Complaint (Jones v. Flossmoor) (File-Stamped)

Case: 1:24-cv-02022 Document #: 1 Filed: 03/11/24 Page 1 of 21 PageID #:1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS, EASTERN DIVISION
JEREL JONES, )
)
Plaintiff, )
) Case No. 24-cv-2022
v. )
)
THE VILLAGE OF FLOSSMOOR, ILLINOIS, )
BRIDGET A. WACHTEL, in her individual capacity, )
) JURY DEMANDED
Defendants. )
COMPLAINT
JEREL JONES (Jerel or Plaintiff), by and through his undersigned counsels, Robert W.
Fioretti, Esq., and Cass T. Casper, Esq., DISPARTI LAW GROUP, P.A., states as follows for his
Complaint against the Village of Flossmoor, Illinois and Bridget A. Wachtel (Wachtel) in her
individual capacity (collectively hereinafter Defendants).
NATURE OF THE CASE
1. This case involves the Village of Flossmoor’s (Village) termination of its first Black Police
Chief, Jerel, as an act of race discrimination and retaliation.
2. On October 5, 2023, Jerel complained to Flossmoor’s Mayor, Michelle Nelson, about
disparate treatment he was received from Defendant Wachtel.
3. Wachtel responded to Jerel’s concerns with a campaign of retaliation culminating in his
termination on or about March 7, 2024.
4. Wachtel’s race-based discriminatory conduct toward Jerel is shown in this Complaint
through three of Wachtel’s self-contradictory and hyperbolic performance Memos to Jerel that
criticize seemingly every aspect of his performance, his speech and speech patterns, his initiative and
non-initiative, and Wachtel’s view that, in her own words, Jerel, a Black man, must:
5. In the context of the Memoranda as a whole, Jerel must do exactly as Wachtel or other
White Administrators say he must do and he must diminish his own thoughts, beliefs, and ideas, and
accept Wachtel’s.
6. The outright race-based animus of Wachtel towards Jerel can be seen through a close
examination of these three Memoranda1.
7. The Memoranda directly evidence what Jerel complains of here: Wachtel imposed a master-
slave dynamic between her and Jerel and, if he did not fit himself into that expected dynamic, he
could not be Police Chief.
8. Wachtel’s behavior is race discrimination in an insidious form, to wit, the emasculation and
evisceration of any form of Blackness out of Jerel and insistence that he reconstitute as White. Then,
and only, then, as White-Black Police Chief will he meet Wachtel’s demands and succeed.
9. Wachtel’s race-based animus can be seen, too, in her castigating the Black Deputy Chief,
Taylor, throughout her Memoranda on the basis of the same kind of false or exaggerated, and hyper-
micro-managerial expectations that she imposed on Jerel.
10. Wachtel has not imposed the same kind of phony job performance standards on White
and Hispanic Department Heads that she has imposed on Jerel leading to his termination.
11. Indeed, Wachtel admitted to Jerel during his six month performance review that she had
never treated other Department Heads the same way she was treating him.
12. Jerel seeks all available relief, including reinstatement, back pay and damages, and an
1
Jerel consents to the Village releasing the Memoranda; he does not include them in full as Exhibits
because he is concerned Defendant Wachtel will claim they contain safety-sensitive information and
further fault him for releasing them. The excerpts included in this Complaint do not contain safety-
sensitive information.
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injunction against the Village requiring it to send the Village Manager and all other administration
officials to comprehensive racial sensitivity training immediately to prevent any comparable action
from happening to anyone else again.
13. Jerel also demands a public apology from the Mayor and the Village for the harms alleged
herein.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
14. Jurisdiction of this Court arises under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1337, pursuant to the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution via 42 U.S.C. §
1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 1988, and pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
15. Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391 because the events and omissions giving rise to
the claims herein have occurred in this judicial district, and because Defendant Flossmoor maintains
its place of operation within this judicial district.
PARTIES
16. Jerel is a legal adult, a resident of this judicial district, and formerly employed as the
Chief of Police with Flossmoor, Illinois
17. Defendant Wachtel is a legal adult, on belief a resident of this judicial district, and the
duly-appointed Village Manager for the Village of Flossmoor, Illinois.
18. Defendant Wachtel is sued in her individual capacity only.
19. At all times, Defendant Wachtel acted under color of law.
20. Defendant Wachtel has no law enforcement background.
21. Defendant Wachtel is the Village Manager, but, in fact, operationally is in charge of the
Village and controls the Mayor, Michelle Nelson, who does what Wachtel says, takes her
recommendations, and generally has ceded operational control of the Village to Wachtel.
22. Defendant Flossmoor, Illinois is a unit of local government with indemnification
3
obligations for wrongful acts committed by its officials, such as Defendant Wachtel See 745 ILCS §
10/1-202 and § 9-102.
23. Defendant Flossmoor is sued in its capacity employer and as indemnitor of Defendant
Wachtel.
FACTS COMMON TO ALL COUNTS
24. Jerel is the first Black Police Chief of the Village of Flossmoor, Illinois in its history,
beginning his career there and sworn in March 27, 2023.
25. Until his termination on or about March 7, 2024, Jerel was the only Black Department
Head in the Village of Flossmoor.
26. On or about October 5, 2023, Jerel met with Mayor Michelle Nelson to discuss concerns
he had about how he was being treated more severely and held to a higher standard of performance
by Defendant Wachtel than the Village’s White and Hispanic Department Heads.
27. Specifically, Jerel advised the Mayor that Village Manager Wachtel was engaging him in
overbearing scrutiny, micromanagement, baseless criticism, personally attacking criticisms, and
generally holding him to a standard of performance that would be unachievable by anyone.
28. Jerel’s meeting with the Mayor carried obvious racial overtones in that he is the only
Black Department Head, all other Department Heads are White or Hispanic, he is the first Black
Police Chief in Flossmoor’s history, and he was complaining to Mayor Nelson about his disparate
and targeted treatment at the hands of Wachtel.
29. Indeed, Jerel stated to the Mayor during this conversation that he felt he was being
disadvantaged and held to a higher performance standard than his non-Black peers because of his
race.
30. Mayor Nelson did not conduct any investigation to Jerel’s knowledge.
31. To the contrary, on October 5, 2023, Wachtel sent Jerel a four-page, single-spaced
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Memorandum nitpicking Jerel’s actions and plans with respect to police security at the Flossmoor
Festival 2023.
32. Wachtel’s Memorandum argued with seemingly everything Jerel did at the Festival,
imposed unrealistic and unachievable requirements that were contrary to Jerel’s judgment as Chief of
Police, and was so micro-managerial and dictatorial that no reasonable Chief of Police or any
Department Head could have complied with it.
33. For example, the October 5, 2023 Memorandum includes this Paragraph:
34. In this paragraph, Wachtel criticizes Jerel’s decision to use a separate form from that used
in the Fire Department.
35. These forms were in place in the event they were needed to activate a major incident, which
never occurred and the forms were not needed anyway.
36. No one had ever raised this issue with Jerel, it is petty, trivial, and micro-managerial, and
this criticism has no purpose other than to find fault with every aspect of Jerel’s performance.
37. Indeed “common sense” to Jerel in running a Police Department was to use a Police
Department form, but Jerel’s Black version of “common sense” was not up to muster with
Wachtel’s White version of “common sense.”
38. The October 5, 2023 Memorandum also includes this Paragraph:
5
39. Wachtel’s criticism of the Police Chief using his cell phone to communicate is contrary to
accepted Police Department practice in modern times where ranking officers use their cell phones
all the time to communicate departmental matters. Indeed, radio communications can often be
difficult to understand, and usually no more than one person can communicate at a given time per
channel, so the use of the cell phone in modern policing is not only accepted within police
command standards, but sensible and widespread.
40. Jerel talked via phone and text message during the Festival, including with Wachtel and other
Department Heads throughout the Festival, and it worked just fine.
41. Wachtel is neither a police officer, nor does she have police background, and the
above examples from her October 5, 2023 Memorandum to Jerel are inflated, hyperbolic, and after-
the-fact quarterbacking are, in fact, not hindsight, but micromanagement in the extreme.
42. So too, Wachtel’s statements in the Memorandum regarding Jerel’s handling of the
Flossmoor festival are false, half-truth, gross exaggerations, leave out key facts, and are deliberately
written to tarnish Jerel, rather than present a true and accurate picture of the state of security as the
Flossmoor Festival.
43. Wachtel’s campaign against Jerel got worse.
44. On October 18, 2023 Wachtel sent Jerel a Memorandum containing this Paragraph:
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45. In this Paragraph, Wachtel is now concerned about Jerel “over-delegating” and having an
“over reliance on the Command staff.” Yet, carefully read, this Paragraph does not actually state any
issue that has been caused by Jerel delegating. In fact, the last sentence criticizes the Sergeants for
not providing as much assistance to officers as they could – but how is this a problem of
“delegating”?
46. Jerel’s concern about cameras, too, is out of due regard for the safety of the Village, but also
to ensure the police force is acting appropriately when responding to the public. Wachtel, however,
evidently does not share Jerel’s concern for widespread cameras that could help capture
inappropriate police conduct, if it occurred. Jerel states that Wachtel does not share his concern for
holding police officers to the highest standards as demonstrated through her opposition to
widespread cameras.
47. Wachtel, too, goes so far as to criticize Jerel’s speaking abilities in language that
seemingly wants Jerel to speak and answer questions exactly as Ms. Wachtel wants him to answer,
with no due regard for the fact that people speak differently, as follows:
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48. Indeed, it is hard to imagine how anyone could speak correctly with the above criticism.
49. Then Wachtel issues a February 22, 2024 Memorandum with this Paragraph:
50. In this Paragraph, Wachtel recounts how the Chief raised an issue with how the Village’s
body worn camera program is out of sync with neighboring jurisdictions and then criticizes how he
spoke and addressed her, once again – “[y]our position involved scare tactics and intimidation” and
that he was “distracting from meaningful conversations.”
8
51. Jerel is the Police Chief talking about a wildly-important issue – how body worn cameras
are operated in Flossmoor. Yet, Wachtel, once again, does not like how he speaks or his forcefully
defending an idea.
52. Too, like Jerel’s concern for more stationary cameras, Wachtel again opposes improvements
in body worn camera systems that have revolutionized police accountability. Wachtel is not only
opposing Jerel’s support of improving body-worn camera systems, via this Paragraph she has now
demonstrated an aversion to camera improvements in the Village that are the crux of the public’s,
including the Black public’s trust of the police.
53. Jerel’s explanation for Wachtel’s hypercritical fixation on his speech and manner of
communication is that, fundamentally, it involves a White-Black power dynamic of an embedded
White Administrator not liking how the Black man is talking.
54. Carefully read, all of Wachtel’s Memoranda have this tone to them, are personally
derogatory toward Jerel and parse nearly every one of Jerel’s actions to such an extent that the
Memoranda reveal that there is more going on here than just management oversight; rather, Jerel
states that Wachtel treated him in this fashion because she does not like that he is Black, does not
like that a Black man takes initiatives, does not like that a Black man might speak differently or use
different speech patterns and tones than her view of how a Black man should speak, and wants to
continue to remind the Black man that he is subservient to the White power structure imposed and
enforced by Wachtel.
55. Here is another example from the February 22, 2024 Memorandum:
9
56. With respect to this Paragraph, Wachtel once again expressed offense that Jerel did not
lay down to the demands of a White man – the Assistant Village Manager Jonathan Bogue.
57. But look at the substance of this Paragraph: Wachtel is criticizing the Chief of Police for
simply wanting to gain access to the camera system in the School District!
58. In the age of school shootings, what in the world is wrong with the Chief of Police
gaining access to school district cameras? If anything, the school district should be ready and willing
to make the school camera systems available to the local police department at the drop of a hat and
Wachtel should be supporting Jerel on this.
59. Except, of course, for the upshot of this Paragraph: Wachtel is more concerned that Jerel
took initiative outside of the White power structure she requires to be kept in place.
60. Here is another example from the February 22, 2024 Memorandum:
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61. Here, Jerel gave a comprehensive update about Police Department matters at a
Community Relations Commission meeting, and Wachtel says it was too long. From Wachtel’s
perspective, the issue here, really, is that when a Black man speaks, it better be short and controlled.
She was offended that Jerel talked for 53 minutes about important police matters.
62. Indeed, Jerel was lauded by others at the Commission meeting for his comprehensive
discussion.
63. Next, the following Paragraph is contained in Wachtel’s February 22, 2024
Memorandum:
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64. Most tellingly, Wachtel bolds and underlines her expectations that Jerel ask others for
permission on how to do his job, and that he accept it!
65. This Paragraph on its face reveals what Wachtel really thinks about Jerel: he is incapable
of making decisions on his own, he needs to be subservient to others (really, subservient to
Wachtel), and, the kicker: he must do as Wachtel says he must do and he must diminish his own
thoughts, beliefs, and ideas, and accept, slavishly, Wachtel’s.
66. However, looking at Paragraph 4(a) in its entirety, what Wachtel is really complaining
about is that the Chief and Deputy Chief suggest that there are other locations in the Village that
should have cameras installed. So what? That does not mean the Village needs to go along with it,
but to put this issue in Jerel’s February 22, 2024 Memorandum as a criticism of Jerel? Why?
12
67. Wachtel does not stop her criticism of Jerel, but she also goes after the performance of
the other Black man in the Police Department, Deputy Chief Taylor:
68. This Paragraph not only calls Deputy Chief Taylor “incompetent,” itself wildly offensive,
but then it recounts that Jerel even tried to intervene “on January 18” to fix the issue but, evidently,
Jerel can do not right by Wachtel.
69. The Memorandum carries on to criticize Deputy Chief Taylor’s “poor performance,”
“lack of understanding,” and then criticizes Jerel’s defending Deputy Chief Taylor.
70. In other words, Wachtel now has a pattern of targeting the Black leaders in the Village.
71. At the end of the day, Wachtel’s Memoranda carry on and on and on in this dictatorial,
micro-managerial, hyper-critical fashion toward Jerel (and Deputy Chief Taylor) and reveal that she
has a set of performance expectations for Jerel that are unachievable and by which Jerel could never,
ever, in any universe or time, do right by Wachtel.
13
72. Wachtel, too, has not treated other Department Heads in this fashion. Specifically, she
has not subjected White Department Heads to the same set of false, hyperinflated, and micro-
managerial performance expectations.
73. Indeed, on information and belief, Wachtel has not treated any White Department Head
in the manner she has treated Jerel as outlined herein.
74. The only explanation for Wachtel’s disparate and discriminatory treatment of Jerel is
anti-Black animus by Wachtel toward Jerel (and Deputy Chief Taylor).
COUNT 1 – FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT EQUAL PROTECTION

DEPRIVATION BASED ON RACE (BLACK) VIA 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(Plaintiff v. Defendant Wachtel)
75. Plaintiff restates, realleges, and incorporates by reference Paragraphs 1 through 74 as if
fully restated herein.
76. The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that “No State. .
.shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”
77. This jurisdiction has recognized that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits denial of equal
protection of the laws in the employment context on the basis of race, and that qualified immunity
does not attach to race-based discriminatory conduct by government officials. See Singmuongthong v.
Brown, 77 F.4th 503, 506 (2023) (recognizing that the Equal Protection clause prohibits race
discrimination in employment and may be enforced via 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
78. Here, Plaintiff has suffered two adverse employment actions by Wachtel: (i) Wachtel’s
imposition of a heightened set of performance standards on Jerel and her uncontrolled and
unhinged campaign of micromanagement of him, and (ii) Jerel’s termination by Wachtel and Nelson
on or about March 7, 2024.
79. Wachtel was motivated by race in her imposition of a heightened set of performance
standards on Jerel and her uncontrolled and unhinged campaign of micromanagement of him.
14
80. Wachtel was motivated by race in her decision to terminate him.
81. While Mayor Nelson formally made the final decision to terminate Jerel, she did so as
Wachtel’s cat’s paw because her decision was made entirely on Wachtel’s input and
recommendation. See Smith v. Bray, 681 F.3d 888 (7th Cir. 2012) (recognizing the cat’s paw theory
under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
82. Wachtel was the true decisionmaker in Jerel’s termination because the Mayor relied on her
input and recommendation, and did not perform any independent assessment of Wachtel’s
recommendation and input, but “rubberstamped” the decision.
83. As a result of Wachtel’s action, Jerel has suffered job loss, reputational damage, salary
and benefits losses, and extreme emotional distress.
84. Wachtel’s actions are the cause-in-fact of Jerel’s job loss, reputational damage, salary and
benefits losses, and extreme emotional distress.
85. Wachtel’s actions are the proximate cause of Jerel’s job loss, reputational damage, salary
WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff requests that this Honorable Court enter
judgment in his favor, and against Defendants, and enter and order all appropriate relief, to include
back pay and back benefits as allowed by law, compensatory damages in an amount to be
determined at trial, make whole relief for all losses resulting from the unlawful discrimination alleged
herein, injunctive relief requiring Defendants to cease and desist from committing race
discrimination, reasonable attorneys’ fees and litigation costs, pre-judgment interest, and all other
available and appropriate relief.
COUNT 2 – RACE DISCRIMINATION IN VIOLATION OF

42 U.S.C. § 1981 VIA 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(Plaintiff v. Defendants Wachtel and Flossmoor)
86. Plaintiff restates, realleges, and incorporates by reference Paragraphs 1 through 74 as if
15
fully restated herein.
87. Section 1981 provides that “[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall
have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties,
give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of
persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains,
penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
88. With respect to Section 1981 claims against the government, they are brought via 42
U.S.C. § 1983. See Campbell v. Forest Preserve District of Cook County, Illinois, 752 F.3d 665, 670 (7th Cir.
2014).
89. Individual liability may be established under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
90. To state a claim for race discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, an employee must plead
that (1) he was a member of a protected class; (2) he met the legitimate expectations of his employer;
(3) he suffered an adverse employment action; and, (4) similarly situated employees who were not
members of his protected class were treated more favorably. See Vega v. Chicago Park District, 165
F.Supp.3d 693, 700-701 (N.D. Ill. 2016); Caskey v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 535 F.3d 585, 591-92 (7th Cir.
2008).
91. Courts in this judicial district “generally have applied the same prima facie requirements to
discrimination claims brought under Title VII and Section 1981. See e.g., Alexander v. Wis. Dep't of
Health & Family Servs., 263 F.3d 673, 682 (7th Cir.2001) (applying same standard to Title VII
and section 1981 discrimination claims); Johnson v. City of Fort Wayne, Ind., 91 F.3d 922, 940 (7th
Cir.1996) (“Although section 1981 and Title VII differ in the types of discrimination they proscribe,
the methods of proof and elements of the case are essentially identical.”); Randle v. LaSalle Telecomms.,
Inc., 876 F.2d 563, 568 (7th Cir.1989) (“It is well settled that the methods and order of proof
applicable to a claim of disparate treatment under Title VII are equally availing under § 1981.”); see
16
also Patterson, 491 U.S. at 186, 109 S.Ct. 2363 (applying McDonnell Douglas framework to section 1981
claims). See Humphries v. CBOCS W., Inc., 474 F.3d 387, 403–04 (7th Cir. 2007), aff'd, 553 U.S. 442,
128 S. Ct. 1951, 170 L. Ed. 2d 864 (2008).
92. Jerel is a member of a protected class, to wit, he is Black.
93. Here, Plaintiff has suffered two adverse employment actions by Wachtel: (i) Wachtel’s
94. Wachtel was motivated by race in her imposition of a heightened set of performance
standards on Jerel and her uncontrolled and unhinged campaign of micromanagement of him.
95. Wachtel was motivated by race in her decision to terminate him.
96. While Mayor Nelson formally made the final decision to terminate Jerel, she did so as
Wachtel’s cat’s paw because her decision was made entirely on Wachtel’s input and
97. Wachtel was the true decisionmaker in Jerel’s termination because the Mayor relied on her
input and recommendation, and did not perform any independent assessment of Wachtel’s
recommendation and input, but “rubberstamped” the decision.
98. As a result of Wachtel’s action, Jerel has suffered job loss, reputational damage, salary
99. Wachtel’s actions are the cause-in-fact of Jerel’s job loss, reputational damage, salary and
benefits losses, and extreme emotional distress.
100. Wachtel’s actions are the proximate cause of Jerel’s job loss, reputational damage,
salary and benefits losses, and extreme emotional distress.
17
COUNT 3 – RETALIATION FOR REPORTING RACE DISCRIMINATION IN

VIOLATION OF 42 U.S.C. § 1981 VIA 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(Plaintiff v. Defendants Wachtel and Flossmoor)
101. Plaintiff restates and incorporates by reference Paragraphs 1 through 74 of this
Complaint as if fully realleged in this Count.
102. Section 1981 provides that “[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the United States
shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be
parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of
persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains,
penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
103. The Seventh Circuit has interpreted Section 1981 to allow for claims of retaliation.
See, e.g., Humphries v. CBOCS West, Inc., 474 F.3d 387, 398 (7th Cir. 2007) (“section 1981
encompasses the ‘termination of contracts,’ and there can be no doubt that a retaliatory discharge is
indeed a termination of the employment contract.”).
104. Courts in this judicial district “generally have applied the same prima facie
requirements to discrimination claims brought under Title VII and section 1981. See e.g., Alexander v.
Wis. Dep't of Health & Family Servs., 263 F.3d 673, 682 (7th Cir.2001) (applying same standard to Title
VII and section 1981 discrimination claims); Johnson v. City of Fort Wayne, Ind., 91 F.3d 922, 940 (7th
18
Cir.1996) (“Although section 1981 and Title VII differ in the types of discrimination they proscribe,
the methods of proof and elements of the case are essentially identical.”); Randle v. LaSalle Telecomms.,
Inc., 876 F.2d 563, 568 (7th Cir.1989) (“It is well settled that the methods and order of proof
applicable to a claim of disparate treatment under Title VII are equally availing under § 1981.”); see
also Patterson, 491 U.S. at 186, 109 S.Ct. 2363 (applying McDonnell Douglas framework to section 1981
claims). See Humphries v. CBOCS W., Inc., 474 F.3d 387, 403–04 (7th Cir. 2007), aff'd, 553 U.S. 442,
128 S. Ct. 1951, 170 L. Ed. 2d 864 (2008).
105. In this case, Jerel engaged in protected activity when he reported Wachtel’s race
discriminatory behavior to Mayor Nelson on October 5, 2023.
106. Mayor Nelson took no action to rectify Wachtel’s discriminatory behavior.
107. Plaintiff has suffered two adverse employment actions by Wachtel: (i) Wachtel’s
108. Wachtel was motivated by retaliation in her imposition of a heightened set of
performance standards on Jerel and her uncontrolled and unhinged campaign of micromanagement
of him.
109. Wachtel was also motivated by retaliation in her decision to terminate him.
110. While Mayor Nelson formally made the final decision to terminate Jerel, she did so
as Wachtel’s cat’s paw because her decision was made entirely on Wachtel’s input and
111. Wachtel was the true decisionmaker in Jerel’s termination because the Mayor totally
19
relied on her input and recommendation, and did not perform any independent assessment of
Wachtel’s recommendation and input, but “rubberstamped” the decision.
112. As a result of Wachtel’s action, Jerel has suffered job loss, reputational damage,
113. Wachtel’s actions are the cause-in-fact of Jerel’s job loss, reputational damage, salary
114. Wachtel’s actions are the proximate cause of Jerel’s job loss, reputational damage,
COUNT 4 – INDEMNIFICATION
(Plaintiff v. Defendant Flossmoor)
115. Plaintiff restates and incorporates by reference Paragraphs 1 through 74 of this
Complaint as if fully realleged in this Count.
116. Illinois statute provides that a local public entity such as Flossmoor, Illinois is
obligated to assume financial responsibility for the actions committed by its officials or employees
such as Wachtel. See 745 ILCS §§ 10/1-202, 10/2-302, and 10/9-102.
117. Defendant Flossmoor, Illinois is obligated to assume such financial responsibility for
Defendant Wachtel.
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WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court enter an order directing
Flossmoor, Illinois to pay, indemnify, and assume financial responsibility for the actions and/or
omissions committed by Defendants for the harms they caused to Plaintiff alleged herein.
JURY DEMANDED ON ALL COUNTS
Dated March 11, 2024
Respectfully submitted,
JEREL JONES
/s/ Robert W. Fioretti

/s/ Cass T. Casper
By:__________________________
One of Plaintiff’s Attorney
Robert W. Fioretti, Esq.
DISPARTI LAW GROUP, P.A.
121 West Wacker Drive, Suite 2300
Chicago, Illinois 60601
P: (312) 506-5511 ext.
E: rfioretti@dispartilaw.com
Cass T. Casper, Esq.

DISPARTI LAW GROUP, P.A.
121 West Wacker Drive, Suite 2300
Chicago, Illinois 60601
P: (312) 506-5511 ext. 331
E: ccasper@dispartilaw.com
21

Complaint (Jones v. Flossmoor) (File-Stamped)

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Case: 1:24-cv-02022 Document #: 1 Filed: 03/11/24 Page 1 of 21 PageID #:1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

individual capacity (collectively hereinafter Defendants).

NATURE OF THE CASE

Chief, Jerel, as an act of race discrimination and retaliation.

2. On October 5, 2023, Jerel complained to Flossmoor’s Mayor, Michelle Nelson, about

disparate treatment he was received from Defendant Wachtel.

3. Wachtel responded to Jerel’s concerns with a campaign of retaliation culminating in his

termination on or about March 7, 2024.

4. Wachtel’s race-based discriminatory conduct toward Jerel is shown in this Complaint

examination of these three Memoranda1.

could not be Police Chief.

micro-managerial expectations that she imposed on Jerel.

from happening to anyone else again.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 1988, and pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981.

its place of operation within this judicial district.

Chief of Police with Flossmoor, Illinois

duly-appointed Village Manager for the Village of Flossmoor, Illinois.

18. Defendant Wachtel is sued in her individual capacity only.

19. At all times, Defendant Wachtel acted under color of law.

20. Defendant Wachtel has no law enforcement background.

22. Defendant Flossmoor, Illinois is a unit of local government with indemnification

10/1-202 and § 9-102.

FACTS COMMON TO ALL COUNTS

beginning his career there and sworn in March 27, 2023.

Head in the Village of Flossmoor.

overbearing scrutiny, micromanagement, baseless criticism, personally attacking criticisms, and

generally holding him to a standard of performance that would be unachievable by anyone.

and targeted treatment at the hands of Wachtel.

Department Head could have complied with it.

in the Fire Department.

never occurred and the forms were not needed anyway.

Wachtel’s White version of “common sense.”

38. The October 5, 2023 Memorandum also includes this Paragraph:

command standards, but sensible and widespread.

Department Heads throughout the Festival, and it worked just fine.

43. Wachtel’s campaign against Jerel got worse.

that he was “distracting from meaningful conversations.”

including the Black public’s trust of the police.

communication is that, fundamentally, it involves a White-Black power dynamic of an embedded

White Administrator not liking how the Black man is talking.

Wachtel should be supporting Jerel on this.

permission on how to do his job, and that he accept it!

of making decisions on his own, he needs to be subservient to others (really, subservient to

thoughts, beliefs, and ideas, and accept, slavishly, Wachtel’s.

Jerel can do not right by Wachtel.

ever, in any universe or time, do right by Wachtel.

managerial performance expectations.

in the manner she has treated Jerel as outlined herein.

anti-Black animus by Wachtel toward Jerel (and Deputy Chief Taylor).

COUNT 1 – FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT EQUAL PROTECTION

75. Plaintiff restates, realleges, and incorporates by reference Paragraphs 1 through 74 as if

fully restated herein.

discrimination in employment and may be enforced via 42 U.S.C. § 1983).

on or about March 7, 2024.

80. Wachtel was motivated by race in her decision to terminate him.

under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983).

recommendation and input, but “rubberstamped” the decision.

and benefits losses, and extreme emotional distress.

benefits losses, and extreme emotional distress.

and benefits losses, and extreme emotional distress.

available and appropriate relief.

COUNT 2 – RACE DISCRIMINATION IN VIOLATION OF

86. Plaintiff restates, realleges, and incorporates by reference Paragraphs 1 through 74 as if

fully restated herein.

89. Individual liability may be established under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.

128 S. Ct. 1951, 170 L. Ed. 2d 864 (2008).

92. Jerel is a member of a protected class, to wit, he is Black.

on or about March 7, 2024.

95. Wachtel was motivated by race in her decision to terminate him.

under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983).