Liberalismo, Individualidad e Identidad

Liberalism, Individuality, and Identity
Kwame Anthony Appiah
Do you wish to know the great drama of my life? I have given my

genius to my life, to my work only my talent.
-OSCAR WILDE1
We have to create ourselves as a work of art.

-MICHEL FOUCAULT2
I first heard of Liberalism in discussions of British politics, where it meant

the views of the party that was neither Conservative (that is Tory) nor
Socialist (that is Labour). Liberalism in that sense began with an upper
This essay began in response to challenges from Tom Nagel, Ronnie Dworkin, and
Richard Bernstein to say more about various aspects of the ethics of identity. I am grateful
to them. I also owe a debt to the editors of this journal and to Jorge Garcia, whose written
comments helped me revise this essay. I had the opportunity to discuss this essay at Vander-
bilt University (where it started out as the Harry Howard Jr. Lecture in the Humanities),
Rutgers University, University College, London, Harvard Law School's Legal Theory Semi-
nar, the National Humanities Center, and the New York Humanities Institute. I wish I had
been able to integrate more of the many insights I gained from these discussions, especially
since I learned in all these places how many of my claims invite debate.
1. Quoted in Ernest La Jeunesse, Andre Gide, and Franz Blei, In MemoriamOscar
Wilde,trans. Percival Pollard (Greenwich, Conn., 1905), p. 49. See also Gide, 29 June 1913,
TheJournals ofAndre Gide, trans. Justin O'Brien, 4 vols. (New York, 1947), 1:339.
2. Michel Foucault, "On the Genealogy of Ethics," Ethics: Subjectivityand Truth,vol. 1
of TheEssential Worksof Foucault, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York, 1997), p. 262.
CriticalInquiry27 (Winter 2001)

? 2001 by The University of Chicago. 0093-1896/01/2702-0001$02.00. All rights reserved.
305
Critical Inquiry 2001.27:305-332.

Downloaded from www.journals.uchicago.edu by California State University - Fresno on 11/30/18. For personal use only.
306 KwameAnthonyAppiah Liberalism,Individuality,and Identity
case L, in the way in which Republican and Democrat begin with a big R
and a big D when they refer to the parties. But in philosophy we have
come to use the word liberalismwith a lower-case L to refer to a particular
tradition in politics and the philosophy of politics whose central ideas
would probably be endorsed by most people in the four political parties
in Britain and the United States that I have just mentioned. In the sense
in which I am discussing the term, just as American electoral politicians
are all small-r republicans and small-d democrats, British politicians are
all small-I liberals. Indeed, if there were a word for the consensus within
which electoral politics are debated in the industrialized world today, it
might as well be liberalism, even if there are some who reject the term
because it has associations they do not care for.
If you are a philosopher, consensus doesn't always make you happy.
Nietzsche once made a remark to the effect that the consensussapientium-
the agreement of the wise-might be evidence of untruth.3 As usual, he
was exaggerating. But the fact that everybody seems to agree about some-
thing isn't always proof that we're right. And even if we are right, it may
do us good to think about the principles, the values and ideals, that un-
derlie our agreement, not just to make the consensus more intellectually
secure, but also to explore consequences we haven't noticed. To start such
an exploration of consensus, however, we first need to say something
about the liberal tradition.
It seems to me there are two obvious ways of going about saying what
you mean by liberalism. One is historical. It is to point to the development
over the last few centuries, but especially since the American and French
Revolutions, of a new form of political life. This form of life finds expres-
sion in certain political institutions: among them, on the one hand, re-
publicanism, or at least constitutional rather than absolute monarchy,
elected rather than hereditary rulers, and, more generally, some sort of
appeal to the consent of the governed; and, on the other hand, a legal
system that respects certain fundamental rights, limiting the power of
those who govern. These civil or political rights carve out for citizens a
corresponding sphere of freedoms including those of political speech, the
press, and religion. Each of these elements can come on its own. There
were republics in Europe as far back as Athens; the first German emper-
3. Friedrich Nietzsche, The Twilightof theIdols, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (London, 1968),

pp. 29-30.
Kwame Anthony Appiah is Charles H. Carswell Professor of Afro-

American studies and of philosophy at Harvard University and author,
with Amy Gutmann, of ColorConscious:ThePoliticalMoralityof Race (1996).
He is also coeditor, with Henry Louis Gates, Jr., of Africana:TheEncyclope-
dia of theAfricanand African-AmericanExperience(1999).

CriticalInquiry Winter2001 307
ors were elected;4 and freedom of the press and religious toleration devel-
oped in England within a monarchical scheme. What characterizes the
beginnings of liberalism is, then, a combination of political institutions:
constitutions, rights, elections, and protections for private property. In
the twentieth century, in both Europe and North America, there was
added to the recognition of these political rights a concern to guarantee
certain minimum conditions of welfare for every citizen, what we call-
even if the extension of the term rightsin this way is a little controversial-
economic and social rights. And it is that combination of civil rights and
welfare provision that is identified in the United States as the liberal and
in Europe as the social democratic tradition.
But the liberal form of life was characterized not only by institutions
but also by a rhetoric, a body of ideas and arguments, which received
their most familiar expression for us here in these United States in these,
the most familiar words of the American Declaration of Independence of
1776:
We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men are created

equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalien-
able rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of hap-
piness. That, to secure these rights, governments are instituted
among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the gov-
erned; that whenever any form of government becomes destructive
of those ends, it is the right of the people to alter or abolish it.
The signatories of the Declaration were not, of course, the first

people to have had any of these ideas. Talk of liberty and the consent of
the people, for example, was already well established in Puritan colonial
rhetoric. But the American founders were surely the first people to try to
put such ideas into practice, and their language (and Thomas Jefferson
himself, as ambassador to Paris at the time the Declaration of the Rights
of Man and Citizen was being drafted) had a profound effect on the rhet-
oric of the French Revolution as well. Indeed, the central ideas in this
4. These elections were, of course, by a small "electorate" of rulers of towns, states

and other units of the Reich. But the first American elections were on a decidedly limited
franchise, too. If democracy means an electoral system with basically full adult franchise,
then democracy is a latecomer in liberal practice. So I haven't put democracy in there as
part of the institutional tradition of liberalism. Indeed, it seems to me that key liberals were
skeptical of democracy: Mill was worried about the tyranny of the majority and, as I say, the
U.S. Constitution isn't democratic, for it doesn't give the franchise to all adult citizens. I do
not mean to express skepticism about democracy in this sense or to suggest that it does not
follow from core liberal ideas. Respect for others as free and equal, of the sort that I talk
about later, requires a means of expressing everyone's political equality by providing every-
one with equal roles in selecting the government, however. In the end, something like de-
mocracy will probably come out of the liberal tradition. But I think the connection between
liberalism and democracy needs to be argued.

passage are captured quite succinctly in the rallying cry of the French
revolutionaries: libert6,egaliti, fraternitW.
Liberty and equality are there in the American Declaration, on its
face, so to speak. But fraternity is there too, for fraternity is what binds
together the people, the people who may alter or abolish forms of govern-
ment. The Declaration takes for granted that there is already an Ameri-
can people to exercise this right. The American Revolution assumes, with
an assurance that is surely bold in a multireligious immigrant country in
the New World, that there is a nation here that can construct an American
government. This is particularly striking since there were important as-
sumptions made by the country's founders about who the we of "we, the
people" were. John Jay in the second of the FederalistPapers blithely ig-
nores most of the difficulties when he tells us that he has
often taken notice that Providence has been pleased to give this one
connected country to one united people-a people descended from
the same ancestors, speaking the same language, professing the same
religion, attached to the same principles of government, very similar
in their manners and customs, and who, by their joint counsels,
arms, and efforts, fighting side by side throughout a long and bloody
war, have nobly established their general liberty and independence.5
This passage puts aside the fact of the Indian, African, Jewish, and Catho-
lic presence in the American colonies. Indeed, it might seem to exclude
from the people (given the limited role of women in the actual fighting
during the War of Independence) most, if not all, women. After all, it was
only in the mid-nineteenth century that "we, the people" came to include
African Americans; and, if suffrage is an expression of our fraternity, then
women were not fully joined to the nation until this century. Only when
fraternity is linked to sorority is the process complete.
Many people nowadays will still find most of the ideas in these early
sentences of the Declaration something close to self-evident (even those
who doubt that it was a Creator who endowed us with our rights). Clearly,
these sentiments were far from uncontroversial when they were first pro-
nounced. Edmund Burke, who was as profound a student of constitu-
tional history as England produced in this age of revolutions, made some
of the obvious objections at the start.
First of all, he asked, doesn't the value of liberty depend on what you
do with it? Or, as he put it in the Reflectionson the Revolutionin France:
I should suspend my congratulations on the new liberty of France,

until I was informed how it had been combined with government,
with public force, with the discipline and obedience of armies, with
5. John Jay, second paper in The FederalistPapers, ed. Clinton Rossiter (New York,
1961), p. 38.

the collection of an effective and well-distributed revenue, with mo-

rality and religion, with solidity and property, with peace and order,
with civil and social manners. All these (in their way) are good things,
too; and without them, liberty is not a benefit whilst it lasts, and is
not likely to continue long. The effect of liberty to individuals is, that
they may do what they please: we ought to see what it will please
them to do, before we risk congratulations, which may soon be
turned into complaints.6
The challenge here is an important one. Liberty cannot be the only

thing that matters. Burke renders liberty a second-order value, a matter
of being free from the constraint of others-and especially of govern-
ments-to "do what [you may] please." But doesn't its value then come
from what we please to do with it? To speak of liberty as an inalienable
right is to suggest that no one may stop us from doing what we please,
whateverwe please. But why? For Burke, at least, this was far from "self-
evident."
Burke was equally skeptical of the idea of equality. It is a familiar
philosophers' observation that when somebody calls for equality, we
should ask, Equality of what? But Burke saw at once that the revolution-
ary notion of equality meant, at least, that everyone was entitled to equal
respect.These revolutions, in at least some of their rhetoric, were commit-
ted to the idea that everyone had what we would now call human dignity.
This affinity between talk of equality and questions of dignity and
respect is articulated in the American colonies a good deal before the
Revolution. John Wise, who graduated from Harvard more than a hun-
dred years before the Declaration of Independence, made the connection
clearly in his 1717 Vindicationof the Governmentof New England Churches:
The word "Man" ... is thought to carry somewhat of dignity in its

sound; and we commonly make use of this as the most proper and
prevailing argument against a rude insulter, viz. "I am not a beast or
a dog, but am a man as well as yourself." Since then human nature
agrees equally with all persons, and since no one can live a sociable
life with another that does not own or respect him as a man, it follows
... that every man esteem and treat another as one who is naturally
his equal, or who is a man as well as he.7
Burke uses the word honor-rather than dignity, esteem,or respect-in his
response to this notion of equality; in his day it was obvious that honor,
6. Edmund Burke, Reflectionson the Revolutionin Franceand on the Proceedingsin Certain

Societiesin Londonrelativeto thatEvent:In a letterIntendedto have beensentto a Gentlemanin Paris,
in The Worksof the Right HonourableEdmundBurke, 3rd ed., 12 vols. (Boston, 1869), 3:242.
7. John Wise, Vindicationof the Governmentof New England Churches,excerpted in The
AmericanPuritans: TheirProseand Poetry,ed. Perry Miller (New York, 1956), p. 128; hereafter
abbreviated V

like dignity, was something that only some people had. (Even radical old
Wise thought that in civil society there must be "just distinctions among
men of honor." [V,p. 128])8 So that, once again, Burke makes what was,
in the context, the obvious objection:
The Chancellor of France, at the opening of the States, said, in a tone

of oratorical flourish, that all occupations were honourable. If he
meant only that no honest employment was disgraceful, he would
not have gone beyond the truth. But in asserting that anything is
honorable, we imply some distinction in its favor. The occupation of
a hair-dresser, or of a working tallow-chandler, cannot be a matter of
honor to any person,-to say nothing of a number of other servile
employments. Such descriptions of men ought not to suffer oppres-
sion from the state; but the state suffers oppression, if such as they,
either individually or collectively, are permitted to rule. In this you
think you are combating prejudice, but you are at war with Nature.9
Questions such as, How can everyone have dignity? and Why is lib-
erty a good thing? arose, then, in the course of the development of the
political institutions of liberalism. They suggest the second way into an
understanding of liberalism, which is to explore its philosophical founda-
tions. Such inquiry seeks to answer Burke's challenges by developing a
general picture of human life that includes government and politics but
also, perhaps, other forms of association.
Burke's answer to questions about the justification of political institu-
tions was what came to be called conservative, as, in the first half of the
nineteenth century, conservativeand liberalbecame standard ways of divid-
ing up the world of political opinion.10 (Eventually, these positions were
codified as Right and Left according to where the proponents of the two
8. John Locke, who is accounted one of the fathers of the spirit of the American Revo-
lution, used the word dignity in the same way Burke would have, to mean the special privi-
leges of people of standing.
9. Burke has a lovely little footnote here, in which he cites the Old Testament: "Ecclesi-
asticus 38: 24, 25. 'The wisdom of a learned man cometh by opportunity of leisure: and he
that hath little business shall become wise. How can he get wisdom that holdeth the plough,
and the glorieth in the goad; that driveth oxen, and is occupied in their labors, and whose
talk is of bullocks?'" (Burke, Reflectionson the Revolutionin France, 3:296).
10. Identifying the institutional and intellectual antecedents of modern liberalism is a
separate task from exploring the history of the word liberalismand its cognates in various
other European languages. Modern liberalism draws on ideas such as those enumerated by
Kant and Locke and practices such as the provision of constitutional rights that were devel-
oped well before the word liberal ever became associated with them. Reputedly, the first
political group that called themselves "liberales" was in Spain in the early nineteenth cen-
tury; Constant began to refer to his political ideas as liberal in the late eighteenth century.
(I owe these historical observations to the conversation after my talk at University College,
London.)

positions sat in the French National Assembly.) Political conservatives

tended to be skeptical of philosophical argument, skeptical of equality,
and skeptical of democracy. But above all they shared Burke's skepticism
about the dignity and the honor of the ordinary man-that hairdresser
and his colleague the tallow-chandler. What could possibly justify defer-
ring to the judgment of these people who lacked the distinction that de-
serves honor, accounting them equal, requiring their collective consent?
I am going to spend some time exploring answers to this fundamen-
tal question. My aim is not so much to reflect on liberal political institu-
tions as to explore a picture of human life that is a starting point for a
defense of those institutions. That picture, as we shall see, is not itself a
political one. Instead, it bears on ethical questions that fall well outside
the range of those that are raised by our collective life within the state.
However, I shall return to its broader significance for politics at the end.
Burke asked why we should think all people were entitled to equal
respect: the working tallow-chandler, his wife, the King of England, all of
them. Many answers have been offered to that question. John Wise, the
radical Protestant divine whom I quoted earlier, answered "that we all
derive our being from one stock, the same common father of [the] human
race," and that we all come into and go out of the world in much the same
way: "Death observes no ceremony, but knocks as loud at the barriers of
the Court as at the door of the cottage" (V,p. 129). Immanuel Kant fa-
mously argued that our equality was grounded in our shared human ca-
pacity for reason. In proposing his story, which was a view not just about
politics but about the whole of moral life, he developed the idea of auton-
omy: the idea of a person's being self-governing, ruling him- or herself,
rather than being ruled from outside, heteronomously, by other forces or
other people.
But I am going to start my exploration of the liberal vision with John
Stuart Mill, who argued some decades after Burke in his still bracing essay
On Liberty(1859) that it is our capacity to use all our faculties in individual
ways that gives us the right to freedom. In the third chapter "On Individ4
uality, as One of the Elements of Wellbeing," he writes, near the start:
If it were felt that the free development of individuality is one of the

leading essentials of well-being; that it is not only a co6rdinate ele-
ment with all that is designated by the terms civilization, instruction,
education, culture, but is itself a necessary part and condition of all
those things; there would be no danger that liberty should be under-
valued, and the adjustment of the boundaries between it and social
control would present no extraordinary difficulty."
11. John Stuart Mill, On Liberty(Amherst, Mass., 1986), p. 65; hereafter abbreviated OL.

And he goes on a little later:
He who lets the world, or his own portion of it, choose his plan of
life for him, has no need for any other faculty than the ape-like one
of imitation. He who chooses his plan for himself, employs all his
faculties. He must use observation to see, reasoning and judgment
to foresee, activity to gather materials for decision, discrimination to
decide, and when he has decided, firmness and self-control to hold to
his deliberate decision. And these qualities he requires and exercises
exactly in proportion as the part of his conduct which he determines
according to his own judgment and feelings is a large one. ... Hu-
man nature is not a machine to be built after a model, and set to do
exactly the work prescribed for it, but a tree, which requires to grow
... according to the tendency of the inward forces which make it a
living thing. [OL, pp. 67-68]
Mill's arguments in On Libertycome in two stripes. First, there are argu-

ments that liberty will have good effects. Such defenses vindicate liberty
by virtue of its consequences. His most famous arguments for freedom of
expression assume that we will find the truth more often and more easily
if we allow our opinions to be tested in public debate, in what we all now
call the marketplace of ideas.
But a second kind of argument appears in passages like this one.
This claim suggests that the cultivation of one's individuality is itself a
part of well-being, something good in itself. This freedom is not a means
to an end but part of the end, for individuality means, among other
things, choosing for myself instead of shaping myself under the constraint
of government sanction or social pressure. This is why he contrasts free
people with "ape-like" imitators; individuals invent themselves rather
than ape models, and that, Mill thinks, is in itself a good thing. It was
part of Mill'sview, in other words, that freedom mattered not just because
it enabled other things-such as the discovery of truth-but because
without it people could not develop the individuality that is an essential
element of human good.12
Mill does not distinguish consistently in chapter three of On Liberty
between two notions of individuality. One is the idea that it is good to be
different from other people and the other that it is good to be self-
created, to "choose"-as he says-one's own "plan of life." Nor is he al-
ways clear that he is defending the position that it is good in itself for us
to have played a central role in shaping our selves, in developing our
12. There are those who believe that Mill was always a consistent utilitarian and who
think, therefore, that he must, at bottom, be arguing for some connection between individu-
ality and utility. But there is no general argument in On Libertyfor such a connection and
Mill speaks here and elsewhere for individuality in ways that are plausible without such
a connection.

individualities. But I think it is best to read Mill as arguing not just for
diversity-being different-but in fact for self-creation, as claiming that
such an enterprise is, in itself, a good. For I might choose a plan of life
that was, as it happened, very like somebody else's and still not be merely
aping them, following them blindly as a model. I wouldn't, then, be con-
tributing to diversity (so, in one sense, I wouldn't be very individual), but
I would still be constructing my own-in another sense, individual-plan
of life. On Libertydefends freedom from government because only free
people can take full command of their own lives.
More generally, I don't think Mill is very clear in On Libertyabout
how what he calls individuality might relate to other kinds of goods. But
reading Mill can lead you to think that sometimes something matters be-
cause someone has chosen to make a life in which it matters and that it
would not matter if they had not chosen to make such a life. If this formu-
lation seems abstract, it is because Mill speaks abstractly; it will help to
imagine a more concrete example.
Consider, then, Mr. Stevens, the butler in Kazuo Ishiguro's novel The
Remains of the Day (played by Anthony Hopkins's in the book's film ver-
sion).13 Mr. Stevens has spent a whole life in service in a "great house,"
and his aim has been to perform his task to the very best of his ability.
He sees himself as fitting into the world as part of the machinery that
made the life of his master, Lord Darlington, possible. Since his master
has acted on the stage of public history, he sees Lord Darlington's public
acts as part of what gives meaning to his own life. As he puts it:
Let us establish this quite clearly: a butler's duty is to provide good

service. It is not to meddle in the great affairs of the nation. The fact
is, such great affairs will always be beyond the understanding of
those such as you and I, and those of us who wish to make our mark
must realize that we best do so by concentrating on what is within
our realm. [R, p. 199]
Mr. Stevens takes what is "within [his] realm" extremely seriously; for
example, he feels, as he says, "uplifted" by a "sense of triumph" when he
manages to pursue his duties unflustered on the evening that the woman
he loves has announced to him that she is going to marry somebody else
(R, p. 228). By the time (well into the book) he tells us about this fateful
day, we know him well enough to understand how such a sentiment is
possible.
At the end of the book, Mr. Stevens is returning to Darlington House
from the holiday in which he has reviewed his life with us, and he tells us
13. Kazuo Ishiguro, TheRemainsof the Day (New York, 1989); hereafter abbreviated R.

he is going back to work on what he calls his "bantering skills" in order

to satisfy his new American master.
I have of course already devoted much time to developing my ban-

tering skills, but it is possible I have never previously approached the
task with the commitment I might have done. Perhaps, then, when
I return to Darlington Hall tomorrow ... I will begin practising with
renewed effort. I should hope, then, by the time of my employer's
return, I shall be in a position to pleasantly surprise him. [R, p. 245]14
Now I am sure no one who reads this essay will have the ambition to
be a butler, certainly not the sort of butler that Mr. Stevens aimed to be.
And there is, indeed, something mildly ridiculous in the thought of an
elderly man working on his skills at light conversation in order to enter-
tain his young "master."Readers are likely to feel when they come to these
last words a tremendous sadness at what is missing from Mr. Stevens's
life. Nevertheless, Mr. Stevens is continuing to live out the life he has
chosen. It does seem to me that we can understand part of what Mill is
suggesting by saying that bantering is something of value to Mr. Stevens
because he has chosen to be the best butler he can be. This is not a life
we would have chosen, but for someone who has chosen it, it is intelligible
that improving one's bantering skills is a good.
To say that bantering is of value to Mr. Stevens is not just to say that
he wants to be able to do it well, as he might want to be good at bowling
or chess. It is to say that, given his aims, given what Mill calls his "plan of
life," bantering matters to him; we, for whom bantering does not matter,
or to whom it does not matter in this way, can still see that it is a value for
him within the life he has chosen.
You may think that this is not a life that anyone who had other rea-
sonable options should have chosen and that even someone who was
forced into it should not have taken to it with the enthusiasm and com-
mitment that Mr. Stevens manifests. You might even explain this by say-
ing that the life of the perfect servant is not one of great dignity. But Mr.
Stevens knows a good deal about dignity, and he even offers a definition
of it in response to the questioning of a doctor he meets on his travels.
'What do you think dignity's all about?'

The directness of the inquiry did, I admit, take me rather by
surprise. 'It's rather a hard thing to explain in a few words, sir,' I
said. 'But I suspect it comes down to not removing one's clothing in
public.' [R, p. 210]
14. It is part of the brilliance of Ishiguro's characterization of Stevens that the butler
ends his account of himself with a split infinitive. Stevens, after all, is proud that he is taken
for a "gentleman," but a gentleman would have been taught to fuss about split infinitives
at school.

This is more than a joke. Mr. Stevens believesin decorum, good manners,
formality. These compose the world that he has chosen to inhabit and
make it the world it is. Once again, these may not be values for us, but
they are values for him, given his plan of life. When he is serious, when
he is explaining to a room full of villagers what makes the difference
between a gentleman and someone who is not, he says, "one would sus-
pect that the quality . .. might be most usefully termed 'dignity.'" And this
is a quality that he, like Burke, believes to be far from equally distributed.
"Dignity's not just something for gentlemen," says a character called
Harry Smith. And Mr. Stevens observes in his narrative voice: "I per-
ceived, of course, that Mr Harry Smith and I were rather at cross pur-
poses on this matter" (R, p. 186).
I like Mr. Stevens as an illustration of self-creation and individuality
as a value; to cite him as such is to read TheRemainsof the Day against the
grain. Ishiguro is like you and me, a modern person, and his novel is
deeply sad because Mr. Stevens's life is, in so many ways, a failure. It is a
failure, in part, because he is and intends to be servile. It is important
here that servility entails not acting as a servant-which is what Burke
plainly thought-but rather behaving like a slave. Servility isn'tjust hap-
pily earning your living by working for another; it's acting as an unfree
person, a person whose will is somehow subjected to another's. Unexcep-
tionally, I have very little enthusiasm for such a disposition (though there
are some who think it appropriate where the other in question is God.)'5
But in my opinion the novel cheats in its argument against this form of
servility. Ishiguro's depiction of Stevens obscures the relationship be-
tween dignity and individuality by conflating servant and slave; he pre-
vents us from seeing that it is servility, not service, that is undignified.
Lord Darlington turns out to be a weak man, an easy mark for the
National Socialist Ribbentrop, Germany's prewar ambassador to London.
The result is that Mr. Stevens's life is a failure because his master's has
proved one, not because service is, in fact, bound to lead to failure. After
all, if Mr. Stevens had been working for Winston Churchill, he at least
could have denied that he had failed; he could have claimed to have been
the faithful servant of a great man, just as he set out to be. Instead, Mr.
Stevens's vocation robs him of both his dignity and his love life, since the
only woman he might have married works in the same household, and
he believes a relationship with her would likely have compromised their
professional lives. Though Mr. Stevens makes a mess of this, there is no
reason to think that these losses are the fault of his vocation. In the end,
Mr. Stevens serves as a good example of the moral power of individuality
15. These observations on servility were prompted by comments from editors of this
journal. The reminder that "Thy way, not mine, Oh Lord" is a possible religious sentiment
I owe to Jorge Garcia (though it was not made in response to my comments about servility,
but as a protest against one reading of Frank Sinatra's lyric, which I discuss below!).

because he exemplifies it even though he doesn't himself believe in lib-

erty, equality, and fraternity. Even someone as illiberal as Mr. Stevens, that
is, demonstrates the power of individuality as an ideal.
How are we to account for the thought that I have been using Mr.
Stevens to help us explore, the idea that, as I put it just now, sometimes
something matters because someone has chosen to make a life in which
it matters? This is more than the thought that what is good for people
depends on what they want. Mill was a sort of utilitarian and believed, in
general, that pleasure was good and pain bad (and also, unlike some
other utilitarians, that there were objectively higher kinds of pleasure
that mattered more than lower ones). So he certainly thought that be-
cause the satisfaction of desire brings pleasure (and its obstruction, pain)
what is good depends on what people desire.
But, as I say, the claim here is something more than that, and, in any
case, Mill commends it to us not as a utilitarian idea but as one that we
will recognize as correct without deriving it from a more general picture.
It is the claim that, having chosen a plan of life, certain aims internal to
that plan come to have value just because they follow from a plan we
ourselves have chosen. And it is a thought that applies to Mr. Stevens
even though he has chosen a life that makes sense only if dignity is not
(as he wrongly believes) something everyone shares equally. That, I think,
is one of the core thoughts in Mill'sarticulation of individuality as a value.
You can find Mill's view more explicitly stated in a later passage in
chapter three: "If a person possesses any tolerable amount of common
sense and experience, his own mode of laying out his existence is best,
not because it is the best in itself, but because it is his own mode" (OL,
pp. 77-78) It is easy to miss this point because Mill goes on, almost imme-
diately, to introduce a different idea.
If it were only that people have diversities of taste that is reason

enough for not attempting to shape them all after one model. But
different persons also require different conditions for their spiritual
development; and can no more exist healthily in the same moral,
than all variety of plants can exist in the same physical atmosphere
and climate. The same things which are helps to one person towards
the cultivation of his higher nature, are hindrances to another....
Such are the differences among human beings in their sources of
pleasure, their susceptibilities of pain, and the operation on them of
different physical and moral agencies, that unless there is a corre-
sponding diversity in their modes of life, they neither obtain their
fair share of happiness, not grow up to the mental, moral, and aes-
thetic statures of which their nature is capable. [OL, pp. 77-78]
Here, the idea is that freedom allows people to make the best of them-
selves, to cultivate their higher natures, and attain their full moral and

aesthetic stature. This is a defense of liberty as a means to these other

ends. In this passage it looks as though making the best of oneself entails
becoming a kind of person that it is objectively valuable to be (a person
of high mental or moral or aesthetic stature) whatever one's chosen plan
of life. What Mill is saying here is not particularly distinctive (even if it is
important and true); it is the view that Matthew Arnold enunciated in
Cultureand Anarchywhen he quoted Epictetus's view that "the formation
of the spirit and character must be our real concern."'6
So here, again, there is some slippage between liberty as a means to
an end (the achievement of the best of which one is capable) and liberty
as part of the end (the idea that what makes the way I have chosen best
for me is just the fact that I chose it). A man's own way, Mill says, is "best,
not because it is the best in itself, but because it is his own." We all know
this sentiment very well in the form that Frank Sinatra made famous. In
a song in which the character reviews his life towards its end ("And now,
the end is near ... ") Mr. Sinatra sings:
I've lived a life that's full.

I've traveled each and ev'ry highway;
But more, much more than this,
I did it my way.17
This life was good-the singer has "too few" regrets "to mention"--not
just because it was full but because it was lived his way. If my choosing it
is part of what makes my life plan good, then imposing on me a plan of
life-even one that is, in other respects, a good one-is depriving me of
a certain kind of good. Once you concede this premise, the argument for
liberty from government, from society, and even from family and friends
is pretty direct. We can answer Burke by saying that liberty allows more
than doing what one pleases; it allows one to shape a plan of life that is
an expression of one's own creativity and to live, then, according not only
to general values-truthfulness, kindness, and the rest, which should be
part of every life-but also in the light of values that flow from one's own
plan. And we can say, with Mill, that it is intrinsically good, other things
being equal, when people live according to their own plan.
The popularity of "My Way" suggests that many people nowadays
share Mill's conviction. And so I want to underline how different this view
is from the view that Burke caricatures as the project of doing as one
pleases. A plan of life here serves as a way of integrating one's purposes
over time, of fitting together the different things one values. That is part
16. Matthew Arnold, Cultureand Anarchy, ed. Samuel Lipman (New Haven, Conn.,
1994), p. 36.
17. Frank Sinatra, "My Way,"WEA/Warner Brothers, 1969. The lyrics are by Paul
Anka.

of why a goal that flows from such a plan has more value than the mere
satisfaction of a fleeting desire. It isn'tjust any desire but one that matters
because it fits into a wider picture. But Mill says that it matters also be-
cause, in effect, the life plan is an expression of my individuality, of who
I am. And in this sense, a desire that flows from a value that itself derives
from a life plan is more important than a desire (such as an appetite) that
I just happen to have; for it flows from my reflective choices, not just
passing fancy.
I want to raise and respond to two problems associated with this

defense of self-chosen individuality. First, it is harder to accept the idea
that certain values derive from my choices if those choices themselves are
just arbitrary. (That may be why, immediately after proposing this view,
Mill introduces the more conventional idea-Arnold's idea-of cultivat-
ing one's higher nature.) Why should the fact that I have laid out my
existence mean that it is the best, especially if it is not the best in itself?
Suppose, for example, I adopt a life as a solitary traveler around the
world, free of obligations to family and community, settling for a few
months here and there, making what little money I need by giving En-
glish lessons to businessmen and -women. My parents tell me that I am
wasting my life, that I have a good education, talent as a musician, and a
great gift for friendship, all of which are being put to no use. Is it a satis-
factory response to say only that this is the way I have chosen? Don't I
need to say something about what this way makes possible for me and for
those I meet? Or about what other talents of mine it makes use of? It is
one thing to say that the government or society or your parents ought
not to stop you from wasting your life if you choose to; it is another to
say that wasting your life in your own way is good just because it is your
way,just because you have chosen to waste your life.
As I say, I think this is why Mill seesaws between arguing that I am
in the best position to decide what plan of life makes most sense for me,
given "the mental, moral, and aesthetic stature" of which I am capable,
and the more radical view that the mere fact that I have chosen a plan of
life recommends it. For on the first and less radical view, my choice is not
arbitrary. It reflects the facts of my capacities and, given that I have
enough "common sense and experience," I am likely to do a better job
than anybody else of making a life that fits those capacities. On this view,
I discover a life for myself, based in the facts of my nature and my place
in the world. But, on the second, my role is as originator of value, not as
discoverer of it.
I am going to call this the problem of the arbitrarinessof basicchoices.
I will return to it in a while, but let me put it aside for a moment in order
to raise a second problem with Mill's formulation.
Mill's way of talking can seem to lead to a particularly unattractive
form of individualism in which the aim is to make a life in which you

yourself matter most. Yet a plan of life for Mill was likely to include family
and friends and might include (as his did) public service. Mill is not ar-
guing for self-cultivation at the expense of sociability. He is arguing for
self-cultivation, for a view of one's self as a project, in a way that seems to
suggest, perhaps, that self-cultivation and sociability are competing val-
ues, though each has its place. This can lead us to think that the good of
individuality is reined in by or traded-off against the goods of sociability
so that there is an intrinsic opposition between the self and society. This
matters for political theory because it can lead to the view that political
institutions, which develop and reflect the value of sociability, are always
sources of constraint on our individuality. Let me dub this the problem
of the unsociabilityof individualism.
These two concerns strike me as both plausible and important. A
credible defense of the value of individuality or self-creation requires that
we respond to them; to do so it is helpful, I think, to reframe Mill's under-
standing.
Mr. Stevens's individuality shows why both unsociability and arbitrar-

iness need not be involved in self-creation. His individuality is far from
unsociable because what he has chosen to be is a butler, which is some-
thing you can only be if there are other people to play other roles in the
social world; a butler needs a master or mistress, cooks, housekeepers,
maids. It is an intrinsically social identity. And Mr. Stevens's individuality
is far from arbitrary because it is an identity that has developed within a
tradition and that makes sense within a certain social world-a social
world that no longer exists, as it happens, which is one of many reasons
why none of us wants to be a butler in the way Mr. Stevens is. We don't
want to be butlers in that way because one can't be a butler in that way
without a social world of "great houses," house parties, and the rest. You
can no more be the kind of butler Mr. Stevens was than a contemporary
Japanese man, whatever his ancestry, can be a Samurai warrior. Mr. Ste-
vens is an individual, and he has made his own plan of life, but he hasn't
made it arbitrarily. The butler elements in his plan, for example, make
sense (to give but two reasons) because there is, first, a career available
with that role, a way of making a living; and, second, because his father
was a butler before him. (Once again, I don't expect you to find these
reasons attractive, merely that you should find them intelligible.)
Mr. Stevens can help us to understand something else about a plan
of life, namely, that it is not like an architect's plan. It doesn't map out all
the important (and many unimportant) features of our life in advance. It
is not like the plans of those ambitious young men in Horatio Alger sto-
ries who want to have a wife and fortune by the time they are thirty-five.
A plan of life is more like a set of distinctive organizing aims, aims within
which you can fit your daily choices and your long-term vision. In fact,
Mill's very use of the term plan of life leads us away from something impor-

tant that we can see in Mr. Stevens's individual existence, which is that
what structures his sense of his life is less like a blueprint and more like
what we nowadays call an identity.
Mr. Stevens has constructed for himself an identity as a butler: more
specifically as the butler to Lord Darlington and of the Darlington House,
and as his father's son. It is an identity in which his gender plays a role
(butlers must be men) and in which his nationality is important, too, be-
cause in the late 1930s Lord Darlington meddles (rather incompetently,
it turns out) in the "great affairs of the" British "nation," and it is his ser-
vice to a man who is serving that nation that gives Mr. Stevens part of his
satisfaction (R, p. 199).
But Ishiguro's character has put these more generic identities-but-
ler, son, man, Englishman-together with other skills and capacities that
are more particular, and, in so doing, he has fashioned a self.
There remains a certain lack of clarity to Mr. Stevens's plan of life.

What, precisely, is his plan? Forced to speak in that way, we should say
that his plan is to be the best butler he can be, to follow in his father's
footsteps, to be a man. But it is, I think, more natural to say that he plans
to live as a butler, his father's son, a man, and a loyal Englishman. To
speak of living as is to speak of identities. So we might as well ask directly
what his identity is; then, it seems to me, we have more to work with. For,
as we shall see, the idea of identity already has built into it a recognition
of the complex interdependence of self-creation and sociability.
The contemporary use of the concept of identity to refer to such
features of people as their race, ethnicity, nationality, gender, religion, or
sexuality first achieved prominence (and perhaps had its origin) in the
work of Erik Erikson. This use of the term identityreflects the conviction
that each person's identity-in the older sense of who he or she truly is-
is deeply inflected by such social features. And it is an undeniable fact of
modern life that people have increasingly come to believe that this is so.
In political and moral thinking nowadays it has become commonplace to
suppose that a person's projects can reasonably be expected to be shaped
by such features of their identity and that this is, if not morally required,
then, at least morally permissible. We understand the woman who orga-
nizes her life and her affiliations around her gender, or the gay man who
sees his sexuality as shaping the meaning of his life.
It seems likely that any adequate theory of identity will proceed by
noting that each person's identity has at least two dimensions. There is
a collective dimension, the intersection of the identities we have been
discussing; but there is also what one might call a personal dimension,
consisting of other socially important features of the person-intelli-
gence, charm, wit, greed-that are not themselves the basis of forms of
collective identity. Not every aspect of the collective dimension will have
the general power of sex or gender, sexuality or nationality, ethnicity or

religion. What the collective dimensions have in common is that they are
what the philosopher Ian Hacking has dubbed kindsof person:men, gays,
Americans, Catholics, but also butlers, hairdressers, and philosophers.'18
Hacking's key insight about "kinds of persons" is that they are
brought into being by the creation of names for them. So he defends
what he calls a "dynamic nominalism," arguing "that numerous kinds of
human beings and human acts come into being hand in hand with our
invention of the categories labeling them" ("M,"p. 87).
Hacking begins from the philosophical truism, whose most influen-
tial formulation is in Elizabeth Anscombe's work on intention, that, in
intentional action, people act "under descriptions"; in other words, their
actions are conceptually shaped.19 (What I do is dependent on what I
think I am doing. To use a simple example, I have to have a wide range
of concepts for my writing my name in a certain way to count as "signing
a contract.") It follows that what I can do depends on what concepts I
have available to me; among the concepts that may shape my action is
the concept of a certain kind of person and the behavior appropriate to
a person of that kind. Mr. Stevens is driven, in thinking about whether
he should develop his bantering skills, by the thought that he is a butler
and that banter is a butler's sort of skill.
Hacking offers as an example Sartre's brilliant evocation in Being
and Nothingnessof another kind of service professional, the Parisian garfon
de cafit:
His movement is quick and forward, a little too precise, a little too
rapid. He comes towards the patrons with a step a little too quick.
He bends forward a little too eagerly, his eyes express an interest too
solicitous for the order of the customer. ["M,"p. 81]
Hacking comments:
Sartre's antihero chose to be a waiter. Evidently that was not a pos-

sible choice in other places, other times. There are servile people in
most societies, and servants in many, but a waiter is something spe-
cific, and a garfon de cafi more specific....
As with almost every way in which it is possible to be a person,
it is possible to be a garfon de cafi only at a certain time, in a certain
place, in a certain social setting. The feudal serf putting food on my
lady's table can no more choose to be a garfon de cafi than he can
18. See Ian Hacking, "Making Up People" in Formsof Desire: Sexual Orientationand
the Social ConstructionistControversy,ed. Edward Stein (New York, 1988), p. 74; hereafter
abbreviated "M."As Hacking would be the first to acknowledge, this insight is already pres-
ent in what sociologists call labeling theory. See Mary McIntosh, "The Homosexual Role,"
in Formsof Desire, pp. 25-42.
19. See G. E. M. Anscombe, Intention (Oxford, 1957).

choose to be lord of the manor. But the impossibility is evidently

different in kind. ["M,"p. 82]
The idea of the garfon de cafr lacks the sort of theoretical commit-
ments that are trailed by many of our social identities: black and white,
gay and straight, man and woman. So it makes no sense to ask of someone
who is employed as a garfon de cafr whether that is what he really is. Be-
cause we have expectations of the garfon de cafi, it is a recognizable iden-
tity. But those expectations are about the performance of the role; they
depend on our assumption of intentional conformity to the expectations.
With other identities, however-and here the familiar collectives of
race, ethnicity, gender, and the rest come back into view-the expecta-
tions we have are not based simply on the idea that those who have these
identities are playing out a role. Rightly or wrongly, we do not normally
think of the expectations we have of men or women as being simply the
result of the fact that there are conventions about how men and women
behave.
Once labels are applied to people, ideas about people who fit the
label come to have social and psychological effects. In particular, these
ideas shape the ways people conceive of themselves and their projects. So
the labels operate to mold what we may call identification,the process
through which individuals intentionally shape their projects-including
their plans for their own lives and their conceptions of the good life-by
reference to available labels, available identities. In identification, I shape
my life by the thought that something is an appropriate aim or an appro-
priate way of acting for an American, a black man, a philosopher. It seems
right to call this identificationbecause the label plays a role in shaping the
way the agent makes decisions about how to conduct a life, in the process
of the construction of one's identity.
Thus, as I have argued elsewhere, every collective identity seems to
have the following sort of structure: there is a label, L, associated with
descriptive criteria-ascriptions- that lead to expectations(which may be
grounded in norms) about how Ls will behave; there are identificationsby
Ls, so that they sometimes act as Ls; and, finally, there are consequences
in the way that people treat Ls (so that sometimes they are treated as Ls).20
These"asLs"-acting as an L, being treated as an L-connect identities to
conceptions of what Ls are or should be like.
In the case of the garfon de cafi, conventions of behavior associated
with a role are explicitly central. The ascriptions are based on the simple
idea that someone who works in caf6s of a certain sort will conform to
20. See my essay, "Race, Culture, Identity: Misunderstood Connections," in ColorCon-

scious: The Political Morality of Race, ed. Kwame Anthony Appiah and Amy Gutmann
(Princeton, N.J., 1998). The discussion of identity here follows closely the account given in
more detail there.

certain expectations; the expectations are based on the conventions that

govern the role of the garfon de cafi; because of those conventions, acting
as a garfon de cafi means constructing the performance Sartre evokes; and
people treat garfonsde cafi better (they give them bigger tips, for example)
if they perform the role well. But for some other identities-as a gay man,
for example-there is more than convention.
For being a gay man is, in part, a matter of having certain desires,
and those desires are not something that the gay man has himself chosen.
You can choose whether or not to play a certain conventional role, and,
if all there is to an identity is a conventional set of behaviors, and you are
capable of them, then you can choose whether to adopt the identity. But
if the criteria for ascribing a certain identity include things over which
you have no control-as is the case with gender, race, and sexual orienta-
tion-then whether you identify with that identity, whether, for example,
you think of yourself as gay and act sometimes as a gay person, is not
only up to you.
Here is one place, then, for a kind of answer to the concern about the
arbitrariness of basic choices. While someone who adopts a gay identity is
doing more than simply acknowledging the fact that he has homosexual
desires, and someone who adopts an identity as a black person, identi-
fying with his or her African American identity, is doing more than simply
acknowledging an African ancestry, it is nevertheless true that they are
both responding to a fact (about desire or ancestry) that is independent
of their choices, a fact that comes, so to speak, from outside the self. Even
the garfon de cafi takes up an identity that has a function outside himself:
he is taking up a profession that provides a service; he is finding, as Mr.
Stevens did as Darlington's butler, a way of making a living.
To see what is going on here, it may be helpful to consider two differ-

ent pictures of what is involved in shaping one's individuality. One, a pic-
ture that comes from romanticism, is the idea of finding one's self, of
discovering in reflection or in a careful attention to the world, a meaning
for one's life that is already there, waiting to be found. This is the vision
we can call authenticity;it is a matter of being true to who you already
really are. The other picture, the existentialistpicture, is one in which, as
the doctrine goes, existence precedes essence. This is just a fancy way of
saying that you exist first and then have to decide what to exist as, who
to be, afterwards. On an extreme version of this view, we have to make a
self up, as it were out of nothing, like God at the Creation, and individual-
ity is valuable because only a person who has made a self has a life worth
living. But neither of these pictures is right.
The authenticity picture is wrong because it suggests that there is no
role for creativity in making a self, that the self already and in its totality
is fixed by our natures. And the existentialist picture is wrong because it
suggests that there is only creativity, that there is nothing for us to re-

spond to, nothing out of which to construct. The reasonable middle view
is that constructing an identity is a good but that the identity must make
some kind of sense. And for it to make sense, as both Mr. Stevens and the
examples of race or gay identity suggest, it must be an identity con-
structed in response to facts outside oneself, things that are beyond one's
own choices. Some philosophers--Sartre among them-have tried to
combine both the romantic and the existentialist views. Michel Foucault
suggested as much some years ago:
I think that from the theoretical point of view, Sartre avoids the idea
of the self as something that is given to us, but through the moral
notion of authenticity, he turns back to the idea that we have to be
ourselves-to be truly our true self. I think the only acceptable prac-
tical consequence of what Sartre has said is to link his theoretical
insight to the practice of creativity-and not to that of authenticity.
From the idea that the self is not given to us, I think there is only
one practical consequence: we have to create ourselves as a work of
art. In his analyses of Baudelaire, Flaubert and so on, it is interesting
to see that Sartre refers the work of creation to a certain relation to
oneself-the author to himself-which has the form of authenticity
or inauthenticity. I would like to say exactly the contrary: we should
not have to refer the creative activity of somebody to the kind of
relation he has to himself, but should relate the kind of relation one
has to oneself to a creative activity.21
Now Foucault in this passage speaks of creativity without, perhaps,

sufficiently recognizing the role of the materials on which our creativity
is exercised. Faced with authenticity and existentialism he opts for the
latter. Foucault resorts to the rhetoric of the self's free choice of oneself
that I have been trying to complicate. So perhaps it will be worthwhile to
carry out an experiment in imagination that might persuade some of
those who speak of choice as the only value that they cannot mean what
they say. Suppose, in the far future, it were possible, by way of a kind of
science-fiction genetic engineering, to change any aspect of one's nature
so that you could have any combination of capacities that has ever been
within the range of human possibility: you could have Michael Jordan's
fade-away shot, Mozart's musicality, Groucho Marx's comic gifts, or
Proust's delicate way with language. You could put these together with
any desires you wanted-homo- or hetero-, a taste for Wagner or Em-
inem. Suppose, further, that there were no careers or professions in this
world because all material needs were met by intelligent machines and all
services were provided by androids. Far from being a utopia, so it seems
to me, this would be a kind of hell. There would be no reason to choose
any of these options because there would be no achievement in putting
21. Foucault, "On the Genealogy of Ethics," in Ethics, 1:262.

together a life. This would not be a world of creativity but a flat and
boring dystopia. Nietzsche articulated the view that explains why this life
would be meaningless:
One thing is needful.-To "give style" to one's character-a great and

rare art! It is practiced by those who survey all the strengths and
weaknesses of their nature and then fit them into an artistic plan
until every one of them appears as art and reason and even weak-
nesses delight the eye. Here a large mass of second nature has been
added; there a piece of original nature has been removed-both
times through long practice and daily work at it. Here the ugly that
could not be removed is concealed; there it has been reinterpreted
and made sublime.22
To create a life is to create a life out of the materials that history

has given you. I suggested earlier that Mill mentions both the value of
individuality and the idea of achieving our capacities in the same para-
graphs because the former can seem arbitrary, but once it is tied to some-
thing out of our control, once our self-construction is seen as a creative
response to our capacities and our circumstances, then the accusation of
arbitrariness loses its power.
Thinking about what history has, in fact, given each of us, as materi-
als for our identities, will also allow us to speak to the supposed unsocia-
bility of the liberal self. The language of identity allows us to remind
ourselves how much it is true that we are, in Charles Taylor's elegant
formulation, "dialogically" constituted. Beginning in infancy, it is in dia-
logue with other people's understandings of who I am that I develop a
conception of my own identity. We come into the world "mewling and
puking in our mother's arms" (as Shakespeare so genially put it) capable
of human individuality, but only if we have the chance to develop it in
interaction with others. An identity is always articulated through con-
cepts (and practices) made available to you by religion, society, school,
and state, mediated by family, peers, friends. Dialogue shapes the identi-
ties we develop as we grow up, but the very material out of which we
make it is provided, in part, by our society, by what Taylor has called our
language in "a broad sense." It "cover[s] not only the words we speak, but
also other modes of expression whereby we define ourselves, including
the 'languages' of art, of gesture, of love, and the like."23It follows that
the self whose choices liberalism celebrates is not a presocial thing-not
some authentic inner essence independent of the human world into
22. Nietzsche, The Gay Science, trans. and ed. Walter Kaufmann (New York, 1974),
p. 232.
23. Charles Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition," in Multiculturalism:Examining "The
Politicsof Recognition,"ed. Gutmann (Princeton, N.J., 1994), p. 32.

which we have grown-but rather the product of our interaction from

our earliest years with others.24
As a result, individuality presupposes sociability, not just a grudging
respect for the individuality of others. A free self is a human self, and we
are, as Aristotle long ago insisted, creatures of the polis, social beings. We
are social in many ways and for many reasons: because we desire com-
pany, because we depend on one another for survival, because so much
that we care about is collectively created.
To have individuality as a value is not, therefore, to refuse to ac-
knowledge the dependence of the good for each of us on relationships with
others. Indeed, as I have suggested, without these bonds we could not
come to be free selves, not least because we could not come to be selves
at all. But a free self isn'tjust dependent on others at the start. Through-
out our lives part of the material that we are responding to in shaping
our selves is not within us but outside us, out there in the social world.
Many people-most, in fact-shape their identities as partners of lovers
who become spouses and fellow parents. And, as we shall now see, there is
more to respond to than our own capacities and the people we meet.
I have been arguing that collective identities (that is, the collective
dimensions of our individual identities) are responses to something out-
side ourselves. They are the products of histories, and our engagement
with them invokes capacities that are not under our control. But they are
also social, not just in the sense that they involve others, but also because
they are constituted in part by socially transmitted conceptions of how a
proper person of that identity behaves. In constructing an identity one
draws, among other things, on the kinds of person available in one's soci-
ety. Of course, there is not just one way that gay or straight people or
blacks or whites or men or women are to behave, but there are ideas
around (contested, many of them, but all sides in these contests shape
our options) about how gay, straight, black, white, masculine, or feminine
people ought to behave. These notions provide loose norms or models,
which play a role in shaping the plans of life of those who make these
collective identities central to their individual identities. Collective identi-
ties, in short, provide what we might call scripts: narratives that people
can use in shaping their life plans and in telling their life stories.
It is important to acknowledge how much our personal histories, the
stories we tell of where we have been and where we are going, are con-
structed, like novels and movies, short stories and folk tales, within narra-
tive conventions. Indeed, one of the things that film or literature does for
us is to provide models for telling our lives. But part of the function of
our collective identities-of the whole repertory of them that a society
24. See my "Identity, Authenticity, Survival: Multicultural Societies and Social Repro-
duction," in Multiculturalism,pp. 149-63.

makes available to its members-is also to structure possible narratives

of the individual self.
Thus, for example, the rites of passage many cultures associate with
the identities male and female provide shape to the transition to adult-
hood; the gay identity organizes lives around the narrative of coming out;
Pentecostalists are born again; and black identity in America engages nar-
ratives of self-construction in the face of racism. One thing that matters
to people across many societies is a certain narrative unity, the ability to
tell a story of one's life that makes sense. The story-my story-should
cohere in the way appropriate to a person in my society. In telling that
story, how it fits into the wider story of various collectivities is, for most
of us, important. It is not just that, say, gender identities, give shape to
one's life; it is also that ethnic and national identities fit that story into a
larger narrative. For modern people, fitting the narrative form entails
seeing one's life as having a certain arc, as making sense through a life
story that expresses who one is through one's own project of self-making.
That narrative arc is yet another way in which an individual's life depends
deeply on something socially created and transmitted.
I made a distinction earlier between a personal and a collective di-
mension of identity. Both can play a role in these stories of the self. But
only the collective identities have scripts, and only they count as what
Hacking meant by kinds of person. There is a logical category but no
social category of the witty, or the clever, or the charming or the greedy.
People who share these properties do not constitute a social group. In
the relevant sense, they are not a kind of person. In our society (though
not, perhaps, in the England of Addison and Steele) being witty does not,
for example, suggest the life script of the wit. And the main reason why
the personal dimensions are different is that they are not dependent on
labeling. While intelligence, in our society, is of the first social importance
and that importance is socially created, people could be intelligent even
if no one had the concept. To say that race is socially constructed, that an
African American is, in Hacking's sense, a "kind of person," is in part to
say that there are no races independent of social practices of response to
the racial label; by contrast, there could certainly be clever people even
if we did not have the concept of cleverness.25
I hope I have persuaded you that you already think that identity-
as I have been explaining it-matters. But how does identity fit into our
broader moral projects?
One view is this: There are many things of value in the world. Their
value is objective; they are important whether or not anybody recognizes
25. This isn't to say that cleverness isn't a social product; it obviously is. You couldn't
be clever if you grew up like Kaspar Hauser. Nor is it to say that the social significance of
cleverness isn't the result of social practices, attitudes, and shared beliefs.

their importance. But there is no way of ranking these many goods or

trading them off against one another, so there is not always, all things
considered, a best thing to do. As a result, there are many morally permis-
sible options. One thing identity provides is another source of value, one
which helps us make our way among those options. To adopt an identity,
to make it mine, is to see it as structuring my way through life. That is,
my identity has patterns built into it (so Mill is wrong to imply that it is
always better to be different from others), patterns that help me think
about my life; one such simple pattern, for example, is the pattern of a
career, which ends, if we live long enough, with retirement. But identities
also create forms of solidarity: if I think of myself as an X, where X might
be "woman," "black,"or "American,"then, sometimes, the mere fact that
somebody else is an X too may incline me to do something with or for
them. Now, solidarity with those who share your identity might be
thought of as, other things being equal, always a good thing. As such
there is a universal value of solidarity but it works out in different ways
for different people because different people have different identities. Or
it might be thought to be a good thing because we enjoy it and, other
things being equal, it is good for people to have and to do what they enjoy
having and doing.
However, as we have seen, there are also values that are internal to
an identity, that make sense for someone who has it, and that, for some-
one who has that identity, are among the values they must take into ac-
count, but are not values for people who do not have that identity. If they
did not have that identity, that thing would not be a value for them. Take
the value of ritual purity, for example, as conceived of by some orthodox
Jews. They think they should keep kosher because they are Jewish; they
don't expect anyone who is not a Jew to do so, and they may not even
think it would be a good thing if he or she did. It is a good thing only for
those who are or those who become Jewish, and they do not think that it
would be a better world if everybody did become Jewish. The covenant,
after all, is only with the children of Israel.
Similarly, we might think that the identity of being a nationalist in a
struggle against colonial domination made it valuable for you to risk your
life for the liberation of your country, as Nathan Hale did, regretting that
he had only one life to give. If you were not a nationalist, you might still
die advancing your country's cause; and then, while some good came of
it, that good would not be, so to speak, a good for you. We might regard
your life as wasted, just because you did not identify with the nation you
had died for.
There are thus different ways that identity might be a source of
value, rather than being something that realizes other values.26 First, if
26. I am grateful to Garcia for pointing out to me that my initial formulation of this
point relied on a notion of intrinsic value that was, at best, unhelpful.

an identity is yours, it may determine certain acts of solidarity as valuable,

or it may be an internal part of the specification of your satisfactions and
enjoyments. It is good for me (or, at any rate, I find it good) to help you
deal with your HIV infection as a fellow American,or as anothergay person.
There are reasons to help people deal with HIV whether or not you share
a social identity with them, of course. But that you share an identity can
be a further reason. Similarly, the presence of an identity concept in the
specification of my aim-as helping a fellow bearer of some identity-
may be part of what explains why I have the aim at all. I may gain satisfac-
tion from giving money to the Red Cross after a hurricane in Florida as
an act of solidarity with other Cuban Americans. Here, the fact of the
shared identity is part of why I have the aim.
Second, it may make certain acts or achievements have a value for
me they would not otherwise have had, had I had not had that identity.
When a Ghanaian team wins the African Cup of Nations in soccer, that is
of value to me by virtue of my identity as a Ghanaian. If I am Catholic, a
wedding in a Catholic church is of value to me because I am a Catholic.
While it might be of worth to me if I were not a Catholic, it would have
to matter to me in a different way.
This picture of self-creation places identity at the heart of human

life. Liberalism, I am suggesting, takes this picture seriously and tries to
construct a state and society within which it is possible. But that alone
doesn't settle much in the way of politics, which is why Jesse Helms and
Barney Frank can agree on it. Still, I believe it is a picture that we can
develop and explore in trying to negotiate the political world we share.
Even the little I have said can allow us to draw some conclusions.
First, if your liberalism is grounded in this picture, there is no reason
to think as libertarians do that government is always the enemy of free-
dom or, more precisely, that government can only give us freedom by
keeping out of our way. What Isaiah Berlin called "negative liberty"-
legal protection from government intervention in certain areas of our
lives-can obviously be an aid in the development of a life of one's own.
But if the view of individuality I have been articulating is right, then we
may need not only liberty from the state and society but also help from
state and society to achieve our selves. Berlin taught us to call this "posi-
tive liberty,"and he was deeply (and thoughtfully) skeptical about it: skep-
tical because, among other things, he thought that in the name of positive
liberty, governments had been and would continue to be tempted to set
out to shape people in the name of the better selves they might become.27
It is hard to deny that terrible things have been done in the name of
freedom and that some bad arguments have led people from the idea of
27. Isaiah Berlin, "Two Concepts of Liberty,"TheProperStudyof Mankind (New York,

1998), pp. 191-242.

freedom down the path to the Gulag. But there are simple cases that
should remind us that enabling people to construct and live out an iden-
tity does not have to go awry.
Governments do, for example, provide public education in many
countries that helps children who do not yet know what their identity is
or what projects, hopes, and dreams they have for their lives. This is more
than negative liberty, more than government's getting out of the way. You
may say that parents could do this; in principle, they could. But suppose
they won't or can't? Shouldn't society step in, in the name of individuality
and identity, to insist that children be prepared for life as free adults?
And, in our society, won't that require them to be able to read? To know
the language or languages of their community? To be able to assess argu-
ments, interpret traditions? And even if the parents are trying to provide
all these things, isn't there a case for society, through the state, offering
them positive support?
Or take welfare provision, which I mentioned at the start. I have
argued that individuality is a matter of developing a life in response to
the materials provided by your capacities and your social world (and,
more particularly, the social identities embedded in it). Liberalism says
we should create a politics that allows people to do this. But there can be
obstacles to the realization of our individuality other than the limitations
of law. Can people really construct dignified individual lives in a modern
world where there is no frontier to conquer, no empty land to cultivate,
unless they have certain material resources? Can people be said to be free
to develop their individuality if they are sick and unable to afford treat-
ment that will free them from it?
What holds together the desire to educate children, provide welfare
for the poor, and give physical assistance to the handicapped who need
it is the idea that education, welfare, and assistance of these sorts frees
people to develop lives worth living. Berlin was skeptical about this be-
cause he wondered who would decide what a life worth living was. But,
as we have seen, Mill already had an answer to that question: "If a person
possesses any tolerable amount of common sense and experience, his own
mode of laying out his existence is best."
There are hard questions here about fairness (my dreams may be
expensive, taxation may be burdensome). People are coerced into provid-
ing resources for governments to spend and may thereby be limited in
their capacity to make the lives they have chosen. That I do not deny. But
hard questions can be questions worth a hard look. And to refuse any
notion of positive liberty is to escape these questions only by refusing to
face them.
I have been suggesting one reason for the liberal faith in allowing
people to make their own lives. That argument is only one of the many

that need to be assembled for a serious defense of liberalism. But I want,

in closing, to suggest that there is something that holds together our lib-
eral ideals. That is the idea of a dignified human life. I have been arguing
that individuality is part of any such life and that that is one reason why
we should have liberal political institutions and a liberal society. Our ca-
pacity for individuality is part of what gives us our dignity, our distinctive
human worth.
Can we say more about how we should understand talk of human
dignity? J. L. Austin once observed apropos of freedom (in the sense, as
it happens, not of political liberty, but of freedom of the will) that
while it has been the tradition to present [freedom] as the "positive"

term requiring elucidation, there is little doubt that to say we acted
"freely" ... is to say only that we acted not unfreely, in one of the
many heterogeneous ways of so acting.28
I think Austin's strategy for understanding freedom of the will can turn
out to be helpful in thinking about human dignity. Forjust as it is harder
to say what makes an act free than to list things that make it unfree, so,
while we cannot easily give a positive account of dignity, we can point to
cases where it is lacking. We know these cases because we have learned
about them over history and in our individual lives; a slave, we learned
over too long and bloody a struggle, cannot lead a dignified existence.
Mr. Stevens troubles us because he is in some ways like a slave. He is
servile; his servility reflects false beliefs and leaves him unable to (or dis-
suades him from trying to) understand Lord Darlington's attempts to rec-
oncile the English government to Hitler.
But slavery is not the only obstacle to dignity. In the modern world
a life with neither job nor money cannot be a life of dignity. We have also
learned that a life of handouts is not dignified either, and we are strug-
gling to find a reasonable middle way between demeaning handouts and
forced labor. People with severe physical disabilities have taught us in
recent years that we need to reshape public space if they are to enter it
with the dignity they deserve. Feminism has taught us for over more than
a century that dignity for women requires both that we respect the identi-
ties of individual women and that we do not bar them from a public
sphere. Gay and lesbian movements have taught us, building on the black
power movement, that dignity cannot come to those who are forced to
leave what matters most to them about themselves locked away in a pri-
vate realm. In many of these cases, identity matters. But at the end of an
essay that has focused on identity, it is right to insist that for liberalism it
is not the only thing that matters.
28. J. L. Austin, "APlea for Excuses,"PhilosophicalPapers,3rd ed. (Oxford, 1979), p. 180.

Ultimately, liberalism is the articulation of the value of a life of dig-

nity: a life as free and equal people, sharing a social world. And that
involves learning from history, from literature, from religion, from the
whole gamut of human experience, about what free lives can look like
and what they enable.


Liberalismo, Individualidad e Identidad

Uploaded by

Liberalismo, Individualidad e Identidad

Uploaded by

Liberalism, Individuality, and Identity

Kwame Anthony Appiah

Do you wish to know the great drama of my life? I have given my

We have to create ourselves as a work of art.

I first heard of Liberalism in discussions of British politics, where it meant

CriticalInquiry27 (Winter 2001)

Critical Inquiry 2001.27:305-332.

3. Friedrich Nietzsche, The Twilightof theIdols, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (London, 1968),

Kwame Anthony Appiah is Charles H. Carswell Professor of Afro-

Critical Inquiry 2001.27:305-332.

We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men are created

The signatories of the Declaration were not, of course, the first

4. These elections were, of course, by a small "electorate" of rulers of towns, states

Critical Inquiry 2001.27:305-332.

I should suspend my congratulations on the new liberty of France,

Critical Inquiry 2001.27:305-332.

the collection of an effective and well-distributed revenue, with mo-

The challenge here is an important one. Liberty cannot be the only

The word "Man" ... is thought to carry somewhat of dignity in its

6. Edmund Burke, Reflectionson the Revolutionin Franceand on the Proceedingsin Certain

Critical Inquiry 2001.27:305-332.

The Chancellor of France, at the opening of the States, said, in a tone

Critical Inquiry 2001.27:305-332.

positions sat in the French National Assembly.) Political conservatives

If it were felt that the free development of individuality is one of the

Critical Inquiry 2001.27:305-332.

And he goes on a little later:

Mill's arguments in On Libertycome in two stripes. First, there are argu-

Critical Inquiry 2001.27:305-332.

Let us establish this quite clearly: a butler's duty is to provide good

Critical Inquiry 2001.27:305-332.

he is going back to work on what he calls his "bantering skills" in order

I have of course already devoted much time to developing my ban-

'What do you think dignity's all about?'

Critical Inquiry 2001.27:305-332.

Critical Inquiry 2001.27:305-332.

because he exemplifies it even though he doesn't himself believe in lib-

If it were only that people have diversities of taste that is reason

Critical Inquiry 2001.27:305-332.

aesthetic stature. This is a defense of liberty as a means to these other

I've lived a life that's full.

Critical Inquiry 2001.27:305-332.

I want to raise and respond to two problems associated with this

Critical Inquiry 2001.27:305-332.

Mr. Stevens's individuality shows why both unsociability and arbitrar-

Critical Inquiry 2001.27:305-332.

There remains a certain lack of clarity to Mr. Stevens's plan of life.

Critical Inquiry 2001.27:305-332.

Sartre's antihero chose to be a waiter. Evidently that was not a pos-

Critical Inquiry 2001.27:305-332.

choose to be lord of the manor. But the impossibility is evidently

20. See my essay, "Race, Culture, Identity: Misunderstood Connections," in ColorCon-

Critical Inquiry 2001.27:305-332.

certain expectations; the expectations are based on the conventions that

To see what is going on here, it may be helpful to consider two differ-

Critical Inquiry 2001.27:305-332.

Now Foucault in this passage speaks of creativity without, perhaps,

21. Foucault, "On the Genealogy of Ethics," in Ethics, 1:262.

Critical Inquiry 2001.27:305-332.

One thing is needful.-To "give style" to one's character-a great and

To create a life is to create a life out of the materials that history

Critical Inquiry 2001.27:305-332.

which we have grown-but rather the product of our interaction from

Critical Inquiry 2001.27:305-332.

makes available to its members-is also to structure possible narratives

Critical Inquiry 2001.27:305-332.

their importance. But there is no way of ranking these many goods or

Critical Inquiry 2001.27:305-332.

an identity is yours, it may determine certain acts of solidarity as valuable,

This picture of self-creation places identity at the heart of human

27. Isaiah Berlin, "Two Concepts of Liberty,"TheProperStudyof Mankind (New York,

Critical Inquiry 2001.27:305-332.

Critical Inquiry 2001.27:305-332.

that need to be assembled for a serious defense of liberalism. But I want,

while it has been the tradition to present [freedom] as the "positive"

28. J. L. Austin, "APlea for Excuses,"PhilosophicalPapers,3rd ed. (Oxford, 1979), p. 180.