NAME : KUNAL

COURSE : BA POLITICAL SCIENCE HONOURS

SUBJECT : CLASICAL POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

TOPIC : SEEKING JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS

SEMESTER : Vth

SUBMITTED TO : DR. LATIKA

In this spirit I review some more definite questions that might prove helpful.
Let’s ask first: What is the audience of political philosophy? Since the audience
will vary from one society to another depending on its social structure and its
pressing problems, what is the au- dience in a constitutional democracy? Thus,
we begin by looking at our own case. Surely, in a democracy the answer to this
question is: all citizens gener- ally, or citizens as the corporate body of all those
who by their votes exer– cise the final institutional authority on all political
questions, by constitu- tional amendment, if necessary. That the audience of
political philosophy in a democratic society is the body of citizens has important
consequences. It means, for one thing, that a liberal political philosophy which,
of course, accepts and defends the idea of constitutional democracy, is not to be
seen as a theory, so to speak. Those who write about such a doctrine are not to
be viewed as experts on a special subject, as may be the case with the sciences.
Political philosophy has no special access to fundamental truths, or reasonable
ideas, about justice and the common good, or to other basic notions. Its merit,
to the extent it has any, is that by study and reflection it may elaborate deeper
and more instructive conceptions of basic political ideas that help us to clarify
our judgments about the institutions and poli- cies of a democratic regime. 2. A
second question is this: In addressing this audience, what are the credentials of
political philosophy? I usethe term “authority” here because some have said
that writers in moral and political philosophy claim a certain authority, at least
implicitly. It has been said that political philosophy conveys a claim to know,
and that the claim to know is a claim to rule.1 This assertion is, I believe,
completely mistaken. In a democratic society at least, political philosophy has
no authority at all, if by authority is meant a certain legal standing and
possession of an authori- tative weight on certain political matters; or if,
alternatively, it means an au- thority sanctioned by long-standing custom and
practice, and treated as having evidential force. Political philosophy can only
mean the tradition of political philosophy; and in a democracy this tradition is
always the joint work of writers and of their readers. This work is joint, since it
is writers and readers together who produce and cherish works of political
philosophy over time and it is always up to voters to decide whether to embody
their ideas in basic institutions. Thus, in a democracy, writers in political
philosophy have no more au- thority than any other citizen, and should claim no
more. I mention the matter only to put aside misgivings about this. Of course,
one might say: political philosophy hopes for the credentials of, and implicitly
invokes the authority of, human reason. Suppose we agree with this and say po-
litical philosophy does invoke this authority. But so likewise do all citizens who
speak reasonably and conscientiously in addressing others about politi- cal
questions, or indeed any other question. Seeking what we have called the
authority of human reason means trying to present our views with their
supporting grounds in a reasonable and sound manner so that others may judge
them intelligently. Striving for the credentials of human reason does not
distinguish political philosophy from any kind of reasoned discus- sion on any
topic. All reasoned and conscientious thought seeks the author- ity of human
reason. Political philosophy, as it is found in a democratic society in texts
thatendure and continue to be studied, may indeed be expressed in unusually
systematic and complete statements of fundamental democratic doctrines and
ideas. In this sense they may more success- fully invoke the authority of human
reason. Yet the authority of human reason is a very special kind of authority. For
whether a text in political phi- losophy makes this appeal successfully is a
collective judgment, made over time, in a society’s general culture, as citizens
individually, one by one, judge these texts worthy of study and reflection. In this
case there is no au- thority in the sense of an office or court or legislative body
authorized to have the final say, or even a probative say. It is not for official
bodies, or bod- ies sanctioned by custom and long-standing practice, to assess
the work of reason. This situation is not peculiar. In matters of political justice in
a de- mocracy, the body of citizens is similar to the body of all physicists in this
matter. This fact is characteristic of the modern democratic world and rooted in
its ideas of political liberty and equality. 3. A third question is: At what point
and in what way does political phi- losophy enter into and affect the outcome of
democratic politics? How should political philosophy view itself in this respect?
Here there are at least two views: the Platonic view, for instance, is the view
that political philosophy ascertains the truth about justice and the common
good. On this view, political philosophy’s knowledge of the truth autho- rizes it
to shape, even to control, the outcome of politics, by persuasion and force if
necessary. Here the claim to truth is understood as carrying with it not only the
claim to know, but also the claim to control and to act politically. Another view,
the democratic view, let’s say, sees political philosophy as part of the general
background culture of a democratic society, although in a few cases certain
classic texts become part of the public political culture. Often cited and referred
to, they are part of public lore and a fund of soci- ety’s basic political ideas. As
such, political philosophy may contribute to the culture of civic society in which
its basic ideas and their history are dis- cussed and studied, and in certain cases
may enter into the public political discussion as well. Some writers2 who dislike
the form and style of much current academic political philosophy see it as trying
to avoid and to render unnecessary the everyday politics of democracy—the
great game of politics.3 Academic po- litical philosophy is said by these writers
to be, in effect, Platonic: it tries to provide basic truths and principles to answer
or to resolve at least the main political questions, thus making ordinary politics
unnecessary. They think that proceeding in that way would lead to a more vi-
brant and lively public life and a more committed citizen body. Now, to say that
a liberal political philosophy is Platonic (as defined above) is surely incorrect.
Since liberalism endorses the idea of democratic government, it would not try
to overrule the outcome of everyday demo- cratic politics. So long as democracy
exists, the only way that liberal philos- ophy could properly do that would be for
it to influence some legitimate constitutionally established political agent, and
then persuade this agent to override the will of democratic majorities. One way
this can happen is for liberal writers in philosophy to influence the judges on a
Supreme Court in a constitutional regime like ours. Liberal, academic writers,
such as Bruce Ackerman, Ronald Dworkin, and Frank Michelman, may address
the Su- preme Court, but so do many conservatives and other non-liberal
writers. They are engaged in constitutional politics, we might say. Given the role
of the Court in our constitutional system, what may look like an attempt to
override democratic politics may actually be the acceptance of judicial re- view,
and of the idea that the Constitution puts certain fundamental rights and
liberties beyond the reach of ordinary legislative majorities. Thus, the discussion
of academic writers is often about the scope and limits of major- ity rule and the
proper role of the Court in specifying and protecting basic constitutional
freedoms. Much depends, then, on whether we accept judicial review and the
idea that a democratic constitution should put certain fundamental rights
andliberties beyond the reach of the legislative majorities of ordinary, as op-
posed to constitutional, politics. I incline to accept judicial review in our case,
but there are good arguments on both sides and it is a question that democratic
citizens must themselves consider. In any case, even those who support judicial
review take for granted that, in ordinary politics, legislative majorities are
normally governing. Our third question was: At what point and in what way
does political philosophy enter into and affect the outcome of democratic
politics? To this let’s say: in a regime with judicial review, political philosophy
tends to have a larger public role, at least in constitutional cases; and political
issues that are often discussed are constitutional issues concerning basic rights
and lib- erties of democratic citizenship. Beyond this, political philosophy has an
ed- ucational role as part of the background culture. This role is the subject of
our fourth question.A political view is a view about political justice and the
common good, and about what institutions and policies best promote them. So
let’s now ask: What basic conceptions of person and political society, and what
ideals of liberty and equality, of justice and citizenship, do citizens initially bring
to democratic politics? In what way do they learn about government and what
view of it do they acquire? Do they come to politics with a conception of citizens
as free and equal, and capable of engaging in public reason and of expressing
through their votes their considered opinion of what is required by political
justice and the common good? Or does their view of politics go no further than
thinking that people simply vote their own economic and class interests and
their religious or ethnic antagonisms, supported by ideals of social hierar- chy,
with some persons viewed as by nature inferior to others? It would seem that a
constitutional regime may not long endure unless its citizens first enter
democratic politics with fundamental conceptions and ideals that endorse and
strengthen its basic political institutions. Yet surely citizens acquire those
conceptions and idealsin part, although only in part, from writings in political
philosophy, which themselves belong to the general background culture of civic
society. They see editorials and discussions debat- ing these ideas in
newspapers and in journals of opinion. Some texts achieve a rank that puts
them in the public political culture, as opposed to the general culture of civic
society. How many of us had to memorize parts of the Declaration of
Independence, the Preamble to the Constitution, and Lincoln’s Gettysburg
Address? While these texts are not authoritative—the Preamble is not part of
the Constitution as law—they may influence our understanding and
interpretation of the Constitution in certain ways. Moreover, in these texts, and
others of this status (if there are any), the values expressed are, let’s say,
political values. For example the Preamble to the Constitution mentions: a more
perfect union, justice, domestic tranquility, common defense, the gen- eral
welfare, and the blessings of liberty. I shall think of a political concep- tion of
justice as trying to give a reasonably systematic and coherent ac- count of these
values, and to set out how they are to be ordered in applying them to basic
political and social institutions. The vast majority of works in political
philosophy, even if they endure a while, belong to general back- ground culture.
However, works regularly cited in Supreme Court cases and in public discussions
of fundamental questions may be viewed as be- longing to the public political
culture, or bordering on it. Indeed a few— such as Locke’s Second Treatise and
Mill’s On Liberty—do seem part of the political culture, at least in the United
States. I have suggested that citizens had best learn from civic society its funda-
mental conceptions and ideals before they come to democratic politics.
Otherwise a democratic regime, should one somehow come about, may not
long endure. One of the many reasons why the Weimar constitution failed was
that none of the main intellectual currents in Germany was pre- pared to defend
it, including the leading philosophers and writers, such as Heidegger and
Thomas Mann. To conclude: Political philosophy has a not insignificant role as
part of general background culture in providing a source of essential political
principles and ideals. This role it performs not so much in day-to-day poli- tics as
in educating citizens to certain ideal conceptions of person and polit- ical society
before they come to politics, and in their reflective moments throughout life.4
5. Is there anything about the politics of a society that encourages the sincere
appeal to principles of justice and the common good? If so, then why isn’t all
talk of justice and the common good simply the manipulation of symbols that
have the psychological effect of getting people to go along with our view, not
for good reasons, plainly, but somehow mesmerized by what we say? What the
cynic says about moral and political principles and ideals can- not be correct.6
For if it were, the language and vocabulary of morals and politics referring to
and appealing to those principles and ideals would long since have ceased to be
invoked. People are not so stupid as not to discern when those norms are being
appealed to by certain groups and their lead- ers in a purely manipulative and
group-interested fashion. This is not to deny, of course, that principles of justice
and fairness and the common good are often appealed to in a manipulative
way. Such an appeal often enough rides piggy-back, so to speak, on those same
principles’ being in- voked sincerely by those who mean them and can be
trusted. Two things, it seems, make an important difference in what ideas citi-
zens have when they first come to politics: one is the nature of the political
system in which they grow up; the other is the content of the background
culture, how far it acquaints them with democratic political ideas and leads
them to reflect on their meaning. The nature of the political system teaches
forms of political conduct and political principles. In a democratic system, say,
citizens note that partyleaders, in forming working majorities, are constrained
by certain princi- ples of justice and the common good, at least as regards their
explicit public political program. Here again the cynic may say that these
appeals to public principles of justice and the common good are self-interested,
because to remain relevant, a group must be recognized as “inside the system,”
and that means that its conduct must respect various social norms consistent
with those principles. This is true, but it overlooks something: that in a rea-
sonably successful political system, citizens in due course become attached to
these principles of justice and the common good, and as with the princi- ple of
religious toleration, their allegiance to them is not purely, even if it is in part,
self-interested. 6. An important question, then, is: what features, if any, of
political and social institutions tend to prevent the sincere appeal to justice and
the com- mon good, or to fair principles of political cooperation? Here I
conjecture that we can learn something from the failure of Germany to achieve
a con- stitutional democratic regime. Consider the situation of German political
parties in Wilhelmine Ger- many of Bismarck’s time. There were six noteworthy
features of the politi- cal system: (1) It was a hereditary monarchy with very
great though not absolute powers. (2) The monarchy was military in character
as the army (officered by the Prussian nobility) guaranteed it against an adverse
popular will. (3) The chancellor and the cabinet were servants of the crown and
not of the Reichstag, as would be the case in a constitutional regime. (4)
Political parties were fragmented by Bismarck, who appealed to their economic
interests in return for their support, turning them into pressure groups. (5) Since
they were no more than pressure groups, political parties never aspired to
govern, and they held exclusive ideologies which made compromise with other
groups difficult. (6) It was not considered improper for officials, not even the
chancellor, to attack certain groups as enemies of the empire: Catholics, Social
Democrats, national minorities: French (Alsace-Lorraine), Danes, Poles, and
Jews. Consider the fourth and fifth features, that political parties were noth- ing
more than pressure groups, and because they never aspired to rule—toform a
government—they were unwilling to compromise or to bargain with other
social groups. The liberals were never ready to support pro- grams wanted by
the working classes, while the social democrats always in- sisted on the
nationalization of industry and dismantling of the capitalist system which
frightened off the liberals. This inability of the liberals and the social democrats
to work together to form a government was fatal in the end to German
democracy, because it persisted into the Weimar regime with its.