SALVACION vs CENTRAL BANK

FACTS

Greg Bartelli y Northcott, an American tourist, coaxed and lured petitioner Karen Salvacion, then
12 years old to go with him to his apartment. Therein, Greg Bartelli detained Karen Salvacion for four
days and rape her three times each day. Along with the criminal case, a civil action was filed against
Bartelli for damages with preliminary attachment.

When the Notice of Garnishment was served to China Banking Corporation, the latter invoked
Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 to the effect that the dollar deposits of defendant Greg
Bartelli are exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative
body, government agency or any administrative body, whatsoever. Thus, petitioners decided to seek
relief from Supreme Court.

ISSUE

WON the questioned law, Sec. 113 of Central Bank Circular Bank No. 960 should be applied to
the case of the aggrieved petitioner

RULING

Adjudging Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 as contrary to the provisions of the
Constitution. In fine, the application of the law depends on the extent of its justice. Eventually, if we rule
that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 which exempts from attachment,
garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any
administrative body whatsoever, is applicable to a foreign transient, injustice would result especially to a
citizen aggrieved by a foreign guest like accused Greg Bartelli. This would negate Article 10 of the New
Civil Code which provides that “in case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is
presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail. “Ninguno non deue
enriquecerse tortizeramente con dano de otro.” Simply stated, when the statute is silent or ambiguous,
this is one of those fundamental solutions that would respond to the vehement urge of conscience.
Duetsche Bank AG Manila Branch vs. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 704 SCRA 216, G.R. No. 188550 August 28, 2013
FACTS

Petitioner remitted to respondent an overpayment of PHP 67,688,553.51, which represented

the fifteen percent (15%) branch profit remittance tax (BPRT) on its regular banking unit (RBU) net
income remitted to Deutsche Bank Germany (DB Germany)

Petitioner filed an administrative claim for refund or issuance of its tax credit. It also requested from the
International Tax Affairs Division (ITAD) a confirmation of its entitlement to the preferential tax rate of
10% under the RP-Germany Tax Treaty.

Petitioner filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) claiming for the refund or
issuance of its tax credit certificate, however the same was denied on the ground that the requirement
of prior application under RMO No. 1-2000 was not met.

ISSUE

WON the failure to comply with RMO No. 1-2000 will deprive persons or corporations of the benefit of a
tax treaty.

RULIN

Yes. Constitution provides for adherence to the general principles of international law as part of
the law of the land. The time-honored international principle of pacta sunt servanda demands the
performance in good faith of treaty obligations on the part of the states that enter into the agreement.
xxx Treaties have the force and effect of law in this jurisdiction.

xxxx

“A state that has contracted valid international obligations is bound to make in its legislations
those modifications that may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken.”
Thus, laws and issuances must ensure that the reliefs granted under tax treaties are accorded to the
parties entitled thereto. The BIR must not impose additional requirements that would negate the
availment of the reliefs provided for under international agreements. More so, when the RP-Germany
Tax Treaty does not provide for any pre-requisite for the availment of the benefits under said
agreement.
BELGICA vs OCHOA
FACTS

Under the 2013 PDAF Article, individual legislators are given a personal lump-sum fund
from which they are able to dictate (a) how much from such fund would go to (b) a specific project or
beneficiary that they themselves also determine. These acts comprise the exercise of the power of
appropriation and authorizes individual legislators to perform the same and legislators have been
conferred the power to legislate which the Constitution does not allow.

These led Petitioners to file an Urgent Petition For Certiorari seeking that the annual “Pork
Barrel System be declared unconstitutional and null and void.

ISSUE

Whether or not the 2013 PDAF and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar thereto are
unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles of non-delegability of legislative power

HELD

Yes. In the cases at bar, the Court observes that the 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it confers
post-enactment identification authority to individual legislators, violates the principle of non-delegability
since said legislators are effectively allowed to individually exercise the power of appropriation, which —
as settled in Philconsa — is lodged in Congress. That the power to appropriate must be exercised only
through legislation is clear from Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states that: “No
money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.”

Thus, keeping with the principle of non-delegability of legislative power, the Court declares the
2013 PDAF Article, as well as all other forms of Congressional Pork Barrel which contain the similar
legislative identification feature as unconstitutional.
PP vs MACEREN
FACTS

The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources promulgated Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84
prohibiting electro fishing in all Philippine waters. Thereafter, Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1,
was issued amending section 2 of Administrative Order No. 84, by restricting the ban against electro
fishing to freshwater fisheries.

Petitioners were charged with violation Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1 after resorting to electro
fishing in the waters of Sta. Cruz Laguna. The municipal court quashed the complaint and held that
electro fishing cannot be penalized because electric current is not an obnoxious or poisonous substance
as contemplated in section 11 of the Fisheries Law. The lower court further held that, since the law does
not clearly prohibit electro fishing, the executive and judicial departments cannot consider it unlawful.

ISSUE

WON The lawmaking body can delegate to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources the
power to declare acts which would constitute a criminal offense

HELD

The lawmaking body cannot delegate to an executive official the power to declare what acts
should constitute a criminal offense. It can authorize the issuance of regulations and the imposition of
the penalty provided for in the law itself.

In the exercise of the rule-making power of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
under the Fisheries Law, he exceeded his authority in penalizing electro fishing by means of an
administrative order.x x x The grant of the rule-making power to administrative agencies is a relaxation
of the principle of separation of powers and is an exception to the nondelegation of legislative powers.

As he exercises the rule-making power by delegation of the lawmaking body, it is a requisite that
he should not transcend the bounds demarcated by the statute for the exercise of that power;
otherwise, he would be improperly exercising legislative power in his own right and not as a surrogate of
the lawmaking body.

Hence, the court affirmed the decision of the municipal court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna
LOKIN vs COMELEC]
FACTS

CIBAC party list submitted 5 nominees from which its representatives would be chosen
should the party list qualify in the 2007 elections. Lokin with Tugna and Galang, were among the
nominees. However, they were later substituted by Cruz-Gonzales and Borje. COMELEC’s basis for
substitution is Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 allowing the party-list organization to withdraw its
nomination already submitted to the COMELEC.

Petitioner alleges that Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 expanded Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941.
He filed a mandamus to compel the COMELEC to proclaim him as a the second nominee.

ISSUE

Whether or not Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 is unconstitutional and violates the RA 7941
(Party-List System Act)

HELD

Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 is daylight clear. The Legislature thereby deprived the party-list
organization of the right to change its nominees or to alter the order of nominees once the list is
submitted to the COMELEC, except when: (a) the nominee dies; (b) the nominee withdraws in writing his
nomination; or (c) the nominee becomes incapacitated. The provision must be read literally because its
language is plain and free from ambiguity, and expresses a single, definite, and sensible meaning. Such
meaning is conclusively presumed to be the meaning that the Legislature has intended to convey. Even
where the courts should be convinced that the Legislature really intended some other meaning, and
even where the literal interpretation should defeat the very purposes of the enactment, the explicit
declaration of the Legislature is still the law, from which the courts must not depart. When the law
speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no reason for interpretation or construction, but only
for application.35 Accordingly, an administrative agency tasked to implement a statute may not
construe it by expanding its meaning where its provisions are clear and unambiguous.

The court granted the petition for mandamus and ordered the Commission on Elections to
proclaim petitioner Luis K. Lokin, Jr. as a Party-List Representative CIBAC
BELGICA vs OCHOA

FACTS

The Court ruled in PHILCONSA: The authority given to the members of Congress is only to propose and
identify projects to be implemented by the President. Under Article XLI of the GAA of 1994, the
President must perforce examine whether the proposals submitted by members of Congress fall within
the specific items of expenditures for which the Fund was set up, and if qualified, he next determines
whether they are in line with other projects planned for the locality.

RULING

As the Court now largely benefits from hindsight and current findings on the matter, among others, the
CoA Report, the Court must partially abandon its previous ruling in Philconsa insofar as it validated the
post-enactment identification authority of Members of Congress on the guise that the same was merely
recommendatory. This postulate raises serious constitutional inconsistencies which cannot be simply
excused on the ground that such mechanism is “imaginative as it is innovative.” Moreover, it must be
pointed out that the recent case of Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima (Abakada) has effectively
overturned Philconsa’s allowance of post-enactment legislator participation in view of the separation of
powers principle.
 Election Law

28 Salvador D. Violago Sr., vs. COMELEC, 658 SCRA 516

FACTS

Petitioner Violago, Sr., and private respondent Alarilla were candidates for the mayoralty in
Meycauayan, Bulacan by which the latter was proclaimed the winner. Violago, Sr. filed a Petition with
the COMELEC questioning the proclamation of private respondent allegedly because of various election
violations.

The COMELEC 2nd Division dismissed petitioner’s protest on the ground that the latter belatedly filed his
Brief in violation of the COMELEC rule on the filing of briefs. A Motion for Reconsideration was filed by
the petitioner. The same was denied on the ground of lack of proper verification. Hence, the petition.

Issue: W/N the COMELEC En Banc is correct in dismissing the MR on the ground of lack of proper
verification.

Held:

No. The COMELEC En Banc is not correct in dismissing the MR on the ground of lack of proper
verification. While it is true that Section 3, Rule 20 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure on Disputes in an
Automated Election System, as well as Section 3, Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, clearly
require that a motion for reconsideration should be verified, however, the settled rule is that the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure are subject to liberal construction.

xxx

Meanwhile, in the case of Panlilio v. Commission on Elections, restated the prevailing principle that the
COMELEC’s rules of procedure for the verification of protests and certifications of non-forum shopping
should be liberally construed.

Furthermore, in Pacanan v. Commission on Elections: x x x An election contest, unlike an ordinary civil

action, is clothed with a public interest. The purpose of an election protest is to ascertain whether the
candidate proclaimed by the board of canvassers is the lawful choice of the people. What is sought is
the correction of the canvass of votes, which was the basis of proclamation of the winning candidate. An
election contest therefore involves not only the adjudication of private and pecuniary interests of rival
candidates but paramount to their claims is the deep public concern involved and the need of dispelling
the uncertainty over the real choice of the electorate. And the court has the corresponding duty to
ascertain, by all means within its command, who is the real candidate elected by the people.

Thus, the Comelec Rules of Procedure are subject to a liberal construction. This liberality is for the
purpose of promoting the effective and efficient implementation of the objectives of ensuring the
holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections and for achieving just, expeditious and
inexpensive determination and disposition of every action and proceeding brought before the Comelec.

Hence, the MR must be granted and hear the case for further proceedings.

Republic of the Philippines vs. Ong, G.R. N. 175430, June 18, 2012

FACTS:

Respondent Ong filed a Petition for Naturalization. Ong was born in Cebu City to parents both of Chinese
citizens. He is registered as a resident alien and possesses an alien certificate of registration and a
native-born certificate of residence from the Bureau of Immigration. At the time of the filing of the
petition, his family were living in Cebu City. Ong alleged in his petition that he has been a businessman.
However, in his testimony, he only said that he has been a businessman since he graduated from college
and did not specify or describe the nature of his business. As proof of his income, he instead presented
four tax returns for the years 1994 to 1997.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Ong has proved that he has some known lucrative trade, profession or lawful
occupation in accordance with Section 2, fourth paragraph of the Revised Naturalization Law.

HELD:

No. Naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the government and
against the applicant. The burden of proof rests upon the applicant to show full and complete
compliance with the requirements of law. Section 2, fourth paragraph of the Revised Naturalization Law,
provides:

any person having the following qualifications may become a citizen of the Philippines by naturalization:
Fourth. He must own real estate in the Philippines worth not less than five thousand pesos, Philippine
currency, or must have some known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation.

Jurisprudence holds that his employment gives one an income such that there is an appreciable margin
of his income over his expenses as to be able to provide for an adequate support in the event of
unemployment, sickness, or disability to work and thus avoid ones becoming the object of charity or a
public charge. His income should permit him and the members of his family to live with reasonable
comfort, in accordance with the prevailing standard of living, and consistently with the demands of
human dignity, at this stage of our civilization.

In the case at bar, respondent Ong failed to prove that he possesses the qualification of a known
lucrative trade provided in Section 2, fourth paragraph, of the Revised Naturalization Law.
Remo vs. Secretary of Foreign Affairs, G.R. No. 169202, March 5, 2010
Facts:

Petitioner Maria Virginia V. Remo is married to Francisco R. Rallonza. In her passport, her surname is
that of her husband Rallonza and her middle name is Remo. In her passport, she used her husband’s
surname. Prior to the expiry of the validity of her passport, petitioner, whose marriage still subsists,
applied for the renewal of her passport with the DFA, with a request to put her maiden name instead of
that of her surname in the replacement passport. However, the petitioner’s request was denied.
Petitioner thus appealed, arguing that RA 8239 (Philippine Passport Act of 1996) conflicted with and was
an implied repeal of Article 370 of the Civil Code which allows the wife to continue using her maiden
name upon marriage. However, her appeal was denied, hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not RA 8239 violates Article 370 of the Civil Code.

Held:
No. A married woman has an option, but not an obligation, to use her husband’s surname upon
marriage. when a woman marries, she does not change her name but only her civil status. RA 8239 does
not conflict with this principle.

Xxx

Even assuming RA 8239 conflicts with the civil code, the provisions of RA 8239 which is a special law
specifically dealing with passport issuance must prevail over the provisions of title XIII of the Civil Code
which is the general law on the use of surnames. A basic tenet in statutory construction is that a special
law prevails over a general law.

Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines, Inc., vs.

COMELEC, 701 SCRA 786

FACTS:

Party list Senior Citizen participated in the May 2007 elections, however failed to get the 2% total votes
and was given only one seat.

In May 2010 elections, Senior Citizen was allowed to participate there.After the May 2010 elections, the
said party list ranked second among all the party-list candidates and was allocated two seats in the
House of Representatives. The first seat was occupied by its first nominee, Rep. Arquiza, while the
second was given to its second nominee, Rep. Kho.

Later, Rep. Kho tendered his resignation with a board resolution of Senior Citizen accepting such
resignation in accordance with the term-sharing agreement made between the nominees of the party-
list. COMELEC, however, did not recognize the resignation saying that it is against public policy. The
COMELEC contended that the term of public officials cannot be made subject of parties for public office
which is not a commodity that can be shared, apportioned or be made subject to any private
agreement. COMELEC resolved to cancel the registration of the Senior Citizens as party-list.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the party list SENIOR CITIZENS has violated Section 7 of Resolution No. 9366 of their
term-sharing agreement which was entered into in 2010 or two years prior to the promulgation of
said resolution on February 21, 2012. 

RULING:

NO. The term-sharing agreement was made in 2010, while the expression of the policy prohibiting it
was promulgated only in 2012 via Section 7, Rule 4 of Resolution No. 9366 .

Hence, the resolution should not be made to apply retroactively to the case of SENIOR CITIZENS as
nothing therein provides for its retroactive effect. When the term-sharing agreement was executed in
2010, the same was not yet expressly proscribed by any law or resolution.
Article 4 of the Civil Code states that “laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is
provided.” As held in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Reyes,“the general rule is that statutes are
prospective. However, statutes that are remedial, or that do not create new or take away vested rights,
do not fall under the general rule against the retroactive operation of statutes.”

It is a well-entrenched principle that statutes, including administrative rules and regulations, operate
prospectively unless the legislative intent to the contrary is manifest by express terms or by necessary
implication because the retroactive application of a law usually divests rights that have already become
vested. This is based on the Latin maxim: Lex prospicit non respicit (the law looks forward, not
backward).

Eastern Mediterranean Maritime, Ltd., vs. Surio, 679 SCRA 21

Facts:
Respondents were former crewmembers of MT Seadance , a vessel owned by petitioner
Eastern Mediterranean Maritime Ltd . As MT Seadance docked at a port in Sweden, representatives of
International Transport Federation found out that wages of its crew members were below the prevailing
rates. As a result, negotiations ensued between the ITF and the vessel owner on the
increase in respondents’ wages resulted in the payment by the vessel owner of wage
differentials and the immediate repatriation of respondents to the Philippines.

Subsequently, the petitioners filed against respondents a complaint for disciplinary

action based on breach of discipline and for the reimbursement of the wage increases in
POEA.

During the pendency of the administrative complaint in the POEA, Republic Act No.
8042 (Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995) took effect on July 15,
1995. Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 vested original and exclusive jurisdiction
over all money claims arising out of employer-employee relationships involving
overseas Filipino workers in the Labor Arbiters. The jurisdiction over such claims was
previously exercised by the POEA under the POEA Rules and Regulations of 1991 (1991
POEA Rules).

POEA dismissed the complaint for disciplinary action. Petitioners filed a partial appeal
before the nLRC. The NLRC dismissed petitioners appeal for lack of jurisdiction. On
appeal before the CA, it affirmed the decision of the NLRC. Thus, this petition.

Issue:

WHETHER OR NOT THE NLRC HAS JURISDICTION TO REVIEW ON APPEAL CASES

DECIDED BY THE POEA ON MATTERS PERTAINING TO DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS
AGAINST RESPONDENTS.

Held:

No, the NLRC has no jurisdiction to review an appeal case decided by POEA on matters pertaining to
disciplinary actions against respondents.

According to Section 28 (b) of the Omnibus Rules and Regulations Implementing the Migrant Workers
and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, the POEA shall exercise original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and
decide disciplinary action cases and other special cases, which are administrative in character, involving
employers, principals, contracting partners and Filipino migrant workers. Since RA No. 8042 has been
passed into a law after the filing of charges by the petitioner to the respondents, the rule on
retroactivity of the laws shall be observed.

As a rule, all laws are prospective in application unless the contrary is expressly provided, or unless the
law is procedural or curative in nature. Thus, such law stating that the POEA has the jurisdiction to
decide on disciplinary cases shall be observed.

Thus, petitioners should have appealed the adverse decision of the POEA to the
Secretary of Labor instead of to the NLRC.
White Light Corporation vs. City of Manila, G.R. No. 122846, January
20, 2009
FACTS

Manila Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed an Ordinance No. 7774 which prohibits short time
admission, or checking in for less than twelve hours, in hotels, motels, lodging houses,
pension houses and similar establishments in the City of Manila. The petitioners
questioned the validity and constitutionality of the ordinance for violating their right to
privacy, freedom of movement and is unreasonable and oppressive inference in their
business.

The RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners and declared the Ordinance No. 7774 as
unconstitutional for infringing personal liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution such
as the right to operate economic enterprises. However, the Court of Appeals reversed
the decision of the RTC on the grounds that (1) it did not violate right to privacy and
freedom of movement as it only penalizes owners or operators of establishments that
admit individual for short time says, and (2) it is a valid exercise of police power.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE

Whether or not the Ordinance is valid.

HELD

No. Ordinance 7774 is not valid. Jurisprudence holds that for an ordinance to be valid,
it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact
and pass according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the
following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any
statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with
public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.

In the case at bar, the Ordinance prohibits two specific and distinct business practices,
namely wash rate admissions and renting out a room more than twice a day.

The apparent goal of the Ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the
covered establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and alike. The Ordinance
could have been valid if it employed less intrusive measures. These measures would
have minimal intrusion on the businesses of the petitioners who may offer short time
rates for families who pass by only for a few hours before continuing their travel.
Further, the means must align with the Constitution.

Executive Secretary vs. Forerunner Multi Resources, G.R. No. 199324,

January 7, 2013
FACTS

Executive Order No. 156 (EO 156) imposes a partial ban on the importation of used
motor vehicles. Respondent Forerunner , a corporation engaged in the importation of
used motor vehicles sued the government EO 156 invalid. One of the grounds is having
been superseded by Executive Order No. 418 (EO 418) modifying the tariff rates of
imported used motor vehicles.

The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioner. On appeal, the CA ruled that the trial
court committed grave abuse of discretion in lifting the preliminary injunctive writ. The
CA held that the implementation of EO 156 would put petitioner in a financial crisis.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE

Whether or not EO 418 repealed EO 156.

HELD

No. EO 418 did not repeal EO 156. The subsequent issuance of EO 148 increasing the
import duties on used motor vehicles did not modify the policy issued by Pres. Arroyo
which prohibits the importation of said vehicle. EO No. 418 does not expressly repeals
EO No. 156. It does not add a specific repealing clause indicating the intent to repeal
previous administrative issuances.

EO No. explicitly prohibits on the importation of used vehicles whereas EO No. 418
merely modifies the tariff and nomenclature rates of import duty on used motors
vehicles. Nothing therein expressly revokes the importation ban.

Penera vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 181613, November 25, 2009

FACTS:

Rosalinda Penera and Edgar T. Andanar were mayoralty candidates during the May
2007 elections. Andanar filed before the Office of the Regional Election Director,
Caraga Region, a Petition for Disqualification against Penera for unlawfully engaging in
election campaigning and partisan political activity prior to the commencement of the
campaign period.
The COMELEC’s Second Division disqualify petitioner Penera on the ground that she engaged in
premature campaigning in violation of Sections 80 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code. A motion
for reconsideration was filed arguing that Penera was not yet a candidate at the time of the incident
under Section 11 of RA 8436 as amended by Section 13 of RA 9369 and that Section 80 of the
Omnibus Election Code was expressly repealed by Republic Act No. 9369. Such MR was denied.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the term “candidate” in Section 15 of RA 8436 as amended by

RA 9369 is in conflict with Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code such that
premature campaigning may no longer be committed.

HELD:

No. The Court declared that “there is no absolute and irreconcilable incompatibility
between Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, and Section 80 of the
Omnibus Election Code, which defines the prohibited act of premature campaigning. It
is possible to harmonize and reconcile these two provisions and, thus, give effect to
both.”

The Court held, further, that:

“True, that pursuant to Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, even after
the filing of the COC but before the start of the campaign period, a person is not yet
officially considered a candidate. Nevertheless, a person, upon the filing of his/her
COC, already explicitly declares his/her intention to run as a candidate in the coming
elections.

When the campaign period starts and said person proceeds with his/her candidacy,
his/her intent turning into actuality, his/her acts can be considered, after the filing of
his/her COC and prior to the campaign period, as the promotion of his/her election as a
candidate, hence, constituting premature campaigning, for which he/she may be
disqualified.

A person, after filing his/her COC but prior to his/her becoming a candidate (thus, prior
to the start of the campaign period), can already commit the acts described under
Section 79(b) of the Omnibus Election Code as election campaign or partisan political
activity. However, only after said person officially becomes a candidate, at the
beginning of the campaign period, can said acts be given effect as premature
campaigning under Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code. Thus, it is only at the
start of the campaign period, when the person officially becomes a candidate, that the
undue and iniquitous advantages of his/her prior acts, constituting premature
campaigning, shall accrue to his/her benefit.

Thus, harmony in the provisions of Sections 80 and 79 of the Omnibus Election Code,
as well as Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended are necessary and
consistent with the legislative intent and policy of the law.

Lledo vs. Lledo, A.M. No. P-95-1167, February 9, 2010

FACTS

TOPIC: IMPLIED REPEALFacts:- Atty. Cesar Lledo wasdismissed from the service as a branch clerk of
court of the Regional Trial Court ofQuezon City, because of the administrative Case filed by her wife
charging him ofimmorality. - Upon his dismissal, his benefits were forfeited.- In the year 2006, Caesar
Jr appealed to the Court to reconsider its December 21,1998 Decision, he seeks the return of his
father's personal contributions to the GSIS. The GSIS Board said that Cesar is not entitled to
the refund of his personal ontributions of the retirement premiums because it is in their
policy that being dismissed from service, the forfeiture of the benefits cannot be recovered anymore. -
Now, to determine the propriety of Cesar Jr.'s request, a reexamination of the laws governing the GSIS is
in order.- The GSIS was created in 1936 by Commonwealth Act No. 186

Section 9. Effect of dismissal or separation from service. -- Upon dismissal forcause of a member of the
System, the benefits under his membership policy shallbe automatically forfeited to the System, except
one-half of the cash or surrendervalue, which amount shall be paid to such member, or in case of death,
to hisbeneficiary.- The said Commonwealth act was amended Republic Act (R.A.) No.
660,adding sec. 11 (d).“ Upon dismissal for cause or on voluntary separation, he shall be entitledonly to
his own premiums and voluntary deposits, if any, plus interest of threeper centum per annum,
compounded monthly."

-In 1997, P.D. 1146 was issued an act "Amending, Expanding, Increasing andIntegrating the Social
Security and Insurance Benefits of Government Employees andFacilitating the Payment thereof under
Commonwealth Act No. 186, as amended, andfor other purposes.". Section 4 of P.D. No. 1146
reads:Section 4. Effect of Separation from the Service. A member shall continue to be amember,
notwithstanding his separation from the service and, unless the terms of hisseparation provide
otherwise, he shall be entitled to whatever benefits which shallhave accrued or been earned at
the time of his separation in the event of anycontingency compensable under this Act.- There
is no provision in P.D. No. 1146 dealing specifically with GSIS membersdismissed from the service for
cause, or their entitlement to the premiums they havepaid.-Subsequently, R.A. No. 8291 was enacted in
1997, and it provides

SEC. 4. Effect of Separation from the Service. - A member separated from theservice shall continue to be
a member, and shall be entitled to whatever benefits hehas qualified to in the event of any contingency
compensable under this Act.ISSUE: W/N any of the amendments impliedly repeal any provision in CA
186.RULING:The SC ruled in the negative. The repealing clause of P.D. No. 1146 reads:Section 48.
Repealing Clause. All laws or parts of law specificallyinconsistent herewith shall be considered amended
or repealed accordingly

Stating the two accepted instances of implied repeal. The first takes place when theprovisions in the
two acts on the same subject matter are irreconcilablycontradictory, in which case, the later
act, to the extent of the conflict, constitutes animplied repeal of the earlier one. The second occurs
when the later act covers thewhole subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute;
thus, it willoperate to repeal the earlier law.Addressing the second instance, we pose the question:
were the later enactmentsintended to substitute the earlier ones? We hold that there was no such
substitution.P.D. No. 1146 was not intended to replace Commonwealth Act No. 186, as amendedby R.A.
No. 660, but "to expand and improve the social security and insuranceprograms administered by the
Government Service Insurance System." Thus, asthe above-quoted repealing clause indicates, only the
laws or parts of law specificallyinconsistent with P.D. No. 1146 were considered amended or repealed.

Accordingly, Commonwealth Act No. 186, as amended, had not been abrogated byP.D. No. 1146.With
regard to R.A. No. 8291, we try to apply the first instance of implied repeal(Contradiction)- the later
statute must be so irreconcilably inconsistent with andrepugnant to the existing law that they
cannot be reconciled and made to standtogether.There is no manifest inconsistency between
Section 11(d) of Commonwealth Act No.186, as amended, and Section 4 of R.A. No. 8291. The latter
provision is a generalstatement intended to cover members separated from the service
whether theseparation is voluntary or involuntary, and whether the same was for cause or not. Forthe
latter law to be deemed as having repealed the earlier law, it is necessary toshow that the statutes or
statutory provisions deal with the same subject matterand that the latter be inconsistent with the
former. There must be a showing ofrepugnance, clear and convincing in character.

Thus, Section 11 (d) of Commonwealth Act No. 186, as amendedby PD 166, continuesto govern cases of
employeesdismissed for cause and their claims for the return oftheirpersonal contributions. Therefore,
Cesar Lledo is entitled to the return of hisGSISpremiums and voluntary deposits.
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Finally, it should be remembered that the GSIS laws are in the nature of social legislation, to be
liberally construed in favor of the government employees. 25 The money subject of the instant request
consists of personal contributions made by the employee, premiums paid in anticipation of benefits
expected upon retirement. The occurrence of a contingency, i.e., his dismissal from the service prior
to reaching retirement age, should not deprive him of the money that belongs to him from the outset.
To allow forfeiture of these personal contributions in favor of the GSIS would condone undue
enrichment.

Pursuant to the foregoing discussion, Cesar is entitled to the return of his premiums and voluntary
deposits, if any, with interest of three per centum per annum, compounded monthly.