Raid Operations 1

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
Headquarters United States Marine Corps

. Washington,‘DC 20380-0001
Z December 1993
FOREWORD
1. PURPOSE
Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM) 7-32, Raid Operukm, explains

doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures (DTTP) for raid
operations conducted by Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs).
It highlights the advantages, disadvantages, and other critical factors
every commander and staff member must consider during planning and
execution of a raid operation.
2. SCOPE
This FMFM is intended for use by commanders and their staffs.

DTTP, planning guidance, and execution principles apply to
amphibious and nonamphibious raids. However, planning
requirements and execution techniques are situation-dependent and
vary according to each mission.
3. SUPERSESSION
None.
4. CHANGES
Recommendations for improving this manual are invited from

commands as well as directly from individuals. Forward suggestions
using the User Suggestion F&m format to-
COMMANDINGGENERAL
DOCTRlNEDlVlSlON (C42)
MARINECORPSCOMBATDEVELOPMENTCOMMAND'
3300RUSSELLROAD
QUANTICOVA 22134.5021
Provided by www.marines.cc
.
i
BY DIRECTION OF THF CO MARINE CORPS
Lieutena OF
Marine Corps Combat Develyment Command

Quantico, Virgmla
DISTRIBUTION: 139 000677 00
USER SUGGESTION FORM
From:
TX COMMANDING GENERAL, DOCTRINE DIVISlON (C 42), MARINE

CORPS COMBAT DEVELOPMENT COMMAND, 3300 RUSSELL ROAD,
QIJANTICO VA 221345021
Subj: RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING Fh4Fhf 7.32, RAID OPERATIONS
1. In accordance with the Foreword to FMFM 7-32, which invites

individuals to submit suggestions concerning this FMPM directly to the
above addressee, the following unclassified recommendation is
forwarded:
Page Article/Paragraph No. Line Figure/Table No.
Nature of Change: 0 Add El Delete 0 Change q Correct
2. Proposed new verbatim text: (Verbatim, double-spaced; continue on

additional pages as necessary.)
3. Justification/source: (Need not be double-spaced.)
NOTE: Only pone recommendation per page.

I (reverse blank)
Iii (meme blank)

Raid OperationS
Table of Contents
Page
Chapter 1. Rald Dealgn
Objectives l-1
Execution Phases l-3
Intelligence. 1-6
Training l-7
Selection of Objective 1-8
Surprise 1-9
Withdrawal l-11
Mobility 1-13
Size, Cmnposition, and Task Organization l-14
Communications l-15
Rehearsals l-17
Unity of Command l-18
Simplicity l-19
Chapter 2. Organization of the Raid Force
Command Element 2-l

Reconnaissance Element 2-2
Support Element 2-2
Assault Element 2-3
Security Element 2-3
, Reserve 2-4
Command Relationships 2-4
Chapter 3. Raid Planning

,’
‘.
Planning Sequence 3-l
Receipt of Mission 3-l
._ “MissionAm&is 3-2
’
~2
“, Studying
_ - All kvailable Information 3-5
., Deception
:: 3-9
FMM 7-32
Page
Objective Area Actions 3-10

Withdrawal 3-11
Fire Support 3-12
Task Organization and Equipment List 3-15
Choice of Landing Place or Departure Point 3-15
Embarkation and Movement lo the Objective Area 3-17
Ship-to-Shore Movement or Departure Landing Zone to
Landing Zone 3-17
Movement from the Assembly Area, Beach, or Landing Zone
to the Objective 3-18
Reembarkation 3-19
S&&on of Date(s) 3-19
Time-Sensitive Planning 3-20
Chapter 4. Loglstlcs
SUPtJb 4-l
Maintenance 4-1
Transportation 4-2
Health Service 4-2
Chapter 5. Tralnlng
Individual Training 5-l

Unit Training 5-2
Rehearsals 5-3
Appendixes
A Time-Sensitive Planning for the Raid Force Commander A-l
B Sample Execution Checklist B-l
-. C Considerations for Amphibious Raids c-1

:
D Considerations for Helicopterborne Raids D-l
VI
: ‘_
Chapter 1
Raid besign
“Nothing is so devastating as to pounce upon the enemy in the dark,

smite him hip and thigh, and vanish silently into the night.”
Brigadier Orde Charles Wingate

Burma, 1943
A raid is an operation, usually small scale, involving a swift penetration

of hostile territory to secure information, confuse the enemy, or to
destroy his installations. It ends with a planned withdrawal upon
completion of the assigned mission. Raids may be conducted as
separate operations or in support of other operations. Examples of
separate operations include raids for psychological purposes, destroying
enemy assets not susceptible to other action, harassment, to gain
combat information, as spoiling attacks to keep enemy forces off
balance, and to recover or rescue friendly personnel and equipment.
OBJECTIVES
Raid design must be understood by all. The commander will articulate

the specific objective and end state to be achieved by the raid force.
Raids in support of larger air, land, naval, joint, or combined

operations include those planned as events within a deception story or
to destroy key facilities that may influence the larger operation. Raids
have recognizable characteristics whether conducted as separate
operations or as part of larger campaigns. The raid force may employ
a variety and combination of transportation assets such as helicopters,
transport aircraft, ground vehicles, and surface/subsurface watercraft to
enter or exit the objective area. Raids may be conducted by aviation,
artillery, infantry, reconnaissance, combat engineers, or any other group
with skills and equipment suited for the mission. Raid forces depend
on surprise, detailed intelligence, timeliness of mission execution, and
violence of action at the objective to ensure success
;..,. _
14 FNFM 7-32
Pi3yCtld*al
A mid may be conducted solely for psychological reasons; e.g., to lift

the morale of friendly military and civilian personnel or demoralize the
enemy. This may be necessary at the outset of hostilities, after
extended periods of inactivity,or after tactical or operational setbacks.
Raids conducted under such circumstances help maintain an offensive
mh&et within the force.
Dcwuctlon
R&is may be required to destroy targets of such importance that

imtisputabfc confirmation of destruction is essential. Targets not easily
destroyed by other mean; n:ay be subject to destruction by a raid force.
. PoLiticalconcerns regarding civilian or cultural collateral damage may
also necessitate a raid mission tasking. Targets for destruction may
in&de military or industrial installations, personnel, communication
and energy facilities, and transportation nodes such as rail and port
facilities, bridges, and tunnels. Raids aimed at destruction may have
strate& operational, or tactical significance.
Hamsrttnutt
Enemy plans and activities can bc disturbed by repeated attacks and

pressure. Raids provide one method of applying this pressure.
Examples of enemy targets that might bc considered for harassment
inchrde isolated units, patrols, fire support agencies, combat service
support, and command and control nodes. Harassment of the enemy
may Iower the enemy’s morale as he develops a feeling of helplessness
in bids to prevent these attacks.
Combat Information
Raids maybe conducted to collect information regarding enemy forces

inchxiing his dispositions, strengths and weaknesses, movement,
reaction to attack, and weapons. All raid forces, regardless of assigned
mission, pcrfom a secondary function of collecting and reporting
information.
Evacuationand Recovery
A raid may be conducted as the main or supporting effort to evacuate

or recover personnel and/or material. Such raids support noncom-.
batant evacuation operations (NECk), tactical recovery of aircraft and
personnel and in-extremis recovery.
Diverelon
A raid may be conducted as a supporting effort to create a diversion

or ambiguty in the enemy commander’s perception of the situation in
connection with strategic, operational, or tactical deception.
Assignment of alternate targets is undesirable unless the object is to
create a diversion. In this case, authority to engage targets of
opportunity may be granted.
EXECUTIONPHASES
Upon mission receipt, the raid commander and his staff process
available information, submit priority intelligence requirements, and
begin mission analysis. Concurrently, security and counterintelligence
plans are implemented to prevent any disclosures of operations to the
enemy. Mission analysis is critical to plan development and is a
continuous process by which the commander refines the focus of the
operation and his intent. All elements of the raid force, the command,
ground combti:, aviation combat, and combat service support elements,
participate in concept development.
Preparationof Plan8
Preliminary organization of the raid force, selecting required personnel,

and a training program are formulated once the plan has tentative
approval. Plans are tested through rigorous wargaming and rehearsal.
Training and rehearsal sites are selected based on similarity to the
objective area and operations security. Constant examination by the
commander and staff of all training and rehearsals provides a basis for
evaluation and modification of plans. Applicable elements of the raid
force conduct training and rehearsals with the specific aim& aircrews,
14 FMFM 7-32
~&i&s, and ships involved in the operation. Representative aircraft

m&u ships do not support preparation requirements of a raid and
&or&3 only he adopted when absolutely necessary. Logistic
~rornertts are determined and equipment procured to support the
apecigc mission of the raid. Equipment and supplies are packaged to
be compatible with specific requirements of transporting aircraft or
shfpping. The raid force trains with the prescribed loads to test the
feasibitity and utility of all equipment.
The most important consideration for embarkation of ships, surface

craft, and/or helicopters is support of the tactical employment of the
raid force. Other considerations include capabilities of specific
platforms, operations security, enroute training requirements, and
flexibility for contingency response.
Movement to the Objecttie Area
Movement to the objective area is conducted to avoid enemy detection

and response. Stealth, speed, and use of deception and disguise in
movement contrtbute to force protection and surprise. During longer
transits, frequent inspections, drills, and rehearsals are conducted to
prevent deterioration of perishable skills. Intelligence updates and
firm1 preparations are performed before debarkation.
Ship+-Shore Movement
‘&phibious raids take on the added requirements of ship-to-shore

movement. Planning and control of movement is the same as that
conducted for amphibious assaults (see NWP 22-3/FMFM l-g, Ship-ro-
Share A4ovemenf). However, force size, proficiency of the ship and
crew, and comfort level achieved through rehearsal may make
-traditional control agencies unnecessary. Silent landing techniques and
care to reduce visual, sonic, and electromagnetic footprints help cover
the force. Prolonged station-keeping operations offshore are difficult
and increase the possibility of detection. Landing craft are either
cached ashore or returned to the ship.
-- 1-s
Approach to the Rald Objective
Once ashore, elements deploy to carry out their missions. Compromise

of the force or elements of the force before reaching the objective may
require execution of an alternate plan or require the commander to
abort the mission. Compromise, personnel and equipment losses, and
unforeseen occurrences may create a situation that prevents mission
accomplishment. The commander’s abort criteria are established
during planning to address these and other potential problems.
Movement to the objective is planned to ensure the force reaches the
objective in the manner best supporting actions in the objective area.
Assautl of the Raid Objective
Synchronization of the assault with execution of supporting and

, supported operations may require a specific timetable for attack of the
target. Likewise, scheduled fires, on-station capability of attack and
transport aircraft, and astronomical parameters may dictate the timing
of the attack. The attack on the objective is characterized by speed
and violence of action. When supporting arms are employed, they
normally commence with the assault of the objective and continue
through the final withdrawal. When necessary, fire support may assist
the deception effort by engaging a wide variety of random targets.
Actions at the objective are planned in as great a detail as intelligence
and time for rehearsal permit.
Withdrawal
Withdrawal must he swift and orderly. It is influenced by the time it

takes to attack and assault the objective, enemy reaction, time needed
to care for and evacuate casualties, and the mode of transportation.
Every effort is made to leave nothing of intelligence value. When
equipment cannot be reembarked, it is destroyed Destruction
techniques for all types of equipment employed by the raid force
should be made a part of individual and unit trairdng. Evacuation of
casualties is expedited.
14 FMm 742
Rombarkation
The means for evacuation must be available for immediate loading

when the raid force arrives at the beach or landing zone (LZ). This is
&thA as the enemy may be actively pursuing the raid force. Cover is
required to prevent enemy interference.
Racowry of Per8onnel
contingency recovery plans are designated in the raid plan. Should

ekments or individuals become separated, an escape and evasion plan
will be executed. Normally, recovery is attempted at 12- or 24-hour
intervals for as many days as are practical without endangering the
whole force. Personnel are briefed as to evasion, escape, and survival
procedures beforehand and may have to depend on these skills to
return to friendly areas. Immediately upon recovery, the raid force is
interrogated and debriefed by designated commanders and staff.
INTELLIGENCE
Dctaikd planning for a raid requires precise intelligence. The

availability or lack of intelligence affects all .aspects of the raid
operation. Good intelligence allows the commander to more precisely
tailor the force size, conduct rehearsals, identify critical targets, and
plan snpport. The Son Tay raid of 21 November 1970points to the
importance of accurate and timely intelligence. It makes clear to
intelligence providers and supported commanders that information
generated to support any operation is perishable and requires constant
and immediate update, even while the raid force is enroute to the
objective area. The raid force must be kept informed of the enemy
situation and weather in the objective area to prevent being surprised.
American forces conducted a raid to liberate American prisoners of

war at the Son Tay prison camp located 20 miles west of Hanoi.
Meticulous detail and extraordinary effort went into planning, selecting
.cmmmders and personnel, training and rehearsal, and operations
security. btehigence support was extensive and included national and
theater assets.
,-
m- l-7
Execution of the raid went as planned. The force entered North

Vietnam undetected. The timing of complex supporting operations was
remarkably accurate. Actions in the objective area were executed as
planned. Unfortunately, the prisoners had been moved to another
camp and the raiders returned empty-handed.
Intelligence was so detailed that it included prisoner’s names. It

allowed penetration of a complex air defense vtem and precise
employment of assault teams within the prison. Despite this level of
detail, on-scene comnumders did not know the prisoners were gone,
even though indications were known at high levels within the
intelligence community.
The raid produced a number of positive reactions by the North

Vietnamese toward their American prisoners and raised the prisoner’s
morale. However, the purpose of the raid-to free American prisoners
of war-was unfulfilled.
TRAINING
Commanders must ensure that training the raid force involves all
participants. Compartmentalized training, insufficient individual
training, and failure to conduct thorough unit training create the
conditions for failure. Well-planned and aggressive training will
prepare the individual Marine, uncover flaws in the plan, match
capabilities of elements to assigned tasks, allow the employment of a
smaller force, and provide situational awareness to al! raid force
members. Thorough training of the raid force fosters initiative and
confidence to overcome unforeseen obstacles. The attack of Fort Eben
Emael by the Germans at the outset of the 1940 w-tern offensive
illustrates the value of meticulous training.
Tha German offensive begun on 11 May 1940ended the “phoney war”

on the western front. In addition to seizing the Netherlands, Army
Group B was tasked with making the Allies believe the attack through
northern Belgium was the main attack. A key element to the plan was
: the gliderbome attack of the ‘Pmplegnable”fortress, Fort Eben Emael
and key bridges along the Aibert Canal. The fort, considered to be the
obje&ve assigned to Assault Force Granite (75 troops and 11 glider
pilots noted for their individualism and fearlessness). As mission
success was critical to the Army Group’s rapid movement into Rclginrn,
no effort was spared in preparing and training the assault force.
Assault Force Granite was provided over 300 miles of the Rettea line
fortitications, located along the Qechoslovakian border, for casemate
assault training. Training ranged from how to get in and out of gliders
to piloting them at night in formation, combat loaded, and landing
WitIt @point accuracy. Assault troops were instructed in the use of
new weapons, most notably the 110 lb shape charge, that were critical
to destroying key parts of the fort. Airplanes and gliders were matched
to ensure the pilots, familiar with each other through extensive training,
could anticipate the other’s actions. Troops studied terrain models,
photos, and table models to ensure complete knowledge of the
objective area. Glider pilots took part in ground training as they
became an integral part of the assault force after their piloting duties
were over. After months of training, the assault force knew every
detail of the f!r ; end the overall plan. A Corporal Alefs, reflecting on
the training, r..entioned that the 8.5 troops felt stronger than the 1,200
they were to attack.
The operation started with a harbinger of disaster. The attack

commenced without the commander when his glider was released
before reaching proper altitude. A sergeant assumed command as the
nearest officer was involved in another action and could not be
reached. However, in spite of these serious problems, the operation
wasa resounding success. The sergeant who took command later
remarked that “the officers had trained all of the men so well that the
officers were expendable.”
SELECTION OF OBJECTIVE
Raids are inherently dangerous. The raid force may be completely

destroyed. Targets must be closely scrutinized. Commanders must
ensure that raid objectives are worth the risk, leading to strategic,
operational, or tactical gain. The attack of the Lofoten Islands is an
excellent example of an ideal selection. It met a military need, the
location and enemy defenses made it susceptible to attack; it was
within the capability of a well-trained but inexperienced raid force.; and
it provided a much needed morale boost to the nation.
The first 2 years of World War II witnessed one Allied setback after
another. The British, limited in resources and alone, continued the
fight through raid operations against German military and economic
targets along the Atlantic coastline. On 4 March 1941, Numbers 3 and
4 Commando and 52 Royal Engineers struck the Lofoten Islands,
located off the northern Norwegian coast. (gee page l-10.)
The Lofotens provided the Germans the majority of their fish oils, an
essential ingredient in manufacturing explosives. The nearest German
airfields were iced over at this time of year and the nearest garrison
able to inthtence the battle was almost 60 miles away. It appeared
resistance from both ground and air forces outside the objective area
would be slight. Numerous raids had been planned and cancelled,
frustrating the commandos who had been well-trained for these
operations. These factors all mitigated in favor of the Lofotens attack.
The Lofotens raid went extremely well. Fish oil factories were
destroyed, a number of German prisoners taken, and over 300
Norwegians returned with the commandos to serve with the Allies
throughout the remainder of the war. The commandos suffered only
one casualty. The raid was filmed and shown throughout Britain to the
delight of every audience.
SURPRISE
Surprise is a force multiplier essential to raid operations, and is

achieved by many means. The capability to conduct the unexpected
raid creates for the enemy a host of contingencies for which he must
prepare. The raid force’s ability to operate over unexpected routes
and terrain which is generally considered impassable and in conditions
of reduced visibility enhances the probability of attaining surprise.
Deception and operations security also contriiute to surprise.
Throughout the operation, the commander can maximize the use of
ruses, feints, and false insertions to confuse and disrupt the enemy.
Conventional operations are also used to mask the raid operation.
LOFOTENS ISLANDS RAID, 1941
to. 5 COYYANGO VEST FJORD
Surprise can be achieved through deception. Successfuldeception wig
create ambiguity in the enemy perception of the situation or cause him
to misdirect his main effort. The deception plan, story, and events
orchestrated by the raid force will depend on available resources, time.
and the enemy capability to collect the desired information. Usually,
deception operations in support of the raid force willbe developed and
executed by higher organizations after coordination with the raid force
commander. The tactical deception plan is coordinated and approved
by the commander of the area of operations affected by both the raid
and the deception operation. The area deception operation may also
be a deciding factor as to the time of the attack, force task
organization, concept of the operation, and method of withdrawal. A
small raid force that achieves surprise can be decisive against a
numerically larger force. A Selous Scout raid into Mozambique is one
example of this affect.
On 9 August 1976,the Selous Scouts Regiment of Rhodesia conducted

a raid 100 kilometers inside Mozambique against a large Zimbabwe
African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) base. After isolating the
base by cutting communications lines, the Scouts drove into the base
with 14 trucks and armored cars disguised as Frente da Liberataco de
Mocambique vehicles. The Scouts deployed the vehicles in a line along
the parade ground.
Mistaken for a vehicle and weapons resupply, soldiers drilling on the

parade ground rushed the vehicles. Just as the ZANLA troops reached
them, the Scouts opened fire. At the cost of tive wounded, the Scouts
killed over 1,000 of the enemy, captured 14 important ZANLA
terrorists, and ambushed a vehicle containing senior ZAh&A officers,
killing all six. The success of this operation would have been
impossrble without complete surprise.
WITHDRAWAL
The raid force, even after a successful attack, is most vulnerable after
actions in the objective area. The enemy, now alerted to the presence
of the raid force, initiates actions to reestablish contact with or interdict
the raid force during its withdrawal. The raid force may now have
casualties, evacuees, and captured personnel and/or equipment that
further complicates its withdrawal. Planning the withdrawal requires
the same forethought as -anyother event in the raid operation. A 1945
raid to hkrate Ame&n and Fnipino prisoners of war se’rves & a
good example of the complexity and importance of withdrawal
p-g.
On 30 Jmmary, 121 men of the 6th Ranger Battalion, assisted by 90
Filipino guerrillas and 160 Filipinos that sewed as porters, conducted
the raid at Cabanatuan in the Philippines.
In a well-orchestrated attack, the Rangers assaulted the camp, rescued

513 prisoners, and began the withdrawal at 2015,30 minutes after the
action was initiated. The withdrawal required a movement of 25 miles,
under pressure from an estimated 2,000 Japanese soldiers. Many of
the 513 prisoners were in tem%le physical condition. However, the
raid force came equipped with 51 carts to transport those prisoners
incapable of walking, enabling the raid force to reach friendly lines at
OWDthe next day. The withdrawal, under these more than difficult
conditions, would not have been possible without the superb planning
involved. This action demonstrates the importance of withdrawal
planning.
MOBILITY
ObviousIy,to attack an objective, the raid force must be able to reach

it. Comn~nders may possess knowledge of critical targets, yet not be
able lo attack if their force lacks the requisite mobility. The raid force
~ commander may have a variety of mobility assets in which the raid
force can reach the objective. The raid force commander should
consider ail of these assets individuallyand in combination for the most
suitable means. The importance of mobility and the imaginative
combination of these assets to allow attack of the target is best
illustrated by the 3 July 1976 Israeli long-range international raid to
rescue 105 hostages held by terrorists at the Entebbe International
‘_
, Airport,Ugandn.
I_,
-,,
CABANATLIAN, 1945
0
!O
11 Roadblak by guwdllaS Mllsr
The incident began a week earlier when Palestinian terrorists hijacked

an Air France aircraft, originating from Ben-Gurion Airport, shortly
after an intermediate stop in Athens, Greece. The flight terminated at
Entebbe, 2,187 miles from Tel Aviv. The great distance, coupled with
the apparent support of the Ugandan dictator, complicated any
attempt to rescue the hostages through military action. In fact, most
in the government had reluctantly conceded the need to negotiate a
terrorist-hostaee exchanee to save the Dassenaers’ lies. Concurrent
with negotiati&ts, the leadership cont&ued & look at a variety of
military options.
The plan for .Operation Thunderball (the codename for the Entebbe
Provided
raid) evolved’ over a 48-hour period. Insertionby
andwww.marines.cc
extraction of the
.. ./
.:’ . -( . ..T..
extt-aordiiary operations security, coor&ation, and logistics planning.
The planbwolved the synchronization of four Gl3Os and two disguised
Boeing airliners, and establishing a return-trip refueling site in Kenya.
The terrorists, secure in the knowledge that the separation between
Uganda and Israel made a rescue attempt remote, were taken by
complete surprise. The Israeli paratroopers landed at Entebbe at
2353, assaulted the terminal, killed every terrorist and approximately
20 Ugandan soldiers, and rescued the hostages at a cost of 1
pa&moper and 3 hostages killed. The raid was a strategic windfall,
reiaforcing the perception that Israel would not tolerate terror against
its citizens regardless of where it occurs. Israeli prestige and confidence
could not have been higher.
SIZE, COMPOSITION, AND TASK ORGANIZATION
The smaller the force, the better. This requires exhaustive cross-
training of all members to ensure required capabilities are not lost due
to attrition of the force. Smaller forces have numerous advantages
over larger formations. The reduced requirement for lift enhances
stealth. The small footprint ashore becomes more difficult for the
enemy to target and otherwise open terrain may conceal a smaller unit.
The urge to employ a larger unit for security’s sake may contribute
more toward compromise and undesirable enemy contact than any true
aecmity a larger force may enjoy. QU&JJ over quantiy as well as
eapahilky are the keys to determine force size.
Size, composition, and task organization are important because they

directly iafluence many other factors such as speed, surprise, and
loghtks. Task organization is ordinarily associated with combining
units to accomplish the mission. Small forces, such as raid forces, are
equally mncemed with the composition of the force, the combining of
individuals or skills necessary to accomplish the mission.
A key to a successful raid is the ability to complete objective area

actions before the enemy has time to react. Men and equipment are
evaluated in terms of overall contribution. The British Special Air
Service (SAS) Regiment, formed in November 1941 and operating in
small detachments, conducted a variety of long-range raids and
sabotage missions against German and Italian forces. The basis for
organizing in small teams came from the realization that a four- to fwe-
man detachment could infiltrate to the objective and inflict significant
destruction aided by the element of surprise whereas a larger force
would have to fight to the target.
SAS operations were conducted across the vast expanse of desert

extending throughout North Africa. This environment was harsh and
difficult to navigate. The weather was unpredictable. The SAS turned
to the Long-Range Desert Group (LRDG)--a unit with extensive
. .
expenence m desert reconnaissance--for assistance.
On the night of 12 December 1941, an SAS detachment, transported

by a LRDG patrol, conducted a raid against the Axis airfield at Tamet.
Twenty-four aircraft were destroyed without loss to the raid force. This
task organization of SAS and LRDG elements resulted in a combina-
tion of capabilities that would eventually destroy over 300 Axis aircraft.
A captured German officer would later remark to a LRDG patrol
leader “We Germans couldn’t do this sort of thing-out 500 hundred
miles from our base for davs or weeks on end. We like to go about in
a crowd!’
COMMUNICATIONS
Communications is part of the information exchange system that

supports and controls the flow of information throughout the raid
force. It is the dissemination of information to those key indiwduals,
elements, units, or the entire force. Effective communications are
required to ensure every member of the raid force understands the
situation and the actions that must be taken to adapt to changes to it.
Many military operations have failed due to the inability of the
commander to redirect his subordinates once he has recognized the
need to change the plan. An example that epitomizes the detrimental
effect of poor communications planning is the failed Iranian hostage
rescue attempt in 1980.
A decade after the Son Tay raid, another raid to rescue American
prisoners was undertaken. On 24 April 1980, a task force consisting of
Special Forces, Ranger, Marine, Air Force, and Navy personnel
146 FMFM 742
attempted to penetrate Iranian territory, assault the United States

embassy, and repatriate the 53 hostages taken when Iranians overran
the embassy 6 months earlier.
The operation began with the launching of eight RH43D helicopters

from the USS Nimita, two more than the minimum of six felt necessary
to succeed. Soon, the helicopters had penetrated Iranian territory
earoute to “Desert One,” a refueling and rendezvous site. One
hebcopter experienced mechanical problems (a rotor blade failure) and
landed to inspect it. A second helicopter landed to assist and when it
wsa decided to abandon the stricken aircraft, the crew boarded the
second helicopter and resumed its flight. The seven remaining
helicopters then ran into a massive dust cloud, 3 hours into the flight.
The helicopters became separated, emerged into the clear, only to run
into a larger and more dense dust cloud an hour later. Though
planners were aware of the dust cloud problems that might be
eacountered, the pilots of the helicopters and Gl3Os had not been
briefed of this phenomenon.
Another helicopter was soon lost when a cooling system failed and
disabled the flight instrumentation. Hampered by poor visibility and
disoriented by vertigo, the pilots returned to the Nimitz. Because of
cemrmmications restrictions, the crew was not aware that one
, helicopter was already lost and that they would be out of the dust
within a few more minutes.
The remaining six helicopters arrived at Desert One from 1 to l-l/2

hours late. Of these, one experienced a hydraulic system failure and
coukl be flown only with great risk. The mission commander was
forced to abort the operation when the number of available helicopters
feI1below the abort criteria of six.
Strict radio silence had been imposed during the helicopter flight to
DesertOne and prevented critical operational reporting when the
unexpected occurred. Silent communications such as signal lamps were
authorized, but when the helicopters entered a massive dust cloud,
thesebecame useless. This lack of communications hindered the ability
of the helicopters to arrive as planned and contributed to significant
d&y and contusion at the site.
The Holloway Review Board, investigating the failed operation, found
the U.S. force did not understand the Iranian signal intelligence
capability, that secure communications were available with the force
while enroute, and that selected use of radio communications may have
resulted in a “more favorable execution of the movement to Desert
One.” The board urged that planners of future operations conduct a
comprehensive analysis, assessment, and training in matters of signal
security operations and planning.
Another factor that contributed to the communications problems was

the failure to conduct a full-dress rehearsal. The overall commander
of the raid operation, for reasons of operations security, had decided
that “regular integration of training was undesirable.” Rehearsals were
conducted with representative aircraft, not all hands, and a thorough
test of the communications plan, to include contingencies such as
adverse weather, was not conducted. Few peacetime military
operations will match the Iranian hostage rescue attempt in interest,
debate, or impact upon national pride, as the nation was glued to news
of the hostages every day until they were finally released.
REHEARSALS
Rehearsals must be conducted to validate plans, ensure precise

execution, correct deficiencies in equipment, personnel, and scheme of
maneuver. Though the Son Tay raid force lacked the definitive
intelligence that would have allowed them to succeed, they spared no
effort in preparations for actions in the objective area. Two months
,. , before the raid, rehearsals began in earnest, with 3day and 3-night
_’: rehearsals conducted each 26hour period. These rehearsals consisted
of dry runs and live fire. Locations of each man and each round was
known to the extent that if an individual was off the mark even a yard,
it would result in a friendly fire casualty. Assessments were conducted
after each rehearsal.
Alternate plans were also rehearsed. Each plan was rehearsed to the
same standard, during day and night, increasing in tempo and via-
lence until the commander was satisfied. In fact, an alternate plan was
executed at Son Tay when one helicopter landed and discharged its
passengers at the wrong complex 400 meters from the prison. The
subordinate commanders executed the alternate plan faultlessly.
During a briefing for Secretary of State Henry Kissinger before the

t-&d, the last question he asked was “What if the raid faii?” The
response impressed hi. He was told the raid stood a 95 to 97 percent
chance of success as air crews had flown 697 hours in 268 sorties and
the operation had been rehearsed 170 times.
UNITY OF COMMAND
In the course of the operation, the raid force will face a number of
decision points that must be reconciled without delay. Go/no-go
decisions before launching the attack, abort decisions during movement
to the objective, and decisions to execute alternate plans all require
quick action on the part of the raid force commander. These
deciaiinmaking requirements mandate the maintenance of a clear,
unencumbered chain of command and the authority of a single
commander.
During World War II, the British created Combined Operations to

supervise the conduct of all raiding activities against the European
continent Combined Operations, headed by Lord Mountbatten,
reviewe4 approved, and tasked operational units with the conduct of
raids, and served as the conduit for all raiding requirements. One raid
ia particular, the Bruneval Raid, illustrates the va!ue of unity of
command in what could be a complex, multiservice operation. The
raid was conducted by soldiers, supported by the Royal Navy and Air
Force, for the benefit of the British air effort against Germany.
The technological battle of the war included the efforts to produce

superior ‘radars : + both defense and direction of offensive air
operations. As German night fighter and bombing capabilities seemed
to improve beyond that resident in the British forces, it was concluded
by the Air Ministry and British scientists that these capabilities
benefited from German radar and radio direction enhancements. A
proposal to conduct a recovery raid against a radar site near Bmnerxl,
France was submitted by the Air Ministry to Combined Operatiorns.
: The object of the raid was to recover components of a Wunbwg radar
>. * Provided by www.marines.cc
w- 119
system for study. Combmed Operations approved the concept and

tasked one company of paratroopers, with a detachment of Royal
Engineers and radar technicians to conduct the raid. (See page l-20.)
Intelligence from aerial photography and the French underground

provided enough detail to allow for precise planning. The raid force,
under the command of Major John Frost, trained and operated with
near complete autonomy, supported by Combiicd Operations, which
coordinated naval and aviation support for the raid force. The raid
force inserted by parachute on the night of 27 February, 1942,
accomplished its mission, and withdrew under pressure to waiting
assault craft on the beach. Major Frost retained complete authority
throughout the raid. He supervised the attack on the objective,
security, and execution of the withdrawal, without the prospect of
higher authority intervention. At the higher level, the authority of
Combined OFrations to organize and task forces to mount raids
provided the unity of command at the strategic level, mitigating against
interservice or branch interference.
SIMPLICITY
The more complicated the plan, the greater the potential for failure.
Since raid forces are as susceptible to the friction of combat as any
other force, the raid force commander must strive to keep his plan as
simple as possible, detailed, and clearly understood by his subordiiates.
Detailed plans should not be confused with complicated plans. As the
tasks planned to accomplish each critical event become more compli-
cated, the risk of failure increases on each successive component of the
task. One failure can unravel the entire plan and force the adoption
of an alternate plan or mission abort. Simplicity was key to
Confederate raid operations against Union forces in Northern Virginia.
Colonel John S. Mosby of Civil War fame, was noted for his successful
antagonism of Union forces throughout Northern Viinia. He
conducted numerous raids against isolated Federal forces in the midst
of powerful Union formations. His raids, noted primarily for their
audacity, were also surprisingly simple. One raid in particular, known
as ‘The Greenback Raid’ for the payroll seized by his raiders,
exemplify the fundamental of simplicity.
w- 1-2l
Colonel Mosby, acting on intelligence revealing a gap in Union

dispositions, conducted a destruction raid on a west-bound passenger
train the night of 13 October 1864between Martinsburg and Harper’s
Ferry. The purpose of the raid was to force Union General Philip H.
Sheridan to divert more combat power to protect his lines of
communications. The plan was simple; infihrate through the gap in
Union forces, sabotage the rail and derail the train, then bum the rail
cars to sensationalize the act. The pkanwas executed without incident,
so well in fact that Mosby and the majority of hi men were asleep
when the train derailed with a tremendous crash. Wakened by the
ensuing commotion, Mosby’s raiders methodically looted and torched
the rail cars, and quicw made their escape unscathed with horses,
prisoners, and over $170,000in payroll.
The effects of the raid were achieved in short order. Union forces
were quickly posted along the railroad at the urging of General
Stevenson of Harper’s Ferry (who requested a mfnfmum of 1,000
cavalry troops from Sheridan for the task). Force redeployments for
security were not limited to the railroad. The raid also reinforced the
inaccurate perception of significant Confederate strength ?nd the need
for increased security forces throughout the region. This and many
other raids conducted by Mosby, bold but simple in design, drained
resources from the Union throughout the war. His ability to mount
almost continuous raiding activities can be traced to his adoption of
standard procedures for movement, rendezvous, and simplicity in
objective area actions.
.,
exktiog force elements.~The m&us ofmostraid f&es is the ground
combatelement (GCE). Its contributionmayrange in size from squad
to battalion. Specificorganizationdependson mission,enemy, terrain
and weather, troops and support available-time available (METI-T).
The raid force is normally organized into functional groups, each
specigcalty tailored to carry out essential tasks. A raid force may
cmsistof raid groups, elements, or teams. In this respect, a raid force
may con& of a command element, a reconnaissance element, a
support element, an assault element, a security element, and a reserve
as shown below.
U
COMMAND
ELEMENT
COMMAND ELEMENT
The command element controls movement to and actions at the

objective and the withdrawal. It consists of the commander, and when
designated, the assistant commander, and the facilities required to
commandand control the raid operation. Organizational staffs may
provide requisite support to the raid force prior to execution yet not
: be part of the command element. When the raid force is part of a
larger organixation conducting extensive operations on a continuing
basis (such as a rifle company is to an infantry battalion), detailed
plans maybe developed and coordinated at a higher level and executed
without a staff.
The mission of the reconnaissance element js to provide continuous
observation of the objective, last-minute intelligence to the commander,
and initial security for the raid force. Organization of this element is
determined by the mission, size and type of enemy force, enemy mobil-
ity and state of alert, terrain and avenues of approach, and the time
needed to isolate the objective area. The reconnaissance element may
bc tasked with specific security tasks during movement, actions in the
objective area, and withdrawal. Tasks may include pre-H- and Lhour
reconnaissance and security of landing points or LZs, establishment of
observation posts, initial terminal guidance, and target surveillance.
SUPPORT ELEMENT
The support element provides the heavy volume of fire needed to

neutralize the objective. Because fires from this unit are violent and
devastating, they must be closely controlled to ensure the precision
required. On order or as planned, fires are lifted and shifted to cover
the maneuver of the assault element by suppressing enemy fire. The
support element may also be given specific locations to cover by fire
in support of the security element if an enemy quick-reaction force
moves toward the objective area. These may include routes into and
out of the objective site, key terrain features, or installations adjacent
to the main objective. Once the assault has been completed or on
order from the raid force commander, the support element covers the
withdrawal of the assault element or displaces to the next planned
position. Support element organization is determined by-
* The objective’s size, the surrounding area’s geography, and the

area’s enemy threat (including air).
l The assault element’s mission.
l Suitable firing positions.
l The size and nature of the enemy force in the objective area and
those enemy forces capable of reinforcement at the objective.
Raid Operations 2-3
l Fire support from other units (aviation, naval surface fire support,
and artillery fire).
ASSAULT ELEMENT
The assault element is normally tasked to conduct the preponderance

of objective area actions; i.e., accomplish the mission. Normally, it is
inserted after the reconnaissance, security, and support elements and
isthe first element to withdraw and reembark.
METT-T considerations determine the organization of the assault

element. The assault element may be organized into one or more
assault teams, prisoner teams, search teams, medical teams, demolition
teams, or breach teams.
To destroy a point target or installation in a heavily defended area

when aircraft cannot get close enough to be effective, the assault
element may consist of no more than a team equipped with laser target
designators which could then be used to direct air-delivered laser-
guided munitions from a safe distance.
SECURITY ELEMENT
The security element inserts after the reconnaissance element and

covers the advance of the assault element to the target and its
subsequent withdrawal. To succeed, the security elemant must orient
on those enemy forces capable of influencing the operation within a
given timeframe. Frequently, security elements may be required to
establish blocking positions along ii~es of communications to interdict
and delay enemy forces reac!iug to the attack. Other tasks fhat may
be assigned include--
* Securing the objective rally point.
l Providing early warning of enemy approach.
l Preventing enemy escape from the objective.
l Providing short-range air defense.
l Providing initial terminal guidance.
RESERVE
The raid force is task-organized to execute its assigned mission without

a reserve. A true reserve may or may not be designated by the raid
force commander. This decision is based on the ambiguity of the
situation, mobility assets available, the affect on surprise and speed,
and the combat power required to accomplish the mission. An
alternative to designating a reserve is to assign subordinate elements
responsibility for conducting those preparations necessary to
accomplish contingency tasks. The inability of the subordinate element
to accomplish its primary task and a contingency task simultaneously
may necessitate designating a true reserve. A reserve may be retained
afloat or in rear areas and inserted only if the raid force needs
assistance in accomplishing the mission. When employed, the reserve
of a raid force is similar to a reserve in other ground combat
operations. However, when a mission is particularlyhazardous or vital,
a resewe may be inserted and employed with the raid force.
COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS
Experience during World War II and the Korean War of both U.S. and
British forces clearly shows the advantages of controlling and directing
all raids from the highest command in the area of operations. This
does not imply that subordinate commands cannot or do not plan and
conduct these raids, but area commanders are kept informed and, in
effect, approve such raids to ensure unity of effort and coordination
within the area of operations. Such control is nece.%ary to avoid
duplication and conflict between units which might interfere with each
other. The principles of organization and of command relationships
applicable to all operations apply to the raid. Due to the unique
nature of raid operations and the resulting variations in troop and
,
Rakt Opsratlons 2-5
navaI forces, it is beyond the scope of this manual to outline the

command relationships of every conceivable situation.
Overall command of the raid rests with the commander of the area of
operation affected. The commander issuing the initiating directive
speci&s the exact details of command relaGonships. Ihe raid force
commander mast report only to one senior. The immediate commander
of the raid force commander provides the raid force commander with
all required support and coordinates with outside agencies and higher
echelons.The superior must speci@ conditions under which basic plans
maybe changed, the raid delayed or aborted, and similar contingencies.
When extensive raid operations are required over an extensive period
of time to satisfy a mission need, a provisional organization may be
established to provide for overall control, planning, and execution of
raid operations.
Commander, Amphibious Task Force
The commander, amphibious task force (CATF) establishes overall

command and control procedures for the amphibious raid. He may
delegate his command authority over a raid force commander to a
subordinate Navy commander; e.g., that of an advance force with a
cnrresponding raid force. Navy staff planning establishes procedures
for embarkation, movement lo the objective area, landing, fire support,
and the withdrawal, after consultation with the raid force commander.
It also covers composition and action of the naval escort and usually
gives a rendezvous at sea within striking distance of the coast.
Planning lays down arrangements for signals and communications

behveen ships and shore and establishes recovery procedures for
picking up raid force personnel who may be stranded ashore after
reembarkation is completed. Raids originating ashore and conducted
against land targets may be supported by any number and type of ship,
craft, and special detachments. Although CATF and commander, land-
ing force (CLF) are still used in Joint Pub 3-02, Joint Doctrine for
Amphibious Operations, emerging doctrbte of the naval expeditionary
force may or may not retain these tents. Nevertheless, new command
relationship with new names willfunction very similar& to CATF and
CLF.
2-6 FMFM 7-32
Marine Air-Ground Task Force Commander
Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) planning is primarily

focused on integrating all subordinate element actions in support of the
raid force. Raids in support of sustained land combat are conducted
through the authority inherent in the established chain of command.
The MAGTF, GCE, and aviation combat element (ACE) commanders
may conduct raids that support their respective schemes of maneuver.
Raids requiring participation of all h4AGTF elements will normally
originate from the MAGTF commander. He may direct all subor-
dinate elements to provide one particular element the necessary
support required to conduct a raid. For example, a raid originating
from and in support of GCE operations may receive assault support
from the ACE as directed by the MAGTF commander.
Aviation support, in particular, may be complex and require significant

planning. Aviation elements supporting the raid may be shore- or
carrier-based. Pros and cons of an air attack before inserting a raid
force are carefully balanced. Although a well-timed air attack inflicts
casualties and damage and drives the enemy forces underground, it
also increases his alert status. Planning is focused toward support of
employment and withdrawal of the force, attack of selected targets, and
contingency plans. Plans for air attacks are closely timed and
coordinated with ground maneuver, naval surface fire support, and
artillery support planners to ensure adequate and integrated fire
support is available throughout the operation. Aircraft can make a
contniution as part of a tactical deception plan by striking targets
throughout the enemy’s depth, conducting false insertions, and
conducting conditioning flights for several days or nights before the
operation. The enemy may become accustomed to regular air activity
and fail to associate this activity with a specific raid target.
Raid Force Commander
Subject to the overall authority of the CATF, MAGTF commander, or

attack group commander, as appropriate, full responsibility for the
conduct of operations ashore-is vested in the raid force commander.
The planning and, in most cases, the execution of the landing, assault,
and withdrawal are primarily his concern. The feasibility of raid force
proposals is considered from the standpoint of the effect on the overall
ion. Proposed raid force courses of action that make demands I
beyond the naval force’s capabilities wig be rejected. The raid force
nd his staff will develop the raid concept of operation. I
Raid force planning requires the latest and best information available
actual conditions in the objective and target areas. Likewise,
planning techniques employed by the raid force must expedite
execution to maximize. the relevance of that intelligence. As late
. _..
:hanges are made as necessary and coordinated
with parallel Navy, MAGTP, and raid force planning staffs. Integration
_ _.
ISand the raid concept is conducted at the raid
rg on ME’iT-T, the commander may be from an
than the GCE. The raid concept of operations provides
the commander’s vision for the conduct of the raid from deoarture
through recovery.
Ireverse blank\
plant&g by the raid force, supporting, and supported organizations.
Parallel planning for the raid is conducted concurrently by Navy,
MAGTP, and raid force staffs, as appropriate. Each staff has special
concerns, but all work to the common mission of the raid force and
production of the raid plan. The raid force is the supported organi-
zation and should include aviation, ground combat, and combat service
support staff representation. Raid operations are planned and exe-
cuted in accordance with procedures delineated in Joint Pub 3-02; Joinr
DocmkeforAmphibious Operations;Joint Pub 3-02.1, Joint Docminefor
Landing Force Operations; and FMFM 3-1, Command and SaflAcdon.
PLANNING SEQUENCE
Critical events within the conduct of a raid are embarkation, movement

to the objective area, ship-to-shore movement, movement to the objec-
tive area, objective area actions, and withdrawal. Though these actions
are executed in sequence, the arrnngement of events for planning ir
different. There are sound reasons for this variation. The preeminent
event is the attack of the target. Ah planning to support other events
is designed to facilitate objective area actions. Force size necessary to
accomplish these actions establishes the basic requirements for logistics
support. The nature of the target and the enemy capability to disrupt
the attack establishes tire support requirements. The direction of
attack may establish the landing, departure, or insertion location.
Actions at ihe objective area form the bask for all otherplanning. Any
part of the plan which fails to support the attack is rejected.
RECEIPT OF MISSION
The receipt of the mission is the event that initiates the raid force
commander’s planning process. Tbe mission may be received via a
number of means (written orders, oral orders, electronic means,
graphic depiction, or a combination). Missions may also be deduced
s2 FMFM 742
by a commander based on the higher commander’s intent or the

outcome of a current operation. Regardless of how the mission is
se&v&, a commander initiates the planning process for the mission
at hand and alerts his subordinates by issuing a warning order. This
initial warning order may lack specifics, but provides subordinates
Iounvkzdge of a pending operation. Warning orders are issued as
required throughout the process to update subordinates sufficiently to
prepare for the operation.
MISSION ANALYSIS
The mid force commander’s mission analysis is the first and perhaps
the most important step in the planning process. It identifies for the
commander and staff the salient tasks that must be accomplished to
accomplish the assigned mission. Mission analysis is a continuous
process, the products of which may be altered based on new
Intelligence or a changed tactical situation. Mission analysis consists of
command and staff actions related to determining information
requirements through the gathering of facts and making assumptions,
analysis of the higher organization’s mission and intent, and
determining the unit’s mission and required tasks.
Information Requirements
The raid force commander determines the information requirements

on the area of operations, the relative combat power of friendly and
enemy forces, and on enemy capabilities. That which is not available
must be collected and integrated into the estimate process.
The raid force staff determines facts on each staff officer’s own
functional area. These provide the raid force commanderan accurate
understanding of the current situation from which he may deduce
assumptions and assessments of capabi!ities and operational factors.
The raid force commander receives information available from his staff
and from higher, lower, and adjacent headquarters. Gaps in
information at this early stage are covered by making assumptions.
Raid Operations 3-3
Assumptions replace necessary but missing facts. An assumption is

appropriate if it meets both tests of validity and necessity. However,
the raid force commander should avoid an over reliance on assump-
tions as this tends to increase risk to the force. Validity defines
whether or not an assumption is likely to occur. “Assuming away”
potential problems is an example of using an invalid assumption,
Necessity defines whether or not the assumption is absolutely essential
for the development of a plan. If planning can continue without
making the assumption, the assumption fails the test of necessity and
is consequently inappropriate. Staff officers must continuously
reevaluate assumptions as part of the estimate process. Additional
facts should replace assumptions as early as possible to reduce
uncertainty in the execution of the plan.
ldentiftcatlon of Tasks
Specified tasks are stated in the higher headquarters order or plan.

They come primarily from paragraphs 2 and 3 but may be found
elsewhere, like in coordinating instructions or annexes. Any task that
pertains to any elemeni of the unit should be identified and recorded.
Implied tasks are those tasks not specifically stated in the order or plan
that must be accomplished to satisf) the overall mission or to satisfy
any of the specified tasks. Implied tas’ks come from further analysis of
the order and analysis in conjunction with the known enemy situation
and the terrain. Inherent, routine, or standing operating procedure
(SOP) tasks are not included in the list of tasks.
Although the raid force commander is responsible for the identification

of the essential tasks and the mission, the staff develops a tentative list
of essential tasks and a preliminary restated mission. From the list of
specified and implied tasks identified earlier, those tasks that define the
success of the mission are identified as essertfial. To properly identify
essential tasks, the staff and commander must be aware of the intent
of the commander ordering the mission and that of his superior.
3-4 FYFY 7-32
ldentlficatlon of Limitations
L,imitations are restrictions placed on a commander specifying things

that cannot be done and/or things that must be done. In most cases,
limitations prescribe some detail of raid force organization, maneuver,
or rules of engagement.
ldentificatlon of Available Assets
The staff considers assets allocated in the task organization,

attachments and detachments, or in organizations for combat in the
execution paragraph. More importantly, the relationship between
mission and assets is critical. The folding together of time, space, and
assets is critical to mission success.
Acceptable Risk Levels
The higher headquarters might specify a risk the tasking commander

is willing to accept to accomplish the mission or provide guidance
pertaining to the use of friendly capabilities. The level of acceptable
risk can be deduced from analysis of mission and intent.
Initial Time Analysis
The element of time is not clearly identified for analysis in any of the
staff estimates. However, time analysis must be an integral part of the
mission analysis, and must be conducted continuously until the mission
is accomplished. Time analysis uses the following guidelines:
DatermIne Time Avallable. Time available begins with receipt of the

mission and ends with the time of execution and completion of the
mission stated in the order.
Know the Declalon Cycle. A decision cycle is the total time required
from the time the commander obtains information, processes it, makes
a decision, issues orders, and subordinates execute the operation. This
is a necessary tool to properly plan time allocation.
Ttme AtlocatIon. Once a raid force commander has a general undcr-
standing of his mission and the time available, he must allocate the
time for the various phases of the operation. This allocation is often
determined by reverse planning. Knowing the time to execute the
operation, the raid force commander must consider how long the unit
needs to move to the point of execution; time for rehearsal, and time
for planning. Since subordinate units also require planning time, the
amount of time available for their planning must also be allocated.
The commander should consider the l/3 - 2/3 rule. Each headquarters
should use roughly one-third of the planning time available and allow
two-thirds of the time for subordinate units and elements. Each
element should use only the minimum amount of tine necessary to
plan an operation. Time allocation must consider the decision cycle of
the unit doing the planning and that of the enemy.
Restated h!isslon
The restated mission will be the mission statement for the raid force.
It contains all the elements of a mission statement (who, what, where,
when, and why). “What” is the essential task(s), the accomplishment
of which defines mission success. If there are multiple tasks, they are
listed in the sequence in which they are expected to occur. At this
stage, the restated mission should not be changed. However, it may
change if an error in analysis is discovered or the mission is changed
by higher authority. The miffonce commander approves the results of
the mission analysis. He makes the final decision on what tasks are
essential and provides the restated mission. The mission statement
provides the focus for subsequent staff planning.
STUDYING ALL AVAILABLE INFORMATION
Mission analysis, in part, determines the information known to the raid

force commander and that which must be determined. Ah infor-
mation is then studied to determine the course of action that promises
the best chance of success. Planners initially analyze current
information on the enemy situation, the objective area (terrain,
weather, hydrography, local communication systems), and the attitude
of civilian inhabitants. Recent, concurrent, and imminent operations
Provided
33 by www.marines.cc
34 FMFM 7-32
by other friendly forces and the effects on the enemy are considered
in detail. The requirements of stealth, speed, and surprise generate a
need for a thorough intelligence preparation of the battlefield.
Sufficient infomation on the enemy and the area of operations is

required to evaluate the adequacy of the proposed raid force as
organized and equipped, and to predict its relative probability of
success or failure. A force assigned a raid mission has to take
calculated risks, but planning a raid based on sketchy or unreliable
intelligence. increases the probability of failure.
Sources and Agencies
Plannen at each level of command carefully analyze available

information to ensure that it is sufficient. Requests for additional
information are initiated as soon as the need is determined. The
request must be expressed in precise terms to minimize collection
efforts. Collection plans provide for continued gathering of
information on the raid objective area until the raid is executed.
Verification of information and operations security are fundamental.
Intelligence Requirements
Intelligence requirements encompass terrain, weather, and

hydrography; enemy defenses and patterns of action; enemy reaction
capabilities; and evasion planning. Intelligence must be presented in
products of consumable form such as terrain models, photographs,
overlays, and easily understood reports, tables, and matrices.
Teualn, Weather, and Hydrography. Intelligence requirements relating to

terrain, weather, and hydrography in the target area include--
* Photographs of landing sites taken at low and high tide showing

beach approaches and exits. When practical, ground photographs,
views from boats, and periscope photography are obtained.
l Detailed weather forecasts including cloud and fog coverage for the
designated period and the probable effects of weather on the
actions of the raid force and the enemy.
Probable effect of expected wind, surf conditions, terrain, and
vegetation on the ability of the enemy to detect the raid force.
Location of possible beaches and/or zones and relative evaluations

of each.
Detailed descriptions of routes to the target area and the relative

advantages and disadvantages of each.
Description of the nature of any possible obstructions or hazards on

routes and beach approaches, including nature of terrain and soil,
local currents as affected by the tide, types of bottom (lava, coral,
or sand), and precautionary measures which may be taken to
circumvent them.
Location and description of possible bides or caches for equipment

and men in the vicinity of assembly areas, landing sites, and/or
Lik
Detailed description of local surf conditions to include any

navigational hazards which may impede the ship-to-shore movement.
Additional topographic maps and hydrographic charts or other

printed information available on routes or beach approaches.
Requirements for special equipment generated by terrain and

weather in the area of operation; e.g., climbing equipment.
Location of any soil or vegetation in the area that could nrematurelv r

reveal recent passage of the raid force; e.g., a muddy road surface,
and indications of best places to cross roads to avoid detection.
Enemy Sttustton. Intelligence requirements relating to enemy defenses

provide the basis for detailed analysis of enemy defenses in and around
the target area to include--
* Strength and arms of enemy forces.
l Plans and intentions of the target installation in as much detail as
frequency of pa!rols, including using sentry dogs.
l Enforcement of continuing actions.
. Emplacements, trenches, barrier systems, and fields of fire.
l Enemy communications systems.
l Existence of illuminating devices and intrusion detection devices,

including mechanical, electronic, magnetic, infrared, seismic, and
acoustic.
l Details of enemy routine, including off-duty routine.
l Purpose of all buildings and installations.
Enemy Reaction CspabllHler. Intelligence requirements pertaining to the

enemy’s reaction capability demand a realistic estimate of the--
* Size and location of forces the enemy has available to reinforce at

the objective.
l Speed with which the enemy can react once the raid is discovered.
l Routes which are available for this purpose.
l Course(s) of action which the enemy is most likely to adopt. When

enemy drills have been observed, the report includes a description
of enemy tactics and defensive plans.
Evrrlon Planning. The G-2/S-2 should issue evasion planning guidance

on actions to be taken by personnel separated from their unit during
operations ashore and the plans to attempt their recovery.
Dissemination
The raid force commander is kept abreast of the ongoing intelligence

collection effort. He must closely monitor current and imminent
friendly operations that may affect the execution of the raid. All
FtsidOperations
aspects of the raid must he familiar to the raid force as the effects of
r an unfamiliar environment detract from efficiency and cooperation
within the force.
Counterintelligence
Detailed counterintelligence planning and active counterintelligence

measures are required in support of raids. Strict security, secrecy, and
isolation of the raid force are required during planning, training,
rehearsals, and movement to the target area.
DECEPTION
The raid operation should always contain plans to deny the enemy
knowledge of the raid force’s insertion, or to deceive him as to the
location and intent of the operation. Deception operations are
planned concurrently with development of the raid order to ensure it
supports the commander’s concept and can be logistically sustained.
Feints, false insertions, and other events all add to the raid force’s
deception plans. Selection of unexpected means, time, place, and
routes of insertion, as well as use of speed and mobility, give less
reaction time to the enemy. All events must be coordinated to ensure
integration with the higher organization’s deception plan.
Deception techniques that may be used include--
* Multiple helicopter and/or waterborne landings.
l Dispersion of insertion craft (air or water), both in time and space.
l False landings and radio or message traffic to disguise actual
l Fires such as air strikes and naval surface fire support in other than
the objective area.
vehicles over false targets.
l Electronic attack.
OBJECTIVE AREA ACTIONS
Objective area actions; i.e., those actions required to accomplish the

purpose of the raid, are developed. Designed to maximize surprise,
speed, shock, and simplicity, they provide the basis for planning of
other critical events such as insertion, withdrawal, and isolation of the
objective by raid force elements and fire support means.
lheplnn for the attackof the targetestablishestheplanning requirements

for ~12other crirical events. The raid mission establishes the general
scope of action during the attack on the target; e.g., whether total or
partial destruction is to be accomplished, removal of specified
equipment, capture of prisoners, number of evacuees, etc. The raid
force is organized into task elements to achieve maximum flexibility
and to reduce troop requirements to the essential minimum number.
Each group is precisely tailored to accomplish a specific task in support
of the general plan of attack. As a minimum, forces are usually organ-
fzed to eliminate enemy security, attack the target, and cover the with-
drawal. Plans for attack of the target are simple, easy to execute, and
within the capabilities of the raid force.
Timing of ah critical events (most importantly objective area actions)

is situation-dependent. Raids that support other operations may
require detailed timelines to ensure the desired effect for the larger
operation is produced. Normally, movement and objective area actions
are conducted under the cover of darkness. Raids that require exten-
.sive movement may necessitate the use of hides or harbor sites during
daylight hours. All times should be checked and verified in a number
of rehearsals approximating actual conditions expected during a raid.
Raid Operations
WITHDRAWAL
The withdrawal normally starts immediately after mission accomplish-

ment. The withdrawal is carefully planned. At this stage of the
operation, the intensity of the raiding troops’ offensive spirit tends to
decline. The enemy is now alert and, depending on the mission, the
raid force may be burdened with wounded, captured enemy, and
captured equipment. For these reasons, the commander ensures that
the withdrawal is executed rapidly and systematically.
Raid elements withdraw along predesignated routes and in a specified

sequence except when the raid commander orders a change. Plans
include provisions for certain elements to cover the withdrawal and to
conduct delaying actions if the enemy pursues. Maximum use is made
of available artillery, naval surface fire support, and aviation support
to cover the withdrawal and, if necessary, reembarkation. Plans for the
withdrawal include alternate provisions as to time, routes, and
sequence of movement to friendly lines, reembarkation points, and/or
landing zones. Accountability is paramount and planned for
throughout this stage of the operation.
Factors considered in planning the withdrawal are the time required to

attack and accomplish the mission, the most probable and most
dangerous enemy reaction, and the foreseeable casualty load. Routes
to the reembarkation point are selected which facilitate movement, are
easily identified, and frequently change direction, thus difficult to
predict. Preferably, they are behind terrain that affords protection to
personnel withdrawing and offer several good positions from which
security elements may block enemy counteractions. Primary and
alternate withdrawal routes cannot include a mere reversal of the route
to the objective. This route may have become the focus of enemy
security activity.
The withdrawal plan is flexible, to include alternate provisions as to

both time and place. Special situations may permit planning for the
withdrawal of the raid force directly into territory of either friendly
conventional or guerrilla forces. Withdrawal by air is considered when
same manner as for landing the raid force. Tides and sea state should
be considered with regard to their effect on landing craft, landing craft
air cushions (LCACs), rigid raiding crafts (RRCs), and combat rubber
raiding craft (CRRCs). Their effect on the surf are considered when
selecting an exact time for withdrawal. A key factor in determining the
suitability of environmental conditions is calculating the modified surf
index. The Joinr Surf Manual (CNSPKNSL INST 384748888740.1)
explains how to calculate the modified surf index and the operating
parameters of landing craft.
Alternate plans for withdrawal include provisions as to routes and

sequence of movement during the withdrawal, alternate methods of
shore-to-ship movement, or air withdrawal. Alternate times are
selected in the same manner as primary times and usually occur at
approximately 12- and 24-hour intervals.
Withdrawal and reembarkation continue until the last man and piece
of equipment are in friendly lerritory or are reembarked. The
psychological impact is much more effective if the raid force disappears
without a trace. However, equipment that cannot be withdrawn is
destroyed
FIRE SUPPORT
The tactical situation will dictate. the fire. support available to the raid
force. Range, other operational demands, and collateral damage
concerns may limit the fire support dedicated to the raid force.
Surprise, speed, superior mobility, and improvisation can obviate some
fiie supportrequirements. However, detailed planning and integration
of available support is essential. The general principles on using
artillery, naval surface fire support, and air support during norma!
operations apply to the raid. Fire support plans must be coordinated
with development of the landing plan, movement to the objective,
objective area actions, withdrawal, and the plan for reembsrkation.
Although fire support planning is basically the same as that for other
types of attacks, it is generally more detailed in raid planning. To
achieve surprise, fire support may be withheld during certain phases.
Raid Operations 3-13
Nevertheless,fire support, particularly on-call fire support, should be

considered for every phase. In the event of premature detection, fire
support may be the most rapid and effective method of reinforcing the
raid force.
Means
All available fire support assets should be considered (see FMFM 2-7,
Fire Support in Marine Air-Ground Task Force Operadons). However,
the environment and distance to the objective from friendly units may
preclude the employment of some assets; e.g., an amphibious raid may
not allow for the employment of arti!lery support. A long-range, inland
raid may likewise preclude employment of mortar or naval surface tire
support. Close air support (CAS) aircraft and EAdB electronic attack
aircraft, however, are capable of supporting most raid scenarios.
Mu!tiple fire support assets should be employed to ensure adequate
coverage and support for the raid force. This may require displacing
fire support assets, such as artiilery or mortars, well-forward to range
the raid force’s route, its objective, and any enemy reinforcements or
counterfire systems. When forced to rely solely on aircraft for
scheduled or on-call fire support, raid planners should avoid any gaps
in scheduled aircraft on-station times. To effectively employ available
fire support means, the raid force should include forward air
controllers (FAC), artillery or mortar forward observers, naval surface
fire support spotters, and/or aerial observers, as appropriate.
Movement to the Objective
Because the success of a raid usually requires surprise, raid forces will
generally not employ any preparation fires on the objective or other
fires in support of their movement that might alert the enemy.
However, pre-H-hour fires may be an effective part of deception
operations to draw enemy attention away from the raid force or its
objective. On-call fire support should also be planned to support the
raid force if it is detected en route and requires assistance to break
contact, conduct an emergency withdrawal, or continue to the objective.
Assault on the Objective
Fire support may be scheduled to isolate the objective from enemy

reinforcementsor to attack known enemy indirect fire weapons capable
of striking the raid force. Raid planners should consider dedicating
on-call tire support to provide responsive counterfire against enemy
indirect fire weapons that engage the raid force and to attack any
lucrative targets that may be exposed during the raid.
Withdiawal
Fiie support may be required (indeed may be critical) to withdrawal

and recovery. At a minimum, raid planners should consider dedicating
fire support assets for preplanned, on-call missions to assist the raid
force in breaking contact and to prevent interference with its
withdrawal.
Coordination
For most small unit raid forces, the raid force commander generally
serves as his own fire support coordinator. However, fire support
coordination centers of higher headquarters and/or the supporting arms
coordination center will be closely involved in raid planning and
execution and should be prepared to assist in providing and
coordinating on-call fire support assets and fires. Standard fire support
coordination measures should be employed in raid operations, although
these measures may be positioned very close to friendly forces (see
NWP 22-2/Fh4Fh4 1-7, Suppotiing Arms in Amphibious Operadons, and
Fh4FM 6-18, Techniques and Proceduresfor Fire Suppon Coordinarion).
Raid planners should consider employing and positioning fire support

&ordination measures to preclude any uncoordinated fires which might
alert the enemy to the raid force or cause him to change his defensive
posture. This can also be accomplished by establishing rules of
engagement which restrict attacks by fire support units or aircraft prior
to assault. Fire support coordination measures can also enable fire
support u&s and aircraft to rapidly engage targets of opportunity that
could interfere with the withdrawal of the raid force.
TASK ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT LIST
After detailed plans are developed, requirements for troop units,

specialists, and support can be accurately determined. Raids are
normally of short duration. Unless operating in extreme climes, the
raid force may be lightly equipped and require minimum logistics
support. The raid force is organized into specific elements/units/teams
commensurate with the number and nature of tasks to be accomp-
lished. Tables of organization are adhered to as much as possible.
However, some deviations are inevitable because elements are tailored
to specific tasks assigned. Based on the organization of the raid force,
lists of specific equipment, weapons, ammunition, and supplies to be
carried by each subordinate group are prepared.
CHOICE OF LANDING PLACE OR DEPARTURE POINT
Beach Selection
All beaches are examined to support objective area actions and

determine the best approach to ihe target. Calm conditions are
desirable although movement through these waters may increase the
difficulty of effecting surprise. Sheltered waters are usually enclosed
in a bay or in the lee of islands. Ships and other surface craft run a
risk of detection as they approach and interception as they return.
Sheltered waters are also more prone to minings. The initial point for
raid force orientation ashore must be determined. The location must
be known precisely with respect to the beach/zone and to the objective.
The landing beach/zone itself should be large enough to allow for
errors in predicted drift of swimmers, boat teams, or air crews.
Normally, landing places are avoided which cannot be approached
from several different directions. Other factors considered in beach
selection include surprise; enemy dispositions; distance to target; sea
approaches, beach characteristics, and beach exits; and equipment to
be moved over the beach.
Sl6 FMFM 7-32
Physlcal Characteristics
Selecting a landing beach usually involves a compromise between a

beach which permits easy landing, with some risk of detection, and one
which provides maximum security at the risk of a difficult or hazardous
landing. Examples of each are the wide, flat, sandy beach backed by an
easily traversed hinterland and the narrow, steep, rocky beach backed
by cliffs.
A predominant factor to be considered is surf state. Hydrographic

offices should be consulted for up-to-date information. Hydrographic
surveys and/or confirmatory beach reports may be required before the
raid.
Surf characteristics on a given day are based on the nature of the

bottom, direction and speed of the wind, the distance between
successive swells (wave length), the state of the tide, and the nature of
currents. Offshore shoals, ledges, and rough bottom contours tend to
reduce the surf. Offshore islands tend to break up ocean swells and
produce several patterns of smaller waves. Kelp or dense seaweed
reduce wave height. Swift currents flowing in the direction of wave
advance and onshore winds reduce wave height.
A reef face or other abrupt break in the bottom may cause each wave
to break up into smaller waves. A submerged ridge perpendicular to
the coast increases wave height; conversely, a submarine canyon
reduces wave height. A stzep bottom causes waves to break rapidly
and close to or directly onto the beach accompanied by violent wave
reaction. A flat bottom causes waves to break gradually and at a
greater distance from the beach with several foam lines being formed
between the breaker line and the beach.
A sand bar parallel to the beach causes waves to peak up or break

depending on the depth of water over the bar. A single breaker line
may form over a bar while another breaker line forms closer to or on
the beach. Several bars may cause multiple breaker lines. Sand bars
are frequently found off sandy beaches exposed to wave action.
Lending Zone or Drop Zone Selection
The raid LZ or drop zone must support the planned actions at the
objective.
The raid force can land on or near the objective and seize it before the
enemy can react. This avoids forced marches over land carrying heavy
combat loads. If there is no suitable landing area near the objective
or the enemy has a strong reaction force nearby, thii option is not
favored.
The raid force can land unseen far from the objective. It then
assembles, reorganizes, and moves into an objective rally point near the
objective. The objective is seized after security and support elements
are in place. This option may ease coordination by allowing a more
ccmplete orientation of the force before engaging the enemy.
EMBARKATION AND MOVEMENT

TO THE OBJECT!VE AREA
Embarkation and movement to the objective area are planned in

,accordance with standard amphibious procedures. Speed and/or
movement in periods of reduced visibility are emphasized to maintain
the element of surprise. Appropriate antiair warfare and
antisubmarine warfare measures are planned to protect the attack
group.
SHIP-TO-SHORE MOVEMENT OR DEPARTURE

LANDING ZONE TO LANDING ZONE
Planning for the ship-to-shore movement is similar to that for the

amphibious assault. The CATF and CLF maintain positive control of
ship-to-shore movement through control groups and temporary organi-
zations. Execution of the waterborne and helicopterbome ship-to-
shore movements is delegated to subordinate commanders.
S-18 FMFM 7-32
The method selected for the ship-to-shore movement should be that

which will land the raid force with the least probability of detection, as
close to its objective as possible, and as simply and rapidly as possible.
This is but one more mitigating factor in favor of smaller raid forces.
Landings should take advantage of night and conditions of reduced
visibility and detection. The raid force emphasizes silent landing
techniques which preserve surprise. Care must be exercised in the
introduction of advance reconnaissance elements designed to facilitate
landing of the raid force and/or conduct target surveillance. Capabil-
ities and benefits provided by employment of these elements must be
weighed against the increased risk of compromise.
Primary control agencies are the Navy control group and tactical air
control group, both of which may be tasked with control and/or
supervision of the ship-to-shore movement. However, due to the
simplicity of plans, the smaller scale of the raid, and proficiency gamed
during rehearsals, control ships, lines of departure, and other control
measures are seldom used. Ship-to-shore movement is rehearsed in
detail under conditions similar to those in the objective area to ensure
proper timing and coordination. The same principles apply to move-
ment by air or surface means.
Detailed guidance for the conduct of waterborne and helicopterborne

ship-to-shore movement is found in chapters 4 and 5 in NWP 22-
3/PMPM l-8. This manual describes the larger amphibious operation.
Descriptions of fundamentals and considerations generally apply to
raids. Control groups and temporary organizations may apply
depending on delivery means, raid force size, distance to the objective,
and other ME’IT-T factors.
MOVEMENT FROM THE ASSEMBLY AREA, BEACH, OR

LANDING ZONE TO THE OBJECTIVE
Plans are made to ensure that the assault element can reach the target
intact. The security element is employed to neutralize and contain any
enemy opposition that attempts to interfere with the assault element.
Compcsition of the security element depends on the task assigned and
the expected resistance it will encounter.
REEMBARKATION
A reembarkation point or points are selected during planning. While

a raid force may reembark at the same point it was launched, another
location may be required to enhance security. Variation in transpor-
tation means (necessary when enemy air or naval action warrants
change) may require alternate reembarkation or pick-up points. Pro-
visions are included in raid plans for their use in emergencies.
Accountability and marshalling of all hands is especially important and
planned for. Specific escape and evasion plans are made for
subsequent recovery of persons unable to reembark with the mzin body
of the raid force.
SELECTION OF DATE(S)
Tidal ranges vary widely based on geographic location and moon phase.
It is most desirable to employ the raid force at the first combination of
suitable moon and tide. Normally, this will provide 3-day employment
windows of reasonably stable conditions. When the force depends on
waterborne transportation through reembarkation, this 3-day window
will be considered for insert, extract, and an alternate day for bad
weather.
Generally, it is better to land with a rising tide to reduce the stranding

of landing craft. However, defensive arrangements are usually
designed to defeat landing parties somewhere near the high watermark.
Landing at low tide may provide the raid force a measure of surprise
by maintaining some distance from enemy local security posts and
avoiding underwater obstacles designed to impede watercraft. The
chief disadvantage of a landing at low tide is the loss of time. It may
add as much as a mile of open terrain to movement requirements.
The moon helps most when it is due to rise on the landward side soon
after the raid force is ashore. This allows ships and boats to approach
in complete darkness with landmarks faintly silhouetted against the
glow which precedes the rising moon. Illumination and moon angle
will also impact on aviation operations and, in particular, must be
considered for helicopterborne insertions and extractions.
tie geographic location. Concealment can be greatly altered by
seasonal changes, which impact the ability of the raid force to
maneuver. Weather has a direct effect on helicopter support to the
raid force and on the ability of the raid force to move through the
terrain.
Additional geo-political factors may impact on determining the date for

a raid. Considerations center on whether to choose a date which will
maximize international political exploitation or that which will minimize
the coverage to local dissemination; e.g., the timing of national and
local elections. Local traditions and festivities; i.e., national or local
holidays, and social mores and customs of the target area; e.g., religious
holidays or work schedules are also considered.
TIME-SENSITIVE PLANNING
Operations may have to be conducted on short notice or immediately.

These raids require a rapid planning cycle to expedite execution.
Rapid planning incorporates the same procedures, albeit in a
condensed timeframe, shown in appendix A. Rapid (or time-sensitive
planning) does not ignore the requirement for detailed planning.
However, it relies on established procedures, a well-trained force, and
a focused effort. The technique of time-sensitive (rapid/compressed)
planning has been developed with the aim of allowing the raid force
commander to commence execution within 6 hours from receipt of the
mission.
Key elements of rapid planning include--
* Reverse planning.
l Each commander uses the l/3 - 213 rule, allocating one-third of the
available planning time to himself and two-thirds to immediate
subordinates.
l Critical, accurate intelligence. Priority information requirements and

critical go/no-go questions should be formed as soon as possible.
Fkiid Opcmttions 3-21
l Fire support planning.
l Maximum use of checklists, SOPS, and specific force modules.

Eliminate forces not required.
l “Play books” developed from prior detailed planning. These cover

most likely or typical missions, and require only slight modification
to meet the requirements of a specific situation.
l The force commander’s confirmation briefing. This is extremely

important. Coordination problems must be resolved on the spot.
Brevity is essential.
the situation, his task organization, equipment, and weapons necessary
to accomplish his mission. During preparation, the force may require
special munitions, personnel with unique skills, and transportation.
Unlike that support provided to extended operations, combat service
support of raid operations is short-term, front-end loaded, and narrow
in focus. Combat service support planners and logistics support
facilities must have specific guidance and detailed prioritization.
SUPPLY
The raid force commander determines the forces’s requirements for all
classes of supply, storage, salvage, and disposal necessary to support
preparations for the operation and that which must be in place during
the operation. When time is available for extensive rehearsals and
other preparations, supply requirements to support the force before
the operation may be significantly greater than at any other time. For
example, a raid force will rarely require class IV items during the
operation, but may require extensive construction materials in
developing rehearsal sites and target mockups. Supplies carried by the
raid force are restricted to that established in planning and tested in
actual rehearsals. Ordinarily, the raid force is not resupplied during
the operation. Emergency supplies, primarily class V, may be
necessary if the enemy disrupts the withdrawal of the raid force.
MAINTENANCE
All items of equipment must be in satisfactory repair. Weapons and

equipment must be inspected, adjusted, modified, or replaced as
necessary before and after each rehearsal and before execution.
Maintenance personnel with requisite spare parts and replacement
items will rarely accompany the raid force during execution, but may
be assigned during preparation. Standard equipment may be modified
4-2 FMFM 7-32
as necessary to cope with the special conditions of its use during the
raid. Special equipment may be improvised or manufactured when
necessary to meet special requirements generated by the nature of the
raid. The raid force mmr have the exact types of equipment required
to carry out its tasks ashore.
TRANSPORTATION
The raid force may be transported into and out of the objective area
by naval, air, and/or ground transportation. The effects of terrain,
weather, and enemy capabilities require detailed coordination of
transportation support to ensure the unhindered movement of the
force. Rehearsals should be conducted with the actual transportation
means assigned for the operation. Spare vehicles/aircraft should be
allocated to account for attrition during training and execution of the
mid.
Transports which ci ;I approach at relatively high speed and

load/unload rapidly are used for large-scale raids. Small units may use
transport aircraft, helicopters, landing craft, small boats, and parachute.
Lightweight, air-transportable vehicles may enhance mobility and

permit the raid force to move rapidly into position, execute its attack,
and withdraw from the objective. When insufficient vehicles are
available to move the entire raid force, the raid force commander may
permit their use by selected teams or force elements to capitalize on
this mobility. The nature of most raids limits the requirement for
ground transportation at the objective.
HEALTH SERVICE
Health services ensure each Marine is physically capable of accom-

plishing the mission. The level of medical support available before
execution is the same as any other unit. Preventive medicine is
significant during preparation to minimize last minute replacement
requirements and prevent the effects of regional endemic diseases.
During the operation, medical care may not be any other than that
provided by the unit hospital corpsman. Evacuation plans must be
established for wounded or others that may impede the ability of the
force to execute the mission or conduct the withdrawal. Casualties are
evacuated as early as practical by the fastest means available.
(revema blank)
Chapter 5
Training
Only the well-trained raid force can be expected to meet the demands
of raid operations. Landing force, Navy, and aviation elements detailed
for the raid operation conduct integrated training as early as possible.
One of the main objectives of training is to rehearse the raid under
conditions approximating, as nearly as possible, those which will be met
during the operation. Every effort is made to rehearse the raid on
coastline and terrain most comparable to the actual objective area.
The aim is to test the plan, train the force, and familiarize them with
the area over which they are to operate.
INDIVIDUAL TRAINING
Individuals are selected for the raid force based on their experience
and special skills required for accomplishment of the mission and/or
specific tasks. Before assignment, personnel are screened for physical
or medical problems which would hinder their performance.
Individuals must be physically able to accomplish a mission calling for
the utmost in physical stamina. When possible, the raid force begins
training slightly overstrength to allow for attrition during training.
Individuals separated from the raid force during training as well as
administrative support personnel are kept in isolation until the mission
is completed.
Separation of individual training and unit training is minimized.

Individual skills are improved while undergoing unit training.
Refresher training in basic subjects, especially applicable to the raid,
is often necessary. This may include amphibious training; swimming;
helicopterborne operations; hand-to-hand combat; evasion and escape
(E&E) training; and survival training. Special training is provided in
small boat handling, demolitions, use of enemy weapons and
equipment, cliff-scaling techniques, and operation of special equipment
and arms, as required.
operations, obstacle recognitionand breaching, physical training that
develops stamina, use of commun&tion means to be employed during
the raid, close quarter battle, and intelligence collection. Each indi-
vidual must be thoroughly familiar with hi own role and the functions
of his fellow Marines in the operation and how they relate to the over-
all plan. Cross-training of all personnel is maximized. It is critical to
reducing the sire of the raid force, the ability to execute contingency
plans, and to the success of the raid force if casualties are sustained.
The difficulty of executing critical events during the raid (in particular
a withdrawal at night) can be mitigated through individual training.
UNIT TRAINING
Unit training is the most important ingredient to successful team-

building. Unit training includes both element and force training.
Rigorous and thorough training develops special skills, unit
cohesiveness, and esprit required to conduct successful raids. SOPS are
established and tested. Emphasis must begin with actions in the
objective area and be followed by all critical events to ensure successful
completion of the mission and recovery of the force. Elements conduct
internal rehearsals of assigned tasks. The use of special equipment
must be practiced and perfected. Demanding unit and individual
standards must be developed and adhered to.
Staff training must not he neglected. Command post exercises, map

exercises, and raid force rehearsals all provide opportunities to prepare
the raid staff. Training must be continuous for all personnel from pre-
mission training, briefings, and rehearsals to mission execution.
Generally, units and commanders are selected for their experience as
a coordinated team, their morale, and their previous combat
experience.
Integrated training with specialists, Navy units, and supporting forces

commences as early as possible. Additional training may be required
to adjust the raid force to special climatic conditions of an objective
area when it differs materially from the one in which they normally
, operate.
During the training cycle while the individual is improving his skills, the
unit specifically trains for its mission. Troops arc uniformed and .
equipped in the exact fashion required for the raid. The raid force
should train against aggressors to refine their skills against an enemy
and to test their individual proficiency. However, the aggressor unit
may require quarantine to ensure operations security. Training
frequently extends to periods where raiding troops are subjected to
extreme physical and mental strain.
When time permits, elements are cross-trained in the functions of the

other elements.
REHEARSALS
Thorough, integrated rehearsals are required to obtain precision and

speed in the execution of a raid. All participating forces are drilled in
every detail of debarkation, movement ashore, operations ashore,
withdrawal, and reembarkation. Timing and synchronization of effort
cannot be accurately estimated without adequate rehearsals of the
entire raid force. The purpose and conduct of rehearsals for raids are
similar to that for the assault. They are conducted to verify time and
space factors for each phase of the raid; to familiarize personnel with
the plan and special equipment and techniques to be employed; to
measure proficiency of the individuals, elements, unit, and group; to
develop coordination, resolve problems, and suggest necessary changes;
:
and to incorporate all previous modifications to the plan.
Requirements
The success or failure of the whole operation depends on the quality

of rehearsals conducted before the operation, and every conceivable
effort to achieve realism enhances the probability of success. Drills
‘, progress in scope from terrain model walk-throughs to full-speed live
~
the rehearsals. A full-scale replica of the target area is constructed,
roads and trails taped out, and buildings represented. Rehearsals are
conducted under the conditions expected, e.g., at night or under
,. reduced visrbility, from over-the-horizon, and against an active enemy.
Movements from point to point are carefully timed. Anticipated con-
tingencies and simulated casualties to key personnel must be covered.
.i..
“- : _
C<‘.‘ Provided by www.marines.cc
s-9
,’ _.’
,
apparatus and/or special demolition hts, are nom?ally generated.
Testing of Plans ’
During rehearsals, the plan for the raid is validated and refined. The
plan of attack is examined to ensure--
. The plan for actions in the objective area provides for efficient
and rapid mission accomplishment without delay or confusion.
l AlI objectives contribute to mission accomplishment.
l The plan is feasible under conditions expected.
l The plan maximizes surprise.
l The plan is flexible so that with a loss of surprise, a smooth

transition can be made from a plan based on stealth to one based
on fuepower.
l H-hour and/or L-hour are valid.
l The raid force is the proper size.
l JZxisting tables of organizations are used as much as possible.
l All available resources have been exploited.
l Tasks assigned to subordinate elements are within their capabilities.
l An adequate reserve is provided for execution of contingency plans

and to take advantage of unforeseen opportunities.
l The most dangerous and most likely enemy reactions have been
considered.
l Selected landing areas best support accomplishment of the mission.
Raid Operations 5-5
l Time is available to land, attack the target, and withdraw without

subjecting the raid force to unnecessary risks.
l The plan for withdrawal allows the force to quickly break co&act
and move undetected even if initiated under pressure.
l AlI essential elements of information (EEIs) and other intelligence

requirements (OIRs) are identified.
Critiques and After-Action Reviews
Pre-mission planning and rehearsals should include the use of critiques

and after-action reviews. It is unreasonable to expect the observations
of only key personnel to provide the necessary basis for plan validation.
After-action reviews (conducted with all hands after each training
milestone or rehearsal) will provide the detailed feedback the raid
force commander requires. Every leader and individual must
understand his mission thoroughly and be required to brief the next
higher leader on the exact scope and purpose of the assigned mission
and how it fits into the overall plan. This action ensures that each
Marine understands the mission, both from his own perspective, as well
as the overall perspective.

Raid Operations 1

Uploaded by

Raid Operations 1

Uploaded by

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

Headquarters United States Marine Corps

Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM) 7-32, Raid Operukm, explains

This FMFM is intended for use by commanders and their staffs.

Recommendations for improving this manual are invited from

Marine Corps Combat Develyment Command

DISTRIBUTION: 139 000677 00

TX COMMANDING GENERAL, DOCTRINE DIVISlON (C 42), MARINE

Subj: RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING Fh4Fhf 7.32, RAID OPERATIONS

1. In accordance with the Foreword to FMFM 7-32, which invites

Page Article/Paragraph No. Line Figure/Table No.

Nature of Change: 0 Add El Delete 0 Change q Correct

2. Proposed new verbatim text: (Verbatim, double-spaced; continue on

3. Justification/source: (Need not be double-spaced.)

NOTE: Only pone recommendation per page.

Iii (meme blank)

Chapter 2. Organization of the Raid Force

Command Element 2-l

Chapter 3. Raid Planning

Objective Area Actions 3-10

Individual Training 5-l

A Time-Sensitive Planning for the Raid Force Commander A-l

B Sample Execution Checklist B-l

-. C Considerations for Amphibious Raids c-1

“Nothing is so devastating as to pounce upon the enemy in the dark,

Brigadier Orde Charles Wingate

A raid is an operation, usually small scale, involving a swift penetration

Raid design must be understood by all. The commander will articulate

Raids in support of larger air, land, naval, joint, or combined

A mid may be conducted solely for psychological reasons; e.g., to lift

R&is may be required to destroy targets of such importance that

Enemy plans and activities can bc disturbed by repeated attacks and

Raids maybe conducted to collect information regarding enemy forces

A raid may be conducted as the main or supporting effort to evacuate

A raid may be conducted as a supporting effort to create a diversion

Preliminary organization of the raid force, selecting required personnel,

~&i&s, and ships involved in the operation. Representative aircraft

The most important consideration for embarkation of ships, surface

Movement to the Objecttie Area

Movement to the objective area is conducted to avoid enemy detection

‘&phibious raids take on the added requirements of ship-to-shore

Approach to the Rald Objective

Once ashore, elements deploy to carry out their missions. Compromise

Assautl of the Raid Objective

Synchronization of the assault with execution of supporting and

Withdrawal must he swift and orderly. It is influenced by the time it

The means for evacuation must be available for immediate loading

contingency recovery plans are designated in the raid plan. Should

Dctaikd planning for a raid requires precise intelligence. The

American forces conducted a raid to liberate American prisoners of

Execution of the raid went as planned. The force entered North

Intelligence was so detailed that it included prisoner’s names. It

The raid produced a number of positive reactions by the North

Tha German offensive begun on 11 May 1940ended the “phoney war”

The operation started with a harbinger of disaster. The attack

Raids are inherently dangerous. The raid force may be completely

Surprise is a force multiplier essential to raid operations, and is

to. 5 COYYANGO VEST FJORD

On 9 August 1976,the Selous Scouts Regiment of Rhodesia conducted

Mistaken for a vehicle and weapons resupply, soldiers drilling on the

In a well-orchestrated attack, the Rangers assaulted the camp, rescued

ObviousIy,to attack an objective, the raid force must be able to reach

The incident began a week earlier when Palestinian terrorists hijacked

SIZE, COMPOSITION, AND TASK ORGANIZATION

Size, composition, and task organization are important because they

A key to a successful raid is the ability to complete objective area

SAS operations were conducted across the vast expanse of desert

On the night of 12 December 1941, an SAS detachment, transported

Communications is part of the information exchange system that

attempted to penetrate Iranian territory, assault the United States

The operation began with the launching of eight RH43D helicopters

The remaining six helicopters arrived at Desert One from 1 to l-l/2

Another factor that contributed to the communications problems was

Rehearsals must be conducted to validate plans, ensure precise

During a briefing for Secretary of State Henry Kissinger before the

During World War II, the British created Combined Operations to