1st NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION

TEAM CODE : P12

SCHOOL OF LAW, IILM UNIVERSITY, GREATER NOIDA

1ST NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION
17th to 19th April 2024

BEFORE THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

ROHAN MEHRA …………Petitioner

Vs.
STATE OF ULTRA PRADESH …………Respondent
RIYASINGH …………Respondent

ON SUBMISSION TO THE REGISTRY OF THE COURT OF THE

HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

MEMORIAL FOR THE PETITIONER – ROHAN MEHRA

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Table of Contents
STATEMENT OF FACTS....................................................................................................................3
STATEMENT OF ISSUE.....................................................................................................................6
SUMMARY OF FACTS.......................................................................................................................7
AGRUMENTS ADVANCED...............................................................................................................8
ISSUE 1. WHETHER THE SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION IS MAINTAINABLE IN THE
HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA?..............................................................................8
ISSUE 3. WHETHER THE CONSENT FOR SEXUAL INTERCOURSE WAS GIVEN BY
RIYA ONLY THE PRETEXT OF MARRIAGE AND DOES IT AMOUNT TO RAPE UNDER
SECTION 375 OF INDIANA PENAL CODE?................................................................................9
3.1 RESPONDENT’S CONSENT GIVEN FOR SEXUAL INTERCOURSE WAS BASED ON LOVE AND
AFFECTION.....................................................................................................................................9
3.2 CONSENSUAL INTERCOURSE DOES NOT AMOUNT TO RAPE...........................................11
ISSUE 4.WHETHER A DENIAL OF BAIL FOR ROHAN FOR THE PURPOSE OF HIS
MARRIAGE WOULD AMOUNT TO AN INFRINGEMENT OF HIS FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT
UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIANA?...............................................................................13
4.1 PROVISION OF BAIL AND POWERS OF SUPREME COURT.................................................13
4.2 GROUNDS FOR BAIL.........................................................................................................14
4.3 PENDING APPEAL.............................................................................................................15
4.4 DENAIL OF BAIL AMOUNTS TO INFIRNGMENT OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT......................15

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

STATUTES REFERRED

1. THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA

2. THE INDIAN CONTRACT ACT, 1872
3. INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860
4. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, 1973
5. INDIAN EVIDENCE ACT, 1872

CASE LAWS

1.

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STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. Rohan Mehra is a 28-year-old entrepreneur and founder of a perfume company and Riya
Singh, a 27-year-old marketing executive, both of them had completed their education
from the Indiana Institute of Technology (Batch 2017-19) in Tucknow, Ultra Pradesh.
2. During the time at the Indiana Institute of Technology, they both started liking each other.
And confessed their love to each other.
3. While in relationship Rohan used to take Riya with him to all the social gatherings and
functions. On the night of November 20, 2022, Rohan took Riya to his brother’s marriage,
where she met Rohan’s family and relatives. Rohan introduced Riya to his mother, where
Rohan’s mother, after meeting Riya, asked both, “When will you two throw a similar
function for us?”. Listening to the question, Rohan and Riya looked at each other and
smiled, and then Riya said, “Soon.” Listening to the same Rohan, he did not respond.

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4. Rohan, during a party when he was in a drunken state, was asked by his friends Rishi and
Radha, who were married, about the future of his relationship with Riya, to which Rohan
replied, ‘Riya will make a perfect wife’. The same conversation was narrated to Riya by
Radha without the consent or knowledge of Rohan. Rohan was unaware of any such
communication being made to Riya by Radha.
5. Rohan and Riya started living together. Rohan pitched an idea to Riya that she should
work with her and develop an app for his perfume company ‘Scents’ so that they can sell
their perfumes directly. Riya liked the idea and started working on developing the app for
it, but at the same time, iterated that she would not quit her job.
6. As they were in a relationship, no formal written contract was executed between the two,
and thus the entire agreement was based on the exchange of messages on WhatApp.
7. Over a WhatApp chat on 13th May 2023, both of them agreed on a payment structure in
which Riya will get a lumpsum amount of Rs 10 Lac once the application is developed.
However, the mode and timing of payments were not clearly defined. As the work
progressed, the parties experienced disagreements relating to the development of the
application, with Rohan claiming that some crucial aspects of the project were left as Riya
was not able to balance her job and working on the application at the same time, thereby
leaving Rohan frustrated.
8. As a consequence of the same, Rohan denied adequate payment as promised in the
WhatApp chats on the ground of a deficiency in services rendered, thus annoying Riya.
But Rohan calmed her down so that their relationship was not affected.
9. On November 17, 2023, Riya asked Rohan to marry her, which Rohan denied and thereby
called off the relationship.
10. Meanwhile, Riya was feeling deceived and emotionally distressed, and filed an FIR
alleging that Rohan had engaged in sexual intercourse with her on the pretext of marriage,
and now he was refusing to fulfil his promise. Rohan denies any expressed promise
relating to marriage made by him, whereas Riya contends that an implied promise of
marriage was made and thus she gave her consent for sexual intercourse on the pretext of
marriage. Following the same, medical tests were performed and it was confirmed on the
basis of reports that sexual intercourse took place frequently between Rohan and Riya.
However, nothing was concluded on the matter of consent.
11. As a consequence of the same, Rohan was arrested. Rohan was presented before the
magistrate. Rohan was denied bail and was later acquitted for the charges by Trial Court

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of Tucknow. The trial court held that, both Riya and Rohan were in consensual
relationship, therefore, Rohan cannot be held liable for Rape.
12. Riya filed an appeal against the trial Court’s Order in High Court of Ultra Pradesh. The
High Court reversed trial Court’s judgment and convicted Rohan for the charge of Rape
on the pretext of Marriage. Rohan then filed a Special Leave Petition in Supreme Court of
Indiana against High Court’s order.
13. Rohan further asked the court to take into consideration that his family had been looking
out for a bride on marriage platform Jeevanteresaathi.com and thus, he and Shreya (the
girl who agreed to marry him through Jeevanteresaathi.com) have decided to get married
and that his fundamental Right to Marry enshrined by the Constitution of Indiana would
be violated.
14. However, Riya also filed a suit for breach of contract. To which Rohan alleges that
conversations on WhatApp are not formal in nature. He also contends that WhatApp chats
do not form a valid contract.
15. Apart from this, Rohan has also challenged the constitutional validity of Section 375 of the
Indiana Penal Code, 1860, entitling only women to file a case on the ground of consent on
the pretext of marriage and the same not available to men.

STATEMENT OF ISSUE
Issue 1. Whether the Special Leave Petition is Maintainable in the Hon’ble
Supreme Court of Indiana.
Issue 2. Whether the agreement entered into by Rohan and Riya on
WhatApp amounts to a valid contract recognizable by laws in
Indiana?
Issue 3. Whether the consent for sexual intercourse was given by Riya only
the pretext of marriage and does it amount to rape under Section 375
of Indiana Penal Code?

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Issue 4. Whether a denial of bail for Rohan for the purpose of his marriage
would amount to an infringement of his fundamental right under the
Constitution of Indiana?

SUMMARY OF FACTS
Issue 1. Whether the Special Leave Petition is Maintainable in the Hon’ble
Supreme Court of Indiana.
The counsel for the petitioner humbly submits that the Special Leave Petition is
maintainable in the Supreme Court of Indiana.
Issue 2. Whether the agreement entered into by Rohan and Riya on WhatApp
amounts to a valid contract recognizable by laws in Indiana?

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Issue 3. Whether the consent for sexual intercourse was given by Riya only the
pretext of marriage and does it amount to rape under Section 375 of
Indiana Penal Code.
The counsel for respondent hum

Issue 4. Whether a denial of bail for Rohan for the purpose of his marriage
would amount to an infringement of his fundamental right under the
Constitution of Indiana?
The counsel for the petitioner humbly submits that the denial of bail for the purpose of his
marriage would amount to an infringement of his fundamental right which is given in
article 21 of the constitution.

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AGRUMENTS ADVANCED

ISSUE 1. WHETHER THE SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION IS

MAINTAINABLE IN THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF
INDIANA?
It is humbly submitted before the hon’ble Supreme Court that the present Special Leave
Petition is maintainable before the court as, (i) the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear
the Special Leave Petition under Article 136 of the Constitution; and, (ii) the Judgement of
the High court was erroneous.

(i) The Supreme court has jurisdiction to hear the Special Leave Petition under
section 136 of the Constitution of Indiana

It is humbly submitted that

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ISSUE 3. WHETHER THE CONSENT FOR SEXUAL INTERCOURSE WAS GIVEN BY

RIYA ONLY THE PRETEXT OF MARRIAGE AND DOES IT AMOUNT TO
RAPE UNDER SECTION 375 OF INDIANA PENAL CODE?
Honourable Judges, The Counsel for the Petitioner in addressing the issue whether
consent for sexual intercourse given by Petitioner (Rohan) under the pretext of
marriage amounts to rape under Section 375 of the Indiana Penal Code is relying upon
their arguments on two main points:

A. Respondent’s consent given for sexual intercourse was based on love and affection.
B. Consensual intercourse does not amount to rape.

3.1 RESPONDENT’S CONSENT GIVEN FOR SEXUAL INTERCOURSE WAS

BASED ON LOVE AND AFFECTION
3.1.1 That the respondent has given her consent for sexual intercourse due to her love and
affection for the petitioner.
3.1.2 That “Section 90 IPC cannot be called in to aid in such a situation, to pardon the act
of a girl in entirety, and fasten criminal liability on the other unless the court is
assured of the fact that from the very beginning, the accused had never really
intended to marry her.1
3.1.3 That they were both smitten by each other and passions of youth ruled over their
minds and emotions. The physical relations that followed were not isolated or
sporadic in nature, but regular over the years.2
3.1.4 That there is a distinction between breach of promise, and not fulfilling a false
promise. Thus, the court must examine whether the prosecutrix agrees to have sexual
intercourse on account of her love and passion for the accused, and not solely on
account of misrepresentation made to her by the accused, or where an accused on
account of circumstances which he could not have foreseen, or which were beyond
his control, was unable to marry her, despite having every intention to do so.3
3.1.5 That in the case of Yedla Srinibas vs State of Andhra Pradesh4, the Apex court
held that the voluntary consent depends on facts of each case and factors such as age
of the girl, her education, her social status and likewise the social status of the boy.

1
Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana (2013) 7 SCC 675
2
Maheshwar Tigga v. State of Jharkhand (2020) 10 SCC 108, 114
3
Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v State of Maharashtra (2019) 9 SCC 608 [18]
4
(2006) 11 SCC 615

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3.1.6 That in this case the respondent and the petitioner were both in their teenage when
they started their relationship and usually in that age they did not know the
consequence of the actions. In the love and affection they both consented for the
sexual intercourse.
3.1.7 That there is a distinction between misrepresentation and misconception of facts,
misrepresentation involves a false statement of fact made with the intention to
deceive, while mistake of fact involves an erroneous assumption.
3.1.8 That the respondent had a misconception of the facts that the petitioner would marry
her, despite the fact that the petitioner never neither openly proposed any such
intention nor made any gesture. The following facts of the case also strengthen this
claim of the petitioner:
A. That in the Para 3 of the statement of facts, the Respondent said that petitioner
used to take her with him to all the social gatherings and functions and specially
on the night of November 20, 2022, the petitioner took me to his brother’s
marriage, where i met his family and relatives and petitioner introduced me to
his mother, where petitioner’s mother, after meeting me, asked me, “When will
you two throw a similar function for us?”. Listening to the question, we both
Petitioner, he did not respond.
 The Petitioner never said yes or promised to marry directly or indirectly. This
presumption was made only by the respondent in her mind.
B. That as per the Para 4 of the statement of facts another incident that the
respondent had highlighted was that the petitioner also used to introduce the
respondent to his friend circle, thereby bringing their relationship into the
knowledge of their social circle. The petitioner, during a party when he was in a
drunken state, was asked by his friends Rishi and Radha, who were married,
about the future of his relationship with the respondent, to which the petitioner
replied, ‘Riya will make a perfect wife’. This conversation was narrated to me by
Radha without the consent or knowledge of the petitioner, and he was unaware of
any such communication being made to me by Radha.
 In this regard, the petitioner had never made any statement directly to the
respondent; this was hearsay evidence and the respondent claims that the
petitioner had said that he would marry. The petitioner had only said that the
respondent is a good woman and she will be a perfect wife to whom she
married.
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C. As per the Para 9 of the statement of facts the petitioner called off the
relationship due to the disagreements relating to the development of the
applications the respondent had left some crucial aspects of the project, and the
respondent was not able to balance her job and working on the application at the
same time, thereby making the petitioner frustrated.
 In this context the petitioner is an entrepreneur and is devoted to his career and
company. The petitioner wanted to focus on the growth of the company. The
petitioner never intended to break the respondent's heart and trust, but foreseen
circumstances came and the petitioner had to call off the relationship.

3.2 CONSENSUAL INTERCOURSE DOES NOT AMOUNT TO RAPE

3.2.1 In the case of Kaini Rajan v. State of Kerala 5 this Court has explained the essentials
and parameters of the offence of rape. In the said decision, in Para 12, this Court
observed and held as under;
“23. Thus, there is a clear distinction between rape and consensual sex. The
court, in such cases, must very carefully examine whether the complainant had
actually wanted to marry the victim or had mala fide motives and had made a
false promise to this effect only to satisfy his lust, as the later falls within the
ambit of cheating or deception. There is also a distinction between mere breach of
a promise and not fulfilling a false promise. If the accused has not made the
promise with the sole intention to seduce the prosecutrix to indulge in sexual acts,
such an act would not amount to rape. There may be a case where the prosecutrix
agrees to have sexual intercourse on account of her love and passion for the
accused and not solely on account of the misconception created by accused, or
where an accused, on account of circumstances which he could not have foreseen
or which were beyond his control, was unable to marry her despite having every
intention to do. Such cases must be treated differently. If the complainant had any
mala fide intention and if he had clandestine motives, it is a clear case of rape.
The acknowledged consensual physical relationship between the parties would
not constitute an offence under Section 376 of the IPC.”
3.2.2 The High Court of Delhi in Sujit Ranjan v. State6 in paragraph 16, observed and held
as under:

5
(2013) 9 SCC 113
6
High court of Delhi, [Criminal Appeal No. 248 of 2011]

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“16. Legal position which can be culled out from the judicial pronouncements
referred above is that the consent given by the prosecutrix to have sexual
intercourse with whom she is in love, on a promise that he would marry her on a
later date, cannot be considered as given under "misconception of fact".
Whether consent given by the prosecutrix to sexual intercourse is voluntary or
whether it is given under "misconception of fact" depends on the facts of each
case. While considering the question of consent, the Court must consider the
evidence before it and the surrounding circumstances before reaching a
conclusion. Evidence adduced by the prosecution has to be weighed keeping in
mind that the burden is on the prosecution to prove each and every ingredient of
the offence. Prosecution must lead positive evidence to give rise to inference
beyond reasonable doubt that accused had no intention to marry prosecutrix at
all from inception and that promise made was false to his knowledge. The
failure to keep the promise on a future uncertain date may be on account of
variety of reasons and could not always amount to "misconception of fact" right
from the inception.”
3.2.3 Where the promise to marry is false and the intention of the maker at the time of
making the promise itself was not to abide by it but to deceive the woman to convince
her to engage in sexual relations, there is a “misconception of fact” that vitiates the
woman’s “consent”. On the other hand, a breach of a promise cannot be said to be a
false promise. To establish a false promise, the maker of the promise should have had
no intention of upholding his word at the time of giving it.
3.2.4 The promise of marriage must have been a false promise, given in bad faith and with no
intention of being adhered to at the time it was given. The false promise itself must be
of immediate relevance, or bear a direct nexus to the woman’s decision to engage in the
sexual act.7
3.2.5 The petitioner and the respondent had done consensual intercourse and consensual sex
does not amount the rape thus the respondent is innocent.

7
Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 9 SCC 608, 620

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ISSUE 4.WHETHER A DENIAL OF BAIL FOR ROHAN FOR THE PURPOSE OF HIS
MARRIAGE WOULD AMOUNT TO AN INFRINGEMENT OF HIS
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIANA?
The Counsel for the Petitioner humbly submits that the denial of bail for the purpose of
marriage would definitely amount to an infringement of fundamental right under the
article 21, article 14 of the Constitution of Indiana.
The constitutional bench observed that the Supreme Court is vested “wide discretionary
power” under this article and this power is required “to be exercised sparingly and only
in exceptional cases”.8

4.1 PROVISION OF BAIL AND POWERS OF SUPREME COURT

4.1.1 “S.389. Suspension of sentence pending the appeal; release of appellant on bail.—(1)
Pending any appeal by a convicted person, the Appellate Court may, for reasons to be
recorded by it in writing, order that the execution of the sentence or
order appealed against be suspended and, also, if he is in confinement, that he be
released on bail, or on his own bond”.9
4.1.2 Article 136. Special leave to appeal by the Supreme Court
(1) Not withstanding anything in this Chapter, the Supreme Court may, in its discretion,
grant special leave to appeal from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or
order in any cause or matter passed or made by any court or tribunal in the territory
of India.
(2) Nothing in clause (1) shall apply to any judgment, determination, sentence or order
passed or made by any court or tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to
the Armed Forces.
4.1.3 In order to complete justice the Supreme Court of Indiana can use its power enshrined
in the constitution of Indiana. Article 142 of the constitution gives the power:
Article 142. Enforcement of decrees and orders of Supreme Court and orders as to
discovery, etc.

(1) The Supreme Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction may pass such decree or make
such order as is necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or matter pending
before it, and any decree so passed or order so made shall be enforceable throughout
the territory of India in such manner as may be prescribed by or under any law made

8
Pritam singh v. the state [air 1950 SC 169]
9
The Criminal Procedure Code 1973

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by Parliament and, until provision in that behalf is so made, in such manner as the
President may by order prescribe.
(2) Subject to the provisions of any law made in this behalf by Parliament, the Supreme
Court shall, as respects the whole of the territory of India, have all and every power
to make any order for the purpose of securing the attendance of any person, the
discovery or production of any documents, or the investigation or punishment of any
contempt of itself.
4.1.4 In accordance with its authority under Article 142 of the Indian Constitution, the
Supreme Court ordered A.G. Perarivalan’s release from prison on. Perarivalan was
convicted in the killing of former Indian Prime Minister Mr Rajiv Gandhi.10
4.1.5 The use of power given in article 142 of the constitution typically uses by the Supreme
Court when there is no statute in place for an existing offense. There was no rule
controlling sexual harassment of women at work, as was demonstrated in the instance
of Bhanwari Devi and Others vs. the State of Rajasthan 11 on January 17, 2002. The
Supreme Court has established a series of procedural rules known as “the Vishaka
Guidelines” to regulate such violations after carefully examining the Indian
Constitution. The Prevention of Sexual Harassment Act, 2013 (POSH) has been
introduced later in 2013.

4.2 GROUNDS FOR BAIL

4.2.1 PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE
(i) An appellate Court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal there is
double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly,
the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of
criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he
is proved guilty by a competent Court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured
his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and
strengthened by the trial Court.12
(ii) In this case petitioner also has double presumption of innocence. (A) The
presumption of innocence under the Criminal Jurisprudence, (B) Trial Court
acquitted him.
4.2.2 MARRIAGE A RIGHT TO LIFE
10
A.G. Perarivalan v. State 2022 SCC OnLine SC 635
11
1997 6 SSC 241
12
State Of U.P. vs Bachchan Khan, GOVERNMENT APPEAL No. - 379 of 2019

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(i) The right to marry is a fundamental human right.13 And No authority need be cited
for the proposition that right to marry is a necessary concomitant of right to life
guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. “Right to life includes right to lead
a healthy life so as to enjoy all the faculties of the human body in their prime
condition”. 14
(ii)In the case of Neha Versus State of Haryana the High Court of Punjab and
Haryana held that the right to procreation survives incarceration and falls within the
ambit of Article 21 of the Constitution of India 15. According to Article 21 of the
Indian Constitution, the right to marriage is an element of the right to life. Within the
scope of the right to start a family, the right to marry is also specified in the Human
Rights Charter.

4.3 PENDING APPEAL

(i) Petitioner submits that there is the pendency of his appeal in this court against the
High Court's decision to convict him. And his continued detention during the appeal
process would amount to pre-trial punishment and deny him the opportunity to
effectively challenge the conviction.

4.4 DENAIL OF BAIL AMOUNTS TO INFIRNGMENT OF FUNDAMENTAL

RIGHT
4.4.1 The Indian Supreme Court ruled that the basic rule is bail, not jail, except where there
is a risk the accused may flee from justice, interfere with the course of justice, repeat
offences or intimidate witnesses.
4.4.2 Personal liberty deprived when bail is refused, is too precious a value of our
constitutional system recognised under Article 21 that the crucial power to negate it is a
great trust exercisable, not casually but judicially, with lively concern for the cost to the
individual and the community.16

13
Vasmi Sudarshini Versus The Sub Registrar Office, Kanyakumari, 2022 0 AIR(Mad) 287 ; 2022 0
Supreme(Mad) 3066
14
Sri X v. Hospital Z, reported in (1998) 8 S.C.C. 296)
15
CRWP-2526-2021
16
Narender Singh vs State Of Rajasthan

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