded with Enacting Clauses.

Since it has been repeatedly held that an enacting clause must appear "on the face" of

the law, such requirement affects the printing and publishing of laws. The fact that the

constitution requires "all laws" to have an enacting clause makes it a requirement on not just

bills within the legislature, but on published laws as well. If the constitution said "Style of

bills" rather than "Style of law" shall have shall have an enacting clause, it could be said that

the requirement in publications would not be required, however this is not the case

here, the Tennessee Constitution clearly states that the enacting clause ("Style of laws") are to

be required for all published laws. This historical usage and application of an enacting clause

has been for them to be printed and published along with the body of the law, thus appearing

"on the face" of the law.

89
 Here, it is obvious that the enacting clause must be readily visible on the face of the

statute in the common mode in which it is published so that the public or the accused does not

have to search through the legislative journals or other records and books to see what enacting

clause is used, or if any exist at all. Therefore, a law in the statute book without an enacting

clause is not a valid publication of law. In regards to the validity of a law that was found in

their statute books with a defective enacting clause, Nevada Supreme Court held that:

Our constitution expressly provided that the enacting clause of every law shall
be, "The people of the state of Nevada, represented in the senate and assembly,
do enact as follows." This language is susceptible of but one interpretation. There
is no doubtful meaning as to the intention. It is, in our judgment, an imperative
mandate of the people, in their sovereign capacity, to the legislature, requiring
that all laws, to be binding upon them, shall, upon their face, express the
authority by which they are enacted, and, since this act comes to us without such
authority appearing upon itsface it is not a law.

Rogers, 10 Nev. At 261; Caine v. Robbins, 131 P.2d at 518; Dettenhaler, 77 N.W. at 452;

Spurling, 290 S.W. at 15. The manner in which the law came to the court was by the way it was

found and stated in the statute book, cited by the Court as "T.C.A. 5 39-14-103" and that is how

the Court judged the validity of the law. Since they saw that the act, as it was printed in the

code book, had an insufficient enacting clause on its face, it was deemed to be "not a law." It is

only by inspecting the publicly printed code book that the people can determine the source,

authority, and constitutional authenticity of the law they are expected to follow. It should be

noted that laws in the above cases were held to be void for having no titles and enacting

clauses.

The preceding examples and declarations on the use and purpose of enacting clauses

shows beyond doubt that nothing can be called or regarded as a law of this State which is

published without an enacting clause on its face. Nothing can exist as a State law except in the

manner prescribed by the State Constitution. One of those provisions is that "all laws" must

bear on their face a specific enacting style, "Be enacted by the General Assembly of the State

90
of Tennessee." Article Il, 5 20 of the Tennessee Constitution. All laws must be published with

this clause every with separate law in order for it to be valid laws, and since the "codes" in the

"T.C.A." are not published with any enacting clauses, they are not valid laws of this State.

The Claimant at Law attests that he was charged/indicted and convicted of

T.C.A. 5

When

reviewing these specific statutes, no enacting clause appears on any of these statutes, therefore,
based on mandate of Article Il, 20 of the Tennessee Constitution, a statute book without the
enacting clause are not valid publication of the laws rendering such laws and all proceedings
thereafter, including the initiation of the charges, finding of the indictment, and conviction by
way of a plea contract or trial are null and void. Therefore the Court must find the face of the
judgments that the convicting court had no subject matter jurisdiction in this cause requiring
this Court to VACATE the judgments of conviction and DISMISS the Indictment with
prejudice.

The Laws Referenced to the Complaint(s)/lndictment(s)/lnformation Contain no Titles.

Claimant at Law/Accused attest that the laws listed in the Complaint(s), Indictment(s),

or Information in question, as cited from the "T.C.A." contains no titles. (See Attachment "G").

All laws are to have titles indicating the subject matter of the law, as required by the Tennessee

Constitution. Article Il 9' 17 (No bill shall embrace more than one subject, that subject to be

expressed in the title). By this provision a title is required to be on all laws. The title is another

one of the forms of law required by the Constitution. This type of constitutional provision

"makes the title an essential part of every law," thus the title "is as much a part of the act as the

body itself." See e.g. Leininger v. Alger, 26

N.W.2d 348, 351 (Mich. 1947); State v. Burlington & M. R.R. co., 84 N.W. 254 (Neb. 1900)
(held that the title to a legislative act is a part thereof, and must clearly express the subject of
legislation).
Nearly all authorities have held that the title is part of the act, especially when a

constitutional provision for a title exists. See e.g. 37 A.L.R. Ann., at 948-949. What then can be

said of a law in which an essential part of it is missing, except that it is not a law under the

91
State Constitution? This provision of the State Constitution, providing that every law is to have

a title expressing one subject, is mandatory and is to be followed in all laws, as stated by the

Tennessee Supreme Court that:

The constitutional provision that "no bill shall become a law which embraces
more than one subject" is mandatory and imperative, and no merely directory. It
is plain, direct, positive, imperative, absolute, and unconstitutional limitation
upon legislative power.

See e.g. Cannon v. Mathes, 55 Tenn. 504 (1872); Kirk v. state, 150 S.W. 83 (Tenn. 1911). The

constitutional provisions for a title have been held in many other states to be mandatory in the

highest sense. See e.g. State v. Beckman, 185 S.W.2d 810, 816 (Mo. 1945); Leininger v. Alger,

26 N.W.2d 348; C.J.S. "Statute," S 564 at 102. The provision for a title in the constitution

"renders a title indispensable." 73 Am.Jur.2d "Statutes," S 99, at 325, citing People v. Monroe,

182 N.E. 439 (Ill, 1932). Since such provisions regarding a title are mandatory and

indispensable, the existence of a title is necessary to the validity of the act. If a title does not

exist, then it is not a law pursuant to Article Il ss 17 of the Tennessee Constitution (1870). In

speaking of the constitutional provision requiring one subject to be embraced in the title of

each law, the Tennessee Supreme Court stated that:

The requirement of the organic law is mandatory, and unless obeyed in every
instance, the legislation attempted is invalid and of no effect whatsoever.

See e.g. State v. Yardly, 32 S.W. 481, 482 (Tenn. 1895). To further determine the validity of

citing laws in a complaint(s)/information/indictment(s), which have no titles, we must also look

at the purpose for this constitutional provision, and the evils and problems which it was

intended to prevent or defeat.

One of the aims and purposes for a title or caption to an act is to convey to the people

who are to obey it and the legislative intent behind the law, as courts in several jurisdictions

stated that:

92
 The constitution has made the title the conclusive index to the legislative intent
as to what shall have operation. See e.g. Megins v. City of Duluth, 106 N.W. 89,
90 (Minn. 1906); Hyman v. state, 9 S.W. 372, 373 (Tenn. 1888).

In ruling as to the precise meaning of the language employed in the statute,

nothing, as we have said before, is more pertinent towards ascertaining the true
intention of the legislative mind in the passage of the enactment that n the
legislature's own interpretation of the scope and purpose of the act, as contained
in the caption. See e.g. Wimberly v. Georgia S. & F.R. Co., 63 S.E. 29 (Ga.
1908).

Under a constitutional provision * * * requiring the subject of the legislation to

be expressed in the title, that portion of the act is often the very window through
which the legislative intent may be seen. See e.g. State v. Clinton County, 76
N.E. 986 (Ind. 1906).

The title of an act is necessary a part of it, and in construing the act the title
should be taken into consideration. See e.g. Glasser v. Rothchild, 120 S.W. 1
(Mo. 1909).

Without the title the intent of the legislature i.s concealed or cloaked from public view.

Yet a specific purpose or function of a title to a law is to "protect the people against covert

legislation." See e.g. Brown u Clower, 166 S.E.2d 363, 365 (Ga. 1969). A title will reveal or

give notice to the public of the general character of the legislation. However, the nature and

intent of the "laws" in the "T.C.A." have been concealed and made uncertain by the nonuse of

titles. Thus, another purpose of the title is to apprise the people of the nature of legislation,

thereby preventing fraud or deception in regard to the laws they are to follow. The U.S.

Supreme Court, in determining the purpose of such a provision in state constitutions, held that:

The purpose of the constitutional provision is to prevent the inclusion of

incongruous and unrelated matters in the same measure and to guard against
inadvertence, stealth and fraud in legislation. * * * Courts strictly enforce such
provisions in cases that fall within the reasons on which they rest, * * * and hold
that, in order to warrant the setting aside of enactments for failure to comply with
the rule, the violation must be substantial and plain.

Posados v. Warner, B. & co., 279 U.s. 340, 344 (1928); Internat Shoe co. v. Shanel, 279 U.s.

429, 434 (1928). The complete omission of a title is about as substantial and plain a violation

of this constitutional provision as can exist. The laws cited in the

93
complaint(s)/information/indictment(s) against the Claimant at Law/Accused are of that nature.

They have no titles at all, and thus are not laws under the Tennessee Constitution.

(See Attachment "H").

For example, the Idaho Supreme Court, in construing the purpose for its constitutional

provision requiring a one-subject title on all laws held that:

The object of the title is to give a general statement of the subject-matter, and
such a general statement be sufficient to include all provisions of the act having a
reasonable connection with the subject-matter mentioned. * * * The object or
purpose of the cfause in the constitution * * * is to prevent the perpetration
offraud upon the members of the legislatures or the citizens of the state in the
enactment of laws.

See e.g. Ex parte Crane, 151 Pac. 1006, 1010 (Idaho 1915), The North Dakota Supreme Court,

in speaking on the constitutional provision requiring titles on laws, stated that, "This provision

is intended * * * to prevent all surprises or misapprehensions on the part of the public." See e.g.

State u MCEnroe, 283 N.W. 57, 61 (N.D. 1938). In another example, the Minnesota Supreme

Court, in speaking on Article 4 27 of the State Constitution held that:

This section of the constitution is designed to prevent deception as to the nature

or subject of the legislative enactments. [Tlhe purpose of the constitutional
provision quoted is * * * to prevent misleading or deceiving the public as to the
nature of an act by the title given it.

See e.g. State v. Rigg, 109 N.W.2d 310, 314 (Minn. 1961); LeRoy v. Special Ind. Sch. Dist.,
172

N.W.2d 764, 768 (Minn. 1969); state v. Helmer, 211 N.W. 3 (Minn. 1926). The purposes of the

constitutional provision requiring a one-subject title, and the mischief which it was designed to

prevent, are defeated by the lack of such a title on the face of a law which an accused is

charged with violating. Upon looking at the laws charged in the

complaint(s)/information/indictment(s) from "T.C.A.," Claimant at Law is left to ask, what is

the subject and nature of the law used in the complaint(s)/information/indictment(s) against

him? What interest or rights are these laws intended to affect? Since the particular objects of

94
the provision requiring a one-subject title are defeated by the publication of laws which are

completely absent to a title, the use of such a publication to indict or charge an accused with

violating such laws is fraudulent and obnoxious to the Tennessee

Constitution. This rationale is further stated that:

It is to prevent surreptitious, inconsiderate, misapprehended legislation,

carelessly, inadvertently, or unintentionally enacted through stealth and fraud,
and similar abuses, that the subject or object of the law is required to be stated in
the title.

73 Am.Jur.2d "Statutes," 100, at 325 citing cases. As Judge Cooley said the object of requiring

a title is to "fairly apprise the people, through such publication of legislative proceedings as is

usually made, of the subjects of legislation that are being considered." See e.g. Colley,

Const.Lim., at 144. The Tennessee Constitution requires one-subject titles. The particular ends

to be accomplished by requiring the title of a law are not fulfilled in the statutes referred to in

the "T.C.A." Therefore, the laws charged in the

complaint(s)/information/indictment(s) against the Claimant at Law are not valid laws.

ha te il o ha

Claimant at Law/Accused attest that Acts 1989, Chapter 591 Bill, also known as the

Tennessee Criminal Sentencing Reform Act of 1989 violates Article Il 5 17 that, "No bill

[SHALL] become law which embraces more than one subject, that subject to be expressed in

the title." The legislative act is a nullity and void where it embraces more than one subject in

the title. See e.g. Cannon v. Mathes, 55 Tenn. 504 (1872); Acklen v. Thomas, 126

S.W. 730 (Tenn. 1909).

An example from the North Dakota Supreme Court in speaking on the constitutional

provision, that the bill in question must contain, but one subject, and that subject be expressed

in the title. Further, the title thus made a part of an act must be agree with by expressing its

subject. The title will fix bounds to the purview, for it cannot exceed the title subject nor be

95
contrary to it. * * * It is not enough that the act embrace but a single subject or object, and that

all its parts are germane. The title must express that subject, and comprehensively enough to

include all of the provisions in the body of the act. See e.g. Daly

v. Berry, 178 N.W. 104, 115 (N.D. 1920), citing StQte v. Nomiand, 57 N.W. 85, 87 (44 A,. st.

Rep. 572); Lewis Southerland, St. Const. 5 87. North Dakota Supreme Court held that:

The provision may be violated in two ways: First. The act must not embrace
more than one subject. If is embraces two subjects, and both are fully expressed
in the title, still the provision is clearly violated. Black, Const. Law 288; Cooley,
Const. Law, 178. Second. If it embraces but one subject, and that subject be not
expressed in the title, the provision is equally violated. This is the clear language
of the provision.

Id. at 115, citing People v, Briggs, 50 N.Y. 553; Richard v. Stark County, 79 N.W. 863, 864;

Cooley, Const. Law, 148. In another example, the Michigan Supreme Court, Judge Cooley,

said:

But it is insisted that the whole law is unconstitutional and void, because it is in
violation of section 20 of article 4 of the constitution, which provides, "no law
shall embrace more than one object, which shall be expressed in its title." The
history and purpose of this constitutional provision are too well understood to
require any elucidation at our hands. The practice of bringing together into one
bill subjects diverse in their nature, and having no necessary connection, with a
view to combine in their favor the advocates of all, and thus secure the passage of
several measures, no one of which could succeed upon its own merits, was one
both corruptive of the legislator and dangerous to the state. It was scarcely more
so, however, that another practice, also intended to be remedied by this provision,
by which, through dexterous management, clauses were inserted in bills of which
the titles gave no intimation, and their passage secured through the legislative
bodies whose members were generally aware of their intention and effect. There
was no design by this clause to embarrass legislation by making laws
unnecessary restrictive in their scope and operation, and thus multiplying their
number; but the framers of the constitution meant to put an end to legislation of
the vicious character referred to, which was little less than a fraud upon the
public, and to require that in every case the proposed measure should stand upon
its own merits, and that the legislature should fairly satisfied of its design when
required to pass upon it.

See e.g. People v. Mahaney, 13 Mich. 481. The Iowa Supreme Court, in placing a construction

on the constitutional provision of "every law shall embrace but one subject," stated that:

96
 The intent of this provision of placing a construction was, to prevent the union,
in the same act, of incongruous matter, and of objects having no connection, no
relation. And with this, it was designed to prevent surprise in legislation, by
having matter of one nature embraced in a bill whose title expressed another. It is
manifest, however, that there must be some limit to the division of matter into
separate bills or acts. It cannot be held with reason, that each thought or step
toward the accomplishment of an end or object, should be embodied in a
separate act. When we find in the revenue law provisions concerning the county
treasurer's powers to levy upon and sell personal property as a constable, or
concerning his fees, or relating to a peddler's license; and when we see in the
school law, provisions about the superintendent of public instruction, and no one
suspects a breach upon the constitution. These things are congruous with the end
proposed. But if we should find in one of these acts, a bank charter, or come
provision establishing roads, or giving the right of way to railroads, or
concerning the law of mechanics' liens, we might well be surprised, and say, this
is not what it professes. Many other instances of both these kinds might be
named.

See e.g. The State, ex rel. Weir v. The County Judge, etc., 2 Iowa 280. In the State of

Tennessee, the Tennessee Supreme Court, in addressing Article Il 5 17 of the Tennessee

Constitution stated that if an act at issue embraces more than one subject or if the title does not

express the subject of the act, the law is unconstitutional and invalid. Such language is

mandatory. It is further said that the purpose of the provision is to prevent surprise or fraud

upon the legislature, by means of provisions in bills which the title gives no intimation, and

which might therefore be overlooked, and carelessly and unintentional adoption. See e.g.

Cannon v. Mathes, 55 Tenn. at 518. The language of Article Il 517 was to prohibit omnibus

bills' and bills containing hidden provision which legislators and other interested persons might

not have appropriate or fair notice. See e.g. Blanton v. Durham, 526 S.W.2d 109, 111 (Tenn.

1975) (held that Chapter 98 of Acts 1997 violated Article Il 517 and is void). Simply put, a law

can have but one subject, and that subject must be expressed in the title. It cannot embrace

more than one subject and become a law, for the Tennessee Constitution says that "no bill shall

become law which embraces more than one subject." If this provision is infracted, it is only a

bill, it can never get beyond this and reach the dignity of a law, when tested by the judiciary,

whose business, and duty is to see that the Constitution remains supreme over all departments

97
of government, as well as over the people of this state. See e.g. Knight v. PI CCann, 72 Tenn. 1,

18 (1879).

The bill (Acts 1989 ch. 591) in question that violates Article Il 5 17 states as follows:
AN ACT to amend and repeal various sections in Titles, 37, 39, 40, 55, 63, 68,
and various other titles containing criminal offenses of the Tennessee Code
Annotated as necessary to effectuate the purposes of this act and to amend
certain portions of the "Tennessee Criminal Sentencing Reform Act of 1982," to
classify all felonies and misdemeanors into categories based on the seriousness
of the offenses and to revise the criminal code.

(See Attachment "I"). Here, the title clearly contains more than one subject and a host of other

violations of Article 115 17. First, the legislature has employed the use of a restrictive caption,

where the act is to amend and repeal various sections in Titles, 37, 39, 40, 55, 63, and 68 and

various other unnamed titles containing criminal offenses of the "T.C.A." as necessary to

effectuate the purposes of this act . . . The language used by the legislature clearly signifies its

intent is to amend and repeal various sections of Titles, 37, 39, 40, 55, 63, 68 rather than repeal

an replace the entire criminal code containing criminal offenses. When examining the body of

the bill beginning on the first page, the bill amends Title 39 by deleting the title in its entirety

and substituting it with a new Title 39. Here, deleting the title in its entirety and substituting it

with a new Title 39 is not embraced in the title of the bill, but rather employed the use of a

restrictive caption, has nothing to do with the amendment and repeal various sections of said

Titles. The title of the bill also fails to identify what "various other titles" are to be amended

and repeal.

Second, the language used by the legislature has employed the use of a restrictive

caption, where the act is to amend certain portions of the "Tennessee Criminal Sentencing

Reform Act of 1982," to classify all felonies and misdemeanors into categories based on the

seriousness of the offenses. Although the body of bill does reclassify all felonies and

misdemeanors into categories based on the seriousness of the offenses, the bill amends Title 40

98
by deleting the title in its entirety and substituting it with a new Title 40 and cited it as

"Tennessee Criminal Sentencing Reform Act of 1989." The language used by the legislature

clearly signifies its intent is to classify all felonies and misdemeanors into categories based on

the seriousness of the offenses, not deleting the title 40 in its entirety and substituting it with a

new Title 40 and renaming the act as the Tennessee Criminal Sentencing Reform Act of 1989.

Likewise, by deleting the title in its entirety and substituting it with a new Title 40 by
renaming the act as the Tennessee Criminal Sentencing Reform Act of 1989 is not embraced in
the title of the bill, but rather employed the use of a restrictive caption, has nothing to do with
the amending certain portions of the "Tennessee Criminal Sentencing Reform Act of 1982," to
classify all felonies and misdemeanors into categories based on the seriousness of the offenses.
Furthermore, the body of the bill amends Title 40 by deleting the title in its entirety and
substituting it with a new Title 40 citing it as the "Tennessee Criminal Sentencing Reform Act
of 1989." As like in the first part of the title of the bill, because the legislature has employed the
use of a restrictive caption, it was limited to classifying all felonies and misdemeanors into
categories based on the seriousness of the offenses.
When examining the body of the bill, deleting the title in its entirety and substituting it

with a new Title 40 citing it as the "Tennessee Criminal Sentencing Reform Act of 1989" is

clearly not embraced in the title of the bill, but rather employed the use of a restrictive caption,

has nothing to do with the classifying of all felonies and misdemeanors into

categories based on the seriousness of the offenses.

Finally, the language used by the legislature, ". . . and to revise the criminal code," is a

revision to the extent and with respect to its intent is to amend and repeal various sections of

Titles, 37, 39, 40, 55, 63, 68 rather than repeal an replace the entire criminal code containing

criminal offenses. The above resembles the practice of bringing together into one bill subjects

diverse in their nature, and having no necessary connection, with a view to combine in their

favor the advocates of all, and thus secure the passage of several measures, no one of which

could succeed upon its own merits, was one both corruptive of the legislator and dangerous to

the state. See e.g. The County Judge, etc., 2 Iowa 280 (1855).

99
Furthermore, the body of the bill lists Titles 2, through 5, 8, 9, 11, 12, 18, 22, 23, 30, 33, 36,

42, 43, 45 through 48, 50, 54, 56, 57, 58, 59, 62, 66, 67, 69, and 71, that is not listed in the title

caption, which Article Il SS 17 clearly prohibits bills containing hidden provision which

legislators and other interested persons might not have appropriate or fair notice. See e.g.

Durham, 526 S.W.2d at 111

There is no ambiguity of the Tennessee Legislature's intent contained in the Title

Caption of Acts 1989 Chapter 591, and as demonstrated above, it is obvious that Title

Caption of the bill says one thing and the body of the bill says another violating Article Il 5 17's

embracement of more than one subject in the title. This is exactly what Article 11517 is

designed to do, prevent a surprise in legislation, by having a matter of one nature embraced in a

bill whose title expressed another that creates more than one subject in the title. This is exactly

what has happened here. Because Acts 1989 Chapter 591 Bill violates Article Il 5 17 of the

Tennessee Constitution is null and void and because the Claimant at Law was

convicted under
T.C.A. 5 that was enacted from this Bill, his conviction(s) is/are also null
and void.

Tennessee Codes are of an unknown and Uncertain Authority.

The so called "codes" in the "T.C.A." are not only absent of enacting clauses, but are

surrounded by other issues and facts which make their authority unknown, uncertain, or

questionable.

The title page of the "T.C.A." states that the statutes therein were, "Compiled, edited,

and published by not only the Code Commission, but were also published by THE MICHIE

COMPANY and NEXIS-LEXIS and the STATE OF TENNESSEE under their copyright.

Nowhere in the "T.C.A." does it say that they are the official law of the legislature of

Tennessee. The official laws of this state have always been listed in the "Session laws" of
100
Tennessee. The title page to the Session Laws makes it clear as to the nature of the laws

therein, to wit: "Session Laws of the State of Tennessee passed during session of the

State Legislature."

The "Session laws" were also published by the Secretary of State, who historically and

constitutionally is in possession of the enrolled bills of the legislature which become State law.

Article Il, 17 of the Tennessee Constitution 1870 requires the every bill which passes both the

Senate and the House, and is signed by the Governor, is to be deposited "he shall keep a fair

register of all official acts and proceedings." Therefore, in this state, as in nearly all other states,

all official laws, records, and documents are universally recognized by their being issued or

published by the Secretary of State.

The "T.C.A.'s" are published by the CODE COMMISSION, THE MICHIE COMPANY, and

NEXIS-LEXIS, and are copyrighted by these CORPORATE entities and the STATE OF

TENNESSEE. The "Sessions Laws" were never copyrighted as they are true public documents.

In fact no true public documer\t this state or any other state or of the united States has been or

can be under a copyright. Public documents are in the public domain. Not only does a

copyright present an inference, but a presumption (UCC 5 1-206), of a private right over the

contents of the books, suggesting that the laws in the "T.C.A." statute books are derived from a

private source, and thus are not true public laws.

The Code Commission, in the preface, publisher's notes, and Code Commission
codification to these statute books called "T.C.A." points out the differences in the various
types of arrangements of laws, and states that these are codification for convenience sake.
The commission further does not state constitutional authority; rather states the following:
"I, James A. Clodfelter, Executive Secretary of the State of Tennessee Code
Commission, acting by the authority of the Commission and pursuant to
Tennessee Code Annotated Section 1-1-110 . . .

(See Attachment "J" "T.C.A." volume 7). The Commission then proceeds to point out the

difference that exists between the "Sessions Laws" and that of a compilation, revision, or code.

101
Clodfelter makes it apparent that the "Sessions Laws" are of a different authority than that of

compilation, revisions codes. Simply put, Clodfelter does not certify the authority that any of

these laws were passed and enacted by the Legislature of the State of Tennessee. The "T.C.A."

are apparently a "revision," or codification of the Public Acts of 1955; and appears to be

nothing more than a reference book, "Dunnell Tennessee Digest," or a MICHIE, and NEXIS-

LEXIS's "T.C.A.," that are copyrighted. The contents of such reference books cannot be used

as any kind of authoritative laws in charging the accused with crimes on criminal complaints,

by information, or indictment.

The Commission does not say that the statutes in the "T.C.A." books are the official

laws of the State of Tennessee passed and enacted by the authority of the Legislature. It

indicates that these statutes are only in "theory" laws of the State. Furthermore, there are

many confusing and ambiguous statements made by the Commission as to the nature and

authority of the "T.C.A." It is not at all made certain that they are laws pursuant to Article Il of

the Tennessee Constitution. That which is uncertain cannot be accepted as true or valid law.

See Maxim of Law (Uncertain things are held for nothing); Coffin v. Ogden, 85 U.S. 120, 124

(1873)(held that "the law requires, not conjecture, but certainty"); Bouvier's Law Dictionary,

vol. 2, "Maxins," (1880 ed.) (Where the law is uncertain, there is no law).

The purported statutes in the "T.C.A." do not make clear by what authority they exist.
The statutes therein have no enacting authority on their face. In fact, there is no hint that the
Legislature of Tennessee had anything at all to do with these so-called statute books. With that
said, the statutes used against the Claimant at Law/Accused are laws that carry absolutely no
authority of any kind on their face that renders all proceedings thereafter, including any
conviction, null and void ab initio.

Established Rules of Constitutional Construction.

The issue of subject-matter jurisdiction is established upon certain provisions of the

Tennessee Constitution (1870), to the following:

102
 Article Il, 5 17. No bill shall become law which embraces more than one subject,
that subject to be expressed in the title.

Article Il, 5 20. The style of the laws of this state shall be. "Be it enacted by the
General Assembly of the State of Tennessee."

These provisions are not in the least ambiguous or susceptible to any other interpretation

than their plain and apparent meaning. For example, the Montana Supreme

Court, in constructing such provisions, held that they were "so plainly and clearly expressed

and are entirely free from ambiguity," that "there is nothing for the court to construe." See e.g.

Vaughn & Ragsdale Co., 96 PG?.d at 423-424. Furtherance, the Minnesota Supreme Court

stated how these provisions are to be construed, when it was considering the meaning of

another provision under the legislative department (Article VI, ss 9), held that:

In treating of constitutional provisions, we believe it is the general rule among

courts to regard them as mandatory, and not to leave it to the will or pleasure of a
legislature to obey of disregard them. Where the language of the constitution is
plain, we are not permitted to indulge in speculation concerning its meaning, nor
whether it is the embodiment of great wisdom. * * * The rule with reference to
constitutional construction is also well stated by Johnson, J., in this case of e.g.
Newell v. People, 7 N.Y. 90, 97 (N.Y.Ct.App. 1852), as follows: "If the words
embody a Definite meaning, which involves no absurdity, and no contradiction
between different parts of the same writing, then that meaning apparent upon the
face of the instrument is the one which alone we are at liberty to say was
intended to be conveyed. In such a case there is no room for construction. That
which the words declare is the meaning of the instrument; and neither court nor
legislatures have the rights to add to or take away from that meaning. *** It must
be very plain, - nay, absolutely have employed in this natural signification
imports, before a court will feel itself at liberty to depart from the plain reading
of the constitutional provision."

See e.g. State v. Sutton, 147 Minn. 147, 149-150 (Minn. 1895); affirmed, State v. Holm, 62

N.W.2d 52, 55-56 (Minn. 1954); Butler Taconite v. Roemer, 282 N.W.2d 867, 870-871 (Minn.

1979). It is certain that the plain and apparent language of these Constitutional provisions are

not followed in the publications known as the "T.C.A." which contain no titles and no enacting

clauses, and thus it is not and cannot be used as valid laws of this State under the Tennessee

Constitution. No language could be plainer and clearer than that used in Article Il, 55 17 & 20

103
of the Tennessee Constitution. There is no room for construction! The contents of these

provisions were written in ordinary language, making their meaning selfevident, as stated by

the Tennessee Supreme Court that:

The provision we are here called upon to construe is in plain and unambiguous
words. The meaning of it is clear and indisputable, and no ground for
construction can be found. The language is: "The Style of Laws of this state shall
be," etc. The word "shall," as used here, is equivalent to "must." We know of no
case in which o provision of the Constitution thus expressed has been held to be
directory. We think this one clearly mandatory, and must be complied with by
the Legislature in all Legislation, important and unimportant, enacted by it;
otherwise it will be invalid.

see e.g. Burrow, 104 S.W. at 529; Kefauver, 290 S.W. at 14; Biggs v. Beeler, 173 S.W.2d 144,

146 (Tenn. 1943). No matter how much the courts of this State relied on, and the use of, the

publications entitled "T.C.A." as being law, that use can never be regarded as an exception to

the Constitution. To support this publication as law, it must be said that it is "absolutely

certain" that the framers of the Constitution did not intend for titles and enacting clauses to be

printed and published with laws, but that they intended for them to be stripped away and

concealed from public view when a compilation of statutes is made. Such absurdity should not

be tolerated or supported by any reviewing court, nor can it be speculated that a revised statute

publication which dispense with all titles and enacting clauses must be allowed under the

Constitution as it is more practical and convenient than the "Session Law" publication. The use

of such speculation can never be used in construing such plain and unambiguous provision. As

the Oklahoma Supreme Court held:

[T]he general rule of law is, when a statute or Constitution is plain and
ambiguous, the court is not permitted to indulge in speculation concerning its
meaning, nor whether it is the embodiment of great wisdom. A Constitution is
intended to be framed in brief and precise language.
is not within the province of the court to read an exception in the constitution
which the framers thereof did not see fit to enact therein.

See e.g. Baskin v. State, 232 Pac. 38, 39 (Okla. 1925). There is of course no need for

construction or interpretation of these provisions as they have been adjudicated upon ,

104
especially those dealing with the use of an enacting clause. The Tennessee Supreme Court has

made it clear that Article Il, 5 20 of the Tennessee Constitution "is mandatory and this act

without such authority appearing upon its face, it is not law. See e.g. Kefauver, 290 S.W. at 15.

Being that the "codes" used against the Claimant at Law/Accused are without enacting clauses

and titles they are void, which means there is no offense(s), no valid complaint(s), information,

or indictment(s), and thus, no subject-matter jurisdiction.

The provisions requiring an enacting clause and one-subject titles were adhered to with

publications known as the "Sessions Law" and "General Laws" for the State of Tennessee.

However, because certain people in government thought that they could devise a more

convenient way of doing things without regard for the mandatory provisions of Article Il, 517

and 20 of the Tennessee Constitution, they devised the contrivance known as the "T.C.A.," and

then held it out to the public as being "public law." Based on these facts, the publication of the

"T.C.A." without enacting clause and one-subject titles in violation of the mandatory provisions

of Article Il, 5 17 and 20 of the Tennessee Constitution clearly are acts of fraud, subversive

activities, deception, and treason upon the people of this State. There is no justification for

deviating from or violating a mandatory constitutional provision. The "T.C.A." cannot be used

as valid laws, as like the "Sessions Laws" were once used, solely because the circumstances

have changed and we now have a massive amount of laws to deal with. It cannot be said that

the use and need of revised statutes without titles and enacting clauses must be justified due to

expediency. New circumstances or needs do not change the mandatory meaning of the

constitution, as Judge Cooley expressed stated that:

A constitution is not to be made to mean one thing as one time, and another at
some subsequent time when the circumstances may have so changed a perhaps to
make a different rule in the case seems desirable. A principal share of the benefit
expected from written constitutions would be lost if the rules they established
were so flexible as to bend to circumstances or be modified by public opinion. *
* * [T]he court or legislature which should allow a change in public sentiment to
influence it in giving to a written constitution a construction not warranted by the

105
 by the intention of its founders, would be justly chargeable with reckless
disregard of official oath and public duty; and if its course could become a
precedent, these instruments would be of little avail. * * * What a court is to do,
therefore, is to declare the law as written.

A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations, at 54-55 (5 th

ed.). Looking beyond the

constitution to ascertain its meaning and the rule for government violates the clear

unambiguous mandatory command that all published laws must have titles and enacting clauses

in the "T.C.A." books. Looking at the constitution alone, it is not at all possible to find support

for the idea that the publications called the "T.C.A." is valid laws of this State. The original

intent of Article Il, 5 17 and 20 of the Tennessee Constitution cannot be stretched to cover use

of published "T.C.A." books without titles and enacting clauses.

These provisions cannot now be regarded as antiquated, unnecessary, or of little importance,

sense "no section of a constitution should be considered superfluous." See e.g. Butler Taconite
v. Roemer, 282 N.W.2d at 870. The constitution was written for all times and circumstances,
because it embodies fundamental principles which do not change with time.
Judges are not to consider the political or economic impact that might ensue from
upholding the above Constitutional provision as written. Furthermore, judges are to uphold
both the United States and Tennessee Constitution regardless of what may result from doing so,
as the ancient maxim says: "Though the heavens may fall, let justice be done."
Therefore, based on the foregoing, the Claimant at Law/Accused attest that that this

cause of action must be dismissed for the lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

A court lacking jurisdiction cannot render judgment, but must dismiss the cause
at any stage of the proceedings in which it becomes apparent that jurisdiction is
lacking.

See e.g. United States v. Siviglia, 686 F.2d 832, 835 (10 th Cir. 1981). Nothing can be regarded
as law in this State which fails to conform to the constitutional prerequisites that calls for an
enacting clause and title. There is nothing in the complaint(s), information, or indictment(s)
that can be constitutionally regarded as laws, and thus, there is nothing in them that the
Claimant at Law/Accused is answerable to, or an offense(s) that he can be charged with. Since
there is no valid law or constitutional laws charged against the Claimant at Law/Accused, there
are no crimes/offenses that exist, therefore, there is no subject-matter jurisdiction by which the
Claimant at Law/Accused can be tried, and by which the convicting court can enter a judgment
of conviction. Therefore, the judgment(s) of conviction entered in this case is/are null and void
ab initio.

106
 CAVEAT

Claimant at law finds it necessary to advise this Court of the consequences if this

Court fails to follow the constitutional mandatory provisions of Article Il, 5 17 and 20 of the

Tennessee Constitution and United States Constitution to uphold your oath and duty in this

cause can result in committing acts of treason, usurpation, and tyranny. Such trespasses would

be clearly evident to the public, especially in light of the clear unambiguous provisions of

Article Il, 5 17 and 20 of the Tennessee Constitution that are involved here that leaves no room

for construction; and in light of numerous adjudications demonstrated above. The possible

breaches of law that may result by denying this cause of action are enumerated as follows:

1. The failure to uphold these clear and plain provisions of Article Il, 5 17 and 20 of
the Tennessee Constitution cannot be regarded as mere error in judgment, but a clear deliberate

USURPATION. "Usurpation is defined as: an unauthorized arbitrary assumption

and exercise of power." See e.g. Danielson b. Village of Mound, 48 N.W.2d 855, 863 (Minn.

1951). While error in judgment is only voidable, such usurpation is void: "The boundary

between an error in judgment and the usurpation of judicial power is this: The former is

reversible by an appellate court and is, therefore, only voidable, which the latter is a nullity."

see e.g. state v. Mandehr, 209 N.W. 750, 752 (Minn. 1926).

To take jurisdiction where it clearly does not exist is usurpation, and no one is bound to

follow acts of usurpation, and in fact it is a duty of the people to disregard and disobey them

since they are void and unenforceable. "[NIO authority need to be cited for the proposition that,

when a court lacks jurisdiction, any judgment rendered by it is void and unenforceable." See

e.g. Hooker v Boles, 364 F.2d 285, 286 (4th Cir. 1965).

The fact that the "Tennessee Code Annotated" has been in use since about 1955 cannot

be held as a justification to continue to usurp power and set aside the Constitutional provisions

107
that are clearly contrary to such usurpation. As Judge Cooley stated: "Acquiescence for no

length of time can legalize a clear usurpation ofpower, where the people have plainly expressed

their will in the Constitution." Cooley, A Treatise on the

Constitutional Limitations, at 71.

2. To assume jurisdiction in this case would result in TREASON. Chief Justice

John

Marshall once stated that: "We [judges] have no more right to decline the exercise of

jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be

treason to the constitution." Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 404 (1821).

The judges in these courts took no oath to uphold and support the Tennessee

Constitution, and this blatant disregard of that obligation and allegiance can only result in an

act of treason, this Court can not condone such action.

3. If this Court departs from the clear meaning of the Tennessee Constitution, it

will be regarded as a blatant act of TYRANNY. Any exercise of power which is done without

the support of law or beyond what the law allows is tyranny. "It has been said, with much truth,

'Where the law ends, tyranny begins."' Marritt v. Welsh, 104 U.S. 694, 702 (1881).

The law, the Constitution, does not allow law to exist without titles and/or enacting

clauses. To go beyond that and allow the "Tennessee Code Annotated" to exist as, "law" is

nothing but tyranny. Tyranny and despotism exists where the will and pleasure of those in

government is followed rather than established law. It has been repeatedly said and affirmed as

a most basic principle of our government that, "this is a government of laws and not of men;

and that there is no arbitrary power located in any individual or body of individuals." See

Cotting v. Kansas City Stroke Yards Co., 183 U.S. 79, 84 (1901). The Tennessee Constitution

requires all laws to have an enacting clause, titles, and titles that does not embrace more that

one subject. If these clear and unambiguous provisions of the Tennessee Constitution can be

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disregarded, then we no longer have a constitution in this State, and we no longer live under

government of law, but a government of men, a system that is governed by the arbitrary will of

those in office. The creation of the "Tennessee Code Annotated" is a typical example of the

arbitrary acts of government which have become all too prevalent in this State and century. Its

use as law is void and a nullity under the Tennessee Constitution. Therefore, the Court must

find on the face of the judgment(s) that the convicting court had no subject matter jurisdiction

in this cause requiring this Court to VACATE the judgments of conviction and DISMISS the

Indictment with prejudice, and ORDER an immediate DISCHARGE from CUSTODY.

Commercial Dealings:

1. All the charging instruments 1) executed against the artificial/fiction entity

Cestui que Trust Estate were procured
under fraudulent pretense by the specifically named Corporate STATE OF
TENNESSEE ACTORS who are exclusively liable for payment terms and
obligations associated with the execution of said instruments under UCC 5 3-401
and 5 3-412 are without absolute immunity when dealing with commercial
paper. All the named liable parties in this cause have endorsed said instruments;
2. The 5 th
and 14th Amended constitutional provisions prohibits
Corporations/Government from arbitrarily depriving a "person" of life, liberty, or
property;
3. The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) is applicable to in all matters in every
American courtroom because the courts are dealing in commerce and their
actions are governed by Commercial Law and the Admiralty/Maritime Military
jurisdictional law of the high seas of commerce in which they operate;
4. Where private corporate commercial paper is concerned, there is no immunity
for the Corporation STATE OF TENNESSEE pursuant to the United State
Supreme Court decision in Clearfield Trust Co. v. U.S., 318 U.S. 363, 371
(1943).
5. There is no mutual domestic or international contracts in existence between the
STATE OF TENNESSEE and artificial/fiction entity Cestui que Trust Estate

109
 that warrants the unlawful and
pernicious against the Claimant at Law;
6. Procedural Due Process Entities the Claimant at Law to the minimal
requirements of notice and a hearing secured by the Due Process Clause of the 5
th
and 14th Amendments; and
7. Contracts failing to make full disclosure constitutes "constructive fraud" and
renders all such contract, agreements, and signature null and void ab initio, nunc
pro tunc; USA 27 CFR 72.11 (Commercial Crimes).
Therefore, because the district attorney's office perpetrated fraud, as stated and defined

above, from the onset of this case, the proceedings, and judgment(s) resulting in a conviction

are/is null and void ab initio.

For The Record. Be It Known: that there is a presumption with respect of the facts
relating to the U.S. Constitution/Bill of Rights that is designed to protect the commercial
interest of its sovereign's and corporate "person's" pursuant to Article l, ss 8, which provides
that such fact(s) is "presumed" and before the "trier of fact" can find the existence of this/these
fact(s), the trespasser has the burden to introduce evidence that supports a finding of its
nonexistence. See UCC 1-206.
IT IS ORDERED that the Claimant at Law be RELEASED from the possession and

Custody of the STATE OF TENNESSEE Criminal Court for the County of

as well as the "TENNESSEE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS," a

subsidiary of the STATE OF TENNESSEE. Furthermore, it is DEMANDED that the Relief

sought to be GRANTED, and that the Collateral (Secured Party/Sovereign/ Claimant at Law)

being held against the Debts and Alleged obligations of the Debtor, be IMMEDIATELY

DICHARGED from

CUSTODY.

RELIEF SOUGHT & CONCLUSION

This is a challenge of Jurisdiction against the County

Criminal Court's judgment(s) of conviction is void on its face ab initio, and had no

subjectmatter jurisdiction and authority to adjudicate and render judgment of a civil matter in
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the criminal court jurisdiction under which it was operating, The trespassers display a military

flag. As the Jurisdiction of a Military Admiralty Jurisdiction in Maritime Law we are not on the

high seas, Claimant at Law is not m the military. Claimant at Law was never informed he was

in a military tribunal and therefore Fraud was committed. This is also a

challenge of the Jurisdiction of the County Criminal Court in

County Case # Claimant's Trust

as this was a trust action, not a criminal action was never indicted. Trespassers cannot provide a
"True Bill Document. Therefore Claimant at Law has been illegally detained, kidnapped and
abused and suffered irreparable harm as the fraudulent actions set off a chain of events
resulting in the persecution of Claimant at Law. Because the Trust was never properly indicted
then the sentence is void on its face and therefore plaintiffs Trust conviction should be
dismissed with prejudice and sentence should be expunged without delay.
l, beneficiary, sui juris and Sovereign and

undersigned of the Social Security Cestui qui Trust

with standing do present this "Common Law Writ of habeas Corpus/Writ of Injunction" BY A

PERSON IN STATE CUSTODY "in a court of law" WITH AN Article Ill of the Constitution

for the United States of America Judge whose "Compensation has not been Diminished during

their Continuance in Office, based on the all that is stated herein.

This Court did knowingly, and willingly allowed the STATE OF TENNESSEE to

proceed against the artificial/fiction entity Cestui que Trust

committing a malfeasance of justice, fraud, Treason etc., through negligence to secure and

present the proper Parties where the STATE OF TENNESSEE failed to serve proper service of

process, as demonstrated above, on presentment or indictment of a duly constituted Grand Jury,

contrary to both State and Federal Constitutions. This Court did in fact charge

the artificial/fiction entity Cestui que Trust _ as the Debtor, a

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governmental created artificial/fiction entity, existing for Commercial purposes only, existing

in contemplation of law, and non-existent as the Living, Breathing, Human Being.

This Court used DECEIT to mislead the Claimant at Law,

beneficiary, sui juris and Sovereign the Living, Breathing, Natural Human Being upon the soil
into believing that the Court was moving against the Sovereign, Living, Breathing, Natural
Human Being. But, regardless of this fact, no proper service of process has ever
been served upon the Claimant at Law, beneficiary, sui juris and
Sovereign the Living, Breathing, Natural Human Being. This Claimant at Law,
beneficiary, sui juris and Sovereign the Living, Breathing, Natural
Human Being invokes Sole Sovereignty over the Debtor, artificial/fiction entity
Cestui que Trust thereby nullifying any claim by the STATE

OF TENNESSEE, and has hereby DISCHARGED the Debtor, described above, from any and

all obligation in this matter.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, Claimant at Law/Sovereign has sufficiently and clearly

challenged the following and respectfully demands the following relief:

(1) That process issue and the trespasser be required to answer the Writ of Habeas Corpus
INSTANTER in full;

(2) That that the clerk assign Claimant at Law's common law writ of habeas corpus to an
Article Ill judge so that the plaintiff can finally get his day in court; and that a Common
Law Writ of Habeas Corpus issue with FIAT requiring trespasser to provide this Court,
if this is an Article Ill Court, with a certified record for an accordant review.

(3) That this Court issue an Order directing the trespasser to produce a valid service of
process containing an Affidavit of Complaint or Complaint upon information and
warrant used to abduct and illegally detain the Claimant at Law on

(4) That this Court has accepted this writ as a contract and must act accordingly by
dismissing the fraudulent charges as described above;

(5). That after a de novo review of the record this Court if an Article Ill court finds that
there was an absence of jurisdiction or excess of jurisdiction or failure to proceed
according to the essential requirements of law.

(5). That this Court is subject to the rules, codes and regulations contained herein, and, I the
Claimant at Law, beneficiary, sui juris and Sovereign the
Living, Breathing, Natural Human Being, is under common-law;

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 (6). That the COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE STATE OF TENNESSEE in
Case No.
be VACATED for Want of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction and be DISMISSED with
PREJUDICE;
(7). That this cause of action must be corrected by releasing the Claimant at Law,
beneficiary, sui juris and Sovereign the Living, Breathing,
Natural Human Being from custody and that this action be carried out without delay in
accordance with both the Tennessee and United States Constitution.

(8). That by the ORDER OF THIS COURT, the artificial/fiction entity Cestui que Trust
be RELEASED TO THE Claimant at Law,
beneficiary, sui juris and Sovereign the Living, Breathing,
Natural Human Being IMMEDIATELY;

(9). That the Claimant at Law, beneficiary, sui juris and

Sovereign the Living, Breathing, Natural Human Being be DISCHARGED from the
CUSTODY of (any) the STATE OF TENNESSEE/DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS.

(10). That the State of Tennessee direct the trespassers to expunge Claimant at Law's
criminal, or otherwise, record;

(13). That after proper review in accordance with common law the Court grants Claimant at
Law any such further relief as this Court deems just and proper.

This HABEAS CORPUS is also an AFFIDAVIT OF CRIMINAL COMPLAINT (AOCC).

In addition, this Habeas Corpus is a COMMON-LAW CONTRACT

In addition, if not answered in full within 304y days you agree that all contained in here

is true and thereby I am entitled tc immediately relief that was asked for.

That this is a HABEAS CORPUS to which i am the Claimant at Law and never the

defendant. That I do not nor have I asked for an attorney, thus please have the ()RDER reflect

this.

I, the human, beneficiary, and Sovereign am the

beneficiary for the Cestui que Trust and as the beneficiary, I

can never make a decision for the TRUST.

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31
This is a condition separate from the Clerk condition of ten (10) days to show
clarification of whether there are Article Ill Judges in the Tennessee Courts as mandated by the United States
Constitution Article Ill.
I, the human, beneficiary, and Sovereign have

personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances set forth in the above writ, and the
allegations are true, correct, and not meant to mislead, to the best of my knowledge and belief.
Be It Known: This security instrument establishes a Common-Law Contract between us under
the Postal rule, which states . . .

"The postal rule (also known as the mailbox rule "deposited acceptance rule") is
the term of Common-Law contracts which determines the timing of acceptance of
an offer when mail is contemplated and the medium of acceptance. The general
rule is that a contract is formed when acceptance is actually communicated to the
offeror. The mailbox rule is an exception to the general principle. The mailbox
rule provides that the contract is formed when a properly prepaid and properly
addressed letter of acceptance is posted. One rationale given for the rule is that
the offeror nominates the post office as implied agent and thus receipt of the
acceptance by the post office is regarded as that of the offeree. The main effect of
the mailbox rule is that the risk of acceptance being delivered late or lost in the
post is placed upon the offeror. If the offer or is reluctant to accept this risk, he
can always require actual receipt before being legally bound."

SOVEREIGN OATH

l, benefic:ary, sui juris and the living, breathing, natural

human being, being a Sovereign, declare upon My Word of Honor that the above mentioned is

True, to the best of My Knowledge and Belief; also, this Sovereign DOES SWARE under the

Pains and Penalties of Perjury, under True Common Law as well as the Law of the Land,

U.S. Constitution/Bill of Rights of the unites State of America, and as a Sovereign, I DO give

freely of My Unlimited Commercial Oath, without Dishonor and without Prejudice, that these

documents are True, Correct, Complete, and Not Meant to Mislead, before GOD

ALMIGHTY.

Further, the Affiant saith not.

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 With Clean hands
Without Prejudice
or Recourse, U.C.C. 1-308

Beneficiary and Sovereign

Authorized Autograph/Representative

AFFIRMATION

SWORN TO AND SUBSCRIBED before me, a Notary Public in and for the County of
Morgan, State of Tennessee, on this day of 2022.

Notary Public (Seal)

VERIFICATION

STATE OF TENNESSEE
COUNTY OF

l, Family of a freeman, Sui Juris,

Appearing in any Military (Admiralty) Jurisdiction Maritime Law tribunal appearing by
paper and Specially, Not generally or Voluntarily, and in Propria Persona and as Human
beneficiary of the Social Security Cestui Que Trust and never
as the Trustee after being duly sworn according to law, make oath that the facts stated in the
foregoing COMMON LAW WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS/WRIT OF INJUNCTION BY
A PERSON IN STATE CUSTODY "in a court of law" WITH AN Article Ill of the
Constitution for the united States of America Judge whose "Compensation has not been
Diminished during their Continuance in Office." hereby notifies this tribunal that as the
claimant at Law, and plaintiff in this commercial action, "herby elect to move according to
the course of common law invoking the state and federal Bill of Rights rejecting and

115
 With Clean hands
Without Prejudice
presumed statutory jurisdiction." are true and correct to the best of my knowledge,
information and belief.
& Honor
UCC 1-308

beneficiary
Authorized Autograph/Representative

SWORN TO AND SUBSCRIBED before me, a Notary Public in and for the County of
Morgan, State of Tennessee, on this day of 2022.

Notary Public (Seal)

NOTARIZATION OF HABEAS CORPUS

STATE OF TENNESSEE
COUNTY OF

l, Family of a freeman, Sui Juris,

Appearing in any Military (Admiralty) Jurisdiction Maritime Law tribunal appearing by
paper and Specifically, Not Generally or Voluntarily, and in Propria Persona and as human
beneficiary of the Social Security Cestui Que Trust AND
NEVER AS THE Trustee after being duly sworn according to law, make oath that the facts
stated in the foregoing COMMON LAW WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS/WRIT OF
INJUNCTION BY A PERSON IN STATE CUSTODY "in a court of law" WITH AN
Article Ill of the
Constitution for the united States of America Judge whose "Compensation has not been
Diminished during their Continuance in Office." hereby notifies this tribunal that as the
claimant at Law, and plaintiff in this commercial action, "herby elect to move according to

116
 With Clean hands
Without Prejudice
the course of common law invoking the state and federal Bill of Rights rejecting and
presumed statutory jurisdiction." are true and correct to the best of my knowledge,
information and belief, and that this notarization is separate from the verification of this
writ.
& Honor
UCC 1-308

beneficiary

Authorized Autograph/Representative

SWORN TO AND SUBSCRIBED before me, a Notary Public in and for the above
referenced county and state, on this day of 2022.

NOTARY PUBLIC

My Commission Expires:

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

l, sovereign, & beneficiary do hereby certify that

a true and exact copy of the foregoing has been mailed to:

by via postage prepaid certified mail return

receipt on this the day of 2022.

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