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3.2 PREAMBLE

The Ordinance by section 3 was to remain in force for two years unless the period was further extended by the
Rajpramukh. Section 4 of the Ordinance provided that during the continuance of the Ordinance no tenant could be
ejected or dispossessed and by section 15 power was conferred upon the Government to exempt any person or
class of persons from the operation of the Ordinance. It was contended before the Supreme Court that the power
conferred upon the Rajpramukh to extend the life of the Act amounted to delegation of legislative function and was
bad and further the power of granting exemption conferred by section 15 was unfettered and uncanalised and
therefore repugnant to Article 14 of the Constitution. In rejecting the first contention the Supreme Court pointed out
that the Preamble of the Ordinance clearly recited the state of facts necessitating the enactment of the law; and the
power to extend the life of the Act conferred on the Rajpramukh was dependent on his satisfaction as to those state
of facts continuing to exist on expiry of the original period of the Act. It was, therefore, a case of conditional
legislation and not a case of delegated legislation.33. Dealing with the second contention regarding section 15, it
observed:

It is true that the section does not itself indicate the grounds on which exemption can be granted, but the Preamble to the
Ordinance sets out with sufficient clearness ‘the policy of the Legislature’; and as that governs section 15 of the Ordinance,
the decision of the Government thereunder cannot be said to be unguided.34.

Thus, discretionary power conferred in wide terms and challenged as unfettered and unguided was upheld by
recourse to the Preamble and by holding that the discretion so conferred was restricted in that, it could be used only
in furtherance of the object and policy of the Act as disclosed in the Preamble.35.

Similarly, section 23(1) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 which permits the allotment of any
land vesting in the Government to any person for any purpose relating to, or in connection with any industry or for
providing residential accommodation of such type as may be approved by the State Government to the employees
of any industry was given a restrictive construction having regard to the Act’s Preamble and section 23(4). The
Preamble shows that the Act was passed with the object of preventing concentration of urban land in the hands of a
few persons and with a view to bringing about an equitable distribution of land in urban agglomerations to subserve
the common good. Section 23(4) provides that subject to the provisions of section 23(1) all vacant land shall be
disposed of by the State Government to subserve the common good. Although section 23(4) was “subject to”
section 23(1), yet it was held that disposal of land under section 23(1) can only be for the common good and not
otherwise. A contrary construction would have made section 23(1) unconstitutional as was held by the minority. The
majority, however, gave it a restricted interpretation observing:

The Preamble to the Act ought to resolve interpretational doubts arising out of the defective drafting of section 23.36.

The Bihar Annual Finance Act, 1950 amended the definition of “dealer” in the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947. It was
contended before the Supreme Court37. that having regard to the Preamble, change in definition of “dealer” was
applicable only for the financial year beginning from 1 April 1950 and was not applicable for subsequent years. The
Preamble of the Finance Act to which recourse was taken for this contention ran as follows:

Whereas it is expedient to amend the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947 to lay down rates of sales tax payable under the Bihar
Sales Tax Act, 1947, for the financial year beginning on the 1 April 1950 and to make further provisions in connection with
the finance of the State of Bihar.

In rejecting the contention so put forward, Kapur J, observed:

The Preamble cannot limit or change the meaning of the plain words of section 2(c) of the Act which apply to the appellant
and therefore the amended section is applicable to the present case. It is erroneous approach to the question to say that
because of the words ‘for the financial year beginning on the first day of April, 1950’ in the particular context in the
Preamble, the definition of the word ‘dealer’ was amended only for one year. Nothing has been shown indicating that
section 2(i) of Bihar Finance Act intended to effect a temporary amendment in the previous definition of the word ‘dealer’ in
clause (c) of section 2 of the Act.38.
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3.2 PREAMBLE

Use of the word “may” in section 5 of the Hindu Marriage Act which provides: “A marriage may be solemnized
between any two Hindus….” has been construed to be mandatory in the sense that both parties to the marriage
must be Hindus as defined in section 2 of the Act. It was, therefore, held that a marriage between a Christian male
and a Hindu female solemnized under the Hindu Marriage Act was void. This result was reached also having regard
to the Preamble of the Act which reads:

An Act to amend and codify the law relating to marriage among Hindus.39.

The Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisition and Development) Act, 1957 in section 4(1) provides: “whenever it appears to
the Central Government that coal is likely to be obtained from land in any locality, it may, by notification in the
Official Gazette, give notice of its intention to prospect for coal therein.” On issue of such a notification in respect of
any land, any prospecting licence or mining lease granted to any person ceases to have effect and provision is
made for acquisition of land so notified as also for payment of compensation etc. The Act contains a Preamble
which runs as follows:

An Act to establish, in the economic interest of India, greater public control over the coal mining industry and its
development by providing for the acquisition by the State of unworked land containing or likely to contain coal deposits or of
right in or over such land, for the extinguishment or modification of such rights accruing by virtue of any agreement, lease,
licence or otherwise, and for matters connected therewith.

The argument before the Supreme Court was that the Act applied only to virgin lands and not to those lands which
are being worked or were worked in the past. Support for this contention was taken from the words “unworked land”
in the Preamble. Rejecting the contention on the ground that the language of the enacting provisions was clear and
therefore not controlled by the Preamble, the Supreme Court pointed out:

On the plain language of sub-section (1) of section 4, the Central Government has been empowered to issue a notification
with reference to its intention of prospecting any land in a locality and not only such land as is virgin.40.

This case was followed in holding that reference to “mismanagement” in the Preamble of the Textile Undertakings
(Taking over of Management) Act, 1983 could not restrict the operation of the Act to only those mills of the
companies mentioned in the Schedule whose financial condition was deplorable only on account of
mismanagement but not otherwise.41.

By section 5 of the Displaced Persons (Claims) Supplementary Act, 1954, power is conferred on the Chief
Settlement Commissioner to revise any verified claim. The expression “verified claim” is defined in section 2(f) to
mean any claim registered under the Displaced Persons (Claim) Act, 1950 in respect of which a final order has
been passed under that Act. The Supplementary Act contains a Preamble which recites that it was enacted to
provide for the disposal of certain proceedings pending under the 1950 Act and for matters connected therewith. It
was argued on the basis of the Preamble that the power of revision under the Supplementary Act was limited to
pending proceedings and a verified claim which had become final after revision by the Chief Claims Commissioner
under the 1950 Act, could not be reopened and revised by the Chief Settlement Commissioner under the
Supplementary Act. This contention was negated having regard to the clear words of section 5 read with the
definition of verified claim in section 2(f) and it was observed:

A Preamble is a key to open the mind of the Legislature, but it cannot be used to control or qualify precise and
unambiguous language of the enactment.42.

A Preamble retrospectively inserted into an earlier Act is not of much assistance for gathering the intention of the
original Act. The point was stressed by Gwyer CJ, in the following words:

But we doubt very much whether a Preamble retrospectively inserted in 1940 in an Act passed 25 years before can be
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3.2 PREAMBLE

looked at by the court for the purpose of discovering what the true intention of the Legislature was at the earlier date. A
Legislature can always enact that the law is, and shall be deemed always to have been such and such, but that is wholly
different thing from imputing to dead and gone Legislators a particular intention merely because their successors at the
present day think that they might or ought to have had it.43.

Similarly, it seems the repeal of a Preamble simpliciter will not affect the construction of the statute.44.

13. It was pointed out by M Hidayatullah J in Constitutional Law of India, Vol 1, p 39 (published by the Bar Council of India,
Trust, 1984) that the importance of Preamble to statutes was expressed by Plato 2000 years back (Plato: “The Laws”—
Penguin classics, p 185) who said that Preamble to enacted laws were essential and added in explanation: “The
‘dictatorial prescription’…… is the law pure and simple; and the part that comes before it, which is essentially
‘persuasive’…… has an additional function analogous to that of a preamble in a speech. It seems obvious to me that
the reason why the legislator gave the entire persuasive address was to make the persons to whom he promulgated his
law accept his orders—the law—in a more cooperative frame of mind and with a correspondingly greater readiness to
learn. That is why, as I see it, the element ought properly to be termed not the ‘text’ of the law, but the preamble.”
14. For example see Secretary, Regional Transport Authority v DP Sharma, AIR 1989 SC 509 [LNIND 1988 SC 580], p
511 : 1988 (4) JT 666 [LNIND 1988 SC 581] : 1989 Supp (1) SCC 407 (Preamble of the Karnataka Contract Carriages
Acquisition Act, 1974).
15. Brett v Brett, (1826) 162 ER 456, pp 458, 459.
16. (1844) 11 Cl & F 85, p 143.
17. See Stowel v Lord Zouch, (1569) 1 Plowd 353, p 369 : 75 ER 536.
18. Sussex Peerage case, (1844) 11 Cl & Fin 85 : 8 ER 1034 (HL), referred to in Commissioners for Special Purposes of
Income-tax v John Frederick Pemsel, (1891-94) All ER Rep 28, p 36 : 1891 AC 531 (HL) (Lord Halsbury, LC); Bhola
Prasad v Emperor, AIR 1942 FC 17, p 21 (Gwyer CJ); see further A Thangal Kunju Musaliar v M Venkatachala Potti,
AIR 1956 SC 246 [LNIND 1955 SC 116], p 264 : (1955) 2 SCR 1196 [LNIND 1955 SC 116] (Bhagwati J); Arnit Das v
State of Bihar, JT 2000 (6) SC 320 [LNIND 2000 SC 859], p 333 : AIR 2000 SC 2264 [LNIND 2000 SC 859], p 2271 :
(2000) 5 SCC 488 [LNIND 2000 SC 859].
19. AG v HRH Prince Ernest Augustus, (1957) 1 All ER 49 : 1957 AC 436 (HL).
20. Ibid, pp 55, 57, 61.
21. Ibid, pp 55, 57, 62.
22. Ibid, pp 54, 58, 60, 62.
23. UOI v Elphinstone Spinning & Weaving Co Ltd, JT 2001 (1) SC 536 [LNIND 2001 SC 2915], p 564 : AIR 2001 SC 724
[LNIND 2001 SC 104], p 740 : (2001) 4 SCC 139 [LNIND 2001 SC 2915] (Constitution bench).
24. Lord Simonds is here referring to the rule laid down by Lord Davey in Powell v Kemption Park Race-course Co Ltd,
(1899) AC 143, to the effect: “You must not create or imagine an ambiguity in order to bring in the aid of preamble”.
25. AG v HRH Prince Ernest Augustus of Hanover, (1957) 1 All ER 49, pp 54, 55 : 1957 AC 436 (HL).
26. Ibid, pp 57, 58.
27. Ibid, P 62.
28. AG v HRH Prince Ernest Augustus of Hanover, (1957) 1 All ER 49, p 60 : 1957 AC 436 (HL).
29. Burakar Coal Co Ltd v UOI, AIR 1961 SC 954 [LNIND 1961 SC 55], pp 956, 957 : 1962 (1) SCR 44 [LNIND 1961 SC
55]. See further State of Rajasthan v Leela Jain, AIR 1965 SC 1296 [LNIND 1964 SC 228], p 1299 : 1965 (1) SCR 276
[LNIND 1964 SC 228]. (“The Preamble may, no doubt, be used to solve any ambiguity or to fix the meaning of words
which may have more than one meaning, but it can, however, not be used to eliminate as redundant or unintended, the
operative provisions of a statute.”) Venkataswami R Naidu v Narasram Naraindas, AIR 1966 SC 361 [LNIND 1965 SC
152], p 363 : 1966 (1) SCR 110 [LNIND 1965 SC 152]; Tribhuvan Parkash Nayyar v UOI, AIR 1970 SC 540 [LNIND
1969 SC 388], p 543 : 1969 (3) SCC 99 [LNIND 1969 SC 388]; YA Mamarde v Authority under the Minimum Wages
Act, AIR 1972 SC 1721 [LNIND 1972 SC 220], p 1726 : (1972) 2 SCC 108 [LNIND 1972 SC 220]; AC Sharma v Delhi
Administration, AIR 1973 SC 913 [LNIND 1973 SC 30], p 917 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 608; Rashtriya Mill Mazdoor Sangh v
National Textile Corp, 1995 (6) Scale 609, p 617 : AIR 1997 SC 710, p 713; Munishwar Pandey v Ramjeet Tiwari, 1996
(8) Scale 736 [LNIND 1996 SC 2690], p 750 : AIR 1997 SC 1571 [LNIND 1996 SC 2690], p 1583; Arnit Das v State of
Bihar, JT 2000 (6) SC 320 [LNIND 2000 SC 859], p 333 : AIR 2000 SC 2264 [LNIND 2000 SC 859], p 2271 : (2000) 5
 Page 6 of 6
3.2 PREAMBLE

SCC 488 [LNIND 2000 SC 859]; UOI v Elphinstone Weaving and Spinning Co Ltd, JT 2001 (1) SC 536 [LNIND 2001
SC 2915], p 564 : AIR 2001 SC 724 [LNIND 2001 SC 104], p 740 : (2001) 4 SCC 139 [LNIND 2001 SC 2915].
30. Maharishi Mahesh Yogi Vedic Vishwavidalaya v State of MP, (2013) 15 SCC 677 [LNIND 2013 SC 587], p 716.
31. AG v HRH Prince Ernest Augustus of Hanover, (1957) 1 All ER 49 : 1957 AC 436 (HL) text and Note 20 supra. See
further Chatper 1, title 3 “Statute must be read as a whole in its context”. Also see Chapter 1, title 6 “Appraisal of the
Principle of plain meaning”.
32. AG v HRH Prince Ernest Augustus of Hanover, supra, p 62 (Lord Somervell). This case was discussed in Oliver
Ashworth (Holdings) Ltd v Ballard (Kent) Ltd, (1999) 2 All ER 791, pp 805, 806 (CA).
33. Sardar Inder Singh v State of Rajasthan, AIR 1957 SC 510 [LNIND 1957 SC 13], p 516 : 1957 SCR 605 [LNIND 1957
SC 13].
34. Ibid, pp 516, 517.
35. Ibid; Bhatnagar & Co Ltd v UOI, AIR 1957 SC 478 [LNIND 1957 SC 22], pp 485, 486 : 1957 SCR 701 [LNIND 1957 SC
22]. See further Bishwambhar Singh v State of Orissa, AIR 1954 SC 139 [LNIND 1953 SC 122], p 144 : 1954 SCR 842
[LNIND 1953 SC 122]; Re Kerala Education Bill, AIR 1958 SC 956, p 974 : 1959 SCR 995. (These cases relate to use
of Long Title and Preamble and are noticed in title 1 “Long Title” text and Note 9, p 173).
36. Maharao Sahab Shri Bhimsinghji v UOI, AIR 1981 SC 234, p 237 : (1981) 1 SCC 166.
37. Motipur Zamindary Co Pvt Ltd v State of Bihar, AIR 1962 SC 660 [LNIND 1961 SC 358], p 662 : 1962 Supp (1) SCR
498.
38. Ibid, p 662.
39. Gullipilli Sowria Raj v Bandaru Pavani, (2009) 1 SCC 714 [LNIND 2008 SC 2369] para 16 : AIR 2009 SC 1058.
40. Burrakur Coal Co v UOI, AIR 1961 SC 954 [LNIND 1961 SC 55], p 957 : 1962 (1) SCR 44 [LNIND 1961 SC 55].
41. UOI v Elphinstone Spinning & Weaving Co Ltd, AIR 2001 SC 724 [LNIND 2001 SC 104], p 741 : (2001) 4 SCC 139
[LNIND 2001 SC 2915].
42. Tribhuvan Parkash Nayyar v UOI, AIR 1970 SC 540 [LNIND 1969 SC 388], p 543 : 1969 (3) SCC 99 [LNIND 1969 SC
388].
43. Bhola Prasad v Emperor, AIR 1942 FC 17, p 21 : 1942 FLR 17 : 43 Cr LJ 481. (The case refers to a Preamble inserted
by the Bihar Excise (Amendment) Act, 1940 in the Bihar & Orissa Excise Act, 1915).
44. Craies : Statute Law, 7th Edn, p 206.

End of Document
 3.3 PREAMBLE OF THE CONSTITUTION
GP Singh: Principles of Statutory Interpretation (also including General Clauses Act, 1897 with Notes), 14th ed
Justice G P SinghJustice A K Patnaik

GP Singh: Principles of Statutory Interpretation (also including General Clauses Act, 1897 with
Notes), 14th ed > GP Singh: Principles of Statutory Interpretation (also including General
Clauses Act, 1897 with Notes), 14th ed > CHAPTER 3 Internal Aids to Construction

CHAPTER 3 Internal Aids to Construction

3.3 PREAMBLE OF THE CONSTITUTION45.

The drafting committee of the Constituent Assembly formulated the Preamble in the light of the Objectives
Resolution but restricted it “to define the essential features of the new State and its basic socio-political objective”.46.
The draft of the Preamble was considered by the Assembly last after considering other parts of the Draft
Constitution—“to see that it was in conformity with the Constitution”47. and a motion was adopted by the Assembly
that “the Preamble stands part of the Constitution”.48. The Preamble of the Constitution like the Preamble of any
statute furnishes the key to open the mind of the makers of the Constitution more so because the Constituent
Assembly took great pains in formulating it so that it may reflect the essential features and basic objectives of the
Constitution. The Preamble is a part of the Constitution. The Constitution, including the Preamble, must be read as
a whole and in case of doubt interpreted consistent with its basic structure to promote the great objectives stated in
the Preamble.49. But the Preamble can neither be regarded as the source of any substantive power nor as a source
of any prohibition or limitation.50. The Preamble of a Constitution Amendment Act can be used to understand the
object of the amendment.51.

The majority judgments in Keshavananda and Minerva Mills strongly relied upon the Preamble in reaching the
conclusion that the power of amendment conferred by Article 368 was limited and did not enable Parliament to alter
the basic structure or framework of the Constitution.52.

By section 2 of the Constitution (42nd Amendment) Act, 1976, two amendments were made in the Preamble. First
for the words “Sovereign Democratic Republic” the words “Sovereign Socialist Secular Democratic Republic” were
substituted and, secondly, for the words “Unity of India”, the words “Unity and Integrity of the Nation” were
substituted. These amendments were held to be valid in Minerva Mills.53. The addition of the word “Socialist”
enabled the courts to lean more in favour of nationalisation54. and economic equality.55. It was also used for
rejection of a classification based on notions of feudalistic society e.g. Kinship.56.

45. For further study see: “Preamble” contributed by GP Singh J in “Constitutional Law of India”, Vol 1, pp 13 to 44
published by the Bar Council of India Trust under the Chief Editorship of M Hidayatullah J, (1984); and “Preamble” by
RC Lahoti J, Anundoram Borooah Law Lecture, Published by Eastern Book Company, Lucknow (2004).
46. Shiva Rao, The Framing of India’s Constitution, A Study, p 128.
47. Ibid, p 130.
48. Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol X, pp 429-56.
49. Kesavananda v State of Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 1461 [LNIND 1973 SC 154]: (1973) 4 SCC 225 [LNIND 1973 SC 154];
Minerva Mills Ltd v UOI, AIR 1980 SC 1789 [LNIND 1980 SC 257]: 1980 (3) SCC 625 [LNIND 1980 SC 257]. See
further Behram Khurshid Pesikaka v State of Bombay, AIR 1955 SC 123 [LNIND 1954 SC 116], p 146 : 1955 (1) SCR
613 [LNIND 1954 SC 116]; Re Kerala Education Bill, 1957, AIR 1958 SC 956, p 965 : 1959 SCR 995; Basheshar Nath
v CIT, AIR 1959 SC 149 [LNIND 1958 SC 147], pp 158, 160 : 1959 Supp (1) SCR 528. These cases are noticed by
Shelat and Grover JJ in Kesavananda, supra, at p 1579. The contrary opinion expressed in the reference on the
Agreement relating to Berubari Union and Exchange of Enclaves, AIR 1960 SC 845, p 856 : (1960) 3 SCR 250 was
overruled in Kesavananda, supra. See further Ashoka Kumar Thakur v UOI, (2008) 6 SCC 1 [LNIND 2008 SC 873]